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THUCYDIDES

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

BOOK VII

EDITED BY
CHRISTOPHER PELLING

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CONTENTS

List of Maps *page* vi
Preface vii
List of Abbreviations ix
Maps xii

Introduction 1
1 *The Story So Far* 1
2 *Thucydides and the Sicilian Expedition* 3
3 *Author, Audience, and Performance* 10
4 *Intertextuality* 14
5 *Book 7 in the History* 19
(a) Books 6–7 19
(b) Book 7 and Book 8 21
(c) Books 6–7 in the Whole 23
6 *Where Does It All Go Wrong?* 26
7 *The Shadow of the Future* 32
8 *The Text* 35

Deviations from Alberti 38

Sigla 40

THUCYDIDES: BOOK VII 41

Commentary 89

Works Cited 263
Indexes 281
1 *General* 281
2 *Language, Style, and Narrative Technique* 286
3 *Greek* 288

MAPS

1 Sicily *page* xii

2 Southern Italy xiii

3 Greece xiv

4 Syracuse xvi

PREFACE

'Tacitus was a great man,' said Thomas Babington Macaulay; 'but he was not up to the Sicilian expedition.'[1] To write commentaries on Thucydides' Sicilian books is a daunting privilege. The excellence of the narrative is beyond doubt: as Plutarch says (*Nicias* 1.1), these books show Thucydides at his 'most emotional, most vivid, and most varied'. To try to explain how that excellence is achieved risks labouring the obvious and compromising that immediacy. Nor is it exactly untrodden territory. The great nineteenth- and early twentieth-century commentaries – Krüger, Poppo and Stahl, and Classen and Steup, all still immensely useful – had mighty successors: Dover's 1970 contribution to Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover's *Historical Commentary on Thucydides* (*HCT*) and Hornblower's 2008 third volume of his *Commentary on Thucydides* (*CT*). Dover has many textual and Hornblower many literary comments to complement their thorough treatment of the history. Yet the attempt to add two more commentaries is still worthwhile. Books 6 and 7 are natural choices for those coming to Thucydides for the first time, perhaps in an undergraduate or graduate class; but Thucydides' Greek is notoriously difficult. It is not just the novice reader that often needs, or at least welcomes, help, and even Dover's shorter school commentaries (1965) took too much prior facility for granted. I have therefore included more linguistic explanation than in two earlier 'green-and-yellows' (Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics), my single-authored Plutarch's *Antony* (1988) and the Herodotus Book 6 co-written with Simon Hornblower (2017). Many notes too are keyed to the *Cambridge Grammar of Classical Greek* (*CGCG*), and I hope that these too will be helpful. In many Thucydidean sentences the syntax is difficult or ambiguous while the meaning is clear, and not every native speaker may have heard that syntax in the same way. I have tried to keep this in mind throughout, along with the importance of oral delivery for texts that were designed for hearing as well as reading.

In line with the aims of the series, I have given particular attention too to literary aspects. This has often squeezed out historical material that would be relevant even for a literary critic, for one can hardly gauge what Thucydides has done with his material without an idea of what that material would have been. Still, brevity here may be forgiven because so much is readily accessible in the commentaries of Dover and Hornblower: 'cf. *HCT* and *CT*' could have been added much more frequently than it is,

[1] Macaulay, letter to Thomas Flower Ellis, 25 July 1836, Pinney 1974–81 iii. 181 (cited by Rood 2017: 20).

and can be taken for granted throughout. In particular, there are many topographical issues which cannot be gone into here, especially in the opening chapters of Book 7 and the account of the final withdrawal in 7.78–85, and here the thorough work done by Dover and by Peter Green (Green 1970) is still as authoritative as ever. What I have tried to contribute is more attention to what listeners or readers without maps or local knowledge would make of the narrative and what sort of picture of the terrain they would build. Thucydides tried to tell them what they needed to know to make sense of his account, but that would not always have been easy and sometimes it is hard to think that it was possible. Still, even when bewildered those readers or listeners would carry away an impression of a writer thoroughly in command of his material, and that, perhaps, was enough.

Many debts have been accumulated. These commentaries were originally to be jointly written with John Marincola: that turned out to be impossible, but I have benefited from his advice and from an Oxford graduate seminar that he and I gave in summer 2017. Emily Baragwanath kindly agreed to expose some of her own graduate students to an early draft of some of the commentary on Book 6, and her reports and advice were invaluable. Edith Foster, busy with her own commentary on Book 4, found time to exchange materials and send very useful comments. I have also gained much from e-correspondence with Elisabetta Bianco, Bob Connor, Irene de Jong, Donald Lateiner, Christopher Mallan, Hunter Rawlings III, Jeff Rusten, Dan Tompkins, and Tony Woodman, and from conversations locally in Oxford with Richard Rutherford, Tim Rood, and Andreas Willi. The series editors, Richard Hunter, Oliver Thomas, and the late Neil Hopkinson, went through the drafts with their usual meticulous eyes for detail and for superfluity, and I am grateful. One final debt is to Simon Hornblower. I have not embarrassed him by asking him to read any of what I have written, but he has been supportive throughout and has lent books and expertise. After collaborating with him literally in our commentary on Herodotus 6, I have often found myself figuratively doing the same in these two volumes, with his commentary always on my desk.

This and its sister commentary on Book 6 should appear almost simultaneously. Each is complete in itself and some material appears in both introductions, but there are many cross-references to the other volume in the form e.g. 'cf. 6.98.2n.' Where references are to other passages in Book 7, the chapter number is printed in **bold**.

ABBREVIATIONS

Where dates are given in the form 418/7 they refer to archon-years; when in the form 418–417 they refer to a period, normally the winter, spanning both calendar years.

I ANCIENT AUTHORS AND WORKS

Abbreviations for Greek and Latin authors usually follow those in *OCD*, except for the following:

D. H.	Dionysius of Halicarnassus
Diod.	Diodorus
Hdt.	Herodotus
Plut.	Plutarch
Th.	Thucydides
X.	Xenophon

Ar. is Aristophanes, Arist. is Aristotle.

II TEXTS, COMMENTARIES, SECONDARY WORKS

Alberti	G. B. Alberti, *Thucydidis historiae*, 3 vols. (Rome, 1972–2000)
Bétant	E.-A. Bétant, *Lexicon Thucydideum*, 2 vols. (Geneva, 1843; repr. Hildesheim 1969)
CGCG	E. van Emde Boas, A. Rijksbaron, L. Huitink, and M. de Bakker, *The Cambridge grammar of classical Greek* (Cambridge, 2019)
C–S	J. Classen, *Thukydides. Siebenter Band: Siebentes Buch, bearbeitet von J. Steup* (Berlin, 3rd ed., 1908)
CT	S. Hornblower, *A commentary on Thucydides*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1991–2008). Unless otherwise noted, references are to volume III, and if no page number is given the reference is to the note on the passage discussed
DK	H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin, 6th ed., 1952)
FGrH	F. Jacoby *et al.*, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin and Leiden, 1923–58; Leiden, 1994–)

Fornara	C. W. Fornara, *Archaic times to the end of the Peloponnesian War* (Translated Documents of Greece & Rome 1, Cambridge, 2nd ed., 1983)
GG	W. W. Goodwin, *A Greek grammar* (Basingstoke and London, new ed., 1930)
GP	J. D. Denniston, *The Greek particles* (Oxford, 2nd ed., 1954)
GSW	W. K. Pritchett, *The Greek state at war*, vols. I–V (Berkeley and London, 1971–91)
Hammond	M. Hammond, *Thucydides: the Peloponnesian War* (Oxford, 2009)
HCT	A. Andrewes, A. W. Gomme, and K. J. Dover, *A historical commentary on Thucydides*, 5 vols. (Oxford, 1945–80). Unless otherwise noted, references are to volume IV, and if no page number is given the reference is to the note on the passage discussed
Hornblower–Pelling	S. Hornblower and C. Pelling, *Herodotus: book VI* (Cambridge, 2017)
Huitink–Rood	L. Huitink and T. Rood, *Xenophon: Anabasis book* III (Cambridge, 2019)
IACP	M. H. Hansen and T. H. Nielsen (eds.), *An inventory of archaic and classical Greek* poleis (Oxford, 2004)
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae* (Berlin, 1873–)
K–A	R. Kassel and C. Austin, *Poetae comici Graeci* (Berlin, 1983–9)
Krüger	K. W. Krüger, Θουκυδίδου Συγγραφη *mit erklärenden Anmerkungen* (Berlin, 2nd ed., 1858)
LSJ	H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. S. Jones, *A Greek–English lexicon* (Oxford, 9th ed. with rev. supplement, 1996)
Marchant	E. C. Marchant, *Thucydides: book VII* (London, 1893)
ML	R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A selection of Greek historical inscriptions to the end of the fifth century* BC (Oxford, rev. ed., 1988)
M&T	W. W. Goodwin, *Syntax of the moods and tenses of the Greek Verb* (Boston and London, 1890; reissued, 1965)
OCD	S. Hornblower, A. J. S. Spawforth, and E. Eidinow (eds.), *The Oxford classical dictionary* (Oxford, 4th ed., 2012)
OCT	Oxford classical text
OR	R. Osborne and P. J. Rhodes, *Greek historical inscriptions 478–404* BC (Oxford, 2017)
P.Oxy.	*Oxyrhynchus papyri*

P–S	E. F. Poppo, *Thucydidis de bello Peloponnesiaco*, vol. III, sect. 2, revised and augmented by J. M. Stahl (Leipzig, 2nd ed., 1882)
Walbank	M. Walbank, *Athenian proxenies of the fifth century* BC (Toronto, 1978)


Tyrrhenian Sea
Lipari Islands
Mylae
Messina/
Zancle
Rhegium
Leucopetra
Hyccara
Panormus
Soloeis
Eryx
Egesta
Motya
Halicyae
Himera
Himera (R.)
Kale Akte
Alcantara
Naxos
Mt. Etna
Ionian
Sea
Selinus
Centuripae
Symaethus
Platani (Halycus)
Catana
Morgantine
?Briccynia
Leontini
Pantacyas River
Megara Hyblaea
Acragas
Acragas (R.)
Himera (S.)
Terias R.
Monte
Climiti
Thapsus
Casmenae
Acrae
Syracuse
Gela
Cacyparis River
Erineus River
Hybla
Camarina
Oanis
Hyrminus
Assinarus River
Mediterranean Sea
Land over 1,000 metres
0 20 40 60 80 km
0 10 20 30 40 50 miles

1 Sicily



2 Southern Italy


Epidamnus
THRACE
Strymon River
MACEDONIA
Amphipolis
CHALCIDICE
Potidaea
Torone
Scione
Corcyra
Dodona
Ionian Sea
Ambracia
AMPHILOCHIA
Anactorium
ACARNANIA
Alyzia
Leucas
Mt Oeta
AETOLIA
PHOCIS
Hestiaea
EUBOEA
Aegition
Naupactus
Delphi
BOEOTIA
Euripus
Chalcis
Mycalessus
Eretria
Tanagra
Channel
Erineus
Rhion
Aegium
Thebes
Delium
Oropus
Cephallenia
Plataea
Decelea
Styra
Marathon
Sicyon
Eleusis
Cyllene
ELIS
Lechaeum
Corinth
Megara
Athens
Carystus
Piraeus
Cleonae
Zacynthos
Pheia
Olympia
ARCADIA
Phlius
Aegina
Laureion
Orneae
Argos
Epidaurus
Sunium
Ceos
Mantinea
Thyrea
Troezen
PELOPONNESE
Sparta
Prasiae
Pylos
Methone
Asine
Epidaurus Limera
Melos
Taenaron
Cythera
Land over 1,000 metres
0 50 100 150 200 km
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 miles

3a Greece

Thespiae
T H R A C E
Selymbria
Byzantium
Chalcedon
Aenos
Cyzicus
Aegospotami
Lampsacus
Imbros
Abydus
Sigeum
Troy
Lemnos
Tenedos
Methymna
Lesbos
Mytilene
Arginusae
Scyros
Aegean Sea
Chios
Ephesus
Andros
Samos
Tenos
Miletus
Thera
Rhodes
Crete

3b Greece


(?)Leon
Trogilus
(?)Labdalon
Syracusan cross-wall
Syracusan wall
Euryelus
EPIPOLAE
Athenian wall
Fig tree
Circle
Quarries
Temenites
Athenian cross-wall (60.2)
Athenian wall
Athenian wall (101.1, 103.1)
Achradina
Little Harbour
Syracuse
(?)Lysimeleia marsh
Anapus River
Athenian Fleet after 6.103.2
Ortygia
Great Harbour
Cyana River
Olympieion
Helorus Road
(?)Dascon
Plemmyrion
Helorus
0 1 2 3 km
0 1 2 miles

4 Syracuse

INTRODUCTION

1 THE STORY SO FAR

As Book 7 opens, things are looking good for the Athenians in Sicily. It is summer 414 BCE, and they have been there for a year. Book 6 described the important decision taken in Athens a year before. At that point an uneasy peace had prevailed since 421, an interval in the 'Peloponnesian War', as we now call it, that had broken out between Athens and Sparta in 431 and would last till 404. It was clear in spring 415 that there were still dangers at home, for Sparta was anything but friendly and many of its allies, Corinth and Thebes in particular, were still fiercer enemies of Athens; any resumption of hostilities would be welcome to them. Still, the prospect of an expedition to Sicily was an attractive one. The immediate prompt was a call from Athens' ally Egesta in western Sicily for support against their neighbour Selinus, but it was clear that the real enemy would be Selinus' ally Syracuse:

> The truest explanation (ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις) was that the Athenians wished to rule all Sicily, and at the same time they wished to help their own kinsmen and the additional allies that had accrued. (6.6.1)

'To rule all Sicily': a big ambition, indeed, and one that had been in Athenian minds for some time (3.86.4). Not everyone was keen; one of the least enthusiastic was Nicias, who tried to argue the Athenians out of it even once the decision had been taken (6.9–14). But the charismatic Alcibiades spoke in its favour (6.16–18), and a further ploy of Nicias badly misfired. If the Athenians were to go at all, he said, they needed to go in greater numbers (6.20–3). He pitched the figures so high in the hope that this would put them off; in fact it had the opposite effect:

> A passion (ἔρως) fell on all alike to sail. The older citizens thought that they would conquer the expedition's targets or at least would inflict no damage on Athens' great power; those in the prime of life were influenced by a yearning desire to see and explore a distant land and were confident of being safe; and the mass of the citizens, men who might serve in the army, thought that this would bring them an immediate income and would give the potential for eternal money-making. (6.24.3)

Thucydides paints a memorable picture of the departure from the Piraeus, with crowds streaming down from the city to see them off, and the vast fleet making a resplendent display (6.30–32.2). What with camp-followers

too – bakers, masons, and carpenters as well as the fighting force – it was as if a whole city was on the move, a new colonising expedition to match those of old.[1] That spectacle, fixed in the audience's imagination, will several times be recalled in Book 7 as the horrors of the end unfold (**69**.3–**71**, **75**.6–7, **87**.5–6nn.).

In fact those vast numbers proved counterproductive. They made nervous even cities that were Athens' traditional allies, notably Rhegium (6.44.3, **1**.2n.), and on their arrival the Athenians did not receive the warm welcome for which they had hoped. Nor did Egesta provide all the promised financial support (6.46.2). An even bigger setback was self-inflicted. Alcibiades was one of the three generals, appointed by the assembly along with Nicias and the experienced military man Lamachus, but Alcibiades had his enemies at home. Their opportunity was offered by two religious scandals that had predated the expedition's departure, the mutilation of the Herms and some profane mimickings of the Eleusinian Mysteries. Alcibiades' name had been in the air in connection with the second, and the accusations soon spread to include the Herms outrage as well. His enemies bided their time, knowing that they would have little chance of bringing Alcibiades down if that meant delaying the expedition, but once the fleet had sailed their agitation and the religious nervousness continued, and Alcibiades was recalled to answer charges. Recalling him was one thing, getting him home was another, and he slipped away en route. His absence made a difference, for his diplomatic skills would have been valuable in persuading wavering allies that the Athenians, however intimidating, were the better side to back. Before the end of Book 6 he had cropped up again in Sparta, denouncing democracy as 'acknowledged folly' and urging the enemy to do what they could to help Syracuse, in particular by sending an experienced general and, closer to home, by fortifying the Athenian outpost of Decelea (6.89–92).

Still, even in his absence things had not gone badly for Athens. True, not much had been achieved by the end of the regular campaigning season of 415, and at that point Syracusan spirits were high. At first many had been incredulous that the Athenians would come at all (6.35) and the populist Athenagoras found a ready audience when he argued that, even if they did come, Syracuse would easily see them off (6.36–40). Not many had believed the more cautious Hermocrates when he had warned of the danger (6.33–4). Even once they were there, the Athenian performance had been so unimpressive during the summer that Syracusan outriders

[1] **77**.7n.; cf. 6.23.2 (quoted on p. 28), 6.44.1, 6.63.3nn., Avery 1973. See also p. 33. References in bold type are to chapters within Book 7.

would gallop up to the Athenian lines and hurl insults at the embarrassed soldiers: had they come just to settle down as their new housemates or neighbours (6.61.2)? Then, though, a surprise Athenian attack led to a substantial victory at the beginning of autumn (the battle of the Anapus, 6.67–71). That put an end to the Syracusans' cockiness, and a hard training regime was set up for the winter (6.72).

There were also diplomatic initiatives, with the Syracusans seeking to strengthen their hold over their subjects and allies and the Athenians seeking to win them over (6.88.3–5, **1**.4n.). In particular, both had wooed the important city of Camarina – a 'swing-city', one that could go either way and could make a big difference – and Thucydides' version of the debate airs the sorts of argument that must have weighed not just there but in the other Sicilian cities as well (6.75.3–88.2). Camarina continued to temporise, waiting to see how events would develop, and it was not alone. In the initial exchanges of 414 a series of engagements began to tilt the balance heavily in Athens' favour (6.94–103). On the other hand, Lamachus had been killed in one of those engagements (6.101.6), and some Peloponnesian reinforcements were on the way, together with the Spartan Gylippus as the skilled commander that Alcibiades had recommended. But the Syracusans were already talking of making terms (6.103.3), and Gylippus himself formed the view that Sicily was as good as lost (6.104.1). Nicias regarded the Peloponnesian force as too small to require any protective measures (6.104.3). He was not to remain insouciant for long.

News of all this would be reaching Athens, often in the gossipy form of harbour rumour and chat (cf. **31**.6, **32**.3n.). There may have been some disappointment that more had not been achieved in 415 by so grand an armada, but the Athenians had been in Sicily during the earlier phase of the war, and that campaign had lasted three years (427–424; cf. Intr. to Book 6, pp. 30–2). It would be no great surprise that this new and bigger version had not been wrapped up in a matter of months, and these new reports were certainly encouraging. There was nothing here to prepare them for the shock of Nicias' dispirited letter a few months later (**11–15**).

2 THUCYDIDES AND THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION

Reports would be reaching Thucydides too, but not in Athens. He had not been in the city since 424, in exile after his failure as general to prevent the loss of the northern city of Amphipolis. One can imagine him now settled in his estate in Thrace and eagerly picking up what news he

could get.[2] He had begun assembling materials for his history as soon as the war had begun in 431, 'realising that this was going to be a great war and more worth recording than any before' (1.1.1). It is an easy guess that he had a presentiment in 421 that it was not over yet, and he will have continued to track events closely: when he came to look back after the war ended in 404, he was sure that it was a single 27-year conflict rather than two wars punctuated by a peace (5.26).

What had still been uncertain in 415 is whether this new initiative would be the trigger to set it off again. Events of winter 415–414 made it clearer that it might well be, but even that was not certain yet: there had been quite serious fighting before during the 'peace', including the large-scale battle of Mantinea in 418, without leading to total war. Nor was it at all clear that the expedition would fail, still less that it would end in catastrophe. It was much more likely during that winter and spring that it would go the other way. Thucydides himself may have felt in 415 that the expedition was unwise, and as a narrator he had made sure from the outset that his readers and listeners would know that it would end badly:

> In the same winter [415–414] the Athenians were wanting to sail again to Sicily in a bigger expedition than that with Laches and Eurymedon [i.e. that of 427–424] and to conquer it if they could, most of them unacquainted with the size of the island and the numbers of people living there, both Greek and non-Greek, and not realising that they were taking upon themselves a war not much smaller than that against the Peloponnesians. (6.1.1)

That is not the way one would introduce an enterprise that was going to end in triumph. Yet he also allows a play in his narrative between causality and contingency, letting the reader sense the uncertainties of the time as events might develop in any number of ways:[3] some of the reasons why the enterprise failed could be explained (and Thucydides finds ways to suggest them, as will be discussed in section 6), but that is not to say that it was predictable that it would play out as it did. He duly emphasises how nearly the Athenians came to victory even as Gylippus arrived: had the walling and counterwalling gone differently by just a few metres, it would have been decisive (**2**.4); had the Athenians pressed on soon after arrival, the city would have been walled off and even Gylippus' arrival would not have helped (**42**.3).

[2] He mentions this estate and his mining interests in the area at 4.105.1; cf. Marcellinus, *Life of Thucydides* 14, 25 (the delightful and implausible detail that he wrote the history there 'under a plane tree'), and 46–7.

[3] Grethlein 2010: 248–52 and 2013, esp. ch. 2, Greenwood 2017: 170–2.

Gathering material was painstaking, and Thucydides needed as many versions as possible:

> As to the actions of the war, I have thought it right to record them not on the basis of chance informants nor according to my own impressions, but covering matters as accurately as possible, and this applies both to what I witnessed myself and to cases where I was reliant on others. It was a laborious business, because eye-witnesses would disagree about events, each according to their own partisanship or memory. (1.22.2–3).

The difficulties, it should be noted, do not seem to include *finding* eye-witnesses;[4] weighing their evidence is the problem. Who might these informants be? Doubtless traders brought tales to Thrace, but Thucydides could get more reliable material too. Exile had one advantage, as it allowed him to become familiar with affairs on the side of 'the Peloponnesians' as well (5.26.5), and at **44**.1 he also makes clear that he had questioned men who had fought for the Syracusans. Sometimes he may have talked to more prominent people too. It is not impossible that Alcibiades was one,[5] though if so it did not blind Thucydides to the man's dangers as well as his charms. Some have wondered about Hermocrates, himself in exile from 411 or 410 to 408 (8.85.3, X. *Hell.* 1.1.27);[6] he might even have visited Thucydides in Thrace, especially if – and it is a big 'if' – Thucydides had already circulated a version of his 431–421 narrative (1–5.24) and was becoming known as an authoritative recorder of the war. Letters doubtless came too, and Thucydides would have stayed in touch with friends in Athens. Nor would he have remained steadily at home. He had the means to travel, and those contacts with 'the Peloponnesians' show that he did. It is tempting to think that he would have visited Syracuse too, at least after the end of the war in 404:[7] he is certainly familiar with features of local topography and their names. Still, this remains unclear. He may just have heard the names so often and pondered so much that he could – or thought he could – visualise it all with great lucidity. Immersed as he was, he may sometimes have committed the human error of assuming that his readers had gathered a similar familiarity.[8]

[4] Hunt 2006: 391 n. 35.

[5] The thesis is most fully argued by Brunt 1952; Delebecque 1965: 231–3 even names the place and date, Thrace in 406–405. Nývlt 2014 thoughtfully revisits the question, and concludes in favour. Gribble 1999 is sceptical (162–3, 188, and 197 n. 102), and Andrewes very cautious (*HCT* v. 3).

[6] Hammond 1973: 52–3; Fauber 2001: 39–40; cf. *CT* on **73**.2.

[7] So e.g. Golden 2015: 204.

[8] So *HCT* 467; cf. *CT* on 6.66.2 and 6.98.2.

All this will have taken time, with his knowledge and his notes gradually building as more information arrived. When he first began to shape a polished narrative can only be a matter of speculation. Even once he had done so, it might not preclude revision: that was a more cumbersome business with papyrus rolls than it is for a modern author, but it was still possible for a section to be snipped out and/or a new version stitched in. So if some passages are clearly written after 404, including the passage at 2.65 discussed below, that does not mean that everything was. What is reasonably certain, given the extraordinary skill and finish of Books 6–7, is that these are now substantially in the form that Thucydides would have wished to pass them on to posterity.

Thucydides did not live to finish the history as a whole, though it is not known when he died. Book 8 terminates in late summer 411, and it was left to several writers – not just Xenophon in the surviving *Hellenica*, but also Cratippus, Theopompus, and the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*[9] – to pick up where he left it.

By 404, and doubtless long before, it was clear that the Sicilian expedition had played a critical part in deciding the war's outcome. Many clearly expected it to end much sooner than it did; many at Athens feared as much when the news of the catastrophe first arrived (8.1.2, quoted on p. 21). But the city gathered its strength, fought on for nine more years, and might well still have won. Thucydides shows his admiration for this resilience in a passage prompted by the death of Pericles and written after the war had ended (2.65.12; cf. **28**.3 with **27–30**n.).

He also says something there about the Sicilian adventure itself. It showed a failure of leadership:

> This resulted in many mistakes (ἡμαρτήθη), as one might expect in a great city and one ruling an empire, including the voyage to Sicily. This was not so much an error of judgement with regard to the expedition's target (οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἁμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὓς ἐπῆισαν), but more a matter of those who despatched the force not making the follow-up decisions that would be advantageous for those in the field (οἱ ἐκπέμψαντες οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες). Instead, their own wranglings as they contended for popular leadership both blunted the edge of affairs in the camp and stimulated the first internal convulsions at home. (2.65.11)

How comfortably does this sit with the narrative of Books 6–7 itself? Not well, many have thought,[10] particularly given the implication in early

[9] Marincola 1997: 289–90; Gray 2017.

[10] Esp. Gomme 1951: 72 and *HCT* II.195–6. Gomme concludes that 2.65.11 and the narrative of Books 6–7 were 'thought at a different time', with 2.65

Book 6 that the decision was indeed a serious error of judgement; furthermore, 'on each occasion that Nikias asked for them, supplies and reinforcements were sent, and in good measure, and, comparatively, with little or no delay' (cf. **16**, 6.96.4); by contrast the narrative of Books 6 and 7 suggests that the failure 'was due . . . almost entirely to military blunders by the men on the spot' (both citations are from Gomme in *HCT* II. 196). Yet the verdict chimes well enough with the narrative, even if the emphasis and outlook are different.[11]

(1) At 2.65.11 Thucydides is not talking directly about the reason for the expedition's failure, as Gomme and many others have implied. He is simply gauging which were the biggest mistakes in political leadership, presaging the wranglings that he claims were a principal reason for Athens' eventual defeat. They 'blunted the edge of affairs in the camp', but this need not be 'the' or even the main explanation for the disastrous outcome. Those reasons can be left to emerge from the narrative: see section 6.

(2) 2.65.11 does not deny that the initial decision was wrong-headed; it clearly says it was a mistake (ἡμαρτήθη). It was simply not so big or consequential a mistake as the subsequent ones. Thucydides is fond of such formulations, which have antecedents in Herodotus and parallels in the Hippocratic corpus:[12] Agamemnon recruited his forces for Troy because of his power 'and not so much because Helen's suitors were bound by their oaths to Tyndareus' (1.9.1); the Spartans decided on war 'not so much persuaded by their allies' arguments as fearing that the Athenians should grow more powerful' (1.88); different cities sided with Athens or with Syracuse 'not more according to justice or kinship but as it fell out for each city through expediency or necessity' (7.57.1).[13] They should be taken literally: 'more X than Y' is not the same as 'X, not Y'.[14]

presumably later; cf. *HCT* v. 368 (Andrewes) and v. 423–7 (Dover). The usual explanation of this presumed change of mind is that Alcibiades' military successes in 410–407 persuaded Thucydides that had he stayed Athens might after all have won; alternatively, Cawkwell 1997: 76 and 81–2 suggests that Thucydides came to think that Athenian ambitions were more limited and realistic than he had originally taken them to be.

[11] So Connor 1984: 158 n. 2; Rood 1998a: 159–61, 177–9, 181–2; Gribble 1999: 178–82. Westlake 1958 had led the way. Hornblower 1994: 157 = 2011: 88 takes 2.65.11 as a warning against being misled by the different perspectives: 'the Sicilian Expedition failed, not so much because of bad judgement – as you might think from reading my books 6 and 7 which you haven't got to yet – as because it was marred in the execution'.

[12] Pelling 2019: 100–2, 104–5.

[13] Cf. also 1.111.1, 1.127.2, and 8.45.2 (Westlake 1958: 102–4 = 1969: 162–5).

[14] Cf. also **57**.1n., 6.31.4 and 6nn.

(3) Mistake or not, the expedition might well have succeeded (**2**.4 and **42**.3, p. 4), and Thucydides even suggests some reasons why: perhaps he would have sided with Nicias in the initial debate, but his initial survey of Sicily provides some support for Alcibiades as well (6.1.2–5.3(n.)). It was not a wholly irrational decision.

(4) 'Not making the follow-up decisions that would be advantageous for those in the field' need not exclude a willingness to send reinforcements.[15] The 'follow-up decision' most in point is surely the recall of Alcibiades (6.61), and his presence would have injected more imagination into diplomacy and tactics alike. Even with reinforcements, it is possible that the timing and quantity was not 'advantageous for those in the field'. More cavalry at an early stage would have been better, for this deficiency becomes crucial to the campaign (p. 27); and once the tide had turned in summer 414 it might have been better not to reinforce at all but to cut losses and withdraw, just as they had ten years earlier (4.65). Alternatively they might have replaced Nicias completely, as Nicias himself suggests at **16**.2.

Why, then, is the emphasis at 2.65.11 so different from Books 6–7? Simply because that stress on leadership is so appropriate to its context, where Thucydides is highlighting the qualities of Pericles and the wisdom of his strategy by contrasting the deficiencies of his successors and the mistakes that ensued.[16] Pericles, he says, had the status and inspired the respect to be able to lead rather than follow the *dēmos*, restraining and reassuring according the the situation;

> those that came later were more on a level with one another and each wanted to be first, and so they turned to letting the *dēmos* do as it liked. (2.65.10)

It is a strong statement, and one that affects how the later books will be read: 'every successive leader at Athens should be measured against Pericles' standard'.[17] In the Sicilian books too the absence of a Pericles is often felt (e.g. **8**.3, **48**.2, **61–8**, **72–4**nn.). It is reasonable to talk of decline, but it is not in the *dēmos* itself – at no stage has Thucydides conveyed confidence in the wisdom of crowds – but in those who carry the responsibility of guiding it. He is interested in 'democracy' as a concept

[15] But for a different view see Kallet 2001: 115–18, arguing both that 2.65.11 does suggest that reinforcements were inadequate and that Thucydides was right.

[16] Cf. esp. Gribble 1999: 169–75, emphasising the contrast of the successors' individualism with Pericles' position and goals. The wisdom of Thucydides' judgement on this is another question, and not one to be discussed here.

[17] Stadter 2017: 287.

too; he allows the Syracusan Athenagoras to give an elaborate theory of democracy (6.36–9), and it certainly matters that Syracuse and Athens are ὁμοιότροποι, both democracies, so that Athens cannot exploit some of its usual subversive tricks (**55**.2, 8.96.5: pp. 31–2). He could doubtless see democracy's inspirational qualities, for otherwise he could not have written Pericles' stirring praises in the Funeral Speech (2.35–46) – though the one system of which he expresses explicit approval is the constitution of the 5,000 in 411 (8.97.2). But whatever the system, it needs leaders, and these are not the right sort. Syracuse's Hermocrates is a different matter (p. 32).

One reason is self-seeking ambition. Pericles had sought to avoid unnecessary risks and argued against adding to Athens' empire during the war:

> Those who followed reversed this completely and pursued other aims apparently extraneous to the war according to their own personal ambitions and gains; this was bad for them and bad for the allies. If these initiatives went well, they brought honour and benefit more to private citizens; if badly, it was the city that suffered damage for the war. (2.65.7)

One naturally thinks of Alcibiades in particular, whose personal ambitions were so important for his urging of the expedition (6.15.3); but it is not just Alcibiades.[18] When peace was in the air in the late 420s, Thucydides makes it clear why:

> Nicias' concern was to protect his good fortune at this point where he had suffered no defeats and had a high reputation. In the short term he wished to get some respite for himself and for his fellow citizens, and for the future he wanted to leave behind a name as someone whose career included no reverses for the city; and he thought that the way to achieve this was to take no risks and to be the person who trusted as little as possible to fortune – and peace was the way to avoid risks. (5.16.1)

That is surely written with an eye to what would happen in Sicily, and the irony that Nicias would leave behind a very different 'name'. Nicias is not wholly selfish there: he wants respite for his fellow Athenians as well as for himself. But there is still a self-directedness that contrasts with Pericles' commended immersion of self in city (2.60.2–4) and concern for the city's 'name' rather than one's own (2.64.3–4). By late summer

[18] Cf. Gribble 2006, esp. 443, 458–64.

413 it is evidently time to abandon the expedition; Nicias knows it. Yet he fears what will happen to him if he returns to Athens as an abject failure, and he prevaricates (**48**.4). That is understandable, given the way the city treated failed generals; Thucydides had good reason to know that himself. Nicias does not even feel the need to conceal that motive from his fellow generals. Still, if this is 'love of the city', it is very different from the Periclean version. If a free state, perhaps particularly a democracy, can pride itself on the scope it leaves for an individual to flourish,[19] it is also all too easy for individuality to become egotism.

3 AUTHOR, AUDIENCE, AND PERFORMANCE

Ancient texts were meant to be heard as well as read.[20] That is why the cumbersome 'reader or listener' will so often recur in this commentary. 'Publication' would often begin with reading versions to a listening audience; even when the book market had spread copies more widely, the experiencing of a book would often be more aural and less optic than we are used to. There is evidence for collective readings among small gatherings of friends;[21] even some solitary 'readers' might have passages read to them by a literate slave. Others would read aloud, as seems to have been quite common even though it is no longer thought that silent reading was rare;[22] even silent readers usually 'hear' the words internally.[23] There might be public readings too, for such ἀκροάσεις of historical works are well attested from the fifth century onwards.[24] Between 424 and 404 Thucydides was in no position to give these in Athens, but any portions of his text that he was willing to release could reach there even if he could not. It seems quite likely, for instance, that Xenophon's *Anabasis* was first released anonymously or pseudonymously; whoever performed it in that case, it was not the self-confessing author himself.[25]

[19] Though the issues here are not straightforward: Pelling 2019: 204–10.

[20] See now esp. Vatri 2017, with careful discussion of the impact this has on an author's style. For this mix of oral and written reception see Morrison 2007, though his emphasis falls more heavily than mine would on the oral side; mine resembles that of Rawlings 2016 and 2017: 199. Crane 1996 and e.g. Bakker 2006 and Wiseman 2018: xvi by contrast focus almost exclusively on the written.

[21] D. H. Kelly 1996, Vatri 2017: 30–2.

[22] See McCutcheon 2015, esp. 10–11 on the way that even accomplished readers like Cicero would often read aloud. On silent reading Knox 1968 was seminal.

[23] Vatri 2017: 29–30.

[24] Clarke 2008: 367–9, Chaniotis 2009: 259–62.

[25] Pelling 2013a: 40–2. On such absent authors see Baragwanath and Foster 2017b: 6–7, Vatri 2017: 18.

A reading might not always have involved a whole book or more, but it might often have done. A combined performance of both Book 6 and Book 7 has been said to take eight hours,[26] but this is almost certainly an overestimate. At 5.2 syllables per second (well below the range of speeds for modern native speakers given by Vatri 2017: 90–1) or 140 words per minute (roughly the speed of a modern lecturer), the 18,000 words or 40,000 syllables of Book 6 would take just over two hours and the 16,500 words or 37,000 syllables of Book 7 just under,[27] and this is roughly in line with the time taken by a modern audiobook of similar length. So Books 6 and 7 together would be no longer than a Wagner opera or an uncut *Hamlet*. Some passages, though, would be particularly suitable for extraction for shorter occasions, and anyone who has attended a live performance of the Melian Dialogue (5.84–116) knows how gripping the experience can be. Within Book 7 the vivid narratives of the night battle on Epipolae (**43–5**) and the battle in the Great Harbour (**57–71**) would be obvious candidates, and in Book 6 the debates in Athens (6.8–26), Syracuse (6.32.3–40), and Camarina (6.75.3–88.2), along with the Peisistratid excursus (6.54–9).[28] So would the splendour of the departure (6.30–2) and the harrowing scenes of the final retreat (**75–86**); the second at times echoes the first, and they could form a poignant performance pair – perhaps too poignant and distressing, indeed, for performance in Athens itself. Eighty years earlier the poet Phrynichus had been fined for his tragedy describing the fall of Miletus as coming 'too close to home' (Hdt. 6.21.2). One wonders too what would have been the Athenians' reaction if they heard Thucydides' version of Alcibiades' speech at Sparta (6.89–92): doubtless mixed, given the polarisation that the man provoked both during his lifetime and after his death, but even his enthusiasts would have found their sympathy strained.

Still, it was not just an Athenian audience that Thucydides would have in mind. There was an international book trade (Xenophon mentions a cargo including books en route for the Black Sea, *Anab.* 7.5.14), and Thucydides could reasonably expect his work, whenever he chose to circulate it, to spread throughout the Greek world. Just as Athenian drama reached an enthusiastic public in Sicily and Southern Italy – many scenes

[26] *CT* 11–12.

[27] Vatri gives good reasons for preferring phonemes-per-second as a more accurate guide to performance time; still, the conversion-rate for syllables into phonemes has to be speculative, and these rougher figures can suffice to give a reasonable idea. The syllable count was made using the method set out by Vatri 2017: 83 n. 57.

[28] *CT* 31 offers some further possibilities.

are depicted on pottery,[29] and some Athenian survivors apparently owed their freedom to their knowledge of Euripides (Plut. *Nic.* 29, **87**.4n.) – so Books 6 and 7 in particular might find an intrigued audience in the Greek west. When Thucydides recorded details of Syracusan topography, he will have known that some of his readers would be able to match them to the locale, though he could hardly think of these as his primary audience. His treatment of Syracusan politics may set the scene for Athens too, especially in view of the oligarchic coup that would come in 411 (p. 33), but many of his readers would be just as interested in Syracuse itself.

Nor is it only, nor even principally, a contemporary audience that Thucydides has in mind. He proudly proclaims his work as a 'possession for ever more than a prize-composition for immediate hearing' (1.22.4): that is another of his 'more *X* than *Y*' formulations (p. 7) and need not exclude a concern for immediate hearing as well, but it does indicate a priority. There is nothing new about this. When Herodotus expressed his hope of saving great events from being 'erased by time' (proem), it is future time that he had in mind; Homer's great figures, not just the fighters but his Helen too (*Il.* 6.358–9), also eyed future memory, and Homer is the poet who gave them that fame. What is new is the explicitness with which Thucydides spells out why these future generations might find useful the knowledge that he gives:[30]

> It will be enough for me if people judge this useful who wish to gain a clear understanding of things that happened in the past and will some day happen again, the human condition being what it is, in the same and similar ways. (1.22.4)

> I shall describe what the plague was like, setting out the symptoms that might allow someone, if it ever strikes again, to have the foreknowledge to be able to recognise it; this is on the basis of my own experience of having the disease myself and of my observation of others. (2.48.3)

> Civil strife brought many hard things to the cities, things that happen and will always happen as long as human nature stays the same, but in more intense or gentler ways and in different forms according to the individual changes of circumstances. (3.82.2)

[29] Taplin 1993: 12–20, 98–9.

[30] The explicitness, but not necessarily the thinking itself. Herodotus too develops patterns of past behaviour that have continued in the present and may continue in the future; his history gives his audience plenty of material that may help in their interpretation. I develop this further at Pelling 2019: 229–31.

So similar events – not identical, but alike – will recur in the future. Thucydides hopes his work will be 'useful' and bring 'clarity' (ὠφέλιμα, σαφές, 1.22.4), both for the past and for these future recurrences. He might have been gratified to know that his history would be studied in modern institutes of international relations and strategic studies,[31] even if he might have reservations about the implications that are often drawn. He puts it carefully: the value will be in 'understanding' and 'recognising' the patterns as they come back. That need not exclude the drawing of morals of what to do about it – how, say, to handle a reckless *dēmos* or fight a naval battle or launch an assault in a distant land, or indeed how to avoid launching a disastrous overseas expedition in the first place. But it does not explicitly include such take-home lessons either.

These envisaged audiences, present and future, are clearly expected to be ready to think hard about what they read or hear; very possibly we should imagine 'an interactive social setting, somewhat on a par with the Athenian assembly, in which Athenian citizens would listen critically . . . and then engage in serious oral debate on the difficult issues in hand',[32] and the same goes for citizens of other states too. That audience need not expect a comfortable ride, for Thucydides is frequently not an easy read and would be an even more difficult listen. That is partly for linguistic reasons: even the native speaker Dionysius of Halicarnassus confessed his trouble in understanding the most rebarbative passages (*On Thucydides* 49, 51), though there are generally reasons why, for instance, speakers come up with formulations that obfuscate as much as clarify (frankness might damage their case),[33] or why there are so many abstractions or impersonal verbs (these may suggest aspects that go beyond the context- or person-specific).[34] But the thinking is not easy either, and often for the same reasons as Thucydides has for making those linguistic choices. He frequently seeks to tease general implications out of the particular and

[31] Low 2007: 7–32. Harloe and Morley 2012 and Lee and Morley 2015 contain several good overviews and critiques: see esp. Forde 2012, Hawthorn 2012, Lebow 2012, Johnson 2015, Keene 2015, Stradis 2015, and Sawyer 2015. For wise reservations about the lessons often drawn for international relations see Welch 2003.

[32] Morrison 2004: 113–14; cf. Morrison 2006: 175 and 2007: 220–1, extending the point to reception outside Athens. Similarly Rawlings 2016 and 2017: 199, Baragwanath and Foster 2017b: 6–7, and for Herodotus Thomas 1992: 125–6 and 2000: 258–60.

[33] Price 2013.

[34] See for instance Macleod's exemplary study (1983: 123–39) of the difficult language in the chapters on Corcyra, 3.82–3. For the taste for abstractions cf. **4**.6, **34**.6, 6.12.1, 6.24.2, 6.89–92nn., Poschenrieder 2011, and the extended study of Joho, forthcoming.

individual, sometimes to indicate a type of encounter that will recur in the narrative and often to suggest a broader truth of human behaviour. Aristotle pointed out that 'poetry deals more with universals, history with particulars' (*Poet.* 1451b6–7), citing 'what Alcibiades did or what happened to him' as the stuff of history (1451b11). That is yet another of those 'more *X* than *Y*' examples that allows some room for both: history, especially Thucydidean history, can be allowed some universals too, even if the balance is different from that in, say, Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*. It is these universal insights, after all, that explain why those similar and parallel events can be expected to recur (1.22.4).

So we need to imagine audiences that are prepared to engage as well as receive; those audiences include us, readers and still listeners too (audiobooks sell well) of that 'possession for ever' in this very distant future. Thucydides has other expectations of his audience as well, not all of which a modern reader or listener is as equipped to satisfy as a contemporary would have been. A. W. Gomme began his great commentary on Thucydides with an introductory section on 'what Thucydides takes for granted',[35] covering 'the work of his predecessors', 'general economic conditions', 'conditions of warfare', and 'constitutional practice' (*HCT* 1. 1–25). The present volume is not that sort of historical commentary, though some related topics will crop up.[36] One of these aspects does need treatment here, though, and that is the work of those predecessors; for this raises questions of intertextuality, the ways in which knowledge of other texts affects one's response to Thucydides' own account.

4 INTERTEXTUALITY

Two earlier works are especially important here, the epics of Homer, particularly the *Iliad*, and the histories of Herodotus. Specific cases will be discussed in the commentary as they arise (cf. esp. **36**.4, **43–5**, **57–59**.1, **73**.3, **75**, **78–85**, **87**.6nn.), but it should be noted here that echoes are even stronger and more frequent in Book 7 than in Book 6: the battle in the Great Harbour often suggests the battle of Salamis (**69**.3–**71**n.), and the miserable retreat and end have several Iliadic echoes, for instance of Achilles fighting the river (**84**.5n.). The whole sequence seems to

[35] On Gomme's idiosyncratic choice of introductory topics see Pelling 2021.

[36] E.g. p. 27 on cavalry; Intr. to Book 6, p. 34 on the Syracusan constitution; **16**.1, **28**.3–4, 6.8.1, 6.31.5, 6.62.4nn. on finance; **24**.2, **39**.2, 6.22, 6.44.2nn. on matters of supply; **13**.2, 6.31.3nn. on crewing; **13**.2, **49**.2, 6.49.3, 6.95.1–2nn. on plunder and ravaging; **12**.4, **34**.5nn. on ship technology; **78**.2n. on marching deployment.

foreshadow the end of the Peloponnesian War just as Salamis prefigures the final Persian defeat in Herodotus 9 and as the death of Hector is a premature counterpart of the fall of Troy (**69**.3–**71**, **75**, **87**.5–6nn.); and 'few from many returned home' (ἀπενόστησαν) might prompt thoughts not just of Odysseus but of the other heroes whose *nostoi* featured in the epic cycle, and of all those too who had died on the plain of Troy, equally far from home (**87**.6n.).

It is not necessary to think that every reader would have picked up every suggestion. Not everyone will have had deep knowledge or total memory even of Homer; some might be familiar only with a 'highlights reel'.[37] Even connoisseurs will not always have been attuned with total alertness. Usually intertextuality does not fundamentally change or subvert the impression that the less sensitive would have received, but just deepens and strengthens that response. Still, the deepening matters, and in several ways. It can elevate, just as Simonides elevated the battle of Plataea by echoing Achilles (fr. 11 W²) and as the Stoa Poikile in Athens elevated Marathon by depicting scenes from that battle alongside those of the Trojan War.[38] These scenes at Syracuse are the modern-day equivalent, just as momentous as the great triumphs and disasters of long ago. It can add immediacy: one might have a strong visual image of classic scenes, possibly created by one's own imagination or possibly drawn from paintings on vases or walls, and the picture will transfer to these similar scenes now. It can add plausibility: if events like these had happened before, or could even be imagined as happening, they could happen again now. Modern studies of court behaviour confirm that juries are more likely to believe narratives that fit story-patterns familiar from the fiction that they know, though these days those patterns are drawn more from television and film. Again, none of these effects *relies* on intertextuality. It would be a dull reader who failed anyway to find the narrative momentous, immediate, and plausible. But those responses are reinforced and intensified.

There are contributions to interpretation too. The idea of Athens as a 'tyrant city' is again in the text explicitly; the Corinthians blame themselves and the other Peloponnesians for allowing this to develop in their midst (1.122.3); Pericles uses the figure as an analogy ('like a tyranny', 2.63.2); Cleon strengthens it to an identification ('is a tyranny', 3.37.2); and Euphemus alludes to the idea at Camarina (6.85.1).[39] Now Athens can

[37] As A. Kelly forthcoming puts it in the context of Hipponax, admittedly referring there to the earlier poetic landscape; cf. also A. Kelly 2015.

[38] Arafat 2013, Arrington 2015: 201–3. The Stoa seems to date from the 460s: Camp 2015: 476–94.

[39] Cf. Raaflaub 1979, Tuplin 1985, Pelling 2019: 86–7 and 144.

be seen as the new Herodotean Xerxes, behaving as he did and meeting with a similar fate (77.4n.). That is more than negative colouring. 'Tyrant' brings with it a bundle of expectations. Those help a reader/listener to understand why Athens acts as it does, brutally and arrogantly driven on by its self-belief until its final overreach and calamity, and to understand too how its enemies react, proudly fighting for freedom and for glory. Pattern-building was an important technique in Herodotus' explanatory repertoire, showing king after king behaving in similar ways and allowing the reader to extrapolate what is recurrent and what is case-specific. Thucydides has a smaller canvas than Herodotus, concentrating as he does on his single test case of the Peloponnesian War, but he can build on his predecessor's work to bring out how his own cases map on to his.[40] It is another way of suggesting what is universal: such things happened before, they happen again in Thucydides' story, and are therefore all the likelier to happen again, 'the human condition being what it is' (1.22.4, quoted above).

This interest in universals might again seem to bring Thucydides closer to tragedy than Aristotle's comment would suggest, even once that 'more than' is taken into account (p. 12). Should tragedy too, then, be taken as another strong intertextual presence in his work along with Homer and Herodotus? Many have thought so.[41] Long ago Sir Richard Jebb toyed with the idea that the whole *History* could be seen as a tragedy in five acts (1880: 317). For Francis Cornford, in his procatively titled *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, by the end of Book 7

> Tyche, Elpis, Apate, Hybris, Eros, Phthonos, Nemesis, Ate – all these have crossed the stage and the play is done.[42]

An Aeschylean Thucydides, indeed. That may be right, though most readers would not now believe, as Cornford did, that Thucydides would himself accept the theological implications that such language usually carries in tragedy.[43] Here, though, the issues are more complicated than they are with Homer and Herodotus. There are relatively few suggestions of particular tragic passages, although of course there may be undetectable ones to plays now lost;[44] within Book 7 the clearest cases relate to Aeschylus'

[40] Pelling 2019: 235.

[41] For particularly thoughtful treatments of the relationship with tragedy see Bayer 1948: 36–44 = 1968: 226–39, de Romilly 1977, esp. ch. 3, Macleod 1983: 140–58, Hornblower 1987: 115–20, 148–9, R. B. Rutherford 2007, Joho 2017a. There are good remarks too in Stahl 2003, e.g. 135–6, 152–3.

[42] Cornford 1907: 220.

[43] See also Introduction to Book 6, pp. 15–16.

[44] Finley 1967: 41–2 notes that he has found fewer parallels with Euripides in the speeches of Books 6–7 than in those of earlier books.

Persians, where they combine with those of Herodotus to evoke memories of Salamis (**66**.3, **67**.2, **69**.2, **69**.3–**71**, **71**.4, **71**.7, **84**.3nn.). Parallels can often be found for Thucydides' more elevated turns of diction, but it is hard to know whether these would be felt as 'tragic' or more loosely as 'poetic' (e.g. **12**.3, **25**.1, **80**.3, **87**.6nn.). It is easy to see Thucydides' narrative in the terms of Aristotle's *Poetics*, with plenty of pity and fear (1452b32), events following 'contrary to expectation but because of one another' (1452a4), and Athens finally destroyed through some ἁμαρτία (1453a10), whether that is taken in the sense of 'factual mistake' (cf. 6.1.1, p. 4) or of some moral flaw or some combination of the two; but how far are those qualities really indicators of tragedy, the literary genre? One could equally see Homer's Achilles and Herodotus' Persia in those terms, and regard historiography and tragedy as sharing a legacy from Homer.[45] Certainly one can see affinities between the two genres: both focus on intense suffering, both use some of the same techniques such as rhetorically accomplished speech and counter-speech,[46] both (especially in Thucydides' case) may engage an audience in reflection on whether something similar might happen in their own time, perhaps indeed to them. Certainly, too, tragedy would be part of an audience's communal life, and like any other experience would contribute to their mindset and world-view; their alertness to the realities of suffering would inevitably be enhanced. But that is some way short of claiming that conscious thoughts of tragedy would often affect the reading of the text *in the same way* as those of Homer or Herodotus. Perhaps indeed we should think in even broader terms, and talk of a shared sensibility to extreme aspects of the human condition that surface in genre after genre, those experiences that are felt as searing, unsettling, but still in keeping with the way that life is shown, and known, to be.

In any case, when ancient critics talk of τὸ τραγικόν the suggestions are usually closer to 'theatrical' or 'dramatic' than to our 'tragic': they refer to spectacle, sensation, and show, and often those critics do not mean it kindly.[47] These are the terms, for instance, in which Plutarch criticises Duris for souping up the sufferings of Samos in 440–439 BCE and Ctesias for embellishing the death of Clearchus (*Per.* 28.2 and *Artax.* 18.7, in each case ἐπιτραγωιδεῖ); and Polybius makes a good deal of the idea in his excoriation of his predecessor Phylarchus, insisting that the aims of tragedy and history should be quite different, history seeking to instruct and tragedy 'to cause consternation and to lead the soul' (ἐκπλῆξαι καὶ

[45] Macleod 1983: 157–8.
[46] Finley 1967: 1–54 assembles many detailed parallels.
[47] Most 2000, Pelling 2015: 115–20.

ψυχαγωγῆσαι, 2.56.10–11). A close reading of Polybius, though, shows that his point is that Phylarchus evokes such pathos indiscriminately, seeking thrills even when the facts do not warrant it (**75**n.). There is plenty of spectacle in Thucydides' narrative too: those recollections of the brilliant Piraeus departure (6.30–1, p. 1) depend on the intense visuality with which the scenes are described (**69**.3–**71**, **75**.5, **82**.3, **84**.5nn.), and the eerie terror of the night battle (**43–5**n.) relies in part on the combination of the visual and the auditory, so expressive for an encounter in which one could see so little and hear only a befuddling din. Here, though, Thucydides has done enough to persuade most readers that the virtuosity is anything but unwarranted, such is the intensity of the emotions involved and the momentousness of what turns on them. That is all the more so as his narrative in the earlier books has been sparing in such effects: the awfulness of the plague (2.47.3–54) and the chill of the Melian dialogue (5.85–113) rely in part on the apparent coolness with which the facts of the first and the arguments of the second are set out, balanced against the reader or listener's constant awareness that human lives are at stake.

When ancient writers praise these books, it is accordingly the *enargeia* on which they dwell, the perceptual clarity with which the events are represented to the reader's eye. This, says Plutarch, is the part of the narrative where Thucydides was at his most 'pathetic, vivid, and varied' (αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ περὶ ταῦτα παθητικώτατος ἐναργέστατος ποικιλώτατος γενόμενος, *Nic.* 1.1), and the battle in the Great Harbour is one of his prime examples for saying that 'Thucydides is always contending for this sort of vividness, striving to make the listener into a type of viewer and to generate in the readers the same astonishing and unsettling emotions as observers felt at the time' (*On the Glory of the Athenians* 347a–b). Dionysius of Halicarnassus quotes the whole of the Great Harbour narrative and concludes that 'the grandeur, the beauty, the incisiveness and the other virtues' are there at their most perfect (*On Thucydides* 27); this will be one of the occasions where 'he made the sufferings seem so raw and piteous that nobody could hope to surpass them, neither historian nor poet' (*On Thucydides* 15). If, then, Thucydides' first readers and listeners did think of tragedy, it was probably more for the manner in which the narrative works, especially the spectacle and the thrill, than for the deep moral insights and challenges that modern critics tend to have in mind.[48]

[48] An exception is Greenwood 2006: ch. 2, linking the strong visuality of Thucydidean narrative to contemporary theatrical culture: that emphasis is closer to the ancient perspective.

5 BOOK 7 IN THE HISTORY

(a) Books 6–7

The eight-book division of the history is not the only one possible; we know of an alternative thirteen-book division in antiquity, and Diodorus twice refers to a nine-book version.[49] But whoever divided the text at 6.105.3 knew what they were doing. As the scholiast points out, Book 7 then begins with a turning point ('this is where Syracuse's victory and Athens' defeat begins'), and Gylippus arrives just as Syracuse is in its greatest danger; that story-pattern is as old as Homer, with Odysseus arriving just as Penelope is on the point of choosing a suitor and Achilles allowing Patroclus to intervene just as the first ship is fired.[50] The 'battle of the walls' (6.96–103) is then at its height, and the Athenians come within a few feet of winning it (**2**.4). Nicias knew that Gylippus and a few ships were coming, but 'did not as yet (πω) take any precautions' (6.104.3, p. 3). Anyone familiar with narrative patterning would barely need that πω to indicate that such confidence will not last. Then the quiet 'return' of the final words of Book 6, (the Argives) ἀπῆλθον ἐπ' οἴκου, is not merely a regular closural motif but also presages the far more searing 'return' of only 'a few from many' that will end Book 7 (**87**.5–6n.).

Books 6–7 could as readily have fallen into three books out of thirteen[51] as two books out of eight or nine, but it is clear that they form a strongly demarcated unit together. It is not that they are wholly self-contained, as we shall see; Thucydides emphasises that this was one 27-year-long war (5.26, p. 4). But he also makes it clear that there is something special about this sequence. 6.1.1, along with the sketch of Sicily that follows at 6.1.2–5.3, was an emphatic opening, and already gave a strong hint that it would not end well (p. 4). **87**.5–6, quoted below, will be even more clear-cut an ending, with many closural features (nn.) and a pathetic echo of the Odyssean hints of the beginning (6.2.1 with 6.1.2–5.3n.). The last

[49] Thirteen books: Marcellinus, *Life of Thucydides* 58, also noting that the eight-book version was the more usual; he cites the authority of 'Asclepios', often amended to 'Asclepiades', who would be the fourth-century historian (*FGrH* 12). The thirteen-book division is at times mentioned by the Scholia (Hemmerdinger 1948: 108). Nine: Diod. 12.37.2, 13.42.5. Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses the eight-book division throughout *On Thucydides*. Cf. Bonner 1920.

[50] Cf. Pelling 1988: 237–8 on Plut. *Ant.* 48.

[51] Break-points at 6.62.5 or 74.2 and at **18**.4 would give three blocks of more or less even length, but Bonner 1920: 77 preferred 6.93.4 and **41**.4. Earlier treatments posited 6.62.5 and **18**.4 (Krüger) and 6.93.4 and **18**.4 (Kalinka and Festa): Hemmerdinger 1948: 109.

stages recall the beginning in other ways too, especially those recollections of the 'brilliance' (λαμπρότης, **31**.6) of the departure (6.30–32.2: pp. 1, 18). That scene is explicitly recalled as they begin their dismal withdrawal:

> It was hard to bear, particularly as the brilliance and pride of the beginning had come to such an ignominious conclusion. This was the greatest reverse of fortunes ever to befall a Greek army. They had set out to enslave others; it now fell to them to depart more in fear of suffering this themselves. They had sailed to the sound of prayers and paeans, and now began to leave with the opposite in their ears, marching on foot rather than sailing, more like an army than a fleet. (**75**.6–7)

And readers and listeners were encouraged to look forward at the beginning just as they will look back at the end. The dominant mood of the Piraeus crowd at 6.30–32.2 was one of excitement and optimism, but there was an undercurrent of unease: there were 'wailings' as well as paeans and prayers (ὀλοφυρμοί, 6.30.2), just as there will be οἰμωγή at the end (**71**.6, **75**.4). That shaping is made even stronger by the recurrent intertextual suggestions of Xerxes' invasion (pp. 14–15), itself moulded into a narrative unity by Herodotus in his Books 7–9.

The traditional two-book division gives some symmetries of structure between Books 6 and 7.[52] Both have early expositions of the problems by Nicias (6.8–14, **11–15**) followed by the despatch of a fleet (6.30, **16**); on arrival the generals debate and decide on strategy (6.47–9, **42** and **49**); pre-battle speeches (6.68, **61–69**.2) lead into substantial encounters (6.69–71, **69**.3–**71**) that wreck the morale of the losing side (6.72–3, **72–5**). Book 6 ends with the Sicilian campaign looking to be as good as over (p. 3) and Book 7 seems to presage the end of the whole war (pp. 14–15), but in each case that impression proves delusive. Within Book 7, too, there are some parallels between events in Sicily and those in Greece: the Spartans fortify Decelea against Attica as the Athenians try to wall off Syracuse (**19**, **27**.3, **28**.3nn.); the naval skirmishing in the Corinthian Gulf goes beyond mere symmetry with that in the Great Harbour, as the one theatre influences the other (**34**, **36**.2nn.).

Still, such mechanical parallels do not bring out the peculiar qualities of Book 7. The first half is slow-moving: the voyage of the urgently requested Athenian reinforcements spreads over a lot of narrative space (**16–41**; cf.

[52] Bayer 1948: 39 and n. 1 = 1968: 230–1 and n. 135.

31–41n.), partly because it is punctuated by an extended description of the encounter in the Corinthian Gulf (**34**). Demosthenes' arrival injects a new energy (**42–6**n.), and Syracusans as well as Athenians feel the difference (**42**.2). Three narrative highspots then follow, first the uncanny confusion of the night battle (**43–5**), then the long-drawn-out suspense of the battle in the Great Harbour (**69**.3–**71**), then the gathering hopelessness of the final retreat and slaughter (**76–85**). Even then the deaths are not at an end, and the imprisonment of the survivors in the quarries (**87**) engages different imaginative senses: after so much that is auditory and visual, now it is the sweating and the shivering, the hunger and the thirst, the filth and the stench on which Thucydides dwells. Plutarch ends his *Nicias* with at least a hint of light, telling of those survivors saved by their knowledge of Euripides (*Nic.* 29, p. 12), but Thucydides offers no such relief:

> This was the greatest event of this war, and it seems to me the greatest of any Greek events that we know of from tradition, most brilliant for the victors and most catastrophic for the victims. For they were altogether defeated in every respect, and their suffering was unqualified in any way. It was what people call total annihilation – infantry, fleet, everything; and only a few returned home from the many who sailed. So much for what happened in Sicily. (**87**.5–6)

(b) Book 7 and Book 8

8.1 immediately goes on to stress the shattering effect on the Athenians at home. At first they could not believe it; when they realised the truth, they turned on the orators who had urged the expedition and the seers and oracle-mongers who had encouraged their hopes, and it is now the Spartans, not the Athenians, who are 'full of good hope' (εὐέλπιδες, 6.24.3 and 8.2.4; cf. p. 1):

> Everything pressed in on every side to cause the Athenians anguish and envelop them in the greatest fear and terror that they had ever known. For individuals and city alike had been stripped of many hoplites and cavalry and a generation of young men for which they could see no ready substitute; they could see too that there were not enough ships in the dockyards nor funds in the treasury nor crews to row. All hope of salvation was gone. (8.1.2)

So, as so often in narrative, one story's end becomes the starting point of the next. That shaping of Books 6–7 may affect how strongly Th.'s

judgements are put. Two years later Athens loses the island of Euboea, so vital for the city's grain supply:

> When news reached the Athenians, there was terror such as there had never been before. Not the disaster in Sicily, even though it had seemed great at the time, nor anything else had ever yet so frightened them. (8.96.1)

'Even though it had seemed great at the time'? Perhaps this is 'progressive correction', a familiar technique in Greek narrative whereby an initial impression is overlaid by a more nuanced one;[53] or there may be some implicit focalisation or free indirect discourse here, what Irene de Jong calls a 'short "peep" into the minds of characters participating in those events',[54] with the narrator conveying the way people thought and talked now that the impact of Sicily was receding into the distance: 'well, that seemed terrifying enough, but this is even worse'. But the phrasing is still grudging. One could understand if, rather as Tycho von Wilamowitz argued for Sophoclean tragedy,[55] Thucydides here allowed the impact of the individual scene to override strict consistency in the whole.

In other ways Books 6–7 fit more snugly with Book 8. The idea of a city on the move (p. 2) develops to the notion that the Athenian force might indeed be equivalent to a city wherever it may settle (**77**.4) as well as carrying the fate of Athens in their hands (**64**.2); both aspects are relevant to Nicias' resounding conclusion, ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις, καὶ οὐ τείχη οὐδὲ νῆες ἀνδρῶν κεναί (**77**.7). Both aspects prepare for an important later development, as the fleet at Samos comes to constitute an alternative Athens, firmly attached to the democracy even as the populace at home turns to the oligarchic revolutions of 411 BCE (**77**.7n.). Book 6 had already prepared some of the ground for those constitutional upheavals, with Athenagoras' theoretical defence of democracy (6.36–40) and the Athenians' nervousness about anti-democratic conspirators (6.27–9, 53.5, 60–1); now Nicias' lack of confidence in the *dēmos* and its procedures (**48**.3–4) also contributes to that wider scene-setting, as do the glimpses of debilitating *stasis* elsewhere (**46**, **50**.1, **57**.11; cf. 6.50.3, 51.2, 74.1). Books 6–7 also leave no doubt as to the expedition's effect on Athens' finances, with 'many talents in all travelling out of the city' in 415 (6.31.5) and more now required for the reinforcements (**16**.2). The fortification of Decelea (**19**) hits both agriculture and the working of the Laureion silver mines (**27**.3–5; cf.

[53] So Rood 1998a: 278 n. 82, but see also *CT* on 8.96.1. For the technique see Pelling 2019, index s.v. 'revision in stride'.

[54] De Jong 1987: 112–13, discussing instances in Homer.

[55] Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1917.

6.91.7), and food imports become both more essential and more difficult (**28**.1).[56] The squeeze (**28**.3n.) is felt when the Athenians cannot afford to retain the Thracian mercenaries they had hired (**27**.2, **29**.1). It is easy to understand why Persian gold will play such a large part in Book 8, and that in its turn points to a broader historical sweep, with first the west and then the east dominating the course of the war; in Book 7 the hoped-for allies in Sicily increasingly side with Syracuse instead, in Book 8 those in the Aegean turn to Sparta. The *History* began by stressing the scale of the conflict, as Thucydides had predicted from the outset,

> reckoning on the basis that both sides went into the conflict at the height of their power and preparation and seeing the rest of the Greek world taking one side or the other, some immediately and others after reflection. This was the greatest disruption that had ever befallen the Greeks and also a part of the non-Greek world, one might even say the greater part of mankind. (1.1.1–2)

Taken together, Books 6–8 describe how that process reached its peak.

(c) Books 6–7 in the whole

Book 5 concluded with Athens' treatment of Melos, highlighted by the inclusion of the Melian dialogue (5.85–113). The island's adult males were killed, the women and children enslaved, and Athenian colonists sent in their stead (5.116.4). 'In the same winter the Athenians were wanting to sail again to Sicily' (6.1.1, p. 4). The juxtaposition must be suggestive, but it is harder to pin down exactly what it suggests: probably some version of the pattern of *hybris* and come-uppance that would come so readily to Greek minds, but one that was more naturalistic and less religious than it might be in Herodotus or Xenophon or tragedy. This is discussed more fully in the Introduction to Book 6 (pp. 17–20). Themes from Melos come back in Syracuse. There the Melians pinned their resistance on the gods, and the Athenians were scathing about it (5.104–5, 112); the Melians felt they had to keep on fighting and hoping, and the Athenians warned them of the perils of hope in the face of reality (5.102–3). By the end of Book 7, it is Nicias who has to rely on the gods and to urge his demoralised men to keep on hoping (**77**.1–4), and the reader and listener will know how vain such hope must be.

There is more to this than a simple pattern of the biter being bit, for there is explanation here too. Paradoxically, at Melos the Athenians are

[56] See esp. **27–30**, **28**.4, and **82**.3nn., with Kallet 2001, esp. 121–46, and 1999.

partially driven by fear, not of Melos itself but of the broader dangers to the empire if a tiny island is seen to resist Athens' imperial might (5.91, 95, 97, 99). Fear plays its part too in the decision to go to Sicily; unless the Athenians strike pre-emptively, there is a danger that Syracuse might enter the war on the side of the enemy, and it is prudent (σῶφρον, 6.6.2) to strike now. It is overcaution that makes the assembly so ready to accept Nicias' disingenuous plea for bigger forces (6.20–3): now, they think, they will certainly be safe – yet in fact these prove counterproductive, scaring the cities that might have been their friends (p. 2). The same qualities drive the excess and now the reversal. Where his contemporaries might have inserted the gods behind such a pattern Thucydides sees a human factor, but it still makes sense.

A similar combination of explanation and table-turning is seen in a longer-distance symmetry that is hinted several times (**27**.5, **61**.1, **62**.2nn.) before becoming explicit at **71**.7.[57] In the Great Harbour battle

> it had been similar to what the Athenians themselves had suffered and done at Pylos; for once the Spartan ships had been destroyed the men who had crossed to the island were lost as well. In the same way there was now no chance of reaching safety by land, unless something paradoxical occurred. (**71**.7)

The reference is to the Athenian success at Pylos in 425, when Demosthenes had established an outpost on the Peloponnesian coast and over 400 Spartan hoplites had been cut off on the island of Sphacteria; the 292 survivors had been taken as prisoners to Athens, and from then on Sparta was desperate to get them back. Now in the cramped waters at Syracuse the Athenians were forced 'to fight a land-battle from the ships' (**62**.2–4); at Pylos 'the Spartans, in their eagerness and their consternation, were doing nothing other than virtually fighting a sea-battle from land, while the Athenians fought . . . a land-battle from their ships' (4.14.3). That was part of a broader strangeness about Pylos, for there it was the landlubbing Spartans who were having to mount an attack by sea and the mariner Athenians who were resisting by land (4.12.3); there is a similar reversal of roles here, and it is now the Athenians who are out of their element, with no way of exploiting their maritime nimbleness

[57] This may also be a case (for others see Intr. to Book 6, p. 21) where Thucydides was already thinking ahead to Sicily when shaping the earlier account: some of the topographical difficulties in the Pylos narrative may come from his moulding the details to bring them closer to what will be the case at Syracuse (Connor 1984: 197 n. 33).

in the narrow waters. This too is more than a curiosity or an example of fortune's turning wheel.[58] It was particularly the success at Pylos that prompted Athenians to think that 'the possible and more intractable were equally within their grasp', and that was why they treated the generals of 427–424 so harshly, exiling two and fining the third, so convinced were they that Sicily could have been conquered (4.65.4). That mindset was still playing a part in 415.

Why, too, were the Athenians at Pylos at all? It was an act of enterprise and initiative on the part of Demosthenes;[59] fighting on land might not come comfortably to Athenians, but the readiness to try anything was in line with the Athenian national character, 'innovative and quick to form ideas and carry them through in action' (1.70.2), and the sailor Athenians at least appreciated the difficulties the Spartans would face and knew how to exploit them (4.10.5). The same general Demosthenes is by now at Syracuse, but the decision to move the ships within the Harbour was taken long before he arrived (6.101.3), and Nicias has so far shown very little of that Athenian taste for enterprise and risk. All is so very different from Phormio's brilliant manoeuvres in the Corinthian Gulf back in 429 (2.86–92), another earlier highlight that is several times recalled (**62**.2, **69**.2nn.); the unimaginative brawn of the tactics reverts to what Thucydides called the 'old-fashioned style' of the battle of Sybota in 433 (1.48–50; **62**.2, **69**.3–**71** nn.). Enterprise and initiative have now moved to the Syracusan side, and this will shift the momentum of the whole war just as Pylos did in 425. The contrast in the situations prompts the reader to reflect on the differing leadership styles that have led to this.

Other echoes go still further back. Book 6 often recalled Book 1, with a feeling that it was all beginning again, with fear prompting the war's renewal (pp. 23–4) just as it had triggered its start in 431 (1.23.6), and an ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις, a 'truest explanation', involving Athenian expansion; there is a resounding echo of that passage at 6.6.1 (p. 4). Now at **19–20** (n.) the Spartan king invades Attica and the Athenians send a fleet around the Peloponnese, just as both sides did in 431. It is a further reprise, with some modulation, of the same old tune. Given the way that

[58] Cf. Macleod 1983: 142–3, Rood 1998a: 6–8.

[59] On this see esp. Cawkwell 1997: 51–3, stressing Demosthenes' wisdom in seeing not merely the potential of light-armed troops but also the chance to exploit Messenian nationalism. It is true that good fortune and Spartan mistakes helped a good deal (Roisman 1993: 33–41), but a general deserves credit for tempting the enemy to make mistakes (Kagan 1974: 231).

the end of Book 7 also hints at Athens' final defeat (**87**.5–6, p. 15), the books together can seem a microcosm of the whole war, rather as the four days' action of the *Iliad* captures in miniature all ten years at Troy.

6 WHERE DOES IT ALL GO WRONG?

'Show not tell' is the watchword of ancient historical narrators; it is rare for them to insert passages of explicit analysis in their own voice, though they allow their speakers often enough to reflect on what is going on. One of the few examples in Thucydides' own voice is that discussion of political leadership after Pericles' death (2.65), discussed at pp. 8–10. There he makes clear one factor contributing to Athens' failure: it was a mistake to go to Sicily in the first place, compounded by the even more mistaken follow-up decisions, and so part of the blame must rest with the politicians and the assembly at home. Still, it must be stressed again that Thucydides is not there predominantly concerned with the reasons why the expedition failed, still less with isolating 'the' cause (though see also p. 30); he is analysing the various mistakes made at Athens in the quarter-century after Pericles and identifying the most serious. He also insists that even so the expedition might well have succeeded (p. 4). The very phrasing of 2.65.11 – 'not so much an error of judgement with regard to the expedition's target, but more a matter of those who despatched the force not making the right follow-up decisions' (p. 6) – suggests as much: if it had been doomed from the start, then the biggest mistake would surely have been the first. The question why it did fail is still left open, and the reader/listener of the speeches and narrative will have to do some of the work in extracting the answer. Nor is it likely that this answer will be simple, or single.

Some of the factors are set out plainly by Nicias early in both books (6.9–14 and particularly 6.20–3; **11–15**: for the symmetry see p. 20). Nicias may be too negative for his audience's taste, perhaps more negative than the circumstances demand (**11–15**n.), but his Athenian listeners appreciate that he is not talking nonsense: that is why they consent to the upgrade he recommends (6.24–6) and agree to send the reinforcements he asks for (**16**). There is, he says, less to be hoped for from the allies, especially Egesta, than the optimists expect (6.12.1, 22). It is the Athenians' own resources that are at risk (6.12.2), and they would have to take with them a large supply of money (6.22). Any setback in Sicily is likely to tempt the enemies nearer home to renew their attacks, so that Athens will face a war on two fronts (6.11.6–7), with the Sicilians now added to their enemies (6.11.4). In Syracuse there is no appetite for constitutional change that

Athens could exploit (6.20.1). The enemy is powerful, well equipped, and wealthy (6.20.3–4). In particular, they have a big advantage in horses (6.20.4), and their cavalry is likely to make foraging especially difficult. Athens would have to rely on the uncertain prospect of cavalry from their local allies (6.21.1); archers would be needed to ward off the enemy cavalry in battle (6.22). Fighting and supplying an army in a distant land will be very different from waging war in the Aegean, where there are always allied bases near at hand (6.21.2). A lot of the provisions would have to come from home (6.22). Self-sufficiency would have to be the aim, and that requires a large range of support services (6.23). As the campaign wears on, so Nicias' letter in Book 7 recounts, Syracuse is benefiting from the advice of an expert Spartan general; that has brought more Sicilian cities over to Syracuse's side (**12**.1), and others can no longer be relied on (**14**.3). The Athenian ships have proved difficult to keep in fighting condition as they are sodden and cannot be dried out on land (**12**.3–4). Their crews have begun to waste away, some of them picked off while foraging; meanwhile servants are deserting and allies, noticing that the balance is tilting towards Syracuse, are melting away into the countryside (**13**.2). The crews are no longer what they were (**13**.2), and Nicias himself is badly sick (**15**.1).

Nicias was not wrong. The narrative often bears him out, and once the campaign has settled into siege-warfare one can add the massive scale of the workings required, especially with a coastal city and far from home.[60] In a case like this, Athens' sea-power, vaunted by Pericles and Alcibiades as guaranteeing the city's invulnerability (2.62.2, 6.18.5), proves less decisive than those proud claims implied.[61] Several of the same predictions are made by the Syracusan Athenagoras, confident as he is that the Athenians would be sensible enough not to come at all (6.36–40). Of all these difficulties, the most insistently traced are the disappointing support from the allies, with even old friends like Rhegium reluctant to welcome the invaders (6.44.3, 1.2n.) and Egesta's promises proving as false as Nicias suspected (6.46.2–3), and the deficiencies in cavalry, sometimes making a difference in combat (6.64.1, 70.3, **6**.3, **44**.8, **78**.3. **78**.6, **81**.1–2, **84**.2) and just as importantly hampering any prospect of living off the land (6.21.1n., 52.2, **4**.6).[62] Silence can be telling too: by the

[60] Cawkwell 1997: 18, Liebeschuetz 1968: 293.

[61] Kopp 2016, esp. 189–207 and 228–30.

[62] 59 per cent of all Thucydides' references to cavalry come in Book 6–7 (Rubincam 1991: 189). Cf. esp. Frederiksen 1968, Stahl 1973: 66–9 and 2003: 178–80, and Rood 1998a: 165–6 and 174; but Cawkwell 1997: 144 n. 29 thinks its importance overstressed.

time of the final retreat the Athenians have no cavalry worth mentioning (**77**.4, **78**.3n.).

Yet Athens very nearly won (**2**.4). There was a further true insight in Nicias' early speeches:

> We must think of ourselves as going to found a colony in the midst of foreigners and enemies, and colonisers have to gain control of the land on the first day that they arrive or realise that, if they make a slip, everything will be against them (6.23.2)

– a 'city on the move again' (p. 2). 'On the first day' is important. The arrival of so massive a force was bound to have an impact: this needed to be followed up by urgent action. That was Lamachus' view at 6.49, and Demosthenes thought so too (**42**.3). It did not happen. This was not the only way to success; the alternative that was followed instead, Alcibiades' plan of seeking allies, might also have worked, at least had Alcibiades' rhetorical flair still been available to carry it through. But urgency would probably have been best, and urgency, not just on the first day, was what turned out to be lacking. The Syracusans themselves noticed as much, and the Athenian failure to press on boosted their morale (6.63.2).

Is Nicias to blame? Largely, yes. After Alcibiades' removal, little is heard of Lamachus; some decisions are taken by 'the generals' (6.62.1, 64.1, 93.4), but Nicias delivers the pre-battle speech at the Anapus (6.68) and Lamachus returns by name to the narrative only for his death (6.101.6). But Nicias too is not often felt as a driving force. In Book 6, decisions that must have been taken by the generals are usually just described as what 'the Athenians' did (e.g. 6.63.1, 65.2, 70.4, 71.1–2, 98.2) or, quite often, did not do (6.63.2, 71.1, 100.1). A similar pattern persists in Book 7. Few decisions are explicitly taken by Nicias: **4**.4–7 notes his decision to fortify Plemmyrion and move his troops there (a momentous choice, and one with mixed results, **4**.5–6 (nn.)), at **8**.1 he sends his letter, **32**.1 records a diplomatic mission and **38**.2 a purely defensive measure (**31–41**n.). In addition **3**.3 notes that he does not press home an advantage; at **6**.1 'Nicias and the generals' acknowledge a need to act and do so. Elsewhere it is just 'the Athenians' (e.g. **3**.1–2, **4**.3, **22**.2, **37**.3). None of this gives an impression of decisiveness or of giving a lead, and delay and inaction are his hallmarks (6.10.5, **49**.3nn.). On the other side Gylippus' presence is much more sensed (**1**.5, **3**, **4**.2–3, **5**.2–3, **7**.2, **22–3**, **37**.2), and he gives the defenders the momentum that the invaders lack.

It takes Demosthenes' arrival to inject anything of the same into the Athenians: it is his views, decisions, and actions that the next few chapters stress (**42**, **43**.1, **43**.5), and after the failure of the night battle (**43–5**) he

has no doubt that it is time to give up and go home (**47**.2). The narrative has left readers and listeners in little doubt either. Awkward questions might have been raised (would withdrawal in fact be so easy by either land or sea?), but are not. Yet the plan is frustrated, thanks to Nicias. First it is by open opposition (**48**), which carries more weight than it might because his colleagues think he knows more than he does (**49**.4: cf. p. 34). Then, when even he sees the need to relent, the further delay is because he insists on a twenty-seven-day suspension in response to the eclipse. Here Thucydides is unusually forthright: 'he was rather too inclined to goddishness and that sort of thing' (**50**.4).

Even if all was still not lost (the battle in the Great Harbour could easily have gone the other way, **69**.3–**71**), it is a formidable indictment. Modern readers are likely to be particularly shocked by Nicias' readiness to jeopardise the safety of his men because of his concern for his own likely fate at the hands of the vindictive *dēmos* (**48**.3–4), though it is notable that he feels no compunction about setting out those reasons to the other generals (**47–9**n.). Yet at the end Thucydides gives Nicias a generous sending-off:

> . . . the least deserving of Greeks, at least in my time, to arrive at such a pitch of misfortune, in view of the way he had ordered all his behaviour according to virtue.[63] (**86**.5)

That is a verdict on his private life, not on his generalship (see n.), and should not be pressed to say more than it does. The indictment still stands. But it does show that Thucydides wished to leave his readers and listeners with a verdict that includes pity as well as condemnation.

Such terminal kindness is not generally his way (it is more in Herodotus' manner).[64] Thucydides is of course generous to Pericles at the end (2.65, pp. 8–10), and in a less elaborate way to Brasidas, expiring at the moment of victory and much honoured by the Amphipolitans (5.10–11). Yet at 7.86 he has mentioned Demosthenes' death with no parting verdict; Lamachus' death was treated with equal lack of fanfare at 6.101.6; earlier Phormio, so admirable in Book 2, has simply (and rather mysteriously)[65] disappeared from the narrative by the beginning of Book 3, and Archidamus of Sparta, a powerful figure in the early years, similarly vanishes unnoticed after 3.1.1. There may be several reasons why Thucydides writes so unusually here. One is the mood of the moment. 'His emotions are rather more in evidence in Book VII than elsewhere',[66] and his readers

[63] If that is how the words should be translated: see n. ad loc.
[64] Hornblower–Pelling 238–9, Pelling 2019: 206–7.
[65] *HCT* and *CT* on 3.7.1. [66] Dover 1965: 24.

and listeners will be feeling those emotions too. It is not just Nicias for whom they will be feeling pity; this precise verdict may not be extendable to those slaughtered at the Assinarus or consigned to lingering death in the quarries (not all will have been so exemplary in their pursuit of virtue), but the pity felt for Nicias can still reflect and be part of that felt for all. Secondly, it is not all Nicias' fault. He opposed the expedition bitterly and never wanted to command (6.8.4). It was the Athenian *dēmos* that insisted on giving him a role for which he was unsuited and then removed the fellow commander with the flair to temper his caution; ill fortune then removed the one who saw the need for urgency and drive. The trenchant denunciation of all post-Periclean leaders at 2.65 explores why Athens lost the war, not primarily why it lost in Sicily, but those failures of leadership and the consequent mistakes of the *dēmos* are part of the explanation here as well (p. 6).

For Thucydides, it is plain, individual personalities matter. Nicias makes a difference; so does Alcibiades; so, certainly, did Pericles; so on the other side do Gylippus and Hermocrates. But there is usually more to it. Even Nicias' egocentricity of **48**.3–4 is part of a wider phenomenon, one going beyond the individual (pp. 9–10), and Athens' difficulty in coping with the brilliant but idiosyncratic Alcibiades fits a pattern that goes back to Themistocles (1.135.3) and indeed to Pericles himself (2.65.2). The thinking of Nicias and Demosthenes is important, but the army's mindset matters too: collective psychology is as absorbing as individual, and the perceptions of whole communities often drive events.[67] Recurrent key words in Book 7 are ῥώμη and its cognates ἐπιρρώνυμι, ἀναρρώνυμι, and ἀρρωστία,[68] and one vital element in that 'strength' is morale. The Athenians are no cowards,[69] but their confidence dips as the enemy's rises.[70] Now it is the Athenians, not the Syracusans, who are fighting for survival, while the Syracusans eye the victor's glory: the athletic imagery running through the books[71] culminates in the inspirational call, καλὸς ὁ ἀγών (**68**.3, cf. **56**.2–3; **59**.2, **66**.1, **70**.7, cf. **86**.2).[72] Leadership affects that,

[67] See esp. Rood 1998a: 61–82, Rogkotis 2006: 59–66, and for his particular interest in crowd psychology Hunter 1988–9 and Tsakmakis 2006. Cf. 6.63–71, **28**.3, **43**–**5**, **69**.3–**71**nn. In Book 4 too he carefully tracks morale: Foster forthcoming on 4.57.

[68] ῥώμη: **18**.2, **42**.2, **63**.4, **75**.4, **77**.2. ἐπιρρώνυμι: 6.93.1, **2**.2, **7**.4, **17**.3. ἀναρρώνυμι: **46**. ἀρρωστίαν: **47**.1.

[69] Cf. Foster 2018: 115–17 on the Epipolae narrative.

[70] 6.103.3, **18**, **47**.1, **50**.3–4, **51**.1, **60**.5, **66**.3–**67**.1, **69**.3, **79**.3: cf. Thompson 1971: 144–9, Hunter 1973: 118, Kirby 1983: 186–90.

[71] 6.16.6, 18.6, 31.4, 80.4 with 76–80n.; **61**.1–2, **70**.3, **71**.1, **71**.3, **84**.3 (nn.).

[72] Cf. Hornblower 2004a: 336–42. This can be seen as a further reversal of the Melian dialogue (pp. 23–4), where the ἀγών language (5.94.1, 101, 104) con-

of course. Nicias' rhetoric can be uninspiring (6.9–14, 6.68, **11–15**nn.: Tompkins 1972), though sometimes the point is that there is nothing better to say (**61–4**, **69**.2, **77**nn.); the dispirit of his letter of **11–15** could easily spread, and even if he was more guarded in what he said in the camp the new arrivals of **42** would know what the *dēmos* had been told. But the morale problem too is not all Nicias' fault. The facts of the case were before both sides' eyes, and ἔκπληξις and κατάπληξις, 'consternation', sound through the narrative like a refrain.[73] So, too, do ἀθυμία and ἀπορία, as it becomes increasingly clear that there is no way out.[74] The Athenians have every reason for depression and the Syracusans for buoyancy.

Cities' characters affect things too, even if the differences are superimposed on an underlying nature that all humans share (p. 12). The Corinthians may have been oversimplifying when, needling the Spartans into war, they contrasted the wide horizons of the innovative, risk-taking, restless Athenians with the parochialism of the cautious, hesitant, conservative Spartans (1.70); there was wisdom too in King Archidamus' 'we should not think that one human differs much from another' (1.84.4). But the Corinthians were not wholly astray, and the differences are still important till the end of Thucydides' narrative (8.96.5, quoted below). That Athenian character was evident in the decision to go to Sicily in 415; the Spartan slowness is reflected when over a year elapses before they fortify Decelea (**19–20**n.). But, crucially, the Athenians are now fighting Sicilians:

> These [the Sicilian cities] were the only ones that resembled Athens in character (ὁμοιότροποι), democracies like themselves and possessing ships and horses and everything on a large scale; therefore the Athenians could not bring into play the prospect of constitutional change to encourage internal divisions, nor could they deploy much greater resources. (**55**.2)

The point comes back at a later retrospect. Athens continued to be very different from Sparta, swift, energetic, and daring, qualities especially valuable in a maritime empire:

> This [the Spartan failure to attack the Piraeus in 411] was by no means the only case when the Spartans proved ideal enemies for the Athenians to have. For the two peoples were as different as they could be, the one sharp and the other slow, the one enterprising and the

veyed what was 'a battle for the Melians and a game for the Athenians' (Fragoulaki 2016: 126).

[73] 6.33.4, 6.98.2nn., **21**.4, **24**.3, **42**.2, **69**.2, **71**.7.

[74] ἀθυμία/-έω: **21**.3, **24**.3, **55**.1, **60**.5, **61**.2, **76**.1; Kowalski 2017. ἀπορία/-έω: **8**.1, **14**.2, **44**.1, **44**.6, **48**.2, **55**.2, **60**.2, **67**.4, **75**.4–5, **80**.1, **83**.4.

> other shying from risk. Especially in the context of a naval empire, this brought the Athenians many advantages. The Syracusans made the point clear. They were the most ὁμοιότροποι to Athens and the most effective of their adversaries. (8.96.5)

And they become all the more capable of out-Athenianing the Athenians as the campaign goes on, eventually deploying naval innovations to get the better of them even in their own cherished maritime skills (6.69–71, **21**.3, **36**.2, **53**.4, **67**.2nn.).[75] Keeping up their hope in adversity used to be an Athenian characteristic (ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες, 1.70.3); now they despair. The most Periclean statesman on view is Hermocrates, the man of Syracuse (Intr. to Book 6, p. 28).

There is a broader explanation too. There has long been a foretaste that something like this will come: not perhaps catastrophe in Sicily, but catastrophe somehow and somewhere, and the qualities that built Athens will eventually bring her down. Pericles, at least Thucydides' Pericles, foresaw the danger. What was needed was a policy of calm restraint (ἡσυχία), not taking risks and not trying to expand the empire during the war (2.65.7):

> I could give you many other reasons why you should feel confident in ultimate victory, if only you will make up your minds not to add to the empire while the war is in progress, and not to go out of your way to add new perils to those you have already. What I fear is more our own mistakes than anything the enemy may devise. (1.144.1)

Well might Pericles have that fear. His strategy required the opposite qualities to the ones that had made Athens great, those described at 1.70: the daring, the risk-taking, the self-belief, the irrepressible energy. Pericles had the leadership skills to keep the Athenian temperament in check – though only just, and even he was thrown out of office before the people thought better of it (2.65.2–4). His successors had no such stature (pp. 8–10). No wonder 'mistakes' followed that were worse 'than anything the enemy may devise'. If failure had not come in Sicily, it might be somewhere else: Carthage, perhaps (6.15.2, 34.2, 90.2nn.: p. 35). One day the empire would fall, as all empires do. Pericles knew that too (2.64.3).

7 THE SHADOW OF THE FUTURE

Thucydides has made sure that his audience knows the most important point about Athens' future: the city will lose the war (6.15.3–4, 5.26.1), but not for some time yet (2.65.12). The 27-year war (5.26) has only

[75] Cf. Finley 1967: 150–51, Connor 1984: 173–6, *CT* 21–2, Intr. to Book 6, pp. 33–4.

completed its eighteenth year (18.4). Most of his contemporary readers and listeners, and a fair number of those in later generations, would already know more than that about what was to come. Those, for instance, who knew of the oligarchic revolutions of 411 BCE or of the 'democracy in exile' at Samos may have sensed in anticipation some of the links with later events discussed earlier (pp. 21–3). Had Thucydides finished his history, there would doubtless have been further echoes as the war reached its end, and those hints of Athens' final defeat (pp. 14–15) would not be the only foreshadowings to have later counterparts for the canny reader. Just as the glorious spectacle of the departure (6.30–32.2) is recalled in the final scenes of Book 7 (p. 2), so it might well be recalled again as Lysander's triumphant Spartan ships sail into the Piraeus (X. *Hell.* 2.2.23, Diod. 13.107.2, Plut. *Lys.* 14.5). At least some would not have needed to wait for any such later prompt to sense that comparison even as they first heard or read these books.

Some would also know something of Syracuse's future. In Book 8 Athens' enemies in the Aegean are joined by twenty-two Sicilian ships, including twenty from Syracuse (8.26.1); Hermocrates is in command, and not slow to make his voice heard (8.29.2, 45.3; cf. 78). They fight well (8.28.2). In 415 one of the fears in Athenian minds had been the prospect of Sicilian intervention (6.6.2, 11.2 and 4); not for the only time in Thucydides,[76] it is the actions precipitated by fear that bring on exactly what is feared, though perhaps with fewer ships than the 'large force' that the Peloponnesians expected (πολλῇ δυνάμει, 8.2.3).[77] Back at home, Syracuse had constitutional upheavals ahead. In 415–413 it was a democracy (p. 31), but a less radical one than Athens (Intr. to Book 6, p. 34). A move to a more thoroughgoing version came a year or so later, perhaps in 412–411 (so Diod. 13.34–5).[78] The changes were substantial enough for Aristotle to describe that as the time when Syracuse moved from being a πολιτεία (for him a 'good' form of government, retaining some oligarchic features) to a 'democracy' (*Pol.* 1304a27–9). Then the rule of Dionysius I began in 406, first as στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ and then unambiguously as tyrant. Hermocrates was implicated in some of this. After his service in the Aegean he was exiled in 411 or 410 (8.85.3). He raised an army and returned, seizing Selinus and ravaging the parts of the island under

[76] One example is the war itself: neither side is eager for it, but Athens' intervention in Corcyra is influenced by the fear that the war may happen anyway and Corcyra would be a valuable ally (1.33.3, 44.2), then the Spartans are driven by fear of Athenian expansion (1.23.6).

[77] Cf. Cawkwell 1997: 79, *CT* on 8.26.1.

[78] See Manni 1979, D. M. Lewis 1994: 125–6, Rutter 2000, esp. 141–3, Robinson 2011: 67–89, esp. 73–4, and on Hermocrates esp. Hinrichs 1981.

Carthaginian control; then he tried to seize Syracuse itself with the aid of supporters within its walls, including Dionysius, and he was killed (408). It was understandably supposed that he was aiming for tyranny himself (Diod. 13.75.5).

None of this is mentioned in Thucydides' narrative, though some of it would have been had he lived to write the later books. Still, many of these developments would anyway be known to his first audience and could affect their reading even of Books 6 and 7. In Book 6, for instance, the rancorous Athenagoras not merely gives his elaborate theoretical defence of democracy (p. 22) but also attacks Hermocrates for nurturing revolutionary ambitions (6.36–40, esp. 38); 'suspicions' of the generals are also in the air at the end of that book, and the existing generals, Hermocrates included, are deposed (6.103.4). Book 7 too has hints of unrest within Syracuse. Those suspicions that Nicias knew more than he said (**49**.4, p. 29) were not unfounded: he really did know more than the others from his inside sources (**48**.2, **49**.1), and the existence, even apparently the identity, of those subversive informants was known at least to Hermocrates (**73**.3 with n.). The similarities of Syracuse to Athens (p. 31) have always gone beyond their both being democracies; politicians have been similar too, Athenagoras to the demagogic Cleon, Hermocrates to the insightful Pericles (Intr. to Book 6, p. 28); and the Syracusan *dēmos* turn vindictively on their leaders as readily as their Athenian counterpart (**48**.4, **81**.1nn., 6.73.1, 103.4; cf. 4.65.3, p. 25). The two cities now face a synchronicity of constitutional reforms as well, but in opposite directions, with the Syracusans moving to more democracy and the Athenians to less. Neither change is destined to last long.

One can only speculate about how Thucydides would have gone on to treat those later ups and downs of Hermocrates. One good guess is that he would make something of the parallel with that other gifted renegade who is exiled and turns against his own country.[79] Hermocrates starts by looking like Pericles; Books 6 and 7 develop some parallels with Nicias, with both reading events similarly but Nicias premature in his despair (**4**.4, **11–15**nn.) and Hermocrates in the measures he initially suggests (Intr. to Book 6, pp. 28–9); and Hermocrates ends his career as an Alcibiades.

[79] Hinrichs 1981: 56–9. The similarities are picked up and developed in the narratives of X. *Hell.* and particularly Diodorus (Rood 2004: 360–4, Kapellos 2019: 47–8, 60, 94–5).

There is also Carthage. In Books 6 and 7 Carthage is the dog that does not bark in the night, the complication that might have happened but does not. Alcibiades talks of Athens' ambitions to extend its empire even beyond Sicily to Carthage (6.90.2); the narrator confirms that he had such ambitions himself (6.15.2). Hermocrates suggests asking for Carthaginian help, and claims that the city is always nervous about possible Athenian attack (6.34.2). The Athenians approach Carthage too, hoping for intervention on their own side (6.88.6). Nothing happens – yet. Plenty will happen soon. In 409, Carthage invades. First Selinus falls, then Himera; in 406 Acragas is captured; a year after that, Gela and Camarina. Syracuse itself is crammed with refugees, and Dionysius is not popular. Then, however, plague strikes the Carthaginian camp; they make terms with Dionysius, and depart.[80] All those thoughts in 415–413 of Carthage as possible target or possible ally have proved amiss, for Carthage has in mind a very different role. Then the dog not merely barks, it also bites.

Much later generations might sense a bigger sweep of history, one in which Sicily is no longer part of a western periphery but firmly and vulnerably situated in the middle, a target over the centuries for Carthage from the south and a rising Rome from the north. But all that lies in the future.

8 THE TEXT

The best text is now that of Alberti (Rome 1972–2000). The preface to his vol. I contains an extensive discussion of the manuscript tradition, and it is updated in his prefaces to vols. II and III. The *apparatus criticus* in this volume is extremely selective, and uses Alberti's sigla. A list is appended at the end of this introduction of the passages where the text printed here diverges from Alberti.

Up to 6.92.5 the manuscripts have fallen into two groups, of which the principal constituents are CG and ABEFHM; after 6.92.5 B and H begin to add readings from a different source, though retaining their affinity with the second group. In the first group, C is closer than G to the hyparchetype (the original from which both manuscripts descend). In the second, M is closest to the group's hyparchetype; EFAB and H, in that order, are progressively further away. From 6.92.5 onwards B probably still has the same exemplar as before, but also imports, and often prefers, readings from an independent tradition. Up to 7.5.1 H derives directly or

[80] See D. M. Lewis 1994: 127–35, Evans 2016: 149–60. Our source for all this is Diod. 13.85–114, as always particularly interested in his native Sicily.

indirectly from B; from 7.5.1 to 7.50, where it ceases, H carries some readings independent both of B and of the main tradition, some of which also crop up in early papyri. See the stemmata representing this diagrammatically at Alberti I.li and cxlii, and with mild corrections at III.xix; Dover 1965: xxvii gives a simpler version of the uncontroversial elements. Still, several of these manuscripts incorporate readings or note variants from sources other than their main exemplar, including sometimes the other branch of the tradition, and apparently correct readings can crop up in late and unexpected places.

Occasionally papyri offer alternative readings. The most important one in Book 7 is *P.Oxy.* 1376, of the second or third century CE, covering many but not all of the chapters from **54** onwards: this is particularly useful at **81**.4 (n.). On several occasions Alberti prefers its reading to that of the manuscripts in cases where neither reading is perceptibly superior.

There are extensive citations from Thucydides in later authors, often clearly intended to be verbatim: Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *On Thucydides* is particularly rich in these. They are naturally subject to the vagaries of their own manuscript traditions and in some cases it is impossible to be sure that the Thucydides text these authors knew was itself uncorrupted, but they still provide a valuable control.

The Latin translation of Lorenzo Valla (1448–52) seems sometimes to draw on a Greek text that diverges from ours, and the reading he knew can in some cases be reconstructed: this is (or may be) valuable especially at **16**.2.

There are many times when conjectural emendation is tempting, but it is often difficult to know if a challenging passage is obscure because of copyists' mistakes or because of Thucydides' style. His difficulty was notorious even in antiquity; when Dionysius of Halicarnassus commented on the problems (p. 13), he added that even those who can cope often need the aid of a linguistic commentary (*Thuc.* 51). The Byzantine scholar Ioannes Tzetzes worked his way through his imperfect manuscript with increasing impatience, at one point complaining that 'the copyist's shit really stinks' (ὄζει κόπρος κάκιστον ἡ βιβλιογράφου), but he knew that it was not always the fault of the scribe; by Book 8 he thought the best way of defending its Thucydidean authorship was to say that the style was too impenetrable to be the work of anyone else. He added an epigram at the end wishing that Athenians had cast the man and his book into a pit. The last word however should be given to a more

generous epigram in the *Palatine Anthology*, found appended to several of our manuscripts:

Ὦ φίλος, εἰ σοφὸς εἶ, λάβε μ' ἐς χέρας· εἰ δέ γε πάμπαν
νῆις ἔφυς Μουσέων, ῥῖψον ἃ μὴ νοέεις.
εἰμὶ γὰρ οὐ πάντεσσι βατός, παῦροι δ' ἀγάσαντο
Θουκυδίδην Ὀλόρου, Κεκροπίδην τὸ γένος.

Friend, if you are wise, take me up; but if utterly untouched
By the Muses, throw away what you do not understand.
My path is not for everyone, though a few have admired
Thucydides son of Olorus, one of Cecrops' race.

(*Anth. Pal.* 9.583)

DEVIATIONS FROM ALBERTI

Note that there are also some minor variations in punctuation and paragraphing.

1.1 ἐπεσκεύασαν rather than ἐπεσκευάσαντο
2.3 ἐς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς rather than πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς
2.4 <ἀπὸ> τοῦ κύκλου rather than deleting τοῦ κύκλου
4.1 and elsewhere: Πλημμύριον rather than Πλημύριον
5.3 ὁ Γύλιππος rather than ὁ μὲν Γύλιππος
6.1 καὶ μηδὲ μάχεσθαι rather than καὶ μηδὲ ἀμύνεσθαι
12.4 τῶι πλήθει rather than τῶι γε πλήθει
13.2 τῶν ναυτῶν τῶν μὲν διὰ rather than deleting the second τῶν
21.3 ὑποσχεῖν rather than ὑπάρχειν
24.2 ὥσπερ rather than ὥστε
24.3 μέγιστόν τε rather than μέγιστον δὲ
27.1 ἐν τῶι αὐτῶι θέρει τούτωι rather than τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους τούτου
27.5 πάντα ἀπωλώλει rather than ἀπωλώλει πάντα
28.3 ἀκούσας, τό γε rather than ἀκούσας. τὸ γὰρ
32.2 ἑνός του rather than ἑνὸς τοῦ
40.5 δεξάμενοι καὶ rather than δεξάμενοι ἠμύνοντο καὶ
40.5 παραπλέοντες καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν rather than παραπλέοντες ἐξ αὐτῶν
41.4 τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς rather than πολλοὺς τοὺς μὲν
43.1 τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν rather than καὶ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν
44.7 κατέστησαν rather than καθίστασαν
45.2 ἄνευ τῶν ἀσπίδων retained
47.2 ἀνέλπιστα rather than ἀνελπιστότατα
49.1 μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ἐθάρσησε κρατήσειν rather than ταῖς γοῦν ναυσὶ θαρσῶν, ἧι πρότερον ἐθάρσησε, κρατηθείς
55.2 ἤδη rather than δὴ
56.2 ἐνεγκεῖν rather than ἀνενεγκεῖν
56.2 καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔπειτα πολὺ θαυμασθήσεσθαι rather than καὶ τῶν ἔπειτα ἐπὶ πολὺ θαυμασθήσεσθαι
56.3 προκινδυνεῦσαί τε καὶ rather than προκινδυνεῦσαι καὶ
56.4 πλήν γε δὴ τοῦ rather than πλήν γε τοῦ
56.4 λόγου rather than ὀλίγων
57.1 ἐπὶ Συρακούσαις rather than ἐς Συρακούσας
57.5 καὶ ἄντικρυς rather than καταντικρὺ
57.6 Συρακοσίοις μὲν Δωριεῦσι rather than Συρακοσίοις μὲν Δωριῆς Δωριεῦσι

58.3 Alberti retains δύναται δὲ τὸ νεοδαμῶδες ἐλεύθερον ἤδη εἶναι and marks as a parenthesis

60.3 ἐσβαίνειν ὅστις rather than πάντας ἐσβαίνειν ὅστις

61.1 ἑκάστοις rather than ἑκάστωι

63.3 colon rather than comma after πλείους, and ἐνθυμεῖσθε rather than ἐνθυμεῖσθαι

68.1 δικαιώσωσιν rather than ἀδίκως ἴωσιν

70.1 προεξαγαγόμενοι rather than προεξαναγαγόμενοι

70.2 προτέρων rather than πρότερον

71.7 ξυμπασῶν rather than ξυμφορῶν

73.1 ὑποχωρήσασα rather than ἀποχωρήσασα

73.2 ἀναπεπαυμένους rather than πεπαυμένους

73.3 οὐκέτι rather than οὐκ

75.4 ἀπολειπόμενοι rather than ὑπολειπόμενοι

75.6 ἡ ἰσομοιρία rather than τῆι ἰσομοιρίαι

75.6 ἀφῖκτο rather than ἀφίκατο

77.6 ἄλλα rather than ἅμα

79.2 ἀνεχώρουν rather than ἀπεχώρουν

79.5 ταῦτα rather than τοῦτο

81.3 σωτηρίαν rather than σωτήριον

81.4 Ἀθηναῖοι retained

SIGLA

A	Parisinus suppl. Gr. 255, early eleventh century
B	Vaticanus Gr. 126, late eleventh century
C	Laurentianus LXIX 2, middle of the tenth century
E	Palatinus (Heidelbergensis) Gr. 252, early tenth century
F	Monacensis Gr. 430, late tenth century
G	Monacensis Gr. 228, late thirteenth century
H	Parisinus Gr. 1734, early fourteenth century
J	Basileensis E-III–4, fourteenth century
K	Ultraiectinus Gr. 13, fifteenth century
M	Britannicus Add. 11.727, eleventh century
Pl	Parisinus suppl. Gr. 256, early fourteenth century
Q	Mosquensis Gr. 216, fifteenth century
Ud	Vaticinuus Urbinas Gr. 92, early fourteenth century
Vm	Vaticanus Palatinus Gr. 133, dated 1469
Z	membranae Mutinenses, late tenth century
Σ	reading cited or presupposed by (some) scholia

Papyri:

P.Oxy. 1376, second or third century, containing **54–68**.2, **72–3**, **78**.5–6, **79**.5–**82**.3

P.Oxy. 4105, second or third century, containing **2**, **4**, along with 6.52–5

Superscripts indicate correcting hands.

THUCYDIDES: BOOK VII

ΘΟΥΚΥΔΙΔΟΥ ΞΥΓΓΡΑΦΗΣ Η

Ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος καὶ ὁ Πυθὴν ἐκ τοῦ Τάραντος, ἐπεὶ ἐπεσκεύασαν τὰς 1
ναῦς, παρέπλευσαν ἐς Λοκροὺς τοὺς Ἐπιζεφυρίους· καὶ πυνθανόμενοι
σαφέστερον ἤδη ὅτι οὐ παντελῶς πω ἀποτετειχισμέναι αἱ Συράκουσαί
εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἔτι οἷόν τε κατὰ τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς στρατιᾶι ἀφικομένους ἐσελθεῖν,
ἐβουλεύοντο εἴτ' ἐν δεξιᾶι λαβόντες τὴν Σικελίαν διακινδυνεύσωσιν
ἐσπλεῦσαι, εἴτ' ἐν ἀριστερᾶι ἐς Ἱμέραν πρῶτον πλεύσαντες καὶ αὐτούς
τε ἐκείνους καὶ στρατιὰν ἄλλην προσλαβόντες, οὓς ἂν πείθωσι, κατὰ
γῆν ἔλθωσιν. καὶ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς Ἱμέρας πλεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῶν 2
Ἀττικῶν τεσσάρων νεῶν οὔπω παρουσῶν ἐν τῶι Ῥηγίωι, ἃς ὁ Νικίας
ὅμως πυνθανόμενος αὐτοὺς ἐν Λοκροῖς εἶναι ἀπέστειλεν. φθάσαντες δὲ τὴν
φυλακὴν ταύτην περαιοῦνται διὰ τοῦ πορθμοῦ, καὶ σχόντες Ῥηγίωι καὶ
Μεσσήνηι ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Ἱμέραν. ἐκεῖ δὲ ὄντες τούς τε Ἱμεραίους ἔπεισαν 3
ξυμπολεμεῖν καὶ αὐτούς τε ἕπεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν νεῶν τῶν σφετέρων
ναύταις ὅσοι μὴ εἶχον ὅπλα παρασχεῖν (τὰς γὰρ ναῦς ἀνείλκυσαν
ἐν Ἱμέραι), καὶ τοὺς Σελινουντίους πέμψαντες ἐκέλευον ἁπαντᾶν
πανστρατιᾶι ἔς τι χωρίον. πέμψειν δέ τινα αὐτοῖς ὑπέσχοντο στρατιὰν 4
οὐ πολλὴν καὶ οἱ Γελῶιοι καὶ τῶν Σικελῶν τινες, οἳ πολὺ προθυμότερον
προσχωρεῖν ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν τοῦ τε Ἀρχωνίδου νεωστὶ τεθνηκότος, ὃς τῶν
ταύτηι Σικελῶν βασιλεύων τινῶν καὶ ὢν οὐκ ἀδύνατος τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις
φίλος ἦν, καὶ τοῦ Γυλίππου ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος προθύμως δοκοῦντος ἥκειν.
καὶ ὁ μὲν Γύλιππος ἀναλαβὼν τῶν τε σφετέρων ναυτῶν καὶ ἐπιβατῶν 5
τοὺς ὡπλισμένους ἑπτακοσίους μάλιστα, Ἱμεραίους δὲ ὁπλίτας καὶ
ψιλοὺς ξυναμφοτέρους χιλίους καὶ ἱππέας ἑκατὸν καὶ Σελινουντίων τέ
τινας ψιλοὺς καὶ ἱππέας καὶ Γελώιων ὀλίγους, Σικελῶν τε ἐς χιλίους τοὺς
πάντας, ἐχώρει πρὸς τὰς Συρακούσας. οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς Λευκάδος Κορίνθιοι 2
ταῖς τε ἄλλαις ναυσὶν ὡς εἶχον τάχους ἐβοήθουν καὶ Γογγύλος, εἷς τῶν
Κορινθίων ἀρχόντων, μιᾶι νηὶ τελευταῖος ὁρμηθεὶς πρῶτος μὲν ἀφικνεῖται
ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας, ὀλίγον δὲ πρὸ Γυλίππου, καὶ καταλαβὼν αὐτοὺς
περὶ ἀπαλλαγῆς τοῦ πολέμου μέλλοντας ἐκκλησιάσειν διεκώλυσέ τε καὶ
παρεθάρσυνε, λέγων ὅτι νῆές τε ἄλλαι ἔτι προσπλέουσι καὶ Γύλιππος
ὁ Κλεανδρίδου Λακεδαιμονίων ἀποστειλάντων ἄρχων. καὶ οἱ μὲν 2
Συρακόσιοι ἐπερρώσθησάν τε καὶ τῶι Γυλίππωι εὐθὺς πανστρατιᾶι ὡς

3 ἀπαντησόμενοι ἐξῆλθον· ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἐγγὺς ὄντα ἠισθάνοντο αὐτόν. ὁ δὲ Ἰέτας τότε τι τεῖχος ἐν τῇ παρόδωι τῶν Σικελῶν ἑλὼν καὶ ξυνταξάμενος ὡς ἐς μάχην ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς· καὶ ἀναβὰς κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον, ἥιπερ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ πρῶτον, ἐχώρει μετὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐπὶ τὸ
4 τείχισμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων. ἔτυχε δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο τοῦ καιροῦ ἐλθὼν ἐν ὧι ἑπτὰ μὲν ἢ ὀκτὼ σταδίων ἤδη ἐπετετέλεστο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα διπλοῦν τεῖχος, πλὴν κατὰ βραχύ τι τὸ πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν (τοῦτο δ' ἔτι ὠικοδόμουν), τῶι δὲ ἄλλωι ⟨ἀπὸ⟩ τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρωγίλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν θάλασσαν λίθοι τε παραβεβλημένοι τῶι πλέονι ἤδη ἦσαν, καὶ ἔστιν ἃ καὶ ἡμίεργα, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξειργασμένα κατελέλειπτο. παρὰ τοσοῦτον μὲν αἱ Συράκουσαι ἦλθον κινδύνου.

3 Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι αἰφνιδίως τοῦ τε Γυλίππου καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων σφίσιν ἐπιόντων ἐθορυβήθησαν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, παρετάξαντο δέ. ὁ δὲ θέμενος τὰ ὅπλα ἐγγὺς κήρυκα προσπέμπει αὐτοῖς λέγοντα, εἰ βούλονται ἐξιέναι ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας πέντε ἡμερῶν λαβόντες τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν, ἑτοῖμος εἶναι
2 σπένδεσθαι. οἱ δ' ἐν ὀλιγωρίαι τε ἐποιοῦντο καὶ οὐδὲν ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀπέπεμψαν. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀντιπαρεσκευάζοντο ἀλλήλοις ὡς ἐς μάχην.
3 καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος ὁρῶν τοὺς Συρακοσίους ταρασσομένους καὶ οὐ ῥαιδίως ξυντασσομένους, ἐπανῆγε τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν μᾶλλον. καὶ ὁ Νικίας οὐκ ἐπῆγε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἡσύχαζε πρὸς τῶι ἑαυτῶν τείχει. ὡς δ' ἔγνω ὁ Γύλιππος οὐ προσιόντας αὐτούς, ἀπήγαγε τὴν στρατιὰν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄκραν τὴν Τεμενῖτιν καλουμένην, καὶ αὐτοῦ ηὐλίσαντο.
4 τῆι δ' ὑστεραίαι ἄγων τὴν μὲν πλείστην τῆς στρατιᾶς παρέταξε πρὸς τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὅπως μὴ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν ἄλλοσε, μέρος δέ τι πέμψας πρὸς τὸ φρούριον τὸ Λάβδαλον αἱρεῖ, καὶ ὅσους ἔλαβεν ἐν αὐτῶι πάντας
5 ἀπέκτεινεν· ἦν δὲ οὐκ ἐπιφανὲς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὸ χωρίον. καὶ τριήρης τῆι αὐτῆι ἡμέραι ἁλίσκεται τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐφορμοῦσα τῶι λιμένι.

4 Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐτείχιζον οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀρξάμενοι ἄνω πρὸς τὸ ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος ἁπλοῦν, ὅπως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ μὴ δύναιντο κωλῦσαι, μηκέτι οἷοί τε ὦσιν
2 ἀποτειχίσαι. καὶ οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι ἀνεβεβήκεσαν ἤδη ἄνω, τὸ ἐπὶ θαλάσσηι τεῖχος ἐπιτελέσαντες, καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος (ἦν γάρ τι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τοῦ
3 τείχους ἀσθενές) νυκτὸς ἀναλαβὼν τὴν στρατιὰν ἐπήιει πρὸς αὐτό. οἱ δ'

2.3 Ἰετὰς Göller: Ἰγέτας H^2 Pl^3 γέτας CEFG^{ac} γε τὰ AB: γε M [*P.Oxy.* 4105]
2.4 ⟨ἀπὸ⟩ Wölfflin: ⟨ἀνὼ⟩ Marchant τοῦ κύκλου del. Poppo
κατελέλειπτο Cobet: κατελείπετο uel κατελίπετο codd.

Ἀθηναῖοι (ἔτυχον γὰρ ἔξω αὐλιζόμενοι) ὡς ἤισθοντο, ἀντεπῆισαν· ὁ δὲ γνοὺς κατὰ τάχος ἀπήγαγε τοὺς σφετέρους πάλιν. ἐποικοδομήσαντες δὲ αὐτὸ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὑψηλότερον αὐτοὶ μὲν ταύτηι ἐφύλασσον, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ξυμμάχους κατὰ τὸ ἄλλο τείχισμα ἤδη διέταξαν, ἦιπερ ἔμελλον ἕκαστοι φρουρεῖν.

Τῶι δὲ Νικίαι ἐδόκει τὸ Πλημμύριον καλούμενον τειχίσαι· ἔστι δὲ 4
ἄκρα ἀντιπέρας τῆς πόλεως, ἥπερ προύχουσα τοῦ μεγάλου λιμένος τὸ στόμα στενὸν ποιεῖ, καὶ εἰ τειχισθείη, ῥάιων αὐτῶι ἐφαίνετο ἡ ἐσκομιδὴ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔσεσθαι· δι' ἐλάσσονος γὰρ πρὸς τῶι λιμένι τῶι τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐφορμήσειν σφᾶς, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν ἐκ μυχοῦ τοῦ λιμένος τὰς ἐπαναγωγὰς ποιήσεσθαι, ἤν τι ναυτικῶι κινῶνται. προσεῖχέ τε ἤδη μᾶλλον τῶι κατὰ θάλασσαν πολέμωι, ὁρῶν τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς σφίσιν ἤδη, ἐπειδὴ Γύλιππος ἦκεν, ἀνελπιστότερα ὄντα. διακομίσας οὖν στρατιὰν καὶ 5
τὰς ναῦς ἐξετείχισε τρία φρούρια· καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τά τε σκεύη τὰ πλεῖστα ἔκειτο καὶ τὰ πλοῖα ἤδη ἐκεῖ τὰ μεγάλα ὥρμει καὶ αἱ ταχεῖαι νῆες. ὥστε 6
καὶ τῶν πληρωμάτων οὐχ ἥκιστα τότε πρῶτον κάκωσις ἐγένετο· τῶι τε γὰρ ὕδατι σπανίωι χρώμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἐγγύθεν, καὶ ἐπὶ φρυγανισμὸν ἅμα ὁπότε ἐξέλθοιεν οἱ ναῦται, ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων τῶν Συρακοσίων κρατούντων τῆς γῆς διεφθείροντο· τρίτον γὰρ μέρος τῶν ἱππέων τοῖς Συρακοσίοις διὰ τοὺς ἐν τῶι Πλημμυρίωι, ἵνα μὴ κακουργήσοντες ἐξίοιεν, ἐπὶ τῆι ἐν τῶι Ὀλυμπιείωι πολίχνηι ἐτετάχατο. ἐπυνθάνετο δὲ καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς τῶν 7
Κορινθίων ναῦς προσπλεούσας ὁ Νικίας· καὶ πέμπει ἐς φυλακὴν αὐτῶν εἴκοσι ναῦς, αἷς εἴρητο περί τε Λοκροὺς καὶ Ῥήγιον καὶ τὴν προσβολὴν τῆς Σικελίας ναυλοχεῖν αὐτάς.

Ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος ἅμα μὲν ἐτείχιζε τὸ διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν τεῖχος, τοῖς **5**
λίθοις χρώμενος οὓς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προπαρεβάλοντο σφίσιν, ἅμα δὲ παρέτασσεν ἐξάγων αἰεὶ πρὸ τοῦ τειχίσματος τοὺς Συρακοσίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους· καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀντιπαρετάσσοντο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔδοξε τῶι 2
Γυλίππωι καιρὸς εἶναι, ἦρχε τῆς ἐφόδου· καὶ ἐν χερσὶ γενόμενοι ἐμάχοντο μεταξὺ τῶν τειχισμάτων, ἦι τῆς ἵππου τῶν Συρακοσίων οὐδεμία χρῆσις ἦν. καὶ νικηθέντων τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ νεκροὺς 3
ὑποσπόνδους ἀνελομένων καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τροπαῖον στησάντων, ὁ Γύλιππος ξυγκαλέσας τὸ στράτευμα οὐκ ἔφη τὸ ἁμάρτημα ἐκείνων, ἀλλ' ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι· τῆς γὰρ ἵππου καὶ τῶν ἀκοντιστῶν τὴν ὠφελίαν τῆι τάξει ἐντὸς λίαν τῶν τειχῶν ποιήσας ἀφελέσθαι· νῦν οὖν αὖθις ἐπάξειν. καὶ διανοεῖσθαι οὕτως ἐκέλευεν αὐτοὺς ὡς τῆι μὲν παρασκευῆι οὐκ 4
ἔλασσον ἔξοντας, τῆι δὲ γνώμηι οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν ἐσόμενον εἰ μὴ ἀξιώσουσι Πελοποννήσιοί τε ὄντες καὶ Δωριῆς Ἰώνων καὶ νησιωτῶν καὶ ξυγκλύδων

6 ἀνθρώπων κρατήσαντες ἐξελάσασθαι ἐκ τῆς χώρας. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ καιρὸς ἦν, αὖθις ἐπῆγεν αὐτούς. ὁ δὲ Νικίας καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι νομίζοντες, καὶ εἰ ἐκεῖνοι μὴ ἐθέλοιεν μάχης ἄρχειν, ἀναγκαῖον σφίσιν εἶναι μὴ περιορᾶν παροικοδομούμενον τὸ τεῖχος (ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρεληλύθει τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῦ τείχους τελευτὴν ἡ ἐκείνων τείχισις, καί, εἰ παρέλθοι, ταὐτὸν ἤδη ἐποίει αὐτοῖς νικᾶν τε μαχομένοις διὰ παντὸς καὶ μηδὲ μάχεσθαι), ἀντεπῆισαν οὖν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις. **2** καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος τοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας ἔξω τῶν τειχῶν μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον προαγαγὼν ξυνέμισγεν αὐτοῖς, τοὺς δ' ἱππέας καὶ τοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς ἐκ πλαγίου τάξας τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατὰ τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, ἧι τῶν τειχῶν **3** ἀμφοτέρων αἱ ἐργασίαι ἔληγον. καὶ προσβαλόντες οἱ ἱππῆς ἐν τῆι μάχηι τῶι εὐωνύμωι κέραι τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὅπερ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἦν, ἔτρεψαν· καὶ δι' αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα νικηθὲν ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων κατηράχθη **4** ἐς τὰ τειχίσματα. καὶ τῆι ἐπιούσηι νυκτὶ ἔφθασαν παροικοδομήσαντες καὶ παρελθόντες τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἰκοδομίαν, ὥστε μηκέτι μήτε αὐτοὶ κωλύεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἐκείνους τε καὶ παντάπασιν ἀπεστερηκέναι, εἰ καὶ κρατοῖεν, μὴ ἂν ἔτι σφᾶς ἀποτειχίσαι.

7 Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο αἵ τε τῶν Κορινθίων νῆες καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λευκαδίων ἐσέπλευσαν αἱ ὑπόλοιποι δώδεκα, λαθοῦσαι τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων φυλακήν (ἦρχε δ' αὐτῶν Θρασωνίδης Κορίνθιος), καὶ ξυνετείχισαν τὸ **2** λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις [μέχρι] τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους. καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Σικελίαν ἐπὶ στρατιάν τε ὤιχετο, καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ πεζὴν ξυλλέξων, καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἅμα προσαξόμενος εἴ τις ἢ μὴ πρόθυμος **3** ἦν ἢ παντάπασιν ἔτι ἀφειστήκει τοῦ πολέμου. πρέσβεις τε ἄλλοι τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ Κορινθίων ἐς Λακεδαίμονα καὶ Κόρινθον ἀπεστάλησαν, ὅπως στρατιὰ ἔτι περαιωθῆι τρόπωι ὧι ἂν ἐν ὁλκάσιν ἢ πλοίοις ἢ ἄλλως ὅπως ἂν προχωρῆι, ὡς καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιμεταπεμπομένων. **4** οἵ τε Συρακόσιοι ναυτικὸν ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἀνεπειρῶντο ὡς καὶ τούτωι ἐπιχειρήσοντες, καὶ ἐς τἆλλα πολὺ ἐπέρρωντο.

8 Ὁ δὲ Νικίας αἰσθόμενος τοῦτο καὶ ὁρῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπιδιδοῦσαν τήν τε τῶν πολεμίων ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν σφετέραν ἀπορίαν, ἔπεμπε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀγγέλλων πολλάκις μὲν καὶ ἄλλοτε καθ' ἕκαστα τῶν γιγνομένων, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τότε, νομίζων ἐν δεινοῖς τε εἶναι καί, εἰ μὴ ὡς τάχιστα ἢ σφᾶς μεταπέμψουσιν ἢ ἄλλους μὴ ὀλίγους ἀποστελοῦσιν, **2** οὐδεμίαν εἶναι σωτηρίαν. φοβούμενος δὲ μὴ οἱ πεμπόμενοι ἢ κατὰ τὴν

6.1 εἰ παρέλθοι Classen: εἴπερ ἔλθοι H: εἰ προέλθοι cett. **7.1** Θρασωνίδης BH: Ἐρασινίδης ACEF<G>M μέχρι del. Holm: μέχρι <τοῦ Εὐρυήλου> Marchant

τοῦ λέγειν ἀδυνασίαν ἢ καὶ μνήμης ἐλλιπεῖς γιγνόμενοι ἢ τῶι ὄχλωι πρὸς χάριν τι λέγοντες οὐ τὰ ὄντα ἀπαγγέλλωσιν, ἔγραψεν ἐπιστολήν, νομίζων οὕτως ἂν μάλιστα τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην μηδὲν ἐν τῶι ἀγγέλωι ἀφανισθεῖσαν μαθόντας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας. καὶ οἱ μὲν ὤιχοντο φέροντες, οὓς ἀπέστειλε, τὰ γράμματα καὶ ὅσα ἔδει 3
αὐτοὺς εἰπεῖν· ὁ δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον διὰ φυλακῆς μᾶλλον ἤδη ἔχων ἢ δι' ἐκουσίων κινδύνων ἐπεμέλετο.

Ἐν δὲ τῶι αὐτῶι θέρει τελευτῶντι καὶ Εὐετίων στρατηγὸς Ἀθηναίων **9**
μετὰ Περδίκκου στρατεύσας ἐπ' Ἀμφίπολιν Θραιξὶ πολλοῖς τὴν μὲν πόλιν οὐχ εἶλεν, ἐς δὲ τὸν Στρυμόνα περικομίσας τριήρεις ἐκ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπολιόρκει ὁρμώμενος ἐξ Ἰμεραίου. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα τοῦτο.

Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος ἥκοντες ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας οἱ παρὰ τοῦ **10**
Νικίου ὅσα τε ἀπὸ γλώσσης εἴρητο αὐτοῖς εἶπον, καὶ εἴ τίς τι ἐπηρώτα ἀπεκρίνοντο, καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀπέδοσαν. ὁ δὲ γραμματεὺς ὁ τῆς πόλεως παρελθὼν ἀνέγνω τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις δηλοῦσαν τοιάδε.

'Τὰ μὲν πρότερον πραχθέντα, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς ἐπιστολαῖς **11**
ἴστε· νῦν δὲ καιρὸς οὐχ ἧσσον μαθόντας ὑμᾶς ἐν ὧι ἐσμὲν βουλεύσασθαι. κρατησάντων γὰρ ἡμῶν μάχαις ταῖς πλέοσι Συρακοσίους ἐφ' οὓς 2
ἐπέμφθημεν καὶ τὰ τείχη οἰκοδομησαμένων ἐν οἵσπερ νῦν ἐσμέν, ἦλθε Γύλιππος Λακεδαιμόνιος στρατιὰν ἔχων ἔκ τε Πελοποννήσου καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Σικελίαι πόλεων ἔστιν ὧν. καὶ μάχηι τῆι μὲν πρώτηι νικᾶται ὑφ' ἡμῶν, τῆι δ' ὑστεραίαι ἱππεῦσί τε πολλοῖς καὶ ἀκοντισταῖς βιασθέντες ἀνεχωρήσαμεν ἐς τὰ τείχη. νῦν οὖν ἡμεῖς μὲν παυσάμενοι τοῦ περιτειχισμοῦ 3
διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐναντίων ἡσυχάζομεν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ξυμπάσηι τῆι στρατιᾶι δυναίμεθ' ἂν χρήσασθαι ἀπανηλωκυίας τῆς φυλακῆς τῶν τειχῶν μέρος τι τοῦ ὁπλιτικοῦ)· οἱ δὲ παρωικοδομήκασιν ἡμῖν τεῖχος ἁπλοῦν, ὥστε μὴ εἶναι ἔτι περιτειχίσαι αὐτούς, ἢν μή τις τὸ παρατείχισμα τοῦτο πολλῆι στρατιᾶι ἐπελθὼν ἕληι. ξυμβέβηκέ τε πολιορκεῖν δοκοῦντας ἡμᾶς ἄλλους 4
αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον, ὅσα γε κατὰ γῆν, τοῦτο πάσχειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῆς χώρας ἐπὶ πολὺ διὰ τοὺς ἱππέας ἐξερχόμεθα.

'Πεπόμφασι δὲ καὶ ἐς Πελοπόννησον πρέσβεις ἐπ' ἄλλην στρατιάν, καὶ **12**
ἐς τὰς ἐν Σικελίαι πόλεις Γύλιππος οἴχεται, τὰς μὲν καὶ πείσων ξυμπολεμεῖν ὅσαι νῦν ἡσυχάζουσιν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν καὶ στρατιὰν ἔτι πεζὴν καὶ ναυτικοῦ παρασκευήν, ἣν δύνηται, ἄξων. διανοοῦνται γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι, τῶι 2
τε πεζῶι ἅμα τῶν τειχῶν ἡμῶν πειρᾶν καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. καὶ 3
δεινὸν μηδενὶ ὑμῶν δόξηι εἶναι ὅτι καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. τὸ γὰρ ναυτικὸν ἡμῶν, ὅπερ κἀκεῖνοι πυνθάνονται, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἤκμαζε καὶ τῶν νεῶν τῆι ξηρότητι καὶ τῶν πληρωμάτων τῆι σωτηρίαι· νῦν δὲ αἵ τε νῆες διάβροχοι

4 τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἤδη θαλασσεύουσαι, καὶ τὰ πληρώματα ἔφθαρται. τὰς μὲν γὰρ ναῦς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνελκύσαντας διαψύξαι διὰ τὸ ἀντιπάλους τῶι πλήθει καὶ ἔτι πλείους τὰς τῶν πολεμίων οὔσας αἰεὶ προσδοκίαν παρέχειν
5 ὡς ἐπιπλεύσονται. φανεραὶ δ' εἰσὶν ἀναπειρώμεναι, καὶ αἱ ἐπιχειρήσεις ἐπ' ἐκείνοις καὶ ἀποξηρᾶναι τὰς σφετέρας μᾶλλον ἐξουσία· οὐ γὰρ ἐφορμοῦσιν
13 ἄλλοις. ἡμῖν δ' ἐκ πολλῆς ἂν περιουσίας νεῶν μόλις τοῦτο ὑπῆρχε καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαζομένοις ὥσπερ νῦν πάσαις φυλάσσειν· εἰ γὰρ ἀφαιρήσομέν τι καὶ βραχὺ τῆς τηρήσεως, τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐχ ἕξομεν, παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνων
2 πόλιν χαλεπῶς καὶ νῦν ἐσκομιζόμενοι. τὰ δὲ πληρώματα διὰ τόδε ἐφθάρη τε ἡμῖν καὶ ἔτι νῦν φθείρεται, τῶν ναυτῶν τῶν μὲν διὰ φρυγανισμὸν καὶ ἁρπαγὴν καὶ ὑδρείαν μακρὰν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων ἀπολλυμένων· οἱ δὲ θεράποντες, ἐπειδὴ ἐς ἀντίπαλα καθεστήκαμεν, αὐτομολοῦσι, καὶ οἱ ξένοι οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες εὐθὺς κατὰ τὰς πόλεις ἀποχωροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ μεγάλου μισθοῦ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπαρθέντες καὶ οἰόμενοι χρηματιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μαχεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ γνώμην ναυτικόν τε δὴ καὶ τἄλλα ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνθεστῶτα ὁρῶσιν, οἱ μὲν ἐπ' αὐτομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἕκαστοι δύνανται (πολλὴ δ' ἡ Σικελία), εἰσὶ δ' οἳ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐμπορευόμενοι ἀνδράποδα Ὑκκαρικὰ ἀντεμβιβάσαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν πείσαντες τοὺς τριηράρχους τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἀφῆιρηνται.
14 ἐπισταμένοις δ' ὑμῖν γράφω ὅτι βραχεῖα ἀκμὴ πληρώματος καὶ ὀλίγοι
2 τῶν ναυτῶν οἱ ἐξορμῶντές τε ναῦν καὶ ξυνέχοντες τὴν εἰρεσίαν. τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀπορώτατον τό τε μὴ οἷόν τε εἶναι ταῦτα ἐμοὶ κωλῦσαι τῶι στρατηγῶι (χαλεπαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑμέτεραι φύσεις ἄρξαι) καὶ ὅτι οὐδ' ὁπόθεν ἐπιπληρωσόμεθα τὰς ναῦς ἔχομεν, ὃ τοῖς πολεμίοις πολλαχόθεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀφ' ὧν ἔχοντες ἤλθομεν τά τε ὄντα καὶ ἀπαναλισκόμενα γίγνεσθαι· αἱ γὰρ νῦν οὖσαι πόλεις ξύμμαχοι ἀδύνατοι Νάξος καὶ Κατάνη.
3 εἰ δὲ προσγενήσεται ἓν ἔτι τοῖς πολεμίοις, ὥστε τὰ τρέφοντα ἡμᾶς χωρία τῆς Ἰταλίας, ὁρῶντα ἐν ὧι τ' ἐσμὲν καὶ ὑμῶν μὴ ἐπιβοηθούντων, πρὸς ἐκείνους χωρῆσαι, διαπεπολεμήσεται αὐτοῖς ἀμαχεὶ ἐκπολιορκηθέντων ἡμῶν [ὁ πόλεμος].
4 Τούτων ἐγὼ ἡδίω μὲν ἂν εἶχον ὑμῖν ἕτερα ἐπιστέλλειν, οὐ μέντοι χρησιμώτερά γε, εἰ δεῖ σαφῶς εἰδότας τὰ ἐνθάδε βουλεύσασθαι. καὶ ἅμα τὰς φύσεις ἐπιστάμενος ὑμῶν, βουλομένων μὲν τὰ ἥδιστα ἀκούειν, αἰτιωμένων δὲ ὕστερον, ἤν τι ὑμῖν ἀπ' αὐτῶν μὴ ὁμοῖον ἐκβῆι, ἀσφαλέστερον
15 ἡγησάμην τὸ ἀληθὲς δηλῶσαι. καὶ νῦν ὡς ἐφ' ἃ μὲν ἤλθομεν τὸ πρῶτον

13.2 τῶν post ναυτῶν del. Poppo Σ: secl. Krüger

14.3 ὁ πόλεμος om. Vm, non legit ut uidetur

καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ὑμῖν μὴ μεμπτῶν γεγενημένων, οὕτω τὴν γνώμην ἔχετε· ἐπειδὴ δὲ Σικελία τε ἅπασα ξυνίσταται καὶ ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ἄλλη στρατιὰ προσδόκιμος αὐτοῖς, βουλεύεσθε ἤδη ὡς τῶν γ' ἐνθάδε μηδὲ τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀνταρκούντων, ἀλλ' ἢ τούτους μεταπέμπειν δέον ἢ ἄλλην στρατιὰν μὴ ἐλάσσω ἐπιπέμπειν καὶ πεζὴν καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ χρήματα μὴ ὀλίγα, ἐμοὶ δὲ διάδοχόν τινα, ὡς ἀδύνατός εἰμι διὰ νόσον νεφρῖτιν παραμένειν. ἀξιῶ δ' ὑμῶν ξυγγνώμης τυγχάνειν· καὶ 2
γὰρ ὅτ' ἐρρώμην πολλὰ ἐν ἡγεμονίαις ὑμᾶς εὖ ἐποίησα. ὅτι δὲ μέλλετε, ἅμα τῶι ἦρι εὐθὺς καὶ μὴ ἐς ἀναβολὰς πράσσετε, ὡς τῶν πολεμίων τὰ μὲν ἐν Σικελίαι δι' ὀλίγου πορισμένων, τὰ δ' ἐκ Πελοποννήσου σχολαίτερον μέν, ὅμως δ', ἢν μὴ προσέχητε τὴν γνώμην, τὰ μὲν λήσουσιν ὑμᾶς, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, τὰ δὲ φθήσονται.'

Ἡ μὲν τοῦ Νικίου ἐπιστολὴ τοσαῦτα ἐδήλου, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες **16**
αὐτῆς τὸν μὲν Νικίαν οὐ παρέλυσαν τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλ' αὐτῶι, ἕως ἂν ἕτεροι ξυνάρχοντες αἱρεθέντες ἀφίκωνται, τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖ δύο προσείλοντο Μένανδρον καὶ Εὐθύδημον, ὅπως μὴ μόνος ἐν ἀσθενείαι ταλαιπωρίαι, στρατιὰν δὲ ἄλλην ἐπεψηφίσαντο πέμπειν καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ πεζὴν Ἀθηναίων τε ἐκ καταλόγου καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων. καὶ ξυνάρχοντας αὐτῶι 2
εἵλοντο Δημοσθένη τε τὸν Ἀλκισθένους καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντα τὸν Θουκλέους. καὶ τὸν μὲν Εὐρυμέδοντα εὐθὺς περὶ ἡλίου τροπὰς τὰς χειμερινὰς ἀποπέμπουσιν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν μετὰ δέκα νεῶν, ἄγοντα εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα ἀργυρίου, καὶ ἅμα ἀγγελοῦντα τοῖς ἐκεῖ ὅτι ἥξει βοήθεια καὶ ἐπιμέλεια αὐτῶν ἔσται· ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ὑπομένων παρεσκευάζετο **17**
τὸν ἔκπλουν ὡς ἅμα τῶι ἦρι ποιησόμενος, στρατιάν τε ἐπαγγέλλων ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ χρήματα αὐτόθεν καὶ ναῦς καὶ ὁπλίτας ἑτοιμάζων. πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἴκοσι ναῦς, ὅπως 2
φυλάσσοιεν μηδένα ἀπὸ Κορίνθου καὶ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν περαιοῦσθαι. οἱ γὰρ Κορίνθιοι, ὡς αὐτοῖς οἱ πρέσβεις ἦκον καὶ τὰ ἐν τῆι 3
Σικελίαι βελτίω ἤγγελλον, νομίσαντες οὐκ ἄκαιρον καὶ τὴν προτέραν πέμψιν τῶν νεῶν ποιήσασθαι, πολλῶι μᾶλλον ἐπέρρωντο, καὶ ἐν ὁλκάσι παρεσκευάζοντο αὐτοί τε ἀποστελοῦντες ὁπλίτας ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Πελοποννήσου οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῶι αὐτῶι τρόπωι πέμψοντες· ναῦς τε οἱ Κορίνθιοι πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐπλήρουν, ὅπως ναυμαχίας τε 4
ἀποπειράσωσι πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῆι Ναυπάκτωι φυλακήν, καὶ τὰς ὁλκάδας αὐτῶν ἧσσον οἱ ἐν τῆι Ναυπάκτωι Ἀθηναῖοι κωλύοιεν ἀπαίρειν, πρὸς τὴν σφετέραν ἀντίταξιν τῶν τριήρων τὴν φυλακὴν ποιούμενοι.

16.2 εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν HPl^{3}: εἴκοσι cett.: *centum uiginti* Valla

18 Παρεσκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβολὴν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὥσπερ τε προυδέδοκτο αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ Κορινθίων ἐναγόντων, ἐπειδὴ ἐπυνθάνοντο τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βοήθειαν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, ὅπως δὴ ἐσβολῆς γενομένης διακωλυθῆι. καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης προσκείμενος ἐδίδασκε τὴν Δεκέλειαν τειχίζειν καὶ μὴ ἀνιέναι τὸν πόλεμον. **2** μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐγεγένητό τις ῥώμη, διότι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐνόμιζον διπλοῦν τὸν πόλεμον ἔχοντας, πρός τε σφᾶς καὶ Σικελιώτας, εὐκαθαιρετωτέρους ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι τὰς σπονδὰς προτέρους λελυκέναι ἡγοῦντο αὐτούς· ἐν γὰρ τῶι προτέρωι πολέμωι σφέτερον τὸ παρανόμημα μᾶλλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι τε ἐς Πλάταιαν ἦλθον Θηβαῖοι ἐν σπονδαῖς, καὶ εἰρημένον ἐν ταῖς πρότερον ξυνθήκαις ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν, ἢν δίκας ἐθέλωσι διδόναι, αὐτοὶ οὐχ ὑπήκουον ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως δυστυχεῖν τε ἐνόμιζον, καὶ ἐνεθυμοῦντο τήν τε περὶ **3** Πύλον ξυμφορὰν καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς τριάκοντα ναυσὶν ἐξ Ἄργους ὁρμώμενοι Ἐπιδαύρου τέ τι καὶ Πρασιῶν καὶ ἄλλα ἐδήιωσαν καὶ ἐκ Πύλου ἅμα ἐληιστεύοντο, καὶ ὁσάκις περί του διαφοραὶ γένοιντο τῶν κατὰ τὰς σπονδὰς ἀμφισβητουμένων, ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οὐκ ἤθελον ἐπιτρέπειν, τότε δὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι νομίσαντες τὸ παρανόμημα, ὅπερ καὶ σφίσι πρότερον ἡμάρτητο, αὖθις ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὸ αὐτὸ περιεστάναι, πρόθυμοι ἦσαν **4** ἐς τὸν πόλεμον. καὶ ἐν τῶι χειμῶνι τούτωι σίδηρόν τε περιήγγελλον κατὰ τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ τἆλλα ἐργαλεῖα ἡτοίμαζον ἐς τὸν ἐπιτειχισμόν, καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῆι Σικελίαι ἅμα ὡς ἀποπέμψοντες ἐν ταῖς ὁλκάσιν ἐπικουρίαν αὐτοί τε ἐπόριζον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Πελοποννησίους προσηνάγκαζον. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ὄγδοον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῶι πολέμωι ἐτελεύτα τῶιδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

19 Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου ἦρος εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου πρωίτατα δὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσέβαλον· ἡγεῖτο δὲ Ἄγις ὁ Ἀρχιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῆς χώρας τὰ περὶ τὸ πεδίον ἐδήιωσαν, ἔπειτα Δεκέλειαν ἐτείχιζον, κατὰ πόλεις **2** διελόμενοι τὸ ἔργον. ἀπέχει δὲ ἡ Δεκέλεια σταδίους μάλιστα τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλεως εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ οὐ πολλῶι πλέον καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Βοιωτίας. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶι πεδίωι καὶ τῆς χώρας τοῖς κρατίστοις ἐς τὸ κακουργεῖν ὠικοδομεῖτο τὸ τεῖχος, ἐπιφανὲς μέχρι τῆς **3** τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλεως. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν τῆι Ἀττικῆι Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐτείχιζον, οἱ δ' ἐν τῆι Πελοποννήσωι ἀπέστελλον περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ταῖς ὁλκάσι τοὺς ὁπλίτας ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν τῶν τε εἱλώτων ἐπιλεξάμενοι τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ τῶν νεοδαμώδων,

ξυναμφοτέρων ἐς ἑξακοσίους ὁπλίτας, καὶ Ἔκκριτον Σπαρτιάτην ἄρχοντα, Βοιωτοὶ δὲ τριακοσίους ὁπλίτας, ὧν ἦρχον Ξένων τε καὶ Νίκων Θηβαῖοι καὶ Ἡγήσανδρος Θεσπιεύς. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι ὁρμήσαντες ἀπὸ 4
τοῦ Ταινάρου τῆς Λακωνικῆς ἐς τὸ πέλαγος ἀφῆκαν· μετὰ δὲ τούτους Κορίνθιοι οὐ πολλῶι ὕστερον πεντακοσίους ὁπλίτας, τοὺς μὲν ἐξ αὐτῆς Κορίνθου, τοὺς δὲ προσμισθωσάμενοι Ἀρκάδων, καὶ ἄρχοντα Ἀλέξαρχον Κορίνθιον προστάξαντες ἀπέπεμψαν. ἀπέστειλαν δὲ καὶ Σικυώνιοι διακοσίους ὁπλίτας ὁμοῦ τοῖς Κορινθίοις, ὧν ἦρχε Σαργεὺς Σικυώνιος. αἱ δὲ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι νῆες τῶν Κορινθίων αἱ τοῦ χειμῶνος πληρωθεῖσαι 5
ἀνθώρμουν ταῖς ἐν τῆι Ναυπάκτωι εἴκοσιν Ἀττικαῖς, ἕωσπερ αὐτοῖς οὗτοι οἱ ὁπλῖται ταῖς ὁλκάσιν ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἀπῆραν· οὗπερ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπληρώθησαν, ὅπως μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς τὰς ὁλκάδας μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὰς τριήρεις τὸν νοῦν ἔχωσιν.

Ἐν δὲ τούτωι καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἅμα τῆς Δεκελείας τῶι τειχισμῶι καὶ τοῦ **20**
ἦρος εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου περί τε Πελοπόννησον ναῦς τριάκοντα ἔστειλαν καὶ Χαρικλέα τὸν Ἀπολλοδώρου ἄρχοντα, ὧι εἴρητο καὶ ἐς Ἄργος ἀφικομένωι κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν παρακαλεῖν Ἀργείων [τε] ὁπλίτας ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς, καὶ 2
τὸν Δημοσθένη ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, ὥσπερ ἔμελλον, ἀπέστελλον ἑξήκοντα μὲν ναυσὶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ πέντε Χίαις, ὁπλίταις δὲ ἐκ καταλόγου Ἀθηναίων διακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις, καὶ νησιωτῶν ὅσοις ἑκασταχόθεν οἷόν τ' ἦν πλείστοις χρήσασθαι, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων τῶν ὑπηκόων, εἴ ποθέν τι εἶχον ἐπιτήδειον ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, ξυμπορίσαντες. εἴρητο δ' αὐτῶι πρῶτον μετὰ τοῦ Χαρικλέους ἅμα περιπλέοντα ξυστρατεύεσθαι περὶ τὴν Λακωνικήν. καὶ ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης ἐς τὴν Αἴγιναν προσπλεύσας τοῦ στρατεύματός τε 3
εἴ τι ὑπελέλειπτο περιέμενε καὶ τὸν Χαρικλέα τοὺς Ἀργείους παραλαβεῖν.

Ἐν δὲ τῆι Σικελίαι ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τούτου τοῦ ἦρος καὶ ὁ **21**
Γύλιππος ἦκεν ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας, ἄγων ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ὧν ἔπεισε στρατιὰν ὅσην ἑκασταχόθεν πλείστην ἐδύνατο. καὶ ξυγκαλέσας τοὺς 2
Συρακοσίους ἔφη χρῆναι πληροῦν ναῦς ὡς δύνανται πλείστας καὶ ναυμαχίας ἀπόπειραν λαμβάνειν· ἐλπίζειν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τι ἔργον ἄξιον τοῦ κινδύνου ἐς τὸν πόλεμον κατεργάσεσθαι. ξυνανέπειθε δὲ καὶ 3
ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης οὐχ ἥκιστα, τοῦ ταῖς ναυσὶ μὴ ἀθυμεῖν ἐπιχειρῆσαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, λέγων οὐδ' ἐκείνους πάτριον τὴν ἐμπειρίαν οὐδ' ἀίδιον τῆς θαλάσσης ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἠπειρώτας μᾶλλον τῶν Συρακοσίων ὄντας

20.1 τε del. Reiske **20**.3 ὑπελέλειπτο Stahl: ὑπελείπετο codd.

καὶ ἀναγκασθέντας ὑπὸ Μήδων ναυτικοὺς γενέσθαι. καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας τολμηρούς, οἵους καὶ Ἀθηναίους, τοὺς ἀντιτολμῶντας χαλεπωτάτους ἂν αὐτοῖς φαίνεσθαι· ὧι γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς πέλας, οὐ δυνάμει ἔστιν ὅτε προύχοντες, τῶι δὲ θράσει ἐπιχειροῦντες καταφοβοῦσι, καὶ σφᾶς ἂν τὸ
4 αὐτὸ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἐναντίοις ὑποσχεῖν. καὶ Συρακοσίους εὖ εἰδέναι ἔφη τῶι τολμῆσαι ἀπροσδοκήτως πρὸς τὸ Ἀθηναίων ναυτικὸν ἀντιστῆναι πλέον τι διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκπλαγέντων αὐτῶν περιγενησομένους ἢ Ἀθηναίους τῆι ἐπιστήμηι τὴν Συρακοσίων ἀπειρίαν βλάψοντας. ἰέναι οὖν ἐκέλευεν ἐς τὴν πεῖραν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ καὶ μὴ ἀποκνεῖν.

5 Καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι, τοῦ τε Γυλίππου καὶ Ἑρμοκράτους καὶ εἴ του ἄλλου πειθόντων, ὥρμηντό τε ἐς τὴν ναυμαχίαν καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπλήρουν·
22 ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος ἐπειδὴ παρεσκεύαστο τὸ ναυτικόν, ἀγαγὼν ὑπὸ νύκτα πᾶσαν τὴν στρατιὰν τὴν πεζὴν αὐτὸς μὲν τοῖς ἐν τῶι Πλημμυρίωι τείχεσι κατὰ γῆν ἔμελλε προσβαλεῖν, αἱ δὲ τριήρεις τῶν Συρακοσίων ἅμα καὶ ἀπὸ ξυνθήματος πέντε μὲν καὶ τριάκοντα ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου λιμένος ἐπέπλεον, αἱ δὲ πέντε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάσσονος, οὗ ἦν καὶ τὸ νεώριον αὐτοῖς, περιέπλεον βουλόμενοι πρὸς τὰς ἐντὸς προσμεῖξαι καὶ ἅμα ἐπιπλεῖν τῶι Πλημμυρίωι, ὅπως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν
2 θορυβῶνται. οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ τάχους ἀντιπληρώσαντες ἑξήκοντα ναῦς ταῖς μὲν πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι πρὸς τὰς πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα τῶν Συρακοσίων τὰς ἐν τῶι μεγάλωι λιμένι ἐναυμάχουν, ταῖς δ' ἐπιλοίποις ἀπήντων ἐπὶ τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νεωρίου περιπλεούσας. καὶ εὐθὺς πρὸ τοῦ στόματος τοῦ μεγάλου λιμένος ἐναυμάχουν, καὶ ἀντεῖχον ἀλλήλοις ἐπὶ πολύ, οἱ
23 μὲν βιάσασθαι βουλόμενοι τὸν ἔσπλουν, οἱ δὲ κωλύειν. ἐν τούτωι δ' ὁ Γύλιππος τῶν ἐν τῶι Πλημμυρίωι Ἀθηναίων πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν ἐπικαταβάντων καὶ τῆι ναυμαχίαι τὴν γνώμην προσεχόντων φθάνει προσπεσὼν ἅμα τῆι ἕωι αἰφνιδίως τοῖς τείχεσι, καὶ αἱρεῖ τὸ μέγιστον πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσω δύο, οὐχ ὑπομεινάντων τῶν φυλάκων,
2 ὡς εἶδον τὸ μέγιστον ῥαιδίως ληφθέν. καὶ ἐκ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου ἁλόντος χαλεπῶς οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ὅσοι καὶ ἐς τὰ πλοῖα καὶ ὁλκάδα τινὰ κατέφυγον, ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐξεκομίζοντο· τῶν γὰρ Συρακοσίων ταῖς ἐν τῶι μεγάλωι λιμένι ναυσὶ κρατούντων τῆι ναυμαχίαι ὑπὸ τριήρους μιᾶς καὶ εὖ πλεούσης ἐπεδιώκοντο· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ δύο τειχίσματα ἡλίσκετο, ἐν τούτωι καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐτύγχανον ἤδη νικώμενοι καὶ οἱ ἐξ αὐτῶν
3 φεύγοντες ῥᾶιον παρέπλευσαν. αἱ γὰρ τῶν Συρακοσίων αἱ πρὸ τοῦ στόματος νῆες ναυμαχοῦσαι βιασάμεναι τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς οὐδενὶ κόσμωι ἐσέπλεον, καὶ ταραχθεῖσαι περὶ ἀλλήλας παρέδοσαν τὴν νίκην τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις· ταύτας τε γὰρ ἔτρεψαν καὶ ὑφ' ὧν τὸ πρῶτον ἐνικῶντο

21.3 ὑποσχεῖν: ὑπαρχειν Η

ἐν τῶι λιμένι. καὶ ἔνδεκα μὲν ναῦς τῶν Συρακοσίων κατέδυσαν, καὶ 4
τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπέκτειναν, πλὴν ὅσον ἐκ τριῶν νεῶν οὓς
ἐζώγρησαν· τῶν δὲ σφετέρων τρεῖς νῆες διεφθάρησαν. τὰ δὲ ναυάγια
ἀνελκύσαντες τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ τροπαῖον ἐν τῶι νησιδίωι στήσαντες
τῶι πρὸ τοῦ Πλημμυρίου, ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὸ ἑαυτῶν στρατόπεδον.

Οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι κατὰ μὲν τὴν ναυμαχίαν οὕτως ἐπεπράγεσαν, τὰ δ' **24**
ἐν τῶι Πλημμυρίωι τείχη εἶχον, καὶ τροπαῖα ἔστησαν αὐτῶν τρία. καὶ τὸ
μὲν ἕτερον τοῖν δυοῖν τειχοῖν τοῖν ὕστερον ληφθέντοιν κατέβαλον, τὰ δὲ
δύο ἐπισκευάσαντες ἐφρούρουν. ἄνθρωποι δ' ἐν τῶν τειχῶν τῆι ἁλώσει 2
ἀπέθανον καὶ ἐζωγρήθησαν πολλοί, καὶ χρήματα πολλὰ τὰ ξύμπαντα
ἑάλω· ὥσπερ γὰρ ταμιείωι χρωμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῖς τείχεσι πολλὰ
μὲν ἐμπόρων χρήματα καὶ σῖτος ἐνῆν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν τριηράρχων,
ἐπεὶ καὶ ἱστία τεσσαράκοντα τριήρων καὶ τἆλλα σκεύη ἐγκατελήφθη καὶ
τριήρεις ἀνειλκυσμέναι τρεῖς. μέγιστόν τε καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον ἐκάκωσε τὸ 3
στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἡ τοῦ Πλημμυρίου λῆψις· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι οὐδ' οἱ
ἔσπλοι ἀσφαλεῖς ἦσαν τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς τῶν ἐπιτηδείων (οἱ γὰρ Συρακόσιοι
ναυσὶν αὐτόθι ἐφορμοῦντες ἐκώλυον, καὶ διὰ μάχης ἤδη ἐγίγνοντο αἱ
ἐσκομιδαί), ἔς τε τἆλλα κατάπληξιν παρέσχε καὶ ἀθυμίαν τῶι στρατεύματι.

Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ναῦς τε ἐκπέμπουσι δώδεκα οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ Ἀγάθαρχον **25**
ἐπ' αὐτῶν Συρακόσιον ἄρχοντα. καὶ αὐτῶν μία μὲν ἐς Πελοπόννησον
ὤιχετο, πρέσβεις ἄγουσα ὅπως τά τε σφέτερα φράσωσιν ὅτι ἐν ἐλπίσιν
εἰσὶ καὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐποτρυνῶσι γίγνεσθαι· αἱ δ' ἔνδεκα
νῆες πρὸς τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἔπλευσαν, πυνθανόμεναι πλοῖα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις
γέμοντα χρημάτων προσπλεῖν. καὶ τῶν τε πλοίων ἐπιτυχοῦσαι τὰ πολλὰ 2
διέφθειραν καὶ ξύλα ναυπηγήσιμα ἐν τῆι Καυλωνιάτιδι κατέκαυσαν, ἃ
τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἑτοῖμα ἦν. ἔς τε Λοκροὺς μετὰ ταῦτα ἦλθον, καὶ ὁρμουσῶν 3
αὐτῶν κατέπλευσε μία τῶν ὁλκάδων τῶν ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ἄγουσα
Θεσπιῶν ὁπλίτας· καὶ ἀναλαβόντες αὐτοὺς οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς 4
παρέπλεον ἐπ' οἴκου. φυλάξαντες δ' αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἴκοσι ναυσὶ
πρὸς τοῖς Μεγάροις μίαν μὲν ναῦν λαμβάνουσιν αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσι, τὰς δ'
ἄλλας οὐκ ἐδυνήθησαν, ἀλλ' ἀποφεύγουσιν ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας.

Ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν σταυρῶν ἀκροβολισμὸς ἐν τῶι λιμένι, οὓς οἱ 5
Συρακόσιοι πρὸ τῶν παλαιῶν νεωσοίκων κατέπηξαν ἐν τῆι θαλάσσηι,
ὅπως αὐτοῖς αἱ νῆες ἐντὸς ὁρμοῖεν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπιπλέοντες μὴ βλάπτοιεν

24.2 ὥσπερ recc. (coniecerat Stahl): ὥστε ACEFGMZ: ἅτε BH **25**.1 ὅπως BH: οἵπερ ACFGM: ὥσπερ EZ φράσωσιν codd.: φράσουσιν $C^3F^2G^2$

6 ἐμβάλλοντες. προσαγαγόντες γὰρ ναῦν μυριοφόρον αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, πύργους τε ξυλίνους ἔχουσαν καὶ παραφράγματα, ἔκ τε τῶν ἀκάτων ὤνευον ἀναδούμενοι τοὺς σταυροὺς καὶ ἀνέκλων καὶ κατακολυμβῶντες ἐξέπριον. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἀπὸ τῶν νεωσοίκων ἔβαλλον· οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς ὁλκάδος ἀντέβαλλον, καὶ τέλος τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν σταυρῶν ἀνεῖλον οἱ
7 Ἀθηναῖοι. χαλεπωτάτη δ' ἦν τῆς σταυρώσεως ἡ κρύφιος· ἦσαν γὰρ τῶν σταυρῶν οὓς οὐχ ὑπερέχοντας τῆς θαλάσσης κατέπηξαν, ὥστε δεινὸν ἦν προσπλεῦσαι, μὴ οὐ προϊδών τις ὥσπερ περὶ ἕρμα περιβάλῃ τὴν ναῦν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτους κολυμβηταὶ δυόμενοι ἐξέπριον μισθοῦ. ὅμως δ' αὖθις οἱ
8 Συρακόσιοι ἐσταύρωσαν. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἷον εἰκὸς τῶν στρατοπέδων ἐγγὺς ὄντων καὶ ἀντιτεταγμένων ἐμηχανῶντο καὶ ἀκροβολισμοῖς καὶ πείραις παντοίαις ἐχρῶντο.

9 Ἔπεμψαν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰς πόλεις πρέσβεις οἱ Συρακόσιοι Κορινθίων καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, ἀγγέλλοντας τήν τε τοῦ Πλημμυρίου λῆψιν καὶ τῆς ναυμαχίας πέρι ὡς οὐ τῇ τῶν πολεμίων ἰσχύι μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ σφετέραι ταραχῇ ἡσσηθεῖεν, τά τε ἄλλα δηλώσοντας ὅτι ἐν ἐλπίσιν εἰσὶ καὶ ἀξιώσοντας ξυμβοηθεῖν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ, ὡς καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων προσδοκίμων ὄντων ἄλλῃ στρατιᾷ καί, ἣν φθάσωσιν αὐτοὶ πρότερον διαφθείραντες τὸ παρὸν στράτευμα αὐτῶν, διαπεπολεμησόμενον. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ Σικελίαι ταῦτα ἔπρασσον.

26 Ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης, ἐπεὶ ξυνελέγη αὐτῷ τὸ στράτευμα ὃ ἔδει ἔχοντα ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν βοηθεῖν, ἄρας ἐκ τῆς Αἰγίνης καὶ πλεύσας πρὸς τὴν Πελοπόννησον τῷ τε Χαρικλεῖ καὶ ταῖς τριάκοντα ναυσὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμίσγει, καὶ παραλαβόντες τῶν Ἀργείων ὁπλίτας ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἔπλεον ἐς
2 τὴν Λακωνικήν· καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῆς Ἐπιδαύρου τι τῆς Λιμηρᾶς ἐδήιωσαν, ἔπειτα σχόντες ἐς τὰ καταντικρὺ Κυθήρων τῆς Λακωνικῆς, ἔνθα τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνός ἐστι, τῆς τε γῆς ἔστιν ἃ ἐδήιωσαν καὶ ἐτείχισαν ἰσθμῷδές τι χωρίον, ἵνα δὴ οἵ τε εἵλωτες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων αὐτόσε αὐτομολῶσι
3 καὶ ἅμα λῃσταὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου, ἁρπαγὴν ποιῶνται. καὶ ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ ξυγκατέλαβε τὸ χωρίον παρέπλει ἐπὶ τῆς Κερκύρας, ὅπως καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ξυμμάχων παραλαβὼν τὸν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν πλοῦν ὅτι τάχιστα ποιῆται· ὁ δὲ Χαρικλῆς περιμείνας ἕως τὸ χωρίον ἐξετείχισε καὶ καταλιπὼν φυλακὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπεκομίζετο καὶ αὐτὸς ὕστερον ταῖς τριάκοντα ναυσὶν ἐπ' οἴκου καὶ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἅμα.

27 Ἀφίκοντο δὲ καὶ Θραικῶν τῶν μαχαιροφόρων τοῦ Διακοῦ γένους ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας πελτασταὶ ἐν τῷι αὐτῷι θέρει τούτωι τριακόσιοι καὶ

27.1 ἐν τῷι αὐτῷι θέρει τούτωι ACEF(G)MB^{1}: τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους τούτου BH

χίλιοι, οὓς ἔδει τῶι Δημοσθένει ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ξυμπλεῖν. οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι, 2
ὡς ὕστερον ἦκον, διενοοῦντο αὐτοὺς πάλιν ὅθεν ἦλθον ἐς Θράικην
ἀποπέμπειν. τὸ γὰρ ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἐκ τῆς Δεκελείας πόλεμον αὐτοὺς
πολυτελὲς ἐφαίνετο· δραχμὴν γὰρ τῆς ἡμέρας ἕκαστος ἐλάμβανεν.
ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ Δεκέλεια τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑπὸ πάσης τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐν τῶι 3
θέρει τούτωι τειχισθεῖσα, ὕστερον δὲ φρουραῖς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων κατὰ
διαδοχὴν χρόνου ἐπιούσαις τῆι χώραι ἐπωικεῖτο, πολλὰ ἔβλαπτε τοὺς
Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον χρημάτων τ' ὀλέθρωι καὶ ἀνθρώπων
φθορᾶι ἐκάκωσε τὰ πράγματα. πρότερον μὲν γὰρ βραχεῖαι γιγνόμεναι 4
αἱ ἐσβολαὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον τῆς γῆς ἀπολαύειν οὐκ ἐκώλυον· τότε
δὲ ξυνεχῶς ἐπικαθημένων, καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν καὶ πλεόνων ἐπιόντων, ὁτὲ δ' ἐξ
ἀνάγκης τῆς †ἴσης† φρουρᾶς καταθεούσης τε τὴν χώραν καὶ ληιστείας
ποιουμένης, βασιλέως τε παρόντος τοῦ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων Ἄγιδος, ὃς
οὐκ ἐκ παρέργου τὸν πόλεμον ἐποιεῖτο, μεγάλα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβλάπτοντο.
τῆς τε γὰρ χώρας ἁπάσης ἐστέρηντο, καὶ ἀνδραπόδων πλέον ἢ δύο 5
μυριάδες ηὐτομολήκεσαν, καὶ τούτων πολὺ μέρος χειροτέχναι, πρόβατά
τε πάντα ἀπωλώλει καὶ ὑποζύγια· ἵπποι τε, ὁσημέραι ἐξελαυνόντων
τῶν ἱππέων πρός τε τὴν Δεκέλειαν καταδρομὰς ποιουμένων καὶ κατὰ
τὴν χώραν φυλασσόντων, οἱ μὲν ἀπεχωλοῦντο ἐν γῆι ἀποκρότωι τε
καὶ ξυνεχῶς ταλαιπωροῦντες, οἱ δ' ἐτιτρώσκοντο. ἥ τε τῶν ἐπιτηδείων **28**
παρακομιδὴ ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας, πρότερον ἐκ τοῦ Ὠρωποῦ κατὰ γῆν διὰ
τῆς Δεκελείας θάσσων οὖσα, περὶ Σούνιον κατὰ θάλασσαν πολυτελὴς
ἐγίγνετο· τῶν τε πάντων ὁμοίως ἐπακτῶν ἐδεῖτο ἡ πόλις, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ
πόλις εἶναι φρούριον κατέστη. πρὸς γὰρ τῆι ἐπάλξει τὴν μὲν ἡμέραν 2
κατὰ διαδοχὴν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι φυλάσσοντες, τὴν δὲ νύκτα καὶ ξύμπαντες
πλὴν τῶν ἱππέων, οἱ μὲν ἐφ' ὅπλοις ποιούμενοι, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους,
καὶ θέρους καὶ χειμῶνος ἐταλαιπωροῦντο. μάλιστα δ' αὐτοὺς ἐπίεζεν 3
ὅτι δύο πολέμους ἅμα εἶχον καὶ ἐς φιλονικίαν καθέστασαν τοιαύτην ἣν
πρὶν γενέσθαι ἠπίστησεν ἄν τις ἀκούσας, τό γε αὐτοὺς πολιορκουμένους
ἐπιτειχισμῶι ὑπὸ Πελοποννησίων μηδ' ὡς ἀποστῆναι ἐκ Σικελίας, ἀλλ'
ἐκεῖ Συρακούσας τῶι αὐτῶι τρόπωι ἀντιπολιορκεῖν, πόλιν οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω
αὐτήν γε καθ' αὑτὴν τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τὸν παράλογον τοσοῦτον
ποιῆσαι τοῖς Ἕλλησι τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τόλμης, ὅσον κατ' ἀρχὰς τοῦ

27.4 ἴσης corruptum: τῆς ἐξ ἀνάγκης φρουρᾶς Dover **27**.5 πολὺ ACEFGM: τὸ πολὺ BH πάντα ἀπωλώλει uel ἀπολώλει ACEFGM: ἀπωλώλει πάντα BH **28**.2 ποιούμενοι AEF<G>MB^{1}: πλοιούμενοι C^{ac}PlUd: που BH **28**.3 φιλονικίαν: φιλονεικίαν codd. τό γε Bothe: τὸ γὰρ codd.

πολέμου οἱ μὲν ἐνιαυτόν, οἱ δὲ δύο, οἱ δὲ τριῶν γε ἐτῶν οὐδεὶς πλείω χρόνον ἐνόμιζον περιοίσειν αὐτούς, εἰ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐσβάλοιεν ἐς τὴν χώραν, ὥστε ἔτει ἑπτακαιδεκάτωι μετὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐσβολὴν ἦλθον ἐς Σικελίαν ἤδη τῶι πολέμωι κατὰ πάντα τετρυχωμένοι, καὶ πόλεμον οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω προσανείλοντο τοῦ πρότερον ὑπάρχοντος ἐκ Πελοποννήσου.
4 δι' ἃ καὶ τότε ὑπό τε τῆς Δεκελείας πολλὰ βλαπτούσης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀναλωμάτων μεγάλων προσπιπτόντων ἀδύνατοι ἐγένοντο τοῖς χρήμασιν. καὶ τὴν εἰκοστὴν ὑπὸ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἀντὶ τοῦ φόρου τοῖς ὑπηκόοις ἐποίησαν, πλείω νομίζοντες ἂν σφίσι χρήματα οὕτω προσιέναι. αἱ μὲν γὰρ δαπάναι οὐχ ὁμοίως καὶ πρίν, ἀλλὰ πολλῶι μείζους καθέστασαν, ὅσωι καὶ μείζων ὁ πόλεμος ἦν· αἱ δὲ πρόσοδοι ἀπώλλυντο.

29 Τοὺς οὖν Θρᾳικας τοὺς τῶι Δημοσθένει ὑστερήσαντας διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ἀπορίαν τῶν χρημάτων οὐ βουλόμενοι δαπανᾶν εὐθὺς ἀπέπεμπον, προστάξαντες κομίσαι αὐτοὺς Διειτρέφει, καὶ εἰπόντες ἅμα ἐν τῶι παράπλωι (ἐπορεύοντο γὰρ δι' Εὐρίπου) καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους,
2 ἤν τι δύνηται, ἀπ' αὐτῶν βλάψαι. ὁ δὲ ἕς τε τὴν Τάναγραν ἀπεβίβασεν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἁρπαγήν τινα ἐποιήσατο διὰ τάχους καὶ ἐκ Χαλκίδος τῆς Εὐβοίας ἀφ' ἑσπέρας διέπλευσε τὸν Εὔριπον καὶ ἀποβιβάσας ἐς τὴν
3 Βοιωτίαν ἦγεν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ Μυκαλησσόν. καὶ τὴν μὲν νύκτα λαθὼν πρὸς τῶι Ἑρμαίωι ηὐλίσατο (ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς Μυκαλησσοῦ ἑκκαίδεκα μάλιστα σταδίους), ἅμα δὲ τῆι ἡμέραι τῆι πόλει προσέκειτο οὔσηι οὐ μεγάληι, καὶ αἱρεῖ ἀφυλάκτοις τε ἐπιπεσὼν καὶ ἀπροσδοκήτοις μὴ ἄν ποτέ τινας σφίσιν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης τοσοῦτον ἐπαναβάντας ἐπιθέσθαι, τοῦ τείχους ἀσθενοῦς ὄντος καὶ ἔστιν ἧι καὶ πεπτωκότος, τοῦ δὲ βραχέος ὠικοδομημένου, καὶ
4 πυλῶν ἅμα διὰ τὴν ἄδειαν ἀνεωιγμένων. ἐσπεσόντες δὲ οἱ Θρᾳικες ἐς τὴν Μυκαλησσὸν τάς τε οἰκίας καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ ἐπόρθουν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐφόνευον φειδόμενοι οὔτε πρεσβυτέρας οὔτε νεωτέρας ἡλικίας, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἑξῆς, ὅτωι ἐντύχοιεν, καὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας κτείνοντες, καὶ προσέτι καὶ ὑποζύγια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔμψυχα ἴδοιεν· τὸ γὰρ γένος τὸ τῶν Θραικῶν ὁμοῖα τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ βαρβαρικοῦ, ἐν ὧι ἂν θαρσήσηι, φονικώτατόν
5 ἐστιν. καὶ τότε ἄλλη τε ταραχὴ οὐκ ὀλίγη καὶ ἰδέα πᾶσα καθειστήκει ὀλέθρου, καὶ ἐπιπεσόντες διδασκαλείωι παίδων, ὅπερ μέγιστον ἦν αὐτόθι καὶ ἄρτι ἔτυχον οἱ παῖδες ἐσεληλυθότες, κατέκοψαν πάντας· καὶ ξυμφορὰ τῆι πόλει πάσηι οὐδεμιᾶς ἥσσων μᾶλλον ἑτέρας ἀδόκητός τε ἐπέπεσεν
30 αὕτη καὶ δεινή. οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι αἰσθόμενοι ἐβοήθουν, καὶ καταλαβόντες προκεχωρηκότας ἤδη τοὺς Θρᾳικας οὐ πολὺ τήν τε λείαν ἀφείλοντο καὶ αὐτοὺς φοβήσαντες καταδιώκουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν Εὔριπον καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν,
2 οὗ αὐτοῖς τὰ πλοῖα ἃ ἤγαγεν ὥρμει. καὶ ἀποκτείνουσιν αὐτῶν ἐν τῆι

ἐσβάσει τοὺς πλείστους οὔτε ἐπισταμένους νεῖν τῶν τε ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις, ὡς ἑώρων τὰ ἐν τῇι γῆι, ὁρμισάντων ἔξω τοξεύματος τὰ πλοῖα, ἐπεὶ ἔν γε τῇι ἄλληι ἀναχωρήσει οὐκ ἀτόπως οἱ Θρᾷικες πρὸς τὸ τῶν Θηβαίων ἱππικόν, ὅπερ πρῶτον προσέκειτο, προεκθέοντές τε καὶ ξυστρεφόμενοι ἐν ἐπιχωρίωι τάξει τὴν φυλακὴν ἐποιοῦντο, καὶ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν ἐν τούτωι διεφθάρησαν. μέρος δέ τι καὶ ἐν τῇι πόλει αὐτῇι δι' ἁρπαγὴν ἐγκαταληφθὲν ἀπώλετο. οἱ δὲ ξύμπαντες τῶν Θραικῶν πεντήκοντα καὶ διακόσιοι ἀπὸ τριακοσίων καὶ χιλίων ἀπέθανον. διέφθειραν δὲ καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων καὶ 3
τῶν ἄλλων οἳ ξυνεβοήθησαν ἐς εἴκοσι μάλιστα ἱππέας τε καὶ ὁπλίτας ὁμοῦ καὶ Θηβαίων τῶν Βοιωταρχῶν Σκιρφώνδαν· τῶν δὲ Μυκαλησσίων μέρος τι ἀπανηλώθη. τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν Μυκαλησσὸν πάθει χρησαμένην 4
οὐδενὸς ὡς ἐπὶ μεγέθει τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἧσσον ὀλοφύρασθαι ἀξίωι τοιαῦτα ξυνέβη.

Ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης τότε ἀποπλέων ἐπὶ τῆς Κερκύρας μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς **31**
Λακωνικῆς τείχισιν, ὁλκάδα ὁρμοῦσαν ἐν Φειᾶι τῆι Ἠλείων εὐρών, ἐν ᾗι οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὁπλῖται ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ἔμελλον περαιοῦσθαι, αὐτὴν μὲν διαφθείρει, οἱ δ' ἄνδρες ἀποφυγόντες ὕστερον λαβόντες ἄλλην ἔπλεον. καὶ 2
μετὰ τοῦτο ἀφικόμενος ὁ Δημοσθένης ἐς τὴν Ζάκυνθον καὶ Κεφαλληνίαν ὁπλίτας τε παρέλαβε καὶ ἐκ τῆς Ναυπάκτου τῶν Μεσσηνίων μετεπέμψατο καὶ ἐς τὴν ἀντιπέρας ἤπειρον τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας διέβη, ἐς Ἀλύζιάν τε καὶ Ἀνακτόριον, ὃ αὐτοὶ εἶχον. ὄντι δ' αὐτῶι περὶ ταῦτα ὁ Εὐρυμέδων 3
ἀπαντᾶι ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας ἀποπλέων, ὃς τότε τοῦ χειμῶνος τὰ χρήματα ἄγων τῆι στρατιᾶι ἀπεπέμφθη, καὶ ἀγγέλλει τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ὅτι πύθοιτο κατὰ πλοῦν ἤδη ὢν τὸ Πλημμύριον ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἑαλωκός. ἀφικνεῖται δὲ καὶ Κόνων παρ' αὐτούς, ὃς ἦρχε Ναυπάκτου, ἀγγέλλων 4
ὅτι αἱ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι νῆες τῶν Κορινθίων αἱ σφίσιν ἀνθορμοῦσαι οὔτε καταλύουσι [τὸν πόλεμον] ναυμαχεῖν τε μέλλουσιν· πέμπειν οὖν ἐκέλευεν αὐτοὺς ναῦς, ὡς οὐχ ἱκανὰς οὔσας δυοῖν δεούσας εἴκοσι τὰς ἑαυτῶν πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι ναυμαχεῖν. τῶι μὲν οὖν Κόνωνι δέκα ναῦς ὁ 5
Δημοσθένης καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων τὰς ἄριστα σφίσι πλεούσας ἀφ' ὧν αὐτοὶ εἶχον ξυμπέμπουσι πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῇι Ναυπάκτωι· αὐτοὶ δὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς τὸν ξύλλογον ἡτοιμάζοντο, Εὐρυμέδων μὲν ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν πλεύσας καὶ πεντεκαίδεκά τε ναῦς πληροῦν κελεύσας αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁπλίτας καταλεγόμενος (ξυνῆρχε γὰρ ἤδη Δημοσθένει ἀποτραπόμενος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἠιρέθη), Δημοσθένης δ' ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἀκαρνανίαν χωρίων σφενδονήτας τε καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς ξυναγείρων.

31.4 τὸν πόλεμον del. Madvig

32 Οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν Συρακουσῶν τότε μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Πλημμυρίου ἅλωσιν πρέσβεις οἰχόμενοι ἐς τὰς πόλεις ἐπειδὴ ἔπεισάν τε καὶ ξυναγείραντες ἔμελλον ἄξειν τὸν στρατόν, ὁ Νικίας προπυθόμενος πέμπει ἐς τῶν Σικελῶν τοὺς τὴν δίοδον ἔχοντας καὶ σφίσι ξυμμάχους, Κεντόριπάς τε καὶ Ἀλικυαίους καὶ ἄλλους, ὅπως μὴ διαφρήσωσι τοὺς πολεμίους, ἀλλὰ ξυστραφέντες κωλύσωσι διελθεῖν· ἄλλῃ γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ πειράσειν·
2 Ἀκραγαντῖνοι γὰρ οὐκ ἐδίδοσαν διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ὁδόν. πορευομένων δ' ἤδη τῶν Σικελιωτῶν οἱ Σικελοί, καθάπερ ἐδέοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐνέδραν τινὰ τριχῇ ποιησάμενοι, ἀφυλάκτοις τε καὶ ἐξαίφνης ἐπιγενόμενοι διέφθειραν ἐς ὀκτακοσίους μάλιστα καὶ τοὺς πρέσβεις πλὴν ἑνός του Κορινθίου πάντας· οὗτος δὲ τοὺς διαφυγόντας ἐς πεντακοσίους καὶ χιλίους ἐκόμισεν
33 ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας. καὶ περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἡμέρας καὶ οἱ Καμαριναῖοι ἀφικνοῦνται αὐτοῖς βοηθοῦντες, πεντακόσιοι μὲν ὁπλῖται, τριακόσιοι δὲ ἀκοντισταὶ καὶ τοξόται τριακόσιοι. ἔπεμψαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Γελῶιοι ναυτικόν τε ἐς πέντε ναῦς καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς τετρακοσίους καὶ ἱππέας διακοσίους.
2 σχεδὸν γάρ τι ἤδη πᾶσα ἡ Σικελία πλὴν Ἀκραγαντίνων (οὗτοι δ' οὐδὲ μεθ' ἑτέρων ἦσαν), οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μετὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων οἱ πρότερον περιορώμενοι ξυστάντες ἐβοήθουν.

3 Καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι, ὡς αὐτοῖς τὸ ἐν τοῖς Σικελοῖς πάθος ἐγένετο, ἐπέσχον τὸ εὐθέως τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιχειρεῖν· ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Εὐρυμέδων, ἑτοίμης ἤδη τῆς στρατιᾶς οὔσης ἔκ τε τῆς Κερκύρας καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἠπείρου, ἐπεραιώθησαν ξυμπάσῃ τῇι στρατιᾶι τὸν Ἰόνιον ἐπ' ἄκραν
4 Ἰαπυγίαν· καὶ ὁρμηθέντες αὐτόθεν κατίσχουσιν ἐς τὰς Χοιράδας νήσους Ἰαπυγίας, καὶ ἀκοντιστάς τέ τινας τῶν Ἰαπύγων πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν τοῦ Μεσσαπίου ἔθνους ἀναβιβάζονται ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς, καὶ τῶι Ἄρται, ὅσπερ καὶ τοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς δυνάστης ὢν παρέσχεν αὐτοῖς, ἀνανεωσάμενοί
5 τινα παλαιὰν φιλίαν ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Μεταπόντιον τῆς Ἰταλίας. καὶ τοὺς Μεταποντίους πείσαντες κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν ἀκοντιστάς τε ξυμπέμπειν τριακοσίους καὶ τριήρεις δύο καὶ ἀναλαβόντες ταῦτα παρέπλευσαν ἐς Θουρίαν. καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι νεωστὶ στάσει τοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων
6 ἐναντίους ἐκπεπτωκότας· καὶ βουλόμενοι τὴν στρατιὰν αὐτόθι πᾶσαν ἀθροίσαντες εἴ τις ὑπελέλειπτο ἐξετάσαι, καὶ τοὺς Θουρίους πεῖσαι σφίσι ξυστρατεύειν τε ὡς προθυμότατα καί, ἐπειδήπερ ἐν τούτωι τύχης εἰσί, τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις νομίζειν, περιέμενον ἐν τῇι Θουρίαι καὶ ἔπρασσον ταῦτα.

32.1 διαφρήσωσι Dobree: διαφήσωσι CM: διαφήσουσι ABEFGH **32.2** ἑνός του Herwerden: ἑνὸς τοῦ codd.

Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦτον οἱ ἐν ταῖς πέντε **34**
καὶ εἴκοσι ναυσίν, οἵπερ τῶν ὁλκάδων ἕνεκα τῆς ἐς Σικελίαν κομιδῆς
ἀνθώρμουν πρὸς τὰς ἐν Ναυπάκτωι ναῦς, παρασκευασάμενοι ὡς ἐπὶ
ναυμαχίαι καὶ προσπληρώσαντες ἔτι ναῦς ὥστε ὀλίγωι ἐλάσσους εἶναι
αὐτοῖς τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεῶν, ὁρμίζονται κατὰ Ἐρινεὸν τῆς Ἀχαΐας ἐν τῆι
Ῥυπικῆι. καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῦ χωρίου μηνοειδοῦς ὄντος ἐφ' ὧι ὥρμουν, ὁ μὲν 2
πεζὸς ἑκατέρωθεν προσβεβοηθηκὼς τῶν τε Κορινθίων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν
ξυμμάχων ἐπὶ ταῖς προανεχούσαις ἄκραις παρετέτακτο, αἱ δὲ νῆες τὸ
μεταξὺ εἶχον ἐμφάρξασαι· ἦρχε δὲ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ Πολυάνθης Κορίνθιος.
οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκ τῆς Ναυπάκτου τριάκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ τρισίν (ἦρχε δὲ 3
αὐτῶν Δίφιλος) ἐπέπλευσαν αὐτοῖς. καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον 4
ἡσύχαζον, ἔπειτα ἀρθέντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ σημείου, ἐπεὶ καιρὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι,
ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐναυμάχουν. καὶ χρόνον ἀντεῖχον 5
πολὺν ἀλλήλοις. καὶ τῶν μὲν Κορινθίων τρεῖς νῆες διαφθείρονται, τῶν
δ' Ἀθηναίων κατέδυ μὲν οὐδεμία ἁπλῶς, ἑπτὰ δέ τινες ἄπλοι ἐγένοντο
ἀντίπρωιροι ἐμβαλλόμεναι καὶ ἀναρραγεῖσαι τὰς παρεξειρεσίας ὑπὸ τῶν
Κορινθίων νεῶν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο παχυτέρας τὰς ἐπωτίδας ἐχουσῶν.
ναυμαχήσαντες δὲ ἀντίπαλα μὲν καὶ ὡς αὐτοὺς ἑκατέρους ἀξιοῦν νικᾶν, 6
ὅμως δὲ τῶν ναυαγίων κρατησάντων τῶν Ἀθηναίων διά τε τὴν τοῦ
ἀνέμου ἄπωσιν αὐτῶν ἐς τὸ πέλαγος καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν Κορινθίων οὐκέτι
ἐπαναγωγήν, διεκρίθησαν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ δίωξις οὐδεμία ἐγένετο, οὐδ'
ἄνδρες οὐδετέρων ἑάλωσαν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι πρὸς
τῆι γῆι ναυμαχοῦντες ῥαιδίως διεσώιζοντο, τῶν δὲ Ἀθηναίων οὐδεμία
κατέδυ ναῦς. ἀποπλευσάντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐς τὴν Ναύπακτον οἱ 7
Κορίνθιοι εὐθὺς τροπαῖον ἔστησαν ὡς νικῶντες, ὅτι πλείους τῶν ἐναντίων
ναῦς ἄπλους ἐποίησαν καὶ νομίσαντες αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἡσσᾶσθαι δι' ὅπερ
οὐδ' οἱ ἕτεροι νικᾶν· οἵ τε γὰρ Κορίνθιοι ἡγήσαντο κρατεῖν εἰ μὴ καὶ
πολὺ ἐκρατοῦντο, οἵ τ' Ἀθηναῖοι ἐνόμιζον ἡσσᾶσθαι ὅτι οὐ πολὺ ἐνίκων.
ἀποπλευσάντων δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ τοῦ πεζοῦ διαλυθέντος οἱ 8
Ἀθηναῖοι ἔστησαν τροπαῖον καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῆι Ἀχαΐαι ὡς νικήσαντες,
ἀπέχον τοῦ Ἐρινεοῦ, ἐν ὧι οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὥρμουν, ὡς εἴκοσι σταδίους. καὶ
ἡ μὲν ναυμαχία οὕτως ἐτελεύτα.

Ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Εὐρυμέδων, ἐπειδὴ ξυστρατεύειν αὐτοῖς οἱ Θούριοι **35**
παρεσκευάσθησαν ἑπτακοσίοις μὲν ὁπλίταις, τριακοσίοις δὲ ἀκοντισταῖς,
τὰς μὲν ναῦς παραπλεῖν ἐκέλευον ἐπὶ τῆς Κροτωνιάτιδος, αὐτοὶ δὲ τὸν
πεζὸν πάντα ἐξετάσαντες πρῶτον ἐπὶ τῶι Συβάρει ποταμῶι ἦγον διὰ

34.7 αὐτοὶ Stahl: αὐτὸ B, γρ. H²: δι' αὐτὸ ACEFGHM

2 τῆς Θουριάδος γῆς. καὶ ὡς ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ τῶι Ὑλίαι ποταμῶι καὶ αὐτοῖς οἱ Κροτωνιᾶται προσπέμψαντες εἶπον οὐκ ἂν σφίσι βουλομένοις εἶναι διὰ τῆς γῆς σφῶν τὸν στρατὸν ἰέναι, ἐπικαταβάντες ηὐλίσαντο πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ Ὑλίου· καὶ αἱ νῆες αὐτοῖς ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπήντων. τῆι δ' ὑστεραίαι ἀναβιβασάμενοι παρέπλεον, ἴσχοντες πρὸς ταῖς πόλεσι πλὴν Λοκρῶν, ἕως ἀφίκοντο ἐπὶ Πέτραν τῆς Ῥηγίνης.

36 Οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τούτωι πυνθανόμενοι αὐτῶν τὸν ἐπίπλουν αὖθις ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀποπειρᾶσαι ἐβούλοντο καὶ τῆι ἄλληι παρασκευῆι τοῦ πεζοῦ, ἥνπερ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο πρὶν ἐλθεῖν αὐτοὺς φθάσαι βουλόμενοι ξυνέλεγον.
2 παρεσκευάσαντο δὲ τό τε ἄλλο ναυτικὸν ὡς ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ναυμαχίας τι πλέον ἐνεῖδον σχήσοντες, καὶ τὰς πρώιρας τῶν νεῶν ξυντεμόντες ἐς ἔλασσον στεριφωτέρας ἐποίησαν, καὶ τὰς ἐπωτίδας ἐπέθεσαν ταῖς πρώιραις παχείας, καὶ ἀντηρίδας ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὑπέτειναν πρὸς τοὺς τοίχους ὡς ἐπὶ ἕξ πήχεις ἐντός τε καὶ ἔξωθεν· ὥιπερ τρόπωι καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῆι Ναυπάκτωι ναῦς ἐπισκευασάμενοι πρώιραθεν
3 ἐναυμάχουν. ἐνόμισαν γὰρ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πρὸς τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀντινεναυπηγημένας, ἀλλὰ λεπτὰ τὰ πρώιραθεν ἐχούσας διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιπρώιροις μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς ἢ ἐκ περίπλου ταῖς ἐμβολαῖς χρῆσθαι, οὐκ ἔλασσον σχήσειν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῶι μεγάλωι λιμένι ναυμαχίαν, οὐκ ἐν πολλῶι πολλαῖς ναυσὶν οὖσαν, πρὸς ἑαυτῶν ἔσεσθαι· ἀντιπρώιροις γὰρ ταῖς ἐμβολαῖς χρώμενοι ἀναρρήξειν τὰ πρώιραθεν αὐτοῖς, στερίφοις καὶ
4 παχέσι πρὸς κοῖλα καὶ ἀσθενῆ παίοντες τοῖς ἐμβόλοις. τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις οὐκ ἔσεσθαι σφῶν ἐν στενοχωρίαι οὔτε περίπλουν οὔτε διέκπλουν, ὥιπερ τῆς τέχνης μάλιστα ἐπίστευον· αὐτοὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν τὸ μὲν οὐ δώσειν διεκπλεῖν, τὸ δὲ τὴν στενοχωρίαν κωλύσειν ὥστε μὴ περιπλεῖν.
5 τῆι τε πρότερον ἀμαθίαι τῶν κυβερνητῶν δοκούσηι εἶναι, τὸ ἀντίπρωιρον ξυγκροῦσαι, μάλιστ' ἂν αὐτοὶ χρήσασθαι· πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶι σχήσειν· τὴν γὰρ ἀνάκρουσιν οὐκ ἔσεσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐξωθουμένοις ἄλλοσε ἢ ἐς τὴν γῆν, καὶ ταύτην δι' ὀλίγου καὶ ἐς ὀλίγον, κατ' αὐτὸ
6 τὸ στρατόπεδον τὸ ἑαυτῶν· τοῦ δ' ἄλλου λιμένος αὐτοὶ κρατήσειν. καὶ ξυμφερομένους αὐτούς, ἤν πηι βιάζωνται, ἐς ὀλίγον τε καὶ πάντας ἐς τὸ αὐτό, προσπίπτοντας ἀλλήλοις ταράξεσθαι (ὅπερ καὶ ἔβλαπτε μάλιστα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ναυμαχίαις, οὐκ οὔσης αὐτοῖς ἐς πάντα τὸν λιμένα τῆς ἀνακρούσεως, ὥσπερ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις)· περιπλεῦσαι δὲ ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, σφῶν ἐχόντων τὴν ἐπίπλευσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ πελάγους τε

36.3 ἀντιπρώιροις Reiske: ἀντίπρω(ι)ροι codd.

καὶ ἀνάκρουσιν, οὐ δυνήσεσθαι αὐτούς, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ Πλημμυρίου πολεμίου τε αὐτοῖς ἐσομένου καὶ τοῦ στόματος οὐ μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ λιμένος.

Τοιαῦτα οἱ Συρακόσιοι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ δύναμιν **37**
ἐπινοήσαντες καὶ ἅμα τεθαρσηκότες μᾶλλον ἤδη ἀπὸ τῆς προτέρας
ναυμαχίας, ἐπεχείρουν τῶι τε πεζῶι ἅμα καὶ ταῖς ναυσίν. καὶ τὸν μὲν πεζὸν 2
ὀλίγωι πρότερον τὸν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Γύλιππος προεξαγαγὼν προσῆγε τῶι
τείχει τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καθ' ὅσον πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῦ ἑώρα· καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ
τοῦ Ὀλυμπιείου, οἵ τε ὁπλῖται ὅσοι ἐκεῖ ἦσαν καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς καὶ ἡ γυμνητεία
τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα προσήιει τῶι τείχει· αἱ δὲ νῆες μετὰ
τοῦτο εὐθὺς ἐπεξέπλεον τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι 3
τὸ πρῶτον αὐτοὺς οἰόμενοι τῶι πεζῶι μόνωι πειράσειν, ὁρῶντες δὲ καὶ
τὰς ναῦς ἐπιφερομένας ἄφνω, ἐθορυβοῦντο, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ τείχη καὶ
πρὸ τῶν τειχῶν τοῖς προσιοῦσιν ἀντιπαρετάσσοντο, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ
τοῦ Ὀλυμπιείου καὶ τῶν ἔξω κατὰ τάχος χωροῦντας ἱππέας τε πολλοὺς
καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς ἀντεπεξῆισαν, ἄλλοι δὲ τὰς ναῦς ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἅμα ἐπὶ
τὸν αἰγιαλὸν παρεβοήθουν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πλήρεις ἦσαν, ἀντανῆγον πέντε
καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ναῦς· καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἦσαν ὀγδοήκοντα μάλιστα.
τῆς δὲ ἡμέρας ἐπὶ πολὺ προσπλέοντες καὶ ἀνακρουόμενοι καὶ πειράσαντες **38**
ἀλλήλων καὶ οὐδέτεροι δυνάμενοι ἄξιόν τι λόγου παραλαβεῖν, εἰ μὴ ναῦν
μίαν ἢ δύο τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ Συρακόσιοι καταδύσαντες, διεκρίθησαν· καὶ
ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν ἀπῆλθεν.

Τῆι δ' ὑστεραίαι οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ἡσύχαζον, οὐδὲν δηλοῦντες ὁποῖόν 2
τι τὸ μέλλον ποιήσουσιν· ὁ δὲ Νικίας ἰδὼν ἀντίπαλα τὰ τῆς ναυμαχίας
γενόμενα καὶ ἐλπίζων αὐτοὺς αὖθις ἐπιχειρήσειν τούς τε τριηράρχους
ἠνάγκαζεν ἐπισκευάζειν τὰς ναῦς, εἴ τίς τι ἐπεπονήκει, καὶ ὁλκάδας
προώρμισε πρὸ τοῦ σφετέρου σταυρώματος, ὃ αὐτοῖς πρὸ τῶν νεῶν
ἀντὶ λιμένος κληιστοῦ ἐν τῆι θαλάσσηι ἐπεπήγει. διαλειπούσας δὲ 3
τὰς ὁλκάδας ὅσον δύο πλέθρα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων κατέστησεν, ὅπως, εἴ τις
βιάζοιτο ναῦς, εἴη κατάφευξις ἀσφαλὴς καὶ πάλιν καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἔκπλους.
παρασκευαζόμενοι δὲ ταῦτα ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν διετέλεσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι
μέχρι νυκτός.

Τῆι δ' ὑστεραίαι οἱ Συρακόσιοι τῆς μὲν ὥρας πρωίτερον, τῆι δ' **39**
ἐπιχειρήσει τῆι αὐτῆι τοῦ τε πεζοῦ καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ προσέμισγον τοῖς
Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ ἀντικαταστάντες ταῖς ναυσὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον αὖθις 2
ἐπὶ πολὺ διῆγον τῆς ἡμέρας πειρώμενοι ἀλλήλων, πρὶν δὴ Ἀρίστων
ὁ Πυρρίχου Κορίνθιος, ἄριστος ὢν κυβερνήτης τῶν μετὰ Συρακοσίων,
πείθει τοὺς σφετέρους τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἄρχοντας, πέμψαντας ὡς τοὺς ἐν τῆι

πόλει ἐπιμελομένους, κελεύειν ὅτι τάχιστα τὴν ἀγορὰν τῶν πωλουμένων μεταναστήσαντας ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν κομίσαι, καὶ ὅσα τις ἔχει ἐδώδιμα, πάντας ἐκεῖσε φέροντας ἀναγκάσαι πωλεῖν, ὅπως αὐτοῖς ἐκβιβάσαντες τοὺς ναύτας εὐθὺς παρὰ τὰς ναῦς ἀριστοποιήσωνται καὶ δι' ὀλίγου
40 αὖθις καὶ αὐθημερὸν ἀπροσδοκήτοις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιχειρῶσιν. καὶ οἱ μὲν πεισθέντες ἔπεμψαν ἄγγελον, καὶ ἡ ἀγορὰ παρεσκευάσθη, καὶ
2 οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐξαίφνης πρύμναν κρουσάμενοι πάλιν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἔπλευσαν καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκβάντες αὐτοῦ ἄριστον ἐποιοῦντο· οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι νομίσαντες αὐτοὺς ὡς ἡσσημένους σφῶν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἀνακρούσασθαι, καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἐκβάντες τά τε ἄλλα διεπράσσοντο καὶ τὰ ἀμφὶ τὸ ἄριστον
3 ὡς τῆς γε ἡμέρας ταύτης οὐκέτι οἰόμενοι ἂν ναυμαχῆσαι. ἐξαίφνης δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πληρώσαντες τὰς ναῦς ἐπέπλεον αὖθις· οἱ δὲ διὰ πολλοῦ θορύβου καὶ ἄσιτοι οἱ πλείους οὐδενὶ κόσμωι ἐσβάντες μόλις ποτὲ
4 ἀντανήγοντο. καὶ χρόνον μέν τινα ἀπέσχοντο ἀλλήλων φυλασσόμενοι· ἔπειτα οὐκ ἐδόκει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὑπὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν διαμέλλοντας κόπωι ἁλίσκεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπιχειρεῖν ὅτι τάχιστα, καὶ ἐπιφερόμενοι ἐκ
5 παρακελεύσεως ἐναυμάχουν. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι δεξάμενοι καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀντιπρῴροις χρώμενοι, ὥσπερ διενοήθησαν, τῶν ἐμβόλων τῆι παρασκευῆι ἀνερρήγνυσαν τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς ἐπὶ πολὺ τῆς παρεξειρεσίας, καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων αὐτοῖς ἀκοντίζοντες μεγάλα ἔβλαπτον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πολὺ δ' ἔτι μείζω οἱ ἐν τοῖς λεπτοῖς πλοίοις περιπλέοντες τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ἔς τε τοὺς ταρσοὺς ὑποπίπτοντες τῶν πολεμίων νεῶν καὶ ἐς τὰ πλάγια παραπλέοντες καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐς τοὺς ναύτας
41 ἀκοντίζοντες. τέλος δὲ τούτωι τῶι τρόπωι κατὰ κράτος ναυμαχοῦντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐνίκησαν, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τραπόμενοι διὰ τῶν ὁλκάδων
2 τὴν κατάφευξιν ἐποιοῦντο ἐς τὸν ἑαυτῶν ὅρμον. αἱ δὲ τῶν Συρακοσίων νῆες μέχρι μὲν τῶν ὁλκάδων ἐπεδίωκον· ἔπειτα αὐτοὺς αἱ κεραῖαι ὑπὲρ
3 τῶν ἔσπλων αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁλκάδων δελφινοφόροι ἠρμέναι ἐκώλυον. δύο δὲ νῆες τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐπαιρόμεναι τῆι νίκηι προσέμειξαν αὐτῶν ἐγγὺς
4 καὶ διεφθάρησαν, καὶ ἡ ἑτέρα αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἑάλω. καταδύσαντες δ' οἱ Συρακόσιοι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἑπτὰ ναῦς καὶ κατατραυματίσαντες πολλάς, ἄνδρας τε τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς ζωγρήσαντες τοὺς δὲ ἀποκτείναντες ἀπεχώρησαν, καὶ τροπαῖά τε ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ναυμαχιῶν ἔστησαν, καὶ τὴν ἐλπίδα ἤδη ἐχυρὰν εἶχον ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶ καὶ πολὺ κρείσσους εἶναι, ἐδόκουν δὲ καὶ τὸν πεζὸν χειρώσεσθαι.

40.5 δεξάμενοι καὶ uett.: δεξάμενοι ἠμύνοντο καὶ Pl Ud καὶ ante ἐξ αὐτῶν om. Q

Καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡς ἐπιθησόμενοι κατ' ἀμφότερα παρεσκευάζοντο αὖθις· ἐν **42**
τούτωι δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Εὐρυμέδων ἔχοντες τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων
βοήθειαν παραγίγνονται, ναῦς τε τρεῖς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα μάλιστα ξὺν ταῖς
ξενικαῖς καὶ ὁπλίτας περὶ πεντακισχιλίους ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων,
ἀκοντιστάς τε βαρβάρους καὶ Ἕλληνας οὐκ ὀλίγους, καὶ σφενδονήτας
καὶ τοξότας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἱκανήν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν Συρακοσίοις 2
καὶ ξυμμάχοις κατάπληξις ἐν τῶι αὐτίκα οὐκ ὀλίγη ἐγένετο, εἰ πέρας
μηδὲν ἔσται σφίσι τοῦ ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ κινδύνου, ὁρῶντες οὔτε διὰ τὴν
Δεκέλειαν τειχιζομένην οὐδὲν ἧσσον στρατὸν ἴσον καὶ παραπλήσιον τῶι
προτέρωι ἐπεληλυθότα τήν τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων δύναμιν πανταχόσε πολλὴν
φαινομένην· τῶι δὲ προτέρωι στρατεύματι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὡς ἐκ κακῶν
ῥώμη τις ἐγεγένητο. ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ἰδὼν ὡς εἶχε τὰ πράγματα καὶ 3
νομίσας οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι διατρίβειν οὐδὲ παθεῖν ὅπερ ὁ Νικίας ἔπαθεν
(ἀφικόμενος γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ὁ Νικίας φοβερός, ὡς οὐκ εὐθὺς προσέκειτο
ταῖς Συρακούσαις ἀλλ' ἐν Κατάνηι διεχείμαζεν, ὑπερώφθη τε καὶ ἔφθασεν
αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου στρατιᾶι ὁ Γύλιππος ἀφικόμενος, ἢν οὐδ' ἂν
μετέπεμψαν οἱ Συρακόσιοι, εἰ ἐκεῖνος εὐθὺς ἐπέκειτο· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ
οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἅμα τ' ἂν ἔμαθον ἥσσους ὄντες καὶ ἀποτετειχισμένοι ἂν
ἦσαν, ὥστε μηδ' εἰ μετέπεμψαν ἔτι ὁμοίως ἂν αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖν), ταῦτα οὖν
ἀνασκοπῶν ὁ Δημοσθένης, καὶ γιγνώσκων ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῶι παρόντι
τῆι πρώτηι ἡμέραι μάλιστα δεινότατός ἐστι τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐβούλετο ὅτι
τάχος ἀποχρήσασθαι τῆι παρούσηι τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐκπλήξει. καὶ 4
ὁρῶν τὸ παρατείχισμα τῶν Συρακοσίων, ὧι ἐκώλυσαν περιτειχίσαι σφᾶς
τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἁπλοῦν ὂν καί, εἰ ἐπικρατήσειέ τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν
τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ αὖθις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου, ῥαιδίως ἂν αὐτὸ
ληφθέν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπομεῖναι ἂν σφᾶς οὐδένα), ἠπείγετο ἐπιθέσθαι τῆι
πείραι, καί οἱ ξυντομωτάτην ἡγεῖτο διαπολέμησιν· ἢ γὰρ κατορθώσας 5
ἕξειν Συρακούσας, ἢ ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιὰν καὶ οὐ τρίψεσθαι ἄλλως
Ἀθηναίους τε τοὺς ξυστρατευομένους καὶ τὴν ξύμπασαν πόλιν.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τήν τε γῆν ἐξελθόντες τῶν Συρακοσίων ἔτεμνον οἱ 6
Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ τὸν Ἄναπον, καὶ τῶι στρατεύματι ἐπεκράτουν ὥσπερ
τὸ πρῶτον, τῶι τε πεζῶι καὶ ταῖς ναυσίν (οὐδὲ γὰρ καθ' ἕτερα οἱ
Συρακόσιοι ἀντεπεξῆισαν ὅτι μὴ τοῖς ἱππεῦσι καὶ ἀκοντισταῖς ἀπὸ
τοῦ Ὀλυμπιείου)· ἔπειτα μηχαναῖς ἔδοξε τῶι Δημοσθένει πρότερον **43**
ἀποπειρᾶσαι τοῦ παρατειχίσματος. ὡς δὲ αὐτῶι προσαγαγόντι

κατεκαύθησάν τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους ἀμυνομένων αἱ μηχαναὶ καὶ τῇι ἄλληι στρατιᾶι πολλαχῆι προσβάλλοντες ἀπεκρούοντο, οὐκέτι ἐδόκει διατρίβειν, ἀλλὰ πείσας τόν τε Νικίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυνάρχοντας, ὡς ἐπενόει, τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ἐποιεῖτο.
2 καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν ἀδύνατα ἐδόκει εἶναι λαθεῖν προσελθόντας τε καὶ ἀναβάντας, παραγγείλας δὲ πέντε ἡμερῶν σιτία καὶ τοὺς λιθολόγους καὶ τέκτονας πάντας λαβὼν καὶ ἄλλην παρασκευὴν τοξευμάτων τε καὶ ὅσα ἔδει, ἢν κρατῶσι, τειχίζοντας ἔχειν, αὐτὸς μὲν ἀπὸ πρώτου ὕπνου καὶ Εὐρυμέδων καὶ Μένανδρος ἀναλαβὼν τὴν πᾶσαν στρατιὰν ἐχώρει
3 πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς, Νικίας δὲ ἐν τοῖς τείχεσιν ὑπελέλειπτο. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο πρὸς αὐταῖς κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον, ἥιπερ καὶ ἡ προτέρα στρατιὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἀνέβη, λανθάνουσί τε τοὺς φύλακας τῶν Συρακοσίων, καὶ προσβάντες τὸ τείχισμα ὃ ἦν αὐτόθι τῶν Συρακοσίων αἱροῦσι καὶ ἄνδρας
4 τινὰς τῶν φυλάκων ἀποκτείνουσιν. οἱ δὲ πλείους διαφυγόντες εὐθὺς πρὸς τὰ στρατόπεδα, ἃ ἦν ἐπὶ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν τρία ἐν προτειχίσμασιν, ἓν μὲν τῶν Συρακοσίων, ἓν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Σικελιωτῶν, ἓν δὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ἀγγέλλουσι τὴν ἔφοδον καὶ τοῖς ἑξακοσίοις τῶν Συρακοσίων, οἳ καὶ
5 πρῶτοι κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν φύλακες ἦσαν, ἔφραζον. οἱ δ' ἐβοήθουν τ' εὐθύς, καὶ αὐτοῖς ὁ Δημοσθένης καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐντυχόντες ἀμυνομένους προθύμως ἔτρεψαν. καὶ αὐτοὶ μὲν εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν, ὅπως τῇι παρούσηι ὁρμῇι τοῦ περαίνεσθαι ὧν ἕνεκα ἦλθον μὴ βραδεῖς γένωνται· ἄλλοι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης τὸ παρατείχισμα τῶν Συρακοσίων οὐχ ὑπομενόντων τῶν φυλάκων ἤιρουν τε καὶ τὰς ἐπάλξεις
6 ἀπέσυρον. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ ἐβοήθουν ἐκ τῶν προτειχισμάτων, καὶ ἀδοκήτου τοῦ τολμήματος σφίσιν ἐν νυκτὶ γενομένου προσέβαλλόν τε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐκπεπληγμένοι
7 καὶ βιασθέντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν τὸ πρῶτον ὑπεχώρησαν. προϊόντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν ἀταξίαι μᾶλλον ἤδη ὡς κεκρατηκότων καὶ βουλομένων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ μήπω μεμαχημένου τῶν ἐναντίων ὡς τάχιστα διελθεῖν, ἵνα μὴ ἀνέντων σφῶν τῆς ἐφόδου αὖθις ξυστραφῶσιν, οἱ Βοιωτοὶ πρῶτοι αὐτοῖς ἀντέσχον καὶ προσβαλόντες ἔτρεψάν τε καὶ ἐς φυγὴν κατέστησαν.

44 Καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἐν πολλῆι ταραχῆι καὶ ἀπορίαι ἐγίγνοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢν οὐδὲ πυθέσθαι ῥάιδιον ἦν οὐδ' ἀφ' ἑτέρων ὅτωι τρόπωι ἕκαστα ξυνηνέχθη. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἡμέραι σαφέστερα μέν, ὅμως δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα οἱ παραγενόμενοι πάντα πλὴν τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος μόλις οἶδεν· ἐν δὲ νυκτομαχίαι, ἣ μόνη δὴ στρατοπέδων μεγάλων ἔν γε τῶιδε
2 τῶι πολέμωι ἐγένετο, πῶς ἄν τις σαφῶς τι ἤιδει; ἦν μὲν γὰρ σελήνη λαμπρά, ἑώρων δὲ οὕτως ἀλλήλους ὡς ἐν σελήνηι εἰκὸς τὴν μὲν ὄψιν τοῦ σώματος προορᾶν, τὴν δὲ γνῶσιν τοῦ οἰκείου ἀπιστεῖσθαι. ὁπλῖται δὲ

43.1 ὡς ἐπενόει BPl Ud: ὡς ἐπενόει καὶ H: ἐπενόει καὶ cett.

ἀμφοτέρων οὐκ ὀλίγοι ἐν στενοχωρίαι ἀνεστρέφοντο. καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων 3
οἱ μὲν ἤδη ἐνικῶντο, οἱ δ' ἔτι τῆι πρώτηι ἐφόδωι ἀήσσητοι ἐχώρουν.
πολὺ δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου στρατεύματος αὐτοῖς τὸ μὲν ἄρτι ἀνεβεβήκει,
τὸ δ' ἔτι προσανήιει, ὥστ' οὐκ ἠπίσταντο πρὸς ὅτι χρὴ χωρῆσαι. ἤδη
γὰρ τὰ πρόσθεν τῆς τροπῆς γεγενημένης ἐτετάρακτο πάντα καὶ χαλεπὰ
ἦν ὑπὸ τῆς βοῆς διαγνῶναι. οἵ τε γὰρ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὡς 4
κρατοῦντες παρεκελεύοντό τε κραυγῆι οὐκ ὀλίγηι χρώμενοι, ἀδύνατον ὂν
ἐν νυκτὶ ἄλλωι τωι σημῆναι, καὶ ἅμα τοὺς προσφερομένους ἐδέχοντο· οἵ
τε Ἀθηναῖοι ἐζήτουν τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίας, καὶ εἰ φίλιον
εἴη τῶν ἤδη πάλιν φευγόντων, πολέμιον ἐνόμιζον, καὶ τοῖς ἐρωτήμασι
τοῦ ξυνθήματος πυκνοῖς χρώμενοι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἄλλωι τωι γνωρίσαι
σφίσι τε αὐτοῖς θόρυβον πολὺν παρεῖχον ἅμα πάντες ἐρωτῶντες καὶ τοῖς
πολεμίοις σαφὲς αὐτὸ κατέστησαν· τὸ δ' ἐκείνων οὐχ ὁμοίως ἠπίσταντο 5
διὰ τὸ κρατοῦντας αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ διεσπασμένους ἧσσον ἀγνοεῖσθαι,
ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἐντύχοιέν τισι κρείσσους ὄντες τῶν πολεμίων, διέφευγον
αὐτοὺς ἅτε ἐκείνων ἐπιστάμενοι τὸ ξύνθημα, εἰ δ' αὐτοὶ μὴ ὑποκρίνοιντο,
διεφθείροντο. μέγιστον δὲ καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα ἔβλαψε καὶ ὁ παιανισμός· 6
ἀπὸ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων παραπλήσιος ὢν ἀπορίαν παρεῖχεν. οἵ τε γὰρ
Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι καὶ ὅσον Δωρικὸν μετ' Ἀθηναίων ἦν, ὁπότε
παιανίσειαν, φόβον παρεῖχε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, οἵ τε πολέμιοι ὁμοίως. ὥστε 7
τέλος ξυμπεσόντες αὐτοῖς κατὰ πολλὰ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, ἐπεὶ ἅπαξ
ἐταράχθησαν, φίλοι τε φίλοις καὶ πολῖται πολίταις, οὐ μόνον ἐς φόβον
κατέστησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐς χεῖρας ἀλλήλοις ἐλθόντες μόλις ἀπελύοντο.
καὶ διωκόμενοι κατά τε τῶν κρημνῶν οἱ πολλοὶ ῥίπτοντες ἑαυτοὺς 8
ἀπώλλυντο, στενῆς οὔσης τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν πάλιν καταβάσεως,
καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐς τὸ ὁμαλὸν οἱ σωιζόμενοι ἄνωθεν καταβαῖεν, οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ
αὐτῶν καὶ ὅσοι ἦσαν τῶν προτέρων στρατιωτῶν ἐμπειρίαι μᾶλλον τῆς
χώρας ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον διεφύγγανον, οἱ δὲ ὕστερον ἥκοντες εἰσὶν
οἳ διαμαρτόντες τῶν ὁδῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἐπλανήθησαν· οὓς, ἐπειδὴ
ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, οἱ ἱππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων περιελάσαντες διέφθειραν.

Τῆι δ' ὑστεραίαι οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι δύο τροπαῖα ἔστησαν, ἐπί τε ταῖς **45**
Ἐπιπολαῖς ἧι ἡ πρόσβασις καὶ κατὰ τὸ χωρίον ἧι οἱ Βοιωτοὶ πρῶτον
ἀντέστησαν, οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἐκομίσαντο.
ἀπέθανον δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅπλα μέντοι ἔτι 2
πλείω ἢ κατὰ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἐλήφθη· οἱ γὰρ κατὰ τῶν κρημνῶν βιασθέντες
ἄλλεσθαι ψιλοὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἀσπίδων οἱ μὲν ἀπώλλυντο, οἱ δ' ἐσώθησαν.

44.7 κατέστησαν ACEFGHMZ: καθίστασαν H²: καθίστησαν B **45**.2 ἄνευ τῶν ἀσπίδων del. Haacke

46 Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ὡς ἐπὶ ἀπροσδοκήτωι εὐπραγίαι πάλιν αὖ ἀναρρωσθέντες, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, ἐς μὲν Ἀκράγαντα στασιάζοντα πεντεκαίδεκα ναυσὶ Σικανὸν ἀπέστειλαν, ὅπως ἐπαγάγοιτο τὴν πόλιν, εἰ δύναιτο· Γύλιππος δὲ κατὰ γῆν ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Σικελίαν ὥιχετο αὖθις, ἄξων στρατιὰν ἔτι, ὡς ἐν ἐλπίδι ὢν καὶ τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων αἱρήσειν βίαι, ἐπειδὴ τὰ ἐν ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς οὕτω ξυνέβη.

47 Οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ἐν τούτωι ἐβουλεύοντο πρός τε τὴν γεγενημένην ξυμφορὰν καὶ πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν ἐν τῶι στρατοπέδωι κατὰ πάντα ἀρρωστίαν. τοῖς τε γὰρ ἐπιχειρήμασιν ἑώρων οὐ κατορθοῦντες
2 καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ἀχθομένους τῆι μονῆι· νόσωι τε γὰρ ἐπιέζοντο κατ' ἀμφότερα, τῆς τε ὥρας τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ταύτης οὔσης ἐν ἧι ἀσθενοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι μάλιστα, καὶ τὸ χωρίον ἅμα ἐν ὧι ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο ἑλῶδες
3 καὶ χαλεπὸν ἦν, τά τε ἄλλα ὅτι ἀνέλπιστα αὐτοῖς ἐφαίνετο. τῶι οὖν Δημοσθένει οὐκ ἐδόκει ἔτι χρῆναι μένειν, ἀλλ' ἅπερ καὶ διανοηθεὶς ἐς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς διεκινδύνευσεν, ἐπειδὴ ἔσφαλτο, ἀπιέναι ἐψηφίζετο καὶ μὴ διατρίβειν, ἕως ἔτι τὸ πέλαγος οἷόν τε περαιοῦσθαι καὶ τοῦ στρατεύματος
4 ταῖς γοῦν ἐπελθούσαις ναυσὶ κρατεῖν. καὶ τῆι πόλει ὠφελιμώτερον ἔφη εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῆι χώραι σφῶν ἐπιτειχίζοντας τὸν πόλεμον ποιεῖσθαι ἢ Συρακοσίους, οὓς οὐκέτι ῥάιδιον εἶναι χειρώσασθαι· οὐδ' αὖ ἄλλως χρήματα πολλὰ δαπανῶντας εἰκὸς εἶναι προσκαθῆσθαι.

48 Καὶ ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης τοιαῦτα ἐγίγνωσκεν· ὁ δὲ Νικίας ἐνόμιζε μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς πόνηρα σφῶν τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τῶι δὲ λόγωι οὐκ ἐβούλετο αὐτὰ ἀσθενῆ ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐδ' ἐμφανῶς σφᾶς ψηφιζομένους μετὰ πολλῶν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τοῖς πολεμίοις καταγγέλτους γίγνεσθαι· λαθεῖν
2 γὰρ ἄν, ὁπότε βούλοιντο, τοῦτο ποιοῦντες πολλῶι ἧσσον. τὸ δέ τι καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων, ἀφ' ὧν ἐπὶ πλέον ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἠισθάνετο αὐτῶν, ἐλπίδος τι ἔτι παρεῖχε πονηρότερα τῶν σφετέρων ἔσεσθαι, ἢν καρτερῶσι προσκαθήμενοι· χρημάτων γὰρ ἀπορίαι αὐτοὺς ἐκτρυχώσειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον ἤδη ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις ναυσὶ θαλασσοκρατούντων. καὶ ἦν γάρ τι καὶ ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις βουλόμενον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὰ πράγματα ἐνδοῦναι, ἐπεκηρυκεύετο ὡς αὐτὸν καὶ οὐκ εἴα ἀπανίστασθαι.
3 ἃ ἐπιστάμενος τῶι μὲν ἔργωι ἔτι ἐπ' ἀμφότερα ἔχων καὶ διασκοπῶν ἀνεῖχε, τῶι δ' ἐμφανεῖ τότε λόγωι οὐκ ἔφη ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιάν. εὖ γὰρ εἰδέναι ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι σφῶν ταῦτα οὐκ ἀποδέξονται, ὥστε μὴ αὐτῶν ψηφισαμένων ἀπελθεῖν. καὶ γὰρ οὐ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ψηφιεῖσθαί τε περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ πράγματα ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁρῶντας καὶ οὐκ ἄλλων

46 ἐπαγάγοιτο Pluygers: ὑπαγάγοιτο codd. **48**.3 αὐτῶν post σφῶν del. Bekker

ἐπιτιμήσει ἀκούσαντας γνώσεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις εὖ λέγων διαβάλλοι, ἐκ τούτων αὐτοὺς πείσεσθαι. τῶν τε παρόντων στρατιωτῶν πολλοὺς καὶ 4
τοὺς πλείους ἔφη, οἳ νῦν βοῶσιν ὡς ἐν δεινοῖς ὄντες, ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένους τἀναντία βοήσεσθαι ὡς ὑπὸ χρημάτων καταπροδόντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀπῆλθον. οὔκουν βούλεσθαι αὐτός γε ἐπιστάμενος τὰς Ἀθηναίων φύσεις ἐπ' αἰσχρᾶι τε αἰτίαι καὶ ἀδίκως ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἀπολέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, εἰ δεῖ, κινδυνεύσας τοῦτο παθεῖν ἰδίαι. τά τε Συρακοσίων 5
ἔφη ὅμως ἔτι ἥσσω τῶν σφετέρων εἶναι· καὶ χρήμασι γὰρ αὐτοὺς ξενοτροφοῦντας καὶ ἐν περιπολίοις ἅμα ἀναλίσκοντας καὶ ναυτικὸν πολὺ ἔτι ἐνιαυτὸν ἤδη βόσκοντας τὰ μὲν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ δ' ἔτι ἀμηχανήσειν· δισχίλιά τε γὰρ τάλαντα ἤδη ἀνηλωκέναι καὶ ἔτι πολλὰ προσοφείλειν· ἢν τε καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἐκλίπωσι τῆς νῦν παρασκευῆς τῶι μὴ διδόναι τροφήν, φθερεῖσθαι αὐτῶν τὰ πράγματα, ἐπικουρικὰ μᾶλλον ἢ δι' ἀνάγκης ὥσπερ τὰ σφέτερα ὄντα. τρίβειν οὖν ἔφη χρῆναι προσκαθημένους καὶ μὴ 6
χρήμασιν, ὧι πολὺ κρείσσους εἰσί, νικηθέντας ἀπιέναι.

Ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοσαῦτα λέγων ἰσχυρίζετο, αἰσθόμενος τὰ ἐν ταῖς **49**
Συρακούσαις ἀκριβῶς καὶ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἀπορίαν καὶ ὅτι ἦν αὐτόθι πολὺ τὸ βουλόμενον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις γίγνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα καὶ ἐπικηρυκευόμενον πρὸς αὐτὸν ὥστε μὴ ἀπανίστασθαι, καὶ ἅμα ταῖς γοῦν ναυσὶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ἐθάρσησε κρατήσειν. ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης περὶ μὲν 2
τοῦ προσκαθῆσθαι οὐδ' ὁπωσοῦν ἐνεδέχετο· εἰ δὲ δεῖ μὴ ἀπάγειν τὴν στρατιὰν ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων ψηφίσματος ἀλλὰ τρίβειν αὐτούς, ἔφη χρῆναι ἢ ἐς τὴν Θάψον ἀναστάντας τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ ἐς τὴν Κατάνην, ὅθεν τῶι τε πεζῶι ἐπὶ πολλὰ τῆς χώρας ἐπιόντες θρέψονται πορθοῦντες τὰ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ ἐκείνους βλάψουσι, ταῖς τε ναυσὶν ἐν πελάγει καὶ οὐκ ἐν στενοχωρίαι, ἢ πρὸς τῶν πολεμίων μᾶλλόν ἐστι, τοὺς ἀγῶνας ποιήσονται, ἀλλ' ἐν εὐρυχωρίαι, ἐν ἧι τά τε τῆς ἐμπειρίας χρήσιμα σφῶν ἔσται καὶ ἀναχωρήσεις καὶ ἐπίπλους οὐκ ἐκ βραχέος καὶ περιγραπτοῦ ὁρμώμενοί τε καὶ καταίροντες ἔξουσιν. τό τε ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν, οὐδενὶ τρόπωι οἱ ἔφη 3
ἀρέσκειν ἐν τῶι αὐτῶι ἔτι μένειν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τάχιστα ἤδη ἐξανίστασθαι καὶ μὴ μέλλειν. καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων αὐτῶι ταῦτα ξυνηγόρευεν. ἀντιλέγοντος 4
δὲ τοῦ Νικίου ὄκνος τις καὶ μέλλησις ἐνεγένετο καὶ ἅμα ὑπόνοια μή τι

49.1 πολὺ Linwood: που BH Pl Ud: om. ACEFGM **49**.1 μᾶλλον Linwood: θαρσῶν γρ. Ud¹: θαρρῶν BH: om. ACEFGM **49**.1 ἐθάρσησε BH, γρ. Ud¹: θαρσήσει ACEFGM **49**.1 κρατήσειν Linwood: κρατηθείς codd. **49**.3 ἐξανίστασθαι καὶ μὴ μέλλειν Haase: καὶ μὴ μέλλειν ἐξανίστασθαι codd.

καὶ πλέον εἰδὼς ὁ Νικίας ἰσχυρίζηται. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι τούτωι τῶι τρόπωι διεμέλλησάν τε καὶ κατὰ χώραν ἔμενον.

50 Ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος καὶ ὁ Σικανὸς ἐν τούτωι παρῆσαν ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας, ὁ μὲν Σικανὸς ἁμαρτὼν τοῦ Ἀκράγαντος (ἐν Γέλαι γὰρ ὄντος αὐτοῦ ἔτι ἡ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις στάσις [ἐς] φιλία ἐξεπεπτώκει)· ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος ἄλλην τε στρατιὰν πολλὴν ἔχων ἦλθεν ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου τοῦ ἦρος ἐν ταῖς ὁλκάσιν ὁπλίτας ἀποσταλέντας,
2 ἀφικομένους ἀπὸ τῆς Λιβύης ἐς Σελινοῦντα. ἀπενεχθέντες γὰρ ἐς Λιβύην, καὶ δόντων Κυρηναίων τριήρεις δύο καὶ τοῦ πλοῦ ἡγεμόνας, καὶ ἐν τῶι παράπλωι Εὐεσπερίταις πολιορκουμένοις ὑπὸ Λιβύων ξυμμαχήσαντες καὶ νικήσαντες τοὺς Λίβυς, καὶ αὐτόθεν παραπλεύσαντες ἐς Νέαν πόλιν Καρχηδονιακὸν ἐμπόριον, ὅθενπερ Σικελία ἐλάχιστον δυοῖν ἡμερῶν καὶ νυκτὸς πλοῦν ἀπέχει, καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ περαιωθέντες
3 ἀφίκοντο ἐς Σελινοῦντα. καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι εὐθὺς αὐτῶν ἐλθόντων παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς ἐπιθησόμενοι κατ' ἀμφότερα αὖθις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῶι· οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ὁρῶντες στρατιάν τε ἄλλην προσγεγενημένην αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἅμα οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον χωροῦντα, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἡμέραν τοῖς πᾶσι χαλεπώτερον ἴσχοντα, μάλιστα δὲ τῆι ἀσθενείαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πιεζόμενα, μετεμέλοντό τε πρότερον οὐκ ἀναστάντες καὶ ὡς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ὁ Νικίας ἔτι ὁμοίως ἐνηντιοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἢ μὴ φανερῶς γε ἀξιῶν ψηφίζεσθαι, προεῖπον ὡς ἐδύναντο ἀδηλότατα ἔκπλουν ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου πᾶσι, καὶ παρασκευάσασθαι ὅταν τις
4 σημήνηι. καὶ μελλόντων αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ ἑτοῖμα ἦν, ἀποπλεῖν ἡ σελήνη ἐκλείπει· ἐτύγχανε γὰρ πασσέληνος οὖσα. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οἵ τε πλείους ἐπισχεῖν ἐκέλευον τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἐνθύμιον ποιούμενοι, καὶ ὁ Νικίας (ἦν γάρ τι καὶ ἄγαν θειασμῶι τε καὶ τῶι τοιούτωι προσκείμενος) οὐδ' ἂν διαβουλεύσασθαι ἔτι ἔφη πρίν, ὡς οἱ μάντεις ἐξηγοῦντο, τρὶς ἐννέα ἡμέρας μεῖναι, ὅπως ἂν πρότερον κινηθείη. καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις μελλήσασι διὰ τοῦτο ἡ μονὴ ἐγεγένητο.

51 Οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῦτο πυθόμενοι πολλῶι μᾶλλον ἐπηρμένοι ἦσαν μὴ ἀνιέναι τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὡς καὶ αὐτῶν κατεγνωκότων ἤδη μηκέτι κρεισσόνων εἶναι σφῶν μήτε ταῖς ναυσὶ μήτε τῶι πεζῶι (οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸν ἔκπλουν ἐπιβουλεῦσαι), καὶ ἅμα οὐ βουλόμενοι αὐτοὺς ἄλλοσέ ποι τῆς Σικελίας καθεζομένους χαλεπωτέρους εἶναι προσπολεμεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ
2 ὡς τάχιστα καὶ ἐν ὧι σφίσι ξυμφέρει ἀναγκάσαι αὐτοὺς ναυμαχεῖν. τὰς

50.1 ἐς del. Bauer **50**.2 ὅθενπερ Σικελία Böhme: ὅθεν πρὸς Σικελίαν codd.

οὖν ναῦς ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἀνεπειρῶντο ἡμέρας ὅσαι αὐτοῖς ἐδόκουν ἱκαναὶ εἶναι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καιρὸς ἦν, τῇι μὲν προτέραι πρὸς τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων προσέβαλλον, καὶ ἐπεξελθόντος μέρους τινὸς οὐ πολλοῦ καὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἱππέων κατά τινας πύλας ἀπολαμβάνουσί τε τῶν ὁπλιτῶν τινὰς καὶ τρεψάμενοι καταδιώκουσιν· οὔσης δὲ στενῆς τῆς ἐσόδου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἵππους τε ἑβδομήκοντα ἀπολλύασι καὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν οὐ πολλούς.

Καὶ ταύτηι μὲν τῆι ἡμέραι ἀπεχώρησεν ἡ στρατιὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων· **52**
τῆι δ' ὑστεραίαι ταῖς τε ναυσὶν ἐκπλέουσιν οὔσαις ἓξ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ τῶι πεζῶι ἅμα πρὸς τὰ τείχη ἐχώρουν. οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι ἀντανῆγον ναυσὶν ἓξ καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ προσμείξαντες ἐναυμάχουν. καὶ τὸν Εὐρυμέδοντα 2
ἔχοντα τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ βουλόμενον περικλήισασθαι τὰς ναῦς τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ ἐπεξάγοντα τῶι πλῶι πρὸς τὴν γῆν μᾶλλον, νικήσαντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τὸ μέσον πρῶτον τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπολαμβάνουσι κἀκεῖνον ἐν τῶι κοίλωι καὶ μυχῶι τοῦ λιμένος καὶ αὐτόν τε διαφθείρουσι καὶ τὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ ναῦς ἐπισπομένας· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὰς πάσας ἤδη ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατεδίωκόν τε καὶ ἐξεώθουν ἐς τὴν γῆν.

Ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος ὁρῶν τὰς ναῦς τῶν πολεμίων νικωμένας καὶ ἔξω τῶν **53**
σταυρωμάτων καὶ τοῦ ἑαυτῶν στρατοπέδου καταφερομένας, βουλόμενος διαφθείρειν τοὺς ἐκβαίνοντας καὶ τὰς ναῦς ῥᾴιον τοὺς Συρακοσίους ἀφέλκειν τῆς γῆς φιλίας οὔσης, παρεβοήθει ἐπὶ τὴν χηλὴν μέρος τι ἔχων τῆς στρατιᾶς. καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ Τυρσηνοί (οὗτοι γὰρ ἐφύλασσον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ταύτηι) 2
ὁρῶντες ἀτάκτως προσφερομένους, ἐπεκβοηθήσαντες καὶ προσπεσόντες τοῖς πρώτοις τρέπουσι καὶ ἐσβάλλουσιν ἐς τὴν λίμνην τὴν Λυσιμέλειαν καλουμένην. ὕστερον δὲ πλέονος ἤδη τοῦ στρατεύματος παρόντος τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ 3
ξυμμάχων καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπιβοηθήσαντες καὶ δείσαντες περὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐς μάχην τε κατέστησαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ νικήσαντες ἐπεδίωξαν καὶ ὁπλίτας τε οὐ πολλοὺς ἀπέκτειναν καὶ τὰς ναῦς τὰς μὲν πολλὰς διέσωσάν τε καὶ ξυνήγαγον κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον, δυοῖν δὲ δεούσας εἴκοσιν οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἔλαβον αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας πάντας ἀπέκτειναν. καὶ 4
ἐπὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἐμπρῆσαι βουλόμενοι ὁλκάδα παλαιὰν κληματίδων καὶ δαιδὸς γεμίσαντες (ἦν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὁ ἄνεμος οὔριος) ἀφεῖσαν [τὴν ναῦν] πῦρ ἐμβαλόντες. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δείσαντες περὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀντεμηχανήσαντό τε σβεστήρια κωλύματα καὶ παύσαντες τήν τε φλόγα καὶ τὸ μὴ προσελθεῖν ἐγγὺς τὴν ὁλκάδα τοῦ κινδύνου ἀπηλλάγησαν. μετὰ **54**
δὲ τοῦτο Συρακόσιοι μὲν τῆς τε ναυμαχίας τροπαῖον ἔστησαν καὶ τῆς ἄνω

52.2 ναῦς <ἑπτὰ> ἐπισπομένας Herwerden **53**.4 τὴν ναῦν del. Bothe

τῆς πρὸς τῶι τείχει ἀπολήψεως τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, ὅθεν καὶ τοὺς ἵππους ἔλαβον, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἧς τε οἱ Τυρσηνοὶ τροπῆς ἐποιήσαντο τῶν πεζῶν ἐς τὴν λίμνην καὶ ἧς αὐτοὶ τῶι ἄλλωι στρατοπέδωι.

55 Γεγενημένης δὲ τῆς νίκης τοῖς Συρακοσίοις λαμπρᾶς ἤδη καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ (πρότερον μὲν γὰρ ἐφοβοῦντο τὰς μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους ναῦς ἐπελθούσας) οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν παντὶ δὴ ἀθυμίας ἦσαν καὶ ὁ παράλογος
2 αὐτοῖς μέγας ἦν, πολὺ δὲ μείζων ἔτι τῆς στρατείας ὁ μετάμελος. πόλεσι γὰρ ταύταις μόναις ἤδη ὁμοιοτρόποις ἐπελθόντες, δημοκρατουμέναις τε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοί, καὶ ναῦς καὶ ἵππους καὶ μεγέθη ἐχούσαις, οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπενεγκεῖν οὔτ' ἐκ πολιτείας τι μεταβολῆς τὸ διάφορον αὐτοῖς, ὧι προσήγοντο ἄν, οὔτ' ἐκ παρασκευῆς πολλῶι κρείσσονος, σφαλλόμενοι δὲ τὰ πλείω, τά τε πρὸ αὐτῶν ἠπόρουν, καὶ ἐπειδή γε καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν
56 ἐκρατήθησαν, ὃ οὐκ ἂν ὤιοντο, πολλῶι δὴ μᾶλλον ἔτι. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι τόν τε λιμένα εὐθὺς παρέπλεον ἀδεῶς καὶ τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ διενοοῦντο κλήισειν, ὅπως μηκέτι, μηδ' εἰ βούλοιντο, λάθοιεν αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι
2 ἐκπλεύσαντες. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοὶ σωθῆναι μόνον ἔτι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιοῦντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως ἐκείνους κωλύσουσι, νομίζοντες ὅπερ ἦν, ἀπό τε τῶν παρόντων πολὺ σφῶν καθυπέρτερα τὰ πράγματα εἶναι καί, εἰ δύναιντο κρατῆσαι Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν, καλὸν σφίσιν ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας τὸ ἀγώνισμα φανεῖσθαι· τούς τε γὰρ ἄλλους Ἕλληνας εὐθὺς τοὺς μὲν ἐλευθεροῦσθαι, τοὺς δὲ φόβου ἀπολύεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ ἔτι δυνατὴν ἔσεσθαι τὴν ὑπόλοιπον Ἀθηναίων δύναμιν τὸν ὕστερον ἐπενεχθησόμενον πόλεμον ἐνεγκεῖν), καὶ αὐτοὶ δόξαντες αὐτῶν αἴτιοι εἶναι ὑπό τε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων
3 καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔπειτα πολὺ θαυμασθήσεσθαι. καὶ ἦν δὲ ἄξιος ὁ ἀγὼν κατά τε ταῦτα καὶ ὅτι οὐχὶ Ἀθηναίων μόνων περιεγίγνοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολλῶν ξυμμάχων, καὶ οὐδ' αὐτοὶ αὖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ξυμβοηθησάντων σφίσιν, ἡγεμόνες τε γενόμενοι μετὰ Κορινθίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τὴν σφετέραν πόλιν ἐμπαρασχόντες προκινδυνεῦσαί
4 τε καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ μέγα μέρος προκόψαντες. ἔθνη γὰρ πλεῖστα δὴ ἐπὶ μίαν πόλιν ταύτην ξυνῆλθε, πλήν γε δὴ τοῦ ξύμπαντος λόγου τοῦ ἐν τῶιδε τῶι πολέμωι πρὸς τὴν Ἀθηναίων τε πόλιν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων.

57 Τοσοίδε γὰρ ἑκάτεροι ἐπὶ Σικελίαν τε καὶ περὶ Σικελίας, τοῖς μὲν ξυγκτησόμενοι τὴν χώραν ἐλθόντες, τοῖς δὲ ξυνδιασώσοντες, ἐπὶ Συρακούσαις ἐπολέμησαν, οὐ κατὰ δίκην τι μᾶλλον οὐδὲ κατὰ ξυγγένειαν

56.2 ἐνεγκεῖν: ἀνενεγκεῖν *P.Oxy.* 1376 **57**.1 ἐπὶ Συρακούσαις Bauer: ἐπὶ Συρακούσας codd.: ἐς Συρακούσας Dover: secl. Classen

μετ' ἀλλήλων στάντες ἀλλ' ὡς ἕκαστοι τῆς ξυντυχίας ἢ κατὰ τὸ ξυμφέρον
ἢ ἀνάγκηι ἔσχον. Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν αὐτοὶ Ἴωνες ἐπὶ Δωριᾶς Συρακοσίους 2
ἑκόντες ἦλθον, καὶ αὐτοῖς τῆι αὐτῆι φωνῆι καὶ νομίμοις ἔτι χρώμενοι
Λήμνιοι καὶ Ἴμβριοι καὶ Αἰγινῆται, οἳ τότε Αἴγιναν εἶχον, καὶ ἔτι Ἑστιαιῆς
οἱ ἐν Εὐβοίαι Ἑστίαιαν οἰκοῦντες ἄποικοι ὄντες ξυνεστράτευσαν. τῶν 3
δ' ἄλλων οἱ μὲν ὑπήκοοι, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ ξυμμαχίας αὐτόνομοι, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οἳ
μισθοφόροι ξυνεστράτευον. καὶ τῶν μὲν ὑπηκόων καὶ φόρου ὑποτελῶν 4
Ἐρετριῆς καὶ Χαλκιδῆς καὶ Στυρῆς καὶ Καρύστιοι ἀπ' Εὐβοίας ἦσαν, ἀπὸ
δὲ νήσων Κεῖοι καὶ Ἄνδριοι καὶ Τήνιοι, ἐκ δ' Ἰωνίας Μιλήσιοι καὶ Σάμιοι
καὶ Χῖοι. τούτων Χῖοι οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ὄντες φόρου, ναῦς δὲ παρέχοντες
αὐτόνομοι ξυνέσποντο. καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον Ἴωνες ὄντες οὗτοι πάντες καὶ ἀπ'
Ἀθηναίων πλὴν Καρυστίων (οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶ Δρύοπες), ὑπήκοοι δ' ὄντες καὶ
ἀνάγκηι ὅμως Ἴωνές γε ἐπὶ Δωριᾶς ἠκολούθουν. πρὸς δ' αὐτοῖς Αἰολῆς, 5
Μηθυμναῖοι μὲν ναυσὶ καὶ οὐ φόρωι ὑπήκοοι, Τενέδιοι δὲ καὶ Αἴνιοι
ὑποτελεῖς. οὗτοι δὲ Αἰολῆς Αἰολεῦσι τοῖς κτίσασι Βοιωτοῖς ⟨τοῖς⟩ μετὰ
Συρακοσίων κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐμάχοντο, Πλαταιῆς δὲ καὶ ἄντικρυς Βοιωτοὶ
Βοιωτοῖς μόνοι εἰκότως κατὰ τὸ ἔθος. Ῥόδιοι δὲ καὶ Κυθήριοι Δωριῆς 6
ἀμφότεροι, οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ἄποικοι Κυθήριοι ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους
τοὺς ἅμα Γυλίππωι μετ' Ἀθηναίων ὅπλα ἐπέφερον, Ῥόδιοι δὲ Ἀργεῖοι
γένος Συρακοσίοις μὲν Δωριεῦσι, Γελώιοις δὲ καὶ ἀποίκοις ἑαυτῶν οὖσι
μετὰ Συρακοσίων στρατευομένοις ἠναγκάζοντο πολεμεῖν. τῶν τε περὶ 7
Πελοπόννησον νησιωτῶν Κεφαλλῆνες μὲν καὶ Ζακύνθιοι αὐτόνομοι μέν,
κατὰ δὲ τὸ νησιωτικὸν μᾶλλον κατειργόμενοι, ὅτι θαλάσσης ἐκράτουν
οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ξυνείποντο· Κερκυραῖοι δὲ οὐ μόνον Δωριῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ
Κορίνθιοι σαφῶς ἐπὶ Κορινθίους τε καὶ Συρακοσίους, τῶν μὲν ἄποικοι
ὄντες, τῶν δὲ ξυγγενεῖς, ἀνάγκηι μὲν ἐκ τοῦ εὐπρεποῦς, βουλήσει δὲ
κατὰ ἔχθος τὸ Κορινθίων οὐχ ἧσσον εἵποντο. καὶ οἱ Μεσσήνιοι νῦν 8
καλούμενοι ἐκ Ναυπάκτου καὶ ἐκ Πύλου τότε ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἐχομένης
ἐς τὸν πόλεμον παρελήφθησαν. καὶ ἔτι Μεγαρέων φυγάδες οὐ πολλοὶ
Μεγαρεῦσι Σελινουντίοις οὖσι κατὰ ξυμφορὰν ἐμάχοντο. τῶν δὲ 9
ἄλλων ἑκούσιος μᾶλλον ἡ στρατεία ἐγίγνετο ἤδη. Ἀργεῖοι μὲν γὰρ οὐ
τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἕνεκα μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων τε ἔχθρας καὶ τῆς
παραυτίκα ἕκαστοι ἰδίας ὠφελίας Δωριῆς ἐπὶ Δωριᾶς μετὰ Ἀθηναίων
Ἰώνων ἠκολούθουν, Μαντινῆς δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι Ἀρκάδων μισθοφόροι ἐπὶ
τοὺς αἰεὶ πολεμίους σφίσιν ἀποδεικνυμένους ἰέναι εἰωθότες καὶ τότε τοὺς

57.5 τοῖς ante μετὰ Συρακοσίων add. Lindau καὶ ἄντικρυς Böhme: καταντικρὺ codd.

μετὰ Κορινθίων ἐλθόντας Ἀρκάδας οὐδὲν ἧσσον διὰ κέρδος ἡγούμενοι πολεμίους, Κρῆτες δὲ καὶ Αἰτωλοὶ μισθῶι καὶ οὗτοι πεισθέντες· ξυνέβη δὲ τοῖς Κρησὶ τὴν Γέλαν Ῥοδίοις ξυγκτίσαντας μὴ ξὺν τοῖς ἀποίκοις,
10 ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀποίκους ἑκόντας μετὰ μισθοῦ ἐλθεῖν. καὶ Ἀκαρνάνων τινὲς ἅμα μὲν κέρδει, τὸ δὲ πλέον Δημοσθένους φιλίαι καὶ Ἀθηναίων
11 εὐνοίαι ξύμμαχοι ὄντες ἐπεκούρησαν. καὶ οἵδε μὲν τῶι Ἰονίωι κόλπωι ὁριζόμενοι· Ἰταλιωτῶν δὲ Θούριοι καὶ Μεταπόντιοι ἐν τοιαύταις ἀνάγκαις τότε στασιωτικῶν καιρῶν κατειλημμένοι ξυνεστράτευον, καὶ Σικελιωτῶν Νάξιοι καὶ Καταναῖοι, βαρβάρων δὲ Ἐγεσταῖοί τε, οἵπερ ἐπηγάγοντο, καὶ Σικελῶν τὸ πλέον, καὶ τῶν ἔξω Σικελίας Τυρσηνῶν τέ τινες κατὰ διαφοράν Συρακοσίων καὶ Ἰάπυγες μισθοφόροι. τοσάδε μὲν μετὰ Ἀθηναίων ἔθνη ἐστράτευον.

58 Συρακοσίοις δὲ ἀντεβοήθησαν Καμαριναῖοι μὲν ὅμοροι ὄντες καὶ Γελῶιοι οἰκοῦντες μετ' αὐτούς, ἔπειτα Ἀκραγαντίνων ἡσυχαζόντων ἐν τῶι ἐπ'
2 ἐκεῖνα ἱδρυμένοι Σελινούντιοι. καὶ οἵδε μὲν τῆς Σικελίας τὸ πρὸς Λιβύην μέρος τετραμμένον νεμόμενοι, Ἱμεραῖοι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τὸν Τυρσηνικὸν πόντον μορίου, ἐν ὧι καὶ μόνοι Ἕλληνες οἰκοῦσιν· οὗτοι δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ
3 μόνοι ἐβοήθησαν. καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ μὲν ἔθνη τῶν ἐν Σικελίαι τοσάδε, Δωριῆς τε καὶ αὐτόνομοι οἱ πάντες, ξυνεμάχουν, βαρβάρων δὲ Σικελοὶ μόνοι ὅσοι μὴ ἀφέστασαν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους· τῶν δ' ἔξω Σικελίας Ἑλλήνων Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ἡγεμόνα Σπαρτιάτην παρεχόμενοι, νεοδαμώδεις δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ εἵλωτας [δύναται δὲ τὸ νεοδαμῶδες ἐλεύθερον ἤδη εἶναι], Κορίνθιοι δὲ καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῶι μόνοι παραγενόμενοι καὶ Λευκάδιοι καὶ Ἀμπρακιῶται κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές, ἐκ δὲ Ἀρκαδίας μισθοφόροι ὑπὸ Κορινθίων ἀποσταλέντες καὶ Σικυώνιοι ἀναγκαστοὶ στρατεύοντες, καὶ
4 τῶν ἔξω Πελοποννήσου Βοιωτοί. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐπελθόντας τούτους οἱ Σικελιῶται αὐτοὶ πλῆθος πλέον κατὰ πάντα παρέσχοντο ἅτε μεγάλας πόλεις οἰκοῦντες· καὶ γὰρ ὁπλῖται πολλοὶ καὶ νῆες καὶ ἵπποι καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ὅμιλος ἄφθονος ξυνελέγη. καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας αὖθις ὡς εἰπεῖν τοὺς ἄλλους Συρακόσιοι αὐτοὶ πλείω ἐπορίσαντο διὰ μέγεθός τε πόλεως καὶ
59 ὅτι ἐν μεγίστωι κινδύνωι ἦσαν. καὶ αἱ μὲν ἑκατέρων ἐπικουρίαι τοσαίδε ξυνελέγησαν, καὶ τότε ἤδη πᾶσαι ἀμφοτέροις παρῆσαν καὶ οὐκέτι οὐδὲν οὐδετέροις ἐπῆλθεν.

2 Οἱ δ' οὖν Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι εἰκότως ἐνόμισαν καλὸν ἀγώνισμα σφίσιν εἶναι ἐπὶ τῆι γεγενημένηι νίκηι τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐλεῖν τε

58.3 αὐτόνομοι οἱ Reiske: οἱ αὐτόνομοι codd. et *P.Oxy.* 1376: οἱ secl. Bekker δύναται . . . εἶναι secl. Aem. Portus

τὸ στρατόπεδον ἅπαν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοσοῦτον ὄν, καὶ μηδὲ καθ' ἕτερα
αὐτούς, μήτε διὰ θαλάσσης μήτε τῶι πεζῶι, διαφυγεῖν. ἔκλησιν οὖν τόν τε 3
λιμένα εὐθὺς τὸν μέγαν, ἔχοντα τὸ στόμα ὀκτὼ σταδίων μάλιστα, τριήρεσι
πλαγίαις καὶ πλοίοις καὶ ἀκάτοις ἐπ' ἀγκυρῶν ὁρμίζοντες, καὶ τἆλλα,
ἢν ἔτι ναυμαχεῖν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τολμήσωσι, παρεσκευάζοντο, καὶ ὀλίγον
οὐδὲν ἐς οὐδὲν ἐπενόουν. τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις τήν τε ἀπόκλησιν ὁρῶσι καὶ **60**
τὴν ἄλλην διάνοιαν αὐτῶν αἰσθομένοις βουλευτέα ἐδόκει. καὶ ξυνελθόντες 2
οἵ τε στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ ταξίαρχοι πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν ἀπορίαν τῶν
τε ἄλλων καὶ ὅτι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὔτε αὐτίκα ἔτι εἶχον (προπέμψαντες
γὰρ ἐς Κατάνην ὡς ἐκπλευσόμενοι ἀπεῖπον μὴ ἐπάγειν) οὔτε τὸ λοιπὸν
ἔμελλον ἕξειν, εἰ μὴ ναυκρατήσουσιν, ἐβουλεύσαντο τὰ μὲν τείχη τὰ ἄνω
ἐκλιπεῖν, πρὸς δ' αὐταῖς ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀπολαβόντες διατειχίσματι ὅσον
οἷόν τε ἐλάχιστον τοῖς τε σκεύεσι καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσιν ἱκανὸν γενέσθαι,
τοῦτο μὲν φρουρεῖν, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἄλλου πεζοῦ τὰς ναῦς ἁπάσας, ὅσαι
ἦσαν καὶ δυναταὶ καὶ ἁπλοώτεραι, πάντα τινὰ ἐσβιβάζοντες πληρῶσαι,
καὶ διαναυμαχήσαντες, ἢν μὲν νικῶσιν, ἐς Κατάνην κομίζεσθαι, ἢν δὲ μή,
ἐμπρήσαντες τὰς ναῦς πεζῆι ξυνταξάμενοι ἀποχωρεῖν ἦι ἂν τάχιστα
μέλλωσί τινος χωρίου ἢ βαρβαρικοῦ ἢ Ἑλληνικοῦ φιλίου ἀντιλήψεσθαι.
καὶ οἱ μέν, ὡς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, καὶ ἐποίησαν· ἔκ τε γὰρ τῶν ἄνω 3
τειχῶν ὑποκατέβησαν καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπλήρωσαν πάσας, ἀναγκάσαντες
ἐσβαίνειν ὅστις καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἐδόκει ἡλικίας μετέχων ἐπιτήδειος εἶναι.
καὶ ξυνεπληρώθησαν νῆες αἱ πᾶσαι δέκα μάλιστα καὶ ἑκατόν· τοξότας 4
τε ἐπ' αὐτὰς πολλοὺς καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς τῶν τε Ἀκαρνάνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ξένων ἐσεβίβαζον, καὶ τἆλλα ὡς οἷόν τ' ἦν ἐξ ἀναγκαίου τε καὶ τοιαύτης
διανοίας ἐπορίσαντο. ὁ δὲ Νικίας, ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἑτοῖμα ἦν, ὁρῶν 5
τοὺς στρατιώτας τῶι τε παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς πολὺ ταῖς ναυσὶ κρατηθῆναι
ἀθυμοῦντας καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων σπάνιν ὡς τάχιστα βουλομένους
διακινδυνεύειν, ξυγκαλέσας ἅπαντας παρεκελεύσατό τε πρῶτον καὶ ἔλεξε
τοιάδε.

Ἄνδρες στρατιῶται Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων, ὁ μὲν **61**
ἀγὼν ὁ μέλλων ὁμοίως κοινὸς ἅπασιν ἔσται περί τε σωτηρίας καὶ
πατρίδος ἑκάστοις οὐχ ἧσσον ἢ τοῖς πολεμίοις· ἢν γὰρ κρατήσωμεν
νῦν ταῖς ναυσίν, ἔστι τωι τὴν ὑπάρχουσάν που οἰκείαν πόλιν ἐπιδεῖν.
ἀθυμεῖν δὲ οὐ χρὴ οὐδὲ πάσχειν ὅπερ οἱ ἀπειρότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἳ 2
τοῖς πρώτοις ἀγῶσι σφαλέντες ἔπειτα διὰ παντὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ φόβου
ὁμοίαν ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς ἔχουσιν. ἀλλ' ὅσοι τε Ἀθηναίων πάρεστε, πολλῶν 3

60.3 πάντας ante ἐσβαίνειν add. *P.Oxy.* 1376 **61**.1 ἑκάστοις: ἑκάστωι B

ἤδη πολέμων ἔμπειροι ὄντες, καὶ ὅσοι τῶν ξυμμάχων, ξυστρατευόμενοι αἰεί, μνήσθητε τῶν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις παραλόγων, καὶ τὸ τῆς τύχης κἂν μεθ' ἡμῶν ἐλπίσαντες στῆναι καὶ ὡς ἀναμαχούμενοι ἀξίως τοῦδε τοῦ πλήθους, ὅσον αὐτοὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐφορᾶτε, παρασκευάζεσθε.

62 "Ἃ δὲ ἀρωγὰ ἐνείδομεν ἐπὶ τῇι τοῦ λιμένος στενότητι πρὸς τὸν μέλλοντα ὄχλον τῶν νεῶν ἔσεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων παρασκευήν, οἷς πρότερον ἐβλαπτόμεθα, πάντα καὶ ἡμῖν νῦν ἐκ τῶν
2 παρόντων μετὰ τῶν κυβερνητῶν ἐσκεμμένα ἡτοίμασται. καὶ γὰρ τοξόται πολλοὶ καὶ ἀκοντισταὶ ἐπιβήσονται καὶ ὄχλος, ὧι ναυμαχίαν μὲν ποιούμενοι ἐν πελάγει οὐκ ἂν ἐχρώμεθα διὰ τὸ βλάπτειν ἂν τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆι βαρύτητι τῶν νεῶν, ἐν δὲ τῆι ἐνθάδε ἠναγκασμένηι
3 ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζομαχίαι πρόσφορα ἔσται. ηὕρηται δ' ἡμῖν ὅσα χρὴ ἀντιναυπηγῆσαι, καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἐπωτίδων αὐτοῖς παχύτητας, ὥιπερ δὴ μάλιστα ἐβλαπτόμεθα, χειρῶν σιδηρῶν ἐπιβολαί, αἳ σχήσουσι τὴν πάλιν ἀνάκρουσιν τῆς προσπεσούσης νεώς, ἣν τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις οἱ
4 ἐπιβάται ὑπουργῶσιν. ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἠναγκάσμεθα ὥστε πεζομαχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν, καὶ τὸ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἀνακρούεσθαι μήτ' ἐκείνους ἐᾶν ὠφέλιμον φαίνεται, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῆς γῆς, πλὴν ὅσον ἂν ὁ πεζὸς ἡμῶν ἐπέχηι, πολεμίας οὔσης.

63 "Ὧν χρὴ μεμνημένους διαμάχεσθαι ὅσον ἂν δύνησθε καὶ μὴ ἐξωθεῖσθαι ἐς αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ ξυμπεσούσης νηὶ νεὼς μὴ πρότερον ἀξιοῦν ἀπολύεσθαι ἢ
2 τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ πολεμίου καταστρώματος ὁπλίτας ἀπαράξητε. καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς ὁπλίταις οὐχ ἧσσον τῶν ναυτῶν παρακελεύομαι, ὅσωι τῶν ἄνωθεν μᾶλλον τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο· ὑπάρχει δ' ἡμῖν ἔτι νῦν γε τὰ πλείω τῶι πεζῶι
3 ἐπικρατεῖν. τοῖς δὲ ναύταις παραινῶ καὶ ἐν τῶι αὐτῶι τῶιδε καὶ δέομαι μὴ ἐκπεπλῆχθαί τι ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς ἄγαν, τήν τε παρασκευὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων βελτίω νῦν ἔχοντας καὶ τὰς ναῦς πλείους· ἐκείνην τε τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθε ὡς ἀξία ἐστὶ διασώσασθαι, οἳ τέως Ἀθηναῖοι νομιζόμενοι καὶ μὴ ὄντες ἡμῶν τῆς τε φωνῆς τῆι ἐπιστήμηι καὶ τῶν τρόπων τῆι μιμήσει ἐθαυμάζεσθε κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας οὐκ ἔλασσον κατὰ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι ἢ τε τὸ φοβερὸν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις καὶ τὸ
4 μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι πολὺ πλέον μετείχετε. ὥστε κοινωνοὶ μόνοι ἐλευθέρως ἡμῖν

63.3 πλείους· ἐκείνην: sic interpunxi: πλείους, ἐκείνην codd.: πλείους. ἐκείνην Maurer ἐνθυμεῖσθε Bloomfield: ἐνθυμεῖσθαι codd. ἐκείνην τε τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι (sic) ὡς ἀξία ἐστὶ διασώσασθαι post καταπροδιδόναι (sic) transiecit Maurer

τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄντες δικαίως αὐτὴν νῦν μὴ καταπροδίδοτε, καταφρονήσαντες δὲ Κορινθίων τε, οὓς πολλάκις νενικήκατε, καὶ Σικελιωτῶν, ὧν οὐδ' ἀντιστῆναι οὐδεὶς ἕως ἤκμαζε τὸ ναυτικὸν ἡμῖν ἠξίωσεν, ἀμύνασθε αὐτούς, καὶ δείξατε ὅτι καὶ μετ' ἀσθενείας καὶ ξυμφορῶν ἡ ὑμετέρα ἐπιστήμη κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἑτέρας εὐτυχούσης ῥώμης. τούς τε Ἀθηναίους **64** ὑμῶν πάλιν αὖ καὶ τάδε ὑπομιμνήισκω, ὅτι οὔτε ναῦς ἐν τοῖς νεωσοίκοις ἄλλας ὁμοίας ταῖσδε οὔτε ὁπλιτῶν ἡλικίαν ὑπελίπετε, εἴ τε ξυμβήσεταί τι ἄλλο ἢ τὸ κρατεῖν ὑμῖν, τούς τε ἐνθάδε πολεμίους εὐθὺς ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα πλευσομένους καὶ τοὺς ἐκεῖ ὑπολοίπους ἡμῶν ἀδυνάτους ἐσομένους τούς τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἐπελθόντας ἀμύνασθαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἂν ὑπὸ Συρακοσίοις εὐθὺς γίγνοισθε, οἷς αὐτοὶ ἴστε οἵαι γνώμηι ἐπήλθετε, οἱ δὲ ἐκεῖ ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίοις. ὥστε ἐν ἑνὶ τῶιδε ὑπὲρ ἀμφοτέρων ἀγῶνι καθεστῶτες 2 καρτερήσατε, εἴπερ ποτέ, καὶ ἐνθυμεῖσθε καθ' ἑκάστους τε καὶ ξύμπαντες ὅτι οἱ ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ὑμῶν νῦν ἐσόμενοι καὶ πεζοὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εἰσὶ καὶ νῆες καὶ ἡ ὑπόλοιπος πόλις καὶ τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τῶν Ἀθηνῶν, περὶ ὧν, εἴ τίς τι ἕτερος ἑτέρου προφέρει ἢ ἐπιστήμηι ἢ εὐψυχίαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐν ἄλλωι μᾶλλον καιρῶι ἀποδειξάμενος αὐτός τε αὐτῶι ὠφέλιμος γένοιτο καὶ τοῖς ξύμπασι σωτήριος.'

Ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοσαῦτα παρακελευσάμενος εὐθὺς ἐκέλευε πληροῦν τὰς **65** ναῦς. τῶι δὲ Γυλίππωι καὶ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις παρῆν μὲν αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁρῶσι καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν παρασκευήν, ὅτι ναυμαχήσουσιν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, προηγγέλθη δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡ ἐπιβολὴ τῶν σιδηρῶν χειρῶν, καὶ πρός τε τἆλλα ἐξηρτύσαντο ὡς ἕκαστα καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο· τὰς γὰρ πρώιρας 2 καὶ τῆς νεὼς ἄνω ἐπὶ πολὺ κατεβύρσωσαν, ὅπως ἂν ἀπολισθάνοι καὶ μὴ ἔχοι ἀντιλαβὴν ἡ χεὶρ ἐπιβαλλομένη. καὶ ἐπειδὴ πάντα ἑτοῖμα ἦν, παρεκελεύσαντο ἐκείνοις οἵ τε στρατηγοὶ καὶ Γύλιππος καὶ ἔλεξαν τοιάδε.

'"Οτι μὲν καλὰ τὰ προειργασμένα καὶ ὑπὲρ καλῶν"Οτι μὲν καλὰ **66** τὰ προειργασμένα καὶ ὑπὲρ καλῶν τῶν μελλόντων ὁ ἀγὼν ἔσται, ὦ Συρακόσιοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, οἵ τε πολλοὶ δοκεῖτε ἡμῖν εἰδέναι (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν αὐτῶν οὕτω προθύμως ἀντελάβεσθε), καὶ εἴ τις μὴ ἐπὶ ὅσον δεῖ ἴσμεθηται, σημανοῦμεν. Ἀθηναίους γὰρ ἐς τὴν χώραν τήνδε ἐλθόντας πρῶτον 2 μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς Σικελίας καταδουλώσει, ἔπειτ', εἰ κατορθώσειαν, καὶ τῆς Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος, καὶ ἀρχὴν τὴν ἥδη μεγίστην τῶν τε πρὶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τῶν νῦν κεκτημένους, πρῶτοι ἀνθρώπων ὑποστάντες τῶι ναυτικῶι, ὥιπερ πάντα κατέσχον, τὰς μὲν νενικήκατε ἤδη ναυμαχίας, τὴν δ' ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος νῦν νικήσετε. ἄνδρες γὰρ ἐπειδὰν ὧι ἀξιοῦσι 3 προύχειν κολουθῶσι, τό γ' ὑπόλοιπον αὐτῶν τῆς δόξης ἀσθενέστερον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐστὶν ἢ εἰ μηδ' ὠιήθησαν τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ τῶι παρ' ἐλπίδα

63.4 δικαίως αὐτὴν: δικαιώσατε Böhme καταπροδίδοτε: καταπροδιδόναι Böhme

τοῦ αὐχήματος σφαλλόμενοι καὶ παρὰ ἰσχὺν τῆς δυνάμεως ἐνδιδόασιν·
67 ὃ νῦν Ἀθηναίους εἰκὸς πεπονθέναι. ἡμῶν δὲ τό τε ὑπάρχον πρότερον, ὥιπερ καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονες ἔτι ὄντες ἀπετολμήσαμεν, βεβαιότερον νῦν, καὶ τῆς δοκήσεως προσγεγενημένης αὐτῶι, τὸ κρατίστους εἶναι εἰ τοὺς κρατίστους ἐνικήσαμεν, διπλασία ἑκάστου ἡ ἐλπίς· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ πρὸς τὰς ἐπιχειρήσεις ἡ μεγίστη ἐλπὶς μεγίστην καὶ τὴν προθυμίαν παρέχεται.

2 Τά τε τῆς ἀντιμιμήσεως αὐτῶν τῆς παρασκευῆς ἡμῶν τῶι μὲν ἡμετέρωι τρόπωι ξυνήθη τέ ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἀνάρμοστοι πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐσόμεθα· οἱ δ', ἐπειδὰν πολλοὶ μὲν ὁπλῖται ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκὸς ὥσι, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἀκοντισταὶ χερσαῖοι ὡς εἰπεῖν Ἀκαρνᾶνές τε καὶ ἄλλοι ἐπὶ ναῦς ἀναβάντες, οἳ οὐδ' ὅπως καθεζομένους χρὴ τὸ βέλος ἀφεῖναι εὑρήσουσι, πῶς οὐ σφαλοῦσί τε τὰς ναῦς καὶ ἐν σφίσιν
3 αὐτοῖς πάντες οὐκ ἐν τῶι ἑαυτῶν τρόπωι κινούμενοι ταράξονται; ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶι πλήθει τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ὠφελήσονται, εἴ τις καὶ τόδε ὑμῶν, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσαις ναυμαχήσει, πεφόβηται· ἐν ὀλίγωι γὰρ πολλαὶ ἀργότεραι μὲν ἐς τὸ δρᾶν τι ὧν βούλονται ἔσονται, ῥᾶισται δὲ ἐς τὸ βλάπτεσθαι ἀφ' ὧν ἡμῖν
4 παρεσκεύασται. τὸ δ' ἀληθέστατον γνῶτε ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς οἰόμεθα σαφῶς πεπύσθαι· ὑπερβαλλόντων γὰρ αὐτοῖς τῶν κακῶν καὶ βιαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς παρούσης ἀπορίας ἐς ἀπόνοιαν καθεστήκασιν οὐ παρασκευῆς πίστει μᾶλλον ἢ τύχης ἀποκινδυνεῦσαι οὕτως ὅπως δύνανται, ἵν' ἢ βιασάμενοι ἐκπλεύσωσιν ἢ κατὰ γῆν μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ποιῶνται, ὡς
68 τῶν γε παρόντων οὐκ ἂν πράξοντες χεῖρον. πρὸς οὖν ἀταξίαν τε τοιαύτην καὶ τύχην ἀνδρῶν ἑαυτὴν παραδεδωκυῖαν πολεμιωτάτων ὀργῆι προσμείξωμεν, καὶ νομίσωμεν ἅμα μὲν νομιμώτατον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους οἳ ἂν ὡς ἐπὶ τιμωρίαι τοῦ προσπεσόντος δικαιώσωσιν ἀποπλῆσαι τῆς γνώμης τὸ θυμούμενον, ἅμα δὲ ἐχθροὺς ἀμύνασθαι
2 ἐκγενησόμενον ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ λεγόμενόν που ἥδιστον εἶναι. ὡς δὲ ἐχθροὶ καὶ ἔχθιστοι, πάντες ἴστε, οἵ γε ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἦλθον δουλωσόμενοι, ἐν ὧι, εἰ κατώρθωσαν, ἀνδράσι μὲν ἂν τἆλγιστα προσέθεσαν, παισὶ δὲ καὶ γυναιξὶ τὰ ἀπρεπέστατα, πόλει δὲ τῆι πάσηι τὴν αἰσχίστην
3 ἐπίκλησιν. ἀνθ' ὧν μὴ μαλακισθῆναί τινα πρέπει μηδὲ τὸ ἀκινδύνως ἀπελθεῖν αὐτοὺς κέρδος νομίσαι. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐὰν κρατήσωσιν ὁμοίως δράσουσιν· τὸ δὲ πραξάντων ἡμῶν ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος ἃ βουλόμεθα τούσδε τε κολασθῆναι καὶ τῆι πάσηι Σικελίαι καρπουμένηι καὶ πρὶν ἐλευθερίαν βεβαιοτέραν παραδοῦναι, καλὸς ὁ ἀγών. καὶ κινδύνων οὗτοι

67.4 ἀποκινδυνεῦσαι Duker: ἀποκινδυνεῦσειν JPl^{ac}: ἀποκινδυνεῦσει cett. **67**.4 πράξοντες: πράξαντες AF *P. Oxy.* 1376 **68**.1 δικαιώσωσιν: [ἀδίκως] ἴωσιν *P.Oxy.* 1376 (ut suppl. Maurer) **68**.1 καὶ τὸ λεγόμενόν: κατὰ τὸ λεγόμενόν Badham

σπανιώτατοι οἳ ἂν ἐλάχιστα ἐκ τοῦ σφαλῆναι βλάπτοντες πλεῖστα διὰ τὸ εὐτυχῆσαι ὠφελῶσιν.'

Καὶ οἱ μὲν τῶν Συρακοσίων στρατηγοὶ καὶ Γύλιππος τοιαῦτα καὶ **69**
αὐτοὶ τοῖς σφετέροις στρατιώταις παρακελευσάμενοι ἀντεπλήρουν τὰς
ναῦς εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡισθάνοντο. ὁ δὲ Νικίας ὑπὸ τῶν 2
παρόντων ἐκπεπληγμένος καὶ ὁρῶν οἷος ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ ὡς ἐγγὺς ἤδη,
ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἔμελλον ἀνάγεσθαι, καὶ νομίσας, ὅπερ πάσχουσιν
ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις ἀγῶσι, πάντα τε ἔργωι ἔτι σφίσιν ἐνδεᾶ εἶναι καὶ λόγωι
αὐτοῖς οὔπω ἱκανὰ εἰρῆσθαι, αὖθις τῶν τριηράρχων ἕνα ἕκαστον ἀνεκάλει,
πατρόθεν τε ἐπονομάζων καὶ αὐτοὺς ὀνομαστὶ καὶ φυλήν, ἀξιῶν τό τε
καθ' ἑαυτόν, ὧι ὑπῆρχε λαμπρότητός τι, μὴ προδιδόναι τινὰ καὶ τὰς
πατρικὰς ἀρετάς, ὧν ἐπιφανεῖς ἦσαν οἱ πρόγονοι, μὴ ἀφανίζειν, πατρίδος
τε τῆς ἐλευθερωτάτης ὑπομιμνήισκων καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῆι ἀνεπιτάκτου
πᾶσιν ἐς τὴν δίαιταν ἐξουσίας, ἄλλα τε λέγων ὅσα ἐν τῶι τοιούτωι
ἤδη τοῦ καιροῦ ὄντες ἄνθρωποι οὐ πρὸς τὸ δοκεῖν τινὶ ἀρχαιολογεῖν
φυλαξάμενοι εἴποιεν ἄν, καὶ ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων παραπλήσια ἔς τε γυναῖκας
καὶ παῖδας καὶ θεοὺς πατρώιους προφερόμενα, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῆι παρούσηι
ἐκπλήξει ὠφέλιμα νομίζοντες ἐπιβοῶνται.

Καὶ ὁ μὲν οὐχ ἱκανὰ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀναγκαῖα νομίσας παρηινῆσθαι, 3
ἀποχωρήσας ἦγε τὸν πεζὸν πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ παρέταξεν ὡς ἐπὶ
πλεῖστον ἐδύνατο, ὅπως ὅτι μεγίστη τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ὠφελία ἐς τὸ
θαρσεῖν γίγνοιτο· ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Μένανδρος καὶ Εὐθύδημος (οὗτοι 4
γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ἐπέβησαν) ἅραντες ἀπὸ
τοῦ ἑαυτῶν στρατοπέδου εὐθὺς ἔπλεον πρὸς τὸ ζεῦγμα τοῦ λιμένος
καὶ τὸν καταλειφθέντα διέκπλουν, βουλόμενοι βιάσασθαι ἐς τὸ ἔξω.
προεξαγαγόμενοι δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ναυσὶ παραπλησίαις **70**
τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πρότερον, κατά τε τὸν ἔκπλουν μέρει αὐτῶν ἐφύλασσον
καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον κύκλωι λιμένα, ὅπως πανταχόθεν ἅμα προσπίπτοιεν
τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα αὐτοῖς παρεβοήθει ἦιπερ καὶ αἱ νῆες
κατίσχοιεν. ἦρχον δὲ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις Σικανὸς μὲν καὶ
Ἀγάθαρχος, κέρας ἑκάτερος τοῦ παντὸς ἔχων, Πυθὴν δὲ καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι
τὸ μέσον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προσέμισγον τῶι ζεύγματι, τῆι μὲν 2
πρώτηι ῥύμηι ἐπιπλέοντες ἐκράτουν τῶν τεταγμένων νεῶν πρὸς αὐτῶι
καὶ ἐπειρῶντο λύειν τὰς κλήισεις· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο πανταχόθεν σφίσι τῶν
Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων ἐπιφερομένων οὐ πρὸς τῶι ζεύγματι ἔτι

70.1 προεξαγαγόμενοι: προεξαναγαγόμενοι Classen: προεξαναγόμενοι Dion. Hal.

μόνον ἡ ναυμαχία, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα ἐγίγνετο, καὶ ἦν καρτερὰ
3 καὶ οἵα οὐχ ἑτέρα τῶν προτέρων. πολλὴ μὲν γὰρ ἑκατέροις προθυμία
ἀπὸ τῶν ναυτῶν ἐς τὸ ἐπιπλεῖν ὁπότε κελευσθείη ἐγίγνετο, πολλὴ δὲ
ἡ ἀντιτέχνησις τῶν κυβερνητῶν καὶ ἀγωνισμὸς πρὸς ἀλλήλους· οἵ τε
ἐπιβάται ἐθεράπευον, ὁπότε προσπέσοι ναῦς νηί, μὴ λείπεσθαι τὰ ἀπὸ
τοῦ καταστρώματος τῆς ἄλλης τέχνης· πᾶς τέ τις ἐν ὧι προσετέτακτο
4 αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἠπείγετο πρῶτος φαίνεσθαι. ξυμπεσουσῶν δὲ ἐν ὀλίγωι
πολλῶν νεῶν (πλεῖσται γὰρ δὴ αὗται ἐν ἐλαχίστωι ἐναυμάχησαν·
βραχὺ γὰρ ἀπέλιπον ξυναμφότεραι διακόσιαι γενέσθαι) αἱ μὲν ἐμβολαὶ
διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὰς ἀνακρούσεις καὶ διέκπλους ὀλίγαι ἐγίγνοντο, αἱ δὲ
προσβολαί, ὡς τύχοι ναῦς νηὶ προσπεσοῦσα ἢ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν ἢ ἄλληι
5 ἐπιπλέουσα, πυκνότεραι ἦσαν. καὶ ὅσον μὲν χρόνον προσφέροιτο ναῦς,
οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων τοῖς ἀκοντίοις καὶ τοξεύμασι καὶ λίθοις
ἀφθόνως ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἐχρῶντο· ἐπειδὴ δὲ προσμείξειαν, οἱ ἐπιβάται ἐς
6 χεῖρας ἰόντες ἐπειρῶντο ταῖς ἀλλήλων ναυσὶν ἐπιβαίνειν. ξυνετύγχανέ
τε πολλαχοῦ διὰ τὴν στενοχωρίαν τὰ μὲν ἄλλοις ἐμβεβληκέναι, τὰ δὲ
αὐτοὺς ἐμβεβλῆσθαι, δύο τε περὶ μίαν καὶ ἔστιν ἥι καὶ πλείους ναῦς κατ'
ἀνάγκην ξυνηρτῆσθαι, καὶ τοῖς κυβερνήταις τῶν μὲν φυλακήν, τῶν δ'
ἐπιβουλήν, μὴ καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον, κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ πανταχόθεν, περιεστάναι,
καὶ τὸν κτύπον μέγαν ἀπὸ πολλῶν νεῶν ξυμπιπτουσῶν ἔκπληξίν τε
ἅμα καὶ ἀποστέρησιν τῆς ἀκοῆς ὧν οἱ κελευσταὶ φθέγγοιντο παρέχειν.
7 πολλὴ γὰρ δὴ ἡ παρακέλευσις καὶ βοὴ ἀφ' ἑκατέρων τοῖς κελευσταῖς
κατά τε τὴν τέχνην καὶ πρὸς τὴν αὐτίκα φιλονικίαν ἐγίγνετο, τοῖς μὲν
Ἀθηναίοις βιάζεσθαί τε τὸν ἔκπλουν ἐπιβοῶντες καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐς τὴν
πατρίδα σωτηρίας νῦν, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὖθις, προθύμως ἀντιλαβέσθαι,
τοῖς δὲ Συρακοσίοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις καλὸν εἶναι κωλῦσαί τε αὐτοὺς
8 διαφυγεῖν καὶ τὴν οἰκείαν ἑκάστους πατρίδα νικήσαντας ἐπαυξῆσαι. καὶ
οἱ στρατηγοὶ προσέτι ἑκατέρων, εἴ τινά που ὁρῶιεν μὴ κατ' ἀνάγκην
πρύμναν κρουόμενον, ἀνακαλοῦντες ὀνομαστὶ τὸν τριήραρχον ἠρώτων, οἱ
μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι εἰ τὴν πολεμιωτάτην γῆν οἰκειοτέραν ἤδη τῆς οὐ δι' ὀλίγου
πόνου κεκτημένης θαλάσσης ἡγούμενοι ὑποχωροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι
εἰ οὓς σαφῶς ἴσασι προθυμουμένους Ἀθηναίους παντὶ τρόπωι διαφυγεῖν,
71 τούτους αὐτοὶ φεύγοντας φεύγουσιν. ὅ τε ἐκ τῆς γῆς πεζὸς ἀμφοτέρων
ἰσορρόπου τῆς ναυμαχίας καθεστηκυίας πολὺν τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ ξύστασιν
τῆς γνώμης εἶχε, φιλονικῶν μὲν ὁ αὐτόθεν περὶ τοῦ πλέονος ἤδη καλοῦ,
2 δεδιότες δὲ οἱ ἐπελθόντες μὴ τῶν παρόντων ἔτι χείρω πράξωσιν. πάντων

70.2 προτέρων: πρότερον Pl^3 Dion. Hal.

γὰρ δὴ ἀνακειμένων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὰς ναῦς ὅ τε φόβος ἦν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὐδενὶ ἐοικώς, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀνώμαλον <***> καὶ τὴν ἔποψιν τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἠναγκάζοντο ἔχειν. δι' ὀλίγου γὰρ οὔσης 3
τῆς θέας καὶ οὐ πάντων ἅμα ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ σκοπούντων, εἰ μέν τινες ἴδοιέν πῃ τοὺς σφετέρους ἐπικρατοῦντας, ἀνεθάρσησάν τε ἂν καὶ πρὸς ἀνάκλησιν θεῶν μὴ στερῆσαι σφᾶς τῆς σωτηρίας ἐτρέποντο, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἡσσώμενον βλέψαντες ὀλοφυρμῷ τε ἅμα μετὰ βοῆς ἐχρῶντο καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν δρωμένων τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τὴν γνώμην μᾶλλον τῶν ἐν τῷι ἔργωι ἐδουλοῦντο· ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἀντίπαλόν τι τῆς ναυμαχίας ἀπιδόντες, διὰ τὸ ἀκρίτως ξυνεχὲς τῆς ἁμίλλης καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτοῖς ἴσα τῆι δόξηι περιδεῶς ξυναπονεύοντες ἐν τοῖς χαλεπώτατα διῆγον· αἰεὶ γὰρ παρ' ὀλίγον ἢ διέφευγον ἢ ἀπώλλυντο. ἦν τε ἐν τῶι αὐτῶι στρατεύματι 4
τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἕως ἀγχώμαλα ἐναυμάχουν, πάντα ὁμοῦ ἀκοῦσαι, ὀλοφυρμὸς βοή, νικῶντες κρατούμενοι, ἄλλα ὅσ' ἂν ἐν μεγάλωι κινδύνωι μέγα στρατόπεδον πολυειδῆ ἀναγκάζοιτο φθέγγεσθαι. παραπλήσια 5
δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν αὐτοῖς ἔπασχον, πρίν γε δὴ οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀντισχούσης τῆς ναυμαχίας ἔτρεψάν τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐπικείμενοι λαμπρῶς, πολλῆι κραυγῆι καὶ διακελευσμῶι χρώμενοι, κατεδίωκον ἐς τὴν γῆν. τότε δὲ ὁ μὲν ναυτικὸς στρατὸς 6
ἄλλος ἄλλῃ, ὅσοι μὴ μετέωροι ἐάλωσαν, κατενεχθέντες ἐξέπεσον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον· ὁ δὲ πεζὸς οὐκέτι διαφόρως, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μιᾶς ὁρμῆς οἰμωγῆι τε καὶ στόνωι πάντες δυσανασχετοῦντες τὰ γιγνόμενα, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς παρεβοήθουν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ τείχους ἐς φυλακήν, ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι ἤδη περὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὅπηι σωθήσονται διεσκόπουν. ἦν τε ἐν τῶι παραυτίκα οὐδεμιᾶς δὴ τῶν ξυμπασῶν ἐλάσσων ἔκπληξις. 7
παραπλήσιά τε ἐπεπόνθεσαν καὶ ἔδρασαν αὐτοὶ ἐν Πύλωι· διαφθαρεισῶν γὰρ τῶν νεῶν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις προσαπώλλυντο αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ ἐν τῆι νήσωι ἄνδρες διαβεβηκότες, καὶ τότε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἀνέλπιστον ἦν τὸ κατὰ γῆν σωθήσεσθαι, ἢν μή τι παρὰ λόγον γίγνηται.

Γενομένης δ' ἰσχυρᾶς τῆς ναυμαχίας καὶ πολλῶν νεῶν ἀμφοτέροις καὶ **72**
ἀνθρώπων ἀπολομένων οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπικρατήσαντες τά τε ναυάγια καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἀνείλοντο, καὶ ἀποπλεύσαντες πρὸς τὴν πόλιν τροπαῖον ἔστησαν, οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι ὑπὸ μεγέθους τῶν παρόντων 2
κακῶν νεκρῶν μὲν πέρι ἢ ναυαγίων οὐδὲ ἐπενόουν αἰτῆσαι ἀναίρεσιν, τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς ἐβουλεύοντο εὐθὺς ἀναχωρεῖν. Δημοσθένης δὲ Νικίαι 3
προσελθὼν γνώμην ἐποιεῖτο πληρώσαντας ἔτι τὰς λοιπὰς τῶν νεῶν

71.2 <***>: lac. stat. Bauer: alii alia. **71**.4 ὅσ' ἂν Herwerden: ὅσα codd. Dion. Hal. **71**.7 ξυμπασῶν: ξυμφορῶν B

βιάσασθαι, ἢν δύνωνται, ἅμα ἕωι τὸν ἔκπλουν, λέγων ὅτι πλείους ἔτι αἱ λοιπαὶ νῆες χρήσιμαι σφίσιν ἢ τοῖς πολεμίοις· ἦσαν γὰρ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις
4 περίλοιποι ὡς ἑξήκοντα, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις ἐλάσσους ἢ πεντήκοντα. καὶ ξυγχωροῦντος Νικίου τῆι γνώμηι καὶ βουλομένων πληροῦν αὐτῶν οἱ ναῦται οὐκ ἤθελον ἐσβαίνειν διὰ τὸ καταπεπλῆχθαί τε τῆι ἥσσηι καὶ μὴ ἂν ἔτι οἴεσθαι κρατῆσαι.

73 Καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡς κατὰ γῆν ἀναχωρήσοντες ἤδη ξύμπαντες τὴν γνώμην εἶχον, Ἑρμοκράτης δὲ ὁ Συρακόσιος ὑπονοήσας αὐτῶν τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ νομίσας δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ τοσαύτη στρατιὰ κατὰ γῆν ὑποχωρήσασα καὶ καθεζομένη ποι τῆς Σικελίας βουλήσεται αὖθις σφίσι τὸν πόλεμον ποιεῖσθαι, ἐσηγεῖται ἐλθὼν τοῖς ἐν τέλει οὖσιν ὡς οὐ χρεὼν ἀποχωρῆσαι τῆς νυκτὸς αὐτοὺς περιιδεῖν, λέγων ταῦτα ἃ καὶ αὐτῶι ἐδόκει, ἀλλὰ ἐξελθόντας ἤδη πάντας Συρακοσίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τάς τε ὁδοὺς ἀποικοδομῆσαι καὶ τὰ στενόπορα τῶν χωρίων προφθάσαντας
2 φυλάσσειν. οἱ δὲ ξυνεγίγνωσκον μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἧσσον ταῦτα ἐκείνου, καὶ ἐδόκει ποιητέα εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους ἄρτι ἀσμένους ἀπὸ ναυμαχίας τε μεγάλης ἀναπεπαυμένους καὶ ἅμα ἑορτῆς οὔσης (ἔτυχε γὰρ αὐτοῖς Ἡρακλεῖ ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν θυσία οὖσα) οὐ δοκεῖν ἂν ῥαιδίως ἐθελῆσαι ὑπακοῦσαι· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ περιχαροῦς τῆς νίκης πρὸς πόσιν τετράφθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν τῆι ἑορτῆι, καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἐλπίζειν ἂν σφῶν πείθεσθαι αὐτοὺς ἢ ὅπλα λαβόντας ἐν τῶι παρόντι
3 ἐξελθεῖν. ὡς δὲ τοῖς ἄρχουσι ταῦτα λογιζομένοις ἐφαίνετο ἄπορα καὶ οὐκέτι ἔπειθεν αὐτοὺς ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης, αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τούτοις τάδε μηχανᾶται, δεδιὼς μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καθ' ἡσυχίαν προφθάσωσιν ἐν τῆι νυκτὶ διελθόντες τὰ χαλεπώτατα τῶν χωρίων. πέμπει τῶν ἑταίρων τινὰς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μετὰ ἱππέων πρὸς τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον, ἡνίκα ξυνεσκόταζεν· οἳ προσελάσαντες ἐξ ὅσου τις ἔμελλεν ἀκούσεσθαι καὶ ἀνακαλεσάμενοί τινας ὡς ὄντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιτήδειοι (ἦσαν γάρ τινες τῶι Νικίαι διάγγελοι τῶν ἔνδοθεν) ἐκέλευον φράζειν Νικίαι μὴ ἀπάγειν τῆς νυκτὸς τὸ στράτευμα ὡς Συρακοσίων τὰς ὁδοὺς φυλασσόντων, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἡσυχίαν
4 τῆς ἡμέρας παρασκευασάμενον ἀποχωρεῖν. καὶ οἱ μὲν εἰπόντες ἀπῆλθον,
74 καὶ οἱ ἀκούσαντες διήγγειλαν τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων· οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἄγγελμα ἐπέσχον τὴν νύκτα, νομίσαντες οὐκ ἀπάτην εἶναι. καὶ ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὡς οὐκ εὐθὺς ὥρμησαν, ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ἡμέραν

73.1 ὑποχωρήσασα: ἀποχωρήσασα CE *P.Oxy.* 1376 **73**.2 ἀναπεπαυμένους: πεπαυμένους B, in lacuna ut uidetur spatii ratione habita *P.Oxy.* 1376 **73**.3 οὐκέτι: οὐκ K *P.Oxy.* 1376 (coniecit Krüger)

περιμεῖναι, ὅπως ξυσκευάσαιντο ὡς ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν οἱ στρατιῶται ὅτι χρησιμώτατα, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα καταλιπεῖν, ἀναλαβόντες δὲ αὐτὰ ὅσα περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐς δίαιταν ὑπῆρχεν ἐπιτήδεια ἀφορμᾶσθαι. Συρακόσιοι δὲ καὶ Γύλιππος τῶι μὲν πεζῶι προεξελθόντες τάς τε ὁδοὺς 2
τὰς κατὰ τὴν χώραν, ἦι εἰκὸς ἦν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἰέναι, ἀπεφάργνυσαν καὶ τῶν ῥείθρων καὶ ποταμῶν τὰς διαβάσεις ἐφύλασσον καὶ ἐς ὑποδοχὴν τοῦ στρατεύματος ὡς κωλύσοντες ἦι ἐδόκει ἐτάσσοντο· ταῖς δὲ ναυσὶ προσπλεύσαντες τὰς ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ ἀφεῖλκον (ἐνέπρησαν δέ τινας ὀλίγας, ὥσπερ διενοήθησαν, αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι), τὰς δ' ἄλλας καθ' ἡσυχίαν οὐδενὸς κωλύοντος ὡς ἑκάστην ποι ἐκπεπτωκυῖαν ἀναδησάμενοι ἐκόμιζον ἐς τὴν πόλιν.

Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ ἐδόκει τῶι Νικίαι καὶ τῶι Δημοσθένει ἱκανῶς **75**
παρεσκευάσθαι, καὶ ἡ ἀνάστασις ἤδη τοῦ στρατεύματος τρίτηι ἡμέραι ἀπὸ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐγίγνετο. δεινὸν οὖν ἦν οὐ καθ' ἓν μόνον τῶν 2
πραγμάτων, ὅτι τάς τε ναῦς ἀπολωλεκότες πάσας ἀπεχώρουν καὶ ἀντὶ μεγάλης ἐλπίδος καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἡ πόλις κινδυνεύοντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῆι ἀπολείψει τοῦ στρατοπέδου ξυνέβαινε τῆι τε ὄψει ἑκάστωι ἀλγεινὰ καὶ
τῆι γνώμηι αἰσθέσθαι. τῶν τε γὰρ νεκρῶν ἀτάφων ὄντων, ὁπότε τις ἴδοι 3
τινὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων κείμενον, ἐς λύπην μετὰ φόβου καθίστατο, καὶ οἱ ζῶντες καταλειπόμενοι τραυματίαι τε καὶ ἀσθενεῖς πολὺ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοῖς ζῶσι λυπηρότεροι ἦσαν καὶ τῶν ἀπολωλότων ἀθλιώτεροι. πρὸς γὰρ 4
ἀντιβολίαν καὶ ὀλοφυρμὸν τραπόμενοι ἐς ἀπορίαν καθίστασαν, ἄγειν τε σφᾶς ἀξιοῦντες καὶ ἕνα ἕκαστον ἐπιβοώμενοι, εἴ τινά πού τις ἴδοι ἢ ἑταίρων ἢ οἰκείων, τῶν τε ξυσκήνων ἤδη ἀπιόντων ἐκκρεμαννύμενοι καὶ ἐπακολουθοῦντες ἐς ὅσον δύναιντο, εἴ τωι δὲ προλίποι ἡ ῥώμη καὶ τὸ σῶμα, οὐκ ἄνευ πολλῶν ἐπιθειασμῶν καὶ οἰμωγῆς ἀπολειπόμενοι, ὥστε δάκρυσι πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα πλησθὲν καὶ ἀπορίαι τοιαύτηι μὴ ῥαιδίως ἀφορμᾶσθαι, καίπερ ἐκ πολεμίας τε καὶ μείζω ἢ κατὰ δάκρυα τὰ μὲν πεπονθότας ἤδη, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν ἀφανεῖ δεδιότας μὴ πάθωσιν.
κατήφειά τέ τις ἅμα καὶ κατάμεμψις σφῶν αὐτῶν πολλὴ ἦν. οὐδὲν γὰρ 5
ἄλλο ἢ πόλει ἐκπεπολιορκημένηι ἐώικεσαν ὑποφευγούσηι, καὶ ταύτηι οὐ σμικρᾶι· μυριάδες γὰρ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ὄχλου οὐκ ἐλάσσους τεσσάρων ἅμα ἐπορεύοντο. καὶ τούτων οἵ τε ἄλλοι ἔφερον πάντες ὅτι τις ἐδύνατο ἕκαστος χρήσιμον, καὶ οἱ ὁπλῖται καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς αὐτοὶ τὰ

75.4 πολλῶν Poppo (*non sine multis* Valla): ὀλίγων codd.: alii alia **75**.4 ἀπολειπόμενοι: ὑπολειπόμενοι B

σφέτερα αὐτῶν σιτία ὑπὸ τοῖς ὅπλοις, οἱ μὲν ἀπορίαι ἀκολούθων, οἱ δὲ ἀπιστίαι· ἀπηυτομολήκεσαν γὰρ πάλαι τε καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι παραχρῆμα. ἔφερον δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἱκανά· σῖτος γὰρ οὐκέτι ἦν ἐν τῶι στρατοπέδωι.
6 καὶ μὴν ἡ ἄλλη αἰκία καὶ ἡ ἰσομοιρία τῶν κακῶν, ἔχουσά τινα ὅμως τὸ μετὰ πολλῶν κούφισιν, οὐδ' ὡς ῥαιδία ἐν τῶι παρόντι ἐδοξάζετο, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ οἵας λαμπρότητος καὶ αὐχήματος τοῦ πρώτου ἐς
7 οἵαν τελευτὴν καὶ ταπεινότητα ἀφῖκτο. μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τὸ διάφορον τοῦτο [τῶι] Ἑλληνικῶι στρατεύματι ἐγένετο, οἷς ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ ἄλλους δουλωσομένους ἥκειν αὐτοὺς τοῦτο μᾶλλον δεδιότας μὴ πάθωσι ξυνέβη ἀπιέναι, ἀντὶ δ' εὐχῆς τε καὶ παιάνων, μεθ' ὧν ἐξέπλεον, πάλιν τούτων τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐπιφημίσμασιν ἀφορμᾶσθαι, πεζούς τε ἀντὶ ναυβατῶν πορευομένους καὶ ὁπλιτικῶι προσέχοντας μᾶλλον ἢ ναυτικῶι. ὅμως δὲ ὑπὸ μεγέθους τοῦ ἐπικρεμαμένου ἔτι κινδύνου πάντα ταῦτα αὐτοῖς οἰστὰ ἐφαίνετο.

76 Ὁρῶν δὲ ὁ Νικίας τὸ στράτευμα ἀθυμοῦν καὶ ἐν μεγάληι μεταβολῆι ὄν, ἐπιπαριὼν ὡς ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἐθάρσυνέ τε καὶ παρεμυθεῖτο, βοῆι τε χρώμενος αἰεί τι μᾶλλον ἑκάστοις καθ' οὓς γίγνοιτο ὑπὸ προθυμίας καὶ βουλόμενος ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον γεγωνίσκων ὠφελεῖν τι.

77 Καὶ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, ἐλπίδα χρὴ ἔχειν (ἤδη τινὲς καὶ ἐκ δεινοτέρων ἢ τοιῶνδε ἐσώθησαν), μηδὲ καταμέμφεσθαι ὑμᾶς ἄγαν αὐτοὺς μήτε ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς μήτε ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν νῦν
2 κακοπαθίαις. κἀγώ τοι οὐδενὸς ὑμῶν οὔτε ῥώμηι προφέρων (ἀλλ' ὁρᾶτε δὴ ὡς διάκειμαι ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου) οὔτ' εὐτυχίαι δοκῶν που ὕστερός του εἶναι κατά τε τὸν ἴδιον βίον καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα, νῦν ἐν τῶι αὐτῶι κινδύνωι τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις αἰωροῦμαι· καίτοι πολλὰ μὲν ἐς θεοὺς νόμιμα
3 δεδιήιτημαι, πολλὰ δὲ ἐς ἀνθρώπους δίκαια καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα. ἀνθ' ὧν ἡ μὲν ἐλπὶς ὅμως θρασεῖα τοῦ μέλλοντος, αἱ δὲ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν δὴ φοβοῦσιν. τάχα δὲ ἂν καὶ λωφήσειαν· ἱκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμίοις ηὐτύχηται, καὶ εἴ τωι θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι ἐστρατεύσαμεν, ἀποχρώντως
4 ἤδη τετιμωρήμεθα. ἦλθον γάρ που καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἤδη ἐφ' ἑτέρους, καὶ ἀνθρώπεια δράσαντες ἀνεκτὰ ἔπαθον. καὶ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς νῦν τά τε ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐλπίζειν ἠπιώτερα ἔξειν (οἰκτου γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀξιώτεροι ἤδη ἐσμὲν ἢ φθόνου), καὶ ὁρῶντες ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς οἷοι ὁπλῖται ἅμα καὶ ὅσοι ξυντεταγμένοι χωρεῖτε μὴ καταπέπληχθε ἄγαν, λογίζεσθε δὲ ὅτι αὐτοί τε πόλις εὐθύς ἐστε ὅποι ἂν καθέζησθε καὶ ἄλλη οὐδεμία ὑμᾶς τῶν ἐν Σικελίαι οὔτ' ἂν ἐπιόντας δέξαιτο ῥαιδίως οὔτ' ἂν ἱδρυθέντας

75.5 ὑπὸ: ἐπὶ Bothe **75**.6 ἡ ἰσομοιρία: ἡ ἰσομοιρίαι B: τῆι ἰσομοιρίαι Steup ἀφῖκτο: ἀφίκατο Badham **75**.7 τῶι del. Σ **76** αἰεί τι Weidgen: ἔτι codd.

που ἐξαναστήσειεν. τὴν δὲ πορείαν ὥστ' ἀσφαλῆ καὶ εὔτακτον εἶναι 5
αὐτοὶ φυλάξατε, μὴ ἄλλο τι ἡγησάμενος ἕκαστος ἢ ἐν ὧι ἂν ἀναγκασθῆι
χωρίωι μάχεσθαι, τοῦτο καὶ πατρίδα καὶ τεῖχος κρατήσας ἕξειν. σπουδὴ 6
δὲ ὁμοίως καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν ἔσται τῆς ὁδοῦ· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιτήδεια
βραχέα ἔχομεν, καὶ ἢν ἀντιλαβώμεθά του φιλίου χωρίου τῶν Σικελῶν
(οὗτοι γὰρ ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ Συρακοσίων δέος ἔτι βέβαιοι εἰσίν), ἤδη νομίζετε
ἐν τῶι ἐχυρῶι εἶναι. προπέπεμπται δ' ὡς αὐτούς, καὶ ἀπαντᾶν εἰρημένον
καὶ σιτία ἄλλα κομίζειν.

Τό τε ξύμπαν γνῶτε, ὦ ἄνδρες στρατιῶται, ἀναγκαῖόν τε ὂν ὑμῖν 7
ἀνδράσιν ἀγαθοῖς γίγνεσθαι ὡς μὴ ὄντος χωρίου ἐγγὺς ὅποι ἂν
μαλακισθέντες σωθεῖτε καί, ἢν νῦν διαφύγητε τοὺς πολεμίους, οἵ τε
ἄλλοι τευξόμενοι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖτέ που ἐπιδεῖν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν μεγάλην
δύναμιν τῆς πόλεως καίπερ πεπτωκυῖαν ἐπανορθώσοντες· ἄνδρες γὰρ
πόλις, καὶ οὐ τείχη οὐδὲ νῆες ἀνδρῶν κεναί.'

Ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοιάδε παρακελευόμενος ἅμα ἐπήιει τὸ στράτευμα, καὶ εἴ **78**
πηι ὁρώιη διεσπασμένον καὶ μὴ ἐν τάξει χωροῦν ξυνάγων καὶ καθιστάς, καὶ
ὁ Δημοσθένης οὐδὲν ἧσσον τοῖς καθ' ἑαυτὸν τοιαῦτά τε καὶ παραπλήσια
λέγων. τὸ δὲ ἐχώρει ἐν πλαισίωι τεταγμένον, πρῶτον μὲν ἡγούμενον τὸ 2
Νικίου, ἐφεπόμενον δὲ τὸ Δημοσθένους· τοὺς δὲ σκευοφόρους καὶ τὸν
πλεῖστον ὄχλον ἐντὸς εἶχον οἱ ὁπλῖται. καὶ ἐπειδὴ [τε] ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ 3
τῆι διαβάσει τοῦ Ἀνάπου ποταμοῦ, ηὗρον ἐπ' αὐτῶι παρατεταγμένους
τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων, καὶ τρεψάμενοι αὐτοὺς καὶ κρατήσαντες
τοῦ πόρου ἐχώρουν ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν· οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι παριππεύοντές τε
προσέκειντο καὶ ἐσακοντίζοντες οἱ ψιλοί.

Καὶ ταύτηι μὲν τῆι ἡμέραι προελθόντες σταδίους ὡς τεσσαράκοντα 4
ηὐλίσαντο πρὸς λόφωι τινὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι· τῆι δ' ὑστεραίαι πρῲ ἐπορεύοντο
καὶ προῆλθον ὡς εἴκοσι σταδίους, καὶ κατέβησαν ἐς χωρίον ἄπεδόν τι
καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο, βουλόμενοι ἔκ τε τῶν οἰκιῶν λαβεῖν τι
ἐδώδιμον (ὠικεῖτο γὰρ ὁ χῶρος) καὶ ὕδωρ μετὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν φέρεσθαι
αὐτόθεν· ἐν γὰρ τῶι πρόσθεν ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια, ἦι ἔμελλον ἰέναι, οὐκ
ἄφθονον ἦν. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τούτωι προελθόντες τὴν δίοδον τὴν ἐν 5
τῶι πρόσθεν ἀπετείχιζον· ἦν δὲ λόφος καρτερὸς καὶ ἑκατέρωθεν αὐτοῦ
χαράδρα κρημνώδης, ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ Ἀκραῖον λέπας.

Τῆι δ' ὑστεραίαι οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προῆισαν, καὶ οἱ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ 6
ξυμμάχων αὐτοὺς ἱππῆς καὶ ἀκοντισταὶ ὄντες πολλοὶ ἑκατέρωθεν ἐκώλυον

77.6 ἄλλα: ἅμα Reiske **78**.3 τε del. Krüger **78**.6 ἑκατέρωθεν B: ἑκάτεροι cett.
P.Oxy. 1376

καὶ ἐσηκόντιζόν τε καὶ παρίππευον. καὶ χρόνον μὲν πολὺν ἐμάχοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἔπειτα ἀνεχώρησαν πάλιν ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ στρατόπεδον. καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐκέτι ὁμοίως εἶχον· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀποχωρεῖν οἷόν τ' ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων.

79 Πρῶι δὲ ἄραντες ἐπορεύοντο αὖθις, καὶ ἐβιάσαντο πρὸς τὸν λόφον ἐλθεῖν τὸν ἀποτετειχισμένον, καὶ ηὗρον πρὸ ἑαυτῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀποτειχίσματος τὴν πεζὴν στρατιὰν παρατεταγμένην οὐκ ἐπ' ὀλίγων ἀσπίδων· στενὸν
2 γὰρ ἦν τὸ χωρίον. καὶ προσβαλόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐτειχομάχουν, καὶ βαλλόμενοι ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου ἐπάντους ὄντος (διικνοῦντο γὰρ ῥᾴιον οἱ ἄνωθεν) καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι βιάσασθαι ἀνεχώρουν πάλιν
3 καὶ ἀνεπαύοντο. ἔτυχον δὲ καὶ βρονταί τινες ἅμα γενόμεναι καὶ ὕδωρ, οἷα τοῦ ἔτους πρὸς μετόπωρον ἤδη ὄντος φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι· ἀφ' ὧν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μᾶλλον ἔτι ἠθύμουν καὶ ἐνόμιζον ἐπὶ τῶι σφετέρωι ὀλέθρωι
4 καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γίγνεσθαι. ἀναπαυομένων δ' αὐτῶν ὁ Γύλιππος καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πέμπουσι μέρος τι τῆς στρατιᾶς ἀποτειχιοῦντας αὖ ἐκ τοῦ ὄπισθεν αὐτοὺς ἧι προεληλύθεσαν· ἀντιπέμψαντες δὲ κἀκεῖνοι
5 σφῶν αὐτῶν τινὰς διεκώλυσαν. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πάσηι τῆι στρατιᾶι ἀναχωρήσαντες πρὸς τὸ πεδίον μᾶλλον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ηὐλίσαντο.

Τῆι δ' ὑστεραίαι προυχώρουν, καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι προσέβαλλόν τε πανταχῆι αὐτοῖς κύκλωι καὶ πολλοὺς κατετραυμάτιζον, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐπίοιεν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὑπεχώρουν, εἰ δ' ἀναχωροῖεν, ἐπέκειντο, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ὑστάτοις προσπίπτοντες, εἴ πως κατὰ βραχὺ τρεψάμενοι πᾶν τὸ
6 στράτευμα φοβήσειαν. καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν τοιούτωι τρόπωι ἀντεῖχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἔπειτα προελθόντες πέντε ἢ ἓξ σταδίους ἀνεπαύοντο ἐν τῶι πεδίωι· ἀνεχώρησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐς τὸ ἑαυτῶν στρατόπεδον.

80 Τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς τῶι Νικίαι καὶ Δημοσθένει ἐδόκει, ἐπειδὴ κακῶς σφίσι τὸ στράτευμα εἶχε τῶν τε ἐπιτηδείων πάντων ἀπορίαι ἤδη, καὶ κατατετραυματισμένοι ἦσαν πολλοὶ ἐν πολλαῖς προσβολαῖς τῶν πολεμίων γεγενημέναις, πυρὰ καύσαντας ὡς πλεῖστα ἀπάγειν τὴν στρατιάν, μηκέτι τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ἧι διενοήθησαν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἢ
2 οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐτήρουν, πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν. ἦν δὲ ἡ ξύμπασα ὁδὸς αὕτη οὐκ ἐπὶ Κατάνης τῶι στρατεύματι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τῆς Σικελίας τὸ πρὸς Καμάριναν καὶ Γέλαν καὶ τὰς ταύτηι πόλεις καὶ
3 Ἑλληνίδας καὶ βαρβάρους. καύσαντες οὖν πυρὰ πολλὰ ἐχώρουν ἐν τῆι νυκτί. καὶ αὐτοῖς, οἷον φιλεῖ καὶ πᾶσι στρατοπέδοις, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς

79.2 ἀνεχώρουν: ἀπεχώρουν B **79**.5 ταῦτα: τοῦτο B

μεγίστοις, φόβοι καὶ δείματα ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐν νυκτί τε καὶ διὰ πολεμίας καὶ [ἀπὸ] πολεμίων οὐ πολὺ ἀπεχόντων ἰοῦσιν, ἐμπίπτει ταραχή· καὶ τὸ μὲν Νικίου στράτευμα, ὥσπερ ἡγεῖτο, ξυνέμενέ τε καὶ 4
προύλαβε πολλῶι, τὸ δὲ Δημοσθένους, τὸ ἥμισυ μάλιστα καὶ πλέον, ἀπεσπάσθη τε καὶ ἀτακτότερον ἐχώρει. ἅμα δὲ τῆι ἕωι ἀφικνοῦνται ὅμως 5
πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐσβάντες ἐς τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν Ἑλωρίνην καλουμένην ἐπορεύοντο, ὅπως, ἐπειδὴ γένοιντο ἐπὶ τῶι ποταμῶι τῶι Κακυπάρει, παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἴοιεν ἄνω διὰ τῆς μεσογείας· ἤλπιζον γὰρ καὶ τοὺς Σικελοὺς ταύτηι οὓς μετεπέμψαντο ἀπαντήσεσθαι. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐγένοντο 6
ἐπὶ τῶι ποταμῶι, ηὗρον καὶ ἐνταῦθα φυλακήν τινα τῶν Συρακοσίων ἀποτειχίζουσάν τε καὶ ἀποσταυροῦσαν τὸν πόρον. καὶ βιασάμενοι αὐτὴν διέβησάν τε τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ ἐχώρουν αὖθις πρὸς ἄλλον ποταμὸν τὸν Ἐρινεόν· ταύτηι γὰρ οἱ ἡγεμόνες ἐκέλευον.

Ἐν τούτωι δ' οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, ὡς ἥ τε ἡμέρα ἐγένετο **81**
καὶ ἔγνωσαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀπεληλυθότας, ἐν αἰτίαι τε οἱ πολλοὶ τὸν Γύλιππον εἶχον ἑκόντα ἀφεῖναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ κατὰ τάχος διώκοντες, ἦι οὐ χαλεπῶς ἠισθάνοντο κεχωρηκότας, καταλαμβάνουσι περὶ ἀρίστου ὥραν. καὶ ὡς προσέμειξαν τοῖς μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους 2
ὑστέροις τ' οὖσι καὶ σχολαίτερον καὶ ἀτακτότερον χωροῦσιν, ὡς τῆς νυκτὸς τότε ξυνεταράχθησαν, εὐθὺς προσπεσόντες ἐμάχοντο, καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐκυκλοῦντό τε ῥᾶιον αὐτοὺς δίχα ἤδη ὄντας καὶ ξυνῆγον ἐς ταὐτό. τὸ δὲ Νικίου στράτευμα ἀπεῖχεν ἐν τῶι πρόσθεν 3
καὶ πεντήκοντα σταδίους· θᾶσσόν τε γὰρ ὁ Νικίας ἦγε, νομίζων οὐ τὸ ὑπομένειν ἐν τῶι τοιούτωι ἑκόντας εἶναι καὶ μάχεσθαι σωτηρίαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡς τάχιστα ὑποχωρεῖν, τοσαῦτα μαχομένους ὅσα ἀναγκάζονται. ὁ 4
δὲ Δημοσθένης ἐτύγχανέ τε τὰ πλείω ἐν πόνωι ξυνεχεστέρωι ὢν διὰ τὸ ὑστέρωι ἀναχωροῦντι αὐτῶι πρώτωι ἐπικεῖσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους, καὶ τότε γνοὺς τοὺς Συρακοσίους διώκοντας οὐ προυχώρει μᾶλλον ἢ ἐς μάχην ξυνετάσσετο, ἕως ἐνδιατρίβων κυκλοῦταί τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἐν πολλῶι θορύβωι αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦσαν· ἀνειληθέντες γὰρ ἔς τι χωρίον ὧι κύκλωι μὲν τειχίον περιῆν, ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν, ἐλάας δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγας εἶχεν, ἐβάλλοντο περισταδόν. τοιαύταις δὲ 5
προσβολαῖς καὶ οὐ ξυσταδὸν μάχαις οἱ Συρακόσιοι εἰκότως ἐχρῶντο· τὸ γὰρ ἀποκινδυνεύειν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἀπονενοημένους οὐ πρὸς ἐκείνων

80.3 ἀπὸ del. Reiske **81**.2 ἤδη B, in lacuna ut uidetur spatii ratione habita *P.Oxy.* 1376: δὴ ACEFGM, supra lin. B¹ **81**.3 σωτηρίαν: σωτήριον B *P.Oxy.* 1376 m. 2 **81**.4 Ἀθηναῖοι fortasse in lacuna omisit *P.Oxy.* 1376, spatii ratione habita: deleuit Krüger

μᾶλλον ἦν ἔτι ἢ πρὸς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἅμα φειδώ τέ τις ἐγίγνετο
ἐπ' εὐπραγίαι ἤδη σαφεῖ μὴ προαναλωθῆναί τωι, καὶ ἐνόμιζον καὶ ὡς
82 ταύτηι τῆι ἰδέαι καταδαμασάμενοι λήψεσθαι αὐτούς. ἐπειδὴ δ' οὖν δι'
ἡμέρας βάλλοντες πανταχόθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ξυμμάχους ἑώρων ἤδη
τεταλαιπωρημένους τοῖς τε τραύμασι καὶ τῆι ἄλληι κακώσει, κήρυγμα
ποιοῦνται Γύλιππος καὶ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πρῶτον μὲν τῶν
νησιωτῶν εἴ τις βούλεται ἐπ' ἐλευθερίαι ὡς σφᾶς ἀπιέναι· καὶ ἀπεχώρησάν
2 τινες πόλεις οὐ πολλαί. ἔπειτα δ' ὕστερον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας
τοὺς μετὰ Δημοσθένους ὁμολογία γίγνεται ὥστε ὅπλα τε παραδοῦναι καὶ
μὴ ἀποθανεῖν μηδένα μήτε βιαίως μήτε δεσμοῖς μήτε τῆς ἀναγκαιοτάτης
3 ἐνδείαι διαίτης. καὶ παρέδοσαν οἱ πάντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑξακισχίλιοι, καὶ
τὸ ἀργύριον ὃ εἶχον ἅπαν κατέθεσαν ἐσβαλόντες ἐς ἀσπίδας ὑπτίας, καὶ
ἐνέπλησαν ἀσπίδας τέσσαρας. καὶ τούτους μὲν εὐθὺς ἀπεκόμιζον ἐς τὴν
πόλιν· Νικίας δὲ καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ ταύτηι τῆι ἡμέραι ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπὶ τὸν
ποταμὸν τὸν Ἐρινεόν, καὶ διαβὰς πρὸς μετέωρόν τι καθῖσε τὴν στρατιάν.
83 Οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι τῆι ὑστεραίαι καταλαβόντες αὐτὸν ἔλεγον ὅτι οἱ
μετὰ Δημοσθένους παραδεδώκοιεν σφᾶς αὐτούς, κελεύοντες κἀκεῖνον τὸ
2 αὐτὸ δρᾶν· ὁ δ' ἀπιστῶν σπένδεται ἱππέα πέμψαι σκεψόμενον. ὡς δ'
οἰχόμενος ἀπήγγειλε πάλιν παραδεδωκότας, ἐπικηρυκεύεται Γυλίππωι
καὶ Συρακοσίοις εἶναι ἑτοῖμος ὑπὲρ Ἀθηναίων ξυμβῆναι, ὅσα ἀνήλωσαν
χρήματα Συρακόσιοι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, ταῦτα ἀποδοῦναι, ὥστε τὴν μετ'
αὐτοῦ στρατιὰν ἀφεῖναι αὐτούς· μέχρι οὗ δ' ἂν τὰ χρήματα ἀποδοθῆι,
3 ἄνδρας δώσειν Ἀθηναίων ὁμήρους, ἕνα κατὰ τάλαντον. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι
καὶ Γύλιππος οὐ προσεδέχοντο τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλὰ προσπεσόντες καὶ
4 περιστάντες πανταχόθεν ἔβαλλον καὶ τούτους μέχρι ὀψέ. εἶχον δὲ καὶ
οὗτοι πονήρως σίτου τε καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἀπορίαι. ὅμως δὲ τῆς νυκτὸς
φυλάξαντες τὸ ἡσυχάζον ἔμελλον πορεύσεσθαι. καὶ ἀναλαμβάνουσί τε τὰ
5 ὅπλα καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι αἰσθάνονται καὶ ἐπαιάνισαν. γνόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι
ὅτι οὐ λανθάνουσι, κατέθεντο πάλιν πλὴν τριακοσίων μάλιστα ἀνδρῶν·
οὗτοι δὲ διὰ τῶν φυλάκων βιασάμενοι ἐχώρουν τῆς νυκτὸς ἧι ἐδύναντο.
84 Νικίας δ' ἐπειδὴ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο ἦγε τὴν στρατιάν· οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι
καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι προσέκειντο τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον πανταχόθεν βάλλοντές
2 τε καὶ κατακοντίζοντες. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἠπείγοντο πρὸς τὸν Ἀσσίναρον
ποταμόν, ἅμα μὲν βιαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς πανταχόθεν προσβολῆς ἱππέων τε
πολλῶν καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου ὄχλου, οἰόμενοι ῥᾴδιόν τι σφίσιν ἔσεσθαι, ἢν διαβῶσι
3 τὸν ποταμόν, ἅμα δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ταλαιπωρίας καὶ τοῦ πιεῖν ἐπιθυμίαι. ὡς
δὲ γίγνονται ἐπ' αὐτῶι, ἐσπίπτουσιν οὐδενὶ κόσμωι ἔτι, ἀλλὰ πᾶς τέ τις
διαβῆναι αὐτὸς πρῶτος βουλόμενος καὶ οἱ πολέμιοι ἐπικείμενοι χαλεπὴν

ἤδη τὴν διάβασιν ἐποίουν· ἀθρόοι γὰρ ἀναγκαζόμενοι χωρεῖν ἐπέπιπτόν τε ἀλλήλοις καὶ κατεπάτουν, περί τε τοῖς δορατίοις καὶ σκεύεσιν οἱ μὲν εὐθὺς διεφθείροντο, οἱ δὲ ἐμπαλασσόμενοι κατέρρεον. ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ 4
θάτερά τε τοῦ ποταμοῦ παραστάντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι (ἦν δὲ κρημνῶδες) ἔβαλλον ἄνωθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πίνοντάς τε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀσμένους καὶ ἐν κοίλωι ὄντι τῶι ποταμῶι ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ταρασσομένους. οἵ τε Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπικαταβάντες τοὺς ἐν τῶι ποταμῶι μάλιστα 5
ἔσφαζον. καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ εὐθὺς διέφθαρτο, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἐπίνετό τε ὁμοῦ τῶι πηλῶι ἡιματωμένον καὶ περιμάχητον ἦν τοῖς πολλοῖς. τέλος **85**
δὲ νεκρῶν τε πολλῶν ἐπ' ἀλλήλοις ἤδη κειμένων ἐν τῶι ποταμῶι καὶ διεφθαρμένου τοῦ στρατεύματος τοῦ μὲν κατὰ τὸν ποταμόν, τοῦ δὲ καί, εἴ τι διαφύγοι, ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων, Νικίας Γυλίππωι ἑαυτὸν παραδίδωσι, πιστεύσας μᾶλλον αὐτῶι ἢ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις· καὶ ἑαυτῶι μὲν χρήσασθαι ἐκέλευεν ἐκεῖνόν τε καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους ὅτι βούλονται, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους στρατιώτας παύσασθαι φονεύοντας. καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος μετὰ τοῦτο ζωγρεῖν 2
ἤδη ἐκέλευεν· καὶ τούς τε λοιποὺς ὅσους μὴ ἀπεκρύψαντο (πολλοὶ δὲ οὗτοι ἐγένοντο) ξυνεκόμισαν ζῶντας, καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς τριακοσίους, οἳ τὴν φυλακὴν διεξῆλθον τῆς νυκτός, πέμψαντες τοὺς διωξομένους ξυνέλαβον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀθροισθὲν τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐς τὸ κοινὸν οὐ πολὺ ἐγένετο, 3
τὸ δὲ διακλαπὲν πολύ, καὶ διεπλήσθη πᾶσα Σικελία αὐτῶν, ἅτε οὐκ ἀπὸ ξυμβάσεως ὥσπερ τῶν μετὰ Δημοσθένους ληφθέντων. μέρος δέ τι 4
οὐκ ὀλίγον καὶ ἀπέθανεν· πλεῖστος γὰρ δὴ φόνος οὗτος καὶ οὐδενὸς ἐλάσσων τῶν ἐν τῶι [Σικελικῶι] πολέμωι τούτωι ἐγένετο. καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις προσβολαῖς ταῖς κατὰ τὴν πορείαν συχναῖς γενομέναις οὐκ ὀλίγοι ἐτεθνήκεσαν. πολλοὶ δὲ ὅμως καὶ διέφυγον, οἱ μὲν καὶ παραυτίκα, οἱ δὲ καὶ δουλεύσαντες καὶ διαδιδράσκοντες ὕστερον· τούτοις δ' ἦν ἀναχώρησις ἐς Κατάνην.

Ξυναθροισθέντες δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, τῶν τε αἰχμαλώτων **86**
ὅσους ἐδύναντο πλείστους καὶ τὰ σκῦλα ἀναλαβόντες, ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὁπόσους 2
ἔλαβον κατεβίβασαν ἐς τὰς λιθοτομίας, ἀσφαλεστάτην εἶναι νομίσαντες τήρησιν, Νικίαν δὲ καὶ Δημοσθένη ἄκοντος τοῦ Γυλίππου ἀπέσφαξαν. ὁ γὰρ Γύλιππος καλὸν τὸ ἀγώνισμα ἐνόμιζέν οἱ εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοὺς ἀντιστρατήγους κομίσαι Λακεδαιμονίοις. ξυνέβαινε δὲ τὸν μὲν 3
πολεμιώτατον αὐτοῖς εἶναι, Δημοσθένη, διὰ τὰ ἐν τῆι νήσωι καὶ Πύλωι, τὸν δὲ διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδειότατον· τοὺς γὰρ ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὁ Νικίας προυθυμήθη, σπονδὰς πείσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ποιήσασθαι, ὥστε ἀφεθῆναι. ἀνθ' ὧν οἵ τε Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἦσαν αὐτῶι 4

85.4 Σικελικῶι del. Dobree

προσφιλεῖς κἀκεῖνος οὐχ ἥκιστα διὰ τοῦτο πιστεύσας ἑαυτὸν τῶι Γυλίππωι παρέδωκεν. ἀλλὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων τινές, ὡς ἐλέγετο, οἱ μὲν δείσαντες, ὅτι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκεκοινολόγηντο, μὴ βασανιζόμενος διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτο ταραχὴν σφίσιν ἐν εὐπραγίαι ποιήσηι, ἄλλοι δέ, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ Κορίνθιοι, μὴ χρήμασι δὴ πείσας τινάς, ὅτι πλούσιος ἦν, ἀποδρᾶι καὶ αὖθις σφίσι νεώτερόν τι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γένηται, πείσαντες τοὺς ξυμμάχους
5 ἀπέκτειναν αὐτόν. καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιαύτηι ἢ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτων αἰτίαι ἐτεθνήκει, ἥκιστα δὴ ἄξιος ὢν τῶν γε ἐπ' ἐμοῦ Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν.

87 Τοὺς δ' ἐν ταῖς λιθοτομίαις οἱ Συρακόσιοι χαλεπῶς τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους μετεχείρισαν. ἐν γὰρ κοίλωι χωρίωι ὄντας καὶ ὀλίγωι πολλοὺς οἵ τε ἥλιοι τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ πνῖγος ἔτι ἐλύπει διὰ τὸ ἀστέγαστον καὶ αἱ νύκτες ἐπιγιγνόμεναι τοὐναντίον μετοπωριναὶ καὶ ψυχραὶ τῆι
2 μεταβολῆι ἐς ἀσθένειαν ἐνεωτέριζον, πάντα τε ποιούντων αὐτῶν διὰ στενοχωρίαν ἐν τῶι αὐτῶι καὶ προσέτι τῶν νεκρῶν ὁμοῦ ἐπ' ἀλλήλοις ξυννενημένων, οἵ ἔκ τε τῶν τραυμάτων καὶ διὰ τὴν μεταβολὴν καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀπέθνησκον, καὶ ὀσμαὶ ἦσαν οὐκ ἀνεκτοί, καὶ λιμῶι ἅμα καὶ δίψηι ἐπιέζοντο (ἐδίδοσαν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἑκάστωι ἐπὶ ὀκτὼ μῆνας κοτύλην ὕδατος καὶ δύο κοτύλας σίτου), ἄλλα τε ὅσα εἰκὸς ἐν τῶι τοιούτωι χωρίωι
3 ἐμπεπτωκότας κακοπαθῆσαι, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἐπεγένετο αὐτοῖς· καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν ἑβδομήκοντά τινας οὕτω διηιτήθησαν ἀθρόοι· ἔπειτα πλὴν Ἀθηναίων καὶ εἴ τινες Σικελιωτῶν ἢ Ἰταλιωτῶν ξυνεστράτευσαν, τοὺς ἄλλους
4 ἀπέδοντο. ἐλήφθησαν δὲ οἱ ξύμπαντες, ἀκριβείαι μὲν χαλεπὸν ἐξειπεῖν,
5 ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἑπτακισχιλίων. ξυνέβη τε ἔργον τοῦτο [Ἑλληνικὸν] τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε μέγιστον γενέσθαι, δοκεῖν δ' ἔμοιγε καὶ ὧν ἀκοῆι Ἑλληνικῶν ἴσμεν, καὶ τοῖς τε κρατήσασι λαμπρότατον καὶ τοῖς
6 διαφθαρεῖσι δυστυχέστατον· κατὰ πάντα γὰρ πάντως νικηθέντες καὶ οὐδὲν ὀλίγον ἐς οὐδὲν κακοπαθήσαντες πανωλεθρίαι δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον καὶ πεζὸς καὶ νῆες καὶ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπώλετο, καὶ ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐπ' οἴκου ἀπενόστησαν. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ περὶ Σικελίαν γενόμενα.

87.5 Ἑλληνικὸν del. Krüger

COMMENTARY

1–3: GYLIPPUS ARRIVES

Book 6 closed with Syracusan prospects looking bleak. The Athenian circumvallation was well advanced, though not yet complete (**2**.4n.), and Athenian ships were now moored in the Great Harbour (6.101.3, 102.3); a series of encounters had gone the Athenians' way (6.96–103), and it is they, not the Syracusans, who were now attracting allies (6.103.2). Talk in Syracuse was all about making terms, and feelers had been put out to Nicias, now in sole command of the Athenian forces (6.103.3, **2**.1n.). Sparta had been persuaded to intervene more aggressively (6.93.2), but so far had not done much: they sent a general, Gylippus, initially with only four ships (6.104.1) with more to follow later (**2**.1, **7**.1nn.). Gylippus himself, informed en route of the situation, 'gave up hope of Sicily' and aimed only to save S. Italy (6.104.1). His initial reception in Italy was lukewarm; he had hopes of Thurii, where his father had been a distinguished citizen (6.104.2), but was unable to bring the town over. At sea he ran into a storm, and returned to the Spartan colony Taras with some ships needing repair. Nicias regarded so paltry a force with contempt, 'and took no protective measures yet (πω)' (6.104.3; cf. **1**.2n., Intr., p. 3). So Gylippus arrives when the crisis is at its peak (**2**.4): that narrative pattern is as old as the *Odyssey* (6.96–103n.). But anyone familiar with such narrative rhythms would sense that this will change, and that 'yet' confirms it. The Spartan general makes an immediate difference, immediately (and importantly, Intr., pp. 30–1) to morale (**2**.2n.), and then also to military effectiveness, with decisive actions conveyed by historic presents (προσπέμπει, αἱρεῖ, ἁλίσκεται, **3**.1–4). The focus is kept sharply on Gylippus and the Syracusan side; there were opportunities for Th. to highlight Athenian negligence (**2**.2–3, **3**.3–4nn.), but 'all his artistic power is focused on maximizing the impact of Gylippus' arrival' (Kern 1989: 81).

Th.'s audience will know from Book 6 that the 'battle of the walls' is at its height, with the Athenians close to completing the circumvallation and the Syracusans desperate to frustrate their efforts. The manoeuvres and constructions are complex, and the modern student finds it difficult to follow them even with the aid of a map (here Map 4). Th.'s ancient audience had no such visual aid, and listeners would find it even harder than readers who could check back through the roll for any detail they had missed. Th. has already introduced with little or no explanation several places that continue to feature, 'Temenitis' at 6.75.1 and 100.2, 'Euryelus' at 6.97.2, 'Labdalon' at 6.97.5 and 98.2, and 'the circle' at

6.98.2, though the context has normally conveyed to the audience what is important. Even an audience with total concentration would tend to accumulate these as disparate facts, not combine them into a coherent bird's-eye view of the whole topography. Modern critics find this dismaying (e.g. 'the description of the topography is too rudimentary to evoke an image of the battleground or to enable us to properly understand the military tactics', Funke–Haake 2006: 381), but they may find it more confusing than ancient listeners and readers would do. They would be used to geography presented 'hodologically', i.e. as a description of the gradually mounting experience as a traveller goes, and less as a bird's-eye view: see e.g. Purves 2010, and for Hdt. Barker–Bouzarovski–Pelling–Isaksen 2016. They would expect their view to be built up piecemeal, and pick up whatever detail they needed to know for each manoeuvre as it came.

1.1 Ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος: δέ links the narrative closely to the end of Book 6, where 6.105 had dealt with affairs in Greece. Gylippus was first mentioned at 6.93.2; further details of his forces and his journey were given at 6.104. His father Cleandridas had been a citizen and general, possibly even an oikist (colony-founder), at Thurii (6.104.2n.); this may have played a part in his selection for this mission. Book 7 will go on to tell of Gylippus' Sicilian glory days, but he would end his career in disgrace and exile, accused of embezzlement (Plut. *Lys.* 16, *Nic.* 28.4, Diod. 13.106.8–9). **ὁ Πυθήν:** introduced at 6.104.1 as commander of the Corinthian forces. **τὰς ναῦς:** those brought ashore at Taras to repair storm-damage (6.104.2). This expeditionary force consisted in all of two Spartan ships and two Corinthian (6.104.1). **ἐς Λοκροὺς τοὺς Ἐπιζεφυρίους:** *IACP* 273–8; see Map 2. Locri's hostility to Athens went back at least to the 420s, and had been made clear the previous year when, like Taras, it had refused to allow the invading Athenians water or mooring (6.44.2(n.)). Locri remained pro-Syracusan throughout the campaign (**4**.7, **25**.3, **35**.2; Fragoulaki 2013: 200–1). **πυνθανόμενοι σαφέστερον ἤδη:** compared with the earlier false information that 'kept coming in' that the circumvallation was complete (imperfect ἐφοιτῶν, 6.104.1). The present rather than aorist participle here again suggests a series of reports. **ἔτι οἷόν τε κατὰ τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς στρατιᾷ ἀφικομένους ἐσελθεῖν:** see Map 4. The form this information takes already pushes the generals towards arriving by land: they would be 'arriving with an army' from the west, climbing Epipolae by way of Euryelus (as Gylippus went on to do, **2**.3(n.)), or from the north. **εἴτ' . . . διακινδυνεύσωσιν . . . εἴτ' . . . ἔλθωσιν:** deliberative indirect questions in historic sequence can take either subjunctive, as here, or optative: *CGCG* 42.18. **ἐσπλεῦσαι:** had Gylippus taken this option and had he had enough local knowledge, he

would presumably have 'sailed in' to the Little Harbour rather than the Great (Map 4); Th. has not yet distinguished the two (**22.1n.**). That would indeed be a big 'risk' (διακινδυνεύσωσιν), vastly outnumbered as his fleet would be. **Ἰμέραν:** Himera had refused to admit Athenian forces the previous year (6.62.2(nn.)), but only now came out firmly for Syracuse: cf. **1.3**, **58.2**. **αὐτούς τε ἐκείνους:** sense-construction (*CGCG* 27.6) after Ἰμέραν. **οὓς ἂν πείθωσι:** sense-construction after στρατιάν.

1.2 ἐπὶ τῆς Ἰμέρας: for ἐπί + genitive = 'heading for', 'in the direction of' see LSJ A.I.3.a, *CGCG* 31.8 p. 338. **τῶν Ἀττικῶν τεσσάρων νεῶν:** 'the' not because they have been mentioned before (they have not) but preparing for the explanation in the relative clause. Engl. would convey by 'the four ships that . . .' with no comma. **οὕπω παρουσῶν ἐν τῶι Ῥηγίωι:** from where they were evidently to cut off passage through the straits: see Map 2. Rhegium had been expected to support their long-standing ally Athens, but the reception there was lukewarm and the city preferred to stay neutral (6.44.2(n.)); it had at least provided Athens with a temporary base (6.50–1), and Nicias clearly relied on access to the harbour there. **ὅμως:** this builds on 6.104.3, where Nicias regarded the small approaching force with contempt καὶ οὐδεμίαν φυλακὴν πω ἐποιεῖτο: now, 'nevertheless', he does take some counter-measure. He evidently assumes that four ships will be enough to face the same number. Superior Athenian seamanship can be relied on. **ἀπέστειλεν:** Engl. would use the pluperfect (*CGCG* 33.40 n.1). **τὴν φυλακὴν ταύτην:** cf. the wording of 6.104.3, quoted above, but here φυλακή is concrete, 'guarding force' (LSJ I.2). **τοῦ πορθμοῦ:** the Straits of Messina. **Ῥηγίωι καὶ Μεσσήνηι:** so Rhegium keeps to its neutral position (6.44.2) and affords access to both sides: see on οὕπω παρουσῶν ἐν τῷ Ῥηγίωι above. Athens had tried several times the previous year to win over Messina, hoping to exploit internal treachery (6.50.1, 74.1(nn.)), but had failed.

1.3 **τε . . . καὶ . . . τε . . . καὶ . . . καί:** τούς τε Ἰμεραίους ἔπεισαν is co-ordinate with καὶ τοὺς Σελινουντίους . . . ἐκέλευον; then the first καί links (a) ξυμπολεμεῖν and (b) αὐτούς τε ἕπεσθαι καὶ . . . παρασχεῖν, with τε and καί tying this second combination more closely together in parallel with ξυμπολεμεῖν to define what form this co-operation should initially take. **τὰς γὰρ ναῦς ἀνείλκυσαν ἐν Ἰμέραι:** Engl. would again (**1.2n.**) use a pluperfect. The parenthesis explains why arms would be needed: for the moment, the sailors' maritime duties were at an end, and they would serve as infantry. **τοὺς Σελινουντίους:** Athens had originally become embroiled to defend Egesta against Selinus (6.6), and Selinus remained one of the targets along with Syracuse (6.20.3, 48, 62.1). Nicias would have preferred

to concentrate wholly on Selinus, 6.47. The city's support for Syracuse had consequently been, and would remain, unwavering: 6.65.1, 67.2, 58.1. **ἔς τι χωρίον:** Th. could simply have said 'come to join them'; this addition makes it clear that the command included explicit instructions, just as earlier in the sentence when specifying how the Himeraeans were to co-operate. Gylippus is a man for detail.

1.4 **τινα . . . στρατιὰν οὐ πολλήν:** τις mildly qualifies (6.1.1n.): 'an army, not a large one . . .' **Γελῶιοι:** Gela had sent some small assistance to Syracuse the previous year (6.67.2), and stepped that up in 414–413 (**33**.1n.; cf. **58**.1). **τῶν Σικελῶν τινες:** Book 6 had distinguished two groups of Sicels, those subject to Syracuse and those who were independent; the independents were more to be found in the interior, the subjects on the plain (6.88.4n.). Syracuse had tightened its grip on the subjects (6.34.1, 45.1, 88.5) and, like Athens (6.48, 62.5, 88.4), had played for the goodwill of the independents. So far Athens had been the more successful in winning it, and some of the subject Sicels had also come over (6.88.4); recently the pro-Athenian momentum had built up further (6.103.2). On the Sicels and their sympathies see Fragoulaki 2013: 292–8 and Pope 2017. **Ἀρχωνίδου:** a considerable figure of the previous generation. He was ruler of Herbita, a town of uncertain location but probably somewhere in the interior west of Etna and south of Kale Akte. Kale Akte was itself a coastal settlement of the 440s in which Archonides joined the Sicel leader Ducetius: Diod. 12.8.2. **τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις φίλος ἦν:** a surviving decree (Walbank no. 66) shows that Archonides and his brother Demon (6.94.3n.) were almost certainly *proxenoi* of Athens, i.e. members of community A who promoted the interests of city B when need arose (6.89.2n.). That is a considerable honour, and reflects the Athenian interest and diplomacy in the area some time before the expedition (Intr. to Book 6, pp. 29–30). Still, the honour is now less relevant than the 'friendship' which, had he lived, would have kept his people pro-Athenian.

1.5 **τῶν τε . . . ὡπλισμένους:** with, at least in the sailors' case, those arms that the Himeraeans had supplied (**1**.3), though the marines had presumably brought their own. **ξυναμφοτέρους χιλίους** 'together totalling 1,000'. **Σελινουντίων τέ τινας ψιλοὺς καὶ ἱππέας:** Th. leaves the point implicit, but this is hardly the πανστρατιᾶι reinforcement that Gylippus had demanded (**1**.3). Selinus may have resented his high-handedness (Green 1970: 212–13). **ἐς χιλίους τοὺς πάντας** 'up to 1,000 in all', acting as a further object of ἀναλαβών.

2.1 **οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς Λευκάδος Κορίνθιοι:** these are then subdivided by τε . . . καί into (a) an understood 'the others', subject of ἐβοήθουν, and (b) Gongylus:

the impact of his arrival is captured by the historic present ἀφικνεῖται. This picks up the narrative from 6.104.1, where the two advance Corinthian ships (1.1n.) were to be followed as soon as possible by the rest of their force, including two ships from Leucas and three from Ambracia with Corinthian crews. At 6.104.1 the Corinthian force is given as 'ten'; it emerges from 7.1 (n.) that those ten include the two that came in advance and this single ship of Gongylus. Plut. *Nic.* 19.1 dramatises: everyone goes rushing to meet Gongylus, but they do not altogether believe the news he brings of Gylippus; then a messenger arrives from Gylippus himself . . . **ὡς εἶχον τάχους** 'as quickly as they could', lit. 'in the degree of speed that they had': *GG* 1092. **Γογγύλος:** named by Th. only here. Plut. *Nic.* 19.7 says he was then killed in the first fighting (5.3n.). **περὶ ἀπαλλαγῆς τοῦ πολέμου μέλλοντας ἐκκλησιάσειν:** there had already been talk about this, and even some feelers to Nicias (6.103.3). **διεκώλυσέ τε καὶ παρεθάρσυνε:** the aorist conveys a single act, presumably by persuading the three Syracusan generals; the imperfect suggests repeated encouragement, presumably to anyone who would listen. λέγων . . . covers both, as he would have been using the same arguments. **καὶ Γύλιππος . . . ἄρχων:** Th. has already mentioned Gylippus' parentage and his Spartan mission (6.93.2), but the portentousness captures the tone of how Gongylus would have put it. His words leave it open, perhaps tactfully, whether ἄρχων means 'as commander' just of the Peloponnesian force or 'to take up command' in Syracuse, but in fact the Syracusans and Gylippus both seem to assume that he will act as supreme commander, even if his pre-eminence then wanes as the Syracusans grow in confidence (33.3n.).

2.2 ἐπερρώσθησαν: a word and a theme that will be important, as the book traces the ups and occasional downs of Syracusan morale: Intr., p. 30. **ἐξῆλθον:** by a route north of the 'circle' (the fortified Athenian base near the southern edge of Epipolae), either over or skirting Epipolae, taking advantage of the Athenian failure to complete the wall in that area (2.4). This was not just an exuberant gesture of welcome, as πανστρατιᾶι shows: they were ready for action if necessary. It is remarkable that so large an exodus was apparently unimpeded by the Athenians (Green 1970: 215), but Th. puts no emphasis on this. **ἤδη:** with ἐγγὺς ὄντα. **ἠισθάνοντο:** αἰσθάνομαι + accusative + participle conveys intellectual, as here, or visual knowledge; + genitive + participle is used for auditory perception (*CGCG* 52.20).

2.3 ὁ δέ: Gylippus. **Ἰέτας:** both location and name are very uncertain: the various MSS readings point to 'Getae', and 'Ietae' is restored from Stephanus of Byzantium, who quotes Philistus for a φρούριον Σικελίας bearing the name. **τῶν Σικελῶν:** either with τι τεῖχος or with παρόδωι or

with both. **κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον:** at the western edge of Epipolae: see Map 4. Th. feeds his audience information about Epipolae as it becomes relevant: see **1–3**n. A large troop-movement again (**2**.2n.) appears to be surprisingly unimpeded and an important position unfortified (Green 1970: 215–16, Kagan 1981: 270–1), and again Th. makes no comment. **ἤιπερ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ πρῶτον:** 6.97.2.

2.4 κατὰ τοῦτο τοῦ καιροῦ: for the genitive, lit. 'at this point of the critical moment', cf. ἐν τῶι τοιούτωι ἤδη τοὺ καιροῦ (**69**.2) and ἐν τούτωι τύχης (**33**.6). καιρός is a recurrent word in Book 7, esp. these early chapters, as critical opportunities are just caught or missed: cf. **5**.2, **6**.1, **11**.1. **ἑπτὰ μὲν ἢ ὀκτὼ σταδίων:** about 1.25–1.6 km (a mile or a little less). **ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα διπλοῦν τεῖχος:** see Map 4. After establishing the 'circle' on Epipolae (6.98.2), the Athenians had first started work on the northern wall (6.99), but the arrival of their ships in the harbour had switched their priorities to the south, as Th. had described at 6.101–3 along with the Syracusan attempts to prevent it. It is here though that he gives fuller details of its length and the progress made, as this is where these details become relevant. The 'double wall' would allow troops to get quickly to any part under attack, and would offer protection as stores were transported from the ships: the two walls probably splayed out in a V-shape to protect all the shoreline where the ships would be moored. **τῶι δὲ ἄλλωι . . . θάλασσαν:** τείχει is understood with τῶι δὲ ἄλλωι, and this is the northern wall: the repetition of 'Trogilus' and 'the other sea' from 6.99.1 point the reader/listener back to the description there, where it is explained that this is the shortest route to that shore. See Map 4 and 6.99.1n. The meaning is clear but the text is uncertain: perhaps τῶι should be added before Wölfflin's supplement <ἀπό>, or perhaps τοῦ κύκλου should be deleted. **λίθοι τε παραβεβλημένοι:** again echoing 6.99.1 οἱ δὲ λίθους καὶ ξύλα ξυμφοροῦντες παρέβαλλον. Gylippus eventually makes use of these at **5**.1. **καὶ ἔστιν ἃ καὶ ἡμίεργα:** still with τῶι δὲ ἄλλωι, 'and it had some parts that were half-built'. **ἐξειργασμένα κατελέλειπτο** 'had been completed and then abandoned'. Th. does not explain why: presumably not through negligence, but because all effort had switched to the southern wall. **παρὰ τοσοῦτον μὲν αἱ Συράκουσαι ἦλθον κινδύνου:** cf. 3.49.4 παρὰ τοσοῦτον μὲν ἡ Μυτιλήνη ἦλθε κινδύνου, when a second ship arrives just in time to stop the Mytileneans being executed on orders carried in the first: this may well recall that passage, though there is plenty of action yet to come before the Syracusan escape from danger is complete (Dewald 2005: 224). The technique is similar (Rood 1998a: 173 n. 57, Joho 2017a: 598–9) to what has been called the 'nearly-episode' or the

'epic almost', where an author stresses what would have happened but for a timely intervention, e.g. 'and then the sons of the Achaeans would have taken high-gated Troy, had not Phoebus Apollo . . .' (*Il.* 21.544–5); there are many other examples (Nesselrath 1992 and, briefly, Pelling 2013b: 3–4). But it is characteristic of Th. to accompany and highlight such a point with sharp circumstantial detail, here the state of the fortifications, in 3.49 the enthusiasm of the rowers and the drama of the execution decree being read.

3.1 **παρετάξαντο:** somewhere on Epipolae in front of the still-to-be-completed wall (cf. πρὸς τῶι ἑαυτῶν τείχει, **3**.3), though it was not easy ground for the full-dress battle for which both sides were shaping up. **θέμενος τὰ ὅπλα ἐγγύς** 'taking up position close to them'. **πέντε ἡμερῶν** 'within five days' (*CGCG* 30.32). **ἑτοῖμος εἶναι:** nominative + accusative by a sense construction, as if following 'Gylippus said to the Athenians'. This marvellous piece of bravado was clearly to raise Syracusan spirits: the Athenians were never going to accept.

3.2 **οἱ δ' ἐν ὀλιγωρίαι τε ἐποιοῦντο:** 'the Athenians' here, sharpening to 'Nicias' at **3**.3–4, but here the contempt of the whole battle-line, not just the general, is relevant. The picture of the herald stopping in front of the line, shouting out his message, and being sent away unanswered is very effective; it is hard, though, to believe that the Athenians refrained from shouting insults any more than the Syracusans did at 6.63.3. Plut. *Nic.* 19.4 adds some, probably from his imagination – 'have one Spartan cloak and staff made such a difference to Syracuse's prospects that you now treat Athenians with scorn . . .?' – but one suspects that in real life the idiom was more rough and soldierly.

3.3 **ταρασσομένους καὶ οὐ ῥαιδίως ξυντασσομένους:** echoing the similar Syracusan disorder at 6.98.3, but there the generals withdrew into the city; Gylippus now merely shifts ground. Still, the Athenians may now have been between his forces and the city, and Gylippus had little choice. **ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν μᾶλλον:** to the north or west, perhaps to more open ground still on the plateau (Dover 1965: 3, Green 1970: 216–17), perhaps to the plain via Euryelus, but it is hard for an audience to picture this clearly: see on ἐπὶ τὴν ἄκραν τὴν Τεμενῖτιν below. **καὶ ὁ Νικίας οὐκ ἐπῆγε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους:** why not? An attack on the disordered Syracusan ranks would seem the obvious response, especially if they were retreating downhill, and that was clearly what Gylippus anticipated (ὡς δ' ἔγνω . . .). Th. again (cf. **2**.2–3nn.) makes no comment on Athenian inaction. **ἡσύχαζε:** ἡσυχία forms a sort of signature tune for Nicias,

both in his opposition to the whole campaign (6.10.2, 25.2nn.) and now in his strategy and tactics (**11**.3). It is pathetically echoed at **73**.3(n.) and **83**.4. It is more a Spartan than an Athenian characteristic (1.69.4): 'an Athenian with a Spartan heart' (Edmunds 1975: 109). **ἐπὶ τὴν ἄκραν τὴν Τεμενῖτιν:** Th. does not give his listeners/readers enough information to form a coherent picture. If they remember 'Temenitis' from 6.75.1 and 100.2(nn.), they would think of it as an area close to the city enclosed by the 'winter wall' of 6.75.1, and τὴν ἄκραν might point to a high point either there or overlooking it from Epipolae. *HCT* 472 assumes the latter, Green 1970: 218 the former. But that audience might still be puzzled to know how the Syracusans could have made their way there. Perhaps they skirted Epipolae to the north.

3.4 παρέταξε πρὸς τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων: the plural τείχη indicates operations against both northern and southern walls, but Th. does not indicate whether this operation was threatening them from the landward side, as on the day before, or from the city: probably the latter. **τὸ φρούριον τὸ Λάβδαλον:** 'the' φρούριον, because the audience will remember it from 6.98.5 and 100.2 as a fortified guard-post built on the northern edge of Epipolae: see Map 4. Most of the goods stored there would now have been moved to 'the circle'. Again Nicias' defensive measures seem inadequate, but again Th. does not say so. **ἦν δὲ οὐκ ἐπιφανὲς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὸ χωρίον:** Th. has again delayed an important detail until the point where it becomes relevant rather than mentioning this at 6.98.5 or 100.2. Still, it was not just the fort itself that needed to be invisible but the whole troop-movement, and Th. again gives no idea of the route by which the Syracusans could attack.

3.5 ἐφορμοῦσα τῶι λιμένι: there were two harbours, the Great Harbour where the Athenians were now moored (6.101.3, 102.3) and the Little Harbour a short distance to the north (Map 4), but Th. has not told his audience this yet: he makes that distinction only at **22**.1(n.). At 6.50.4 and 101–2 and **2**.4 Th. specified 'the Great Harbour', and here and at **4**.4 any reader lacking local knowledge would assume that 'the harbour' again meant that one. In fact any ship bringing provisions to the city would head for the Little Harbour, still under Syracusan control, and trireme captains keeping watch would be alert to that. Probably Th. did not think distinguishing the two harbours important enough yet to trouble the reader, who has plenty of other topographical detail to assimilate; this item partly prepares for **4**.5(n.), and what will matter there is where the Athenian ships were coming from, not where any incoming ships were heading.

4–7: THE BALANCE SHIFTS

Gylippus has already made a difference, especially to morale (**1–3**n.). He continues to do so, though not through any change of tactics: both sides continue the 'battle of the walls' with the same aims as before, the Athenians to cut off the city and the Syracusans to forestall them (cf. 6.99.2–3, 101.2), though for Syracuse this means beginning a fresh wall (**4**.1). Gylippus continues the mix of harassing the fortifiers and offering battle, though he makes the error of picking terrain unsuited to cavalry (**5**.3) and renews the diplomatic missions in search of allies (**7**.2n.). Even his pick-me-up rhetoric after a reverse has some similarities to Hermocrates' (**5**.3–4n.; cf. 6.72.3). The immediate alteration is more to the Athenian tactics, with some injection of energy (**4**.4 and 7), though with mixed results (**4**.6, **7**.1). But the big change is to morale, and on both sides: Nicias despairs, probably too soon (**4**.5), whereas Syracusan spirits continue to rise (**7**.4n.). Gylippus' rhetoric of reassurance is immediately effective in a way that Hermocrates' was not, and Syracuse begins to win the exchanges, both on the battlefield and with the spade (**6**). **2**.4(n.) has already prepared for the Syracusans' blocking of the completion of the northern wall to be a decisive turning point, and that moment is now emphasised in stylistically expressive language (**6**.4n.). The narrative focus is sharply on the two generals – Green 1970: 218–20 speculates on what the Syracusans thought about the newly arrived Gylippus, but Th. does not – but that focus is more evenly dispersed than in **1–3**, with more interest in Nicias' actions and mindset. That then dominates in the next section, **8–17**(n.).

4.1 **ἐτείχιζον:** inceptive imperfect, but suggesting also that it took time: *CGCG* 33.52 n. 1. **ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως:** more precisely, from a point somewhere on the 'winter wall' of 6.75.1(n.) built to protect the city: see Map 4. **πρὸς τὸ ἐγκάρσιον** 'cross-ways', adverbial: ἐγκάρσιον is not an adjective qualifying τεῖχος as it is at **7**.1. This τεῖχος is to be distinguished from the now-destroyed 'cross-wall' in the lower ground (6.99.3), which had aimed to cut off the southern Athenian wall to the Great Harbour; this one climbs up Epipolae (cf. ἄνω) and its purpose is to cut through the line of the proposed northern wall. See Map 4. **ὥσιν:** retained subjunctive in a purpose clause in historic sequence: *CGCG* 45.3. **ἀποτειχίσαι** 'to (successfully) wall off', aorist to convey the completed action.

4.2 **ἀνεβεβήκεσαν . . . ἐπήιει:** the juxtaposition of pluperfect and imperfect is effective: no sooner had the Athenians departed than Gylippus was on the move. **τὸ ἐπὶ θαλάσσηι τεῖχος:** i.e. the V-shaped southern wall that was still incomplete at **2**.4. Only now, with its completion, is it 'by' (ἐπί + dative) the

sea; at **2**.4 it was still being built 'towards' (πρός + accusative) the sea. **τοῦ τείχους:** presumably the southern wall, the one just mentioned.

4.3 ἔτυχον γὰρ ἔξω αὐλιζόμενοι 'for they were bivouacked outside at the time': not 'they chanced to be', as they were presumably there in anticipation of such an attack. τυγχάνω points to contemporaneity rather than chance (Gomme, *HCT* III. 488); cf. **50**.4n. **ὑψηλότερον:** predicative, 'they built it up higher'. **τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ξυμμάχους:** 'the other allies' can be used loosely for 'the others, i.e. the allies': cf. **61**.1 and e.g. 1.128.5, 3.19.2, X. *Hell.* 2.4.34. **τὸ ἄλλο τείχισμα** 'the rest of the wall': not 'the other wall', which would be ἕτερον, but this does presumably include the northern wall as well as the southern.

4.4 Πλημμύριον: on the southern pincer of the Great Harbour entrance: see Map 4. Its potential strategic importance is clear, especially for the sea-war (cf. προσεῖχέ τε ἤδη μᾶλλον τῶι κατὰ θάλασσαν πολέμωι), and it goes on to play a big role at **22–4**. It is arguable, though, that it was a mistake for Nicias to move so much here so soon: cf. **4**.5n. **ἔστι δὲ ἄκρα . . . κινῶνται:** the topography and the explanation are unusually full, corresponding to the audience's need to know why Plemmyrion will be so important. **τὸ στόμα στενὸν ποιεῖ:** not as narrow as all that, as **59**.3, slightly exaggerating (n.), gives the distance as 'eight stades'. **δι' ἐλάσσονος . . . ἐφορμήσειν σφᾶς** 'for they would be running their blockade close to the harbour of the Syracusans, with a shorter distance to travel'. Th.'s audience would again (**3**.5n.) naturally take 'the harbour' here to be the Great Harbour, even though the 'blockade' would have to include the Little Harbour. Still, the Athenians are also concerned with protecting their own imports (ἡ ἐσκομιδὴ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων: for their importance cf. **13**.1, **14**.3), and those would be coming into the Great Harbour. The Athenian ships would now regularly ride at anchor (C. M. Harrison 1999) close to the shore at the Harbour mouth. Such a 'blockade' would be different from those familiar from more modern times: a continuous patrol by a squadron of ships was unfeasible under ancient conditions, and it was more a matter of individual ships keeping watch to give an alert if others were approaching (Lazenby 2004: 13, Kopp 2016: 135–6). The new base would reduce the risk of such ships being isolated and captured as at **3**.5, and increase the chance of such an alert being in time to have some effect. **ἐκ μυχοῦ τοῦ λιμένος** 'from the inner recesses of the harbour': cf. **52**.2 and see Map 4. **τὰς ἐπαναγωγὰς ποιήσεσθαι** 'put out to sea against' any Syracusan ships. **κινῶνται:** the understood subject is 'the Syracusans'. **τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς** 'the prospects on land', lit. 'matters coming from the land'. **ἀνελπιστότερα ὄντα:** not for the only time (**11–15**n., Intr., p. 000), Nicias' response to a setback seems disproportionate: he has

completed and defended the southern wall, the sea-blockade would if successful mean that all Syracusan provisions would have to come along the northern route via Trogilus, and there was still some prospect of completing the circumvallation to block that off. Only at **6**.4(n.) is that frustrated.

4.5 **διακομίσας . . . ἐξετείχισε:** apparently without Syracusan opposition, and the aorist ἐξετείχισε conveys completion as well as inception. The southern wall will here have made a difference, hampering any Syracusan attempts to move quickly to Plemmyrion's defence. **τὰ πλοῖα . . . αἱ ταχεῖαι νῆες:** respectively the transports and the fighting ships, as at 6.65.2. It was probably a mistake to transfer so much to Plemmyrion: besides the lack of water (**4**.6), it also opened a dangerous gap on land between this and the Epipolae base at 'the circle', and mooring the ships here abandoned the protection that the V-shaped southern walls (**2**.4, 6.103.1) had given.

4.6 **ὥστε:** introducing a new sentence as at **44**.7, **63**.4, and **64**.2: see *CGCG* 46.6. **οὐχ ἥκιστα:** best taken as qualifying τῶν πληρωμάτων, which is picked up by οἱ ναῦται: all the Athenian forces suffered, but especially the sailors in Plemmyrion on whom the burden of the foraging fell and who were less well-off for water than the soldiers on Epipolae. **κάκωσις ἐγένετο:** Th. could more simply have said 'began to deteriorate', but such a roundabout ('periphrastic') use of fashionable -σις compounds is a feature of his style: cf. **5**.2 οὐδεμία χρῆσις ἦν, **42**.4, 6.26.2n., Yaginuma 1995: 137–9, and Allison 1997a: 20–1. **τῶι τε γὰρ ὕδατι σπανίωι χρώμενοι . . . καὶ ἐπὶ φρυγανισμὸν ἅμα ὁπότε ἐξέλθοιεν:** as τε . . . καί indicates, these clauses are parallel despite the typically Thucydidean variety of construction, giving the two circumstances that rendered the Athenians vulnerable to the Syracusan cavalry. **ἐπὶ τῆι ἐν τῶι Ὀλυμπιείωι πολίχνηι:** taken as familiar to the reader/listener from 6.64.1 and 70.4. The 'Olympieion' is the domain of the temple of Olympian Zeus, at Le Colonne, west of the Great Harbour and south of the Anapus and Cyana rivers: see Map 4. The word πολίχνη points to more than a temple or a fort, and there must have been some community there. To get there from the city the cavalry would have to take a circuitous route to the north, but once established they were well placed to harry Athenian foragers from Plemmyrion.

4.7 **τὰς λοιπὰς τῶν Κορινθίων ναῦς:** **2**.1n. These numbered twelve (**7**.1n.). **ἐς φυλακὴν αὐτῶν** 'to guard against them'. **τὴν προσβολὴν τῆς Σικελίας** 'the approach to Sicily', as at 6.48(n.). The route was regularly across the Adriatic to the Italian coast and then south along it. **ναυλοχεῖν** 'to lie in wait for them'.

5.1 τὸ διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν τεῖχος: i.e. the cross-wall of 4.1. **προπαρεβάλοντο σφίσιν** 'had earlier thrown down nearby for their own use' (Engl. would use the pluperfect; cf. 1.2n.) when building their own northern wall at 6.99.1. There the Athenians 'threw down stones and timber next to' the planned line for *their own wall* (παρέβαλλον: the change from active there to middle here reinforces the 'for themselves' of σφίσιν), i.e. at right angles to this Syracusan wall, and so the παρ- here is loose. Cf. 2.4(n.). **πρὸ τοῦ τειχίσματος:** this is presumably this cross-wall, but possibly includes the winter wall of 6.75.1.

5.2 καιρός: 2.4n. **ἐμάχοντο μεταξὺ τῶν τειχισμάτων:** this must have been on Epipolae, as only there would the Athenian and Syracusan walls come close together but leave enough room for a fight (see Map 4), though Th. leaves that for his audience to infer. **οὐδεμία χρῆσις ἦν** 'there was no way of making use of': for the periphrastic -σις phrasing cf. 4.6n.

5.3 καὶ νικηθέντων τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων: Plut. *Nic.* 19.7 says that Gongylus (2.1n.) was among the dead. If this is right (and Plut. may well be drawing on the eye-witness Philistus, whom he has just quoted), this shows how perfunctory Th. is being here. He hurries on to the more interesting topic of Gylippus' response.

5.3–4 *Gylippus reassures the troops.* This echoes some of the themes already articulated by Hermocrates, both in his own reassurance after the battle of the Anapus (6.72: mistakes have been made, but your γνώμη was fine) and in his diplomacy (6.77.1: Dorians superior to Ionians and islanders). But at 6.72 Hermocrates blames his troops' ill discipline (5.4n.) rather than himself, and says that more training is needed; Gylippus' line, making it all his own error, is well judged to protect the Syracusans' morale, so important a theme in these chapters. There is no interest in any potential damage within Syracuse to his reputation and position that such an admission might cause, and on this Th. does not speculate (4–7n.). It is most unusual for a general to admit error; cf. X. *Anab.* 3.3.12–19 (Huitink–Rood 138), where again the leader quickly learns his lesson and switches tactics. **τῇ τάξει:** readers/listeners might take the dative with τὴν ὠφελίαν, 'the usefulness to the deployment', or with ἀφελέσθαι, 'by his deployment he had removed'; either way, a further τάξιν is understood as the object of ποιήσας.

5.4 διανοεῖσθαι 'to adopt the following mindset'. **τῇ μὲν παρασκευῇ . . . τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ:** Hermocrates adopted a similar μέν . . . δέ contrast at 6.72.3 τὴν μὲν γάρ γνώμην αὐτῶν οὐχ ἡσσῆσθαι, τὴν δὲ ἀταξίαν βλάψαι, but Gylippus can be even more upbeat: there is no need now to think there is

anything wrong with their preparations. The construction changes from the personal ἔξοντας to the impersonal ἐσόμενον, but the focus remains on the listeners' mindset. **Πελοποννήσιοί τε ὄντες καὶ Δωριῆς:** similarly Hermocrates at 6.77.1 (n.) Δωριῆς ἐλεύθεροι ἀπ' αὐτονόμου τῆς Πελοποννήσου. Syracuse itself was a colony of Peloponnesian and Dorian Corinth, and among Syracuse's current allies Selinus, Gela, and Megara were Dorian; so was Camarina, a half-hearted ally (6.88.2), and Hermocrates made much of that in his speech demanding their support (6.77.1, 80.3). Cf. **58**.3(n.). Himera however was a mixed foundation (6.5.1), and Gylippus also ignores the Sicels fighting on Syracuse's side (**1**.4n.). Not that all Dorians were united: **57** will stress the number of Dorians fighting on Athens' side. Still, pre-battle rhetoric is not the place for nuance or qualification. **Ἰώνων καὶ νησιωτῶν καὶ ξυγκλύδων ἀνθρώπων:** chiastically arranged, with Ἰώνων starkly juxtaposed with Δωριῆς and νησιωτῶν καὶ ξυγκλύδων answering Πελοποννήσιοι. Hermocrates again was similar in his contempt for 'islanders' (6.77.1), while the contempt for ξύγκλυδες people, lit. 'washed together by the waves', recalls Alcibiades' scorn for the ὄχλοι . . . ξύμμεικτοι of Sicily (6.17.2); cf. also Plato, *Rep.* 8.569a, the slaves and σύγκλυδες ἄλλοι whom a tyrant attracts as his cronies. **57** will catalogue these allies.

6.1 μετὰ ταῦτα: on the next day, in fact (**11**.2). **ἐπειδὴ καιρὸς ἦν:** echoing **5**.2, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔδοξε τῶι Γυλίππωι καιρὸς εἶναι, but perhaps with a difference: at **5**.2 Gylippus thought it was the καιρός, but now it really is. **ὁ δὲ Νικίας καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι:** an odd specification: why not just 'Nicias', as it was the commander's decision to take? This may just emphasise that it was uncontroversial, but it may also presage the comparative absence of Nicias as a driving force later in the narrative: Intr., p. 28. **ἐκεῖνοι:** the Syracusans, contrasting with σφίσιν = the Athenians. **καί, εἰ παρέλθοι . . . μηδὲ μάχεσθαι** 'and, if it got past [their own wall], it would straightaway make no difference whether the Athenians won every single fight or did not fight at all'. ἐποιεῖ = 'had the effect', as at 2.89.2 and perhaps 2.8.4 (see Rusten's (1989) n.), with the infinitives νικᾶν and μάχεσθαι as its subjects. This is put in the indicative rather than in indirect speech, which would have required ποιεῖν: it is not just what Nicias and the Athenians saw and thought, it is what, at least for the moment, Th. represents as true (cf. **42**.3n.). εἰ παρέλθοι is the past form of what Nicias and the Athenians would in the present have put as ἐὰν παρέλθηι: cf. Eur. *Bacch.* 612 with Dodds' n., τίς μοι φύλαξ ἦν, εἰ σὺ συμφορᾶς τύχοις, and Wakker 1994: 163–4 and n. 83. Still, the reading of the situation is extreme or at least premature, and at **42**.4(n.) Demosthenes immediately sees that the wall can be retaken. The Athenians had already destroyed two completed Syracusan walls (6.100.3, 102.2).

6.2 ἔξω τῶν τειχῶν: in contrast to μεταξὺ τῶν τειχισμάτων (**5**.2): Gylippus is avoiding the previous day's error. The description is succinct, but Th. must mean that this time the Syracusan line of advance was along the north side of their cross-wall until they reached the εὐρυχωρία north and north-west of the points where this and the Athenian north wall currently terminated (ἧι τῶν τειχῶν ἀμφοτέρων αἱ ἐργασίαι ἔληγον). See Map 4. **ξυνέμισγεν:** see **6**.3n.

6.3 ἔτρεψαν . . . κατηράχθη: after the imperfect ξυνέμισγεν in 6.2 has set the scene as the armies engage, the aorists here then capture the crucial intervention and its sequel. **τῶι εὐωνύμωι κέραι τῶν Ἀθηναίων:** this would be to the west or north-west, with the Athenian line facing north or north-east. **καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα** 'the rest of the army as well'. **κατηράχθη** 'was smashed back' (from καταράσσω), a strong word: cf. Hdt. 9.69.2, of the aftermath of the battle of Plataea, and ἀπαράξητε at **63**.1. **ἐς τὰ τειχίσματα:** presumably into the 'circle'.

6.4 παροικοδομήσαντες καὶ παρελθόντες: picking up παροικοδομούμενον and παρεληλύθει from **6**.1 to round off this important sequence: this was what the Athenians knew they had to fear. The heavy polysyllables mark the moment stylistically. In fact the Athenians' plight might not have proved so impossible (**6**.1n.); but this *turned out* to be a critical moment, and Th.'s emphasis is reasonable. **μήτε αὐτοὶ κωλύεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν:** αὐτοί = the Syracusans, who would not be prevented from (presumably) continuing their building. This is again put very strongly, as the Athenians might still move along the west side of the northern wall and harry any continuation, though the Syracusan cavalry would doubtless give them a hard time. **ἐκείνους τε . . . ἀποτειχίσαι** 'while they [the Syracusans] had totally deprived them [the Athenians] of any chance still of walling them [the Syracusans] off, even if they were to be victorious'. Verbs of 'preventing' regularly take μή + infinitive (*CGCG* 51.35), and here that infinitive is expanded with a condition; in direct speech this would be εἰ καὶ κρατοῖεν, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἡμᾶς ἀποτειχίσαιεν. This again echoes the language of **6**.1 (ἤδη γὰρ . . . μηδὲ μάχεσθαι) to round off the account.

7.1 αἵ τε τῶν Κορινθίων . . . αἱ ὑπόλοιποι δώδεκα: at 6.104.1 the advance force consisted of two Corinthian and two Spartan ships; these would be followed by the rest, with Corinth manning two ships from Leucas and three from Ambracia 'as well as their own ten'. The four advance ships were left at Himera (**1**.3), and a further Corinthian ship, that of Gongylus, arrived at Syracuse at **2**.1(n.). As these 'remaining ships' now numbered twelve including the five from Ambracia and Leucas, 'their own ten' at 6.104.1 must include the two of the advance force and the single ship

of Gongylus. **ἐσέπλευσαν:** presumably into the Little Harbour (**3**.5n.), but Th. still does not distinguish the two. If these ships sailed in unhindered, it is a remarkable failure of Athenian alertness, not just of the advance φυλακή but also of the watchers on Plemmyrion or offshore. Th. might again have passed sharper comment: cf. **2**.2–3, **3**.3–4nn. **τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων φυλακήν:** the twenty ships that Nicias had despatched at **4**.7. **ξυνετείχισαν:** sense-construction (cf. **1**.1n.) after νῆες to convey those who sailed in them. The aorist again conveys that the work was completed. **τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις [μέχρι] τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους:** the construction to be completed was 'of' the cross-wall, not 'to' it, and the deletion of μέχρι is the easiest solution. The alternative would be to keep μέχρι and assume that some words have fallen out after it to specify how far the continuation extended; Rehm 1934: 135–7, followed in later editions of the OCT, suggested that a gap was left by Th. himself to be filled in later. It is true that Th. does not otherwise give this information, and it is important (the Athenians could not be left the possibility of building a new wall further west to complete the circumvallation in a bigger loop); but another genitive here would be very harsh before τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους.

7.2 ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Σικελίαν 'to the rest of Sicily'. Before he went he apparently ordered the fortification of several positions on Epipolae, but Th. delays mention of these to **43**.4–5(nn.). **ᾤιχετο** 'had gone': οἴχομαι usually operates as a perfect, 'I have gone' or 'come' (LSJ 1), and so as at **8**.3 and **25**.1 this is equivalent to a pluperfect, throwing the narrative focus forward to some as yet unspecified future time, either the resumption of the battlefield action or the lull before that point (**8–17**n.). It appears from **21**.1 that Gylippus did not return until spring 413. **καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ πεζὴν ξυλλέξων:** there was very little Syracusan maritime activity in Book 6, and the elaborate preparations of winter 415–414 (6.72.4, 75.1) did not include any specifically naval training or ship-building. Morakis 2015 infers that it was only the arrival of Gylippus and the Corinthian ships that focused attention on this aspect. καὶ τούτωι, **7**.4, confirms that this is a new phase. **τε . . . καὶ . . . καὶ . . . καί:** τε is picked up by καὶ τῶν πόλεων, specifying Gylippus' second purpose. The intervening καὶ . . . καί expands and explains ἐπὶ στρατιάν: he wanted both naval and land forces. **τῶν πόλεων . . . τοῦ πολέμου:** continuing and intensifying the requests made at **1**.3–4, and earlier Syracusan attempts at 6.41.4, 45, and 75.3; but this time Gylippus went himself, and he had successes to report.

7.3 πρέσβεις τε: the use of τε as a sentence-connective, again at **7**.4, is a mannerism of Th. (6.18.7n., *GP* 499–500, Rusten 1989: 23; some twenty-one times in Book 7). Here it co-ordinates the activities all

going on at the same time. **τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ Κορινθίων:** i.e. the Corinthians who have arrived in Syracuse (**2**.1, **7**.1). The lack of a second τῶν before Κορινθίων ties them closely into, now, a single co-operating group. **ἐς Λακεδαίμονα καὶ Κόρινθον:** after the similar embassies late in the previous summer (6.88.7–8) the Spartans had been sympathetic, but had not done much: they 'applied their mind to the fortification of Decelea [cf. **18**.1n.] and, immediately, to sending some help to those in Sicily', but that had consisted only in sending Gylippus with two ships and encouraging Corinth (6.93.2(n.)). Corinth itself had done more (**7**.1n.). The present request elicited a positive response (**17**.3–4). **τρόπωι . . . προχωρῆι:** for the repetition of ἄν see 6.10.4n. and *CGCG* 60.12. One can hear the insistent tone: send them in cargo ships, or in warships – or any other way that might work. For the distinction of ὁλκάδες and πλοῖα cf. **29**.3, 6.30.1 and 44.1, but πλοῖα can also mean 'ships' more generally, including cargo ships, e.g. **4**.5, **25**.1–2, 6.88.9. **ὡς καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιμεταπεμπομένων:** ὡς captures either what they thought or what they said in the missions; probably both. It is unclear whether they already knew of Nicias' letter (**8**.1) or were just assuming that he would do this: that letter was sent after the exercising of **7**.4 had started (αἰσθόμενος τοῦτο, **8**.1), but the various developments of **7**.2–4 will have overlapped.

7.4 ναυτικὸν ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἀνεπειρῶντο: imperfects for continued action. With their superiority in ships and experience one would expect the Athenians to hamper these exercises, wherever they took place (perhaps in the Little Harbour and off the adjoining coast?). Perhaps they did; the narrative is moving quickly here. **ὡς καὶ τούτωι ἐπιχειρήσοντες:** this 'as well' as the land warfare for which they had trained during the winter (6.72.3–73.1) and which had so far predominated: cf. **7**.2n. on καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ πεζὴν ξυλλέξων above. Nicias' expectations too were now turning to the sea (**4**.4). **ἐπέρρωντο:** particularly in morale, as often with ἐπιρρώνυμι (**17**.3, 6.93.1, 8.89.1, etc.): this echoes ἐπερρώσθησαν at **2**.2, rounding off and summarising the impact that Gylippus made, with aorist at **2**.2 for the instantaneous impact and imperfect here for the continuing and lasting process that followed.

8–17: NICIAS' LETTER

After so much activity and change of the two sides' fortunes, there now followed a lull: the various actions of **7**.2–4 occupied the rest of the summer, and much less happens in winter 414–413 than in the equivalent season the previous year (6.63–93). Th. does here comment on Nicias' lack of aggression (**8**.3), but leaves readers/listeners to form their own

opinion on its wisdom. His principal act is to send home the long letter of **11–15**. Letters could often be regarded with suspicion as possibly deceitful and possibly forged (S. Lewis 1996: 144); oral reporters could be cross-examined, and would carry particular credence if, as in this case, they were eyewitnesses. Even here Nicias also tells them 'what they had to say' (**8**.3), partly in response to questioning (**10**). He could readily anticipate what they were likely to be asked. But he has his own reasons for preferring the written form, ones in which his nervousness of the Athenian *dēmos* may already be sensed (**8**.2; cf. **48**.4n.). He had had bad experiences before at the hands of men who spoke τῶι ὄχλωι πρὸς χάριν, Cleon in 424 (4.27–8) and especially Alcibiades, both in 420 (5.45–6) and in the debate of 415 (6.8–26).

Nicias' concerns at **8**.2 have parallels with Th.'s own at 1.22.3, where he notes how eye-witness accounts can be distorted ὡς ἑκατέρων τις εὐνοίας ἢ μνήμης ἔχοι: faulty μνήμη is a concern in both passages, and there the relevant εὔνοια is the partisanship of the informant while here the speaker may be playing for the goodwill of the *dēmos* (τῶι ὄχλωι πρὸς χάριν τι λέγοντες). Still, one should not press the analogy. Both Nicias and Th. are concerned with making the truth clear (περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, **8**.2; τὸ σαφές, 1.22.4), but Nicias is targeting a particular listening audience in the here-and-now while Th. is (also) envisaging readers in an indefinite future (Ceccarelli 2013: 144); and Th.'s point at 1.22.3 is the need to compare a variety of eye-witness reports to reach the truth whereas Nicias' is to protect the truth, as he sees it, from any such comparisons. It would be better to compare Th.'s procedure with the expected response of Nicias' audience, questioning the eye-witness messengers (**10**.1) and presumably subjecting Nicias' report too to sceptical critique: at least, they do not give him all he wants (**16**.1n.). Cf. also **14**.4n.; Greenwood 2006: 76–81.

The contents of the letter are given not now when Nicias writes it, but at **11–16** when the Athenians hear it. Thus Th.'s audience discover its contents at the same time as the Athenians, and interest will immediately focus on how the city will respond. On those contents see **11–15**n.

8.1 **ἀπορίαν:** the first occurrence in Book 7 of a word that will sound with increasing frequency: Intr., p. 31. **ἔπεμπε:** imperfect, because this covers both the earlier reports καθ' ἕκαστα τῶν γιγνομένων and this one in, presumably, late summer 414. It is particularly the current one that would be after Nicias 'had perceived this', i.e. the steadily increasing Syracusan strength, but this is the one on which the emphasis rests. **καὶ αὐτός** 'he too', like the Syracusans sending to Sparta. **πολλάκις μὲν καὶ ἄλλοτε . . . μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τότε:** elegantly balancing one another. **εἰ μὴ . . . μεταπέμψουσιν ἢ . . . ἀποστελοῦσιν:** εἰ + future indicative is particularly

found 'in threats, appeals, warnings etc.' (*CGCG* 49.5, Wakker 1994: 167–8, 6.6.2n.): cf. **5**.4, **13**.1, **14**.3, **42**.2, **60**.2, **73**.1. That indicative is here retained in indirect speech (*CGCG* 41.19).

8.2 φοβούμενος δὲ . . . ἔγραψεν ἐπιστολήν: there is clearly something unusual or special about this missive, and yet at **11**.1 Nicias refers to the πολλαὶ ἐπιστολαί that have already informed the Athenians of earlier events: he presumably means his own communications rather than any from individuals to their families (this is not World War I). ἐπιστολή can be used of oral as well as written messages, and perhaps Nicias' earlier reports had simply been for the messengers to deliver orally. Still, elsewhere in Th. ἐπιστολαί are written, either explicitly (1.128.6–129.3 and 132.5, 4.50.2) or by implication (8.33.3, 39.2, 45.1, 51.1); and in other authors oral ἐπιστολαί are 'instructions' or 'commands' (Hdt. 4.10.1, 6.50.3, Soph. *Ajax* 781, Eur. *Bacch.* 442, etc.: cf. LSJ ἐπιστέλλω 2, Ceccarelli 2013: 17–18), whereas **11**.1 makes it sound as if Nicias' earlier messages were 'reports' like those, clearly written ones, recorded in cases not many years later (e.g. X. *Hell.* 1.7.4 and the Laconically brief one at 1.1.23). Cf. Ceccarelli 2013: 143 n. 119. It is most likely that Nicias' earlier ἐπιστολαί were written too, and what was unusual about this one was its fullness regarding Nicias' interpretation (γνώμην) as well as the events themselves. **κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λέγειν ἀδυνασίαν ἢ . . . γιγνόμενοι ἢ . . . λέγοντες:** the variety of construction is typically Thucydidean. For ἢ . . . ἢ καί cf. 6.80.5n.: καί is best seen as emphasising that this second explanation is like the first a generous one, for it might 'also' be a genuine mistake. One would not expect messengers to be chosen who were unused to public speech, but doubtless the capacity to put things clearly would vary, and so would memory. For speakers who tell the people what they want to hear cf. 2.65.10 on the successors of Pericles (Intr., p. 8): Cleon and Alcibiades are probably particularly in mind there, and ambition is the explanation, as it is in Diodotus' generalisation at 3.42.6. In the messengers' case here it would be fear, presaging Nicias' own nervousness at **48**.4. **οὕτως ἂν . . . βουλεύσασθαι:** Nicias' thinking would have been οὕτως ἄν . . . μαθόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι βουλεύσαιντο; in indirect speech the optative becomes an infinitive. μηδέν is accusative of respect with ἀφανισθεῖσαν, 'not concealed in any way at all'; for ἐν τῶι ἀγγέλωι cf. 2.35.1, Pericles' affected regret that the cogency of his praise should now depend on one man's rhetoric (ἐν ἑνὶ ἀνδρὶ . . . κινδυνεύεσθαι εὖ τε καὶ χεῖρον εἰπόντι πιστευθῆναι).

8.3 ὤιχοντο: effectively = a pluperfect (**7**.2n.), and the οἱ μέν . . . ὁ δὲ . . . clauses go closely together: while the envoys were away, Nicias busied himself with defensive measures. **οὓς ἀπέστειλε:** defining οἱ μέν, though the clarification seems unnecessary. **καὶ ὅσα ἔδει αὐτοὺς εἰπεῖν:** so they

would do more than just hand over the letter: cf. **10n.** **τὰ κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον:** some may have heard this as object of ἔχων, some as internal accusative with ἐπεμέλετο (cf. 6.41.4), some as both, and nobody would stop to puzzle which it was. **διὰ φυλακῆς . . . κινδύνων** 'already in a defensive way rather than taking any unnecessary risks': LSJ classifies this διά + genitive under διά A.4, 'to express conditions or states', though it might equally be placed under A.3.c, 'of manner'. ἤδη hints that Nicias is shifting to this strategy earlier than might be expected, but the point is not developed. Avoiding voluntary risks was Pericles' hallmark policy (1.144.1, 2.65.7), and Nicias echoed it at 6.9.3(n.); but Pericles need not have extended the principle to the conduct of campaigns under way, and at 2.39 and 2.43.4 he encouraged citizens to face dangers with a will.

9 *Events in Thrace.* Th. has twice already punctuated the Sicilian narrative with such glances eastwards (6.7, winter 416–415, before the expedition starts; 6.105, events earlier in summer 414: cf. nn. there for the varying effect of the two passages). This one transports the reader/listener to a very different world from Sicily, picking up a thread from before 415. The eastern and western theatres will soon interact more closely: see **18n.** **Εὐετίων:** not mentioned elsewhere by Th., but his name may figure in the accounts of the Treasurers of Athena for 414/3 (*IG* I^3 371). **μετὰ Περδίκκου:** Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, had changed sides so many times that Th. does not even make it explicit that this represents another shift: at 6.7.3–4 Athenians had been attacking his territory (nn.). **Ἀμφίπολιν:** see Map 3a, *IACP* 819–20. Sparta had taken the city in 424, but the terms of the 421 Peace had stipulated its return to Athens (5.18.5). That had not happened (5.35.3–5, 46.2); at some point, probably late 417, Athens had planned a campaign in alliance with Perdiccas, but Perdiccas' aid did not materialise and it came to nothing (5.83.4; cf. 6.7.4n.). Th., exiled after his command in the Amphipolis campaign and now living not too far away (Intr., pp. 3–4), would have been close to these events, but one could not tell it from this sparse account. **Θραιξὶ πολλοῖς:** dative of accompaniment (*CGCG* 30.51). These were probably mercenaries. **περικομίσας:** περι-, because they would sail 'around' the coast of Chalcidice. **ἐκ τοῦ ποταμοῦ:** with ἐπολιόρκει, which is inceptive imperfect. **ἐξ Ἱμεραίου:** the location is uncertain.

10 **Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος:** 414–413. **ὅσα τε . . . ἀπέδοσαν:** some important procedure is glossed over here (Hornblower 2009: 258–9 and in *CT* ad loc.). The ambassadors would first have come before the *boulē*, which will have taken the decision to grant access to the assembly, and at least some of the questioning (εἴ τίς τι ἐπηρώτα) was doubtless in the *boulē*. Nor does Th. say whether the *boulē* recommended in advance

the decisions that the assembly takes at **16**. **ὅσα τε ἀπὸ γλώσσης εἴρητο** 'the things they had been told by word of mouth': cf. Hdt. 1.123.4. Nicias had doubtless prepared them carefully. Presumably they would say a few words in preamble, both in *boulē* and in assembly, before the letter was read; the questioning might be expected to follow the reading, but in an excited atmosphere one can imagine some shouted out straightaway, and in any case some questioning in the *boulē* would have preceded the assembly. **ὁ δὲ γραμματεὺς ὁ τῆς πόλεως:** this seems to be the 'secretary of the *boulē* and the *dēmos*' attested in some inscriptions, and he filled that office for one prytany (i.e. one tenth of the year). **παρελθών:** the regular word for 'coming forward' to speak. **δηλοῦσαν:** repeated at **16**.1, ἐδήλου, and in the letter at **14.4**. The word carries some edge: Nicias' worry was that his own opinion might disappear from view (ἀφανισθεῖσαν, **8**.2).

11–15 *Nicias' letter.* Probably (*pace* Luginbill 2015) this is not to be taken as a verbatim transcription, unlike the treaties of 4.118–19 and 5.18–19, though it may incorporate some language that Nicias genuinely used: τοιάδε here (**10**) contrasts with the way Th. introduces the treaty documents, γίγνεται οὖν ἐκεχειρία . . . ἥδε and αὕτη ἐγένετο (4.117.3, 119.3) and ἐσπείσαντο . . . τάδε and αὗται αἱ σπονδαὶ ἐγένοντο (5.17.2, 20.1). Th. may or (more probably) may not have had access to such a transcription, but in any case will have adapted and perhaps abbreviated it just as he recast speeches. Dionysius of Halicarnassus indeed counts this among the speeches, and includes it among those he praises as 'pure and clear and suited to real-life debates' (*Thuc.* 42). As in a speech, therefore, Th. takes the opportunity to characterise the speaker, and this is not just an alternative way of presenting or repeating factual information; it is also an invitation to an audience to compare Nicias' reading with the version already presented in the narrative.

Such a comparison is telling. Things have not been going well since Gylippus' arrival, but nothing has suggested that matters are as gloomy as this. Nicias' emphasis is on reversal: initial victory (**11**.2) to imminent defeat; besiegers to besieged (**11**.4, **14**.3); naval supremacy to a struggle even to keep watch (**12**.3–**13**.1). Some of the claims map reasonably closely on to Th.'s own narrative version, though in a tone of self-defence that involves some exaggeration of the numbers faced (**11**, **12**.4nn.); that is understandable rhetoric, underlining the need for reinforcements if the campaign is to continue (**15**.2). Other information is fresh, such as the state and number of the ships (**12**.3–4) or the problems of desertion (**13**.2), or stated in newly strong and specific terms, such as the problems of supply (**13**.1, **14**.3) or Nicias' own illness (**15**.2n.). Some months have passed since the last phase of detailed narrative (**6**; cf. **7**nn.), and much of

this new information is presumably to be taken as accurate; in the narrative Th. may have passed over these topics to avoid duplication here. Still, it is not clear that Nicias can really be so certain of the enemy's plans and prospects as he implies, with his characteristic claim to superior information (**12**.1–2), nor is it evident that the prospects are so hopeless. Even where his reading turns out to be right, it may be that he is *prematurely* right in his pessimism, just as at times Hermocrates is prematurely right in his optimism (Intr., p. 34). Things are not that good for Syracuse quite yet, nor that bad for Athens, but in each case the attitude of the speaker/writer helps to make his reading come true.

The letter begins with relatively simple sentences, piling up first the things that have gone wrong (**11**), then the even gloomier prospects (**12–13**); more stylistic complexity (Tompkins 1972: 196–7) comes for the combination of factors wearing away the manpower (**13**.2), and the emotion intensifies ('the most desperate thing of all . . .') and the engagement of the audience becomes more direct ('I am writing to people who know . . .', 'your natures make you difficult to command') as he builds to the climax of **14**.3, 'the war will be over . . .'. The tone then turns to self-defence, exploiting tropes familiar from forensic rhetoric (**14–15**nn.), with further intricate subordination of style as he finally states his requests (**15**.1–2). One of those tropes is his insistence on the forces gathered against him, but here these include the character of the Athenians themselves (**14**.2, 4). Pericles (2.65.8–9) and Cleon (3.38) had been able to rebuke their audiences with spirit, but Nicias' tone is more self-abasing and self-pitying, presaging the fearfulness before the 'natures' of the *dēmos* that will later be so important (**48**.4), and it contributes to a defeatism that is likely to be as rhetorically counterproductive now as it was in the initial debate of 415 (6.9.3). It is no surprise when the *dēmos* does not give him all that he asks for (**16**nn.).

See esp. Westlake 1968: 190–4, Green 1970: 236–43, Connor 1984: 188–9, Rood 1998a: 189–91, Greenwood 2006: 76–81, Meyer 2010 (comparing Sall.'s imitative counterpart at *Hist.* 2.98 M), Luginbill 2015, and *HCT* and *CT*.

11.1 **ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς ἐπιστολαῖς ἴστε:** a shorthand expression for 'you [have read] in many other communications [and therefore you] know'. On these ἐπιστολαί see **8**.2n. **οὐχ ἧσσον:** i.e. 'than in the past', justifying his going over old ground. This time, though, the account will be to clarify the predicament that 'we are in' now.

11.2 **κρατησάντων γὰρ ἡμῶν . . . Συρακοσίους:** κρατέω + accusative is used of a victory in battle (e.g. 2.39.3, 3.91.5, 6.2.5), κρατέω + genitive of domination or control (e.g. **4**.6, **5**.4, **42**.4, **56**.2). **μάχαις ταῖς πλέοσι:**

the main ones were the battle of the Anapus (6.67–70) and the various encounters of 6.96–102, but there may have been other minor skirmishes, especially in the thrusts and counters during the 'battle of the walls'. A couplet of Euripides (T 92 K) honoured the men who 'won eight victories over the Syracusans in the days when the gods were impartial' (Plut. *Nic.* 17.4). **Συρακοσίους ἐφ' οὓς ἐπέμφθημεν:** a change of tune for Nicias himself, as at 6.47 he had regarded the remit as one about Selinus and Egesta; it had been Alcibiades and Lamachus then who had focused on Syracuse (6.48–50). Still, it is now in his rhetorical interest to emphasise that the Athenians had concentrated on the real target. At 6.8.2 the formulation was 'to help Egesta against Selinus, to join in refounding Leontini if the course of the war allows, and to deal with other Sicilian affairs in the way the generals judge best for Athens'. **στρατιὰν ἔχων:** this puts it strongly: at **1**.5 Gylippus arrived with only c. 700 of his own men, though with over 2,000 from Sicilian allies. More arrived at **7**.1. **ἔστιν ὧν:** idiomatic for 'some', therefore the present tense. The singular ἔστιν οὕς/ὧν/οἷς etc. (cf. **70**.6, 1.6.5, 6.88.6) tends to be used for the oblique cases, the plural εἰσὶν οἱ for the nominative (**13**.2, **44**.8, 6.88.4). **μάχηι τῆι μὲν πρώτηι νικᾶται ὑφ' ἡμῶν:** that of **5**. **τῆι δ' ὑστεραίαι . . . ἐς τὰ τείχη:** the encounter of **6**.2–3, described there in similar terms, though βιασθέντες here emphasises that the Athenians had no choice. It was not there said that this happened 'on the following day', and so this is new information.

11.3 **διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐναντίων:** as with στρατιὰν ἔχων in **11**.2, this puts it more strongly than in the narrative, though **7**.1 did give the impression that the arrival of the reinforcements from Corinth and Ambracia made a difference. Nicias does not yet mention his loss of the fortifications race: cf. on οἱ δὲ παρωικοδομήκασιν ἡμῖν τεῖχος ἁπλοῦν below. **ἡσυχάζομεν:** Nicias' keyword (**3**.3n.). **οὐδὲ γάρ:** the implied point is 'if we were to try to take on so numerous a foe, we would not *even* be able to use our whole army'. **ἀπανηλωκυίας:** perfect of ἀπαναλίσκω. **μέρος τι: 30**.3n. **οἱ δὲ παρωικοδομήκασιν ἡμῖν τεῖχος ἁπλοῦν: 6**.4. Nicias gives the impression, without quite saying, that this *followed* his forced desisting from circumvallation (παυσάμενοι τοῦ περιτειχισμοῦ); he does not bring out that the enemy's success in that fortifications race was the immediate reason for that desisting. The effect is to conceal his loss of that race but increase the stress on his current ἀπορία. See also **42**.4n. **ὥστε μὴ εἶναι ἔτι περιτειχίσαι αὐτούς:** for οὐκ ἔστιν + infinitive = 'it is not possible to' cf. LSJ εἰμί A.6. **πολλῆι στρατιᾶι:** size again, complementing the emphasis on his enemies' numbers (στρατιὰν ἔχων, τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐναντίων). It prepares for the plea for

reinforcements (15.2), and in fact this strategy is what Demosthenes will set about implementing at 42.4 once the reinforcements arrive.

11.4 ξυμβέβηκέ τε . . . πάσχειν: for such paradoxical reversals cf. 4.29.2, οὐ μᾶλλον πολιορκούμενοι ἢ πολιορκοῦντες (the Athenians at Sphacteria), and earlier 4.12.3, with the Athenians becoming the land-fighters and Spartans the attackers on sea. The notion of 'the besiegers becoming the besieged' became a commonplace: cf. e.g. Plb. 1.18.10, 1.84.1, Plut. *Caes.* 39.9, Livy 23.37.5, Woodman 1983 on Vell. Pat. 2.51.2. **δοκοῦντας:** both 'seeming' and 'thinking'. ἡμᾶς is the subject and ἄλλους the object of πολιορκεῖν δοκοῦντας. **ὅσα γε κατὰ γῆν** 'at least on land': as yet, he acknowledges no problem on sea. That will change. **οὐδὲ γάρ:** this might be heard either as 'we cannot *even* venture far into the land' or as 'our initiatives here have failed, and we do not have control of the open country *either*'. Journeying inland would be necessary for foraging (cf. 4.6); also buying in local markets, the usual practice (6.44.2–3, 50.1), would now be possible only if the produce could then be transported in by sea. **διὰ τοὺς ἱππέας:** cf. 4.6, and on the general importance of cavalry Intr., p. 27.

12.1 Πεπόμφασι . . . οἴχεται: chiastically phrased, with the verb at the beginning of the one clause and the end of the other, with a similar chiastic arrangement in τὰς μὲν καὶ πείσων . . . ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν καὶ . . . ἄξων. For these missions cf. 7.2–3; some of the wording there (καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ πέζην) is echoed here, but ἡσυχάζουσιν shows Nicias using his favourite word (11.3n.). Nicias had his own sources of information in Syracuse (next n.), but doubtless word of these missions had spread widely.

12.2 ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι: for such pride in superior information cf. Hermocrates at 6.33.1; it is here given particular bite because of Nicias' special sources of intelligence within the city (48.2, 73.3nn.), as he had already hinted at 6.20.2(n.). The suggestion is understated here, but no less powerful for that. Some such Syracusan plans might anyway be inferred from their request for nautical as well as land reinforcements; the stress though is that these are planned for offensive as well as defensive use, and so this strengthens the idea of a reversal of roles (11.4). The prediction comes true: 37.1n. **τῶν τειχῶν ἡμῶν πειρᾶν:** for πειράω + genitive = 'make an attempt on' see 6.63.2n. This again suggests the idea of the besiegers being besieged. Nicias writes as if any other sort of land-encounter, e.g. the sort of battle he had offered at 3.2 and fought at 5.2 and 6.2–3, was not now to be expected.

12.3 μηδενὶ ὑμῶν δόξῃ: prohibitive aorist subjunctive with μή: *CGCG* 34.7. **καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν:** διανοοῦνται . . . πειρᾶν is understood again. Nicias appreciates that this prospect might seem absurd to Athenians

confident in their maritime superiority, and accustomed to hearing only of land operations (7.2n.). **διάβροχοι** 'sodden', which would make the ships heavy and sluggish. διάβροχος is 'a word of rather scientific flavour in prose' (Mastronarde 1994: 536: cf. e.g. [Hipp.] *Airs Waters Places* 10, *On Diseases* 2.1), though it also finds a place in high poetry (Eur. *El.* 503, *Bacch.* 1051, *Phoen.* 1381). Zadorojnyi 1998 plausibly suggests an echo here of Agamemnon's καὶ δὴ δοῦρα σέσηπε νεῶν καὶ σπάρτα λέλυνται, 'the ships' wood is rotten and their ropes are slack' (*Il.* 2.135), and goes on to argue for a broader recollection of Agamemnon's defeatist rhetoric: Agamemnon there, like Nicias here, is recommending 'premature retreat' (Greenwood 2006: 80). See also **15**.1n. **τὰ πληρώματα ἔφθαρται:** **4**.6.

12.4 **τὰς μὲν γὰρ ναῦς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνελκύσαντας διαψύξαι** 'it is not possible to draw the ships up on land and dry them out': διαψύχω has a technical ring (cf. **12**.3n. on διάβροχος), though X. *Cyr.* 8.2.21 suggests a wider application. This is not a reference to overnight beaching; Nicias means that they cannot be drawn up and left on land for long enough for essential maintenance, as Xerxes does at Hdt. 7.59.3 and Lysander at X. *Hell.* 1.5.10 (though, as Green 1970: 238 says, there seems little reason why ships could not have been withdrawn and overhauled by rota). What was needed was drying out, scraping the hulls free of marine growths, and then recoating with pitch. Morrison, Coates, and Rankov 2000: 276–9 estimate that untreated ships would lose c. 10–12 per cent of their top speed and would take some 8 per cent longer to make a turn. Crews would also tire more quickly with the extra effort required. **ἀντιπάλους τῶι πλήθει καὶ ἔτι πλείους:** the narrative has mentioned Syracuse's naval reinforcements (**7**.1–2(nn.)), but nothing so far has indicated that they had reached or even exceeded parity. Still, it seems true: the Syracusans have eighty ships at **22**.1 and **37**.3, the Athenians have sixty at **22**.2 and seventy-five at **37**.3. That compares with the initial Athenian force in 415 of 134 triremes and two penteconters (6.43), with three further penteconters arriving from Etruria (6.103.2). **ὡς ἐπιπλεύσονται:** Nicias does not say what the Syracusans could expect to achieve by 'sailing against' them, but ships might well be in greater danger now that they were based around Plemmyrion (**4**.4) than they had been when protected by the V-shaped double wall inside the harbour (6.103.1n., **2**.4, **4**.2). One might expect the greater danger to be to incoming supply ships, but Nicias will move on to this at **13**.1–2.

12.5 **ἀναπειρώμεναι . . . ἐπιχειρήσεις:** cf. **7**.4, the Syracusans were training (ἀνεπειρῶντο) in maritime skills ὡς καὶ τούτωι ἐπιχειρήσοντες. **ἐπ' ἐκείνοις . . . ἐξουσία** 'and the initiative to launch attacks lies with them, and they have greater opportunity to dry out their ships'. But Nicias gives no

explanation for ruling out an Athenian attack on the Syracusan fleet, presumably equally vulnerable in the Little Harbour; if the Syracusans had feared this, they would have had to operate under the same constraints.

13.1 **ἡμῖν δ' . . . φυλάσσειν** 'we would have had difficulty in securing this [i.e. the initiative in attack and the possibility to dry out our ships] even if we had had a great advantage in ships and were not forced, as we are now, to keep guard with our whole force'. **εἰ γὰρ ἀφαιρήσομέν τι καὶ βραχὺ τῆς τηρήσεως** 'if we relax our watch even in the slightest degree', lit. 'if we shall subtract even a small part from . . .' For Th.'s taste for such -σις words see 4.6n. **παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνων πόλιν χαλεπῶς καὶ νῦν ἐσκομιζόμενοι** 'bringing them in past the enemy city in a way that even now is difficult': χαλεπῶς and καὶ νῦν go closely together. Nicias is here writing only about food-cargoes arriving by sea; he has already explained why living off the land or buying from local markets, the usual practice, is not possible here (11.4), and tactfully reminds his audience of that point in the next sentence.

13.2 **διὰ τόδε** 'for the following reasons', referring forwards whereas τοῦτο typically refers backwards: *CGCG* 29.32. The sentence then deals with the varying factors coming into play with different 'sailors', first (τῶν μέν) those who had been picked off while foraging – no distinction is made with these in terms of status or ethnicity – and then (οἱ δὲ . . . καὶ οἱ) the subdivisions of slave and foreign and the particular factors that bore on each. The last group is further subdivided into those serving under compulsion and mercenaries (οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ . . . οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ μεγάλου μισθοῦ). Finally a further group of co-ordinate clauses (οἱ μὲν ἐπ' αὐτομολίας . . . οἱ δὲ . . . εἰσὶ δ' οἳ καί) deals with all the ploys that have been used. The intricacy and the variety of construction, first the genitive absolute and then the strings of co-ordinates, are typically Thucydidean, but they mirror the multiplicity and complexity of events. **ἐφθάρη . . . φθείρεται:** picking up τὰ πληρώματα ἔφθαρται (12.4). **τῶν ναυτῶν . . . ἀπολλυμένων:** Th.'s readers and listeners know this from 4.6, whose language (ὕδατι . . . οὐκ ἐγγύθεν . . . φρυγανισμὸν . . . ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων . . . διεφθείροντο) is echoed here, and further know, as the original assembly audience may not have known, that this was worsened by the decision to move base to Plemmyrion. Poppo's deletion of the τῶν after ναυτῶν would give a *contrast* of 'the sailors' as a whole, presumed to be free, with the slaves and foreigners, but it now seems clear that the Athenian fleet did include slaves as well as free (Graham 1992 and 1998, Hunt 1998: 83–101). It is unlikely too that the foraging was conducted only by the free. **ἁρπαγήν** 'plunder': i.e. looting farmsteads (O'Connor 2011: 95–102). **θεράποντες** 'slaves'. **ξένοι** 'foreigners', i.e. non-Athenians. **ἀναγκαστοί:** those requisitioned from the Athenian allies (57nn.), and so the ἀνάγκη is

initially applied to the cities rather than the individuals. Still, they must often have been recruited within their own cities by conscription rather than volunteering. **κατὰ τὰς πόλεις ἀποχωροῦσιν:** a shorthand expression for 'they leave [and then scatter] city by city [presumably the cities of Sicily]': cf. 1.89.2 ἀπέπλευσαν . . . ὡς ἕκαστοι κατὰ πόλεις. **οἰόμενοι χρηματιεῖσθαι:** as much or more from plunder as from pay. It was not just mercenaries who indulged such hopes at the outset: cf. 6.24.3 on the Athenian populace. **καὶ τἆλλα ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνθεστῶτα** 'and the rest of the opposition put up by the enemy'. **ἐπ' αὐτομολίας προφάσει:** this probably means 'openly deserting' to join the enemy: αὐτομολία regularly carries that connotation of fleeing to the other side (cf. **26**.2, 1.142.4, 2.57.1, Hdt. 3.156.1, 8.82.1–2, etc.), not just melting away (λιποστρατία or λιποταξία). πρόφασις is often used of pretexts, e.g. 6.76.2 and 78.1, but can be used of explanations put forward that are true or partly true, most conspicuously at 1.23.6 and 6.6.1(n.): see Rawlings 1975 and Pelling 2019: 8–9. Evidently the explanation would not be put forward *to the Athenians* as they went – nobody says 'it's all right, I'm only deserting' – but rather *after* their desertion, to anyone interested; the distinction is between (a) those who switched sides and, as mercenaries, presumably then fought for Syracuse, (b) those who simply disappeared among other cities, and (c) those who went openly, but claimed not to be diminishing the strength because they were providing a substitute. Cf. Rawlings 1978, Welwei 1974: 94 n. 108. Other interpretations do not convince. Graham 1992: 260–2 and Bétant suggest that the phrase meant 'on the excuse of searching for their own escaped slaves'; it is credible that some of these ξένοι might have had slaves serving with them, but this seems too compressed to be easily understood. **πολλὴ δ' ἡ Σικελία:** 'a bitter reminder of the Athenians' former ignorance' (6.1.1), Rood 1998a: 191. **εἰσὶ δ' οἳ: 11**.2n. **καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐμπορευόμενοι** 'practising trade on their own account', as well as relying on accompanying professionals. **ἀνδράποδα Ὑκκαρικά:** slaves from the Sicilian town of Hyccara, captured and sold by the Athenians at 6.62.4: see n. there. **τὴν ἀκρίβειαν:** perhaps 'the meticulousness' achieved by experienced rowers; perhaps the 'unqualified excellence' of an undiluted body of highly skilled men. Cf. 6.18.6(n.) for another case where ἀκριβής is clearly positive but similarly hard to pin down.

14.1 ἐπισταμένοις δ' ὑμῖν γράφω: the same 'you all know this already' ploy as used by the Corinthians at Sparta (1.68.3), the Athenians at Melos (5.89.1), Pericles (2.36.4, 43.1), and Hermocrates (4.59.2, 6.76.2, 77.1(n.)). It is a stock rhetorical ploy (e.g. Dem. 19.72, Andoc. 3.5, X. *Cyr.* 3.3.35), and the more effective here for appealing to the naval expertise of which Athens is so proud, just as the general Demosthenes

did at 4.10.5. **βραχεῖα ἀκμὴ πληρώματος** 'a crew is not at its peak for long'. **ὀλίγοι . . . εἰρεσίαν** 'it is only a few of the sailors who get a ship going and keep everyone rowing together'.

14.2 τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀπορώτατον: the shift from τό + infinitive to ὅτι + indicative is characteristic syntactic variation. For the ἀπορία theme cf. Intr., p. 31. **χαλεπαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑμέτεραι φύσεις ἄρξαι:** a *cri de cœur* that prepares the ground for his nervousness before the *dēmos* at **48**.4 but is less than tactful to his listeners: see **11–15**n. Defence might well require speakers to mention the power of their adversaries (e.g. Isoc. 16.16), but it is not good for a general to admit a failure to control his troops, nor to assimilate his listeners to those who have caused him the trouble and let the state down. χαλεπός is a favourite word of Nicias, as he so often dwells on difficulties: **13**.2, 6.11.1, 14.2. Luginbill 2015: 410–11 points out that Th.'s speakers usually describe national character in terms of τρόποι (Pericles at 2.36.4, 39.4, and 41.2, Nicias himself at 6.9.3 and **63**.3, and cf. ὁμοιοτρόποις at **55**.2 and 8.96.5;); φύσεις recurs at **14**.4 and in the echoing description of Nicias' motives at **48**.4(n.). Perhaps φύσεις was indeed now Nicias' word in a memorable phrase, and/or perhaps it is preferred because 'natures' sound more deeply embedded than the 'turns' (τρόποι) that a state has freely chosen and might change. **ἐπιπληρωσόμεθα** 'replenish', a rare word that occurs for the first time in extant literature either here or at [Hipp.] *On Regimen* 1.32: it is most frequent elsewhere in such medical texts. Nicias may be groping for a weighty word, but it anyway echoes the stress already on 'crews', πληρώματα. **τά τε ὄντα καὶ ἀπαναλισκόμενα** 'what we have and what we are expending from it': the second participle elaborates the first – we use what we came with, and as we use it we expend it. The reference is primarily to manpower, but the vagueness of the language makes it also applicable to provisions, the next point. **ἀδύνατοι:** 'to help' or 'to send sufficient reinforcements' is understood.

14.3 τὰ τρέφοντα ἡμᾶς χωρία τῆς Ἰταλίας: cf. 6.103.2 τὰ δ' ἐπιτήδεια τῇ στρατιᾷ ἐσήγετο ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας πανταχόθεν, presumably especially from those places that agreed to furnish a market (6.44.2–3). **καὶ ὑμῶν μὴ ἐπιβοηθούντων:** not explicitly a point about what the Italian cities would notice (that would be ὑμᾶς . . . ἐπιβοηθοῦντας), but this is implied both by the τε . . . καί construction and because this would be a factor leading them to favour Syracuse. **διαπεπολεμήσεται αὐτοῖς ἀμαχεὶ ἐκπολιορκηθέντων ἡμῶν** 'the war will be won for them without a battle, with us besieged into defeat'. There are echoes of διαπεπολεμήσεται at **25**.9 and **42**.5, first the Syracusans' and then Demosthenes' outlook on prospects, and of

ἐκπολιορκηθέντων at **75**.5, the grim reality at the end. The one unrealised prognosis is ἀμαχεί, and that is because Nicias is persuasive enough to get his reinforcements: that makes it possible for the two big battles to be fought, but their loss makes the outcome even more catastrophic.

14.4 ἡδίω . . . χρησιμώτερα . . . σαφῶς εἰδότας: the contrast or combination of the pleasant and the useful is a staple of programmatic statements (e.g. Plb. 1.4.11), including those of the orators (e.g. Isoc. 2.50): the orator Demosthenes, perhaps influenced by this passage, included Nicias among the exemplary old-time orators who did not sacrifice usefulness for pleasurability (3.21–2). Nicias here turns it in a way that, like the description of his concerns at **8**.2(n.), shows a faint similarity with Th.'s own programme at 1.22.4, prioritising usefulness over pleasure (ἀτερπέστερον . . . τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν . . . ὠφέλιμα). His aspiration, at least, is admirable. **καὶ ἅμα τὰς φύσεις ἐπιστάμενος ὑμῶν:** Nicias is again (cf. **14**.2(n.)) confident that he understands Athenian 'natures'. This will be echoed at **48**.4, ἐπιστάμενος τὰς Ἀθηναίων φύσεις, where the same clarity on what to expect leads him to hang on in Sicily unwisely rather than, as here, to air the possibility of withdrawal. **βουλομένων μὲν τὰ ἥδιστα ἀκούειν, αἰτιωμένων δὲ ὕστερον:** cf. Pericles, calling on the Athenians not to vent their anger on him when they themselves had agreed (2.64.1). There may be a recollection too of 2.65.10, Pericles' successors turning καθ' ἡδονὰς τῶι δήμωι (Intr., p. 8), and paradoxically even of Nicias' *bête noire* Cleon, rebuking his Athenian audience for being misled ἀκοῆς ἡδονῆι (3.38.7), though neither point is quite identical to Nicias' here: the point at 2.65.10 is giving the *dēmos* its head on policies rather than reporting what it wants to hear and at 3.38.7 the pleasure it takes in elegant style, not in agreeable reports or predictions. **ἀπ' αὐτῶν:** as a result of that pleasurable advice. **μὴ ὁμοῖον:** contrary to what was reported or predicted. **ἀσφαλέστερον:** a key preoccupation for Nicias (6.23.3, 24.1–3nn.), along with his distaste for unnecessary κίνδυνοι (6.10.5, 12.2, 13.1, 47); cf. 5.16.1, his concern to leave a reputation ὡς οὐδὲν σφήλας τὴν πόλιν διεγένετο (Intr., p. 9).

15.1 ὡς ἐφ' ἃ μὲν . . . γεγενημένων 'on the basis that, with regard to the objectives we originally had, both the soldiers and the generals have not merited your blame'. ἐφ' ἃ μέν is picked up by ἐπειδὴ δὲ Σικελία: with regard to the initial objectives we have done our best, and now things have changed . . . Nicias writes as if he is already on trial. **Σικελία τε ἅπασα ξυνίσταται:** overstated – he has just said that Naxos and Catana are allies (**14**.2), and so is Egesta – but the present tense describes a process without implying that it is already complete. **βουλεύεσθε . . . ὡς** 'take counsel on the assumption that . . .'; the point of ἤδη is that the time has already

come to think in these terms. **μηδὲ τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀνταρκούντων** 'not even enough to deal with the present predicament'. **μεταπέμπειν . . . ἐπιπέμπειν** 'send for . . . send in addition': the play on words (*paronomasia*) adds force – *some* sort of πέμπειν is called for, and you cannot just ignore this. This use of ἐπιπέμπω is not found before Th., here and at 6.73.2. **δέον:** accusative absolute of an impersonal verb (*CGCG* 52.30), and still dependent on βουλεύεσθε . . . ὡς. For Nicias' taste for impersonal verbs see Tompkins 1972: 189–91. **ἄλλην στρατιὰν μὴ ἐλάσσω ἐπιπέμπειν:** this recalls Nicias' ploy in the assembly at 6.20–3, pleading for a much enhanced force in the hope that this will scare the Athenians into abandoning the expedition and ending with an offer to resign his command, but what was there a misjudged rhetorical strategy is now meant in earnest. There is some parallel with the way Homer's Agamemnon makes an extravagant suggestion, that of abandoning the expedition, first as a ploy (the 'test', *Il.* 2.110–41) but later in earnest as the situation worsens (*Il.* 9.17–28, 14.65–81). Zadorojnyi 1998 builds on the allusion of **12**.3(n.) to suggest that Nicias' aim here is similar to Agamemnon's in the 'test', provoking his listeners to harden their resolve: 'that is what Nicias really wants, not permission to withdraw from Sicily' (301). This seems unlikely. After all, he really is ill, and has always been lukewarm about the expedition: cf. esp. 6.47; Rood 1998b: 236–9, Meyer 2010: 102–3 n. 16. But it is not necessary to go the other way, with Allison 1997a: 228, and think that Nicias really wanted to come home 'with some sort of exemption from prosecution' rather than secure extra forces. Even Th. does not presume to know what Nicias really wanted; what is important is that it was presented, and apparently received at Athens, as a genuine choice. **ἐμοὶ δὲ διάδοχόν τινα:** for Nicias' earlier offers to relinquish his command cf. 4.28.3 and 6.22.3. No other Athenian commander, in the history of Athenian democracy (508–323 BCE), is known to have attempted to give up his command (Tompkins 2017: 109). **διὰ νόσον νεφρῖτιν:** an oddly low-key and delayed way to introduce a matter of such importance (cf. **77**.2), though such 'almost quavering diffidence' (Meyer 2010: 105) is rhetorically effective: this, he suggests, is not primarily about him. Already at 6.102.2(n.) some unspecified illness forced him to remain in camp. Presumably he would have been attended by military doctors (cf. X. *Anab.* 3.4.30 with Huitink–Rood's n., [Hipp.] *On the Doctor* 14), though they are oddly absent from this and from other campaign narratives: cf. Fragoulaki forthcoming.

15.2 ἀξιῶ δ' ὑμῶν . . . εὖ ἐποίησα: Nicias again sounds like a defendant in court, where it was not unusual to stress one's past services to the community (Dover 1974: 292–5, Rood 1998a: 190). ἀξι- words are a favourite of

Nicias (Tompkins 2017: 109) as he stresses what he or city or army have, or increasingly have not, 'deserved': **50**.3, **61**.3, **63**.3, **69**.2, **77**.2–4; cf. 6.10.2, 10.5, 12.1, 21.1, 47.1, 68.4. The narrator pathetically echoes that preoccupation at **86**.5(n.). **καὶ γάρ:** 'introducing additional information (καί) which has explanatory force' (*CGCG* 59.66): cf. **48**.3, 6.103.3. **ὅτι δὲ μέλλετε** 'whatever you are going to do': πράσσειν is understood. **μὴ ἐς ἀναβολὰς πράσσετε** 'do not put it off': ἐς ἀναβολάς is effectively adverbial, 'delayingly'. Cf. Hdt. 8.21.2 οὐκέτι ἐς ἀναβολὰς ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν, with Bowie's n. **ὡς . . . φθήσονται:** ὡς = 'on the assumption that . . .', followed initially by a genitive absolute as at **15**.1 ὡς . . . ἀνταρκούντων, then the construction changes to present the Peloponnesian threat in indicatives, with a further οἱ πολέμιοι understood as the subject of λήσουσιν and φθήσονται. τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δ' . . . τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δέ . . . are all accusatives of respect. **ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον:** that is, with Gylippus and the Corinthian ships (**1–2**, **7**.1). But Nicias himself had been aware of Gylippus' mission and had initially thought it negligible (6.103.3).

16 *The Athenians' response.* Th. gives no reason for their refusal to grant Nicias his release, nor for their preference for the option of strengthening rather than that of withdrawal. There surely was some airing of the arguments and may have been some debate already in the *boulē*; the second-century CE declaimer Aelius Aristides even reconstructs, very wordily, what might be said on each side (*Or.* 29 and 30). But Th. moves on quickly, giving an impression of the assembly's decisiveness that contrasts with Nicias' typical dithering (Westlake 1968: 194). Perhaps he is avoiding a reprise of the arguments already aired in the big debate of 6.8–26 (Zuretti 1922: 1–3), though the Syracusan momentum might now have changed people's outlook; or perhaps he simply does not wish to distract the audience for too long from the Sicilian theatre.

Unlike Th., modern scholars speculate on the Athenians' thinking, e.g. Green 1970: 242, the letter's 'self-exculpatory technique had proved all too successful', and Kagan 1981: 283–7, 'the special place that Nicias had in the minds of the Athenian people' (284) and their belief that his piety might win divine favour. On that piety see **50**.4n.

16.1 τοσαῦτα: there is probably no significance here in the choice of τοσαῦτα rather than τοιαῦτα: see 6.35.1n. **ἐδήλου:** **10**n. **ξυνάρχοντες:** rather than ξυνάρξοντες, here and at **16**.2, because they are chosen 'as co-commanders'. **τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖ** 'men actually there' or 'on the spot', as with αὐτοῦ ταύτηι or τῆιδε (Hdt. 1.189.4, 5.19.2) or ἐνθάδ' αὐτοῦ (Solon fr. 36 W², Soph. *OC* 78). **δύο προσείλοντο Μένανδρον καὶ Εὐθύδημον:** on their formal status see **69**.4n. Menander has not been mentioned before; Euthydemus may well be the signatory to the peace at 5.19.2 and the

alliance at 5.24.1. They reappear in the narrative at **43**.2 (M.) and **69**.4 (both M. and E.), and Menander is probably the same man as the general of 405/4 (X. *Hell.* 2.1.16). Plut. *Nic.* 20.6 makes more of them than Th., and has them responsible for urging on the naval encounter of **40**, anxious to make a name for themselves before Demosthenes arrived. It is unclear whether he has any authority for that (Pelling 1992: 16–17 = 2002: 121–2). **στρατιὰν δὲ ἄλλην . . . καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ πεζήν:** echoing Nicias' language (**15**.1). It becomes clear at **16**.2 that the *dēmos* also agreed the χρήματα μὴ ὀλίγα that he there requested. The assembly must have specified numbers, but Th. leaves these until the forces depart (**16**.2, **20**.2) and then arrive (**42**.1). It is possible, no more, that at least some fragments of OR 171 = ML 78 = Fornara 146 relate to the funding of these reinforcements rather than the first expedition in 415: so Mattingly 1968: 453–4 = 1996: 219–20 and Kallet 2001: 184–93; see 6.8.2n. **Ἀθηναίων τε ἐκ καταλόγου:** those eligible to be drafted: 6.26.2, 31.3nn.

16.2 Δημοσθένη τε τὸν Ἀλκισθένους: an experienced general: he had won brilliant victories in Amphilochia (3.105–14, winter 426–425 BCE) and at Sphacteria (4.1–41, 425 BCE), but there had also been failures in Aetolia (3.97–8, 426 BCE) and then in 424 in Megara (4.66–9) and Boeotia (4.76, 89, 101). His enterprising and vigorous style (Roisman 1993, Cawkwell 1997: 50–5) probably played a part in the choice: he was very different from Nicias. **Εὐρυμέδοντα τὸν Θουκλέους:** chosen no doubt because of his experience in Sicily in 425–424, though the Athenians had fined him on his return 'on the grounds that the generals could have subdued Sicily but had been bribed to withdraw' (4.65.3: Intr., p. 25). His two co-commanders had then been exiled, not merely fined, so he was presumably regarded as the least culpable. Both Demosthenes and Eurymedon were probably chosen from among the existing ten generals (*CT*) rather than irregularly pre-elected for 413/2 (*HCT*). **περὶ ἡλίου τροπὰς τὰς χειμερινάς:** an elastic term that may mean any time before the end of January: cf. Wenskus 1986. **ἀποπέμπουσιν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν:** at the end of Euripides' *Electra* the Dioscuri, appearing 'on the machine', bid farewell as they depart 'swiftly to the Sicilian sea to save the seafaring prows' (1347–8). If, as is often thought, the play dates to the Dionysia in March 413 the words would carry a peculiar resonance for the nervous Athenian public, remembering the crisis and the reinforcements on the way (Denniston 1939: xxxiii– xxxiv, Leimbach 1972; contra Cropp 1988: l–li, 190–1). It would be all the starker as such direct contemporary allusiveness is so rare: that would not be the only unusual feature of this particular closing epiphany. Still, that dating is not at all secure. **εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα ἀργυρίου:** most MSS have '20' rather than '120', but the

larger figure is confirmed by Valla (Intr., p. 36; Diod. 13.8.7 has '140'. '20' would be far too small. The payment is recorded in *IG* I³ 371 (accounts of the Treasurers of Athena), but the relevant lines of the inscription rely on heavy restoration. **καὶ ἅμα ἀγγελοῦντα . . . ἔσται:** and also, presumably, to report the appointment of Menander and Euthydemus. Eurymedon himself was then to return (otherwise the appointment of Menander and Euthydemus would be unnecessary), but this is made clear only at **31**.3. His arrival in Syracuse, doubtless a dramatic scene, is never mentioned; Th. does not allow space to that rare moment of good news.

17.1 αὐτόθεν: i.e. from Athens (6.21.2n.).

17.2 φυλάσσοιεν + **μηδένα** + infinitive, 'keep watch to ensure that nobody . . .': *M&T* 374. Only at **17**.4 does Th. make clear that their destination was Naupactus.

17.3 γάρ: not necessarily explaining the Athenians' decision of **17**.2 – they would know of the Syracusan request for such reinforcements (**12**.1), but could only guess at the Corinthian mindset – but giving a transition to a new narrative item: cf. 6.54.1n. and de Jong 1997. On Th.'s gliding technique here to link different units see on οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι below and Dewald 2005: 145–7. **οἱ πρέσβεις: 7**.3, **12**.1. **καί:** i.e. 'the earlier force *too* was timely' (just as this one will be). **τὴν προτέραν πέμψιν τῶν νεῶν:** 6.93.2, 104.1, **2**.1, **7**.1nn. **πολλῶι μᾶλλον ἐπέρρωντο:** mirroring the gathering emotional ῥώμη within Syracuse itself: **7**.4n., Intr., p. 30. **ἐν ὁλκάσι . . . πέμψοντες:** the word order throws weight on this: the use of cargo-ships as transports was usual, but for stores and non-combatants (6.22.1, 30.1, 34.5, 44.1). Hoplites were normally conveyed in 'troop-carriers', called ὁπλιταγωγοί (6.25.2, 31.3) or στρατιώτιδες (6.43.1, 8.62.2): Morrison, Coates, and Rankov 2000: 168, 247–8. **καὶ . . . οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι:** another gliding transition (cf. on γάρ above), as the slipping in of this second grammatical subject prepares for the move to the Spartans in **18**.

17.4 ὅπως . . . ἀποπειράσωσι . . . κωλύοιεν: cf. 6.96.3(n.) for a similar combination of the alternative subjunctive and optative constructions in purpose clauses; see also *CGCG* 45.3. Here the aorist subjunctive is used for the one-off 'making trial of a battle', the present optative for the more lasting consequence. **τὴν ἐν τῆι Ναυπάκτωι φυλακήν:** these will be the twenty ships despatched at **17**.2: φυλακήν echoes φυλάσσοιεν there. For Naupactus, ideally suited as a naval base close to the narrowest part of the Corinthian Gulf, see Map 3a and *IACP* 395–6; for its importance in the war, especially in the early years, Kallet 2016. An Athenian squadron and garrison had been posted there throughout the Archidamian War,

and memories of Athens' naval victory in 429 (2.83–92), with Phormio's fleet operating out of Naupactus, would still have been raw in the Peloponnese. The Athenian force there may have been reduced during the Peace, but there is no reason to suppose that it had been totally withdrawn: Green 1970: 245. **τὰς ὁλκάδας . . . τῶν τριήρων:** respectively the cargo-ships serving as transports (**17**.3) and the fighting ships that would preoccupy the Naupactus squadron: cf. **19**.5, where the information is repeated. **πρὸς τὴν σφετέραν . . . ποιούμενοι** 'as they would be keeping guard in response to their own [i.e. the Corinthians'] counter-deployment of the triremes'.

18: SPARTANS ENTHUSED

17 has smoothly shifted focus from Athens to the Peloponnese (**17**.3nn.); the year ends with this important excursus on Sparta's thinking, which prepares for a new phase of the narrative in which Greek and Sicilian affairs are more thoroughly intertwined (Dewald 2005: 147–8, 223–5). A year has passed since Alcibiades persuaded the Spartans to become more energetically involved (6.89–93), but apart from sending Gylippus they have done little: at that point 'they began to think about the fortification of Decelea' (6.93.2) as Alcibiades had suggested, but evidently Alcibiades had had to keep up the pressure (**18**.1n.) before anything was done. Even now a further explanation is needed for this burst of energy, and Th. finds it in the upsurge of morale, largely because they now thought they were in the right whereas in the Archidamian War they had put themselves in the wrong and been punished for it, presumably by the gods. Th. had said nothing about this in his narrative of events at the time, probably because such guilty feelings grew in retrospect and only now had any impact on events: nothing in the tenses here suggests that the Spartans had felt that way as early as the late 430s. Th. is often thin on religious matters, but this is stronger than the perfunctory 'it seemed an omen for the expedition' at 6.27.3, and has none of the dismissiveness about the interpretation of oracles visible at 2.54.3 and 8.1.1. The emphasis still falls on religious *psychology*, what humans thought about the gods and divine retribution, rather than (as sometimes in Hdt.) on any possibility that the gods might be playing a genuine part. For example, 5.16.1, on Spartan thinking about Pleistoanax, and 5.32.1, on the Athenians and Delium, are similar. On Th.'s attitude towards such matters cf. also **50**.4n.; Marinatos 1981, Hornblower 1992, Furley 2006, and Rahe 2017.

18.1 Παρεσκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ . . . οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι: echoing ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης . . . παρεσκευάζετο (**17**.1) and οἱ γὰρ Κορίνθιοι . . . παρεσκευάζοντο (**17**.3): all sides

are limbering up. **τὴν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβολήν:** 'the' invasion, as this is something that has been envisaged for some time (next n.) and as it was an expected part of a full-scale war: the Spartans had invaded every year from 431 to 425 except for 429 and 426. **προυδέδοκτο αὐτοῖς:** 6.93.2. αὐτοῖς carries emphasis: they had already decided this themselves, and it was not just because of the continued Syracusan and Corinthian pressure. **ὅπως δὴ ἐσβολῆς γενομένης διακωλυθῆι:** not that the Athenians were likely to be so easily deterred, and δή in the purpose clause may lightly suggest 'that the object . . . is not to be attained by the means in question' (*GP* 232). **καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης προσκείμενος ἐδίδασκε:** the imperfect denotes repeated action: the Spartans took some telling. Alcibiades clearly remained at Sparta for some time. Th. may well have known stories of his seduction and impregnation of the Spartan queen (Plut. *Alc.* 23.7–9, etc.), but his is not that sort of history.

18.2 ῥώμη: the keyword again: Intr., p. 30. Syracusans, Corinthians (**17**.3n.), and Spartans have all been boosted. **ἐγεγένητο:** pluperfect, referring back to the time when they had taken the preliminary decision (προυδέδοκτο). **εὐκαθαιρετωτέρους** 'easier to defeat'. It is a very rare word, not found again before the second century CE, and perhaps coined by Th.: the comparative makes it even more striking. With καὶ Σικελιώτας, this makes an iambic trimeter with one resolution (*CT*); perhaps something could be made of this in delivery, though the closeness of iambics to everyday speech rhythms (Arist. *Poet.* 1449a26–7) would make this easy to miss. **τὰς σπονδὰς προτέρους λελυκέναι ἡγοῦντο αὐτούς** 'they (the Spartans) thought that they (the Athenians) had been the first to break the terms of the peace'. **τῶι προτέρωι πολέμωι:** Th. can refer to the Archidamian War of 431–421 like this despite his conviction that 431–404 represent a single war (5.26.2): he even rounds off his narrative of 431–421 by calling it 'the first war' (5.20.3 and esp. 24.2). Similarly at 4.81.2 the Ionian War is 'the war some time later'. Cf. de Romilly 1963: 189 and n. 1. **ἐς Πλάταιαν ἦλθον Θηβαῖοι ἐν σπονδαῖς:** 2.1–6, the act that triggered the outbreak of war in 431. The outrage of this attack ἐν σπονδαῖς (2.5.5), i.e. while the thirty-year Peace of 446 was still in force (2.2.1), was an important theme when the Plataeans were pleading their case to the implacable Spartans in 427: 3.56.2; cf. 3.65.1. **καὶ . . . τῶν Ἀθηναίων:** this had been an issue in the final diplomatic exchanges of 432–431, therefore earlier than the Theban attack on Plataea. The thirty-year treaty of 446 (last n.) had specified this arbitration procedure to resolve disputes, but its exact terms are not known, and it is not clear what state could have been regarded as a suitably impartial arbiter. Athens had been willing for their actions over Potidaea, Megara, and Aegina to be treated

in this way (1.78.4, 145), an offer which the Spartan king Archidamus took seriously (1.85.2) but Sparta as a whole refused. A good deal is made of this refusal in Pericles' pre-war speech (1.140.2, 144.2). **εἰρημένον:** accusative absolute (*CGCG* 52.30). **ἐνεθυμοῦντο:** the *mot juste* for 'taking to heart' a religious consideration: cf. **50**.4 ἐνθύμιον ποιούμενοι and 5.16.1, 32.1. **τήν τε περὶ Πύλον ξυμφοράν:** in 425, when 292 hoplites including about 120 Spartiate citizens were taken prisoner (4.1–41: Intr., pp. 24–5). **εἴ τις ἄλλη αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο** 'any other that had befallen them' (*CGCG* 29.42).

The Spartans are hard on themselves here. They had after all consulted Delphi before going to war in 432–431 and Delphi had given encouragement (1.118.3): Eckstein 2017: 492.

18.3 οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι . . . ἐληιστεύοντο: aorist ἐδήιωσαν for the one-off attacks, imperfect ἐληιστεύοντο for the continuing raiding, and 'the' thirty ships because they are taken as familiar from 6.105.2(nn.), which mentioned both these attacks and the plundering raids from Pylos. There, though, the two are more firmly contrasted, as the Pylos raiding had been going on for some time but these maritime attacks at that point (summer 414) 'afforded the Spartans a reason for self-defence against the Athenians that was now made easier to argue'. **Ἐπιδαύρου:** Epidaurus Limera, in south-eastern Laconia: 6.105.2n., **26**.2. **ἐληιστεύοντο:** the verb is not elsewhere used in the middle, and so this is likely to be passive. The shifts of subject – the Athenians ἐδήιωσαν, the Spartans ἐληιστεύοντο, the Athenians οὐκ ἤθελον – are awkward; it may be because it was the Messenians in Pylos, not the Athenians themselves, who did much of that plundering (4.41.2, 5.56.3). **περί του** = περί τινος. **τῶν κατὰ τὰς σπονδὰς ἀμφισβητουμένων:** these centred particularly on the Spartans' failure to restore Amphipolis and the Athenians' retaliation in not restoring Pylos: the disputes started immediately after the conclusion of the Peace in 421. Cf. 6.10.2n. **ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων:** these challenges have not been mentioned before. Kagan 1981: 289 n.2 suggests that they were made in 414–413. **ὅπερ καὶ σφίσι πρότερον ἡμάρτητο:** in the active παρανόμημα would have been internal accusative with ἁμαρτάνειν, and the internal accusative then becomes the subject of the passive verb (*GG* 1240): cf. **77**.3 and 2.65.11 ἡμαρτήθη καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς. **περιεστάναι** 'had now come round to rest with . . .': cf. 6.61.4.

18.4 σίδηρόν τε περιήγγελλον κατὰ τοὺς ξυμμάχους 'sent around, ally by ally, for iron', i.e. iron tools (6.44.1n.): cf. 2.85.3 ναῦς τε προσπεριήγγειλαν κατὰ πόλεις. In both passages κατά + accusative may carry a slightly different connotation from τοῖς ξυμμάχοις or ταῖς πόλεσι, suggesting that the requisition varied according to the city: cf. also 2.10.1 and contrast 6.88.6

περιήγγελλον δὲ καὶ τοῖς Σικελοῖς, where the request 'to send as many horses as possible' could be phrased identically for all (similarly 2.80.2, X. *Hell.* 6.4.2). **ἐν ταῖς ὁλκάσιν:** **17**.3n. **ἐπικουρίαν:** object of both ἐπόριζον and ἀποπέμψοντες. **προσηνάγκαζον:** προσ- conveys 'in addition', and πορίζειν is understood. **καὶ ὁ χειμὼν . . . ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν:** i.e. 414–413 BCE. For the formula cf. 6.7.4n., 6.93.4.

19–20: GREECE, SPRING 413

So far in Books 6–7 the glances eastwards have recounted only desultory activity, though more in 414 than in 415 (6.7, 95, 105, **9**(nn.)). The Spartan decision eighteen months before to become more involved (6.93) has led only to the mission of Gylippus and the Corinthian squadron. These chapters mark a new urgency and introduce an important new phase. Some aspects recall the beginning of the war in 431: the invasion of Attica, the solemn and formal naming of the commanders, the despatch of Athenian ships around the Peloponnese. But there are differences too, especially the fortification of Decelea, left unscathed until now (**19**.1n.), and the refocusing of both sides on Sicily, with the Peloponnesian reinforcements beginning to generate the outnumbering on land and sea that Nicias had prematurely claimed (**11**.3, **13**.1). There is also the first hint (**19**.2n.) of the symmetry between events in Greece and in Syracuse (Intr., p. 20).

19.1 πρωίτατα δή 'at a very early date', possibly 'earlier than ever before': a sense of energy, emphasised by δή, is immediately conveyed. **ἡγεῖτο δὲ Ἄγις ὁ Ἀρχιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς:** for the formality cf. 2.19.1 ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν· ἡγεῖτο δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ Ζευξιδάμου, Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς (though Archidamus has there already been prominent), and the similar 2.47.2, 71.1, 3.1.1, 4.2.1, 5.57.1. The yearly rhythm of the early phase of the war is reasserting itself, but with Decelea as the extra twist. Diod. 13.9.2 says that Agis 'and Alcibiades' were leading: a co-command is impossible, but Alcibiades may indeed have been there too, giving local advice and keeping up his pressure concerning Decelea (**18**.1n.). **τὸ πεδίον:** the plain stretching north and north-west of Athens towards Mt Parnes. **Δεκέλειαν ἐτείχιζον:** Alcibiades claimed (6.91.6) that this was what the Athenians had particularly dreaded. One reason why Sparta had not occupied it before is given not by Th., parsimonious on religious and mythical matters as he so often is (**18**nn.), but by Hdt. (9.73.3): the Deceleans had legendarily helped the Spartans when they were seeking to recover Helen after her abduction by Theseus, and the Spartans had consequently always honoured the town 'to such a degree that they left Decelea unscathed when ravaging the rest of Attica in the war between

Athenians and Peloponnesians that happened many years later [than 479]'. Hdt. presumably wrote this before 413. Perhaps the Spartans were confident that their divine approval (**18**.2–3nn.) meant that the gods were more likely now to be indulgent, but probably their approach was simply hardening. Cf. 6.93.2n.

19.2 ἀπέχει δὲ ἡ Δεκέλεια . . . τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλεως: the geography now becomes important, and so Th. gives the detail here rather than at 6.93.2. Decelea lay on the slopes of Mt Parnes: see Map 3a. **σταδίους μάλιστα . . . εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν:** the length of a 'stade' varies in Th., but is usually between 150 and 200 m (Bauslaugh 1979: 5–6). The distance here is about 18 km (≈ 11 miles) as the crow flies, which would give a stade-length of c. 150 m; but Th. may not be thinking in crow-fly terms. **παραπλήσιον . . . ἀπὸ τῆς Βοιωτίας:** in fact rather less on the route across Mt Parnes, some 9–10 km, but Th. is thinking of the main route via Oropus. **ἐπί** + dative 'over', combining the senses 'overlooking' and 'against'. **κρατίστοις:** here 'best' rather than 'strongest': agricultural excellence is in point. **ἐς τὸ κακουργεῖν** 'with a view to ravaging'. **ἐπιφανὲς μέχρι τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλεως:** just as Epipolae is μέχρι τῆς πόλεως (of Syracuse) ἐπικλινές τε . . . καὶ ἐπιφανὲς πᾶν ἔσω (6.96.2n.). On the parallel between the two theatres see Intr., p. 20.

19.3 ἀπέστελλον . . . τοὺς ὁπλίτας: **18**.4. **νεοδαμώδων:** enfranchised helots, lit. 'new members of the *dēmos*': cf. Cawkwell 2011: 286–7. **Ἔκκριτον:** not mentioned, it seems, in the subsequent narrative, but cf. **58**.3n. **Βοιωτοί:** included here among οἱ ἐν τῇι Πελοποννήσωι in defiance of geography, but as part of the alliance. **Ξένων . . . Νίκων . . . Ἡγήσανδρος:** these men too do not feature again. The listing of commanders does however add a further air of formality, like the phrasing of **19**.1 (n.). A ship bearing Thespian hoplites is mentioned at **25**.3.

19.4 ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι 'first among these': ἐν τοῖς is idiomatic for 'within the relevant category'. Cf. **24**.3, **27**.3, **70**.3; LSJ ὁ, ἡ, τό A.VIII.6. **Ταινάρου:** on the tip of the middle southern prong of the Peloponnese: see Map 3a. **ἐς τὸ πέλαγος:** these, in the open sea, would be less vulnerable to the Athenians in Naupactus than the others, which probably sailed from Corinth's port of Lechaeum (Map 3a) along the Corinthian Gulf; but a voyage directly across the sea, without hugging the shore as usual, would have its own dangers. **ἀφῆκαν . . . ἀπέπεμψαν . . .** [**19**.5] **ἀπῆραν:** aorists for the one-off actions after the imperfects ἐτείχιζον and ἀπέστελλον (**19**.3) for the more protracted preparations. ἀφῆκαν is intransitive, 'set sail': LSJ ἀφίημι A.V. **Ἀρκάδων:** as so many mercenaries were, including some now fighting for the Athenians (7.57.9), and later nearly half of X.'s

Ten Thousand: cf. Trundle 2004: 53–4, 58–9, J. Roy 1967: 308–9 and 1999: 347–9. **Ἀλέξαρχον Κορίνθιον . . . Σαργεὺς Σικυώνιος:** they too are not mentioned again. **Σικυώνιοι: 58**.3n.

19.5 αἱ δὲ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι νῆες τῶν Κορινθίων: 17.4. **ἀνθώρμουν:** Th. does not say exactly where: perhaps in the bay of Erineus, where they took up their battle position at **34**.1–2(nn.), from where they posed a threat to Naupactus if Athenian ships left harbour (Salmon 1984: 333); perhaps at Panormus or Rhion, more obvious points to hamper any squadron sailing west. See McKenzie and Hannah 2013: 216 n. 27. **ταῖς ἐν τῇι Ναυπάκτωι εἴκοσιν Ἀττικαῖς: 17**.2, **17**.4nn. **ἕωσπερ** 'till the moment when' (Wakker 1994: 320 n. 40). **ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου:** not just 'from port': the Corinthian ships could not relax their watch till the squadrons had left the Corinthian Gulf and were out to sea. **οὗπερ ἕνεκα καὶ . . . ἔχωσιν:** this repeats information given at **17**.4, and ἀπῆραν echoes ἀπαίρειν there. The ring rounds off these Peloponnesian preparations and departures.

20.1 περί τε Πελοπόννησον ναῦς τριάκοντα ἔστειλαν: again (cf. **19**.1n.) reminiscent of 431, but then it had been a hundred Athenian and fifty Corcyrean ships that had been sent περὶ Πελοπόννησον (2.23.2, 25.1), with instructions for coastal raids. With so many ships now in Sicily and the further twenty ships despatched at **17**.2 to Naupactus (**17**.4), the diminished scale is unsurprising. **Χαρικλέα τὸν Ἀπολλοδώρου ἄρχοντα:** he reappears at **26**. The vague ἄρχοντα leaves it unclear whether he was 'in command' as *stratēgos* or as nauarch. This is probably the same man as the later member of the Thirty in 404–403 (X. *Hell.* 2.3.2, *Mem.* 1.2.31–8); in 415 he had been one of the ζητηταί in the Herms and Mysteries affair (6.27.2–3nn.). **καὶ . . . παρακαλεῖν:** καί = 'also', in addition to the main task of the joint operation with Demosthenes (**20**.2). **κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικόν:** the Argos–Athens treaty of 420 (5.47) had in 418–417 been replaced by an Argos–Sparta alliance after the battle of Mantinea (5.77), but that had soon broken down (5.82–84.1, 115.1; cf. 6.7.1n.), and in 415 and 414 Athenians and Argives had fought together against Sparta (6.7, 105).

20.2 ὥσπερ ἔμελλον: 16.2–**17**.1. **ἑξήκοντα . . . ξυμπορίσαντες:** these numbers give the outcome of the preparations and the instructions to the allies of **17**.1. Given the number of soldiers to be carried, many of these ships must have been troop-carriers (*HCT* 309). The numbers are carefully analysed by Cawkwell 1997: 115–20, who brings out the unusually high reliance on allied forces: 'Athens was scraping the bucket' to send as much as possible. **καὶ πέντε Χίαις: 57**.4n. **ἐκ καταλόγου: 16**.1n. **νησιωτῶν ὅσοις ἑκασταχόθεν**

οἷόν τ' ἦν πλείστοις χρήσασθαι 'as many of the islanders from each city as he could make use of', lit. 'as many as it proved possible to exploit in the greatest numbers available from each'. Cf. Cawkwell 1997: 117–20, arguing that the islanders are stressed because most of these had no regular obligation to serve: cf. **57**.4n. **εἴ ποθέν τι εἶχον ἐπιτήδειον ἐς τὸν πόλεμον:** as at 6.30.1 (n.) and 6.32.2, the 'if any . . .' construction does not convey any hint that such contributions were doubtful or small; indeed it is 'implied that the situation referred to was *sometimes/in some cases* realized' (Wakker 1994: 276). Cf. **20**.3 εἴ τι ὑπελέλειπτο, **21**.5 εἴ του ἄλλου. Th. is probably thinking of specialist skills such as those of Acarnanian slingers and javelin-throwers (**31**.5): Cawkwell 1997: 118. **ξυμπορίσαντες:** the ξυμ- conveys 'bringing together' all these procured resources, not (as LSJ συμπορίζω) 'help in procuring': cf. 8.1.3, 8.4. **εἴρητο δ' αὐτῶι πρῶτον . . . περὶ τὴν Λακωνικήν:** on the face of it, an unnecessary diversion when Nicias' need for reinforcements was so urgent: cf. Green 1970: 250–1. The Athenians doubtless recalled the spectacular achievement of Demosthenes in 425, when an enforced stop in the Peloponnese on the way to Corcyra and Sicily (4.3.1) had led to Athens' most significant success of the Archidamian War: cf. **26**.2n. **περιπλέοντα** rather than περιπλέοντι because attracted into the accusative by the infinitive: *CGCG* 51.12 n.1.

20.3 τοῦ στρατεύματος . . . παραλαβεῖν 'waited for whatever parts of his force had been left behind and for Charicles to collect the Argives'. The variety in construction with περιέμενε is characteristic.

21–5: FIRST ENGAGEMENTS, 413

Nicias' gloomy evaluation may have been premature (**11–15**n.), but it is coming true, including his expectation that the Syracusans will shortly try their hand at sea. This move is now encouraged both by Gylippus and, especially, by Hermocrates, who is confident that they can out-Athenian the Athenians in risk-taking boldness (**21**.3–4), a twist in the notion of Syracuse as Athens' dangerous mirror-image (Intr., pp. 31–2). Hermocrates had already shown some of the same qualities at 6.72–3, and his boldness now also recalls his proposal two years earlier of sailing out to confront the Athenians en route (6.33). Now as on those occasions (see nn. there) his optimism may be overdone: the Athenian fleet is not as vulnerable as Hermocrates thought and Nicias feared, and the naval encounter goes Athens' way. Still, that is only part of the combined operation (Green 1970: 242–60 and Kagan 1981: 298–9 see it as no more than a diversionary tactic), and Gylippus' skilful land attack on Plemmyrion is successful. There have already been plentiful signs of the balance tilting (**4–7**n.),

and now the capture of Plemmyrion is a further turning point (**24**.3). Demosthenes and Eurymedon therefore arrive as Athenian fortunes are particularly desperate, rather as Gylippus arrived when Syracusan prospects were at their gloomiest (**1–3**n.). The tables are indeed turned.

21.1 ὧν: relative attraction (*CGCG* 50.13). **ἔπεισε:** Engl. would put it in the pluperfect (*CGCG* 33.40 n.1). This is Gylippus' mission of **7**.2: he had apparently been away all autumn and winter. **ὅσην ἑκασταχόθεν πλείστην:** cf. the similar phrasing at **20**.2, the only other occurrence of ἑκασταχόθεν in Th. Both sides are gathering their allies similarly for the showdown.

21.2 ὡς δύνανται πλείστας 'as many as they could': LSJ ὡς Ab.III.c. **ἐλπίζειν γὰρ . . . κατεργάσεσθαι:** Gylippus' Laconic style contrasts with Hermocrates' wordiness. **ἀπ' αὐτοῦ:** neuter, though both ναυμαχία and ἀπόπειρα are feminine; = ἀπὸ τοῦ ναυμαχίας ἀπόπειραν λαμβάνειν.

21.3 ξυνανέπειθε . . . τοῦ . . . μὴ ἀθυμεῖν 'he joined in urging . . . with the intention of their not despairing of', genitive of article + infinitive to express purpose (*CGCG* 51.46). Not 'urging them not to . . .', which would have been μὴ ἀθυμεῖν without τοῦ: Hermocrates' rhetoric is more upbeat than 'do not despair', but that is his preoccupation and aim. **ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης:** last heard of at 6.99.2 and 103.4, when he was ejected from power. He is now clearly influential again, whether or not he had returned to office. **ναυτικοὺς γενέσθαι:** Hermocrates appropriates the Athenians' proud claim to have become ναυτικοί in 480, sometimes put not merely in terms of fighting at Salamis but also of taking to the ships to evacuate the population (1.18.2). This picture of earlier Athenians as nautically inactive 'mainlanders' is a considerable overstatement, but Th. himself agrees that 'Athens, Aegina, and any others' had only small fleets before the Persian Wars and 'it was only late' that Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to build the fleet they fought with (1.14.3, drawing on Hdt. 7.144.1–2; cf. also 1.90.1). Like the Corinthians at 1.121.4, Hermocrates might seem wildly unrealistic in thinking that his side can so swiftly compete: cf. Pericles at 1.142.6–7, emphasising that many years of practice do not suffice. But eventually, though not immediately (**23**.3), Hermocrates is proved right. **καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας . . . φαίνεσθαι** 'and when it comes to fighting men of daring, like the Athenians, it is those who respond daringly themselves who would appear to them the most formidable enemy'. **οἵους καὶ Ἀθηναίους** = οἷοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοί εἰσιν. For Athenian τόλμα cf. esp. the Corinthians' characterisation at 1.70.3, παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταί, Pericles at 2.40.3, 43.1, 62.5, and e.g. 6.31.6, 33.4(nn.). Hermocrates was already urging the Syracusans to match such τόλμα at 6.34.8–9; Th. gave them

credit for showing it in the first land-battle at 6.69.1, and καί here insinuates the idea that the Syracusans already have this quality just as the Athenians do 'too'. For the idea that Syracuse was a particularly intractable enemy because it mirrored Athens' own qualities see **55**.2n., 8.96.5 and Intr., pp. 31–2. **χαλεπωτάτους ἂν αὐτοῖς φαίνεσθαι:** representing χαλεπώτατοι ἂν αὐτοῖς φαίνοιντο in direct speech. Badham deleted αὐτοῖς, but it is important to stress the effect on the startled enemy, not just how it would appear to any outside observer: cf. καταφοβοῦσι. **ὧι γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι . . . ὑποσχεῖν** 'for the means that they use against their neighbours, sometimes (ἔστιν ὅτε) having no advantage in power but intimidating them by launching bold attacks, the Syracusans too could similarly adopt and have the same effect on their enemies'. Hermocrates, shrewd player on enemy psychology that he is, was saying something similar as early as 415: εἰ δ' ἴδοιεν παρὰ γνώμην τολμήσαντας, τῶι ἀδοκήτωι μᾶλλον ἂν καταπλαγεῖεν ἢ τῆι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς δυνάμει (6.34.8n.). For οἱ πέλας cf. 6.12.1n.; σφᾶς ἂν . . . ὑποσχεῖν is the equivalent of ἂν ὑπόσχοιμεν, and for σφᾶς rather than σφεῖς cf. 6.49.2n. ὑποσχεῖν is an unexpected word in this sense (παρασχεῖν or ἐπενεγκεῖν would be easier), but ὑπάρχειν (H), 'they themselves would take the initiative in the same way' (cf. 2.67.4), seems even harsher.

21.4 τολμῆσαι ἀπροσδοκήτως . . . ἐκπλαγέντων: similar language to 6.34.8, quoted on **21**.3, and for the theme of ἔκπληξις/κατάπληξις see **42**.2n. and Intr., p. 31. **πλέον τι . . . βλάψοντας:** combining two thoughts, (a) the Syracusans would achieve more (πλέον τι) by this unexpected daring than the Athenians would by the advantage of skill over inexperience, and (b) it would rather be the case that they would be victorious (περιγενησομένους) than that the Athenians would harm them.

21.5 εἴ του ἄλλου: **20**.2n. The εἴ τις ἄλλος idiom is so entrenched that it can be declined as if it were a noun. **ὥρμηντο:** pluperfect (6.6.1n.), setting out the emotional prerequisite for the manning of the ships (imperfect ἐπλήρουν) and for Gylippus' night-time land manoeuvre, **22**.1.

22.1 παρεσκεύαστο: pluperfect passive. **ἀγαγών:** presumably by a circuitous route over or around Epipolae, then crossing the Anapus. **ὑπὸ νύκτα:** 6.7.2n. **αὐτὸς μέν:** μέν might be expected to have preceded πεζήν, as the contrast is between the land movement and the concerted sea assault introduced by αἱ δὲ τριήρεις, but its position here emphasises αὐτός and Gylippus' personal role. **τοῖς ἐν τῶι Πλημμυρίωι τείχεσι:** 4.4–5. **αἱ δὲ τριήρεις τῶν Συρακοσίων:** these are then subdivided by the further μὲν . . . δέ division into the groups from each harbour. **ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου λιμένος . . . ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάσσονος:** see Map 4. This is the first mention of the Little Harbour (**1**.1, **3**.5n., **4**.4, **7**.1) and

the first indication that the Syracusan fleet was divided; 6.52.4, 101–2, and **2**.4 had specified 'Great Harbour', but only those with local knowledge would have sensed any implication that there was a second one, still less that it was the Syracusans' main naval base. It is presumably delayed to here because of the new emphasis on naval operations (**21**.2–3), but this would have been an obstacle to any reader trying to build a coherent overview as the narrative unfolds. **αἱ δὲ πέντε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα** 'the [other] forty-five', the same use of the article as at **24**.1, τὰ δὲ δύο, and **25**.1, αἱ δ' ἕνδεκα. **βουλόμενοι:** sense construction agreeing with '[the men in] αἱ τριήρεις'.

22.2 ἑξήκοντα ναῦς: cf. **12**.4n. for the diminution of the numbers of Athenian ships. The first-time reader might presume that this was all that could be managed in view of the ships' deterioration (**12**.2–3), but then at **37**.3 the Athenians man seventy-five: as this attack was sudden and before dawn (**23**.1n.), it may be that these were all the crews that could be scrambled at short notice. Some ships do seem to be left out of the action (**23**.2). Whatever the explanation, Th. is not concerned to give it: cf. **37**.3n. and Keyser 2006: 341–3.

23.1 ἐν τούτωι . . . φθάνει . . . καὶ αἱρεῖ: historic presents for the critical actions after the imperfects of **22**.2 have set the scene of the continuing naval fight. The picture of concerned observers crowding the shore prefigures the more expanded and magnificent **71**.1–4. Gylippus' circuitous night march had clearly remained undetected. **ἅμα τῆι ἕωι:** thus indirectly indicating that the naval action had begun in the dark. **τὸ μέγιστον . . . τὰ ἐλάσσω δύο:** the three φρούρια of **4**.5.

23.2 ὅσοι καὶ . . . κατέφυγον 'as many as did escape'. Not everyone did (**24**.2). καί adds emphasis to ὅσοι: cf. 1.15.2 ὅσοι καὶ ἐγένοντο (there were no big wars, and 'those that *did* happen . . .'), X. *Hell.* 3.2.17 ὅσοι δὲ καὶ ἔμενον; *GP* 321–3. **ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον:** shorthand for the *other* main camp, i.e. the area extending down from 'the circle' to the shore and protected by the V-shaped walls: see Map 4. **τῶν γὰρ Συρακοσίων . . . ἐπεδιώκοντο:** this explains (γάρ) mainly χαλεπῶς: it was a difficult escape because they were pursued. But there is also some explanation of the escape itself, as it was only a single trireme that chased. **ὑπὸ τριήρους μιᾶς καὶ εὖ πλεούσης** 'by a single fast-sailing trireme', presumably chosen for this duty because of its speed. **ἐτύγχανον:** this conveys simultaneity rather than chance: **4**.3n. This emphasis on the escape deftly leads back to the course of the sea-battle.

23.3 βιασάμεναι . . . ἐσέπλεον: picking up βιάσασθαι . . . τὸν ἔσπλουν (**22**.2). So they succeeded in forcing their entrance, then botched it in the

narrower waters. The emphasis falls on their lack of skill; the Athenians do no more than exploit it. **καὶ ὑφ' ὧν . . . ἐν τῶι λιμένι:** 'those' is understood before ὑφ' ὧν.

23.4 πλὴν ὅσον ἐκ τριῶν νεῶν 'with the exception of [the men] from three ships', lit. 'except in so far as [they did not kill the men] from three ships'; οὓς ἐζώγρησαν then qualifies the understood 'the men'. Van Wees 2011: 89 suggests that perhaps these three crews formally surrendered, and therefore their execution would be regarded as parallel to killing prisoners of war rather than enemies in action; or perhaps some victors were simply more merciful than others. **τῶι νησιδίωι . . . τῶι πρὸ τοῦ Πλημμυρίου:** the only time that this is mentioned. There are several tiny islands off Plemmyrion, and it is unclear which is meant. **ἐς τὸ ἑαυτῶν στρατόπεδον:** as at **23**.2, the only camp that is left.

24.1 αὐτῶν: i.e. τῶν τειχῶν, the three forts they had captured, or more loosely the three engagements. For the genitive cf. **41**.4, **54**.1, 6.98.4. **τοῖν δυοῖν τειχοῖν τοῖν ὕστερον ληφθέντοιν: 23**.1. **τὰ δὲ δύο** 'the [other] two' (**22**.1n).

24.2 ἄνθρωποι δ': advanced to first position for the juxtaposition with χρήματα, with πολλοί . . . πολλά stressing the scale of both losses: cf. the frequent juxtaposition of χρήματα and σώματα (6.12.1n.). **χρήματα πολλὰ τὰ ξύμπαντα ἑάλω:** χρήματα here is 'possessions', not just 'money', as the next sentence makes clear: cf. 6.97.5n. The initial generalisation about τὰ ξύμπαντα is then broken down into constituent parts: cf. 6.2.1, 6.43. **ταμιείωι** 'storehouse'. There was a similar store on Epipolae, 6.97.5. **καὶ σῖτος:** presumably this too is to be taken with ἐμπόρων: the troops evidently relied for their food-supply on the traders (O'Connor 2011: 89–90). Nicias at 6.22(nn.) seemed to envisage a more centralised public organisation. **τριηράρχων:** see 6.31.3n. It was the trierarch's job to keep a ship equipped and in good repair. **ἱστία:** sails would be left behind when action was expected, as oar-power was expected to be decisive and this would make ships less cluttered and more manoeuvrable (cf. X. *Hell.* 6.2.27); but these may also have been the sails of ships no longer deemed seaworthy.

24.3 μέγιστον . . . τῶι στρατεύματι: an unusually explicit generalisation. The language echoes **4**.4–6 when Plemmyrion was first occupied, bringing out how those advantages – the easier ἐπαναγωγαί and ἐσκομιδὴ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων and the safer ἔσπλοι – are now reversed and the prospect then of an Athenian blockade (ἐφορμήσειν σφᾶς) is now replaced by its Syracusan equivalent (ἐφορμοῦντες). **ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον: 19**.4n. **ἐκάκωσε:** this sits uneasily with **4**.6, where the κάκωσις of the crews began with Plemmyrion's

occupation (τῶν πληρωμάτων οὐχ ἥκιστα τότε πρῶτον κάκωσις ἐγένετο): but the impact of its loss was even bigger (μέγιστον) and extended to the whole army. **οὐδ'** 'not even'. **διὰ μάχης:** as often (6.11.7n.), διά + genitive conveys both means and manner (LSJ A.III.b and c). **ἔς τε τἆλλα** 'with respect to the other things' that they would have to do: not just 'in other respects'. **κατάπληξιν . . . καὶ ἀθυμίαν:** Th. characteristically puts as much weight on the psychological as the practical consequences: Intr., pp. 30–1 and **42**.2n.

25.1 Ἀγάθαρχον: mentioned again at **70**.1. **ὠιχετο:** effectively = pluperfect 'had gone' (**7**.2n.), focusing the listener/reader's attention on the time when the other eleven ships are active. **τά τε σφέτερα φράσωσιν ὅτι ἐν ἐλπίσιν εἰσί:** a variant of the 'I know thee who thou art' construction (6.6.3n.), where the topic is first stated and then more closely defined, here and at the echoing **25**.9 by an indirect statement: cf. **63**.2 ἐκείνην τε τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι ὡς ἀξία ἐστὶ διασώσασθαι. Here ἐν ἐλπίσιν is a striking phrase, again echoed at **25**.9: it combines 'in good hopes' with a hint of 'we live in hope', conveying a combination of optimism and some apprehension (cf. Soph. *Trach.* 951, Eur. *El.* 352). Both aspects support the plea for help. An adjective, e.g. μεγάλαις (X. *Anab.* 1.4.17) or ἀγαθαῖς (Plato, *Laws* 4.718a5), would be needed to tilt the hopes towards unqualified optimism. **πρὸς τὴν Ἰταλίαν:** on the assumption that the Athenian ships will be taking the usual route across the Adriatic to Calabria (6.13.1n.), then will 'sail along' (hence παραπλεῖν, **25**.4, **26**.3, etc.) the coast southwards. **πυνθανόμεναι . . . [25.2] ἐπιτυχοῦσαι:** sense-construction for the men within the ships: cf. **41**.3. **πλοῖα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις γέμοντα χρημάτων προσπλεῖν:** presumably not the silver-bearing ships of Eurymedon (**16**.2), as Eurymedon re-enters the narrative at **31**.3 with no indication of such a mishap.

25.2 ξύλα ναυπηγήσιμα: they had presumably been stockpiled, and would now have been useful to repair the rotting ships (**12**.3–4). **ἐν τῇι Καυλωνιάτιδι:** the land around Caulonia, on the southern Italian coast some 40 km north-east of Epizephyrian Locri (*IACP* 265–6): see Map 2. For Italy's richness in timber cf. 6.90.3; for this region in particular, Meiggs 1982: 354–5, 463.

25.3 μία τῶν ὁλκάδων . . . ἄγουσα Θεσπιῶν ὁπλίτας: **19**.3(n.).

25.4 ἀναλαβόντες αὐτοὺς οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς: because they would be safer from attack on triremes than in a slow-moving ὁλκάς. **φυλάξαντες** 'kept watch for'. **εἴκοσι ναυσί:** the first mention of this squadron. Green 1970: 261 equates it with that sent at **4**.7, but it would hardly have remained at sea all winter. Clearly the Athenians did not yet find it impossible to sail out of the harbour. **τοῖς Μεγάροις:** Megara Hyblaea; see Map 1.

25.5 **ἐν τῶι λιμένι:** presumably the Great Harbour, where the two sides' ships were moored close to one another (**25**.8), though Th. might have said so more clearly after distinguishing the harbours at **22**.1. At 6.75.1 the Syracusans had planted stakes on some parts of the shore 'where there were possible landing grounds', but these may not have included the harbour. **τῶν παλαιῶν νεωσοίκων:** not mentioned before. These boathouses had presumably been abandoned once the new νεώριον was built in the Little Harbour (**22**.1). **ἐμβάλλοντες** 'ramming', as at **70**.6.

25.6 **μυριοφόρον** 'a ten-thousander', apparently one that could carry 10,000 *amphorae* or *medimni*, perhaps 525 cubic metres (Wallinga 1964): Casson 1971: 172 n. 25 estimates this as a burden of 400+ tons. **πύργους τε ξυλίνους:** for such towers cf. Casson 1971: 22 n. 92. **παραφράγματα** 'screens' as a protection from missiles. **ἔκ τε τῶν ἀκάτων . . . ἐξέπριον** 'working from small boats. they lashed the stakes and winched them up and broke them or [lit. "and"] dived and sawed them off'. Probably the lashing and diving was done from the small boats, and the winching (ὀνεύω from ὄνος, a 'windlass') from the ὁλκάς. A vivid picture is painted with just a few words.

25.7 **σταυρώσεως** 'palisade', material rather than abstract 'staking': for Th.'s taste for -σις formations see **4**.6n. **ἡ κρύφιος** 'the hidden part': feminine, assimilated to the gender of σταύρωσις. **μὴ οὐ:** μή goes with περιβάλῃ, οὐ closely with προϊδών. **ἕρμα** 'underwater rock'. **περιβάλῃ:** an expressive compound, 'casting' the ship on to the stake so that it is stranded 'around' it: so effectively = 'impale'. **μισθοῦ:** so these were presumably locals, or perhaps mercenaries with a particular skill. **ὅμως δ' αὖθις οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐσταύρωσαν:** elegantly brief after the intricate language for an intricate activity at **25**.6. The Syracusans simply set some new ones.

25.8 **οἷον εἰκός** + genitive absolute: 'as one would expect with . . .'

25.9 **Ἔπεμψαν:** aorist for a single action after the imperfects ἐμηχανῶντο and ἐχρῶντο (**25**.8) conveyed the protracted activity. This echoes the mission of the 'one ship' going to the Peloponnese (**25**.1), but it is a different embassy (see next n.): the message resembles (cf. esp. ἐν ἐλπίσιν εἰσί, **25**.8) but is more elaborate than that of **25**.1, and here the request is for reinforcements rather than for a more energetic prosecution of the war in Greece. **Κορινθίων καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων:** with πρέσβεις, not with πόλεις, as these ambassadors are going to the cities of Sicily (**32**.1). Their pleas might be expected to be more persuasive than those of the self-interested Syracusans, and they were largely successful: **32**.1–**33**.2. **ἀγγέλλοντας . . . δηλώσοντας . . . ἀξιώσοντας:** there is no

great significance in the difference of tenses, but the future puts more weight on the mission's purpose (*CGCG* 52.41), the present more on what they said. **πέρι:** with τῆς ναυμαχίας, hence the paroxytone accentuation (*CGCG* 24.37). ὡς . . . ἡσσηθεῖεν goes on to say what they reported. Their claim chimes well enough with Th.'s own account at **23**.3, with ταραχῇ here echoing ταραχθεῖσαι there. **τά τε ἄλλα δηλώσοντας ὅτι ἐν ἐλπίσιν εἰσί: 25**.1n. **ξυμβοηθεῖν ἐπ' αὐτούς** 'come to their [the Syracusans'] aid against them [the Athenians]'. **ὡς καὶ . . . καί** 'on the grounds that . . .' + first a genitive absolute (τῶν Ἀθηναίων . . .), then an accusative absolute with an impersonal verb (διαπεπολεμησόμενον: *CGCG* 52.30). **τῶν Ἀθηναίων προσδοκίμων ὄντων ἄλλῃ στρατιᾷ . . . διαπεπολεμησόμενον** 'the war would be over', future perfect passive participle of an impersonal verb: a counterpart on the other side of what Nicias wrote to the Athenians, **15**.1 ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ἄλλη στρατιὰ προσδόκιμος αὐτοῖς and **14**.3(n.) διαπεπολεμήσεται. **αὐτοί:** the Athenians. **αὐτῶν:** the Syracusans.

26: DEMOSTHENES ON HIS WAY

After the emphasis on speed at **25**.9, with the war being as good as over if the Athenian reinforcements arrive quickly enough, the sense of ill-judged sidetracking is strong. But it is not Demosthenes' fault: he is carrying out his orders (**20**.2n.), and the strategy might have brought further successes like that of 425 (**26**.2n.). His preparations and journey are described in fits and starts (**16**.2–**17**.1, **20**.2–3, **26**, **31**, **33**.3–6, **35**, **42**.1) 'as if to show almost cinematographically his progress' (Kirby 1983: 205), and this strengthens the impression of time passing.

26.1 ἐπεὶ ξυνελέγη αὐτῶι τὸ στράτευμα: as he was instructed to do and set about at **17**.1; he sailed to Aegina at **20**.3 to wait for the last arrivals. **τῶι τε Χαρικλεῖ καὶ ταῖς τριάκοντα ναυσὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων: 20**.1–2. **παραλαβόντες τῶν Ἀργείων ὁπλίτας ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς:** as instructed at **20**.1, in similar language. The subject switches to plural for the two co-operating commanders.

26.2 Ἐπιδαύρου τι τῆς Λιμηρᾶς ἐδήιωσαν: as they had the previous year, 6.105.2; cf. **18**.3n. **Κυθήρων τῆς Λακωνικῆς:** see Map 3a; *IACP* 583–4. **ἔνθα τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνός ἐστι:** the temple was probably on the mainland, on the tip of Cape Malea, and hence the antecedent of ἔνθα is τὰ καταντικρύ, not Κυθήρων. The Athenians had captured the island in 424, installed a garrison, and incorporated it as a tribute-paying member of the Delian League (4.53–4, 57.4). It was to be restored to Sparta under the treaty of 421 (5.18.7), but as the Athenian allied forces now included Cytherans (**57**.6) that had presumably not been done. **ἔστιν ἅ: 11**.2n. **ἰσθμῶδές τι χωρίον:** probably Elafonisos, now an island. **ἵνα**

δὴ . . . ποιῶνται: as at **18**.1 (n.), δή may convey some scepticism about the realism of the plan. The fort was abandoned a year later (8.4). **καὶ ἅμα λήσεσθαι . . . ἁρπαγὴν ποιῶνται:** there had already been some raiding from Cythera during the Archidamian War, similar to that from Pylos (5.14.3). For the raids from Pylos cf. also 4.41.2, 5.115.2, and 6.105.2n.: much of the raiding had been done by the refugee helots themselves (**18**.3n.). **ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου:** after Demosthenes' success in 425, fortifying a position on the mainland and then capturing 292 Spartan prisoners on the island of Sphacteria (4.1–41): cf. Intr., pp. 24–5), **18**.2–3nn. Memories of this were implicitly playing a part at **20**.2 (n.), and the point now becomes explicit.

26.3 ξυγκατέλαβε 'jointly captured'. **ἐπί** + genitive: 'towards', as at **31.1**: cf. 1.2n. **τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ξυμμάχων** 'some of the allies who would be coming from there'. Others might sail with Eurymedon (**31**.5). **ὅτι τάχιστα:** yet it takes some time for him to get to Corcyra: cf. **31**. **αὐτοῦ** 'there'.

27–30: DECELEA AND MYCALESSUS

Th. might have placed his survey of Athens' financial difficulties at several points within Book 7, for instance straight after the fortification of Decelea and the decision to send reinforcements (**19**); that could have suggested links between the wasting away of troops and material in Syracuse and the financial exhaustion at home. A hint of that may still be felt now, but Th. prefers to place it here, juxtaposing with the harrowing story of Mycalessus. The two go together partly because of the causal link, for it was the financial pressure on the Athenians that made them send the Thracians home, and their vague instructions are partly responsible for what followed. Verbal echoes stress the connection: cf. Kallet 1999 and 2001: 121–46, who along with Connor 1984 Appendix 7 stresses the medical vocabulary that also suggests disease within both the finances and the broader body politic. Th.'s own emotional engagement is clear (Intr., p. 29), first in his admiration for Athenian resilience (**28**.3), then even more for the pathos of Mycalessus, probably the most moving chapters in the *History* and narrated with both skill and passion (**29–30**n.). Any audience satisfaction that the Thracians themselves suffer for their brutality (**30**.2) is not enough to offset the horror. The episode is the climactic illustration of one of Th.'s deepest convictions: the big powers may dominate, the greatest wars would not be fought without them, but it is the little people and little cities that suffer worst, Corcyra (3.82–3), Melos (5.84–105), and now Mycalessus.

This also gives Th. the opportunity to broaden his gaze to the whole war, not just in classifying Mycalessus as proportionately its most lamentable πάθος (**30**.4) but also in the perspectives looking forward (**27**.5, **28**.2) and back (**28**.3). If Th. was writing after 404, the stress on Athens' resilience might easily, as at 2.65.12 (Intr., p. 6), have prompted the further thought that 'even after Sicily they fought on for nine more years'; but for the moment he concentrates on the impression others received at the time (τὸν παράλογον τοσοῦτον ποιῆσαι τοῖς Ἕλλησι, **28**.3), and anyway he would not have wanted to compromise the feeling of total catastrophe given at **87**.6.

27.1 **Θραικῶν τῶν μαχαιροφόρων τοῦ Διακοῦ γένους:** mentioned at 2.96.2 as 'mountain-dwelling, independent and dagger-carrying, called Dioi, mostly living on Mt Rhodope'. On these cf. esp. Sears 2013: 250–63. **οὓς ἔδει τῶι Δημοσθένει ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ξυμπλεῖν** 'who were supposed to be sailing with Demosthenes to Sicily'.

27.2 **ὕστερον** 'too late': cf. 2.5.3 and 80.7. **πρὸς τὸν ἐκ τῆς Δεκελείας πόλεμον:** more readers/listeners would probably hear this as 'to retain them for the Decelean War' than (*CT*) 'seemed expensive in view of the Decelean War', though the second prepares better for the stress on the financial impact of that war. ἐκ τῆς Δεκελείας points especially to the incursions made 'from' Decelea, but a broader reference to 'the Decelean War' is not excluded: cf. 4.81.2 τὰ ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας. **δραχμὴν γὰρ τῆς ἡμέρας** 'a drachma per day': for the genitive see *CGCG* 30.32. On the rate see 6.31.3n. and for Thracian mercenaries cf. 2.96.2, 5.6.2.

27.3 **ἡ Δεκέλεια τὸ μὲν πρῶτον . . . τειχισθεῖσα:** cf. **19**.1. τειχισθεῖσα is subordinate to ἐπωικεῖτο, with τὸ μὲν πρῶτον . . . τειχισθεῖσα answered by ὕστερον δὲ. . . ἐπιούσαις: the place was occupied after (a) first its fortification by the whole army and (b) then the arrival of a succession of allied detachments. The variation of construction within the μέν . . . δέ-clauses is typically Thucydidean. **κατὰ διαδοχὴν χρόνου** 'in succession at intervals'. **ἐπωικεῖτο** 'was occupied against', i.e. 'as the seat of offensive operations against' (LSJ): cf. 6.86.3. **ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον:** **19**.4n. **χρημάτων τ' ὀλέθρωι καὶ ἀνθρώπων φθορᾶι:** the phrasing builds on the often casual linking of χρήματα καὶ σώματα in describing losses (**24**.2n.). φθορᾶι echoes what is happening to the crews in Sicily (**12**.3, **13**.2), here as there referring to desertions as well as deaths, and hints at the parallel between the two theatres (below). ὄλεθρος is usually used of human deaths, and its combination with χρημάτων is bold: it is echoed at αἱ δὲ πρόσοδοι ἀπώλλυντο (**28**.4) and may be felt as part of the medical colouring (Kallet 1999: 229 and 2001: 131–2; cf. **27–30**n.). It impressed later writers, and is imitated

in heightened passages of Plut. (*How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend* 59f, *Table Talk* 705c) and Josephus (*Jewish Antiquities* 18.1). There may be an echo of Theognis 830 (which became proverbial), πίστει χρήματ' ὄλεσσα, ἀπιστίηι δ' ἐσάωσα, but if so it does not seem especially pointful. **ἐκάκωσε τὰ πράγματα:** mirroring the κάκωσις at Syracuse caused by first the occupation (**4**.6) and then the loss (**24**.3) of Plemmyrion, again involving difficulties of provision (**13**.1, **14**.3, **24**.3; cf. **28**.1) and the loss of χρήματα and men both through enemy action in the surrounding countryside and through desertion (**4**.6, **13**.2, **24**.2).

27.4 βραχεῖαι γιγνόμεναι αἱ ἐσβολαί: the invasions between 431 to 425 (**18**.1n.). The longest (430) lasted about forty days, the shortest (425) fifteen days: 2.57.2, 4.6.2. The damage inflicted during those invasions was considerable (Thorne 2001: 248–51), but *Hell. Oxy.* 12.5 confirms that it was much slighter than that after 413. **οὐκ ἐκώλυον:** 'the Athenians' is understood as object. **ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῆς †ἴσης† φρουρᾶς:** the text is corrupt, as ἴσης cannot mean the required 'normal' or 'permanent' and ἐξ ἀνάγκης is a surprising shift of point of view to the Peloponnesian side; nor would the Peloponnesians be ravaging only from their own 'necessity' but also to cause the maximum damage. τῆς ἐξ ἀνάγκης φρουρᾶς (Dover) is possible; or τῆς ἀναγκαίας φρουρᾶς, 'the minimum garrison' (lit. 'that left there from necessity'), on which ἐξ ἀνάγκης might originally have been a marginal gloss; or Alan Griffiths' ingenious ὅτε δ' ἐξενεγκούσης τῆς φρουρᾶς, 'and sometimes when the garrison had burst out' (reported in *CT*). **βασιλέως τε παρόντος . . . Ἄγιδος: 19**.1. **ἐκ παρέργου** 'as a sideshow', something other than the principal concern: cf. Pericles at 1.142.9, naval skills cannot be practised ἐκ παρέργου; 6.69.3.

27.5 ἐστέρηντο . . . ηὐτομολήκεσαν . . . ἀπωλώλει: pluperfects, throwing attention forward to the (extended, **28**.2n.) period after these developments to focus on the consequences. It is not implied that all this had been completed when the Thracians were sent home, just that the impact was already being felt (cf. **28**.4n.). Alcibiades had stressed these prospects to the Spartans at 6.91.7; he had overegged his case (see n. there), but he was not wrong. **ἀνδραπόδων πλέον ἢ δύο μυριάδες:** a vast number, presumably spread over a long period (otherwise there would have been logistical problems in housing and then transporting them: Hanson 1992: 210–11 n. 1). This will be Th.'s own estimate and there is no guarantee that it is an accurate one, but he was in a better position to make it than modern scholars to correct it. **ηὐτομολήκεσαν:** so the Athenians suffer a Pylos in reverse (**18**.3, **26**.2nn.); cf. Intr., pp. 24–5. **πολὺ μέρος** 'in large part': MS authority favours this reading rather than τὸ πολὺ μέρος (BH), 'for the most part'. **χειροτέχναι** 'skilled manual workers'. There

has been considerable discussion whether these were predominantly agricultural workers or slaves from the silver mines at Laureion: probably both, though agricultural slaves would find it easier to slip away and the mineworkers would have a long distance to travel undetected (6.91.7n.). There may also have been domestic slaves or factory-workers from the city itself. **πρόβατά τε . . . καὶ ὑποζύγια** 'sheep and beasts of burden'.

28.1 ἥ τε τῶν ἐπιτηδείων παρακομιδὴ ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας: esp. of grain. Moreno 2007: 77–143 provides evidence that Euboea 'was Athens' main granary from 446 to 411' (81), and argues that this was a principal reason for the despondency when Euboea broke away in 411 (cf. 8.96.2, 'Euboea, from which they gained even more benefit than from Attica': Intr., p. 22). **πρότερον . . . θάσσων οὖσα:** sea-transport was normally quicker and more convenient than by land, but the land-route from Oropus (see Map 3a) was only 48 km = 30 miles, and the voyage around Sunium was difficult; cargoes might also require the organisation of convoys requiring protection. Even once arrived, the goods would need to be transported by cart from Piraeus. Cf. Moreno 2007: 117–18. **πολυτελής:** the word is repeated from **27**.2, one of several such repetitions. The actual and potential expenses are piling up. **τῶν τε πάντων ὁμοίως ἐπακτῶν ἐδεῖτο ἡ πόλις:** τε as sentence-connective (**7**.3n.) marks this as a further point: it is not just that imports from Euboea stayed on the same scale but became more expensive; Athens was also more dependent on such imports as home-grown produce was being destroyed in the fields. **ἀντὶ τοῦ πόλις εἶναι φρούριον κατέστη** 'and instead of being a city it became a garrison town': more symmetry (cf. **27**.3n.), this time with the invaders – the Decelean φρουρά turns Athens too into a φρούριον – as well as with events in Syracuse (**11**.4, **14**.3), for at home too Athens has to behave as if under siege.

28.2 κατὰ διαδοχήν: Athens too, then, has its rota, and a more frequent and even more exhausting one than the Peloponnesians' (κατὰ διαδοχήν, **27**.3). **οἱ μὲν ἐφ' ὅπλοις ποιούμενοι:** φυλακήν is understood from the preceding φυλάσσοντες, rather as τεῖχος is understood from τειχίζεται at 1.91.1 ὅτι τειχίζεταί τε καὶ ἤδη ὕψος λαμβάνει: cf. Larini 1997. This is harsher than that passage and some editors prefer the less well attested που to ποιούμενοι, but besides its blandness that also gives the wrong sense, as it would mean not 'in various places' but 'somewhere' = 'in one (particular but undefined) place': cf. Renehan 1963. Renehan proposes <ὕπνους> ποιούμενοι, but probably no change is necessary. ἐφ' ὅπλοις differs from ἐν ὅπλοις or μεθ' ὅπλων in that it does not mean that they are parading all night, only that 'they have an assigned station at which to find their arms and their comrades in case of alarm' (Andrewes, *HCT* v. 178–9).

Until then, they are free to sleep. **καὶ θέρους καὶ χειμῶνος:** so Th. is dwelling not just on the immediate impact but the longer-term consequences, as in the number of slave-desertions at **27**.5. He may have the whole Decelean War in mind (so e.g. Figueira 2005: 85), looking forward as **28**.3 ('in the beginning of the war', 'in the seventeenth year') will look back. **ἐταλαιπωροῦντο:** echoing ταλαιπωροῦντες (**27**.5) of the horses: miseries are piling up along with expenses.

28.3 ἐπίεζεν 'squeezed', of financial difficulties also at Hdt. 5.35.1 and Aesch. *Cho.* 301: the physicality of the metaphor may again suggest a parallel between bodily and financial pain (cf. 3.87.2 and Kallet 1999: 226–7, 2001: 129–30). The ὅτι-clause, or an understood τοῦτο that the ὅτι-clause then defines, serves as grammatical subject. **δύο πολέμους:** cf. **18**.2. **ἐς φιλονικίαν καθέστασαν:** pluperfect, bringing out that this is the culmination of a long-standing development. φιλονικία, 'love of victory', need not be a bad quality, especially in battle (**70**.7, **71**.1), but Th.'s speakers have also brought out how often it can be damaging (1.41.3, 4.64.1, 5.111.4), and it is a bloody feature of internal *stasis* (3.82.8; cf. 8.76.1). It is often confused in MSS with φιλονεικία, 'love of quarrels' (here as elsewhere, e.g. **70**.7 and **77**.1, Th.'s MSS have φιλονεικ-), and it is arguable that both connotations are simultaneously felt (Pelling 2002: 347 n. 24). The word characterised Alcibiades on his first entry (5.43.2), and it may recall 2.65.7, where internal wranglings driven by private φιλοτιμίαι and gain led to many Athenian errors, including the Sicilian expedition (2.65.11): cf. Intr., p. 6: φιλοτιμία and φιλον(ε)ικία are often closely linked (e.g. 3.82.8, Lys. *Epit.* 16, Plato, *Rep.* 8.548c6–7 and 9.586c8–9, Arist. *Rhet.* 2.1389a12). So here too there may be a hint that internal divisions, and Alcibiades in particular, promoted the choices that Athenians made. φιλον(ε)ικία has caused great harm; now, paradoxically, it is key to their survival (de Romilly 1963: 221–2). Just as again at 2.65 (Intr., p. 6), their resilience is felt as extraordinary; their wisdom is another question. **ἣν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἠπίστησεν ἄν τις ἀκούσας** 'which, before it happened, nobody would have believed if they had heard of it'. ἀπιστέω + accusative = 'not believe possible' (cf. Ar. *Eccl.* 775, X. *Ages.* 5.6, 8.7), whereas 'distrust' requires the dative: see Parker 2007: 279 on Eur. *Alc.* 1130. As with τὸν παράλογον τοσοῦτον ποιῆσαι τοῖς Ἕλλησι, Th.'s interest in the psychological dimension – what 'someone' would find incredible and 'contrary to expectations' – is characteristic: 6.30–32.2n. and Intr., pp. 30–1. **τό γε αὐτοὺς πολιορκουμένους . . . ἐκ Πελοποννήσου:** the length and syntactic confusion of this convoluted sentence match the hectic complexity of what the Athenians were taking on. The syntax is at several points difficult. (a) The text printed here incorporates Bothe's emendation of τὸ γάρ to

τό γε and soft punctuation after ἀκούσας: τό γε . . . then explains what constituted that barely credible φιλονικία. Most editors retain τὸ γάρ and punctuate with a full stop. In that case the long sentence τὸ γὰρ . . . ἐκ Πελοποννήσου lacks a main verb: γάρ will have to mean something like 'I mean' (Dover 1965; cf. *GP* 60–1, 67–8, and esp. Plato, *Phd.* 99b). If γάρ is retained, alternatively Eduard Fraenkel (in a marginale in his copy of Schadewaldt 1929, now in the Sackler Library at Oxford) took τό + infinitive as exclamatory, comparing Ar. *Birds* 5–6 τὸ δ' ἐμὲ . . . περιελθεῖν (where Sommerstein translates 'To think that . . .'): cf. *M&T* 805. Such exuberance seems more suited to comic dialogue than to Th.'s sober analysis, but it would effectively be free indirect discourse, capturing the amazement of that imaginary τις. Oral delivery could make something of that, but it still seems less likely than Bothe's solution. (b) τοσοῦτον looks/sounds at first as if it is followed by ὅσον but in fact goes on to have a further correlative in ὥστε. The syntax can be regularised in retrospect by taking the ὅσον-clause as parenthetic, 'in so far as', but some readers and (especially) hearers may simply have assumed an anacoluthon or understood a further τοσοῦτον, 'so much so that at the beginning people thought . . . [and so much so that] they went in the twenty-seventh year . . .' The meaning is clearer than the syntax. **πολιορκουμένους ἐπιτειχισμῶι . . . τῶι αὐτῶι τρόπωι ἀντιπολιορκεῖν:** a symmetry between the two theatres, several times suggested, now becomes explicit. This is the first time that the predicament at home has been called a 'siege', though this may have been suggested by the description at **28**.2; for the Athenians at Syracuse as besieged rather than besiegers cf. Nicias at **11**.4 and **14**.3, and for the Peloponnesians' ἐπιτειχισμός, **18**.4. **μηδ' ὡς** 'not even in those circumstances'. ὡς is adverbial, as the accent shows. **αὐτήν γε καθ' αὑτήν** 'considered in itself': γε acknowledges that there are other ways of looking at it, most obviously by taking into account the different scale of the Athenian empire. **τὸν παράλογον:** the use of παράλογος as a masculine noun is a quirk of Th. (cf. **55**.1, **61**.3), several times used to bring out how much in warfare goes 'contrary to expectation': the wise Spartan king Archidamus warned as much at 1.78.1 (cf. 2.11.4), and Pericles produces the memorable formulation that events can proceed 'ignorantly', ἀμαθῶς: they haven't read the script (1.140.1). Still, Th. also gives both Archidamus and Pericles predictions that run counter to the summary here of expectations 'at the beginning of the war'. Archidamus foresees a long war at 1.80–1, and 'fears that we may even leave it for our children'; Pericles recommends a strategy that would allow Athens περιεῖναι (1.144.1, 2.13.9 and 65.7), as much 'to win through', 'to survive' as simply 'to win': cf. περιοίσειν here. But Pericles also knows that the Athenians may find it hard to keep to his strategy (1.144.1, Intr., p. 32), and at 5.14.3 Th. attributes to 'the Spartans' as a whole the

belief at the war's outset that they would win 'within a few years'. Brasidas says something similar at 4.85.2. **τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τόλμης:** so closely linked in Athens' case (6.31.1, 6.31.6, 6.33.4nn.) that a single definite article suffices. Things have moved on since the Corinthians described the Athenians as παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταί (1.70.3). **ὅσον . . . χώραν:** on the syntax see on τό γε αὐτούς . . . above. **οἱ δὲ τριῶν γε ἐτῶν οὐδεὶς πλείω χρόνον** 'and nobody at all thought . . .' γε marks this as the climax of the sequence, οἱ δέ is initially co-ordinated with οἱ μὲν ἐνιαυτόν and οἱ δὲ δύο, then in apposition οὐδείς gives the sentence a new turn; τριῶν ἐτῶν is the regular genitive of comparison with πλείω. **περιοίσειν** 'hold out', 'survive'. **εἰ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐσβάλοιεν ἐς τὴν χώραν:** for these invasions see **18**.1, **27**.4nn. **τετρυχωμένοι** 'worn down', from τρυχόω (cf. 4.60.2): a medical tinge ('emaciate'; cf. LSJ and Kallet 2001: 130) may be felt. This partly echoes Nicias at 6.12.1, but even Nicias there admits that Athens had to an extent recovered, and Th. himself puts it more strongly at 6.26.2: see nn. Still, Th. is here giving the way the startled 'Greeks' saw it, not necessarily how it really was. Andoc. *On the Peace* 8, probably exaggerating, says that 7,000 talents had built up in the treasury during the peace. **πόλεμον οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω . . . Πελοποννήσου:** recalling the way Th. introduced the expedition at 6.1.1, where the Athenians largely failed to realise ὅτι οὐ πολλῶι τινι ὑποδεέστερον πόλεμον ἀνηιροῦντο [cf. προσανείλοντο here] ἢ τὸν πρὸς Πελοποννησίους. Here more explicitly than at 6.1.1 Th. makes it clear that the 'war against Peloponnesians' was one still continuing: that again fits Nicias' warnings (6.10.1–3), but is also in line with Th.'s firm view of a '27-year war' (5.26.2). Cf. 6.10.2n.

28.4 **καὶ τότε** 'then *too*', returning from the more extended time-frame (**27**.5, **28**.2nn.) to summer 413. **ὑπό τε τῆς Δεκελείας πολλὰ βλαπτούσης** 'because of the great damage inflicted by Decelea', the 'dominant' use of the participle (*CGCG* 52.45) that is more common in Latin (e.g. *ab urbe condita*) than in Greek: cf. **42**.2 and 6.3.3n. βλαπτούσης is one of several further repetitions (πολλὰ ἔβλαπτε, **27**.3) to close the ring as the financial survey reaches its end. **προσπιπτόντων:** as diseases so often 'fall upon' one (Kallet 1999: 277–8, 2001: 130): cf. 2.50.1, of the plague, and similarly ἐπιπίπτω (**29**.5n.). **ἀδύνατοι ἐγένοντο τοῖς χρήμασιν:** Kallet 1999: 228 and 2001: 130–1 again stresses the medical connotations, as ἀδύνατος can often be used of the disabled (Lys. 24 is περὶ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου, 'On the Invalid'). The reversing of that great δύναμις (**28**.3) is also felt. Evidently the Athenians were not completely helpless or bankrupt, as they could send such big reinforcements to Syracuse and had not yet touched their reserve of 1,000 talents (2.24.1; cf. 8.15.1), but they could not do all that they wanted. **τὴν εἰκοστήν:** a 5 per cent tax on all imports or

exports, and probably on both; it is unclear if it was charged at each port for goods in transit (Figueira 2005: 113). 'The' tax makes it sound as if it would be a familiar feature at least to Th.'s first audiences, unless he is whetting interest by affecting that this is the case (as Engl. might say 'the famous . . .': cf. de Jong forthcoming on Hdt. 5.35.2). The tax probably but not certainly lasted until the end of the war. It is much discussed: see esp. *CT*, Kallet 2001: 195–226, Kallet and Kroll 2020: 107–11, Figueira 2005, esp. 84–94, and Bubelis 2019: 40–3. Probably it was outsourced to tax-farmers, but the logistics would not be straightforward, especially for goods transported between island ports rather than to Athens, and the planning for it may have started in the years of peace before 415. It could not have been an easy calculation whether this would in fact be more lucrative than the tribute, and the financial spadework was presumably done by the *boulē*. **ὑπὸ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον** 'around this time': the imprecision confirms that Th. might have placed this financial disquisition at several different points (**27–30n.**). **ἐποίησαν** 'imposed', lit. 'created for' + dative. **προσιέναι**: in direct discourse this would have been optative, προσίοι. **ὅσωι καὶ μείζων ὁ πόλεμος ἦν**: picking up the notion of 'the double war', 28.3, to round off the argument. **ἀπώλλυντο** 'were dying away', imperfect: this refers to the whole extended period implied at 27.5 and 28.2, but again presumes that the effect was already being felt (**27.5n.**). It echoes χρημάτων . . . ὀλέθρωι (27.3).

29–30 *Mycalessus*. Th.'s abhorrence is clear, and reflected in the slow pace and detail with which he dwells on an incident that had no effect on the war as a whole but that brings out the reality of what war can mean. He does so without any of the sensationalising that Polyb. later criticised in Phylarchus (2.56.7; cf. **75nn.**); the pathos of, particularly, the school massacre is clear, and he leaves no doubt that 'lamenting', ὀλοφύρασθαι (30.4), is the appropriate readerly response, encouraged too by emphatic repetition (**29.5, 30.4nn.**). All springs from the original Athenian instructions of **29.1**, and Th. would not have included those had he wished to suppress Athens' partial responsibility for what followed. Then the verbs are initially singular rather than plural, ἀπεβίβασεν, ἐποιήσατο, διέπλευσε, ἦγεν, προσέκειτο, αἱρεῖ, ἐπιπεσών, to focus on the Athenian commander Dieitrephes. The shift to plurals for the killings themselves leaves it uncertain how far Dieitrephes ordered these, but at least he cannot be acquitted of standing by and letting it happen (Quinn 1995). Cf. esp. Kallet 1999 and 2001: 121–46, Fragoulaki 2020, and Sears 2013: 150–63.

29.1 **τοὺς τῶι Δημοσθένει ὑστερήσαντας** 'who had come too late for Demosthenes' (**27.1**). **ἀπέπεμπον**: imperfect, because the dismissal had 'reached [its] end-point by the time the next action in the narrative

occurs'; in such cases the tense 'directs attention towards the consequences of the action' (*CGCG* 33.51, observing that the use is particularly frequent with verbs of commanding). **Διειτρέφει:** presumably one of the *stratēgoi*. He was not disgraced by the episode, if he is the same man as held a command, again involving Thrace, in 411 (8.64.2). He was probably the Dieitrephes ridiculed as a 'shameless beast' (Cratinus fr. 251 K–A), 'a crazy foreigner, Cretan, barely Attic' (Plato com. fr. 30 K–A), and an over-promoted nobody (Ar. *Birds* 798–800 with Dunbar 1995: 484–5). **καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους, ἤν τι δύνηται, ἀπ' αὐτῶν βλάψαι:** ἀπ' αὐτῶν = 'by making use of them' (the Thracians): LSJ ἀπό III.4. The Athenians were prone to giving such vague instructions: cf. 4.2.4, Demosthenes should 'make use of these ships, if he wished, around the Peloponnese', and esp. 6.8.1, the generals should deal with Egesta, Selinus, and Leontini 'and settle the rest of Sicilian affairs in the manner they think best for Athens'.

29.2 Τάναγραν . . . Χαλκίδος τῆς Εὐβοίας . . . Μυκαλησσόν: see Map 3a, and for Mycalessus, the later Rhitsona, *IACP* 446. The earlier landing would have been in the territory of Tanagra, not at the town, which is some distance inland. **ἀφ' ἑσπέρας . . . ἅμα δὲ τῇι ἡμέραι:** Th. could simply have said 'they attacked', but the fullness ('at evening . . . for the night . . . by the shrine of Hermes . . . about sixteen stades . . . at dawn') alerts the audience to the episode's significance, while the stealth and time-biding of the Thracians contrasts with the suddenness and frenzy of the attack itself.

29.3 τῶι Ἑρμαίωι: location uncertain. Livy 35.50.9 clearly thought that it was near the shore (cf. Briscoe's n., 1981: 216), but if Th.'s 'about sixteen stades' is right (about 2.5–3 km, **19**.2n.) it was at least a few kilometres inland, perhaps halfway to Mycalessus: cf. on τοσοῦτον ἐπαναβάντας below. **ἅμα δὲ τῇι ἡμέραι:** preparing for the pathetic detail at **29**.5, the schoolchildren had just arrived. **οὐ μεγάλῃι:** but not as small as all that: it was big enough to have more than one school (ὅπερ μέγιστον ἦν αὐτόθι, **29**.5). The 'smallness' adds to the sense of vulnerability. It also fits one of Th.'s persistent insights, that in war the little cities suffer most (**27–30**n.). **ἀπροσδοκήτοις . . . ἐπιθέσθαι:** μή . . . ἐπιθέσθαι is dependent on ἀπροσδοκήτοις as if it were a participle 'not expecting' (cf. 6.69.1); for the apparent double negative with μή cf. 2.93.3 οὔτε προσδοκία οὐδεμία μὴ ἄν ποτε οἱ πολέμιοι ἐξαπιναίως οὕτως ἐπιπλεύσειαν. In direct discourse ἐπιθέσθαι would be optative, ἐπίθοιντο. **τοσοῦτον ἐπαναβάντας** 'coming so far inland (ἀνα-) against (ἐπι-) them': Mycalessus is some 6.5 km (4 miles) inland. The range of mountains separating Mycalessus from the Euripus may have added to the villagers' sense of security (Sears 2013: 251). **ἔστιν ἧι** 'in some places' (**11**.2n.), followed by τοῦ δέ . . ., 'and other parts were . . .'

29.4 **καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους . . . ἴδοιεν:** the short cola tumble out, capturing the hectic fury of the slaughter with emphatic repetition, for παῖδας is already conveyed by νεωτέρας ἡλικίας, ὅτῳ ἐντύχοιεν is implied by πάντας ἑξῆς, and κτείνοντες repeats ἐφόνευον. The extremity would be felt by an ancient as well as a modern audience: cf. the guilt the Athenians later felt about Melos, Isoc. 4.100 and 110, 12.62–6, and for the particular pathos of the deaths when a school at Chios collapses, Hdt. 6.27.3 (cf. **32**.2n.). Even if they had not spared the townspeople (φειδόμενοι), they might have taken at least the women and children prisoner to be sold as slaves, as the Athenians themselves had done at Scione and at Melos (5.32.1, 5.116.4). The Thracians are so murderous that they are blind even to their own profit. **φειδόμενοι:** another financial metaphor, and probably an echo of the Persian rampage before the battle of Plataea, Hdt. 9.39.2 ἀφειδέως ἐφόνευον, οὐ φειδόμενοι οὔτε ὑποζυγίου οὐδενὸς οὔτε ἀνθρώπου (Fragoulaki 2020: 44). **ἐντύχοιεν . . . ἴδοιεν:** indefinite construction with 'iterative' optative (*CGCG* 40.9, 50.21). **τὸ γὰρ γένος . . . φονικώτατόν ἐστιν:** this view of Thracian bloodthirstiness would be familiar, particularly to Athenians: cf. E. Hall 1989: 103–10 and Archibald 1998: 98–102. Many of Th.'s first audiences would not find anything amiss in such sweeping racism, used as they were both to confident ethnographic generalisations and to convictions of Greek moral superiority (though this did not stop Hdt. from qualifying as well as echoing such prejudices: Pelling 2019, esp. chs. 9(e), 14(c)). Many would also know that Th. spent his exile in Thrace, and might well think 'and he should know!' Here the ground has been prepared in, particularly, Th.'s ethnographic excursus on Thrace at 2.96–8: see Fragoulaki 2020: 43–4. **ὁμοῖα:** accusative of respect, effectively = ὁμοίως: cf. 1.25.4 and the similar use of ἴσα (**71**.3). **τοῖς μάλιστα:** φονικοῖς is understood. **ἐν ὧι ἂν θαρσήσηι** 'in any case when they think they can', with the use of ἄν + subjunctive 'to refer to actions which occur habitually (repeatedly, typically, generically) in or up to the present' (*CGCG* 40.9).

29.5 **ἰδέα πᾶσα . . . ὀλέθρου** 'every form of death': ὄλεθρος echoes its use in the financial survey, returning now to its normal application to human death (**27**.3n.). ἰδέα may carry a medical (cf. **27–30**n.: some twenty-one times in the Hippocratic corpus) or more generally scientific flavour (it is frequent in Aristotle), but its intellectualising air is no barrier to its conveying grimness: elsewhere Th. pairs it with θανάτου (3.81.5), κακοτροπίας (3.83.1), τῆς φυγῆς καὶ τοῦ ὀλέθρου (3.98.3; cf. 3.112.7), and πολέμων (1.109.1), and cf. **81**.5. **καὶ ἄρτι ἔτυχον οἱ παῖδες ἐσεληλυθότες:** ἐς ὅ is understood. **κατέκοψαν** 'cut down', 'butchered' (LSJ) – a particularly brutal word. It is used of slaughtering beasts of burden at 4.128.4 and

of a fierce hand-to-hand battle at 4.96.3, and Hdt. 9.89.4 too applied it to Thracians. **οὐδεμιᾶς ἥσσων μᾶλλον ἑτέρας:** close to being another (**29**.4n.) case of repetition, but the two phrases are doing different work: οὐδεμιᾶς ἥσσων defines ξυμφορά, whereas μᾶλλον ἑτέρας qualifies ἀδόκητός τε . . . καὶ δεινή in explaining more sharply why it was so unsurpassed. The 'pathos statement' (Rood 2006: 248; cf. Lateiner 1977) seems to round off the incident, but this is false closure: the bloodshed is not over yet. **ἐπέπεσεν:** another word often used of disease, e.g. 2.49.6, [Hipp.] *Airs Water Places* 3 and 10, *On the Sacred Disease* 6; cf. 6.24.3n. There is again some similarity to **28**.4, the expenses 'falling on' Athens (προσπιπτόντων).

30.1 οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι αἰσθόμενοι ἐβοήθουν: this would take some time, for Thebes is over 20 km from Mycalessus. Others too came to help (**30**.3), perhaps from villages passed as the Thebans rushed to the scene, perhaps from Boeotians alerted and joining once the pursuit was under way. **ἀφείλοντο καὶ . . . καταδιώκουσιν . . . ἀποκτείνουσιν:** aorist for the single action of the stripping, then historic presents for the climax of the pursuit and killing.

30.2 τοὺς πλείστους 'most [of those that they killed]', going closely with ἐν τῇι ἐσβάσει; not 'most [of the Thracians]', as becomes clear from what follows. **οὔτε ἐπισταμένους νεῖν:** seen by Greeks, so used to the sea, as characteristic of landlubberly barbarians. Cf. Hdt. 6.44.3, 8.129.2, and esp. 8.89.1–2, the Persians at Salamis, which might be in Th.'s and his audience's minds here: Bowie 2007: 98–9, Fragoulaki 2020: 47–9, and E. Hall 1994. **οὐκ ἀτόπως** 'not inappropriately', but the word's root meaning is also felt: this was 'not out of *place*', for they knew what to do on land, exploiting the tactics and formation that Thracians were used to (ἐν ἐπιχωρίωι τάξει). Cf. Sears 2013: 254–5. **προεκθέοντές τε καὶ ξυστρεφόμενοι** 'running forward out of the line, then closing ranks'. It is hard to picture what is envisaged, but there may also be a suggestion of 'wheeling round' (LSJ συστρέφω II.2), as a way of organising the retreat. **μέρος δέ τι: 30**.3n. **πεντήκοντα καὶ διακόσιοι . . . τριακοσίων καὶ χιλίων . . .** [**30**.3] **ἐς εἴκοσι μάλιστα:** Th. is fond of such 'rhetorical calculus of disaster' (Lateiner 1977: 50 n. 28). Cf. Rubincam 1991, whose collection of material shows that none of these numbers is particularly recurrent elsewhere; that suggests that Th. had good information, though there is doubtless some rounding. The incident was presumably much talked about, though the '1,300' may come from the Athenians' original computation of the potential cost (**27**.2, **29**.1).

30.3 Θηβαίων τῶν Βοιωταρχῶν: Thebes appointed two of the eleven Boeotarchs: cf. 4.91.1. **Σκιρφώνδαν:** not mentioned by Th.

elsewhere. **μέρος τι:** a favourite Thucydidean locution for, often, 'a *substantial* part': cf. **11**.3, 1.1.2 and 23.3, 2.64.1 (with Rusten's (1989) n.), etc. Here it echoes the similar phrase for Thracian losses at **30**.2, but the total number of Thracian deaths was quantified; the absence of any number here adds even more pathos. The losses were literally countless. Cf. 3.113.6, quoted in **30**.4n. on ὡς ἐπὶ μεγέθει. **ἀπανηλώθη:** also with μέρος τι at **11**.3, but here the notion of 'expending' may pick up the financial language of **27–8**. The Athenians' sending the Thracians away saved money but spent innocent lives.

30.4 τὰ μὲν κατὰ . . . τοιαῦτα ξυνέβη: a rounding-off formula used by Th. especially after episodes of suffering and loss, with μέν preparing for the next item (δέ . . .) as the war goes relentlessly on: 'that was Mycalessus' story . . .; and next . . .' Cf. 3.50.3 τὰ μὲν κατὰ Λέσβον οὕτως ἐγένετο, 3.68.5 καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ Πλάταιαν . . . οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν, and the last words of Book 7 (**87**.6n.). **πάθει χρησαμένην:** one of the occasions where 'suffer' is a better translation of χράομαι than 'use': cf. Hdt. 1.42.1 συμφορῇ τοιῇδε κεχρημένον (similarly Eur. *Med.* 347), Hdt. 1.117.5 τοιούτῳ μόρῳ ἐχρήσατο ὁ παῖς. For πάθος see **33**.3n. **οὐδενὸς . . . ἧσσον ὀλοφύρασθαι ἀξίωι:** again an unusually direct and emotional comment (cf. **86**.5 on Nicias), and again (**29**.4n.) a repetition: **29**.5 has already stressed how this catastrophe was unsurpassed (οὐδεμίας ἥσσων there ~ οὐδενὸς . . . ἧσσον here). For Th.'s taste for such rankings and superlatives cf. **85**.4, Grant 1974: 83–6, and Price 2001: 358–60. **ὡς ἐπὶ μεγέθει** 'given the size of the town', forestalling objections along the lines 'What about the plague at Athens? Or the Sicilian disaster itself?' Cf. 3.113.6, of a disaster befalling Ambracia in 426/5: 'this was the greatest πάθος that befell a single Greek city, in a period of the same length [a qualification like ὡς ἐπὶ μεγέθει here], during this war; and I have not given the number of the dead, because the figure is said to have been incredible relative to τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως'.

31–41: WAITING FOR DEMOSTHENES AND EURYMEDON

The journey of Demosthenes and Eurymedon is described in fits and starts (**31**, **33**.3–6, **35**). They eventually arrive only at **42**.1, a long textual distance after the decision to send them at **16–17**, and the impression of slowness is reinforced by the manner in which **33**.6 and **35**.2 leave them (nn.). The contrast with the urgency of Nicias' appeal (**11–15**) is inescapable. The Syracusans use the interval well, building up their alliance (**33**.2), then rethinking their naval strategy in a way that mirrors events in the Corinthian Gulf (**34**, **36**): this quickly bears dividends (**40**.5). Another

piece of Syracusan enterprise takes the Athenians by surprise (**40–1**), and the expectation on both sides of Athenian naval supremacy is on the wane (**34**.7, **41**.4). Th.'s interest in the psychological aspect is again clear, as it is in the emphasis on Athenian θόρυβος under attack (**37**.3, **40**.3). The Athenians themselves are much more inactive, and Nicias is mentioned only twice, once in response mode (**32**.1), once concerned with defence (**38**.2–3): cf. Intr., p. 28. The one notable success is won by the Sicels on his behalf (**32**.2). The pace will pick up once the new commanders arrive: **42–6**n.

31.1 **ἀποπλέων ἐπὶ τῆς Κερκύρας** 'sailing away [from the Peloponnese] towards [**26**.3n.] Corcyra'. This picks up the narrative from **26**.3, as the similar language (there παρέπλει ἐπὶ τῆς Κερκύρας) makes clear. **τὴν ἐκ τῆς Λακωνικῆς τείχισιν:** the ἐκ is influenced by the sense of movement in ἀποπλέων. **Φειᾶι:** see Map 3a. It was an important harbour town for ships heading west: cf. 2.25.4 and *IACP* 492. **οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὁπλῖται:** **19**.4–5. **ἔπλεον:** for the imperfect see **29**.1n.

31.2 **Ζάκυνθον καὶ Κεφαλληνίαν:** Athens' allies since the beginning of the war. **ὁπλίτας τε παρέλαβε:** those, presumably, that the allies had been instructed to provide at **17**.1. It made sense to collect those from western Greece en route, as in the case of the forces from Corcyra (**26**.3, **31**.5). **ἐκ τῆς Ναυπάκτου τῶν Μεσσηνίων μετεπέμψατο** 'and sent for some of the Messenians to come from Naupactus'. Messenian ex-helots were settled there by Athens in (?) 456/5 (1.103.3 with *CT* there, *IACP* 396, Kallet 2016); these will now be the second or third generation. Cf. **57**.8n. **ἀντιπέρας:** i.e. 'opposite' Zacynthus and Cephallenia. **Ἀλύζιάν τε καὶ Ἀνακτόριον:** see Map 3a, *IACP* 354, 356–7. Anactorium at least was a Corinthian colony, and had supported Corinth in 435 (1.46.1); it, and perhaps Alyzia too, had fallen to Athens in 425 (4.49).

31.3 **ὄντι δ' αὐτῶι περὶ ταῦτα** 'while he was occupied in this' and/or 'while he was in this area'. **ὃς τότε . . . ἀπεπέμφθη:** **16**.2(n.). **κατὰ πλοῦν ἤδη ὤν:** i.e. on his *return* trip from Syracuse. **τὸ Πλημμύριον ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἑαλωκός:** **22–4.**

31.4 **Κόνων:** his only mention in Th. He had a distinguished naval career ahead of him, culminating in his victory over Sparta at Cnidos in 394. His precise status now (nauarch or *stratēgos*?) is unclear: see *CT*. **ὃς ἦρχε Ναυπάκτου:** i.e., was in charge of the Athenian garrison and fleet, which effectively made him the town's 'governor' (Jordan 1970: 233 n. 15 = 1975: 123 n. 21). **αἱ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι νῆες . . . ἀνθορμοῦσαι:** **17**.4, **19**.5. **καταλύουσι** 'ceasing' [from their blockade], intransitive. τὸν

πόλεμον, the MSS reading here, is not possible (there could be no question of 'ending the war' rather than just this operation), and was presumably inserted by a scribe unfamiliar with the intransitive use and groping for a familiar phrase (1.24.6, 2.95.2, 5.47.3–4, etc.). **ἐκέλευεν** 'urged' or 'asked', as often (6.62.5n.): whatever his current status (above), Conon was in no position to give Demosthenes and Eurymedon 'orders'. **ὡς οὐχ ἱκανὰς οὔσας . . . ναυμαχεῖν:** a genitive absolute might have been expected, but see *M&T* 853 for this use of accusative + participle after ὡς or ὥσπερ, conveying what the subject of the main verb thinks or, as here, says. **δυοῖν δεούσας εἴκοσι:** evidently two of the original twenty (**19**.5) had been lost or were not seaworthy. Athenian maritime confidence is clearly not what it was in 429, when Phormio attacked forty-seven ships with twenty of his own and won (2.86–92); cf. **34**.7(n.).

31.5 ξυμπέμπουσι 'send with' Conon. **τῆς στρατιᾶς τὸν ξύλλογον:** τὸν τῆς στρατιᾶς ξύλλογον or τὸν ξύλλογον τὸν τῆς στρατιᾶς would be more usual, but τῆς στρατιᾶς is advanced for emphasis: cf. 6.33.1n. **ἀποτραπόμενος** 'after returning', i.e. from Sicily: cf. 3.24.3, 5.13.1. There is no need to take this as 'turning aside from his return to Athens', with C–S, *HCT*, and *CT*. **ὥσπερ καὶ ἠιρέθη: 16**.2. **ἐκ τῶν . . . ἀκοντιστάς:** specialised skills of Acarnania (2.81.8, 3.107.4): cf. **60**.4, **67**.2.

32.1 τότε . . . οἰχόμενοι ἐς τὰς πόλεις: 25.9. **ἔπεισαν:** the arguments were given at **25**.9, their success noted only here. **τοὺς τὴν δίοδον ἔχοντας** 'those controlling the route through their territory'. **Κεντόριπάς τε καὶ Ἀλικυαίους:** for Centoripa see 6.94.3n. and Map 1. This is Th.'s only mention of Halicyae, an ally of Athens since, probably, 418/7 (*IG* I^3 12). It was in the west, south of Egesta: that seems an odd place to be able to 'let through' or ambush these Syracusan allies, but troops from Selinus might move north-west to join those from Himera. The Halicyaeans might then follow them to concert an attack with Sicels coming from further east. **διαφρήσωσι** 'let them through', from the rare verb διαφρέω: cf. Ar. *Birds* 193. **ἄλλῃ γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ πειράσειν** 'for [the Athenians thought and said] they would not even try to come any other way'. **Ἀκραγαντῖνοι:** Acragas (*IACP* 186–9) had long been suspicious of Syracuse and had been sympathetic to Athens in 422/1 (5.4.6), but kept a studied neutrality in 415–413 (**33**.2, **58**.1; Bauslaugh 1990: 151–2); for the expulsion of a pro-Syracusan faction see **50**.1. Its influence extended over 'a vast area of central Sicily' (*IACP*): hence the importance of its refusal now. That would particularly affect those coming from Selinus and Himera, but not those from Gela and Camarina (P–S): those are mentioned separately at **33**.1. **οὐκ ἐδίδοσαν . . . ὁδόν** 'did not grant passage'.

32.2 τῶν Σικελιωτῶν: the word for Sicilian *Greeks* (Malkin 2011: 107), which gives extra point to the wordplay with Σικελοί. **ἀφυλάκτοις τε καὶ ἐξαίφνης:** cf. **29**.3 of the Mycalessus attack, one of several links of the two episodes (**33**.3n.). In this interval between major battles, this is what the war in both theatres has become, a matter of surprise killings. **ἐς ὀκτακοσίους μάλιστα . . . ἐς πεντακοσίους καὶ χιλίους:** cf. **30**.2–3 and Rubincam 1991 for Th.'s taste for such bloody statistics. These losses are unusually high, both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the original force. **ἑνός του Κορινθίου** 'one, a Corinthian': του = τινος: cf. Soph. *OT* 117 θνήισκουσι γάρ, πλὴν εἷς τις. This is Herwerden's conjecture for the MSS ἑνὸς τοῦ Κορινθίου, 'one, the Corinthian', which would imply, as **25**.9 does not, that only one of the ambassadors was Corinthian. Th. did not write accents, and so this is an interpretation rather than an emendation of the transmitted text. The 'only one escaped' motif is recurrent in such disaster stories (*CT*), but this has none of the pathos of Hdt. 6.27.3, the one surviving child from the collapsed school (**29**.4n.).

33.1 οἱ Καμαριναῖοι: cf. 6.52.1n., 6.67.2 when they gave Syracuse lukewarm support, and esp. 6.75–88.2, the debate where Athens and Syracuse both pleaded for support: that ended in a decision to keep a front of neutrality (6.88.2n.; Intr., p. 3). This therefore marks a change in their position in the light of the Syracusan successes, but Th. leaves that for the audience to infer. **τριακόσιοι δὲ ἀκοντισταὶ καὶ τοξόται τριακόσιοι:** the chiastic order seems overmannered; perhaps it is influenced by ἀκοντισταὶ καὶ τοξόται closely juxtaposed in a stock phrase, though usually in the opposite order (1.49.1, 6.20.4, X. *Cyr.* 3.3.57 and 60, etc.). **οἱ Γελῶιοι:** see Map 1 and cf. 6.4.3n. and **1**.4n. Gela was already helping Syracuse in 415, but then only with cavalry, then too 200 in number (6.67.2). Like Camarina, it now steps up its support. The need for ships in particular had been stressed by the envoys (**25**.9).

33.2 οὐδὲ μεθ' ἑτέρων 'neutral', 6.44.3n.; cf. **32**.1n. for Acragas' stance. **οἱ δ' ἄλλοι:** resumptive, picking up σχεδὸν γάρ τι . . . πᾶσα ἡ Σικελία after the parenthesis. In fact, Naxos, Catana, Egesta, and most Sicels were Athenian allies (**57**.11), and Messina did not support Syracuse, but Th. is focusing on οἱ πρότερον περιορώμενοι. **ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους:** with ἐβοήθουν, while μετὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων goes with ξυστάντες: the word order emphasises the two adversaries. **περιορώμενοι:** cf. 6.93.1n. At 6.103.2 Athens had benefited when the Sicels abandoned their previous 'circumspection'; now it is Syracuse's turn.

33.3 οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι: 'the Syracusans', put generally, rather than 'Gylippus': that might be more noticeable because of the contrasting

ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Εὐρυμέδων. *HCT* 381 counts this as one of the pointers towards Gylippus' waning authority as Syracusan confidence grew (**2**.1n.). Plut. quotes Timaeus as saying that the Syracusans found his stern rigour and Spartan style hard to take (*Nic.* 28.4 = *FGrH* 566 F 100b); he adds that they also suspected him of personal greed, but that is likely to be Plut.'s own guesswork, based on his broader general knowledge (cf. *Lys.* 16) as he ties Gylippus in to his general view of Spartan avarice and decline (Lucchesi 2016). **πάθος:** a favourite word of Th. for such serious losses. Cf. 1.106.2, 3.113.2 and 6 (of Ambracia, quoted at **30**.4n.), 4.14.2 and 55.1 (Sphacteria), and esp. **30**.4, of Mycalessus: that is a further link between the two episodes (**32**.2n.). **ἐπέσχον** 'checked', implying that this is what they would otherwise have done. For the construction with τό + infinitive cf. Soph. *Phil.* 881 μηδ' ἐπίσχωμεν τὸ πλεῖν. **ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Εὐρυμέδων:** ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων might have been expected, as when they first started acting in concert at **31**.5; cf. **1**.1, **50**.1. But the two men are linked with a single definite article again at **35**.1, and cf. also **69**.4 ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Μένανδρος καὶ Εὐθύδημος and 4.3.1 ὁ μὲν Εὐρυμέδων καὶ Σοφοκλῆς; similarly X. *Hell.* 3.2.20 ὁ δὲ Τισσαφέρνης καὶ Φαρνάβαζος. The effect is to represent the men as a closely co-operating unit: cf. **43**.2 τοὺς λιθολόγους καὶ τέκτονας. **ἑτοίμης ἤδη τῆς στρατιᾶς . . . ἠπείρου:** the force Demosthenes was collecting at **31**.2. **τὸν Ἰόνιον** 'the Ionian Sea'. **ἐπ' ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν:** 'Point Iapygia', in the heel of southern Italy (Map 2), the modern Santa Maria di Leuca: 6.30.1n.

33.4 ἐς τὰς Χοιράδας νήσους Ἰαπυγίας: the small islands lying opposite the harbour of (hostile) Taras. **τῶν Ἰαπύγων . . . τοῦ Μεσσαπίου ἔθνους:** see Map 2, and for Athens' previous relations Fragoulaki 2013: 287–92: Messapians might naturally be at odds with their powerful neighbour Taras. **τῶι Ἄρται . . . ἀνανεωσάμενοί τινα παλαιὰν φιλίαν:** this 'friendship' is mentioned by the comic poet Demetrius (1 fr. 1 K–A) in his 'Sicily', quoted by Ath. 3.108f–109a: 'A: And then we sailed on the south wind to Italy, crossing the sea to the Messapians; Artos [*sic*, at least according to Ath.] received us and entertained us well. B: A fine host! A: He was a big man there, a brilliant chap.' Artas/-os was probably an officially recognised *proxenos* (**1**.4n.): Walbank no. 70. It is unclear when this 'friendship' was contracted and if it amounted to a full alliance, as it did with Metapontum (below); perhaps the late 430s, at the time when alliances with Leontini and Rhegium were confirmed (6.6.2, 6.44.2nn.), perhaps during the war of 427–424 at the same time as 'the alliance under Laches' with Camarina (not mentioned until 6.75.3(n.)), perhaps when Phaeax visited 'some cities' in 422/1 to sound out 'friendship' (5.5.1). Whenever it was, it is further evidence for Athenian interest in the west well before

415: cf. Intr. to Book 6, pp. 29–32. **Μεταπόντιον:** see Map 2 and *IACP* 279–82. **τῆς Ἰταλίας:** probably here in its narrower sense of Bruttium and Lucania.

33.5 κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικόν: again, as with Artas/-os (**33**.4n.), a pointer to previous diplomatic activity and again a connection that has not been mentioned before. Metapontum did not figure in the description of the initial journey along the coast in 415 (6.44). It would be surprising if Metapontum was among the cities that refused a market then (6.44.2) if it were already an ally, but there may have been some Athenian diplomatic activity between then and now (Fragoulaki 2013: 288 and O'Connor 2011: 63–4 n. 120) and the alliance may be a recent one. **Θουρίαν:** see Map 2 and *IACP* 304–7. **στάσει:** such factionalism was frequent in Thurii (Berger 1992: 32–4), not perhaps surprisingly since it had been refounded in 444–443 as a Panhellenic colony, combining therefore those with Dorian and those with Ionian ties: 6.61.6n. **καταλαμβάνουσι** 'find that . . .' + participle (LSJ II.2), purely cognitively; there need be no suggestion of 'seize' (LSJ I.1).

33.6 εἴ τις ὑπελέλειπτο: this could be taken as an indirect question prompted by the inquiry implicit in ἐξετάσαι, 'examine' (and find out whether . . .): first you collect, then you review. But it might also be taken with ἀθροίσαντες, 'collecting any who had been left behind'. **ξυστρατεύειν τε ὡς προθυμότατα:** there is no mention of any previous help, though it must have been presumed friendly when the ship carrying Alcibiades docked there at 6.61.7 and at 6.104.2. Gylippus, who had a paternal connection with the city, had tried but failed to bring the town over to the other side. On the possibility, no more, that Gylippus 'renewed his father's citizenship' see 6.104.2n. **ἐν τούτωι τύχης** 'things being as they are', lit. 'at this point of fortune' (**2**.4n.), i.e. now that the city is free of the anti-Athenian faction. **τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις νομίζειν:** the formulation for a full offensive and defensive alliance; cf. 1.44.1, 3.70.6, 3.75.1. In fact most alliances by now limited themselves to a commitment to help each other if attacked (sometimes differentiated as ἐπιμαχία, 1.44.1, 5.48.2), but that would not be sufficient to bring Thurii into Athens' aggressive war. Th. does not say whether such an alliance materialised: Diod. 13.11.1 seems to say that it did, but συμμαχία there might be a looser 'agreement to join the fight'. Thurii certainly did send help (**35**.1, **57**.11). **περιέμενον ἐν τῆι Θουρίαι καὶ ἔπρασσον ταῦτα:** so even this burst of activity ends in further delay to their arrival.

34 *Fighting in the Corinthian Gulf.* This is the most expansive treatment of any non-Sicilian event in Books 6–7, though despite the detail it leaves

several matters unexplained (**34**.1–2nn.). The engagement does not end decisively, but it does show how the balance in naval superiority was shifting even in Greece (**34**.7n.), as it shortly would in Sicily. The way that shift comes about is also similar, with the Corinthian technological innovation (**34**.5) mirroring that of the Syracusans (**36**.2(n.)); here as in Syracuse human ingenuity is directed to destructive ends (**53**.4n.). The topography too has similarities with that of the Great Harbour (**34**.2n.). The need for the innovation is a tribute to Athens' maritime reputation, as only sheer brawn can match the Athenians' superior seamanship, but its effectiveness does not bode well for the expedition's prospects. Cf. Hunter 1973: 90–3, McKenzie and Hannah 2013: 215–21, Kopp 2016: 192–3, and *CT*.

34.1 ταῖς πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι ναυσίν . . . τὰς ἐν Ναυπάκτωι ναῦς: **17**.4, **19**.5, **31**.4. **τῶν ὁλκάδων ἕνεκα τῆς ἐς Σικελίαν κομιδῆς** 'for the safe passage of the transport-ships to Sicily', with τῶν ὁλκάδων in first position for emphasis. **παρασκευασάμενοι ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαι:** as Conon had gauged (**31**.4). Th. gives no reason why they should have decided now to offer battle; his audience might perhaps infer that they will have reckoned that the ὁλκάδες would by now be out of range, and so their mission of distraction (**19**.5) was completed. **προσπληρώσαντες ἔτι ναῦς:** this must mean crewing extra ships (ἐλάσσους εἶναι agrees with an understood ναῦς) as at 6.104.1, not just finding additional manpower for the twenty-five. Th. presumably did not know exactly how many more: fewer than eight, on the assumption that all the original twenty-five were seaworthy, but that does not emerge until the mention of 'thirty-three' Athenian ships at **34**.3. **κατὰ Ἐρινεὸν τῆς Ἀχαΐας ἐν τῆι Ῥυπικῆι:** see Map 3a and *IACP* 485–6. Erineus is mentioned by Paus. 7.22.10 as a harbour 60 stades along the coast from Aegium.

34.2 τοῦ χωρίου μηνοειδοῦς ὄντος ἐφ' ὧι ὥρμουν: and so a smaller-scale equivalent of the Great Harbour, where again the Athenian fleet – there on the defensive, here attacking – will be hampered by the cramped waters and face hostile troops on the surrounding horns of land (**36**.4–6). **τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων** presumably Achaeans, by now Sparta's allies (2.9.2, 5.82.1). **ἐπὶ ταῖς προανεχούσαις ἄκραις** 'on the promontories jutting out beyond' the anchorage. **παρετέτακτο . . . εἶχον . . .** [**34**.3] **ἐπέπλευσαν:** the tenses demarcate the sequence: the troops 'had been' drawn up, the Peloponnesian ships 'were' in position (for the imperfect marking a preliminary to action cf. **29**.1n.), the Athenians now 'attacked'. **ἐμφάρξασαι** 'blocked the passage', from ἐμφράσσω. What is unclear is why the passage needed to be blocked. The Athenian ships did not need to mount an attack on the ships there unless they chose, nor to accept an invitation to battle in cramped waters. **Πολυάνθης:** his only

appearance in Th., but he is probably the man mentioned at X. *Hell.* 3.5.1 and Paus. 3.9.8 as one of those bribed by the Persians in 395 BCE to stir up war with Sparta: cf. Salmon 1984: 346, 359 with n. 69.

34.3 τριάκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ τρισίν: but at **31**.4–5 Conon had only eighteen and was reinforced by ten more. Th. leaves the extra five unexplained; perhaps they were brought by Diphilus, together with an extra one to take Conon home. **Δίφιλος:** presumably Conon's successor (**31**.4). He too, like Polyanthes, is not mentioned again by Th.

34.5 ἁπλῶς . . . ἄπλοι 'absolutely . . . unseaworthy', from ἁπλοῦς (= ἁπλόος) and ἄπλοος respectively. It is not clear whether any wordplay would be sensed. **ἑπτὰ δέ τινες** 'some seven', with τινες expressing caution as at **33**.4. **ἀντίπρωιροι . . . ἐχουσῶν** 'through being rammed head-on and having their outriggers broken off by the Corinthian ships, whose catheads had been strengthened for the purpose'. See Morrison, Coates, and Rankov 2000: 161–7: ἐπωτίδες were the (lit.) 'ear-timbers' in the bows projecting further out than the outrigger (παρεξειρεσία). The clash is head-on rather than broadside, but the Corinthian ship would direct its ram off-centre so that it will slide along the Athenian ship and sheer off its outrigger. The Syracusans adopt the same change at **36**.3(n.), and McKenzie and Hannah even see this as a trial run for Syracuse (2013: 216–19, but cf. **36**. n. on the questionable sequence): here as there it is a sensible move to outwit Athenian skill, dependent as that was on fast movement and outmanoeuvring (**36**.3–4). Th. is as usual very well informed on Corinthian matters. Stroud 1994: 295–7 and 302–4 suggests that he spent time there during his exile, and saw the ships themselves.

34.6 καὶ ὡς αὐτοὺς ἑκατέρους ἀξιοῦν νικᾶν 'and in such a way that both sides claimed that they were the victors', a result clause with ὡς (*CGCG* 46.2, 46.7). **ἄπωσιν** 'pushing away': for Th.'s liking for abstractions in -σις see **4**.6n. Here, as again with ἐπαναγωγήν, it would have been easy to phrase the sentence using subordinated verbs or participles rather than abstract nouns. **αὐτῶν:** i.e. the ναυάγια. **διὰ τὴν τῶν Κορινθίων οὐκέτι ἐπαναγωγήν** 'and because the Corinthians made no further move against them', lit. 'because of the Corinthians' no longer putting out to sea against them'. For an adverb qualifying a noun cf. **44**.8n. **οὐδεμία κατέδυ ναῦς:** as was already said at **34**.5.

34.7 καὶ νομίσαντες . . . νικᾶν 'and because they thought that they were not defeated for the same reason that the other side thought that they were not victorious' (most commentators and translators), or, less likely, 'they thought that they were not defeated *because* the other side thought that they were not victorious' (C–S, Mynott), i.e. they thought 'if those Athenians

don't think they've won, that means we've done well enough'. That would be a complex layering of focalisation, but it would be easier with διότι than δι' ὅπερ. ὅτι . . . ἐποίησαν is co-ordinated with the participle νομίσαντες in typical Thucydidean variation, and a further ἐνόμισαν is understood before νικᾶν. The comment is unfriendly to Corinth, and ignores the point that the Athenians did claim victory by erecting their τροπαῖον (**34**.8, McKenzie and Hannah 2013: 221); but the interest is more in Athenian psychology than Corinthian, and there have already been indications (**31**.4n.) that their brash cockiness (1.70.7) and maritime confidence (2.86–92) have begun to disappear, even though there are still vestiges (ἐνόμιζον ἡσσᾶσθαι ὅτι οὐ πολὺ ἐνίκων). The mirroring loss of Athenian morale at Syracuse will be more serious (Intr., pp. 30–1). For the present νικᾶν and the imperfect ἐνίκων ('were victorious', **41**.1n.) see 6.101.4n. **εἰ μὴ καὶ πολύ . . . ὅτι οὐ πολύ:** the two phrases are parallel. No real doubt is conveyed by εἰ.

34.8 ὡς εἴκοσι σταδίους: 3–4 km ≈ 2–2.5 miles (**19**.2n.).

35.1 Ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Εὐρυμέδων: the resumption of their narrative from **33**.6 is marked by the repetition of ξυστρατεύειν and ἐξετάσαι/ἐξετάσαντες. For the single definite article see **33**.3n. **παρεσκευάσθησαν:** passive: they had been effectively worked on by Demosthenes and Eurymedon (πεῖσαι, **33**.6). **ἐπὶ τῆς Κροτωνιάτιδος . . . τῆς Θουριάδος γῆς:** ἐπί + genitive = 'in the direction of' (**1**.2n.). These are the territories of Croton (Map 2 and *IACP* 266–70) and Thurii respectively, not the cities themselves. The river Hylias (**35**.2) was clearly the boundary between the two. Croton stayed out of the war (6.88.7n.). **τῶι Συβάρει ποταμῶι:** close to Thurii; see Map 2. It gave its name to the city that had previously stood on Thurii's site.

35.2 ἐπὶ τῶι Ὑλίαι ποταμῶι: not certainly identified. **οὐκ ἂν σφίσι βουλομένοις εἶναι** 'it would not be with their consent . . .', representing οὐκ ἄν ἡμῖν βουλομένοις εἴη in the Crotoniates' direct speech. The dative can be classified as one of advantage/disadvantage (*CGCG* 30.49) or 'ethical', 'of feeling' (*CGCG* 30.53): cf. 2.3.2 τῶι γὰρ πλήθει τῶν Πλαταιῶν οὐ βουλομένωι ἦν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀφίστασθαι. **ἐπικαταβάντες** 'going down to' the coast. **ἀναβιβασάμενοι:** τὸν στρατόν is understood. **πλὴν Λοκρῶν:** **1**.1n. **Πέτραν τῆς Ῥηγίνης:** apparently = Leucopetra, the extreme south-western point of Italy: see Map 2. So the narrative leaves Demosthenes and Eurymedon poised for the last crossing into Sicily until **42**.1, a considerable length of text. That strengthens the impression of slowness (**31–41**n.), but it is less clear that it corresponds to any delay in fact: **36–41** jumps back in time (**36**.1n.), and its events may be simultaneous with those of **35** and even with those of **34** (**36**.2n.).

36 *Syracusan preparations.* A vague 'meanwhile' (ἐν τούτωι, **36**.1(n.)) allows Th. to resume the Sicilian narrative from where he left it at **33**. The focus and the initiative are firmly with the Syracusans. The work on their triremes (**36**.3) must have taken some time and, even if it was out of sight and hearing of the Athenians in the Little Harbour νεώριον (**22**.1), Nicias might be expected to have heard of it through his intelligence network (**48**.2n.); and yet there is no sign that he took any counter-measure. These technological adaptations are treated in detail, even though they are unmistakably similar to those made by the Corinthians at **34**.5 and the audience therefore already knows their purpose. Hunt 2006: 407–8 rightly stresses Th.'s interest in the intricacies for their own sake. What makes the changes particularly effective here is the στενοχωρία of the cramped waters and the Syracusan control of the shores, and this too is explained with unusual fullness (and some repetitiveness, **36**.5–6nn.): it will be relevant not just for these exchanges but also for the others that will follow, culminating in the great battle of **69–72**. That is made explicit at **36**.6 (ὅπερ καὶ ἔβλαπτε μάλιστα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ναυμαχίαις), giving a further indication that events are heading towards Athenian defeat.

36.1 **ἐν τούτωι:** the events of **36–41** may therefore have happened at any point since the Syracusans heard of the approach (ἐπίπλουν) of the Athenian reinforcements, and that would be soon after Demosthenes and Eurymedon set sail at **33**.3. **ἥνπερ . . . ξυνέλεγον:** as requested at **25**.9 (cf. φθάσωσιν there). They began to gather at **32**.1–**33**.2, but there is no need to take the imperfect ξυνέλεγον in a pluperfect sense like the aorists that follow (next n.): this 'collecting' doubtless was a gradual process, and some may well have been continuing during the events of **36–41**.

36.2 **παρεσκευάσαντο . . . ἐποίησαν . . . ἐπέθεσαν . . . ὑπέτειναν:** aorists, with a pluperfect sense (*CGCG* 33.40 n. 1): they had got the ships ready in the way that Th. goes on to explain, in preparation for the exchange that follows. **τό τε ἄλλο ναυτικὸν . . . καὶ τὰς πρώιρας** 'other aspects of their naval force . . . and in particular': the ἄλλοι τε καί idiom (6.8.2n.). **ὡς . . . σχήσοντες** 'in such a way as they saw from the earlier sea-battle would give them an advantage', probably 'over the other side' as in **36**.3 οὐκ ἔλασσον σχήσειν rather than 'over their previous performance'. The 'earlier sea-battle' is that of **21**.5–**23**. For ἐνεῖδον see **62**.1n.; for the future form σχήσω see George 2016, esp. 607–15, who shows that it typically carries a telic force ('will gain/acquire') as it does here, whereas ἕξω is durative ('will have/possess'). **τὰς πρώιρας . . . ἐποίησαν:** the beak-like prow of a trireme was normally quite slender and sharp, good for slicing into a ship by ramming broadside (cf. **36**.3); now it needed to be

shortened as well as thickened. **τὰς ἐπωτίδας** 'the catheads' or (lit.) 'ear-timbers' (**34**.5n.), 'the' because the idea of them is familiar from **34**.5. **ἀντηρίδας** 'struts' to help the ἐπωτίδες withstand the blow of the collisions. **ὡς ἐπὶ ἕξ πήχεις ἐντός τε καὶ ἔξωθεν** 'to a distance of about six cubits both inside and outside', i.e. they were threaded through specially drilled holes in the bow-walls. **ὥιπερ τρόπωι καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι . . . ἐναυμάχουν:** the similarity to the Corinthians' ploy (**34**.5), already clear to an alert reader, now becomes explicit. Hunter 1973: 91–2 suggests that Th.'s audience would grasp that the Syracusans have learnt of, and from, that innovation; they might well draw that inference, but Th. does not say so, and the vagueness of ἐν τούτωι (**36**.1n.) leaves it unclear which battle was in fact the earlier. In any case, the two developments are unlikely to be independent, and both innovations may well be owed to Corinthian maritime expertise. Diod. 13.10.2 says that the Syracusans were acting on the advice of the Corinthian Ariston (**39**.2n.) – very likely his own guess, and very possibly right. **πρώιραθεν:** with ἐπισκευασάμενοι, 'at' the prows or literally 'from' them, as the struts were suspended from those strengthened prows.

36.3 ἐνόμισαν γάρ: γάρ is used five times in the elaborate series of explanations in **36**.3–6, necessary because it is so counterintuitive that an old-fashioned and crude a tactic should prove so successful against the Athenians' sophisticated skill (Hunter 1973: 86–8). **τὰ πρώιραθεν** 'their prow section', lit. 'the parts [extending back] from the prow'. **διὰ τὸ μὴ . . . χρῆσθαι** 'because they did not ram prow-on-prow rather than after sailing around' and then ramming amidships: cf. **34**.5, **36**.2nn. **οὐκ ἐν πολλῶι πολλαῖς ναυσὶν οὖσαν** 'involving many ships in not much space'. **πρὸς ἑαυτῶν** 'to their own advantage' (LSJ πρός A.III.2).

36.4 περίπλουν . . . διέκπλουν: respectively (a) 'sailing around' them (σφῶν), i.e. outflanking the entire squadron, and (b) punching through the enemy array in a single line and 'sailing through'. On the διέκπλους cf. Morrison, Coates, and Rankov 2000: 43 and 293, Cawkwell 2005: 63–5 and 221–32. **ὥιπερ τῆς τέχνης μάλιστα ἐπίστευον** 'which was the element of their skill on which they [the Athenians] particularly relied'. **αὐτοὶ γὰρ . . . μὴ περιπλεῖν** '[they thought that] they themselves would as far as possible prevent the sailing through, while the narrowness of the waters would prevent them from sailing around'. μέν is delayed from its usual second position to highlight the contrast of διεκπλεῖν and περιπλεῖν. The meaning is clearer than the syntax. Marchant takes τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δέ as adverbial like a Herodotean τοῦτο μὲν . . . τοῦτο δέ (e.g. Hdt. 1.30.4, 1.118.2), but it is unclear that this is a legitimate construction in Th. It is better to take it as 'they themselves would prevent τὸ διεκπλεῖν and the narrowness

of the waters would prevent the other' (τὸ δέ), with ὥστε μὴ περιπλεῖν added to clarify 'the other'. **στενοχωρίαν:** as the cramped waters of the straits of Salamis had played a crucial role in the Greek victory of 480 BCE (1.74.1 and Hdt. 8.60α–β): cf. Intr., pp. 14, 16–17. This will also be recalled at **44**.2(n.), and perhaps by the very different and even deadlier στενοχωρία of **87**.2(n.).

36.5 τῇ τε πρότερον ἀμαθίαι . . . χρήσασθαι 'they would make particular use of what had hitherto seemed a lack of skill on the captain's [**36**.2n.] part, the head-on clash'. In direct discourse they would have said or thought μάλιστ' ἂν χρησαίμεθα. For Th.'s taste for connective τε cf. **7**.3n.; τὸ ἀντίπρωιρον ξυγκροῦσαι conveys the content of what they had previously thought (δοκούσῃ) to reveal a lack of expertise, despite the mismatch of case (cf. **67**.1). Th. shows similar interest in developing naval tactics at 1.49.1–3, describing the 'older style' in 433 BCE with hoplites, archers, and javelin-men on board engaging on static ships as if on land, and noting that 'there were no διέκπλοι'; cf. **62**.2n. **πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷι σχήσειν:** repeating the language of **36**.3 τι πλέον . . . σχήσοντες (n.) and **36**.4 οὐκ ἔλασσον σχήσειν, rather as ἀντίπρωιρον repeats **36**.3 twice; the points are hammered home. **ἐξωθουμένοις** 'if (or when) they were forced out' of their line. **καὶ ταύτην δι' ὀλίγου καὶ ἐς ὀλίγον** 'and this [i.e. the ἀνάκρουσις] would be over a small space and into a small space'. **τοῦ δ' ἄλλου λιμένος** 'the rest of the harbour'.

36.6 βιάζωνται: passive. **προσπίπτοντας ἀλλήλοις** 'falling foul of one another'. **ταράξεσθαι:** middle in form but passive in sense, as at **67**.2. **σφῶν ἐχόντων . . . ἀνάκρουσιν** 'given that they themselves controlled the approach from the open sea and the possibility of retreating': further (**36**.5n.) repetition, with the third use of ἀνάκρουσις within ten lines. τε would normally be positioned before ἐπίπλευσιν; its delay ties the 'open sea' more exclusively into the preceding 'attack' part of the contrast. The retreating might include withdrawal into the more open parts of the harbour, not just the πέλαγος. **τοῦ Πλημμυρίου πολεμίου τε αὐτοῖς ἐσομένου:** τε would be expected to follow τοῦ or Πλημμυρίου, but is delayed 'as if e.g. καὶ ἐπικειμένου τῶι στόματι were to follow' (P–S). The effect is to make the cramped harbour-mouth a second point about Plemmyrion rather than a separate independent fact: Plemmyrion is one of the capes that make the bay so narrow. This recalls Th.'s insistence on the importance of its capture, and adds a further reason to those set out there (**24**.3).

37.1 πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ δύναμιν 'with a view to their own skill and strength', i.e. taking into account their inferiority in maritime skill and knowing where their strengths lie.

37.2 καθ' ὅσον πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῦ ἑώρα 'along the extent of it (αὐτοῦ = τοῦ τείχους) that looked towards the city': see Map 4. **τοῦ Ὀλυμπιείου:** 4.6n. and Map 4. The Olympieion had been strengthened as a Syracusan φρούριον in late summer 415 (6.70.4, 75.1), and some cavalry stationed there in summer 414 (4.6). **ἡ γυμνητεία** 'the light-armed troops', what Th. usually calls πελτασταί as at **27**.1; perhaps this was a special term used in Syracuse. Its literal meaning is 'nakedness', but it will refer more to their energetic training than their garb. **ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα** 'from the opposite direction'. **προσήιει:** singular because of ἡ γυμνητεία, the closest item in the list (*CGCG* 27.4).

37.3 καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι . . . ὁρῶντες δὲ καὶ . . . καὶ οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δὲ . . . ἄλλοι δὲ . . . καὶ ἅμα . . . καὶ ἐπειδή: the cluster of co-ordinates captures the pell-mell confusion, caught too by the feeling of swift sequence – first thinking that it will be only a land-attack, then the ships are seen; the cavalry and javelin-men are coming quickly; rush to the shore, man the ships. After so much hecticness the outcome is rather a let-down (**38**.1) – for the moment. **ἐπὶ τὰ τείχη:** ἐπί + genitive or dative, 'on', might be expected, but the accusative captures the rush to arms, 'to the walls, in front of the walls'. **ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπιείου καὶ τῶν ἔξω** 'from the Olympieion and the exterior', as opposed to τὴν πόλιν (**37**.2). **ἀντανῆγον πέντε καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ναῦς:** on the number see **22**.2n. Plut. *Nic.* 20.5–8 says that Nicias was reluctant to fight any naval battle before Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived, but was forced into it by Menander and Euthydemus: cf. **40**.4n. **τῶν Συρακοσίων ἦσαν ὀγδοήκοντα μάλιστα:** μάλιστα may suggest that Th. is less confident of the exact Syracusan numbers than the Athenian. He may just be extrapolating from the eighty that fought at **22**.1, assuming that the eleven then lost (**23**.4) have been made up for by the reinforcements they had sought from the allies (**25**.9); Gela for instance had sent about five (**33**.1). Still, as usual he is not concerned to explain exactly how the number came about: Keyser 2006: 341.

38.1 παραλαβεῖν 'make any gain'. **εἰ μὴ . . . καταδύσαντες:** for εἰ μή = 'except' + participle cf. Eur. *Med.* 368–9 δοκεῖς γὰρ ἄν με τόνδε θωπεῦσαί ποτε | εἰ μή τι κερδαίνουσαν ἢ τεχνωμένην, with Mastronarde 2002 ad loc.

38.2 ὁποῖόν τι τὸ μέλλον ποιήσουσιν 'what sort of thing they were going to do next': τὸ μέλλον is accusative of respect as at 6.69.3, and so effectively adverbial. **ἀντίπαλα τὰ τῆς ναυμαχίας γενόμενα** 'that the sea-battle had been evenly fought'. **ἐπεπονήκει** 'had suffered any damage', πονέω as at 6.104.2. **ὃ αὐτοῖς . . . ἐν τῇι θαλάσσηι ἐπεπήγει:** pluperfect of πήγνυμι. The stockade of 6.66.2 (summer 415) was on land (see n. there), and so this is the first mention of this separate one. Several gaps would be left

for ships to get in and out. **λιμένος κλητστοῦ** 'a closed harbour'. That normally refers to a harbour whose shoreline is wholly embraced within a town's walls (Lehmann-Hartleben 1923: 65–74), but here the 'closing' must be a matter of protecting the sea-entrance. Cf. 2.94.4, where the Athenians respond to a scare at the Piraeus λιμένων τε κλήισει καὶ τῆι ἄλληι ἐπιμελείαι. How one usually 'closed off' a harbour like this is unclear; perhaps with chains, as may be implied for a smaller gap at **70**.2(n.) and as App. *BC* 4.82.344, *Mith.* 4.71.303, Dio 75.10.5, and Frontin. *Strat.* 1.5.6 record for much later instances; or perhaps with a bridge of boats as at **59**.3(n.).

38.3 **ὅσον δύο πλέθρα:** about 50–60 metres. **ὅπως . . . ἔκπλους:** Th. does not yet explain why these barriers should be sufficient to stop any enemy pursuit: that becomes clear only at **41**.2. **κατάφευξις:** cf. **4**.6n. for such abstract nouns. **καθ' ἡσυχίαν:** i.e. in their own time, without being harassed.

39.1 **τῆς μὲν ὥρας πρωΐτερον** 'at an earlier time' (for the genitive cf. ὀψὲ τῆς ἡμέρας, 4.25.1) than on the previous day (**37**.2), when the naval attack had been held back until after the preliminary land-assault.

39.2 **πρὶν δή:** for this way of highlighting a turning point cf. **71**.5, 1.118.2, Hdt. 7.239.4, Eur. *Andr.* 1147. **Ἀρίστων:** his only mention in Th., but he was later much remembered: Diod. 13.10.2 attributes the technological innovations to him (**36**.2n.), and Plut. *Nic.* 20.8 refers allusively to the Athenians being 'out-thought by Ariston the Corinthian κυβερνήτης in the lunch affair, as Thucydides recounted', clearly expecting his audience in the early second century CE to know what he means. According to Plut. *Nic.* 25.4 he was killed in the battle of **70–1**. **ἄριστος ὢν κυβερνήτης:** probably drawing attention to 'Ariston' as a 'speaking name': so J. E. Powell 1937: 103 and Ceccarelli 2019: 43–5, comparing the persuasive Peithias at 3.70.5–6 where again the language drives the point home (πείθει . . . ἀναπείσειν): cf. 6.35.1n. (Athenagoras). **κυβερνήτης:** closer in modern terms to 'captain' or 'master' (Morrison, Coates, and Rankov 2000: 111) than 'helmsman', given his responsibility for tactics: cf. **36**.5. Still, he has no overall authority in the fleet, and has to 'persuade' his fellows. **πείθει:** the verb attracts such historic presents, understandably given the use of the historic present to refer to pivotal moments and the number of such moments that depend on persuasion: cf. 6.60.2, with Jacquinod 2011. **τοὺς σφετέρους τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἄρχοντας** 'his own naval commanders', i.e. those on his own, Syracusan, side. **ὡς τοὺς ἐν τῆι πόλει:** not, it seems, Gylippus, but this may be because such logistic arrangements, mainly involving local civilians, were regarded as Syracusan

business. This may not therefore be a sign of his diminishing authority (**2**.1, **33**.3nn.). **τὴν ἀγορὰν τῶν πωλουμένων:** 'the' market, as the audience will know that this was the regular way of providing the men with their food: cf. 6.44.2 n. and O'Connor 2011, esp. 116–18. **ὅσα τις ἔχει ἐδώδιμα:** oddly emphatic. The point may be 'bring all the food you have for sale rather than holding some of it back' (as they might well, to keep prices up), or possibly it includes private stocks not normally for resale (*HCT*). Providing an abundant market close by would speed up the time needed to buy and prepare food (O'Connor 2011: 117 n. 265). **αὐτοῖς** 'for them', i.e. the people selling the food. **εὐθύς:** probably of time, 'straightaway', rather than of space, next to the ships (Dover 1965 ad loc.): they are not to dawdle as the Athenians will do (**40**.2). **ἀριστοποιήσωνται** 'have their lunch': the subject is 'the commanders', but evidently this means the men as well; cf. 8.95.3 [Agesandridas] ἀριστοποιησάμενος . . . ἀνήγαγε τὰς ναῦς.

40.1 καὶ . . . καὶ . . . καὶ . . . καί: the swift accumulation of co-ordinate clauses expresses the smoothness with which the plan was executed. **αὐτοῦ** 'there', on the shore.

40.2 ὡς ἡσσημένους σφῶν 'as defeated by them', as acknowledging it: for ἡσσᾶσθαι + genitive cf. 3.57.3, 5.111.3 and 4. **διεπράσσοντο:** a mix of inceptive – they set about their business – and scene-setting: this is what they were doing when the sudden attack came. **ἂν ναυμαχῆσαι:** representing ἄν + optative in direct discourse.

40.3 οὐδενὶ κόσμωι ἐσβάντες: contrasting with καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἐκβάντες (**40**.2).

40.4 καὶ χρόνον μέν τινα ἀπέσχοντο ἀλλήλων φυλασσόμενοι: and so the Syracusans apparently forego the advantage of surprise, unlike Lysander when he outwitted the Athenians with a similar trick at Aegospotami in 405 (X. *Hell.* 2.1.27–8). So Th. implies that the trick works only because of the lunchless and fatigued Athenians' impatience later in the afternoon. Perhaps this was what Ariston was counting on all along, but it may be more that the Syracusan captains, whatever the plan, were reluctant to engage their more skilful enemy. Still, it is true that the Syracusan fleet would find it easier to keep the necessary close order if they were receiving rather than launching the attack. **οὐκ ἐδόκει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις:** Plut. *Nic.* 20.5–8 represents this as owed to the impetuosity of Menander and Euthydemus: cf. **16**.1, **37**.3nn. Plut. may there be drawing his own inference to explain an initiative so out of character for Nicias: Pelling 1992: 16–17 = 2002: 121–2. **ὑπὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν:** with ἁλίσκεσθαι. The Athenians are reluctant to become their own victims. **ἐναυμάχουν:** inceptive.

40.5 τῶν ἐμβόλων: advanced for emphasis. **ἀνερρήγνυσαν . . . παρεξειρεσίας** 'broke up the Athenians' ships for much of the length of the outrigger'. **τοὺς ταρσούς** 'the banks of oars', as at Hdt. 8.12.1. **ὑποπίπτοντες** 'slipping under'. **ἐς τὰ πλάγια παραπλέοντες:** better 'sailing up to the sides' (LSJ πλάγιος I.2) than 'on the flank' (Dover 1965). **ἐξ αὐτῶν:** i.e from those small boats.

41.1 κατὰ κράτος: with ναυμαχοῦντες. **ἐνίκησαν:** for the aorist cf. Huitink–Rood on X. *Anab.* 3.2.13; as at **67**.1, it focuses on the battle itself, whereas imperfect ἐνίκων would point to its consequences (6.101.4n.). **κατάφευξιν:** cf. **38**.3. The precautions taken there have turned out to be wise.

41.2 αἱ κεραῖαι . . . δελφινοφόροι 'the yard-arms carrying "dolphins"', dolphin-shaped blocks of lead and iron that were suspended from the yard-arms and dropped on enemy decks. Th. clearly expects his audience to be familiar with the term; so does Ar., for at *Knights* 762 the chorus tell the Sausage Seller to 'raise his dolphins high and bring your boat alongside' ready to take on his rival demagogue; Pherecrates fr. 12 K–A also refers to them. The yard-arms could not have extended far enough to protect the whole two πλέθρα between the ὁλκάδες, but the narrower gaps in the σταύρωμα (**38**.2n.) could be protected in this way by a suitably moored ship.

41.3 ἐπαιρόμεναι τῇι νίκηι: the ships stand for 'the men in them', as at **25**.1 (n.).

41.4 ἑπτὰ ναῦς: maybe including the one or two from the previous day (**38**.1), but probably not: the sentence up to ἀπεχώρησαν concentrates on this day's events, and the two τροπαῖα also suggest that the Syracusans were regarding them as separate encounters. **κατατραυματίσαντες:** of disabling ships also at 8.10.4 and 4.14.1 (ἔτρωσαν): cf. τρῶμα at Hdt. 6.16.1 with Hornblower–Pelling's n. **ἤδη ἐχυρὰν . . . καὶ πολύ:** both ἤδη and καί are important modifiers of the adjectives: they had hopes before but these are now firm; they thought they held a naval advantage before, but now think they are even far ahead. **εἶχον . . . ἐδόκουν:** the shift from aorists (ἀπεχώρησαν, ἔστησαν) moves the narrative forward as the imperfects set the scene for what is to come; ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶ . . . δὲ καὶ τὸν πεζόν rounds off the panel by echoing **37**.2 τὸν μὲν πεζὸν . . . αἱ δὲ νῆες and **39**.1 τοῦ τε πεζοῦ καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ. The land-job remains, but the naval one is done – or so they think. The emphasis on psychology is characteristic, but that confidence is shortly to be jolted (**42**.2).

42–6: DEMOSTHENES ARRIVES; THE NIGHT BATTLE

Some months and much textual space have elapsed while Demosthenes and Eurymedon have been on their way (31–41n.), but their arrival immediately injects a new urgency, and those high Syracusan spirits (41.4) take a brutal knock (42.2n.). Demosthenes – the spotlight for a while rests on him, with Nicias and Eurymedon barely mentioned – crisply evaluates the situation (42.3); despite the massive reinforcements (42.1), his conclusion is not one of unqualified confidence but rather of the need to settle the issue quickly one way or the other (42.5). Other touches too reinforce the impression of new momentum (43.1 οὐκέτι ἐδόκει διατρίβειν, 43.5n.). For some time the campaign's focus has rested on the sea, but that is now reversed, and this itself points to the enfeebling of Athens' traditional strength; Epipolae, central to the end of Book 6 but barely relevant since 6.4, now resumes importance. Surprise, recently used so effectively by the Syracusans (23.1, 40.3) but not an Athenian strong point since 6.63–71(n.), now becomes Demosthenes' weapon (43.3). The night attack is vividly described (43–5n.), and this panel like the last ends on a note of Syracusan confidence (46; cf. 41.4), now firmly restored and even strengthened.

42.1 **τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βοήθειαν:** its collection has been noted at 17.1, 20.2–3, 26, 31, and 35.1; the numbers leaving Athens were given at 20.2, but more have accumulated at the stopping-off points since then. **παραγίγνονται:** historic present for an important moment. Plut. *Nic.* 21.1 elaborates visually: Demosthenes 'appears off the harbours λαμπρότατος τῇι παρασκευῇι . . . fitted out with glorious weaponry and trireme insignia and numerous rowing-beat callers and pipers, all in a dramatic way (θεατρικῶς) aimed at causing consternation in the enemy'; Th. resists the temptation to duplicate the visuality of 6.30–32.2(n.). **τριῶν καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα μάλιστα** 'some seventy-three': not a rounding, as seventy-three is not a round number, but expressing some uncertainty, very likely because it rests on Th.'s personal calculation (Rubincam 1979: 82). The number leaving Athens was 65 (20.2); Eurymedon's one ship rejoined at 31.3; ten were detached and fifteen were commissioned from Corcyra at 31.5; two came from Metapontum (33.5). Seventy-three may well represent the totalling of these figures, as Th. saves his reader/listener the trouble of recalling those details. But if so Th. was right to be cautious: this assumes that none of the ten leaving at 31.5 had rejoined by now, that all those commissioned at Corcyra had materialised, and none had been lost along the way. Alternatively, the caution may be because he had independent information about the total but was unsure that its precision was reliable. For discussion of all these figures see *CT*

here and Appendix 2, emphasising that Th. here does not subdivide, as he did at 6.43, into fighting ships and troop-carriers (στρατιώτιδες): as many as half (or more: O'Connor 2011: 574 and 576) may have been troop-carriers. **ξὺν ταῖς ξενικαῖς** 'including the non-Athenian' ships, those provided by their allies. **ὁπλίτας περὶ πεντακισχιλίους:** including 1,200 Athenians (**20**.2) and 700 Thurians (**35**.1). **ἀκοντιστάς . . . καὶ σφενδονήτας:** including those from Acarnania (**31**.5), the 450 ἀκοντισταί from Iapygia and Metapontum (**33**.4–5), and the 300 from Thurii (**35**.1). The slingers, javelin-men, and archers totalled 'not less than 3,000' according to Plut. *Nic.* 21.1.

42.2 κατάπληξις: this and ἔκπληξις (cf. **42**.3, **43**.6) featured several times in the Syracusan debate in 415 (6.33.4n.), there mainly of potential reactions if the invasion were to take place. By now the prospect has become reality. The first 'consternation' was created by the initial Athenian successes in 414 (6.98.2), but in 413 it has so far been the Athenians who have been so shaken (**21**.4, **24**.3). The reversion to the mood of 415–414 adds further point to πέρας μηδὲν ἔσται σφίσι τοῦ ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ κινδύνου: they thought they were out of it, but they are now right back where they were. Still, this change will not last: there will be a further and decisive reversion of consternation to the Athenian side at and after **69**.2(n.). Cf. 6.98.2n. **εἰ πέρας μηδὲν ἔσται σφίσι τοῦ ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ κινδύνου** 'if there was to be no end to the escaping from danger': a beautifully expressed oxymoron, psychologically sharper than the more obvious 'if there was to be no end to the dangers' themselves. It was the zigzagging of joyful release and renewed terror that was so hard to cope with, and what was endless was the claiming that the dangers were at an end. **ὁρῶντες:** the nominative in anacoluthon after τοῖς . . . Συρακοσίοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις, as if κατεπλάγησαν had been said: cf. **70**.7, **74**.1, and 6.24.3nn. **τὴν Δεκέλειαν τειχιζομένην: 19**.1. In fact Decelea had had a considerable effect and but for it the reinforcements would have been even bigger (**27**.2–3, **29**.1), but others too were impressed that the Athenians could do as much as they did (**28**.3–4). **ἴσον καὶ παραπλήσιον:** perhaps 'equal [in size] and similar [in composition]', but it may just = 'as large, *or* approximately as large' (Dover 1965, comparing τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων at 1.22.4; cf. **78**.1). So not merely had the Athenians taken on a war on the same scale as the one in Greece itself (**28**.3, 6.1.1), they were now redoubling even that second war. This exaggerates, but not by much, especially as regards the land force: the first force in 415 comprised 5,100 hoplites including 1,500 Athenians, but rather more ships than now, 134 triremes and two penteconters (6.43). In any case, τῶι προτέρωι may refer to 'the previous army' there now, as it then does in τῶι δὲ προτέρωι στρατεύματι,

rather than that which set out in 415, and by now it had suffered severe losses (**13**.2, etc.). **ἐπεληλυθότα:** probably 'had come to join' the first army rather than 'had come against them' (**58**.4n.). **πανταχόσε** 'wherever they went', suggested by the idea of motion in -οσε. That is transferred to the 'appearing', which would more literally be πανταχοῦ, everywhere: cf. Manetho, *FGrH* 609 F2.111, the much-conquering Sesostris 'raised memorials πανταχόσε of his control'; D. H. *Ant. Rom.* 8.9.1, Coriolanus was granted the power to seek office πανταχόσε in any Volscian town. **ὡς ἐκ κακῶν** 'given their previous plight'. **ῥώμη τις:** Intr., p. 30. **ἐγεγένητο:** the pluperfect sets this as the background for what follows.

42.3 **ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης:** he now dominates (**42**–**6**n.), probably through force of personality rather than formal hierarchy: the earlier narrative had spoken of Eurymedon as sharing the command (**16**.2, **31**.5), and both men were appointed as ξυνάρχοντες with Nicias (**16**.1–2). The strategy would doubtless have been a matter for debate, but Th. ignores these discussions until **43**.1, where they are mentioned casually: more interest is shown by Diod. 13.11.3 and Plut. *Nic.* 21.3–5, and Plut. even elaborates what Nicias' arguments would have been. **οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι διατρίβειν οὐδὲ παθεῖν ὅπερ ὁ Νικίας ἔπαθεν** 'that it was not possible to waste time nor to experience what Nicias had experienced' (as he would if he too delayed). 'No διατρίβειν!' becomes Demosthenes' signature tune: **43**.1, **47**.3. **ἀφικόμενος . . . ταῦτα οὖν ἀνασκοπῶν:** had this just been Demosthenes' own thinking, the parenthesis would have been couched in indirect speech. The indicatives add Th.'s narratorial authority to the analysis, including the counterfactual speculation on what would have happened had Nicias launched a prompt attack. Still, this will reflect Demosthenes' thinking *as well*, as ταῦτα οὖν ἀνασκοπῶν makes clear. The approach strongly recalls the initial proposal of Lamachus, and that is reinforced by linguistic echoes (see 6.49nn.). Th. makes it clearer now than he did then that he thinks that this was the right approach, and the criticism of Nicias too is more explicit than it was in the Book 6 narrative. Here εὐθύς leaves it unclear how 'immediately' the attack should have come: directly on arrival in Sicily at 6.50, which is closest to Lamachus' blunt advice at 6.49.2? After establishing themselves at Catana (6.51.3), which would best fit the surprise and derision of the Syracusans at 6.63.2 that 'the Athenians did not immediately attack' when their arrival had created so much fear? Or after the land-battle of 6.67–70, which might best fit 'but wintered in Catana' here? Perhaps it need not be pinned down. Demosthenes himself probably did not waste time on analysing exactly what timing would have been best two years earlier. The important

thing was to avoid that whole mistaken strategy now, and this time to seize the initiative. Cf. Dover 1988: 74–82. **ἀφικόμενος γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ὁ Νικίας φοβερός** 'for Nicias, inspiring fear on his first arrival'. This echoes both Lamachus (τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον πᾶν στράτευμα δεινότατον εἶναι, 6.49.2) and esp. the Syracusan response at 6.63.2, ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὸν πρῶτον φόβον . . . οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπέκειντο. In fact Nicias had shared responsibility for the strategy with Lamachus and (until 6.61.6) Alcibiades, but it is the contrast with him and his cautious mindset that is most in point now. **ὡς οὐκ εὐθὺς προσέκειτο ταῖς Συρακούσαις:** like εὐθὺς ἐπέκειτο later, again echoing 6.63.2, cited above. **ἐν Κατάνῃ διεχείμαζεν:** in fact the Athenians wintered in Naxos as well as Catana (6.74.2, 75.2, 88.3 and 5). These words fit best if **42**.3 refers to a failure to press the advantage late in the summer (see above), but it is possible to take this as shorthand for 'but prolonged matters so long that he spent the winter in Catana'. **ὑπερώφθη:** at 6.63.3 the Syracusan horsemen ride up to the Athenian camp and throw insults (ἐφύβριζον). **ὁ Γύλιππος ἀφικόμενος:** this, like 'wintered in Catana', jumps forward: Gylippus did not arrive till mid 414 (**1–2**). **ἦν οὐδ' ἂν μετέπεμψαν . . . εἰ ἐκεῖνος εὐθὺς ἐπέκειτο:** a counterfactual (or 'unreal') conditional in the past (*CGCG* 49.10), and the 'what would have happened in that case' analysis is carried over into ἅμα τ' ἂν ἔμαθον and ἀποτετειχισμένοι ἂν ἦσαν. Th. is fonder of such counterfactual speculation than Hdt. or X. (Flory 1988): for the use he makes of it see Tordoff 2014 and Bianco 2018. **μετέπεμψαν:** the first approach to Sparta was at 6.73.2, but that was a request to prosecute the war in Greece rather than to send an army. The request to send help came at 6.88.8, with Alcibiades then focusing on the need for a Spartan (6.91.4), and the Spartans follow that advice, a little half-heartedly, at 6.93.2(n.). **αὐτοί** 'on their own', unaided. Hermocrates for one had not been so confident (6.33–4), but Th.'s audience might also recall the sceptical popular response to his warnings (6.35.1) and especially the swaggering overconfidence of Athenagoras (6.36–40). **ἅμα τ' ἂν . . . ὠφελεῖν** 'at the same moment they would have learnt that they were outmatched and would have been walled off, with the result that even if they had sent for assistance they [the Spartans] would no longer have been able to help them in the same way' or 'so effectively'. Some would have heard αὐτούς as subject (= the Spartans), some as object (= the Syracusans , with a vague 'it' understood as subject), of ὠφελεῖν: it comes to the same thing. **καὶ αὐτός** 'he too', like Nicias. **τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέραι μάλιστα δεινότατός ἐστι τοῖς ἐναντίοις:** even more closely echoing Lamachus at 6.49.2, and also, ironically, Nicias himself at 6.23.2(n.). μάλιστα goes more closely with τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέραι than with δεινότατος, but still the effect is close to that of a double superlative like Eur. *Hipp.* 1421 μάλιστα φίλτατος: cf. Page 1938 on

Eur. *Med.* 1323. **ὅτι τάχος:** not distinguishable from ὅτι τάχιστα, 'as quickly as possible': cf. Hdt. 9.7β.2 and the frequent ὡς τάχος (Soph. *OT* 945, etc.). **ἐκπλήξει:** **42**.2n.

42.4 *The decision to attack through Epipolae.* After so much emphasis on what not to do – delay – Th. presents this positive decision very simply. In fact there were alternatives, especially attacking Plemmyrion or re-engaging the enemy at sea. The targeting of Epipolae arguably picked one of Syracuse's strongest rather than most vulnerable points (Roisman 1993: 57–8); but success there, if it could be followed up by an effective circumvallation, might indeed lead to the quickest victory. **τὸ παρατείχισμα . . . τοὺς Ἀθηναίους:** the wall that was finished at **6**.4–7.1. **ἁπλοῦν ὄν:** **4**.1. Nicias mentioned this detail at **11**.3, but as an incidental point when he was emphasising the situation's seriousness; Demosthenes sees it as offering a possibility, as a single wall was less likely to be defended than a double wall with constant patrols. **τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβάσεως:** at Euryelus (**43**.3); cf. 6.97.2, **2**.3nn. and see Map 4. **καὶ αὖθις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου** 'and go on to take the [enemy] camp on Epipolae (αὐταῖς)'; this is the triple camp that will be described in more detail at **43**.4(n.). **ῥαιδίως ἂν αὐτὸ ληφθέν . . . ὑπομεῖναι ἄν:** for direct discourse ῥαιδίως ἂν ληφθείη . . . ὑπομείνειεν ἄν. Th. does not give such unequivocal assent to this judgement of Demosthenes as he did to the analysis of **42**.3, but ὁρῶν, 'seeing', does imply that the possibility was real, despite Th.'s apparent agreement at **6**.1(n.) that losing the walling race would be decisive. But in Th. as in Hdt., any anticipation of 'easy' success tends to be delusive (6.17.6n.), and first the ascent and victory need to be achieved. **οὐδὲ γάρ:** 'introducing additional information . . . which has explanatory force' (*CGCG* 59.66, on the positive counterpart καὶ γάρ). **καί οἱ ξυντομωτάτην ἡγεῖτο διαπολέμησιν** 'and he thought this the shortest way he had of bringing the war to an end': for the omission of 'this' cf. **86**.2. οἱ is the dative of the singular reflexive ἑ. For Th.'s taste for -σις words see **4**.6n.; διαπολέμησις is not found again until the second-century CE grammarian Pollux.

42.5 οὐ τρίψεσθαι . . . τὴν ξύμπασαν πόλιν: just as Nicias himself had been concerned two years earlier 'not to put the city at risk by spending its own money', 6.47. Cf. **47–9**n. and Kallet 2001: 156. **ἄλλως** 'to no purpose', 'pointlessly'.

42.6 τήν τε γῆν . . . ἔτεμνον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ τὸν Ἄναπον: see Map 4. Since Nicias began to focus on the sea campaign at **4**.4 Th. has given the impression that little has been tried on land except in defence, with the Athenians intimidated by the Syracusan cavalry (**4**.6). Demosthenes immediately

reverses the emphasis. **τῶι τε πεζῶι καὶ ταῖς ναυσίν:** in apposition to τῶι στρατεύματι. This need not imply further engagements: the οὐδὲ γάρ parenthesis explains the way that this domination became clear – the Syracusans had been cowed into offering little in response. **καθ' ἕτερα... ὅτι μή** 'in either [land or sea] except . . .' For ὅτι μή see LSJ ὅ τι or ὅτι II. **ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπιείου:** **4**.6, **37**.2nn.

43–5 *The night battle,* memorably described, with many verbs of cognition, both visual and auditory, conveying the frustration and the terror of being unable to grasp what is going on. The tumult of conflicting impressions is stylistically mirrored and conveyed (nn.), and the psychology, already so characteristic an interest of this book (Intr., pp. 30–1), now becomes nightmarish, culminating in the fleeing Athenians' helpless leaps into the dark and, in the main, to their deaths (**44**.8). On a smaller scale, it is as effective as Tolstoy's description of Austerlitz in *War and Peace* and the bewilderment there caused by the thick fog. There may be some reminiscence of the Homeric Doloneia (*Il.* 10), but if so it suggests more differences than similarities: Odysseus and Diomedes are there conducting a more limited and more successful mission and the auditory dimension is different too, there a screeching heron sounding eerily through the quiet (*Il.* 10.274–6), here a disorienting racket. Some may also have recalled the magnificent frustrated cry of Ajax when Zeus has clouded the battlefield in mist: 'kill me in the light, as killing is your choice' (*Il.* 17.647).

With so much confusion conveyed, it is unsurprising that even a reader/listener with perfect recall of the earlier narrative would struggle to get a clear picture. The initial attack with siege-engines (**43**.1) is distinguished from the Epipolae assault that follows, and is already targeted on the παρατείχισμα and is evidently large-scale. It is not evident, though, whether it is launched from the shore-camp against the easternmost sector of the wall or, as most commentators assume, from 'the circle' against the western; but 'the circle' has not been mentioned since **2**.4, a year earlier, and that attentive reader/listener might not be certain that it is still occupied (cf. **60**.2n.). It is difficult too to work out the placing of the Syracusan προτειχίσματα 'on Epipolae', mentioned for the first time at **43**.4. Were they 'in front of' (προ-) the cross-wall (*HCT*)? In that case they were not effective enough to prevent a detachment from launching an immediate attack on that wall (**43**.5). Or 'in front of' the main city, on the northern side of Epipolae (*CT*)? It would then take some time for Gylippus and his troops to be alerted and come into action, and those initial Athenian successes are more explicable – but Th. might have said so. It is not even clear if the fighting takes place north of the cross-wall, as most reconstructions assume, or south.

On the topography see Map 4 and *HCT*, esp. pp. 477–8, and *CT*; the liveliest modern account is that of Green 1970: 282–9, based on close knowledge of the terrain but making several questionable assumptions. On Demosthenes' strategy and tactics see Roisman 1993: 57–63. On the literary effect see Greenwood 2006: 34–6, exploring the presentation of sensory confusion, and Foster 2018: 115–17, bringing out how the empathy generated in a reader/listener makes it possible to read this as an exoneration of the Athenian troops: how could anyone cope?

43.1 μηχαναῖς: perhaps battering-rams. **πρότερον ἀποπειρᾶσαι τοῦ παρατειχίσματος** 'to make an attempt' (this picks up πεῖρα, **42**.4: the 'attempt' will initially take this form) 'on the cross-wall first', before the Epipolae initiative he has in mind at **42**.4. This would not be a straightforward decision: surprise will be essential for attacking Epipolae (**43**.2), and this showing of the Athenians' hand will reveal that the focus will now be on the παρατείχισμα. **πείσας τόν τε Νικίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυνάρχοντας:** **42**.3n. These 'others' will include Menander and Euthydemus (**16**.1, **69**.4nn.) as well as Eurymedon.

43.2 ἡμέρας: for the genitive see 6.3.2n.; George 2014: 80–1 observes that the genitive is favoured over the dative especially when, as here, there is an implied contrast with νυκτός. **παραγγείλας δὲ πέντε ἡμερῶν σιτία** 'gave instructions for five days' provisions' (to be carried). **τοὺς λιθολόγους καὶ τέκτονας:** a single τούς is enough because the two groups work closely together: **33**.3n. They are again mentioned together at 6.44.1 (n.) and X. *Hell.* 4.8.10. τέκτονες, 'carpenters', work mainly with wood, while λιθολόγοι are 'stone-gatherers', a skilled job when stones need to fit tightly together: both were essential crafts in siege-warfare. **τοξευμάτων:** referring more to the archers here, as at Hdt. 6.112.2, than to their equipment. **ἀπὸ πρώτου ὕπνου** 'at the time of first sleep'. For ἀπό cf. LSJ II and ἀφ' ἑσπέρας (**29**.2); for 'first sleep' cf. 2.2.1 and Austin 1964 on Virg. *Aen.* 2.268 *prima quies*. **Μένανδρος:** **16**.1n. **ἀναλαβὼν . . . ἐχώρει:** the singular participle and verb should technically go with the nearest subject Μένανδρος (cf. 6.65.2n.), but many would have heard them as referring to Demosthenes after the strong αὐτὸς μέν. **τὴν πᾶσαν στρατιάν:** Diod. 13.11.3 gives the numbers as 10,000 hoplites and the same number of ψιλοί. **Νικίας δὲ ἐν τοῖς τείχεσιν ὑπελέλειπτο:** perhaps because of his sickness (cf. 6.102.2), but Th. does not tell us so. It made sense to leave one of the generals behind during what was expected to be a protracted mission (πέντε ἡμερῶν).

The imperfect ἐχώρει has set the scene; the pluperfect ὑπελέλειπτο keeps the temporal focus on the time of the subsequent march; then the aor.

ἐγένοντο (43.3) shifts forward to the moment of arrival, and the historic presents λανθάνουσι . . . αἱροῦσι . . . ἀποκτείνουσιν . . . [43.3] ἀγγέλλουσι convey the swift and effective sequence of actions (Allan 2013: 376).

43.3 αὐταῖς = ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς. **τὸ πρῶτον ἀνίβη:** 6.97.2. **τὸ τείχισμα ὃ ἦν αὐτόθι τῶν Συρακοσίων:** the first time Th. has mentioned this: see next n.

43.4 τὰ στρατόπεδα, ἃ ἦν ἐπὶ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν τρία: the first mention of these as well; on their location see 43–5. They will have been built after the successful completion of the cross-wall at 7.1(n.), but Th. has delayed mentioning them until now when they become relevant to the action. **προτειχίσμασιν** 'advanced fortifications'. **Σικελιωτῶν:** the Sicilian Greeks (32.2n.). **τῶν ξυμμάχων:** the non-Sicilian ones listed at 58.3. Th. does not say where the Sicels (58.3) were stationed. **τοῖς ἑξακοσίοις τῶν Συρακοσίων:** this elite corps was mentioned at 6.96.5. They had suffered severe losses at 6.97.4, but there had been time since then to reconstitute the numbers. Diod. 13.11.4 says that they were commanded by Hermocrates. **πρῶτοι . . . φύλακες** 'advance guard'.

43.5 αὐτοί μέν: Demosthenes and the Athenians. **ὅπως τῇ παρούσῃ ὁρμῇ . . . γένωνται** 'so as not to be slow with the momentum they now had towards [or "in"] the achievement of what they had come to do'. τοῦ περαίνεσθαι is passive; some listeners/readers may have heard it as dependent on ὁρμῇ (LSJ, so 'towards'), some as on μὴ βραδεῖς (most commentators, so 'in'). The difference from Nicias' caution and delay is again pronounced, and the vagueness of ὧν ἕνεκα ἦλθον allows this to be taken as meaning the goals of the whole expedition, not just of this operation. **ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης** 'right at the beginning' (cf. 1.77.3), immediately after the ascent and without needing any preliminary attack on the προτειχίσματα. **ἤιρουν . . . ἀπέσυρον:** the imperfects convey both the beginning (inceptive) and the continuation of the actions: 74.2n.

43.6 ἐκπεπληγμένοι: 42.2n.

43.7 ἐν ἀταξίαι μᾶλλον ἤδη ὡς κεκρατηκότων: rather like the Syracusans in the naval battle at 23.2–3: the roles are reversed as now the Athenians think it is all over (perfect). **διὰ παντὸς . . . διελθεῖν** 'to go on as quickly as possible through every part of the enemy that had not yet fought'. **ἵνα μὴ ἀνέντων σφῶν τῆς ἐφόδου αὖθις ξυστραφῶσιν:** μή goes with ξυστραφῶσιν; ἀνέντων (aorist participle of ἀνίημι) carries conditional force (*CGCG* 52.40), 'if' they relaxed their assault. **οἱ Βοιωτοί:** presumably those recruited at 19.3, some of whom had arrived at 25.3. Plut., a Boeotian himself, colourfully elaborates at *Nic.* 21.7–8.

44.1 ἤδη ἐν πολλῇι ταραχῇι καὶ ἀπορίαι: the two nouns are so closely linked that they can be picked up by the singular ἥν: cf. **75**.6, 6.59.1n. The stages of growing confusion are carefully delineated – first order, then ἀταξία . . . ἤδη (**43**.7), then (with a shift to the psychological register) ἤδη . . . πολλὴ ταραχὴ καὶ ἀπορία. **οὐδὲ πυθέσθαι . . . οὐδ' ἀφ' ἑτέρων:** each οὐδέ must be given its force, 'hard even to find out about' (never mind coping with at the time), then 'not from either side', pointing to Th.'s questioning of people on both sides during his exile (5.26.7). The historian's desperation is felt, but that is used as an index for the difficulty of anyone, participants at the time included, to grasp exactly what was going on. **σαφέστερα μέν:** probably heard as free-standing with an understood 'events are . . .' rather than as object of οἶδεν. **ὅμως δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα . . . μόλις οἶδεν:** another emphatic οὐδέ, 'not even these', with the plural subject picked up in a sense-construction by ἕκαστος . . . οἶδεν. Eur.'s Theseus makes a similar point: do not trust detailed stories of combat, for they are 'empty words': 'when facing the enemy, you can scarcely (μόλις) see what you have to see' (*Supp.* 846–56: cf. Marincola 1997: 68–9). The attempt to convey the lived experience of battle prefigures the manner of Keegan 1976: cf. 4.34.2–3 with Allan 2013: 379–81 and Hunt 2006: 392–4. Th. does not usually admit such difficulty in reconstructing events, despite his insistence at 1.22.3 that eyewitnesses often disagree. Woodman 1988: ch. 1 illustrates from modern examples the limitations of eye-witness knowledge and recollection, noting (16–17) this passage as an exception to Th.'s 'almost unvarying level of magisterial assurance' (Dover 1973: 29). **ἔν γε τῶιδε τῶι πολέμωι:** i.e. the Peloponnesian War, not just the Sicilian expedition. Agis' night march on Athens in 408 involved similar numbers if Diod. 13.72–3 can be trusted, but the actual fighting was delayed to the daytime and was less bloody than this. Pritchett, *GSW* II.162–71 lists other examples of night fighting; Demosthenes had two successful night attacks to his credit already (3.112.4 and 4.31–2; cf. Roisman 1993: 59–60), but in those cases too the actual fighting was delayed till dawn or just before. **πῶς ἄν τις σαφῶς τι ἤιδει;** 'how could anyone have had clear knowledge of anything?', with counterfactual indicative (*CGCG* 38.15). The only other rhetorical question in Th.'s narrative is 8.96.2, on the Athenian despair at losing Euboea: πῶς οὐκ εἰκότως ἠθύμουν; It would be all the more effective in oral delivery, and the passion and empathy so characteristic of Book 7 (Intr., p. 29) are strongly felt.

44.2 ἦν μὲν γὰρ σελήνη λαμπρά: Plut. *Nic.* 21.9–10 again (cf. **42**.1, **43**.7nn.) elaborates: the Athenians had the moon behind them, and so their vision was even more impaired by their own shadows whereas the light made the enemies seem more numerous and their glinting armour more

intimidating. But Plut. is unlikely to have good information: see Kagan 1981: 312 n. 12 and *HCT*. **ἑώρων δὲ οὕτως . . . ἀπιστεῖσθαι** 'their view of each other was as one might expect in moonlight: they could see a body in front of them, but could not be sure whether it was friend or foe', lit. 'as might be expected . . . for one to see the appearance of the body in front of one, but for the recognition of someone on one's own side to be distrusted'. The infinitives are dependent on ὡς . . . εἰκός. **ἐν στενοχωρίαι:** this suggests an analogy with the cramping at sea at 36.4(n.), just as Hdt. had hinted at a parallel between the narrows of Thermopylae (7.211.2, 225, etc.) and the straits of Salamis (8.60β.1). But in fact the terrain on Epipolae is not specially cramped, though it is rough and uneven: see *HCT* and *CT*, though they are not necessarily right in fixing the battle on the north rather than south of the cross-wall.

44.3 The tenses give a snapshot of one particular phase. The imperfects ἐνικῶντο . . . ἐχώρουν . . . προσανήιει and the pluperfect ἀνεβεβήκει set the scene – some already defeated (cf. 6.101.4n.), some pressing on, some already ascended, some still climbing towards them (both προσ- and ἀνα- are important prefixes); then the gaze moves from the parts to the whole, as all 'did not know' where to go, given the confusion in front that had already (pluperfect ἐτετάρακτο) set in, with shouting all the while (imperfect ἦν). These 'shouts' introduce the auditory dimension that is then developed in 44.4. **ἔτι:** this may go with ἀήσσητοι, 'still undefeated', or ἐχώρουν, 'still pressed on', or both. **διαγνῶναι** 'to discern' what was happening πρόσθεν.

44.4 **ἀδύνατον ὄν:** accusative absolute (*CGCG* 52.30). **οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι . . . καὶ . . . καὶ . . . σφίσι τε αὐτοῖς . . . καί:** the co-ordinate clauses accumulate as the confusions crowd in. **καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίας . . . ἐνόμιζον** 'and they assumed that everything in front of them was an enemy, even if it was in fact friendly and part of those already fleeing'. **τοῦ ξυνθήματος:** Aeneas Tacticus 24 has an interesting discussion of passwords (cf. the commentary of Whitehead 1990), suggesting e.g. 'Crafty Hermes' for an operation involving stealth. The point here is not that 'it must sometimes have happened that opposite sides had the same password' (*HCT*), but that the Syracusans discovered what it was because they heard it so often at close quarters. **διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἄλλωι τωι γνωρίσαι** 'because it was not possible to recognise people by any other way' (τωι = τινι).

44.5 Grammatical subjects and 'they's here shift confusingly from one side to the other: 'they' (the Athenians) did not know 'their' (ἐκείνων = the Syracusans') password because 'they' (the Syracusans) were on top and therefore kept formation better; and so 'if they [the Athenians] did

encounter any of the enemy and had an advantage, they [the Syracusans] would escape because they knew their [the Athenians'] password, whereas if they [the Athenians] did not give it themselves when questioned they were cut down'.

44.6 μέγιστον δὲ καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα: cf. **24**.3 μέγιστον καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον. **ὁ παιανισμός:** for the singing of a paean when going into battle see Pritchett, *GSW* 1.105–8. **Δωρικόν:** the point is probably that Ionian and Dorian paeans were different, a possibility allowed by I. Rutherford 2001: 44, and that those distinctively Dorian paeans were now being sung on both sides. Any Ionian paeans would not confuse in the same way, as Syracuse now had no Ionian allies (6.77.1n.). Syracusan defenders might similarly be confused by the Dorian ones, but they were keeping better order (μὴ διεσπασμένους); in any case the focus rests firmly on the Athenians. *HCT* and *GSW* 1.107 suggest instead that only Dorians would be singing paeans. It is true that elsewhere in Th. Ionians, including Athenians, do not sing them as a preliminary for battle or at any other time, but Thrasybulus' Athenians will sing one only ten years later (X. *Hell.* 2.4.17), and Athenian sailors had presumably joined in the general Greek paean before Salamis (Aesch. *Pers.* 393; cf. Lys. *Epit.* 38). **ὅσον Δωρικὸν μετ' Ἀθηναίων ἦν:** for Dorians on the Athenian side see **57**.6–9.

44.7 τοῦ στρατοπέδου 'the army', as at **44**.1, not 'the camp' as at 44.8. **φίλοι τε φίλοις καὶ πολῖται πολίταις:** almost redundant given that the idea of fighting one's own men is already clear, but (a) there is some sense of 'even' friends and fellow citizens – not all would know one another, especially the new arrivals – and (b) the intensification, marked by the polyptoton (same word repeated in different cases), anyway contributes to the passion of the narrative, as does the alliteration of φ/π and of λ.

44.8 οἱ πολλοί 'most', not of the combatants, but of those who ἀπώλλυντο in this phase. **τῆς . . . πάλιν καταβάσεως:** for the adverb πάλιν qualifying a noun cf. **62**.3 τὴν πάλιν ἀνάκρουσιν and **86**.5, and see 6.49.2, 80.5nn. **καταβαῖεν:** optative for 'whenever' the various stragglers made it down. **τῶν προτέρων στρατιωτῶν:** i.e. those who were there already when the reinforcements (οἱ ὕστερον ἥκοντες) arrived. **εἰσὶν οἳ: 11**.2n.

45.1 ἦι ἡ πρόσβασις: presumably by Euryelus (**43**.3). **ἦι οἱ Βοιωτοὶ πρῶτον ἀντέστησαν: 43**.7.

45.2 οὐκ ὀλίγοι: 2,500 according to Diod. 13.11.5, 2,000 according to Plut. *Nic.* 21.11. **ἢ κατὰ τοὺς νεκρούς** 'than would be expected from the number of bodies'. **ψιλοί:** predicative with ἅλλεσθαι, 'to jump without their armour'. **ἄνευ τῶν ἀσπίδων:** deleted by Haacke and later

editors as a redundant gloss on ψιλοί, but ψιλοί may be taken closely with ἄλλεσθαι, ἄνευ τῶν ἀσπίδων with ἀπώλλυντο and ἐσώθησαν: dead or alive, this would be a particular horror and humiliation, for to throw away one's shield was the ultimate act of cowardice for a hoplite: cf. e.g. Ar. *Clouds* 353 (the hapless Cleonymus) with Dover's n.

46 πάλιν αὖ ἀναρρωσθέντες, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον: the end of the panel echoes the beginning (**42**.2), but Syracusan despair and Athenian buoyancy (at **42**.2 ῥώμη τις) are here reversed. Now the high morale of **41**.4 is reinstated. πάλιν may refer particularly to that restoring and αὖ to its being one of a sequence of such restorations (so C–S): if so, it reinforces the paradox of **42**.2, 'no end to these releases from danger'. **Ἀκράγαντα:** **32**.1n. It had a long history of *stasis* (Berger 1992: 15–18). This mission failed, as the pro-Syracusan faction was expelled before Sicanus could get there: **50**.1. **πεντεκαίδεκα ναυσί:** a single ship would have been sufficient for a polite request. The detachment was clearly intended to intimidate, and perhaps to intervene. **Σικανόν:** mentioned at 6.73.1(n.) as one of the three generals elected in the crisis of autumn 415; he will hold a further command in the great naval battle, **70**.1. **ὥιχετο αὖθις:** as he had a year earlier (**7**.2), with a similar plan to capitalise on a success. Here as there (n.), the tense of ὥιχετο – effectively 'had gone' – pushes the narrative forward into the interval that followed the success. **ἄξων στρατιὰν ἔτι:** that previous mission (last n.) had some success (**21**.1), and the attempts to recruit more had continued (**25**.1–2 and 9, **32**–**3**). **ἐν ἐλπίδι ὤν:** taking an infinitive as if it were ἐλπίζων: cf. **48**.2, 4.70.2, and e.g. X. *Hell.* 5.4.43.

47–9: TO STAY OR TO GO?

What is now Book 6 was punctuated halfway through by a debate on the Athenians' arrival (6.47–9); now, two years later, Book 7 has a similar halfway debate before the final scenes. The debate begins with Demosthenes as trenchant as he was at **42**, though this time with a mention of discussion with colleagues (**42**.3n.); it ends in ὄκνος τις καὶ μέλλησις, Nicias' hallmarks (**49**.4), as his rhetoric proves uncharacteristically persuasive. Two years earlier Nicias had pleaded for a quick departure (6.47); now he wants to remain. He argued then that they should not 'put the city at risk by spending its own money (δαπανῶντας τὰ οἰκεῖα)'; now it is Demosthenes who speaks in terms of the city's interests and of expense (τῇ πόλει . . . πολλὰ δαπανῶντας, **47**.4). A large part of Nicias' reasoning – not all, for he has genuine reasons for regarding the position as better than it seemed (**48**.2, **49**.1) – depends on his own skin, his knowledge of the personal

risk he would be taking if they left without authorisation from Athens. He is not being unrealistic: the fate of the unsuccessful generals in 424 was a stark warning (4.65.3; cf. Intr., p. 25), after a much smaller-scale reverse. Nor does he see any need to keep such thinking to himself, at least among the generals (**48**n.), and even Demosthenes then acknowledges that there was a case for a compromise, with a temporary removal to a safer base until such authorisation could come (but would it?) (**49**.2). Nicias is not cowardly: he is more concerned to save his honour than his life (**48**.4), a consideration that would resonate strongly with an ancient audience. He can still be seen as choosing to 'put forward as disgraceful a proposition as any general in history' (*HCT*), risking so many lives and the future of his city to save that honour. Th.'s history as a whole traces a curve whereby the personal comes to dominate over the public (Intr., pp. 9–10). Nicias embodies this as surely as Alcibiades.

See Losada 1972: 128–32, Kagan 1981: 314–22, Rood 1998a: 187–8, Kopp 2016: 230–2, Tompkins 2017: 110–12, and *HCT* and *CT*.

47.1 Οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοί: at least Demosthenes, Nicias, and Eurymedon (**49**.3); it is unclear whether Menander and Euthydemus (**16**.2) were *stratēgoi* (**69**.4n.), but even if they were they clearly carried less weight. At **42**.3 Demosthenes seemed to carry the day by force of personality and will (n.); now there is more attention to discussion. **πρός** + accusative: 'in the light of'. **ἀρρωστίαν:** physical sickness (cf. the emphasis on shortage of food and water at **4**.6 and **13**.2), but also poor morale, corresponding to the strengthening on the other side (ἀναρρωσθέντες, **46**). The next two sentences explain each aspect in turn. **μονῆι:** noun, 'delay'. **ἀχθομένους . . .** [**47**.2] **ἐφαίνετο:** the complicated structure is (a) a division of two reasons (νόσωι τε . . . τά τε ἄλλα . . .) for the soldiers' discontent, first their disease, secondly because everything seemed hopeless; (b) that disease aspect is itself subdivided by κατ' ἀμφότερα, 'for two reasons', the first of those then given by the genitive absolute (τῆς τε ὥρας . . . μάλιστα), the second added in an independent finite construction (καὶ τὸ χωρίον . . . ἦν: cf. **80**.1n.). The different reasons crowd in and reach their climax in the hopelessness (ἀνέλπιστα), forcefully delayed to the sentence's end.

47.2 τῆς τε ὥρας τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ: it was high summer, a little before the eclipse of 27 August (**50**.4n.). The illness was probably *Plasmodium falciparum*, the deadliest form that malaria takes (Grmek 1979), but other diseases may have contributed as well.

47.3 ἅπερ καὶ διανοηθείς: 42.5. **ἐς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς διεκινδύνευσεν** 'took a desperate risk by moving on Epipolae': for the injection of an idea

of motion cf. 3.36.2 ἐς Ἰωνίαν . . . παρακινδυνεῦσαι. **μὴ διατρίβειν:** Demosthenes' watchword (**42**.3n.). **ἔτι τὸ πέλαγος οἷόν τε περαιοῦσθαι:** i.e. before winter set in and made a voyage across the open sea impracticable. August is early to be thinking like that, but Demosthenes may be weighing this not merely against staying in Syracuse but also against his fallback suggestion of moving elsewhere and waiting for instructions (**49**.2) – very much second-best in his eyes. **τοῦ στρατεύματος:** partitive genitive with ναυσί. **ταῖς γοῦν ἐπελθούσαις ναυσί:** the point is not that the earlier ships were useless, though they were doubtless in worse repair (**12**.3–4, **41**.4), but that it was the recent arrivals that made the difference: cf. **55**.1.

47.4 τῇ πόλει . . . ἄλλως χρήματα πολλὰ δαπανῶντας: the same considerations as at **42**.5 οὐ τρίψεσθαι ἄλλως Ἀθηναίους τε τοὺς ξυστρατευομένους καὶ τὴν ξύμπασαν πόλιν. **τοὺς ἐν τῇ χώραι σφῶν ἐπιτειχίζοντας:** the forces at Decelea (**19**.1–2). **εἶναι:** infinitive as still within indirect speech, showing that this is Demosthenes' argument rather than a comment of Th.: not that Th. would have disagreed. **ἄλλως** 'to no purpose', as at **42**.5. **εἰκός** 'reasonable'.

48 *Nicias' view.* There are several curiosities here. (1) This is evidently a non-public meeting of the generals, but ἐμφανῶς . . . μετὰ πολλῶν implies that a public session will follow and ψηφιζομένους that there would be further 'voting' (**48**.1): cf. **50**.3. This suggests that the final decision will be subject to some sort of majority vote in the way that becomes familiar in X.'s *Anabasis*. (2) μετὰ πολλῶν (**48**.1) leaves it unclear how 'many' are meant. Just the Athenian citizens, replicating a civic assembly on the move? Or all the troops including allies and mercenaries, which is closer still to the world of the *Anabasis*? Or might a smaller group consisting of subordinate officers still be regarded as 'many'? The last seems unlikely: **48**.4 seems to be envisaging 'many of the ordinary soldiers' changing their tune once back in Athens, and this has most point if they will also be voting now. (3) Demosthenes' proposal is for immediate departure, but λαθεῖν γὰρ ἄν, ὁπότε βούλοιντο, τοῦτο ποιοῦντες πολλῶι ἧσσον (**48**.1) implies that there would, or might, be some delay. That again implies a further stage of decision-making with the question still open, including the possibility of leaving but not immediately. (4) Nicias is clearly watching his words (**48**.1 and 3), but sees no reason to conceal his concern for himself and his preference to die here rather than in disgrace at Athens. He presumably thinks these arguments likely to weigh with his fellow generals as well as himself – he is wrong about that (**49**.4n.) – but it is impossible to think that this argument is *only* a point of rhetoric rather than Nicias' genuine concern: it is too much in line with his speeches elsewhere,

especially the self-referentiality and the knowing remark about Athenian nature (**48**.4n.; Tompkins 1972 and 2017: 110–12). This, though, has a trenchancy that those speeches lack, even though here too the language is sometimes convoluted (nn.). 'The paradox is that he spoke with a vehemence at odds with his uncertainty; and that this vehemence ensured that his own uncertainty prevailed on his colleagues' (Rood 1998a: 188), and a further paradox is that his mysterious silence about his sources proves more persuasive than, usually, his speeches (**49**.4; Lateiner 1985: 202). Cf. esp. Hornblower 2004b and in *CT*, largely followed here.

48.1 **ἐγίγνωσκεν . . . ἐνόμιζε:** both are mental words, but γιγνώσκω is often also used when a speaker delivers a verdict orally, as e.g. with Alcibiades at 6.18.7, or when a firm decision is taken, as at 1.70.2 and 7 or 3.36.4: it is appropriate for Demosthenes' forthrightness. With Nicias, his thoughts (ἐνόμισεν) are *contrasted* with what he said openly. **σφῶν . . . σφᾶς:** i.e. 'the Athenians', clearly in σφῶν and also in **48**.2 σφετέρων and therefore probably in σφᾶς as well, referring to the anticipated public vote; σφᾶς might otherwise have been taken to mean 'the generals' as (probably) in **48**.3 σφῶν. **τῶι δὲ λόγωι:** not just 'in the λόγος that he or they will present in public', but also, it seems, in what he says now in private discussion: that becomes clear at **48**.3, where τῶι δ' ἐμφανεῖ τότε λόγωι refers to what he says now. **οὐδ' ἐμφανῶς . . . γίγνεσθαι:** the construction with ἐβούλετο changes from infinitive, what he did not want to do, to indirect statement, what he did not want to happen. **ἐμφανῶς . . . μετὰ πολλῶν:** not tautologous, as ἐμφανῶς contrasts what he said openly with what he really thought, and μετὰ πολλῶν defines how big an audience would hear those open words. **ψηφιζομένους μετὰ πολλῶν:** see introductory **48**n. **τοῖς πολεμίοις καταγγέλτους:** it is taken for granted that information would leak, perhaps through deserters (**13**.2), but perhaps the Syracusans too had spies just as Nicias had access to information from within the city (**48**.2). **λαθεῖν γὰρ ἂν . . . πολλῶι ἧσσον:** nominative (cf. ποιοῦντες) + infinitive (*CGCG* 51.20), as Nicias is thinking of himself as part of the army: cf. 6.25.2. λαθεῖν and βούλοιντο correspond to λάθοιμεν and βουλοίμεθα in what Nicias would have thought (not in what what he would have said: see above). **τοῦτο ποιοῦντες:** i.e. withdrawing.

48.2 **τὸ δέ τι** 'and to an extent' (probably, rather than 'and another thing' as commentators take it): cf. 1.107.4, 1.118.2. This qualifies the whole sentence; the second τι then goes with the preceding ἐλπίδος, 'a degree of hope'. **ἀφ' ὧν ἐπὶ πλέον ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἠισθάνετο αὐτῶν** 'based on his information about those matters, which was greater [lit. "to a greater extent"] than that of the others'. The indicative gives narratorial authority for this superior information and, by implication and more

disturbingly, for Nicias' keeping it to himself. It is doubtless true that the more people who know, the greater the danger to any channel of information (F. S. Russell 1999: 195–8) – Hermocrates had similar concerns in Syracuse, 6.72.5 – but Demosthenes and Eurymedon had reason to resent that Nicias gave only hints of his knowledge (**49**.4; Losada 1972: 130–1, Kallet 2001: 158). For these contacts see below on καὶ ἦν γάρ τι . . . ἐνδοῦναι. Ironically, their existence will play a part in Nicias' death: **86**.4. **παρεῖχε:** the subject is τὰ τῶν πολεμίων, followed by a future infinitive as at **46**. **πονηρότερα:** picking up πόνηρα (**48**.1): our position is bad, but theirs is worse. **ἐκτρυχώσειν** 'wear them down', just as the Athenians too were τετρυχωμένοι by the expense of the war (**28**.3n.). A strong metaphor: see n. there. Th. does not commit himself on the realism of this prospect, but **49**.1 does acknowledge Syracusan financial ἀπορία. He also accepts, here and at **49**.1, that Nicias genuinely had that 'degree of hope', based on what his private sources told him. It contrasts both with the general feeling of 'hopelessness' (ἀνέλπιστα, **47**.2) and the 'hope' of Gylippus at **46**, better grounded but also eventually unrealised. At the beginning it had been the Athenians as a whole who indulged in ungrounded hopefulness and Nicias who tried to restrain them (6.8–26); that is now reversed. Cf. Avery 1973: 4–5, and on the further reversal of a theme from the Melian dialogue see Intr., p. 23. **θαλασσοκρατούντων:** for the genitive absolute when -κρατοῦντας or -κρατοῦντες would also have been possible cf. *CGCG* 52.35 n. 1. Not for the only time (6.8–26, 9.3nn.), Nicias echoes Pericles, whose confidence in Athenian sea superiority gave encouragement even amid great personal and civic adversity (2.62.2). But then the naval superiority was real; this time it will soon prove illusory (**51–2**). Cf. Kopp 2016: 231–2. **καὶ ἦν γάρ τι . . . ἐνδοῦναι:** not the same use of καὶ γάρ as at **48**.3(n.), as the word-order shows: ἦν γάρ introduces a parenthetical explanation inserted within the clause that it explains (*GP* 68–9), and καί is taken with ἐπεκηρυκεύετο and οὐκ εἴα. The indicative ἦν does commit the narrator to the reality of this 'fifth column', just as ἠισθάνετο vouches for Nicias' making use of them, as he had before at Cythera (4.54.3) and at Mende (4.130.5–6). Nicias himself may have had long-standing Syracusan friends if it is true that he was a *proxenos* of the city (Diod. 13.27.3: see Trevett 1995; Kallet 2001: 157 n. 26 is sceptical). For *stasis* in Syracuse, real and suspected, cf. 6.5.1, 6.38.4, and 6.36–40nn., but mention of a pro-Athenian element has been delayed till here (Brock 2013: 56), presumably because this is the moment when it affects Athenian decision-making most. By **49**.1 this has apparently (see n.) strengthened to a 'large' element, there too (it seems) in the narratorial voice. Perhaps these were disaffected Leontinian exiles 'hankering after an independent Leontinoi' (*HCT*; cf. **73**.3n.), but it is just as likely that their aim was

ascendancy within Syracuse (F. S. Russell 1999: 131) after an Athenian victory, or that they were 'proponents of more thoroughgoing democracy' than Syracuse yet had (Brock 2013: 56–7). Polyaenus 1.43.1 also gives some indication of a slave revolt within Syracuse, in which 300 deserted to the Athenians (Carlà 2014); but that sounds like a single outbreak, swiftly suppressed, whereas Th.'s indications here and at 73.3 and 86.4 point to a continuing and covert group of the well-connected. **ἐπεκηρυκεύετο:** just 'was sending messages', as at 49.1; evidently these furtive communications are not a matter for κήρυκες = 'heralds'. **οὐκ εἴα** 'urged him not to', as at 6.72.2 and e.g. 1.28.2: not 'forbade him', as they were in no position to do that.

48.3 **ἐπιστάμενος:** the verb can convey (possibly unfounded) certainty rather than knowledge (6.37.1n.), but Th. did think that Nicias had good information (49.1 ἀκριβῶς). **ἐπ' ἀμφότερα ἔχων** 'keeping both options open'. **ἀνεῖχε** 'held back'. **τῶι δ' ἐμφανεῖ τότε λόγωι:** see 48n. **σφῶν ταῦτα οὐκ ἀποδέξονται** 'would not find it acceptable', lit. 'accept this action of theirs': the genitive as at 1.84.1 ὃ μέμφονται μάλιστα ἡμῶν. Here σφῶν = 'the generals'. **μὴ αὐτῶν ψηφισαμένων:** 'if they [the Athenians] had not voted for this themselves': 'if', signalled by μή (*CGCG* 52.40), rather than 'when' or 'given that', as this leaves open the possibility that withdrawal be delayed until permission came from home. At 49.2 Demosthenes will favour a version of that option. **καὶ γάρ:** here as at 6.103.3 and 15.2, 'introducing additional information (καί) which has explanatory force' (*CGCG* 59.66). **οὐ τοὺς αὐτοὺς . . . γνώσεσθαι** 'it would not [in Athens] be the same people voting on themselves and reaching a decision through seeing things as they themselves too could see them rather than hearing about them on the basis of others' criticisms'. Nicias is contrasting what will happen in Athens with what he expects to happen now, in the further debate envisaged after the generals have reached their view privately (48.1n.): however big that assembly here might be (48n.), it will consist of men who will be 'the same people voting on themselves and seeing things as they really are', but in Athens it will be different (ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν . . . πείσεσθαι). This is not the usual interpretation. Commentators usually refer σφῶν αὐτῶν back to the speaker Nicias as what he would have put as 'ourselves', taking the point of τοὺς αὐτούς to be 'it would not be the same people both voting as those who were now seeing . . .', but Dover 1965 reasonably says 'σφῶν αὐτῶν could only refer to those who are the subject of ψηφιεῖσθαι'; Dover's own preference is then to delete αὐτῶν (so Bekker). A further possibility would be to take τοὺς αὐτοὺς . . . καί closely together (*CGCG* 32.14) as at Hdt. 4.109.1 Βουδῖνοι οὐ τῇι αὐτῇι γλώσσηι χρέωνται καὶ Γελωνοί, and understand as 'those voting would not be the same as people who are seeing . . .', i.e. 'would be very different from . . .';

but τούς would be expected before τὰ πράγματα, and the difficulty of σφῶν αὐτῶν remains. On καί in ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοί see 6.68.2n. **ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν . . . πείσεσθαι** 'but based on the recriminations that some smart speaker might make, through those would they [the Athenians] be persuaded'. πείσεσθαι is passive in sense despite its middle form.

48.4 τῶν τε παρόντων στρατιωτῶν: 48.3 dealt with speakers and listeners at Athens who had not been in Syracuse; now Nicias turns to the prospect of returning soldiers who might form part of that judging assembly. **πολλοὺς καὶ τοὺς πλείους** 'many – indeed the majority': one can hear Nicias' rhetoric uncharacteristically catching fire. **βοῶσιν . . . βοήσεσθαι:** 'shouting' is a frequent unfriendly word for demagogic and populist rhetoric: 6.28.2n. For the middle form of the future cf. e.g. Ar. *Clouds* 1154. **ὑπὸ χρημάτων καταπροδόντες:** just as the generals of 424 had been condemned on the grounds that 'they had been persuaded by gifts to withdraw when they might have brought Sicily under their control' (4.65.3). Such charges were familiar, and not just at Athens: cf. the case of Pleistoanax of Sparta (6.104.2n.). **αὐτός γε:** the force of γε is along the lines of 'that's *my* preference'. **τὰς Ἀθηναίων φύσεις:** Nicias likes to refer to 'the natures of the Athenians': cf. **14**.2 and 4nn., 6.9.3 and Tompkins 2017: 110–11. **ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἀπολέσθαι** 'to die at the Athenians' hands'. Th. could just have said ὑπ' αὐτῶν, but Ἀθηναίων is repeated for the contrast with πολεμίων. **ἰδίαι:** as opposed to by public decree, δημοσίαι.

48.5 ἔτι: 'even' (LSJ II.2), strengthening the comparative ἥσσω, in tune with Nicias' acceptance that the Athenian position is bad but insistence that the Syracusan is worse (**48**.1–2). ἔτι occurs four times in this sentence, as Nicias piles up points and contrasts. **περιπολίοις** 'outposts', as at 6.45. **καὶ ναυτικὸν πολὺ ἔτι ἐνιαυτὸν ἤδη βόσκοντας** 'and besides that (ἔτι) maintaining a large fleet, as they have already for a year'. **ἀπορεῖν . . . ἀμηχανήσειν:** close synonyms, which often come closely together (Hdt. 5.3.1, Soph. *Ant.* 358–62, Ar. *Birds* 473–4). **δισχίλιά τε γὰρ τάλαντα ἤδη ἀνηλωκέναι:** the sum is doubtless a rounding, but Nicias intimates his inside knowledge of Syracuse even while not sharing all his information (**48**.3). Whether that information was good, and indeed whether he had it at all rather than giving a guess, are further questions. But the figure is plausible: see *CT*. **προσοφείλειν** 'owe in addition'. **φθερεῖσθαι:** for this future middle form used as a passive cf. Soph. *OT* 272 with Finglass 2018 ad loc. **ἐπικουρικὰ μᾶλλον ἢ δι' ἀνάγκης** 'given that they were mercenary forces rather than serving through necessity', loosely in apposition to τὰ πράγματα; not that this 'necessity' on the Athenian side had prevented desertions among the Athenian forces (**13**.2), and Nicias'

contrast also ignores the voluntary contributions from Athens' allies. For Syracusan mercenaries see also **13**.2n. on ἐπ' αὐτομολίας προφάσει.

48.6 τρίβειν . . . προσκαθημένους καὶ μὴ χρήμασιν . . . νικηθέντας ἀπιέναι: Nicias echoes but reverses Demosthenes' conclusion, χρήματα πολλὰ δαπανῶντας . . . προσκαθῆσθαι (**47**.4). τρίβειν, taken up by Demosthenes at **49**.2, may also reverse Demosthenes' catchword διατρίβειν: we're not wasting time, we're wearing them out. The change of tune from the Nicias of two years before, so concerned to go home quickly if Egesta did not provide the funds (6.47), is remarkable. **ὧι** 'in which', i.e. in the matter of money.

49.1 τοσαῦτα: there may be a hint of 'so much and no more' (cf. 6.35.1n.), given Nicias' reticence about his sources of information. **ἰσχυρίζετο** 'asserted vehemently' (not necessarily 'persistently, obstinately', as LSJ: cf. Thorburn 1999): cf. 3.44.3, 6.55.1. It will be this vehemence (ἰσχυρίζηται again) that will persuade his fellow generals that he knows more (**49**.4). Nicias' trenchancy (**48**n.) is matched by Th.'s own, as **49**.1 repeats much of **48** in the same language (τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἀπορίαν ~ **48**.5 πολὺ τὸ βουλόμενον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις γίγνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα ~ **48**.2 ἐπικηρυκευόμενον πρὸς αὐτὸν ὥστε μὴ ἀπανίστασθαι ~ **48**.2 ταῖς γοῦν ναυσὶ . . . κρατήσειν), but this time unequivocally marks Nicias' perception as precise and, presumably, accurate (ἀκριβῶς). **αἰσθόμενος** + accusative: **2**.2n. **πολὺ τὸ βουλόμενον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις γίγνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα:** **48**.2(n.). τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις is dative of possession with γίγνεσθαι (*CGCG* 30.41). πολύ (Linwood) is a probable but not certain conjecture for the MSS που. It is lent plausibility by Plut. *Nic.* 21.5, 'there were ἄνδρες οὐκ ὀλίγοι in Syracuse communicating secretly with Nicias': that passage relies heavily on Th., though Plut. is admittedly capable of his own elaboration. **ταῖς γοῦν ναυσὶ . . . κρατήσειν** 'and with the ships, at least, he was more confident than before that they would be victorious': Nicias acknowledges that the prospects on land have taken a bad knock. The text is very uncertain, and here two emendations of Linwood 1862 are accepted. Alberti prints ταῖς γοῦν ναυσὶ θαρσῶν, ᾗι πρότερον ἐθάρσησε, κρατηθείς, presumably 'confident in the ships, at least, now that he had been defeated in the area where he was previously confident'. But that construction is ugly, and for many months Nicias has not shown much confidence in land. For θαρσέω as 'think confidently' with appropriate constructions cf. 1.81.1 τάχ' ἄν τις θαρσοίη ὅτι . . . ὑπερφέρομεν and 6.92.1 ὥς γε δυνατά . . . πάνυ θαρσῶ.

49.2 οὐδ' ὁπωσοῦν: the emphatic negative equivalent of καὶ ὁπωσοῦν = 'in any way at all' (e.g. Aeschin. 3.17, Plato, *Laws* 2.657b, 10.905d). **εἰ δὲ δεῖ . . . ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων ψηφίσματος:** despite the conditional form, Demosthenes seems to accept this point, or at least not reject it out of

hand. **τρίβειν αὐτούς:** **48**.6n. Thus Demosthenes accepts that if they do remain it must be to wage a war of attrition, at least until permission comes to leave. Cutting off provisions by siege is no longer a possibility, but plundering (O'Connor 2011: 105–9) and ravaging and sea-operations to cut off supplies might still have that effect: Syracuse still had to feed many more mouths than usual. **Θάψον . . . Κατάνην:** the Athenians had occupied Thapsus, 'a peninsula with a narrow neck not far from Syracuse by land or sea' (6.97.1), briefly in mid 414; Catana (6.3.3n.) had been their winter base in 415–414 (6.88.5). **στενοχωρίαι:** **36**.4–6nn. **πρὸς τῶν πολεμίων** 'to the advantage of the enemy', LSJ πρός A.III.2. **ἐν ἧι . . . ἔξουσιν** 'in which their own expertise would be useful, and they would be able to retreat and attack without having to operate from a narrow and circumscribed space in which to put out to sail and back into port'.

49.3 τό τε ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν: effectively part of the indirect speech: 'to bring it all together, he said . . .' Cf. **77**.7. **μὴ μέλλειν:** a variation on his signature phrase μὴ διατρίβειν (**43**.2n.). But delay, Nicias' trademark (Intr., p. 28, 6.10.5n.), carries the day, and μέλλ- words recur twice in **49**.4 and twice again at **50**.4. A character in Aristophanes' *Birds* (414 BCE) urges the company not to μελλονικιᾶν, translated by Dunbar 1995 as 'suffer from the Nikias-dithers'.

49.4 μέλλησις ἐνεγένετο: initially an internal (ἐν-) wavering before making up their minds; it leads on to the delay in action (διεμέλλησαν). There is no need to think that Demosthenes and Eurymedon were outvoted, and that therefore Menander and Euthydemus must have had a say and sided with Nicias (Kagan 1981: 321): Demosthenes and Eurymedon are simply led to hesitate. **ἅμα ὑπόνοια μή τι καὶ πλέον εἰδὼς ὁ Νικίας ἰσχυρίζηται:** for μή + subjunctive after verbs of suspicion see *CGCG* 43.1. It is this suspicion that makes the difference with them, not their fear of Athenian retribution, though both had reasons to know that this fear of Nicias was well grounded: after a setback in 426 Demosthenes had lingered around Naupactus 'fearing the Athenians after what had happened' (3.98.5), while Eurymedon was one of the generals punished in 424 (4.65.3). **διεμέλλησάν τε καὶ κατὰ χώραν ἔμενον:** διεμέλλησαν, aorist, of their indecisiveness now; ἔμενον, imperfect, of their consequent protracted behaviour.

50–6: THE BALANCE TILTS FURTHER

The night battle (**43–5**) was one climax, both as a turning point in the campaign and as an artistic tour de force; but these chapters swiftly give a sense of an even greater confrontation to come, with the Syracusan forces massing and the Athenians daunted (**50**). The emphasis lies as much on

morale as on the successes or failures themselves, first the Athenian regret at their failure to pull out and their response to the eclipse (50.3–4), then the corresponding Syracusan uplift (51.1). Further encounters only reinforce these feelings on both sides, and the confidence that even Nicias felt in the fleet (49.1) proves as delusory as any hopes on land. The Athenian despair takes an even more melancholic and reflective turn (55); the Syracusan buoyancy turns from confidence in survival to a glow of anticipation of the glory to be won – καλὸν σφίσιν ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας τὸ ἀγώνισμα (56.2) – and the prominence that will follow. The similarities to Athens herself, especially her past glories of the Persian Wars, are increasingly felt (55.2, 56.2–4nn.), a theme that was adumbrated by Hermocrates as early as 6.33.6. If, too, Syracuse is the new Athens, that symmetrically casts Athens as the new Persia, yet all the more vulnerable because it is an invader that is not alien but all too similar (55.2).

50.1 **Ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος καὶ ὁ Σικανός:** returning from their missions of 46(nn.). **ἡ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις στάσις [ἐς] φιλία** 'the faction friendly to the Syracusans'. The ἐς was interpolated by a scribe who presumably misunderstood στάσις as the strife itself rather than one party to it and read or interpreted φιλία as φίλια, neuter plural. **ἄλλην τε στρατιὰν πολλήν** 'another large army': cf. 21.1. **τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου . . . ἀποσταλέντας:** 19.3–5; one ship had arrived at 25.3. The rest had taken their time; cf. next nn.

50.2 **ἀπενεχθέντες:** by winds, as at 6.104.2 and Hdt. 2.114.2 and 116.2 (Helen in Egypt). This whole section has a Herodotean flavour: cf. Dorieus getting embroiled with Sybaris against Croton (Hdt. 5.44) or the Samians with Rhegium, Zancle, and Gela (6.23). **Κυρηναίων:** Euesperides was the colony of Cyrene and Cyrene's mother-city Thera was itself a colony of Sparta, and those ties will have influenced Cyrene's contribution of the ships and the Spartans' support of Euesperides. Even so, Syracuse would have hoped and expected that the ships would arrive earlier. Adding the Cyrenaean ships, and just as important the guides, made sense, but getting involved with the Euesperides seems a distraction. Perhaps it was a quid pro quo for the ships. **Εὐεσπερίταις:** the modern Benghazi: *IACP* 1041–3. **Νέαν πόλιν Καρχηδονιακὸν ἐμπόριον:** probably Naibaul. **ἐς Σελινοῦντα:** presumably not sailing directly to Syracuse because of their fear of the reinforced Athenian fleet.

50.3 **τῇ ἀσθενείαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων:** 47.2n. **ἀλλ' ἢ:** i.e. ἀλλὸ ἢ, 'in any other respect other than . . .' **φανερῶς . . . ψηφίζεσθαι:** 48n. **προεῖπον ὡς ἐδύναντο ἀδηλότατα:** contrasting with μὴ φανερῶς . . . ψηφίζεσθαι, not an open vote but as covert an order as possible (21.2n.). προεῖπον

governs first the accusative ἔκπλουν (cf. e.g. X. *Cyr.* 1.6.18), then the verb παρασκευάσασθαι (cf. e.g. 6.65.1). **παρασκευάσασθαι ὅταν τις σημήνῃ** 'to prepare [to leave] when the signal was given'.

50.4 μελλόντων: the keyword again (**49**.3n.), though here in the sense 'as they were about to'. **ἡ σελήνη ἐκλείπει:** 27 August 413. For other eclipses in antiquity that affected military campaigns see *GSW* III.308–13. They tended particularly to impede imminent departures, though it was also possible to argue that they were good omens rather than bad: see below on ἦν γάρ τι καὶ ἄγαν . . . The historic present for a natural phenomenon rather than a human action is rare (Rijksbaron 2011: 7 with n. 15), and marks the extreme importance of the moment. **ἐτύγχανε** 'it was at the time'. This is a particularly clear instance where τυγχάνω carries no suggestion of 'chance' (**4**.3n.): there is nothing chancy about an eclipse coinciding with a full moon. **οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι:** the subject, subdivided then into οἵ τε πλείους . . . καὶ ὁ Νικίας, each with a different verb. **ἐκέλευον** 'urged' (not 'ordered', 6.13.1n.): cf. **72**.4n. **ἐνθύμιον ποιούμενοι** 'taking it to heart': cf. Hdt. 2.175.5. **ἦν γάρ τι καὶ ἄγαν θειασμῷ τε καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ προσκείμενος:** a famous judgement; cf. Intr., p. 29. The later usage of θειασμός suggests that it is more general than 'divination', though not quite 'superstition' (LSJ). It conveys behaviour driven by a preoccupation with things divine: 'goddishness' or 'religiosity' captures the range, though the Greek word is not always so pejorative. τι, 'to an extent' or 'somewhat', softens the judgement, but it is hard to catch its force in τι καὶ ἄγαν, as καί emphasises ἄγαν ('not only true, but true in a marked degree', *GP* 317): probably 'inclined to an extent, even too much inclined, to . . .' So it is a criticism, but a qualified one. Plut. reasonably cites it as an example of moderate language when a malicious writer might have used the harsher θεόληπτος, 'god-possessed' (*Herodotus' Malice* 855b). Th.'s careful phrasing leaves it open for some degree of θειασμός to be acceptable and appropriate, just not as much as this. Generals were expected to take the advice of seers seriously; how seriously, though, could evidently be a matter of debate (*GSW* III.48–9; cf. *CT*). Plato's Socrates is firm that 'the law prescribes that a μάντις should not rule a στρατηγός but the other way round' (*Laches* 199a), and Homer's Hector does not come over badly when he overrides the warning of the seer Poulydamas (*Il.* 12.230–50). The interpretation of an omen could itself be unclear. Plut., who was interested in Nicias' religiosity, adds several useful items here (*Nic.* 23), though the authors he quotes are fourth-century or later and may have been concerned to save the good name of μαντική. Stilbides, Nicias' favourite μάντις, had apparently just died: Plut. quotes Philochorus (*FGrH* 328 F 135) for the view that had he been alive he would have advised that it was a good

omen, for the departure required stealth and darkness. Similarly in 357 BCE a μάντις conveniently advised that an eclipse was a good sign, and Dion went on to overthrow the tyrant Dionysius (Plut. *Dion* 24.2–3). That parallel too is quoted by Plut. at *Nic.* 23, not in Nicias' favour. Plut. adds that 'people used to' (imperfect) regard three days as sufficient for watching the heavens after an eclipse, and this was also what was recorded by Autocleides (*FGrH* 353 F 7), an 'exegete' (i.e. 'interpreter') of uncertain date; Diod. 13.13.6 too refers to 'the customary three days'. Plut. adds that the physical causes of eclipses were beginning to be understood by now, thanks largely to Anaxagoras (cf. DK 59 A 42.9, 77), but this had not affected popular superstition. See A. Powell 1979: 25–8, Keyser 2006 (a good comparison of Hdt. and Th. on eclipses and earthquakes), and Flower 2008: 114–19. **διαβουλεύσασθαι:** the equivalent of an optative in direct speech, 'he would not discuss it'. Th. writes as if this is wholly Nicias' decision; one wonders what Demosthenes and Eurymedon thought. Diod. 13.12.6 wondered too: 'Demosthenes and the others were forced to agree in order to play safe with the divine power'. Roisman 1993: 65 thinks that Demosthenes should have done more to object. **ἐξηγοῦντο** 'interpreted', recommended as advisable. Not all seers might have agreed: see above on ἦν γάρ τι καὶ ἄγαν . . . For the significance of 27 see also 5.26.1–4, the 27 years that many rightly prophesied that the war would last; here as there 'thrice nine' has an oracular ring. 27 does show certain mathematical curiosities (3 × 3 × 3, the only positive integer that is three times the sum of its digits, etc.), but here its significance is more likely to be lunar in response to the eclipse (cf. Plut. *Nic.* 23.9, 'to wait for another cycle of the moon'): the sidereal month lasts 27.5 days (*GSW* III.209 and n. 178). **ὅπως ἂν πρότερον κινηθείη:** indirect question after διαβουλεύσασθαι (*CGCG* 40.5). **μελλήσασι:** cf. διεμέλλησάν (**49**.4), with a similar play of tenses: here an aorist for the initial decision to delay, then ἡ μονή for the wait that followed, with the pluperfect ἐγεγένητο pushing the narrative focus forward into that interval (**42**.2n.).

51.1 ὡς καὶ αὐτῶν . . . σφῶν 'on the grounds that they too [the Athenians] had already passed judgement on themselves as no longer having superiority over them [σφῶν = the Syracusans]'. **οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸν ἔκπλουν ἐπιβουλεῦσαι** 'for they would not otherwise have planned to sail away'. **οὐ βουλόμενοι . . . ναυμαχεῖν:** thus implicitly supporting the wisdom of Demosthenes' fallback proposal of **49**.2; ἐν ὧι σφίσι ξυμφέρει makes the same point as ἐν στενοχωρίαι, ἢ πρὸς τῶν πολεμίων μᾶλλόν ἐστι there. But the Syracusans' concern also shows that Nicias had been right to argue that, if they were to go, they should not make that decision clear in advance (**48**.1; cf. **50**.3), as the Syracusans would try their hardest

to frustrate that plan. **ἄλλοσε:** picking up the idea of motion implicit in καθεζομένους. **χαλεπωτέρους . . . προσπολεμεῖν** 'harder to fight against'. **αὐτοῦ** 'there'.

51.2 ἀνεπειρῶντο 'trained'. **τῇι μὲν προτέραι:** indicating that two days are envisaged for the action, and picked up by **52.1** τῇι δ' ὑστεραίαι. **πρὸς τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων προσέβαλλον:** the Athenians had several walls (Map 4), and here and at **52.1** Th. does not help the reader to visualise this by specifying which are meant, though ἄνω (**54**) suggests that the attack was on Epipolae. **ἀπολαμβάνουσι . . . καταδιώκουσιν . . . ἀπολλύασι:** only a preliminary, as Th. has made clear, but the historic presents mark that it has some importance. So does the specification of 'seventy' horses: this loss will have more lasting effect (Intr., pp. 27–8) than that of 'not many hoplites'. Th. does not elaborate the scene, holding his narrative fire for the great scenes to come, but we can imagine the chaos of cavalrymen abandoning their mounts to scramble to safety.

52.1 ἀπεχώρησεν . . . ἐκπλέουσιν . . . ἐχώρουν . . . ἀντανῆγον . . . ἐναυμάχουν: first the aorist ἀπεχώρησεν for the one-off withdrawal, then historic present ἐκπλέουσιν for the dramatic offering of battle; imperfects ἐχώρουν and ἀντανῆγον set the scene for the fight, then in ἐναυμάχουν mark its beginning and continuation. Plut. *Nic.* 24.1–3 gives a different picture of this engagement, with some Syracusan fisher-lads taunting the Athenians until one sails too close and is caught: ten triremes sail to his rescue, then it escalates to a full-scale battle. **ἓξ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα:** at **37.3**(n.) the Syracusans had 'about eighty', and then two were sunk and one captured (**41.2**). Two more had come from Cyrene (**50.1**). That should give a total now of about seventy-nine, within the margin of error given by that initial 'about'; but in any case there will have been a varying number of ships that were unseaworthy. Diod. 13.13.1 says 'seventy-four'. Cf. Keyser 2006: 341: as usual, Th. is more concerned to convey the scale of the conflict than to explain the exact number. **ἓξ καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα:** not by any means all of their fleet. At **37.3** the Athenians had manned seventy-five, subsequently losing 'one or two' (**38.1**) and then seven, with more damaged (**41.4**); then Demosthenes and Eurymedon brought 'about seventy-three' (**42.1**), though some of these may well have been troop-carriers (*CT* 1063). Perhaps the full fleet would be unusable in the narrow bay (C–S), but it may also be that few of the original ships were now battleworthy. Now they will lose another eighteen (**53.3**); in their final desperate break-out, then manning even the less seaworthy (**60.2**), they will muster 110 (**60.4**). Th. again leaves it to the attentive reader to trace all this without further explanation.

52.2 ἐπεξάγοντα . . . πρὸς τὴν γῆν μᾶλλον 'extending his line more towards the shore', i.e. more than he should have done. **κἀκεῖνον** 'him too', as well as the ships in the middle that they have already beaten. **ἐν τῶι κοίλωι καὶ μυχῶι τοῦ λιμένος:** the interior recesses of the harbour, with μυχῶι as at **4**.4. Given that Eurymedon was in command of the Athenian right and the middle has collapsed, Diod. 13.13.3 is probably correct in puttting this in the southern curve of the bay, which he calls 'Dascon' (cf. 6.66.2n.); but *HCT* and *CT* put it to the north. **αὐτόν τε διαφθείρουσι:** the verb does double duty for killing him and sinking the ships. His death is given even less emphasis than that of Lamachus (6.101.6(n.)). Th.'s farewell to Nicias (**86**.6) will be very different. **τὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ ναῦς ἐπισπομένας:** seven of them according to Diod. 13.13.3. Herwerden suspected, perhaps rightly, that ἑπτά has here fallen out of Th.'s text after ἐπισπομένας: it would easily be lost between two other επ- words. **κατεδίωκόν τε καὶ ἐξεώθουν:** imperfects, both because inceptive and because this is what they were doing when Gylippus noticed (**53**.1): **74**.2n.

53.1 ἔξω τῶν σταυρωμάτων . . . καταφερομένας: the reader/listener will initially be unclear whether this would have been north or south of the Athenian V-shaped walls (6.103.1, **4**.5nn.: see Map 4). 'The χηλή' and **53**.2 'Lysimeleia' would make it clear which it was (see **53**.2n.), but only to those who knew the terrain: neither has been mentioned before. This does however convey an impression of knowingness: cf. 6.66.1n. and Rawles 2015: 134. **ἀφέλκειν** 'haul away' from the shore, presumably then to add to their own fleet if not too severely damaged. **τῆς γῆς φιλίας οὔσης** 'if the land was in friendly hands', conditional use of the participle (*CGCG* 52.40). **τὴν χηλήν** probably 'the spit', apparently between Lysimeleia (wherever that was) and the sea. It may have been reinforced with stones to strengthen the sea-defence, as at 1.63.1 if the scholiast's explanation there is right: see *HCT* ad loc. 'The' spit seems to assume it will be familiar, but most of Th.'s readers/listeners will have had no idea what was meant.

53.2 οἱ Τυρσηνοί: **57**.11 and 6.88.6nn. **τὴν λίμνην τὴν Λυσιμέλειαν καλουμένην:** this time καλουμένην concedes that this will be unfamiliar, though on one view of the topography it may be the λίμνη mentioned at 6.66.2(n.). Its location is uncertain: *HCT* 484 puts it south-west of the Athenian walls, in which case Gylippus will have been operating from Plemmyrion or the Olympieion; Green 1970: 184 and 300 and Kagan 1981: 326 n. 58 place it to the north, with Gylippus coming from the city. (Kagan's map on p. 232 seems inconsistent with his narrative.) Rawles 2015 suggests (a) that true or false etymology, either 'limb-loosening' as

in the Homeric λῦσε δὲ γυῖα or 'care-releasing', may have added resonance here, and (b) that this was a holy lake of Persephone and Demeter (cf. Theocr. 16.84) and 'driving them into' the lake could be seen as a perversion of animal sacrifice (**50**.4). Th.'s language here gives no hint of that aspect, but this will be in line with his general religious reticence.

53.2–3 Various echoes accentuate 'the rapid switches of fortune' (Rawles 2015: 133), with for the moment the Athenians and their allies taking over the role of 'helpers' (ἐπεκβοηθήσαντες and ἐπιβοηθήσαντες ~ παρεβοήθει, Gylippus at **53**.1) and then 'victors' (νικήσαντες ~ the Syracusans at **52**.2), 'turning' (τρέπουσι ~ τρεψάμενοι, **51**.2) and then 'pursuing' the enemy (ἐπεδίωξαν ~ καταδιώκουσιν, **51**.2 and κατεδίωκον, **52**.2) and killing 'not many hoplites' (~ **51**.2). But that 'not many' also contrasts with the Syracusan slaughter now of all the captured seamen, perhaps as many as 3,600 men. Van Wees 2011: 83 rightly observes the brevity of Th.'s notice of that and infers that such executions, even if not on this scale, were not unusual.

53.4 κληματίδων καὶ δαιδός 'branches and pinewood'. Fireships are rarely attested in the ancient world (one other instance was their use by Tyre against Alexander in 322, Arr. *Anab.* 2.19), and this may well be an innovation now, a further example like the strengthened rams (**34**n.) of the wartime direction of human inventiveness towards the bloodiest ends (3.82–3; cf. Macleod 1979). **παύσαντες . . . τὴν ὁλκάδα** 'putting out the flame and stopping the cargo-ship from coming closer', with παύσαντες taking first an accusative and then the τὸ μή + infinitive often found with verbs of preventing, though παύω more usually takes a bare infinitive (*CGCG* 51.36 and n. 1).

54 τῆς ἄνω τῆς πρὸς τῶι τείχει ἀπολήψεως τῶν ὁπλιτῶν: echoing ἀπολαμβάνουσί τε τῶν ὁπλιτῶν τινάς at **51**.2. ἄνω is the first clear indication that the engagement took place away from the shore, probably on Epipolae (**51**.2n.). **ἥς τε οἱ Τυρσηνοὶ τροπῆς ἐποιήσαντο . . . καὶ ἧς αὐτοί:** relative attraction for ἐκείνης τε τῆς τροπῆς ἣν οἱ Τυρσηνοὶ ἐποιήσαντο . . . καὶ ἐκείνης ἣν αὐτοὶ [ἐποιήσαντο]. **τῶι ἄλλωι στρατοπέδωι** 'by the rest of the army'.

55.1 Γεγενημένης δὲ τῆς νίκης τοῖς Συρακοσίοις λαμπρᾶς ἤδη καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ: careful wording and word order. The perfect γεγενημένης, not aorist γενομένης, prepares for a lasting state consequent on what had happened; λαμπρᾶς combines the idea of 'clear' (LSJ 1.6) – so clear that neither side could doubt it – with 'resplendent', preparing for the καλὸν τὸ ἀγώνισμα theme of **56**.2–3 and the impression this would make on all Greece; ἤδη is then delayed to go particularly closely with καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ,

for land-superiority had been clear before but the maritime issue had still been in doubt. **πρότερον μέν:** preparing for a νῦν δέ which is left implicit. **ἐν παντὶ δὴ ἀθυμίας** 'in complete despondency': for the idiom cf. ἐν παντὶ κακοῦ, Plato, *Rep.* 9.579a and Aeschin. 1.61 ἐν παντὶ κινδύνου, X. *Hipp.* 12.8, and the simple ἐν παντί = 'terrified', X. *Hell.* 5.4.29, Plato *Smp.* 194a. **οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι:** Th. does not blur the slickness of the Athens ~ Syracuse comparison by mentioning Athens' allies, not all of whom came from democracies. **ὁ παράλογος** 'the unexpectedness': **28**.3n. **τῆς στρατείας ὁ μετάμελος** 'the regret for the expedition', i.e. that it happened at all: the word-order throws the stress on τῆς στρατείας. Other occurrences of μετάμελος as a noun are much later, and Th. may well have coined it for the jingling juxtaposition with ὁ παράλογος.

55.2 πόλεσι γὰρ ταύταις μόναις ἤδη ὁμοιοτρόποις ἐπελθόντες: cf. Intr., pp. 31–2, esp. 8.96.5 (quoted there) where ὁμοιότροποι makes a similar point about Syracuse. Here, though, Th. speaks of 'cities', plural, though the rest of the analysis – ναῦς καὶ ἵππους καὶ μεγέθη ἐχούσαις – clearly focuses on Syracuse, and that is central to the point at **56**.4, ἐπὶ μίαν πόλιν. Still, attracting local allies was important, and it was not just Syracuse where the usual Athenian ploy of supporting local democrats would not work, despite the *stasis* that was such a Sicilian feature. Other cities too were either democracies or close enough to it to make it difficult to play for regime change (πολιτείας μεταβολή): the set-up at Selinus (*IACP* 222) and Himera (*IACP* 199) is obscure, but at Camarina the assembly could at least make decisions (6.75.4n.); Acragas stayed neutral, but may have been democratic enough (*IACP* 187, Berger 1992: 17) to rule out any revolutionary sweetener to win the city over. Thus ἤδη here is to be taken closely with ὁμοιοτρόποις (which includes democracy even though not confined to that aspect, Intr., p. 31): cities were *already* democracies, even if in Syracuse's case a less extreme variety than at Athens. **δημοκρατουμέναις τε . . . πολλῶι δὴ μᾶλλον ἔτι:** short phrases jostle one another in this sentence, suiting the one-damn-thing-after-another depression. The style becomes more flowing for Syracusan buoyancy: **56**. **ἵππους:** Intr., pp. 27–8. **μεγέθη:** the plural indicates that everything was on a large scale. **ἐπενεγκεῖν . . . τὸ διάφορον** 'bring divisiveness to bear upon them', with τό adding a hint of 'that well-known feature'. **οὔτ' ἐκ πολιτείας τι** [= 'to any extent'] **μεταβολῆς . . . ἐκ παρασκευῆς πολλῶι κρείσσονος:** two ways in which discord might normally be sown. Regime change was now ruled out more by δημοκρατουμέναις and intimidation more by the ναῦς καὶ ἵππους καὶ μεγέθη that the Sicilians too possessed. **ὧι προσήγοντο ἄν:** middle, 'by which they might have brought them over'. **τά τε πρὸ αὐτῶν** 'both earlier', lit. 'with respect to the things before these': accusative of

respect. **ἐπειδή γε** 'now indeed that', causal as well as temporal, with γε emphasising the link: 6.18.1n. **ὃ οὐκ ἂν ᾤοντο** 'something they would not have thought possible'.

56.1 διενοοῦντο κλήισειν: as they go on to do at **59**.3. **ὅπως μηκέτι . . . λάθοιεν:** purpose clause in historic sequence (*CGCG* 45.3). See also **56**.2n. on ὅπως . . . κωλύσουσι.

56.2 περὶ τοῦ αὐτοὶ σωθῆναι 'about their own safety': αὐτοί is nominative as 'they' are also the subject of the main verb. Th. does not overstate: survival is still a concern *as well* as the glory (οὐ . . . μόνον . . . ἀλλὰ καί). **ὅπως ἐκείνους κωλύσουσι:** an 'effort clause' in historic sequence (*CGCG* 44.2). The variety of construction after τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιοῦντο is characteristic. The future indicative gives even greater immediacy than the optative ὅπως τε λάθοιεν: this is how the future is shaping in their own minds. **ἀπό τε τῶν παρόντων** 'on the basis of each side's current resources'. **καλὸν σφίσιν ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας τὸ ἀγώνισμα φανεῖσθαι:** cf. Intr., p. 30: this becomes a rising theme (**56**.3, **59**.2, **66**.1, **68**.3, **70**.7, **71**.1, and **86**.2). The expedition began with the Athenians preoccupied with the impression they would make on 'the Greeks' elsewhere (ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐπίδειξιν . . . τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ ἐξουσίας, 6.31.4(n.)); now an end is in prospect with the Syracusans able to think in similar terms. 'In regard to the Greeks' (LSJ εἰς IV) goes not just with the 'appearing' but with the ἀγώνισμα too, a 'contending' on their behalf as well as the Syracusans'. **ἐλευθεροῦσθαι . . . ἀπολύεσθαι:** present infinitives to capture the Syracusans' thinking: it is as good as happening already. It did not eventually come about so soon, but still those imaginings were not unrealistic. Cf. 8.2.1, the stir among οἱ Ἕλληνες when they heard of the Athenian calamity. **τὸν ὕστερον ἐπενεχθησόμενον πόλεμον ἐνεγκεῖν** 'to bear the war that would afterwards be borne down upon them': whether ἐνεγκεῖν or ἀνενεγκεῖν is read, there is wordplay with the two φέρω words. **ὑπό τε . . . θαυμασθήσεσθαι:** again (cf. on καλὸν σφίσιν . . . φανεῖσθαι above) the sort of language familiar from Athenian self-belief: cf. Pericles at 2.39.4, 2.64.5, and esp. 2.41.4 τοῖς τε νῦν καὶ τοῖς ἔπειτα θαυμασθησόμεθα. Nicias echoes such thinking more sombrely at **63**.3(n.). Cf. also 6.12.2n.

56.3 καὶ ἦν δὲ ἄξιος ὁ ἀγών: the switch to direct discourse marks this as Th.'s own endorsing comment, and the combination καὶ . . . δέ marks this as a new and separate point (*GP* 199). The focus remains on the way the Syracusans were seeing it, but Th. marks this as reasonable. For the agonistic language cf. ἀγώνισμα in **56**.2 and see Intr., p. 30. **περιεγίγνοντο:** perhaps again in anticipation like ἐλευθεροῦσθαι and ἀπολύεσθαι in **56**.2(n.), but this also reflects current reality: they

were already 'overcoming'. **οὐδ' αὐτοὶ αὖ μόνον:** in one way this might reduce their glory, but it also emphasises the size of the conflict and the leadership role that Syracuse has come to play along the foremost cities of Greece. The similarities to Athens are felt even more strongly, and more particularly with their leadership role in 480–479: see next n. **τὴν σφετέραν πόλιν . . . προκόψαντες:** similar to the claims Athens proudly made about their part in the Persian Wars: cf. esp. the Athenians at Sparta, φάμεν γὰρ Μαραθῶνί τε μόνοι προκινδυνεῦσαι (1.73.4), then (in 480) ἀριθμόν τε νεῶν πλεῖστον καὶ ἄνδρα στρατηγὸν ξυνετώτατον καὶ προθυμίαν ἀοκνοτάτην (1.74.1); but here the claim to expertise is made not about a 'very canny leader' but about the 'improvements', προκόψαντες, that they have made in a great part of τὸ ναυτικόν. That is probably to be taken as 'naval skill', as at e.g. 8.45.2 ἐκ πλείονος χρόνου ἐπιστήμονες ὄντες τοῦ ναυτικοῦ, rather than concretely 'the fleet'.

56.4 ἔθνη: echoed at 57.11 to round off the Athenian catalogue. **πλεῖστα δὴ . . . πλήν γε δὴ τοῦ ξύμπαντος λόγου . . . Λακεδαιμονίων:** 'the greatest number . . . if one discounts the total count of those opposing Athens and Sparta in this war': the qualification makes rather a meal of it, as Th.'s point was already clear. For his taste for 'the greatest . . . in this war' observations see **30**.4n.

57–59.1: THE CATALOGUES

Th. could have inserted these catalogues at several points before this, most obviously at the first arrival of the Athenians in 415 or, better, on the arrival of the reinforcements at **42**.1: the latter could have taken into account the shifts in alliance as the tide turned. Placing them here is, like the speeches at **60**.5–**69**.2, a pointer to the decisiveness of the encounter to come; their length points to the massiveness of the fight, though Th. does not give numbers beyond the relative proportions on the Syracusan side (**58**.4). The ultimate model is Book 2 of the *Iliad*, and Hdt. has several in his later books: the most elaborate of these is at 7.59–100 and the most similar to this one is at 8.43–8, curtain-raising for Salamis just as this too precedes a great naval battle. This, Th. implies, is to be a battle on the same level as those of the Trojan and the Persian Wars, and his narrative too stakes its claim to be a classic.

Few of the contingents on the Athenian side have been specifically mentioned before in Sicily; they have been lumped together as 'allies' (e.g. 6.26.2) or, in speeches, as 'islanders' (e.g. 6.68.2). A particular interest now is *why* these allies should be there. Race is traced throughout, and especially cases where colony fights against mother-city (**57**.6 and 9) or

kin against kin, but it is immediately stressed that ethnicity, like justice, played no more part than expediency or necessity (57.1(n.)) – which is not to say that those factors played no part at all. The distinction between subject allies and allies by choice is recurrently drawn, and there is no pretence that those subject allies are here by their own wish: they fall into the 'necessity' rather than 'expediency' grouping (57.4 and 5, 57.7 ἀνάγκη, 58.6 ἠναγκάζοντο, then on the other side 58.3 ἀναγκαστοί). There are other forms of necessity too (cf. Orwin 2017: 364–6), for *stasis* imposes its own ἀνάγκη (57.11(n.)), and island-existence its own constraint (57.7). Nor does Th. play down the role of the emotions, and hatred (57.5, 7, 9) and to a lesser extent liking (57.10) play as great a part as ever. Fear too has its impact: Syracuse is in the 'greatest' danger (58.4), but the other states were endangered too, and thus far Hermocrates' rhetoric (4.61, 6.77) is vindicated. In 57 Th. starts with those allies most similar to the protagonists and moves on gradually through those more diverse, in race, degree of independence, and finally geography; in 58 the same dividing principles apply, but they are ordered differently, with geography predominating, initially moving through the Greek cities (Maurer 1995: 74 n. 28) in what we would call a clockwise direction, then dealing with the interior, and finally listing the extra-Sicilian allies.

There is much more to be said about each of the cities and islands mentioned: see *CT*, together with the cities' entries in *IACP* and, especially on matters of kinship, Fragoulaki 2013: index s.vv.

57.1 ἐπὶ Σικελίαν τε καὶ περὶ Σικελίας, τοῖς μὲν ξυγκτησόμενοι . . . τοῖς δὲ ξυνδιασώσοντες: the ξυγκτησόμενοι goes with the attackers coming 'against Sicily', the ξυνδιασώσοντες with the defender fighting 'for Sicily'; not in either case 'for Syracuse', and so the formulation acknowledges that Athens had broader ideas of conquest (6.6.1n.). **ἐπὶ Συρακούσαις:** the MSS have ἐπὶ Συρακούσας, which would have to depend awkwardly on the sense of motion explicit in ἐλθόντες. Like ἐν Συρακούσαις (cf. e.g. Plato, *Seventh Letter* 329c) Dover's tentative ἐς Συρακούσας would suggest fighting within the city rather than around it. His objection to Bauer's ἐπὶ Συρακούσαις is that it 'has too strong a flavour of purpose' (*HCT* 436), but a hint of purpose is good: both sides are fighting 'over Syracuse' as well. **ἐπολέμησαν** 'went to war', aorist for the one action. But through the catalogue Th. varies aorists of this sort with imperfects for the continuing activity with no great differentiation of point (though see 57.1on. on ἐπεκούρησαν). **οὐ κατὰ δίκην . . . οὐδὲ κατὰ ξυγγένειαν:** Th.'s insistence is striking, and might be combating rival views: it is possible enough that Dorian propaganda made something of the outcome as a racial triumph over feebler Ionians and a vindication of their rightful cause. But it is

just as likely that this is picking up the emphases of Hermocrates, who inveighed against the morally evil and ethnically alien Athenians (6.76–8on.): these, Th. now points out, were not in the event the reasons that weighed most. **οὐ . . . μᾶλλον . . . ἀλλ' ὡς . . . ἔσχον:** such 'not more . . . than . . .' or 'not so much . . . as' locutions are several times used by Th. to pass important judgements: the Sicilian expedition was 'not so much' a matter of an initial mistake as of bad follow-up decisions (2.65.11; cf. Intr., p. 6 and examples cited there); cf. **57**.7 οὐχ ἧσσον, **57**.9 οὐ . . . μᾶλλον ἤ, and **57**.10 ἅμα μὲν . . .τὸ δὲ πλέον. This should not be taken as an understated way of conveying 'a very great deal more/less than', still less as excluding one factor completely: both factors are important, and Th. knows that motives are usually mixed. Cf. 6.31.4n., and on Hdt.'s similar way of thinking Pelling 2019: 104. **ὡς ἕκαστοι . . . ἔσχον** 'in whatever situation each was in according either to expediency or necessity', expediency more in the case of the free allies acting from choice, necessity for the subject allies. For the genitive ξυντυχίας, lit. 'according to whatever sort of circumstances each experienced', cf. 6.97.3n. and e.g. **33**.6 ἐν τούτωι τύχης.

57.2 Ἀθηναῖοι . . . Ἴωνες ἐπὶ Δωριᾶς Συρακοσίους: chiastically arranged. **ἑκόντες . . . τῆι αὐτῆι φωνῆι καὶ νομίμοις:** the leading themes of the catalogues are immediately struck. ἑκόντες hardly needed saying in the case of the Athenians, but contrasts with the necessity faced by others; the Ionian/Dorian division will be traced throughout, and 'speech and customs' narrows rather than rephrases that division, as not all Ionians spoke the Attic dialect or shared the same customs. **Λήμνιοι καὶ Ἴμβριοι καὶ Αἰγινῆται . . . καὶ ἔτι Ἑστιαιῆς . . . ἄποικοι ὄντες:** ἄποικοι ὄντες qualifies all four, not just the Hestiaeans. Lemnos passed into Athenian possession shortly after 500 and cleruchies were established both there and at Imbros *c.* 450; the clumsy phrases 'the Aeginetans, the ones who then occupied Aegina' and 'the Hestiaeans settled in the Euboean Hestiaea' refer to the mass expulsions of the Aeginetan population in 431 (2.27.1) and of the Hestiaeans in 446 (1.114.3). Th. distinguishes the current occupants, settled there after the expulsions, from the previous inhabitants now relocated within the Peloponnese (Aegina, 2.27.2) and Macedonia (Hestiaea, Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 387). Aegina was reclaimed in 405 (X. *Hell.* 2.2.9), and it is probably right to infer that the passage was written or adjusted after that date, unless τότε is simply framed from the viewpoint of Th.'s putative future readers. See also **57**.8, **58**.1nn.

57.3 οἱ δ' ἀπὸ ξυμμαχίας αὐτόνομοι: an alliance might impose some moral obligation to participate, though less for an aggressive war than for self-defence (6.79.1n.); but 'autonomy' (6.77.1n.) meant that such allies were

free to choose whether or not to fulfil that expectation. Cf. 6.6n.: there could be hot debate whether or not to respond to an ally's call. **εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οἵ:** **11**.2n.

57.4 τῶν μὲν ὑπηκόων καὶ φόρου ὑποτελῶν: apparently contradicted by τούτων Χῖοι οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ὄντες φόρου, but Th. is progressively correcting or 'revising in stride' (Pelling 2019: ch. 5[c]) to subdivide 'tribute-bearing subjects' into those paying 'tribute' in its usual sense of money and those who made their contribution by providing ships, i.e. the Chians and also the Methymnaeans (**57**.5). Euphemus refers to their special status at 6.85.2(n.). This had come about by a gradual development within the Delian League, with most states making financial contributions rather than providing ships. At 1.99.3 Th. unsympathetically holds the allies 'themselves to blame' for how difficult they consequently found it to revolt. **Κεῖοι . . . Χῖοι:** Th. lists the islands in (as we would put it) an anti-clockwise sweep. One striking aspect is how many islands are absent from Th.'s lists, and Cawkwell 1997: 118–19 infers that by now islanders had no obligation to serve. Cf. **20**.2n. Of those listed only the Chians have been specifically mentioned as participants before (6.43, **20**.2), there too because of their ships. **τὸ πλεῖστον Ἴωνες ὄντες** 'being for the most part Ionian', acknowledging that there was some racial mix even here and going on to explain by noting the non-Ionian Carystians. *HCT* is wrong to take τὸ πλεῖστον as meaning that these allies 'contributed the greater part of the Athenian force'. **Ἴωνες . . . καὶ ἀπ' Ἀθηναίων:** for this misleading Athenian claim to be the mother-city of all Ionians cf. 1.2.6 and 12.4. It was inflated at the time of the Delian League, but the claim to be the 'eldest land of Ionia' goes back to Solon (fr. 4a W). **Δρύοπες:** they lived around Mt Oeta, but their supposed descendants crop up in various places: cf. Hdt. 8.43 with Bowie 2007 ad loc. **ὑπήκοοι δ' ὄντες . . . ἠκολούθουν:** δ' is adversative: they may have been descended from Athens, but still they were following by necessity, as subjects. ὅμως then goes closely with what follows: however reluctant, 'nevertheless' they were 'at least' (γε) Ionians fighting Dorians, in contrast to the Aeolians and Dorians who will come next and who were fighting against those of their own ethnicity (obviously against the others too, but Th. singles out the kinfolk).

57.5 Μηθυμναῖοι μὲν ναυσὶ καὶ οὐ φόρωι ὑπήκοοι: **57**.4n. **καὶ ἄντικρυς Βοιωτοὶ Βοιωτοῖς** 'in an outright fight of Boeotians against Boeotians', as opposed to the more distant Aeolian connection by lineage with Boeotia. καὶ ἄντικρυς (Böhme) is needed to give the required sense rather than the MSS καταντικρύ, 'right opposite'. **εἰκότως κατὰ τὸ ἔχθος** 'understandably in view of their hatred', in particular for Thebes. That neighbourly hatred went back at least to the sixth century (Hdt. 6.108) and had

reached its climax in 431–427, with the Theban attack on Plataea precipitating the war (2.1–6; cf. **18**.2n.) and the final massacre of Plataean males and enslavement of women and children (3.52–68). The Plataeans fighting now will be those who fled to Athens (3.24.2) or their sons.

57.6 Ῥόδιοι δὲ καὶ Κυθήριοι . . . ἠναγκάζοντο πολεμεῖν: the 'Rhodians' came from, at that time, three separate cities, Lindos, Ialysos, and Cameiros: the synoecism into a single city came only in 408/7 (*IACP* 1205). They are 'Argive by ancestry' because legendarily founded by Heracles' son Tlepolemus (Pind. *Ol.* 7). Their two penteconters and their slingers are recorded at 6.43(n.). On Cythera see **26**.2n. Th. does not elaborate on the Cytherans' motives as he does with the Plataeans. There is no suggestion of necessity with them: Sparta might be thought their mother-city, but Cytherans had no reason to love the city which until 424 had garrisoned the island and sent an annual Spartan Κυθηροδίκης to govern it (4.53.2; *IACP* 583). Necessity does however play a part with the Rhodians (ἠναγκάζοντο), oddly as there are signs of particular enthusiasm at 6.43(n.). But they were tribute-paying subjects, and perhaps Th. did not pick up, or rejected the implications of, those earlier hints. **Γελώιοις δὲ καὶ ἀποίκοις ἑαυτῶν οὖσι:** 6.4.3(n.).

57.7 Κεφαλλῆνες μὲν καὶ Ζακύνθιοι: 31.2n. **μᾶλλον:** probably 'more' by being islanders than because they lacked autonomy, but some may have taken this as 'more' than mainlanders (so e.g. P–S) or by necessity 'rather' than voluntarily (Marchant). **Κερκυραῖοι:** some had recently joined (**26**.3, **31**.5(n.)), and some may have been part of the first voyage as it set sail from Corcyra (6.42.1). **Κορίνθιοι σαφῶς** 'unequivocally Corinthian'. **τῶν δὲ ξυγγενεῖς:** as Syracuse and Corcyra shared the same mother-city, Corinth. **ἀνάγκηι μὲν ἐκ τοῦ εὐπρεποῦς** 'from necessity and giving a good impression': ἀνάγκηι and ἐκ τοῦ εὐπρεποῦς (= εὐπρεπῶς, LSJ ἐκ III.8) both qualify εἵποντο, but their linkage conveys that the 'good impression' comes from a claim that, as Athens' allies, they have no choice. On εὐπρεποῦς see 6.6.1n.: not just 'specious'. **κατὰ ἔχθος τὸ Κορινθίων:** that bad feeling between mother-city and daughter-colony went back a long way (Hdt. 3.49.1): it reached its peak in the quarrel that precipitated the war (1.24–55). **οὐχ ἧσσον: 57**.1n.

57.8 οἱ Μεσσήνιοι νῦν καλούμενοι: those recruited from the ex-helots (**31**.2n.), as would have been clear even without νῦν καλούμενοι. Th.'s point is not quite clear: perhaps (a) now 'called Messenians' rather than the more humiliating 'helots'; but they were called Messenians even before their rebellion (1.101.2); or (b) 'the Messenians, as the inhabitants of Naupactus were now called'; or (c) 'the Messenians, as they

are now called', despite the fact that not all were of genuine Messenian descent, 1.101.2; or (d) 'the people we now call the Messenians' rather than the inhabitants of the geographical Messenia. A combination of (c) and (d) might contribute most; Th. does not normally hesitate to call helots and ex-helots 'Messenians' (4.3.3 etc.), but given the role played by both race and geography in the chapter he may have felt the qualification necessary. In any case the phrase gestures to their Peloponnesian past as they now fight fellow Peloponnesians on the other side. Th. does not specify that they too are 'Dorian', but Messenians later thought of themselves as such (Paus. 4.27.11), and that view seems implied by Hdt. 8.73.2: see J. M. Hall 2003. There is a further ambiguity in νῦν: 'now' as in 413 BCE, or like τότε at **57**.2(n.) assuming the viewpoint of Th. himself or his readers? If the latter, it points to composition before 401/0, the probable date of the Messenians' expulsion from Naupactus, but it may well be the former. **ἐκ Ναυπάκτου καὶ ἐκ Πύλου τότε ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἐχομένης:** probably heard with παρελήφθησαν – this is where they were picked up – rather than as 'the Messenians . . . from Naupactus and Pylos', for which a second οἱ after καλούμενοι would be expected. For Naupactus see **31**.2n.; for Pylos, 6.105.2, **18**.3nn. Athens lost Pylos in 409 (X. *Hell.* 1.2.18), and τότε suggests that this was probably written after that date: cf. **57**.2n. on Aegina. **παρελήφθησαν:** aorist with a pluperfect sense (**21**.1n.). **Μεγαρέων φυγάδες:** 120 of them, mentioned at 6.43(n.) as light-armed troops. They had fled to Athens in 424 (4.74.2). **Μεγαρεῦσι Σελινουντίοις οὖσι:** 6.4.2(n.). **κατὰ ξυμφοράν:** probably just 'as events had turned out': cf. e.g. 1.140.1 bis, 2.44.1; or possibly 'by misfortune', as such ξυμφοραί tend to be unpleasant. There is no need to make this as strong as 'calamity'.

57.9 ἑκούσιος μᾶλλον: the comparative suggests that even in those cases the freedom of choice may have been qualified: cf. οὐ . . . μᾶλλον ἤ . . . in what follows. **ἤδη** 'already': the idea is 'as we work through the list, we are already reaching . . .' **Ἀργεῖοι:** 500 of them in 415 (6.43; cf. 6.71.1n.), and Demosthenes had brought more (7.20.3, 26.1). Argives and Mantineans are mentioned together as so often (e.g. 6.29.3, 43, 68.1, 89.3); 6.67.1 suggests they were brigaded together. **οὐ . . . μᾶλλον ἤ:** **57**.1n. **τῆς ξυμμαχίας:** contracted in 420 (5.43–7). **τῆς παραυτίκα ἕκαστοι ἰδίας ὠφελίας:** suggesting that the Argives were volunteers, which fits Nicias' talk of acquiring Peloponnesian allies 'either by persuasion or by reward' (6.22) and the importance of personal Argive enthusiasm for Alcibiades (6.29.3, 61.5). Some may well have been mercenaries, but not all (6.43n.). **Δωριῆς ἐπὶ Δωριᾶς:** **44**.6 has already noted the confusion in the night battle caused by the presence of paean-singing

Dorians on both sides. **Μαντινῆς δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι Ἀρκάδων μισθοφόροι:** 250 of them in 415 (6.43n.). For Arcadian mercenaries cf. **19**.4n. **ἐπὶ τοὺς αἰεὶ πολεμίους σφίσιν ἀποδεικνυμένους** 'against those who were at any one time pointed out to them as their enemies', αἰεί as at e.g. 2.37.3 τῶν αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇι ὄντων and 6.18.2. **τοὺς μετὰ Κορινθίων ἐλθόντας Ἀρκάδας:** the first mention of these, and **58**.3 will make clear that these too were mercenaries. **Κρῆτες:** 6.43 mentions eighty archers in the original force: archery was a Cretan speciality (6.25.2n.). **Αἰτωλοί:** not mentioned before. They had perhaps been recruited at Naupactus, despite the generally bad relations between that settlement and its neighbours (3.94.3 etc.), or perhaps at Corcyra. **τοῖς Κρησὶ τὴν Γέλαν Ῥοδίοις ξυγκτίσαντας:** 6.4.3(n.). **ξυγκτίσαντας . . . ἑκόντας:** Th. could have said ξυγκτίσασι and ἑκοῦσι to agree with Κρησί, but the participles are drawn into an accusative + infinitive construction: *CGCG* 51.12 n. 1.

57.10 ἅμα μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ πλέον: mixed motives again (**57**.1n.), and ἅμα μέν makes it particularly explicit that the lesser motive is operating as well. **Δημοσθένους φιλίαι καὶ Ἀθηναίων εὐνοίαι:** following Demosthenes' campaign in 426/5 (3.94–114). **ἐπεκούρησαν:** Th. has been skilfully varying his verbs and their tenses, and now the Acarnanians, fired by goodwill, did not simply 'follow' or 'fight', they 'came to help'.

57.11 Ἰταλιωτῶν . . . Σικελιωτῶν: as at 6.44.3(n.), Th. does not regard Sicily as part of 'Italy'. Σικελιῶται are Sicilian Greeks (**43**.4, 6.10.4nn.): hence the further contrast with 'barbarians'. **Θούριοι:** 700 hoplites and 300 javelin-men (**35**.1). Thurii had been broadly friendly since 415 (otherwise the ship carrying Alcibiades would not have docked there, 6.61.6), but Gylippus too had links there (6.104.2); for the *stasis* cf. **33**.6(n.). By 412 Thurian ships will be fighting on the other side (8.35.1). **Μεταπόντιοι:** 300 javelin-men and two ships (**33**.5(n.): cf also 6.44.2n.). **ἐν τοιαύταις ἀνάγκαις** 'in such constraints' as to force this upon them: that is, but for the *stasis* and the current dominance of the pro-Athenians they might have taken a different option, possibly neutrality. **Νάξιοι καὶ Καταναῖοι:** the cities where they had spent winter 415–414. Naxos had been friendly from the outset (6.20.3, 50.2–3(n.), **14**.2); Catana had been initially reluctant to admit the Athenians (there was *stasis* there too), but was won over by a trick (6.50.3–51.2n.) and could afterwards be relied on (**14**.2). The only numbers Th. gives for their detachments are at 6.98.1, where Egesta and Catana together provide horses for 250 cavalry and Naxos and the Sicels provide a hundred cavalrymen, but there will have been more. On the possibility of a financial contribution see 6.44.2, 50.3nn. **βαρβάρων δὲ Ἐγεσταῖοί τε, οἵπερ ἐπηγάγοντο:** 6.6, 6.8.1–2nn. The Egestaean contribution was

disappointing (6.46.1–2) but not negligible, especially in cavalry (6.62.3 and 300 horsemen at 6.98.1(n.)). On Elymian Egesta as 'barbarian' cf. 6.2.3n. **καὶ Σικελῶν τὸ πλέον:** both sides had tried to recruit Sicel allies (6.34.1, 45.1; 6.48.1, 62.5), but the Athenians had been much more successful (6.88.3–4), even more so after the successes of early summer 414 (6.103.2). They had provided horses and horsemen in 414 (6.98.1; cf. 88.6), and cf. **32**(nn.) for the **πάθος** (**33.3**) inflicted on the Syracusans earlier in 413. Cf. 1.4n. and Fragoulaki 2013: 292–8. **Τυρσηνῶν τέ τινες κατὰ διαφορὰν Συρακοσίων:** 6.88.6(n.) notes that some Etruscan cities had made overtures to the Athenians in 415 with offers of help. Three penteconters (6.103.2) and the land-force that played an effective role at 7.53.2–4 had arrived. See Fragoulaki 2013: 283–7, suggesting that the Etruscans may have been influenced by their ancestral kinship with Athens (4.109.4). **καὶ Ἰάπυγες μισθοφόροι:** 150 javelin-men (**33.4**(n.)). **ἔθνη ἐστράτευον:** plural verb with a neuter plural subject because it refers to people: *CGCG* 27.2.

58.1–2 Καμαριναῖοι . . . Γελῷοι οἰκοῦντες μετ' αὐτούς, ἔπειτα Ἀκραγαντίνων . . . Σελινούντιοι . . . Ἱμεραῖοι: Th. first moves round the Greek cities, hence the Geloans 'after them', i.e. as one mentally goes, and 'then the Selinuntians'.

58.1 Καμαριναῖοι: after the debate in late 415 (6.75.3–87) the city had decided to maintain a front of neutrality but to do more, though still as little as possible, for Syracuse (6.88.2). The Syracusan successes of 414–413 had led them to step up their assistance, and at **33.1**(n.) they had sent 500 hoplites and 300 javelin-men and archers. **ὅμοροι ὄντες:** the point is largely one of Th.'s presentational strategy – these are the first one comes to on that mental journey – but not only that: the fear of having a mighty neighbour had weighed heavily in the Camarinaean minds (**ἐγγὺς ὄντας**, 6.88.1(n.)). **Γελῷοι:** Gela had sent cavalry in 415 (6.67.2), and like Camarina had now increased its support (1.4), sending five ships and 400 javelin-men as well as 200 cavalry (**33.1**). **Ἀκραγαντίνων ἡσυχαζόντων:** on Acragas' neutrality see **32.1**n., **33.2**, and on the expulsion of pro-Syracusans **50.1**. Other states were neutral too, especially Messina and Rhegium, but Acragas was especially important. **ἐν τῷι ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα** 'on the far side'. **Σελινούντιοι:** Th. does not, as he did with Egesta (**57.11**), explain their allegiance by going back to the origins of the conflict (6.5.2). They had provided help since the outset (6.65.1, 67.2, and 1.3–4).

58.2 Ἱμεραῖοι: Gylippus had won them over in 414 (1.2–3) after Athens had made an unsuccessful approach in 415 (6.62.2). **ἐν ὧι καὶ μόνοι Ἕλληνες οἰκοῦσιν:** as Th. had already noted at 6.62.2. There and here the

present tenses have been taken as an indication that Th. drafted this before the Carthaginians destroyed the city in 409, but that is uncertain: there was probably some continuing occupation (*CT* 66o, *IACP* 199). **καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ μόνοι ἐβοήθησαν:** καὶ . . . μόνοι echoes the preceding καὶ μόνοι, but this καί = 'they were also the only ones to . . .' whereas the preceding καί is to emphasise μόνοι.

58.3 Δωριῆς τε . . . οἱ πάντες: not quite, as Himera was founded from Zancle (= Messina, founded from Chalcis and therefore Ionian) and, though Dorian exiles migrated there, its customs were largely Chalcidian: 6.5.1. The text is not certain, though the meaning is clear. Perhaps οἱ should be deleted, but it might easily have dropped out after αὐτόνομοι and been reinstated in the MSS in the wrong place. **αὐτόνομοι:** indicating that this was their own free choice, in contrast to the Sicels. Th. does not elaborate on their reasons for making that choice: his narrative and speeches, especially those of Hermocrates, have made these clear. **ξυνεμάχουν:** as at **58**.11, plural verb with a neuter plural subject when they are people. **Σικελοὶ . . . ὅσοι μὴ ἀφέστασαν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους:** 'rebel' is enough to show that the remaining Sicels were not αὐτόνομοι like the Greeks (**57**.11n.). 6.88.3–4 noted that the autonomous Sicels were those in the interior, and had nearly all been pro-Athenian from the outset; it was more those in the plains who had been Syracusan subjects, and most of these had by late 415 come over to Athens. More followed in 414 (6.103.2), but the pro-Syracusan remainder were enthused by Gylippus' arrival and sent something short of 1,000 men (**1**.4–5(nn.)). **ἡγεμόνα Σπαρτιάτην . . . νεοδαμώδεις δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ εἵλωτας:** the 'Spartan commander' would almost certainly be taken to be Gylippus, so prominent a figure, rather than Eccritus, mentioned at **19**.3(n.) as commander of these 600 'best of the helots and of the νεοδαμώδεις' but thereafter ignored. **δύναται δὲ τὸ νεοδαμῶδες ἐλεύθερον ἤδη εἶναι:** to be deleted as a gloss, though the explanation is accurate (**19**.3n.): Th. had not felt the need to explain the term at **19**.3 or 5.34.1. The Schol. seems not to have read the words, as it gives a similar explanation itself. **Κορίνθιοι δὲ καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῶι μόνοι παραγενόμενοι:** the Corinthians originally provided ten ships: cf. 6.104.1 and **7**.1n. In spring 415 they sent a further 500 hoplites (**19**.4); they also provided the merchant ships to transport the Peloponnesian force (**17**.3–4, **19**.5), though ναυσί here will refer more to the fighting ships. μόνοι is not quite accurate, as there were two Spartan ships as well as the troops (6.104.1). **Λευκάδιοι καὶ Ἀμπρακιῶται:** Leucas provided two ships and Ambracia three (6.104.1). **κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές:** this applies to Corinth as well as Leucas and Ambracia: both were her daughter-cities (*IACP* 355, 365), as was Syracuse. **ἐκ δὲ Ἀρκαδίας μισθοφόροι ὑπὸ Κορινθίων**

ἀποσταλέντες: **19**.4(n.). **Σικυώνιοι ἀναγκαστοὶ στρατεύοντες:** 200 hoplites (**19**.4). *IACP* 470 interprets this compulsion as one of 'supporting Sparta' as a member of the Peloponnesian League, but other Peloponnesian states were not so compelled. Perhaps it was more a matter of Corinth bullying her neighbour, or perhaps the oligarchic regime in power since 417 (5.81.2) was being heavy-handed in getting rid of its opponents (A. Griffin 1982: 66). **Βοιωτοί:** 300 hoplites (**19**.3), including Thespians (cf. **25**.3) as well as Thebans. The Boeotians were important in the night battle (**43**.7).

58.4 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐπελθόντας τούτους: πρός = 'in comparison with', as again in πρὸς ἅπαντας: LSJ πρός C.III.4. ἐπελθόντας = 'had come to join them', with the prefix conveying 'in addition to' (ἐπί + dative) rather than 'against' (ἐπί + accusative): cf. ἐπελθούσαις (**47**.3), and probably ἐπεληλυθότα (**42**.2). **οἱ Σικελιῶται:** the Greek Sicilians (**32**.2n.). The pro-Syracusan Sicels might have been included without harming the numerical point (cf. **43**.4n.), but πόλεις are thought of as a Greek phenomenon (6.48n.). **κατὰ πάντα** 'in all respects', broken down then into ὁπλῖται πολλοὶ καὶ νῆες etc. **ὁ ἄλλος ὅμιλος:** including light-armed troops. **ὡς εἰπεῖν:** this 'limits a sweeping statement' (Rusten 1989 on 2.51.2): 6.30.2n. **διὰ . . . καὶ ὅτι:** characteristic variation of ways of saying 'because'.

59.1 ξυνελέγησαν: aorist carrying a pluperfect sense (*CGCG* 33.40 n. 1). **παρῆσαν:** imperfect conveying 'were there now'. **ἐπῆλθεν:** aorist, jumping forward to later. The flashforward in 'no further reinforcements' strengthens the feeling that the end is in sight.

59.2–69.2: BEFORE THE GREAT BATTLE

Quite so elaborate a build-up is almost unparalleled (Keitel 1987a: 294–5), and the very length and elaboration leave no doubt that this will be the decisive clash. Both sides, it is immediately clear, are holding nothing back, but on the Syracusan side it is a matter of thinking big, ὀλίγον οὐδὲν ἐς οὐδὲν ἐπενόουν (**59**.3). The Athenian note is one of desperation: all ships, even the less seaworthy, have to be used (**60**.2); if this fails, any friendly town will do, barbarian or Greek (**60**.2); all manpower is to be used, whoever and whatever age they may be (**60**.3). After the pre-battle speeches, that note of desperation returns. Whatever has been said, Nicias feels, it is not enough (**69**.2). The speeches themselves bring out how the tables have been turned: see **61–8**n.

59.2 καλὸν ἀγώνισμα: this resumes the narrative with a close verbal echo of **56**.2 καλὸν σφίσιν ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας τὸ ἀγώνισμα: this is by now the

Syracusan keynote (Intr., p. 30), and this time Th. adds that the aspiration was 'reasonable', εἰκότως. The object of that 'contest' is defined in ἑλεῖν . . . διαφυγεῖν, picking up but also sharpening καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν from the same context of **56**.2: not just 'victory', as there, but allowing no escape. **ἐπὶ τῇι γεγενημένηι νίκηι τῆς ναυμαχίας:** ἐπί + dative 'of the occasion or cause' (LSJ B.III.1), and here of both: 'on top of' that victory and also 'because of' it. γεγενημένηι, perfect, rather than γενομένηι, points to its continuing effect in the present.

59.3 ἔκλῃιον οὖν τόν τε λιμένα . . . ὁρμίζοντες: chains might alternatively be used for such harbour-closing (**38**.2n.) and might have been used here across the narrow exit-gap (**70**.2), but this barrier of ships would be far more difficult to break through. Diod. 13.14.1–2 says that the work took three days. **ὀκτὼ σταδίων μάλιστα:** between 1.2 and 1.6 km ≈ 0.75–1 mile (**19**.2n.), but μάλιστα marks this as an approximation: distances across water are hard to judge (6.1.2n.). The actual width is 1.04 km ≈ 3,400 feet measured from the island off the tip of Plemmyrion and 1.24 km ≈ 4,200 feet from Plemmyrion itself (*HCT*). **πλοίοις:** here presumably merchant-ships or transports, as at **4**.5(n.) and **25**.1–2, though cf. **7**.3n. It would make sense to use as many of these bulky ships as possible, leaving the triremes to fight. **ἀκάτοις: 25**.6. **ἤν** + subjunctive: 'in case . . .' (*CGCG* 49.25). **ὀλίγον οὐδὲν ἐς οὐδὲν ἐπενόουν:** cf. **59**.1 οὐκέτι οὐδὲν οὐδετέροις ἐπῆλθεν: both sides are giving their all. There may be a longer-distance echo of the beginning of the war, when ὀλίγον . . . ἐπενόουν οὐδὲν ἀμφότεροι (2.8.1), and this is in its turn echoed at **87**.6(n.). The destruction unleashed in 431 is reaching its climax.

60.1 τὴν ἄλλην διάνοιαν αὐτῶν 'the rest of their thinking'.

60.2 ξυνελθόντες οἵ τε στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ ταξίαρχοι: the ταξίαρχοι were the commanders of each tribe's hoplite contingent. Th. has not mentioned their presence at previous deliberations, and has given the impression that decisions were a matter just for οἱ στρατηγοί (**47**.1, **50**.3, 6.46.5) or 'Nicias and his co-commanders' (**43**.1(n.)), presumably Menander and Euthydemus (**16**.1) as well as Eurymedon. The inclusion of these captains now may be a response to the seriousness of the crisis: more heads were needed to decide, especially now that Eurymedon was dead (**52**.2), and perhaps Demosthenes and Nicias wanted responsibility shared more widely, knowing the dangers they would face if they got home. **πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν ἀπορίαν** 'in the light of the helplessness that they faced'. ἀπορίαν is further defined first by the genitive τῶν . . . ἄλλων, 'in other respects too', then, with characteristic syntactic variation, by the ὅτι-clause. This is the ἄλλα τε καί idiom, 'and in particular'. **προπέμψαντες γὰρ**

ἐς Κατάνην ὡς ἐκπλευσόμενοι ἀπεῖπον μὴ ἐπάγειν: aorist in a pluperfect sense. This was presumably in the context of **50**.3 before the eclipse, but it was not mentioned there. This is also the first explicit indication that their supplies came from Catana, though this had not been difficult to infer. **εἰ μὴ ναυκρατήσουσιν:** for εἰ + future indicative see **8**.1n. **τὰ μὲν τείχη τὰ ἄνω:** possibly the 'circle', but that has not been mentioned since **2**.4, a year earlier, and it is not clear that it was still occupied: cf. **43–5**n. Or Th. may mean 'the upper sections of the walls' that descended in a V to the shore (**2**.4n.; see Map 4). The cross-wall (διατείχισμα) that the Athenians now inserted between the arms of the V protected the lower area where they were concentrated. **ὅσον οἷόν τε . . . γενέσθαι** 'the smallest possible space that would be enough for their equipment and their invalids'. **ὅσαι ἦσαν καὶ δυναταὶ καὶ ἀπλοώτεραι** 'both those that were seaworthy and those that were less so'. **πάντα τινά** 'every individual', as at **70**.3 and **84**.3. In fact by no means every individual will be on board, and **71** will make much of the anxious onlookers (**69**.3–**71**n.). **διαναυμαχήσαντες:** the δια- prefix conveys 'fight it out to the finish', making this the decisive battle. Hdt. 8.63 uses it of the similar resolve in 480 to fight at Salamis. **ἢν δὲ μή . . . ἀντιλήψεσθαι:** for the note of desperation see **59**.2–**69**.2n.

60.3 ὑποκατέβησαν 'descended', as at X. *Anab.* 7.4.11. **ὅστις καὶ . . . εἶναι** 'any person who was not too old who appeared useful in any way at all'. Alberti follows a papyrus in adding πάντας before ἐσβαίνειν: that might be right, but is more likely to be a gloss that has crept into the text. ἡλικίας μετέχων is surprising, as all the troops and sailors would be of military age, but the point is probably that specialists (e.g. the λιθολόγοι καὶ τέκτονες, **43**.2) and servants were deployed as well as the troops who would normally fight only on land.

60.4 δέκα μάλιστα καὶ ἑκατόν: **52**.1n. Diod. 13.4.4 says 115. **τῶν τε Ἀκαρνάνων:** **31**.5n. **ἐξ ἀναγκαίου τε καὶ τοιαύτης διανοίας** 'in line with their thinking in a dire predicament and in this way'.

60.5 τῶι τε παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς πολὺ ταῖς ναυσὶ κρατηθῆναι ἀθυμοῦντας 'in low spirits at this unaccustomed big naval defeat'. Th. again stresses morale. Nicias tries to address this mindset directly in **61**, but the stress on 'unaccustomed' supports the point made on the other side at **66**.3, that people are all the more despondent when they had previously counted on superiority. **ξυγκαλέσας ἅπαντας:** the narrative here loops back a little (*CT*), as the address must have preceded the manning of the ships at **60**.3. This is explicitly presented as an address to the whole army at once, unlike 6.68 which probably represented several similar speeches as Nicias

rode along the line (6.67.3n.). It is not clear that this is how it really was. In an open space the usual limit is about sixty-five metres for anything more complex than short, simple sentences to be understood (Aldrete 1999: 81), and there has been much discussion whether such pre-battle speeches were really given. That debate is settling in favour of the view that they were given even if not everybody could hear. In many cases, as probably in this, historical accounts will either have embellished briefer remarks or collapsed a series of shorter addresses into one: for instance, if Nicias' distinct remarks to Athenians and allies are historical he may have made them separately to the different contingents. See Anson 2010 and Lendon 2017b: 149–50 n. 21, both with extensive bibliographies.

61–8 *The pre-battle speeches*: for this convention see 6.68n. Here the Athenians sound like the defenders, besieged men fighting for their lives, and now the Syracusans are the confident aggressors. The two speeches use some of the same familiar tropes: 'you have beaten these people before' – but Nicias has to go back to the earlier triumphs, and the way he puts it (these Sicilians wouldn't even have resisted in the days when our fleet was strong, **63.4**) is a reminder that those days have passed. Gylippus and the Syracusans by contrast can point to the victories in the here and now (**66.2**). Both speeches point to the unaccustomed nature of the looming battle, but Nicias acknowledges that 'fighting a land-battle at sea' is not the Athenian way; various echoes of Phormio's exploits at 2.83–92 make that point even clearer (nn.). Nicias can only observe that the cramped waters mean that it will make sense to have land-fighters on deck (**62.1–2**); the enemy speech exposes how those fighters may not find it easy to be effective (**67.2–3**). Even on the technological measures and counter-measures the Athenians, traditionally so proud of their ingenuity, have been out-thought (**62.3** and **65.2**). Most unusually (**61.1n.**), Nicias divides up his auditors, addressing different points to the hoplites from those to the sailors (**63.2–3**) and to the Athenians from those to the allies (**61.3**, **63.3–64.2**): their contrasting reasons for being there will be in Th.'s readers' and listeners' minds from **57**. Gylippus and the Syracusans have a diverse force too (**58**), but rather than dividing them that speech brings everyone together, as if everyone is fighting for 'our' land and 'the'city (**68.2**). Nicias' appeal is to the glorious past, reinforced for Th.'s audience by the echoes of Pericles (**61.3**, **63.3**, **64.2nn.**; cf. **69.2n.**); when he looks forward, he can dwell only on the dangers not just to the fighting force but to the whole city (**64.2(n.)**). Gylippus and the Syracusans emphasise the future and the glory to be won, and their peroration strikes the note on which the panel began, καλὸς ὁ ἀγών (**68.3**; cf. **59.2**).

61–4 *Nicias' speech.* At **11–15** Nicias' letter may have been despondent ahead of its time. Things were not yet that bad. Now they really are that bad, and Nicias does not conceal it; he indeed emphasises the danger not just to the fighting force – that was already evident – but to the whole city. One may wonder how enthusing this would be to an already despondent army. What little cheer he offers rings hollow compared with the speech of Gylippus and the Syracusans, better matched as that is to the predicament. It does not follow that these are all the wrong things to say, though some are (nn.): Nicias' earlier pre-battle speech at 6.68 may have been too backs-to-the-wall (n.), but here as at **69**.2 and **77** the point is more that there was nothing better to be said.

As at 6.68, Nicias' pre-battle rhetoric is stylistically more forceful than in his circumlocutory assembly speeches (6.9–14n.): the sentences are shorter, though here too some of the syntax is convoluted (nn.), and the direct addresses to different types of combatant (**63**.2–3) and of ally (**61**.3, **63**.3–**64**.1) should ensure their attention, even if they also emphasise the army's disparate character (**61–8**n.). His assembly style was marked by complicated subordination, with a profusion of concessionary clauses (Tompkins 1972); here the concessions are more a matter of thought than of syntax, as he acknowledges and even stresses the recent reverses (**61**.2, **63**.3), the enemy's dominance over the shore (**62**.4), and the tactical disadvantages of waters where it will be like 'a land-battle fought from ships' (**62**.2, 4). This is one of the speeches praised by D. H. *On Thucydides* 42 as 'pure, clear, and suitable for the contests of real life'; modern critics are less impressed, e.g. Green 1970: 307: 'earnest, sincere, practical, and deadly dull'.

See Tompkins 1972, esp. 201–2, Hunter 1973: 107–11, Rood 1998a: 193–8; de Romilly 2012: 91–3, Tsakmakis and Themistokleous 2013: 394–400, Kopp 2016: 232–3, and *CT*.

61.1 **Ἄνδρες στρατιῶται Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων:** cf. 6.68.1n. for such formulae of address, and for ἄνδρες στρατιῶται cf. **77**.7, 2.89.1, and e.g. X. *Hell.* 5.1.14, *An.* 5.5.1; for 'the other allies' = 'the others, i.e. the allies' cf. **4**.3n. Here and at **77**.1 it is unusual to acknowledge the presence of allies, but in the Pylos battle (**62**.2, **71**.7nn.) Brasidas similarly made a special appeal to Sparta's allies not to spare their ships but run them hard ashore, 'mindful of the great benefits the Spartans had shown them' (4.11.4); cf. also Archidamus at 2.11.1. Nicias did something of the same even at 6.68.2, and here it prepares for the differentiation of **61**.3 and **63**.3–**64**.1. **ὁ μὲν ἀγὼν . . . οὐχ ἧσσον ἢ τοῖς πολεμίοις:** Nicias had used ἀγών language in his earlier pre-battle speech (6.68.1 and 3), but it is now more pointed for Th.'s listeners/readers because of the

gathering Syracusan καλὸς ὁ ἀγών theme (**56**.2, **59**.2nn.): things are even worse than Nicias' 'no less' suggests, as by now the Syracusan ἀγών is more for honour than for survival. **τωι:** = τινι, here effectively 'everyone': cf. **68**.3(n.) and Hornblower–Pelling on Hdt. 6.9.3. **τὴν ὑπάρχουσάν που οἰκείαν πόλιν** 'his own city, wherever that may be': cf. 6.69.3.

61.2 τοῖς πρώτοις ἀγῶσι σφαλέντες: see **61**.1n. on the ἀγών figure; it now becomes more clearly athletic, as σφαλέντες suggests a trip in wrestling. The figure recurs at **66**.3, dwelling on this likely blow to Athenian morale, and again at **67**.2, **68**.3, and perhaps **77**.7. **διὰ παντὸς . . . ἔχουσιν** 'always have their expectation driven by their fear [lit. "belonging to the fear"] to be in line with what they have suffered'. Nicias makes a similar point at **77**.3(n.): their ξυμφοραί are terrifying them more than they should. ξυμφοραί understandably now becomes a favourite word of Nicias, also at **63**.3 and 4, **77**.1, and so by now, pathetically, does ἐλπίς (Lateiner 2018: 148), also at **61**.3, **77**.1, 3, and 4.

61.3 ἔμπειροι: in contrast to those ἀπειρότατοι of **61**.2. **ξυστρατευόμενοι αἰεί:** so they too are ἔμπειροι. **τῶν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις παραλόγων:** wise figures have dwelt before in Th. on the παράλογος of war, most explicitly Archidamus at 1.78.1; Pericles says something similar at 1.140.1. But Archidamus was arguing for caution and Pericles for constancy; Nicias' words are more desperate – 'a catalog of futile clichés about chance and hope' (Lateiner 1985: 202), the more ironic as Nicias has always been so sceptical about trusting to fortune (5.16.1, 6.23.3). The true παράλογος of this war will lie elsewhere, first in the Athenian débâcle (**55**.1) and then in their resilience (**28**.3). **τὸ τῆς τύχης . . . ἀναμαχούμενοι** 'hoping that what fortune offers might also stand on our side, and intending to fight back'. κἂν . . . στῆναι represents κἂν . . . σταίη in direct discourse. **τοῦδε τοῦ πλήθους:** cf. 2.87.6, 6.68.1 for such pre-battle appeals to one's side's numerical strength. Nicias here leaves the confidence-building aspect implicit; he might have said more, especially if *CT* is right that the Athenians still had numerical superiority.

62.1 ἐνείδομεν: the ἐν- conveys seeing possibilities 'in' a situation: cf. **36**.2, of the Syracusan insight that led to their technological innovation. **ἐπί** + dative 'in view of'. **ὄχλον** 'crowding', conveying both the big number and the crush that will result: cf. **62**.2n. **τὴν . . . παρασκευήν, οἷς πρότερον ἐβλαπτόμεθα:** cf. **40**.5. οἷς is neuter, with both ὄχλος and παρασκευή as its antecedents. **καὶ ἡμῖν** 'us too', acknowledging that the need for counter-measures came from serious thinking on the other side. **ἐκ τῶν παρόντων . . . ἡτοίμασται:** for such reassurances that the preparations have been impeccable cf. 2.89.8 and e.g. Livy 36.17.12; but

ἐκ τῶν παρόντων, 'given the circumstances' and/or 'on the basis of what is available', is less comforting.

62.2 ὄχλος: repeated from **62**.1, there of the ships and here of the men on board. The word is often negative even in a military context (6.63.2n.), though it can also be less charged (**75**.5, **78**.2, **84**.2, 6.20.4n.). It is not the most tactful word for Nicias to choose. At 2.88.2, in the context of Phormio's victory (see next n.), the Athenians have long had the conviction that they would never retreat before any ὄχλος of Peloponnesian ships. **ναυμαχίαν μὲν ποιούμενοι ἐν πελάγει οὐκ ἂν ἐχρώμεθα:** cf. **36**.4(n.) for the Athenian preference for open waters where they could deploy their skill. Th.'s readers/listeners may particularly recall the exploits of Phormio in the εὐρυχωρία of the Corinthian Gulf in 429 (2.83–92), when Athenian skill and nimbleness brought notable victories over a much bigger fleet. Phormio's pre-battle speech at 2.89.8 explains that in cramped waters there cannot be careful positioning or διέκπλοι (cf. **36**.4n.) or quick turns, but 'the sea-battle has to become a land-battle'. **διὰ τὸ βλάπτειν ἂν τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης** 'because it would impede the element of skill'. **τῇ ἐνθάδε ἠναγκασμένῃ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζομαχίαι** 'in the land-battle from the ships that is forced on us here'. The conceit is repeated only a few lines later at **62**.4, and was used also in Phormio's pre-battle speech at 2.89.8 (above) and in the Pylos fighting at 4.14.3 (**71**.7n.; Intr., p. 24). This may also recall the battle of Sybota in 433, the first in Th.'s narrative, fought 'in the old manner with a lack of expertise': ἦν τε ἡ ναυμαχία καρτερά, τῇ μὲν τέχνῃ οὐχ ὁμοίως, πεζομαχίαι δὲ τὸ πλέον προσφερὴς οὖσα (1.49.1–2), there too with many archers and javelin-men on board. The Athenians in particular had moved on a long way in skill and tactics, but are now forced back to where they began. Cf. **69**.3–**71**n.; Intr., p. 25. **πρόσφορα** 'advantageous', but the choice of word may be influenced by προσφερής, 'similar', at 1.49.2, quoted above: so *CT* on 1.49.2.

62.3 καὶ πρὸς . . . ἐπιβολαί: καί here = 'and in particular': cf. e.g. Hdt. 7.8β.1, ὅσα δὴ πεποιήκασι Πέρσας τε καὶ πατέρα τὸν ἐμόν, *GP* 291–2, and Dover 1968 on Ar. *Clouds* 800. **τὰς τῶν ἐπωτίδων αὐτοῖς παχύτητας:** **36**.3–4. **ὥιπερ:** neuter, 'a thing by which': *GG* 1022. **χειρῶν σιδηρῶν:** grappling irons: cf. 4.25.4; on these see Casson 1971: 121–2. Th. is using the speech to convey this detail, as he has not mentioned it in the narrative. They cannot have been easy to forge at short notice (Green 1970: 308 n. 5). **ἐπιβολαί** 'castings' or 'throwings', the actions that the troops on board will perform in the fight: cf. ἐπιβαλλομένη at **65**.2, picking up ἐπιβολή at **65**.1. **αἳ σχήσουσι τὴν πάλιν ἀνάκρουσιν τῆς προσπεσούσης νεώς** 'which will prevent the ship that has rammed (us) from backing water'. For πάλιν qualifying a noun cf. **44**.8n. **ἢν τὰ ἐπὶ**

τούτοις οἱ ἐπιβάται ὑπουργῶσιν 'if the men on board do what they have to do in what will follow', i.e. in the hand-to-hand combat after boarding.

62.4 πεζομαχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν: **62**.2n. **τῆς γῆς . . . πολεμίας οὔσης:** the same point as at **36**.5. **ἐπέχηι** 'occupy'.

63.1 διαμάχεσθαι 'fight it out to the end': cf. **60**.2 διαναυμαχήσαντες. Hdt. had used the word of the battle of Plataea, 9.48.4 and 67. **ξυμπεσούσης νηὶ νεὼς . . . ἀπαράξητε:** Nicias fills out what he meant by ἢν τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις οἱ ἐπιβάται ὑπουργῶσιν (**62**.3). **μὴ πρότερον . . . ἀπαράξητε** 'not to think it right to break away before you have swept off the hoplites coming from the enemy deck'. Hdt. used very similar language of a memorable moment at Salamis, τοὺς ἐπιβάτας ἀπὸ τῆς καταδυσάσης νεὸς βάλλοντες ἀπήραξαν (8.90.2). πρότερον ἤ + subjunctive without ἄν is very rare in Attic prose (*M&T* 653, *CGCG* 47.16).

63.2 ὅσωι 'given that', lit. 'to the same degree as', with μᾶλλον and drawing a parallel with οὐχ ἧσσον: the degree to which he is addressing these remarks more to those on deck (οἱ ἄνωθεν) is the same as the degree to which the job falls more to them. Cf. 6.89.6n. **ὑπάρχει δ' ἡμῖν ἔτι νῦν γε τὰ πλείω τῶι πεζῶι ἐπικρατεῖν:** Nicias might again (cf. **61**.3n.) make more of the Athenians' numerical strength, and the concessions also weaken the point: 'even now', reinforced by γε, points to the earlier reverses, and he promises only to 'be victorious for the greater part'.

63.3 παραινῶ καὶ ἐν τῶι αὐτῶι τῶιδε καὶ δέομαι 'I advise you and at the same time I beg you'. **μὴ ἐκπεπλῆχθαί τι ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς ἄγαν:** echoing Pericles, whose last speech conveyed a resounding appeal to ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς μὴ εἴκειν (2.64.3; cf. 2.60.1, 61.4): cf. **64**.2n. **τήν τε παρασκευὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων:** in answer to the Syracusans' own ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων παρασκευή, **62**.2 (Allison 1989: 111–12). ἀπό here is not quite 'on' the decks (Allison 1989: 112) but preparation for fighting 'from' them: cf. **70**.3. **καὶ τὰς ναῦς πλείους:** i.e. more now (110: **60**.4) than at **52**.1 (86: see n. there). Nicias wisely passes over the complication that some of these ships are of dubious seaworthiness (**60**.2). **ἐκείνην τε τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθε ὡς ἀξία ἐστὶ διασώσασθαι:** for the construction cf. **25**.1n. on τά τε σφέτερα ... εἰσί. **οἳ τέως Ἀθηναῖοι νομιζόμενοι καὶ μὴ ὄντες:** 'for them' or 'for you' is understood as the antecedent of οἵ; μή rather than οὐ as the participle is conditional, 'thought of as Athenian even if you are not' (*CGCG* 52.40). 'He is talking about the metics', says the Schol., i.e. Athens' resident aliens: Nicias does seem here to be assuming that these sailors are all non-Athenians but Atticised and enjoying a similar esteem to citizens, and that fits metics. These will be a subdivision of 'the sailors' he turned to at the beginning of **63**.3 (τοῖς δὲ ναύταις . . .), for it seems likely

that at least some oarsmen *were* Athenian citizens (Meiggs 1972: 440–1; cf. *CT*); Nicias will return to the citizens at **64**.1. Yet it seems unsatisfactory for Nicias to begin the address so generally and then switch so abruptly to focus only on a part of his audience without a clear marker that this is what he is doing. The text printed here, with a colon rather than a comma after πλείους and Bloomfield's ἐνθυμεῖσθε for the MSS ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, gives at least some indication that he is now turning to this particular group. (Maurer 2002 suggested a full stop after πλείους and a more drastic rearrangement of the text.) τέως is also odd if taken as 'up to this time' for it would suggest that some change in the addressees' status is now looming; but it makes adequate sense if taken as 'for a time', i.e. for as long as you are resident in Athens or fighting for the city. For τε as connective see **7**.3n.: **64**.1 is here similar as he turns back to the citizens. **τῆς τε φωνῆς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃι:** the Attic dialect. **τῶν τρόπων:** just as Pericles had laid so much weight on the Athenian way of life, τρόποι, in the Funeral Speech (2.36.4): Rood 1998a: 193. **ἐθαυμάζεσθε κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα:** a further echo of Periclean language, e.g. 2.39.4 τὴν πόλιν ἀξίαν εἶναι θαυμάζεσθαι and 2.41.4: cf. **56**.2n. **καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας . . . μετείχετε** 'and you shared in our empire no less than we did concerning its advantages, and had a much greater share in terms of intimidating the subjects and not being wronged yourselves': chiastic in expression, with οὐκ ἔλασσον and πολὺ πλέον sandwiching the explanations for each. This certainly is aimed at metics rather than subject allies, who are for the moment cast as the intimidated; given that there would be many of these allies listening, this is not the most tactful thing for Nicias to say. 'A much greater share' is puzzling; perhaps the point is not, implausibly, that they would be more intimidating than citizens or less easy to wrong, but that their metic status adds even more value to their lives as it protects them from the vulnerability that would otherwise be a non-citizen's lot.

63.4 μόνοι ἐλευθέρως: they alone, as free men, have made the decision voluntarily to be participants not just in this expedition (that would also be true of mercenaries and allied volunteers) but in the city as a whole, i.e. by making it their home. **μὴ καταπροδίδοτε:** imperative, as are ἀμύνασθε and δείξατε: the present tense fits a lasting resolve, whereas the two aorists call for action on the single occasion. **οὓς πολλάκις νενικήκατε:** a standard theme in pre-battle encouragement: cf. 2.89.5 and 11, 5.9.1, and e.g. Polyb. 3.64.4–7, Arr. *Anab.* 2.7.3, Sall. *Iug.* 49.2. **Σικελιωτῶν:** **43**.4n. **ὧν οὐδ' ἀντιστῆναι οὐδεὶς ἔως ἤκμαζε τὸ ναυτικὸν ἡμῖν ἠξίωσεν:** again tactless. The listeners needed no reminding that their fleet was not what it was. Nor is this wholly true. The Athenians had not found fighting in Sicily such a walkover in 427–424 (Intr. to Book 6, pp. 30–2). **καὶ μετ'**

ἀσθενείας καὶ ξυμφορῶν 'even when we are weak and have suffered badly' – again not a helpful complication, when the long-standing maritime skill should be one of Nicias' strongest and simplest points. **εὐτυχούσης ῥώμης** 'strength [contrasting with ἀσθενείας] which has had a run of success' (as opposed to ξυμφορῶν).

64.1 τούς τε Ἀθηναίους ὑμῶν 'the Athenians among you'. The transition is clearly marked, unlike in the transmitted text of **63**.3(n.). **καὶ τάδε** 'these things *too*': the remarks of **63**.4 were pertinent to Athenians as well. **οὔτε ναῦς . . . πλευσομένους:** closely echoed at 8.1.2 (Intr., p. 21), once Nicias' fears here have become those of everyone in Athens. Further points added there are the shortage of money in the treasury and of crews for the ships. In fact the enemies did not then immediately sail on Athens, but the fear was reasonable. **ὁμοίας ταῖσδε:** not that all the ships at hand were of high quality (**60**.2), but the recently arrived ones should still have been in good condition. At 8.1.2 (see last n.) this point is phrased as 'not having *enough* ships in the boathouses': Nicias gears it to what his listeners can see (ταῖσδε, deictic), just as at 8.1.2 the Athenians at home 'did not see' and 'were not seeing' a quantity of replacement troops or ships. **τούς τε αὐτοῦ** 'those on the spot'. **τοὺς ἐπελθόντας** 'those who have come against them' (to give the point with ἐπήλθετε: see on οἵαι γνώμηι ἐπήλθετε below), i.e. those who will have done so by then, rather than 'those who have come in addition'. **οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δέ:** a different division from the previous ones. This divides the Athenians into two groups, those here (i.e. 'you', as the second-person verb γίγνοισθε makes clear) and those at home (ἐκεῖ). ἂν γίγνοιντο is understood with οἱ δέ. **οἵαι γνώμηι ἐπήλθετε** 'the thinking with which you came against them', with ἐπήλθετε picking up ἐπελθόντας. That is, you know what you intended to do with them (presumably enslavement and worse, **68**.2n.), and can infer that they will now be intending the same for you and your compatriots.

64.2 ἀγῶνι: Nicias rounds off his speech by reverting to the figure with which he started (**61**.1n.): cf. de Romilly 2012: 92 n. 63. **εἴπερ ποτέ:** i.e. now, if ever, is the time: cf. **70**.7, 4.20.1. The point is understandably frequent in exhortations, e.g. Dem. 1.6, 3.3. **καθ' ἑκάστους τε καὶ ξύμπαντες:** cf. Hdt. 7.53.1 ἀλλ' εἴς τε ἕκαστος καὶ οἱ σύμπαντες προθυμίην ἔχωμεν (Xerxes to his nobles). The words are slightly, but not much, more than rhetorical bombast: the last few words of the speech will explain. **οἱ ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ὑμῶν νῦν ἐσόμενοι** 'those of you . . .', because the invalids and the small force protecting the camp (**60**.9) will also be listening. **καὶ πεζοὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις . . . τῶν Ἀθηνῶν:** a precursor of Nicias' ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις (**77**.7): everything depends on the men on the ships. The language

no more bears pedantic analysis (e.g. Marchant's 'the statement οἱ ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ νῆες εἰσί is not very sane', ad loc.) than Andromache's σύ μοί ἐσσι πατὴρ καὶ πότνια μήτηρ | ἠδὲ κασίγνητος, σὺ δέ μοι θαλερὸς παρακοίτης (*Il.* 6.429–30): Hector is now everything to Andromache, the men on the ships are everything to Athens. Cf. 4.95.2 (Hippocrates before Delium) for the warning that one's city is at stake even in a fight on alien soil, and see Huitink–Rood on X. *An.* 3.1.17 and 3.2.15 and Rood 1998a: 195–6. **τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τῶν Ἀθηνῶν:** grandiose language; τὸ μέγα τῆς Ῥώμης ὄνομα are the first words of Plut. *Rom.* It echoes the peroration of Pericles' final speech, 2.64.3 γνῶτε δὲ ὄνομα μέγιστον αὐτὴν [the city] ἔχουσαν ἐν ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις διὰ τὸ ξυμφοραῖς μὴ εἴκειν, already recalled at **63**.3(n.). **εἴ τίς τι ἕτερος ἑτέρου προφέρει:** this appeal to show one's individual superiority teases out the competitiveness implicit in the ἀγών figure. **οὐκ ἂν ἐν ἄλλωι μᾶλλον καιρῶι:** reverting to and expanding εἴπερ ποτέ: there has been and will be no better time to make a decisive contribution. **αὐτός τε αὑτῶι . . . καὶ τοῖς ξύμπασι:** picking up καθ' ἑκάστους τε καὶ ξύμπαντες: individuals should think about what they can do, and that will be good for everyone.

65 *Syracusan preparations.*

65.1 **τοσαῦτα:** there may be no significant distinction between this and τοιαῦτα at **69**.1 (cf. **16**.1n.), but it is possible that the nuance 'so much and no more' may be caught: cf. **49**.1, 6.35.1nn. If so, it may prepare for **69**.2, when Nicias feels that more is needed. **καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν παρασκευήν** 'the actual preparations themselves': they did not have to draw any difficult inferences. **ὅτι ναυμαχήσουσιν:** to be taken with αἰσθάνεσθαι. **προηγγέλθη δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡ ἐπιβολὴ τῶν σιδηρῶν χειρῶν:** **62**.3. The ἐπιβολή, 'throwing', is what is planned for the battle itself, but it is 'reported in advance'. The narrative pays less attention to the Syracusans' scouting and espionage than to Nicias' 'fifth column' (**48**.2n.), but it was clearly effective. Deserters too will have brought information.

65.2 **τῆς νεὼς ἄνω ἐπὶ πολύ** 'over a large part of the upper section of the ship', singular as at **62**.3 for 'each ship in question'. **κατεβύρσωσαν** 'covered with hides'. **ὅπως ἄν** + optative in a purpose clause is rare in Attic: this is the only case in Th., but there are four in X. and one in Aesch. (*M&T* 330). It is frequent in Hdt. **μὴ ἔχοι ἀντιλαβήν** 'and not get anything to fasten on'. **οἵ τε στρατηγοὶ καὶ Γύλιππος:** the phrasing reflects the artificiality of the historiographic pre-battle speech convention, as evidently they could not speak in unison any more than 'the Corcyreans' or 'the Corinthians' could speak as one at 1.32–43 or the two Plataeans at 3.53–9. Perhaps one spokesman represented all, but if the speech is

a stylised amalgamation of what was delivered separately to different contingents (**60**.5n.) perhaps several distinct shorter speeches might be imagined. Giving it to Gylippus alone might have produced a more satisfying focus on the dominant figures on either side (Hermocrates is for the moment out of the picture, **73**.1n.), but (a) Gylippus' authority may by now have been waning (**33**.3n.), and (b) a Syracusan speaker is needed for the stress on 'our city' (**68**.2; cf. **61–8**n.).

66–8 *Speech of Gylippus and the generals.* The task here is easier than it was for Nicias, and the speech can be a little shorter. Syracusan morale is already strong and needs only to be reinforced, and there are solid recent successes and good preparations to point to. 'Hope' in Th. is often delusive (Lateiner 2018), most conspicuously in the Melian Dialogue (5.102–3, 111.2, 113.1), and even here the battle will be close-run; but eventually the outcome will be in line with the optimistic wish (**67**.1). Several arguments correspond to those made in Nicias' speech (**66**.2 (enslavement) ~ **64**.1; **66**.2 (past victories) ~ **63**.4; **66**.3 (blows to Athenian self-belief) ~ **61**.2; **67**.2–3 (preparations and counter-preparations) ~ **62**; **67**.4 (Athenians trusting to luck) ~ **61**.3). Of course Gylippus and the generals could not have heard that speech, but this does not strain credibility, for the same considerations might well be weighed independently on both sides. The speech is in line with the narrative in putting special weight on psychology, both the Athenians' (they can be assumed to be the more dispirited because of their earlier triumphs, **66**.3, and are reduced to trusting to fortune, **67**.4) and that of the Syracusans and their allies, proud as they can be of what they have already achieved (**66**.2). Their anger against the Athenians is justified, and the time will soon be here to indulge it, with all the pleasure that will bring (ἥδιστον, **68**.2) – psychology again. The ἀγών figure with which Nicias began (**61**.1) is the starting point for this speech too, but here it picks up the stress on glory (καλά, καλῶν, **66**.1) from earlier (**56**.2, **59**.2), and that is the theme to which the peroration returns: καλὸς ὁ ἀγών (**68**.3). See also **61–8**n.

66.1 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν αὐτῶν οὕτω προθύμως ἀντελάβεσθε 'for otherwise you would not have put your hands to the tasks so eagerly', with 'the tasks' (lit. 'them') extending to both the προειργασμένα and the μέλλοντα. For οὐδὲ γάρ see **42**.4n.

66.2 ἐπὶ τῆς Σικελίας καταδουλώσει: this naturally puts the most negative slant on Athenian aspirations, but Th. would not think the claim unfair: from the outset the narrative signalled 'conquest' (καταστρέψασθαι, 6.1.1) and 'rule over all Sicily' (τῆς πάσης ἄρξαι, 6.6.1) as the aspiration, and 'enslavement' was a usual enough consequence of victory to make the

assumption credible. Cf. 64.1(n.), 75.7. **καὶ τῆς Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος:** it is less clear how far this aspiration was universal in Athens, but Alcibiades at least had held out a similar prospect: an empire cannot hold back from going further (6.18.3), and 'with the gains we shall make there we shall either, in all probability, rule over all Greece or at least cause damage to Syracuse' (6.18.4). At 6.90.3 he puts it even more strongly when speaking at Sparta, stressing the intention to move on to an attack on the Peloponnese as a preliminary to rule over all τὸ Ἑλληνικόν. 'Enslaving' everyone might be a different matter, but even if domination might vary in texture the language might be applicable to everyone (Pelling 2019: 176). Anyway, the scaremongering was again plausible. **τῶν τε πρὶν Ἑλλήνων:** the limitation was necessary, as the obvious predecessor was the evidently broader empire of Persia; there were also other eastern precursors – Assyrians, Medes, etc. Pericles' claim is similar, 2.64.3 Ἑλλήνων . . . ὅτι Ἕλληνες πλείστων δὴ ἤρξαμεν. **πρῶτοι ἀνθρώπων ὑποστάντες τῶι ναυτικῶι:** an overstatement, as Corinth had taken on Athens both at Sybota in 433 and in the Corinthian Gulf in 427, and both may be in Th.'s audience's minds (61–8, 62.3nn.). But Syracuse has now done so with much more success. **νενικήκατε ἤδη:** 63.4n. The verb takes a double accusative, Ἀθηναίους (direct object) and τὰς νίκας (internal accusative). **ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος** 'in all probability'; again at 68.3.

66.3 **ἄνδρες . . . ἐνδιδόασιν:** Nicias warned against this at 61.2, using some of the same language (61.2 σφαλέντες ~ 66.3 σφαλλόμενοι), and Pericles too alerted the Athenians to a similar danger when they were demoralised by the plague: resolve is shaken by a sudden μεταβολή, as one's thinking is frozen by the unexpected (2.61.2–3). But that was a very different sort of setback. **ὧι ἀξιοῦσι προύχειν** 'in a sphere where they claim to be pre-eminent'. **κολουθῶσι:** κολούω is literally 'prune' or 'dock', so the metaphor is similar to Engl. 'clip someone's wings'. Aesch.'s chorus (*Pers.* 1035) and Hdt.'s Artabanus (7.10ε) both use it of Xerxes; given the other hints of Salamis (Intr., pp. 14, 16–17), that too might be picked up by some of Th.'s audience. **τῆς δόξης:** here 'self-esteem'. **ἀσθενέστερον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐστὶν ἢ εἰ μηδ' ὠιήθησαν τὸ πρῶτον** 'weakens more than if they had not had that opinion in the first place'. This combines two comparisons, 'weaker than it was' (αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ) and 'weaker than it would have been if . . .' **παρ' ἐλπίδα . . . παρὰ ἰσχύν:** if the MSS are right (they may not be) in eliding the first παρά but not the second, it may be because παρ' ἐλπίδα is a more familiar phrase: cf. e.g. 4.62.3, Aesch. *Ag.* 900, Soph. *Phil.* 882. The wordplay is neat in Greek but difficult to capture in Engl., which would use different words for each παρά: the defeat has come 'contrary to expectation', and they lose hope 'disproportionately to the

strength of the power' that they still have. **τοῦ αὐχήματος:** best taken with 'expectation', i.e. the expectation that they have internalised from their 'boasting', in symmetry with παρὰ ἰσχὺν τῆς δυνάμεως; less likely, with σφαλλόμενοι, 'falling short' (lit. 'tripped up'; cf. **61**.2) of their boasts. The word comes back at **75**.6(n.).

67.1 τό τε ὑπάρχον πρότερον 'what we had before', again conceived psychologically – morale and courage. **καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονες ἔτι ὄντες:** more might be expected on this growth of Syracusan expertise, but the focus remains on the mental level of self-belief. **ἀπετολμήσαμεν:** a strong word, here only in Th.; cf. Aeschin. 3.131 and 160, Lys. 7.28. The ἀπο- prefix conveys something extreme and potentially decisive, as in ἀποπειρᾶσαι (**17**.4, **36**.1, **43**.1) and ἀποκινδυνεύειν (**67**.4, **81**.5). **τὸ κρατίστους εἶναι εἰ τοὺς κρατίστους ἐνικήσαμεν:** for the mismatch of case with τῆς δοκήσεως cf. **36**.5(n.) τῆι τε πρότερον ἀμαθίαι . . . τὸ ἀντίπρωιρον ξυγκροῦσαι; for the aorist, **41**.1n. **μεγίστην καὶ τὴν προθυμίαν:** 'enthusiasm' keeps the focus on morale. What might be expected is more 'the greatest success', even though that is not conspicuously true of ἐλπίς in Th.'s narrative (Lateiner 2018, **66–8**n.); but the more pragmatic reasons for expecting victory are held back to the following paragraph.

67.2 ἀντιμιμήσεως: either 'mirroring' or 'mimicking in retaliation' or both, by countering the ship-adaptation and by adopting the same tactics of boarding rather than outmanoeuvring. **τῆς παρασκευῆς:** this includes both the physical adaptation and equipping of the ships and the preparing to fight in a particular way. **οὐκ ἀνάρμοστοι πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν** 'not unfitted to deal with each of their ploys'. **χερσαῖοι ὡς εἰπεῖν** 'land-creatures, so to speak'. Some may have sensed a looming parallel with the battle of Salamis, where the landlubber Persians fell into the water and were slaughtered like a catch of fish, Aesch. *Pers.* 424–6. **Ἀκαρνᾶνές τε καὶ ἄλλοι:** very similar language to the narrative at **60**.2. **σφαλοῦσι:** one of three uses of the word in the speech (cf. **66**.3 and **68**.3): the ships will foul one another. **ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς . . . ταράξονται:** so the encouraging picture begins with the men on the crowded decks impeding one another when 'moving in a way that is not their own'; **67**.3 then moves to an analogous confusion among the ships themselves in the cramped waters and fighting in an unaccustomed manner. On the passive sense of ταράξονται cf. **36**.6n.

67.3 ἐπεὶ καί: giving an additional reason for accepting what has just been claimed; cf. e.g. 1.12.1, 4.80.3. **εἴ τις καὶ τόδε ὑμῶν:** 'the *if*-clause provides a condition under which the information in the main clause is likely to be relevant for the addressee' (Wakker 1994: 242). τόδε refers forward

(as is regular: LSJ ὅδε III.2) to ὅτι οὐκ ἴσαις ναυμαχήσει. **ἀφ' ὧν** = ἀπ' ἐκείνων ἅ: relative attraction is unusual when the relative pronoun serves as a nominative in the relative clause (*CGCG* 50.13 n. 1), but the instances tend, as here, to be in cases with a neuter relative pronoun and where the verb is passive or intransitive: Probert 2015: 196 n. 89. **παρεσκεύασται:** echoing παρασκευῆς at **67**.2 to round off these reasons for thinking that the Syracusan preparations give them the advantage.

67.4 **ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς οἰόμεθα σαφῶς πεπύσθαι** 'from what we think we have clear information about'. For Syracusan intelligence-gathering cf. **65**.1n. **ἀπόνοιαν** 'desperation' (LSJ; cf. 1.82.4), but keeping also some of the basic idea of 'lack of sense' (cf. e.g. Dem. 18.249): this, the speakers claim, is a crazy decision for the Athenians to take. **οὐ παρασκευῆς πίστει μᾶλλον ἢ τύχης: 61**.3n. **ἀποκινδυνεῦσαι: 67**.1n. The infinitive is 'final-consecutive' after ἐς ἀπόνοιαν καθεστήκασιν (*CGCG* 51.16 and n. 2). **οὕτως ὅπως δύνανται** 'in the only way they can'. **ἵν' ἢ βιασάμενοι . . . ποιῶνται:** closely similar to Th.'s own version of their thinking (**60**.2). **ὡς τῶν γε παρόντων οὐκ ἂν πράξοντες χεῖρον** 'thinking that they could do no worse than the position they were in already': the future participle with ἄν is rare but does occur in Attic prose (e.g. *M&T* 216), and is to be preferred to the less well attested πράξαντες.

68.1 **τύχην ἀνδρῶν ἑαυτὴν παραδεδωκυῖαν:** sardonically picking up οὐ παρασκευῆς πίστει μᾶλλον ἢ τύχης (**67**.4): they have trusted to fortune, but their fortune has already surrendered. **πολεμιωτάτων:** with ἀνδρῶν. **νομιμώτατον εἶναι . . . τὸ θυμούμενον** 'that it is the most rightful act of all against enemies when people claim to satisfy to the full the anger in their minds to punish the aggressor'. ἐκείνοις or τούτοις is understood as the antecedent of οἵ. For τῆς γνώμης τὸ θυμούμενον cf. e.g. 2.59.3 τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης and 1.90.2 τὸ μὲν βουλόμενον καὶ ὕποπτον τῆς γνώμης; Rusten 1989: 22–3. The justification of anger against one's defeated enemies recalls Cleon (3.38.1), and the wordplay νομίσωμεν . . . νομιμώτατον is presumably deliberate: what is νόμιμον is a matter of what is thought appropriate, so let us νομίζειν that way too. **ἅμα δὲ ἐχθροὺς . . . εἶναι** 'and successful defence against our enemies will be possible for us and is, so they say, the most pleasant thing of all'. The unravelling of the syntax is not straightforward, though the meaning is reasonably clear. Here τὸ λεγόμενόν που is assumed to be parenthetic and νομίσωμεν to take first a participial construction (ἐκγενησόμενον) and then an infinitive. Some of the audience may have heard it differently, e.g. 'and successful defence will be possible for us, together with what is said to be the most pleasant thing of all', i.e. vengeance. A similar meaning would be conveyed by Badham's conjecture κατά for καί, 'according to what is said to be the most pleasant

thing'. For the saying cf. esp. Arist. *Rhet.* 1.1370b30 καὶ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι ἡδύ, and a few pages earlier Arist. has also argued that 'revenge on one's enemies and not being reconciled' is among τὰ καλά (*Rhet.* 1.367a20–2). That fits the old Greek principle of helping friends and harming enemies (Whitlock Blundell 1989: ch. 2), and cf. e.g. the chorus at Eur. *Bacch.* 877–80, 'what finer god-given honour is there among mortals than to hold your hand in mastery over your enemy's head?'

68.2 οἵ γε ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἦλθον δουλωσόμενοι: **64**.1, **66**.2nn. **ἀνδράσι . . . παισὶ δὲ καὶ γυναιξί . . . πόλει δὲ τῇ πάσῃι:** a fine tricolon with the three varied superlatives, euphemistically conveying execution of the males, rape of the women and enslavement of the women and children, and destruction of the city or reassignment to new occupants. Such fates were only to be expected (van Wees 2011: 89–98), but it is rare for them to be made so explicit in pre-battle speeches (Iglesias Zoido 2008: 37); more often it is left as the familiar, more general, phrasing of fighting for one's family (Hom. *Il.* 15.494–9 and 661–6, Callinus fr. 1.6–8, Aesch. *Pers.* 402–4, etc.: **69**.2n.). Here the idea is introduced not so much to inspire troops to defend their families, as the battle is by now for glory and vengeance, but put instead in an unreal condition in the past, arousing anger for what the Athenians would have done had they already won the victory. **τὴν αἰσχίστην ἐπίκλησιν:** this 'most disgraceful of names' (perhaps extinction, perhaps just the shame of defeat) prepares for the contrasting final emphasis on glory and honour, **68**.3. For the concentration on the single city cf. **61–8**n.

68.3 τινα: stronger than 'someone', effectively 'each and every one of you': cf. **61**.1n. and e.g. Hom. *Il.* 16.200 and 209. **μηδὲ τὸ ἀκινδύνως ἀπελθεῖν αὐτοὺς κέρδος νομίσαι** 'nor think their risk-free departure gain (enough)', with ἀκινδύνως embracing risk both to the Syracusans and to themselves. Many thought that way about the Persians after Salamis (cf. Hdt. 8.108.2–4). **τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐὰν κρατήσωσιν ὁμοίως δράσουσιν:** for they are fighting now only to break out, and even if victorious they will not resume the siege. **ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος** 'as we can reasonably expect' (**68**.2n.). **τούσδε τε κολασθῆναι . . . παραδοῦναι:** ἡμᾶς is understood with παραδοῦναι; for the switch of subjects cf. **18**.3, **44**.5, and e.g. 6.27.2, 86.2(nn.). **τῇ πάσῃι Σικελίαι . . . παραδοῦναι:** this does shift the emphasis away from the single city, but is still aimed at Syracusans: this liberty is something they will bestow, not just share. The stress on freedom-fighting is again conventional (6.76.4n., Hdt. 6.11.2, and Aesch. *Pers.* 402–5, quoted in **69**.2n.) and again (**68**.2n.) requires a tweak: the Sicilians' freedom is no longer in immediate peril, but victory now will strengthen it by removing a permanent threat; cf. Hermocrates at 4.64.5. **καλὸς**

ὁ ἀγών: rounding off the speech by echoing its beginning (**66**.1n.), and picking up the theme already in the narrative from **56**.2 and **59**.2: Intr., p. 30. **οἳ ἄν . . . ὠφελῶσιν:** indefinite construction 'to refer to actions which occur habitually' (*CGCG* 40.9(3)). **σφαλῆναι:** **67**.2n.

69.1 καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς σφετέροις στρατιώταις: καί conveys 'they too, to their own soldiers', as well as Nicias to his.

69.2 *Nicias adds more.* The long sentence reflects his agitation as the clauses tumble one after another: 'one of the greatest, most truly beautiful periods in Thucydides' (Maurer 1995: 121 n. 32). Th.'s own tone is hard to catch. Connor 1984: 200–1, Lateiner 1985, Crane 1996: 107, and Grethlein 2008: 134–6 think it disapproving, in line with Th.'s general negative verdict on Nicias: in particular, Lateiner finds such platitudes and 'old-fashioned talk' (ἀρχαιολογεῖν) symptomatic of Nicias' failure to move with the times, and contrasts his frantic words with Pericles' calmer celebration of Athens in the *Epitaphios* (2.35–46). Yet those circumstances were very different, and that verdict seems harsh, however critical Th. may be of Nicias' generalship as a whole (Intr., pp. 28–30). Certainly this speech compares unfavourably with that, say, of Phormio (2.89), giving much more solid reasons for encouragement before another naval battle: but here, as at **61–4** and **77**(nn.), the point is more that there were no such reasons to give and nothing better to say. At Hdt. 8.83 Themistocles' final words before Salamis are similarly old-hat, and here the valour of the Athenians and the closeness of the battle may confirm that the old themes sometimes remain the best. Cf. Rawlings 1981: 155–7, Rood 1998a: 194–5, Tompkins 2017: 113–16, and *CT*. **ἐκπεπληγμένος:** despite Nicias' warning at **63**.3, ἔκπληξις and κατάπληξις now (cf. **42**.2n.) settle on the Athenian side (**71**.7, **72**.4, **77**.4, though cf. also **70**.6n.), and at 8.1.2 will spread to the city itself. **ὡς ἐγγὺς ἤδη:** ὡς may be heard here as introducing either an indirect statement (= ὅτι), 'that it was near at hand', or an indirect question, 'how close it was'. **καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἔμελλον ἀνάγεσθαι** 'they were on the very point of putting to sea'. **πάσχουσιν:** a vague 'people' is understood as subject. **σφίσιν . . . αὐτοῖς:** plural, and reflexive as Nicias includes himself: not enough, he thought, for either himself or the troops. **ἔργωι . . . λόγωι:** Th.'s favourite antithesis, and as often the two are complementary as much as contrasting: something, feels Nicias, is lacking in both, but further λόγοι may inspire listeners to correct what is deficient ἔργωι. **τῶν τριηράρχων:** it would be impracticable to address the whole force as at **60**.5(n.), as the rowers would already be at their benches below decks. We should imagine Nicias to be going along the line of ships on the shore rather like Agamemnon at Hom. *Il.* 4.223–41, just as he did with the land-force at 6.67.3(n.). **ἀνεκάλει:** the verb

is stronger than simply 'address', and is appropriate for 'calling on' someone by name to perform or to aid. It recurs at **70**.8, again of calling to trierarchs, then in a different sense at **73**.3, and on only two other occasions in Th. **πατρόθεν τε ἐπονομάζων καὶ αὐτοὺς ὀνομαστὶ καὶ φυλήν:** this alludes to Hom. *Il.* 10.68 (noted already by the Schol.), where Menelaus is told to alert the chieftains πατρόθεν ἐκ γενεῆς ὀνομάζων ἄνδρα ἕκαστον; Agamemnon addressed some of the leaders similarly as he moved along the lines, e.g. *Il.* 4.370 to Diomedes, ὤ μοι, Τυδέος υἱὲ δαΐφρονος ἱπποδάμοιο . . . Cf. Carmona Centeno 2014: 104–6. 'Tribes' figure briefly in Homer (*Il.* 2.362–3) but not in naming formulae, and so φυλήν gears this to the Athenian context: thought of the tribe and its eponymous heroes (e.g. Erechtheus and Ajax) might be inspirational. In this Nicias ignores the allies, except for the few who shared the Athenian tribes. **τό τε καθ' ἑαυτόν, ὧι ὑπῆρχε λαμπρότητός τι, μὴ προδιδόναι τινά** 'anyone who already had any distinguished achievements not to let himself down'. λαμπρότης recurs in a different retrospect at **75**.6(n.), there transferred from the individual to the civic level. **τὰς πατρικὰς ἀρετάς . . . μὴ ἀφανίζειν:** appeals to ancestors' virtues and achievements are the stuff of patriotic oratory (used briefly by Pericles at 2.36.1–2 and extensively at e.g. Lys. 2.20–43, Isoc. 4.64–109; cf. 6.83.2n.), but μὴ ἀφανίζειν gives particular urgency: it is not just the usual appeal to live up to them, but now to ensure that they are not wiped out along with the city that they served. Like πρόγονοι, ἐπιφανεῖς may recall Pericles' funeral speech (2.43.3). **πατρίδος τε τῆς ἐλευθερωτάτης:** Nicias even more clearly ignores the allies. This too may recall the funeral speech, esp. 2.37.2, 40.5, and 43.4. **τῆς ἐν αὐτῆι ἀνεπιτάκτου πᾶσιν ἐς τὴν δίαιταν ἐξουσίας** 'the power, not subject to close control, that all have to live as they choose'. A clearer recall of the funeral speech, 2.37.2 on the easygoing, live-and-let-live δίαιτα. Rawlings 1981: 157 notes the irony that what follows will be the only 'funeral' that many of these men will receive. ἀνεπίτακτος is not found again in extant literature until much later, though Aristotle was remembered as saying that he had learned from philosophy 'to do ἀνεπιτάκτως what some do through fear of the laws' (Diog. Laert. 5.20). **ἄλλα τε λέγων . . . ἐπιβοῶνται:** the structure is best taken as ἄλλα τε λέγων ὅσα ἄνθρωποι . . . εἴποιεν ἄν, καὶ . . . ἐπιβοῶνται, with the optative 'would (be likely to) say' hardening to the indicative 'and (do) invoke'; then, within the καί limb, προφερόμενα as direct object of ἐπιβοῶνται and then, by a slight anacoluthon understandable in so breathless a sentence, ἀλλ' . . . νομίζοντες contrasting with ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων . . . προφερόμενα. The words are clichés, but they think them useful anyway. **τῶι τοιούτωι ἤδη τοῦ καιροῦ** 'such a pitch of crisis': **2**.4n. **οὐ πρὸς τὸ δοκεῖν τινὶ ἀρχαιολογεῖν φυλαξάμενοι**

'without guarding against giving anyone the impression of old-fashioned talk'. For the meaning of ἀρχαιολογεῖν see Rood 1998a: 195 n. 58, and on Th.'s tone here see intr. n. to **69**.2. **ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων παραπλήσια** 'similar things on every occasion' (LSJ ὑπέρ A.III). **ἔς τε γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας καὶ θεοὺς πατρώιους:** as at Aesch. *Pers.* 402–5, when a great cry (βοή) goes up, ὦ παῖδες Ἕλληνων, ἴτε | ἐλευθεροῦτε πατρίδ', ἐλευθεροῦτε δὲ | παῖδας γυναῖκας θεῶν τε πατρώιων ἕδη | θήκας τε προγόνων· νῦν ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀγών: cf. **68**.2n. For the 'children and wives' and 'this is the decisive battle' *topoi* see Huitink–Rood 2019 on X. *An.* 3.4.46, and for the Homeric antecedents (e.g. *Il.* 15.661–6) Keitel 1987b: 167–9 and Carmona Centeno 2014: 101–4. **ἐπὶ τῆι παρούσηι ἐκπλήξει:** ἐπί + dative of 'occasion or cause' (LSJ ἐπί B.III.1); ἐκπλήξει picks up ἐκπεπληγμένος from the beginning of the sentence, but here it is an agitation felt at such moments by both speakers and listeners; then at **70**.6 it affects both sides in the din of battle. **ἐπιβοῶνται:** 'shouting' can be a sign of a bad leader (**48**.4n.) and the word is taken by Lateiner 1985: 203 to be pejorative here; but cf. βοή at Aesch. *Pers.* 402 (cited above), and ἐπιβοᾶν is used again of such appeals at **70**.7, **75**.4, and 8.92.8. The appeal by the gods may have affected the choice of verb: when, in mortal danger, the Plataeans invoke their ancestral gods and the graves of their fathers, ἐπιβοώμενοι is the word used both by the Plataeans themselves (3.59.2) and by the Thebans (3.67.2), and though the Thebans may mean it sneeringly the Plataeans certainly do not. See also Rawlings 1981: 156, Allison 1997b: 506–7, Rood 1998a: 195 n. 61, and *CT* on **75**.4.

69.3–71: THE BATTLE IN THE GREAT HARBOUR

The catalogues of **57–9**.1 and the elaborate speeches have made it clear that the decisive battle is about to come, and with it the second narrative climax of the book (Intr., p. 21). The narrating itself lives up to the expectations aroused, and was much admired. D. H. quotes all **69**.4–**72**.1, and takes it as a model of Thucydides' gift for blending plain and figurative language: such passages show, he says, his grandeur, beauty, acuity, and other virtues at their most perfect, so that the highbrow critic and the casual reader will alike be satisfied (*Thuc.* 26–7). Plut. similarly cites this as an example of Th. at his best, 'striving to turn his listener into something like a viewer and to generate in his readers the terrifying and disturbing emotions felt by those who saw the events' (*On the Glory of the Athenians* 347a: cf. *Nic.* 1.1; both passages are cited at Intr., p. 18). Plut.'s own account of the battle of Actium contains several echoes (*Ant.* 66.1–3 with Pelling 1988 ad loc.).

The pictorial description does not adopt a 'low-camera' approach (Lendon 2017a), zooming in to attention-grabbing details in the way that Hdt. describes the attention of Xerxes at 8.88 and 90. One important technique in this 'turning the listener into something like a viewer' is Th.'s emphasis on the engagement of the onlookers, greatly imitated by later authors, and the focalising of much through their eyes (**71**.1–4). This chimes with modern cognitive studies on how the perceptual imagination works, more concerned with what it is like to be a viewer than with mentally painting an exhaustive picture (Grethlein and Huitink 2017, Huitink 2019). That involvement of the onlookers is the more pointed because they are sharing not just the combatants' thoughts and emotions (ξύστασιν τῆς γνώμης, **71**.1n.), even their body-movements (**71**.3n.), but will also share their fate, and they know it. Th. leaves unexplored the complication that these non-participants face a grim fate even if Athens wins: if the ships do manage to sail away, presumably to Catana in the first instance, those remaining will be dreadfully vulnerable.

The earlier narrative has already made many aspects clear – the constraints of fighting in the narrows, the aim of the Athenians to break out, the desire of the Syracusans to annihilate, even the parallel with Pylos that now becomes explicit (**71**.7; cf. earlier **27**.5, **62**.2) – and this allows the factual course of the battle to be sketched relatively briefly (**70**.3–6). There is almost nothing on the manoeuvring (**70**.2n.), nor on any ebb and flow until the end, though this will also be because there was little room for either once the battle had started. The emotions too of the combatants have been prepared, as they echo the pre-battle speeches (**70**.3, **70**.7, **71**.1nn.), confirming that those words had been well judged. Nor is the presentation simply visual: the cries of encouragement and reproach, the crash of collisions, the shouts of the pilots, the calls to the gods, and finally the wails and moans all appeal to the auditory imagination, just as in the description of Salamis in Aesch.'s *Persians* (384–432: Pelling 2019: 174–5). Here it culminates in the stylistic tour de force of **71**.4(n.), 'wailing, shouting, victors, vanquished'. The emphasis on psychology is as dominant as ever, but the crisis in Athenian morale (Intr., pp. 30–1) does not impair their zest for the fight until it is lost (**71**.7), and it is a close-run thing.

The strong visuality recalls the grand spectacle of the Athenians' departure at 6.30–32.2 (**70**.3, **71**.3nn.): so much nervous hope then, so much fear now. Several points also recall the battle of Sybota in 433 (1.48–50), itself καρτερά (1.49.1; cf. **70**.2) and like a πεζομαχία (1.49.2) and the fiercest inter-Greek battle yet (1.50.2): this one is now fiercer still (**70**.2). Thus the climactic battle of the narrative takes us back to the first one, and all the technical and tactical advances have been rendered

useless: cf. **62**.2(n.). Some touches recall Hom. *Il.* 15–16, when the Trojans were on the verge of firing the ships and cutting off the Greeks from any hope of returning home (**70**.7n., cf. **69**.2n.; Carmona Centeno 2014). More suggestive still are the echoes of Salamis (**70**.3, **71**.4, **71**.7nn.), that other great battle fought 'in the narrows' (**36**.4n.) – but in that case by the Greeks' choice, not through necessity. The verbal parallels with Aesch.'s account are closer than with Hdt. (Finley 1942: 321–2 and 1967: 46–7, Rood 1999: 160 = 2009: 168), but there is a structural analogy with Hdt.: this, like Salamis, will be the decisive battle, leading soon but not immediately to the end of this campaign; in 413 as in 480 the end of the campaign will prefigure, but not immediately bring, the end of the war. Cf. **87**.6n.

There are no verbs in the historic present: frequently though Th. uses these elsewhere to indicate pivotal moments, he tends to avoid them in the most intensely dramatic episodes of all (Foster 2015: 71–2, Willi 2017: 238). As usual, the scene is largely set by imperfects: **69**.3 ἦγε, **69**.4 ἔπλεον, **70**.1 ἐφύλασσον, παρεβοήθει, and ἦρχον, and **70**.2 προσέμισγον. Normally these would be followed by aorists for the moments of action, just as ἦγε is immediately followed by παρέταξεν, but here the imperfects continue, some thirty in **69**.4–**71**.5 with only two aorists; it is only once the battle is decided that the decisive aorists come, ἔτρεψαν and ἐξέπεσον (**71**.5–6). The effect is to put us more firmly in the role of participants and/or spectators, viewing the action as it unfolds (Bakker 1997: 12–13, 40–5, and 2007: 118–19, Basset 2011: 170–2, 174; Bruzzone 2018: 594–5 thinks rather of a still image on a frieze). It also conveys a battle where much of the action was recurrent (hence the number of 'whenever' clauses and the repetition of certain phrases), without the mass moves and distinct phases typical of most encounters.

The excellence of the narrative is much discussed: see esp. Green 1970: 305–14, Hunter 1973: 113–22, Rutter 1989: 55–6, Walker 1993: 355–61, Kallet 2001: 163–6, Hornblower 2004a: 342–6, Rogkotis 2006: 76–82, de Romilly 2012: 93–7, Grethlein 2015, Lendon 2017b: 159–63, Bruzzone 2018, Harman 2018: 284–6, and Rood forthcoming.

69.3 **ἀναγκαῖα** 'a bare minimum'. It was not enough, Nicias thought, but it would have to do. **παρέταξεν ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐδύνατο** 'drew them up along the shore (παρ-) over the greatest distance that he could'. **ἐς τὸ θαρσεῖν:** the emphasis immediately falls on psychology and morale.

69.4 **Μένανδρος καὶ Εὐθύδημος:** **16**.1(n.); on their status see below. **στρατηγοὶ ἐπέβησαν** 'these generals had come on board' or 'these had come on board as generals' (for the pluperfect use of the aorist see *CGCG* 33.40 n. 1): the choice between those two renderings depends on whether

Menander and Euthydemus were officially made generals by the assembly at 16.2 (thus Develin 1989: 152, *CT*) or just 'were sometimes called upon during the year to act in the capacity of *stratēgoi*' (Hamel 1998: 196–200; cf. Fornara 1971: 65 and n. 113). Whether for formal or for informal reasons, they clearly carried less weight than Nicias, Demosthenes, and – until his death – Eurymedon (**47**.1, **49**.4nn.). **τὸ ζεῦγμα τοῦ λιμένος:** **59**.3. **τὸν καταλειφθέντα διέκπλουν** 'the gap that had been left there for ships to come in and out': cf. **70**.2. There was no mention of that gap at **59**.2(n.), but this is when it becomes relevant.

70.1 **προεξαγαγόμενοι:** προεξαναγαγόμενοι (Classen; D. H. has προεξαναγόμενοι) makes the 'putting out to sea' more explicit but seems unnecessary: cf. ἐπεξάγοντα, **52**.2. **παραπλησίαις τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πρότερον** 'similar in number to before' (LSJ καί A.III.1; cf. **71**.7n.), i.e. about seventy-six (**52**.1n.). They would therefore be outnumbered (cf. **60**.4), but the poor condition of some of the Athenian ships (**60**.2) would have compensated for this. **ἤιπερ καὶ αἱ νῆες κατίσχοιεν** 'to the places where the ships too might come to shore', so that the land-troops could attack the enemy crews or rescue their own. **Σικανὸς . . . Ἀγάθαρχος . . . Πυθήν:** for Sicanus see 6.73.1 and **46**; for Agatharchus, **25**.1; for Pythen, 6.104.1 and **1**.1.

70.2 **τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ ῥύμῃ ἐπιπλέοντες:** Th. thus passes very briefly over the first stages. They clearly reached the ζεῦγμα easily. The squadron opposing them (**70**.1) will have been heavily outnumbered, but perhaps it was also the Syracusan tactic to let them through, delaying the main resistance until they could attack πανταχόθεν and hem them in still further. **τῶν τεταγμένων νεῶν πρὸς αὐτῶι:** the detachment mentioned at **70**.1 (μέρει). **τὰς κλήισεις:** presumably the gap between the anchored hulks (**59**.3, **69**.4) had been closed with chains: cf. **38**.2. **σφίσι:** the Athenians. **οἵα οὐχ ἑτέρα τῶν προτέρων:** for the slight illogicality cf. 6.13.1(n.) μέγιστον δὴ τῶν πρὶν κίνδυνον, and esp. 1.50.2 of Sybota, μεγίστη δὴ τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς. D. H.'s MSS have τῶν πρότερον, perhaps rightly: γενομένων would be understood.

70.3 **πολλὴ . . . πολλή:** for the anaphora cf. 1.49.1 πολλοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας . . . πολλοὺς δὲ τοξότας τε καὶ ἀκοντίστας, again of Sybota. **ὁπότε κελευσθείη** 'whenever the order was given': for the passive cf. τὸ κελευόμενον at e.g. Hdt. 3.63.3 and 7.16.1. The optative leaves it ambiguous whether the enthusiasm is before the fight (eagerness to attack at whatever time the order would come) or during it (eagerness at whatever time the order came): doubtless both. **ἡ ἀντιτέχνησις . . . καὶ ἀγωνισμός:** the one definite article serves for, and tightly connects, the two nouns, attracted into

agreeing with the nearer: cf. **70**.4 τὰς ἀνακρούσεις καὶ διέκπλους. ἀντιτέχνησις is a very rare word, possibly coined by Th.; it is not found again until D. H. uses it, doubtless in imitation (*Ant. Rom.* 14.10.2). ἀγωνισμός picks up the ἀγών talk that has been prominent on both sides (**56**.2, **59**.2, **61**.1–2, **66**.1, **68**.2–3): cf. **71**.1 and (ἀμίλλης) **71**.3. **ὁπότε προσπέσοι ναῦς νηί:** the ambiguity is the same as in ὁπότε κελευσθείη, leaving it unclear whether the marines are thinking this way in anticipation or when the clashes came; again, probably both. The phrase is closely repeated at **70**.4 ναῦς νηὶ προσπεσοῦσα. **μὴ λείπεσθαι τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ καταστρώματος τῆς ἄλλης τέχνης** 'that what happened on deck [lit. "what came from the deck"; cf. **63**.3n.] should not fall short of the skill exhibited in other respects', i.e. by the pilots and sailors. **πᾶς τέ τις** 'every individual', as at **60**.2. **ἐν ὧι προσετέτακτο αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἠπείγετο πρῶτος φαίνεσθαι:** this picks up the appeals to individual prowess in, particularly, Nicias' exhortations (**64**.2, **69**.2), and as at **64**.2 it reflects the competitiveness implicit in the ἀγών figuring. It may also recall (a) the competitive προθυμία of the Athenians as they set out, each in the task ὧι τις ἕκαστος προσετάχθη (6.31.3–4: Jordan 2000: 76–7), and (b) Xerxes' critical comparison of his crews' performance at Salamis (Hdt. 8.88, 90.4).

70.4 βραχὺ γὰρ ἀπέλιπον ξυναμφότεραι διακόσιαι γενέσθαι 'taken together, fell just short of numbering 200', i.e. 110 Athenian + about 76 Syracusan (**52**.1, **60**.4, **70**.1). For the construction cf. Hdt. 7.9α.2 ὀλίγον ἀπολιπόντι ἐς αὐτὰς Ἀθήνας ἀπικέσθαι. **ἐμβολαὶ . . . προσβολαί:** the distinction is between deliberate 'ramming' (ἐμβολή) and possibly accidental 'collision' (προσβολή). **διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὰς ἀνακρούσεις καὶ διέκπλους:** after **36**.4–5 and **62**.3 no explanation is needed for why these were rarely possible. For the close link given by the definite article see **70**.3n. **ὡς** + optative: 'whenever'.

70.5 οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων 'those on deck', but ἀπό is also influenced by the projectiles coming 'from' it: cf. **47**.3, **71**.1, 6.7.2, 6.32.2nn. **λίθοις:** mainly cast by slingers (σφενδονηταί, **31**.5, **42**.1), but some might be thrown. For the use of stones as missiles in naval battles see *GSW* v.60–1: rare, but by no means unknown. It reinforces the sense of a land-battle (Bruzzone 2018: 593), but there is no reason to doubt that it happened. Plut. *Nic.* 25.3–4 says that the Syracusan stone-throwers were more effective than the Athenian javelin-throwers and archers, whose aim was affected more by the surge: he adds that they were following the advice of Ariston (**39**.2n.), and that Ariston was himself killed in the action.

70.6 ξυνετύγχανέ τε πολλαχοῦ . . . παρέχειν: a magnificent sentence, whose interlocking clauses convey the tangled confusion: first the collisions,

with the ramming ship itself being rammed; then the result, with ships inextricably entangled; then psychology, as the captains have to think simultaneously of attack and defence, alert to all directions at once; finally the transition to noise, so deafening that it did not matter what orders were given as nobody could hear. **τὰ μὲν ἄλλοις ἐμβεβληκέναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐμβεβλῆσθαι** 'that they had attacked others in one direction and been attacked themselves in another': the perfect tenses here and in ξυνηρτῆσθαι and περιεστάναι focus on the position after the collisions. τὰ μέν and τὰ δέ are accusatives of respect. **ἔστιν ἧι** 'in some places': **11**.2n. **καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον** 'one by one'. **περιεστάναι:** lit. 'encircling' the helmsmen (LSJ περιίστημι B.I.2): cf. 3.54.5 μέγιστος φόβος περιέστη τὴν Σπάρτην, and the mental application of the figure to the helmsmen's concerns is aided by the physical pressing of the ships 'from all sides' (πανταχόθεν). **ἔκπληξιν**: **69**.2n.; this is the last time that this affects Syracusans as well as Athenians. **κελευσταί:** not the commanders themselves, but the boatswains who gave the rowers their instructions and beat out the rhythm.

70.7 ἀφ' ἑκατέρων τοῖς κελευσταῖς: the noisy encouragement came *from* both sides and fell *to* the boatswains to execute. **κατά τε τὴν τέχνην καὶ πρὸς τὴν αὐτίκα φιλονικίαν** 'relating to matters of skill' – i.e. the technical commands – 'and in response to the immediate concern for victory'. For αὐτίκα with a noun cf. 6.49.2n.; for φιλονικία, repeated at **71**.1, see **28**.3n. The word again (**70**.3n.) suggests the competitiveness of the ἀγών. **τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις . . . τοῖς δὲ Συρακοσίοις:** cf. Hom. *Il.* 15.699–702, 'the Achaeans thought they would not escape, but would perish there; the Trojans' hopes rose in each man's breast, eager to burn the ships and kill the Achaeans' (Carmona Centeno 2014: 109). **ἐπιβοῶντες: 69**.2n. οἱ κελευσταί is understood; for the loosely attached nom. see **42**.2, **74**.1, 6.24.3nn. **τῆς ἐς τὴν πατρίδα σωτηρίας** 'safe return to their native country', as in νόστιμος σωτηρία (Aesch. *Pers.* 797): cf. [Dem.] 50.16 τὴν οἰκάδε σωτηρίαν. **εἴ ποτε καὶ αὖθις:** echoing Nicias (**64**.2): there will never be a better time. **καλὸν εἶναι . . . ἐπαυξῆσαι:** very much the notes struck by Gylippus and the Syracusan generals, especially at the beginning and end of the speech.

70.8 εἴ τινά που ὁρῶιεν: a habitual conditional clause in the past (*CGCG* 49.13), effectively = 'whenever' (*CGCG* 49.16): cf. **78**.1, **79**.5. **μή:** with κατ' ἀνάγκην, 'backing water when they did not have to'. **ἀνακαλοῦντες ὀνομαστὶ τὸν τριήραρχον:** again as Nicias had done (**69**.2), but this now refers to both sides and the questioning is reprimanding rather than inspirational. **εἰ τὴν πολεμιωτάτην γῆν . . . ὑποχωροῦσιν** 'if they were thinking this most hostile land more their element than the sea that it

had cost them no little effort to make their own'. 'No little effort' refers to the accumulated work of seventy years that has brought maritime supremacy. **διαφυγεῖν** 'to make good their escape', aorist infinitive, in contrast to the presents φεύγοντας φεύγουσιν, 'fleeing': cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 1216 ἢν μή γε φεύγων ἐκφύγῃς πρὸς αἰθέρα with Mastronarde 1994 ad loc., Hdt. 4.23.5, X. *An.* 2.5.7.

71.1 ἐκ τῆς γῆς: ἐκ is influenced by their looking on 'from' the shore: cf. **70**.5n. (ἀπό). **καθεστηκυίας:** the choice of this verb, rather than οὔσης or γενομένης, reflects the way that the battle had settled into a steady state of equal balance. **πολὺν τὸν ἀγῶνα:** **70**.3n. Plut.'s citation of the passage has ἄλαστον ('unforgettable') rather than πολὺν τόν (*On the Glory of the Athenians* 347b), and *HCT* followed Vollgraff 1906: 426 in speculating that Th. wrote ἀλίαστον ('unabating'); but Plut. may well be quoting from memory, and his text there is anyway uncertain. D. H. has πολύν. **ξύστασιν τῆς γνώμης:** best taken as 'mental involvement', as if their thought-processes are joining in and 'standing alongside' those of the combatants: thus Barrett 1964: 347–8 on Eur. *Hipp.* 983–5. LSJ, *HCT*, and *CT* prefer 'conflict', but the parallels cited by LSJ σύστασις B.1 refer to the physical confrontation of bodies or of elements within the body, and the extension to mental processes is not easy. The imitation in Dio 49.9.3 is too close to help, as both interpretations are possible there too. **φιλονικῶν . . . πράξωσιν:** closely echoing the φιλονικία and exhortations of those fighting (**70**.7(nn.)), but adding the comparison with the present predicament, the one side fighting to enhance their glory still further, those who had come against them (οἱ ἐπελθόντες) fearing that matters might become even worse.

71.2 τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις: the focus has now shifted exclusively to the Athenian side. **<***>:** something has clearly fallen out of the text here, e.g. διὰ τὸ ἀνώμαλον <τῶν γιγνομένων ἀνώμαλον> καὶ τὴν ἔποψιν τῆς ναυμαχίας . . . ἠναγκάζοντο ἔχειν. The point will be that the varying fortunes of the battle meant that the viewing experience had corresponding shifts; the scribe's eye will have jumped forward from ἀνώμαλον. The Schol. took τὸ ἀνώμαλον rather to refer to the unevenness of the ground, and Classen therefore suggested <τῆς τάξεως ἀνώμαλον>; the point would then be that different onlookers therefore had different views. An emphasis on the tos and fros seems more likely.

71.3 δι' ὀλίγου 'at close quarters'. **ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ σκοπούντων:** σκοπεῖν includes both the 'seeing' and the 'considering' and reflecting on what is seen (Crane 1996: 242–4, Kallet 2006: 354–5), and here it is both aspects that provoke the reaction. **εἰ μέν τινες ἴδοιεν . . . ἀνεθάρσησάν τε ἄν καὶ . . .**

ἐτρέποντο: the regular construction for a habitual condition in the past is pluperfect or imperfect indicative in the main clause, as here ἐτρέποντο, and εἰ + optative in the condition (*CGCG* 49.13). The aorist indicative + ἄν is rarer, but see *M&T* 162. **μὴ στερῆσαι σφᾶς τῆς σωτηρίας:** for the infinitive see *CGCG* 51.32. **ὁλοφυρμῶι τε ἅμα μετὰ βοῆς:** ὁλοφυρμός βοή is repeated in **71**.4, and βοή is itself repeated from **70**.7. **ἀπὸ τῶν δρωμένων . . . ἐδουλοῦντο** 'and the sight of what was being done caused them, even more than the men in action, to have their minds enslaved', lit. 'they were enslaved in their minds'. The metaphor is bold, but cf. 4.34.1 τῆι γνώμηι δεδουλωμένοι and 2.61.3. It also fits the future that looms: slavery is the prospect, and they are feeling it already. For the idea that spectators might feel the tension even more than participants cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 1388–9, 'more sweat dripped from the onlookers than from those in action [οἱ δρῶντες, i.e. the brothers Eteocles and Polynices], through terror for their friends'. **τὸ ἀκρίτως ξυνεχές** 'the continuous confusion', lit. 'the indistinguishably continuous quality': the different phases so blurred into one another that it was impossible to judge what was going on. **τῆς ἁμίλλης:** the contest figure again (**70**.3n.). Listeners/readers might recall the very different maritime ἅμιλλα as the fleet set out (6.30.2(n.)). **ἴσα τῆι δόξηι** 'according to the appearance' or 'to their opinion'. **ξυναπονεύοντες** 'following with their bodily gestures', the sort of involuntary movement familiar to any enthusiastic sports fan. Sall.'s imitation spells it out more, 'some advised, some encouraged, pointing with their hands or gesticulating with their bodies, swaying this way and that as if they were dodging or hurling weapons' (*Iug.* 60.4). Neurological research confirms that perceptible physiological responses are an intrinsic part of the 'viewing' experience (Huitink 2019; cf. **69**.3–**71**n.) and one that can extend to the reader of a vivid narrative as well (Huitink 2020). **ἐν τοῖς:** **19**.4n. **παρ' ὀλίγον** 'very nearly', or 'they were on the verge of . . .'

71.4 ὁλοφυρμὸς βοή, νικῶντες κρατούμενοι: a remarkable stylistic effect; cf. Chariton 5.8.4 (probably in allusive imitation) πάντα ἦν ὁμοῦ, δάκρυα, χαρά, θάμβος, ἔλεος, ἀπιστία, εὐχαί, and X. *Cyr.* 7.1.38 ἐώθουν ἐωθοῦντο, ἔπαιον ἐπαίοντο. For the asyndeton (i.e. no connective particles) in such battle-narrative clusters see Huitink–Rood on X. *An.* 3.4.25, appositely quoting [Longin.] *On the Sublime* 19.1, 'the words come out without connections and as it were pour forth, almost outstripping the speaker himself'; 'Demetrius' *On Style* 193–4 adds that one cannot help acting out such an asyndetic sequence, and one can imagine how effective this would be in oral performance: cf. Vatri 2020: 228–31. Just as striking is the jump from nouns to participles, with νικῶντες corresponding to βοή and κρατούμενοι chiastically to ὁλοφυρμός. Again one can almost hear their cries

– 'We're victorious! We're done for!' A Schol. compares Hom. *Il.* 4.450–1 ἔνθα δ' ἄμ' οἰμωγή τε καὶ εὐχωλὴ πέλεν ἀνδρῶν | ὀλλύντων τε καὶ ὀλλυμένων, and the parallel is also noted in the Homeric Scholia ad loc. (Grossi 2016: 113–14); that is in the first and this in the climactic engagement of the respective narratives. The account of Salamis in Aesch.'s *Persians* similarly concludes with the οἰμωγή and κωκύματα of the defeated (426–7). See Hornblower 2004a: 362–3. **ἀναγκάζοιτο:** an indicative ἀναγκάζεται would have served, but the optative appeals even more to the readerly imagination – 'would be . . .', just imagine! **φθέγγεσθαι:** repeated from **70**.6, but here it can extend to moaning as well as words.

71.5 πρίν γε δή: 39.2n. **λαμπρῶς:** not just clearly but 'brilliantly', again suggesting splendid visuality: **55**.1n. The grand departure in 415 was remarkable for its ὄψεως λαμπρότης (6.31.6): cf. **75**.6, **87**.5 (nn.). **πολλῆι κραυγῆι καὶ διακελευσμῶι:** this shifts immediately back to the auditory, and contrasts with the οἰμωγὴ καὶ στόνος on the other side (**71**.6).

71.6 οὐκέτι διαφόρως: that is, no longer with the mixed reactions of **71**.3. **οἰμωγῆι τε καὶ στόνωι:** the Schol. again (cf. **71**.4n.) compares Homer, this time *Il.* 22.409 κωκυτῶι τ' εἴχοντο καὶ οἰμωγῆι κατὰ ἄστυ. **δυσανασχετοῦντες** 'finding hard to bear'. The word was a Thucydidean coinage according to Pollux 3.130. **τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ τείχους** 'what was left of the wall', i.e. after they had abandoned the upper part at **60**.2. **ὅπηι:** both of place ('where') and of manner ('how').

71.7 οὐδεμιᾶς δὴ τῶν ξυμπασῶν ἐλάσσων ἔκπληξις: the sequence of greatest-yets follows the course of the battle, the greatest battle (**70**.2), the biggest numbers in the tightest location (**70**.4), the unparalleled fear for the future (**71**.2), now the greatest terror. The superlative is emphasised by ξυμπασῶν, strictly redundant after οὐδεμιᾶς but clearly stronger than ξυμφορῶν (B): to take ξυμφορῶν as objective genitive, 'this consternation was smaller [than consternations at other] ξυμφοραί' (C–S) gives too compressed a construction. **παραπλήσιά τε ἐπεπόνθεσαν καὶ ἔδρασαν αὐτοὶ ἐν Πύλωι** 'they had suffered similarly to what they had themselves inflicted in Pylos', i.e. in 425: this is the use of καί to convey similarities (LSJ A.III.1), as at **70**.1. The Pylos comparison has been latent before, but the point so far has been deserting slaves and helots (**27**.5) and, particularly, the blurring of πεζομαχία into ναυμαχία (**62**.2n.); now the point shifts to the immediate consequences. There may be a larger-scale parallel too, with this defeat shifting the balance of the whole war just as Pylos was a turning point in the Archidamian War; but Th. leaves this for his readers and listeners to infer. Cf. Intr., pp. 24–5. **προσαπώλλυντο αὐτοῖς:** αὐτοῖς like τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις is dative of (dis)advantage. There may be a

further hint of Salamis, where 'the defeat of the fleet destroyed the land-army too' (Aesch. *Pers.* 728), a line echoed by Hdt. (8.68γ). **οἱ ἐν τῇι νήσωι ἄνδρες διαβεβηκότες:** these are the 420 Spartiates and the helots who had crossed to the island of Sphacteria (4.8.8–9), and who had been cut off there by the Athenian victory in the bay (4.13). ἐν + dative rather than ἐς + accusative because the important thing is that they are trapped 'in it'; hence also the perfect, conveying the state resulting from the past act. Cf. 4.14.1 ἐν τῆι γῆι καταπεφευγυίαις. **παρὰ λόγον:** cf. Nicias at **61**.3, but his words sounded desperate even then. The irony now is that this follows the greatest παράλογος of them all, the total Syracusan victory.

72–4: AFTER THE BATTLE

All might still not be lost (**72**.3), but despair is felt even more strongly by the sailors than the commanders (**72**.4). The distance from the can-do Periclean mindset is immense, and now 'all the dash and confidence is with the Syracusans' (Avery 1973: 8). The Athenians now fall victim to a trick by Hermocrates which itself is reminiscent of Athens at its best and wiliest (**73**.3–**74**.1n.); not for the first (**48**.2, **49**.1 and 4) or last (**86**.4) time, a potential strength – the presence of sympathisers and informants in the city – turns out lethally. And, again not for the first time (**49**.4, **50**.4), the error is compounded by delaying even more than was needed (**74**.1).

72.1 Γενομένης δ' ἰσχυρᾶς τῆς ναυμαχίας: for a 'mighty' battle cf. 3.85.2 λιμὸς ἰσχυρός. It has a Herodotean ring: cf. Hdt. 1.214.1 ταύτην τὴν μάχην . . . κρίνω ἰσχυροτάτην γενέσθαι, 5.119.1, 7.235.4, 9.62.2.

72.2 νεκρῶν μὲν πέρι . . . οὐδὲ ἐπενόουν αἰτῆσαι ἀναίρεσιν: an extreme sign of the demoralisation, especially remarkable for the religiously punctilious Nicias: after Arginusae in 406 six Athenian generals were executed for not trying hard enough to retrieve the dead (X. *Hell.* 1.6–7). At 3.113.5 an Ambraciot herald reacts similarly in similar circumstances (**30**.4n.). Cf. also **75**.3n., *GSW* IV.197, 235–41. **τῆς δὲ νυκτός:** with ἀναχωρεῖν.

72.3 γνώμην ἐποιεῖτο + infinitive: 'proposed'; cf. 1.128.7, 2.2.4. **βιάσασθαι, ἢν δύνωνται, ἅμα ἕωι τὸν ἔκπλουν:** ironically, this might well have succeeded, given the probable state of the Syracusans the morning after their night-time celebrations (**73**.2). **ἦσαν . . . πεντήκοντα:** the indicative shows that Th., not just Demosthenes, is vouching for these numbers (**42**.3n.); Demosthenes would not have had precise Syracusan numbers anyway, at least for seaworthiness. Thus the Athenians had lost around fifty of their 110, the Syracusans more than twenty-six of their

seventy-six (**70**.4n.). Diod. 13.17.5 gives the losses as sixty Athenian, eight Syracusan lost and sixteen seriously damaged.

72.4 οἱ ναῦται οὐκ ἤθελον ἐσβαίνειν: the first case of outright disobedience, though the troops' pressure (**50**.4) and morale have affected decisions before: see Hornblower 2004b. **καταπεπλῆχθαι:** **42**.2, **69**.2nn. **μὴ ἂν ἔτι οἴεσθαι κρατῆσαι:** in direct discourse their thinking would be οὐκ ἂν ἔτι κρατήσαιμεν.

73.1 ἤδη ξύμπαντες τὴν γνώμην εἶχον: as opposed to the difference of opinion between commander and sailors at **72**.4. **Ἑρμοκράτης δὲ ὁ Συρακόσιος:** his first appearance in the narrative since **21**.3–5; there is no sign that he had commanded in any of the summer's battles and he was clearly not one of those ἐν τέλει now, but by 412/1 he was general again (8.29.2). **εἰ . . . βουλήσεται αὖθις σφίσι τὸν πόλεμον ποιεῖσθαι:** more nervous than the καλὸς ὁ ἀγών thinking that underpinned the similar appeal for total victory at **68**.3, as Hermocrates reverts to the mood of **51**.1 and puts the stress on continuing danger. **ποι** rather than που as καθεζομένη includes the preliminary movement towards any new base: cf. ὅποι at **77**.4, **77**.7. **τοῖς ἐν τέλει οὖσιν:** presumably the three Syracusan generals (cf. 6.73.1, 103.4), but Gylippus may have been consulted too. **λέγων ταῦτα ἃ καὶ αὐτῶι ἐδόκει** 'setting out what was in his mind too', as well as in those of the Athenians: so Dover 1988: 79 and n. 6, retracting his earlier view in *HCT*. **ἀποικοδομῆσαι** 'wall off', recalling in miniature the 'battle of the walls' of 414. That would still leave the possibility of escaping cross-country, but the numbers were such that this would be much harder, especially if τὰ στενόπορα were guarded. The infinitives ἀποικοδομῆσαι and φυλάσσειν can be taken either with ἐσηγεῖται (the variety of construction with the ὡς clause would be characteristic) or with ὡς οὐ χρεὼν . . . ἀλλά, that it was necessary *not* to περιιδεῖν *but* to do this.

73.2 ἔτυχε γὰρ αὐτοῖς Ἡρακλεῖ ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν θυσία οὖσα: the accusative of duration rather than dative is a nice touch: the festival lasted all day. Th. holds that detail back till now. Plut. *Nic.* 24.6–25.1 makes more of it in the preliminaries to the battle, with the Syracusan μάντεις proclaiming that this pointed to a great victory provided they allowed the Athenians to commence the fight. For Heracles and Syracuse see 6.3.2n. **ἂν . . . ἐθελῆσαι:** representing what would have been optative in direct discourse. **καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον . . . ἐξελθεῖν** 'and they [οἱ ἐν τέλει] expected that they (the celebrating victors) would obey their orders in anything else at all rather than taking up their arms just at present and going out to action'. The jump between 'they's is easier in Greek because σφῶν makes it clear that it refers back to the subject of the sentence. The move from τοὺς πολλούς

with τετράφθαι to an understood οἱ ἐν τέλει as subject of ἐλπίζειν remains awkward, but cf. **18**.3, **44**.5, 6.27.2, 86.2, 93.3nn. For πείθεσθαι + genitive = 'take orders from' see Eur. *IA* 726 and Hornblower–Pelling on Hdt. 6.12.3, but this is the only example in Attic prose. That infinitive again corresponds to an optative in direct discourse.

73.3 οὐκέτι ἔπειθεν: probably the imperfect here conveys 'was no longer persuading them' rather than (conative) 'no longer tried to persuade them'.

73.3–74.1 *Hermocrates' trick.* The Athenian generals had themselves played a similar trick on the Syracusans two years earlier (6.64.2–3): the turning of the tables might be sensed by an alert listener or reader. Hermocrates' stratagem also recalls Themistocles' two similar ploys before and after Salamis (8.75, 110.3) when he sent the schoolmaster Sicinnus with messages to Xerxes: those may even have been Hermocrates' models in real life. The first said that the Greeks were planning to flee, and so Xerxes should move quickly before they left: Themistocles thus stirred the enemy to action, whereas Hermocrates here causes delay. The second comes after Themistocles has failed to persuade the allies to sail to the Hellespont to cut off Xerxes' retreat, but he now tells Xerxes that he was the one responsible for *preventing* that from happening, so that the Persians can depart κατ' ἡσυχίην πολλήν (cf. καθ' ἡσυχίαν here); that, like Hermocrates' ploy, concerns a withdrawal and depends on the assumption that the enemy have friends in the sender's camp, though Themistocles' concern is there for himself, to secure personal Persian goodwill, whereas Hermocrates' is for his city, to gain an even greater and bloodier triumph.

73.3 πέμπει: in asyndeton (**71**.4n.) because τάδε μηχανᾶται has already established the connection: cf. 6.64.2n. **ἐξ ὅσου:** i.e. ἐς τοσοῦτον ἐξ ὅτου. **ἀκούσεσθαι:** the middle form is regularly used as the future of the active ἀκούω, so this τις must be 'someone' on the Athenian side who 'would hear them'. **ἀνακαλεσάμενοί τινας:** probably 'called for by name', not just shouting 'is anyone there?' This would lend credence to their masquerade as regular informants. Diod. 13.18.5 says that the Athenians thought these were men from Leontini. **ἦσαν γάρ τινες τῶι Νικίαι διάγγελοι τῶν ἔνδοθεν:** τῶν ἔνδοθεν might be heard as masculine, 'some of those from inside the city', or as neuter, 'informants of what was going on in the city'. For these go-betweens cf. **48**.2, **49**.1 and 4(nn.). The implication is not merely that these informants existed (Th. has already made that clear with the indicatives at **48**.2 and **49**.1) but that Hermocrates knew it. **μὴ ἀπάγειν τῆς νυκτὸς τὸ στράτευμα:** rather as at **48**.2 and **49**.1 the genuine informants had urged Nicias μὴ ἀπανίστασθαι.

That too had been disastrous. **ὡς Συρακοσίων τὰς ὁδοὺς φυλασσόντων:** the Athenians should have been suspicious, for it was hardly likely that the Syracusans would forget to guard the roads again on the next day. But after **43–5** it was understandable that a night encounter would be particularly dreaded. **καθ' ἡσυχίαν:** repeated from a few lines earlier, then as what Hermocrates feared, now as the enticement that he offers. The echo of Nicias' favourite quality (**3**.3n.) may be sensed.

74.1 πρός 'in response to'. **ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὡς οὐκ εὐθὺς ὥρμησαν:** probably 'given that in any case they had not set out immediately': καὶ ὡς = καὶ οὕτως, lit. = 'even in the manner (they had chosen)'. Alternatively, καὶ ὡς might be taken as 'even in spite of their original intention' (*CT*) or 'even after such a disaster and amid such despair'. **ξυσκευάσαιντο:** echoing παρασκευασάμενον in the deceitful message. It is going exactly as Hermocrates planned. **ὡς ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν** 'as best they could'. **ἀναλαβόντες:** nominative, as if ἐβουλεύσαντο rather than ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς had preceded: cf. **70**.7. **αὐτὰ ὅσα περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐς δίαιταν ὑπῆρχεν ἐπιτήδεια** 'only as much as was required for their bodily needs'.

74.2 προεξελθόντες: προ- = 'before' the Athenian departure signalled by ἀφορμᾶσθαι in **74**.1. The narrative jump to (presumably) the following day is eased by τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ἡμέραν in **74**.1. **ἀπεφάργνυσαν** 'blocked off' (the word is rare, but was familiar enough for Soph. to use it metaphorically at *Ant.* 241), probably by felling trees and packing them together as the Nervii do at Caes. *BC* 2.17.4–5. It is possible that something similar happened before Marathon (Nepos *Milt.* 5.3–4); cf. Hornblower–Pelling 244. **ᾗ ἐδόκει** 'where they thought best': not quite reprising ᾗ εἰκὸς ἦν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἰέναι, as that referred to the overall route and this to the points along it where the Athenians would be particularly vulnerable. **αἰγιαλοῦ:** the word is quite rare in Attic prose, and Allison 1997b: 505–6 tentatively counted this a Homeric touch, comparing esp. *Od.* 22.384–8. The tone of the narrative is unmistakably deepening and darkening, but Th. uses the word several times elsewhere, e.g. **37**.3 and 6.52.1, in an apparently uncharged way. **ἀφεῖλκον . . . ἐκόμιζον:** as usual with an imperfect that seems inceptive ('they began to. . .') these imply that the action started *and continued*: *CGCG* 33.52 n. 1. **ἐνέπρησαν . . . διενοήθησαν:** aorists in pluperfect sense (**21**.1n.), with διενοήθησαν reaching further back into the past than ἐνέπρησαν. The plan had been to burn them, and they had then done that with a few ships but not with all. **καθ' ἡσυχίαν:** the third use of the phrase in a few sentences, but the first two concerned the Athenian side (**73**.3n.); now it switches to the Syracusans, and it becomes real, not just a prospect. **ὡς ἑκάστην ποι ἐκπεπτωκυῖαν** 'in whatever place each had run ashore'.

75: DESPAIR

Demoralised armies brought out the best in several historians; cf. esp. the account of the headless Ten Thousand at X. *An.* 3.1–3, and Pelling 1988: 237–8 on Plut. *Ant.* 48 for further examples. Still more frequent were accounts of defeated *cities* (Paul 1982), descending from the *Iliou Persis* tradition. Polyb. 2.56.7–9 criticises the excesses of the Hellenistic writer Phylarchus in this regard, 'bringing in pictures of clinging women with their dishevelled hair and exposed breasts, and tears and laments of men and women as they were led away along with their children and aged parents; he keeps doing this throughout his history'. Th.'s description here shares some of those characteristics, *mutatis mutandis* for the male-only camp. The point of Polyb.'s criticism is that Phylarchus' pathos is excessive and indiscriminate, deployed whether or not the circumstances warranted it (Marincola 2001: 127 and 2013: 76–7). Th. has done enough already to convince listeners and readers that the pathos here is fully appropriate.

Familiarity with that *Iliou Persis* tradition, mediated through epic, lyric, visual art, and tragedy (e.g. Eur. *Tro.* and *Hec.*) still more than through historians, suggests the comparison with a defeated city even before it is made explicit (75.5); the touches of Homeric diction (75.4n.; Allison 1997b) will have helped the epic resonance. Some may well have thought of Athens' coming fate in 404 BCE (R. B. Rutherford 2012: 31), and this prepares for the city's own apprehensive anticipation of defeat at 8.1; Nicias has already made it clear that the whole city's safety is at stake (64.2n.). The contrast with the eager hopes of 415 has already been suggested in the earlier narrative (56.2, 70.3, 71.5nn.) and recurs here (75.2 and 7). It is given extra sharpness by the hints in Book 6 of this as a sort of colonising expedition, a matter of founding, rather than destroying, a city (6.1.2–5.3, 23.2nn.; Intr., pp. 2, 28).

Comparison with Plut.'s version at *Nic.* 26 is illuminating, especially as that seems to be Plut.'s own imaginative elaboration of Th.'s account (Pelling 1992: 14–16 = 2002: 120–1). That too is a tour de force, but – as is natural in a biography – it focuses on Nicias himself: 'amid many terrible sights, the saddest of all was Nicias himself, weakened by his illness, reduced against all dignity to the most meagre of food and the slightest of bodily provisions when he needed so much more because of his disease; yet despite his weakness he carried on performing and enduring more than many of the healthy'. Th. concentrates on the ordinary soldier and sailor. There has already been much on their psychology and morale, but that has been at the most generalised level; now the camera zooms in to picture the unburied corpses, the sight of dead friends, the entreaties, the tears, and the heartbreaking abandonment of close comrades. The

sounds of the battlefield come back too, with further cries and further laments; now though the contrast is not with those of jubilation on the other side but imaginatively with the 'prayers and paeans' with which they had set out.

See Allison 1997b, Sternberg 1999, 196–9 and 2006: 117–30, and *CT*.

75.1 **παρεσκευάσθαι:** impersonal. **τρίτηι ἡμέραι:** counting inclusively, so one day, ἡ ἐπιοῦσα ἡμέρα of 74.1, has been spent in preparation.

75.2 **οὐ καθ' ἓν μόνον τῶν πραγμάτων** 'not in just one aspect of the situation', that defined by ὅτι . . . κινδυνεύοντες. Then ἀλλὰ καί adds the further reasons. **καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἡ πόλις:** the danger to the city as a whole picks up Nicias' words at 64.2; see also 75n. **ξυνέβαινε τῆι τε ὄψει ἑκάστωι ἀλγεινὰ καὶ τῆι γνώμηι αἰσθέσθαι:** the interdependence of the visual and the intellectual – αἰσθάνομαι can be used for both sorts of 'perception' (2.2n.) – recurs in what follows, esp. in λύπην μετὰ φόβου (75.3), εἴ τινά πού τις ἴδοι . . . and the consequent ἀπορία and fear (75.4), the shame and self-blaming because it looked like a city in flight (75.5), and the mental contrasting of this sight with that of the departure in 415 (75.7).

75.3 **ἀτάφων ὄντων:** 'the whole earth is the grave of famous men', said Th.'s Pericles in the Funeral Speech (2.43.3): now these men are left with no grave at all. **φόβου:** partly through a religious dread of divine displeasure for the failure to bury, partly because of the image of what might happen soon to themselves. **οἱ ζῶντες καταλειπόμενοι τραυματίαι τε καὶ ἀσθενεῖς:** only as a last resort would the sick and wounded be left to the mercy of an enemy; it was highly irregular when Spartans had to do the same in 373 BCE (X. *Hell.* 6.2.26). Normally the wounded could rely on their comrades, or in the case of hoplites and cavalry their attendants, to take them along: Sternberg 1999: 196–9, 2006: ch. 4. Those expectations would now lend urgency to the appeals (75.4) and intensify the sense of guilt (75.5). **τοῖς ζῶσι λυπηρότεροι ἦσαν καὶ τῶν ἀπολωλότων ἀθλιώτεροι:** both comparatives, not just λυπηρότεροι, are to be taken with τοῖς ζῶσι: the men left behind caused pain 'to them' and seemed even more wretched 'in their eyes'. – Diod. 13.18.6 disagrees with Th. (probably consciously, as he evidently knew Th.'s account). Those unable to fight, Diod. says, were marshalled with the pack animals in the centre, with the fighting men in the van and rear. Diod. may well be drawing on the fourth-century historian Ephorus here, and the different versions may go back to shortly after the events. Shame might easily encourage the few survivors to cover up their feeling of guilt.

75.4 **ἀντιβολίαν καὶ ὀλοφυρμόν** 'entreaty and lamentation'. ἀντιβολ- and ὀλοφυρ- words both have a poetic ring; Allison 1997b: 503 counts

ὀλοφυρ- among her examples of 'Homeric' diction, whereas ἀντιβολ- is frequent in comedy (thirty-nine times in Aristophanes), probably because its hyperbolic tone and accompanying actions can raise a laugh. Here the hyperbole is far removed from comedy. **ἕνα ἕκαστον:** cf. ἑκάστωι at **75**.2: it was the appeals to men *as individuals* from their personal friends and relations that were so painful (Sternberg 1999: 197–8, 2006: 125–6). **ἐπιβοώμενοι:** **69**.2n. **ἐκκρεμαννύμενοι:** cf. the 'clinging women' in Polyb.'s criticism of Phylarchus (2.56.7): see **75**n. and **75**.7n. **πολλῶν:** the MSS ὀλίγων must be wrong. E.g. οἰκτρῶν (Herwerden) might also be possible. **ἐπιθειασμῶν:** more likely here 'appeal *by* the gods' (cf. 8.53.2) than '*to* the gods' (cf. 2.75.1), but perhaps both. **ἀπολειπόμενοι:** editors usually prefer ὑπολειπόμενοι (B), but ἀπολειπόμενοι is better attested and more strongly conveys the sense of abandonment (Sternberg 2006: 127). **δάκρυσι πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα πλησθέν:** δακρύων might be expected, but Allison 1997b: 504–5 compares the Homeric τὼ δέ οἱ ὄσσε | δακρυόφι πλῆσθεν (*Il.* 17.695–6) and ὄσσε δ' ἄρα σφέων | δακρυόφιν πίμπλαντο (*Od.* 20.348–9); cf. Aesch. *Pers.* 133 πίμπλαται δακρύμασιν. This is the only time that Th. uses the simple verb πίμπλημι, very likely for the poetic resonance; it is also his only mention of 'tears', and he mentions them here twice. **ἐκ πολεμίας:** ἀφορμωμένους is understood. **μείζω ἢ κατὰ δάκρυα:** cf. Bacchyl. fr. 2, mourning a child, μεῖζον ἢ πενθεῖν ἐφάνη κακόν, ἀφθέγκτοισιν ['unspeakable'] ἴσον, Hdt. 3.14.10 μέζω κακὰ ἢ ὥστε ἀνακλαίειν. **πεπονθότας . . . δεδιότας:** sense-construction after τὸ στράτευμα.

75.5 **κατήφειά τέ τις ἅμα καὶ κατάμεμψις σφῶν αὐτῶν:** Th. does not use κατήφεια elsewhere, and this may be an echo of the Homeric κατηφείη καὶ ὄνειδος (*Il.* 16.498, 17.556: Allison 1997b: 507–8). κατήφεια is 'a feeling of grief which makes one look downwards' (Plut. *On Bashfulness* 528e), and the visual connotations would be felt by Th.'s audience: cf. [Hipp.] *Epid.* 7.25 οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ κατηφέες, ἐς τὸ κάτω βλέφαρον μᾶλλον ἐγκείμενοι, *Epid.* 7.41, Eur. *Medea* 1012 τί δαὶ κατηφεῖς ὄμμα καὶ δακρυρροεῖς; The 'blaming of themselves' will be largely for their defeat, but may also be for their inability to give comrades the help they needed: so Sternberg 1999: 197 and 2006: 124–5. **οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο:** 'it was' is understood. **πόλει ἐκπεπολιορκημένηι ἐώικεσαν ὑποφευγούσηι:** see **75**n.; the ὑπο- need not suggest anything secret or furtive – that does not fit the big number – but rather 'flee from under' a threat. The recollection of 6.30–32.2 and 6.44.1, with all their suggestions of a city on the move, is here particularly strong: see nn. there and Intr., p. 2. The fall of Troy, followed as that was by the escape of Aeneas and others, is again particularly in mind: real-life sieges rarely ended with 'flights' but with the grimmer reality of

executions and enslavement (*CT*). The Trojan parallel was already noted by the Schol. on Hom. *Il.* 22.409, citing this passage. **τοῦ ξύμπαντος ὄχλου:** ὄχλος is not pejorative here or at **78**.2 (6.63.2n.), but is used to include all the camp-followers and support staff (6.44.1) as well as combatants: cf. *GSW* v.427. Most Greek cities would indeed have populations much smaller than 40,000. That number does however seem implausibly high: see *CT* 1061–6 and Rubincam 1979: 85–6. **ὑπὸ τοῖς ὅπλοις** 'under the weapons', literally: they would be carried in, probably, the right hand, below the level of shield (usually carried in the left) and breastplate. Many editors emend to ἐπὶ τοῖς ὅπλοις, 'in addition to their weapons'. **ἀπηυτομολήκεσαν γὰρ πάλαι τε καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι παραχρῆμα** 'for they had deserted either long before or, in the case of most of them, immediately at this point'. For desertions cf. **13**.2.

75.6 ἡ ἄλλη αἰκία καὶ ἡ ἰσομοιρία: the two are regarded as so closely linked that they take the singular verbs ἐδοξάζετο and (if the text is genuine) ἀφῖκτο: cf. **44**.1n. Editors sometimes prefer to emend to τῆι ἰσομοιρίαι, but that weakens the point: the sharing of the pain, despite the consolation it gave, was still part of the humiliation in a status-conscious society. Cf. **77**.2n. **ἔχουσά τινα ὅμως τὸ μετὰ πολλῶν κούφισιν** 'which despite everything had its being shared with many others as some alleviation'. There is no reason to take τό as suggesting a proverbial phrase: '"in company", as they say' (C–S, *HCT*). **ἄλλως τε . . . ἀφῖκτο:** e.g. ἐνθυμουμένοις is understood. The contrast with 415, long hinted, becomes explicit: λαμπρότης in particular echoes the spectacle of the departure at 6.30–32.2(n.). Cf. **69**.2, **71**.5, **87**.5nn., and for αὔχημα **66**.3. If ἀφῖκτο is the right reading, ἡ ἄλλη αἰκία καὶ ἡ ἰσομοιρία τῶν κακῶν will still be the subject: that is bold but not impossible, rendering the state in which such grandeur had 'arrived' in the present. But Badham's ἀφίκατο (third person plural pluperfect) might be right.

75.7 μέγιστον . . . ἐγένετο 'this was the biggest reverse of fortune ever to befall a Greek army'. As at **87**.5 and 6.31.1, 'Greek' is needed to exclude, in particular, the obviously greater case of Xerxes in 480. **οἷς:** sense-construction with στρατεύματι. **ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ ἄλλους δουλωσομένους ἥκειν** 'instead of coming to enslave others': cf. **64**.1, **66**.2nn. **εὐχῆς τε καὶ παιάνων, μεθ' ὧν ἐξέπλεον:** 6.32.1–2. There may be a hint here of real-life laments, which often contrasted present grief with past happiness or glory. **ἐπιφημίσμασιν** 'words of ominous import' (LSJ), in this case of ill omen. **πεζούς τε ἀντὶ ναυβατῶν . . . ναυτικῶι:** the final humiliation for this once-great naval power: Kopp 2016: 229. **ἐπικρεμαμένου:** the literal 'hanging on' to them (**75**.4) was bad; what metaphorically 'hangs over' them threatens to be worse.

76–7: NICIAS TRIES TO RALLY THE MEN

76 **ἐν μεγάλῃι μεταβολῆι:** picking up the theme of **75**.6–7, the 'great change' from the mood of 415 in which they are caught. **ἐπιπαριών:** repeated at **78**.1, ἐπήιει. As at 6.67.3, this makes it clear that Nicias is going along the ranks and delivering several speeches: see n. there and **69**.2n., and contrast **60**.5(n.). **ὡς ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων** 'as best he could in the circumstances'; cf. **62**.1. **βοῆι τε χρώμενος . . . ὠφελεῖν τι:** an unusual acknowledgement of the difficulties of making oneself heard: cf. **60**.5n. Logically τε belongs not with βοῆι χρώμενος but with ὑπὸ προθυμίας as the first of the two reasons why he was shouting, but there is no need to emend: cf. the similar displacements listed at *GP* 519 and 6.15.2n. On Nicias' shouting see **69**.2n. **αἰεί τι μᾶλλον:** the MSS have ἔτι μᾶλλον, which would mean 'even louder' than he did at **69**.2. There seems little point in that; better is 'raising his voice louder and louder as he came to each new group' (ἑκάστοις καθ' οὓς γίγνοιτο). **ὑπὸ προθυμίας:** in contrast with the dispirited (ἀθυμοῦν) men. **ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον γεγωνίσκων** 'making his voice carry as far as possible'. The verb is very rare, connoting 'giving voice to', 'speaking out loud', and Th. does not use it elsewhere: cf. [Aesch.] *Prom.* 627, Eur. *El.* 809.

77 *Nicias' last speech.* Demosthenes spoke too (**78**.1), but as at **61–4** and **69**.2 Th. focuses on Nicias; so also at **86**(nn.). This is not an occasion for tactical or strategic instructions, for these are already in place (**78**.2). What is important is to raise despondent spirits, and give what hope he can. Such as it is, this hope comes from the gods; the Athenians had derided such hope in the Melians (5.105), but are now forced to rely on it (Intr., p. 23). It is extremely rare for gods to figure in Th.'s speeches (Iglesias Zoido 2008: 34–6), almost certainly rarer than it would be in their real-life originals (Hutchinson 1985: 47–8 on Aesch. *Seven against Thebes* 35 εὖ τελεῖ θεός); the closest parallel is 4.92.7, where the theme has particular point because of the arguable Athenian sacrilege at Delium. Nicias is the right person to offer such hope because of his record of personal piety (**77**.2; cf. **86**.5n.), and it therefore makes rhetorical sense for him to talk about himself in a way that he has seldom done since his opening remarks at 6.9.2, a passage possibly recalled here (**77**.2n.). Even his disease has so far received only the briefest of references in his letter at **15**.1. Other aspects are closer to his recent speeches, for instance his alertness to their allies as well as the Athenians themselves (**77**.1, 7; cf. **61–4**). The ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις peroration also develops a theme already suggested at **64**.2(n.). Here the point is both, as there, that the city's future is at stake but also that the men are themselves already a πόλις, and one intimidating enough to settle wherever they chose (**77**.4(n.)).

That theme of the expedition as a sort of colonisation (**75**n.; Intr., pp. 2, 28) has taken an odd turn at the end.

Critics tend to be ungenerous: this is 'the most unimaginative of all his addresses', 'these naïve and old-fashioned arguments are grounded in a theology and a view of history that has nowhere else been affirmed in the *Histories*' (Connor 1984: 201–3); 'saturated with the religious and other delusions of a desperate man' (Lateiner 1985: 207). The contrast with the calm and dignified reassurance offered by Pericles (2.60–4) is certainly stark, and is pointed by some particular echoes (see nn.; Rawlings 1981: 157–61). The godly material in particular could certainly be characterised as ἀρχαιολογεῖν (**69**.2). That still does not make it the wrong thing to say, in these circumstances and to men with conventional beliefs. It merely adds to the pathos that Th. himself, and many readers and listeners, would sense how vain such hopes were in hard reality. Still, Nicias might have said it all better. Several points of the argument are convoluted, and as he returns to talk about himself he also reverts to some of the stylistic features of 6.9, with parentheses and qualifications impeding the urgency of the plea (Tompkins 1972, esp. 197–204). But the peroration is magnificent.

Cf. also Kagan 1981: 338–9, Macleod 1983, 143–5, and *HCT* and *CT*.

77.1 ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι: Nicias began similarly at **61**.1; he comes back to the allies at **77**.7. **ἤδη τινὲς καὶ ἐκ δεινοτέρων ἢ τοιῶνδε ἐσώθησαν:** the asyndeton (**71**.4n.) is eased by τοιῶνδε (**73**.3n. on πέμπει) but is still strong: Pindar also often uses asyndeton to introduce a 'gnomic' generalisation (Hornblower 2004a: 361–3 and *CT*). **καταμέμφεσθαι ὑμᾶς ἄγαν αὐτούς:** Nicias acknowledges and confronts the κατάμεμψις σφῶν αὐτῶν of **75**.5, specifying the reasons why they might be blaming themselves (the datives). **παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν:** both 'more than you deserve' and 'out of keeping with your worth', with ἀξία as at 6.68.4 appealing to Athenian pride and the allies' share in that. See on οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν δὴ φοβοῦσιν (**77**.3n.).

77.2 κἀγώ τοι: for the turn to himself cf. 6.9.2 and **77**n. τοι conveys an arresting appeal to the audience, seeking 'a close rapport between the mind of the speaker and the mind of another person' (*GP* 537). Here the force is along the lines of 'take my own example', delivered in an 'emotional and personal tone' (Tompkins 1972: 198). Nicias' own case develops the idea of παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, looking backwards, and καίτοι . . . ἀνεπίφθονα adds further reasons why the suffering is unmerited; but that thought of his good behaviour is then the springboard for the more positive **77**.3. **ῥώμῃ:** the word was used of psychological strength at **18**.2 and **42**.2, but Nicias now turns to the physical. He also began at 6.9.2 by musing on a soldier's physical contribution, and that may now be recalled.

Here as there the thought is convoluted: his point seems to be that superior strength (which he does not have) or better fortune (which he so far has had) might normally be some protection against danger, but neither is now operating for him. **ἀλλ' ὁρᾶτε δὴ ὡς διάκειμαι ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου:** ὁρᾶτε is probably heard as indicative rather than imperative. On the parenthetic style see **77**n. For Nicias' kidney disease cf. **15**.1n.; this has been surprisingly unstressed in the narrative, but this passage inspired Plut.'s remarkable elaboration at *Nic.* 26.4, quoted at **75**n. **οὔτ' εὐτυχίαι δοκῶν που ὕστερός του εἶναι:** the contrast may be felt with Pericles' similar claim to be οὐδενὸς ἥσσων, but in his case in insight and in interpretative power (2.60.5: Rawlings 1981: 159). δοκῶν can be either 'seeming' or 'thinking', here probably both; που, 'I think', adds a touch of diffidence appropriate to a claim that might appear hybristic; του = τινος. At 5.16.1 Th. gives as a motive for Nicias' 421 peace-making his concern to 'protect his εὐτυχία' while he 'had a name as someone whose career included no reverses for the city' (Intr., p. 9); at 6.17.1(n.) Alcibiades cites Nicias' apparent (δοκεῖ again) εὐτυχία as a reason for giving him a share in the Sicilian command. See also 6.9–14, 6.23.3nn. **τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις:** φαῦλος is not always derogatory (6.18.6n.) and Nicias has already used it of common soldiers at 6.21.1, but this assumption of his own superiority still seems tactless to modern sensibilities. Yet even democratic Athens was status-conscious, and this recalls Th.'s point in ἡ ἄλλη αἰκία καὶ ἡ ἰσομοιρία (**75**.6(n.)). Nicias turns himself into an a fortiori example (Edmunds 1975: 136–7); his fall from his worth and from what he merits (ἀξία, **77**.1n.) is greater than that of most of his addressees. **αἰωροῦμαι** 'I am hanging in suspense', a bold metaphor: cf. μετεώρωι τῆι πόλει . . . κινδυνεύειν (6.10.5(n.)). **πολλὰ μὲν ἐς θεοὺς νόμιμα:** **86**.5n. Nicias' piety is made much of in Plut. *Nic.*, esp. ch. 3. **δεδιήιτημαι** 'I have spent my life doing . . .': for the accusative (probably internal rather than as direct object) cf. 1.6.6 τὸ παλαιὸν Ἑλληνικὸν ὁμοιότροπα τῶι νῦν βαρβαρικῶι διαιτώμενον.

77.3 **ἀνθ'** 'in return for'. **ὅμως:** 'it is as if he had gone on too long in the first sentence [i.e. **77**.2], and then had sharply to point out that "all the same" . . . according to his religious beliefs, salvation is sure' (Tompkins 1972: 199). **αἱ δὲ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν δὴ φοβοῦσιν** 'our misfortunes are causing more fear than they should'. κατ' ἀξίαν picks up παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν in **77**.1; your misfortunes were indeed unmerited, but now the terror they are causing is unmerited too. Nicias' point is again obscurely put: whose 'terror' is in point, 'ours' as in this interpretation or 'mine', and does οὐ go more closely with κατ' ἀξίαν, as taken here, or with φοβοῦσιν? Most translators and commentators prefer 'mine' and link οὐ and φοβοῦσιν: they

do not frighten me as far as desert is concerned or as much as they might. But the interpretation preferred here is more forceful, and is supported by the Schol.'s comment οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν δή, ἀλλὰ μειζόνως δηλονότι; it is also in line with what Nicias said at **61**.2. Francis Hickes's insightful seventeenth-century translation took it that way too ('your calamities offend you more, then cause requiers'): Gillespie and Pelling 2016: 334–5. **ἱκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμίοις ηὐτύχηται** 'the enemy have had enough good fortune', and now, it is implied, it is our turn; εὐτυχίαι (**77**.2) has reminded the men that good fortune is Nicias' speciality. ἱκανά, which would have been internal accusative with an active verb, becomes the subject in the passive: **18**.3n. **εἴ τωι θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι ἐστρατεύσαμεν:** τωι = τινι. At **77**.2 ἀνεπίφθονα referred to human interaction, but bad behaviour among humans can still arouse divine envy (Hdt. 4.105 etc.), and so both that and ἐς θεούς are picked up here: despite Nicias' personal record he allows that Athens' collective behaviour might still have offended the gods. In fifth-century thought, and particularly in Hdt., such envy tends to be aroused more by presumptuous action or excessive success than just by 'thinking big', but the three often go together (Pelling 2006: 150–2); the confident grandeur with which imperial Athens embarked on the expedition could certainly be felt as risky.

77.4 ἦλθον γάρ που καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἤδη ἐφ' ἑτέρους: Xerxes may again (cf. **69**.3–**71**, **73**.3–**74**.1, **75**.7nn.) be in mind, especially as many then did get home to Persia, but Nicias is tactful enough to leave the reference inexplicit. Athens as the 'new Persia' was an uncomfortable theme. Cf. Intr., pp. 15–16. **ἀνθρώπεια δράσαντες ἀνεκτὰ ἔπαθον** 'did what humans do and suffered what humans can bear'. This acknowledges aggression as a recurrent human phenomenon, but should not be taken as indicating any moral endorsement. **τοῦ θεοῦ:** the singular is in the manner of Hdt. (Hornblower–Pelling 121 on Hdt. 6.27.3): it may mean 'whatever god is concerned', which would pick up εἴ τωι θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι (**77**.3), or more generally 'the divine', what Th. elsewhere calls τὸ θεῖον. **οἵκτου . . . ἀξιώτεροι:** ἀξία language again, picking up **77**.1 and **77**.3: this is what we and our sufferings *really* deserve. Gods rarely show pity (Konstan 2001: ch. 4), but it is not an absurdity to think that they might, as individual gods do several times in the *Iliad* (16.431, 19.340, 24.19, 23). At Eur. *El.* 1329–30 Castor says that he and the other gods feel pity for all suffering humanity. **οἷοι ὁπλῖται ἅμα καὶ ὅσοι ξυντεταγμένοι** 'the quality and quantity of you hoplites arrayed together'. Other parts of the fighting force – light-armed troops, archers, slingers, etc. – are ignored. In particular, the Athenian cavalry are too ineffective even to be mentioned; cf. **78**.3n. and Intr., pp. 27–8. **μὴ καταπέπληχθε ἄγαν: 42**.2n. Logically

ἄγαν should imply that there might be a correct amount of κατάπληξις (cf. **50**.4n.), but this is not a moment for pedantic analysis. **αὐτοί τε πόλις εὐθύς ἐστε . . . ἐξαναστήσειεν:** cf. **77**n. for the echo of the colonisation theme. This, especially the likely violent reaction of other cities, recalls in particular the sketch of earlier colonisations at 6.3–5; the beginning of the Sicilian narrative is remembered as the end approaches. The idea of founding a new colony rather than returning home looms large towards the end of X.'s *Anabasis* (5.6–7, 6.4.7, etc.). It is unclear whether Nicias is to be taken as thinking literally of a new colony or just of a temporary staging-post until they can return home (Luschnat 1942: 104–5), perhaps indeed a continuing city-on-the-move (Mossé 1963). **ὅποι** rather than ὅπου: **73**.1n. **οὔτ' ἂν ἐπιόντας δέξαιτο ῥαιδίως:** ἐπιόντας suggests aggression rather than just approach, and so δέξαιτο will mean 'receive the enemy', 'withstand' (cf. **40**.5, **44**.4) rather than 'welcome'. This recalls Themistocles' angry words at Hdt. 8.61.2 (Longo 1975: 96), threatening to sail away unless the Greeks stay and fight: as long as Athens had 200 ships, they had *polis* and country enough, for no other Greek city could withstand them. But Themistocles' threat is issued from a position of strength, for he does have those ships, and it is effective.

77.5 τοῦτο καὶ πατρίδα καὶ τεῖχος κρατήσας ἔξειν: again not to be pressed too literally, as of course any battle-site was unlikely to be an ideal spot for a colony; but victory would allow one to be founded. Not all the troops will have been cheered to hear their general ruling out all hope of getting home; Nicias draws back a little in **77**.7.

77.6 του = τινος. **Σικελῶν:** the Sicels, it would seem, are the best bet for reliable allies rather than any Greek cities, even Naxos and Catana: cf. Fragoulaki 2013: 293, but see also **80**.2n. **οὗτοι γὰρ . . . ἔτι βέβαιοι εἰσίν:** one wonders how much evidence Nicias had for this. In the event, there was no chance to find out. **εἰρημένον** 'orders having been given', accusative absolute as at **18**.2: cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 1619–20 γνώσῃ γέρων ὢν ὡς διδάσκεσθαι βαρὺ | τῶι τηλικούτωι, σωφρονεῖν εἰρημένον, with Fraenkel's n. **σιτία ἄλλα** 'other provisions', to supplement the ἐπιτήδεια βραχέα that they have left. Reiske's ἅμα is unnecessary.

77.7 τό τε ξύμπαν 'to bring it all together' in summary, as τό τε ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν in Demosthenes' indirect speech at **49**.3; cf. Hermocrates at 4.63.2. **ὦ ἄνδρες στρατιῶται:** 6.68.1n. **ὅποι: 73**.1n. The 'you have nowhere else to retreat to' argument goes back to the *Iliad* (Ajax at 15.735–41: Keitel 1987b: 156). Nicias made a similar point as early as 6.68.3. **καὶ . . . οἵ τε ἄλλοι τευξόμενοι . . . καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι . . . ἐπανορθώσοντες:** still dependent on γνῶτε, with the 'you' now subdivided. **τευξόμενοι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖτέ που ἐπιδεῖν:** τεύξομαι (the middle serves as future of τυγχάνω) + genitive can

= 'obtain' anything, but ἐπιδεῖν, 'live to see', suggests their going home: cf. **61**.1 and esp. 6.69.3, where the same word and desire similarly feature in the allies' motivation while the Athenians are spurred on by their city's interests. It is natural enough that the allies might be less fired by hopes of restoring Athens' greatness, but Nicias no longer presents them, as he did at **63**.3, as feeling the same strong engagement with the city's fortunes. **τὴν μεγάλην δύναμιν . . . ἐπανορθώσοντες:** rousing words, perhaps recalling Pericles' own final words as he reassured a demoralised city at 2.64.3. Nicias acknowledges that even if they escape Athens will have suffered a 'fall'; as at **61**.2(n.), **67**.2, and **68**.3, the metaphor may particularly suggest wrestling. The phrasing remains as consistent with founding a colony in Sicily (**77**.4–5) as with returning home: see **77**n. **ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις, καὶ οὐ τείχη οὐδὲ νῆες ἀνδρῶν κεναί:** not a novel thing to say. Alcaeus said that 'cities are not a matter of stones or of wood or of the carpenter's craft, but wherever there are men who know how to save themselves, there exist walls and cities' (Ael. Arist. 46.207 = Alc. fr. 426 and probably also = fr. 112.10, 'warlike men are the tower of the city'), and Nicias may be sensed as appealing to the authority of that poem or to the proverb that lies behind it. The same thought underlies Aesch. *Pers.* 349 and Soph. *OT* 56–7. It has special point now, when walls and ships have dominated fortunes for three summers but are now abandoned, and the city at home, emptied of many men on campaign, is so much at risk. The words also look back (Macleod 1983: 143) to Pericles' proud words at 1.143.5, bidding the Athenians not care too much about damage to their estates, 'for these do not own the men, but the men own them'; and forward (Bassi 2007: 192–3, S. Roy forthcoming) to the 'democracy in exile' set up by the Athenian forces in Samos as a counter to the oligarchic revolution in Athens (8.76, 86.8: Intr., p. 22). The 'not *X* but *Y*' phrasing is characteristic of such 'gnomic' pronouncements: cf. e.g. 1.83.2 ἔστιν ὁ πόλεμος οὐχ ὅπλων τὸ πλέον ἀλλὰ δαπάνης; Meister 1955: 33. This, like the preceding words, again fits the idea of a new foundation as much as, perhaps better than, return to Athens: it is indeed prepared by αὐτοί τε πόλις εὐθύς ἐστε ὅποι ἂν καθέζησθε at **77**.4(n.).

For a broader treatment of the interplay of ships, walls, and men in fifth-century Athenian thinking see Dougherty 2014.

78–85: RETREAT AND SLAUGHTER

Much of the nightmarish effect of these chapters comes from the work that narrative and speeches have already done. The despondency even before they start has been made clear; the terror and confusion of close combat have been brought out in, particularly, the night battle (**43–5**);

the willingness none the less to put up a fight was evident in the battle in the harbour (**69**.3–**71**). All that needs no description, and can be imagined anew. The gathering hopelessness as each attempt fails is easy to infer. At first, as so often in the *Iliad*, the pathos is intensified by some tension between the restrained, apparently dispassionate precision of the narrative and the audience's awareness that life and death are continually at stake: Th. gives distances and specifies localities and each day's movement is carefully discriminated. The pace of both march and narrative gradually slows (Joho 2017a: 591–2): for the effect cf. the day-by-day narrative of Corcyrean *stasis*, 3.72–81 (Connor 2017: 217), or the diary of Alexander's last illness at Plut. *Alex.* 76. Readers unfamiliar with the terrain would have difficulty in plotting these moves exactly (nn.), but are told what Th. thinks they need to know. The march starts with effective professionalism, with the generals ensuring that everyone smartly gets into a sensibly ordered formation (**78**.1–2); illness or no, Nicias is impressively energetic. There is even some initial success (**78**.3), though the Syracusans are a move ahead at each point. It takes some days for order to break down. But then first a thunderstorm and then a night-time panic strike, with an implied contrast with an earlier instance which had been handled better (**79**.3 and **80**.3 with 6.70.1(nn.)). The rearguard under Demosthenes has the worst of it, and cracks first (**82**–**3**). The style gradually heightens in emotional intensity, and the camera finally closes in for the horrid and vivid climax at the Assinarus (**84**): pathos again, but conveyed in a very different way from that of a few pages earlier. Echoes of Thermopylae and Salamis (**81**.4, **83**.3, **83**.5, **84**.3nn.; T. Harrison 2000: 91–2) and of Achilles' Iliadic fight at the river (**84**.5n.) convey the level at which the momentousness is to be gauged.

See Paul 1987: 310–12, Connor 2017: 220–2. The best reconstruction of the route is Green 1970: 321–32, acknowledged by Dover 1972 to be superior to the one he advanced in *HCT*.

78.1 **ἐπήιει:** **69**.2n. on τῶν τριηράρχων. **εἴ πηι ὁρώιη:** **70**.8n. on εἴ τινά που ὁρῶιεν, 'whenever'. **διεσπασμένον . . . χωροῦν:** τὸ στράτευμα is understood. **ὁ Δημοσθένης:** he has rather faded from view since **49**.1, though his command in the naval battle was mentioned without elaboration at **69**.4 and he urged re-engagement at **72**.3. **τοιαῦτά τε καὶ παραπλήσια λέγων:** this includes both the encouragement of **77**, though Demosthenes would not have echoed Nicias' more personal notes, and the orders to get into position.

78.2 **ἐν πλαισίωι τεταγμένον:** 'in a square' or 'rectangle', with hoplites guarding wings as well as front and rear. 'That of Nicias' and 'that of Demosthenes' suggest that there were two squares; the singular ἐν πλαισίωι

is military phraseology, just as 'form up in line' need not suggest only one line. This was a regular formation for a march expected to be under pressure, as often in X. *An.*: see Huitink–Rood on *An.* 3.4.36. Difficulties would evidently come when the army had to negotiate awkward terrain, particularly a narrow defile. For possible ways of dealing with this see Huitink–Rood on *An.* 3.4.21. **τὸν πλεῖστον ὄχλον:** including the camp-followers (**75**.5n.). **ἐντός:** i.e. in the centre of each 'square'.

78.3 **τοῦ Ἀνάπου ποταμοῦ:** unlike the later rivers mentioned (**80**.5–6, **84**.2) this would be familiar to Th.'s audience from 6.66.2, 6.96.3, and **42**.6, though they would have only the haziest idea from those passages of where it was: cf. 6.96.3n. An alert reader with a very good memory might remember from 6.66.2–3 the connection with the road to Helorus, and rightly infer that the Athenians were setting off to the south or west: in fact the crossing was almost due west of their camp. See Map 4. **ἐπ' αὐτῶι** 'on its bank'. **τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων:** 'some of' is understood. The Syracusans had separated their forces at **74**.2 as they were not yet sure which route the Athenians would take: cf. **80**.6n. **οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι . . . οἱ ψιλοί:** οἱ ψιλοί is in partial apposition to οἱ Συρακόσιοι. Such descriptions recur at **78**.6, **79**.2, **81**.2, **81**.4, **82**.1, **83**.3, and **84**.1 and 4 as a sort of refrain, mimicking the relentless repetition of the attacks. Cf. **77**.4n. and Intr., pp. 27–8 for the silence concerning Athens' own cavalry and light-armed troops. Perhaps by now the horses were no more. Starving men had to eat.

78.4 **σταδίους ὡς τεσσαράκοντα . . . ὡς εἴκοσι σταδίους:** respectively 6–8 km ≈ 4–5 miles and 3–4 km ≈ 2–2.5 miles (**19**.2n.). **λόφωι τινὶ . . . χωρίον ἄπεδόν τι:** see Green 1970: 321–2 for plausible identifications. Th.'s original audience could infer only that the Athenians were continuing to the south or west. In fact it seems likely that they started heading west, in the general direction of the modern Floridia, but they may swiftly have veered to the north-west if they were heading for Catana: cf. **80**.2n. **τῆι δ' ὑστεραίαι:** so day 2 of the march. **ἄπεδον** 'level'. This is Th.'s only use of the word; Hdt. has it four times. **ὠικεῖτο γὰρ ὁ χῶρος:** whatever there was to plunder would scarcely feed so large a number, but it was better than nothing. **ἧι ἔμελλον ἰέναι:** but Th. does not yet say where they were heading; that is held back to **80**.2, and even then is not fully clear (n.).

78.5 **ἀπετείχιζον:** inceptive imperfect, though as usual this implies 'began and continued to . . .' (*CGCG* 33.52). **ἦν δὲ λόφος καρτερός:** so the διοδος was a mountain pass. **Ἀκραῖον λέπας:** identified by Green 1970: 323 as Monte Climiti, some 13 km north-west of Syracuse. Palermo 1992

prefers a location near Pantalica, further inland, which would be in the territory of Acrae, but Ἀκραῖον is more probably a synonym for ἄκρον, 'Highest Rock', a description that fits the imposing Monte Climiti very well. Only a very few of Th.'s readers and listeners would find the name helpful for reconstructing the route, but so descriptive a name might still have resonance; some might also recognise it from the reminiscences of survivors. In any case, such a detail does convey a narrator who is in command of his material.

78.6 Τῇι δ' ὑστεραίαι: day 3. **προῆισαν . . . ἐκώλυον . . . ἐσηκόντιζον . . . παρίππευον . . . ἐμάχοντο:** here and elsewhere in these chapters the use of imperfects rather than historic presents emphasises the unrelenting continuity of the attacks (Rood 2012: 146). **ἀνεχώρησαν:** aorist for the single action that rounds off the day. **ἀποχωρεῖν:** probably the Schol. is right to take this as implying ἀποσκίδνασθαι, 'scatter': nobody could leave the main body to look for provisions. **ὑπό** 'under pressure from', 'because of': cf. 6.37.2.

79.1 Πρὼι δὲ ἅραντες: day 4. **τὸν λόφον . . . τὸν ἀποτετειχισμένον:** 78.5. **ὑπέρ** 'in defence of', i.e. in front of. **οὐκ ἐπ' ὀλίγων ἀσπίδων** 'many ranks deep', lit. 'no few shields deep'. It is the phrasing of a military man: cf. X. *Hell.* 2.4.11 and 6.4.12 οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ ἐπὶ πεντήκοντα ἀσπίδων, and Arr. *Anab.* 1.5.12 ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ἀσπίδων. The accusative is also used (4.93.4).

79.2 ἐτειχομάχουν: a grim echo of all the fighting over 'walls' earlier in the campaign, but then the Athenians were generally the attackers. **ἐπάντους** 'rising steeply before them'. **διικνοῦντο γὰρ ῥᾷον** 'reached them more easily' than they would otherwise have done. **οἱ ἄνωθεν:** effectively = οἱ ἄνω, but the -θεν is influenced by their *throwing* 'from' above: cf. 6.102.4n.

79.3 βρονταί τινες . . . γίγνεσθαι: just as had happened in the first big battle of the campaign in autumn 415 (6.70.1). Then, though, it was only the inexperienced who were alarmed; the veterans on the Athenian side said that it was just a matter of the time of year, and they should concentrate on the enemy. Now morale has so collapsed that even the experienced no longer think like that. See Paul 1987. **ἐπὶ τῶι σφετέρωι ὀλέθρωι καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γίγνεσθαι:** some, perhaps most, would have put this in religious terms – look what the gods are sending – but Th. does not make that explicit: 'everything is against us, including these things too (καί)' is anyway a humanly understandable thought.

79.4 ὁ Γύλιππος καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι: sharing responsibility as at 65.3. Gylippus' authority may not be what it once was (33.3n.), and he does

not get his own way at **86**.4, but he has an important role in these final chapters (**81**.1, **82**.1, **83**.2–3, **85**.1–2). The Syracusans were by now used to siege and naval warfare; as the campaign shifted to pursuit, perhaps they turned again to his broader expertise. **διεκώλυσαν:** aorist: they were successful.

79.5 **Τῇι δ' ὑστεραίαι:** day 5. **προυχώρουν:** Th. does not say whether this was in the same direction as the day before. Probably not: Green 1970: 326, Kagan 1981: 344. **εἰ μὲν ἐπίοιεν . . . εἰ δ' ἀναχωροῖεν:** 'whenever . . .' (**70**.8n.). **εἴ πως . . . φοβήσειαν:** 'in the hope that' (*CGCG* 49.25).

79.6 **πέντε ἢ ἓξ σταδίους:** around 1 km.

80.1 **τῶν τε ἐπιτηδείων πάντων ἀπορίαι ἤδη:** ἤδη modifies both πάντων and ἀπορίαι – 'by now' it was not just a shortage but 'everything' was gone, and there was 'no way' of getting more; the accumulation is one of several features of the sentence that inject more emotional intensity. **καὶ κατατετραυματισμένοι ἦσαν πολλοί:** formally co-ordinate with κακῶς σφίσι τὸ στράτευμα εἶχε, but also linked by τε . . . καί with the 'shortage of provisions' as a further reason why 'their army was in a bad state'. **47**.2, 1.110.2, and 5.61.4 are similar. **πολλοὶ ἐν πολλαῖς προσβολαῖς τῶν πολεμίων:** the polyptoton (**44**.7n.) and the alliteration again add emphasis, and would be marked in any oral performance: cf. **80**.3. Nobody could be left in doubt that this was a crucial moment. **πυρὰ καύσαντας ὡς πλεῖστα:** to deceive the enemy into thinking they were encamped for the night. **μηκέτι τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ἧι διενοήθησαν:** but Th. still does not say what that was. It is explained only at **80**.2, and is not wholly clear even then: see **80**.2n. διενοήθησαν carries a pluperfect sense (*CGCG* 33.40 n. 1).

80.2 **ἦν δὲ ἡ ξύμπασα ὁδὸς αὕτη οὐκ ἐπὶ Κατάνης** 'this route as a whole did not have Catana as its destination': but which route is 'this' (αὕτη)? It has usually been interpreted as the way that the Athenians had been 'intending' and the Syracusans were 'guarding', and Th. taken as indicating that *up till now* the Athenians were not making for Catana. That is reasonable, given that Nicias had said at **77**.6 that they would make for the Sicels, but it puts Th. in direct contradiction with Diod. 13.18.6, who is explicit that the Athenians had been aiming for Catana. Green 1970: 323 n. 7 argues that Th.'s 'this' refers to the *new* route, and 'not to Catana' indicates that Catana had been their original target but that they now changed their plan. That is possible, but **77**.6 remains odd on that reading, and Green's convincing identification of the Ἀκραῖον λέπας (**78**.5n.) is reconcilable with the Sicel cities as the destination originally in mind: it may fit Catana better, but the Anapus valley is a good route

into the interior as well. Best of all is to interpret 'this' as covering both the original and the new route, and indicating that communities in the opposite direction, not Catana, were the aim throughout: that gives better sense to ξύμπασα too – the whole route, had they been able to complete it. κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον μέρος . . . βαρβάρους then gives the general direction of the march (κατά) rather than indicating places that might welcome them, and so there is no conflict there with **77**.6; there was certainly no help to be expected from Camarina or Gela, and on their new route they would need to loop back to the north to find friendly territory. 'Not to Catana' may be said simply because this was the destination one might expect, but it may also be combative, correcting a rival version that later surfaces in Diod. It is also possible that Th. was simply wrong and Diod. right, and Catana was always the target: so Kagan 1981: 339 n. 23. **ἐπί** + genitive: 'towards', 'in the direction of' (**1**.2n.). **κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τῆς Σικελίας:** i.e. to the south.

80.3 **ἐχώρουν:** inceptive imperfect. **οἷον φιλεῖ . . . φόβοι καὶ δείματα ἐγγίγνεσθαι:** similarly 4.125.1 ὅπερ φιλεῖ μεγάλα στρατόπεδα ἀσαφῶς ἐκπλήγνυσθαι, there of a Macedonian army: ἀσαφῶς there = 'without any apparent cause'. φόβος is used particularly of *sudden* terror, 6.33.5n.; so is δεῖμα (e.g. Hdt. 6.74.1, 7.47.2, Aesch. *Ag.* 926, Soph. *OT* 153). **διὰ πολεμίας καὶ [ἀπὸ] πολεμίων οὐ πολὺ ἀπεχόντων:** more polyptoton and alliteration: cf. **80**.1n. **ἐν νυκτί:** almost = νυκτός, 'by night', but George 2014: 93 shows that the ἐν construction carries more explanatory force: this is *why* the panic strikes. **ἐμπίπτει ταραχή:** such panics are often grammatical subjects as they 'take' or 'surround' or 'fall upon' people in this vivid, semi-personified way: cf. esp. 2.91.4, 8.1.2, Hdt. 7.43.2, 8.38.1, X. *An.* 2.2.19, and see Hornblower–Pelling 185 on Hdt. 6.74.1. It is the more marked as put in the historic present, rare in these chapters (**78**.6n.). For 'falling on', as a disease or enemy falls upon one, see **28**.4, **29**.5, 6.24.3nn.

80.4 **ὥσπερ ἡγεῖτο** 'just as [one would expect as] he was leading': cf. 8.57.2, Hdt. 6.41.1 with Hornblower–Pelling's n. **προύλαβε πολλῶι** 'got far ahead'. The alliteration may again be heard, with **80**.1 and **80**.3 still in the reader's mind or listener's ear. **τὸ ἥμισυ μάλιστα καὶ πλέον** 'constituting about half and indeed more': **48**.4n.

80.5 **ἅμα δὲ τῆι ἕωι:** day 6. **ἀφικνοῦνται ὅμως πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν:** ὅμως must mean 'in spite of the gap opened between the two divisions': therefore Demosthenes' section also reached the coast, though some time after Nicias'. Whichever route they took, they would have covered more than the equivalent of all their previous marches, i.e. 65 or 66 stades = 10–13

km: the distance from Monte Climiti (78.5n.) to the Helorus road is about 20 km ≈ 12 miles (Green 1970: 328). That is quite an achievement in the dark. **τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν Ἑλωρίνην:** the main coastal road south from Syracuse, as the reader might know or, with a good memory, remember inferring from 6.66.3 and 6.70.4. See Map 1. It reaches the Cacyparis some 18 km ≈ 11 miles from the city. **ἐπὶ τῶι ποταμῶι τῶι Κακυπάρει:** the modern Cassibile. See Map 1. Neither this nor the Erineus has been mentioned before. Some but not many of the audience might have heard of one or both, but they could anyway infer their rough location. **τοὺς Σικελοὺς . . . οὓς μετεπέμψαντο:** aorist with a pluperfect sense. Nicias mentioned at 77.6 that Sicels had been summoned, but this is the first time the narrator has confirmed the claim. Further messages may have been sent informing them of the change of route.

80.6 καὶ ἐνταῦθα: i.e. as well as at the crossing of the Anapus (78.2) and at the mountain pass (78.5). **φυλακήν τινα τῶν Συρακοσίων:** presumably part of the original division of forces (74.2, 78.3nn.). **ἀποτειχίζουσάν τε καὶ ἀποσταυροῦσαν τὸν πόρον:** present tenses: they were still at work. That is, 'they had built a wall on the northern bank of the river in front of its fordable section, then erected palisades across the river at each end of the wall' (Kagan 1981: 345 with 346 n. 32). **ἐχώρουν αὖθις πρὸς ἄλλον ποταμὸν τὸν Ἐρινεόν:** not certainly identified. **ἡγεμόνες** 'guides'.

81.1 ἐν αἰτίαι . . . ἀφεῖναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους: as at 5.65.5, the infinitive is used as if the verb had been ἠτιῶντο. Syracusan democracy is again (Intr., pp. 31, 34) reminiscent of Athens, so given to blame generals when things go wrong (esp. 4.65.3: Intr., p. 25). But why pick on Gylippus? The command is jointly in the hands of 'Gylippus and the Syracusan generals' (65.3, 69.1, 79.4, 82.1, 83.2–3). It may just be the tendency to pick on the outsider or a feeling that he was not sharing their passionate hatred, but there may have been other reasons: perhaps a dislike of his stringency (33.3n.), perhaps a suspicion that a Spartan might have a soft spot for Nicias, though hardly for Demosthenes: cf. 86.3–4 nn. **ἡισθάνοντο** + accusative (rather than genitive) and participle, for intellectual and visual perception (*CGCG* 52.20): 6.91.6n. **καταλαμβάνουσι:** Th. has been sparing with historic presents (78.6, 80.3nn.); this one marks the opening of the critical action.

81.2 ἀτακτότερον χωροῦσιν: echoing 80.4 ἀτακτότερον ἐχώρει: there the fact, here the consequence. **ὡς . . . ξυνεταράχθησαν:** ὡς is 'just as', not simply 'because': the disorder that set in during the panic (80.3) had not yet been sorted out. Demosthenes was not good at orderly retreats (Roisman 1993: 69): cf. 3.98. **ἐμάχοντο . . . ἐκυκλοῦντο . . .**

ξυνῆγον: inceptive imperfects, but as usual (**74**.2n.) they are durative too: the Syracusans began and continued to . . . **ῥᾴων:** i.e., more easily than they would have been able to do had the force not become separated. **ἤδη** underlines the point: the gap already there did some of the Syracusans' work for them.

81.3 καὶ πεντήκοντα σταδίους: as much as (καί, lit. 'even') the equivalent of 7.5 to 10 km. Even given the circumstances, the figure is surprisingly large: Devoto 2002: 65 thinks it should have been '30'. **θᾶσσόν τε γὰρ ὁ Νικίας ἦγε:** τε is correlative with ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης . . ., **81**.4 (*GP* 513: 'the idea of contrast is added to the original idea of addition'), as the two points combine to explain (γάρ) why so big a gap had opened. **νομίζων . . . ὅσα ἀναγκάζονται** 'thinking that safety did not mean waiting voluntarily at a time like this and fighting, but moving away at maximum speed, fighting [only] as much as they had to': elegantly and forcefully phrased. The appositional σωτηρίαν conveys not merely what would contribute to safety but what would be equivalent to it (this is lost with the alternative reading σωτήριον, the adjective); τὸ ὑπομένειν is balanced against τὸ . . . ὑποχωρεῖν and τοσαῦτα μαχομένους ὅσα ἀναγκάζονται against μάχεσθαι. Most listeners/readers would probably hear ὑπομένειν as intransitive, especially as it is explaining Nicias' hurry, but the word is usually transitive and it might also be taken as 'stand and receive' the attack; that would give closer symmetry with ὑποχωρεῖν, 'withdraw before'. εἶναι is apparently superfluous after ἑκόντας, but is particularly used when a negative is stated or implied (LSJ, *GG* 1535).

81.4 τὰ πλείω: probably 'the more' [of the two generals], like ξυνεχεστέρωι and ὑστέρωι keeping the comparison firmly in focus and emphasising that each general had good reason for his different response, but some may have taken it as 'most of the time'. **τὸ ὑστέρωι . . . τοὺς πολεμίους:** closely repeating **81**.2, there seen from the Syracusan viewpoint, here from Demosthenes'. **οὐ προυχώρει μᾶλλον ἢ ἐς μάχην ξυνετάσσετο:** again in contrast to Nicias. **κυκλοῦταί τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν:** again repeating **81**.2, and another historic present (**81**.1n.). The shift then to the imperfect ἦσαν is awkward, but that imperfect is needed along with ἐβάλλοντο to set the scene and bring out the extended horror of what follows. **Ἀθηναῖοι:** deleted by Krüger and several editors, and there does not seem to be room for the word in a lacuna in *P.Oxy.* 1376. As editors observe, there were certainly allies with Demosthenes as well as Athenians, but that can be the same shorthand as οἱ Συρακόσιοι in the next sentence. Still, the word is hardly necessary, and it may be right to delete. Cf. Maurer 1995: 90. **ἐλάας δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγας εἶχεν:** these would impede movement even more, though they might also give some protection from the missiles.

A walled olive grove conveys a momentary hint of its usual peaceful pleasantness. Plut. *Nic.* 27.1 names it as τὴν Πολυζήλειον αὐλήν. **περισταδόν** 'from all sides', lit. 'in a standing-around manner'. The adverb usually modifies an active verb, naturally enough as it is the attackers who are 'standing around'. The ultimate prototype is *Il.* 13.551–2 (Allison 1997b: 510–12), but the more powerful suggestion here is of Hdt. 7.225.3, of the Spartans' last stand at Thermopylae: κατέχωσαν οἱ βάρβαροι βάλλοντες, οἱ μὲν ἐξ ἐναντίης ἐπισπόμενοι . . ., οἱ δὲ περιελθόντες πάντοθεν περισταδόν. This is the Athenians' latter-day equivalent. Both this and ξυσταδόν (**81**.5n.) are not used by Th. elsewhere. Cf. also **83**.3n.

81.5 ξυσταδόν 'at close quarters'. The word is not found again in extant literature until Cassius Dio uses it in imitation 600 years later, though Plb. has συστάδην. Th. very probably coined it for the wordplay with περισταδόν (**81**.4). **εἰκότως** 'as was reasonable', and the γάρ clause explains why. **ἀποκινδυνεύειν . . . ἀπονενοημένους:** the two ἀπο- compounds give another expressive jingle like **81**.3 ὑπομένειν/ὑποχωρεῖν: the Athenians are crazily desperate, but that is no reason for the Syracusans to take desperate risks. Cf. X. *Hell.* 7.5.12 τοῖς ἀπονενοημένοις οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑποσταίη. **πρὸς ἐκείνων** 'in their [the Syracusans'] interests'. **φειδώ τέ τις ἐγίγνετο ἐπ' εὐπραγίαι ἤδη σαφεῖ μὴ προαναλωθῆναί τωι** 'now that success was already clear-cut, there was some concern to save lives so as not to lose anyone before it was all over'. μὴ προαναλωθῆναι (passive aorist infinitive of προαναλίσκω, 'spend in advance: 1.141.5) is epexegetic infinitive explaining what form the φειδώ took; τωι = τινι, better taken with προαναλωθῆναι (the 'someone' with whose body expenditure might unnecessarily be made) than, as Dover 1965, with φειδώ . . . τις ἐγίγνετο ('somebody' – anybody – wanted not to be expended). The concern to save lives extended only to their own side: the missiles were meant to kill. **καὶ ὥς** 'even in this way', without hand-to-hand combat. **ταύτηι τῆι ἰδέαι:** **29**.5n. **καταδαμασάμενοι:** another very rare word, probably felt as poetic (C–S) or more specifically epic: δαμάζω is frequent in Homer.

82.1 δι' ἡμέρας 'all day long': LSJ διά A.II.1. **πανταχόθεν:** **83**.3n. **εἴ τις βούλεται ἐπ' ἐλευθερίαι ὡς σφᾶς ἀπιέναι:** formally an indirect question dependent on an 'asking' implicit in κήρυγμα. ἐπ' ἐλευθερίαι, 'on terms of freedom', makes the double point of guaranteeing that they would not be enslaved and insinuating that Athens had taken their freedom away: the first point would matter more to the islanders at the moment, but the second is the reason why they are treated differently from the other allies (**82**.2), assumed to be there by choice. Th. drew a similar distinction himself at **57**.4 ὑπήκοοι δ' ὄντες καὶ ἀνάγκηι. **τινες πόλεις οὐ πολλαί:** the compressed phrase indicates that each island's contingent took the

decision as a unit, or at least now tended to act in a unified way. Probably the reality was messier; even if brigaded together, they must by now have been all over the place. It is anyway striking how few accepted the offer. Perhaps the feeling of unity appealed to by Nicias (**63**.3–4) was real, or perhaps they just 'distrusted the Syracusans and preferred to stick with their mates' (Lazenby 2004: 284 n. 25).

82.2 τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας τοὺς μετὰ Δημοσθένους: both Athenians and the non-islander allies (**57**). Presumably the decision to surrender was taken by Demosthenes himself; it was by now 'both justified and commendable' (Roisman 1993: 69). Philistus *FGrH* 556 F 53 (= Paus. 1.29.12 and presumably Plut. *Nic.* 27.2) claimed that Demosthenes tried to kill himself before he was captured: cf. **86**.5n. **μὴ ἀποθανεῖν . . . διαίτης:** but no promise is given not to enslave them. **μήτε τῆς ἀναγκαιοτάτης ἐνδείαι διαίτης** 'nor through lacking sufficient rations to survive'. The rations meted out at **87**.2 hardly met that stipulation.

82.3 οἱ πάντες . . . ἑξακισχίλιοι '6,000 in all'. 40,000 had set out according to **75**.5; at **80**.5 Demosthenes had half or more of those who were still marching. The losses on the route were evidently vast, even when one has allowed for the few islanders of **80**.1. Not all will have been killed, as many will have melted away when they could; some wounded along the way may also have been left to whatever mercy from locals they could find (cf. **75**.3n.). **καὶ τὸ ἀργύριον . . . ἐνέπλησαν ἀσπίδας τέσσαρας:** the narrative pace slows: 'after the frantic scene of the retreat of Demosthenes' army, there is a certain calm in the scene' (Kallet 2001: 174). The precision again aids visualisation, and one can imagine the filmic equivalent of the sad evening scene as the bedraggled and wounded came up one by one and tossed their coins into the shields. Kallet 2001: 174–6 convincingly argues that 'four shields' would strike Th.'s audience as a little rather than a lot, and she roughly calculates that it might amount to 12 talents. **τούτους μὲν εὐθὺς ἀπεκόμιζον ἐς τὴν πόλιν:** τούτους must = the 6,000; it is uncertain whether the islanders were taken back to the city (keeping their disgruntled former comrades separate from them would in that case not be easy) or just released. The logistic problem of suddenly coping with so many prisoners of war will have been huge. **Ἐρινεόν:** **80**.6n.

83.1 τῇι ὑστεραίαι: day 7. **καταλαβόντες** 'after catching up with'.

83.2 ἀπήγγειλε πάλιν 'reported back'. **ὅσα ἀνήλωσαν χρήματα . . . ἕνα κατὰ τάλαντον:** such an offer from the defeated was 'not at all common' (Kallet 2001: 177), though a victor might sometimes impose indemnities and/or demand hostages. It is not surprising that it was dismissed out of

hand, and not just because robbing Athens of manpower would make a more substantial contribution to the war effort (*HCT*) or because of Syracusan blood-lust. The sum involved would be immense, the indemnity might never arrive (Nicias would not have nearly enough with him), and the Syracusans could expect to be saddled with hostages who might never be released in return for letting a large number of prisoners go. Better to insist on unconditional surrender; ransoms might or might not then be offered. But Plut. *Nic.* 27.4 clearly disapproved of the Syracusan refusal, imaginatively constructing or accepting a variant version that 'they responded with arrogant and angry threats and abuse'.

83.3 προσπεσόντες καὶ περιστάντες πανταχόθεν ἔβαλλον: further alliteration of π and here of β: cf. **80**.1, **80**.3, and **80**.4. This also echoes περισταδόν (**81**.4) and πανταχόθεν (**82**.1) to reinforce the point of καὶ τούτους, 'these too' like Demosthenes' troops the day before. Both with Demosthenes and especially here, there may also be an echo of the naval battle in the Great Harbour, ὅπως πανταχόθεν ἅμα προσπίπτοιεν (**70**.1), πανταχόθεν . . . ἐπιφερομένων (**70**.2), κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ πανταχόθεν περιεστάναι (**70**.6). This is the equivalent on land, rather as in Hdt. there are analogies between the two fights in the narrows at Thermopylae and Salamis.

83.4 εἶχον δὲ καὶ οὗτοι πονήρως: again like Demosthenes' troops (**82**.1). **σίτου τε καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἀπορίαι** picks up **80**.1 τῶν τε ἐπιτηδείων πάντων ἀπορίαι ἤδη. With Demosthenes this aspect was subsumed in τῇι ἄλλῃι κακώσει (**82**.1). **τῆς νυκτὸς φυλάξαντες τὸ ἡσυχάζον** 'waiting for the quiet part of the night', i.e., as the Schol. says, καθ' ὃ μάλιστα ἔμελλον τῆς νυκτὸς ἡσυχάζειν οἱ πολέμιοι. **ἀναλαμβάνουσι . . . αἰσθάνονται:** historic presents again for, in this case, what might have been a critical moment but was not. The switch of subjects gives crispness: they take up weapons, the Syracusans notice and sing their paean (**44**.6n.), the Athenians put their weapons down.

83.5 πλὴν τριακοσίων μάλιστα ἀνδρῶν: even though 300 is a 'typical number' that often recurs (Rubincam 1979, 1991, 2003), in this context it would again prompt memories of Thermopylae (Hdt. 7.205.2 etc.); but those 300 stood their ground, these now get away – for the moment. **ἐχώρουν:** inceptive imperfect. They did not get far (**85**.2). **ᾗ ἐδύναντο** 'where they could'.

84.1 ἐπειδὴ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο: day 8. The anniversary, the Syracusans decided, was to be celebrated by an annual festival, the 'As(s)inaria' (Plut. *Nic.* 28.1–2). If the date that Plut. then gives is correct, it would work out as 8 October (Meritt 1932), but this is very uncertain (*CT*). **προσέκειντο . . . πανταχόθεν βάλλοντες:** more close repetition of now familiar language

(**83**.3(n.)), as again in **84**.2 ὑπὸ τῆς πανταχόθεν προσβολῆς, with similar alliteration: the same attacks keep on coming. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον is internal accusative.

84.2 τὸν Ἀσσίναρον ποταμόν: probably the river called Fiumara di Noto, which used to be called 'Asinaro' upstream; possibly the Tellaro (Green 1970: 335 n. 3, Kagan 1981: 349). **ἅμα μὲν βιαζόμενοι . . . οἰόμενοι ῥᾴδιόν τι σφίσιν ἔσεσθαι:** the two participles go closely together to give the first reason why they pressed on (ἠπείγοντο): under this pressure, they thought they might get some respite if they could cross. ἅμα δ' . . . ἐπιθυμίαι then gives the second, with characteristic variation of dative noun after the the participles. A τε . . . καί linking the participles might have made the connection clearer, but another καί would have been awkward after καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου ὄχλου, and the asyndeton of οἰόμενοι is expressive too. One can almost hear the breathlessness. 'We're in trouble. If we could only cross that river . . .'

84.3 γίγνονται . . . ἐσπίπτουσιν: further historic presents for the next awful crisis. **πᾶς τέ τις διαβῆναι αὐτὸς πρῶτος βουλόμενος** 'every individual [**60**.2n.] wanting himself to be the first to cross', a grim version of the competitiveness of the ἀγών figure (Intr., p. 30), esp. 6.32.2 and **64**.2. Cf. X. *An.* 3.4.20 with Huitink–Rood's n. **ἤδη** 'already', even before the enemy had occupied the opposite bank (**84**.4). **περί τε τοῖς δορατίοις καὶ σκεύεσιν** 'on their spears and baggage', stabbing themselves and one another with their spears (so these in particular died εὐθύς), or carried away by the stream (κατέρρεον) after getting entangled (ἐμπαλασσόμενοι) as if in a net (Hdt. 7.85.2). The hint of hooked or netted fishes is left implicit (cf. Ael. *NA* 12.44, 15.1), but some would again think of 480 BCE, this time of Aesch.'s description of the Persians slaughtered like a catch of fish as they struggled in the water (*Pers.* 424–6). This may already have been suggested at **67**.2(n.). The detail and the long, heavy words combine with the vividness to make this one of the most gruesomely memorable aspects of the scene. **ἐμπαλασσόμενοι κατέρρεον** 'became entangled as they rushed down'.

84.4 ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ θάτερά τε τοῦ ποταμοῦ: τε is the sentence-connective (a Thucydidean mannerism, **7**.3n.), delayed to follow ἐπὶ θάτερα as this is the new phase: the Syracusans are no longer just pressing from the rear (**84**.3). **ἦν δὲ κρημνῶδες:** Connor 2017: 221 rightly stresses the vividness of the sight, as the reader's eye follows the weapons down from above to the chaos in the hollow river-bed and the befouled water. **ἔβαλλον ἄνωθεν:** again a recurrence of a scene a few days earlier (**79**.2). **κοίλωι:** at Plb. 21.37.4 a river is κοῖλος because its banks are deep, and that is

probably the meaning here as well. LSJ and some commentators take it as 'low-running', but there had been heavy rain only a few days before (79.3) and there was now enough to carry the floundering men downstream (84.3).

84.5 **ἔσφαζον**: a vivid word, 'cut the throats of'. It has the emotive force of Engl. 'butcher' or 'slaughter'. **διέφθαρτο**: the pluperfect immediately shifts the focus to the scene that follows, again dreadfully visualisable, of the men still scrambling in their death-throes to drink: καὶ περιμάχητον ἦν τοῖς πολλοῖς tops even that – they were even fighting over it, and this is the only μάχη left for these soldiers. [Longin.] 38.3 quotes this sentence to exemplify a hyperbole rendered credible 'under the stress of violent emotion'.

The description of the river choked with blood and (85.1) corpses evokes Achilles' slaughter of Trojans at the river bank in *Iliad* 21, esp. 21.21 ἐρυθαίνετο δ' αἵματι ὕδωρ and 325, the river μορμύρων ἀφρῷ τε καὶ αἵματι καὶ νεκύεσσι; a Schol. on *Il.* 21.9 cites 84.3 as a parallel. Cf. Fragoulaki forthcoming, pointing out that references to blood, so frequent in the *Iliad*, are very rare in Th.: elsewhere only at 2.49.2, the 'blood-red' colour of a plague victim's throat and tongue.

85.1 **διεφθαρμένου**: as the river itself διέφθαρτο. The effect is frigid to the modern ear; most languages would now use different verbs, e.g. 'befoul' and 'slaughter'. **πιστεύσας μᾶλλον αὐτῶι ἢ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις**: the reason is held back to 86.2–4. Plut. *Nic.* 27.5–6 dramatises the encounter. Cf. 4.46.2 with the n. of Foster forthcoming: the Corcyrean oligarchs surrender to Athenians rather than to their domestic enemies. There too it does them no good. **ὅτι βούλονται** 'in whatever way they liked', internal accusative.

85.2 **ὁ Γύλιππος . . . ζωγρεῖν ἤδη ἐκέλευεν**: so, whatever the limitations in or criticism of his authority (86.4; cf. 81.1n.), he seems able to give this order and to be obeyed by all. Admittedly, it was 'the Peloponnesians' who were doing the close-quarter butchering (84.5), but the Syracusans had to stop (or not resume) their missile assault as well. **τοὺς τριακοσίους**: 83.5.

85.3 **μὲν οὖν**: 'retrospective and transitional . . . often the μέν clause sums up and rounds off the old topic, while the δέ clause introduces the new one' (*GP* 470, 472). **ἐς τὸ κοινόν**: as state prisoners, to be sold or used as the democracy decided. **τὸ δὲ διακλαπὲν πολύ**: this expands on the many who were 'hidden away' (85.2) and prepares for the transition to what happened to the survivors (86–7). Plut. *Nic.* 29 has more to say about those who now 'filled Sicily': 87.4n. **οὐκ ἀπὸ ξυμβάσεως**

ὥσπερ τῶν μετὰ Δημοσθένους ληφθέντων: those terms made the prisoners the responsibility of the state; individual Syracusans now had much more opportunity to spirit captives away so that they could sell them themselves. Cf. *GSW* v.159–60.

85.4 πλεῖστος . . . τούτωι: perhaps πλεῖστος = 'greatest during the retreat' while οὐδενὸς . . . τούτωι intensifies to 'greatest in this war' (*HCT*), but some may have heard πλεῖστος . . . καὶ οὐδενὸς ἐλάσσων as just emphatically pleonastic. The word φόνος is rare in Th. and 'is brought out only on special occasions' (*CT*): cf. esp. 1.23.2. For Th.'s taste for such 'greatest in this war' rankings cf. **30**.4(n.), **87**.5. **[Σικελικῶι]:** rightly deleted by Dobree: there was no reason for Th. to weaken his claim in this way. It was presumably a misguided marginal gloss that found its way into the text. The Schol. already suspected the word and proposed Ἑλληνικῶι, but 'this' war needs no such specification; in contrast the 'Greek' qualification is necessary at **66**.1, **87**.4, and 6.31.1 to exclude Xerxes from the comparisons. **οὐκ ὀλίγοι ἐτεθνήκεσαν:** **82**.3n. Diod. 13.19.2 says that 18,000 were killed and 7,000 taken prisoner 'at the Assinarus', clearly including Demosthenes' men and, if his information on the number is good, perhaps including also those who died on the march. **δουλεύσαντες καὶ διαδιδράσκοντες** 'becoming slaves [aorist for that single event] and then running away'. **τούτοις δ' ἦν ἀναχώρησις ἐς Κατάνην:** these included the speaker of Lys. 20, who claimed to have then raised 30 minas through raiding and spent it on ransoming prisoners (20.24–6). A tale was also told of one 'Callistratus', whose band of cavalry broke through the Syracusans and made it to Catana; Callistratus himself returned to Syracuse, found the enemy stripping the Athenian camp, and killed about five before himself being mortally wounded (Paus. 7.16.4–5).

86–7: THE END OF THE STORY

After the burst of energy injected by Demosthenes' arrival (**42–6**n.), the narrative has focused on Nicias: he was the one given the speeches, **61–4** and **77**, and it was his feeling of their inadequacy that was stressed at **69**.2; at **78**.1 it was simply said that Demosthenes spoke similarly. During the retreat attention was paid to both, as it had to be in view of their different fortunes, but there too the climax of the suffering was the fate of Nicias and his troops. The balance of **86** is similar. There is no obituary for Demosthenes, important though he has been not merely in Sicily but also earlier in Acarnania and Pylos; the closing comment on Nicias is by contrast remarkable (**86**.5n.). This may simply be because Th. found Nicias the more interesting character, flawed, mentally torn, and placed

in the command that he never wanted of the expedition that he thought a mistake. Demosthenes, the military man, was in comparison a disappointingly straightforward subject. But there is also a question of narrative shape. From the beginning of Book 6 Nicias has been central to the expedition's story; Demosthenes was a latecomer on the scene. These final chapters round off by returning to the people whose thinking and actions have dominated the story throughout, first in **86** Nicias and then, just as important, in **87** the men who for the moment survived. It was the Athenian *dēmos*, full of hope and confidence, that took the decision to sail; the miserable fortune of the ordinary Athenians here, along with their allies, is the note on which the story ends.

There were other ways Th. could have chosen to conclude. Comparison with Plut. *Nic.* is illuminating, as it is here the biographer Plut. whose focus has the broader historical range, giving much more attention to the successful Syracusans. *Nic.* 27.8–28.2 tells of their elaborate trophies, the victors' triumphant return to the city, and the decision to celebrate the anniversary in future years with a festival (**84**.1, **86**.1nn.): such trophies have been regularly mentioned before (**23**.4, **24**.1, **41**.4, **45**.1, **54**.1, **72**.1), and the celebrations were highlighted at **73**.2, but Th. passes over them now. So far, too, Th. has been very interested in Syracusan politics, and especially in Hermocrates; here there is only a very little on their debate (**86**.4), with no names. It is Plut. (*Nic.* 28.3) who records that Hermocrates now spoke for more lenient treatment of the prisoners, saying that moderation in victory is more important than victory itself, but was howled down. Diod. 13.19.5, interested as usual in affairs of his native Sicily, dramatises this debate at length (**86**.4n.). Plut.'s account probably mixes material from Timaeus and from Philistus, both of whom he quotes (*Nic.* 28.4–5 = *FGrH* 566 F 100b, 556 F 55), and some at least of what is recounted will go back to versions that Th. would have known. There was an opportunity here to lay a trail for some future narrative themes, for he probably planned to go on in later books to recount Hermocrates' mixed fortunes with the Syracusan *dēmos* (Intr., pp. 33–4). But for now this is Athens' story, a sad and pathetic one, and (characteristically, as Stahl 2013 observes) Th. prefers to end with a focus on the defeated. The victors are, for the moment, much less interesting.

86.1 **τὰ σκῦλα** 'the spoils'. Before they went they decorated the two biggest and finest trees at the riverside with Athenian panoplies (Plut. *Nic.* 27.8); Diod. 13.19.3 adds that each trophy carried the arms of one of the generals. See **86–7**n. **ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν:** 'wearing crowns and leading their own horses with glorious decorations while cropping the enemy horses' tails', says Plut. *Nic.* 27.8. Plut. is capable of adding that sort

of detail from his imagination and there may have been few enemy horses left to crop (**78**.3n.), but it would be odd if that journey were anything other than triumphant.

86.2 τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους . . . Νικίαν δὲ καὶ Δημοσθένη: this sets the framework for **86–7**, with **87** returning chiastically to the fate of οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι. **ἐς τὰς λιθοτομίας:** the definite article suggests that the audience already knew of these, and they are a striking feature of the city's topography; many of Th.'s first audience might have heard of them from prior oral tale-telling of the prisoners' miseries. Cicero described them evocatively, probably with Th. in mind: 'You have all heard of the quarries at Syracuse, and most of you know them. It is a vast, magnificent work of kings and tyrants; the stone has been cut out to an extraordinary depth by many men's hands; there is nothing so lacking in ways out, nothing so enclosed on all sides, no safer a guarding-place could be constructed or conceived' (Cic. 2 *Verr.* 5.68). **ἀσφαλεστάτην εἶναι νομίσαντες τήρησιν** 'thinking this the safest way of guarding them'. For the omission of 'this' cf. **42**.4 ξυντομωτάτην ἡγεῖτο διαπολέμησιν. **ἄκοντος τοῦ Γυλίππου:** Plut. *Nic.* 28.3 says and Diod. 13.19.5 implies that it was against Hermocrates' wishes too, but Syracusan individuals are for the moment out of focus: see **86–7**n. The concentration on Gylippus picks up from **85**.1, and Th. now explains why Nicias then chose to surrender personally to him. **ἀπέσφαξαν** 'cut their throats'. Plut. quotes Timaeus for the variant version that Hermocrates sent word to Demosthenes and Nicias to kill themselves (*Nic.* 28.5 = *FGrH* 566 F 100b), presumably to avoid this humiliation. **καλὸν τὸ ἀγώνισμα:** a final echo of this dominant theme (Intr., p. 30), but given a more personal twist (οἱ, the singular reflexive pronoun). The Syracusans were understandably not moved by Gylippus' quest for personal glory at home, but Plut. adds from Timaeus (*FGrH* 566 F 100b = *Nic.* 28.4) some other reasons for their refusal, Gylippus' harsh leadership, stinginess, and greed: **33**.3, **81**.1nn.

86.3 πολεμιώτατον . . . ἐπιτηδειότατον 'worst enemy . . . best friend'. **τὰ ἐν τῇι νήσωι καὶ Πύλωι:** in 425 BCE: **71**.7 n. **τοὺς . . . ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας:** the 292 men captured on Pylos and transported to Athens, where they remained until the Peace of 421. Plut. *Nic.* 9.6, perhaps through imaginative expansion of this passage, says more about Nicias' efforts to make their imprisonment as comfortable as possible. **ὥστε ἀφεθῆναι:** with προυθυμήθη; ἀφεθῆναι is aorist passive infinitive of ἀφίημι. προθυμέομαι more usually takes a simple infinitive, but the ὥστε construction indicates that this was the actual result, not simply what he was eager for: cf. Eur. *Hipp.* 1325 Κύπρις γὰρ ἤθελ' ὥστε γίγνεσθαι τάδε. At 5.16 concern for the prisoners is not mentioned among Nicias' motives for peacemaking (Intr., p. 9), but Th.'s interest here is in how the Spartans saw it.

86.4 ἑαυτὸν τῶι Γυλίππωι παρέδωκεν: 85.1. **τῶν Συρακοσίων τινές . . . ἀπέκτειναν αὐτόν:** Th. says nothing more of any debate; it is unclear what procedure is here envisaged, and the role of 'the Corinthians' in persuading 'the allies' does not suggest a popular assembly. See **86–7**n. for Plut.'s version. Diod., always interested in moderation in victory (Sacks 1990: 42–6), elaborates a full-dress debate scene to explore the moral question in depth (13.19.4–33.1), and his Gylippus argues fiercely against leaving the prisoners alive: Diod.'s Gylippus is very different from Th.'s. Th. keeps the focus on Nicias. Distinctive strengths of his past now combine to defeat him, his channel of information from within Syracuse (**48**.2n.) and the wealth which had helped to build his career (6.9.2n.). **ὡς ἐλέγετο:** Th. indicates caution, as again in **86**.5 τοιαύτηι ἢ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτων αἰτίαι. Doubtless speculation was rife. **βασανιζόμενος διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτο:** to be taken together: the torture would not be mere vindictiveness but designed to extract names. **ἄλλοι δέ, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ Κορίνθιοι:** if ἄλλοι δὲ καί is in its usual sense 'others and in particular' (**36**.2, 6.8.2n.), τῶν Συρακοσίων must include their allies, as often (cf. **81**.4n.). **ὅτι πλούσιος ἦν:** Lys. 19.47 says he was thought to be worth 100 talents; it was said that he employed 1,000 slaves in his silver-mines (X. *Poroi* 4.14). The use Nicias made of those riches is a recurrent theme of Plut. *Nic.*, though Th. himself has so far made little of this: cf. Rood 1998a: 288–9. **νεώτερόν τι** 'some trouble'.

86.5 ἢ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτων: Th. again (**86**.4n.) does not sound too sure. ὅτι ἐγγύτατα is adverbial, but qualifying the noun αἰτίαι, cf. **44**.8n. **ἥκιστα δὴ ἄξιος ὢν . . . ἐπιτήδευσιν** 'the least deserving of Greeks, at least in my time, to arrive at such a pitch of misfortune [**2**.4n.], in view of the way he had ordered all his behaviour according to virtue'. The man so famed for his εὐτυχία (**77**.2n.) has ended at the other extreme; the man who has so often talked of 'worthiness' (ἄξιος, ἀξιῶ: **15**.2n.) endures a fate sadly short of his deserts.

'Such a pitch of misfortune' presumably refers generally to so miserable a death amid general catastrophe, though Gray 2011: 88–9 refers it also to the suspicion that he might have resorted to bribery or broken under torture. The imputations would be particularly unfortunate for a man of such virtue.

This sentence is much discussed, (a) because ambiguities have been found in the Greek and (b) because the verdict has seemed surprising in view of Th.'s presentation elsewhere. The issues are best aired by Murray 1961: 41–6, Connor 1984: 205 n. 53, Lateiner 1985: 208–13, Rood 1998a: 183–4, Price 2001: 242–4, Tompkins 2017: 120–2, *HCT* and *CT*.

(a) The difficulties are these. (i) Does πᾶσαν qualify ἀρετήν or ἐπιτήδευσιν? Either is possible. The Schol. took it with ἀρετήν and so did Ael. Arist. *Against Plato on behalf of the Four* 268 J., Thucydides ἐπαινεῖ δέ που καὶ τὸν Νικίαν διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτηδεύειν. *HCT* also gives parallels in verse inscriptions for πᾶσα ἀρετή as 'complete virtue'. It remains easier and more forceful to take it with ἐπιτήδευσιν, but this may be a case where different native speakers may have read the syntax differently; in oral performance, though, the delivery would probably have made one or the other clear. (ii) Does the διά explanation give the reason for his arriving at such a pitch of misfortune (so Connor) or for thinking such a fate undeserved? The second is much easier: whatever the reasons for his downfall, it would require more explanation to clarify 'because of his ἀρετή'. (iii) Does νενομισμένην qualify ἀρετήν or ἐπιτήδευσιν? With ἀρετήν it will mean 'as ἀρετή has been customarily understood', pointing to Nicias' traditionalism and hinting that alternative conceptions of ἀρετή might be possible. That is not an impossible view either of Nicias' mindset (cf. **69**.2) or of Th.'s, yet this does not seem the place to gesture towards, but leave undeveloped, deep questions about the nature of virtue; nor is ἐς easy with ἐπιτήδευσιν without the qualifying participle. With ἐπιτήδευσιν, νομίζω will mean 'order' or 'regulate', an extension of its sense 'practise' or 'adopt as a custom' (cf. LSJ I.1). That seems relatively straightforward. It does not commit Th. to seeing ἀρετή in the same way as Nicias, though it does not exclude that; it does give Nicias credit for making ἀρετή his guiding principle.

(b) Th.'s narrative has certainly not suggested unmixed enthusiasm for Nicias. His military judgement has often been questionable (Intr., pp. 28–9), and Th. made his own criticism clear at **42**.3(n.); nor is it only modern sensibilities that would find uncomfortable his concern for his own skin at **48**, even though he saw no reason to conceal that reasoning from his fellow generals (**47–9**n.). But it is important not to make Th. say more here than he implies. This is not an overall verdict on Nicias' generalship, his judgement, or even of all his morality. He could leave his audience to make up their own minds about those. It relates to ἐπιτήδευσις, the way he conducted his everyday life, an individually focused equivalent of Pericles' pride in the ἐπιτηδεύματα of Athens (2.37.2) and a contrast with the ἐπιτηδεύματα of Alcibiades that caused such widespread annoyance (6.15.4, 28.2). This must be taken with Nicias' own claim at **77**.2, πολλὰ μὲν ἐς θεοὺς νόμιμα δεδιήτημαι, πολλὰ δὲ ἐς ἀνθρώπους δίκαια καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα. There was no reason for Th. to doubt that claim, and this passage is the best guide to how Nicias himself would see the ἀρετή he took as his guide. If there is 'irony' here (so Green 1970: 346 and most recently Tompkins 2017), it casts doubt not on Nicias' merits but on any expectation that

virtue might win some reward, or that, as Nicias had hoped at **77**.2, the gods might therefore relent. That is not Th.'s mental world. But he could still pity the man and feel that he 'did not deserve' to end like this, and the modern reader might feel the same. If anything is surprising, it is the triteness of the reflection, but at the fraughtest moments the trite is often the most appropriate.

Th.'s words have something of an epitaph about them (Ossipova 2001): that has its own sombre effect, as it does in Dido's 'I have lived my life, and finished the course that Fortune had given me . . .' (Virg. *Aen.* 4.653–8), though the manner there is different. Others were less sympathetic than Th. According to Paus. 1.29.12, Nicias' name was excluded from the official casualty list because he willingly surrendered whereas Demosthenes had tried to kill himself (**82**.2n.). Steinbock 2017: 130–2 suggested that Th. intended his words as a pointed substitute for the official commemorative appreciation that had been denied; this however may imply too narrowly Athenian a target audience. Nicias' reputation recovered during the fourth century: he is a sympathetic character in Plato's *Laches*, and [Arist.] *Ath. pol.* 28.3–5 and Dem. 3.21 include him when they list model fifth-century statesmen (Steinbock 2017: 132–5).

See also Intr., pp. 28–31.

87.1 χαλεπῶς τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους μετεχείρισαν: at **86**.2 Th. stressed the effectiveness of the quarries as a guarding-place (ἀσφαλεστάτην . . . τήρησιν); so also does Cicero in the passage quoted at **86**.2n., adding that in his day criminals were sent there for custody from the other Sicilian towns. It would be odd though if the victors did not employ their prisoners as (effectively) slave labour: there was quarrying to be done. That will have added to the mortality rate. **οἵ τε ἥλιοι** 'spells of hot sunshine', as Greek talks of τὰ ψύχη and Engl. of 'the colds' of winter. **ἔτι:** it was now October: **84**.1n. **ἐπιγιγνόμεναι:** either 'following on' the daytime warmth or 'following after' the still warm autumn as winter set in. **τῇ μεταβολῇ ἐς ἀσθένειαν ἐνεωτέριζον:** the hazard to health from climatic μεταβολαί is a Hippocratic commonplace, e.g. *Airs Waters Places* 10, *Aphorisms* 3.1, and is noted by Hdt. 2.77.3. νεωτερίζω is a striking choice of verb, but this is not the only place where Th. extends its use beyond the political to apply to cases where violent change is made to others: cf. 2.3.1 and 3.66.2.

87.2 πάντα τε ποιούντων αὐτῶν . . . ἐν τῷι αὐτῷι: the reference to bodily functions is delicately phrased but clear: cf. the herald's complaints of the Athenian behaviour in the sanctuary at Delium, 'everything that humans do on secular ground is happening there' (4.97.3). **διὰ στενοχωρίαν:** στενοχωρία had blighted the Athenians' chances both on

land (**44**.2) and, especially, in the Great Harbour (**49**.2, **70**.6; cf. **36**.4 in the Corinthian Gulf). It is now even more dreadful and inescapable. This is a long way from Pericles' vision of the whole world open to Athens (2.62.2). **ὁμοῦ ἐπ' ἀλλήλοις ξυννενημένων** (perfect passive participle of ξυννέω, 'pile together'): as had happened during the plague, 2.52.2, and this might stir those memories in any Athenian audience (Zacharia 2003: 67, Joho 2017b: 40–1). It is not meant to be easy reading. **ἀπέθνησκον:** imperfect. They kept dying. **καὶ ὁσμαὶ ἦσαν οὐκ ἀνεκτοί:** as again had happened in the plague, though then from the victims' breath (2.49.2). **κοτύλην ὕδατος καὶ δύο κοτύλας σίτου:** reckoned as 0.27 of a litre of water, 540–50 cc. of food (*HCT*; cf. *CT* on 4.16.1) – starvation rations, in flagrant breach of the agreement made with Demosthenes at **82**.2. The Spartans on Sphacteria had been allowed 'two Attic *choinikes* of barley [that is four times as much as two *kotulai*], two *kotulai* of wine, and some meat', and their servants half those quantities: 4.16.1. **ἄλλα τε . . . ἐπεγένετο αὐτοῖς** 'and whatever other sufferings one might expect to befall people cast into such a place, nothing failed to happen to them in addition' (to the woes they had already). ἐμπίπτω here is in effect a passive of ἐμβάλλω, as in ἐμπίπτειν εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον (Din. 2.9, Dem. 25.60). There is a mild anacoluthon as the sentence builds to its climax, with οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ serving as if it were πάντα in picking up ἄλλα τε ὅσα: cf. Plato, *Rep.* 10.598c8–d1 ἀνθρώπωι . . . τἆλλα πάντα ὅσα εἷς ἕκαστος οἶδεν, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐχὶ ἀκριβέστερον ὁτουοῦν ἐπισταμένωι. οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ recurs at **87**.6; elsewhere in Th. only at 6.28.2 and at 3.81.5, another passage of the highest emotional intensity, πᾶσά τε ἰδέα κατέστη θανάτου, καὶ οἷον φιλεῖ ἐν τῶι τοιούτωι γίγνεσθαι, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ ξυνέβη καὶ ἔτι περαιτέρω.

87.3 **ἡμέρας μὲν ἑβδομήκοντά τινας** 'some seventy days', so well into December. **εἴ τινες . . . τοὺς ἄλλους:** for the full list of allies cf. **57**. The Athenians, Sicilians, and Italians remained in the quarries for six more months. Th. does not say what happened to any who survived; maybe they too were sold, but D. H. Kelly 1970 thinks they may then have been ransomed. Perhaps some had even been ransomed before: see **87**.4n. It seems odd that the Syracusans had not realised this potential profit earlier, when the prisoners' number and condition were higher (*GSW* v.272–3 n. 386). **ξυνεστράτευσαν:** aorist in a pluperfect sense.

87.4 **ἐλήφθησαν . . . ἑπτακισχιλίων:** ἀκριβείαι μὲν χαλεπὸν ἐξειπεῖν, ὅμως δέ is parenthetic, with ὅμως δέ indicating that despite the uncertainty Th. can say this much. The 'not less than 7,000' may be based on no more than the 6,000 of **82**.3, with an estimate of 1,000+ added for those taken with Nicias. If so, Thucydides is being very cautious, and the true number

could be considerably more than 7,000. Devoto 2002: 67–9 thinks that it may be c. 13,000.

Th. adds nothing more about the fate of any survivors. Plut. again has more to say (*Nic.* 29), even though by then he has completed Nicias' own story: most died in the quarries, but many were sold as slaves, with a horse motif branded on their foreheads. Some were freed soon afterwards, presumably ransomed; others willingly remained with their masters. Plut. adds that many now saved themselves through their knowledge of Euripides, as his songs appealed to Sicilian taste, and either they were freed in return for teaching their masters the songs, or if they slipped away they survived by begging food and drink in return for their singing. Those who made it back to Athens sought the poet out and thanked him warmly. The difference from Th.'s manner could hardly be greater. That pleasant tale is found credible by Taplin 1993: 98–9, and it is mirrored by a grimmer Euripidean story at the end of Plut.'s paired *Life* of Crassus (*Crass.* 33).

Diod. 13.33.1 says that 'the more educated' of those in the quarries were in time rescued by 'the younger' Syracusans: that sounds like another version of Plut.'s tale (D. H. Kelly 1970: 128). If so the 'rescues' presumably involved ransoming, and may have been going on before the end of the eight months. The story of Lys. 20.24–6 (**85**.4 n.) also attests some ransoming, and a certain Epicerdes of Cyrene spent 100 minas to 'save from starvation' Athenian prisoners (Dem. 20.41–2; cf. *IG* I^3 125) perhaps by providing extra rations (so Kremmydas 2012: 268–70) but perhaps by ransoming whoever survived those eight months.

87.5–6 *Envoi.* Th. likes rounding-off formulae, especially after scenes of suffering and slaughter (**30**.4n.): their effect is normally gained through understatement, most obviously at 3.68.5, 'And so ended Plataea's story, in the ninety-third year of the Athenian alliance.' The present ending is anything but understated, understandably after so much emotional build-up, with superlatives (μέγιστον . . . λαμπρότατον . . . δυστυχέστατον), polyptoton and emphatic reduplication (πάντα γὰρ πάντως . . . πανωλεθρίαι, οὐδὲν ὀλίγον ἐς οὐδέν, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ), and everything stated in the starkest and most sweeping terms. Key terms recur, some from very recently (διαφθαρεῖσι from **87**.1 and earlier **84**.3, **85**.1, δυστυχέστατον from **86**.5, κακοπαθήσαντες from **87**.2 and earlier **77**.2, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ from **87**.2, 'greatest in this war' from **85**.4), some from a greater distance (λαμπρότατον, recalling the departure at 6.31.6, οὐδὲν ὀλίγον ἐς οὐδέν, recalling the beginning of the war, 2.8.1, as it reaches its destructive climax).

Where long ancient narratives have survived in their entirety, their final endings are often quieter and less formally marked than modern readers

expect (West 2007), or, as in Hdt. or X. *Cyr.* or X. *Hell.*, marked in unexpected ways: cf. the cases collected by Marincola 2005. Interim endings, marking the close of phases or episodes, can be stronger, as again they are in Hdt. (Dewald 1997: 64–5) and already in the *Odyssey*, with the formal closure rounding off the first half at *Od.* 13.88–92. This interim ending too shows clear closural features (Fowler 2000: 254–5): such generalising summaries and 'unqualified assertions' as this are a cross-generic closural technique (Smith 1968: 182–6, Campbell 1988: 46, Zeelander 2011: 89–91), and 'return' is a favourite terminal motif, with again the *Odyssey* often in mind. ἀπενόστησαν ends on that note, but here to stress the absence of a νόστος for so many.

Such 'unqualified assertions' can verge on the hyperbolic (Smith 1968: 185–6, Zeelander 2011: 91–2). Here too perhaps there is overstatement, though it will hardly strike first-time readers as such, especially when they go on to the impact of the news at Athens (8.1). At 8.96.1 that impression is however qualified, for the loss of Euboea in 411 caused an 'ἔκπληξις that was greater than anything before: for neither the disaster in Sicily, though it seemed great at the time, nor anything else before had created such terror'. Cf. Intr., p. 22. But the strength of the statement here helps the way in which the conclusion prefigures the end of the war, even if that takes nine more years (2.65.12: Intr., pp. 14–15). 'Total' defeat now anticipates, and in the end may largely and belatedly explain, the even more total defeat that is to come.

Th.'s statement left a strong impression on later writers, who often echoed or imitated it: see Rood 2017. Arr. *Anab.* 1.9.1–2 is especially notable, pointing out that the destruction of Thebes in 336 was even more shattering.

87.5 **[Ἑλληνικόν] . . . Ἑλληνικῶν:** only one is needed, and that must be the second: that is where the limitation is needed to exclude, as at 6.31.1 and **75**.7, the case of Xerxes in 480, and perhaps other Asian disasters as well (cf. 6.11.3n.). **τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε μέγιστον:** **85**.4n. on πλεῖστος . . . τούτωι. **δοκεῖν δ' ἔμοιγε** 'so it seems to me', parenthetical: *CGCG* 51.49, *M&T* 778. The phrase has a Herodotean ring (Hdt. 8.22.3, 103, and often): Rood 1998b: 246. **ὧν ἀκοῆι Ἑλληνικῶν ἴσμεν:** again Herodotean (7.170.3, 9.64.1; Rood 1998b: 246–7), and the hints prepare for the Herodotean allusiveness in πανωλεθρίαι (**87**.6). **λαμπρότατον:** as at **75**.6(n.), the word recalls the 'brilliance' of the expedition when it set out (6.31.6): cf. 6.30–32.2n. That brilliance had transferred to the Syracusan side by **55**.1 and **71**.5. **καὶ τοῖς διαφθαρεῖσι δυστυχέστατον:** a perfect iambic line (Hornblower 1994: 68, Dover 1997: 169). As Aristotle

knew (*Poet.* 1449a25–6, *Rhet.* 2.1404a32–3), iambics often slip out in ordinary speech, but this context is not ordinary, and this is one case where an affinity with tragedy may be sensed (Intr., pp. 16–18). Cf. 6.36.1n.

87.6 κατὰ πάντα γὰρ πάντως: similarly a few sentences later when the news hits Athens, πάντα δὲ πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς ἐλύπει (8.1.2). For the polyptoton (**44**.7n.) cf. 6.87.4 ἐν παντὶ γὰρ πᾶς χωρίωι and Eur. *Med.* 853–4 (another highly charged moment) πρὸς γονάτων σε πάνται | πάντως ἱκετεύομεν. Gorg. goes further, *Pal.* 12: life among one's fellow soldiers, ἐν οἷς <πάντες> πάντα ὁρῶσι καὶ πάντες ὑπὸ πάντων ὁρῶνται. πάντως ἄρα καὶ πάντηι πάντα πράττειν ἀδύνατον ἦν μοι. **οὐδὲν ὀλίγον ἐς οὐδέν:** cf. **59**.3n. for the echo of the beginning of the war, ὀλίγον τε ἐπενόουν οὐδὲν ἀμφότεροι (2.8.1). **πανωλεθρίαι δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον** 'in utter ruin, as they say'. Closely similar phrasing was certainly idiomatic or even proverbial ('as they say'), probably deriving from curse-formulae: cf. Aesch. *Seven against Thebes* 552 ἢ τᾶν πανώλεις παγκάκως τ' ὀλοίατο, Soph. *El.* 1009 πανωλέθρους τὸ πᾶν . . . ὀλέσθαι . . . γένος, and Eur. *Med.* 277–8. But πανωλεθρία itself does not in fact seem frequent until much later (πανώλεθρος occurs more often), and Th. is probably recalling Hdt. 2.120.5, where divinity orchestrates the Trojan War so that by perishing πανωλεθρίηι the Trojans might make it clear to mortals that great transgressions generate great punishments. That reinforces the comparison with the great wars of old (**87**.5): cf. Rood 1998b: 250–4, Kallet 2001: 114–15, Grethlein 2008: 132. It is less likely that there is any implicit engagement here with the theology or metaphysics of Hdt.'s interpretation, either to adopt it, at least as reinterpreted in terms of τύχη (Marinatos Kopff and Rawlings 1978), or to suggest its inadequacy (e.g. Grethlein 2008: 137–8 and 2010: 264–7.) **οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ: 87**.2n. **ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐπ' οἴκου ἀπενόστησαν:** an alert reader might recall 1.110.1 ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν πορευόμενοι διὰ τῆς Λιβύης ἐς Κυρήνην ἐσώθησαν, after Athens' Egyptian expedition in the 450s. That adds an extra point of comparison, as Egypt was Athens' most disastrous overseas adventure before this. ἀπενόστησαν also suggests Homer, and not just the Odyssean theme of νόστος (Allison 1997b: 512–15); at Troy too there were many who were 'not to return home' (*Il.* 5.684–6, 18.60–1, etc.) but die far from home (J. Griffin 1976: 163–5). Th.'s own words are then recalled at X. *An.* 3.5.16 (Huitink–Rood ad loc.). **ταῦτα μὲν τὰ περὶ Σικελίαν γενόμενα:** on the effect of such μέν . . . final remarks cf. **30**.4n.: here too the war goes on relentlessly. The δέ at the beginning of Book 8 leads into the reception of the news at Athens and the great κατάπληξις it caused: Intr., p. 21. Again the contrast in manner with Plut. is marked: Plut. describes how the first to bring the news was a visitor

getting a haircut in the Piraeus, who began to chat assuming that the barber knew about it already (*Nic.* 30; cf. *On Talkativeness* 509a–c). Th. focuses instead on the way in which the *dēmos* immediately turned on the orators that had urged the expedition – 'as if they had not voted for it themselves' – and on oracle-mongers and seers; then they set about doing what they could to replenish the fleet, build up resources, and keep a firm watch on their allies, and appointed a commission of *probouloi* to consider what needed to be done. The story of resilience has begun.

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INDEX

⊥ GENERAL

Acarnania: 127, 148, 163, 196, 212, 252
Achaea: 152
Achilles: 14, 15, 17, 19, 240, 251
Acrae: 242
Acragas: 35, 148, 149, 173, 188, 197
Actium, battle of (31 BCE): 217
Adriatic Sea: 99, 132
Aegean Sea: 23, 27, 33
Aegina: 122–3, 128, 134, 192, 195
Aegium: 152
Aegospotami, battle of (405 BCE): 160
Aelius Aristides: 118
Aeneas: 232
Aeneas Tacticus: 171
Aeschylus: 16–17, 211, 212, 217–19, 225–6, 250
Aetolia: 119, 196
Agamemnon: 7, 112, 117, 215–16
Agatharchus, Syracusan commander: 132, 220
Agis II, king of Sparta: 124, 137, 170
Ajax: 167, 216
Akraion Lepas: 241–2
Alcaeus: 239
Alcibiades: 1–11, 14, 27, 28, 30, 34, 35, 101, 105, 106, 110, 121–2, 124, 137, 139, 151, 165, 174, 176, 195, 196, 211, 235, 256
Alexarchus, Corinthian commander: 126
Alyzia: 147
Ambracia: 93, 102, 110, 133, 146, 150, 198, 226
Amphilochia: 119
Amphipolis: 3, 29, 107, 123
Anactorium: 147
Anapus, river: 99, 129, 241, 243–5; battle of, 415 BCE, 2, 28, 100, 110
Anaxagoras: 184
Arcadia: 125–6, 196, 198–9
Archers: 27, 149, 157, 163, 169, 196, 197, 205, 221, 237
Archidamus, king of Sparta: 25, 31, 123, 124, 140, 203, 204; Archidamian War, 120–1, 122, 127, 135, 225
Archonides: 92
Arginusae, battle of (406 BCE): 226
Argos: 19, 126–7, 134, 194, 195
Ariston, Corinthian sea-captain: 156, 159, 221
Aristophanes: 181, 232
Aristotle: 14, 16, 17, 33, 122, 144, 260–1
Arrian: 260
Artabanus: 211
Artas/Artos: 150–1
As(s)inaria: 249, 253
Assinarus river: 30, 240, 250–2
Assyrians: 211
Athenagoras, Syracusan politician: 2, 9, 22, 27, 34, 159, 165
Athens: Sicilian alliances, 150–1; as 'tyrant city', 15–16; decision to go to Sicily, 415 BCE, 6–8, 26; earlier interest in Sicily, 150–1; expedition of 427–424 BCE, 3, 4, 25, 150, 207; fighting in 415/4 BCE, 1–3; resilience after 413 BCE, 6, 135–6, 139, 204, 262; similarities with Syracuse *see* Syracuse; war aims, ⊥, 91–2, 110, 143, 210–11
Attica: 20, 25, 124–5, 137–8
Autocleides: 184

Blockade: 98–9, 131
Blood: 251
Boeotia: 119, 125, 145, 169, 172, 193, 199
boulē: 107–8, 118, 142
Brasidas, Spartan general: 29, 141, 203
Bruttium: 151

Cacyparis river: 245
Calabria: 132
Callistratus, Athenian cavalry commander: 252
Camarina: 3, 35, 101, 148, 149, 188, 197, 244; alliance with Athens, 150; Camarina debate (6.75–88), 3, 11, 15, 197
Cameiros: 194
Carthage: 32, 34, 35, 198
Carystos: 193

Catana: 116, 149, 164–5, 181, 196, 201, 218, 238, 241–4, 252
Caulonia: 132
Cavalry: 8, 27–8, 31, 97, 99, 102, 111, 149, 158, 166, 185, 196–7, 231, 237, 241, 252
Centoripa: 148
Ceos: 193
Cephallenia: 147, 194
Chalcidice: 107
Chalcis: 143, 198
Charicles, Athenian commander: 126–7, 124
Chios: 126, 144, 193
Choerades: 150
Cicero, M. Tullius: 254, 257
'Circle': 89–90, 93–4, 96, 99, 102, 130, 167, 201
Cleandridas, father of Gylippus: 90
Clearchus: 17
Cleon, Athenian politician: 15, 34, 105, 106, 109, 116, 213
Cleonymus, Athenian: 173
Cnidos: 147
Colonisation: 2, 22, 28, 230, 235, 238, 239
Conon, Athenian commander: 147–8, 152–3
Corcyra: 33 n. 76, 127, 135, 147, 162, 194, 196, 240
Corinth: 1, 15, 90, 93, 101–4, 110, 114, 118, 120–2, 124–6, 128, 147, 149, 151–6, 159, 194, 198–9, 209, 211, 255; Corinthians' characterisation of Athens and Sparta at 1.69–70, 25, 31–2, 120, 128, 141
Corinthian Gulf: 15, 21, 25, 125, 146, 151–4, 205, 211, 258
Coriolanus: 164
Corn-supply: 22–3, 138
Cornford, Francis: 16
Crassus, M. Licinius: 259
Cratippus: 6
Crete: 143, 196
Croton: 154, 182
Ctesias: 17
Cyana river: 99
Cyrene: 182, 185, 259
Cythera: 134–5, 177, 194

Dascon: 186
de Jong, Irene: 22
Decelea: 2, 20, 22–3, 31, 104, 121, 124–5, 135–9, 141, 163, 175
Delium, battle of (424 BCE): 120, 209, 234, 257
Delphi: 123
Demetrius, comic poet: 150
Democracy: 2, 8–9, 10, 22, 31, 33–4, 117, 178, 188, 199, 239, 245, 251
Demon: 92
Demosthenes, Athenian general: 21, 24–5, 28–30, 101, 111, 114–6, 119, 126–8, 134–6, 142, 143, 146–8, 150, 154–5, 158, 162–81, 184, 185, 195, 196, 200, 220, 226, 234, 239–54, 257–8
Demosthenes, fourth-century politician and orator: 116
Dido: 257
Dieitrephes, Athenian commander: 142–3
Diodorus Siculus: 19, 34 n. 70, 35 n. 80, 156, 164, 184, 231, 243–4, 253, 254, 255, 259
Diodotus: 106
Dioi: 136
Diomedes: 167, 216
Dion of Syracuse: 184
Dionysius I of Syracuse: 33–5
Dionysius II of Syracuse: 184
Dionysius of Halicarnassus: 13, 18, 19 n. 49, 36, 108, 203, 217, 220, 221, 223
Diphilus, Athenian: 153
Doctors, military: 117
'Dolphins': 161
Dorians: 100, 101, 151, 172, 181, 192–6, 198
Dorieus: 182
Dryopes: 193
Ducetius: 92
Duris of Samos: 17

Eccritus, Spartan commander: 125, 198
Eclipses: 29, 174, 182–5
Egesta: 1–2, 148, 197; alliance with Athens, 116, 149; and Athenian war-aims, 110, 143; and Selinus, 1, 91, 197; pressure on Athens to intervene in 417–415 BCE, 1, 91; support in fighting, 2, 80, 196–7; wealth and funding of Athens, 2, 26–7, 180
Egypt: 261

Eleusinian Mysteries: 2, 126
Enslavement: 20, 23, 194, 208, 210–11, 214, 224, 232–3, 247, 248; *see also* slaves
Ephorus of Cyme, historian: 231
Epicerdes of Cyrene: 259
Epidaurus Limera: 123, 134
Epipolae: 11, 90, 93–100, 103, 125, 129, 131, 162, 166–73, 174–5, 185, 187
Erectheus: 216
Erineus: 126, 152
Erineus river: 245, 248
Etna: 92
Etruscans: 112, 197; *see also* Tyrrhenians
Euboea: 22, 138, 170, 192, 260
Euesperides: 182
Euetion: 107
Euphemus, Athenian: 15, 193
Euripides: 12, 16 n. 44, 21, 110, 119, 259
Euripus channel: 143
Euryelus: 89, 90, 94, 95, 166, 172
Eurymedon, Athenian general: 4, 119–20, 128, 132, 135, 146, 148, 154, 155, 158, 162, 164, 168, 174, 177, 181, 184–6, 200, 220
Euthydemus, Athenian general: 118–20, 158, 160, 168, 174, 181, 200, 219–20
Eye-witnesses: 5, 100, 105, 170

Fear: 17, 23–4, 25, 32, 33, 106, 109, 191, 204, 208, 218, 236–7
Fireships: 187
Fraenkel, Eduard: 140

Gela: 35, 92, 101, 149, 158, 182, 194, 196, 197, 244
Gomme, A. W.: 6–7, 14
Gongylus, Corinthian commander: 92–3, 100, 102–3
Great Harbour: 11, 14, 18, 20, 21, 24, 25, 29, 89, 94–9, 112, 129–30, 133, 152, 157, 159, 162, 186, 217–26, 240, 249, 258
Gylippus, Spartan general: 3, 4, 19, 28, 30, *et passim*, esp. 88–104, 127–30, 149–50, 151, 202–3, 209–15, 242–3, 245, 254–5

Halicyae: 148
Hector: 15, 183, 209
Hegesander, Thespian commander: 125
Hellenica Oxyrhynchia: 6
Hellespont: 228
Helorus: 241, 245
Helots: 125, 135, 147, 194–5, 198, 225–6
Heracles: 194, 227
Herbita: 92
Hermocrates of Syracuse: 2, 5, 9, 30, 32, 33–5, 97, 100–1, 109, 111, 114, 127–9, 165, 169, 177, 182, 191–2, 198, 210, 214, 226–8, 238, 253–4
Herms: 2, 126
Herodotus: 7, 12, 14–18, 20, 23, 29, 121, 124–5, 144, 149, 165, 166, 171, 182, 190, 192, 215, 218–19, 221, 226, 237, 238, 247, 249, 260, 261
Hestiaea: 192
Hickes, Francis: 237
Himera: 34, 91, 92, 101, 102, 148, 188, 197, 198
Himeraion: 107
Hippocratic corpus: 7, 144, 257
Hipponax: 15 n. 37
Homer: 12, 14–17, 19, 26, 89, 112, 117, 167, 183, 186–7, 190, 216, 217, 219, 222, 225, 229, 230, 232, 237, 238, 240, 247, 251, 260–1
Hope: 23, 32, 132, 177, 210, 234, 253
Hyccara: 114
Hylias river: 154

Ialysos: 194
Iapyges: 163, 197
Ietae: 93
Iliou Persis: 230
Imbros: 192
Ionian Sea: 150
Ionian War: 122
Ionians: 100, 101, 151, 172, 191–3, 198

Javelin-men: 127, 149, 157, 158, 163, 196, 197, 205, 220, 221
Jebb, Sir Richard: 16
Josephus: 137

Kale Akte: 92

Labdalon: 89, 96
Laches, Athenian politician: 4, 150

Laconia: 123
Lamachus: 2, 3, 28, 29, 110, 164–5, 186
Laureion: 22–3, 138
Lechaeum: 125
Lemnos: 192
Leontini: 110, 143, 177, 228; alliance with Athens, 150
Letters: 105–9
Leucas: 92–3, 102, 198
Leucopetra: 154
Lindos: 194
Little Harbour: 90–1, 96, 98, 103, 104, 113, 129–30, 133, 155, 162
Locri, Epizephyrian: 90, 132
Lucania: 151
Lysander: 33, 112, 160
Lysimeleia: 186–7

Macaulay, Thomas Babington: vii
Macedonia: 107, 192, 244
Malaria: 174
Manetho, historian: 164
Mantinea: 195, 196; battle of (418 BCE), 4, 126
Marathon, battle of (490 BCE): 15, 229
Medes: 211
Megara: 119, 122–3, 195
Megara Hyblaea: 101, 132
Melos: 23–4, 135, 144; Melian dialogue (5.85–113), 11, 18, 23–4, 30–1 n. 72, 114, 177, 210
Menander, Athenian commander: 118–20, 158, 160, 168, 174, 181, 200, 219–20
Menelaus: 216
Mercenaries: 107, 113–14, 125, 133, 136, 175, 179–80, 195–9, 207
Messapia: 150
Messenia: 25 n. 59, 147, 194–5; Messenians in Naupactus, 147, 194–5; Messenians in Pylos, 123, 195
Messina: 91, 149, 197, 198; Straits of: 91
Metapontum: 150–1, 162, 163, 196
Methymna: 193
Metics: 206–7
Miletus: 11
Morale: 20, 30–1, 89, 93, 97, 100, 104, 121, 154, 173, 174, 181–2, 188, 201, 204, 210, 212, 218, 219, 226, 227, 230, 242; *see also Index 2*, psychological interest
Mycalessus: 135–6, 142–6, 149, 150
Mytilene: 94; Mytilenean debate (3.36–50), 106

Naupactus: 120–1, 125–6, 147, 181, 194–5, 196
Naxos: 116, 149, 165, 196, 238
neodamōdeis: 125, 198
Nicias: 1–10, 19, 20, 22–31, 34 *et passim*, esp. 104–21, 173–81, 202–9, 215–16, 234–9, 252–7; his illness, 27, 109, 117, 168, 230, 234, 236, 240; his piety, 29, 118, 183–4, 234, 236, 256–7; sounding Spartan, 96; style of speaking, 22–3, 31, 108–9, 111, 115, 117–18, 175–6, 179, 180, 202–3, 215, 234–6; sources of intelligence within city, 34, 111, 155, 175–80, 226, 228, 255; wealth, 255
Nicon, Theban commander: 125

Odysseus: 15, 19, 167
Oeta, Mt: 193
Oligarchs and oligarchy: 12, 22, 33, 199, 239, 251
Olympieion: 99, 158, 186
Oropus: 125, 138

Paeans: 20, 172, 195–6, 231, 249
Panormus: 126
Parnes, Mt: 124, 125
Passwords: 171
Peisistratid excursus (6.54–9): 11
Perdiccas: 107
Pericles: 6–9, 15, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 34, 106, 107, 109, 114–16, 123, 128, 137, 140, 177, 189, 202–11, 215–16, 231, 235, 236, 239, 256, 258
Persia: 15, 17, 23, 144, 145, 153, 182, 211, 212, 214, 228, 237, 250; Persian Wars, 128, 182, 190; *see also* Xerxes
Petra: 154
Phaeax, Athenian: 150
Pheia: 147
Pherecrates, comic poet: 161
Philistus, Syracusan historian: 93, 100, 248, 253
Philochorus, Athenian historian: 183
Phormio: 25, 29, 141, 148, 202, 205, 215

Phrynichus, tragic poet: 11
Phylarchus, historian: 17–18, 142, 230, 232
Piraeus: 1–2, 18, 20, 31, 33, 138, 159, 262
Pity: 17, 30, 237
Plataea: 122, 193–4, 259; battle of (490 BCE), 15, 102, 144, 206; Plataean debate (3.52–68), 122, 209, 217
Plato: 183, 257
Pleistoanax, king of Sparta: 120, 179
Plemmyrion: 28, 98–9, 103, 112, 113, 127, 131–2, 157, 166, 186, 200
Plutarch: vii, 12, 17, 18, 21, 93, 95, 100, 119, 137, 158, 159, 160, 162, 164, 169, 170–1, 180, 183–4, 185, 217, 221, 227, 230, 236, 249, 251, 253–5, 259, 261–2
Point Iapygia: 150
Pollux, grammarian: 166
Polyaenus: 178
Polyanthes, Corinthian commander: 152–3
Polybius: 17–18, 137, 142, 230, 232
Potidaea: 122
proxenoi: 92, 150, 177
Pylos: 24–5, 123, 135, 137, 195, 203, 205, 218, 225, 252, 254
Pythen, Corinthian commander: 90, 220

Race: 190–2
Rhegium: 2, 27, 91, 154, 182, 197; alliance with Athens, 2, 91
Rhion: 126
Rhodes: 194, 196
Rhodope, Mt: 136
Rome: 35, 209

Salamis, battle of (480 BCE): 14–15, 17, 128, 145, 157, 171, 172, 190, 201, 206, 211, 212, 214, 215, 218–19, 221, 225–6, 228, 240, 249
Samos: 17, 22, 33, 182, 239
Sargeus, Sicyonian commander: 126
Scione: 144
Scirphondas, Boeotarch: 145–6
Seers: 21, 183–4, 262
Selinus: ⊥, 33, 35, 91, 188; and Athenian war-aims, 91–2, 110, 143; and Egesta ⊥, 91; role in fighting, 92, 101, 148, 197
Sesostris: 164
Sicanus: 173, 182, 220
'Siceliots': 149, 169, 196, 199, 207
Sicels: 92, 93–4, 101, 147, 148, 149, 169, 196–7, 198, 199, 238, 243, 245
Sicinnus: 228
Sicyon: 126, 199
Simonides: 15
Slaves: 10, 113–14, 137–9, 144, 178, 224, 225, 252, 255, 257, 259; *see also* enslavement
Slingers: 127, 163, 194, 221, 237
Sophocles: 14, 22
Sparta: as characterised by Corinthians (1.69–70), 31–2, 96; in Archidamian War, 24–5, 107, 122, 135, 140, 194, 258; in 415/4 BCE, 1–2, 89, 104, 121–2, 165; in 413, 120–5, 254; in years after 413, 23, 33
Sphacteria: 24, 111, 119, 135, 150, 226, 258
'Spit': 186
Stade: 125
stasis: 22, 139, 173, 188, 191, 196, 240
Stilbides: 183
Stoa Poikile: 15
Sunium: 138
Swimming: 145
Sybaris: 154, 182
Sybota, battle of (433 BCE): 25, 205, 211, 218, 220
Syracuse: and Egesta, ⊥; and Selinus, ⊥; constitution, 26–7, 31, 33–4; in 415/4 BCE, 2–3 politics at, 253; quarries, 21, 30, 254, 257–9; similarities with Athens, 9, 31–2, 34, 127, 129, 182, 188, 245; *stasis* in, 34, 177; *et passim*

Tacitus: vii
Taenaron: 125
Tanagra: 143
Taras: 89, 90, 150
Taxiarchs: 200
Temenitis: 89, 96
Thapsus: 181
Thebes: ⊥, 122, 145, 193–4, 199, 217, 260
Themistocles: 30, 128, 215, 228, 238
Theognis: 137

Theopompus: 6, 192
Thermopylae, battle of (480 BCE): 171, 240, 247, 249
Thespiae: 125, 199
Thrace: 3, 5, 23, 107, 135–7, 142–6
Thrasybulus, Athenian: 172
Thucydides: and religion, 16, 29, 121–3, 124, 187, 234–5, 237, 242, 256–7, 261; book-divisions, 19–20; composition of history, 3–6; concern with future audience, 12–14; exile, 3, 5; gathering information, 4–5, 170; judgement of Sicilian expedition, 4, 6–10; publication or circulation of History, 5, 10–12; ranking of explanations, 7, 12, 191–2; speeches, 108 *and see Index 2* 'speeches, pre-battle'; travels, 5
Thurii: 89, 90, 151, 154, 163, 196
Timaeus of Tauromenium, historian: 150, 253, 254
Tolstoy, Leo: 167
Torture: 255
Tragedy: 16–18, 22, 23, 230, 261
Tribes: 216
Trierarchs: 131, 215–16
Trogilus: 94, 99
Troy and Trojan War: 14–15, 26, 190, 232–3, 251, 261; *see also* Homer
Tyranny: 15–16, 101; at Syracuse, 33–4, 184, 254; tyrant city: *see* Athens
Tyrrhenians: 186–7, 197; *see also* Etruscan
Tzetzes, Ioannes: 36

Valla, Lorenzo: 36, 119–20

Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Tycho von: 22
Xenon, Theban commander: 125
Xenophon: 6, 10, 11, 23, 34 n. 70, 175, 238, 260
Xerxes: 16, 20, 112, 208, 211, 218, 221, 228, 233, 237, 252, 260

Zacynthus: 147, 194
Zancle: 182, 198; *see also* Messina

2 LANGUAGE, STYLE, AND NARRATIVE TECHNIQUE

Abstractions: 13, 153, 159
Adverb qualifying noun: 153, 172, 205, 222, 224
Alliteration: 171, 243, 244, 249, 250
Anaphora: 220
Asyndeton: 224, 228, 235, 250
Audience address: 203, 206–7, 208, 238
Auditory effects: 18, 21, 167, 171, 218, 222, 225, 230–1

Catalogues: 190–1
Chiastic arrangement: 101, 111, 149, 192, 207, 224, 254
Closure: 19–20, 145, 259–60
Conditional clauses: 127, 154, 165, 178, 180–1, 186, 206, 212, 222
Co-ordinate clauses accumulated: 113, 158, 160, 171
Counterfactual speculation: 164, 165

Delay, narrative: 96, 103, 117, 120, 125, 130, 169, 177, 220, 241, 251

Expressions of time: 168, 244, 247

Focalisation: 22, 154, 218, 219
Free indirect discourse: 22, 140

Gliding transitions: 120

Hearing syntax in different ways: vii, 107, 111, 136, 140, 151, 165, 169, 213, 215, 228, 246, 252, 256
Hyperbole: 232, 260

'I know thee who thou art' construction: 132
Iambic rhythm: 122, 260–1
Imagery: athletic and competitive, 30–1, 189–90, 203–4, 208–9, 210, 214–15, 221, 222, 224, 250–1, 254; enslavement, 224; erotic, ⊥; medical, 135, 136, 139, 141, 144, 145, 244; military, 244
Impersonal verbs: 13, 101, 117, 134, 231
Indirect questions: 90, 151, 184, 215, 247
'Introduction' of characters: 124

Linguistic difficulty: vii, 36, 139–40, 171

'Nearly episodes': 94–5
Numbers: 145, 149, 158, 162–3, 179, 185, 226–7, 233, 249

Opening: 19
Oracular tone: 184
Oral performance: 10–11, 13, 14, 140, 256
Oxymoron: 163

Paronomasia: 117
Participle: conditional, 186, 206; dominant (*ab urbe condita*), 141; future, with ἄν, 213
Pathos: 18, 19, 96, 118, 135, 142–6, 149, 204, 230, 235, 240, 253
Plural verb with neuter plural subject: 197
Polyptoton: 172, 243, 244, 259, 261
Polysyllables: 102
Progressive correction: 22, 193
Proverbs: 137, 214, 233, 239, 261
Psychological interest: 30–1, 121, 129, 132, 139, 147, 154, 161, 162, 167, 170, 210, 212, 218, 219, 222, 226, 230; *see also Index* ⊥, morale
Purpose clauses: 97, 120, 122, 128, 189, 209

Relative attraction: 128, 187, 213
Result clauses: 153
Revision in stride: *see* progressive correction
Rhetorical tropes and clichés: ancestors' virtues and achievements, 216; fighting for freedom, 214; forces gathered against us, 108; 'I have served the community well', 117; look at our strength, 204, 206; 'my adversaries are powerful', 115; pleasure and usefulness, 116; the city is in danger, 234; this is the decisive battle, 171; we are well prepared, 204–5; your families, 214, 217; 'you have beaten this enemy before', 202, 207; 'you know all this already', 114–15
Ring composition: 126, 141, 173
Rounding-off formulae: 146, 261–2

Sense-construction: 91, 95, 103, 130, 132, 170, 232, 233
'Speaking names': 159
Speeches: pre-battle, 20, 201–3, 205, 209–10, 214, 215–16, 234
Symmetry between Greek and Syracusan theatres: 20, 124, 125, 138, 140, 149, 150, 152, 154, 171

Technical phraseology: 112
Tense:
  Aorists: 103, 207, 224, 242, 243, 252; aorist subjunctive with μή, 111; in pluperfect sense, 155, 195, 199, 201, 219, 229, 243, 245, 258
  Combinations of tenses: 102, 104, 120, 123, 125, 133, 145, 152, 161, 171, 181, 184, 185, 191, 219, 223, 246, 252
  Imperfects: 97, 125, 142, 184; conative, 228; continuing action, 104, 133, 155, 169, 171, 181, 191, 242; inceptive, 97, 107, 160, 169, 186, 229, 241, 244, 246, 249; preliminary to main action, 129, 142–3, 152; repetitive, 105, 122, 123, 219, 258; scene-setting, 102, 130, 161, 168, 171, 185, 219, 246
  Perfect: 169, 258; conveying continuing result of past action, 187, 200, 222, 226
  Pluperfect: 97, 122, 129, 139, 168, 224, 233; as repositioning the narrative, 103, 132, 137, 164, 171, 184, 251; other tenses used when English would use pluperfect, 91, 100, 128, 155, 195, 199, 201, 219, 229, 243, 245, 258
  Present: 90, 116, 120, 134, 154, 198, 207, 223, 245; historic, 89, 93, 130, 145, 159, 162, 169, 183, 185, 219, 242, 244, 245, 246, 249, 250; in lively predictions of the future, 189
Topographical description: viii, 5, 12, 24 n. 57, 89–90, 94, 96, 98, 152, 167–8, 186, 240

Variation of construction: 99, 106, 113, 115, 118, 127, 134, 136, 154, 176, 182–3, 187, 189, 199, 200, 227, 250
Verbs of hindrance or prevention: 102, 187
Verbs of suspicion: 181
Visuality: 18, 21, 162, 167, 185, 217–19, 225, 230–2, 248, 250, 251

Year-endings: 124

3 GREEK

ἀγών, ἀγώνισμα, ἀγωνισμός: 30–1, 182, 187, 189–90, 199–200, 202–4, 208–10, 215, 217, 220–1, 222, 223, 227, 250, 254
ἀθυμία: 31, 128, 132, 188, 201, 234
αἰγιαλός: 229
αἰσθάνομαι: 93, 180, 231, 245
αἰωρέομαι: 236
ἀκρίβεια: 114
ἄλλοι τε καί: 155
ἀμηχανέω: 179
ἄν . . . ἄν: 104
ἄν + future participle: 213
ἄν + optative: 160
ἄν + subjunctive: 144
ἀναγκαῖος: 137, 220, 248
ἀνάγκη: 113–14, 137, 179, 191, 194, 196, 199, 247
ἀνακαλέω: 215–16, 222, 228
ἀναρρώνυμι: 30, 173, 174
ἀνεπίτακτος: 216
ἀντιβολία: 231–2
ἀντιμίμησις: 212
ἀντιτέχνησις: 221
ἄξιος, ἀξία, ἀξιόω: 117–18, 235–7, 255
ἀπιστέω: 139
ἁπλοος: 153, 201
ἁπλοῦς: 153
ἀποικοδομέω: 227
ἀποκινδυνεύω: 212, 213
ἀπόνοια: 213
ἀπορία: 31, 105, 110, 115, 170, 177, 179, 180, 200, 231, 243, 249
ἀποτολμάω: 212
ἀποφάργνυμι: 229
ἀπροσδόκητος: 143
ἀρρωστία: 30, 174
ἀρχαιολογέω: 215, 216–17
ἀσφάλεια: 116
ἄτοπος: 145
αὐτομολία: 114
αὔχημα: 212, 233

βοάω, βοή: 179, 217, 222, 224, 232, 234

γεγωνίσκω: 234
γιγνώσκω: 176

δάκρυ: 232
δέ positioning: 131
δή: 122, 124, 135
δηλόω: 108
διά + gen.: 107, 132
διάβροχος: 112
διαμάχομαι: 206
διαναυμαχέω: 201
διαπολεμέω: 115–16
διατρίβω: 164, 175, 180, 181
διαφθείρω: 251
διαφρέω: 148
διαψύχω: 112
διέκπλους: 156
δυσανασχετέω: 225

ἐάω: 178
εἰ + future indicative: 105–6, 201
εἴ τις ἄλλος: 129
εἰσὶν οἵ: 110, 113, 172
ἑκασταχόθεν: 128
ἔκπληξις/ἐκπλήσσω: 17–18, 31, 129, 163, 215, 217, 222, 225, 260
ἐκτρυχόω: 177
ἑκὼν εἶναι: 246
ἔλπις: 132, 134, 173, 204, 212; *see also Index 1*, hope
ἐμφράσσω: 152
ἐν τοῖς: 125, 131, 136, 224
ἐνεῖδον: 155, 204
ἐνθυμέομαι: 123
ἐπέρχομαι: 199, 208
ἐπέχω: 150
ἐπί + acc.: 158, 199
ἐπί + dat.: 97–8, 125, 158, 199, 200, 204, 217
ἐπί + gen.: 91, 135, 154, 158, 242, 244
ἐπιβολή: 205, 209
ἐπικρεμάννυμι: 233
ἐπιπέμπω: 117
ἐπιπληρόω: 115

ἐπιρρώνυμι: 30, 93, 104, 120
ἐπίσταμαι: 178
ἐπιστολή: 106
ἐπωτίδες: 153, 156, 205
ἔστιν ὧν: 110, 143, 222
εὔελπις: 21, 32
εὐκαθαίρετος: 122
εὐπρεπής: 194

ἤδη: 116–17, 161, 187–8, 195, 243, 246, 250
ἥλιοι: 257
ἤν + subjunctive: 200
ἡσσάομαι: 160
ἡσυχία: 32, 95–6, 110, 111, 159, 160, 197, 228, 229, 249

θαρσέω: 180
θαυμάζω: 189, 207
θειασμός: 182–3

ἰδέα: 144, 247
ἰσομοιρία: 233, 236
ἰσχυρίζομαι: 180
ἰσχυρός: 227

καὶ . . . δέ: 189
καὶ γάρ: 118, 166, 177, 178
καιρός: 94, 100, 101, 209, 216
κατά + acc.: 123–4
καταδαμάζω: 247
κατακόπτω: 144–5
καταλαμβάνω: 151
κατάπληξις/καταπλήσσω: 31, 129, 163, 215, 227, 237–8, 261
καταράσσω: 102
κατατραυματίζω: 161
κατήφεια: 232
κελεύω: 148, 183, 220
κοῖλος: 250–1
κολούω: 211
κρατέω: 109
κυβερνήτης: 159

λαμπρός: 20, 162, 187, 216, 225, 233, 259, 260
λῃστεύω: 123
λιθολόγοι: 188, 201

μελλονικιάω: 181
μέλλω: 173, 181, 183, 184
μέν positioning: 129, 156
μὲν οὖν: 251

μέρος τι: 146
μετάμελος: 188
μή + double negative: 143
μή + participle: 178, 206

ναυτικόν: 190
νεωτερίζω: 257
νικάω: 154, 161
νομίζω: 256

ξυμπορίζω: 127
ξυμφορά: 195, 204, 206, 208, 236–7
ξυσταδόν: 247
ξύστασις: 223

οἰμωγή: 225
οἶχομαι: 103, 106, 132, 173
ὄλεθρος: 136, 144
ὁλκάς: 104, 120, 121
ὁλοφυρμός: 224, 231–2
ὁμοιότροπος: 188
ὅπως + subjunctive or optative: 120
ὅπως ἄν + optative: 209
ὅτι τάχος: 166

οὐδὲ γάρ: 110, 166, 210
οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ: 258
ὄχλος: 204, 205, 233

πάθος: 146, 150
πανταχόσε: 164
πανωλεθρία: 261
παράλογος: 139, 140, 188, 204, 226
παρασκευή: 162, 206, 212, 213
πᾶς τις: 201, 221, 250
πείθω, πείθομαι: 159, 228
πειράω: 111
περιίστημι: 222
περισταδόν: 247
πιέζω: 139
πίμπλημι: 232
πλοῖον: 104, 200
ποιέω: 101
πολίχνη: 99
πονέω: 158
πρὶν δή: 159, 225
προθυμέομαι: 254
προκόπτω: 190
πρός + acc.: 98, 136, 174
πρός + gen.: 181
πρόσφορος: 205
πρότερον ἤ + subjunctive: 206
πρόφασις: 1, 25, 114

ῥώμη: 30, 120, 122, 164, 173, 208, 205–6, 235–6

-σις formations: 99, 100, 113, 133, 153, 159, 166
σκοπέω: 223
στενοχωρία: 155, 157, 171, 184, 257–8
σφάζω: 251
σφάλλω: 211, 212, 215
σχήσω: 155

τε as connective: 103–4, 138, 157, 207, 250
τε positioning: 157
τέως: 206–7
τοι: 235
τόλμα: 128–9, 141
τρυχόω: 141, 177
τυγχάνω: 98, 130, 183, 238–9

ὑπομένω: 246
ὑποφεύγω: 232

φαῦλος: 236
φθόνος: 237
φιλονικία/φιλονεικία: 139, 140, 222, 223
φιλοτιμία: 139
φόβος: 244; *see also Index 1*, fear
φόνος: 252
φυλάσσω: 120

χαλεπός: 115
χράομαι: 146
χρήματα: 131

ψυχαγωγέω: 18

ὡς + optative: 221
ὥστε introducing sentence: 99