

PLATO
GORGIAS

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GORGIAS

A Revised Text
with Introduction and Commentary

BY
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PREFACE

THE notion of producing a commentary on the *Gorgias* took root in my mind when at the outbreak of the last war I found myself lecturing on it to undergraduates who were soon to be soldiers. The circumstances of the time brought sharply home both to me and to my audience the relevance of this dialogue to the central issues, moral and political, of our own day—a relevance which modern readers perhaps feel the more directly because here Plato's case is not yet encumbered with all the metaphysical baggage of the *Republic*. Of this relationship Victorian editors like Thompson and Lodge naturally had no inkling. Nor did their commentaries provide even the minimum historical background which is essential if the student is to perceive both the resemblance and the difference between Plato's situation and that of the intellectual today. In other respects also their editions were, inevitably, out of date, as well as out of print. But they have hitherto found no English successor; indeed, no serious commentary on the *Gorgias* has appeared in any language for the past fifty years.

War-time duties made it impossible for the time being to proceed with the idea, and after the war it had to be postponed in favour of more urgent commitments. When at last I was free to return to it, I was disconcerted to find that Burnet's *apparatus* provided no adequate basis for a modern edition: not only had account to be taken of the papyri and of W (which in the *Gorgias* Burnet had virtually ignored), but F proved to have been gravely misreported, and the claims of the minor manuscripts (usually lumped together by Burnet as 'scr. recc.') demanded investigation, as did the exceptionally rich indirect tradition. This work, which consumed much time, has led me to give more space to textual matters than I had originally intended, and more, I fear, than some of my readers will think justified. I am conscious that very few of the textual problems I have discussed affect our understanding of Plato's thought; and I do not forget the remark of Henry Sidgwick that 'it is much more important for ordinary men to learn to think correctly about historical and philosophical subjects than about philological'. Nevertheless it

seemed in this case worth while that someone should re-examine the evidence for the text and should then indicate his reasons for preferring one reading to another—a thing that has not been systematically done for the *Gorgias* since Stallbaum.¹ Those who find such minutiae unrewarding will, I trust, practise the art of skipping.

A list of the books and articles which I have most frequently found useful appears elsewhere in this volume. But I must record here my gratitude to a number of younger Oxford colleagues: to David Lewis for advice on historical questions; to Philippa Foot for help with the appendix on Socrates, Calicles, and Nietzsche; to Gwilym Owen and John Gould, who made valuable suggestions on individual passages; and especially to Donald Russell, who read the whole of the commentary in typescript and saved me from a variety of errors. It is also a pleasant duty to thank Richard Bluck, M. C. Stokes, and Father H. D. Saffrey, O.P., who were good enough to inspect manuscripts for me in Paris, Vienna, Rome, and Madrid; the Association Guillaume Budé, who generously put at my disposal their photographs of W and Y; the Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes, who had several manuscripts microfilmed for my use; the Council of the Hellenic Society, for permission to incorporate part of an article which appeared in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*; and finally, Dr. Paul Maas and Dr. Richard Walzer, without whose vigilant proof-reading this book would contain more blunders than it does.

¹ How widely the opinions of two first-rate scholars can still diverge on the text of Plato may be seen by comparing Theiler's edition of the *Gorgias* with that of Burnet. Neither of them, alas, is accompanied by a commentary which might explain the divergence and relate it to basic principles.

INTRODUCTION

I. THE DIALOGUE

i. SUBJECT AND STRUCTURE

IN our medieval manuscripts, and in the catalogue quoted by Diogenes Laertius (3. 59), the *Gorgias* bears the sub-title ἡ περὶ ῥητορικῆς.¹ This is formally correct, in the sense that the whole debate arises out of the question 'What is ῥητορικὴ?' (449 cd), just as the debate in the *Laches* arises from the question 'What is ἀνδρεία?' and that in the *Charmides* from the question 'What is σωφροσύνη?'. But its inadequacy as a description of the *purpose* (σκοπός) of the dialogue was already recognized by the Neoplatonic commentators. Olympiodorus (p. 3. 6 Norvin) defined the σκοπός of the *Gorgias* as περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν ἠθικῶν διαλεχθῆναι τῶν φερουσῶν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, 'to discuss the ethical postulates required for social well-being'; and the anonymous author of an *Introduction to Plato's Philosophy*, whose source is probably Proclus, took a similar view (c. 22, in *Platonis Dialogi*, ed. C. F. Hermann, vi. 215). They thought, in fact, that the dialogue is primarily concerned with the moral basis of politics. And this is substantially the opinion of many modern critics.² It is supported by Socrates' emphatic warning to Polus at 472 c that what is now at issue between them is nothing less than the question ὅστις τε εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν καὶ ὅστις μὴ, by his equally emphatic warning to Callicles at 487 e and 500 c that the choice is between two opposed ways of life, ποῖόν τινα χρὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα, or ὅντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν, and by the conclusion of the dialogue, where this opposition is reaffirmed and Socrates appeals to Callicles with the words ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενος ἀκολούθησον ἐνταῦθα, οἱ ἀφικόμενος εὐδαιμονήσεις καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας (527 c).

¹ These sub-titles are as old as the 'tetralogical' edition of Plato, and some of them are older: Aristotle already quotes the *Menexenus* by the sub-title ὁ ἐπιτάφιος (*Rhet.* 1415^b30). But despite R. G. Hoerber, *Phronesis*, ii (1957), 10 ff., the systematic sub-titling is surely Alexandrine at earliest.

² Cf. Pohlenz, 142, 151; Wilamowitz, i. 234; Taylor, 106, 'Life and the way it should be lived, not the value of rhetoric, is the real theme'; Festugière, 382, 'Le vrai sujet est de savoir quelle est la vie que doit mener un homme digne de ce nom.'

This does not mean, however, that the original question about rhetoric has been either forgotten or disposed of. The two themes of *ῥητορική* and *εὐδαιμονία* are, in fact, interlaced throughout the dialogue, somewhat as the themes of *ῥητορική* and *ἔρως* are interlaced in the *Phaedrus*,¹ but more logically and more skilfully. The conversation with Gorgias is ostensibly concerned with the first theme alone; but the moral issue is implicit in the definition offered by Gorgias at 454 b, and his failure to take a consistent line on that issue leads to his dialectical defeat (see commentary on 459 c 6–460 a 4). In the conversation with Polus the theme of *ῥητορική* forms a framework for that of *εὐδαιμονία*. Socrates' definition of rhetoric (stated, but not at this point proved) naturally provokes Polus to raise at 466 b the question of the *power* exercised by *ῥήτορες*, which in turn leads Socrates to formulate his distinction between true and apparent will and the ethical paradoxes which result from it. The question of *εὐδαιμονία*, introduced by Polus in rejecting these paradoxes at 470 d, dominates the remainder of this discussion down to 480 a, where Socrates applies the results obtained to the valuation of *ῥητορική*. Then the great *ῥῆσις* of Callicles (482 c–486 d) lays bare the fundamental issues involved in both themes: the question of *εὐδαιμονία* appears as a choice between "natural" and "conventional" good; the question about the nature and value of *ῥητορική* is seen to involve a choice between the *πρακτικὸς βίος* as lived by fifth-century politicians and the *θεωρητικὸς βίος* as lived by Socrates. The latter choice depends on the former, which is accordingly taken up first; the discussion of it culminates in the dialectical proof that pleasure and good are not interchangeable terms (495 e–499 b). With this Socrates has secured a basis for his distinction between true and false *τέχναι*, and thus for the definition of *ῥητορική* which he offered at 463 d; and he is now in a position to revert, at 500 a, to that definition and its consequences. After an illustrative digression on the social function of music and tragedy, the question of the value of *ῥητορική* as *actually practised* by the "Four Men" is raised by Callicles at 503 c. In order to answer it, Socrates must first complete his disproof of hedonism by establishing the true function of the statesman (503 d–515 b). He then disposes of the claims of the Four Men

¹ See Robin, Introduction to the *Phaedrus* (Budé edition), § iii; Hackforth, Introduction to his translation of the *Phaedrus*, 8 ff.

(515 b–517 a) and of Athenian *ρήτορες* in general (517 b–521 a), and the outcome of the long debate is that virtually only one man in Athens knows what true statesmanship is (521 d). There follow the antithetic pictures of the Human and the Divine Assize, and the final *προτρεπτικός λόγος* which links in successive sentences the two themes of *ρήτορική* and *εὐδαιμονία*. If we call the former *a* and the latter *b*, the interlacing may be displayed schematically as follows:

Socrates and Gorgias

a (*b*) 449 c–461 b

Socrates and Polus

a 461 b–466 a
b 466 a–480 a
a 480 a–481 b

Socrates and Callicles

b + *a* 482 c–486 d
b 486 d–500 a
a 500 a–503 d
b 503 d–515 b
a 515 b–521 a
b 521 a–526 d
a + *b* 526 d–527 e.

Does such an analysis imply that the dialogue lacks ‘unity of plot’? I do not think so. The interweaving is dynamic, not external and mechanical; each of the long excursions into theme *b* brings the reader back to theme *a* with a deeper insight into its problem.¹ The movement is not that of a pendulum but that of an ascending spiral, where at each fresh turn of the road we can see farther than before. Moreover, the two themes are far

¹ This point is well made by Jacqueline Duchemin, ‘Remarques sur la composition du *Gorgias*’, *Rev. des Ét. Gr.* lvi (1943), 271–4, 282. She goes on to claim that the dialogue has a third subject, namely the defence of Socrates. But to put this side by side with the other two is surely to confuse two different methods of analysis. The desire to vindicate his master may have been one of Plato’s *motives* for composing the dialogue (though I am inclined to doubt it, see below, pp. 28 f.); but the vindication is in any case not an overt ‘theme’ in the sense in which I use the term.

more intimately connected than the English or even the Roman reader would naturally suppose. To the average modern Englishman 'rhetoric' means a distastefully emotional or showy way of talking; to the Roman of the imperial age it meant a traditional branch of education; to the contemporaries of Socrates it meant the practical art of influencing men's will through the spoken word. And in an age when books were still few, and newspapers no more dreamt of than cinema or television, the spoken word was the one effective medium of mass-communication.¹ Its mastery was in a democracy the royal road to power and also, in the last resort, the best guarantee of personal safety (as Callicles does not tire of pointing out, cf. 486 ab, 510 a, 511 a, 521 c, 522 c), since most Athenian politicians had sooner or later to defend themselves and their policy before a jury. "If you intend a boy to live with gods," said Antisthenes, "teach him philosophy; if with men, rhetoric."² Rhetoric was the Art of Success, and the term *ρήτωρ* was applied not only to a professor of the art, such as Gorgias, but also (and far more frequently) to its practitioners—politicians like Callicles (see note on 449 a 6). But by what standard shall we measure success? The standard of the men who rule and have ruled Athens, or the standard of Socrates? Once the question of 'the value of rhetoric' was put in this form, it could not be answered without raising the most general of all issues about human values, *ὅντινα χρή τρόπον ζῆν*.

The same dynamic movement, from the superficial to the fundamental, governs the choice of interlocutors and thus determines the *formal* structure of the dialogue. Formally, the *Gorgias* is made up of three distinct conversations—Socrates–Gorgias, Socrates–Polus, Socrates–Callicles—preceded by a brief prelude (447 a–449 c) and followed by an epilogue (523 a–527 e, the myth and *προτρεπτικός λόγος* of Socrates). This is a very unusual structure for a Platonic dialogue; as Friedländer points out (ii². 226), the nearest parallel (on a miniature scale) is the first book

¹ Cf. 454 b 6, and Aristotle's requirement that a city shall be of such a size that the whole community can hear an order given by word of mouth—*τίς γὰρ στρατηγὸς ἔσται τοῦ λίαν ὑπερβάλλοντος πλῆθους, ἢ τίς κήρυξ μὴ Στεντόρειος;* (*Pol.* 1326^b5). What this meant, for good and evil, to the ancient community we have begun to learn since the invention of radio and television. Hitler held that 'all the ordinary men and women who read the newspapers and listen to the wireless can be made to believe, and consequently to do, almost anything their rulers wish'. Gorgias exhibits the same confidence (452 de).

² Fr. 125 Mullach.

of the *Republic*, where Socrates successively discusses the same topic with Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus, and there is the same progressive widening of the issue. It has often been compared to the structure of a three-act play, but the resemblance does not go very deep. As we have seen, the movement of the dialogue is not rectilinear like that of most plays (and most philosophical treatises) but spiral: cf. 517 c 6 οὐδὲν πανόμεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ περιφερόμενοι. And, as we shall see below, the three interlocutors do not represent three distinct forces confronting Socrates, but three successive developments of the same force: Polus is the spiritual heir of Gorgias, Callicles the spiritual heir of Polus. Accordingly, each takes up the discussion where his predecessor broke down, carries it to a deeper level, and shows that it involves wider issues.¹ As a result, the three 'acts' are unequal in importance, as they are in length.

Taylor thought such an artificially formal structure a sign of immaturity (106 n. 3). But it is worth noticing that Plato has been at some pains to soften its artificiality. In the prelude we are introduced to all the speakers (and given a foretaste of Polus' quality); the transition from each conversation to the next is carefully motivated; and Gorgias does not vanish completely from the scene when he has said his say—he remains as a kind of unofficial chairman, who at 463 d asks Socrates for an explanation, and twice intervenes to prevent the debate being broken off at a crucial point (497 b, 506 a). Plato has also taken much trouble to avoid monotony by varying the pace, tone, and style of the discussion. Dry passages of dialectical argument are skilfully alternated with lively dramatic exchanges, and from time to time the reader's interest is rekindled by splendid displays of 'protreptic' eloquence like the great harangue of Callicles (482 c–486 d) and the delightful speech of Socrates on lifesaving (511 c–513 c). To the same end ingenious use is also made of special devices, such as the unedifying success-story of Archelaus (471 a–d), the apologue of the Watercarriers (493 a–494 a), the 'stay-mute' strike of Callicles at 505 c which enables Socrates to give a continuous exposition of his case, and the brilliantly juxtaposed pictures of the two Assizes. This does not seem like the achievement of a beginner in the new art of writing prose dialogue.

¹ Cf. Gauss, II. i. 27, where the three conversations are compared to three concentric circles, each having a wider radius than its predecessor.

ii. PERSONAGES AND PERIOD

IN the *Gorgias* Plato abandoned the method of indirect narration which he had used to such effect in the *Protagoras* and elsewhere, and was to use again in the three great dialogues of his middle period, in favour of the direct dramatic form which we find in the majority of the early dialogues. His reason may have been simply that he was less interested in describing the audience at an ἐπίδειξις than he was in portraying the Congress of Sophists, Agathon's party, Socrates' last day, or the lively palaestra scenes of *Charmides*, *Lysis*, *Euthydemus*. But whatever the reason, the *Gorgias* has the form of a drama with a cast of five characters, apart from the κωφὰ πρόσωπα who make a θόρυβος at 458 c.

1. *Chaerephon*

This minor figure is given a short innings in the prelude as a kind of 'sorcerer's apprentice', and makes two brief appearances later, at 458 c where he expresses his eager appetite for further discussion, and at 481 b where Callicles appeals to him in an 'aside'. He has a comparable minor role at the beginning of the *Charmides*, where he rushes to greet the Master and introduce him to the company. He was an old and faithful disciple of Socrates (*Apol.* 20 e, *Xen. Mem.* 1. 2. 48), a man of enthusiastic and excitable temperament (σφοδρός *Apol.* 21 a, μανικός *Charm.* 153 b), and hence a favourite butt of the comic poets,¹ who nicknamed him "the bat" from his squeaky voice. But he is famous chiefly as the inquirer who asked the Delphic Oracle whether any man was wiser than Socrates (*Apol.* 21 a).

2. *Gorgias*

In our histories of Greek literature and of Greek thought Gorgias usually figures as one of the creators of 'the sophistic movement'. But it is doubtful whether he should in fact be called a 'sophist' at all, in the specific sense in which historians of philo-

¹ Aristophanes, *Clouds* 104, 144 ff., 503-4, 831, 1465; *Wasps* 1408 ff.; *Birds* 1296, 1564; frs. 291, 539, 573; Cratinus fr. 202 K.; Eupolis frs. 165, 239 K.; com. adesp. 26.

sophy use the term.¹ Plato² does indeed once call him ὁ Λεοντίνος σοφιστής (*Hipp. ma.* 282 b 5), but in a passage where the word clearly retains its original unspecialized meaning of 'wise man', so that it covers ancient sages like Bias (281 d 9).³ On the other hand, at the great Congress of Sophists in the *Protagoras* Gorgias is not present, nor does any one remark on his absence. And in the *Gorgias* he is clearly *not* regarded as a sophist. He describes himself as a rhetor (449 a), and the professions of rhetor and sophist are carefully distinguished by Socrates, though he admits that people are apt to confound them (465 c). Nor is this merely a Socratic subtlety; for Callicles does not hesitate to declare in the presence of Gorgias, his guest and friend, that sophists are "worthless people" (520 a 1). Gorgias had certain external characteristics in common with the early sophists—the itinerant life, the epideictic method, the shocking practice of teaching for pay (cf. Isocrates, *Antid.* 155)—but he disowned what is perhaps their most distinctive common feature,⁴ the claim to be able to 'teach ἀρετή' (*Meno* 95 c, cf. commentary on 459 c 6–460 a 4).

Equally dubious, in my view, is the now fashionable contention that Gorgias was an original philosophical thinker, though no doubt he was acquainted with current physical and logical speculations. Late writers⁵ make him a 'pupil' of Empedocles, perhaps because he held the Empedoclean theory of perception by means of ἀπορροαί and pores (*Meno* 76 c), perhaps merely because they were both Sicilians. But nowhere outside the *Meno* passage does Plato suggest that he had any serious interest in philosophical questions. Plato certainly knows nothing of the

¹ Cf. Grote, *Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates*, 521, 'If the line could be clearly drawn between rhetors and sophists, Gorgias ought rather to be ranked with the former'; and more recently H. Raeder, 'Platon und die Sophisten', *Proc. Royal Danish Academy (Filos. Medd. Dan. Vid. Selsk.)*, 1938, p. 11, and 'Platon und die Rhetoren', *ibid.* 1956, p. 4.

² The arguments against the authenticity of the *Hippias major* seem to me to have little weight. In its defence, see most recently M. Soreth, *Der plat. Dialog Hippias major*, and O. Gigon, *Gnomon*, xxvii (1955), 14 ff.

³ At Isocr. *Antid.* 268 Gorgias similarly figures in a list of τῶν παλαιῶν σοφιστῶν which includes Parmenides, Empedocles, &c. On the other hand, *Apol.* 19 e need not, and in the light of the *Gorgias* probably should not, be read as implying that Plato considered Gorgias a sophist in the narrower meaning of the term. On the various senses in which the word was used in the fourth century Henry Sidgwick, 'The Sophists, I', *J. Phil.* iv (1872), 66 ff., is still worth reading.

⁴ See Pohlenz, 195 ff., where the evidence is collected.

⁵ Diog. L. 8. 58 (= *Vors.* 82 [76] A 3), on the untrustworthy authority of Satyrus; Ol in *Gorg.* 6. 17 N. (= A 10); Suidas s.v. Γοργίας (= A 2).

'philosophical nihilism' with which Gorgias has been credited on the strength of his notorious 'proof' that (a) nothing exists; (b) if anything did exist it would be inapprehensible; (c) if anything were apprehensible, the apprehension would be incommunicable. The details of this 'proof', which has come down to us in two different late paraphrases,¹ raise problems too complex to be discussed here.² But if it was really intended as anything more than an ingenious *παίγνιον* or *jeu d'esprit*—a parody, perhaps, of Eleatic logic—it is surprising that neither Plato nor Aristotle should anywhere allude to it; and that the one early writer who does allude to it, namely Isocrates, who was Gorgias' personal pupil and admirer, should mention it merely as an example of a *ὑπόθεσις ἄτοπος καὶ παράδοξος* which served to demonstrate *ὅτι ῥαδιόν ἐστι, περὶ ᾧν ἂν τις πρόθηται, ψευδῇ μηχανήσασθαι λόγον* (*Helena* 1–4).³

What, then, *was* Gorgias? If we can believe Plato, the answer is clear: he was simply *δεινὸς λέγειν* (*Symp.* 198 c), a man who could alter the appearance of things *διὰ ῥώμην λόγου* (*Phdr.* 267 a), and whose only profession was to make others *δεινοὺς λέγειν* (*Meno* 95 c). His art was in fact the art of verbal magic, what he himself called "the incantatory power which by its witchery enchants, persuades, and changes the souls of men" (*Enc. Hel.* 10). And the extant samples of his writing—the *Encomium on Helen*, the *Palamedes*, and a page from a funeral oration⁴—are entirely consistent with such a view. They make the impression of a dazzling insincerity, an insincerity so innocently open as to be (except in the funeral oration) entirely void of offence. They are the work of an indefatigable stylist, a man who polished painfully every sentence that he wrote, caring passionately about its form, but (as Plato says, *Phdr.* 267 a) very much less about its relationship

¹ Pseudo-Aristotle, *de Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia* 979^a11–980^b21; Sext. Emp. *adv. math.* 7. 65–87 (= B 3). Both are second-hand reports (not, as they are sometimes called, 'excerpts'), and there are puzzling differences between them.

² See most recently G. B. Kerferd, *Phronesis*, i (1955/6), 3 ff., who gives a bibliography of earlier discussions.

³ Cf. H. Gomperz, *Sophistik und Rhetorik*, chap. i. It is no answer to point out that Isocrates also treats Plato and the Eleatics as paradox-mongers; he judges these from the outside, but he knew Gorgias' work from the inside as a personal pupil.

⁴ *Vors.* B 11, 11a, 6. 'Dionysius the Elder', who has preserved the *Epitaphios* fragment, and who still read an extensive collection of Gorgias' works, says that they included a few public addresses and *Τέχναι*, but the majority were epideictic. He knows nothing of any philosophical works by Gorgias.

to the truth.¹ For him fidelity to fact is a subsidiary matter: he knows that "a speech delights and persuades a vast audience by the skilfulness of its composition, not by the accuracy of its statements" (*Enc. Hel.* 13). The style seems to us, as it did to later antiquity, affected and boring: the well-drilled words execute *ad nauseam* the same repetitive manœuvres with the mechanical precision of a platoon on a barrack square. But Gorgias' contemporaries were bewitched by it, perhaps just because it was so easily imitable, a style that could be taught and learned. We can still see for ourselves that men as diverse in their gifts and interests as Thucydides, Antiphon, and Isocrates succumbed in varying degrees to the fascination.²

Plato did not. But he abstains from direct criticism or parody of it; he is content to parody its imitators, Polus (448 c) and Agathon (*Symp.* 194 e–197 e). And in general he treats Gorgias, both in our dialogue and elsewhere, with the consideration due to an elderly and respected literary figure whose personal probity was unquestioned. His picture of him does not look to me like a caricature; it lacks the burlesque traits of his portrait of Hippias in the *Hippias major* or of the two sophists in the *Euthydemus*. He does indeed poke unobtrusive fun at Gorgias' complacency (448 a, 449 cd), pomposity (451 d, 455 d) and naïve vanity (449 a, 463 d). But we have some ground for suspecting that these were in fact traits of the historical Gorgias: we hear of his care for *κόσμος* and *σεμνότης*, the purple robe in which he appeared on public occasions, and the golden statue of himself which he dedicated at Delphi.³ For the rest, Plato depicts him as a well-meaning but somewhat muddle-headed old gentleman, who exhibits 'that obstinate affection displayed by the unadventurous for the compromises which bring them comfort'.⁴ But, unlike Polus and Callicles, he is a good loser: when his compromises are exposed for what they are, he accepts his dialectical defeat in

¹ Cf. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style*, 12, 'Starting with the initial advantage of having nothing in particular to say, he was able to concentrate all his energies upon saying it'.

² A brief account of Gorgias' style and its influence is given by Denniston, *op. cit.* 10 ff. For a fuller analysis see Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit*, i. 63–71, or Norden, *Die Antike Kunstprosa*, i. 63 ff.

³ Philostratus, *vit. soph.* 1. 9. 2 (= *Vors.* A 1); Aelian, *V.H.* 12. 32 (= A 9); Paus. 10. 18. 7, Pliny, *N.H.* 33. 83 (= A 7).

⁴ Harold Nicolson, *Public Faces*, 170.

a dignified silence, and continues to take a benevolent interest in the further course of the discussion.

It is desirable to be clear about the grounds of Plato's quarrel with Gorgias. Plato never doubted that the spoken word could "change the souls of men"; Socrates himself describes rhetoric as *ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων* (*Phdr.* 261 a). Nor, despite the comic paradox advanced by Socrates at 480 a ff., did Plato think this skill unimportant: he knew that the *ρήτορες* in the Assembly exercised the power of life and death (cf. 466 bc, *Rep.* 565 e–566 a), and he held that the salvation of Athens depended on the emergence of a new type of *ρήτωρ*, *ὁ τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγαθός* (504 d). But he thought the kind of education offered by Gorgias both inadequate and dangerous, for the two reasons indicated at 465 a. (a) The skill which Gorgias taught was unscientific, being *πιστευτική ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλική* (455 a 1): it relied solely on an appeal to men's irrational desires,¹ and there can be no true science of the irrational. And (b) it was morally neutral, in Aristotle's phrase *α δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων* (456 c ff.); but in Plato's view no society can afford to be content with a morally neutral education, which puts the instruments of domination into the hands of the morally ignorant. Men like Callicles did not pay high fees to Gorgias because they enjoyed playing tricks with words, but because they were hungry for power and the new education was *αἴτιον τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει* (452 d, cf. *Meno* 73 cd). Gorgias set men's feet on the road to tyranny without warning them that the tyrant is of all men the most unhappy.²

¹ The language of the *Gorgias* often suggests a view like that of Mr. Aldous Huxley, that "Those who use the devices of oratory for instilling even right beliefs are guilty of pandering to the least creditable elements in human nature. . . . They deepen the quasi-hypnotic trance in which most human beings live and from which it is the aim and purpose of all true philosophy, all genuinely spiritual religion, to deliver them" (*The Devils of Loudun*, 20 f.). Yet in the *Phaedrus* at least Plato recognized that some degree of 'pandering' is inevitable, and justifiable so long as it serves the truth. In the *Gorgias* the emphasis is different, but I am not sure that the doctrine really is (see note on 504 d 5). Certainly the protreptic passages of the *Gorgias* are not in fact innocent of rhetoric: as Cicero put it, *mihi in oratoribus irridendis ipse* (sc. Plato) *esse orator summus videbatur* (*de orat.* 1. 47).

² Plato's criticism has recently been condemned as unfair by E. A. Havelock, *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics*, 245 ff.; but in seeking to defend Gorgias and other 'Greek liberals' against an admittedly hostile tradition he seems to me to construct a counter-myth out of very slender materials.

3. *Polus*

Polus was born at Acragas in Sicily and was a professional teacher of rhetoric; but beyond these bare facts we know little more of him than can be gleaned from the *Gorgias*.¹ Apart from the *Tέχνη* or Handbook of Rhetoric which Socrates had read (462 b 11), he is credited by Suidas with a work *περὶ λέξεων* (and, doubtfully, with some treatises on mythology). A passage in the *Phaedrus* (267 bc), where Plato makes fun of his passion for coining new technical terms, has been thought to allude to the title of another (or the same?) work by him; but this is quite uncertain. Nothing, probably, of his writing survives; for the words put into his mouth at 448 c seem more likely to be a parody of his *Tέχνη* than a quotation from it (see commentary ad loc.). In the dialogue he is young (463 e 2), young enough to be Socrates' or Gorgias' son (461 cd), though old enough to have composed the *Tέχνη*.

Plato's portrait of him is unflattering. He has a "coltish" impatience (463 e), and his manners are much inferior to his master's. Thrusting himself forward in Gorgias' place (448 a), from the first he treats both Chaerephon and Socrates with a prickly resentfulness (e.g. 448 b 1, 461 d 8, 467 b 1). He is as innocent of dialectical method as Gorgias himself, but displays an unteachable stupidity beside which Gorgias looks quite intelligent. When gravelled for an argument, he falls back on an appeal to popular opinion (471 cd), on bursts of rhetorical derision (473 b-d), or on ill-bred laughter (473 e). He is intellectually and morally vulgar, and he measures Socrates' moral stature by his own (471 c 8).

In the ethical discussion which develops out of his appeal to current moral standards, Polus' fatal error, as Callicles will point out (482 d), lies in divorcing the 'right' from the 'good', morality from the true interest of the individual (see commentary on 474 c 4-476 a 2). In this he expresses the moral attitude of a 'shame-culture' (to use a convenient anthropological term), in which to be 'well thought of' is the accepted social aim. To Plato such an aim seemed characteristic of the Athenian society of his day: cf. *Rep.* 362 e ff., parents preach morality to their children *οὐκ αὐτὸ δίκαιοςύνην ἐπαινοῦντες, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς εὐδοκίμησεις*,

¹ The few notices about him are collected by Radermacher, 'Artium Scriptores', 112-14 (*Sitzb. Akad. Wien*, ccxxvii (1951), Abh. 3).

throwing in for good measure τὰς παρὰ θεῶν εὐδοκιμήσεις. He detested this bogus morality, which seemed to him both intellectually contemptible and socially dangerous (cf. *Rep.* 365 a–366 b), leading men as it did to observe one standard in their public behaviour while secretly adopting another.¹ Hence the severity with which Polus is handled. Plato had far more sympathy with a Callicles.

4. *Callicles*

Of Callicles we know absolutely nothing beyond what Plato tells us in the *Gorgias*. Since scholarship abhors a vacuum, various older scholars decided that he must be a ‘mask’ for some one whom we do know—Charicles (Bergk), or Critias (Cron, Menzel), or Alcibiades with whom he is linked at 519 a (Apelt), or even (absurdly) the respectable and unadventurous Isocrates (Sudhaus). More recent guesses are that he stands for Polycrates, author of a *Κατηγορία Σωκράτους* (see below, p. 28, and note on 484 b 1–c 3); or for the handsome Demos, with whom he is said to be in love.² But on the whole present-day scholars have mercifully abandoned this sort of speculation.³ Some, however, still hold that he is an invented character.⁴ I think the probabilities are strongly against either view. (a) There seem to be no clear instances either of purely fictitious characters with personal names introduced as speakers in conversation with Socrates or of real persons introduced as speakers under fictitious names.⁵ (b) In the case of Callicles Plato supplies details which would have little point if he were fictitious, such as his deme (495 d 3); his relations with Demos, a real person and one connected by marriage with Plato’s family (see note on 481 d 5); and at 487 c the names of his three cronies, two at least of whom are known to us as real persons. A modern novelist might go to this trouble to ‘establish’ a fictitious character, but hardly Plato.

¹ Democritus was equally emphatic in his repudiation of this double standard: “One should not respect public opinion more than one’s own, or be more ready to do evil in secret than in the sight of all men” (fr. 264).

² J. Humbert, *Polycratès*; H. Schmalenbach, ‘Platons Abschied von der Politik’, in *Festschrift Fritz Medicus*, 201 f.

³ Cf. Bonitz, *Platonische Studien*, 20 n. 15; Pohlenz, 142 n. 1; Ritter, i. 402 f.; Wilamowitz, i. 211 n. 1; Taylor, 116; Kranz, *Rh. Mus.* xciv (1951), 231 n.

⁴ e.g. L. Stefanini, *Platone*, i. 92; Festugière, 386; Jaeger, i. 322; Gauss, ii. i. 59.

⁵ I. Bruns, *Das literarische Porträt der Griechen*, 239 f.; R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, i. 176; Burnet, *Thales to Plato*, 120 f.

Why, then, did such a vigorous and richly endowed personality leave no mark whatever on the history of his time? We cannot know the answer; but we may make a guess at one on the basis of a hint of Plato's. When Socrates is made to say to him at 519 a 7 σοῦ δὲ ἴσως ἐπιλήψονται, εἰ μὴ εὐλαβῇ, is not Plato putting in his mouth a prophecy *post eventum*?¹ In the desperate last years of the Peloponnesian War, and still more in the revolutions which followed its close, a man so ambitious and so dangerously frank about it may well have forfeited his life. I suspect that Callicles, who in the dialogue is just embarking on an active career (515 a), died too young to be remembered—if Plato had not remembered him.

Callicles' opinions are often thought of as typically 'sophistic', but he is certainly not a sophist—on the contrary, his contempt for such "worthless persons" (520 a 1) is as outspoken as that of Anytus or Laches. He acts as host to Gorgias, but that is another matter; Gorgias was a great literary and social figure, who had discharged major political missions with distinction. He himself is a wealthy young Athenian gentleman,² who looks forward to an important career in politics and views the philosophic life with an amused pity (484 c ff.). He is sometimes described (e.g. by Lamb) as a typical democrat; but he is surely no more a democrat at heart than Hobbes or Nietzsche. As a politician in a democratic society he must pay court to the δῆμος (481 de), but his championship of "Nature" against "Law" marks him as anti-democratic in principle.³ And his contempt for the people is in fact even greater than Socrates': they are in his eyes the "weaklings" (483 b), no better than a *συρφετὸς δούλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδενὸς ἀξίων* (489 c). These are the sentiments, not of a democrat, but of Plato's "tyrannical man", who is at once a product of democracy and its deadliest enemy (*Rep.* 565 d).⁴

Plato had certainly known such men in his early youth, and

¹ Cf. Ritter, *Untersuchungen*, 136.

² Wilamowitz declared that Callicles was no gentleman, on the strength of the omission of his father's name at 495 d 3. But Socrates addresses him as ὦ γενναῖε (494 e 9); he is the sort of man who would not marry his daughter to an engineer's son (512 c); and his παιδικά, Demos, belonged to one of the best families in Athens. Snell seems right in calling him 'ein attischer Junker', *Entdeckung des Geistes*², 406.

³ Cf. Jaeger, *Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers*, 180. νόμος was the watchword of good democrats like Protagoras and the Anonymus Iamblichi, while praise of φύσις is usually associated with an aristocratic bias, from Pindar onwards.

⁴ Cf. Raeder, 117 f.

had probably felt a measure of sympathy for them. He admired their candour, and he shared their contempt for the masses, for the professors of ἀρετή, and for all the hypocrisies of a society whose morality was built on appearances (cf. commentary on 491 a 4–492 c 8). Hence his portrait of Callicles not only has warmth and vitality but is tinged with a kind of regretful affection. True, the young man is insufferably patronizing (484 c–485 e); true, as the discussion proceeds he becomes unpleasantly rude (e.g. 489 b, 490 e 4, 497 bc), and at one stage turns sulky (505 cd). Yet he likes Socrates (485 e 2), and his repeated expressions of concern for the philosopher's safety (486 ab, 511 b, 521 c) are, I think, quite sincerely meant. Socrates on his side perceives in him the true touchstone (486 de): he praises his honesty in "saying frankly what other people think but will not say" (492 d 2, cf. 487 a); he also recognizes him to be by current standards a cultivated man (487 b 6) who, unlike Polus, has acquired some tincture of philosophy παιδείας χάριν (485 a 4). But what is more significant is the powerful and disturbing eloquence that Plato has bestowed on Callicles—an eloquence destined to convince the young Nietzsche, while Socrates' reasonings left him cold (see Appendix). One is tempted to believe that Callicles stands for something which Plato had it in him to become (and would perhaps have become, but for Socrates), an unrealized Plato who, as Jaeger has said,¹ lies deeply buried beneath the foundations of the *Republic*.

Be that as it may, Callicles represents a 'philosophy of life' of whose prevalence in the later years of the fifth century we have much convergent testimony,² and of whose persistence in the fourth Plato assures us in the *Laws* (889 e–890 a: cf. also Isocr. *Areop.* 20, *Panath.* 131, *Antid.* 283). His personal variant of this philosophy differs, in form at any rate, from that presented (how much less attractively!) by Thrasymachus in the *Republic*. They agree in approving of actions which the world calls "unjust"; but whereas Thrasymachus—at one point at least, 348 e 6³—approves

¹ ii. 138. Cf. Festugière, 387, 'Nul auteur ne rend si fortement les sentiments d'autrui à moins que son propre cœur ne batte à l'unisson.'

² Collected by A. Menzel, *Kallikles* (1922), and by F. Heinemann, *Nomos und Physis* (1945). Cf. commentary on 482 c 4–483 c 6, 483 d 2, 491 a 4–492 c 8.

³ It must be admitted that Thrasymachus is not entirely consistent (nor indeed is Callicles). Mr. G. B. Kerferd has argued ably (*Durham University Journal*, 1947/8, 19 ff.) that to save his consistency we must make Thrasymachus too a believer in

of them *despite their admitted injustice*, Callicles approves of them because they express for him a higher justice, "the justice of nature" (483 c 8). He does not deny the significance of ethical value-judgements, but like Nietzsche he 'transvalues' them: τὸ δίκαιον is for him a meaningful term, as are φρόνιμος and ἀνδρείος (491 ab). As Burnet put it,¹ he holds, not like Thrasymachus that "right" is reducible to might (εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον, *Rep.* 338 c 1), but that might really is *right*.

In the *Gorgias* this philosophy is presented not merely as an intellectual theorem but as the basis of a way of life which Plato compares with the Socratic way of life and finds wanting. He seems to imply that its origin may be traced to two causes. One is the *trahison des clercs* by which men like Gorgias put a deadly instrument into unscrupulous hands for the corruption of simple people who are morally only children.² That is why the dialogue is called *Gorgias*, not *Callicles*:³ Gorgias' teaching is the seed of which the Calliclean way of life is the poisonous fruit. The other cause lay farther back, in the false conception of statesmanship which had governed the relations of politicians and people ever since the Persian Wars.⁴ If Gorgias and his like had made a mistake in supposing that a 'value-free' education would produce the Good Life, the creators of the Athenian ἀρχή had made a no less grave mistake in supposing that wealth and power would produce it: neither party had given any thought to the true sources of εὐδαιμονία.

"natural justice"—which he *calls* "injustice". But Thrasymachus nowhere uses the φύσις language, and I think we must take this as meaning that he represents a different tradition (cf. H. Maier, *Sokrates*, 248). It would be odd, after all, if Plato had introduced two characters who merely duplicate each other's views.

¹ *Thales to Plato*, 121. Cf. also Menzel, *Kallikles*, 46 f.

² That the Sovereign People is a tool in the hands of the ῥήτορες because it has the moral outlook and the intellectual capacity of a child is a point repeatedly emphasized in the *Gorgias* (464 d, 502 e 7 ὥσπερ παισὶ προσομιλοῦσι τοῖς δήμοις, 521 e).

³ It may sometimes have gone, not unnaturally, under the latter title. In a list of books written down at Oxyrhynchus in the third century A.D. and published by Medea Norsa, *Aegyptus*, ii (1921), 17 ff., we find πρὸς Καλλικλέα γ', "*Against Callicles*, three parts (rolls?)", included in a group of works by Plato. If Professor Turner (*J. Eg. Arch.* xxxviii (1952), 90) is right in thinking that the list is a bookseller's note of customers' orders, the customer may have meant the *Gorgias* but confused its title with that of Demosthenes' speech πρὸς Καλλικλέα (which is much too short to fill three rolls). Cf. J. U. Powell, *New Chapters in Greek Literature*, ii. 211 ff.

⁴ See below, p. 33.

5. *Socrates*

This is not the place to attempt a characterization either of the historical or of the Platonic Socrates. But a word must be said of some of the differences which distinguish the Socrates of the *Gorgias* from the figure presented to us in other dialogues of the early group.

(a) His *tone* is different; more exactly, it *becomes* different in the course of the dialogue. In the conversation with Gorgias, Socrates is the man we know, questioning a specialist about his speciality in the manner of the *Euthyphro* or the *Ion*, insisting in his usual way on an exact definition, and arriving in his usual way at no conclusion.¹ But in the course of the discussion with Polus a change seems to come over him: he speaks of himself and his isolation in Athens with a passionate bitterness which strikes us as new (471 e–472 b); and he asserts a positive doctrine with a certitude about its truth which also appears new (473 b). In the first exchanges with Callicles the old Socrates, with his familiar sly irony, peeps out again; but even here there is a new confidence—whatever Socrates and Callicles agree on will be nothing less than the final truth (487 e). Later on he claims that his thesis has been “secured and made fast by arguments of steel or adamant” (508 e 6), though this is immediately qualified by the usual Socratic profession of basic ignorance (509 a 4).² And in the last pages of the dialogue the transformation is complete: he speaks in the ringing tones of the prophet and preacher summoning men to a new life—tones which recall the end of the *Apology* (though with a marked increase of assurance), but nothing else in the early work of Plato.

¹ Hence the suggestion recently made by Gauss (II. i. 40 f., 99) that this part of the dialogue was composed earlier than the rest. The inference is tempting, but probably delusive: if the *Gorgias* is the first statement of Plato's personal views on ethics and politics, later to be developed in the *Republic*, he may well have thought it appropriate to establish a strictly Socratic foundation on which to erect this Platonic superstructure.

² Professor Vlastos, in his interesting and original introduction to Ostwald's translation of the *Protagoras* (New York, 1956), explains this (p. xxxi) as meaning that Socrates asserts the logical validity of his arguments but not the correctness of the premisses on which they rest. Nothing is said, however, about the premisses; the possibility which Socrates contemplates is that Callicles or some one else might still disprove (ἀνελν) the arguments themselves (509 a 2). And no such qualification is made or suggested at 473 b.—The positiveness of the *Gorgias* was already noticed in antiquity, *Proleg. in Plat. Phil.* 11 fin.

(b) He uses new *methods*; or rather, new methods are added, like the new tones, to those already familiar. He is still the dialectician, still the sworn foe of *μακρολογία* (449 b, 461 d, 466 b, cf. *Prot.* 329 a, *Hipp. mi.* 364 b, &c.). Yet he himself indulges in *μακρολογία* to an extent which has no real parallel in any other early dialogue; his apologies for it (465 e, 519 d) amount to an admission that he is behaving out of character. His long speech at 464 b–466 a reveals for the first time the interest in classification which will reappear many years later in the *Sophist* (cf. commentary ad loc.); his allegories of the Water-carriers and the Jars (493 a–494 a) are an exceptional borrowing from an unsocratic source, and marked as such; his concluding myth is an innovation which will be repeated in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*.

(c) He has also made important additions to his small stock of positive *beliefs*. He continues to hold that “virtue is knowledge” (460 a–c), that οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνει (467 c–468 e), that true possession of one “virtue” implies possession of them all (507 a–c). But he has acquired other convictions which do not spring at all directly from these; some of them are listed below, pp. 20 f.

Note on the ‘dramatic date’

In what year are we to imagine the conversation as taking place? If Plato ever asked himself this question (which may perhaps be doubted), his answer must have been ‘In no particular year’. For, as Herodicus of Babylon already noticed (Athenaeus 217 d–218 a), no ingenuity can reconcile the various chronological data which he has obligingly supplied.¹ The following dates are indicated or suggested in the course of the dialogue.

429 or soon after: 503 c 2, Pericles is recently dead.

Not before 427: this is the date of Gorgias’ first (and only attested) visit to Athens.²

About 422: 481 d, Demos (cf. Aristoph. *Wasps* 98 and schol.).

Before 415: 519 a, prediction about Alcibiades.

413 or soon after: 470 d, Archelaus has come to power “only the other day”.

¹ Compare the shifts to which Taylor was driven (104 f.), being committed to the historical veracity of Plato’s picture of Socrates. But even he has to confess that Plato has fallen into ‘a small error here or there’.

² Diodorus 12. 53. But there may well have been later visits: Isocrates says Gorgias did not settle down anywhere for long (*Antid.* 156).

411 at earliest: if we can believe schol. *Frogs* 53, this is the earliest possible date for Euripides' *Antiope*, quoted at 485 e and elsewhere; 408 is more probable.

405: 473 e, allusion to the trial of the generals after Arginusae as having taken place "last year" (the allusion has been disputed, but see commentary).

We must conclude either that Plato did not care how his readers situated his fictions in time or, with Gercke and Cornford, that he deliberately lifted the present fiction 'out of the historical sphere of actual circumstances and the course of party politics at Athens'.¹ As Thompson sensibly said, 'Nothing can be truer than the remark of Athenaeus, ὅτι πολλὰ ὁ Πλάτων παρὰ τοὺς χρόνους ἀμαρτάνει, nor anything idler than his abuse of Plato on this account.'

iii. DATE OF COMPOSITION

1. *The Relative Date*

The evidence of stylometry

It is now universally accepted that the dialogues can be divided, primarily on the evidence of stylometric tests (formulae of response, use of particles, &c.), into three main groups, early, middle, and late. And there is broad agreement on the dialogues which should be assigned to each group: the exceptions are either cases where the stylometric evidence is thought by some to conflict with the evidence of content (*Cratylus*, *Phaedrus*, *Timaeus*), or else simple 'borderline' cases (*Meno*, *Phaedo*, *Symposium* can be placed either at the tail of Group I or at the head of Group II). It is agreed that the *Gorgias* belongs to the early group, along with *Apology*, *Charmides*, *Crito*, *Euthydemus*, *Euthyphro*, *Hippias major*, *Hippias minor*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, *Menexenus*, and *Protagoras*, to which most scholars add *Meno*.² But the order of composition

¹ *Einleitung* to Sauppe's edition, xvii; cf. Cornford in the introduction to his translation of the *Republic*, xx. This 'timelessness' is not, however, peculiar to the *Gorgias*; there are similar difficulties about the 'dramatic date' of the *Protagoras*. In his later dialogues Plato shows a disposition to avoid references from which a definite date could be inferred, apart from cases where there is an obvious reason for putting the conversation very early in Socrates' life (*Parmenides*) or very late (*Theaetetus*).

² I omit the *Cratylus*, whose place in the sequence is too sharply disputed for it to be safely used in dating other dialogues, and on similar grounds disregard the

within this large group remains for the most part uncertain. Ritter, who in 1910 had admitted that stylometry had so far failed to settle this problem (*Platon*, i. 246), tried to bring stylistic criteria to bear on it in a paper in *Hermes*, lxx (1935), 1 ff. But he did no more than show that certain dialogues of Group I—*Gorgias*,¹ *Lysis*, *Menexenus*, *Euthydemus*, possibly *Hippias major*—exhibit one or two stylistic peculiarities which point forward to Group II.²

Why is the Gorgias so bitter?

The *Gorgias* stands out among the early dialogues by the tragic tone of its later pages and by the direct and bitter criticism which it levels against Athenian politics and politicians (cf. below, § iv). Since the criticism culminates in a prediction of the condemnation of Socrates (521 e ff.), it was a natural first guess that it was composed under the immediate impact of that event, i.e. in 399 or soon after (so Hermann, Hirzel, and others). But this dating is open to so many objections that it is now generally abandoned; Max Wundt has tried to revive it (*Ztschr. f. philosoph. Forschung*, iv, 1949, 29 ff.), but its last major defenders were, I think, Immisch and (in less precise terms) A. E. Taylor. A different way of accounting for the disillusioned bitterness of the dialogue is suggested, as Thompson already saw, by the passage from the *Seventh Letter* which will be quoted below under 'absolute date'. That the

possible early dating of *Republic*, Book I. I also omit the *Alcibiades i*, whose authenticity is doubted or denied by the majority of present-day scholars. A useful general survey of what stylometric arguments have and have not established is provided by R. Simeterre, *Rev. Ét. Gr.* lviii. 146 ff. (reprinted as chap. 2 of his *Introduction à l'étude de Platon*).

¹ The *Gorgias* has two instances of adversative μήν (493 c 4, 526 a 2), which is common in middle and late dialogues but is found by Ritter in no other early dialogue save *Lysis* (once) and *Euthydemus* (twice); and Ritter's only early parallel to ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι βέλτιστος ὢν (526 d 7) is *Menex.* 248 e 1 ὡς δύναμαι προθυμότερα. We may add from his *Untersuchungen* (58 f.) a single instance of καθάπερ (very rare in Group I, less so in Group II, common in Group III), and three of χάριν used as a preposition (not found elsewhere in Group I, ἔνεκα being preferred, except *Prot.* 324 b 4 where ἔνεκα has already been used and *Menex.* 249 b 1).—Lutoslawski's statistical calculations indicated (for what they are worth) that the *Gorgias* was the latest dialogue in his large early group (*Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*, 189).

² Ritter's promise of further evidence was not fulfilled. The evidence he published provides only slender justification for his division of Group I into 'first earlies' and 'second earlies'; and I can find nothing in it to justify his placing *Gorgias* (with *Meno*) at the end of the 'first early' subgroup while *Hippias major*, *Euthydemus*, *Menexenus*, *Lysis*, are placed among the 'second earlies'.

early dating will not do appears from the following considerations among others.

Reasons for placing the Gorgias late in Group I

(a) The *Gorgias* is the longest of all the dialogues save for the *Republic*, *Timaeus*, and *Laws*. It seems unlikely that Plato disregarded his own advice against "learning pottery on the big jar" (514 e, *Laches* 187 b); or that if he had done so he would have produced so finished an article (cf. p. 5, above).

(b) If we accept the general view (which is hard to resist) that the Platonic Socrates grew in stature as the historical Socrates receded in time, we cannot place the *Gorgias* very early in the 'Socratic' series; for in addition to his usual traits the Socrates of this dialogue uses tones and methods which appear very rarely or not at all in the other dialogues of Group I (see above, pp. 16f.). On the other hand, he is not yet 'a myth or a saint'.¹

(c) As Hackforth says,² 'Until the *Gorgias* Socrates' ethical attitude is not determined by any views or speculations about a future life, and the natural inference is that such views begin to be attributed to him when, and because, they are beginning to influence Plato.' This feature links the *Gorgias* with the *Phaedo*, but with the important difference that in the *Gorgias* the notion of a future life is kept out of the actual discussion.

(d) The *Gorgias* shows generally recognized marks of Pythagorean influence: see commentary on 492 d 1-493 d 4, 507 c 8-508 c 3, 523 a 1-524 a 7. The preference for mathematical illustrations (451 bc, 453 e, 465 bc, 508 a) may be due to the same cause. And even the Pythagorean doctrine of rebirth seems to be tacitly implied in two places (493 c 3, 525 c: see commentary), although it is nowhere stated. All this associates the *Gorgias* with the *Meno* and the *Phaedo*, but distinguishes it from the other dialogues of Group I.

(e) The *Gorgias* seems also to foreshadow a number of other doctrines which are absent from all or most of the other early dialogues but are characteristic of Plato's mature thought. Such are the distinction between *ἐπιστήμη* and *δόξα*, which appears at 454 c-455 a as a distinction between *ἐπιστήμη* and *πίστις*; the

¹ G. Rudberg in *Symbolae Osloenses*, xxx (1953), 40, a lucid paper to which I am much indebted throughout this discussion.

² In the introduction to his translation of the *Phaedo*, p. 16.

conception of the philosopher-king, whose starting-point may be seen in Socrates' claim to be virtually the only true statesman (521 d); and the theory of Forms, of which we may detect the germ (but I think only the germ) at 503 e.¹

These general arguments can be made a little more precise by considering the relationship of the *Gorgias* to some individual dialogues of Group I.

Dialogues certainly or probably earlier than the Gorgias

(a) *Gorgias* 521 e ff., with its parody of the charges against Socrates, vividly recalls the *Apology*; and we can perhaps see in the *Gorgias* the fulfilment of Socrates' prediction at *Apol.* 39 cd concerning the new accusers who will arise to denounce the Athenian way of life, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζήτε. Yet the two can hardly be close together in date: the Socrates who presents his myth as a λόγος (523 a) is not the agnostic of *Apol.* 29 b and 40 c; and whereas *Apol.* 32 b implies that Socrates was not ἐπιστάτης at the trial of the generals, *Gorg.* 473 e 7 implies that he was (see note ad loc.). On both points the *Apology* seems to be historically the more faithful; and it is reasonable to conclude that the more faithful account is the earlier.

(b) A similar line of reasoning strongly suggests that the *Gorgias* is considerably later than the *Protagoras*, a dialogue which, as Vlastos says,² shows us a Socrates 'with no wart or wrinkle smoothed out of the portrait'; a Socrates, moreover, who does not always triumph in argument (cf. 350 c ff.), and who can prove that "virtue is knowledge" only on a hedonist assumption which is plainly incompatible with the ethical standpoint of the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*.³ Artistically too, as well as

¹ The use of *παρουσία* (*παρεῖναι*) at 497 e, 498 d, 506 d, and of *μετέχειν* at 467 e, proves nothing. 503 e is much more striking, because of its close resemblance to *Crat.* 389 a-c and *Rep.* 596 b (see commentary). But we need not, and probably should not, take it as implying that the theory was fully developed in Plato's mind when he wrote the *Gorgias*. Lutoslawski was probably right in saying that 'the *Gorgias* contains, not *vestiges*, but *germs* of the theory' (*Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*, 217).

² Introduction to *Protagoras*, xxv. Cf. Wilamowitz, i. 149.

³ Scholars who resent the suggestion that Plato ever changed his mind have tried to paper over this crack in the 'unity' of his thought by methods which seem to me more ingenious than intellectually honest. The dialogue contains no hint that the assumption is made merely for the sake of argument—and why should it be, since it is *not* the assumption of Protagoras (351 d), or even of "the many" (352 de)? What does appear unsocratic, and is candidly marked as a borrowing

philosophically, the *Protagoras* appears much less mature: I think the majority of unprejudiced readers will agree with Friedländer (ii². 324) that the *Gorgias* is 'incomparably deeper and more intense', as well as better constructed.¹

(c) The main ethical thesis of the *Gorgias* is already stated at *Crito* 49 b 4, τό γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχροὺν τυγχάνει ὃν παντὶ τρόπῳ. But no proof of it is there offered (or required, since *Crito* is no immoralist). The statement may well reflect the immediate impression made on Plato by his master's trial and condemnation; but some time may have elapsed before he felt able to defend it formally against the immoralist position.

(d) The analysis of τὸ καλόν, which is the main subject of the *Hippias major*, is briefly dealt with at *Gorg.* 474 d ff. Here the priority is disputed; but since the *Gorgias* seems to reflect a slightly more advanced stage of Plato's aesthetic (see note on 474 d 4) I am inclined to think with H. Gomperz and Raeder that it presupposes, while it also corrects, the much fuller discussion in the *Hippias major*.²

(e) Similarly, it appears more likely than not that the very brief references to ὁσιότης and ἀνδρεία at *Gorg.* 507 b presuppose the fuller discussion of these virtues in the *Euthyphro* and the *Laches* respectively (cf. in particular *Euthyphro* 12 e, *Laches* 191 e, 192 d).

Dialogues apparently close in date to the Gorgias

(a) As mentioned above, the *Euthydemus* exhibits slight stylistic indications of relative lateness; at 290 c the relation of the mathematician to the διαλεκτικός points forward to the *Republic*; and if scholars are right in thinking that at 304 d–306 d Plato had Isocrates in mind it can hardly be dated very early. As in the *Gorgias*, Socrates engages in προτρεπτικοὶ λόγοι (282 d 6); the language of the two dialogues shows some striking similarities;³ and both lead up to the question "What is true statesmanship and what sort of knowledge does it involve?" Since in the from another source (507 e), is the new 'Platonic' way of describing the Good in terms of "order" (τάξις, κόσμος) which is introduced for the first time in the *Gorgias*. Cf. Pohlenz, 152 f., 164; Hackforth, *CQ*, xxii (1928), 39 ff.; Vlastos, op. cit. xl f.

¹ For further arguments against putting the *Protagoras* later than the *Gorgias* see J. Geffcken, *Hermes*, lxxv (1930), 33, and G. Rudberg, loc. cit. (p. 20 n. 1 above).

² One may add that *Hipp. ma.* 304 ab looks like a first sketch of the case for rhetoric as stated by Socrates' opponents in the *Gorgias*, 454 b, 457 a, 486 a–d, &c.

³ Cf. *Euthyd.* 275 a 4 with *Gorg.* 447 c 3; 289 e 5 with 463 d 2; 290 a 3 with 454 b 6; 304 d 1 with 458 a 3; and for the thought, 292 b with 519 a.

Euthydemus the investigation of this problem ends in an *ἀπορία* (infinite regress, 292 de), whereas the *Gorgias* already foresees the philosopher-king solution (521 d), it is natural to suppose with Friedländer and others that the *Euthydemus* is the earlier.

(b) The *Meno* is closely linked with the *Gorgias* by its references to the great Athenian statesmen of the fifth century, to Gorgias himself, and to the Pythagorean σοφοί:¹ hence there is now general agreement that the two are close together in date. But the order of composition is disputed. The priority of the *Meno* has been inferred from its apparently milder treatment of the statesmen (cf. especially 93 a 5, ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ἄνντε, καὶ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν ἐνθάδε ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ καὶ γεγονέναι, which directly and formally contradicts *Gorg.* 516 e 9); such a retraction, it is urged, would come strangely between the *Gorgias* with its violent attack on democracy and the *Republic* in which the attack is renewed.² The “goodness” of the *Meno*, however, is a goodness not based on knowledge; statesmen are classed with diviners and poets (99 cd), which in Socrates’ mouth is no compliment. And if a motive is still needed for the formal ‘retraction’, it may perhaps have been provided by Polycrates’ intervention in the debate (see below, p. 29). The arguments for the priority of the *Gorgias* are stronger. The allusion at *Meno* 71 c to a meeting between Socrates and Gorgias looks like a reference back to the earlier dialogue; the statement at 95 c about Gorgias’ attitude to the teaching of ἀρετή seems designed to correct the false impression which a reader might well get from the *Gorgias*;³ the πίστις of *Gorg.* 454 d ff. is replaced in the *Meno* by δόξα (97 b ff.), which is henceforward the regular Platonic term; and the doctrine of rebirth, which remained ‘offstage’ in the *Gorgias*, is for the first time openly produced in the *Meno* (81 b ff.).

(c) Of all the early dialogues, the most closely related in subject to the *Gorgias* is the *Menexenus*. Both deal with rhetoric, and with the use of rhetoric by Athenian politicians;⁴ but while the

¹ Cf. also *Meno* 70 c 1 with *Gorg.* 447 c 6; 73 c 9 with 452 d 5 ff.; 77 b 4 with 494 c 2.

² Paul Cauer, *Rh. Mus.* lxxii (1917), 284 ff.

³ To say this is not to accept all the conclusions which Pohlenz (169 ff.) drew from the passage: see commentary on 459 c 6–460 a 4.

⁴ The identity of theme is marked by the opening words of the little dialogue, where Menexenus, like Callicles, has recently abandoned philosophy for “more serious things” (τὰ μείζω, 234 a 6, cf. *Gorg.* 484 c 4), i.e. a career in politics.

Gorgias examines its theoretical basis, the *Menexenus* illustrates its practice by means of an imaginary funeral oration which parodies the stylistic tricks and the historical falsifications of patriotic oratory.¹ The two are thus complementary, unequal though they are in length and importance; and both of them convey the same criticisms of Athenian democracy and Athenian foreign policy, though the expression is direct in the one case, ironical in the other.² The *Menexenus* seems in fact to stand to the *Gorgias* somewhat as a satyr-play does to the tragic trilogy to which it is appended; it could well have been composed less for its own sake than as a kind of playful appendix to the major dialogue.

2. *The Absolute Date*

Evidence of the Menexenus

The *Menexenus* is unique among the dialogues in containing, thanks to a deliberate and fantastic anachronism, direct and uncontrovertible evidence of its date. Since 'Aspasia's' oration carries the history of Athens down to the King's Peace, it cannot have been composed before 386; and since it stops there, it is unlikely to have been composed very much later. If I am right in guessing—it can only be a guess—that the *Menexenus* was designed as an afterpiece to the *Gorgias*, this would mean dating the latter about 387–385. It may be objected that we should then bring the *Gorgias* too close in time to the foundation of the Academy,³ which is sometimes dated 387, and to the composition of the *Symposium*, which is often dated 385. But in fact these latter dates are at best

¹ Cf. Taylor, 42 ff., and for a detailed analysis of the parody Pohlenz, 264–92.

² e.g. Socrates' account of his reactions to oratory (235 a–c, cf. *Gorg.* 502 e); the sly use of *δοκεῖν* throughout the praise of the Athenian constitution (238 d–239 a); the historical distortions by which Athenian foreign policy is represented as invariably disinterested; and the references to the rebuilding of the fleet and the Long Walls (245 a, 245 e, cf. *Gorg.* 519 a). I cannot see in the *Menexenus* that prudent 'watering down' of Plato's criticism which Wilamowitz (i. 269) discovered in it. After being told that such speeches praise Athens for *καὶ τὰ προσόντα καὶ τὰ μὴ* (234 c 6) and being warned that this one is *παιδιά* (236 c 9), the stupidest of Plato's contemporaries can hardly have failed to notice the tongue in the cheek; that later ages took the speech seriously, when both Plato and Athens had long been canonized, is another matter. Pamela Huby, who has recently revived the view that it was seriously meant (*Phronesis*, ii, 1957, 104), fails to consider its relationship to the *Gorgias*.

³ Personally, I find nothing in the *Gorgias* which excludes the possibility that the Academy has already been founded. The phrase used at 484 e 2, *τὰς ὑμετέρας διατριβάς*, might even be held to favour it (cf. note ad loc.).

termini post quos. All we are told about the foundation of the Academy is that it was subsequent to Plato's return from his first Sicilian visit;¹ and if a phrase used at *Symp.* 193 a really alludes to the dioecism of Mantinea in 385 (which I do not think certain²), the allusion need not follow immediately on the event. I suspect that the dates suggested by Taylor and others for *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, *Republic*, are all too early: they give Plato too much to do in the eighties and nothing at all, apart from teaching, in the seventies (if the *Theaetetus* is to be dated after 369).

Evidence of the Seventh Letter

Another line of approach to the question of date starts from the famous passage at the beginning of the *Seventh Letter* where Plato³ recalls in old age the heart-searchings which preceded his first visit to Sicily. Having described the growing demoralization of Athenian society in the nineties, and his own growing doubts as to the possibility of playing an honest and effective part in Athenian politics, he concludes (326 a), "At last I decided that all existing forms of society are wrong: their institutions are pretty well past remedy, unless some quite unexpected force should intervene at a lucky moment. I was thus constrained to give my devotion to a true philosophy, and say that only from the standpoint of such a philosophy could one get a comprehensive view of what was right, for the social order as for individuals; so that mankind would never be rid of its miseries until philosophers, in the genuine sense of the term, gained political power, or else, by some miracle, the governing classes took to genuine philosophy. In this mind I arrived on my first visit to Italy and Sicily." It has long been realized that the *Gorgias* contains the earliest announcement⁴ of this crucial decision

¹ Olympiodorus, *vit. Plat.* 6 *init.* Even if we believe the story about the ransoming of Plato and the use of the ransom-money for buying a plot of ground *ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ* (Diog. L. 3. 20), it does not follow that the Academy was founded immediately thereafter. Taylor is surely right in saying that 'the exact date of the foundation of the Academy is unknown'.

² See now the full and careful discussion by Harold B. Mattingly, *Phronesis*, iii (1958), 31 ff., who agrees with Wilamowitz in denying the supposed anachronistic allusion.

³ I accept the general opinion of recent scholars that this letter is genuine. It is in any case the work of someone who was very well acquainted with Plato's life.

⁴ So already Thompson (Introd. xiv ff.). The notion of philosophers coming to power was not worked out until the *Republic* (which cannot be placed in the early eighties), but it may well have been in Plato's thoughts much earlier (cf. Field,

(cf. below, § iv); and accordingly nearly all scholars now place the dialogue close in date to the first Sicilian visit. That took place when Plato was σχεδὸν ἔτη τετταράκοντα γεγονώς (*Ep. vii* 324 a 6), i.e. about 389–387. (If we believe that on the return journey Plato fell into Spartan hands and was ransomed from slavery by Anniceris, who was just then on his way to the Olympic Games, his homecoming will be precisely dated 388; but the story is suspect.¹)

Before or after the Sicilian visit?

If the *Gorgias* preceded the visit to the West, which may be supposed to have occupied at least a year, the likely limits of date for its completion will be 390–388; if it followed, they will be 387–385. Some scholars prefer the earlier dating on the questionable chronological grounds considered above, or because according to the letter Plato's decision was taken before he left Athens, or because of the supposed relationship to Polycrates (see below, p. 29). None of these considerations has much force. Others urge that internal evidence supports the later dating.² Some of their arguments are weak: little can be built on the alleged 'Sicilisms' put in Gorgias' mouth at 450 b 9; or on a casual quotation from Epicharmus (505 e 1); or on the 'portrait of Dionysius I' which some have claimed to recognize in Plato's description of a typical tyrant (see commentary on 509 c 6–511 a 3). But perhaps the "Sicilian cookery-book" of Mithaecus (518 b 6) should not be dismissed so lightly: it may well represent a reminiscence of the *Siculae dapes* which Plato experienced with displeasure (*Ep. vii* 326 b, cf. *Rep.* 404 d). Again, the Pythagoreanism of the *Gorgias* is most naturally explained by a new personal influence, that of Archytas, whom Plato met for the first time on this western visit, though other explanations are doubtless possible.³ And Plato's acquaintance with an anonymous Pytha-

71 f.); we can see it in germ at *Gorg.* 521 d. I suspect that Plato had been rereading the *Gorgias* when he wrote the letter: the phrase about disregard of τὰ τῶν νόμων γράμματα (325 c 5) suggests *Gorg.* 484 a 4, while ἡλιγγιᾶν (325 e 3) recalls a later passage of the same speech (486 b 1).

¹ See most recently U. Kahrstedt, *Würzburger Jahrbücher* 1947, 295 ff.

² The dialogue is put before the visit by Pohlenz (167), Wilamowitz (i. 242), Field (74), and others; after it by Nestle (Einleitung, 23), Frank (*Platon und die sogenannten Pythagoreer*, 90), Stenzel (*Platon der Erzieher*, 92), Geffcken (*Hermes*, lxxv, 1930, 14 ff.), and others.

³ Plato's new-found interest in Pythagoreanism could have been the motive,

gorean text based on a west-Greek mythological poem (a text which he evidently does not expect his readers to know) would be most naturally acquired in Magna Graecia, even if we cannot identify its author as Archytas or Philolaus: see commentary on 492 d 1–493 d 4. These probabilities hardly add up to proof; but they may be thought to create a presumption in favour of the later dating—which exactly coincides with that deduced above from the relationship with the *Menexenus*. The sequence might then be *Euthydemus*—western visit—*Gorgias*—*Menexenus*—*Meno*.¹

The Gorgias and contemporary writers

Scholars have also tried to fix the date of the dialogue by relating it to contemporary works by Isocrates, Polycrates, Antisthenes, and Aeschines Socraticus. Something must be said of these attempts, although in my view they have thrown little or no additional light on the question.

(a) In the *contra sophistas*, published soon after he opened his school (*Antid.* 193), i.e. probably round about 390, and in the undated *Helena*, Isocrates engages in polemic against certain unnamed persons who give a purely theoretical instruction in philosophy, whose watchword is *ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλεια* (*c. soph.* 8), who claim to possess not *δόξα* but *ἐπιστήμη* (*Hel.* 5, cf. *c. soph.* 8), who pretend “that courage, wisdom, and justice are the same thing, and are not natural gifts” (*Hel.* 1). These persons are evidently Socratics, and presumably include Plato; but I see no reason at all to think with Jaeger² that in either place Isocrates is hitting specifically at the *Gorgias* (where the antithesis of *ἐπιστήμη* is *πίστις*, not *δόξα*, and wisdom is not among the virtues which are

rather than the result, of his visit to the West (Hackforth, Introduction to *Phaedo*, 6). Mr. Morrison, *CQ*, xlix (1956), 156, thinks the Pythagoreanism of the *Gorgias* pre-Archytan, and therefore earlier than the western visit, on the ground that it recommends the geometric mean in politics (508 a 6), but does not mention the harmonic mean, which for Archytas symbolised the best political constitution. The inference, however, is hardly a safe one: even if the Archytas passage (*apud* Stob. 4. 1. 137) is genuine (which many scholars have doubted), the fact remains that geometrical proportion is still the rule of justice for Aristotle (*E.N.* 1131^b13, *Pol.* 1301^b29) and, it would seem, for Plato in the *Laws* (757 bc).

¹ I cannot place the *Lysis* in relation to the *Gorgias*, and do not wish to exclude the possibility that it may belong to this period.

² *Paideia*, iii. 43, 303. Where we do find seeming echoes of, or answers to, the *Gorgias* is in the much later *Antidosis* (cf. 456 d with *Antid.* 252, 464 b ff. with 181 f., 485 a with 266–8, 502 e with 132 ff., 504 de with 84) and perhaps in another very late work, the *Panathenaicus* (cf. 469 c with *Panath.* 117 f., 485 a with 27 f.).

shown to be "the same thing"). Nor is there any real evidence of the reverse relationship, in which Thompson and others believed. The similarity of wording between *Gorg.* 463 a 6 ff. and *c. soph.* 17, on which they mainly relied, seems to me too slight and superficial to prove anything (cf. note ad loc.).

(b) Polycrates, a teacher of rhetoric, composed an imaginary *Κατηγορία Σωκράτους* (Isocrates, *Busiris* 4), which he put into the mouth of Anytus. It is lost, but some of its arguments can be reconstructed from the answers to it composed by Xenophon (*Mem.* 1. 1-2) and many centuries later by Libanius (*Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους* in vol. v of Förster's edition). As Richard Bentley was the first to point out, it must have been written after 394, since we know from Favorinus (*apud* Diog. L. 2. 39) that it mentioned the rebuilding of the Long Walls, which started in that year. It may thus have been about contemporary with the *Gorgias*, in which Plato took up again the questions raised at Socrates' trial; and since both works referred to the same (admittedly very famous) passage of Pindar (484.b.c; Libanius, 87), it is likely enough that there was some relationship between them. On this basis an immense scaffolding of confident conjecture has been erected by continental scholarship.¹ But is the *Gorgias* an answer to Polycrates, or did it provoke Polycrates' attack? There is no agreement. The former used to be the general assumption, and Wilamowitz's too ingenious inference from the Pindar passage (*Platon* ii. 95 ff.) fails in my view to upset it² (see commentary ad loc.). But one cannot help feeling that the *Gorgias* was not a very convincing reply to a charge that Socrates was *μισόδημος*, which had a prominent place in Polycrates' *Κατηγορία* (Libanius, 54, cf. *Mem.* 1. 2. 9 ff., schol. Aristides iii. 480 Dindorf). And to drag in two allusions to "my friend Alcibiades" (481 d, 519 a) may appear positively foolhardy, when one of the counts in the new accusation was that Alcibiades was Socrates' pupil (Isocrates, *Busiris* 5; *Mem.* 1. 2. 12; Libanius, 136-47). In fact, as

¹ See especially Gercke, *Einleitung*, xliii-1; H. Markowski, *de Libanio Socratis defensore* (Bresl. Abh. xl, 1910); J. Mesk, *Wien. Stud.* xxxii (1910), 56 ff.; Pohlenz, 164-7; Wilamowitz, ii. 95-105; J. Humbert, *Polycratès* (1930). In the commentary on 484 b 1-c 3 and on 522 b 8 I have tried to dismantle some of the more precarious scaffolding. Most of what is known or guessed about Polycrates' pamphlet has now been summarized for English readers by A.-H. Chroust, *Socrates, Man and Myth*, chap. 4; but his dating is much too confident.

² Except in so far as the *Gorgias* seems more likely to have suggested the quotation to Polycrates than vice versa.

Gigon has put it,¹ 'Plato shows himself astonishingly indifferent to the charges of Polycrates.' The reason may be that they had not yet been made. On the other hand, Plato's belittling of the Walls (517 c, 519 a) might account for Polycrates' anachronistic allusion to their rebuilding; his criticism of Themistocles and Miltiades (516 de) might rouse Polycrates to defend them (Libanius, 155); and his charge that Pericles made the Athenians ἀργοί (515 e) might provoke a similar charge against Socrates (Libanius, 127).

Whichever view we take, no useful inference can be drawn as to the date of the *Gorgias*. If the *Gorgias* followed the *Κατηγορία*, we can conclude it to be later than 394, which we knew already; if it preceded, we can draw no conclusion whatever, since we have no trustworthy *terminus ante quem*² for the *Κατηγορία*—the most one can say is that if its publication fell between that of the *Gorgias* and that of the *Meno*, it might account for the somewhat more tactful language used about Athenian statesmen in the latter dialogue,³ and also for the careful explanation in the *Symposium* of Socrates' relations with Alcibiades, which have "brought him a lot of trouble".⁴

(c) Still less can we determine the chronological relationship of the *Gorgias* to the *Ἀρχέλαος ἢ περὶ βασιλείας* of Antisthenes (see commentary on 470 c 9–471 d 2), or to his *Πολιτικός*, in which he "ran down all the Athenian demagogues" (Herodicus *apud* Athen. 220 d); nor do we in any case know the date of either of these lost works.

(d) Equally undatable is the long, extant passage in praise of Themistocles' cleverness from the *Alcibiades* of Aeschines Socraticus (Aristides ii. 292 Dind. = Aeschines fr. 8 Dittmar, now supplemented by P. Oxy. 1608). Dittmar and Pohlenz⁵ were possibly

¹ Commentary on *Memorabilia* Book I, p. 40.

² Pohlenz (164 n. 2) tried to construct one from the favourable mention of Conon by Polycrates (Libanius, 160), which he declared not to be 'thinkable' after 392/391. I cannot see why: indeed, the allusion to him and Thrasybulus suggests, if anything, a time when both were dead. Chroust (72) adds no argument that will stand criticism.

³ Behind the figure of Anytus, with his complaint that Socrates too lightly vilifies eminent men (*Meno* 94 e), it is tempting to see Polycrates complaining of the *Gorgias*. Cf. R. Hirzel, *Rh. Mus.* xlii (1887), 249 f.; Dümmler, *Akademika*, 28 f.

⁴ *Symp.* 213 c. Cf. Robin's introduction, x–xi.

⁵ H. Dittmar, *Aeschines von Sphettos*, 113, 158; Pohlenz, 183 ff. Taylor in his essay on Aeschines (*Philosophical Essays*, 1 ff.) attempted to smooth over the discrepancy between Aeschines' view of Themistocles and that presented in the *Gorgias*; but it

right in thinking that Aeschines wrote it to undo the harm done to Socrates' memory by his unkind handling of the great democratic statesman in the *Gorgias*, and that Plato was thus led to make him speak of Themistocles somewhat more politely in the *Meno* (93 e); but these guesses are clearly very speculative.

iv. PLATO AND ATHENS

FOR the modern reader the main interest of the *Gorgias* does not lie in its formal 'dialectical' arguments, whose logic is seldom entirely convincing and sometimes transparently fallacious.¹ His reaction to them is apt to be that of Callicles at 513 c: *δοκεῖς εὖ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι*. Socrates' reasoning does indeed serve to clarify Callicles' real position by removing ambiguities and bringing out its full implications; but that position cannot in the end be disproved by any formal 'refutation', only by an appeal to the experience of living.² The passages which move a reader today, as they have done in the past,³ are those which make this appeal—the comparison of Archelaus and Socrates (470 d–474 c), the comparison of *λίθου βίος* (492 e) and *χαραδριοῦ βίος* (494 b) or *ληστοῦ βίος* (507 e), the rejection of a life whose highest value is the avoidance of death (511 a–513 c). In such passages, and in the great *ῥῆσις* of Callicles, two opposing ideals are brought into relation with real experience, so that they come warmly and vividly to life. It is now fashionable to hold that the making of

remains, I think, undeniable, however we choose to explain it. Xen. *Mem.* 4. 2. 2 seems to agree with Aeschines.

¹ Cf. commentary on 474 c 4–476 a 2; 477 e 7–479 e 9; 507 a 4–c 7. A detailed discussion of some of the fallacies of the *Gorgias* will be found in a forthcoming book, *Merit and Responsibility*, by my pupil Arthur Adkins.

² Hence the part played at crucial places in the discussion by *αἰσχύνη* (461 b, 482 d, 494 c–e). Each of Socrates' opponents reaches a point (a different point in each case) where he shrinks from a conclusion repugnant to ordinary moral sense; for none of them is prepared to say that *all* moral judgements are meaningless. A society which had lost the capacity for *αἰσχύνη* was in Plato's view a doomed society (*Laws* 701 ab).

³ It is safe to say that the Corinthian farmer in Aristotle's dialogue (fr. 64 Rose³, pp. 23 f. Ross), who on reading the *Gorgias* left his farm and "put his soul under Plato's guidance", was moved less by the cogency of its reasoning than by its moral appeal as an affirmation of a new way of life. He is an early example of the sort of 'conversion to philosophy' discussed by A. D. Nock, *Conversion*, chap. xi. The *Dialogus* of Tacitus seems also to reflect the moral impression made by the *Gorgias*: see F. Egermann, *Hermes*, lxx (1935), 424 ff.

value-judgements is no part of a philosopher's business. Plato, rightly or wrongly, thought otherwise; he is one of the great moralists, not as dealing in virtuous platitudes, but in the undebased eighteenth-century sense of the term, as deepening our understanding of man's moral life.

The secret of the peculiar emotional power of the *Gorgias* is, I think, that its author felt the issue as a deeply personal one, and has communicated the resulting tension to his readers. We are repeatedly reminded that Socrates has wagered his life on his decision (486 ab, 511 ab, 521 c); and he foresees that he will lose his wager, as the world understands losing (521 e ff.). Yet he is completely confident that he has made the right choice for his own happiness (the issue is judged throughout, by Socrates as well as Callicles, in terms of happiness, not in terms of 'duty'). This is a reaffirmation of what was affirmed in the *Apology*, but with the difference that here, behind the figures of Socrates and Callicles, we can for once catch sight of Plato himself. For in the light of the *Seventh Letter* (see above, p. 25) it is fairly clear that the *Gorgias* is more than an *apologia* for Socrates; it is at the same time Plato's *apologia pro vita sua*.¹ Behind it stands Plato's decision to forgo the political career towards which both family tradition and his own inclinations (*Ep. vii* 325 e 1) had urged him, and instead to open a school of philosophy. The decision was, as he tells us, the outcome of a long internal struggle, and that struggle seems to have left its mark on certain pages of the *Gorgias*: we shall hardly be wrong in hearing an echo of it in Socrates' bitter words about the cloud of false witnesses from the best Athenian families whom Polus can call to prove him mistaken (472 a-c); or in the sneer of Callicles at people who turn their backs on public life "to spend the rest of their days whispering in a corner with three or four young lads" (485 d); or in Socrates' final call to a new way of living, without which there can be no true statesmanship (527 de).²

These personal tones give the *Gorgias* a unique place among the dialogues. It is also unique, or nearly so, in another respect.

¹ That the *Gorgias* is 'Plato's Apology' was first said by Schleiermacher in the introduction to his translation of the dialogue (pp. 15 f. of the 3rd edition).

² Cf. Wilamowitz, i. 232-8. The enduring importance of Wilamowitz's 'biographical novel' or 'Plato for housemaids' (as the stuffier sort of critics called it) is that it has compelled subsequent writers to think of Plato as a man and not as a self-generating system of metaphysics.

Apart from some short passages in the *Laws*,¹ nowhere else in the dialogues has Plato told us *directly* what he thought of the institutions and achievements of his native city. Before the *Gorgias*, the question of the Just and the Unjust Society has not yet emerged into the foreground of his thought. After it, the question is usually examined in the abstract, without specific reference to Athens; thus when the charges of the *Gorgias* are repeated at *Rep.* 426 bc, they are applied to "badly managed cities" in general, though no doubt the reader is expected to have Athens in mind. The experiment of direct and detailed criticism is one which Plato found it unnecessary, and perhaps inexpedient, to repeat.

Born within a couple of years of Pericles' death, at a time when the Periclean society still seemed intact, or nearly so, Plato had witnessed as a boy its gradual disintegration under the stress of war; as a young man in his early twenties he had experienced its death-agonies. For the major part of his life this vanished world was more real to his imagination than that in which he lived and worked; it is the world of all his dialogues down to the *Theaetetus* at least, even though the voices of a later time are increasingly audible in it. At first he seems to have looked back to it with the kind of simple regretful affection that people felt in the nineteen-twenties for the world they had known before 1914—witness the evident pleasure with which in the introduction to the *Protagoras* he depicts a typical scene from 'the good days before the war'. After the rule of the Thirty, that was no doubt an almost universal sentiment.² But by the time the restored democracy had celebrated its tenth birthday sentimental regrets were beginning to translate themselves in many Athenian minds into positive ambitions. Athens was on her feet again economically; the Long Walls had been rebuilt, and Conon, like a second Themistocles, had created a new Athenian navy. Might one not live to see the Periclean ἀρχή restored? And in the meantime, should not the structure of the Periclean Welfare State be completed by making it financially possible for every Athenian to attend the Assembly?³

Such questions forced Plato to meditate more deeply than he had yet done on the causes which had brought about the

¹ Especially 698 a–701 b. I leave out of account *Alc.* i 118 b–120 c, which is suspect of being an imitation based on *Gorgias* and *Meno*.

² Cf. *Ep.* vii 324 d 7: ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ χρυσὸν ἀποδείξαντας τὴν ἔμπροσθεν πολιτείαν.

³ Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 41. 3. We do not know the date at which this step was actually taken.

material and spiritual ruin of Periclean Athens.¹ And the result of his meditation is stated in blunt terms in the *Gorgias*. He declines to put the whole blame for the collapse on the generation of Alcibiades (who were at most *συνάιτιοι*, 519 b), or on the misdeeds of one political party.² The ultimate responsibility rested in his view on Pericles himself and on those earlier leaders who had made the Periclean society possible—in fact, on the whole fifth-century conception of the statesman's task. Nothing could be more misleading than to say as W. C. Greene has done³—perhaps in a mistaken attempt to make Plato more acceptable to the American public—that 'what Plato is attacking is not what we conceive as "democracy" . . . what he attacks is the irresponsible late-fifth- and fourth-century dictatorship of the proletariat'. On the contrary, what he attacks in the *Gorgias* is the whole way of life of a society which measures its 'power' by the number of ships in its harbours and of dollars in its treasury, its 'well-being' by the standard of living of its citizens. Such a society, he holds, was Periclean Athens, a society whose basically corrupt principles led to the corruption of all its institutions, musical and dramatic as well as political and social.

Later Greek opinion was, not surprisingly, shocked at this sort of criticism (see commentary on 515 b 6–517 a 6); and no doubt it shocked Plato's contemporaries also (see on 502 d 10–503 d 3). Much of it looks unfair today. He mentions the dockyards (517 c, 519 a) but not the Parthenon; he condemns the dramatists along with the politicians for flattering the prejudices of the mob (502 b), but forgets the *Trojan Women* and the *Knights*; he ignores the economic conditions which made the Periclean *μισθοφορία* (515 e) a necessity if democracy was to be more than a façade. Yet both

¹ Cf. Field, 123 ff. Professor Michael Oakeshott has recently observed that 'the pedigree of every political ideology shows it to be the creature, not of premeditation in advance of political activity, but of meditation upon a manner of politics' (*Political Education*, 14). Plato's political theory is in my view no exception, despite his professed contempt for *ἐμπειρία*.

² The great 'conservative' families are mocked no less than the Alcmaeonids, 472 ab; Miltiades and Cimon are condemned equally with Themistocles and Pericles, 515 b–517 a. I cannot agree with Magalhaes-Vilhena (and some other recent writers) that Plato was particularly concerned to defend 'l'avenir de sa classe' (author's italics), or that his aim was 'permettre aux aristocrates, aux classes esclavagistes dirigeantes . . . de retrouver un nouvel accès au pouvoir' (*Socrate et la légende platonicienne*, 139). The *Gorgias* does not lend itself to these Marxist simplifications.

³ *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, lxi (1953), 59.

on the immediate political issue—against views like those expressed by Isocrates in the *Panegyricus*—and on the wider moral one it could be argued that history has proved him right. We can see clearly enough now that 404 was the end of an age,¹ and the clock could not be put back; the Periclean ἀρχή was an unrepeatable historical accident. We also know from experience that as the belief in traditional moral standards is progressively undermined, the foundations of democracy become increasingly insecure; we are in a position to verify (as our parents were not) Plato's analysis of the way in which the corruption of democracy opens the road to tyranny. And in the light of our own experience we can understand Plato's view that his country's first need was not for a new machinery of living but for a new way of life which at least a few might try to follow—κάπειτα οὕτω κοινῇ ἀσκήσαντες, τότε ἤδη, εἰὰν δοκῇ χρῆναι, ἐπιθησόμεθα τοῖς πολιτικοῖς (527 d 2).

II. THE EVIDENCE FOR THE TEXT

i. THE MEDIEVAL MANUSCRIPTS

'CRITICAL work on the text of Plato, which in the second half of the nineteenth century had taken an all too easy but mistaken path, had to make a fresh start in the last years before the war [of 1914–18] and is still in its beginnings.' So wrote Pasquali² in 1934; and despite the contributions which have been made in the interval by Post, Jachmann, Bickel, Theiler, des Places,³ and others the statement remains broadly true today, at any rate as regards the first seven tetralogies. To this day no one can say with certainty how many primary witnesses to the text there are,⁴ or how they are related to each other and to the secondary MSS.

¹ More clearly, I imagine, than anyone could see it at the time. For Plato's contemporaries there would be at first no conscious transition from one 'age' to another, but only a day following a day. Compare the gradual and reluctant realization of the break in culture produced by the First World War.

² G. Pasquali, *Storia della Tradizione e Critica del Testo*², 247.

³ In his Budé edition of the *Laws* (Parts i and ii, 1951), which sets a new standard of precision in presenting the manuscript evidence. For the other works referred to, see List of Works Cited, at the end of this book.

⁴ Schanz recognized only two witnesses, B and T (the 'easy path' condemned by Pasquali); Burnet used also W (in the *Gorgias* P) and F; the Budé editors have added Y; Theiler has suggested (without collating them) a number of others; while Jachmann (235) thinks that 'a couple of dozen manuscripts' should be taken into account.

The main cause of this ignorance is the lack of trustworthy collations. There are at least 64¹ extant MSS. which contain the *Gorgias*, or part of it. Of these only two, B and T, have been accurately collated in their entirety. In the *Gorgias* a third primary witness, W, has hitherto been known only from a few selected readings; a fourth, F, has been gravely misreported (see below, p. 42). For most of the remaining MSS. we are still dependent on the notoriously unreliable collations of Bekker and Stallbaum; some have never been collated at all.

For this state of affairs the present edition does not pretend to offer any complete or final remedy: that is a task which must be left to the next editor of *Platonis Opera Omnia*—such questions cannot be settled on the basis of a single dialogue. I have tried, however, to give a faithful report of the evidence of the four main witnesses, B, T, W, and F; and I have considered the claims which have been made in recent years for certain other MSS., particularly Laurentianus 85. 7 (Flor. x), Laurentianus 85. 6 (Flor. b), Parisinus 2110 (V), and Vind. phil. gr. 21 (Y).

In what follows, the recognized primary witnesses are grouped in two families, on the ground that B, T, and WP, even if derived (as I incline on the whole to believe) from distinct uncial exemplars, are much more closely related to one another than any of them is to F, which I regard as the sole primary representative of the second family.

1. *The First Family: B T W and P*

B

The Bodleian MS. Clarkianus 39 (B) is our oldest medieval witness to the *Gorgias*, and was at one time thought to be the only primary witness. It has often been described—most fully by Waddell and Allen.² A *subscriptio* tells us that it was written in 895 by “John the Calligrapher” for the Byzantine scholar Arethas, who was at that time Deacon at Patras and later³ became Archbishop of Caesarea. It contains the first six tetralogies

¹ I take this figure from Post’s list, which includes in all 178 manuscripts containing some part of Plato’s works.

² W. G. Waddell, Introduction to *Parmenides*, ciii ff., with two facsimile pages; T. W. Allen, Preface to the complete photographic facsimile of B (Leiden, 1898).

³ This unfortunately removes the basis of Bickel’s suggestion (140) that B was copied from an old book in the episcopal library at Caesarea, where there may have been a tradition of Platonic studies going back to the time of Basil the Great.

in their tetralogical order, and never contained more; probably it was the first volume of a complete Plato.¹ It has been corrected throughout by a contemporary hand (B²), presumably a διορθωτής who checked the scribe's work against his exemplar; this is now usually accepted as being the hand of Arethas himself.² The same hand entered variants in the margin, some of which are introduced by the words ἐν ἄλλῳ, indicating that either B or one of its ancestors has been collated with another MS. Further variants (or conjectures) have been added by a succession of later hands; as these are seldom or never of independent value, at least in the *Gorgias*, I have not attempted to distinguish them but have followed Burnet in calling them collectively 'b' or, if they are plainly very late, 'rec. b'. The margins also contain two sets of scholia. One set (those edited as 'Arethae scholia' by Greene) were written by B²; as they are in the main peculiar to this MS., some have thought that they were composed or compiled by Arethas himself, but it seems more likely that the bulk of them were copied from the exemplar. The other set (Greene's 'scholia vetera') are for the most part found also in T and W, and were introduced into B later than the first set and evidently from a different source. In the *Gorgias* these outnumber the Arethan scholia by two to one, and are written in an early hand, which could be that of Arethas himself in later life.³ On the character and origin of the scholia see below, pp. 60 ff.

B was the last of the great Plato MSS. to reach the West. It was discovered in 1801 by Porson's friend, the Cambridge mineralogist E. D. Clarke, in the Monastery of the Apocalypse on the island of Patmos, 'lying upon the floor, a prey to the damp and to worms'.⁴ Clarke bought it from the Superior, and eight

¹ The second volume may well have been the extant though now incomplete MS. O (Vat. gr. 1), which is of about the same date as B though certainly in a different hand, and appears originally to have contained all of Plato that is not in B. Lenz, *Gött. Nachr.* 1933, thinks that the O scholia are in the same hand as the 'Arethae scholia' in B—which, if true, would be almost decisive—but this is denied by Post (9 n. 7) and Greene (*Praefatio* xxii), though accepted by Maas (*Byz. Zeitschr.* xxxiv, 177 f.) and des Places (*Introd.* ccviii).

² For the evidence cf. Greene, *Praefatio*, xx ff. T. W. Allen originally refused to believe that so great a man as Arethas could occupy himself with the menial tasks of a διορθωτής. But Arethas had a passion for MSS., and in 895 he was not yet a great public figure. In his later Oxford lectures Allen recanted his earlier views.

³ Greene, *Praef.* xv. Cf. Allen, *Praef.* vii f., where this hand is called F.

⁴ E. D. Clarke, *Travels in various countries of Europe, Asia and Africa*, Part II, Section ii (1814), 348.

years later it was acquired with his other MSS. by the Bodleian; there Gaisford examined it, and in 1820 he published a collation, thus initiating a revolution in the criticism of the text. A more exact and detailed collation was subsequently made by Schanz, and this was in turn checked by Burnet. In the present edition I accept Burnet's report save where the contrary is stated, but I have rechecked a few doubtful points.

Comparison of early catalogues of the Patmos library shows that it acquired B at some date between 1201 and 1355.¹ Its seclusion on a remote island during the late Byzantine and Renaissance periods may explain the otherwise rather surprising fact that although B is our oldest authority for the dialogues which it contains it had little influence on the general tradition of Plato as compared with T and W. Among all the secondary MSS. which contain the *Gorgias* Schanz recognized only one, Vaticanus 225 (Bekker's Δ), which is perhaps of the fifteenth century, as dependent on B, and that only partially (the resemblance to B only begins in the later pages of the *Gorgias*).²

T

After a period during which B reigned without a rival, a second MS. was recognized by Schanz as a primary source and the main fountain-head of the later Byzantine tradition. This is Marcianus Append. Class. 4. 1 (Venetus T). It contains (apart from Renaissance additions which do not concern us) the first seven tetralogies and part of the eighth, breaking off abruptly at *Rep.* 389 d 7; and is dated on palaeographic grounds to the late eleventh or the early twelfth century. At the end of the seventh tetralogy it has a note τέλος τοῦ α' βιβλίου, which indicates its descent from a two-volume work, presumably a complete text of the whole of Plato. Now the famous MS. A (Parisinus 1807, written *circa* 900), containing the eighth and ninth tetralogies, *Definitions*, and *Spuria*, is evidently the second volume of such a text; and in the eighth tetralogy, where T overlaps with A, there are strong reasons for thinking T a copy of A. It is therefore a likely guess that in the earlier tetralogies T was copied from the

¹ C. Diehl, *Byz. Zeitschr.* i (1892), 496 ff.

² Schanz, *Platocodex*, 68 f. Some MSS., however, have not been classified, and others may have been classified wrongly.

lost first volume of A, and can be treated as representing the A tradition for this part of Plato.¹

T has been checked against its exemplar, apparently by the scribe himself. Where he has copied the words in a false order (as he was prone to do), he has usually indicated the true order by transposition marks; and he has written corrections (or variants) in the margin, some of which he subsequently introduced into the text. There are also occasional corrections in later hands (t). The MS. is furnished with 'old' scholia in the same hand as the text. Change of speaker is indicated by a horizontal stroke in the margin, as in A and in many papyri (most other medieval MSS., and some papyri, use a double dot [:] in the text for this purpose; names are usually omitted, save where a fresh interlocutor intervenes). For a fuller description see Schanz or Waddell.²

How close is the relationship between B and T? Burnet, who rejected the derivation of T from the missing first volume of A, thought that B and T might be copies of the same exemplar;³ and in the *Gorgias* the differences between them are perhaps slight enough to be consistent with such a view. B, however, exhibits here and there what looks like an uncial error peculiar to itself, e.g. *Lysis* 204 a 3 δῆ for ἄν, *Meno* 88 c 3 λέγε for δέ γε, *Alc. i* 123 a 3 γεγραμμένα for τετραμμένα. Moreover, Král pointed out long ago that the two MSS. differ far more often and more widely in some dialogues than they do in others: he found the difference greatest in *Phaedrus*, *Alcibiades i*, *Erastae*, least in *Gorgias* and *Meno*. To explain this curious fact, he suggested that in the former group the hyparchetype was more amply furnished with variants and glosses than in the latter.⁴ But it would surely be odd if such variants were more abundant in the little-read *Erastae* than in popular dialogues like the *Gorgias* and the *Meno*. I think the true explanation may lie, not in divergence due to choice of different variants, but in convergence due to contamination:⁵ it looks rather as if B and T represent different traditions of the

¹ A. Jordan, *Hermes*, xiii (1878), 478 ff.; Schanz, *Platocodex*, 78 and *Rh. Mus.* 1878, 303 ff.; Alline, 214; Bickel, 138.

² Schanz, *Platocodex*, 1 ff.; Waddell, Introduction to *Parmenides*, cxxii ff., with a facsimile page.

³ *CQ*, viii (1914), 231.

⁴ J. Král, *Wien. Stud.* xiv (1892), 188.

⁵ The antiquity of contamination in the tradition of Plato is shown by the *Protagoras* papyrus, Oxy. 1624, which has been systematically corrected, almost certainly from another MS. For later examples of contamination see below, pp. 45, 54.

text, but in certain dialogues the two traditions have been brought into closer uniformity through correction of an ancestor of B from an ancestor of T or vice versa. This would also explain how W can be right, as it sometimes is, against the joint testimony of B and T, even if each of the three is independently derived from the hyparchetype: the agreement of two witnesses against a third can be the result of collusion.

W and P

Thus far we have been dealing with MSS. which clearly derive from a two-volume edition of Plato, in which the dialogues were presented in tetralogical order. The origin of the next group of MSS.—W, P, and their congeners¹—is less clear.

W (Vindobonensis suppl. phil. gr. 7) contains in its older part, which alone concerns us, Tetralogies I to III followed by the dialogues of Tetralogies IV to VII in a jumbled order and with the omission of *Alc. ii*. It contains 'old' scholia in the scribe's hand, closely resembling, but not always identical with,² those of T and B². Current opinion assigns it tentatively to the twelfth century; but Diels³ thought it belonged to the eleventh, and Dr. Paul Maas tells me that he would date it c. 950–1050, which would make it older than T. That it is independent of both B and T was proved by Král⁴ for a long series of dialogues, including the *Gorgias*, and is now universally accepted. In the *Gorgias*, however, its text has not hitherto been fully known, as only a few selected readings were available to Burnet, and Croiset's report adds but little to these. I have therefore made a fresh collation from photographs generously placed at my disposal by the Association Budé.⁵

W may have been the first extant MS. of Plato to reach Italy. It was probably acquired in Greece or Sicily in the fourteenth

¹ These include Vaticanus 1029 up to and including the *Menexenus*; Vind. 109 (32), which is Bekker's Φ ; and the Lobcovicianus. All three are generally thought to depend on W. The W tradition is also the original basis of the Y text, at least in the *Gorgias*: see below, p. 54.

² In schol. 494 e, W alone preserves the true text *ἰνυγος*, and in schol. 496 e the true text *καθὼς ἐν τῷ*.

³ *Berl. Sitzb.* 1906, 749. So now H. Hunger, *Katalog, Supplementum Graecum* (1957).

⁴ *Wien. Stud.* xiv (1892), 161–208.

⁵ Working from photographs I have not always been able to distinguish the different hands which have introduced variants. On these see R. Hensel, *Vindiciae Platonicae* (diss. 1906), 41 ff.

century by Nerio Acciaiuoli, from whose family it passed in 1478 to the Certosa near Florence, and thence in 1725 to Vienna (Immisch, 66 ff.; Post, 33, has a slightly different view of its acquisition).

P (Palatinus Vaticanus 173) is a book of selections. In addition to the *Gorgias* it contains five other complete dialogues (all of which are in W), followed by extracts from a number of others (some of which are not in W). Stevenson dated it tenth to eleventh century, which would make it roughly coeval with W (as dated by Maas). It is in any case independent of W, as W of it. Král proved this for the *Meno* and *Hippias major*;¹ and it is true in our dialogue also.² The two MSS. are, however, extremely similar, so similar in the *Gorgias* that they may well have been copied from the same exemplar. Accordingly, P rarely adds anything to what we learn from W, and I have quoted it only in these rare cases. Burnet's report of it rests on a collation by P. S. McIntyre, which I have been able to correct in a few places, thanks to the kindness of Mr. M. C. Stokes who checked for me selected readings of P during a brief visit to Rome.

The origin of WP, and their relationship to B and T, remains uncertain. Some have held that they represent only a Byzantine recension,³ which drew on some lost source as well as on the T tradition; others that they derive from a separate ancient exemplar, distinct from those postulated for B and T. The second of these opinions was strengthened by the discovery that a number of W's characteristic readings were known to the author of the papyrus commentary on the *Theaetetus*, published by Diels and Schubart in 1905, which dates from the second century A.D. In view, however, of the peculiar make-up of both W and P it is unsafe to assume that their contents necessarily derive from a single uniform source.⁴ And in the *Gorgias* some striking agreements between W and T do suggest the possibility of a common

¹ Loc. cit. 205. The independence of P was first pointed out by Jordan, *Hermes*, xiii (1878).

² e.g. P has the words omitted by W at 459 a 3, 465 c 1, and 474 e 7, while W is free from P's omissions at 479 a 4, 521 c 7, and 527 a 9. At 464 d 1 P and Aristides alone preserve the true reading (apart from late correctors who have restored it in B and elsewhere).

³ It should be noted that W is not entirely free from false conjectures, e.g. at 492 b 2 and 493 c 4.

⁴ Cf. Bickel 144, where the difference in this respect between tetralogical MSS. and 'Mischcodices' like W is rightly stressed.

hyparchetype.¹ Yet even in the *Gorgias* there are a few indications pointing to derivation from a different uncial MS. W has occasional uncial errors, or what look like uncial errors, peculiar to itself, such as λέγειν for ἄγειν (461 c 4), δόκει for ἄσκει (variant at 486 c 5), and a marked tendency to confuse τε and γε (450 d 7, 457 d 5, 496 c 3, 512 e 1). Moreover at 493 b 4 W and Iamblichus agree in a false reading against all other witnesses.² On this evidence I have, with some hesitation, placed WP in a separate group, though it remains possible (I think likely) that their separate tradition has been hybridized with that of T.

2. *The Second Family: F*

All the MSS. so far considered appear to represent the same ancient edition of the text; indeed, their similarity is such that it has been possible for some scholars to argue that all descend from a single copy of this edition, which was discovered and transcribed during the renaissance of scholarship at Byzantium in the ninth century. We now come to a MS. which is demonstrably of different origin. This is Vindobonensis suppl. phil. gr. 39, christened F by Schneider, who first collated it for his edition of the *Republic* published in 1830. It contains the dialogues from Tetralogy VI. 3 (*Gorgias*) to Tetralogy IX. 1 (*Minos*) inclusive,³ in their tetralogical order, save that *Ion* and *Menexenus* are transposed.

Schneider noticed how frequently its readings agreed with quotations in Stobaeus and Eusebius; but it was Burnet⁴ who first established its importance (a) by listing instances of its agreement, both in true and in false readings, with the indirect tradition, and (b) by listing errors peculiar to F which are of unmistakably uncial origin. His conclusion, that F was independently derived from an uncial exemplar which represented an ancient tradition of the text distinct from that preserved in our

¹ Particularly noteworthy are the identical error at 481 d 6 and the identical interpolation at 500 b 4; identical variants at 486 c 4, 491 b 8, 519 e 1.

² I discount the agreement of W with F and Aristides in omitting a long clause at 465 c 1, since there is a good mechanical reason for the omission.

³ These contents in themselves suggest a different origin from that of the other primary MSS. BTW evidently descend from a two-volume edition of Platonis Opera Omnia, of which the first volume usually contained the first seven tetralogies, as indicated by the note in T. But it looks as if in the edition from which F descends the division into volumes was different.

⁴ CR, xvi (1902), 98 ff.; xvii (1903), 12 ff.

older medieval MSS., was later elaborated and confirmed by Deneke,¹ and can be accepted as certain. (If further confirmation is wanted, it is supplied by the papyrus fragments of the *Gorgias*, most of which were unknown to Burnet and Deneke. Thus at 486 d 6, where BTW have εὖ εἴσεσθαι ὅτι and F has ἤδη εὖ εἴσεσθαι ὅτι ἦ, P.S.I. 1200 has ἤδη εὖ εἴσεσθαι ὅτιῃ. Again, at 522 d 8, where BTW have ῥαδίως ἴδοις ἄν με, both F and P.S.I. 119 have ἴδοις ἄν με ῥαδίως, and so, apparently, had the Fouad I papyrus, to judge from what is left of it. The F tradition thus goes back at least as far as the second century A.D., to which all these papyri belong.) F accordingly holds a unique position among the manuscripts of Plato.

The Král-Burnet collation of F

Burnet did not collate F himself; his information about its readings was supplied to him by Josef Král, except for the *Republic*, where he had Schneider's collation. His report has generally been accepted without question by subsequent editors. But the results of a fresh collation, which I have made from good photographs, are decidedly disconcerting. They show that in the *Gorgias* at least his report is not only very incomplete—as was inevitable, owing to the restricted amount of *apparatus criticus* allowable in an Oxford Classical Text—but in many places quite false. In particular, he attributes to F a large number of 'good' readings which are not in fact to be found there. According to Burnet's *apparatus* F has at 450 c 4 οὔτοι: at 459 c 8 πρὸς λόγον: at 471 c 1 τοῦ Περδίκκου: at 472 e 5 πάντως: at 477 d 2 ἐστι καὶ: at 479 c 7 εἰ σοί γε δοκεῖ: at 480 a 4 ἀδικήσει: at 486 a 1 διατρέπεις: at 509 c 3 τοῦ μῆ: at 514 a 3 φῶμεν: at 515 c 1 πολῖται without article: at 516 d 9 Μαραθῶνι without preposition: at 522 c 7 ἐν. All these readings are plausible, and some necessary; all of them were already known, either as modern conjectures or from inferior MS. sources, before F was examined; all of them had been adopted in Schanz's edition of 1880; but unless my photographs lie, not one of them can be found in F—its reading in all these places is identical with that of BTW, save at 509 c 3 where it has τὸ μῆ. How did these alarming errors arise? They cannot be the result of mere carelessness, though Král was in fact a careless collator; on the other hand there can be no question of

¹ *De Platonis . . . F memoria* (diss. Göttingen, 1922).

impugning either his good faith or Burnet's. It looks rather as if Burnet had misinterpreted Král's silence in these places as meaning that F agreed with Schanz, whereas it really meant that F agreed with BTW. But whatever their origin, these misstatements seriously impair the foundation of Burnet's text (and those of Croiset and Theiler) in this dialogue. Nor are they the only ones. Král has sometimes confused the hand of the scribe (F) with that of the corrector (f, see below), e.g. at 482 d 5, where Burnet would surely have adopted *κατεγέλα* had he known it to be the reading of F as in fact it is (*καταγελᾶν* f with BTW). Further, Král (or less probably Burnet) has omitted to record a number of readings in F which have a *prima facie* claim to consideration, such as *ἐάν γε ἄρα* for *ἐὰν γὰρ ἄρα* (a collocation which Wilamowitz doubted) at 469 d 3; the addition of *εἴη* after *πορίζεσθαι* at 493 e 7 (which appears also in Iamblichus' citation); and *συμβουλεύσειν* for *συμβουλεύειν* at 520 e 4 (supporting a conjecture of Cobet).

The corrector of F

The original text of F had numerous lacunae, which the scribe recognized as such, since he left blank spaces; their distribution reveals their origin in some mechanical injury to the exemplar, probably wormholes.¹ These lacunae have been filled by another hand, which with Burnet I shall call f (in the Budé editions it is called F²). This hand has also supplied the scribe's other omissions, corrected many of his casual blunders, and written numerous variants between the lines or in the margin. It has sometimes been supposed that its readings, or some of them, may have been drawn from F's exemplar and should therefore be taken seriously—so most recently Professor Theiler. But f has been even more incompletely and incorrectly reported than has F; and a more accurate collation removes all ground for this supposition.

(a) f is able to supply words which in F's uncial source had been obliterated by mechanical injury.

(b) f corrects F to agree with the main tradition even in places where the original reading of F is manifestly right, and may therefore be presumed to have stood in F's exemplar: e.g. 492 b 2 *ὅσοις* F *recte*, *θεοῖς* BTPf (Burnet's *apparatus* is wrong, and has misled Theiler); 492 d 7 *ἀμόθεν* [sic] F, *ἀμόθεν* Bekker *recte*,

¹ See *JHS*, lxxvii (1957), 26.

ἄλλοθεν BTWf (Burnet's *apparatus* is again wrong); 493 b 1 ἀνοήτων F Iamb. Stob. *recte*, ἀμνήτων BTWf; 500 b 4 f interpolates κατὰ (not περὶ) τὸ σῶμα with TW.

(c) Where the readings introduced by f diverge from the main tradition, they nearly always agree—as Theiler has himself pointed out—with Florentinus 85. 6 (Stallbaum's Laur. b); in the few cases where they do not, they have the appearance of worthless conjectures. Evidence of the close connexion between f and Flor. 85. 6 will be quoted below, pp. 51 f., where it will be shown that Flor. 85. 6 has nothing to do with F but represents a recension of the T text.

(d) The one good reading in the *Gorgias* for which f seems to be our sole authority is τίνος for τίς, written by f in the margin at 462 d 11; and this exception is more apparent than real, for Flor. 85. 6 has the meaningless conflation τίς τίνος, evidently representing τίς with τίνος suprascript.

I conclude that f has no independent importance, at least in the *Gorgias*.

The relationship of Florentinus x to F

Is F the sole independent witness to the tradition which it represents? Burnet thought so.¹ But the claims of Florentinus x (Laur. 85. 7), a MS. identical in contents with F but considerably later (it was written in 1420), have several times been put forward—tentatively by James Adam, who realized the shakiness of the evidence, more confidently by Immisch and Theiler.² And on the basis of the information hitherto available about F and x the claim was an entirely reasonable one. Unfortunately, full collation of F in the *Gorgias*, combined with a fresh inspection of crucial passages in x, shows that the appearance of independence is in fact illusory: it arose merely from the mistakes of Král (or the omissions of Burnet) in collating F and the still more numerous mistakes of Stallbaum in collating x. Readings hitherto thought peculiar to F, like δεῖν at 449 c 7, τέχνης ἐπιστήμων at 449 c 9, καὶ λέγειν at 449 e 6, φήσκει at 452 c 5, are in fact found also in x. Conversely, readings like νῦν διερωτᾶν at 447 c 6, σὺ

¹ See the articles referred to in n. 4, p. 41.

² Adam, *CR*, xvi (1902), 215; Immisch, *Philologische Studien zu Platon*, ii. 84, n. 1; Theiler, *op. cit.* 138. In 1420, as we learn from a note on f. 262^v of F, that MS. was in the possession of the Venetian collector Francesco Barbaro, who might well have a copy made for the use of Guarino, Poggio, or some other of his learned friends.

κρίνεις at 452 c 4, οὐ γὰρ at 505 b 7, which appeared to distinguish x from F, now prove to be in F also. In the instance quoted by Theiler to show the independence of x, 451 a 7, the interlinear variants added by f were misreported by Král: they are in fact identical with the variants written by the first hand in the margin of x. In a few cases readings foreign to F have been introduced into x by a second hand, e.g. δῆ for τοίνυν at 454 b 5; but that seems to be all. On the other hand, there is strong positive evidence that x is derived from F. Thus at 448 d 8 F has a half-erased σε which could easily be read as γε: above it f has written σοι (the reading of BTW): x has γε σοι. Again, at 449 b 7 F has ἀποθέσθαι, above which f has written να (i.e. ἀναθέσθαι, the reading of Flor. 85. 6): x has ἀναποθέσθαι. In the same line F has ψεύση, above which f has written μέμψη: x has the nonsense word μεύση, corrected by the second hand to μέμψη. We must regretfully conclude, with Schanz and Burnet, that x is a copy of F, made after the latter had been corrected by f.

The exemplar of F

Full collation of F tends strongly to confirm Deneke's view that it is a direct or almost direct transcript from an uncial MS. Not only does it abound, as Burnet pointed out, in uncial errors foreign to the main tradition, but it is also characterized, to an extent which could not be guessed from Burnet's *apparatus*, by faulty word-division, false accents, wildly erratic punctuation, and false distribution between speakers. These features suggest an exemplar in which words were not divided, accents few or non-existent, punctuation scanty, change of speakers perhaps marked only by a marginal paragraphos—in other words, an uncial exemplar.

The date of F is significant in this connection. Burnet and others have assigned it to the fourteenth century; but Dr. Paul Maas, who kindly inspected a photograph for me, thinks the thirteenth equally likely, and there is some evidence suggesting that characteristic readings of F were known to Thomas Magister,¹ who was secretary to Andronicus II at some date between 1282 and 1328.

¹ In his *Ecloga Vocum Atticarum* Thomas condemns the forms ὀψοποιητικός at Gorg. 465 d 6 and αἰσχυντηλός at 487 b 1, both of which are found in F; he also omits μῆ with F at 511 a 6. But it is no doubt possible that he found the text so quoted in the indirect tradition on which he drew.

Now it is known that the late thirteenth century was a time when Byzantine scholars were discovering and transcribing old uncial MSS. which had escaped attention during the earlier revival of learning in the ninth and tenth centuries.¹ To this renewed transcription we owe *inter alia* the Ambrosian tradition of Theocritus and of Pindar's *Olympians*. And it seems likely that we owe to it also the F tradition of Plato. For (a) the profusion of uncial errors in F suggests transliteration from a script which had become unfamiliar, as uncials had in the thirteenth century;² (b) had the F tradition been made available at an earlier date we might expect to find some trace of its influence in our older medieval MSS.³

I have tried elsewhere⁴ to calculate from the lacunae in F the probable dimensions of its exemplar. If my estimate of about 38 letters to a line and a little over 30 lines to a page is anywhere near the truth, it would fit very well, as Mr. C. H. Roberts has pointed out to me, the type of cheap papyrus codex which was manufactured in quantity in and after the third century A.D.—‘the omnibus volumes of a poverty-stricken age’, as he has called them.⁵ The guess is attractive. For such an origin would not only explain the frequent agreement of F with papyri of the Antonine and post-Antonine periods and with late citations; it would also fit Stuart Jones's conclusion that the F tradition ‘represents the “commercial” texts which circulated amongst the reading public, rather than the more scholarly editions’.⁶ F in fact tends to vulgarize the text⁷ by eliminating Attic idioms like *θαυμασιώς*

¹ Cf. A. Dain, *Les Manuscrits*, 135 f.

² Cf. J. Irigoin, *Histoire du texte de Pindare*, 107, on the difficulties experienced by these late transcribers in transliterating uncials.

³ Chambry, *Introd. to Rep.* p. cxliii, finds the influence of F in the MS. D (Ven. 185), which is traditionally assigned to the twelfth century; but one learns to distrust traditional datings of minor Platonic MSS.

⁴ *JHS*, 1957, 26.

⁵ C. H. Roberts, ‘The Codex’, *Proc. Brit. Acad.* 1954, 195. Examples of third-century papyrus codices of Attic authors having similar dimensions are P. Rylands 549 (Xenophon) with an average of 39 letters to a line and 32 to 35 lines to a page, and P. Oxy. 459 (Demosthenes) with about 42 letters to a line and 32 to 34 lines to a page.

⁶ *CR*, xvi (1902), 391. Immisch had already spoken in similar terms of F, *op. cit.* ii. 15.

⁷ Deneke put forward the opposite contention, that in the *Gorgias* (though not elsewhere) the F tradition shows traces of having been revised by an Atticist. But he produced as evidence only two words, one of which, *ἐππέρη* at 471 c 2, turns out not to be in F, while the other, *ἀρτοποιός* for *ἀρτοκόπος* at 518 b 6, has no claim to be called an Atticism.

ὥς (471 a 9) and φλυαρεῖς ἔχων (490 e 4), and Attic forms like τουτοισί (458 e 1) and ἐδιώκαθες (483 a 7); by introducing vulgar forms like ἀποκτιννύει (469 a 9); and by interpolating unwanted explanatory words like φησὶν at 477 e 2. These features are just what we should expect to find if Mr. Roberts's guess is right.

Comparison of the two families

Despite the relatively 'popular' character of the F tradition, no editor can afford to neglect its testimony. It is true that not all the treasures which Burnet's *apparatus* ascribed to it are its rightful property; but even when shorn of adventitious glories it remains our sole or our principal authority for a large number of self-evidently sound readings. These present no problem. But the question which confronts an editor of the *Gorgias* on every page is whether to accept or reject the numerous more or less indifferent variants which F offers, and in particular the many small additional words, predominantly particles, which appear in F but not in the manuscripts of the first family.¹ Certainly one must not answer it on the principle that three MSS. weigh more than one. A few of F's additions are merely repetitions from the line above, as at 478 d 4 and 481 b 3; a few more are certainly false, like those at 471 d 7 and 477 e 2, and this may cause us to distrust its other gifts. On the other hand, a number of them are demonstrably old, since they appear also in a papyrus or in the indirect tradition; and one can argue that it is easier for a copyist to leave out a word which is in his exemplar than to insert one which is not. Accordingly I have, like Burnet, attempted to decide each case on its own merits, if any, though with the consciousness that my decision may often be wrong. Where I could see absolutely nothing to choose I have followed the first family; but the real answer in such cases is, I suppose, '*non liquet*'.

3. *The Byzantine Recensions*

The period between Cobet and Burnet saw a progressive increase in the number of recognized primary authorities for the text of the first six tetralogies: Cobet (and at one time Schanz) admitted only B; but first T, then W and P, then F, had their

¹ Chambry has called attention to this feature of F in his Introduction to the Budé edition of the *Republic*, p. cxli. He notes especially F's fondness for the particle γε.

independence vindicated. And we cannot be sure that we have reached the end of the process: Wilamowitz¹ was certainly right in stressing the need for a critical valuation of those witnesses whom Burnet too often lumped together as *scribae recentiores*. Hence it was natural that more recent scholars should propose further additions to the list of authorities. Two such proposals require consideration here.

A. Recensions of the T tradition

Among the numerous progeny of T, Schanz² distinguished a group of three MSS. characterized by common omissions in the *Gorgias*. These are Laurentianus 85. 6 (which was called b by its collator Stallbaum but will here be called Flor to avoid confusion with the correcting hands in the Clarkianus), and two late Parisini collated by Bekker, 2110 (V) and 1815 (Bekker's I, here called J with Schanz). Flor contains Tetralogies I–VII (the seventh in a jumbled order) together with *Clitopho*, *Timaeus*, and the beginning of *Republic*; its date is not later than 1355,³ and probably not very much earlier. V consists of two distinct MSS. which were bound together in the reign of Henri II. The first contains the *Axiochus* only; the second, in a different hand and with an independent numeration of quaternions, contains the *Gorgias* and some works of Lucian. The second part belonged to the fifteenth-century humanist Francisco Filelfo, and may well have been written for him.⁴ J contains *Gorgias*, *Cratylus*, and *Parmenides* only, and is attributed by Omont to the sixteenth century.

Schanz discerned no particular merit in these MSS.; but Theiler points out that in the *Gorgias* they have in common a number of good or at any rate plausible readings which are not found in BTW or in the original text of F, and concludes that they derive these from a distinct ancient recension. He has also

¹ ii. 334. Ritter had made the same point in a review of Burnet's text, *Bursians Jahresbericht*, clxi (1913), 64 f.

² *Über d. Platocodex in Venedig*, 68 f.

³ Flor has on the fly-leaf a note referring to events of that year which was almost certainly made at the time of their occurrence; it is not in the scribe's hand. Immisch, overlooking this, assigned the MS. to the fifteenth century; Rostagno made it late thirteenth.

⁴ I am indebted for these particulars to my pupil Father H. D. Saffrey, O.P., who kindly examined V for me. The fact that Immisch and Post have considered V a primary authority for the *Axiochus* has thus no bearing on its value in the *Gorgias*.

noticed (as already mentioned above) that some of these readings were introduced into F by the second hand f. Had he pursued his researches farther, however, he would have discovered that for many of the readings in question Flor VJf are not the only, or the oldest, extant sources.

In the first place, on collating the *Gorgias* in the Malatestianus (M), which for close on five centuries¹ has lain almost² unregarded in the library of the Malatestas in the little town of Cesena, I found in it a large number of the readings characteristic of Theiler's group. It may well be, older than any of the group—Dr. Maas assigns it to the thirteenth or fourteenth century, Rostagno said twelfth—and I was at first inclined to regard it as their source. Its contents are Tetralogies I–VII, *Spuria*, *Clitopho*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Republic*, in that order. But secondly, Schanz³ long ago gave reasons for thinking that in Tetralogies I–VII both M and Flor derive from Parisinus 1808 (Bekker's B, which I shall call Par since the symbol B is now appropriated to the Clarkianus), and through it from T. Initially I was disposed to discount his arguments, as Theiler appears to have done, since such a pedigree seemed to offer no explanation of the distinctive readings of these MSS. But a fresh examination of the text of the *Gorgias* in the three MSS. has confirmed Schanz's view, at least as regards this dialogue, and has shown the source of the novelties common to M and Flor to be the hand of a corrector in Par. [The converse hypothesis, that M or Flor is the source of the corrections in Par, is excluded (a) by the fact that M Flor reproduce characteristic errors of the *first* hand in Par, e.g. 526 b 8 ἀνίματος BTWF *recte*, ἀδύματος Par (corr. s.l. Par³) M Flor; (b) by places like 510 a 8, where the scribe of Par omitted the word αὐτόν and restored it in the margin with the result that it is misplaced in M.]

¹ M belonged to Dr. Giovanni di Marco da Rimini, who left it at his death to the library of the Franciscan convent at Cesena, which formed the nucleus of the Biblioteca Malatestiana.

² Lewis Campbell described M in *J. Phil.* xi (1882), 195–200, and collated it for his edition of the *Republic*; but so far as I know it has not been collated for any other dialogue. For Tetralogies I–VII and *Spuria* collation would probably in fact be labour wasted, but its remaining contents should be examined.

³ *Platocodex*, 56 ff. and 104. Post has since shown that M derives from Par in the *Spuria* also (*Vatican Plato*, 53 f.). It seems to be a direct copy, while Flor is an indirect derivative. Parisinus 1809 (Bekker's C) appears to have (as Schanz thought) the same origin, but I have not personally examined it.

Par contains Tetralogies I–VII followed (as in M) by the *Spuria*, and is assigned by Omont to the thirteenth century. Before correction, its text nearly everywhere resembled, even in the smallest detail,¹ that of T; since, however, in one or two places it corrects an error of T,² we may suppose with Schanz that it descends from T through an intermediary which had been occasionally corrected from B (or W). In its original state Par offered virtually³ no readings of interest which are not in one or other of the older MSS. But it has been corrected by at least two hands other than the scribe's. The earliest of these, Par², is responsible for all the novelties common to M and Flor. A subsequent hand (or hands), Par³, has added interlinear variants which often reappear in Y, but never in M or Flor. Par³ has also in some places restored, with the sign $\gamma\rho.$, the original reading of T Par erased by Par².

The primary question, then, is whether Par² derived his readings from Theiler's 'ancient recension' or from his own powers of divination. But this is not the whole of the problem: there is a complication. For in addition to the novelties of Par², Flor presents others that are absent from Par and M (they usually reappear in V). We have to ask ourselves a similar question about these readings. And we have to ask it yet again about certain readings peculiar to V or (in one case) VJ.⁴ To enable my readers to form an opinion, I list below the most plausible of the readings belonging to these three groups,⁵ noting those which are adopted by Bekker, Burnet, or Theiler.

¹ e.g. 491 b 8 $\pi\acute{o}\tau\epsilon$ [*sic*] T Par M Flor. Schanz, *Platocodex*, 47 ff., cited instances where Par omits a complete line of T, and others where Par is corrupted through misunderstanding T's corrections.

² Notably at 507 c 8, ἀληθῆ ταῦτα T: ταῦτα ἀληθῆ BWF Par Oxy. Stob. Here T's false order could not have been corrected by conjecture.

³ The sole exception which I have noticed is at 523 d 7, where Par and its derivatives have νῦν μὲν with Plutarch (νῦν BTWF).

⁴ M has a few small and obvious corrections which I cannot trace in Par as it now stands and which Stallbaum has not noted in Flor: θαυμάζης for θαυμάζοις at 454 b 9 (also in E and Y); ὅποι for ὅπη at 456 b 6 (also in J); μοι s.l. for με at 486 d 7 (also in E, Y, and V); ἴδια for ἰδίᾳ at 514 c 2. J's only independent contribution would seem to be οὗτοι (which is not in F) for οὗ τι at 450 e 4. It is a hybrid MS.: its text has been systematically contaminated from F as far as 472 d, and perhaps sporadically elsewhere. On f see above, pp. 43f.

⁵ The collation of Par, M, and f is my own, and I have personally checked some though not all of the readings cited from Stallbaum's collation of Flor and Bekker's of V. For the unimportant J, I am entirely dependent on Bekker.

1. *Novelties introduced into the tradition by the first corrector of Parisinus 1808 (Par²).*

- 452 a 1 ἄν post αὐτίκα add. Par² M Flor Vf Bekker: om.
BTWF (εἰ post ὅτι add. F)
- 452 b 2 γ' ἄν Par² (ut vid.) M Flor V Bekker: τᾶν BTWF
- 454 e 7 τὸ ante πιστεύειν add. Par² M Flor V Bekker Theiler:
om. BTWF
- 456 d 2 ἔμαθέ τις Par² M Flor Vf Bekker: ἔμαθεν BTWF
- 458 d 8 καὶ ταῦτα ante αὐτὸν add. Par² M Flor Vf Bekker:
om. BTWF
- 458 e 1 τουτοισί Par² M Flor Bekker Burnet Theiler: τού-
τοις(ν) BTW: τούτοις F
- 460 d 2 κακῶς post πυκτικῇ add. Par² M Flor V et revera f:
om. BTWF
- 461 c 1 ὁ post τοῦτο add. Par² M Flor Vf Bekker Burnet
Theiler: om. BTWF
- 465 b 3 οὔσα post τε add. Par² M Flor Vf cum Aristidis libro
E Bekker Theiler: om. BTWF
- 497 e 4 τοὺς ἄφρονας Par² M Flor VJf Bekker: ἄφρονας BTWF
- 503 d 2 ἔχεις εἰπεῖν post γεγονέναι add. Par² M Flor VJ et
revera f Bekker: om. BTWF
- 505 c 3 αὐτὸ Par² M (primitus) Flor V (primitus) Theiler:
αὐτὸς BTWF
- 511 e 3 ἀποβιβάσασα Par² MVJf Bekker Burnet Theiler:
ἀποβιβάσας BTW: om. F
- 517 d 4 ἄλλα ὦν Par² M Flor VJf (etiam rec. p) Bekker
Burnet Theiler: ἄλλων ὦν BTWF

2. *Novelties which appear first in Laurentianus 85. 6 (Flor).*

- 457 b 5 κατὰ Flor V Bekker Burnet Theiler: κατὰ BTWF
Par (καὶ Par² in mg.)
- 457 c 1 δικαία Flor V (etiam Y) Bekker Theiler: δικαίου
BTWF Par et suprascr. m. pr. Flor
- 462 d 11 τίνος τίς Flor VJ: τίνος f Bekker Theiler: τίς
BTWF Par
- 503 a 2 τοῦτο Flor VJ cum Aristide Bekker Burnet Theiler:
τοῦτο ὁ BTWF Par
- 505 c 8 καταλύωμεν Flor VJ et revera f Theiler: καταλύομεν
BTW Par: om. F

- 506 c 1 ἐξελέγξης Flor Jf Bekker: ἐξελέγχης BTWF Par
 507 d 7 καὶ ante τὰ add. Flor V Bekker Theiler: om.
 BTWF Par
 512 c 7 τῷ σαυτοῦ post αὐτὸς add. Flor V Bekker: om.
 BTWF Par
 519 d 4 ᾧ Flor VJf Bekker Burnet: ὃ BTW Par: ἀλλ' F

3. *Novelties apparently peculiar to V or VJ.*

- 469 c 8 τοῦ λόγου suprascr. V cum Olympiodoro: τῷ λόγῳ
 V cett.
 474 e 7 τὰ om. V
 476 d 5 ὁμολογημένων V: ὁμολογουμένων cett.
 483 d 1 αὖ V Bekker Theiler: ἄν Y: αὐτὸ cett.
 486 a 8 ἀπαγάγοι V Bekker Theiler: ἀπάγοι cett.
 490 a 5 ῥήματα V Bekker: ῥήματι cett.
 491 d 4 τί ἢ τί ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους om. V Bekker
 517 e 8 τὸ om. VJ Bekker Burnet Theiler: τε F: τὸ cett.
 524 c 8 τε post κατεαγότα add. V Bekker: om. cett.: ἢ ante
 κατεαγότα add. Eus.
 524 e 1 οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς εὐρώπης παρὰ τὸν αἰακὸν post 'Παδά-
 μανθιν add. V: om. cett.

It will be seen that Bekker, the exponent of an uninhibited eclecticism, accepted without demur nearly all these novelties; and that even Burnet, sceptical as he was about the value of 'apographa' and conservative as is his general treatment of the text, felt himself constrained to adopt four readings from the first group, three from the second, and one from the third. It will be seen also that Aristides once confirms Flor and once (perhaps) Par², and that V has in one place the support of Olympiodorus (but the possibility of contamination cannot be ruled out in either case: as regards Aristides see below, p. 64). On the other hand:

- (i) It appears that the later the MS., the greater its wealth of good readings: Flor has more good readings than Par², and V surpasses them both. This is contrary to the normal behaviour of MSS.
- (ii) It is relevant to recall that Par² and Flor date, so far as can be judged, from the age of Manuel Moschopoulos,

Thomas Magister, and Triclinius—that is, from the age of deliberate and systematic textual emendation¹—and that V has all the appearance of an ‘edition’ of the *Gorgias* compiled by a Renaissance scholar.²

- (iii) Most of the readings I have listed can fairly be described as ‘normalizations’ of a more or less abnormal (in some cases manifestly corrupt) text, and are such as might occur to any tolerably scholarly reader.
- (iv) These ‘good’ readings are accompanied by others which are quite plainly false emendations dictated by ignorance of idiom or misconception of Plato’s meaning. Such are, to quote only a few:

450 e 5 διότι for οὐχ ὅτι, Par² M Flor Vf;

456 b 8 insertion before ἱατρὸν of ῥήτορα ἦ, Par² M Flor Vf;

511 e 1 ἐὰν . . . εὐεργεσίας marked for deletion in Par, relegated to the margin in M, omitted by Flor V, and τύχη inserted before σώσασα by Par² M Flor V.

If these things derive from Theiler’s ‘ancient recension’, must we not view all its gifts with suspicion?

I conclude—most reluctantly, for I have spent much time on these MSS.—that while Theiler has done a service in calling attention to them, and while the hypothesis of an independent ancient source cannot be excluded, it is safest to accord their readings no higher status than that of simple conjectures.³

¹ Cf. Paul Maas, *Byz. Zeitschr.* 1935, 299 ff., 1936, 27 ff., and *Gnomon*, xxv (1953), 441 f.; also A. Turyn, ‘The Sophocles Recension of Manuel Moschopoulos’, *T.A.P.A.* 1949, who shows that the Byzantine recensions of Sophocles reach well back into the thirteenth century. As F. H. Sandbach has recently observed, ‘there is a danger of underestimating the powers of the late Byzantine scholars, and so, through unnecessarily crediting them with access to unknown traditions, of according unwarranted honour to their conjectures’ (*CR*, lxxviii, 1954, 251).

² While the main basis of V appears to be Flor, it has readings apparently derived from F (e.g. ὅτι ἂν φῆ at 481 d 6) and others characteristic of the Y group (e.g. καὶ αἰσχίον καὶ κάκιον at 508 e 5). Theiler himself expresses uncertainty ‘conjecturae debeantur bonae lectiones unius codicis V’.

³ To assist scholars in making up their minds on the point I have included in my *apparatus* a fairly complete report of the most important set of new readings—those, both good and bad, which were introduced into the tradition by the Paris corrector.

B. *The Y recension*

There is a group of late MSS. which contain the same distinctive selection of dialogues in the same distinctive order, viz. Tetralogies I and II followed by *Parmenides*, *Gorgias*, *Meno*, *Hippias ma.*, *Symposium*, *Timaeus*, *Alcibiades i* and *ii*, and finally the *Spuria* (except *Eryxias*) in a characteristic order. Of these the best known, and probably the best,¹ is the Vienna MS. Y (Vind. 21, called Vind. 2 by Stallbaum). Immisch's date for it, 'fourteenth century at earliest',² has been generally accepted. It has corrections both by the scribe (Y¹) and in a small neat hand which may be that of the διορθωτής (Y²).

This MS. was thought by Jordan and Immisch to represent an independent recension of early Byzantine date, and on the strength of this view the Budé editors have treated it as a primary witness to the text for all the dialogues which it contains.³ But as Alline judiciously observed, 'Y est loin de présenter la même valeur dans tous les dialogues, et ne doit être employé qu'avec une grande prudence.'⁴ The tradition on which it draws appears in fact to vary in different dialogues, sometimes even within the same dialogue, as Schanz noticed in the *Phaedo*.⁵ In the *Gorgias*, not only is the text of Y exceedingly corrupt but it is infected with interpolations and false conjectures.⁶ And it is plainly a hybrid text. While the scanty scholia (which may have been added later) are almost entirely Arethan, without admixture of W scholia, the basis of the text is evidently a MS. of the W group, as is shown by common transpositions and omissions;⁷ but the W tradition has been overlaid in many places with readings derived from F after the latter had been corrected

¹ The others are Veneti 189 (S or Σ), 186, and 590, Monacensis 408, and Zittaviensis. All these have been thought to derive from Y (save for certain additions from a different source in Ven. 189 and 186); certainly Ven. 189 and Zitt. do. So also does Vind. 116, which contains part of the Y selection; and so, in the *Gorgias*, does Ven. 184 (Bekker's *Σ*, Schanz's *E*).

² *Philologische Studien zu Platon*, ii. 70-72.

³ Wohlrab had already used it for the *Theaetetus*, Burnet for *Timaeus* and *Spuria*.

⁴ Alline 235. Cf. Post 36.

⁵ *Platocodex*, 67; cf. Robin, Introduction to *Phaedo*, lxxix.

⁶ e.g. 493 a 1 inserts *οπερ*; 494 b 1 *πληρώσεται* (see commentary); 496 d 1 omits *καί*; 526 d 5 inserts *ἔχων* after *ύγιεστάτην*.

⁷ e.g. 459 e 7 *διδάξαι αὐτόν* WPY; 500 c 2 *εἰσω ἡμῖν* WPY; 521 c 8 *ὄντινοῦν...* οἷδ' om. WY; 523 a 6 *ἔτι* om. WPY. The same agreement with W may be seen in the *Timaeus*.

by f.¹ This last fact excludes the possibility that the recension as we have it is early Byzantine.

It is generally thought that despite these suspicious features Y preserves, even in the *Gorgias*, remnants of a sound ancient tradition not found elsewhere. But when we have eliminated everything that stands in one of the older MSS.² the list of good readings presumptively due to Y is not very impressive. It consists, I think, mainly of the following:³

- 452 b 7 δὲ for δὴ (so also Vat. 225);
- 482 a 7 ἀεὶ (with Olympiodorus) for εἶ (F): om. BTW;
- 503 e 3 προσφέρει <ᾶ προσφέρει>;
- 517 c 7 γοῦν (so also Laur. 85. 12) for τε οὖν (F): οὖν BTW;
- 525 b 2 παραδείγματι (so also V) for παράδειγμά τι.

To these we may probably add, although late hands have introduced it into B and into Par. 1808, 509 c 3 τοῦ μή for τὸ μή (F): ἐτοίμη BTW.

Most of these are extremely easy corrections—in three cases corrections of the F text, then perhaps newly discovered. The addition of ᾶ προσφέρει at 503 e 3 may look at first sight less obvious; but it might suggest itself to anyone who recalled the earlier occurrence of προσφέρει ᾶ προσφέρει at 465 a 4. Since we know that Y is addicted to conjecture, I conclude that in the *Gorgias* at any rate there is no adequate ground for treating it as a primary authority.⁴ It should be noted that none of its characteristic

¹ e.g. 450 a 1 add. ποιεῖ FY; 451 d 3 add. τις f, τίς Y; 458 d 8 add. καὶ ταῦτα fY; 480 d 4 add. μὴ φειδόμενον ἀλλ' εἶ F, μὴ φειδόμενον ἀλλ' Y. It seems quite certain that Y is the borrower. The reverse hypothesis, that F borrowed from Y (or rather from a predecessor of Y), would require two operations, one by F, the other by f; and it would fail to explain the peculiarities of F as described above (p. 45). Moreover, at 525 d 3 Y conflates the readings of W and F by writing τούτων τοὺς.

² Two obvious corrections—the addition of τὸ at 454 e 7, and δικαίῳ for δικαίου at 457 c 1—are common to Y and the revisers of the T tradition, despite the fact that f abstained from introducing them into F. They may have reached Y through some channel other than F; but it is quite likely that they occurred independently to the author of the Y recension.

³ I omit certain readings of Y which, though plausible enough to have found a place in some modern texts, look to me like false conjectures (see commentary). Such are διαφυγῶν at 473 e 1; addition of μὴ at 479 c 7; omission of δυοῖν at 481 d 4; addition of τε at 483 c 1; addition of τί (*rectius* τί ἄν) at 492 b 4. Bolder, but equally questionable, is τί δέ for περὶ at 490 c 8, which a late hand has also introduced into B.

⁴ This was Schanz's conclusion, *Philol.* xxxv (1876), 652: 'Die Werthlosigkeit von Y in diesem Dialog [*Gorgias*] kann nicht bezweifelt werden.'

readings has here the support of a papyrus or of the indirect tradition, save for the casual omission of a *καὶ* with Iamblichus at 527 e 3, and the *ἀεὶ* at 482 a 7, which could easily be restored from F's *εἰ*.¹

The MSS. I have discussed are by no means the only ones which offer occasional sound or plausible readings in the *Gorgias*. Quite a number were found by Stephanus in Parisinus 1811 (Bekker's E), and through him passed into the *textus receptus*; most of them seem to be due to the scholar who corrected this MS. Others which make small and rather obvious contributions are Laur. 85. 12 (Stallbaum's d) at 469 a 1 and 521 d 1; Laur. 89. 78 (Stallbaum's f) at 502 d 2; Vind. 109 (Bekker's Φ) at 450 a 1 and 509 e 3; Bod. misc. 189 (Meermanianus) at 524 a 6 with Olympiodorus; and the corrector of Par. 1812 (Bekker's F) at 514 d 7. It would be fantastic to suggest that these small scattered insights are the *disiecta membra* of an ancient tradition. They are the first-fruits of a new age, the work of men who were no longer content to copy a corrupt text but had enough confidence in their own scholarship to substitute one which they deemed better.

ii. THE PAPYRI

FOUR papyri of the *Gorgias* have been published—a number exceeded only, among the works of Plato, by the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*.² All of them belong, like the majority of Plato papyri, to the second and third centuries A.D., and testify to the renewal of interest in Platonism characteristic of that age. Unfortunately all four are brief and more or less fragmentary. Some readings from a part of one of them (*Π^{2a}*) were cited by Burnet and Croiset; otherwise they have not been utilized by previous editors. I subjoin a list, with brief descriptions.

Π¹. P. Rainer, published in *Mittheilungen Rainer*, ii, p. 76 (1887). Fragment of a third-century codex from the Fayum, written on

¹ At 458 b 5 Y's agreement with Olympiodorus is explained by W; at 525 b 2 Y's correction appears also in some late MSS. of Gellius, but the best Gellius MS. agrees with F. What one misses in the *Gorgias* is the sort of confirmation we find at *Symp.* 223 c 4, where the distinctive word-order of the Oxyrhynchus papyrus is reproduced in Y.

² I take the figures from R. Pack, *The Greek and Latin Literary Texts from Greco-Roman Egypt* (Michigan, 1952).

both sides in a careful professional hand, with corrections in the same hand. Contains (recto) 504 b 9 ἰσχὺν—d 1 κοσμήσειν; and (verso) 504 e 7 διακειμένω—505 a 9 οὐδέποτε, with some gaps.

Π². This is in two parts, which have been published separately, viz. (a) P. Oxy. 454 (published in 1903), containing fragments of 507 b 8 καὶ—508 d 6 φημι; (b) P.S.I. 119 (published in 1913), consisting of seven badly mutilated fragments which cover portions of 522 b 5—526 a 6 (details are given in the *apparatus criticus*). Hunt recognized that the two are in the same hand; and both are written on the back of second-century Latin accounts. Vitelli's objection, that the number of lines per column is not identical in (a) and (b), appears not to be valid, since considerable variation in this respect can occur within the same papyrus roll. I have therefore followed Pack in treating them as parts of the same MS. They are written in 'an uncial hand of the middle or later part of the second century' (Grenfell and Hunt), and have a few corrections, some of them in a later hand. Cf. Blass, *Arch. f. Pap.* iii, 294.

Π³. P.S.I. 1200 (published in 1935). Four fragments of a second-century roll from Oxyrhynchus, interesting as having slight remains of marginal scholia (which are not identical with any of the published medieval scholia). Contains, with some gaps, (a) 447 b 3 νῦν—c 2 δύναμις; (b) 467 e 7 μὲν—468 a 4 ἀλλὰ; (c) 468 b 8 ποιοῦντες—d 1 ὁμολογοῦμεν; (d) 486 d 5 αὐτήν—6 ἔχω. Fragment (d) has hitherto escaped recognition: it appears in P.S.I. as 'unidentified'.

Π⁴. P. Fouad I no. 2 (published by P. Jouguet in *Textes et documents de la Société Fouad I*, vol. iii, 1939). Written in careful second-century uncials; has accounts on back. Provenance unknown. Contains fragments of 522 c 8 βεβροθηκῶς—e 1 αὐτό.

Of these papyri, Π³ is probably a relatively 'learned' copy, as the presence of scholia suggests;¹ and it offers in fact the soundest text of the four. The other three exhibit corruptions from which our medieval MSS. are free; and none presents us with a new reading of any merit. They are, however, of considerable interest for the history of the text. They show (as we should expect)

¹ Its date and provenance seem to associate it with the group of 'scholar's texts' recently studied by Prof. E. G. Turner, 'Scribes and scholars of Oxyrhynchus', *Mitteilungen aus der Papyrussammlung der österr. Nationalbibliothek*, v (1956), 141–6. There are traces of scholia also in the slightly later papyrus of the *Symposium*, P. Oxy. 843.

the antiquity of those corruptions which are common to the whole medieval tradition;¹ they also demonstrate the antiquity of many of the characteristic readings of F (see above, p. 42). It may be added here that while none of these papyri anywhere agrees in manifest error with BTW against F, on the other hand *II*², *II*³, and probably also *II*⁴ agree in manifest error with F against BTW.² For what it is worth, this evidence suggests that these papyri are to be classed with the Second Family, and thus goes to support Deneke's conclusion³ that the archetype common to both families belonged at latest to the latter part of the second century A.D.

iii. ANCIENT COMMENTARIES

Olympiodorus

THE *Gorgias* was one of the ten or twelve *πραττόμενοι*, the dialogues which were regularly lectured on in the later Neoplatonic Schools; its place in the cycle was immediately after the *Alcibiades i*, which was used as an introduction to the study of Plato, and before the *Phaedo*.⁴ Most of the Neoplatonic commentaries were based on such lecture-courses, of which transcripts were circulated either by students or by the lecturer himself. We know that the Athenian Neoplatonists Plutarchus and Proclus, and Olympiodorus' teacher, Ammonius, all lectured on the *Gorgias*;⁵ but the only commentary on it which has survived otherwise than in excerpts is a transcript of a course of fifty lectures (*πράξεις*) delivered at Alexandria in the sixth century by Olympiodorus, one of the last pagan philosophers.⁶ This was

¹ e.g. *ἐκεῖνο* at 504 c 3, omission of *ἄθλιοι* at 508 b 2, and the omission of a necessary article at 523 b 7.

² *II*² and apparently also *II*⁴ at 522 d 8; *II*³ at 486 d 6 (*ὁτιή*).

³ *De Platonis . . . F memoria* 52. For the argument cf. P. Collomp, *Rev. Ét. Gr.* xlii (1929), 266 f.

⁴ *Proleg. in Plat. Phil.* 26 (Hermann, *Platonis Dialogi*, vi. 219); Ol 5. 3 Norvin. This curriculum was drawn up by Iamblichus, but no doubt similar curricula existed much earlier. Earlier interest in the *Gorgias* is attested by the title of a lost work by Eubulus, who was Head of the Academy in the third century A.D., *Περὶ τοῦ Φιλύβου καὶ τοῦ Γοργίου καὶ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλει πρὸς τὴν Πλάτωνος πολιτείας ἀντειρημένων* (Porph. *vit. Plot.* 20. 41 Henry-Schwyzler).

⁵ See schol. vet. 462 c, 495 d; Proclus in *Remp.* ii. 139. 19 Kroll, 178. 6; Ol 183. 11.

⁶ It is preserved, with others of Ol's lectures on Plato, in a manuscript written c. 900 (Marcianus gr. 196), and has been edited, not very well, by W. Norvin (Teubner, 1936). On the general character and plan of Ol's work see R. Beutler in P.-W. s.v.

taken down in the lecture room (*ἀπὸ φωνῆς*), and has evidently not been revised by the lecturer: we still hear him apologize for a mistake in the order of his notes (68. 13) and remark towards the end of a lecture "We must leave this question till next time" (140. 24). Each lecture deals with one or two pages of the Platonic text. He first paraphrases the passage, explains its purpose (*σκοπός*), analyses the argument, and deals with any problems (*ἀπορίαι*) which it raises. After this general introduction, which he calls *θεωρία*, the text (*λέξεις*) is read aloud (140. 24) and he comments on individual sentences or words. His exegesis is seldom of much direct interest: when it does not merely restate the already obvious, it usually consists in the discovery of imaginary symbolic meanings behind Plato's simplest phrases. Factual information is rare, and the philosophical interpretations are as a rule superficial or fanciful. The whole performance throws more light on cultural conditions and educational methods in sixth-century Alexandria than it does on Plato.

Olympiodorus' work does, however, give us some picture, though an incomplete and uncertain one, of the state of the text at the end of antiquity. He was not, unfortunately, interested in textual questions, and very seldom refers to them.¹ But each of his notes is introduced by a brief 'lemma', a short phrase (sometimes only a single word) quoted from the dialogue; and his paraphrases sometimes enable us to guess what reading he must have had in his text of Plato. The testimony of the lemmata (*ΟΙΛ*) is clearly more reliable than that of the paraphrases (*ΟΙΠ*), to which some scholars have given undue weight;² but we must remember that both have been exposed to the hazards of dictation, in addition to the ordinary risks of corruption in the course of MS. transmission.³ Nevertheless, we have enough evidence to

¹ At 481 c 1 he reports an otherwise unattested (and impossible) variant; at 495 a 5 he knows two readings (both false), one of which is that of F.

² e.g. his use of *τί* at 19. 16 in a paraphrase of 448 b 5 does not prove that his text of Plato had *τί* instead of *τίνα*; his *ζηλωτός* at 86. 18 in a paraphrase of 469 a 1 does not prove that it stood in the text. Still less can we safely argue anything from his silence, e.g. his failure to quote or comment on the disputed words *καὶ ποῦ* at 453 c 8: our record of these lectures may well be incomplete (they vary widely in length). On the other hand, *ΟΙ*'s evidence has sometimes been overlooked, as at 482 a 7, 487 a 3, 524 a 6.

³ Sometimes the lemma is shown to be corrupt by comparison with the paraphrase: e.g. 449 e 5 *οὐ καὶ ΟΙΛ*: *οὐκοῦν ΟΙΠ* (30. 9) with Plato. In such cases I have usually not reported the variant. There is no sign that the lemmata have been

justify the statement that his text was related to that of F, but in some cases at least superior to it. The relationship is shown by places like 482 a 7, where F's $\epsilon\iota$ is clearly a corruption of Ol's $\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\iota$ (124. 12, π : om. BTW), and 487 e 9, where F conflates the readings of Ol (λ) and BTW. Ol agrees in manifest or probable error with F at 449 e 6 ($\kappa\alpha\iota$ λέγειν, 30. 10, π), at 493 d 4 ($\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$, 144. 1, λ), at 518 b 6 ($\acute{\alpha}\rho\tau\omicron\pi\omicron\iota\omicron\varsigma$, 203. 12, π).¹ On the other hand, in several places he preserves the true reading against all the primary MSS. of Plato: 454 d 8 $\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha$ (43. 18, λ); 487 a 3 $\epsilon\ddot{\upsilon}\nu\omicron\iota\alpha\nu$ (133. 14, π); 524 a 6 $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\rho\eta\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ $\tau\iota$ (236. 31, π). His paraphrases show that he had the right punctuation at 522 c 1 and the right distribution between speakers at 462 d 10–11 and 491 d 4, against the whole medieval tradition (see commentary).

The scholia

Further remains of ancient commentaries survive, along with other matter, in the scholia found in the margins of medieval MSS. of the first family. As we have seen (p. 36), there are two sets of these. One set were entered in B by the hand of Arethas, and are therefore called 'Arethae scholia' in W. C. Greene's *Scholia Platonica*; some of them reappear in the Y recension, but they are otherwise peculiar to B and its derivatives. The other and larger set were subsequently added to B by another hand; they appear also in T, and usually in W. Greene calls them *scholia vetera* (though there is in fact no proof that they were compiled earlier than the Arethan scholia). The two groups are largely independent in their origin, as in their history; in the *Gorgias* their contents do not overlap very much, and when they do the wording is not identical, seldom even similar.

The scholia of Arethas are much more abundant for two dialogues, *Gorgias* and *Theaetetus*, than they are for any other. The reason, I suspect, is that for these two the compiler was able to draw on a Neoplatonic commentary. Almost all the Arethan scholia on the *Gorgias* are exegetic,² and some of them reproduce

corrected (or inserted by a later hand) from the direct tradition, as has happened in some other ancient commentaries.

¹ An apparent counter-instance is 465 b 4, where Ol's paraphrase $\beta\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\mu\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$ (74. 30) suggests that he had the false reading $\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\acute{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\iota$ which we find in BTW. But the corruption could occur independently: $\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\acute{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\iota$ and $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\theta\acute{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\iota$ sounded exactly alike in Byzantine Greek, and the latter was a relatively rare word.

² Exceptions are the Arethan scholion on 469 d, which draws on the same

late-Neoplatonist theories.¹ Their source was not Olympiodorus; possibly it was, as Burnet thought,² the lost commentary of Proclus.

The *scholia vetera* are also exceptionally copious on the *Gorgias*. Their content and sources are more varied than those of the Arethan set. They include, among other things, (a) some valuable notes on Attic words and usages, which probably derive from the dictionaries of Attic phrases compiled in the age of Hadrian by Aelius Dionysius and Pausanias;³ (b) other explanations of rare words which coincide with glosses in Hesychius' lexicon (? *saec.* vi A.D.) and are thought to come from the lost lexicon of Diogenianus (*saec.* ii A.D.), on which Hesychius largely drew (Diogenianus is several times named in the scholia);⁴ (c) notes on proverbs, some of which appear to be taken directly from the collection made by Lucillus of Tarrha in the first century after Christ.⁵ But the main staple is evidently drawn here also from a continuous exegetic commentary: the scholiast even uses the commentator's phrase, ὅπερ ἐλέγομεν, to refer the reader back to a previous note (506 d). And since his exegetic notes agree as a rule closely, and often verbatim, with those of Olympiodorus, it has generally been thought that Olympiodorus is their principal source. Beutler⁶ has, however, shown that there are significant differences between the two, and that where the same point

'Atticist' source as Photius *s.v.* ὑπὸ μάλῃς; and those on 451 e, 497 a, which come from the same sort of source as the corresponding schol. vet. A few elementary comments may be due to Arethas himself.

¹ The Arethan scholia on 466 e and 523 e reflect views which seem not to be older than Iamblichus. They are more technical than anything in the schol. vet. or in Ol, which supports the idea that they come from Proclus, as does the textual agreement of schol. Arethae with Proclus at 464 b 8.

² The source-attributions in the *apparatus* of Greene's edition of the scholia are taken over from Burnet's manuscript notes.

³ Examples are the notes on χαραδριῶν (494 b, with quotation from Hipponax) and on ἐπὶ κόρρης (508 d, cf. Eustathius 947. 25), and perhaps the interesting general matter on σκολιόν (451 e). These 'Atticistic' scholia have recently been discussed by H. Erbse, 'Untersuchungen zu den attizistischen Lexika', *Abh. Berl. Akad. Phil.-Hist. Kl.*, 1949, Nr. 2.

⁴ e.g. the glosses on προῦργιαιτερον (458 c), νεανιεύεσθαι (482 c), κιναίδων (494 e). See L. Cohn, 'Untersuchungen über die Quellen der Plato-Scholien,' *Jahrb. f. Class. Phil.*, Supplementband xiii (1883), 783 ff. This essay is still the fundamental study on the sources of the Platonic scholia. The English reader will find a convenient short account by W. C. Greene in *Trans. Amer. Philol. Ass.* 1937, 184 ff.

⁵ e.g. on κατόπιν ἐορτῆς ἤκομεν (447 a), on δις καὶ τρίς τὰ καλὰ λέγειν (498 e), on ὁ ὁμοῖος τῷ ὁμοίῳ (510 b). Cf. Cohn, *op. cit.* 836-52. Lucillus is quoted by name on *Rep.* 337 a.

⁶ R. Beutler, 'Die Gorgiasscholien und Olympiodor', *Hermes*, lxxiii (1938), 380 ff.

is made by both the scholion often expresses it more lucidly and logically. He explains this by the hypothesis of derivation from a common prototype, which he conjectures to be the lost commentary by the Athenian Neoplatonist Plutarchus (d. 431), who is twice mentioned by name in the *scholia vetera* to the *Gorgias*. Alternative possibilities are (i) that the scholia derive from a different version of Olympiodorus' lectures;¹ or (ii) that their compiler supplemented Olympiodorus' notes with others drawn from Plutarchus or (as Mettauer and Burnet supposed) from Proclus.

The scholia proper, as distinct from marginal variants, only rarely throw light on the text. Unlike Olympiodorus, they have no lemmata;² their paraphrases are seldom close; and they do not discuss textual questions (unless schol. vet. 499 a 7 is an exception). It is worth noticing, however, that at 464 b 8, while schol. vet. read *δικαιοσύνην* with BTW and probably Ol, schol. Arethae appears to have had *δικαστικήν* with F and Proclus; and that at 502 c 5 schol. vet. agrees with F and Aristides against BTW. At 491 d 4 schol. vet. agrees (as we should expect) with Ol in attributing the words *τί ἢ τί;* to Callicles. But at 495 a 5 schol. vet. implies the true reading (*μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος*), which is that of BTW, while Ol (if correctly reported) knows only two false ones.

IV. THE INDIRECT TRADITION

THE *Gorgias* was among those Platonic dialogues which were most generally read and admired in later antiquity. In the Neoplatonic Schools, as we have seen, it was a 'specially prescribed book'. It was also of special interest to students of rhetoric. Many, no doubt, were content, as Quintilian says,³ to read a few excerpts from it; but Cicero makes Lucius Licinius Crassus claim to have read it carefully at Athens with a Greek teacher (*de orat.* 1. 47),

¹ Ancient lecturers revised their courses when they repeated them, as a scholar should (cf. Praechter, *Gött. gel. Anz.* clxvii (1905), 505 ff.; Jaeger, *Praefatio in Aristotelis Metaphysica*, xvi). We have two quite different versions of one of Ol's lectures on the *Alc. i*, with a note by the original editor, *ἐν διττῷ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔγραψα πρᾶξιν, ἄλλως ἔχουσῶν τῶν ἐπιστάσεων* (192. 10 Cr.).

² The lemmata in Greene's edition are taken from Burnet's text, not from the MSS.

³ *Inst. or.* 2. 15. 24 *plerique . . . pauca ex Gorgia Platonis a prioribus imperite excerpta legere contenti, neque hoc totum neque alia eius volumina evolvunt.*

and Aristides tells us that some admired it more than any other work of Plato (II. 6 Dind. = 10 Canter). It is therefore not surprising that it is widely quoted or referred to—most often by professed Platonists and by writers on rhetoric, but also by such various authors as Cicero, Epictetus, Gellius, and Athenaeus, and by Christian writers from Justin Martyr onwards, who were attracted by the lofty moral teaching of the dialogue and especially by the concluding Vision of Judgement. An alphabetical list of authors who made use of the *Gorgias* will be found in Index I; it makes no claim to exhaustive completeness.

For the establishment of the text, however, only verbatim quotations are of much value, and these are less frequent than paraphrases or allusions.¹ Moreover, *short* quotations are as a rule unreliable, since they were often made from memory. The authors whose testimony is important from this point of view are chiefly those who copy out long passages of the text, viz. Plutarch or pseudo-Plutarch (c. A.D. 100), Aristides (saec. ii A.D.), Iamblichus (c. A.D. 300), Eusebius (c. A.D. 300), and Stobaeus (probably saec. v A.D.: drew on earlier anthologies, but probably not for Plato).

1. *Plutarch*, or whoever wrote the *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, has transcribed the myth. He did it rather carelessly, transposing words and altering connectives;² but he alone preserves a necessary article at 523 b 7 and, with Stobaeus, the Attic prose form *σφισιν* at 523 c 1. It is noteworthy that he nowhere agrees in error with BTW against F, while his one agreement in error with F against BTW (at 523 e 5) may well be fortuitous. This suggests that his exemplar may have been older than the divergence between the two families.

2. *Aelius Aristides*, the Atticist rhetorician, quotes and paraphrases the *Gorgias* fairly extensively in orations xlv (where he defends his profession against Plato's criticisms) and xlvi (where he defends the "Four Men"). Like Plutarch, he quotes somewhat carelessly; but in three places (464 a 6, 484 b 7, 503 a 2) he preserves the true reading against all primary MSS. of the direct tradition. He seems to have agreed with F at 463 c 4 and 519 c 1;

¹ In the *testimonia* attached to this edition paraphrases are indicated by 'cf.', allusions by 'resp.'.

² In the later MSS. of the *Cons. ad Apoll.* some of these slips have been corrected from the direct tradition.

but, like Plutarch, he shows no consistent tendency to side with one medieval family against the other (an omission shared with F at 503 b 4 and one shared with BTW at 526 a 7 can both be explained by haplography). He was a good deal read at Byzantium, and a text of the *Gorgias* was sometimes included in copies of his works;¹ hence it is not surprising to find traces of contamination between his tradition of the Platonic text and the direct tradition.²

3. *Iamblichus*, the Neoplatonist philosopher, pillaged the *Gorgias*, along with other classical works, to provide material for his *Protrepticus*, an exhortation to the philosophic life. Sometimes he paraphrases and abbreviates; and even where he transcribes he does not present his quotations as quotations, but adapts them to the form of a 'protreptic', eliminating whatever might betray their origin in a dialogue. As a rule, however, he makes only such changes as are necessary for this purpose, so that the value of his evidence is not greatly impaired, though he has a bad name for negligence and lack of scruple.³ In one place (492 e 7) his paraphrase points to what I believe to be the true reading, lost in the direct tradition. For the rest, his text of Plato seems closer to the second family than to the first; it shows striking agreement in error with F at 493 b 5 and at 505 b 4 and 7, beside which a minor agreement in error with BTW at 492 e 8 is less probative.

4. *Eusebius* copied out in his *Praeparatio Evangelica* part of the myth and most of Socrates' concluding $\rho\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$. His accuracy as a transcriber has been warmly defended by Paul Henry,⁴ but his version of the passage in question does not bear this out, even when allowance is made for the ravages of subsequent copyists.⁵

¹ The oldest MSS. of Aristides which contain the *Gorgias* seem to be Vat. gr. 933 and Par. gr. 2953, both of which are attributed by Post to the thirteenth century.

² Readings from Aristides have occasionally been introduced into the direct tradition by late hands, e.g. at 464 b 7 (Bod. misc. 189, a MS. which also contains Aristides), 465 b 3 (Paris corrector, from E of Aristides?), 484 b 7 (V marg.), 503 a 2 (Flor). Conversely, at 463 c 4 the reading of BTW has been introduced into L of Aristides, whose tradition otherwise agrees here with F; and at 519 c 1 F's $\tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\varsigma$ has been deleted in N of Aristides.

³ Cf. Alline, 152.

⁴ *Recherches sur la Préparation Évangélique d'Eusèbe et l'édition perdue des Œuvres de Plotin* (Bibl. de l'École des Hautes Études, Sciences Rel. 50, 1935), 16-26.

⁵ I have omitted from my apparatus a few variants which are shown by the evidence of Theodoret to be due to later corruption of the Eusebian text. The oldest and best MS. of the *Praep. Evang.* (A, Par. gr. 451), which belonged to Arethas and was used by him to correct errors in the Clarkianus of Plato (Gifford, CR, xvi (1902), 16 f.), does not include the quotations from the *Gorgias*.

In fact, he was almost as careless as Plutarch, especially in transcribing connectives. His exemplar had a text very close to that of F's exemplar: cf. 524 c 1 (where F corrupts this text further), 525 b 3, 526 d 6, e 6, 527 a 1, a 5.

It should be added that Eusebius, not Plato, is the immediate source of the quotations from the *Gorgias* in Theodoret (saec. v); and that from Theodoret some of them were in turn copied out by Georgios Monachos (saec. ix) and eventually found their way into Suidas s.v. Πλάτων. Community of error and progressive corruption make this virtually certain.¹ Theodoret and his derivatives are thus not independent witnesses to the text of Plato; their only value is as a check on corruptions introduced by medieval copyists into the text of Eusebius.

5. The most copious excerptor of the *Gorgias* is the anthologist Stobaeus. He quotes thirteen separate passages, amounting together to about one-eighth of the entire dialogue, so that we can form a good idea of what his text was like. Burnet's report of his readings was incomplete, and sometimes incorrect (the best modern edition, that of Wachsmuth and Hense, was only partially available to him). Stobaeus' text has suffered a good deal in transmission; but when allowance is made for this it is clear that his exemplar was much like the exemplar of F, a relationship which holds good in other dialogues also (*Meno*, *Menex.*, *Rep.*, *Tim.*).² He agrees in manifest error with F at 478 d 1 and 479 a 9, but nowhere (I think) agrees in manifest error with BTW. At 476 c 5 F conflates Stobaeus' false reading with the true one transmitted in BTW. In several places Stobaeus is alone in preserving the true reading: 472 e 5 πάντως for ἀπάντων; 477 d 2 ἐστι καὶ for ἐστιν; 478 e 4 omits ἀδικίαν, which appears to be a mistaken gloss; perhaps also 493 b 5.

To sum up, we may say broadly:

(i) The indirect tradition is in general decidedly inferior to the direct, whether this is due to the use of an inferior exemplar, to careless transcription by the citator, or to subsequent corruption

¹ A good example of progressive corruption is 525 c 5—διὰ τὰς ἀμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα Plato: διὰ τὰς ἀμαρτίας τὰς μεγίστας Eus. Theod.: διὰ τὰς μεγίστας ἀμαρτίας Georg. Mon.: διὰ τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμαρτίας Suid. That Theodoret took all his Plato quotations at second hand from Eusebius or Clement was shown by C. Roos, *De Theodoro Clementis et Eusebii compilatore* (diss. Hal. 1883).


² Cf. Burnet, *CR*, xvi (1902), 100; Deneke, *de Platonis . . . F memoria*, 29, 53, 56.

of the citator's text. It is, however, not negligible, and is occasionally our only authority for a good reading.

(ii) While the older quotations (Plutarch, Aristides) appear more or less neutral¹ as between the two medieval traditions of the *Gorgias*, the later (Iamblichus, Eusebius, Stobaeus) show a marked tendency to agree with F, in false as well as in true readings.

¹ It is noteworthy, however, that Gellius (saec. ii A.D.) agrees in error with F at 525 b 2 and 3.

STEMMA CODICUM



SIGLA

B	Bodleianus Clark. 39	}	familiae primae
T	Venetus App. Class. 4. 1		
W	Vindobonensis suppl. phil. gr. 7 (olim 54)		

F Vindobonensis suppl. phil. gr. 39 (olim 55), familiae alterius

B² T² designantur manus διορθωτῶν

b t similibus designantur manus recentiores

Nonnunquam citantur :

P	Vaticanus Palatinus 173, familiae primae	}	recensiones Byzantinae
Par ² , Par ³	manus correctrices Parisini 1808 (Bekkeri B)		
Flor	Laurentianus 85. 6 (Stallbaumi b)		
V	Parisinus 2110		
Y	Vindobonensis phil. gr. 21		

fragmenta papyracea :

Π ¹	P. Rainer
Π ²	P. Oxy. 454 et P.S.I. 119
Π ³	P.S.I. 1200
Π ⁴	P. Fouad I 2

Olλ Olympiodori lemmata

Olπ Olympiodori paraphrasis

ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ

ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΗΣ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ

ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ ΠΩΛΟΣ

St. I

p. 447

ΚΑΛ. Πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ χρῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, α οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἢ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν ἐορτῆς ἤκομεν καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν;

ΚΑΛ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἀστείας ἐορτῆς· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ 5 Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο.

ΣΩ. Τούτων μέντοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, αἴτιος Χαιρεφῶν ὅδε, ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς διατρίψαι.

ΧΑΙ. Οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι. b φίλος γάρ μοι Γοργίας, ὥστ' ἐπιδείξεται ἡμῖν, εἰ μὲν δοκεῖ, νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, εἰς αὖθις.

ΚΑΛ. Τί δέ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν; ἐπιθυμεῖ Σωκράτης ἀκοῦσαι Γοργίου;

ΧΑΙ. Ἐπ' αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ' ἐμὲ ἦκειν οἴκαδε· παρ' ἐμοὶ γὰρ Γοργίας καταλύει καὶ ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν.

ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. ἀλλ' ἄρα ἐθελήσειεν ἂν ἡμῖν διαλεχθῆναι; βούλομαι γὰρ πυθέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ τίς ἢ c

b 3 νῦν—c 2 δύναμις P.S.I. 1200 (II³)

a 3 ἀλλ'—ἤκομεν Suidas s.v. ἀλλ' ἢ

a 3 κατόπιν ἐορτῆς ἤκομεν *Etym. Magn.* s.v. κατόπιν; pseudo-Didymus, *Plat. Lex.* s.v. κατόπιν (E. Miller, *Mélanges*, p. 399); Thomas Magister, *Ecloga Voc. Att.*, p. 199. 7 Ritschl

b 7 οὐκοῦν—8 καταλύει pseudo-Didymus, *Plat. Lex.*, p. 406

b 7 ὅταν—οἴκαδε Thomas Mag., p. 132. 19

a 1 πολέμου καὶ secl. Maas a 3-4 καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν secl. Cobet a 5 ἐορ-
τῆς secl. Hirschig a 8 ὅς ἀναγκάσας F (ὅς ἠνάγκασεν f) b 2 δοκῇ
F (corr. f) b 4 τί δαί B²W b 6 τούτῳ F b 7 παρ' ἐμὲ
ἦκειν οἴκαδε] χρῆ παρ' ἐμὲ ἦκειν ps.-Did. b 8 γὰρ BWΠ³ ps.-Did.: om.
TPF ὁ Γοργίας κατέλυσε ps.-Did. b 9 ἐθελήσειεν ἂν] ἐθελήσει Oll
c 1 πιθέσθαι ex πείθεσθαι factum F

δύναμις τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἀνδρός, καὶ τί ἐστὶν ὃ ἐπαγγέλλεται τε καὶ διδάσκει· τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἐπιδείξιν εἰς αὐθις, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ποιησάσθω.

- 5 ΚΑΙ. Οὐδὲν οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐν τοῦτ' ἦν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως· ἐκέλευε γοῦν νυνδὴ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βούλοιτο τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἔφη ἀποκρινεῖσθαι.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καλῶς λέγεις. ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.

- 10 ΧΑΙ. Τί ἔρωμαι;

d ΣΩ. Ὅστις ἐστίν.

ΧΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός, ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν δήπου σοι ὅτι σκυτοτόμος· ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὥς

- 5 λέγω;

ΧΑΙ. Μανθάνω καὶ ἐρήσομαι. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλη ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι ἂν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ;

- 448 ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν· καὶ γὰρ νυνδὴ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπηγγελλόμεν, καὶ λέγω ὅτι οὐδεὶς μέ πω ἠρώτηκε καινὸν οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν.

ΧΑΙ. Ἡ που ἄρα ῥαδίως ἀποκρινῇ, ὦ Γοργία.

- 5 ΓΟΡ. Πάρεστι τούτου πεῖραν, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, λαβεῖν.

ΠΩΛ. Νῆ Δί' ἂν δέ γε βούλῃ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐμοῦ. Γοργίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπειρηκέναι μοι δοκεῖ· πολλὰ γὰρ ἄρτι διεξελέλυθεν.

- ΧΑΙ. Τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; οἷε σὺ κάλλιον ἂν Γοργίου
10 ἀποκρίνασθαι;

b ΠΩΛ. Τί δὲ τοῦτο, ἐὰν σοί γε ἱκανῶς;

ΧΑΙ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ σὺ βούλει, ἀποκρίνου.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρώτα.

ΧΑΙ. Ἐρωτῶ δὴ· εἰ ἐτύγχανε Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων ὢν

d 6—a 2 resp. Cicero, *de oratore* 3. 129

a 2—3 resp. [Alexander] in *Soph. El.*, pp. 15. 14 et 196. 3 Wallies

c 6 νῦν διερωτᾶν F c 10 ἔρωμαι OIλ d 7 ἐπαγγέλλη W ἀποκρίνεσθαι BTPf et s.l. W: ἀποκρίνασθαι W: ἀποκρινεῖσθαι F a 2 ἠρώτησε W (corr. s.l.) a 5 λαβεῖν F OIπ: λαμβάνειν BTWf a 6 δέ om. F βούλει F
a 8 διεξελέλυθε F: διελέλυθεν BTW

τῆς τέχνης ἥσπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἡρόδικος, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν 5
ὠνομάζομεν δικαίως; οὐχ ὅπερ ἐκείνον;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΧΑΙ. Ἰατρὸν ἄρα φάσκοντες αὐτὸν εἶναι καλῶς ἂν
ἐλέγομεν.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

10

ΧΑΙ. Εἰ δέ γε ἥσπερ Ἀριστοφῶν ὁ Ἀγλαοφῶντος ἢ ὁ
ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἔμπειρος ἦν τέχνης, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς
ἐκαλοῦμεν;

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι ζωγράφον.

c

ΧΑΙ. Νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ τίνος τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν, τίνα
ἂν καλοῦντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς καλοῦμεν;

ΠΩΛ. ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν
ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ἡύρημένοι· ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ 5
ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ
κατὰ τύχην. ἐκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι
ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἄριστοι· ὧν καὶ Γοργίας
ἐστὶν ὅδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς γε, ὦ Γοργία, φαίνεται Πῶλος παρεσκευ- d
άσθαι εἰς λόγους· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁ ὑπέσχετο Χαιρεφῶντι οὐ
ποιεῖ.

ΓΟΡ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Τὸ ἐρωτώμενον οὐ πάνυ μοι φαίνεται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. 5

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰ βούλει, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ αὐτῷ γε σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι,
ἀλλὰ πολὺ ἂν ἡδιον σέ. δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος καὶ ἐξ ὧν
εἴρηκεν ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν
ἢ διαλέγεσθαι.

10

c 4 πολλὰ—8 ἄριστοι Stobaeus 3. 1. 183

c 4 πολλὰ—5 ἡύρημένοι Syrianus, *schol. in Hermogenem* ii. 8. 24 Rabe

c 5 ἐμπειρία—7 τύχην Asclepius in *Met.*, pp. 5. 14 et 8. 11 Hayduck; Elias
in *Cat.*, p. 140. 3 Busse; resp. Aristoteles, *Met.* 981^a4, Alexander in
Met., p. 5. 13 Hayduck, Olympiodorus in *Cat.*, p. 34. 18 Busse

c 5 ἐμπειρία—6 τέχνην Olympiodorus in *Phaed.*, p. 64. 1 Norvin

b 5 ἡρόδικος BTW Oll: πρόδικος F τίνα] τί Oll (ci. Buttman) b 6 ὀνο-
μάζομεν W ὅπερ ci. Findeisen b 8 post ἂν rep. αὐτόν F b 11 ἢ] ἦν
F (corr. f) c 3 καλοῦμεν BTW: ἂν καλοῦμεν F: καλέσοιμεν Oll c 6 ἡμῶν
τὸν αἰῶνα ποιεῖ Elias c 8 οἱ ἄριστοι <ἄριστα> Egelie d 2 εἰς BTWf:
περὶ F: πρὸς Oll d 7 ἀποκρίνασθαι F d 8 σέ F: σοὶ BTWf

e ΠΩΛ. Τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐρομένου Χαιρεφώντος τίνος Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἥτις δέ ἐστιν οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω.

5 ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι εἴη ἡ καλλίστη;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἡρώτα ποία τις εἴη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὄντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν· ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο Χαιρεφών καὶ αὐτῷ καλῶς
449 καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἰπέ τίς ἡ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρή ἡμᾶς. μᾶλλον δέ, ὦ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἰπέ τίνα σε χρή καλεῖν ὥς τίνος ἐπιστήμονα τέχνης.

5 ΓΟΡ. Τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ῥήτορα ἄρα χρή σε καλεῖν;

ΓΟΡ. Ἀγαθόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὁ γε εὐχομαι εἶναι, ὥς ἔφη Ὀμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ βούλομαι.

10 ΓΟΡ. Κάλει δή.

b ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατὸν εἶναι ποιεῖν;

ΓΟΡ. Ἐπαγγέλλομαί γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐθελήσais ἄν, ὦ Γοργία, ὥσπερ νῦν δια-
5 λεγόμεθα διατελέσαι, τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀποκρινόμενος, τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἷον καὶ Πῶλος ἤρξατο, εἰς αὐθις ἀποθέσθαι; ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνῇ, μὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀλλὰ ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΓΟΡ. Εἰσὶ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔνιαι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων
10 ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ
c πειράσομαί γε ὥς διὰ βραχυτάτων. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἔν ἐστιν ὧν φημι, μηδένα ἄν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν.

a 3-4 cf. David, *Prol. Phil.*, p. 43. 2 Busse

a 6-8 resp. Ammonius in *Arist. de interp.*, p. 205. 13 Busse

e 2 ὅτι δή OIλ e 5 ἡ om. F e 6 ἡρώτα Bekker: ἐρωτᾶ BTW: τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾶ F εἴη post τις BTW: post Γοργίου F: om. P, del. Burnet b 7 ἀναθέσθαι Flor f post ἀποθέσθαι suppl. ναί Bod. misc. 189, lacunam statuit Schanz ὅπερ <ἄν> Morstadt ψεύσῃ] μέμψῃ f c 2 ἔν ἐστιν BPft: ἔνεστιν TW

ΣΩ. Τούτου μὴν δεῖ, ὦ Γοργία· καὶ μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐ-
τοῦ τούτου ποιῆσαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ εἰς 5
αὐθις.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς φήσεις βραχυλογωτέρου
ἀκοῦσαι.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ φῆς ἐπιστήμων τέχνης
εἶναι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ ἄλλον ῥήτορα· ἢ ῥητορικὴ περὶ τί d
τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει οὕσα; ὥσπερ ἢ ὑφαντικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν
ἱματίων ἐργασίαν· ἢ γάρ;—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ
ἢ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποιήσιν;—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Νῆ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ Γοργία, ἄγαμαί γε τὰς ἀποκρίσεις, 5
ὅτι ἀποκρίνη ὡς οἶόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων.

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

ΣΩ. Εἴ λέγεις. ἴθι δὴ μοι ἀπόκριναι οὕτως καὶ περὶ
τῆς ῥητορικῆς, περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη;—

ΓΟΡ. Περὶ λόγους.—ΣΩ. Ποίους τούτους, ὦ Γοργία; ἄρα e
οἱ δηλοῦσι τοὺς κάμνοντας, ὡς ἂν διαιτώμενοι ὑγιαίνειν;—

ΓΟΡ. Οὐ.—ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα περὶ πάντας γε τοὺς λόγους ἢ
ῥητορικὴ ἐστίν.—ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆτα.—ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν

γε ποιεῖ δυνατός.—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ ὧν περ 5
λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν;—ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν
ἢ νυνδὴ λεγομένη ἱατρικὴ περὶ τῶν καμνόντων ποιεῖ 450
δυνατοὺς εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν;—ΓΟΡ. Ἀνάγκη.—

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἢ ἱατρικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, περὶ λόγους ἐστίν.—

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Τούς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα;—ΓΟΡ. Μά-

λιστα.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἢ γυμναστικὴ περὶ λόγους ἐστίν 5

τοὺς περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ καχεξίαν;—ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ

γε.—ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, ὦ Γοργία, οὕτως

d 1 ἢ—2 οὕσα Thomas Mag., p. 390. 16

d 8 ἴθι—οὕτως Thomas Mag., p. 390. 8

d—e resp. Philodemus, *Rhet.* ii. 185 Sudhaus, et Quintilianus, *Inst. Or.* 2.

21. 1, 4 Radermacher

c 4 μὴν] μέντοι Olλ c 7 ποιήσομαι Coraës φήσεις BTW: φαίης

δεῖν F: φαίης f c 9 ἐπιστήμων τέχνης BTW Olλ: τέχνης ἐπιστήμων F

e 1 ποίους] περὶ λόγους ποίους F e 5 ποιεῖν TP e 6 λέγειν] καὶ

λέγειν F (sed καὶ s.l.) Olπ οὖν BTW: οὖν καὶ revera F: οὐ καὶ b a 1 ἢ

νυνδὴ λεγομένη F (suprascr. ἦν f): ἦν νυνδὴ λέγομεν ἢ BTW (ἢ om. T):

ἦν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ἢ Vind. 109 ποιεῖ F: om. BTW a 3 ἢ om. F

a 6 τε—καχεξίαν om. F a 7 μὴν] νῦν W αἱ om. W

b ἔχουσιν· ἐκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν τούτους, οἱ τυγ-
 χάνουσιν ὄντες περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἐκάστη ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη.
 —ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται.—ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ ποτε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας
 οὐ ρητορικὰς καλεῖς, οὕσας περὶ λόγους, εἴπερ ταύτην
 5 ρητορικὴν καλεῖς, ἢ ἂν ἢ περὶ λόγους;

ΓΟΡ. Ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ
 χειρουργίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πᾶσα
 ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ρητορικῆς οὐδέν ἐστιν τοιοῦτον
 χειρουργήμα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ πράξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λόγων
 c ἐστίν. διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν ρητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ
 λόγους, ὀρθῶς λέγων, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν μανθάνω οἷαν αὐτὴν βούλει καλεῖν; τάχα
 δὲ εἴσομαι σαφέστερον. ἀλλ' ἀπόκριναι· εἰσὶν ἡμῖν τέχναι·
 5 ἢ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πασῶν δὴ οἶμαι τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ
 πολὺ ἐστὶν καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, ἔνιαι δὲ οὐδενός,
 ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνουτο ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς, οἷον
 10 γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί. τὰς τοι-
 d αύτας μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, περὶ αἷς οὐ φῆς τὴν ρητορικὴν εἶναι
 ἢ οὐ;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἔτεραι δέ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν αἱ διὰ λόγου πᾶν
 5 περαίνουσι, καὶ ἔργου ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ οὐδενός προσδέονται
 ἢ βραχέος πάνυ, οἷον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεω-
 μετρικὴ καὶ πεπτευτικὴ γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι, ὧν
 ἔνιαι σχεδόν τι ἴσους τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, αἱ
 δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους, καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ πράξις καὶ τὸ
 e κύρος αὐταῖς διὰ λόγων ἐστίν. τῶν τοιούτων τινὰ μοι
 δοκεῖς λέγειν τὴν ρητορικὴν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

c 7-e 1 cf. Troilum, *Prol.* 47. 12 (Rabe, *Prolegom. Sylloge*); schol. Hermog.
 264. 22 (ibid.); resp. Sextus Empiricus, *adv. math.* 2. 2, 2. 5; Elias in *Cat.*,
 p. 155. 27

b 9 κύρωσις διὰ, c 1 διὰ et ἀξιῶ εἶναι, c 3 μανθάνω om. F relicto spatio
 (suppl. f) c 7 δὴ] δὲ Vat. 225 ἐργασία] ἐν ἐργασίᾳ F d 1 δοκεῖ F
 fort. <πράξεις>, περὶ αἷς d 5 καὶ ἔργου καὶ ὡς W d 7 γε] τε W

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ τι τούτων γε οὐδεμίαν οἶμαί σε βούλεσθαι
 ῥητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες, ὅτι ἡ διὰ 5
 λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορικὴ ἐστίν, καὶ ὑπολάβοι ἂν τις,
 εἰ βούλοιτο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, “Τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν
 ἄρα ῥητορικὴν, ὦ Γοργία, λέγεις;” ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶμαί σε οὔτε
 τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν οὔτε τὴν γεωμετρίαν ῥητορικὴν λέγειν.

ΓΟΡ. Ὅρθως γὰρ οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ δικαίως ὑπο- 451
 λαμβάνεις.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι νυν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἧ ἡρόμην διαπέρανον.
 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ῥητορικὴ τυγχάνει μὲν οὔσα τούτων τις τῶν τεχνῶν
 τῶν τὸ πολὺ λόγῳ χρωμένων, τυγχάνουσιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι 5
 τοιαῦται οὔσαι, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἡ περὶ τί ἐν λόγοις τὸ κῦρος
 ἔχουσα ῥητορικὴ ἐστίν. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις με ἔροιτο ὦν νυνδὴ
 ἔλεγον περὶ ἡστινοσοῦν τῶν τεχνῶν. “ᾧ Σώκρατες, τίς
 ἐστίν ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη;” εἴποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ σὺ ἄρτι, b
 ὅτι τῶν διὰ λόγου τις τὸ κῦρος ἐχουσῶν· καὶ εἴ με ἐπανέ-
 ροιτο. “Τῶν περὶ τί;” εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε
 καὶ περιττόν [γνώσις], ὅσα ἂν ἐκάτερα τυγχάνη ὄντα. εἰ δ'
 αὖ ἔροιτο. “Τὴν δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην;” εἴποιμ' 5
 ἂν ὅτι καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν τῶν λόγῳ τὸ πᾶν κυρουμένων· καὶ εἰ
 ἐπανέροιτο. “Ἡ περὶ τί;” εἴποιμ' ἂν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ
 συγγραφόμενοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἡ c
 λογιστικὴ ἔχει—περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ ἐστίν, τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ
 τὸ περιττόν—διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ
 πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἔχει πλήθους ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιττόν καὶ
 τὸ ἄρτιον ἡ λογιστικὴ. καὶ εἴ τις τὴν ἀστρονομίαν ἀνέ- 5
 ροιτο, ἐμοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι καὶ αὕτη λόγῳ κυροῦται τὰ πάντα,

e 5-6 cf. Philodemum, *Rhet.* ii, p. 3 col. xii. 8

b 7-c 1 cf. Ammonium in *Arist. de interp.*, pp. 46. 20 et 47. 3

e 4 οὐ τι BTW et revera F: οὔτοι Par. 1815 e 5 οὐχ ὅτι] διότι Par² f
 ἡ om. W e 7 ἐν F (ci. Heindorf): om. BTW e 9 γεωμετρίαν
 ῥητορικὴν] γεωμετρικὴν T (corr. T²) a 3 νυν] οὖν F (corr. f in marg.)
 ἧ ci. Sauppe: ἦν BTWF a 4 ἡ ῥητορικὴ F Par² a 5 τῷ λόγῳ F
 a 7 ὦν] τῶν F (suprascr. ὦν δf) b 2 ἔχουσιν T (corr. T²) b 4 γνώσις
 secl. Bekker, sed latet fort. corruptio maior τυγχάνη BTP et revera F, in
 marg. W¹: τυγχάνει W b 5 λογικὴν f (et λογικὴ c 2) b 6 ὅτι—7 ἂν
 omissa add. in marg. W¹, repetitis etiam b 3 ὅτι—6 ἂν b 7 ἐπανέροι W
 ὥσπερ οἱ om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) c 5 ἀνέροιτο TWb: ἀναιροῖτο B:
 ἔροιτο F c 6 λόγῳ om. F (add. f)

“Οἱ δὲ λόγοι οἱ τῆς ἀστρονομίας”, εἰ φαίη, “περὶ τί εἰσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες;” εἵπομι’ ἂν ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀστρων φοράν καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα τάχους ἔχει.

10 ΓΟΡ. Ὅρθως γε λέγων σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

d ΣΩ. Ἰθι δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ Γοργία. τυγχάνει μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἡ ῥητορικὴ οὕσα τῶν λόγῳ τὰ πάντα διαπραττομένων τε καὶ κυρουμένων [τινῶν]· ἡ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

5 ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ τῶν περὶ τί; <τί> ἐστὶ τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων, περὶ ὃ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι εἰσὶν οἷς ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρῆται;

ΓΟΡ. Τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄριστα.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ’, ὦ Γοργία, ἀμφισβητήσιμον καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις
e καὶ οὐδέν πω σαφές. οἶμαι γὰρ σε ἀκηκοέναι ἐν τοῖς
συμποσίοις ἀδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν, ἐν ᾧ κατ-
αριθμοῦνται ἀδοντες ὅτι ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστόν ἐστιν,
τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ, ὥς φησιν
5 ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀκήκοα γάρ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

452 ΣΩ. Ὅτι εἴ σοι αὐτίκα παρασταῖεν οἱ δημιουργοὶ τού-
των ὧν ἐπήνεσεν ὁ τὸ σκολιὸν ποιήσας, ἰατρός τε καὶ
παιδοτρίβης καὶ χρηματιστής, καὶ εἴποι πρῶτον μὲν ὁ ἰατρὸς
ὅτι “ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξαπατᾷ σε Γοργίας· οὐ γάρ ἐστὶν ἡ
5 τούτου τέχνη περὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ’
ἡ ἐμή”—εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ ἐροίμην· Σὺ δὲ τίς ὧν ταῦτα
λέγεις; εἴποι ἂν ἴσως ὅτι ἰατρός. Τί οὖν λέγεις; ἡ τὸ τῆς
σῆς τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν; “Πῶς γὰρ οὐ,”
φαίη ἂν ἴσως, “ὦ Σώκρατες, <ἥς γ’> ὑγίεια; τί δ’ ἐστὶν μεῖζον
b ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώποις ὑγείας;” εἰ δ’ αὖ μετὰ τοῦτον ὁ παιδοτρίβης
εἴποι ὅτι “Θαυμάζοιμί τᾶν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς εἴ σοι ἔχει

c 3 ὑγιαίνειν—5 ἀδόλως cf. Athenaeum 694 e; Stobaeum 4. 39. 9 [Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. iii. 645]

c 9 πῶς] καὶ πῶς F d 3 τινῶν BTW: τις Par² f: om. F (secluserat Hermann)
d 5 alt. τί add. Heindorf d 6 ὃ Hirschig: οὗ BTWF e 2 ἀνθρώπων
secl. Maas e 4 τὸ τρίτον W a 1 εἴ F: om. BTW αὐτίκα ἂν Par² f
a 3 πρῶτος Hirschig a 7 ἡ] ὅτι F a 9 <ἥς γ’> ὑγίεια ci. Vahlen: ὑγίεια
secl. ci. Hirschig b 1 τοῦτο OIA b 2 τᾶν BTWF: γ’ ἂν Par² ut vid.,
Flor (ci. Coraës): μεντᾶν Cobet ἔχει WPF: ἔχοι BT et suprascr. W

Γοργίας μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδείξαι τῆς αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἢ ἐγὼ τῆς ἐμῆς·” εἵποίμ’ ἂν αὖ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον· Σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, καὶ τί τὸ σὸν ἔργον; “Παιδοτρίβης,” φαίη ἂν, 5 “τὸ δὲ ἔργον μού ἐστιν καλοὺς τε καὶ ἰσχυροὺς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα.” μετὰ δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην εἵποι ἂν ὁ χρηματιστής, ὡς ἐγῶμαι πάνυ καταφρονῶν ἀπάντων· “Σκόπει δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάν σοι πλούτου φανῇ τι μείζον c ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἢ παρὰ Γοργία ἢ παρ’ ἄλλω ὅττω οὖν.” φαίμεν ἂν οὖν πρὸς αὐτόν· Τί δὲ δὴ; ἢ σὺ τούτου δημιουργός; φαίη ἂν. Τίς ὢν; “Χρηματιστής.” Τί οὖν; κρίνεις σὺ μέγιστον ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πλούτον; φήσομεν. “Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ;” 5 ἐρεῖ. Καὶ μὴν ἀμφισβητεῖ γε Γοργίας ὅδε τὴν παρ’ αὐτῷ τέχνην μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν εἶναι ἢ τὴν σὴν, φαίμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτ’ ἂν· “Καὶ τί ἐστιν τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἀποκρινάσθω Γοργίας.” ἔθι οὖν νομίσας, d ὦ Γοργία, ἐρωτᾶσθαι καὶ ὑπ’ ἐκείνων καὶ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ, ἀποκρίναι τί ἐστιν τοῦτο ὃ φῆς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ.

ΓΟΡ. “Ὅπερ ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον 5 ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει ἐκάστω.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΓΟΡ. Τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ’ οἶόν τ’ εἶναι τοῖς λόγοις καὶ e ἐν δικαστηρίῳ δικαστὰς καὶ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτὰς καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκκλησιαστὰς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ συλλόγῳ παντί, ὅστις ἂν πολιτικὸς σύλλογος γίγνηται. καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἔξεις τὸν ἰατρόν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν 5 παιδοτρίβην· ὁ δὲ χρηματιστής οὗτος ἄλλω ἀναφανήσεται

e 1–8 resp. Quintilianus, *Inst. Or.* 2. 15. 10

b 7 δὲ Y Vat. 225: δὲ δὴ BTWF: δὲ δὴ Deuschle c 1 σκόπει τούτων δῆτα
F φανείη F c 3 τί δὲ δὴ; ἢ Par², γρ. b: τι δε η suprascr. δ* T: τί
δὲ ἢ F: τί δὲ ἂν ἢ BW, γρ. t c 4 σὺ κρίνεις revera F c 5 φήσει
F c 7 φάμεν ἂν F c 8 τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο] * * * * τοσοῦτον F (τὸ
μετὰ τοῦτο in lacuna suppl. f) d 1 τούτου F d 2 ἐκείνου f
d 7 τοῦ BTWF Olp: τῶν F: τοῦ τῶν Heindorf ἄλλον W e 2 καὶ ἐν
βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτὰς om. B (add. in marg. b) e 4 γέννηται F

χρηματιζόμενος καὶ οὐχ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ λέγειν καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλήθη.

ΣΩ. Νῦν μοι δοκεῖς δηλῶσαι, ὦ Γοργία, ἐγγύτατα τὴν
 453 ῥητορικὴν ἥντινα τέχνην ἡγῇ εἶναι, καὶ εἴ τι ἐγὼ συνήμι,
 λέγεις ὅτι πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική, καὶ ἡ πρα-
 γματεία αὐτῆς ἅπαντα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ·
 ἢ ἔχεις τι λέγειν ἐπὶ πλέον τὴν ῥητορικὴν δύνασθαι ἢ πειθῶ
 5 τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖν;

ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς ἱκανῶς
 ὀρίζεσθαι· ἔστιν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς.

ΣΩ. Ἄκουσον δὴ, ὦ Γοργία. ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι, ὡς
 b ἐμαντὸν πείθω, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἄλλῳ διαλέγεται βουλό-
 μενος εἰδέναι αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ὅτου ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, καὶ ἐμέ
 εἶναι τούτων ἕνα· ἀξιῶ δὲ καὶ σέ.

ΓΟΡ. Τί οὖν δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ νῦν. ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς πειθῶ,
 ἥτις ποτ' ἐστὶν ἥν σὺ λέγεις καὶ περὶ ὧντινων πραγμάτων
 ἐστὶν πειθῶ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ'
 ὑποπτεύω γε ἦν οἶμαί σε λέγειν καὶ περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν μέντοι
 ἦττον ἐρήσομαι σε τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθῶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς
 c ῥητορικῆς καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτὴν εἶναι. τοῦ ἕνεκα δὴ αὐτὸς
 ὑποπτεύων σέ ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω; οὐ σοῦ
 ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα οὕτω προῖη ὡς μάλιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν
 καταφανὲς ποιοῖ περὶ ὅτου λέγεται. σκόπει γὰρ εἴ σοι
 5 δοκῶ δικαίως ἀνερωτᾶν σε· ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε
 ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστιν τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξις, εἴ μοι εἶπες ὅτι
 ὁ τὰ ζῶα γράφων, ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν δικαίως σε ἡρόμην ὁ τὰ ποῖα
 τῶν ζώων γράφων καὶ ποῦ;

e 9 νῦν—a 7 ὀρίζεσθαι Stobaeus 2. 3. 2 (libri FP)

a 2 resp. Quintilianus, *Inst. Or.* 2. 15. 4 f.; Plutarchus, *an seni* 792D;
 Sextus Empiricus *adv. math.* 2. 2; Nicolaus Soph., *Progymn.*, Spengel,
Rhet. Gr. iii. 451. 21; Hermias in *Phaedrum*, p. 221. 30 Couvreur; etc.

e 7 χρημάτιζόμενος B²TWF: χρηματιζομένῳ B et suprascr. W σοὶ] εἰ F
 (corr. f) a 4 ἐπὶ BTWF et Stobaei F: ἐπὶ Flor f et Stobaei P
 a 6 δοκεῖ Stob. b 3 δὲ] δ' ἔγωγε F b 6 εἴ τις W b 7-c 2
 locus in F lacunosus relictis spatiis ubi omissa suppl. f c 1 τοῦ οὖν
 Par² f c 3 μάλιστ' ἂν] μάλιστα F c 6 ὅτι om. W c 8 καὶ
 ποῦ non agnoscit Ol, secl. H. Schmidt: καὶ ποῖ' οὐ van Heusde: ἢ οὐ
 Woolsey

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ἼΑρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγράφοι γρά- d
φοντες ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῶα;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μηδεὶς ἄλλος ἢ Ζεῦξις ἔγραφε, καλῶς ἂν
σοι ἀπεκέκριτο; 5

ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ· πότερόν σοι
δοκεῖ πειθῶ ποιεῖν ἢ ῥητορικὴ μόνη ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι;
λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ὅστις διδάσκει ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, πότερον
ὁ διδάσκει πείθει ἢ οὐ; 10

ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὴ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγωμεν ὧν περ e
νυνδὴ· ἢ ἀριθμητικὴ οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς ὅσα ἐστὶν τὰ τοῦ
ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἄνθρωπος;—ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.—

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πείθει;—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Πειθοῦς ἄρα
δημιουργός ἐστιν καὶ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ;—ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται.— 5

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐάν τις ἐρωτᾷ ἡμᾶς ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ περὶ τί,
ἀποκρινόμεθά πον αὐτῷ ὅτι τῆς διδασκαλικῆς τῆς περὶ τὸ
ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν ὅσον ἐστίν· καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αὖ 454
νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τέχνας ἀπάσας ἔχομεν ἀποδείξαι πειθοῦς
δημιουργούς οὕσας καὶ ἥστινος καὶ περὶ ὅτι· ἢ οὐ;—
ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ῥητορικὴ μόνη πειθοῦς ἐστὶν
δημιουργός.—ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. 5

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνη ἀπεργάζεται τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλαι, δικαίως ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου μετὰ
τοῦτο ἐπανερούμεθ' ἂν τὸν λέγοντα· Ποίας δὴ πειθοῦς καὶ
τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς ἢ ῥητορικὴ ἐστὶν τέχνη; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι
δίκαιον εἶναι ἐπανερέσθαι; b

ΓΟΡ. Ἐμοιγε.

e 7 διδασκαλικῆς Antiatticista Bekkeri, p. 90. 14

d 5 ἀπεκέκριτο BTWf: ἀπεκρίνατο PF d 8 ἢ om. F d 10 δ] ἀ F
(corr. f) e 1 δὴ BPF: δ' εἰ TW λέγωμεν T: λέγομεν BWF et revera P
e 3 ἀριθμοῦ] ἀριθμητικοῦ W a 1 περιττὸν F: τὸ περιττὸν BTW ὅσον
ἐστίν] ὅσα ἐστίν v. Kleist: secl. Kratz a 2 ἐλέγομεν] εἵπομεν F a 3 ὅτι
BTWf (sed δ in ras. B): ὅτου F et rec. t a 4 ῥητορικὴ BTP: ῥητο-
ρητικὴ W: ἢ ῥητορικὴ F a 7 μετὰ τοῦτο om. W a 9 τί] τοῦ W

ΣΩ. Απόκριναι δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως.

5 ΓΟΡ. Ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῆς ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἃ ἐστὶ δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδिका.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγὼ τοι ὑπώπτειν ταύτην σε λέγειν τὴν πειθὴν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὦ Γοργία· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς ἐὰν καὶ
10 ὀλίγον ὕστερον τοιοῦτόν τί σε ἔτερον ἀνέρωμαι, ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν δῆλον
c εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶ—ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω, τοῦ ἐξῆς ἔνεκα περαίνεσθαι τὸν λόγον ἐρωτῶ, οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ ἐθιζόμεθα ὑπονοοῦντες προαρπάζειν ἀλλήλων τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαντοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν βούλῃ
5 περαίνῃς.

ΓΟΡ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖς ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα. καλεῖς τι μεμαθη-
κέναι;—ΓΟΡ. Καλῶ.—ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πεπιστευκέναι;—ΓΟΡ.
d Ἔγωγε.—ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ταῦτόν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθη-
κέναι καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο
τι;—ΓΟΡ. Οἶμαι μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο.—ΣΩ.
Καλῶς γὰρ οἶε· γνώση δὲ ἐνθένδε. εἰ γάρ τίς σε ἔροιτο·
5 “Ἄρ' ἐστὶν τις, ὦ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς;”
φαίης ἂν, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι.—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἐπιστήμη
ἐστὶν ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς;—ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.—ΣΩ. Δῆλον
ἄρα ὅτι οὐ ταῦτόν ἐστιν.—ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.—ΣΩ.
e Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἷ τε [γε] μεμαθηκότες πεπεισμένοι εἰσὶν καὶ οἱ
πεπιστευκότες.—ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν δύο εἶδη θῶμεν πειθοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν
παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμην;—ΓΟΡ. Πάνν
5 γε.—ΣΩ. Ποτέραν οὖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ πειθὴν ποιεῖ ἐν δικαστη-

b 5-7 resp. Quintilianus, *Inst. Or.* 2. 15. 18

c 7 Ἴθι—ἐπισκεψώμεθα Thomas Mag., p. 390. 7

454 e cf. Apuleium, *de Plat.* 2. 8 (p. 111. 7 Helm)

b 5 τοίνυν BTWF OIλ: δὴ τοίνυν Par²

θαυμάζοις BTWF OIλ alt. καὶ F: om. BTW

BTW d 8 ἄρα OIλ (ci. Hirschig): γὰρ αὖ BTWF: ἄρ' αὖ Deuschle

ταῦτά εἰσιν OIλ: ταῦτόν ἐστιν Badham

om. F: γε post Stephanum secl. Wilamowitz

πειθοῦς transp. F

b 9 θαυμάζῃς Malatest. Y:

b 10 ἔτερον F: om.

e 1 τε γε lectio duplex: τε

e 3 εἶδη] ἤδη W: post

ρίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις περὶ τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων; ἐξ ἧς πιστεύειν γίγνεται ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἢ ἐξ ἧς τὸ εἰδέναι;—ΓΟΡ. Δῆλον δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν.—ΣΩ. Ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν πιστευτικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλικῆς περὶ 455 τὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ ἄδικον.—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐστὶν δικαστηρίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων δικαίων τε πέρι καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ πειστικὸς μόνον· οὐ γὰρ δήπου ὄχλον γ' ἂν δύναίτο τοσοῦτον ἐν 5 ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα.—ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς· ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ τοι οὐδ' αὐτός πω δύναμαι κατα- b νοῆσαι ὅτι λέγω. ὅταν περὶ ἱατρῶν αἰρέσεως ἢ τῇ πόλει σύλλογος ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργικοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς οὐ συμβουλεύσει; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐν ἐκάστῃ αἰρέσει τὸν τεχνικώτατον δεῖ αἰρεῖσθαι. 5 οὐδ' ὅταν τειχῶν περὶ οἰκοδομήσεως ἢ λιμένων κατασκευῆς ἢ νεωρίων, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀρχιτέκτονες· οὐδ' αὖ ὅταν στρατηγῶν αἰρέσεως πέρι ἢ τάξεώς τινος πρὸς πολεμίους ἢ χωρίων καταλήψεως συμβουλὴ ἢ, ἀλλ' οἱ στρατηγικοὶ τότε συμ- c βουλεύουσιν, οἱ ῥητορικοὶ δὲ οὐ· ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Γοργία, τὰ τοιαῦτα; ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτός τε φῆς ῥήτωρ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλους ποιεῖν ῥητορικούς, εὖ ἔχει τὰ τῆς σῆς τέχνης παρὰ σοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι. καὶ ἐμὲ νῦν νόμισον καὶ τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν· 5 ἴσως γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει τις τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων μαθητῆς σου βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὡς ἐγὼ τινας, σχεδὸν καὶ συχνούς αἰσθάνομαι, οἳ ἴσως αἰσχύνοιντ' ἂν σε ἀνερέσθαι. ὑπ' ἐμοῦ οὖν ἀνερωτώμενος νόμισον καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀνερωτᾶσθαι· d

c 9—a 2 cf. Aristidem, *orat.* xlv, p. 79 Canter; Sextum Empiricum, *adv. math.* 2. 2, 2. 5: resp. Olympiodorus in *Phaed.*, p. 17. 4; Proclus in *Alc.*, p. 310. 1—5, 14 Westerink; *Prol. in Hermog.*, p. 190. 8, 191. 5 Rabe; etc.

c 7 τὸ πιστεύειν Par² Y a 1 πειστικῆς Sextus, *Prol. Herm.* a 2 οὐκ OIλ a 4 πειστικὸς P et s.l. T: πιστικὸς BT: πιστικῶς suprascr. ei W: πιστικοῦ F: πιστευτικὸς OIπ (ci. Dähne) a 5 μόνου F b 1 μὲν om. OIλ b 4 ἢ om. T (add. rec. t) b 8 πέρι αἰρέσεως [sic] F c 3 τε] γε B d 1 νόμισον] νόμισον δὴ F

“Τί ἡμῖν, ὦ Γοργία, ἔσται, ἐάν σοι συνῶμεν; περὶ τίνων τῇ πόλει συμβουλεύειν οἰοί τε ἐσόμεθα; πότερον περὶ δικαίου μόνον καὶ ἀδίκου ἢ καὶ περὶ ὧν νυνδὴ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν;”
 5 πειρῶ οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ σοι πειράσομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σαφῶς ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς δύναμιν ἅπασαν· αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι τὰ νεώρια ταῦτα
 e καὶ τὰ τεῖχη τὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἡ τῶν λιμένων κατασκευὴ ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμβουλῆς γέγονεν, τὰ δ’ ἐκ τῆς Περικλέους, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν.

ΣΩ. Λέγεται ταῦτα, ὦ Γοργία, περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους·
 5 Περικλέους δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἤκουον ὅτε συνεβούλευεν ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ διὰ μέσου τεύχους.

456 ΓΟΡ. Καὶ ὅταν γέ τις αἵρεσις ἢ ὧν νυνδὴ σὺ ἔλεγες, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς ὅτι οἱ ῥήτορές εἰσιν οἱ συμβουλευόντες καὶ οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας περὶ τούτων.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα καὶ θαυμάζων, ὦ Γοργία, πάλαι ἐρωτῶ ἥτις
 5 ποτὲ ἡ δύναμις ἐστὶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δαιμονία γάρ τις ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὕτω σκοποῦντι.

ΓΟΡ. Εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀπάσας τὰς δυνάμεις συλλαβοῦσα ὑφ’ αὐτῇ ἔχει.
 b μέγα δέ σοι τεκμήριον ἐρῶ· πολλάκις γὰρ ἤδη ἔγωγε μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἰατρῶν εἰσελθὼν παρά τινα τῶν καμνόντων οὐχὶ ἐθέλοντα ἢ φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἰατρῷ, οὐ δυναμένου τοῦ
 5 ἰατροῦ πείσαι, ἐγὼ ἔπεισα, οὐκ ἄλλη τέχνη ἢ τῇ ῥητορικῇ. φημί δὲ καὶ εἰς πόλιν ὅποι βούλει ἐλθόντα ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα καὶ ἰατρόν, εἰ δέοι λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ συλλόγῳ ὁπότερον δεῖ αἰρεθῆναι ἰατρόν, οὐδαμοῦ

e 4 λέγεται—Θεμιστοκλέους Ammonius in Cat., p. 18. 10 Busse

e 6 resp. Harpocration s.v. διὰ μέσου τεύχους, Plut. Per. 13. 6

d 2 περὶ] ἢ περὶ F d 4 μόνου Olp νυνδὴ] δὴ F: non agnoscit Olp
 e 3 ἀλλ’—5 Περικλέους om. F (suppl. f in marg. λέγεται—Περικλέους)
 e 3 τῶν] τῆς τῶν Schaefer: τῆς Buttmann e 6 τὸν T (corr. t) a 1 νυνδὴ
 post Ficinum Burnet: νῦν αὖ F: δὴ BTWf a 4 πάλαι] πάλιν Ol
 ἥτις BTW: τίς F a 5 ἐστὶν ἡ δύναμις F a 7 εἰ BTWF Ol: Τί,
 εἰ Madvig: Τί δ’ εἰ Richards εἰδείεις F b 5 τῇ om. F b 6 ὅποι
 Malatest.: ὅπη BTWF ἐλθόντε Dobree b 8 ἰατρόν] ῥήτορα ἢ ἰατρόν Par²f

ἂν φανῆναι τὸν ἱατρόν, ἀλλ' αἰρεθῆναι ἂν τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνα- c
 τόν, εἰ βούλοιτο. καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλον γε δημιουργὸν ὄν-
 τιν αὐτὸν ἀγωνίζοιτο, πείσειεν ἂν αὐτὸν ἐλέσθαι ὁ ῥητορικὸς
 μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλος ὅστισοῦν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν περὶ οὗτου οὐκ ἂν
 πιθανώτερον εἴποι ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἢ ἄλλος ὅστισοῦν τῶν δη- 5
 μιουργῶν ἐν πλήθει. ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις τοσαύτη ἐστὶν
 καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς τέχνης· δεῖ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ
 ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγωνίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ
 τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ πρὸς ἅπαντας χρῆσθαι d
 ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἔμαθεν πυκτεύειν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν καὶ
 ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, ὥστε κρείττων εἶναι καὶ φίλων καὶ
 ἐχθρῶν—οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα τοὺς φίλους δεῖ τύπτειν οὐδὲ
 κεντεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι. οὐδέ γε μὰ Δία ἐάν τις εἰς 5
 παλαιστραν φοιτήσας, εὖ ἔχων τὸ σῶμα καὶ πυκτικὸς γενό-
 μενος, ἔπειτα τὸν πατέρα τύπτῃ καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἢ ἄλλον
 τινὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἢ τῶν φίλων, οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ τοὺς
 παιδοτρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις διδάσκοντας μάχεσθαι e
 μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ
 παρέδοσαν ἐπὶ τῷ δικαίῳ χρῆσθαι τούτοις πρὸς τοὺς πολε-
 μίους καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἀμυνομένους, μὴ ὑπάρχοντας·
 οἱ δὲ μεταστρέψαντες χρώνται τῇ ἰσχύϊ καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ οὐκ 457
 ὀρθῶς. οὐκ οὖν οἱ διδάξαντες πονηροί, οὐδὲ ἡ τέχνη οὔτε
 αἰτία οὔτε πονηρὰ τούτου ἕνεκά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι
 οἶμαι ὀρθῶς. ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς.
 δυνατὸς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἅπαντάς ἐστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ περὶ 5
 παντὸς λέγειν, ὥστε πιθανώτερος εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσιν
 ἔμβραχυ περὶ οὗτου ἂν βούληται· ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον b
 τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ οὔτε τοὺς ἱατροὺς τὴν δόξαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι—

c 7 δεῖ—d 2 ἀνθρώπους Thomas Mag., p. 51. 4

c 8—a 4 cf. Sext. Emp. *adv. math.* 2. 44

d 5 ἐάν—6 σῶμα Thomas Mag., p. 389. 12

a 5—6 cf. Ciceronem, *de inv.* 1. 7

b—c resp. Philodemus, *Rhet.* ii. 177

c 2 alt. εἰ s.l. F

c 7 τῇ—8 ὥσπερ om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f)

c 8 ὥσπερ] ὥσπερ καὶ Par² f: καθάπερ Thos. Mag.

d 1 ἀγω-, d 2 ὅτι

ἐ-, d 4 οὐ om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f)

d 2 ἔμαθεν] ἔμαθέ τις Par² f

d 4 οὐ] οὐδὲ Par² f

d 6 ἔχον F

d 7 τύπτει F

e 3 τῷ] τὸ F

b 1 ἔμβραχυ BTW Ol schol. vet. et Arethae: ἐν βραχεῖ F et rec. t

ὅτι δύναίτο ἂν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι—οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουρ-
 γούς, ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ
 5 ἀγωνίᾳ. ἐὰν δὲ οἶμαι ῥητορικὸς γενόμενός τις κᾶτα ταύτῃ
 τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδικῇ, οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ μισεῖν
 τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ
 c δικαίᾳ χρεῖᾳ παρέδωκεν, ὁ δ' ἐναντίως χρῆται. τὸν οὖν
 οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρώμενον μισεῖν δίκαιον καὶ ἐκβάλλειν καὶ
 ἀποκτείνῃναι ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα.

ΣΩ. Οἶμαι, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν
 5 λόγων καὶ καθεωρακέσαι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ ῥαδίως
 δύνανται περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν διαλέγεσθαι διορισά-
 μενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες ἑαυτούς,
 d οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας, ἀλλ' ἐὰν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισ-
 βητήσωσιν καὶ μὴ φῇ ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον ὀρθῶς λέγειν ἢ
 μὴ σαφῶς, χαλεπαίνουσί τε καὶ κατὰ φθόνον οἶονται τὸν
 ἑαυτῶν λέγειν, φιλονικούντας ἀλλ' οὐ ζητοῦντας τὸ προκεί-
 5 μενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ· καὶ ἔνιοί γε τελευτῶντες αἵσχιστα
 ἀπαλλάττονται, λοιδορηθέντες τε καὶ εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκού-
 σαντες [περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν] τοιαῦτα οἶα καὶ τοὺς παρόντας
 ἄχθεσθαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ἡξίωσαν
 e ἀκροαταὶ γενέσθαι. τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα λέγω ταῦτα; ὅτι νῦν
 ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς σὺ οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα λέγειν οὐδὲ σύμφωνα οἷς
 τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς· φοβοῦμαι οὖν δι-
 ελέγχειν σε, μή με ὑπολάβῃς οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα φιλο-
 5 νικούντα λέγειν τοῦ καταφανὲς γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ.
 458 ἐγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ σὺ εἶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧνπερ καὶ ἐγώ,
 ἡδέως ἂν σε διερωτώην· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐώην ἄν. ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων

457 d resp. Methodius, *de resurr.* 1. 30. 2 Bonwetsch

b 3 δύναίτο Ft: δύναιντο BTW

b 4-5 τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ Laurentianus

85. 12: ὥσπερ—ἀγωνίᾳ secl. ci. Sauppe

b 5 κᾶτα Flor: κατὰ BTWF

c 1 δικαίᾳ Flor (suprascr. ου) Y: δικαίου BTWF

c 3 διδάσκοντα F

c 6 post δύνανται add. corr. Parisini 1811 οἱ ἄνθρωποι

d 1 οὕτω] ὁ τω W

του BTP: τούτου WF ἀμφισβητῶσι F (corr. f)

d 4 φιλονικούντες ἀλλ'

οὐ ζητοῦντες Bod. misc. 189 s.l. m. 1

d 5 γε] τε W

d 7 περὶ

σφῶν αὐτῶν secl. ci. Sauppe

εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, ἡδέως δ' ἂν ἐλεγχάντων εἴ τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, οὐκ ἀηδέστερον μεντὰν ἐλεγχθέντων ἢ ἐλεγχάντων· μείζον 5 γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡγοῦμαι, ὅσωπερ μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι τοσοῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅσον δόξα ψευδῆς περὶ ὧν τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὦν. εἰ μὲν οὖν b καὶ σὺ φῆς τοιοῦτος εἶναι, διαλεγώμεθα· εἰ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἑάν, ἐώμεν ἤδη χαίρειν καὶ διαλύωμεν τὸν λόγον.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ φημί μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἶον σὺ ὑφηγῇ· ἴσως μέντοι χρῆν ἐννοεῖν καὶ τὸ 5 τῶν παρόντων. πάλαι γάρ τοι, πρὶν καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν, ἐγὼ τοῖς παροῦσι πολλὰ ἐπεδειξάμην, καὶ νῦν ἴσως πόρρω ἀποτεινούμεν, ἣν διαλεγώμεθα. σκοπεῖν οὖν χρή καὶ τὸ τούτων, c μὴ τινὰς αὐτῶν κατέχομεν βουλομένους τι καὶ ἄλλο πράττειν.

ΧΑΙ. Τοῦ μὲν θορύβου, ὦ Γοργία τε καὶ Σώκρατες, αὐτοὶ ἀκούετε τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν βουλομένων ἀκούειν ἑάν τι λέγητε· ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ γένοιτο τοσαύτη ἀσχολία, 5 ὥστε τοιούτων λόγων καὶ οὕτω λεγομένων ἀφεμένῳ προὔργιαίτερόν τι γενέσθαι ἄλλο πράττειν.

ΚΑΛ. Νῆ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς d πολλοῖς ἤδη λόγοις παραγενόμενος οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ πώποτε ἦσθην οὕτως ὥσπερ νυνί· ὥστ' ἔμοιγε, κἂν τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην ἐθέλητε διαλέγεσθαι, χαριεῖσθε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει, 5 εἴπερ ἐθέλει Γοργίας.

a 3-4 cf. Bekker, *Anecd.* i. 128. 22

a 5-b 1 cf. Methodium, *de resurr.* i. 30. 2 f.

b 5-6 cf. Plutarchum, *Q. conv.* 613D, 634A

d 3 ὥστ'—4 χαριεῖσθε Priscianus, *Inst.* 18. 124 et 176 Hertz

a 4 εἴ τίς—5 ἐλεγχάντων om. F (add. in marg. f) a 4 λέγει f a 6 ἀγα-
θὸν αὐτὸ W b 4 φημί] φῆς F b 5 χρῆν BTF: χρῆν W: χρή Y OIΛ:
ἔδει in marg. bt et s.l. W b 6 ἡμᾶς pr. T? b 7 πολλὰ] πολὺ F
ἀποστεροῦμεν F c 1 ἦν] μὴν pr. B c 2 κατέχομεν BWt: κατέχωμεν
TF c 4 τοῦτο F c 5 γοῦν OIΛ τοιαύτη OIΛ c 7 γίνεσθαι F
d 2 πότε [sic] OIΛ d 3 οὕτως om. F (add. f) νῦν F ἔμοιγε, κἂν] εἴ μοί
γε καὶ Priscian. ὅλην om. F d 4 ἐθέλητε F: ἐθέλοιτε BTW Priscian.
χαριεῖσθαι B Priscian.

ΓΟΡ. Αἰσχροὺν δὴ τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται ἐμέ γε μὴ ἐθέλειν, αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βού-
e λεται. ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ τουτοισί, διαλέγου τε καὶ ἐρώτα ὅτι βούλει.

ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, ἃ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ· ἴσως γάρ τοι σοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς
5 ὑπολαμβάνω. ῥητορικὸν φῆς ποιεῖν οἷός τ' εἶναι, ἐάν τις βούληται παρὰ σοῦ μαθάνειν;—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὥστ' ἐν ὅχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι, οὐ διδάσκοντα ἀλλὰ
459 πείθοντα;—ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.—ΣΩ. Ἐλεγές τοι νυνδὴ ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται ὁ ῥήτωρ.—ΓΟΡ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ἐν γε ὅχλῳ.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὅχλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται.—ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται, τοῦ εἰδότος πιθανώτερος γίγνεται;—ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ
b γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἱατρός γε ὢν· ἦ γάρ;—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ μὴ ἱατρός γε δήπου ἀνεπιστήμων ὢν ὁ ἱατρός ἐπιστήμων.—ΓΟΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι.—ΣΩ. Ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ
5 πιθανώτερος ᾖ. τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι;—ΓΟΡ. Τοῦτο ἐνταῦθά γε συμβαίνει.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπάσας τέχνας ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ· αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν
c δέ τινα πειθοῦς ἡύρηκέναι ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδόντων.

ΓΟΡ. Οὐκ οὖν πολλὴ ῥαστώνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν
5 ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν;

a 6–7 cf. Suidam s.v. ἐμποδῶν

d 8 post ἐθέλειν add. καὶ ταῦτα Par² f e 1 τουτοισί Par²: τούτοις W: τούτοις BT: καὶ τούτοις F e 7 παντός F (corr. f) a 1 τοίνυν νῦν δὴ F a 3 οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὅχλῳ om. W a 5 ἔστιν F (corr. f) a 6 λέγω W a 7 προσέσται F (punctis corr. f) πάνυ γε om. F (add. f) b 1 ὁ] εἰ F b 2 γε δήπου om. F rel. spat. (δήπου suppl. f) ὁ om. W b 7 καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ secl. Cobet b 8 αὐτὸν Beck, Cobet c 3 Οὐκ οὖν Denniston: οὐκοῦν BTWF c 4 μαθόντας Par² c 5 δημιουργῶν] ἄλλων Par

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἢ μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ὁ ῥήτωρ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, εἴαν τι ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον ᾗ· νῦν δὲ τόδε πρότερον σκεψόμεθα, ἄρα τυγχάνει περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ d τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οὕτως ἔχων ὁ ῥητορικὸς ὥς περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὧν αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς, τί ἀγαθὸν ἢ τί κακὸν ἐστὶν ἢ τί καλὸν ἢ τί αἰσχρὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, πειθὼ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν με- 5 μηχανημένος ὥστε δοκεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσιν μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰδότος; ἢ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖ προεπιστά- e μενον ταῦτα ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ σὲ τὸν μέλλοντα μαθήσεσθαι τὴν ῥητορικὴν; εἰ δὲ μή, σὺ ὁ τῆς ῥητορικῆς διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις τὸν ἀφικνούμενον—οὐ γὰρ σὸν ἔργον —ποιήσεις δ' ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖν εἰδέναι αὐτὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα 5 οὐκ εἰδότα καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐχ οἷός τε ἔσῃ αὐτὸν διδάξαι τὴν ῥητορικὴν, εἴαν μὴ προειδῇ περὶ τούτων τὴν ἀλήθειαν; ἢ πῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει, ὦ Γοργία; καὶ πρὸς Διός, ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες, ἀποκαλύψας τῆς ῥητορικῆς 460 εἰπέ τίς ποθ' ἢ δύναμὶς ἐστίν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴαν τύχη μὴ εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθήσεται.

ΣΩ. Ἐχε δὴ· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις. εἴανπερ ῥητορικὸν 5 σύ τινα ποιήσης, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἥτοι πρότερόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ.—

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὁ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκὼς b τεκτονικός, ἢ οὐ;—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός;—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ τὰ ἱατρικὰ ἱατρικός; καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁ μεμαθηκὼς ἕκαστα τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷον ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεται;— 5 ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκὼς δίκαιος;—ΓΟΡ. Πάντως δήπου.—

b 7 resp. Olympiodorus in Alc. p. 199. 2 Creuzer

c 7 ἐπισκεψόμεθα WF c 8 πρὸς λόγον Hermann: πρὸς λόγου BTW et
revera F: πρὸ λόγου OIλ d 1 περὶ BWF et s.l. T: καὶ περὶ OIλ καὶ ante
τὸ ἄδικον om. W d 3 ὥς περὶ] ὥσπερ F e 3 μὴ om. B (in marg. γρ.
μὴ b) e 6 ὄντα] ἀκοντα [sic] W e 7 διδάξαι αὐτὸν W a 4 μαθήσε-
σθαι F a 6 εἰδέναι] ἔσται εἰδέναι F a 7 ἥτοι] ἢ τὸ revera F (corr. f)

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά που πράττει.—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—
 c ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ
 δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν;—ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται γε.—
 [ΣΩ. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν.—
 ΓΟΡ. Ἀνάγκη.—ΣΩ. Τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου
 δίκαιον εἶναι.—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—] ΣΩ. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται
 ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν.—ΓΟΡ. Οὐ φαίνεται γε.

ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων ὀλίγω πρότερον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τοῖς
 d παιδοτρίβαις ἐγκαλεῖν οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐὰν ὁ
 πύκτης τῇ πυκτικῇ χρηταί τε καὶ ἀδικῇ, ὡσαύτως δὲ
 οὕτως καὶ ἐὰν ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἀδίκως χρηταί,
 μὴ τῷ διδάξαντι ἐγκαλεῖν μηδ' ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως,
 5 ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρωμένῳ τῇ ῥητορικῇ;
 ἐρρήθη ταῦτα ἢ οὐ;—ΓΟΡ. Ἐρρήθη.—ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε
 e ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος φαίνεται, ὁ ῥητορικὸς, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἀδι-
 κήσας. ἢ οὐ;—ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται.—ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώ-
 τοις γε, ὦ Γοργία, λόγοις ἐλέγετο ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ λόγους
 εἴη οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δικαίου
 5 καὶ ἀδίκου· ἢ γάρ;—ΓΟΡ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ τοίνυν σου τότε
 ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον ὡς οὐδέποτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ῥητορικὴ
 ἀδικὸν πρᾶγμα, ὃ γ' αἰεὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους
 ποιεῖται· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἔλεγες ὅτι ὁ ῥήτωρ
 461 τῇ ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἀδίκως χρῶτο, οὕτω θαυμάσας καὶ ἡγησά-
 μενος οὐ συνάδειν τὰ λεγόμενα ἐκείνους εἶπον τοὺς λόγους,
 ὅτι εἰ μὲν κέρδος ἡγοῖο εἶναι τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι ὥσπερ ἐγώ,
 ἄξιον εἴη διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔαν χαίρειν. ὕστερον δὲ ἡμῶν
 5 ἐπισκοπουμένων ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι πάλιν αὖ ὁμολογεῖται
 τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀδίκως χρηθῆσθαι τῇ ῥητορικῇ

c 1 οὐκοῦν—2 πράττειν Quintilianus, *Inst. Or.* 2. 15. 27

b 8—c 6 suspecta ut nimis plena: c 3 Οὐδέποτε—5 Ναί fort. non legit
 Quint., secl. Hermann, ante c 1 transp. Robin: c 1 Οὐκοῦν—2 Φαίνεται γε
 secl. Schanz: b 8 Ὁ δὲ—Ναί et c 4 Τὸν δὲ—5 Ναί secl. Deuschle c 1 post
 εἶναι add. Ναί Stallbaum τὸν δὲ] ὄντα δὲ Theiler c 4 τὸν δὲ περὶ τὸ
 ῥητορικὸν ἐκ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἀνάγκη F (sed οὐκ eras. et in marg. ἀνάγκη f)
 d 2 χρηταί γε καὶ ἀδίκως χρηταί καὶ ἀδικεῖ F χρηταί] κακῶς χρηταί Par^a
 et revera f d 6 Ἐρρήθη om. F (add. f) e 2 ἢ οὐ φαίνεται: φαίνεται
 F (corr. f) e 6 ὑπελάμβανον W ἢ om. F e 7 ὃ γ' εἰ γ' F
 a 3 ἡγοῖο in marg. f a 5 πάλιν F: om. BTW

καὶ ἐθέλειν ἀδικεῖν. ταῦτα οὖν ὅπη ποτὲ ἔχει, μὰ τὸν
κύνα, ὦ Γοργία, οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας ἐστὶν ὥστε ἱκανῶς **b**
διασκέψασθαι.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὕτω καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς
ῥητορικῆς δοξάζεις ὥσπερ νῦν λέγεις; ἢ οἶει—ὅτι Γοργίας
ἤσχύνθη σοι μὴ προσομολογήσαι τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα μὴ **5**
οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ, καὶ
ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδὼς παρ' αὐτόν, αὐτὸς διδάξειν, ἔπειτα
ἐκ ταύτης ἴσως τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐναντίον τι συνέβῃ ἐν τοῖς
λόγοις, τοῦτο <δ> δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, αὐτὸς ἀγαγὼν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα **c**
ἐρωτήματα—ἐπεὶ τίνα οἶει ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν
ἐπίστασθαι τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄλλους διδάξειν; ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ
τοιαῦτα ἄγειν πολλὴ ἀγροικία ἐστὶν τοὺς λόγους.

ΣΩ. ὦ κάλλιστε Πῶλε, ἀλλὰ τοι ἐξεπίτηδες κτώμεθα **5**
ἐταίρους καὶ υἱεῖς, ἵνα ἐπειδὰν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι
σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπανορθοῖτε ἡμῶν
τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις. καὶ νῦν εἴ τι ἐγὼ καὶ
Γοργίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σφαλλόμεθα, σὺ παρὼν ἐπανόρθου— **d**
δίκαιος δ' εἶ—καὶ ἐγὼ σοι ἐθέλω τῶν ὁμολογημένων εἴ τί σοι
δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ὁμολογηθῆναι, ἀναθέσθαι ὅτι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ,
ἐάν μοι ἐν μόνον φυλάττης.

ΠΩΛ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις; **5**

ΣΩ. Τὴν μακρολογίαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἣν καθέρξης, ἥ τὸ πρῶτον
ἐπεχείρησας χρῆσθαι.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ; οὐκ ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν ὅποσα ἂν βού-
λωμαι;

ΣΩ. Δεινὰ μεντὰν πάθοις, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ Ἀθήναζε **e**

d 1-3 cf. Stephanum in *Ar. de interp.*, p. 2. 29 Hayduck

b 4 ἢ F: ἢ BT: καὶ W b 7 διδάξειν] δοξάζειν W c 1 δ add. Par²
f: om. BTWF c 2 ἀπαρνήσασθαι PF c 3 εἰς τὰ] εἴ γε F, εἰς
γε f c 4 ἄγειν] λέγειν W c 5 τοι] τι F c 6 ἐταίρους καὶ
υἱεῖς Ft: ἐτέρους υἱεῖς BTW: καὶ υἱοὺς καὶ ἐταίρους Olπ γενόμενοι F: γι-
γνόμενοι BTW c 7 ἐπανορθώτε F d 1 παρόν F d 2 δεῖ F
(corr. f) ἐγὼ σοι F: ἐγὼ BTW d 3 ὁμολογεῖσθαι W σὺ] σοι F
d 6 καθέρξης BTW Olπ: κατέξης F

ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ
λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος ἀτυχήσῃς. ἀλλ'
ἀντίθεες τοι· σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος τὸ ἐρωτώ-
5 μενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐ δεινὰ ἂν αὖ ἐγὼ πάθοιμι, εἰ μὴ ἐξέσται
462 μοι ἀπιέναι καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν σου; ἀλλ' εἴ τι κήδη τοῦ λόγου
τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι αὐτὸν βούλει, ὥσπερ
νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ἀναθέμενος ὅτι σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν τῷ μέρει ἐρωτῶν
τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τε καὶ Γοργίας, ἔλεγχέ τε
5 καὶ ἐλέγχου. φῆς γὰρ δήπου καὶ σὺ ἐπίστασθαι ἅπερ
Γοργίας· ἢ οὐ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ κελεύεις σαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν ἐκάστοτε ὅτι
ἂν τις βούληται, ὥς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι;

10 ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

b ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποίει, ἐρώτα ἢ
ἀποκρίνου.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναί, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες· ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς,
5 σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φῆς εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Ἄρα ἐρωτᾷς ἥντινα τέχνην φημὶ εἶναι;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδεμία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ὥς γε πρὸς σε
τάληθ' εἰρησθαι.

10 ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Πρᾶγμα ὃ φῆς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι
c ὃ ἐγὼ ἑναγχος ἀνέγνω.

ΠΩΛ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐμπειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐμπειρία ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;

5 ΣΩ. Ἔμοιγε, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.

ΠΩΛ. Τίνος ἐμπειρία;

e 3-4 [Crates fr. 15. 1 Kock]

b 8 γε om. F (add. f) b 9 εἰρησθαι] δοκεῖ εἰρησθαι F (punctis
corr. f) b 11 πρᾶγμα—c 4 εἶναι in marg. W b 11 σὺ φῆς W
c 5 τι] τις F

ΣΩ. Χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ οὖν καλὸν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἀνθρώποις;

ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; ἤδη πέπυσαι παρ' ἐμοῦ ὅτι φημὶ 10 αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾶς εἰ οὐ καλὴ μοι d δοκεῖ εἶναι;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ πέπυσμαι ὅτι ἐμπειρίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φῆς εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾶς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, σμικρόν τί 5 μοι χαρίσασθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐροῦ νῦν με, ὁψοποιία ἦτις μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ δὴ, τίς τέχνη ὁψοποιία;—ΣΩ. Οὐδεμία, ὦ Πῶλε. Ἀλλὰ τί; φάθι.—ΠΩΛ. Φημὶ δὴ.—ΣΩ. Ἐμπειρία τις. 10 Τίνος; φάθι.—ΠΩΛ. Φημὶ δὴ.—ΣΩ. Χάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας, ὦ Πῶλε. e

ΠΩΛ. Ταῦτόν ἄρ' ἐστὶν ὁψοποιία καὶ ῥητορικὴ;

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς μὲν ἐπιτηδεύσεως μόριον.

ΠΩΛ. Τίνος λέγεις ταύτης; 5

ΣΩ. Μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν· ὁκνῶ γὰρ Γοργίου ἔνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οἴηταί με διακωμωδεῖν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτηδεύμα. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἣν Γοργίας ἐπιτηδεύει, οὐκ οἶδα—καὶ γὰρ ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἡμῖν 463 καταφανὲς ἐγένετο τί ποτε οὗτος ἡγείται—ὁ δ' ἐγὼ καλῶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν, πράγματός τινός ἐστι μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν.

ΓΟΡ. Τίνος, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰπέ, μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθεῖς. 5

c 7 resp. Quintilianus, *Inst. Or.* 2. 15. 24, et Philodemus, *Rhet.* ii. 183

e 6 ὁκνῶ—8 ἐπιτηδεύμα cf. Aristidem, *orat.* xlvi, p. 504 Canter

c 8 Οὐκ οὖν scripsi: οὐκοῦν BTWF c 10 δέ] δὴ F OI d 1 εἰ B²PF
Par²: ἡ TW: ἡ B d 3 οὐ—4 εἶναι om. F (add. in marg. f) d 8 ἦτις
F Par²: εἴ τις BTW εἶναι τέχνη F d 10–11 ita personas distrib. post
OI Hirschig: ἀλλὰ τί; φάθι et τίς; φάθι Polo trib. BTWF, cetera Socrati
d 11 τίνος f marg.: τίνος τίς Flor: τίς BTWF e 2 ἄρ' F, ἄρα OI: δ'
BTW e 3 μὲν om. F sed post τῆς rasura e 6 γὰρ W: om. BTF,
non agnoscit Aristides a 5 αἰσχυνθεῖς s.l. F¹ (non B¹): αἰσχυνθῆς
BTWF

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Γοργία, εἶναι τι ἐπιτήδευμα
 τεχνικὸν μὲν οὐ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ
 φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ
 b ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν. ταύτης μοι δοκεῖ τῆς ἐπι-
 τηδεύσεως πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μόρια εἶναι, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἡ
 ὀψοποιική· ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὥς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ
 ἔστιν τέχνη ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή. ταύτης μόριον καὶ
 5 τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐγὼ καλῶ καὶ τὴν γε κομμωτικὴν καὶ τὴν
 σοφιστικὴν, τέτταρα ταῦτα μόρια ἐπὶ τέτταρσιν πράγμασιν.
 εἰ οὖν βούλεται Πῶλος πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθανέσθω· οὐ γάρ
 c πω πέπυσται ὁποῖόν φημι ἐγὼ τῆς κολακείας μόριον εἶναι
 τὴν ῥητορικὴν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν λέληθα οὐπω ἀποκεκριμένος, ὃ δὲ
 ἐπανερωτᾷ εἰ οὐ καλὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτῷ οὐκ
 ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρότερον εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦμαι
 5 εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν πρὶν ἂν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅτι ἐστίν.
 οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ὦ Πῶλε· ἀλλ' εἴπερ βούλει πυνθέσθαι, ἐρώτα
 ὁποῖον μόριον τῆς κολακείας φημί εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ δὴ, καὶ ἀποκρίναι ὁποῖον μόριον.

d ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀποκριναμένου; ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ
 ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἶδωλον.

ΠΩΛ. Τί οὖν; καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Αἰσχρὸν ἔγωγε—τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ καλῶ—ἐπειδὴ
 5 δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι ὥς ἤδη εἰδότε ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω.

a 6 δοκεῖ—465 c 5 δικαιосύνην Aristides, *orat.* xlv, p. 11 Canter [MSS. ΘΕΛΜΝ], unde Doxopatres in *Aphthonii Progymn.* 117. 1 (Rabe, *Prol. Syll.*)

a 6 δοκεῖ—b 6 πράγμασιν Sopatrus (?), *Prol. ad Aristidem*, p. 747. 6 Dind. (*Aristidis Opera*, iii)

a 6–8 cf. Plutarchum, *an seni* 792v

b 2 ἐν—3 τέχνη Thomas Mag., p. 269. 2

d 2 resp. Quintilianus, *Inst. Or.* 2. 15. 25; Apuleius, *de Plat.* 2. 8 (p. 111. 8); Troilus, *Prol.* 55. 12; etc.

d 3 τί—4 καλῶ resp. Sopatrus, *Prol.*, p. 747. 15

a 6 τι om. Arist. (habet Sop.)

F: αὖ ἐγὼ τοῦτο Sop.

a 8 αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ BTW Arist.: ἐγὼ αὐτοῦ

b 2 ἡ om. Arist. (habent Sop., Thos. Mag.)

b 3 ὀψοποιητική F (et saepius)

b 5 γε om. Sop.

c 2 οὐπω F

Arist. et s.l. b Par²: οὐτω BTW

c 4 εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν BTW,

Aristidis L: εἴτε αἰσχρὸν εἴτε καλὸν F, Aristidis ΘΕΜΝ

c 5 εἶναι

om. Arist. ὃ ἐστίν Arist. et ut vid. primitus F (τι add. s.l. ead. m.)

c 6 πυνθάνεσθαι Arist.

c 8 καὶ ἀποκρίνου F (corr. s.l. ead. m.): καὶ

ἀποκρίναί μοι Arist.: secl. Sauppe

d 2 μόριον W

d 4 καλῶ] ἐγὼ

καλῶ Par²

d 5 ἃ] ὃ Arist.

ἐγὼ om. Arist.

ΓΟΡ. Μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς συνίημι ὅτι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Εἰκότως γε, ὦ Γοργία· οὐδὲν γάρ πω σαφὲς λέγω, **e** Πῶλος δὲ ὅδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δ' εἰπέ πῶς λέγεις πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδωλον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι ὃ γέ μοι φαίνεται **5** εἶναι ἡ ῥητορικὴ· εἰ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνει ὃν τοῦτο, Πῶλος ὅδε ἐλέγξει. σῶμά που καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχὴν;—ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; **464** —ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τούτων οἷε τινα εἶναι ἑκατέρου εὐεξίαν;—

ΓΟΡ. Ἐγωγε.—ΣΩ. Τί δέ; δοκοῦσαν μὲν εὐεξίαν, οὔσαν δ' οὐ; οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω· πολλοὶ δοκοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, οὓς οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως αἰσθοιτό τις ὅτι οὐκ εὖ ἔχουσιν, **5** ἀλλ' ἡ ἱατρός τε καὶ τῶν γυμναστικῶν τις.—ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.—ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὃ ποιεῖ μὲν δοκεῖν εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον.—ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. **b**

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ σοι, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὃ λέγω. δυοῖν ὄντων τοῖν πραγμάτων δύο λέγω τέχνας· τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ σώματι μίαν μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μιᾶς δὲ οὔσης τῆς τοῦ **5** σώματος θεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν μὲν γυμναστικὴν, τὴν δὲ ἱατρικὴν· τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς τὴν νομοθετικὴν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἱατρικῇ τὴν δικαιοσύνην.

Aristides, *orat.* xlv, p. 12, unde Doxopatre I.c.

e 2 cf. Hesychium et Photium s.v. νέος, Suidam s.v. νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς

464 b resp. Quintilianus, *Inst. Or.* 2. 15. 25, et Apuleius, *de Plat.* 2. 9 (p. 111. 15 ff.)

b 2-7 resp. Sopatrus, pp. 438. 1 et 747. 21; Troilus, *Prol.* 55. 12; alii (cf. Rabe, *Rhett. gr.* xiv, *praef.*, p. xcvi)

b 8 resp. Plutarchus, *ser. num. vind.* 550A; Proclus in *Alc.*, p. 272. 7-8

d 6 ἀλλ' ἐγὼ BTWF Ολπ: ἀλλ' ἐγωγε Arist. **e 6** ἡ om. B τυγ-
 χάνει TW Arist.: τυγχάνη BF **a 4** τοιόνδε τι Par² **a 6** ἀλλ'
 ἡ Arist.: ἄλλο ἡ Par²: ἄλλος ἡ BTWF **ὁ ἱατρός** F **a 8** ὁ F Arist.:
 ὅτι BTW **b 2** ἐπιδείξαι F **b 3** ὄντων τῶν πραγμάτων Arist.
 τοῖν om. F καὶ τὴν F **b 4** μὲν οὖν Arist. τὴν ψυχὴν T (corr.
 T²) τῷ F Arist.: om. BTW **b 7** ἀντίστροφον μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ
 Arist. **b 8** δικαιοσύνην BTW, schol. vet., Plut., Arist. et schol. Arist.:
 δικαστικὴν F, schol. Arethae, Procl. Sop. Olp et fort. Apul.; cf. ad **c 2**
 et **465 c 5**

- c ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἀλλήλαις, ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὔσαι, ἐκάτεραι τούτων, ἥ τε ἰατρικὴ τῇ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ νομοθετικῇ· ὁμῶς δὲ διαφέρουσιν τι ἀλλήλων. τεττάρων δὴ τούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευουσῶν
- 5 τῶν μὲν τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἡ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομένη—οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη—τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανείμασα, ὑποδύσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται
- d εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδν, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου οὐδὲν φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ, ὥστε δοκεῖν πλείστου ἀξία εἶναι. ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἡ ὀψοποικὴ ὑποδέδουκεν, καὶ προσποιεῖται τὰ βέλτιστα σιτία
- 5 τῷ σώματι εἰδέναι, ὥστ' εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ διαγωνίζεσθαι ὀψοποιόν τε καὶ ἰατρὸν, ἡ ἐν ἀνδράσιν οὕτως ἀνοήτοις ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, πότερος ἐπαῖτει περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ
- e ποιηρῶν, ὁ ἰατρὸς ἢ ὁ ὀψοποιός, λιμῷ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἰατρὸν. κολακείαν μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ, καὶ αἰσχρόν φημι
- 465 εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὧ Πῶλε—τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σέ λέγω—ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος στοχάζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου· τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν οὗ φημι εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ὧ προσφέρει <ῆ> ἀ προσφέρει ὅποι' ἅττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε

Aristides, *orat.* xlv, p. 13, unde Doxopatres l.c.

cf. Sopatrum, *Prol.*, pp. 438 et 747; paraphr. anon., *Rhett. gr.* xiv, p. 339. 15 resp. Quintilianus, *Inst. Or.* 2. 15. 25; Apuleius, *de Platone* 2. 9, p. 112. 3; schol. Arist., p. 438; etc.

c 5-d 1 cf. Ar. *Rhet.* 1356^a27; Plutarchum, *vit. Ant.* 29; Proclum in *Tim.* i. 250. 29 Diehl

465 a resp. Apuleius, *de Plat.* 2. 8 (p. 111. 5); Olympiodorus in *Phaed.*, p. 11. 12

a 2 τέχνην—4 ἐστίν schol. Dion. Thrac., p. 118. 22 Hilgard

a 4 ὧ προσφέρει ἀ προσφέρει Philodemus, *Rhet.* i. 2

c 2 δικαιοσύνη BTW Arist.: δικαστικὴ F c 4 δὴ BTWF: δὲ Arist. OIA c 5 αἰσθομένη F Arist.: αἰσθανομένη BTW c 7 ὑπὸ om. Arist. d 1 ὅπερ P Par² f, rec. b, Arist.: ὅπου BTWF: ὑπὸ δ Schanz: ὅπερ ὑπέδν del. Sauppe d 2 ἀεὶ om. Arist. (habet Sop.) θηρεύει Arist.: θεραπεύεται Sop. d 3 δοκεῖν B²F Arist.: δοκεῖ BTW ἀξίαν Arist. a 1 εἶναι post Πῶλε transp. F a 2 τοῦ ἡδέως W αὐτὴν] αὐτοῦ F a 3 εἶναι om. schol. Dion. Thrac. οὐδένα] δοῦναι Hissink, οὐδένα <δοῦναι> Theiler a 4 ὧ προσφέρει ἀ προσφέρει BTWF Philod.: ὧ προσφέρει Aristidis LMN et schol. Dion. Thrac.: ἀ προσφέρει Aristidis E, Ast: ὦν προσφέρει Doxopatres, Cornarius: ῆ addidi ἅττα om. schol. Dion. Thrac.

τὴν αἰτίαν ἐκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν· ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ 5
καλῶ ὃ ἂν ᾗ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα. τούτων δὲ πέρι εἰ ἀμφισβητεῖς,
ἐθέλω ὑποσχέιν λόγον.

Τῇ μὲν οὖν ἰατρικῇ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἡ ὀψοποικὴ κολακεία b
ὑπόκειται· τῇ δὲ γυμναστικῇ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον
ἡ κομμωτικὴ, <ῆ> κακοῦργός τε καὶ ἀπατηλὴ καὶ ἀγεννὴς καὶ
ἀνελεύθερος, σχήμασιν καὶ χρώμασιν καὶ λειότητι καὶ ἐσθῆσιν
ἀπατῶσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀλλότριον κάλλος ἐφελκομένους τοῦ 5
οἰκείου τοῦ διὰ τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελεῖν. ἔν' οὖν μὴ
μακρολογῶ, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι—ἤδη γὰρ
ἂν ἴσως ἀκολουθήσαιοις—ὅτι ὁ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικὴν, c
τοῦτο ὀψοποικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικὴν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὦδε, ὅτι ὁ κομ-
μωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικὴν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομοθετικὴν,
καὶ ὅτι ὁ ὀψοποικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικὴν, τοῦτο ῥητορικὴ πρὸς
δικαιοσύνην. ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω, διέστηκε μὲν οὕτω φύσει, ἅτε 5
δ' ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύρδονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα σοφισταὶ
καὶ ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι χρήσονται οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς
οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τούτοις. καὶ γὰρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ
τῷ σώματι ἐπεστάτει, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης d
κατεθεωρεῖτο καὶ διεκρίνετο ἢ τε ὀψοποικὴ καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ,
ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔκρινε σταθμώμενον ταῖς χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς
αὐτό, τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ᾗν, ὧ φίλε Πῶλε—σὺ γὰρ
τούτων ἔμπειρος—ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ 5

a 5 τὴν—c 5 δικαιοσύνην Aristides, *orat.* xlv, p. 14, unde Doxopates l.c.

a 5 ἐγὼ—6 πρᾶγμα Ammonius in *Ar. de interp.*, p. 223. 7; Asclepius in
Met., p. 5. 24; Elias in *Cat.*, p. 191. 19; Philoponus *de anima*, pp. 54-
25, 57. 12, 61. 33 Hayduck; schol. Dion. Thrac., p. 355. 10; Syrianus,
schol. in Hermog. i. 4. 12 et ii. 6. 14; etc.

b-c resp. Synesius, *Calv. Enc.* 23, p. 230 Terzaghi

b 1-2 resp. Maximus Tyrius 14. 8 (p. 181. 3 Hobein)

465 c resp. Clemens, *Strom.* 1. 44. 2 Staehlin; Quintilianus, *Inst. Or.*
2. 15. 25; *Proleg. Plat. Phil.* 27 (Hermann, *Platonis Opera*, vi. 221)

b 2 τοῦτον] τούτων B: om. Arist.

b 3 ἡ addidi: τε οὐσα καὶ Par² f

marg. et Aristidis E

b 4 σχήμασί τε καὶ Par² λειότησι Doxopates,

paraphr. anon., Parisinus 1811 ἐσθῆσι F (ν add. f), ci. Canter: ἐσθῆτι

Aristidis N (αἰσθῆτι cett.), Doxopates: αἰσθήσει BTW et ut vid. Ol

(βλέμματος, π): ὁσμήσει Theiler b 5 ἐφελκομένη Arist. b 6 τοῦ

om. Arist. c 1 ὅτι—2 ὦδε BTP: om. WF Arist., secl. Thompson

c 5 δικαιοσύνην BTW Arist. Ol, 'iustitiae' Quint.: δικαστικὴν F, Proleg.

διέστηκε μὲν F: διέστηκεν BTW c 6 δ'] δὴ W c 7 χρήσονται T

d 5 ἐφύρετο F: ἐφέρετο BTW

αὐτῷ, ἀκρίτων ὄντων τῶν τε ἱατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ ὀψοποιικῶν.

“Ο μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ φημι τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι, ἀκήκοας· ἀντί-
 e στροφον ὀψοποιίας ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι. ἴσως
 μὲν οὖν ἄτοπον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἐὼν μακροῦς λόγους
 λέγειν αὐτὸς συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα. ἄξιον μὲν οὖν
 ἐμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστίν· λέγοντος γάρ μου βραχέα οὐκ
 5 ἐμάνθανες, οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἣν σοι ἀπεκρινάμην
 οὐδὲν οἶός τ’ ἦσθα, ἀλλ’ ἐδέου διηγήσεως. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν καὶ
 466 ἐγὼ σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου μὴ ἔχω ὅτι χρήσωμαι, ἀπότεινε
 καὶ σὺ λόγον, ἐὰν δὲ ἔχω, ἔα με χρῆσθαι· δίκαιον γάρ. καὶ
 νῦν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἴ τι ἔχεις χρῆσθαι, χρῶ.

ΠΩΛ. Τί οὖν φῆς; κολακεία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἡ
 5 ῥητορική;

ΣΩ. Κολακείας μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε εἶπον μόριον. ἀλλ’
 οὐ μνημονεύεις τηλικούτος ὢν, ὦ Πῶλε; τί τάχα
 δράσεις;

ΠΩΛ. Ἄρ’ οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
 10 φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες;

b ΣΩ. Ἐρώτημα τοῦτ’ ἐρωτᾷς ἢ λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν λέγεις;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς
 5 πόλεσιν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ δύνασθαί γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ
 δυναμένῳ.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ λέγω γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐλάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει
 10 δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες.

d 6 ἀκρίτων—e 1 σώματι Thomas Mag., p. 269. 4

d 6–7 καὶ ὑγιεινῶν secl. Dobree: post ὀψοποιικῶν add. καὶ πονηρῶν Naber,
 καὶ ἡδέων Richards: an <τῶν> ὀψοποιικῶν? ὀψοποιητικῶν F (damnat Thos.
 Mag.) e 1 ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ F e 3 λόγον om. F (add. f) “ἄξιον
 μέντοι” γρ. τινές Ol e 4 ἐμοὶ BTWf: μοι F Ol a 1 ἀποκρινομέ-
 νου] ἀπολογουμένου F χρήσωμαι BTW: χρήσομαι Ft a 3 χρήσασθαι
 F Olπ a 6 κολακεία F (corr. f) b 6 γε om. F b 8 μὲν
 δὴ Heindorf: μὴν δὴ BTWF: μὴν Stephanus

ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτεινύασιν τε ὃν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν c ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;

ΣΩ. Νῆ τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνοῶ μέντοι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐφ' ἐκάστου ὧν λέγεις πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶ γνώμην σαυτοῦ ἀποφαίνει, ἢ ἐμέ ἐρωτᾷς. 5

ΠΩΛ. Ἄλλ' ἔγωγε σέ ἐρωτῶ.

ΣΩ. Εἶέν, ὦ φίλε· ἔπειτα δύο ἄμα με ἐρωτᾷς;

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς δύο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες· “Ἡ οὐχὶ ἀποκτεινύασιν οἱ ῥήτορες οὓς ἂν βούλωνται, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματα d ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελαύνουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;”

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν σοι ὅτι δύο ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὰ ἐρωτήματα, 5 καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαί γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρα. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν σμικρότατον, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅτι e ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ οὖν τοῦτο ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι;

ΣΩ. Οὐχ, ὥς γέ φησιν Πῶλος.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγὼ οὐ φημι; φημὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε. 5

ΣΩ. Μὰ τὸν—οὐ σύ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι φῆς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.

ΠΩΛ. Φημὶ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἶε εἶναι, ἐάν τις ποιῇ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν

b 11 τί—c 1 βούλωνται Thomas Mag., p. 169. 1

b 11—c 2 resp. [Alexander] in *Soph. El.*, p. 53. 6

c 3 ἀμφιγνοῶ—4 ὧν λέγεις Thomas Mag., p. 20. 5

c 9—d 5 resp. Ammonius in *Ar. de interp.*, p. 201. 15

d 5 λέγω—469 c 2 ἢ ἀδικεῖν Stobaeus 4. 4. 31

e 6 resp. schol. ad Aristophanis *Ran.* 1374

c 9 Ἡ οὐχὶ Burnet: εἰ οὐχὶ F: εἰ ὅτι BTW: ὅτι P

tus 189

e 4 ὁ πῶλος Stob.

e 6 μὰ τὸν κύνα Stob. (sed μὰ

τὸν Oll)

μέγα om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f)

φῆς Baier: ἔφῆς BTWF

Stob.

e 9 ἂν om. T

- 10 δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι, νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς
σὺ μέγα δύνασθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

- ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ῥήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ
467 τέχνην τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ κολακείαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας; εἰ
δέ με ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς
πόλεσιν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύραννοι οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο
κεκτηῖσονται. ἡ δὲ δύναμις ἐστίν, ὥς σὺ φῆς, ἀγαθόν, τὸ
5 δὲ ποιεῖν ἄνευ νοῦ ἃ δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς κακὸν εἶναι.
ἢ οὐ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

- ΣΩ. Πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιτο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ Πώλου ὅτι
10 ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;

- b ΠΩΛ. Οὗτος ἀνὴρ—

ΣΩ. Οὐ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ βούλονται· ἀλλὰ μ' ἔλεγε.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἄρτι ὁμολόγεις ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα
εἶναι [τούτου πρόσθεν];

- 5 ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ οὖν ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;

ΣΩ. Οὐ φημι.

ΠΩΛ. Ποιοῦντες ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς;

ΣΩ. Φημί.

- 10 ΠΩΛ. Σχέτλιά γε λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυῇ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

- ΣΩ. Μὴ κακηγόρει, ὦ λῶστε Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε
c κατὰ σέ· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπίδειξον ὅτι
ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ μή, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου.

ΠΩΛ. Ἄλλ' ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅτι
λέγεις.

Stobaeus 4. 4. 31

b 11 ὦ—c 1 σέ Hermogenes, π. μεθ. δειν., p. 429. 12 Rabe; Romanus
sophista, p. 3. 11 Camphausen

e 10 βέλτιστα αὐτῷ F εἶναι om. W e 11 σὺ F Stob.: om. BTW
a 4 ἡ δὲ BTWF: εἰ δὲ Stob.: εἰ δὲ Heindorf a 8 οὖν ἂν F b 4 τού-
του πρόσθεν secl. Schleiermacher b 8 ποιοῦντες F Stob.: ποιοῦντες δὲ
BTW: ποιοῦντές γε Richards b 10 σχέτλιά] ἔχεται ἃ F (corr. f) γε
Ola Stob.: om. BTWF καὶ om. W b 11 κακηγόρει Naber: κατη-
γόρει BTWF Ola

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βού- 5
 λεσθαι ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἐκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὐ ἔνεκα πράτ-
 τουσιν τοῦθ' ὃ πράττουσιν; οἷον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες
 παρὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν τοῦτο βούλεσθαι
 ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο,
 τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ ἔνεκα πίνουσιν;—ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ 10
 ὑγιαίνειν.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλείοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον d
 χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ
 ποιοῦσιν ἐκάστοτε (τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κινδυν-
 νεύειν καὶ πράγματ' ἔχειν;) ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οἶμαι οὐ ἔνεκα
 πλέουσιν, πλουτεῖν· πλούτου γὰρ ἔνεκα πλέουσιν.—ΠΩΛ. 5
 Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων; ἐάν τις
 τι πράττη ἔνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται ὃ πράττει, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο
 οὐ ἔνεκα πράττει;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἔστιν τι τῶν e
 ὄντων ὃ οὐχὶ ἦτοι ἀγαθὸν γ' ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων,
 οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν;—ΠΩΛ. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώ-
 κρατες.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ
 ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τὰναντία 3
 τούτων;—ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε.—ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε
 κακὰ ἄρα τοιάδε λέγεις, ἃ ἐνίοτε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ,
 ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ 468
 βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα
 καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἢ ἄλλ' ἅττα καλεῖς
 τὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ;—ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα.—
 ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἔνεκεν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράτ- 5
 τουσιν ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἢ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τῶν μεταξὺ;—ΠΩΛ. Τὰ
 μεταξὺ δῆπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν.—ΣΩ. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες b

e 7 μὲν—α 4 ἀλλὰ P.S.I. 1200 (Π³)

Stobaeus 4. 4. 31

c 6 πράττουσιν] πράττωσι W c 10 οὐ—d 1 ὑγιαίνειν om. F (add. f)
 c 10 δῆλον—d 1 ὑγιαίνειν in marg. T d 1 post ὑγιαίνειν rep. οὐ ἔνεκα
 πίνουσιν W et in marg. T τε om. F (add. f) d 3 τε om. F Stob.
 d 5· πλούτου—πλέουσιν secl. Cobet (habet Ol): an signum interrogationis
 post πλέουσιν ponendum? d 6 ἀπάντων F Stob. d 7 τι om. Stob.
 e 1 ἔστιν—2 κακὸν om. F (suppl. f in marg.) e 2 ἦτοι] ἢ Flor f
 e 4 εἶναι om. Stob. ἀγαθὰ Stob. τε om. F (add. f) Stob. e 6 μήτε
 κακὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ F a 2 καὶ πλεῖν addubitavit Robin: καὶ νεῖν
 D. A. Russell a 3 τὰ om. W a 5 ἔνεκεν BTWF Stob.: ἐν ἐκ P

- καὶ βαδίζομεν ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσταμεν ὅταν ἐστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἢ οὐ;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνουμεν, εἴ τιν' ἀποκτείνουμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή;—ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Ἐνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες.—ΠΩΛ. Φημί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὠμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἔνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι, αὐτὰ ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὐ ἔνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν;—ΠΩΛ.—Μάλιστα.—ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἀπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ἢ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα, ὡς φῆς σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα, οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ. ἢ γάρ; ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢ οὐ; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνη;—ΠΩΛ. Ἀληθῆ.
- d ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύραννος ὢν εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὃν κάκιον, οὗτος δὴπου ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἢ γάρ;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἃ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνη;—ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' οὐ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.—ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος e μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἀγαθόν τι κατὰ τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν;—ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔστιν.—ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι 5 μὴδὲ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.
- ΠΩΛ. Ὡς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναι σοι ποιεῖν ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ μή, οὐδὲ

b 8 ποιοῦντες—d 1 ὁμολογοῦμεν P.S.I. 1200 (Π³)

Stobaeus 4. 4. 31

468 c resp. Boethius, *Cons. phil.* 4. 1. 130 Peiper

b 6 ταῦτα ἡμῖν F

c 6 μήτε κακὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ Stob.

ζηλοῖς ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόμενον χρήματα ἢ δήσαντα.

ΣΩ. Δικαίως λέγεις ἢ ἀδίκως; 10

ΠΩΛ. Ὅπότερ' ἂν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτόν ἐστιν; 469

ΣΩ. Εὐφήμει, ὦ Πῶλε.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐ χρὴ οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε τοὺς ἀθλίους, ἀλλ' ἐλεεῖν. 5

ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ; οὔτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ λέγω τῶν ἀνθρώπων;

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΠΩΛ. Ὅστις οὖν ἀποκτείνουσιν ὃν ἂν δόξῃ αὐτῷ, δικαίως ἀποκτεινύς, ἀθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεεινός; 10

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἄρτι ἀθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεεινόν b γε πρὸς τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωτον.

ΠΩΛ. Ἡ που ὁ γε ἀποθνήσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεεινός τε καὶ ἀθλιός ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἡττον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτεινύς, ὦ Πῶλε, καὶ ἥττον ἢ ὁ 5 δικαίως ἀποθνήσκων.

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὕτως, ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὃν τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

ΠΩΛ. Ἡ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μείζον; 10

ΣΩ. Ἡκιστά γε.

ΠΩΛ. Σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν;

ΣΩ. Βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη c ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἐλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.

Stobaeus 4. 4. 31

b 10-11 resp. Synesius, *Epist.* 30, p. 653 Hercher

b 12 σὺ ἄρα—c 2 μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι cf. Aristidem, *orat.* xlv, p. 103

c 1-2 resp. Cicero, *Tusc.* 5. 56; Seneca, *Phoen.* 494; Simplicius in *Ar. de caelo*, p. 570. 10 Heiberg; Elias, *Prol. Phil.*, p. 23. 2 Busse; Gregorius Naz. i. 568b Migne: cf. etiam ad 473 a 5

e 8 ἀποκτείνοντα F (corr. f) a 1 ζηλωτός Olπ, Laur. 85. 12 a 7 τῶν

om. F a 9 οὖν om. Stob. Olπ b 2 γε F Stob.: δέ BTW τὸν δέ]

τόν γε Stob. b 7 δῆτα] δῆ Stob. b 10 ἦ] εἰ s.l. B² b 11 ἥκιστα

γάρ F c 1 εἴη <ῆ> Hirschig

ΠΩΛ. Σὺ ἄρα τυραννεῖν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἐγώ.

5 ΠΩΛ. Ἄλλ' ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι καὶ ἐκβάλλοντι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν.

ΣΩ. ὦ μακάριε, ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος [τῷ λόγῳ] ἐπιλαβοῦ.
d εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ λαβὼν ὑπὸ μάλης ἐγχει-
ρίδιον λέγοιμι πρὸς σέ ὅτι “ὦ Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύνάμεις τις καὶ
τυραννὶς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγένονεν· εἴαν γε ἄρα ἐμοὶ
δόξῃ τινα τούτων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν σὺ ὀρᾷς ἀντίκα μάλα
5 δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει οὗτος ὃν ἂν δόξῃ· κἂν τινα δόξῃ μοι
τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεαγέναι δεῖν, κατεαγὼς ἔσται ἀντίκα
μάλα, κἂν θοιμάτιον διεσχίσθαι, διεσχισμένον ἔσται· οὕτω
e μέγα ἐγὼ δύναιμαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει,” εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντί σοι
δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον, ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδὼν ὅτι “ὦ Σώ-
κρατες, οὕτω μὲν πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναιντο, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐμπρη-
σθεῖν οἰκία τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἥντινά σοι δοκοῖ, καὶ τά γε
5 Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ
δημόσια καὶ τὰ ἴδια.” ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὸ μέγα
δύνασθαι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα οὕτω γε.

470 ΣΩ. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν δι' ὅτι μέμφῃ τὴν τοιαύτην
δύναμιν;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δὴ; λέγε.

5 ΠΩΛ. Ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα ζημιοῦσθαί
ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ζημιοῦσθαι οὐ κακόν;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

d 5 τεθνήξει—6 ἀντίκα Thomas Mag., p. 364. 1 et 191. 8

c 7 πάντα] πανταχῶς F c 8 τῷ λόγῳ BTWF: τοῦ λόγου suprascr. V,
Olπ: τῶν λόγων Budaeus: secl. Hirschig d 3 γε F: γὰρ BTW post
ἄρα add. προσγένηται F (unde mox δόξα f) d 4 τούτων F d 5 τε-
θνήξεται F et s.l. P d 6 κατεαγῆναι BTWF: corr. Thos. Mag.
d 7 διέσχισται F (corr. f) e 4 ἥντινά σοι δοκοῖ F: ἥντιν' ἂν σοι δοκοῖ
BT: ἥντιν' ἂν σοι δοκῇ WP (sed suprascr. oi P) e 5 αἱ τριήρεις Schaefer
a 1 οὖν om. F a 4 τί δῆτα W a 5 τὸν οὕτω] τοῦτο Olπ

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, [τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι] πάλιν αὖ
 σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ἃ δοκεῖ ἔπεται τὸ ὠφελι- 10
 μως πράττειν, ἀγαθὸν τε εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν
 τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, κακόν, καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι.
 σκεψώμεθα δὲ καὶ τόδε· ἄλλο τι ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐνίστε μὲν b
 ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτεινύναι τε
 καὶ ἐξελαύνειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι χρήματα, ἐνίστε
 δὲ οὐ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνν γε.

5

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρ'
 ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πότε οὖν σὺ φῆς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἰπέ
 τίνα ὅρον ὀρίζῃ.

10

ΠΩΛ. Σὺ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι [ταῦτό] τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν φημί, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴ σοι παρ' ἐμοῦ c
 ἡδιόν ἐστιν ἀκούειν, ὅταν μὲν δικαίως τις ταῦτα ποιῇ,
 ἄμεινον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἀδίκως, κάκιον.

ΠΩΛ. Χαλεπόν· γέ σε ἐλέγξαι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' οὐχὶ
 καὶν παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις;

5

ΣΩ. Πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγὼ τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἔξω, ἴσῃν δὲ καὶ
 σοί, ἐάν με ἐλέγξης καὶ ἀπαλλάξης φλυαρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴ
 κάμῃς φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλ' ἔλεγχε.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέν γέ σε δεῖ παλαιοῖς
 πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν· τὰ γὰρ χθὲς καὶ πρώην γεγονότα ταῦτα d
 ἱκανά σε ἐξελέγξαι ἐστὶν καὶ ἀποδείξαι ὡς πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες
 ἄνθρωποι εὐδαίμονες εἰσιν.

ΣΩ. Τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα;

c 9 ἀλλὰ—471 a 3 ἄδικος Stobaeus 4. 40. 25

a 9 τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι secl. Thompson a 10 ἔπεται] ἔπειτα F a 12 alt.
 δύνασθαι non agnoscit Ol, secl. Thompson b 1 δὴ F b 2 εἶναι
 om. W b 9 πότε F: πότερον BTWf φῆς σὺ F (corr. f) ταῦτα] ταῦτό
 τοῦτο F b 11 ταῦτό secl. ci. Heindorf: σταντῶ Coraës c 2 ἀκούειν
 ἐστὶν F c 4 γέ] τέ Olλ οὐχὶ] οὐ F c 6 ἴσιν B, corr. B² c 7 ἐξ-
 ἐλέγξης F d 1 χθὲς F et revera Stob.: ἐχθὲς BTW d 2 ἱκανά σε]
 ἱκανῶς Stob. ἐλέγξαι W πολλοὶ] πολὺ W

5 ΠΩΛ. Ἀρχέλαον δῆπου τοῦτον τὸν Περδίκκου ὄρα^s
ἄρχοντα Μακεδονίας;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἀκούω γε.

ΠΩΛ. Εὐδαίμων οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ ἄθλιος;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐ γάρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί.

e ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ; συγγενόμενος ἂν γνοίης, ἄλλως δὲ αὐτόθεν
οὐ γινώσκεις ὅτι εὐδαιμονεῖ;

ΣΩ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτα.

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δὲ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα
5 γινώσκειν φήσεις εὐδαίμονα ὄντα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει
καὶ δικαιοσύνης.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ; ἐν τούτῳ ἢ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν;

ΣΩ. Ὡς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὦ Πῶλε· τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν
10 καγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναικα εὐδαίμονα εἶναί φημι, τὸν δὲ
ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἄθλιον.

471 ΠΩΛ. Ἄθλιος ἄρα οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Ἀρχέλαος κατὰ τὸν
σὸν λόγον;

ΣΩ. Εἴπερ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἄδικος.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος; ᾧ γε προσῆκε μὲν
5 τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν ἦν νῦν ἔχει, ὄντι ἐκ γυναικὸς ἢ ἡν δούλη
Ἀλκέτου τοῦ Περδίκκου ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον
δούλος ἦν Ἀλκέτη, καὶ εἰ ἐβούλετο τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν, ἐδού-
λευεν ἂν Ἀλκέτῃ καὶ ἦν εὐδαίμων κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.
νῦν δὲ θαυμασίως ὥς ἄθλιος γέγονεν, ἐπεὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἡδί-
b κηκεν· ὅς γε πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην καὶ
θεῖον μεταπεμφάμενος ὥς ἀποδώσων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἦν Περδίκκας

d 5 Ἀρχέλαον—a 3 ἄδικος Stobaeus 4. 40. 25; latine vertit Cicero, *Tusc.* 5. 35

d-e resp. Julianus, *Or.* 2, 79AB; Proclus *in Alc.*, p. 295. 10-14

d 5-8 resp. [Alexander] *in Soph. El.*, p. 115. 1

e 6-7 resp. Plutarchus (?), *lib. educ.* 6A

a 1 ἄθλιος—3 ἄδικος Athenaeus 217 d

b 1-c 6 resp. Aristides, *orat.* xlv, p. 93

e 1 τί δαί T Stob.

e 2 εὐδαίμων eI F

e 4 μέγα F (corr. f)

e 8 Τί—9 ὦ Πῶλε om. Stob.

e 10 καὶ ἀγαθὸν libri

εὐδαίμονας

Stob. a 1 ὁ Ἀρχελαός ἐστι Athen.

a 3 γε om. F (add. f)

a 4 ἀλλὰ μὴν δὲ OIλ

a 5 ὄντι] ὅτι W

a 8 ἦν ἂν F

a 9 ὥς

om. F ἐπειδὴ F

b 1 post δεσπότην add. τε F

αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο, ξενίσας καὶ καταμεθύσας αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν
 υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀνεψιὸν αὐτοῦ, σχεδὸν ἡλικιώτην,
 ἐμβالὼν εἰς ἄμαξαν, νύκτωρ ἐξαγαγὼν ἀπέσφαξέν τε καὶ 5
 ἠφάνισεν ἀμφοτέρους. καὶ ταῦτα ἀδικήσας ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν
 ἀθλιώτατος γενόμενος καὶ οὐ μετεμέλησεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον
 ὕστερον τὸν ἀδελφόν, τὸν γνήσιον [τὸν] Περδίκκου υἱόν, παῖδα c
 ὡς ἐπτάτη, οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐγίνετο κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐβου-
 λήθη εὐδαίμων γενέσθαι δικαίως ἐκθρέψας καὶ ἀποδοῦς τὴν
 ἀρχὴν ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ' εἰς φρέαρ ἐμβالὼν καὶ ἀποπνίξας πρὸς
 τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ Κλεοπάτραν χῆνα ἔφη διώκοντα ἐμπεσεῖν 5
 καὶ ἀποθανεῖν. τοιγάρτοι νῦν, ἅτε μέγιστα ἡδικηκῶς τῶν
 ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, ἀθλιώτατός ἐστιν πάντων Μακεδόνων, ἀλλ'
 οὐκ εὐδαιμονέστατος, καὶ ἴσως ἐστὶν ὅστις Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ σοῦ
 ἀρξάμενος δέξαιτ' ἂν ἄλλος ὅστισοῦν Μακεδόνων γενέσθαι d
 μᾶλλον ἢ Ἀρχέλαος.

ΣΩ. Καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐγωγέ σε.
 ἐπῆνεσα ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὖ πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν πεπαιδευσθαι—
 τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἡμεληκέναι· καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι οὗτός ἐστιν 5
 ὁ λόγος, ᾧ με καὶ ἂν παῖς ἐξελέγξῃς, καὶ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν,
 ὡς σὺ οἶει, ἐξελέγχεμαι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, φάσκων τὸν ἀδι-
 κοῦντα οὐκ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι; πόθεν, ὦγαθέ; καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γέ
 σοι τούτων ὁμολογῶ ὦν σὺ φῆς.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γέ σοι ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω. e

ΣΩ. ὦ μακάριε, ῥητορικῶς γάρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν,
 ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούμενοι ἐλέγχειν. καὶ γὰρ
 ἐκεῖ οἱ ἕτεροι τοὺς ἐτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν, ἐπειδὰν τῶν
 λόγων ὦν ἂν λέγωσι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρέχωνται καὶ 5
 εὐδοκίμους, ὁ δὲ τάναντία λέγων ἓνα τινὰ παρέχεται ἢ
 μηδένα. οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἔλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἀξίός ἐστιν πρὸς τὴν

b 3 ξενίσας—αὐτόν Thomas Mag., p. 231. 13

b 4 καὶ σχεδὸν F b 7 αὐτοῦ ut vid. F (corr. f) c 1 τὸν BTW
 et revera F: τοῦ corrector Parisini 1811: seclusi (fort. non habet schol.
 vet.): τὸν Περδίκκου υἱόν secl. Cron c 2 ἐπταετῇ vel ἐπταέτη libri
 (etiam F) Arist. OIλ c 7 πάντων τῶν F d 1 δείξαιτ' B (corr. s.l.
 b) ἄλλος BF: ἄλλως TW d 3 ὦ Πῶλε, τῶν λόγων F OIλ σε om.
 F (add. f) d 4 ὅτῳ F (corr. f) ἐδόκει ci. Thompson d 5 τοῦ
 δέ] οὐδὲ W (corr. s.l. W²) d 7 οἶει] οἶει εἶναι F e 4 ἐκεῖ οἱ]
 ἐκεῖνοι W e 5 παρέχονται WF

- 472 ἀλήθειαν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ἂν καὶ καταψευδομαρτυρηθεῖη τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναί τι. καὶ νῦν περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσιν ταῦτά Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι, ἔαν βούλῃ κατ' ἐμοῦ μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι ὥς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω· μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἔαν μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ, ὧν οἱ τρίποδες οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἐστῶτές εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, ἔαν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης b ὁ Σκελλίου, οὗ αὖ ἐστιν ἐν Πυθίου τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ἀνάθημα, ἔαν δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ Περικλέους ὅλη οἰκία ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια ἦντινα ἂν βούλῃ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἐκλέξασθαι. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι εἰς ὧν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ· οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις, ἀλλὰ ψευδο- 5 μάρτυρας πολλοὺς κατ' ἐμοῦ παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σέ αὐτὸν ἕνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν c ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾗ· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἔαν μὴ ἐγὼ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἰς ὧν μόνος, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πάντας τούτους χαίρειν ἐᾷς. ἔστιν μὲν οὖν οὗτός τις τρόπος ἐλέγχου, ὥς σύ τε οἶει καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί· ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι. παραβα- 5 λόντες οὖν παρ' ἀλλήλους σκεψώμεθα εἴ τι διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων. καὶ γὰρ τυγχάνει περὶ ὧν ἀμφισβητοῦμεν οὐ πάνυ σμικρὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ταῦτα περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι τε κάλλιστον μὴ εἰδέναι τε αἰσχιστον· τὸ γὰρ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἢ γινώσκειν ἢ ἀγνοεῖν ὅστις τε εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν καὶ d ὅστις μὴ. αὐτίκα πρῶτον, περὶ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, σὺ ἡγῇ οἶόν τε εἶναι μακάριον ἄνδρα ἀδικοῦντά τε καὶ ἄδικον ὄντα, εἴπερ Ἀρχέλαον ἄδικον μὲν ἡγῇ εἶναι, εὐδαίμονα δέ. ἄλλο τι ὥς οὕτω σου νομίζοντος διανοώμεθα;
- 5 ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.
- ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δέ φημι ἀδύνατον. ἐν μὲν τουτὶ ἀμφισβη-

c 4-8 cf. Methodium, *de resurr.* 1. 30. 3

a 1 ὑπὸ] ὁ ὑπὸ OIa a 3 οἱ del. Stallbaum a 4 παρέχεσθαι F
a 6 τρίπαιδες W a 7 Διονύσω OIa b 1 σκελίου IG i. 422 πυθίου
F: πυθοῖ BTWf b 7 αὐτόν] ἐπ' αὐτῷ F ὧν ἂν F c 3 τις]
τίς ὁ F c 4 αὖ ἐγὼ F παραβαλόντες F Meth.: παραλαβόντες BTW
c 6 καὶ γὰρ BTW Meth.: καὶ γὰρ καὶ F d 1 πρῶτον del. Hirschig
d 4 ἄλλο τι F: ἀλλ' ὅτι BTW: ἄλλο τι ἢ rec. b διανοούμεθα F (corr. f)

τοῦμεν. εἶέν· ἀδικῶν δὲ δὴ εὐδαίμων ἔσται· ἄρ' ἂν τυγχάνῃ δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας;

ΠΩΛ. Ἦκιστα γε, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γ' ἂν ἀθλιώτατος εἴη.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὁ ἀδικῶν, κατὰ τὸν εὐδαιμόνων ἔσται;

ΠΩΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Κατὰ δέ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ὁ ἄδικος πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ἐὰν μὴ 5 διδῶ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνῃ τιμωρίας ἀδικῶν, ἥττον δὲ ἄθλιος ἐὰν διδῶ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀτοπά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν. 473

ΣΩ. Πειράσομαι δέ γε καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ταῦτά μοι λέγειν· φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἃ διαφερόμεθα ταῦτ' ἐστίν· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ. εἶπον ἐγώ που ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι. 5

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἀθλίους ἔφην εἶναι ἐγώ, καὶ ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ. 10

ΠΩΛ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία.

ΣΩ. Ὡς σὺ οἶει, ὦ Πῶλε. b

ΠΩΛ. Ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος.

ΣΩ. Ἰσως. σὺ δέ γε εὐδαίμονας αὖ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἐὰν μὴ διδῶσι δίκην.

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 5

e 4 κατὰ—7 ἀνθρώπων Stobaeus 4. 40. 26; resp. Libanius, *Ep.* 167 (x. 158.

5 Foerster); Synesius, *Ep.* 30; Boethius, *Cons. phil.* 4. 4. 40

a 1 ἀτοπά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες Proclus in *Tim.* i. 80. 12

a 5 cf. Gellium, *Noct. Att.* 12. 9. 6; resp. Plutarchus, *aud. poet.* 36A; Basilii iii. 364c Migne

d 8 τιμωρίας] μωρίας W e 4 γε om. F e 5 πάντως Stob.: ἀπάντων BTW et revera F μέντοι F Stob.: μὲν τοίνυν BTW e 6 et 7 τυγχάνει F e 7 διδῶ δίκην καὶ secl. Theiler τε om. F καὶ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων F Stob. a 9 post ἀδικοῦντας add. σε F a 10 ἐξηλέγχθην BTW: ἐξηλέγχθησαν tf: ἐξηλέγχθης, omissio ὑπὸ σοῦ F b 1 σύ γε F b 3 ἴσως Socrati tribuunt BF (coniecerat van Prinsterer), Polo TW post ἴσως add. φ F (puncto deletum) αὖ τοὺς TW: αὐτοὺς B (corr. rec. b) F

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀθλιωτάτους φημί, τοὺς δὲ διδόντας δίκην ἤττον. βούλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν;

ΠΩΛ. Ἄλλ' ἔτι τοῦτ' ἐκείνου χαλεπώτερόν ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξελέγξαι.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Πῶλε, ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται.

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; ἐὰν ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος ληφθῇ, τυραν-
 c νίδι ἐπιβουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεὶς στρεβλῶται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται
 καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκάρηται, καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας
 καὶ παντοδαπὰς λύβας αὐτός τε λωβηθεὶς καὶ τοὺς αὐτοῦ
 ἐπιδὼν παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκα τὸ ἔσχατον ἀνασταυρωθῇ ἢ
 5 καταπιττωθῇ, οὗτος εὐδαιμονέστερος ἔσται ἢ ἐὰν διαφυγὼν
 τύραννος καταστῇ καὶ ἄρχων ἐν τῇ πόλει διαβιῶ ποιῶν ὅτι
 ἂν βούληται, ζηλωτὸς ὢν καὶ εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν
 d πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων; ταῦτα λέγεις ἀδύνατον εἶναι
 ἐξελέγχειν;

ΣΩ. Μορμούττη αὖ, ὦ γενναῖε Πῶλε, καὶ οὐκ ἐλέγχεις·
 ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου. ὅμως δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με σμικρόν. ἐὰν
 5 ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι, εἶπες;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν τοίνυν οὐδέποτε ἔσται οὐδέ-
 τερος αὐτῶν, οὔτε ὁ κατειργασμένος τὴν τυραννίδα ἀδίκως
 οὔτε ὁ διδοὺς δίκην—δυοῖν γὰρ ἀθλίῳ εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν
 e οὐκ ἂν εἴη—ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ὁ διαφεύγων καὶ τυραννεύσας.
 τί τοῦτο, ὦ Πῶλε; γελᾷς; ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου
 ἐστίν, ἐπειδάν τις τι εἴπῃ, καταγελᾶν, ἐλέγχειν δὲ μή;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ οἶμι ἐξεληλέγχθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα
 5 λέγῃς ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τίνα τουτωνί.

ΣΩ. ὦ Πῶλε, οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, καὶ πέρυσι βου-
 λεύειν λαχόν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε καὶ ἔδει με ἐπι-

b 10-11 resp. Syrianus in *Metaph.* p. 81. 3 Kroll

d 7 resp. Themistius in *Ar. de caelo*, p. 153. 1 Landauer

e 6 καὶ—a 1 ἡπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν Athenaeus 217 e

b 6 δὲ γε αὐτοὺς F

b 12 ἀδικῶν] ἀδίκως ci. Findeisen: del. Dobree

c 4 γυναῖκας F

c 5 εὐδαιμονέστερος F: εὐδαιμονέστατος BTW: εὐδαίμων

Par

d 9 διδοὺς δίκην F: διδοὺς BTW: δικὴν δούς H. Schmidt: ἀλούς

Winckelmann

e 1 διαφυγὼν Y τυραννήσας F

e 2 τοῦτο αὖ

ἄλλο F εἶδος τοῦτο W

c 5 ἐροῦ τίνα τουτωνί om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f)

ψηφίζεις, γέλωτα παρείχον καὶ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζεις. 474
 μὴ οὖν μηδὲ νῦν με κέλευε ἐπιψηφίζεις τοὺς παρόντας, ἀλλ'
 εἰ μὴ ἔχεις τούτων βελτίω ἔλεγχον, ὅπερ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον,
 ἐμοὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει παράδος, καὶ πείρασαι τοῦ ἐλέγχου οἷον ἐγὼ
 οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὦν ἂν λέγω ἓνα μὲν παρασχέσθαι 5
 μάρτυρα ἐπίσταμαι, αὐτὸν πρὸς ὃν ἂν μοι ὁ λόγος ᾗ, τοὺς δὲ
 πολλοὺς ἐὼ χαίρειν, καὶ ἓνα ἐπιψηφίζεις ἐπίσταμαι, τοῖς δὲ
 πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. ὅρα οὖν εἰ ἐθελήσεις ἐν τῷ μέρει b
 διδόναι ἔλεγχον ἀποκρινόμενος τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ
 οἶμαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους τὸ ἀδικεῖν
 τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ
 διδόναι. 5

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγὼ δέ γε οὐτ' ἐμὲ οὐτ' ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα.
 ἐπεὶ σὺ δέξαι' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ σύ γ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.

ΠΩΛ. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἐγὼ οὔτε σὺ οὐτ' ἄλλος
 οὐδεὶς. 10

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οὐκ ἀποκρινῇ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὅτι ποτ'
 ἐρεῖς. c

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι, ἵν' εἰδῆς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς σε
 ἠρώτων· πότερον δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Πῶλε, κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ 5
 ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι;—ΠΩΛ. Τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε.—
 ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ; αἴσχιον πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι;
 ἀποκρίνου.—ΠΩΛ. Τὸ ἀδικεῖν.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον,
 εἴπερ αἴσχιον.—ΠΩΛ. Ἦκιστα γε.—ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· οὐ
 ταῦτόν ἡγῇ σύ, ὥς ἔοικας, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ κακὸν d
 καὶ αἰσχρόν.—ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἷον καὶ σώματα καὶ

a 2-b 1 cf. Epictetum, Diss. 2. 12. 5, 2. 26. 6

a 2 μὴ—παρόντας et a 7 καὶ—ἐπίσταμαι Thomas Mag., p. 159. 5 et 7

b 2 ἐγὼ—5 διδόναι Stobaeus 4. 5. 91

a 1 ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζεις] ἠδυνάμην ἐπιψηφίσαι Athen. post alt. ἐπι-
 ψηφίζεις add. τοὺς παρόντας F a 2 μὴ οὖν om. F (add. f) a 3 ἔχεις
 P et ex corr. W: ἔχης BT, primitus W, et revera F a 4 πάροδος F
 πειράσει Hartman a 5 δεῖν om. F (add. f) παρέχεσθαι OI
 b 1 ἐθελήσης F b 3 post ἀνθρώπους add. πείσαι f b 6 ἄλλον
 BW: ἄλλων TF c 8 καὶ om. F d 1 alt. καὶ om. T

- χρώματα καὶ σχήματα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς
 5 οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἐκάστοτε καλά; οἶον πρῶτον τὰ
 σώματα τὰ καλά οὐχὶ ἦτοι κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν λέγεις καλά
 εἶναι, πρὸς δ' ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾗ, πρὸς τοῦτο, ἢ κατὰ
 ἡδονὴν τινα, εἰάν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιῇ τοὺς θεω-
 ροῦντας; ἔχεις τι ἐκτὸς τούτων λέγειν περὶ σώματος κάλ-
 e λους;—ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔχω.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰλλα πάντα
 οὕτω, καὶ σχήματα καὶ χρώματα ἢ διὰ ἡδονὴν τινα ἢ διὰ
 ὠφελίαν ἢ δι' ἀμφοτέρω καλὰ προσαγορεύεις;—ΠΩΛ.
 "Εγώ γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν
 5 πάντα ὡσαύτως;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τά γε κατὰ
 τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δήπου ἐκτὸς τούτων
 ἐστίν, τὰ καλά, τοῦ ἢ ὠφέλιμα εἶναι ἢ ἡδέα ἢ ἀμφοτέρω.—
 475 ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθη-
 μάτων κάλλος ὡσαύτως;—ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε· καὶ καλῶς γε
 νῦν ὀρίζῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὀριζόμενος τὸ
 καλόν.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχροὺς τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπη τε καὶ
 5 κακῷ;—ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.—ΣΩ. "Όταν ἄρα δυοῖν καλοῖν θά-
 τερον κάλλιον ᾗ, ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτοις ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερ-
 βάλλον κάλλιον ἐστίν, ἦτοι ἡδονῇ ἢ ὠφελίᾳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις.
 —ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅταν δὲ δὴ δυοῖν αἰσχροῖν τὸ
 b ἕτερον αἷσχον ᾗ, ἦτοι λύπη ἢ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον αἷσχον
 ἔσται· ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, πῶς ἐλέγετο νυνδὴ περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ
 ἀδικεῖσθαι; οὐκ ἔλεγες τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ
 5 δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἷσχον;—ΠΩΛ. "Ελεγον.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ
 αἷσχον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἦτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστιν
 καὶ λύπη ὑπερβάλλον αἷσχον ἂν εἴη ἢ κακῷ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις;
 οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη;—ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;—ΣΩ. Πρῶτον
 c μὲν δὴ σκεψώμεθα, ἄρα λύπη ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ
 ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀλγοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἀδικού-

d 4 καὶ σχήματα om. F (add. in marg. f) d 6 τὰ om. F (add. in marg. f)
 d 7 ἢ κατὰ om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) d 8 ἐν om. F θεωρεῖσθαι
 ex corr. B e 2 καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχήματα F e 5 ἅπαντα F γε]
 τε F e 7 τὰ καλά BTPF: om. W: καλά V τοῦ ἢ WF: τοῦ T: ἢ B
 a 1 μαθητῶν B a 3 ὀρίζεις F a 6 τούτοις] αὐτοῖς F (corr. f)
 a 7 prius ἢ] καὶ revera F a 8 δὲ om. F (add. f) b 1 post
 κακῷ add. ἢ ἀμφοτέροις Hirschig b 3 νυνδὴ PF: τὸ νυνδὴ BTW
 b 4 κακόν T (corr. t) b 7 ἂν om. F

μενοι;—ΠΩΛ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα λύπη γε ὑπερέχει.—ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ λύπη, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὑπερβάλλοι.—ΠΩΛ. Οὐ φαίνεται.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ ἐτέρῳ λείπεται.—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Τῷ κακῷ.—ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.—ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὁμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἴσχιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε κάκιον ἐφάνη.—ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικε.—ΣΩ. Δέξαιο ἂν οὖν σὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἴσχιον ἀντὶ τοῦ ἦττον; μὴ ὅκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσῃ· ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, καὶ ἢ φάθῃ ἢ μὴ ἂ ἐρωτῷ.—ΠΩΛ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, ὦ Σώκρατες.—ΣΩ. Ἄλλος δέ τις ἀνθρώπων;—ΠΩΛ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.—ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὐτ' ἂν ἐγὼ οὐτ' ἂν σὺ οὐτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων δέξαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· κάκιον γὰρ τυγχάνει ὄν.—ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὅρᾳς οὖν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον παραβαλλόμενος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ ἐξαρκεῖς εἰς ὧν μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυρῶν, καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ μόνον ἐπιψηφίζων τοὺς ἄλλους ἐὼ χαίρειν. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτως ἐχέτω· μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ περὶ οὗ τὸ δεύτερον ἡμφεσβητήσαμεν σκεψώμεθα, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην ἄρα μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν, ὥς σὺ ᾤου, ἢ μείζον τὸ μὴ διδόναι, ὥς αὖ ἐγὼ ᾤμην.

a 3 μετὰ—479 c 4 λέγειν Stobaeus 4. i. 149; resp. Apuleius, *de Plat.* 2. 17 (p. 120. 11)

c 3 τοῦτό γε et c 4-5 εἰ μὴ λύπη om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) c 3-4 Οὐκ ἄρα] καὶ οὐ ut vid. F (corr. f) c 4 γε in ras. B d 2 ὁμολόγητο f
πρόσθεν W χρόνῳ] aut del. aut λόγῳ scrib. Findeisen d 5 αἴσχιον
F: αἰσχρὸν BTW τοῦ W: τοῦ τὸ BTf: τοῦτο F d 6 ἀποκρίνεσθαι F
e 1 δ] ἂν revera F (corr. f) e 4 οὐτ' ἂν ἄλλος F a 1 ἐπιψηφίζων
B² TW: ἐπιψηφίζω BF a 2 τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους F a 3 οὐ F Stob.: ὁ
BTW τὸ om. W a 5 ὥς γε αὖ F

- Σκοπώμεθα δὲ τῇδε· τὸ διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολάζεσθαι
δικαίως ἀδικοῦντα ἄρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς;—ΠΩΛ. "Ἐγωγε.—
- b ΣΩ. "Ἐχεις οὖν λέγειν ὡς οὐχὶ τά γε δίκαια πάντα καλὰ
ἐστίν, καθ' ὅσον δίκαια; καὶ διασκεψάμενος εἰπέ.—ΠΩΛ.
Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.—ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε·
ἄρα εἴ τίς τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου
5 τοῦ ποιούντος;—ΠΩΛ. "Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.—ΣΩ. Ἄρα τοῦτο
πάσχον ὃ τὸ ποιῶν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιοῦτον οἶον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιῶν;
λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι;—
ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.—ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἢ ταχὺ ὃ
c τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτεσθαι;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—
ΣΩ. Τοιοῦτον ἄρα πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστὶν οἶον ἂν τὸ
τύπτον ποιῇ;—ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ κάει
τις, ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι;—ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;—ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ
5 σφόδρα γε κάει ἢ ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτω κάεσθαι τὸ καόμενον ὡς
ἂν τὸ κᾶον κᾶη;—ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ
τέμνει τις, ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος; τέμνεται γάρ τι.—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.
—ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἢ βαθὺ τὸ τμήμα ἢ ἀλγεινόν, τοιοῦ-
d τον τμήμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον οἶον τὸ τέμνον τέμνει;—
ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.—ΣΩ. Συλλήβδην δὴ ὅρα εἰ ὁμολογεῖς, ὃ
ἄρτι ἔλεγον, περὶ πάντων, οἶον ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ποιῶν, τοιοῦτον
τὸ πάσχον πάσχειν.—ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ὁμολογῶ.
- 5 ΣΩ. Τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότερον
πάσχειν τί ἐστίν ἢ ποιεῖν;—ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες,
πάσχειν.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ τίνος ποιούντος;—ΠΩΛ. Πῶς
γὰρ οὐ; ὑπὸ γε τοῦ κολάζοντος.—ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζων
e δικαίως κολάζει;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Δίκαια ποιῶν ἢ οὐ;
—ΠΩΛ. Δίκαια.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ κολαζόμενος δίκην διδούς
δίκαια πάσχει;—ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.—ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ δίκαιά που

Stobaeus 4. 1. 149

b 4 cf. Ammonium in *Cat.*, p. 70. 13, et Philoponum in *Cat.*, p. 109. 29 Busse

b 2 καθ' ὅσον καὶ δίκαια Stob.

b 3 post τόδε add. ὦ πῶλε F

b 4 ἀνάγκη

τί ἐστι OΛ πάσχειν Stob.

b 6 prius τὸ ποιῶν] τὸ ποιόν Stob.

b 7 τὸ τοιόνδε] τόδε τοιο***δε F (corr. f): τοιόνδε Stob.

c 3 ποιεῖ F

κᾶη F

c 5 κάει ἢ] καὶ εἰ Stob.: κάει καὶ εἰ F

c 7 τις Stob. et fort.

F primitus: τι BTWF

d 3 ἂν τι ποιῇ F

d 5 ὁμολογημένων V

d 6 Ἀνάγκη Richards: ἀνάγκη BTWF Stob.

καλὰ ὡμολόγηται;—ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Τούτων ἄρα ὁ
 μὲν ποιεῖ καλὰ, ὁ δὲ πάσχει, ὁ κολαζόμενος.—ΠΩΛ. Ναί. 5
 —ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλὰ, ἀγαθὰ; ἢ γὰρ ἡδέα ἢ ὠφέ- 477
 λιμα.—ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.—ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὰ ἄρα πάσχει ὁ δίκην
 διδούς;—ΠΩΛ. Ἐοικεν.—ΣΩ. Ὁφελείται ἄρα;—ΠΩΛ.
 Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα ἤνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφελίαν; βελ- 5
 τίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίννεται, εἴπερ δικαίως κολάζεται;—ΠΩΛ.
 Εἰκός γε.—ΣΩ. Κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ δίκην
 διδούς;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ἄρα οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου ἀπαλ-
 λάττεται κακοῦ; ὦδε δὲ σκόπει· ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ b
 ἀνθρώπου κακίαν ἄλλην τινὰ ἐνορᾶς ἢ πενίαν;—ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ,
 ἀλλὰ πενίαν.—ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐν σώματος κατασκευῇ; κακίαν
 ἂν φήσαιοις ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἰσχος καὶ τὰ
 τοιαῦτα;—ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονη- 5
 ρίαν ἡγῇ τινα εἶναι;—ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—ΣΩ. Ταύτην
 οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαν καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ τὰ
 τοιαῦτα;—ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρημάτων
 καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν ὄντων, τριττὰς εἴρηκας πονη- c
 ρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν
 τούτων τῶν πονηριῶν αἰσχίστη; οὐχ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ συλλή-
 βδην ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία;—ΠΩΛ. Πολύ γε.—ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ
 αἰσχίστη, καὶ κακίστη;—ΠΩΛ. Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις; 5

ΣΩ. Ὡδὲ· ἀεὶ τὸ αἰσχιστον ἦτοι λύπην μεγίστην
 παρέχον ἢ βλάβην ἢ ἀμφοτέρω αἰσχιστόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν
 ὡμολογημένων ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν.—ΠΩΛ. Μάλιστα.—ΣΩ.
 Αἰσχιστον δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία νυνδὴ
 ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν;—ΠΩΛ. Ὡμολόγηται γάρ.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν d
 ἢ ἀνιαιρότατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνία ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχιστον τούτων

Stobaeus 4. 1. 149 [MSS. MA et inde a 477 b 8 S]
 477 a resp. Clemens, *Paed.* 1. 67. 1

e 4 ὡμολογεῖται Stobaei M, ὁμολογεῖται Stobaei A a 5 βελτίω T
 b 2 ἐνορᾶς] ἐρωτᾶς W Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πενίαν om. F (add. in marg. f)
 b 4 ἂν om. Stob. b 6 ἡγῇ] ἡγεῖται W c 2 οὖν om. Stob.
 c 3 οὐχ ἢ] οὐχὶ F c 4 δὲ] δέ F c 6 ὦ δὲ ἂ εἰ F c 7 ἀμφοτέρον
 Stob. d 2 ἢ F: ἢ BTW: εἰ Flor² f Stob. ἀνιαιρότατον Wt: ἀνιαιρώ-
 τατον BTP Stob. et revera F ἐστι καὶ Stob.: ἐστιν BTW et revera F
 τούτων αἰσχιστον F

ἐστὶν ἢ βλάβη ἢ ἀμφοτέρα;—ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.—ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἀλγεινότερόν ἐστιν τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ κάμνειν τὸ ἄδικον
 5 εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ;—ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπὸ τούτων γε.—ΣΩ. Ὑπερφνεῖ
 τινι ἄρα ὡς μεγάλη βλάβη καὶ κακῶ θαυμασίῳ ὑπερβάλλουσα
 e τᾶλλα ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία αἰσχιστόν ἐστι πάντων, ἐπειδὴ
 οὐκ ἀλγηδόνι γε, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος.—ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.—
 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν που τό γε μεγίστη βλάβη ὑπερβάλλον
 μέγιστον ἂν κακὸν εἴη τῶν ὄντων.—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ἡ
 5 ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς πονηρία
 μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακὸν ἐστίν;—ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει; οὐ χρηματι-
 στική;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ νόσου; οὐκ ἰατρική;—
 478 ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.—ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ πονηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας; εἰ μὴ
 οὕτως εὐπορεῖς, ὦδε σκόπει· ποῖ ἄγομεν καὶ παρὰ τίνας
 τοὺς κάμνοντας τὰ σώματα;—ΠΩΛ. Παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, ὦ
 Σώκρατες.—ΣΩ. Ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολα-
 5 σταίνοντας;—ΠΩΛ. Παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις;—ΣΩ. Οὐκ-
 οὖν δίκην δώσοντας;—ΠΩΛ. Φημί.—ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ
 δικαιосύνῃ τινὲ χρώμενοι κολάζουσιν οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες;
 ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δῆ.—ΣΩ. Χρηματιστική μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλ-
 b λάττει, ἰατρική δὲ νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας.—
 ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν [ὧν λέγεις];—
 ΠΩΛ. Τίνων λέγεις;—ΣΩ. Χρηματιστικῆς, ἰατρικῆς, δίκης.
 5 —ΠΩΛ. Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν
 αὐ ἦτοι ἡδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ ἢ ὠφελίαν ἢ ἀμφοτέρα, εἴπερ

Stobaeus 4. 1. 149 [MSS. SMA]

478 a cf. Plutarchum, *ser. num. vind.* 550A: resp. Synesius, *Epist.* 44, p. 658;
 Methodius, *de resurr.* 1. 31. 1 f.

d 3 βλάβη F Stob.: βλάβη ἢ λύπη BTWf ἀμφοτέροις Hirschig d 5 οὐκ
 punctis delevit f (vel F) d 6 ἀπὸ τούτων γε post e 2 Φαίνεται transp.
 Th. Gomperz d 7 καὶ κακῶ θαυμασίῳ secl. Cobet e 2 ὡς] ὡς
 φησὶν F ὡς ὁ σὸς om. Stob. e 3 που om. F γε om. Stob. e 8 τίς]
 τῆς Stob. οὐχὶ F a 3 ἰατρούς om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) post
 ἰατρούς add. φῆς Stobaei MA, post a 4 Σώκρατες Stobaei S a 4 καὶ
 τοὺς BTW: τοὺς καὶ F: καὶ Stob. b 3 οὖν TWf Ol: om. BF Stob.
 ὧν λέγεις secl. Heindorf (non vertit Ficinus)

κάλλιστόν ἐστιν;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τὸ ἰατρεύ-
εσθαι ἡδύ ἐστιν, καὶ χαίρουσιν οἱ ἰατρευόμενοι;—ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.—ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὠφέλιμόν γε· ἦ γάρ;—ΠΩΛ.
Ναί.—ΣΩ. Μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὥστε λυσι- c
τελεῖ ὑπομεῖναι τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ ὑγιῇ εἶναι.—ΠΩΛ. Πῶς
γὰρ οὗ;—ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἂν περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονέστατος
ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἰατρευόμενος, ἢ μὴδὲ κάμνων τὴν ἀρχήν;—ΠΩΛ.
Δῆλον ὅτι μὴδὲ κάμνων.—ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν εὐδαιμονία, 5
ὥς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγῇ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴδὲ κτήσις.—
ΠΩΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀθλιώτερος πότερος δυοῖν ἐχόντοιν κακὸν d
εἶτ' ἐν σώματι εἶτ' ἐν ψυχῇ, ὃ ἰατρευόμενος καὶ ἀπαλλαττό-
μενος τοῦ κακοῦ, ἢ ὃ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος, ἔχων δέ;—ΠΩΛ. Φαί-
νεται μοι ὃ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι
μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγῇ ἦν, πονηρίας;—ΠΩΛ. Ἦν γάρ. 5
—ΣΩ. Σωφρονίζει γὰρ πονεῖν καὶ δικαιότερους ποιεῖ καὶ ἰα-
τρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἢ δίκη.—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Εὐδαι-
μονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὃ μὴ ἔχων κακίαν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο
μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐφάνη.—ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δὴ.—ΣΩ. Δεύ- e
τερος δέ που ὃ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.—ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν.—ΣΩ. Οὗ-
τος δ' ἦν ὃ νοουθετούμενός τε καὶ ἐπιπληττόμενος καὶ δίκην
διδούς.—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Κάκιστα ἄρα ζῇ ὃ ἔχων [ἀδικίαν]
καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.—ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται. 5

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν ὃς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικῶν
καὶ χρώμενος μεγίστη ἀδικίᾳ διαπράξῃται ὥστε μήτε νο-
υθετεῖσθαι μήτε κολάζεσθαι μήτε δίκην διδόναι, ὥσπερ σὺ 479
φῆς Ἀρχέλαον παρεσκευάσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τυράννους
καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυνάστας;

Stobaeus 4. 1. 149 [MSS. MA et usque ad 478 b 9 S]

d 4 οὐκοῦν—7 δίκη Stobaeus 4. 5. 16

d-e resp. Synesius, *Epist.* 44, p. 658, et fort. Hippolytus, *Philosophumena*
p. 569. 32 Diels

c 3 εὐδαιμονέστερος F c 4 τὴν ἀρχὴν F: ἀρχὴν BTW Stob. c 5 εὐδαι-
μονίας F Stob. d 1 τί BTWf: τίς F Stob. κακὸν BTW Stob.: κακῶς
P: κακοῖν F d 2 καὶ] καὶ ὃ Stob. d 4 μοι om. Stob. ἔχων δέ
post ἰατρευόμενος repetit F d 5 μεγάλου Stob. 4. 1. 149 (sed μεγίστου
4. 5. 16) e 2 δέ που F Ol et Stobaei M primitus (ci. Keck) δήπου
BTW et Stobaei M²A e 4 Ναί om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) ἀδικίαν
om. Stob., secl. Burnet: κακίαν Dobree e 6 ὃς] ὡς F (corr. f)

ΠΩΛ. "Εοικε.

- 5 ΣΩ. Σχεδὸν γάρ που οὗτοι, ὦ ἄριστε, τὸ αὐτὸ διαπεπραγμένοι εἰσὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις νοσήμασιν συνισχόμενος διαπράξαιτο μὴ διδόναι δίκην τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἁμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἰατροῖς μηδὲ ἰατρεύεσθαι, φοβούμενος ὥσπερ ανεὶ παῖς τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι, ὅτι
b ἀλγεινόν. ἥ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ σοὶ οὕτω;

ΠΩΛ. "Εμοιγε.

- ΣΩ. Ἄγνων γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἀρετὴ σώματος. κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ὡμο-
5 λογημένων τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες, ὦ Πῶλε, τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὅσω ἀθλιώτερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιὺς σώματος μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ συνοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθρᾶ καὶ ἀδίκῃ
c καὶ ἀνοσίῳ, ὅθεν καὶ πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι μηδ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ φίλους καὶ ὅπως ἂν ὦσιν ὡς πιθανώτατοι λέγειν· εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀληθῇ ὡμολογήκαμεν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἄρ'
5 αἰσθάνη τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου; ἡ βούλει συλλογισώμεθα αὐτά;

ΠΩΛ. Εἰ σοί γε ἄλλως δοκεῖ.

- ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακὸν ἡ ἀδικία καὶ τὸ
d ἀδικεῖν;—ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται γε.—ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀπαλλαγή γε ἐφάνη τούτου τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ δίκην διδόναι;—ΠΩΛ. Κινδυνεύει.—ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε μὴ διδόναι ἐμμονὴ τοῦ κακοῦ;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Δεύτερον ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν κακῶν μεγέθει
5 τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην πάντων μέγιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον κακῶν πέφυκεν.—ΠΩΛ. "Εοικεν.

usque ad c 4 λέγειν Stobaeus 4. 1. 149

a-c resp. Gregorius Nyss., *Or. cat.* 36cd Migne

d 6 ἔοικεν—7 ἡμφεσβητήσαμεν *Etym. Magn.* s.v. ἀμφισβητεῖν

a 4 "Εοικε om. P Stob.

a 6 εἴ et μεγίστοις om. Stob.

a 7 συννησχόμενος B

a 9 εἰ παῖς BTW : εἰ εἴποισ F Stob.

b 1 οὐ δοκεῖ BTWf :

ἐδοκεῖ [sic] F ut vid.

b 3 γε] δέ F

ἡ om. F

b 6 αὐτοῦ] αὐτὸ

Stob.

b 8 ὑγιὺς ψυχῇ B (corr. rec. b)

b 8-c 1 ἀδίκως καὶ ἀνοσίως F

c 7 σοί γε ἄλλως BTW Ol et revera F : ἄλλως del. Schanz : μὴ σοί γε ἄλλως YV

d 1 alt. γε] τε F

d 3 δέ om. T

d 4 μεγέθει τῶν κακῶν F

d 5 ἀδικεῖν] ἀδικεῖν δίκην διδόντα Stallbaum : ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην Hirschig

d 6 τε] γε B

"Εοικεν om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f)

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ περὶ τούτου, ὦ φίλε, ἡμφεσβητήσαμεν, σὺ μὲν τὸν Ἀρχέλαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικούντα δίκην οὐδεμίαν διδόντα, ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦναντίον οἰόμενος, **e** εἴτε Ἀρχέλαος εἴτ' ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ὅστισοῦν μὴ δίδωσι δίκην ἀδικῶν, τούτῳ προσήκειν ἀθλίῳ εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αἰετὶ τὸν ἀδικούντα τοῦ ἀδικουμένου ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὴ διδόντα δίκην τοῦ **5** διδόντος; οὐ ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγόμενα;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐλέγετο;

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Εἰδέν' εἰ οὖν δὴ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ Πῶλε, τίς ἢ **480** μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς; δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὡμολογημένων αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα φυλάττειν ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσῃ, ὥς ἱκανὸν κακὸν ἔξοντα. οὐ γάρ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. **5**

ΣΩ. Ἐὰν δέ γε ἀδικήσῃ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις ὧν ἂν κήδηται, αὐτὸν ἐκόντα ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε ὅπου ὥς τάχιστα δώσει δίκην, παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν ὥσπερ παρὰ τὸν ἱατρόν, σπεύδοντα ὅπως μὴ ἐγχρονισθὲν τὸ νόσημα τῆς ἀδικίας **b** ὑπουλον τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσῃ καὶ ἀνίατον· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴπερ τὰ πρότερον μένει ἡμῖν ὁμολογήματα; οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτα ἐκείνοις οὕτω μὲν συμφωνεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ μή; **5**

ΠΩΛ. Τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀδικίας τῆς αὐτοῦ ἢ γονέων ἢ ἐταίρων ἢ παίδων ἢ πατρίδος ἀδικούσης οὐ χρήσιμος οὐδὲν ἢ ῥητορικὴ ἡμῖν, ὦ Πῶλε, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις ὑπολάβοι ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον—κατηγορεῖν δεῖν μάλιστα μὲν **c** ἑαυτοῦ, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅς ἂν αἰετὶ τῶν φίλων τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι ἀλλ'

a-d resp. Boethius, *Cons. phil.* 4. 4. 123

d 7 οὐ F: om. BTW ἡμφεσβητοῦμεν F (corr. f) a 2 γὰρ μὲν F (μὲν punctis del. f) a 3 ὁμολογουμένων W a 4 ἀδικήσῃ BTW et revera F: ἀδικήσει Vind. 109 b 2 ποιήσῃ Ven. 184 λέγομεν WF: λέγωμεν BT b 3 μενεῖ Richards b 9 οὐδὲν om. W c 1 ἐπὶ] ἐπεὶ F (corr. f)

- εἰς τὸ φανερόν ἄγειν τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἵνα δῶ δίκην καὶ ὑγιὲς
 5 γένηται, ἀναγκάζειν τε καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ ἀποδειλιάν
 ἀλλὰ παρέχειν μύσαντα εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ὥσπερ τέμνειν
 καὶ κάειν ἱατρῷ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν διώκοντα, μὴ ὑπολογι-
 ζόμενον τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἐὰν μὲν γε πληγῶν ἄξια ἡδίκηκώς
 d ᾗ, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ δεσμοῦ, δεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας,
 ἀποτίνοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φυγῆς, φεύγοντα, ἐὰν δὲ θανάτου, ἀπο-
 θνήσκοντα, αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὄντα κατήγορον καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ
 τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρώμενον τῇ ῥητορικῇ,
 5 ὅπως ἂν καταδήλων τῶν ἀδικημάτων γιγνομένων ἀπαλλάτ-
 τωνται τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἀδικίας. φῶμεν οὕτως ἢ μὴ
 φῶμεν, ὦ Πῶλε;
- e ΠΩΛ. Ἄτοπα μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τοῖς μέντοι
 ἔμπροσθεν ἴσως σοι ὁμολογεῖται.
- ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ κακείνα λυτέον ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν;
- ΠΩΛ. Ναί, τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχει.
- 5 ΣΩ. Τὸναντίον δέ γε αὖ μεταβαλόντα, εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινα
 κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἴτ' ἐχθρὸν εἴτε ὄντιν οὖν, ἐὰν μόνον μὴ αὐτὸς
 ἀδικῇται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ—τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εὐλαβητέον—ἐὰν
 δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικῇ ὁ ἐχθρός, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον, καὶ
 481 πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα, ὅπως μὴ δῶ δίκην μηδὲ ἔλθῃ παρὰ
 τὸν δικαστήν· ἐὰν δὲ ἔλθῃ, μηχανητέον ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ
 καὶ μὴ δῶ δίκην ὁ ἐχθρός, ἀλλ' ἐάντε χρυσίον <ᾗ> ἡρπακῶς
 πολὺ, μὴ ἀποδιδῶ τοῦτο ἀλλ' ἔχων ἀναλίσκη καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν
 5 καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως, ἐάντε θανάτου
 ἄξια ἡδίκηκώς ᾗ, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθανεῖται, μάλιστα μὲν μηδέ-
 ποτε, ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος ἔσται πονηρὸς ὢν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπως ὥς
 b πλείστον χρόνον βιώσεται τοιοῦτος ὢν. ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
 ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τῷ
 γε μὴ μέλλοντι ἀδικεῖν οὐ μεγάλη τίς μοι δοκεῖ ἢ χρεία

c 5 τε F: δὲ BTWf prius καὶ om. F (add. f) c 6 μύσαντας Ol
 εἰ F: om. BTW d 4 post οἰκείων add. μὴ φειδόμενον ἀλλ' εἰ revera F
 τούτῳ W d 5 ἀπαλλάττονται B ex corr., Wt: ἀπαλλάττονται B prim.,
 TF d 6 μεγάλου F ἀδικίας om. W e 2 ὁμολόγηται Par²
 e 5 δεῖ] δὴ W e 7 ἀδικεῖται F primitus a 3 δῶ Ft: δώη BW:
 δώη T ᾗ hic add. Schanz: post ἡρπακῶς Y a 4 ἀναλίσκη P ex
 corr. (ci. L. Dindorf): ἀναλίσκηται BTWF: ἀναλίσκη τε W s.l., P primitus
 a 5 ἐάντε αὖ F a 6 ἀποθανῇται WF (corr. f) b 1 βιώσεται s.l. W
 ἐπὶ τὰ] ἔπειτα F (corr. f) b 3 post ἀδικεῖν rep. ὦ πῶλε F

αὐτῆς εἶναι, εἰ δὴ καὶ ἔστιν τις χρεία, ὥς ἔν γε τοῖς
πρόσθεν οὐδαμῇ ἐφάνη οὔσα. 5

ΚΑΛ. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης
ἢ παίζει;

ΧΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυῶς σπου-
δάζειν· οὐδὲν μέντοι οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.

ΚΑΛ. Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμῶ. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώ- 10
κρατες, πότερόν σε θῶμεν νυνὶ σπουδάζοντα ἢ παίζοντα; εἰ c
μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ
λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀν-
θρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἃ δεῖ;

ΣΩ. ὦ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μή τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, 5
τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι [ἢ] τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τις
ἡμῶν ἰδιόν τι ἔπασχεν πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ῥάδιον
ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθημα. λέγω δ' ἐννοήσας d
ὅτι ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταῦτόν τι πεπονθότες;
ἐρῶντε δύο ὄντε δυοῖν ἑκάτερος, ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τε
τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ δυοῖν, τοῦ τε Ἀθη-
ναίων δήμου καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους. αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σου 5
ἐκάστοτε, καίπερ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὅτι ἂν φῇ σου τὰ παιδικὰ
καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῇ ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω
καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου· ἔν τε τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐάν τι σοῦ e
λέγοντος ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων μὴ φῇ οὕτως ἔχειν, μετα-
βαλλόμενος λέγεις ἃ ἐκεῖνος βούλεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πυρι-
λάμπους νεανίαν τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον τοιαῦτα ἕτερα πέπονθας.
τοῖς γὰρ τῶν παιδικῶν βουλευμασὶν τε καὶ λόγοις οὐχ οἶός 5
τ' εἶ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὥστε, εἴ τίς σου λέγοντος ἐκάστοτε ἃ
διὰ τούτους λέγεις θαυμάζοι ὥς ἄτοπὰ ἔστιν, ἴσως· εἴποις
ἂν αὐτῷ εἰ βούλοιο τἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὅτι εἰ μή τις παύσει τὰ

c 1 cf. Aristidem, *orat.* xlvi, p. 492

c 5 εἰ—d 1 πάθημα Themistius, *de anima*, p. 104. 3 Heinze

c 1 θῶμεν Madvig (habuit fort. Arist.) : φῶμεν BTWF Ol : om. nonnulli teste
Ol νῦν F c 2 γὰρ om. W c 3 τι F : τι ἢ BTWf c 6 ἢ
om. Them. (habet Ol ut vid.), del. Aldina d 3 ἐρῶντες . . . ὄντες F
(corr. f) d 4 δυοῖν om. Y d 6 ἂν φῇ F : ὅπως ἂν φῇ B : ὅπως ἂν
ἀντιφῇ TW (ἂν ἀντιφῇ f) d 7 φῇς F (corr. f) e 2 alt. ὁ om. B
e 4 νεανίαν secl. Gercke e 5 βουλήμασι Par. 1811 e 8 παύσει F

482 σὰ παιδικὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων, οὐδὲ σὺ παύσῃ ποτὲ ταῦτα
λέγων. νόμιζε τοίνυν καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ χρῆναι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα
ἀκούειν, καὶ μὴ θαύμαζε ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλὰ τὴν
φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά, παῦσον ταῦτα λέγουσαν. λέγει
5 γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, αἰεὶ ἂ νῦν ἐμοῦ ἀκούεις, καὶ μοί ἐστιν
τῶν ἐτέρων παιδικῶν πολὺ ἥττον ἔμπληκτος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κλει-
νίειος οὗτος ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἐστὶ λόγων, ἢ δὲ φιλοσοφία αἰεὶ
b τῶν αὐτῶν, λέγει δὲ ἂ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις, παρήσθα δὲ καὶ
αὐτὸς λεγομένοις. ἢ οὖν ἐκείνην ἐξέλεγξον, ὅπερ ἄρτι
ἔλεγον, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐστὶν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην μὴ δι-
δόναι ἀπάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν· ἢ εἰ τοῦτο ἑάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον,
5 μὰ τὸν κύνα τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν, οὗ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλ-
λικλῆς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ διαφωνήσῃ ἐν ᾧ παντὶ τῷ βίῳ.
καίτοι ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον
εἶναι ἀναρμοστεῖν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοίην,
c καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ' ἐναντία
λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἓνα ὄντα ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι
καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν.

ΚΑΛ. ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς μοι νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις
5 ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὢν· καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημηγορεῖς ταῦτόν
παθόντος Πύλου πάθος ὅπερ Γοργίου κατηγορεῖ πρὸς σέ
παθεῖν. ἔφη γάρ που Γοργίαν ἐρωτώμενον ὑπὸ σοῦ, ἐὰν
ἀφίκηται παρ' αὐτόν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος τὰ δίκαια ὁ τὴν ῥητο-
d ρικὴν βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάξοι αὐτόν ὁ Γοργίας,
αἰσχυνθῆναι αὐτόν καὶ φάναι διδάξειν διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀν-
θρώπων, ὅτι ἀγανακτοῖεν ἂν εἴ τις μὴ φαίη· διὰ δὲ ταύτην
τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἀναγκασθῆναι ἐναντία αὐτόν αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν,

a 4 resp. Libanius, *Ep.* 667 (x. 609. 11 Foerster)

b 5 μὰ—θεόν Olympiodorus in *Alc.* 2. 135 Westerink

a 5 αἰεὶ TWf Ol: om. BF

ἐκβλητος praebent B²W Ol

σὺ W

b 4 τῶν κακῶν W

corr. W et s.l. T: τῶν αἰγυπτίων T et pr. W: τὸν αἰγύπτιον F Ol (sed αἰγύπτιον F): τὸν παρ' αἰγυπτίοις Ol in *Alc.* Καλλικλῆς] καλλικλεῖ B

b 7 καὶ] κἂν Richards

BTWF: post τε add. εἶναι corrector Laurentiani 85. 7

πολλοὺς F

c 2 ἐαυτῷ F

c 4 μοι F Ol: om. BTW

δέη [sic] F

d 4 αὐτῷ om. F (suppl. f)

a 6 ἑταίρων TP ad ἔμπληκτος var. lect.

a 7 αἰεὶ Y Olπ: εἰ F: om. BTW

b 1 νῦν

b 5 τὸν αἰγυπτίων B et revera P et ex

c 1 πλείστους]

d 3 δὴ]

σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾶν. καὶ σου κατεγέλα, ὥς γέ μοι 5
δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς, τότε· νῦν δὲ πάλιν αὐτὸς ταῦτόν τοῦτο ἔπαθεν.
καὶ ἔγωγε κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ ἄγαμαι Πῶλον, ὅτι σοι
συνεχώρησεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἐκ
ταύτης γὰρ αὖ τῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεὶς e
ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη, αἰσχυνθεὶς ἃ ἐνόει εἰπεῖν. σὺ
γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικά καὶ
δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν, ἃ φύσει μὲν
οὐκ ἔστιν καλά, νόμῳ δέ. ὥς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντί' 5
ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἥ τε φύσις καὶ ὁ νόμος· ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύ-
νηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἄπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία 483
λέγειν. ὁ δὲ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκῶς κακουρ-
γεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μὲν τις τὰ κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, τὰ κατὰ
φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου.
ὥσπερ αὐτίκα ἐν τούτοις, τῷ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι, 5
Πῶλον τὸ κατὰ νόμον αἴσχιον λέγοντος, σὺ τὸν λόγον
ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν. φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἴσχιόν ἐστιν
ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, <οἶον> τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. οὐδὲ
γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τοῦτό γ' ἐστίν τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' b
ἀνδραπόδου τινὸς ᾧ κρεῖττόν ἐστιν τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, ὅστις
ἀδικούμενος καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος μὴ οἶός τέ ἐστιν αὐτὸς
αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν μηδὲ ἄλλῳ οὐ ἂν κήδηται. ἀλλ' οἶμαι οἱ
τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποι εἰσιν καὶ οἱ 5
πολλοί. πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τοὺς τε
νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ τοὺς

e 5-a 4 resp. Aristoteles, *Soph. El.* 173^a7

a 2-8 cf. [Alexandrum] in *Soph. El.*, pp. 118. 22 et 172. 27

a 2-b 7 resp. Anon. *Paraphr. in Soph. El.*, p. 35. 13 Hayduck

a 7-8 resp. Proclus in *Alc.*, p. 323. 5-9

d 5 κατεγέλα revera F: καταγελᾶν BTW et s.l. f d 6 δοκεῖ F ἔπαθες
F (corr. f) d 7 ὅτι σοι om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) e 4 δημηγο-
ρικὸν f e 6 ἐὰν οὖν τις] καὶ ἐάν τις οἶμαι F a 3 τὰ κατὰ (bis) F:
τὸ κατὰ (bis) ps.-Alex.: κατὰ (bis) BTW a 4 post νόμου add. λέγειν F
a 5 τῷ] τὸ (bis) F a 6 νόμον—τὸν om. BW αἰσχρὸν F λόγον
Riemann: νόμον BTWF: τὰς διαλέξεις paraphr. ps.-Alex. a 7 ἐδιώ-
καθες BTW Oll: ἐδίωκες F et in marg. B²T, γρ. W κατὰ φύσιν om. T
πᾶν αἴσχιόν] παναἰσχίον ps.-Alex.: πᾶσιν αἴσχιόν Sybrand: πάντως αἴσχιόν
Wagner: πᾶν secl. Rückert a 8 καὶ om. Oll οἶον add. ed. Bipont.:
τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι . . . ἀδικεῖν secl. Dobree (habet ps.-Alex.) b 2 τεθνάναι
ἐστίν T b 4 οὐ] ᾧ T κήδεται F (corr. f)

c ψόγους ψέγουσιν· ἐκφοβοῦντες τοὺς ἐρρωμενεστέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλέον ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν πλέον ἔχωσιν, λέγουσιν ὡς αἰσχροὺν καὶ ἄδικον τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων
5 ζητεῖν ἔχειν· ἀγαπῶσι γὰρ οἶμαι αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ ἴσον ἔχωσιν φαυλότεροι ὄντες.

Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἄδικον καὶ αἰσχροὺν λέγεται, τὸ πλέον ζητεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν· ἡ δέ γε οἶμαι φύσις αὐτῇ ἀποφαίνει αὐτὸ ὅτι
d δίκαιόν ἐστιν, τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν,
5 ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δικαίῳ χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας; ἢ
e ἄλλα μυρία ἂν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι οὗτοι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου ταῦτα πράττουσιν, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως κατὰ τοῦτον ὃν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα· πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ
5 ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες ὥσπερ λέοντας, κατεπάρδοντές τε καὶ γοητεύοντες καταδουλούμεθα
484 λέγοντες ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρή ἔχειν καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐὰν δέ γε οἶμαι φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνὴρ, πάντα ταῦτα ἀποσεισάμενος καὶ διαρρήξας καὶ διαφυγὼν, καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέτερα γράμματα καὶ μαγγα-
5 νεύματα καὶ ἐπωδὰς καὶ νόμους τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας, ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα
b ἐξέλαμψεν τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Πίνδαρος ἅπερ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐνδείκνυσθαι ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι ἐν ᾧ λέγει

b 1-4 cf. *Celsum apud Orig. c. Celsum* 5. 34 (ii. 38. 7 Koetschau)

c 1 ἐκφοβοῦντές τε Y c 3 λέγουσιν secl. Hermann c 9 αὐτὸ fort. secludendum: αὐ V (ἂν Y): an αὐτὸ <τὸναντίον>? d 2 τὸν] τὸ F (corr. f) d 5 τὸν] τὸ τὸν F d 6 ἐπὶ] περὶ OIλ d 7 prius ἦ] καὶ F a 3 ὁ ἀνὴρ T a 3-4 καὶ διαφυγὼν secl. Morstadt
a 4 γράμματα] ἀγρεύματα Theiler: πλάσματα Cobet: γοητεύματα Richards

ὅτι

νόμος δ' πάντων βασιλεὺς
θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων·

5

οὗτος δὲ δῆ, φησίν,

ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαιότατον
ὑπερτάτα χειρί· τεκμαίρομαι
ἔργοισιν Ἡρακλέος, ἐπεὶ—ἀπριάτας—

λέγει οὕτω πως—τὸ γὰρ ἄσμα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι—λέγει δ' ὅτι 10
οὔτε πριάμενος οὔτε δόντος τοῦ Γηρυόνου ἡλάσατο τὰς βοῦς,
ὥς τούτου ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου φύσει, καὶ βοῦς καὶ τᾶλλα κτή- c
ματα εἶναι πάντα τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ κρείττονος τὰ τῶν
χειρόνων τε καὶ ἡττόνων.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθές οὕτως ἔχει, γνώση δέ, ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ
μείζω ἔλθῃς ἑάσας ἤδη φιλοσοφίαν. φιλοσοφία γάρ τοί 5
ἐστίν, ὧ Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, ἂν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ἄψῃται ἐν
τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίψῃ, δια-
φθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ πάνυ εὐφυνῆς ᾖ καὶ
πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας φιλοσοφῇ, ἀνάγκη πάντων ἄπειρον γεγο-
νέναι ἐστὶν ὧν χρὴ ἔμπειρον εἶναι τὸν μέλλοντα καλὸν d
καγαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσεσθαι ἄνδρα. καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων
ἄπειροι γίνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῶν λόγων οἷς
δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία, καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν 5
ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ συλλήβδην τῶν ἡθῶν παντάπασιν ἄπειροι
γίνονται. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἔλθωσιν εἰς τινα ἰδίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν
πράξιν, καταγέλαστοι γίνονται, ὥσπερ γε οἶμαι οἱ πολιτι- e
κοί, ἐπειδὰν αὖ εἰς τὰς ὑμετέρας διατριβὰς ἔλθωσιν καὶ τοὺς
λόγους, καταγέλαστοί εἰσιν. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπί-

b 4 νόμος—10 ἐπίσταμαι [Pindaros fr. 152 Bowra, 169 Snell] cf. Aristidem,
orat. xlv, p. 89, et schol. ad loc.

b 4-8 schol. Pindar, Nem. 9. 35

b 7-8 resp. Libanius, Apol. Socr. 87 (v. 62 Foerster)

c 5 φιλοσοφία—e 3 εἰσιν Gellius 10. 22. 3 ff.

b 7 δικαίων τὸ βιαιότατον V marg., Arist., et schol. Pind. (cf. etiam Legg.
715 a): βιαιῶν τὸ δικαιοτάτον BTWF: βιαιῶν τὸ δικαιοτάτον Libanius ut
vid., Wilamowitz

b 8 χερὶ TP

b 11-c 1 -λάσατο τὰς βοῦς, ὥς

τούτου om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f)

c 5 γάρ om. F (add. f)

d 2 εὐδό-

κιμον TWF Gell.: εὐδαίμον' B

d 3 τὴν om. F

d 4 δεῖ] δῆ W

δου· λαμπρός τέ ἐστιν ἕκαστος ἐν τούτῳ, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ
5 ἐπείγεται,

νέμων τὸ πλείστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος,
ἔν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὢν·

- 485 ὅπου δ' ἂν φαῦλος ᾖ, ἐντεῦθεν φεύγει καὶ λαιδορεῖ τοῦτο,
τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἐπαινεῖ, εὐνοία τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἡγούμενος οὕτως
αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι τὸ ὀρθότατόν ἐστιν
ἀμφοτέρων μετασχεῖν. φιλοσοφίας μὲν ὅσον παιδείας χάριν
5 καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακίῳ ὄντι φιλοσοφεῖν·
ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ὢν ἄνθρωπος ἔτι φιλοσοφῇ,
καταγέλαστον, ὡς Σώκρατες, τὸ χρήμα γίγνεται, καὶ ἔγωγε
b ὁμοιότατον πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ὥσπερ πρὸς
τοὺς ψελλιζομένους καὶ παίζοντας. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ παιδίον
ἴδω, ὃ ἔτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι οὕτω, ψελλιζόμενον καὶ
παῖζον, χαίρω τε καὶ χαρίεν μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ
5 πρέπον τῇ τοῦ παιδίου ἡλικίᾳ, ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς διαλεγομένου
παιδαρίου ἀκούσω, πικρὸν τί μοι δοκεῖ χρήμα εἶναι καὶ ἀνὴρ
μου τὰ ὦτα καὶ μοι δοκεῖ δουλοπρεπές τι εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ
c ἀνδρὸς ἀκούσῃ τις ψελλιζομένου ἢ παίζοντα ὀργᾶ, κατα-
γέλαστον φαίνεται καὶ ἄνανδρον καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον. ταῦτόν
οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο πάσχω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας. παρὰ
νέῳ μὲν γὰρ μειρακίῳ ὁρῶν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, καὶ πρέπειν
5 μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ἐλεύθερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν
ἄνθρωπον, τὸν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντα ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐδέ-
ποτε οὐδενὸς ἀξιόσποντον ἑαυτὸν οὔτε καλοῦ οὔτε γενναίου
d πράγματος· ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἴδω ἔτι φιλοσοφοῦντα

e 4-7 [Euripides fr. 183 Nauck², cf. *Alc.* ii 146 a 4-6; Aristotelem, *Rhet.* 1371^b31, *Probl.* 917^a13; Plutarchum, *de garr.* 514A, *Q. conv.* 1. 4. 3, 622A, 2. 1. 2, 630B, *aud. poet.* 43B]
a 3 ἀλλ'—e 2 φθέγγασθαι Gellius 10. 22. 10 ff.

e 6 τὸ πλείστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ] τὸ πλείστον τούτῳ F: ἐκάστης ἡμέρας πλείστον
Ar. *Rhet.* τούτῳ] αὐτῷ [Ar.] *Probl.* e 7 τυγχάνει T Ar.: τυγχάνη
BWF *Alc.* ii (BT) et fere Plut. βέλτιστος BTWF Ar. *Rhet.*: κράτιστος *Alc.*
ii, [Ar.] *Probl.*, Plut. a 6 φιλοσοφεῖ F a 7 ὡς Σώκρατες, τὸ χρήμα
om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) χρήμα] σχῆμα f b 2 καὶ παίζοντας,
b 3-4 καὶ παῖζον, c 1 ἢ παίζοντα ὀργᾶ secl. Morstadt b 3-4 ψελλιζόμενον
καὶ παῖζον secl. Cobet c 3 πάσχω τοῦτο F παρὰ Stephanus: περὶ
BTWF Gell. c 6 post ἀνελεύθερον add. τινα εἶναι F d1 δὴ om. Gell.

καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἤδη δεῖσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ. ὁ γὰρ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κἂν πάνυ εὐφύης ἦ, ἀνάνδρῳ γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἔφη ὁ 5 ποιητῆς τοὺς ἀνδρας ἀριπρεπεῖς γίγνεσθαι, καταδεδυκότι δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν βίον βιῶναι μετὰ μεираκίων ἐν γωνία τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων ψιθυρίζοντα, ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ ἱκανὸν e μὴδέποτε φθέγξασθαι.

Ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σέ ἐπιεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς· κινδυνεύω οὖν πεπονθέναι νῦν ὅπερ ὁ Ζῆθος πρὸς τὸν Ἀμφίονα ὁ Εὐριπίδου, οὗπερ ἐμνήσθην. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοιαῦτ' ἅττα ἐπέρχεται 5 πρὸς σέ λέγειν, οἷάπερ ἐκείνος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν, ὅτι "Ἀμελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὣν δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ὧδε γενναίαν <λαχῶν> μεираκιώδει τινὶ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι, καὶ οὐτ' ἂν δίκης βουλαῖσι προσθεῖ' ἂν ὀρθῶς λόγον, οὐτ' 486 εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν ἂν λάκοις, οὐθ' ὑπὲρ ἄλλου νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιο." καίτοι, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες—καί μοι μὴδὲν ἀχθεσθῆς· εὐνοία γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇ—οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι οὕτως ἔχειν ὥς ἐγὼ σέ οἶμαι ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς 5 πόρρω αἰὲ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας; νῦν γὰρ εἴ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὅτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀπάγοι, φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μὴδὲν ἀδικοῦντα, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ὅτι χρήσαιο σαυτῷ, ἀλλ' ἱλιγγιώης ἂν καὶ χασμῶ οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι b

usque ad e 2 φθέγξασθαι Gellius 10. 22. 10 ff.

d 3-7 cf. Plutarchum, *max. cum princ.* 777B

e 3 ἐγὼ—φιλικῶς Lacapenus, p. 176. 21 Lindstam

e 6-a 3 [Euripides fr. 185 Nauck², cf. Philostratum, *vit. Apoll.* 4. 21]

e 7 φύσιν—8 μορφώματι Thomas Mag., p. 105. 13

a 6 νῦν—b 5 χείρονα cf. Philodemum, *Rhet.* ii. 176

d 2 ἐμοὶ F ἤδη δεῖσθαι] ἢ διακεῖσθαι ut vid. F (corr. f) d 5 τὰς ἀγοράς] τῆς ἀγορᾶς W e 1 ἱκανόν] καλὸν Coraës: καινόν Theiler e 3 δέ] μὲν οὖν Lacapenus φιλικῶς fort. secludendum: <καὶ> φιλικῶς Richards e 4 prius ὁ om. F e 5 ἐμνήσθη F e 7 καὶ] κατὰ F (corr. f) e 8 λαχῶν add. Weil (ἔχων Ruhnken) μεираκιώδει om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) διαπρέπεις BTW et revera F, Oll, Philostr., Thos. Mag.: διατρέπεις Grotius: διαστρέφεις Valckenaer a 1 -τ' ἂν δίκης om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) δίκαις Oll προσθεῖ WF ἀνορθῶς (-ὡς suprascr. ai) F a 2 ἂν λάκοις Bonitz: ἂν λάβοις BTWf: ἀναλάβοις F a 4 ἀχθεσθεῖς F a 5 εἶναι om. F a 6 νυνὶ F a 7 ἀπαγάγοι V b 1 ἱλιγγιώης WFbt: εἰλιγγιώης BTP

εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀναβάς, κατηγοροῦν τυχὼν πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ, ἀποθάνοις ἂν, εἰ βούλοιτο θανάτου σοι τιμᾶσθαι. καίτοι πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, 5 ἥ τις εὐφυῆ λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτ' ἔθηκε χείρονα, μήτε αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν μηδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μήτε ἑαυτὸν μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ c τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλαῖσθαι πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀτεχνῶς δὲ ἄτιμον ζῆν ἐν τῇ πόλει; τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροϊκό-τερον εἰρησθαι, ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἀλλ' ὠγαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου, παῦσαι δὲ ἐλέγχων, πρα- 5 γμάτων δ' εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν, ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφείς, εἴτε ληρήματα χρή φάναι εἶναι εἴτε φλυαρίας, ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοι-κήσεις δόμοις. ζηλῶν οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ d ταῦτα, ἀλλ' οἷς ἔστιν καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ χρυσὴν ἔχων ἐτύγχανον τὴν ψυχὴν, ὦ Καλλί- κλεις, οὐκ ἂν οἶμι με ἄσμενον εὔρεῖν τούτων τινὰ τῶν λίθων ἣ βασανίζουσιν τὸν χρυσόν, τὴν ἀρίστην, πρὸς ἣντινα ἔμελ- 5 λον προσαγαγὼν αὐτήν, εἴ μοι ὁμολογήσειεν ἐκείνη καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἥδη εὖ εἴσεσθαι ὅτι ἱκανῶς ἔχω καὶ οὐδὲν [μ'] ἔτι δεῖ ἄλλης βασάνου;

e ΚΑΛ. Πρὸς τί δὴ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ νῦν· οἶμαι ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐντετυχηκῶς τοιούτῳ ἐρμαίῳ ἐντετυχηκέναί.

ΚΑΛ. Τί δή;

d 5 αὐτήν—6 ἔχω partim P.S.I. 1200 (Π³)

b 4-5 [Euripides fr. 186]

c 3 resp. pseudo-Didymus, *Plat. Lex.* s.v. ἐπὶ κόρρης (p. 400 Miller)

c 4-8 [Euripides fr. 188, cf. Stobaeum 4. 15. 13, Dio Chrys., *orat.* 73. 10]

b 2 τυχὼν F b 5 ἥ τις B et revera F: εἴ τις TW, et ut vid. Philod.
εὐφυῆ BTW: εὐφύει F (sed ult. syll. ex corr.): εὐγενῆ Philod. b 6 μήτε]
μηδ' Hirschig c 2 δὲ] δὴ Heindorf καὶ om. B c 4 πιθοῦ
Cobet ἐλέγχων BTWF: ματαιάζων P, ἐν ἄλλῳ πρόσκειται παῦσαι ματαιάζων
(μεταίρων W) in marg. TW c 5 καὶ ἄσκει] γρ. καὶ δόκει s.l. W: καὶ
σκόπει Richards: secl. Hissink d 1 post πολλὰ add. καὶ F (punctis del.f)
d 4 ἥ BTW: ἥ F: a1 Parisinus 1812: a15 ci. Stallbaum τήν] τὸ F (τὸν f)
d 5 προσαγαγὼν F ὁμολογήσῃ ἐν ἐκείνῃ F d 6 ἥδη F Π³: om. BTW
ὅτι ἥ F (ἥ puncto del. f), ὅτι Π³ sed η s.l. d 7 με BTWF: μοι
Malatest. s.l., YV: seclusi ἔτι F: om. BTW e 1 δὴ] δὲ F

ΣΩ. Εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἂν μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσης περὶ ὧν ἡ ἐμὴ 5
 ψυχὴ δοξάζει, ταῦτ' ἤδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τἀληθῆ. ἐννοῶ γὰρ
 ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα βασανιεῖν ἱκανῶς ψυχῆς πέρι ὀρθῶς τε 487
 ζώσης καὶ μὴ τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἔχειν ἃ σὺ πάντα ἔχεις, ἐπιστή-
 μην τε καὶ εὐνοίαν καὶ παρρησίαν. ἐγὼ γὰρ πολλοῖς ἐντυγ-
 χάνω οἷ ἐμὲ οὐχ οἰοί τέ εἰσιν βασανίζειν διὰ τὸ μὴ σοφοὶ
 εἶναι ὥσπερ σύ· ἕτεροι δὲ σοφοὶ μὲν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν δέ 5
 μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τὸ μὴ κήδεσθαί μου ὥσπερ σύ·
 τῷ δὲ ξένῳ τῷδε, Γοργίας τε καὶ Πῶλος, σοφῶ μὲν καὶ
 φίλῳ ἐστὸν ἐμῷ, ἐνδεεστέρῳ δὲ παρρησίας καὶ αἰσχυνη- b
 λοτέρῳ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος· πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ὦ γε εἰς τοσοῦτον
 αἰσχύνῃς ἐληλύθατον, ὥστε διὰ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ ἐκά-
 τερος αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἐναντία λέγειν ἐναντίον πολλῶν
 ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων. σὺ δὲ ταῦτα 5
 πάντα ἔχεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν· πεπαίδευσαι τε γὰρ
 ἱκανῶς, ὥς πολλοὶ ἂν φήσαιεν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐμοὶ εἰ εὖνους.
 τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῶμαι; ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα ὑμᾶς ἐγώ, ὧ c
 Καλλίκλεις, τέτταρας ὄντας κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας, σέ
 τε καὶ Τείσανδρον τὸν Ἀφιδναῖον καὶ Ἄνδρωνα τὸν Ἄνδρο-
 τίωνος καὶ Ναυσικύδην τὸν Χολαργέα· καί ποτε ὑμῶν ἐγὼ
 ἐπήκουσα βουλευομένων μέχρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκητέον 5
 εἶη, καὶ οἶδα ὅτι ἐνίκα ἐν ὑμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυ-
 μεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι
 παρεκελεύεσθε ἀλλήλοις ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφῶ- d
 τεροι γενόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες. ἐπειδὴ οὖν σου ἀκούω
 ταῦτα ἐμοὶ συμβουλευόντος ἅπερ τοῖς σεαυτοῦ ἐταιροτάτοις,
 ἱκανόν μοι τεκμηρίον ἐστὶν ὅτι ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι εὖνους εἶ.

e 6 ἐννοῶ—a 3 παρρησίαν Stobaeus 4. 5. 94

a 2-3 resp. ut vid. Clemens, *Paed.* 1. 97. 3

b 1 αἰσχυνηλοτέρῳ—2 δέοντος Thomas Mag., p. 27. 11

d 3 ταῦτα—ἐταιροτάτοις Thomas Mag., p. 159. 9

e 5 ἂν Bekker (ἃ ἂν Par. 1811)

a 1 πέρι] τε πέρι Stob.

a 2 ἃ σὺ

πάντα revera etiam Stob.

a 3 εὐνοίαν Olp (unde corrector Veneti 189),

legisse videtur Clemens: δόξαν BTWF Stob.

b 1 αἰσχυνηλοτέρῳ F

(dāmnat Thos. Mag.): αἰσχυνηλοτέρῳ BTW

b 5-6 πάντα ταῦτα F

c 3 τείσανδρον F: τίσανδρον BTWf

c 4 ἐγὼ ὑμῶν F

c 5 ὑπή-

κουσα F βουλευομένων μέχρι et c 6 ὅτι ἐνίκα om. F rel. spat. (suppl.

f, qui ἡνίκα pro ἐνίκα)

d 2 λήσεσθε F (corr. f)

d 3 ταῦτα Ficinus:

ταῦτα BTW Thos. Mag.: ταῦτα ταῦτ' [sic] F

- 5 καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε οἷος παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι, αὐτός τε φῆς καὶ ὁ λόγος ὃν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες ὁμολογεῖ σοι. ἔχει δὴ οὕτως δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πέρι νυνί·
- e εἴαν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογήσης μοι, βεβασανισμένον τοῦτ' ἤδη ἔσται ἱκανῶς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, καὶ οὐκέτι αὐτὸ δεήσει ἐπ' ἄλλην βάσανον ἀναφέρειν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὐτὸ συνεχώρησας σὺ οὔτε σοφίας ἐνδεία οὔτ' αἰσχύνης
- 5 περιουσία, οὐδ' αὖ ἀπατῶν ἐμὲ συγχωρήσαιο ἂν· φίλος γάρ μοι εἶ, ὥς καὶ αὐτὸς φῆς. τῷ ὄντι οὖν ἢ ἐμῇ καὶ ἢ σῇ ὁμολογία τέλος ἤδη ἔξει τῆς ἀληθείας. πάντων δὲ καλλίστη ἐστὶν ἢ σκέψις, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, περὶ τούτων ὦν σὺ δὴ μοι ἐπετίμησας, ποῖόν τινα χρή εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τί
- 488 ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ, καὶ πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα. ἐγὼ γὰρ εἶ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττω κατὰ τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ, εἴ ἴσθι τοῦτο ὅτι οὐχ ἐκὼν ἐξαμαρτάνω ἀλλ' ἀμαθία τῇ ἐμῇ· σὺ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἤρξω νουθετεῖν με, μὴ ἀποστῆς,
- 5 ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς μοι ἐνδειξαι τί ἔστιν τοῦτο ὃ ἐπιτηδευτέον μοι, καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτησαίμην ἂν αὐτό, καὶ εἴαν με λάβῃς νῦν μὲν σοι ὁμολογήσαντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑστέρω χρόνῳ μὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα ἄπερ ὁμολόγησα, πάνυ με ἡγοῦ βλάκα εἶναι καὶ
- b μηκέτι ποτέ με νουθετήσης ὕστερον, ὥς μηδενὸς ἄξιον ὄντα.
- Ἐξ ἀρχῆς δέ μοι ἐπανάλαβε· πῶς φῆς τὸ δίκαιον ἔχειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; ἄγειν βία τὸν κρείττω τὰ τῶν ἡττόνων καὶ ἄρχειν τὸν βελτίῳ τῶν χειρόνων καὶ πλεόν
- 5 ἔχειν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ φαυλοτέρου; μή τι ἄλλο λέγεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ ὀρθῶς μέμνημαι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἔλεγον καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν λέγω.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν βελτίῳ καλεῖς σὺ καὶ κρείττω;

a 8 βλάκα Antiatticista Bekkeri, p. 84. 5

- d 6 ὀλίγον BTWf: ὀλίγω P: om. F (corr. f) ὁμολόγησ F (corr. f) e 3 δεήσει W (corr. s.l.) e 4 συνεχώρησά F σὺ σοι F: om. P οὔτε] οὔτε γε F e 5 περιουσία F: παρουσία BTW με F (corr. f) e 5-6 μοι γὰρ F e 6 alt. ἢ om. W e 9 τινα] ποτε OIl: τινα ποτέ F a 1-2 ὄντα post πρεσβύτερον transp. F a 6 αἰτησαίμην W εἴαν με F: εἴαν μὲν BTW: εἴαν P: εἴαν γε f b 1 με] μὲν F sed v erasum b 2 ἐπανάλαβε F (corr. f) b 2-3 καὶ σὺ] σύ τε F b 4 πλείω F b 7 ἔλεγον secl. Schanz b 8 καὶ τὸν κρείττω F (punctis del. f)

οὐδὲ γάρ τοι τότε οἶός τ' ἢ μαθεῖν σου τί ποτε λέγεις, **c**
 πότερον τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους κρείττους καλεῖς καὶ δεῖ ἀκροᾶ-
 σθαι τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου τοὺς ἀσθενεστέρους, οἷόν μοι δοκεῖς
 καὶ τότε ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὥς αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τὰς μικρὰς
 κατὰ τὸ φύσει δίκαιον ἔρχονται, ὅτι κρείττους εἰσὶν καὶ **5**
 ἰσχυρότεραι, ὥς τὸ κρείττον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ βέλτιον
 ταῦτόν ὄν, ἢ ἔστι βελτίω μὲν εἶναι, ἥττω δὲ καὶ ἀσθενέ-
 στερον, καὶ κρείττω μὲν εἶναι, μοχθηρότερον δέ· ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς
 ὅρος ἐστὶν τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ τοῦ κρείττονος; τοῦτό μοι **d**
 αὐτὸ σαφῶς διόρισον, ταῦτόν ἢ ἕτερόν ἐστιν τὸ κρείττον καὶ
 τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι σαφῶς λέγω, ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶν κατὰ **5**
 φύσιν; οἱ δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνί, ὥσπερ
 καὶ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες.

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα τὰ τῶν κρείττωνων
 ἐστίν. 10

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ τῶν βελτιόνων; οἱ γὰρ κρείττους βελ- **e**
 τίους που κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ τούτων νόμιμα κατὰ φύσιν καλὰ, κρειτ-
 τόνων γε ὄντων; 5

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως, ὥς ἄρτι αὖ σὺ
 ἔλεγες, δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν
 τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἔστιν ταῦτα ἢ οὔ; καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀλώσῃ **489**
 ἐνταῦθα σὺ αὖ αἰσχυνόμενος. νομίζουσιν, ἢ οὔ, οἱ πολλοὶ
 τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πλεόν δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αἴσχιον
 τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; μὴ φθόνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι

c 1 ἢ F (εἰ f): ἢ BT: ἢ W Par² λέγοις F c 4 μικρὰς BTWF: συμ-
 κρὰς Par c 5 τὸ om. W c 6 τὸ ἰσχυρότερον F (quo recepto <τὸ>
 βέλτιον Naber, c 7 ταῦτόν secl. Theiler) e 2 που Hermann: πολὺ
 BTWF: πάλιν Coraës: secl. ci. Wilamowitz a 1 ἀλώσῃ] ἄλλως ἢ F
 a 2 αὖ F: om. BTW a 2 ἢ—3 ἴσον et a 4 -κρίνασθαι om. F rel. spat.
 (suppl. f) a 3 οὐχί F

5 τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἔν', ἐάν μοι ὁμολογήσης, βεβαιώσωμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ, ἅτε ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς διαγινώσκειν ὁμολογηκός.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' οἷ γε πολλοὶ νομίζουν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐ νόμῳ ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ
b ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει·
ὥστε κινδυνεύεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδὲ
ὀρθῶς ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν λέγων ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὁ νόμος
καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς κακουργῶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις,
5 ἐὰν μὲν τις κατὰ φύσιν λέγῃ, ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον ἄγων, ἐὰν δέ
τις κατὰ νόμον, ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν.

ΚΑΛ. Οὕτοσι ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ
Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ τηλικούτος ὢν ὀνόματα θηρεύων, καὶ
c ἐάν τις ῥήματι ἀμάρτη, ἔρμαιον τοῦτο ποιούμενος; ἐμὲ γὰρ
οἷε ἄλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον εἶναι ἢ τὸ βελτίους; οὐ
πάσαι σοι λέγω ὅτι ταῦτόν φημι εἶναι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ
κρεῖττον; ἢ οἷε με λέγειν, ἐὰν συρφετὸς συλλεγῇ δούλων
5 καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδενὸς ἀξίων πλήν ἴσως τῷ
σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι, καὶ οὗτοι φῶσιν ἅττα, ταῦτα εἶναι
νόμιμα;

ΣΩ. Εἰέν, ὦ σοφώτατε Καλλίκλεις· οὕτω λέγεις;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

d ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάσαι τοπάζω
τοιούτων τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ ἀνερωτῶ γλιχόμενος
σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅτι λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε τοὺς δύο
βελτίους ἡγῇ τοῦ ενός, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούλους βελτίους
5 σοῦ, ὅτι ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰπέ,
τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδὴ οὐ τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους;
καί, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πραότερόν με προδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω
παρὰ σοῦ.

e ΚΑΛ. Εἰρωνεύῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὦ σὺ χρώμενος πολλὰ

e 2 μὰ—Καλλίκλεις Hermogenes, π. μεθ. δειν., p. 437. 13

a 5 <ὦ> Καλλίκλεις Heindorf μοι] μὴ F (corr. f) βεβαιώσομαι B
b 1 καὶ] τῇ W b 6 νόμον F (ci. Hirschig): τὸν νόμον BTW c 4 σὺ
λέγῃ F (corr. f) c 6 ἅττα Heindorf: αὐτὰ BTWF quo retento fort.
οὗτοί <τι> d 5 post ἰσχυρότεροί add. σου F d 6 ὅτι F: τίνας
Routh βελτίους WF: βελτίστους BTf e 2 οὐ μὰ Laur. 85. 12 marg.,
Hermog. (et Olπ)

νυνδὴ εἰρωνεύου πρὸς με. ἀλλ' ἴθι εἰπέ, τίνας λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. Τοὺς ἀμείνους ἔγωγε.

5

ΣΩ. Ὅρᾳς ἄρα ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸς ὀνόματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδέν; οὐκ ἐρεῖς, τοὺς βελτίους καὶ κρείττους πότερον τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλους τινάς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τούτους λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Πολλάκις ἄρα εἰς φρονῶν μυρίων μὴ φρονούντων 490 κρείττων ἐστὶν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ τοῦτον ἄρχειν δεῖ, τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πλεόν ἔχειν τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἀρχομένων· τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖς βούλεσθαι λέγειν—καὶ οὐ ῥήματι θηρεύω—εἰ ὁ εἰς τῶν μυρίων κρείττων.

5

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἃ λέγω. τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι ἐγὼ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίῳ ὄντα καὶ φρονιμώτερον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλεόν ἔχειν τῶν φαυλοτέρων.

ΣΩ. Ἐχε δὴ αὐτοῦ. τί ποτε αὖ νῦν λέγεις; ἐὰν ἐν b τῷ αὐτῷ ὦμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἄθροοι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἡ ἐν κοινῷ πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά, ὦμεν δὲ παντοδαποί, οἱ μὲν ἰσχυροί, οἱ δ' ἀσθενεῖς, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν ἡ φρονιμώτερος περὶ ταῦτα, ἱατρὸς ὢν, ἡ δέ, οἷον εἰκός, τῶν μὲν ἰσχυρότερος, 5 τῶν δὲ ἀσθενέστερος, ἄλλο τι ἢ οὗτος, φρονιμώτερος ἡμῶν ὢν, βελτίων καὶ κρείττων ἔσται εἰς ταῦτα;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων πλεόν ἡμῶν ἐκτέον αὐτῷ, c ὅτι βελτίων ἐστίν, ἡ τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν πάντα ἐκείνον δεῖ νέμειν, [ἐν] τῷ δὲ ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ καταχρῆσθαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα οὐ πλεονεκτητέον, εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν πλεόν, τῶν δ' ἔλαττον ἐκτέον, ἐὰν δὲ τύχη πάντων 5 ἀσθενέστατος ὢν, πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ, ὦ Καλλί- κλεις; οὐχ οὕτως, ὠγαθέ;

a 5 ῥήματα V: ῥημάτια Badham: ῥημά τι Deuschle a 6-7 οἶμαι post
δίκαιον transp. F b 2 ἄθροοι Burnet (cum OIλ): ἀνθρώποι F (ἄνθρωποι
ὄντες ut vid. f): ἀθροοί (ἀθροοί W) ἄνθρωποι BTW: ἄνθρωποι ἀθροοί P
b 4 ἡ φρονιμώτερος] εἰ φρόνιμος F (φρονιμώτερος f) b 6 ἀλλ' ὅτι W
φρονιμώτατος F c 1 ὑμῶν F primitus c 3 ἐν τῷ δὲ BTFF: ἐν δὲ
τῷ W: ἐν del. Sauppe c 4 μέλλει T²W: μέλλη BTPF c 7 ὠγαθέ
Calliclii tribuit Hirschig

ΚΑΛ. [περὶ] Σιτία λέγεις καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ἰατροὺς καὶ φλυα-
d ρίας· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ ταῦτα λέγω.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὐ τὸν φρονιμώτερον βελτίω λέγεις; φάθι
ἢ μή.

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.

5 ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ τὸν βελτίω πλέον δεῖν ἔχειν;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σιτίων γε οὐδὲ ποτῶν.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱματίων, καὶ δεῖ τὸν ὑφαντι-
κώτατον μέγιστον ἱμάτιον ἔχειν καὶ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα
ἀμπεχόμενον περιέναι;

10 ΚΑΛ. Ποίων ἱματίων;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰς ὑποδήματα δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τὸν
e φρονιμώτατον εἰς ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστον. τὸν σκυτοτόμον
ἴσως μέγιστα δεῖ ὑποδήματα καὶ πλεῖστα ὑποδεδεμένον
περιπατεῖν.

ΚΑΛ. Ποῖα ὑποδήματα; φλυαρεῖς ἔχων.

5 ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεις, ἴσως τὰ τοιάδε· οἶον
γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα περὶ γῆν φρόνιμόν τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν,
τοῦτον δὴ ἴσως δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν σπερμάτων καὶ ὥς
πλείστῳ σπέρματι χρῆσθαι εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ γῆν.

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἀεὶ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν.

49I ΚΑΛ. Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ
κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύῃ, ὥς
περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὄντα τὸν λόγον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν σὺ ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων; <τίνων> ὁ κρείττων τε καὶ
5 φρονιμώτερος πλέον ἔχων δικαίως πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὔτε ἐμοῦ
ὑποβάλλοντος ἀνέξῃ οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐρεῖς;

e 9-11 resp. Proclus in Alc., p. 305. 4-6

c 8 περὶ secl. Hirschig: τί δὲ Y et suprascr. b d 2 οὐ BF: οὖν TWf
d 5 πλέω F δεῖν BF et s.l. T: δεῖ T: δὴ W: γε δεῖν P d 7 καὶ om.
F (corr. f) e 1 φρονιμώτατον F: φρονιμώτερον BTW e 4 ἔχων]
λέγων F (corr. f) e 9 ταῦτα Wb: ταῦτα BTF a 1 ἀτέχνως B
a 2 κναφέας F et primitus T ὥς] ὥσπερ Baiter a 3 ὄντα] τα T
(corr. t) a 4 τίνων addidi: περὶ secl. Hirschig a 5 ἢ om. B
(add. B²)

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι λέγω. πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς κρείττους οἳ εἰσιν οὐ σκυτοτόμους λέγω οὐδὲ μαγείρους, ἀλλ' οἳ ἂν εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρόνιμοι ὦσιν, ὅντινα ἂν **b** τρόπον εὖ οἰκοῖτο, καὶ μὴ μόνον φρόνιμοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἃ ἂν νοήσωσιν ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίαν τῆς ψυχῆς.

ΣΩ. Ὅρας, ὦ βέλτιστε Καλλίκλεις, ὥς οὐ ταῦτά σύ τ' **5** ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ; σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ φῆς ἀεὶ ταῦτά λέγειν, καὶ μέμφη μοι· ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τούναντίον, ὅτι οὐδέποτε ταῦτά λέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τότε μὲν τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους ὠρίζου, αὐθις **c** δὲ τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους, νῦν δ' αὖ ἕτερόν τι ἤκεις ἔχων· ἀνδρεϊότεροί τινες ὑπὸ σοῦ λέγονται οἱ κρείττους καὶ οἱ βελτίους. ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι τίνας ποτὲ λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους καὶ εἰς ὅτι. **5**

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' εἴρηκά γε ἔγωγε τοὺς φρονίμους εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα καὶ ἀνδρείους. τούτους γὰρ προσήκει τῶν πόλεων ἄρχειν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' **d** ἔστιν, πλεόν ἔχειν τούτους τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ αὐτῶν, ὦ ἐταῖρε;

ΚΑΛ. Τιῇ τί;

ΣΩ. Ἀρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐνα ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα· ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σώφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῇ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. **e**

a 7 λέγω] ἀλεγω F b 1 alt. ἂν om. F b 5 οὐτ' αὐτὰ B b 6 κατηγορεῖς—σὺ, b 7 λέγειν, καὶ, b 7–8 ὅτι οὐδέποτε om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f)
b 7 ταῦτά] τὸν αὐτὸν F (ταῦτα f) b 8 τότε (τότέ T) suprascr. π TW
c 1 βελτίστους W c 6 εἴρηκά γε] ὅτ' εἴρηκα F (corr. f in marg.)
c 7 τούτοις F (corr. f) d 4 αὐτῶν BT: αὐτῶν WF Ol
d 5 Τιῇ τί; Wilamowitz (et sic fort. legit Ol): τί ἢ (ἢ B) τί BTWF: τί· ἢ τί Par: τί; ἢ τι Burnet: haec Callicli tribuunt Olπ et schol. vet., Socrati BTWF
d 5–6 Τιῇ—ἀρχομένους om. V d 6 ἄρχοντας ἢ om. B (ἢ τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ ἀρχομένους in marg. rec. b) d 12 ὄντα αὐτοῦ καὶ F (punctis del. f)

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ· τοὺς ἡλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας.

ΣΩ. Πῶς γάρ [οὔ]; οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν γνοίῃ ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγω.

- 5 ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων γένοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων ὁπωῦν; ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃ ἐγὼ σοι νῦν παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἔαν ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάζειν, 492 ταύταις δὲ ὡς μεγίσταις οὔσαις ἱκανὸν εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν δι' ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν, καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι ὧν ἂν αἰεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' οἶμαι τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐ δυνατόν· ὅθεν ψέγουσιν τοὺς τοιούτους δι' αἰσχύνην, ἀποκρυπτόμενοι 5 τὴν αὐτῶν ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ αἰσχροὺς δὴ φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀκολασίαν, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, δουλούμενοι τοὺς βελτίους τὴν φύσιν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐκπορίζεσθαι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς πλήρως ἐπαινοῦσιν τὴν σωφρο- b σύνην καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν. ἐπεὶ ὅσοις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπῆρξεν ἡ βασιλέων ὑέσις εἶναι ἢ αὐτοὺς τῇ φύσει ἱκανοὺς ἐκπορίσασθαι ἀρχήν τινα, ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ δυνα- στείαν, <τί ἂν> τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἷσχιον καὶ κάκιον εἴη σωφρο- 5 σύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οἷς ἐξὸν ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδῶν ὄντος, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς δεσπότην ἐπαγάγοιντο τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον τε καὶ λόγον καὶ ψόγον; ἢ πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἄθλιοι γεγονότες c εἴησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τούτου, τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφρο-

e 2-4 resp. Alexander in *Top.*, pp. 158. 6 et 530. 7 Wallies

e 2 resp. Plotinus I. 6. 1. 46 Henry-Schwyzler; Proclus in *Remph.* i. 160. 2 Kroll

e 3 οὐ post Ficinum secl. Routh οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀγνοοίῃ Alex. οὐ τοῦτο T (ex corr.) WF Alex. schol. vet. et (ut vid.) Ol: ουτω B e 5 σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες BTW: τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, σφόδρα F e 7 νῦν] τοίνυν F (corr.f) a 2 ἡ] ἐν P a 4 ὅθεν ψέ- et δι' αἰσχύνην, ἀποκρυπτόμενοι, a 5 καὶ αἰσχροὺς δὴ φασιν, a 6 πρόσθεν, a 7 τὴν φύσιν om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) a 6 πρόσθεν BW: ἔμπροσθεν Tf b 2 ὅσοις F: θεοῖς BTP et revera f: δὲ οἷς W: γε οἷς Y et rec. b: τοῖς t b 3 πορίσασθαι F b 4 τί ἂν add. Woolsey (τί add. Y et in marg. rec. b) τῇ ἀληθείᾳ γε F b 5 καὶ δικαιοσύνης F: om. BTW ἐξὸν] ἐξ ὧν W b 6 αὐτοὶ F et ex corr. B: αὐτοῖς B primitus, TW b 8 καὶ λόγον secl. ci. Schanz (habuit Ol) c 1 εἶεν Hirschig τούτου Hissink: τοῦ BTWF τῆς σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης F

σύνης, μηδὲν πλέον νέμοντες τοῖς φίλοις τοῖς αὐτῶν ἢ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἄρχοντες ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν πόλει; ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἣν φῆς σὺ διώκειν, ὧδ' ἔχει· τρυφή καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, εἰς ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἀρετὴ 5 τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ' ἐστίν, τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν συνθήματα ἀνθρώπων, φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐπεξέρχῃ τῷ λόγῳ d παρρησιαζόμενος· σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μὲν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. δέομαι οὖν ἐγώ σου μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀνεῖναι, ἵνα τῷ ὄντι κατάδηλον γένηται πῶς βιωτέον. καί μοι λέγε· τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῆς οὐ 5 κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἶον δεῖ εἶναι, ἐὼντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρῳσιν αὐταῖς ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν ἐτοιμάζειν, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν; e

ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ ταῦτα ἐγώ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι εὐδαίμονες εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. Οἱ λίθοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαι- 5 μονέστατοι εἶεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὦν γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βίος. οὐ γάρ τοι θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ Εὐριπίδης ἀληθῆ ἐν τοῖσδε λέγει, λέγων

τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστὶ κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν;

10

e 3 ὀρθῶς—494 b 6 λέγεις Iamblichus, *Protrept.*, p. 84. 4 ff. Pistelli

e 7 ἀλλὰ—493 c 3 λήθην Stobaeus 4. 53. 36

e 8—493 a 1 resp. Clemens, *Strom.* 3. 21. 1

e 10—11 [Eur. fr. 638 Nauck²] Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrrh. Hyp.* 3. 229; Diogenes Laertius 9. 73, al.

c 4 σὺ φῆς W

c 6 ἐστίν secl. Deuschle: ἄρα Schanz

d 2 σαφῶς.

σὺ γὰρ F

νῦν σὺ W

d 3 οὐ θέλousi W

d 7 πληρώσειν F

(corr. f): πλήρῳσιν δ' Par²

ἀμόθεν Bekker: ἀμόθεν F: ἄλλοθεν BTW et

revera f

e 2 ἐγώ] λέγω F

e 5 ἂν] δὴ Schanz (recepto e 6 εἰσιν)

e 6 εἶεν F: εἰσιν BTW

e 7 ὦν Iamb. ut vid. (ci. Badham): ὧς BTWF

Stob. σὺ] σύ γε F

e 8 τοι F Stob.: τι BTW Iamb.

e 10 δ'

om. F (add. f)

- 493 καὶ ἡμεῖς τῷ ὄντι ἴσως τέθναμεν· ἤδη γάρ του ἔγωγε καὶ ἤκουσα τῶν σοφῶν ὥς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναμεν καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσὶ τυγχάνει ὃν οἶον ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ μεταπίπτειν
- 5 ἄνω κάτω, καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνὴρ, ἴσως Σικελὸς τις ἢ Ἰταλικός, παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι διὰ τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πειστικὸν ὠνόμασε πίθον, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους ἀμύητους,
- b τῶν δ' ἀνοήτων τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσὶ, <συνεῖς> τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν, ὥς τετρημένος εἴη πίθος, διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας. τούναντίον δὲ οὗτος σοί, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνδείκνυται ὥς τῶν ἐν Αἰδου—τὸ αἰδὲς
- 5 δὴ λέγων—οὗτοι ἀθλιώτατοι εἶεν, οἱ ἀμύητοι, καὶ φοροῖεν εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὕδωρ ἐτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ, κοσκίνῳ. τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὥς ἔφη ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ
- c λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι· τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν κοσκίνῳ ἀπήκασεν τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὥς τετρημένην, ἅτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν δι' ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ λήθην. ταῦτ' ἐπιεικῶς μὲν ἐστὶν ὑπό τι ἄτοπα, δηλοῖ μὲν ὃ ἐγὼ βούλομαί σοι ἐνδειξάμενος, ἐάν
- 5 πῶς οἶός τε ᾧ, πείσαι μεταθέσθαι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλήστως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος βίου τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς αἰὲ παροῦσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ ἐξαρκούντως ἔχοντα βίον ἐλέσθαι. ἀλλὰ πότε-
- Iamblichus, *Protrept.*, p. 84. 9 ff.; usque ad c 3 λήθην Stobaeus 4. 53. 6 [MSS. SA]
- a 1–3 resp. Plotinus 4. 8. 1. 31 Bréhier; Gregorius Naz. iii. 68c; Olympiodorus in *Phaed.*, p. 97. 2
- a 6 Ἰταλικός Antiatticista Bekkeri, p. 100. 7
- 493 b cf. Zenobium 2. 6
- b 5–7 resp. Basilius iii. 581A

a 1 ἤδη γάρ F Iamb. Stob.: ἤδη BTW: ὅπερ ἤδη Y alt. καὶ om. W
a 3 τῆς om. W (add. W²) αἱ F et Stobaei S: om. BTW Iamb. et Stobaei A
a 4 <ὅτι> τυγχάνει ci. Richards ὃν οἶον] ὅμοιον Iamb.
a 5 ἄνω καὶ κάτω T ἴσος (sic) Iamb. a 6 σικελός BTWf: σικελικός F Iamb. Stob. Ol
a 7 πειστικὸν F: πιστικὸν BTW Iamb. Stob.: fort. πειστόν
b 1 ἀνοήτων F Iamb. Stob.: ἀμύητων BTWf b 2 συνεῖς addidi: διὰ add. ci. Heindorf: αὐτοῦ secl. Sauppe τετριμμένος F (et sim. saepius)
b 4 αἰδὲς F et ut vid. Ol: αἰδὲς BTPf Stob.: ἀηδὲς W Iamb.
b 5 εἶεν Stob.: ἄν εἶεν BTWf: εἰσὶν F Iamb. b 6 τετρημένῳ secl. Hirschig
c 1 ἀπείκασε F c 3 δι'—λήθην secl. Cobet ἀπιστίαν] ἀπληστίαν ci. Schleiermacher c 4 δηλοῖ μὲν Tf Iamb.: δηλοίμην F: δηλοῖ μὲν BP: δηλοῖ δὲ Wb c 7 καὶ] ὥς F (corr. f)

ρον πείθω τί σε καὶ μετατίθεσαι εὐδαιμονεστέρους εἶναι d
τοὺς κοσμίους τῶν ἀκολάστων, ἢ οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλα πολλά
τοιαῦτα μυθολογῶ, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον μεταθήσῃ;

ΚΑΛ. Τοῦτ' ἀληθέστερον εἶρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἄλλην σοι εἰκόνα λέγω ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ 5
γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν. σκόπει γὰρ εἰ τοιόνδε λέγεις περὶ τοῦ
βίου ἐκατέρου, τοῦ τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οἷον
εἰ δυοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἐκατέρῳ πίθοι πολλοὶ εἶεν καὶ τῷ μὲν
ἐτέρῳ ὑγιεῖς καὶ πλήρεις, ὁ μὲν οἶνου, ὁ δὲ μέλιτος, ὁ δὲ e
γάλακτος, καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πολλῶν, νάματα δὲ σπάνια καὶ
χαλεπὰ ἐκάστου τούτων εἶη καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων καὶ
χαλεπῶν ἐκποριζόμενα· ὁ μὲν οὖν ἕτερος πληρωσάμενος
μήτ' ἐποχετεύοι μήτε τι φροντίζοι, ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τούτων 5
ἡσυχίαν ἔχοι· τῷ δ' ἐτέρῳ τὰ μὲν νάματα, ὥσπερ καὶ
ἐκείνῳ, δυνατὰ μὲν πορίζεσθαι εἶη, χαλεπὰ δέ, τὰ δ' ἀγγεῖα
τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά, ἀναγκάζοιτο δ' αἰεὶ καὶ νύκτα καὶ
ἡμέραν πιμπλάναι αὐτά, ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας· 494
ἄρα τοιούτου ἐκατέρου ὄντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τὸν τοῦ ἀκο-
λάστου εὐδαιμονέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὸν τοῦ κοσμίου; πείθω
τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κόσμιον βίον τοῦ
ἀκολάστου ἀμείνω εἶναι, ἢ οὐ πείθω; 5

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ πείθεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πληρω-
σαμένῳ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν ἡδονὴ οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ'
ἔστιν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν, ἐπειδὰν
πληρωθῇ, μήτε χαίροντα ἔτι μήτε λυπούμενον. ἀλλ' ἐν b
τούτῳ ἔστιν τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὥς πλείστον ἐπιρρεῖν.

Iamblichus, *Protrept.*, p. 85. 6 ff. (omissis fere c 7 ἀλλὰ—d 4 Σώκρατες)
d—e resp. Dio Chrys., *orat.* 65. 9

d 1 μετατίθεσαι correctores Laur. 85. 12 et Par. 1811: μετατίθεσθαι BTWf: μεταθέσθαι F d 2 οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλα Sauppe: οὐδέν ἀλλὰ BTW et revera F: οὐδέν ἀλλ' ἂν P: οὐδέν ἀλλὰ κᾶν t: οὐδέν· ἀλλ' εἰ Par² d 3 μᾶλλον] καλὸν F (corr. f) μεταθέσαι W (corr. s.l.) d 4 ἀληθέστερον BTW: ἀληθέστατον FOIλ εἶρηκώς F d 6 τῇ] τὴν Iamb. e 2—3 καὶ χαλεπὰ secl. Morstadt e 7 ἐκείνῳ] ἐκεῖ F (corr. f) εἶη F Iamb.: om. BTW e 8 δ' F Iamb.: om. BTW: καὶ ante ἀναγκάζοιτο add. Y a 2 ἐκατέρου non agnoscit Iamb.: ἐκατέρῳ Laur. 85. 12 a 7 οὐκέτ'] οὐκ T b 1 πληρωθῇ ci. Stallbaum: πληρώσῃ BTWF: πληρώσεται Y

- ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γ', ἂν πολὺ ἐπιρρέη, πολὺ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸν εἶναι, καὶ μεγάλ' ἄττα τὰ τρήματα εἶναι ταῖς ἐκροαῖς;
- 5 ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
- ΣΩ. Χαραδριοῦ τινα αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ' οὐ νεκροῦ οὐδὲ λίθου. καὶ μοι λέγε· τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις, οἷον πεινῆν καὶ πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν;
- ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.
- c ΣΩ. Καὶ διψῆν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν;
- ΚΑΛ. Λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἀπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦν χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν.
- ΣΩ. Εὖ γε, ὦ βέλτιστε· διατέλει γὰρ ὥσπερ ἡρξω, καὶ 5 ὅπως μὴ ἀπαισχυνῇ. δεῖ δέ, ὥς ἔοικε, μηδ' ἐμὲ ἀπαισχυνθῆναι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰπὲ εἰ καὶ ψωρῶντα καὶ κνησιῶντα, ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνῆσθαι, κνώμενον διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνως ἔστι ζῆν.
- d ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος.
- ΣΩ. Τοιγάρτοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, Πῶλον μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ ἐξέπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλαγῆς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆς· ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ εἶ. ἀλλ' ἀπο- 5 κρίνου μόνον.
- ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ τοίνυν καὶ τὸν κνώμενον ἡδέως ἂν βιῶναι.
- ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἡδέως, καὶ εὐδαιμόνως;
- ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.
- e ΣΩ. Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησιῶ—ἢ ἔτι τί σε ἐρωτῶ; ὅρα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἀποκρινῇ, ἐάν τις σε τὰ ἐχόμενα τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἅπαντα ἐρωτᾷ. καὶ <τὸ> τούτων τοιούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον, ὃ τῶν κιναιδῶν βίος, οὗτος οὐ 6 usque ad b 6 λέγεις cf. Iamblichum, *Protrept.*, p. 85. 23 ff.
- c 6 καὶ πρῶτον—8 ζῆν pseudo-Didymus, *Plat. Lex.*, p. 404
- c 7 κνησιῶντα Suidas s.v. κνησεῖοντα
- e 4 cf. Antiatticistam Bekkeri, p. 104. 6
- b 3 γ', ἂν] ἐάν F b 4 τρήματα F (corr. f) b 7 οὐδὲ λίθου et τὸ om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) c 2 ἀπάσας om. W c 3 πληροῦν Stephanus: πληροῦντα BTWF c 6 εἰ καὶ] καὶ εἰ F ψωριῶντα Ft ps.-Did.
- c 7 κνησιῶντα B: κνησεῖοντα ps.-Did. (ut vid.), Suid. d 1 ἄτεχνος F
- d 3 prius καὶ om. F d 4 οὐδ' οὐ μὴ F e 1 κνησιῶ Bekker: κνησιοῖ BTWf: κνησθῇ F e 2 ὦ Καλλίκλεις ante ἐάν transp. F ἀποκρινεῖ B: ἀποκρίνει T: ἀποκρίνη WF e 3 ἐχόμενα BTWF: ἐπόμενα ci. Bekker: secl. Schanz τὸ add. Buttman e 4 ὄντων om. F (add. f) κεφάλαιον Fb: κεφαλαίων BTW: κεφαλαιότατον fort. Ant. Bekk. οὐ] ὁ W

δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχροὺς καὶ ἄθλιος; ἢ τούτους τολμήσεις λέγειν 5
εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, ἐὰν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς λόγους;

ΣΩ. Ἡ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, ὦ γενναῖε, ἢ ἐκεῖνος 10
ὃς ἂν φῇ ἀνέδην οὕτω τοὺς χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν χαίρωσιν, 10
εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διορίζεται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὅποιαι 495
ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί; ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε πότερον φῆς εἶναι
τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναι τι τῶν ἡδέων ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν
ἀγαθόν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἵνα δὴ μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος ἦ ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν 5
ἕτερον φήσω εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὸ φημι εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Διαφθείρεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τοὺς πρώτους λόγους,
καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ' ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις, εἴπερ
παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρεῖς.

ΚΑΛ. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

b

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὔτ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο,
οὔτε σύ. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ἄθρει μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν,
τὸ πάντως χαίρειν· ταῦτά τε γὰρ τὰ νυνδὴ αἰνιχθέντα
πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχροὰ φαίνεται συμβαίνοντα, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως 5
ἔχει, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς σύ γε οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἰσχυρίζῃ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ ὥς σοῦ σπουδάζοντος;

c

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ, διελοῦ τάδε· ἐπι-
στήμην που καλεῖς τι;—ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.—ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ ἀν-
δρείαν νυνδὴ ἔλεγές τινα εἶναι μετὰ ἐπιστήμης;—ΚΑΛ. 5
Ἐλεγον γάρ.—ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ὥς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν
τῆς ἐπιστήμης δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες;—ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.—

e 6 ἀφθονα F

e 9 κεῖνος F

e 10 ἀνέδην BTf et suprascr. W:

ἀναίδην WF

a 1 διορίζεται F

a 2 ἀγαθαὶ καὶ PF: αἱ ἀγαθαὶ καὶ

BT: αἱ ἀγαθαὶ καὶ αἱ W

a 5 μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος BTWf et schol.

vet.: μὴ ὁμολογούμενος F: γρ. καὶ ἀνομολογούμενος καὶ μὴ ὁμολογούμενος Ol

a 9 σαυτῷ ἐρεῖς om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f)

b 2 post τοίνυν spat. viii fere

litt. rel. F

ποιῶ οὐ- om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f)

b 5 φαίνεται καὶ F

(punctis del. f)

c 6 ἔλεγον—7 ἐπιστήμης om. F (suppl. in marg. f)

ἕτερον <ὄν> Heindorf

c 7 ταύτας W

- ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡδονὴν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταῦτόν ἢ ἕτερόν;—
 d ΚΑΛ. Ἐτερον δήπου, ὦ σοφώτατε σύ.—ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἀν-
 δρείαν ἑτέραν ἡδονῆς;—ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;—ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ
 ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα, ὅτι Καλλικλῆς ἔφη Ἀχαρνεὺς
 ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταῦτόν εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν
 5 καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕτερον.

ΚΑΛ. Σωκράτης δέ γε ἡμῖν ὁ Ἀλωπεκῆθεν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ
 ταῦτα, ἢ ὁμολογεῖ;

- e ΣΩ. Οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ· οἶμαι δέ γε οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς, ὅταν
 αὐτὸς αὐτόν θεάσῃται ὀρθῶς. εἰπέ γάρ μοι, τοὺς εὖ πράτ-
 τοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ τοῦναντίον ἡγῇ πάθος
 πεπονθέναι;

- 5 ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις,
 ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου;
 οὐ γὰρ ἅμα δήπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ
 ἅμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγείας τε καὶ νόσου.

- 10 ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

- ΣΩ. Οἶον περὶ ὅτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν
 496 σκόπει. νοσεῖ που ἄνθρωπος ὀφθαλμούς, ὃ ὄνομα ὀφθαλ-
 μία;—ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;—ΣΩ. Οὐ δήπου καὶ ὑγιαίνει γε
 ἅμα τοὺς αὐτούς;—ΚΑΛ. Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.—ΣΩ. Τί δέ
 ὅταν τῆς ὀφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττηται; ἄρα τότε καὶ τῆς ὑγείας
 5 ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τελευτῶν ἅμα ἀμφοτέρων
 ἀπήλλακται;—ΚΑΛ. Ἡκιστά γε.—ΣΩ. Θαυμάσιον γὰρ
 b οἶμαι καὶ ἄλογον γίγνεται· ἢ γάρ;—ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.—
 ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐν μέρει οἶμαι ἑκάτερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ ἀπόλ-
 λυσι;—ΚΑΛ. Φημί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ ἀσθένειαν
 ὡσαύτως;—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτῆτα;—
 5 ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ
 τὰναντία τούτων, κακὰ τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει
 καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἑκατέρου;—ΚΑΛ. Πάντως δήπου.

d 2 ἕτερον P

d 3 καλλίκλεις F (corr. f)

d 6 δέ γε BTWf: δέ PF

e 7 ἔχει] τε W

e 11 ὅτου BTW: τοῦ ὅτου F: ὅλου Par² f ἀναλαβὼν F

a 1 ἄνθρωπος Bekker

a 2 γὰρ οὐ om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f), tum

οὐ δήπου (sed ult. syll. ex corr. f) πάνυ γε καὶ ὑγιαίνει F (puncta add. f)

b 1 καὶ] κατὰ F (corr. in marg. f) ἢ] οὐ F (corr. f)

b 2 ἀπόλλυσι

Hirschig: ἀπολλύει BTW: ἀπολύει F

—ΣΩ. Ἐὰν εὖρωμεν ἄρα ἅττα ὧν ἅμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται c
 ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἂν εἶη τό
 τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; καὶ εὖ μάλα
 σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνου.—ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ὑπερφυῶς ὥς ὁμο-
 λογῶ. 5

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογημένα. τὸ πεινῆν
 ἔλεγες—πότερον ἢδὺ ἢ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν.
 —ΚΑΛ. Ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἢδὺ.
 —ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγὼ· μανθάνω. ἀλλ' οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν· d
 ἢ οὐχί;—ΚΑΛ. Φημί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν;—ΚΑΛ.
 Σφόδρα γε.—ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὁμολογεῖς
 ἅπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι;—ΚΑΛ. Ὅμο-
 λογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.—ΣΩ. Εἰέν· διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν 5
 ἄλλο τι ἢ ἢδὺ φῆς εἶναι;—ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν
 τούτου οὐ λέγεις τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δήπου εἶναι;
 —ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσίς τε τῆς ἐνδείας e
 καὶ ἡδονή;—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαί-
 ρειν λέγεις;—ΚΑΛ. Μάλιστα.—ΣΩ. Διψῶντά γε.—ΚΑΛ.
 Φημί.—ΣΩ. Λυπούμενον;—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Αἰσθάνη οὖν
 τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν λέγεις ἅμα, ὅταν 5
 διψῶντα πίνειν λέγῃς; ἢ οὐχ ἅμα τοῦτο γίνεται κατὰ
 τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον [καὶ χρόνον] εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος
 βούλει; οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι διαφέρει. ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὐ;—
 ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν.—ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εὖ γε πράττοντα κακῶς
 πράττειν ἅμα ἀδύνατον φῆς εἶναι.—ΚΑΛ. Φημί γάρ.—ΣΩ. 497
 Ἀνιώμενον δέ γε χαίρειν δυνατόν ὁμολόγηκας.—ΚΑΛ.
 Φαίνεται.—ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν
 οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον γίνεται τὸ ἢδὺ τοῦ
 ἀγαθοῦ. 5

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα σοφίζῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

c 2 ἄνθρωπος Bekker c 3 τε] γε W c 4 ὥς om. T c 7 λέγεις
 Richards d 1 καὶ ἐγὼ BTWF: punctum post ἐγὼ posuit Hermann: ἐγὼ
 Y: λέγω Stallbaum, καλῶ Badham, Callicli tributentes: secl. Ast d 5 δὲ
 om. F (add. f) d 6 ἢ del. Sauppe e 1 πλήρωσίς F: πλήρης BTP:
 πλήρη W c 6 ἅμα] ἃ μοι F c 7 τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ et c 8 οὐδὲν
 om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) τόπον καὶ χρόνον BTWF: post lacunam τρόπον
 F: χρόνον καὶ τόπον Richards: καὶ χρόνον seclusi c 8 γὰρ οἶμαι] γάρ
 μοι F (corr. f) a 1 φῆς Baiter: ἔφης BTWF a 2 ἀνωμολόγησας
 suprascr. κ W

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ἀκκίζῃ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· καὶ πρόιθι γε ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν.

ΚΑΛ. Τί ἔχων ληρεῖς;

b ΣΩ. Ἵνα εἰδῇς ὡς σοφὸς ὢν με νουθετεῖς. οὐχ ἅμα διψῶν τε ἕκαστος ἡμῶν πέπανται καὶ ἅμα ἡδόμενος διὰ τοῦ πίνειν;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις.

ΓΟΡ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν
5 ἔνεκα, ἵνα περανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι.

ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' αἰεὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν Σωκράτης, ὦ Γοργία· σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγον ἄξια ἀνερωτᾷ καὶ ἐξελέγχει.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ τί σοὶ διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἀλλ' ὑπόσχεσ Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι ὅπως ἂν
10 βούληται.

c ΚΑΛ. Ἐρώτα δὴ σὺ τὰ σμικρὰ τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα, ἐπείπερ Γοργία δοκεῖ οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Εὐδαίμων εἶ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα με-
μύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρὰ· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ὥμην θεμιτὸν εἶναι.
5 ὅθεν οὖν ἀπέλιπες ἀποκρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἅμα παύεται διψῶν
ἕκαστος ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδόμενος.—ΚΑΛ. Φημί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν
καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν ἅμα
παύεται;—ΚΑΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν
d καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ
μὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν γε καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἅμα παύεται, ὡς σὺ
ὠμολόγεις· νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς;—ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε· τί
οὖν δῆ;—ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὦ φίλε, τὰγαθὰ τοῖς
5 ἡδέσιν οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιστοῦσι. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅμα
παύεται, τῶν δὲ οὐ, ὡς ἐτέρων ὄντων· πῶς οὖν ταῦτα ἂν
εἶη τὰ ἡδέα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τὰ ἀνιστὰ τοῖς κακοῖς;

a 7 καὶ—9 ληρεῖς Proclus in Alc., p. 289. 9

c 1 cf. [Alexandrum] in Soph. El., p. 117. 20

a 7 πρόιθι] προίτοι ut vid. F (corr. f) a 9 Τί ἔχων ληρεῖς; Badham:
ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς BTWF Proclus, Socrati tribuentes: post b 3 οἶδα transp.
ci. Heindorf, deletis ὅτι λέγεις: post b 3 λέγεις Hermann: post a 6 Σώκρατες
Owen b 1 ἰδῇς F b 3 τί F b 8 οὔση αὐτὴ ἡ B c 1 τε
om. F c 2 οὕτως Socrati tribuunt BW c 5 ἀπέλιπες F (corr. f)
d 2 γε F: om. BTW d 4 ὅτι om. F οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ WF: οὐ ταῦτα T
(corr. t): αὐτὰ B d 5 τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅμα et d 6 ὄντων om. F rel. spat.
(suppl. f) d 6 ὡς ἐτέρων ὄντων secl. Deuschle

Ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, καὶ τῇδε ἐπίσκεψαι· οἶμαι γάρ σοι οὐδὲ ταύτῃ
ὁμολογεῖσθαι. ἄθρει δέ· τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρου- **e**
σία ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ [τοὺς] καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος
παρῇ;—ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.—ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καλεῖς
ἄφρονας καὶ δειλοὺς; οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους
καὶ φρονίμους ἔλεγες· ἢ οὐ τούτους ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς;— **5**
ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.—ΣΩ. Τί δέ; παῖδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα
ἤδη εἶδες;—ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.—ΣΩ. Ἄνδρα δὲ οὐπω εἶδες
ἀνόητον χαίροντα;—ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο;—
ΣΩ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου.—ΚΑΛ. Εἶδον.—ΣΩ. Τί δέ; **498**
νοῦν ἔχοντα λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα;—ΚΑΛ. Φημί.—
ΣΩ. Πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρό-
νιμοι ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες;—ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε οὐ πολὺ τι δια-
φέρειν.—ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἤδη **5**
εἶδες ἄνδρα δειλόν;—ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—ΣΩ. Τί οὖν;
ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων πότεροί σοι ἐδόκουν μᾶλλον χαί-
ρειν, οἱ δειλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀνδρείοι;—ΚΑΛ. Ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε
〈χαίρειν, ἴσως δ' ἐκεῖνοί γε〉 μᾶλλον· εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε.— **b**
ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν διαφέρει. χαίρουσιν δ' οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοί;—ΚΑΛ.
Σφόδρα γε.—ΣΩ. Καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὥς ἔοικεν.—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—
ΣΩ. Προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνοι λυποῦνται ἢ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρείοι;
—ΚΑΛ. Ἀμφότεροι.—ΣΩ. Ἄρα ὁμοίως;—ΚΑΛ. Μᾶλλον ἴσως **5**
οἱ δειλοί.—ΣΩ. Ἀπιόντων δ' οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν;—ΚΑΛ.
Ἰσως.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσιν καὶ οἱ
ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρείοι παρα-
πλησίως, ὥς σὺ φῆς, μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων; **c**
—ΚΑΛ. Φημί.—ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἷ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ
ἀνδρείοι ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοί;—ΚΑΛ.
Ναί.—ΣΩ. Παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσιν καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ
ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί;—ΚΑΛ. Φημί. **5**

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ

d 8 τήνδε B e 1 δέ BF: δή TWf e 2 τοὺς secl. Hirschig
e 4 τοὺς ἄφρονας Par²f e 5 ὁ ἔλεγες B e 7 εἶδες] ἴδες bis F
(corr. f) οὐδέπω T (corr. t) a 1 δέ] δαί suprascr. W a 3 πότεροι
F: πότερον BTW a 4 τι] τό F (corr. f) a 6 εἶδες] εἶδεσαν F
b 1 excidisse aliquid ci. Hermann: χαίρειν, ἴσως δ' ἐκεῖνοί γε addidi
exempli gratia (ἢ παραπλησίως ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ δειλός Olπ): μᾶλλον om. Laur.
85. 12 παραπλήσιον W b 4 μόνοι F (coniecerat Hirschig): μόνον BTW
c 2 καὶ F: καὶ οἱ BTW c 4 ἄρα om. F (suppl. s.l. F vel f)

ἀγαθοί τε καὶ οἱ κακοί; ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοί [οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοί] εἰσιν οἱ κακοί;

d ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῆς παρουσία
εἶναι ἀγαθούς, καὶ κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς
ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας;—ΚΑΛ. *Εγωγε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν
5 τοῖς χαίρουσιν πάρεστιν τὰγαθὰ, αἱ ἡδοναί, εἴπερ χαίρουσιν;
—ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων
ἀγαθοὶ εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες;—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τοῖς
ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστιν τὰ κακὰ, αἱ λῦπαι;—ΚΑΛ. Πάρεστιν.
e —ΣΩ. Κακῶν δέ γε παρουσία φῆς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς
κακοὺς· ἢ οὐκέτι φῆς;—ΚΑΛ. *Εγωγε.—ΣΩ. Ἀγαθοὶ ἄρα
οἱ ἂν χαίρωσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἱ ἂν ἀνιώνται;—ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.—
ΣΩ. Οἱ μὲν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἱ δ' ἥττον ἥττον, οἱ δὲ
5 παραπλησίως παραπλησίως;—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν
φῆς παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τοὺς φρονίμους
καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ἢ
καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς δειλοὺς;

ΚΑΛ. *Εγωγε.

10 ΣΩ. Συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει
ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων· καὶ δις γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς φασιν καλὸν
499 εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. ἀγαθὸν μὲν
εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν φαμεν. ἢ γάρ;—ΚΑΛ.
Ναί.—ΣΩ. Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν;—ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ
γε.—ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὖ τὸν χαίροντα;—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—
5 ΣΩ. Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἀνιῶμενον;—ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη.—ΣΩ.
Ἀνιῶσθαι δὲ καὶ χαίρειν τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὁμοίως,
ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακόν;—ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν
ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον
b ἀγαθὸς ὁ κακός; οὐ ταῦτα συμβαίνει καὶ τὰ πρότερα ἐκείνα,

e 11 resp. Proclus in Alc., p. 305. 3

c 7 prius οἱ om. W μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) c 7-8 καὶ
οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ F: οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ TWf: οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοὶ B: secl.
H. Schmidt: οἱ ἀγαθοὶ secl. Routh d 1 οὐκ οἶδ' οἰκοῖ δ' W d 3 καὶ
κακοὺς F: κακοὺς BTW: τοὺς κακοὺς Flor f d 8 αἱ] καὶ αἱ F e 3 ἂν
χαίρουσι W e 11 ὡμολογουμένων F καλὸν φασὶν F a 1 τὰ] τὸ B
a 4 δὲ] τε F a 8 ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς F (corr. f)

εάν τις ταῦτα φῇ ἡδέα τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι; οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;

ΚΑΛ. Πάλαι τοί σου ἀκροῶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι, κἂν παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῶ ότιοῦν, 5 τούτου ἄσμενος ἔχῃ ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια. ὥς δὴ σὺ οἶε ἐμέ ἢ καὶ ἄλλον ὄντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους.

ΣΩ. Ἰοῦ ἰού, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὥς πανοῦργος εἶ καὶ μοι ὥσπερ παιδί χρῇ, τοτὲ μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ φάσκων οὕτως ἔχειν, 6 τοτὲ δὲ ἐτέρως, ἐξαπατῶν με. καίτοι οὐκ ᾤμην γε κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐκόντος εἶναι ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι, ὥς ὄντος φίλου· νῦν δὲ ἐψεύσθην, καὶ ὥς ἔοικεν ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ 5 διδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ. ἔστιν δὲ δῆ, ὥς ἔοικεν, ὃ νῦν λέγεις, ὅτι ἡδοναί τινές εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ κακαί· ἢ γάρ;—

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.—ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι, κακαὶ d

δὲ αἱ βλαβεραί;—ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Ὡφέλιμοι δέ γε αἱ ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ κακόν τι;—ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

—ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τὰς τοιάσδε λέγεις, οἷον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἄς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς—[εἰ] ἄρα 5 τούτων αἱ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιοῦσαι ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἢ ἰσχὺν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, αὗται μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ τὰναντία τούτων κακαί;—ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν e

καὶ λῦπαι ὡσαύτως αἱ μὲν χρησταί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πονηραί;—

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ αἰρετέον ἐστὶν καὶ πρακτέον;—ΚΑΛ.

Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς οὐ;—ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δῆ.— 5

ΣΩ. Ἐνεκα γάρ που τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἔδοξεν

c 4 καὶ—5 ποιεῖν cf. Hesychium s.v. τὸ παρὸν εὖ τίθεσο, Suidam et Photium s.v. τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν

c 6 ἔστιν—500 b 5 ἱατρικὴν τέχνην Stobaeus 3. 5. 56

b 2–3 οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη ὦ om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) b 4 τοί] του F (corr. f)

b 6 σύ] σοι F (corr. f) c 1 τὰ αὐτὰ F: αὐ BTW c 4 φίλου]

φαύλου F μοι om. W c 6 δῆ om. Stob. c 7 εἰσὶ τινες Stob.

d 2 alt. γε om. F Stob. d 3 prius τι om. Stob. d 5 δῆ νῦν

Stob. ἔλεγον μὲν F (corr. f) ἄρα Heindorf: εἰ ἄρα BTWF Stob. (quo retento mox ποιοῦσιν Y)

πρακτέον εἶναι, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ἐμοί τε καὶ Πώλῳ. ἄρα
καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἀπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ
ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἔνεκα δεῖν πάντα τᾶλλα πράττεσθαι
500 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνο τῶν ἄλλων; σύμφηφος ἡμῖν εἶ καὶ σὺ ἐκ
τρίτων;—ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.—ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα ἔνεκα δεῖ
καὶ τᾶλλα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ γαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων.
—ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.—ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστίν
5 ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖα κακά, ἢ
τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον;—ΚΑΛ. Τεχνικοῦ.

ΣΩ. Ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὧν αὖ ἐγὼ πρὸς Πῶλον καὶ
Γοργίαν ἐτύγχανον λέγων. ἔλεγον γάρ, εἰ μνημονεύεις,
b ὅτι εἶεν παρασκευαὶ αἱ μὲν μέχρι ἡδονῆς, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον
παρασκευάζουσai, ἀγνοοῦσαι δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον, αἱ
δὲ γινώσκουσai ὅτι τε ἀγαθόν καὶ ὅτι κακόν· καὶ ἐτίθην
τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν μαγειρικὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἀλλὰ οὐ
5 τέχνην, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην. καὶ
πρὸς Φιλίου, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, μήτε αὐτὸς οἷον δεῖν πρὸς ἐμέ
παίζειν μὴδ' ὅτι ἂν τύχῃς παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτ'
c αὖ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀποδέχου ὥς παίζοντος· ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι
περὶ τούτου ἡμῖν εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι, οὐ τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ
τις καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων ἄνθρωπος, ἢ τοῦτο, ὅντινα χρή
τρόπον ζῆν, πότερον ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ, τὰ τοῦ
5 ἀνδρός δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ
ῥητορικὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον
ὃν ὑμεῖς νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, ἢ [ἐπὶ] τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν
φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων. ἴσως

usque ad b 5 ἰατρικὴν τέχνην Stobaeus 3. 5. 56

c 1-4 cf. Methodium, *de resurr.* 1. 30. 2

c 6 τοῦτον—7 πολιτεύεσθε Quintilianus, *Inst. Or.* 2. 15. 27

e 8 συν[δοκεῖ οὕτω, τ]έλος: inclusa om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) δοκεῖ Stob.
τέλος εἶναι om. Stob. e 9 ἔνεκα F Stob. Ol: ἔνεκεν BTW a 1 εἰ om.
F (add. f) ἐκ τρίτων] ἐκ τούτων F (corr. f): κρείττων Stob. a 5 ὁποῖα]
ποῖα Stob. ἢ] εἰ F a 6 εἰς] ὥς F (corr. f) a 8 ἔλεγον γάρ
BTW: ἔλεγον γάρ αὖ F: ἔλεγεν γάρ αὐτός Stob. b 1 μόνον om. Stob.
b 3 ἐτίθην BTW: ἐτίθουν f Stob.: ἔτι θεῖν F b.4 post μαγειρικὴν add.
κατὰ τὸ σῶμα TW et revera in marg. f b 7-c 1 μήτε αὐτὰ Ol: μὴ
ταῦτα F c 2 ἡμῖν εἰσιν BTF Method.: εἰσιν ἡμῖν W c 7 νῦν om.
Quint. πολιτεύεσθαι F (corr. f) ἐπὶ secl. Findeisen c 8 καὶ τί
ποτ' ἐστὶν οὗτος et d 1 οὖν om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) διαφέρων F

οὖν βέλτιστόν ἐστιν, ὥς ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα, διαιρεῖσθαι, d
διελομένους δὲ καὶ ὁμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλοις, εἰ ἔστον τούτῳ
διττῷ τῷ βίῳ, σκέψασθαι τί τε διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν καὶ
ὁπότερον βιωτέον αὐτοῖν. ἴσως οὖν οὕτω οἶσθα τί λέγω.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

5

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. ἐπειδὴ ὁμολο-
γήκαμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μὲν τι ἀγαθόν, εἶναι δέ τι ἡδύ,
ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἑκατέρου δὲ αὐτοῖν μελέτην
τινὰ εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως, τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἡδέος
θήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ—αὐτὸ δέ μοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἢ 10
σύμφαθι ἢ μή. σύμφης;

e

ΚΑΛ. Οὕτως φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δῆ, ἃ καὶ πρὸς τούσδε ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, διομολόγησαί
μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοι ἔδοξα τότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν. ἔλεγον δέ που
ὅτι ἢ μὲν ὀψοποικὴ οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία, 5
ἢ δ' ἰατρικὴ, λέγων ὅτι ἢ μὲν τούτου οὐ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν 501
φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὧν πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει
τούτων ἐκάστου δοῦναι, ἢ ἰατρικὴ· ἢ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς,
πρὸς ἣν ἢ θεραπεία αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἅπασα—κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπ'
αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σκεψαμένη τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε 5
τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως τε παντάπασιν, ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν
διαριθμησαμένη, τριβῇ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μνήμην μόνον σωζομένη
τοῦ εἰωθότος γίνεσθαι, ᾧ δῆ καὶ πορίζεται τὰς ἡδονάς. ταῦτ' b
οὖν πρῶτον σκόπει εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ἱκανῶς λέγεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι
τινες καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν τοιαῦται ἄλλαι πραγματεῖαι, αἱ μὲν
τεχνικαί, προμήθειάν τινα ἔχουσαι τοῦ βελτίστου περὶ τὴν
ψυχὴν, αἱ δὲ τούτου μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσαι, ἐσκεμμένοι δ' αὖ, 5

a 4-7 resp. Sextus Empiricus, *adv. gramm.* 61

a 7 cf. Proclum in *Tim.* i. 67. 8; resp. Quintilianus, *Inst. Or.* 10. 7. 11;
Apuleius, *de Platone* 2. 8 (p. 111. 5)

d 1 βέλτιόν ἐστιν W d 2 ἔστον Hirschig: ἔστιν BTWF τοῦτο f
d 3 τε om. F (add. f) d 4 πότερον F d 10 δέ μοι BTW: δῆ
ἐμοὶ F: γέ μοι Flor et revera f e 1 μή. συμφῆς; F: μή συμφῆς BTW:
μὴν συμφῆς revera f a 1 οὐ] ὅ F (οὐ f) a 3 τῆς] ἢ τῆς Flor f
a 4 αὕτη F ἀτέχνως B²W: ἀτεχνῶς BTF a 6 ἄλογός Findeisen
a 7 τριβῇ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ Par. 1811 μνήμην μόνον σωζομένη Par b 3 τοιαῦ-
ται ἄλλαι] καὶ ἄλλαι τοιαῦται F b 4 τινα ἔχουσαι τοῦ βελτίστου et b 5
-γωροῦ- om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f)

ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, τὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς, τίνα ἂν αὐτῇ
τρόπον γίγνοιτο, ἥτις δὲ ἢ βελτίων ἢ χείρων τῶν ἡδονῶν,
οὔτε σκοπούμεναι οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς ἄλλο ἢ χαρίζεσθαι
c μόνον, εἴτε βέλτιον εἴτε χείρον. ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ, ὦ Καλ-
λίκλεις, δοκοῦσίν τε εἶναι, καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι τὸ τοιοῦτον
κολακείαν εἶναι καὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ
ἄλλο ὅτου ἂν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν θεραπείῃ, ἀσκέπτως ἔχων τοῦ
5 ἀμείνονός τε καὶ τοῦ χείρονος· σὺ δὲ δὴ πότερον συγκατα-
τίθεσαι ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἢ ἀντίφης;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῇ
ὁ λόγος καὶ Γοργία τῷδε χαρίσωμαι.

d ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν μίαν ψυχὴν ἔστιν τοῦτο, περὶ
δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς οὐκ ἔστιν;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ περὶ πολλὰς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀθρόαις ἅμα χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι, μὴδὲν
5 σκοπούμενον τὸ βέλτιστον;

ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν αἵτινές εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιτηδεύσεις αἱ
τοῦτο ποιοῦσαι; μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ βούλει, ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, ἢ
μὲν ἂν σοι δοκῇ τούτων εἶναι, φάθι, ἢ δ' ἂν μή, μὴ φάθι.
e πρῶτον δὲ σκεψώμεθα τὴν αὐλητικὴν. οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοιαύτη
τις εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις—τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡμῶν μόνον διώκειν,
ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν φροντίζειν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε ἅπασαι, οἷον ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἢ
ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ἢ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία καὶ ἢ τῶν διθυ-
ράμβων ποίησις; οὐ τοιαύτη τίς σοι καταφαίνεται; ἢ ἡγῇ
10 τι φροντίζειν Κινησίαν τὸν Μέλητος, ὅπως ἐρεῖ τι τοιοῦτον
ὄθεν ἂν οἱ ἀκούοντες βελτίους γίγνοιτο, ἢ ὅτι μέλλει
502 χαριεῖσθαι τῷ ὀχλῷ τῶν θεατῶν;

b 6 αὐτῇ BWF: αὐτῇ T: αὐτῇ Heindorf

TWF

b 8 μέλλον WF

c 4 θεραπείῃ F

b 7 ἢ βελτίων B: ἢ βελτίων

c 5 τοῦ om. F

c 8 χαρίσομαι F

d 3 prius καὶ om. F (add. f)

d 4 μὴδὲν F: μὴδὲ

BTW

d 9 μή T (s.l.) Wf: om. BF

e 5 πᾶσαι F

e 10 prius

τι om. W

κινησίαν φροντίζειν T (corr. t)

ὅπως om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f)

ἐρεῖ τι] ἐρεῖται T (corr. t)

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, Κινησίου γε πέρι.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Μέλης; ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον βλέπων ἐδόκει σοι κιθαρωδεῖν; ἢ ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ 5 ἡδιστον; ἡνία γὰρ ἄδων τοὺς θεατάς. ἀλλὰ δὴ σκόπει εἰ οὐχὶ ἢ τε κιθαρωδικὴ δοκεῖ σοι πᾶσα καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις ἡδονῆς χάριν ἡρῆσθαι.

ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοίγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὕτη καὶ θαυμαστή, ἡ τῆς b τραγωδίας ποίησις, ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν; πότερόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδὴ, ὥς σοι δοκεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς μόνον, ἢ καὶ διαμάχεσθαι, ἐάν τι αὐτοῖς ἡδὺ μὲν ἢ καὶ κεχαρισμένον, πονηρόν δέ, ὅπως τοῦτο μὲν μὴ ἐρεῖ, εἰ 5 δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ λέξει καὶ ἄσεται, ἐάντε χαίρωσιν ἐάντε μὴ; ποτέρως σοι δοκεῖ παρεσκευάσθαι ἡ τῶν τραγωδιῶν ποίησις;

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν μᾶλλον ὥρμηται καὶ τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς. c

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νυνδὴ κολακεῖαν εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, εἴ τις περιέλοι τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε 5 μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι ἢ λόγοι γίνονται τὸ λειπόμενον;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον οὗτοι λέγονται οἱ λόγοι;

10

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

a 4-6 resp. Aristides, *orat.* xlvī, p. 305

a 7-8 resp. *ibid.*, p. 388

c 5-12 resp. *ibid.*, p. 461, et Sopatrus, *Prol.*, p. 748. 21

a 2 alt. γε] τε F

a 5 κείνος F

a 6 εἰ F: om. BTW

b 1 αὐτὴ W

b 2-3 suspecta: ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν secl. Cobet: αὐτῆς—σπουδῇ secl. Hermann (περισσόν Vind. phil. gr. 126), post b 1 δὴ posito interrog. puncto

b 3 ὥς σοι δοκεῖν Kratz: ὥς μοι δοκεῖ Schanz: del. Ast

b 6 ὠφέλιμον

<ὄν> Hirschig

b 8 παρασκευᾶσθαι F (corr. f)

b 9 δὴ om. F

(add. f)

c 5 περιέλοι F Arist. et schol. vet.: περιέλοιτο BTWf

τῆς]

τῆς τε F

ΣΩ. Δημηγορία ἄρα τίς ἐστὶν ἡ ποιητική.

d ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ῥητορικὴ δημηγορία ἂν εἴη· ἢ οὐ ῥητορεύειν δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ποιηταὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε.

5 ΣΩ. Νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς ἠύρηκαμεν ῥητορικὴν τινα πρὸς δῆμον τοιοῦτον οἶον παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἣν οὐ πάνυ ἀγάμεθα· κολακικὴν γὰρ αὐτὴν φάμεν εἶναι.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

10 ΣΩ. Εἰδέν· τί δὲ ἡ πρὸς τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ῥητορικὴ
e καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν δῆμους τοὺς τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, τί ποτε ἡμῖν αὕτη ἐστίν; πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεὶ λέγειν οἱ ῥήτορες, τούτου στοχαζόμενοι, ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται διὰ τοὺς
5 αὐτῶν λόγους, ἢ καὶ οὗτοι πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις ὠρμημένοι, καὶ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ αὐτῶν ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὥσπερ παισὶ προσομιλοῦσι τοῖς δήμοις, χαρίζεσθαι αὐτοῖς πειρώμενοι μόνον, εἰ δέ γε βελτίους ἔσονται ἢ χείρους
503 διὰ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς· εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν λέγουσιν ἃ λέγουσιν, εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ οἷους σὺ λέγεις.

5 ΣΩ. Ἐξαρκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν ἕτερόν που τούτου κολακεία ἂν εἴη καὶ αἰσχροὴ δημηγορία, τὸ δ' ἕτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἡδίω εἴτε ἀηδέστερα ἔσται τοῖς ἀκούουσιν.
b ἀλλ' οὐ πώποτε σὺ ταύτην εἶδες τὴν ῥητορικὴν· ἢ εἴ τινα

e 2 πότερον—503 b 6 εἰπεῖν Aristides, *orat.* xlvī, p. 454

e 2 πότερον—a 7 καλόν Aristides, *orat.* xlv, p. 145; resp. Sopatrus, *Prol.*, p. 748. 25

d 2 ῥητορικὴ Laur. 89. 78 (ci. Heindorf) : ἡ ῥητορικὴ BTWF d 6 οἶον
παίδων om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) e 2 ἡμῖν F : ἡμῶν BTW e 5 καὶ
om. W e 7 τε τοῖς F a 2 ἔτι BTW Arist. : ἐστι PF τοῦτο Flor
Arist. : τοῦτο δ BTWF a 7 βέλτιστ' Arist. a 8 καὶ] καὶ ἀεὶ T
(corr. t) a 9 ἐστὶ Arist. b 1 σὺ πώποτε F

ἔχεις τῶν ῥητόρων τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸν ἔφρασας τίς ἐστιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγέ σοι εἰπεῖν τῶν γε νῦν ῥητόρων οὐδένα. 5

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις τινὰ εἰπεῖν δι' ὄντινα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος ἥρξατο δημηγορεῖν, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χείρους ὄντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστιν οὗτος.

ΚΑΛ. Τί δέ; Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν c γεγονότα καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὗ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας;

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἔστιν γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἣν πρότερον σὺ ἔλεγες ἀρετήν, ἀληθῆς, τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι καὶ τὰς αὐτοῦ 5 καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ λόγῳ ἠναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν—ὅτι αἱ μὲν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν πληρούμεναι βελτίῳ ποιοῦσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ταύτας μὲν ἀποτελεῖν, αἱ δὲ χείρῳ, μή, τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις d εἶναι <ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν—ἀρ' ἔχεις φάναι> τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα τούτων τινὰ γεγονέναι;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε πῶς εἶπω.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐὰν ζητῆς καλῶς, εὐρήσεις. ἴδωμεν δὴ οὕτως 5 ἀτρέμα σκοπούμενοι εἴ τις τούτων τοιοῦτος γέγονεν· φέρε γάρ, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων, ἂν ἂν λέγῃ ἄλλο τι οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐρεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τι; ὥσπερ καὶ e οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ βλέποντες πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει <ἂ προσφέρει>

usque ad b 6 εἰπεῖν Aristides, *orat.* xlvī, p. 454

c 2 καὶ Περικλέα—3 τετελευτηκότα Athenaeus 217 d

e 3 οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει Thomas Mag., p. 21. 16

b 2 οὐχὶ] οὐ Arist. b 3 ὅστις Arist. b 4 μὰ τὸν Δία Arist. ἔγωγέ
om. F Arist. γε om. Arist. b 7 γεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ et b 8 ἐν τῷ om. F rel.
spat. (suppl. f) b 9 μὲν om. W γὰρ] ἀρ' F (corr. f) c 2 τοῦτον
Ath. c 3 τὸν om. Ath. d 1 τοῦτο] τούτου Y d 2 εἶναι
BTWF: οἷε Sauppe: post εἶναι lacunam statuit Schanz, exempli gratia
supplevi: post γεγονέναι add. ἔχεις εἰπεῖν Par² et revera f (unde habet Y)
d 4-5 Οὐκ—εἶπω Socrati, Ἀλλ'—εὐρήσεις Callicli tribuit F (non W)
d 5 δὴ] δὲ Olā οὕτως om. Olā d 7 ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίστῳ f e 1 ἄλλο
τι ἢ Par² f e 2 βλέποντες del. Sauppe e 3 ἂ προσφέρει add. Y:
ἂν προσφέρῃ add. Hirschig

[πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτῶν,] ἀλλ' ὅπως ἂν εἰδὸς τι αὐτῷ σχῆ
 5 τοῦτο ὃ ἐργάζεται. οἷον εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν τοὺς ζωγράφους,
 τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας
 δημιουργούς, ὅντινα βούλει αὐτῶν, ὥς εἰς τάξιν τινὰ
 504 ἕτερον τῷ ἐτέρῳ πρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἀρμόττειν, ἕως ἂν τὸ
 ἅπαν συστήσῃται τεταγμένον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον πρᾶγμα.
 καὶ οἱ τε δὴ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, οἱ
 περὶ τὸ σῶμα, παιδοτρίβαι τε καὶ ἰατροί, κοσμοῦσί που
 5 τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντάττουσιν. ὁμολογοῦμεν οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχειν
 ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Τάξεως ἄρα καὶ κόσμου τυχούσα οἰκία χρηστή ἂν
 εἴη, ἀταξίας δὲ μοχθηρά;

10 ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πλοῖον ὡσαύτως;

b ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματά φαμεν τὰ ἡμέτερα;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἡ ψυχὴ; ἀταξίας τυχούσα ἔσται χρηστή, ἢ
 5 τάξεώς τε καὶ κόσμου τινός;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ τοῦτο συνομολογεῖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς τάξεώς
 τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνομένῳ;

ΚΑΛ. Ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν ἴσως λέγεις.

c ΣΩ. Ἐγωγε. τί δὲ αὖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνομένῳ ἐκ
 τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου; πειρῶ εὐρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ
 ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὄνομα.

b 9 ἰσχὺν—d 1 κοσμήσεων P. Rainer (Π')

resp. Sopatrus, *Prolog.*, p. 749. 2

a 8 τάξεως—505 b 12 ἀκολασία cf. Iamblichum, *Protrept.*, p. 86. 17 ff.

e 4 πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτῶν (αὐτοῦ Par^a) del. Sauppe εἰδός] εἰδώς B
 αὐτῷ] αὐτὸ F a 1 ἀρμόττον Flor f a 2 τε] τί F a 3 δημι-
 ουργοὶ post ἐλέγομεν transp. F a 4 καὶ ἰατροί, κοσμοῦ- et a 5 ὁμο-
 λογοῦμεν om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) a 5 τοῦθ' οὕτω f b 2 alt.
 καὶ om. Olb b 6 πρόσθε B b 8 γιγνομένῳ—c 2 κόσμου om. W
 sed add. in marg. ead. m. c 1 τῷ] τὸ W c 3 ἐκείνῳ Heindorf:
 ἐκείνο BTWFII^a: ἐκεῖ Burnet

ΚΑΛ. Τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἴ σοι ἡδιόν ἐστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρῶ· σὺ δέ, ἂν μὲν 5
σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔλεγχε καὶ μὴ
ἐπίτρεπε. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν
ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, ἐξ οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται καὶ ἡ
ἄλλη ἀρετὴ τοῦ σώματος. ἔστιν ταῦτα ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν.

10

ΣΩ. Ταῖς δέ γε τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσι καὶ κοσμήσεσιν d
νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμιμοι γίνονται καὶ κόσμιοι·
ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. φῆς ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκεῖνος, ὁ 5
τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ταῖς
ψυχαῖς οὓς ἂν λέγῃ, καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀπάσας, καὶ δῶρον
εἴαν τι διδῶ, δώσει, καὶ εἴαν τι ἀφαιρῇται, ἀφαιρήσεται,
πρὸς τοῦτο αἰετὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως ἂν αὐτῷ τοῖς πολίταις
δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνηται, ἀδικία δὲ ἀπαλ- e
λάττηται, καὶ σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνηται, ἀκολασία δὲ
ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνηται, κακία δὲ ἀπίη.
συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Συγχωρῶ.

ΣΩ. Τί γὰρ ὄφελος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, σώματί γε κάμνοντι
καὶ μοχθηρῶς διακειμένῳ ἢ σιτία πολλὰ διδόναι καὶ τὰ ἡδίστα
ἢ ποτὰ ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν, ὃ μὴ ὀνήσει αὐτὸν ἔσθ' ὅτι πλέον, ἢ
τοῦναντίον κατὰ γε τὸν δίκαιον λόγον καὶ ἔλαττον; ἔστι
ταῦτα;

10

c 4 τί—d 1 κοσμήσεσιν et e 7 διακειμένῳ—505 a 9 οὐδέποτε P. Rainer (Π')

cf. Iamblichum, *Protrept.*, p. 86. 23 ff. (qui inde a d 6 artius Platonem
sequitur); resp. Sopatrus, *Prol.*, p. 749

c 7 ἐμοὶ γὰρ FΠ¹ et in marg. B²: ἐμοιγε TWB²f: ἐμοιγε γὰρ B c 8 ἐν] ἂν
F (corr. f) prius ἢ sup. lin. Π¹ d 1 γε FΠ¹: om. BTW τε καὶ W
et fort. primitus B d 2 νόμος] κόσμος vel κόσμιον Kratz d 5 ταῦτα
a F (corr. f) d 7 οὓς] οὐδ' F (corr. in marg. f) d 9 αὐτῷ
Deuschle: αὐτοῦ TWF, αὐτοῦ B: δι' αὐτοῦ ci. Schanz e 3 ἀπίη Iamb.:
ἀπὴ Sop. e 6 ὄφελος BF (corr. f) e 7 ἢ FΠ¹ Iamb.: om. BTWf
πολλὰ] πολλοὶ Π¹ e 8 ἢ ἄλλ' καὶ ἄλλ' Π¹ sed corr. s.l. ὀνήσει FΠ¹
Iamb.: ὀνήσῃ BTW αὐτὸν B primitus, FΠ¹ Iamb.: αὐτὸ TWf et ex corr.
B vel b ἔσθ' ὅτε Bod. misc. 104, Cornarius e 9 <ἢ> κατὰ γε Cor-
narius: κατὰ δὲ Schleiermacher: malim <καὶ> κατὰ γε

505 ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι λυσιτελεῖ μετὰ μοχθηρίας σώματος ζῆν ἀνθρώπων· ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ζῆν μοχθηρῶς. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;

5 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, οἷον πεινῶντα φαγεῖν ὅσον βούλεται ἢ διψῶντα πιεῖν, ὑγιαίνοντα μὲν ἐῶσιν οἱ ἰατροὶ ὡς τὰ πολλά, κάμνοντα δὲ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτ' ἐῶσιν ἐμπίμπλασθαι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ; συγχωρεῖς
10 τοῦτό γε καὶ σύ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

b ΣΩ. Περὶ δὲ ψυχὴν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; ἕως μὲν ἂν ποιηρὰ ἦ, ἀνόητός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος, εἴργειν αὐτὴν δεῖ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἄλλ' ἅττα ποιεῖν ἢ ἀφ' ὧν βελτίων ἔσται·
5 φῆς ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὕτω γὰρ που αὐτῇ ἄμεινον τῇ ψυχῇ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ εἴργειν ἐστὶν ἀφ' ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν;

10 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ κολάζεσθαι ἄρα τῇ ψυχῇ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἢ ἡ ἀκολασία, ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ῥου.

c ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἄλλον τινὰ ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. Οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠφελούμενος καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάσχων περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόμενος.

5 ΚΑΛ. Οὐδέ γέ μοι μέλει οὐδὲν ὧν σὺ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτά σοι Γοργίου χάριν ἀπεκρινάμην.

usque ad a 9 οὐδέποτ' P. Rainer (Π¹)

usque ad b 12 ἀκολασία cf. Iamblichum, *Protrept.*, p. 87. 27

c 1 οὐκ—2 ἐρώτα [Alexander] in *Soph. El.*, p. 117. 15

a 2 ad γὰρ suprascr. καὶ Π¹ λυσιτελεῖν Π¹ Iamb. a 3 prius ζῆν] ἐστὶν Π¹ sed corr. s.l. καὶ ζῆν WPFbΠ¹ Iamb.: καὶ ζῆν καὶ BT a 6 καὶ FΠ¹ Iamb.: om. BTW b 4 ἄλλ' ἅττα] ἀλλ' αὐτὰ Iamb., omisso ἢ ἀφ' ὧν BTW: ἀ ποιῶν F: ἀ ἂν ποιῶν Iamb. b 7 οὕτω] οὐ F (corr. in marg. f) Iamb. b 11 ἢ om. F Iamb. c 1 οἶδ' ἅττα BTW Ol: οἶδα τί F Alex. c 3 αὐτὸ Par², Dobree c 5 σὺ om. F (add. f)

ΣΩ. Εἰέν· τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξύ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν;

ΚΑΛ. Αὐτὸς γνώσῃ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξύ θέμις εἶναι 10 καταλείπειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιθέντας κεφαλὴν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνευ κεφαλῆς d περιίῃ. ἀπόκριναι οὖν καὶ τὰ λοιπά, ἵνα ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος κεφαλὴν λάβῃ.

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς βίαιος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, 5 εἴσεις χαίρειν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ἢ καὶ ἄλλω τῷ διαλέξῃ.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει; μὴ γάρ τοι ἀτελῇ γε τὸν λόγον καταλίπωμεν.

ΚΑΛ. Αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναιο διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον, ἢ λέγων κατὰ σαυτὸν ἢ ἀποκρινόμενος σαυτῷ;

ΣΩ. Ἴνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται, ἃ πρὸ τοῦ e δύ' ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἰς ὧν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι. ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι. οὕτωςι μέντοι ποιήσωμεν· οἶμαι ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονίκως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τί ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν λέγομεν καὶ τί ψεῦδος· 5 κοινὸν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἅπασιν φανερόν γενέσθαι αὐτό. δίειμι μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐγὼ ὥς ἂν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν· ἐὰν δέ τῳ 506 ὑμῶν μὴ τὰ ὄντα δοκῶ ὁμολογεῖν ἐμαυτῷ, χρὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν. οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς πάντι λέγω ἃ λέγω, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ' ὑμῶν, ὥστε, ἂν τὶ φαίνεται λέγων ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν ἐμοί, ἐγὼ πρῶτος συγχωρήσομαι. 5 λέγω μέντοι ταῦτα, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι διαπερανθῆναι τὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλεσθε, ἐῷμεν ἤδη χαίρειν καὶ ἀπώμεν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, χρῆναί πω

e 1-2 [Epicharmus fr. 253, apud Athenaeum 308 c, 362 d]

c 7 ποιήσωμεν F c 8 -λύομεν—9 αὐ- et c 10 μεταξύ om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) c 8 καταλύομεν Flor et revera f: καταλείψωμεν Y: καταλύσομεν Stephanus d 1 καταλείπειν BTWf: καταλιπεῖν PF d 2 περιίῃ TWf: περιειμι B: περιήει PF d 4 δὲ om. F (add. f) d 5 εἴσεως F καὶ om. F d 6 ἐβλήσει Par² f ἀτελῇ] ἀτε[δῇ sic revera F (corr. f) d 7 καταλίπωμεν W: καταλιπὼν μὲν F: καταλείπωμεν BTf e 1 ante ἵνα add. in marg. μὰ δὲ f (non F) e 2 δύ'] δὲ F ἄνδρες B (s puncto notatum) γένομαι F e 3 οὕτωςι F (ci. Coraës): οὕτως. εἰ BTW ποιήσομεν W Par² e 4 πάντας F: πάντα BTW a 1 τῷ λόγῳ Coraës a 3 πάντι F: om. BTW a 4 ἃ λέγω] ἀλλ' ἐγὼ F a 5 ἔγωγε F a 6 διαπερᾶναι F (corr. f) a 7 ἤδη F: δὴ BTWf

b ἀπιέναι, ἀλλὰ διεξελθεῖν σε τὸν λόγον· φαίνεται δέ -μοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκεῖν. βούλομαι γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοῦσαί σου αὐτοῦ διόντος τὰ ἐπίλοιπα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ αὐτὸς ἡδέως μὲν ἂν
5 Καλλικλεῖ τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμεν, ἕως αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφίονος ἀπέδωκα ῥῆσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σύ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλεις συνδιαπερᾶναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούων ἐπιλαμβάνου, εἰάν τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ
c καλῶς λέγειν. καί με εἰάν ἐξελέγχῃς, οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαί σοι ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀναγεγράψῃ.

ΚΑΛ. Λέγε, ὠγαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέραινε.

5 ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμοῦ ἀναλαβόντος τὸν λόγον. Ἄρα τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστίν;—Οὐ ταῦτόν, ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὡμολογήσαμεν.—Πότερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρακτέον, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔνεκα τοῦ ἡδέος;—Τὸ ἡδὺ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.—Ἡδὺ δὲ ἐστίν τοῦτο οὐ
d παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα, ἀγαθὸν δὲ οὐ παρόντος ἀγαθοῦ ἐσμεν;—Πάνυ γε.—Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοὶ γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ὅσ' ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης;—Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις.—
5 Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἢ γε ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου, καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὐ καὶ ζώου παντός, οὐχ οὕτως εἰκὴ κάλλιστα παραγίνεται, ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ἣτις ἐκάστῳ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν· ἄρα ἐστίν ταῦτα;—Ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ φημι.
e —Τάξει ἄρα τεταγμένον τι καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου;—Φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε.—Κόσμος τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἐκάστῳ ὁ ἐκάστου οἰκεῖος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν

c 6 ἄρα—508 a 8 ἀμελεῖς Iamblichus, *Protrept.*, p. 88. 11 ff.

b 3 ἐπίλοιπα et b 4 ἡδέως om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) b 4 ἂν om. F (add. f)
b 5 τοῦτο F (corr. f) ἀμφίονος WF: ἀμφίωνος BT b 6 τῆς om. F (add. in marg. f)
b 7 ὁ καλλικλεῖς sic F (corr. f) et similia saepius
c 1 ἐξελέγχῃς Flor f ἀχθέσομαι Hirschig c 1 -ης—c 2 μέγ- om. F (add. f in marg.)
d 2 ἀγαθοὶ γέ] ἀγαθοὶ τέ Iamb. d 6 alt. καὶ om. F οὐχ οὕτω F: οὐ τῷ BTW Iamb.: οὔτοι Vind. phil. gr. 109 κάλλιστα] καὶ κάλλιστα Iamb.: secl. Coraës
d 7 τέχνῃ, ἣτις] τέχνῃ τις Ol
d 8 γάρ] γὰρ δὴ T e 1 τι Iamb.: om. BTWF e 3 ἐκάστου] ἕκαστον T (ἐκάστων t): ἐκάστῳ Par suprascr. ou

όντων;—Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.—Καὶ ψυχὴ ἄρα κόσμον ἔχουσα
τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἀμείνων τῆς ἀκοσμήτου;—Ἀνάγκη.—Ἀλλὰ μὴν 5
ἢ γε κόσμον ἔχουσα κοσμία;—Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει;—Ἡ δέ
γε κοσμία σώφρων;—Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.—Ἡ ἄρα σώφρων ψυχὴ 507
ἀγαθὴ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλα φάναι, ὦ φίλε
Καλλίκλεις· σὺ δ' εἰ ἔχεις, δίδασκε.

ΚΑΛ. Λέγ', ὠγαθέ.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ ὅτι, εἰ ἡ σώφρων ἀγαθὴ ἐστίν, ἡ τοῦ- 5
ναντίον τῇ σώφρονι πεπονθυῖα κακὴ ἐστίν· ἣν δὲ αὕτη ἡ
ἄφρων τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος.—Πάνυ γε.—Καὶ μὴν ὁ γε σώ-
φρων τὰ προσήκοντα πράττει ἂν καὶ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ περὶ
ἀνθρώπους· οὐ γὰρ ἂν σωφρονοῖ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα πράτ-
των.—Ἀνάγκη ταῦτ' εἶναι οὕτω.—Καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώ- b
πους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ
θεοὺς ὅσια· τὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὅσια πράττοντα ἀνάγκη
δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον εἶναι.—Ἔστι ταῦτα.—Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ
ἀνδρεῖόν γε ἀνάγκη· οὐ γὰρ δὴ σώφρονος ἀνδρός ἐστίν οὔτε 5
διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν ἅ μὴ προσήκει, ἀλλ' ἅ δεῖ καὶ πρά-
γματα καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας φεύγειν καὶ
διώκειν, καὶ ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν ὅπου δεῖ· ὥστε πολλὴ
ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σώφρονα, ὥσπερ διήλθομεν, c
δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅσιον, ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι
τελέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἅ ἂν
πράττει, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα
εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἄθλιον· οὗτος 5
δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων τῷ σώφρονι, ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ὃν
σὺ ἐπήνεις.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὕτω τίθεμαι καὶ φημι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ

b 8 καὶ—508 d 6 φημι fragmenta P. Oxy. 454 (Π²)

Iamblichus, *Protrept.*, p. 88. 24 ff.

c 8 ἐγὼ—508 a 8 ἀμελεῖς Stobaeus 3. 5. 13

c 5 μὴ[ν—c 6 ἔχου]σα inclusa om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) a 5 εἰ om. F
a 8 alt. περὶ om. Iamb. a 9 σωφρονοίη f b 2 ἂν om. F b 6 ἀλλ'
ἅ δεῖ Heindorf: ἀλλὰ δεῖ BTWf Iamb.: ἀλλὰ δὴ PF c 3 καλὸν Π², corr.
m. alt. c 5 πονηρῶς W c 8 οὖν om. Π² ταῦτα ἀληθῆ BWFΠ²
Stob. (om. Iamb.): ἀληθῆ ταῦτα T

εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ, τὸν βουλόμενον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐ-
d δαίμονα εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ ἀσκητέον,
ἀκολασίαν δὲ φευκτέον ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, καὶ
παρασκευαστέον μάλιστα μὲν μηδὲν δεῖσθαι τοῦ κολάζεσθαι,
ἐὰν δὲ δεηθῇ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων, ἢ ἰδιώτης
5 ἢ πόλις, ἐπιθετέον δίκην καὶ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει εὐδαίμων
εἶναι. οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι πρὸς ὃν βλέ-
ποντα δεῖ ζῆν, καὶ πάντα εἰς τοῦτο τὰ αὐτοῦ συντείνοντα
καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως δικαιοσύνη παρέσται καὶ σωφρο-
e σύνη τῷ μακαρίῳ μέλλοντι ἔσεσθαι, οὕτω πράττειν, οὐκ
ἐπιθυμίας ἑῶντα ἀκολάστους εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ἐπιχειροῦντα
πληροῦν, ἀνήνυτον κακόν, ληστοῦ βίον ζῶντα. οὔτε γὰρ
ἂν ἄλλω ἀνθρώπῳ προσφιλεῖς ἂν εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος οὔτε θεῷ.
5 κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος, ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἔνι κοινωνία, φιλία οὐκ
ἂν εἴη. φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὧ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ
508 γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ
φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην,
καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὧ ἑταῖρε,
οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσ-
5 ἔχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὢν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέν
σε ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις
μέγα δύναται, σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἶε δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμε-
τρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς. εἰέν· ἢ ἐξελεγκτέος δὴ οὗτος ὁ λόγος
b ἡμῖν ἔστιν, ὡς οὐ δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης κτήσεται εὐδαί-
fragmenta P. Oxy. 454 (II²)

usque ad a 8 ἀμελεῖς Iamblichus, *Protrept.*, p. 89. 20 ff., et Stobaeus 3. 5. 13
a 3-4 resp. Aristoteles, fr. 17 Rose³; [Aristoteles], *de mundo* 6, 399^a14;
Plutarchus, *vit. Dion.* 10; Aristides, *orat.* xlvi, p. 219
a 6 resp. Gregorius Naz. i. 568A

c 9 εἰ—ἀληθῆ om. F (add. in marg. f) δέ] δὴ Iamb. Stob. d 2 φευ-
κτέον om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) ἡμῶν ἕκαστος W d 3 παρασκευα-
στέον BTWfII² Iamb.: ποῶς σκευαστέον ut vid. F: παρασκευαστέον ἑαυτὸν
Stob. μηδὲν] μὴ II² d 4 primum ἢ om. Iamb. (habet II²)
d 5 ἐπεισακτέον in marg. f d 6 εἶναι. οὗτος] οὗτος εἶναι II² ὁ om.
Stob. OIA (habet II²) d 7 τοῦτο καὶ τὰ Flor d 8 σωφροσύνη]
δικαιοσύνη II² e 1 μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ II² e 2 ταύτας TWF Stob.:
ταῦτα B Iamb. e 4 ἂν εἴη BTW: εἴη FII² Iamb. Stob. e 5 δὲ
BTWf: γὰρ II² Iamb. Stob. (et suprascr. Par³): om. F ἐν] εἴη Stob.
e 6 δ' οἱ] δὴ Stob. a 6 prius ἢ om. Stob. (habet II²) a 7 post
μέγα add. s.l. τι (ut vid.) II² m. alt. b 1 ἡμῖν] ἡ μὴν F (corr. in marg. f)

μονες οἱ εὐδαίμονες, κακίας δὲ οἱ ἄθλιοι <ἄθλιοι>, ἢ εἰ οὗτος ἀληθὴς ἐστίν, σκεπτέον τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα. τὰ πρόσθεν ἐκεῖνα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, συμβαίνει πάντα, ἐφ' οἷς σύ με ἥρου εἰ σπουδάζων λέγοιμι, λέγοντα ὅτι κατηγορητέον εἶη καὶ αὐτοῦ 5 καὶ υἱός καὶ ἐταίρου, ἐάν τι ἀδικῇ, καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρηστέον· καὶ ἃ Πῶλον αἰσχύνῃ ὥου συγχωρεῖν, ἀληθῇ ἄρα ἦν, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὅσῳ περ αἴσχιον τοσοῦτῳ κάκιον· καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς ῥητορικὸν 6 ἔσεσθαι δίκαιον ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονα τῶν δικαίων, ὃ αὖ Γοργίαν ἔφη Πῶλος δι' αἰσχύνῃν ὁμολογήσαι.

Τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων σκεψώμεθα τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἃ σὺ ἐμοὶ ὀνειδίζεις, ἄρα καλῶς λέγεται ἢ οὐ, ὥς ἄρα ἐγὼ οὐχ 5 οἶός τ' εἰμὶ βοηθῆσαι οὔτε ἐμὰντῷ οὔτε τῶν φίλων οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τῶν οἰκείων, οὐδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων, εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτιμοι τοῦ ἐθέλοντος, ἄντε τύπτειν βούλῃται, τὸ νεανικὸν δὲ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ d λόγου, ἐπὶ κόρρης, ἐάντε χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐάντε ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἐάντε, τὸ ἔσχατον, ἀποκτεῖναι· καὶ οὕτω διακεῖσθαι πάντων δὴ αἰσχιστόν ἐστιν, ὥς ὁ σὸς λόγος. ὁ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸς ὅστις, πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη εἴρηται, οὐδὲν δὲ 5 κωλύει καὶ ἔτι λέγεσθαι· οὐ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸ τύπτεσθαι ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀδίκως αἰσχιστόν εἶναι, οὐδέ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλλάντιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ e τύπτειν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ ἀδίκως καὶ τέμνειν καὶ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον, καὶ κλέπτειν γε ἅμα καὶ ἀνδραποδίζεισθαι καὶ τοιχωρυχεῖν καὶ συλλήβδην ὁτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κάκιον καὶ αἴσχιον εἶναι ἢ ἐμοὶ τῷ 5 usque ad d 6 φημι fragmenta P. Oxy. 454 (Π²)

c 1 τὸν—2 δικαίων Quintilianus, *Inst. Or.* 2. 15. 28; Syrianus, *schol. in Hermog.* ii. 4. 14

d 6–7 resp. Plutarchus, fr. 11, p. 56. 8 Bern.

b 2 ἄθλιοι hic add. Heindorf, post δὲ Bekker (semel tantum habet Π²)

b 3 ἐκεῖνα om. Π² b 5 σπουδάζω F (corr. f) b 6 υἱός—τι om.

F rel. spat. (suppl. f) c 2 δεῖν f καὶ om. Syrianus c 7 οὐδὲ

σῶσαι FΠ² c 8 ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ BTW: ἐπὶ τῷ βουλευομένῳ F: in Π²

vestigia tantum: secl. Morstadt: τοῦ ἐθέλοντος secl. Hirschig d 1 τοῦτο]

τοῦτο τὸ F d 2 ἐκβαλεῖν Π² d 4 πάντων] τούτω[ν] Π² ἐστιν,

ὥς om. F (ὥς add. f) d 7 τὸ om. F c 1 prius οὔτε] οὐδὲ F

βαλλάντιον BTP: βαλάντιον WF Olā

ἀδικουμένῳ. ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις
οὕτω φανέντα, ὥς ἐγὼ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δέδεται, καὶ
509 εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἔστιν, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις
λόγοις, ὥς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν οὕτωςί, οὕς σὺ εἰ μὴ λύσεις
ἢ σοῦ τις νεανικώτερος, οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄλλως λέγοντα ἢ ὥς
ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω καλῶς λέγειν· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος
5 ἔστιν αἰεὶ, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ἔχει, ὅτι μέντοι
ὦν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα, ὥσπερ νῦν, οὐδεὶς οἷός τ' ἔστιν ἄλλως
λέγων μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος εἶναι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὖ τίθημι
b ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν· εἰ δὲ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν
ἔστιν ἡ ἀδικία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἔτι τούτου μείζον μεγίστου
ὄντος, εἰ οἷόν τε, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην, τίνα ἂν
βοήθειαν μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ καταγέ-
5 λαστος ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἴη; ἄρα οὐ ταύτην, ἣτις ἀποτρέψει
τὴν μεγίστην ἡμῶν βλάβην; ἀλλὰ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ταύτην
εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν μήτε
αὐτῷ μήτε τοῖς αὐτοῦ φίλοις τε καὶ οἰκείοις, δευτέραν δὲ
c τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ καὶ τρίτην τὴν τοῦ τρίτου καὶ τὰλλα
οὕτως· ὥς ἐκάστου κακοῦ μέγεθος πέφυκεν, οὕτω καὶ κάλλος
τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐφ' ἑκάστα βοηθεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνῃ τοῦ μή.
ἄρα ἄλλως ἢ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;

5 ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἄλλως.

ΣΩ. Δυσὸν οὖν ὄντων, τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι,
μεῖζον μὲν φάμεν κακὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.
τί οὖν ἂν παρασκευασάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθήσειεν αὐτῷ,
d ὥστε ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὠφελίας ταύτας ἔχειν, τὴν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ
μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι; πότερά δύναμιν
ἢ βούλησιν; ὧδε δὲ λέγω· πότερον εἴαν μὴ βούληται ἀδι-

c 6-7 resp. fort. Philo, *de Josepho* 20: cf. ad 469 c 1-2, 473 a 5

c 6 πρόσθεν TPF: πρόσθε BW ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις secl. Hirschig
a 1 -ροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) a 2 ἂν δόξειεν
οὕτωςί BTW: ἂν δόξη tum spat. F (δόξειεν ἂν οὕτωςί f) λύσεις T²f et
revera W: λύσης BTF a 4 νυνὶ F a 7 λέγων μὴ οὐ om. F rel.
spat. (suppl. f) b 3 οἷόν τέ ἐστιν OIΛ τὸ corrector Parisini 1811:
τὸν BTWF b 5 ἀποστρέψει F b 7 αἰσχίστην etiam W, sed ιστ
ex corr. c 1 prius καὶ om. F c 3 τοῦ μή Y et recens b: τὸ μή
revera F: ἐτοίμη BTW c 6 οὖν] μὲν οὖν OIΛ c 7 μὲν om. F
c 8 παρασκευασμένος [sic] W primitus

κείσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται, ἢ ἐὰν δύναμιν παρασκευάσῃται τοῦ
μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι [οὐκ ἀδικήσεται]; 5

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ἐὰν δύναμιν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται
ἀδικεῖν, ἱκανὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν—οὐ γὰρ ἀδικήσῃ—ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ
τοῦτο δεῖ δύναμιν τινα καὶ τέχνην παρασκευάσασθαι, ὥς, e
ἐὰν μὴ μάθῃ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀσκήσῃ, ἀδικήσῃ; τί οὐκ αὐτό γέ
μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, πότερόν σοι δοκοῦμεν
ὀρθῶς ἀναγκασθῆναι ὁμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις
ἐγὼ τε καὶ Πῶλος ἢ οὐ, ἥνίκα ὁμολογήσαμεν μηδένα 5
βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄκοντας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας
ἀδικεῖν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω σοι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως, ἵνα δια- 510
περάνης τὸν λόγον.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικεν, παρασκευαστέον
ἐστὶ δύναμιν τινα καὶ τέχνην, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσωμεν.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. 5

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶν τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ
μηδὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ὥς ὀλίγιστα; σκέψαι εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ ἢπερ
ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἦδε· ἢ αὐτὸν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἐν
τῇ πόλει ἢ καὶ τυραννεῖν, ἢ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας
ἐταῖρον εἶναι. 10

ΚΑΛ. Ὅρῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥς ἐγὼ ἔτοιμός εἰμι ἐπαινεῖν,
ἂν τι καλῶς λέγῃς; τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖς πάνυ καλῶς εἰρηκέναι. b

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εὖ λέγειν. φίλος
μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἐκάστῳ εἶναι ὥς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, ὃνπερ
οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ. οὐ
καὶ σοί; 5

ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε.

a 11 cf. Methodium, *de resurr.* 1. 30. 5

b 4 cf. Clementem, *Paed.* 1. 28. 2

d 5 οὐκ ἀδικήσεται secl. Cobet d 7 μὴ βούληται et d 8 -κήσει om. F rel.
spat. (suppl. f) e 2 καὶ μὴ ἀσκήσῃ F e 2-3 γέ μοι F: γε ἐμοὶ BTW
e 3 ἀπεκρίνω Vind. 109, Heindorf: ἀπεκρίνου BTWF a 1 οὕτως] ἴσως
W: ἴσως ἂν in marg. f διαπερανῇ B a 4 ἀδικήσομεν Heindorf
a 7 ἢπερ TPf: ἢπερ BW: καὶ εἴπερ F a 8 ἦδε W: ἦδε BT et revera F
ἄρχειν δεῖν BT: ἄρχειν δεῖ F: δεῖν ἄρχειν W a 10 ἐταῖρον F: ἕτερον
BTW et in marg. f

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅπου τύραννός ἐστιν ἄρχων ἄγριος καὶ ἀπαίδευτος, εἴ τις τούτου ἐν τῇ πόλει πολὺ βελτίων εἴη, φοβοῖτο δήπου ἂν αὐτὸν ὁ τύραννος καὶ τούτῳ ἐξ ἅπαντος
 c τοῦ νοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποτε δύναιτο φίλος γενέσθαι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε εἴ τις πολὺ φαυλότερος εἴη, οὐδ' ἂν οὗτος· καταφρονοῖ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῦ ὁ τύραννος καὶ οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὥς
 5 πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσειεν.

ΚΑΛ. Καὶ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Λείπεται δὴ ἐκείνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅς ἂν ὁμοήθης ὦν, ταῦτ' ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐπαινῶν, ἐθέλῃ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι. οὗτος μέγα
 d ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται, τοῦτον οὐδεὶς χαίρων ἀδικήσει. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τις ἐννοήσειεν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν νέων,
 5 "Τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδεὶς με ἀδικοίη;" αὕτη, ὥς ἔοικεν, αὐτῷ ὁδός ἐστιν, εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ἐθίζειν αὐτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὁμοιος ἔσται ἐκείνῳ. οὐχ οὕτως;

10 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ μέγα
 e δύνασθαι, ὥς ὁ ὑμέτερος λόγος, ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπεπρά-
 ξεται.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν; ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ, εἴπερ
 5 ὁμοιος ἔσται τῷ ἄρχοντι ὄντι ἀδίκῳ καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ μέγα δυνήσεται; ἀλλ' οἶμαι ἔγωγε, πᾶν τοῦναντίον οὕτως ἢ παρασκευῇ ἔσται αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸ οἶω τε εἶναι ὥς πλεῖστα ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην· ἢ γάρ;

b 9 τούτῳ] τοῦτο F et ex corr. W: του W primitus ut vid. c 3 Οὐδέ γε εἴ τις om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) οὗτος] οὕτως Schanz c 8 ὥς ἂν F (corr. f) ὁμοήθης ex corr. f λέγων W c 9 ἐθέλει F et primitus W d 1 τῇ WFb: om. BT d 4 ἄρ' οὖν εἴ τις F ἐν om. F ταύτῃ F: αὐτῇ BTW: αὐτῇ ταύτῃ ci. Stallbaum d 5 μηδεὶς] μὴ δεῖσθαι F (corr. f) d 5-6 ἀδικοίη; αὕτη ed. Basileensis²: ἀδικοῖ ἢ αὐτῇ BTWf: ἀδικοῖ αὕτη F d 6 ἢ ὁδός F e 6 οὕτως F c 8 ἀδικοῦντα BTW: ἀδικοῦντι F

ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μέγιστον αὐτῷ κακὸν ὑπάρξει μοχθηρῷ 511
ὄντι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λελωβημένῳ διὰ τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ δε-
σπότης καὶ δύναμιν.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ στρέφεις ἐκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω
καὶ κάτω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι οὗτος ὁ μιμούμενος 5
τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἐκείνον ἀποκτενεῖ, εἰ βούληται, καὶ
ἀφαιρήσεται τὰ ὄντα.

ΣΩ. Οἶδα, ὡγαθὲ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφός γ' εἰμί, καὶ b
σοῦ ἀκούων καὶ Πώλου ἄρτι πολλάκις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγου
πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει· ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐμοῦ ἄκουε, ὅτι
ἀποκτενεῖ μέν, ἂν βούληται, ἀλλὰ πονηρὸς ὢν καλὸν καγαθὸν
ὄντα. 5

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οὖν τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν;

ΣΩ. Οὐ νοῦν γε ἔχοντι, ὥς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. ἢ οἶε
δεῖν τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, ὥς πλείστον χρόνον
ζῆν, καὶ μελετᾶν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας αἰ ἡμᾶς ἀεὶ ἐκ τῶν
κινδύνων σώζουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἦν σὺ κελεύεις ἐμὲ μελετᾶν c
τὴν ῥητορικὴν τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις διασώζουσιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία ὀρθῶς γέ σοι συμβουλεύων.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε; ἢ καὶ ἡ τοῦ νεῖν ἐπιστήμη
σεμνή τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι; 5

ΚΑΛ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν σώζει γε καὶ αὕτη ἐκ θανάτου τοὺς ἀνθρώ-
πους, ὅταν εἷς τι τοιοῦτον ἐμπέσωσιν οὗ δεῖ ταύτης τῆς
ἐπιστήμης. εἰ δ' αὕτη σοι δοκεῖ σμικρὰ εἶναι, ἐγὼ σοι
μείζονα ταύτης ἐρῶ, τὴν κυβερνητικὴν, ἢ οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς d
σώζει ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων
κινδύνων, ὥσπερ ἡ ῥητορικὴ. καὶ αὕτη μὲν προσεσταλμένη
ἐστὶν καὶ κοσμία, καὶ οὐ σεμνύνεται ἐσχηματισμένη ὥς

a 5 οὐκ—6 βούληται Thomas Mag., p. 243. 14

a 4 ὅπῃ F Olλ: ὅποι BTW

a 6 μὴ om. WF Thos. Mag.

b 2 ἄρτι]

ἄρα F

b 4 post καλὸν add. τε f

b 7 ὁ σὸς λόγος Par²

c 3 συμ-

βουλεύων F: συμβουλεύω BTW: κελεύω Par², κελεύων Flor et in marg. f

c 4 ἢ καὶ ἡ B: ἢ καὶ εἰ revera F: ἢ καὶ TP: ἢ καὶ W

c 5 τί WF (corr. f)

c 8 τι F: om. BTW

d 1 μείζω F

d 2 καὶ τὰ σώματα del.

Morstadt

- 5 ὑπερήφανόν τι διαπραττομένη, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διαπραξαμένη
 τῇ δικανικῇ, ἐὰν μὲν ἐξ Αἰγίνης δεῦρο σώσῃ, οἶμαι δὴ
 ὀβολοὺς ἐπράξατο, ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου,
 e ἐὰν πάμπλου, ταύτης τῆς μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας, σώσασα ἃ
 νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ παῖδας καὶ χρήματα καὶ γυναῖ-
 κας, ἀποβιβάσας εἰς τὸν λιμένα δύο δραχμὰς ἐπράξατο,
 καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἔχων τὴν τέχνην καὶ ταῦτα διαπραξάμενος
 5 ἐκβὰς παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν καὶ τὴν ναῦν περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ
 σχήματι· λογίζεσθαι γὰρ οἶμαι ἐπίσταται ὅτι ἄδηλόν
 ἐστὶν οὐστινὰς τε ὠφέληκεν τῶν συμπλεόντων οὐκ ἑάσας
 καταποντωθῆναι καὶ οὐστινας ἔβλαψεν, εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν
 512 αὐτοὺς βελτίους ἐξεβίβασεν ἢ οἳ ἐνέβησαν, οὔτε τὰ σώ-
 ματα οὔτε τὰς ψυχάς. λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ, εἰ μὲν τις
 μεγάλοις καὶ ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασιν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχό-
 μενος μὴ ἀπεπνίγη, οὗτος μὲν ἄθλιός ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέ-
 5 θανεν, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὠφέληται· εἰ δέ τις ἄρα ἐν τῷ
 τοῦ σώματος τιμιωτέρῳ, τῇ ψυχῇ, πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει
 καὶ ἀνιάτα, τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶν καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσει,
 ἅντε ἐκ θαλάττης ἅντε ἐκ δικαστηρίου ἑάντε ἄλλοθεν ὅπο-
 b θεοῦν σώσῃ, ἀλλ' οἶδεν ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεων ἐστὶν ζῆν τῷ
 μοχθηρῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· κακῶς γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ζῆν.

Διὰ ταῦτα οὐ νόμος ἐστὶ σεμνύνεσθαι τὸν κυβερνήτην,
 καίπερ σώζοντα ἡμᾶς, οὐδέ γε, ὧ θαυμάσιε, τὸν μηχανο-
 5 ποιόν, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγοῦ, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὔτε ἄλλου
 οὐδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίοτε δύναται σώζειν· πόλεις γὰρ ἐστὶν
 ὅτε ὅλας σώζει. μή σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι;

d 5 ὑπερήφανόν Antiatticista Bekkeri, p. 114. 33

d 6-b 4 cf. Aristidem, *orat.* xlv, pp. 154 f.

e 8 καταποντωθῆναι pseudo-Didymus, *Plat. Lex.*, p. 405

b 1-2 resp. Chrysippus, *SVF* iii. 761

d 5 διαπραξαμένη F Ol: διαπραττομένη BTWf d 6 δεῦρο] ὡδε F
 d 7 ἐκ om. F e 1 πάμπλου—εὐεργεσίας punctis del. Par² ante
 σώσασα add. τύχη Par² e 2 γυναῖκα corrector Parisini 1812, Naber
 (γυναῖκας etiam Olπ) e 3 ἀποβιβάσασα Par² f: ἀποβιβάσας BTW:
 -βιβάσας(α) om. F rel. spat. e 4 prius καὶ om. F (add. f) a 1 ἢ
 οἳ t Olπ: οἳ οἳ F: ἢ οἳ BTW a 5 ὑπ'] ἀπ' F (corr. f) a 7 βιωτόν
 ἔσται Hirschig ὀνήσει Deuschle: ὀνήσειεν BTW: ὠνήσειεν revera F: ὀνή-
 σειεν ἄν ci. Heindorf a 8 ἅντε ἐκ θαλάττης om. F b 4 θαυμα-
 σιώτατε F b 6 πόλεις B

καίτοι εἰ βούλοιτο λέγειν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἅπερ ὑμεῖς, σεμνύ-
 νων τὸ πρᾶγμα, καταχώσειεν ἂν ὑμᾶς τοῖς λόγοις, λέγων c
 καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίνεσθαι μηχανοποιούς, ὡς
 οὐδὲν τᾶλλά ἐστιν· ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ σὺ
 οὐδὲν ἦττον αὐτοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῆς τέχνης τῆς ἐκεί- 5
 νου, καὶ ὡς ἐν ὀνειδίει ἀποκαλέσαις ἂν μηχανοποιόν, καὶ 5
 τῷ ὑεὶ αὐτοῦ οὐτ' ἂν δοῦναι θυγατέρα ἐθέλοις, οὐτ' ἂν
 αὐτὸς λαβεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου. καίτοι ἐξ ὧν τὰ σαυτοῦ ἐπαι-
 νεῖς, τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ τοῦ μηχανοποιοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ
 τῶν ἄλλων ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον; οἶδ' ὅτι φαίης ἂν βελτίων d
 εἶναι καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων. τὸ δὲ βέλτιον εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ὃ ἐγὼ
 λέγω, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ, τὸ σώζειν αὐτὸν καὶ
 τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ὄντα ὁποῖός τις ἔτυχεν, καταγέλαστός σοι ὁ
 ψόγος γίγνεται καὶ μηχανοποιοῦ καὶ ἱατροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 5
 τεχνῶν ὅσαι τοῦ σώζειν ἔνεκα πεποίηται. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε,
 ὅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γένναϊον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ <ῆ> τὸ
 σώζειν τε καὶ σώζεσθαι. μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν, τὸ ζῆν ὅπο-
 σονδὴ χρόνον, τὸν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἐατέον ἐστίν, καὶ e
 οὐ φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ
 καὶ πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξίν ὅτι τὴν εἰμαρμένην οὐδ' ἂν
 εἰς ἐκφύγοι, τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ σκεπτέον τίν' ἂν τρόπον τοῦτον
 ὃν μέλλοι χρόνον βιώναι ὡς ἄριστα βιώῃ, ἄρα ἐξομοίων 5
 αὐτὸν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ ἐν ἣ ἂν οἰκῇ, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ 513
 σὲ ὡς ὁμοιότατον γίνεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, εἰ
 μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλεῖς εἶναι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ
 πόλει· τοῦθ' ὅρα εἰ σοὶ λυσιτελεῖ καὶ ἐμοί, ὅπως μὴ, ὦ
 δαιμόνιε, πεισόμεθα ὅπερ φασὶ τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαι- 5
 ρούσας, τὰς Θετταλίδας· σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἢ αἵρεσις ἡμῖν
 ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει. εἰ δέ σοι οἶει
 d 6 ἀλλ'—e 5 βιώῃ Marcus Antoninus 7. 46 [codex A et editio Xylandri]

c 3 τᾶλλά ἐστιν] τᾶλλα ὄντα Heindorf c 5 -χανοποιόν om. F rel. spat.
 (suppl. f) c 6 prius οὐτ' ἂν] ὅταν F (corr. f) c 7 αὐτὸς] αὐτὸς
 τῷ σαυτοῦ Flor ἐπαινοῖς W d 1 οἶδ'] οἶδ' B d 4 ὄντα] ὄντα
 καὶ W d 7 ἦ add. Heindorf; ἦ τοῦ corrector Coisliniani d 8 τὸ
 σώζεσθαι F ὁπόσον δὲ Wf Ant.: ὁπόσον δὲ B: ὁπόσον δεῖ TPF e 1 γε]
 τε W e 5 μέλλοι BTWf et Ant. A: μέλλει Ant. Xyl. et revera F
 βιοίῃ Schanz a 2 τῷ ἀθηναίων T: τῶν ἀθηναίων BWF et revera P
 a 4 ὅπως] καὶ ὅπως f a 5 πεισόμεθα Par a 6 θετταλίδας BF:
 θετταλικὰς TW Olπ ad ἡ suprascr. εἰ W a 7 σοι] σὺ W

ὄντινούν ἀνθρώπων παραδώσειν τέχνην τινὰ τοιαύτην, ἥτις
 b σε ποιήσῃ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇδε ἀνόμοιον ὄντα
 τῇ πολιτείᾳ εἶτ' ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἶτ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ὥς ἐμοὶ
 δοκεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλευή, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν
 δεῖ εἶναι ἀλλ' αὐτοφυῶς ὅμοιον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι γνή-
 5 σιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ καὶ ναὶ
 μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους γε πρός. ὅστις οὖν σε τούτοις
 ὁμοιότατον ἀπεργάσεται, οὗτός σε ποιήσῃ, ὥς ἐπιθυμεῖς
 πολιτικὸς εἶναι, πολιτικὸν καὶ ῥητορικόν· τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ
 c ἤθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἄλλο-
 τρώ ἄχθονται, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, ὦ φίλη κεφαλὴ.
 λέγομέν τι πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εἶν λέγειν, ὦ
 5 Σώκρατες, πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνυ σοι
 πείθομαι.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δῆμον γὰρ ἔρως, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνὼν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
 τῇ σῇ ἀντιστατεῖ μοι· ἀλλ' ἔάν πολλαῖς [ἴσως] καὶ βέλτιον
 d ταῦτα ταῦτα διασκοπώμεθα, πεισθήσῃ. ἀναμνήσθητι δ' οὖν
 ὅτι δύο ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ ἕκαστον θερα-
 πεύειν, καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν, μίαν μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν,
 τὴν ἑτέραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ καταχαριζόμενον ἀλλὰ
 5 διαμαχόμενον. οὐ ταῦτα ἦν ἃ τότε ὠριζόμεθα;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν ἑτέρα, ἢ πρὸς ἡδονήν, ἀγεννὴς καὶ
 οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ κολακεία τυγχάνει οὕσα· ἢ γάρ;

e ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω, εἰ βούλει, σοὶ οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δέ γε ἑτέρα <γενναιότερα>, ὅπως ὥς βέλτιστον ἔσται
 τοῦτο, εἴτε σῶμα τυγχάνει ὃν εἴτε ψυχὴ, ὃ θεραπεύομεν;

c 4 οὐκ—6 πείθομαι Aristides, *orat.* xlvī, p. 194; *Prol. in Hermog.*, p. 241. 16;

cf. Hieroclem *in aur. carm.* 8, *Romanum sophistam*, p. 4. 21

d 2—e 3 cf. Aristidem, *orat.* xlvī, p. 194

a 8 ἀνθρώπων om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f)

b 5 ἀπεργάσασθαι F

b 6 πρὸς] προσίθι f b 6—7 ὁμοιότατον τούτοις F

b 8 πολιτικὸς om. Bod.

misc. 189, del. Ast αὐτῶν] αὐτῷ F (corr. f)

c 3 λέγωμέν Y c 4 οὐκ]

σὺ μὲν οὐκ Arist. δοκεῖς τρόπον Prol. Herm.

c 8 ἴσως secl. Schaefer:

ἴσως καὶ secl. Burnet: habet Olā

d 1 ταῦτα om. F

d 2 ἐκάτερον

Hirschig

d 5 ἃ τότε] ἃ τε T (corr. t)

e 1 ἔστω σοι ταῦτα εἰ

βούλει οὕτω F

σοὶ] σύ W

e 2 deesse aliquid vidit anonymus apud

Heindorf collato Aristide: exempli gratia supplevi

e 3 ὃν] ὦν W

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἔστιν τῇ πόλει 5
καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν, ὥς βελτίστους αὐτοὺς τοὺς
πολίτας ποιοῦντας; ἄνευ γὰρ δὴ τούτου, ὥς ἐν τοῖς ἔμ-
προσθεν ἠγύρισκομεν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄλλην εὐεργεσίαν οὐδε-
μίαν προσφέρειν, ἐὰν μὴ καλὴ καὶ ἀγαθὴ ἡ διάνοια ἥ τῶν 514
μελλόντων ἢ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἢ ἀρχὴν τινων ἢ
ἄλλην δύναμιν ἡντινοῦν. θῶμεν οὕτως ἔχειν;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε, εἴ σοι ἥδιον.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, δημο- 5
σία πράξοντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά,
ἢ τειχῶν ἢ νεωρίων ἢ ἱερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα οἰκοδομή-
ματα, πότερον ἔδει ἂν ἡμᾶς σκέψασθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ
ἐξετάσαι πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα τὴν τέχνην ἢ οὐκ b
ἐπιστάμεθα, τὴν οἰκοδομικὴν, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμάθομεν; ἔδει
ἂν ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δεύτερον αὖ τόδε, εἴ τι πώποτε οἰκοδόμημα 5
ὠκοδομήκαμεν ἰδίᾳ ἢ τῶν φίλων τινὶ ἢ ἡμέτερον αὐτῶν, καὶ
τοῦτο τὸ οἰκοδόμημα καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἔστιν· καὶ εἰ μὲν
ἠγύρισκομεν σκοπούμενοι διδασκάλους τε ἡμῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ
ἐλλογίμους γεγονότας καὶ οἰκοδομήματα πολλὰ μὲν καὶ καλὰ c
μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων ὠκοδομημένα ἡμῖν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἴδια
ἡμῶν ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων ἀπηλλάγημεν, οὕτω μὲν δια-
κειμένων, νοῦν ἔχόντων ἦν ἂν ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἔργα·
εἰ δὲ μήτε διδάσκαλον εἵχομεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιδειῖξαι οἰκο- 5
δομήματά τε ἢ μηδὲν ἢ πολλὰ καὶ μηδενὸς ἄξια, οὕτω

c 5 ἀρ' οὖν—7 ποιοῦντας et a 4 πάνυ—ἥδιον Aristides, *orat.* xlvī, p. 195

c 5–8 resp. Proclus in *Alc.*, p. 235. 5–7

e 5 οὕτως] . . τως F (suppl. f) e 5–6 τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς πολίτας F, Stephanus e 6–7 τοὺς πολίτας secl. Herwerden c 7 πρόσθεν F
e 8 εὐρήκαμεν F ὄφελος B (corr. b) a 2 ἀρχειν F a 3 θῶμεν
revera etiam F a 6 πράξοντες F et suprascr. P et recens b: πρά-
ξαντες BTWP: πράξοντας Y: <τι> πράξοντας Richards ἐπὶ secl. Theiler
b 1 τὴν—b 2 ἐπιστάμεθα om. BT sed addunt in marg. b 2 οἰκονομικὴν
B et suprascr. T παρὰ τοῦ BPF: παρὰ του TW c 2 καὶ om. W
ἴδια Malatest.: ἰδίᾳ BTWF: ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' V: ἰδίᾳ <δι> Madvig c 4 ἂν ἰέναι
F: ἀνιέναι [sic] W: ἀνιέναι BTP c 6 πολλὰ] μὴ πολλὰ Coislinianus:
φαῦλα Vermehren

δὴ ἀνόητον ἦν δήπου ἐπιχειρεῖν τοῖς δημοσίοις ἔργοις καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἀλλήλους ἐπ' αὐτά. φῶμεν ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέ-
 d γεσθαι ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ εἰ ἐπιχειρή-
 σαντες δημοσιεύειν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ὥς ἱκανοὶ ἰατροὶ
 5 ὄντες, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δήπου ἂν ἐγὼ τε σὲ καὶ σὺ ἐμέ, Φέρε
 πρὸς θεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης πῶς ἔχει τὸ σῶμα πρὸς
 ὑγίειαν; ἢ ἤδη τις ἄλλος διὰ Σωκράτην ἀπηλλάγη νόσου,
 ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος; καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι περὶ σοῦ ἕτερα
 τοιαῦτα ἐσκόπουν· καὶ εἰ μὴ ἡύρισκομεν δι' ἡμᾶς μηδένα
 e βελτίω γεγονότα τὸ σῶμα, μήτε τῶν ξένων μήτε τῶν
 ἀστῶν, μήτε ἄνδρα μήτε γυναῖκα, πρὸς Διός, ὦ Καλλίκλεις,
 οὐ καταγέλαστον ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀνοίας
 ἔλθειν ἀνθρώπους, ὥστε, πρὶν ἰδιωτεύοντας πολλὰ μὲν ὅπως
 5 ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατορθῶσαι καὶ γυμνάσασθαι
 ἱκανῶς τὴν τέχνην, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν
 κεραμείαν ἐπιχειρεῖν μαθάνειν, καὶ αὐτοὺς τε δημοσιεύειν
 ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους παρακαλεῖν; οὐκ ἀνόητόν
 σοι δοκεῖ ἂν εἶναι οὕτω πράττειν;

10 ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε.

15 ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, ἐπειδὴ σὺ μὲν αὐτὸς
 ἄρτι ἄρχῃ πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἐμέ δὲ παρα-
 καλεῖς καὶ ὀνειδίζεις ὅτι οὐ πράττω, οὐκ ἐπισκεψόμεθα
 ἀλλήλους, Φέρε, Καλλικλῆς ἤδη τινὰ βελτίω πεποίηκεν
 5 τῶν πολιτῶν; ἔστιν ὅστις πρότερον πονηρὸς ὢν, ἀδίκος τε
 καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄφρων, διὰ Καλλικλέα καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς
 γέγονεν, ἢ ξένος ἢ ἀστός, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος; λέγε μοι,

c 4 ἰδιωτεύοντας Antiatticista Bekkeri, p. 100. 9

c 6 τὸ λεγόμενον—7 μαθάνειν schol. vet. Plato, *Laches* 187 b

c 7 δὴ] δὲ editio Basileensis²: δ' ἂν Sauppe ἦν δήπου ἐπιχειρεῖν] ἐπι-
 χειρεῖν ἦν F: ἦν ἂν που ἐπιχειρεῖν Schanz: <ἂν> ἦν δήπου ἐπιχειρεῖν Gercke
 c 8 δῶμεν F d 3 ἐπιχειρήσοντες Heindorf d 5 δὴ ἂν που F
 ἐγὼ τε T²WF: ἔγωγε BT d 7 ἤδη corrector Parisini 1812, Heindorf:
 εἰ δὴ BTWF d 9 ἡύρισκομεν B: εὕρισκομεν TWF e 6 τῷ om.
 schol. *Laches* c 9 οὕτω] τοῦτο F a 2 δὲ om. F (add. in marg. f)
 a 3 οὐκ] ὅτι οὐκ F ἐπισκεψόμεθα F a 4 καλλίκλεις B, καλλικλεῖς F
 a 6 καλλικλῆ F sed η ex corr. καλός] καλλός T (corr. t) a 7 ἢ ἀστός
 om. B

ἐάν τις σε ταῦτα ἐξετάζῃ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἐρεῖς; τίνα b
 φήσεις βελτίω πεποιηκέναι ἄνθρωπον τῇ συνουσίᾳ τῇ σῇ;
 ὁκνεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι, εἴπερ ἔστιν τι ἔργον σὸν ἔτι ἰδιω-
 τεύοντος, πρὶν δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν;

ΚΑΛ. Φιλόνικος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

5

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ φιλονικία γε ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' ὥς ἀληθῶς βου-
 λόμενος εἰδέναι ὄντινά ποτε τρόπον οἷε δεῖν πολιτεύεσθαι
 ἐν ἡμῖν. ἥ ἄλλου του ἄρα ἐπιμελήσῃ ἡμῖν ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ
 τῆς πόλεως πράγματα ἢ ὅπως ὅτι βέλτιστοι οἱ πολῖται ὦμεν; c
 ἢ οὐ πολλάκις ἤδη ὠμολογήκαμεν τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν τὸν
 πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα; ὠμολογήκαμεν ἢ οὐ; ἀποκρίνου. ὠμο-
 λογήκαμεν· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σοῦ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο
 δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα παρασκευάζειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει, νῦν 5
 μοι ἀναμνησθεῖς εἰπὲ περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὧν ὀλίγω
 πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἰ ἔτι σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται γεγο-
 νέναι, Περικλῆς καὶ Κίμων καὶ Μιλτιάδης καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς. d

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι ἕκαστος αὐτῶν
 βελτίους ἐποίει τοὺς πολίτας ἀντὶ χειρόνων. ἐποίει ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

5

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε Περικλῆς ἤρχετο λέγειν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ,
 χείρους ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἢ ὅτε τὰ τελευταῖα ἔλεγεν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἴσως δῆ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν
 ὠμολογημένων, εἴπερ ἀγαθός γ' ἦν ἐκεῖνος πολίτης.

10

ΚΑΛ. Τί οὖν δῆ;

e

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἰπὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ λέγονται
 Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἢ πᾶν τοῦναν-
 τίον διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀκούω,

c-d resp. Aristides, *orat.* xlvī, p. 463; Olympiodorus in *Alc.*, p. 32. 2

b 1 ἐξετάζῃ om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f)

b 3 ἰδιωτεύοντας f

b 8 ἢ

—ἡμῖν om. F (suppl. f in marg.)

ἢ Heindorf; ἢ B: ἢ TWf

c 1 οἱ

revera etiam F

c 2 δεῖν] δ' ἦν W

c 6 ὀλίγον F

c 7 ἀγαθοὶ

οἱ πολῖται F

d 4 prius ἐποίει et punctum post χειρόνων om. F

d 5 Ναί] ἐποίει corrector Parisini 1811, ed. Aldina

d 7 οἱ om. F

d 9 δῆ WF: δεῖ BT

ἀνάγκη Schanz: ἀνάγκη BTWF

d 10 γ']

τ' F

- 5 Περικλέα πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίους ἀργούς καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ
λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον καταστή-
σαντα.

ΚΑΛ. Τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγότων ἀκούεις ταῦτα, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες.

- 10 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τάδε οὐκέτι ἀκούω, ἀλλ' οἶδα σαφῶς καὶ
ἐγὼ καὶ σύ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠὺδοκίμει Περικλῆς καὶ
οὐδεμίαν αἰσχρὰν δίκην κατεψηφίσαντο αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι,
ἥνικα χεῖρους ἦσαν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλοὶ καγαθοὶ ἐγεγόνεσαν
516 ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Περικλέους, κλοπὴν
αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ θανάτου ἐτίμησαν,
δῆλον ὅτι ὡς πονηροῦ ὄντος.

ΚΑΛ. Τί οὖν; τούτου ἔνεκα κακὸς ἦν Περικλῆς;

- 5 ΣΩ. Ὅντων γοῦν ἂν ἐπιμελητῆς καὶ ἵππων καὶ βοῶν
τοιούτος ὢν κακὸς ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰ παραλαβὼν μὴ λακτί-
ζοντας ἑαυτὸν μηδὲ κυρίττοντας μηδὲ δάκνοντας ἀπέδειξε
ταῦτα ἅπαντα ποιῶντας δι' ἀγριότητα. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι
b κακὸς εἶναι ἐπιμελητῆς ὅστισοῦν ὅτουοῦν ζώου, ὃς ἂν παρα-
λαβὼν ἡμερώτερα ἀποδείξῃ ἀγριώτερα ἢ παρέλαβε; δοκεῖ
ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε, ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι.

- 5 ΣΩ. Καὶ τότε τοίνυν μοι χάρισαι ἀποκρινάμενος· πότε-
ρον καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῶν ζώων ἐστὶν ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων Περικλῆς ἐπεμέλετο;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

- 10 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔδει αὐτούς, ὡς ἄρτι ὠμολογοῦμεν,
δικαιοτέρους γεγενῆσθαι ἀντὶ ἀδικωτέρων ὑπ' ἐκείνου, εἴπερ
c ἐκεῖνος ἐπεμελεῖτο αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸς ὢν τὰ πολιτικά;

e 5-6 resp. Aristides, *orat.* xlvī, p. 210; Sopatrus, *Prol.*, pp. 437. 7 et 749. 17
a 5 ὄνων—8 ἀγριότητα Aristides, *ibid.*, p. 392

e 6 λάλους tf: ἀλάλους B (sed a erasum) TW: καλοὺς F μισθοφορὰν Arist. Sop.
e 11 ἠὺδοκίμει B: εὐδοκίμει TWF e 13 ἐπεὶ F a 1 τοῦ Περικλέους
secl. Hirschig a 5 γοῦν ἂν TWF: ἂν γ' οὖν ἂν B (sed prius ἂν erasum):
γοῦν Arist. a 6 εἰ] μὴ F a 7 ἑαυτὸν BT: αὐτὸν WF Arist.: αὐτοὺς
Par² f: om. Y, del. Ast ἐπέδειξε Arist. a 8 ἅπαντας F: om. Arist.
οὐ om. W (add. w) b 2 ἀποδείξει W post ἢ ras. unius lit. T: ἢ B
b 6 καὶ om. W b 8 ἐπεμελεῖτο F b 10 ἀρτίως ὠμολογοῦμεν F

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἷ γε δίκαιοι ἡμεροί, ὥς ἔφη Ὀμηρος· σὺ δὲ τί φῆς; οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

5

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγριωτέρους γε αὐτοὺς ἀπέφηνεν ἢ οἷους παρέλαβεν, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς αὐτόν, ὃν ἥκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο.

ΚΑΛ. Βούλει σοι ὁμολογήσω;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δοκῶ γε σοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω δὴ ταῦτα.

10

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἶπερ ἀγριωτέρους, ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ χείρους;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω.

d

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ Περικλῆς ἦν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σύ γε φῆς.

ΣΩ. Μὰ Δί' οὐδέ γε σὺ ἐξ ὧν ὁμολόγεις. πάλιν δὲ 5 λέγε μοι περὶ Κίμωνος· οὐκ ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτόν οὗτοι οὐς ἐθεράπευεν, ἵνα αὐτοῦ δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀκούσειαν τῆς φωνῆς; καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα ταῦτα ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ προσεζημίωσαν; Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν πρύτανιν, ἐνέπεσεν e ἄν; καίτοι οὗτοι; εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, ὥς σὺ φῆς, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ταῦτα ἔπασχον. οὐκ οἷ γε ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐκ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν ζευγῶν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ θεραπεύσωσιν τοὺς ἵππους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμείνους γένωνται 5 ἡνίοχοι, τότε ἐκπίπτουσιν· οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτ' οὐτ' ἐν ἡνιοχείᾳ οὐτ' ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔργῳ οὐδενί· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

c 6-7 cf. Aristidem, *orat.* xlvi, p. 470

d 9 Μιλτιάδην—Μαραθῶνι Aristides, *ibid.*, p. 266

d 9-e 2 resp. *ibid.*, p. 401, et Sopatrus, *Prol.*, p. 749. 20

e 3 οὐκ οἷ—6 ἐκπίπτουσιν Aristides, *ibid.*, p. 392

c 7 αὐτόν P Par: αὐτόν BTWF Arist.: secl. Cobet ἂν om. Arist. ἐβούλετο om. F (add. in marg. f)

c 8 εἰ βούλει F (punctis corr. f)

d 5 ὁμολογέῃς F d 9 ἐν BTW et revera F, Arist., schol. Arist., Sop.:

secl. Thompson

e 2 ὥς σὺ φῆς, ἀγαθοί Sop.

e 3 οὐκ οἷ F:

οὐκοῦν BTW

e 4 ἐκ om. Arist.

e 5 γένωνται ἀμείνους Arist.

e 6 ἐν om. F

ΣΩ. Ἀληθεῖς ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι ᾗσαν,
 517 ὅτι οὐδένα ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα τὰ πολιτικά
 ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. σὺ δὲ ὠμολόγεις τῶν γε νῦν οὐδένα,
 τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ προείλου τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας·
 οὗτοι δὲ ἀνεφάνησαν ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς νῦν ὄντες, ὥστε, εἰ οὗτοι
 5 ῥήτορες ᾗσαν, οὔτε τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐχρῶντο—οὐ γὰρ
 ἂν ἐξέπεσον—οὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μή
 ποτέ τις τῶν νῦν ἔργα τοιαῦτα ἐργάσεται οἷα τούτων ὅστις
 b βούλει εἵργασται.

ΣΩ. ὦ δαιμόνιε, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ψέγω τούτους ὥς γε διακό-
 νους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν διακονικώ-
 τεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οἰοί τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὧν
 5 ἐπεθύμει. ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ
 ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὅθεν ἔμελ-
 λον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν
 c τούτων διέφερον ἐκείνοι· ὅπερ μόνον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ
 πολίτου. ναῦς δὲ καὶ τείχη καὶ νεώρια καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ
 τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐγὼ σοι ὁμολογῶ δεινοτέρους εἶναι ἐκείνους
 τούτων ἐκπορίζειν. πρᾶγμα οὖν γελοῖον ποιούμεεν ἐγὼ τε
 5 καὶ σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ἐν παντὶ γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ ὃν διαλεγό-
 μεθα οὐδὲν παυόμεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ περιφερόμενοι καὶ
 ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων ὅτι λέγομεν. ἐγὼ γοῦν σε πολλάκις
 οἶμαι ὠμολογηκέναι καὶ ἐγνωκέναι ὥς ἄρα διττὴ τις αὕτη
 d ἡ πραγματεία ἐστὶν καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν,
 καὶ ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα διακονικὴ ἐστίν, ἥ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐκπορίζειν,
 εἴαν μὲν πεινῇ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν, σιτία, εἴαν δὲ διψῇ, ποτά,
 εἴαν δὲ ῥιγῶ, ἱμάτια, στρώματα, ὑποδήματα, ἄλλ' ὧν ἔρχεται
 5 σώματα εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδές σοι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν
 εἰκόνων λέγω, ἵνα ῥᾶον καταμάθῃς. τούτων γὰρ ποριστικὸν

a 4 ὥστε—6 κολακικῇ Aristides, *orat.* xlvī, p. 446

b 2 οὐδ'—c 4 ἐκπορίζειν Sopatrus, *Prol.*, p. 749. 28

e 9 ὥς ἔοικεν om. W sed suppl. in marg. ead. m. a 4 alt. οὗτοι] τοιοῦτοι
 Arist. a 6 ante τῇ κολακικῇ lacunam posuit Meiser a 8 οἷα om.
 F (add. f) ὅστις F: ὅς BTW b 2 γε om. Sop. c 7 γοῦν Y Laur.
 85. 12: τε οὖν F: οὖν BTW c 8 διττὴ τις αὕτη F: διττὴ αὕτη (αὐτὴ B)
 τις BTW d 4 ἄλλα ὧν Par² f: ἄλλων ὧν BTWF d 5 σῶμα W
 d 6 τοῦτον F

εἶναι ἢ κάπηλον ὄντα ἢ ἔμπορον ἢ δημιουργόν του αὐτῶν
τούτων, σιτοποιόν ἢ ὀψοποιόν ἢ ὑφάντην ἢ σκυτοτόμον ἢ **c**
σκυτοδεψόν, <ὄν> οὐδέν θαυμαστόν ἐστίν ὄντα τοιοῦτον δόξαι καὶ
αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῷ
μὴ εἰδότει ὅτι ἐστίν τις παρὰ ταύτας ἀπάσας τέχνη γυμνα-
στική τε καὶ ἰατρική, ἢ δὴ τῷ ὄντι ἐστίν σώματος **5**
θεραπεία, ἣν περ καὶ προσήκει τούτων ἄρχειν πασῶν τῶν
τεχνῶν καὶ χρῆσθαι τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι
τε χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν τῶν σιτίων ἢ ποτῶν ἐστίν εἰς ἀρετὴν
σώματος, τὰς δ' ἄλλας πάσας ταύτας ἀγνοεῖν· διὸ δὴ καὶ **518**
ταύτας μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς τε καὶ διακονικὰς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους
εἶναι [περὶ σώματος πραγματείαν], τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, τὴν δὲ
γυμναστικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεσποίνας εἶναι
τούτων. ταῦτα οὖν ταῦτα ὅτι ἐστίν καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν, τότε **5**
μὲν μοι δοκεῖς μανθάνειν ὅτε λέγω, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς ὡς εἰδὼς
ὅτι ἐγὼ λέγω· ἦ κεις δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον λέγων ὅτι ἄνθρωποι
καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν πολῖται ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐπειδὴν **b**
ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶ οἷτινες, δοκεῖς μοι ὁμοιοτάτους προτείνεισθαι
ἀνθρώπους περὶ τὰ πολιτικά, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ περὶ τὰ γυμνα-
στικά ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος οἷτινες ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν ἢ εἰσὶν
σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ἔλεγες μοι πάνυ σπουδάζων, Θεαρίων **5**
ὁ ἀρτοκόπος καὶ Μίθαικος ὁ τὴν ὀψοποιίαν συγγεγραφῶς
τὴν Σικελικὴν καὶ Σάραμβος ὁ κάπηλος, ὅτι οὗτοι θαυμάσιοι
γεγόνασιν σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὁ μὲν ἄρτους θαυμαστοὺς
παρασκευάζων, ὁ δὲ ὄψον, ὁ δὲ οἶνον. **c**

Ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἡγανάκτεις, εἴ σοι ἔλεγον ἐγὼ ὅτι Ἄνθρωπε,
ἐπαῖεις οὐδὲν περὶ γυμναστικῆς· διακόνους μοι λέγεις καὶ

b 4 οἷτινες—**c** 1 οἶνον Athenaeus 112 de; resp. Maximus Tyrius 15. 4 (p. 186. 7), 17. 1 (p. 207. 4), 33. 5 (p. 386. 6); Aristides, *orat.* xlv, pp. 317, 376; Pollux 7. 193; Themistius, *orat.* 21, 251 c

d 7 εἶναι secl. Rieckher: τινα Richards: sed vide ad e 2 **c** 2 ὄν addidi
e 4 τέχνη om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) **e** 5 ἢ PF: ἢ BTW τῷ ὄντι] τῷ
ὄντι γε F: ἢ τῷ ὄντι Wecklein ἐστίν om. F (add. f) **c** 6 τούτῳ F
(corr. f) **e** 7 τούτων BW et revera F, γρ. T: τοιούτοις T **e** 8 τε
revera F: τὸ BTW: om. V **a** 1 ταύτας] ταῦτα Coraïs **a** 3 περὶ
σώματος πραγματείαν seclusi: περὶ σώμα πραγματείας Cobet **a** 4 δέσποιναν
Cobet **a** 5 γοῦν W **a** 6 ἐδόκει et ὁμολόγεις Par² ὅτε anon.
apud Stallbaum, Madvig: ὅτι BTWF **b** 6 ἀρτοκόπος BTW Ath.:
ἀρτοποιὸς F Par² Olπ συγγεγραφεῖς F **b** 7 σάραβος primitus W

ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους, οὐκ ἐπαίοντας καλὸν
 5 καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν, οἳ, ἂν οὕτω τύχωσιν, ἐμπλήσαντες καὶ
 παχύναντες τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπαινούμενοι ὑπ'
 αὐτῶν, προσαπολοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας σάρκας· οἱ
 d δ' αὖ δι' ἀπειρίαν οὐ τοὺς ἐστιῶντας αἰτιάσονται τῶν νόσων
 αἰτίους εἶναι καὶ τῆς ἀποβολῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων σαρκῶν, ἀλλ'
 οἱ ἂν αὐτοῖς τύχωσι τότε παρόντες καὶ συμβουλευόντες τι,
 ὅταν δὴ αὐτοῖς ἦκη ἢ τότε πλησμονὴ νόσον φέρουσα συχνῶ
 5 ὕστερον χρόνῳ, ἅτε ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ γεγονυῖα, τούτους
 αἰτιάσονται καὶ ψέξουσιν καὶ κακόν τι ποιήσουσιν, ἂν οἱ οἶ
 τ' ᾧσι, τοὺς δὲ προτέρους ἐκείνους καὶ αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν
 e ἐγκωμιάσουσιν. καὶ σὺ νῦν, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, ὁμοιότατον
 τούτῳ ἐργάζῃ· ἐγκωμιάζεις ἀνθρώπους, οἱ τούτους εἰστιά-
 κασιν εὐωχοῦντες ᾧν ἐπεθύμουν. καί φασι μεγάλην τὴν
 πόλιν πεποιηκέναι αὐτούς· ὅτι δὲ οἶδεῖ καὶ ὕπουλός ἐστιν
 519 δι' ἐκείνους τοὺς παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ
 σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ
 τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασιν τὴν
 πόλιν· ὅταν οὖν ἔλθῃ ἢ καταβολὴ αὕτη τῆς ἀσθενείας, τοὺς
 5 τότε παρόντας αἰτιάσονται συμβούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ
 καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκωμιάσουσιν, τοὺς αἰτίους
 τῶν κακῶν· σοῦ δὲ ἴσως ἐπιλήψονται, ἔαν μὴ εὐλαβῇ, καὶ
 τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἐταίρου Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὅταν καὶ τὰ ἀρχαῖα προσ-
 b απολλύωσι πρὸς οἷς ἐκτῆσαντο, οὐκ αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν κακῶν
 ἀλλ' ἴσως συναιτίων.

Καίτοι ἔγωγε ἀνόητον πρᾶγμα καὶ νῦν ὁρῶ γιγνόμενον καὶ
 ἀκούω τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν πέρι. αἰσθάνομαι γάρ, ὅταν ἡ πόλις
 5 τινὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν μεταχειρίζεται ὡς ἀδικοῦντα,
 ἀγανακτούντων καὶ σχετλιαζόντων ὡς δεινὰ πάσχουσι· πολλὰ καὶ

a 1 ἄνευ—4 πόλιν Sopatrus, *Prol.*, p. 750. 5; resp. Aristides, *orat.* xlvi, p. 331;
 Plutarchus, *vit. Arist.* 25; Olympiodorus in *Alc.*, p. 32. 4

c 4 παρασκευὰς τὰς τοὺς F (corr. in marg. f) c 5 οὐδὲν Wft: οὐδὲ BTP
 οὕτω om. F (add. f) c 5-6 καὶ παχύναντες] παχύναι καὶ F (corr. in
 marg. f) c 7 προσαπολοῦσιν B: προσαπόλλουσιν F: προσαπολλύουσιν TW
 d 1 ἐσθίωντας voluit f d 3 αὐτούς W συμβουλευσάντες F d 4 δὴ
 F: δὲ BTWf c 4 οἶδεῖ] οὐ δεῖ F a 8 ἐτέρου W b 3-4 καὶ
 οὐκ ἀκούω F (punctis corr. f) b 4 πέρι. αἰσθάνομαι Wbtf: περιαισθάνομαι
 BTP: πέρι om. rel. spat., tum ὑπεραισθάνομαι F

ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότες ἄρα ἀδίκως ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται,
ὡς ὁ τούτων λόγος. τὸ δὲ ὅλον ψευδὸς ἐστίν· προστάτης γὰρ
πόλεως οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ποτε ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπ' αὐτῆς ταύτης τῆς c
πόλεως ἧς προστατεῖ. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ταῦτόν εἶναι, ὅσοι τε
πολιτικοὶ προσποιοῦνται εἶναι καὶ ὅσοι σοφισταί. καὶ γὰρ οἱ
σοφισταί, τὰλλα σοφοὶ ὄντες, τοῦτο ἄτοπον ἐργάζονται πρᾶγμα·
φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι πολλάκις κατηγο- 5
ροῦσιν τῶν μαθητῶν ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς [αὐτούς], τοὺς τε
μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες,
εἰ παθόντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου τί ἂν ἀλογώ- d
τερον εἴη πρᾶγμα, ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους γενο-
μένους, ἐξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου,
σχόντας δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ ὃ οὐκ ἔχουσιν; οὐ
δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὦ ἑταῖρε; ὡς ἀληθῶς δημη- 5
γορεῖν με ἠνάγκασας, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀποκρί-
νεσθαι.

ΚΑΛ. Σὺ δ' οὐκ ἂν οἶός τ' εἴης λέγειν, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι
ἀποκρίνοιτο;

ΣΩ. Ἐοικά γε· νῦν γοῦν συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων, e
ἐπειδὴ μοι οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, εἰπέ
πρὸς Φιλίου, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄλογον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν φάσκοντα
πεποιηκέναι τινὰ μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ ὅτι ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθὸς
γεγονώς τε καὶ ὣν ἔπειτα πονηρός ἐστιν; 5

ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων τῶν φασκόντων
παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε· ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδενὸς 520
ἀξίων;

b 8 προστάτης—c 2 προστατεῖ Aristides, *orat.* xlvī, p. 448

b 7 ἄρα] εἰ ἄρα Richards: fort. post ἀδίκως transponendum b 8 ὁ τού-
των] οὐτούτων [sic] W c 1 ἀπόλλοιτο F ταύτης F Arist.: om. BTW
c 3-4 καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφισταί om. F (add. in marg. f) c 5 διδάσκαλον F
(corr. f) c 6 αὐτούς TWF: αὐτοὺς B: secl. Bekker d 1 καὶ]
καίτοι Heindorf d 4σχόντας BT: ἔχοντας WF δ] ἀλλ' F: φ Flor f
d 5 τοῦτο om. F, add. in marg. F vel f d 6 με] μὲν B (corr. b)
d 8 εἴης] ἧς F e 1 γοῦν] δὲ in marg. t, suprascr. W: δ' οὖν P ἀπο-
τείνω Cobet e 2 μου F c 4 τινὰ om. F (add. in marg. f) ὑπ'
αὐτῶν F (corr. f)

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἂν περὶ ἐκείνων λέγοις, οἳ φάσκοντες προ-
 εστάναι τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὅπως ὥς βελτίστη
 5 ἔσται, πάλιν αὐτῆς κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν τύχωσιν, ὥς πονη-
 ροτάτης; οἷε τι διαφέρειν τούτους ἐκείνων; ταῦτόν, ὧ
 μακάρι', ἐστὶν σοφιστῆς καὶ ῥήτωρ, ἢ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παρα-
 πλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον· σὺ δὲ δι' ἄγνοϊαν
 b τὸ μὲν πάγκαλόν τι οἷε εἶναι, τὴν ῥητορικὴν, τοῦ δὲ κατα-
 φρονεῖς· τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κάλλιον ἐστὶν σοφιστικὴ ῥητο-
 ρικῆς ὥσπερ νομοθετικὴ δικαστικῆς καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἰατρικῆς.
 μόνοις δ' ἔγωγε καὶ ὥμην τοῖς δημηγόροις τε καὶ σοφισταῖς
 5 οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι ὃ αὐτοὶ παι-
 δεύουσιν, ὥς πονηρόν ἐστιν εἰς σφᾶς, ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ
 τούτῳ ἅμα καὶ ἐαυτῶν κατηγορεῖν ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφελήκασιν
 οὓς φασιν ὠφελεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;

c ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ προέσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνευ μισθοῦ,
 ὥς τὸ εἰκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον.
 ἄλλην μὲν γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις εὐεργετηθεὶς, οἷον ταχὺς
 5 γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτρίβην, ἴσως ἂν ἀποστερήσειε τὴν
 χάριν, εἰ προοῖτο αὐτῷ ὃ παιδοτρίβης καὶ μή, συνθέμενος
 [αὐτῷ] μισθόν, ὅτι μάλιστα ἅμα μεταδιδούς τοῦ τάχους λαμ-
 d βάνοι τὸ ἀργύριον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ βραδυτῇτι οἶμαι ἀδικοῦσιν
 οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' ἀδικία· ἢ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἀδικίαν,
 5 οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μήποτε ἀδικηθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἀσφαλές
 ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προέσθαι, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι δύναιτό τις
 ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὕτω;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλὰς
 10 συμβουλεύειν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἷον οἰκοδομίας πέρι
 ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν.

a 3 κείνων BW b 1 μὲν] μὲν γε F b 2 κάλλιστόν F (corr. f)
 b 5 ὧ corrector Bod. misc. 189 c 2 προέσθαι δε [sic] W c 6 μή]
 μὴν f c 7 αὐτῷ TWf; αὐτῷ B: om. F, seclusi d 1 δὴ F: om. BTW
 d 2-3 ἢ γάρ; Ναί om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) d 5 ἀλλὰ F: ἀλλ' ὃ BTW
 d 5-6 ἀσφαλές ταύτην] ἀσφαλέστατον Flor, ἀσφαλέστατον ταύτην f d 6 δέ-
 νεται F d 9 ὥς ἔοικε δὴ F

ΚΑΛ. "Εοικέ γε.

e

ΣΩ. Περὶ δέ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὄντιν' ἂν τις τρόπον ὡς βέλτιστος εἴη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ ἢ πόλιν, αἰσχροὺς νενόμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλευεῖν, εἰ μὴ τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ. ἦ γάρ;

5

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο αἰτιὸν ἐστίν, ὅτι μόνη αὕτη τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν, ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντ' εὖ πείσεται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐ. 10
ἐστὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα;

ΚΑΛ. "Εστίν.

521

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ ποτέραν οὖν με παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως, διόρισόν μοι· τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, ὡς ἱατρόν, ἢ ὡς διακονήσοντα καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλήσοντα; τάληθῇ μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· 5
δίκαιος γὰρ εἶ, ὥσπερ ἤρξω παρρησιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ, διατελεῖν ἃ νοεῖς λέγων· καὶ νῦν εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ.

ΚΑΛ. Λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι ὡς διακονήσοντα.

ΣΩ. Κολακεύσοντα ἄρα με, ὦ γενναϊότατε, παρακαλεῖς. b

ΚΑΛ. Εἴ σοι Μυσὸν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὡς εἰ μὴ ταῦτά γε ποιήσεις—

ΣΩ. Μὴ εἴπῃς ὁ πολλάκις εἶρηκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με ὁ βουλόμενος, ἵνα μὴ αὖ καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι Πονηρός γε 5
ὢν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα· μὴδ' ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται εἰάν τι ἔχω, ἵνα μὴ αὖ ἐγὼ εἴπω ὅτι Ἄλλ' ἀφελόμενος οὐχ ἔξει ὅτι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ με ἀδίκως ἀφείλετο, οὕτως καὶ λαβὼν ἀδίκως χρήσεται, εἰ δὲ ἀδίκως, αἰσχροῶς, εἰ δὲ c
αἰσχροῶς, κακῶς.

ΚΑΛ. "Ως μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν μὴδ' ἂν

e 3 βέλτιστος F Oll: βέλτιστον BTW e 3-4 διοικοῖ ἢ] διοικοίη B (corr. b)
e 4 συμβουλευεῖν F (coniecerat Cobet) e 5 δίδωσιν F (corr. in marg. f)
e 7 τοῦτο] αὐτὸ F e 8-9 ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν B: ἀντενποιεῖν TWF
a 2 τὴν om. Y a 5 ὦ F: om. BTW a 6 πρὸς με F
a 7 ἂ] ἂν F a 8 ὡς om. F (add. in marg. f) b 3 γε] τε F
b 4 ὁ TWf: ὅτι B: om. revera F ἀποκτείνει F (corr. f) b 5-6 γε
ὢν] ἐὼν F (corr. f) b 8 ἐμέ F c 1 χρήσαιο f c 2 καὶ
κακῶς F c 3 δοκεῖς ὦ σωκράτης F: δοκεῖ σώκρατες BTW: δοκεῖ Σωκράτης Schanz

ἐν τούτων παθεῖν, ὡς οἰκῶν ἐκποδὼν καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθεὶς
5 εἰς δικαστήριον ὑπὸ πάνυ ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ
φαύλου.

ΣΩ. Ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ
οἶμαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ὄντιν οὖν ἂν ὅτι τύχοι, τοῦτο παθεῖν.
τόδε μέντοι εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἐάνπερ εἰσῶ εἰς δικαστήριον περὶ
d τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων, ὃ σὺ λέγεις, πονηρός τις μ' ἔσται
ὃ εἰσάγων—οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν χρηστὸς μὴ ἀδικοῦντ' ἀνθρωπον
εἰσαγάγοι—καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄτοπον εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι. βούλει σοι
εἶπω δι' ὅτι ταῦτα προσδοκῶ;

5 ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οἶμαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἶπω μόνος,
ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ
πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν· ἄτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς
λόγους οὕς λέγω ἐκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς
e τὸ ἡδιστον, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ παραινεῖς, τὰ κομψὰ
ταῦτα, οὐχ ἔξω ὅτι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. ὃ αὐτὸς δέ
μοι ἤκει λόγος ὅνπερ πρὸς Πῶλον ἔλεγον· κρινοῦμαι γὰρ
ὡς ἐν παιδίῳ ἱατρὸς ἂν κρίνοιτο κατηγοροῦντος ὀψοποιοῦ.
5 σκόπει γάρ, τί ἂν ἀπολογοῖτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνθρώπος ἐν τούτοις
ληφθεὶς, εἰ αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῖ τις λέγων ὅτι “ὦ παῖδες,
πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὅδε ἐργασται ἀνὴρ καὶ αὐτούς, καὶ
τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν διαφθείρει τέμνων τε καὶ κάων, καὶ
522 ἰσχυραίνων καὶ πνίγων ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, πικρότατα πώματα
διδούς καὶ πεινῇν καὶ διψῇν ἀναγκάζων, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ
πολλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ἠυώχουν ὑμᾶς.” τί ἂν οἶει
ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα ἱατρὸν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν; ἢ εἰ
5 εἴποι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὅτι “Ταῦτα πάντα ἐγὼ ἐποιοῦν, ὦ

e 6 εἰ—τις Thomas Mag., p. 200. 11

c 4 οἰκῶν] οὐκ ὦν W
(corr. in marg. f)

d 8 νυνί F

τοιοῦτοις F

F (corr. f)

om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f)

Bekker: πόματα BTWF

ἱατρὸν om. F (add. f)

ταῦτ' F

c 8 ὄντιν οὖν—9 οἶδ' om. W
d 1 ὃ] ὦν Laur. 85. 12, Heindorf

e 1 περαινέις W

e 6 αὐτόν F

ἀνὴρ Bekker

om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f)

a 1 ἰσχυραίνων] γρ. ἰσχυων Ol

a 3 ἂν] οὖν F

εἰ F: om. BTW, del. f

c 8 ὅτι] τι F
d 3 εἰσαγοί F

e 4 ἂν ἱατρὸς F

e 5 τούτοις]

e 7 ὑμεῖς

e 8 νεω-

a 4 ὑποληφθέντα Flor f

a 5 εἶπη F

πάντα

παῖδες, ὑγιεινῶς," πόσον τι οἶει ἂν ἀναβοῇσαι τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστάς; οὐ μέγα;

ΚΑΛ. Ἰσως.

ΣΩ. Οἷεσθαί γε χρή. οὐκ οὐκ οἶει ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ ἂν αὐτὸν ἔχεσθαι ὅτι χρή εἰπεῖν; b

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοιούτον μέντοι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα ὅτι πάθος πάθοιμι ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικαστήριον. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονὰς ἄς ἐκπεπόρικα ἔξω αὐτοῖς λέγειν, ἄς οὗτοι εὐεργεσίας καὶ ὠφελίας νομί- 5 ζουσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε τοὺς πορίζοντας ζηλῶ οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται· ἂν τέ τις με ἢ νεωτέρους φῇ διαφθείρειν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα, ἢ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κακηγορεῖν λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔξω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι "Δικαίως πάντα ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω καὶ πράττω"—τὸ ὑμέτερον δὲ τοῦτο— c "ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί", οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν· ὥστε ἴσως, ὅτι ἂν τύχω, τοῦτο πείσομαι.

ΚΑΛ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς ἔχειν ἄνθρωπος ἐν πόλει οὕτως διακείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος ὢν ἑαυτῷ 5 βοηθεῖν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ πολλάκις ὠμολόγησας· εἰ βεβοηθηκὼς εἴη αὐτῷ, μήτε περὶ ἀνθρώπους μήτε περὶ θεοὺς ἀδικον μηδὲν μήτε εἰρηκὼς μήτε d εἰργασμένος. αὕτη γὰρ τῆς βοηθείας ἑαυτῷ πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὠμολόγηται κρατίστη εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐμέ τις ἐξελέγχοι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν ἀδύνατον ὄντα ἑμαυτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βοηθεῖν,

b 5 εὐεργεσίας—9 δημοσίᾳ fragmenta mutila P.S.I. 119 (Π²)

c 8 βεβοηθηκὼς—e 1 αὐτὸ fragmenta P. Fouad I. 2 (Π⁴)

a 6 πόσον F: ὁπόσον BTW τι οἶει Fuhr: ποιεῖ B primitus: οἶει TWfB
 ἂν om. F a 9 οἷεσθαί γε χρή Socrati tribuit Forman, qui haec verba
 post a 7 μέγα transp.: Callicli continuant BTWF, quo recepto ἴσως del.
 ci. Hirschig b 1 εἰπεῖν] ποιεῖν W b 4 ἄς om. B ἐκπεπόρικα F
 b 5 καὶ ὠφελίας om. F (add. in marg. f) Π² b 7 τοὺς νεωτέρους Hirschig
 b 8 κακηγορεῖν BT: κατηγορεῖν WF (corr. f) c 1 ταῦτα πάντα W interpunctionem veram revocavit Maas, collato Ol (et post πράττω interpunct. revera BWF)
 c 7 εἰ] ἢ F ἐν Cōraēs: ἐν BTW et revera F ὃς σὺ T (corr. t)
 c 8—d 1 μήτε περὶ ἀνθρώπους] τὰς πεπο***** F (vera suppl. in marg. f) [μήτε περὶ θεοὺς] μήτε ἀνθρώ[πους Π⁴ ut vid. d 1 εἰρηκὼς] ἡδικηκὼς F (corr. f) d 2 αὕτη—3 κρατίστη om. Π⁴ d 2 τῆς βοηθείας F: τις βοήθεια BTWf (quo recepto τοιαύτη γάρ Deuschle): ἡ βοήθεια Cobet: τοι βοήθεια ci. Sauppe d 3 ἐμέ τις BTW: με τις F: τίς με Π⁴

5 αἰσχυνοίμην ἄν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις ἐξελεγχόμενος
καὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου, καὶ εἰ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ἀποθνή-
σκοιμι, ἀγανακτοίην ἄν· εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐνδεία
τελευτῶν ἔγωγε, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι ῥαδίως ἴδοις ἄν με φέροντα
e τὸν θάνατον. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται,
ὅστις μὴ παντάπασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἄνανδρός ἐστιν, τὸ
δὲ ἀδικεῖν φοβεῖται· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων γέμοντα τὴν
ψυχὴν εἰς Ἄιδου ἀφικέσθαι πάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν ἐστιν.
5 εἰ δὲ βούλει, σοὶ ἐγώ, ὥς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἐθέλω λόγον
λέξαι.

ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ περ γε καὶ τᾶλλα ἐπέρανας, καὶ τοῦτο
πέρανον.

523 ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν
ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὥς ἀληθῆ γὰρ
ὄντα σοὶ λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ Ὅμηρος λέγει,
διενείμαντο τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν καὶ ὁ Πλούτων,
5 ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον. ἦν οὖν νόμος ὃδε περὶ
ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνου, καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔστιν ἐν θεοῖς,
τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ
b ὁσίως, ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντα οἰκεῖν
ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς κακῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως
εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον, ὃ δὴ Τάρταρον

usque ad e 1 αὐτὸ fragmenta P. Fouad I. 2 (Π⁴)

d 5 καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς—e 4 ψυχὴν et a 6 νῦν—b 3 Τάρταρον fragmenta mutila
P.S.I. 119 (Π²)

a 1 ἄκουε—524 b 4 ἀλλήλων Plutarchus (?), *Cons. ad Apoll.* 120E [MSS.
p g α A E Z v B]

a 1 ἄκουε—524 a 7 ἀνθρώποις Stobaeus 1. 49. 63

a 1 ἄκουε—3 λέγειν Eusebius, *Pr. Ev.* 577B (unde Theodoret., *Graec. Aff.*
Cur. 11. 25 Raeder); cf. Plutarchum, *ser. num. vind.* 561B

a 3 ὥσπερ—4 Πλούτων Proclus in *Remph.* i. 156. 30

a 5—6 resp. Proclus in *Alc.*, p. 220. 14

a 7 τὸν μὲν—b 4 ἵεναι Eus. *ibid.* 577B et 699C (unde Theod. *ibid.*)

b 3 cf. Proclum in *Remph.* ii. 140. 7

d 5 ἐλεγχόμενος Π⁴ d 6 alt. καὶ om. W εἰ διὰ FbtwΠ²Π⁴: ἰδίᾳ BTW
δύναμιν primitus W (corr. ead. m.) d 8 ἴδοις ἄν με ῥαδίως FΠ² et fort.

Π⁴ (qui post ὅτι om. ῥαδίως) e 4 κακόν F Olπ ἔσται W (corr. s.l.
ead. m.) e 6 λέξαι] δέξαι F (corr. f) e 7 ἐπεὶ περ γε] ἐπειδή περ W

a 1 φασί BTWF Eus. Olπ: φησί Stob. et fort. Plut. a 2 ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι,
μῦθον Plut. a 5 ὥδε F (corr. f) a 6 ἐπὶ] καὶ ἐπὶ Plut. καὶ
ante ἀεὶ om. F (add. f) νῦν ἔτι ἔστιν] νῦν ἔστιν νῦν W a 7 διελθόντα

τὸν βίον Plutarchi α A E Z v B b 3 τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τίσεως Plut.

καλοῦσιν, ἰέναι. τούτων δὲ δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ ἔτι
 νεωστὶ τοῦ Διὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων, 5
 ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ δικάζοντες ἢ μέλλοιεν τελευτᾶν· κακῶς οὖν
 αἱ δίκαι ἐκρίνοντο. ὃ τε οὖν Πλούτων καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ οἱ
 ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἰόντες ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Δία ὅτι φοιτῶν
 σφισιν ἄνθρωποι ἐκατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ζεὺς· “Ἄλλ’ c
 ἐγώ,” ἔφη, “παύσω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. νῦν μὲν γὰρ κακῶς
 αἱ δίκαι δικάζονται. ἀμπεχόμενοι γάρ,” ἔφη, “οἱ κρινόμενοι
 κρίνονται· ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνονται. πολλοὶ οὖν,” ἢ δ’ ὅς,
 “ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες ἡμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά τε καλὰ 5
 καὶ γένη καὶ πλούτους, καί, ἐπειδὰν ἡ κρίσις ἦ, ἔρχονται
 αὐτοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες ὥς δικαίως βεβιώ-
 κασιν· οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπὸ τε τούτων ἐκπλήττονται, καὶ d
 ἅμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι δικάζουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς
 αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ὦτα καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκαλυμ-
 μένοι. ταῦτα δὲ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰ
 αὐτῶν ἀμφιέσματα καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινομένων. πρῶτον μὲν 5
 οὖν,” ἔφη, “παυστέον ἐστὶν προειδόμενος αὐτοὺς τὸν θάνατον·
 νῦν γὰρ προῖσασι. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προ-
 μηθεῖ ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα γυμνοὺς κριτέον c
 ἀπάντων τούτων· τεθνεώτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίνεσθαι. καὶ τὸν
 κριτὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν
 ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἐκάστου, ἔρημον

b 4 καλοῦσιν—8 ἰόντες et d 1 καί—e 3 κριτὴν fragmenta mutila P.S.I. 119 (Π²)

Plutarchus (?), *Cons. ad Apoll.* 121A

Stobaeus 1. 49. 63

d 4 καί—5 κρινομένων Thomas Mag., p. 51. 11

e 1 ἔπειτα—6 κρίσις ἢ Eusebius, *Pr. Ev.* 577BC (unde Theod. 11. 26)

e 3 resp. Synesius, *Epist.* 44, p. 657

b 4 οἱ δικασταὶ Plut. δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνου et b 5 ζῶν- om. F rel. spat.
 (suppl. f) ἐπὶ χρόνου B b 6 ἐν ἐκείνῃ F τῇ FΠ² Plut. Stob. Oll:
 om. BTW τελευτήσῃ Plut. b 7 alt. οἱ Plut.: om. BTWF Stob. et
 ut vid. Π² c 1 σφισιν Plut. Stob.: σφιν vel σφὶν BTWF c 2 ἔφη
 del. Par² c 4 ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνονται BTW (κρίνονταν) F Plut. Oll: om.
 P Stob. οὖν] μὲν οὖν ἴσως Plut. (μὲν om. Plut. p g) c 5 πονηρὰς
 ψυχὰς Plut. c 7 μάρτυρες om. Plut. (secl. Cobet) d 3 ὀφθαλμοὺς
 τε Plut. τὸ om. F (add. f) d 4 δὴ] δὲ Stob. ἐπίπροσθεν] ἐπιπρόσ-
 θησις Plut.: ἐμπροσθεν Stob. d 5 [αὐ]τοῦ Π² d 6 ἔφη om. Plut.
 d 7 νῦν] νῦν μὲν Par f Plut. προῖσασι W οὖν καὶ δὴ] δὴ καὶ Stob.
 e 1 αὐτῶν BTF Stob.: αὐτόν W: αὐτό Plut. e 3 δεῖ] δὲ δεῖ Cobet

5 πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα
ἐκείνον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις ᾗ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν
ταῦτα ἐγνωκῶς πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς ἐποιησάμην δικαστὰς ὑεῖς
ἐμαυτοῦ, δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, Μίνω τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυν,
524 ἓνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης, Αἰακόν· οὗτοι οὖν ἐπειδὴν τελευ-
τήσωσι, δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ ἐξ ἧς
φέρετον τὼ ὁδῶ, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ' εἰς Τάρ-
ταρον. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας Ῥαδάμανθους κρινεῖ, τοὺς
5 δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Αἰακός· Μίνω δὲ πρεσβεία δώσω ἐπιδι-
κρῖναι, εἰς ἀπορήτον τι τῷ ἐτέρῳ, ἵνα ὡς δικαιοτάτῃ ἡ κρίσις
ᾗ περὶ τῆς πορείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.”

Ταῦτ' ἔστιν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἃ ἐγὼ ἀκηκοὺς πιστεύω
b ἀληθῆ εἶναι· καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων τοιόνδε τι λογιζομαι
συμβαίνειν. ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὧν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν
ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτων διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ
σώματος, ἀπ' ἀλλήλων· ἐπειδὴν δὲ διαλυθῇτον ἄρα ἀπ'
5 ἀλλήλων, οὐ πολὺ ἦττον ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἔχει τὴν ἕξιν τὴν
αὐτοῦ ἥνπερ καὶ ὅτε ἕξῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τό τε σῶμα τὴν φύσιν
τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ θεραπεύματα καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἔνδηλα
c πάντα. οἷον εἴ τινας μέγα ᾗν τὸ σῶμα φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ

usque ad b 4 ἀλλήλων Plutarchus (?), *Cons. ad Apoll.* 121c

usque ad a 7 ἀνθρώποις Stobaeus i. 49. 63

e 6—a 7 resp. Justinus, *Apol.* i. 8, 57b; Athenagoras, *Supp.* 12. 1; Olympio-
dorus in *Meteor.*, p. 144. 24 Stüve

e 8—a 2 cf. Proclum in *Remph.* ii. 128. 4, 16 et 132. 24

a 8 ταῦτ'—527 b 6 δημοσίᾳ Eusebius, *Pr. Ev.* 577c (huius loci excerpta tran-
scripsit ex Eus. Theod. i. 65; 6. 28; 11. 28–30, 67; 12. 40–41; quae e
Theod. postea compilavit Georgius Monachos, *Chron.* i. 86. 18 de
Boor, e Georgio demum Suidas s.v. Πλάτων)

e 5 ἀπάντων Plut. καὶ om. F (add. f) Plut. τὰ ἐπὶ F τῆς om. Eus. et
Plutarchi p g v B e 6 ἵνα δὲ Eus. (sed ἵνα Theod.) μὲν om. Plut.
(habet Olλ) e 7 ταῦτα om. Stob. (habet Olλ) πρότερος BTWF Stob.
Olπ: πρότερον Plut. Olλ e 8 μίνων F primitus a 1 οὖν] νῦν Plut.
a 2 τῇ om. Stob., non agnoscit Olπ a 3 ἐφέρετον τῶν ὁδῶν Stob.
a 4 τοὺς μὲν] τοῦ μὲν Stob. ὁ Ῥαδάμανθους F a 6 ἀπορήτον τι Olπ,
Bod. misc. 189: ἀπόρητον τι BTWF: ἀπόρητον τι ἢ Plut. Stob. τῷ ἐτέρῳ
B: τῷ ἐτέρῳ TWF Plut. Stob.: τῷ ἐτέρῳ sic revera P a 6–7 ἡ κρίσις ἢ
BTWF: κρίσις ἢ Plut.: ἢ κρίσις Stob. b 1 τι om. Eus. b 2 ὅ] ὅτι ὁ
Plut. ὧν om. Eus. b 3 πραγμάτων W b 4 ἐπειδὴν—5 ἀλλήλων
om. F (add. in marg. f) ἄρα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων om. Eus. b 5 οὐ πολὺ]
οὐδὲν Eus. b 7 τὴν om. P Eus. c 1 μέγα ᾗν BTW: ᾗν μέγα
Eus.: ἢ μέγα F

ἀμφοτέρα ζῶντος, τούτου καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ νεκρὸς
 μέγας, καὶ εἰ παχύ, παχύς καὶ ἀποθανόντος, καὶ τὰλλα
 οὕτως· καὶ εἰ αὖ ἐπετήδευε κομᾶν, κομήτης τούτου καὶ ὁ
 νεκρός. μαστιγίας αὖ εἴ τις ἦν καὶ ἔχνη εἶχε τῶν πληγῶν 5
 οὐλὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ὑπὸ μαστίγων ἢ ἄλλων τραυμάτων
 ζῶν, καὶ τεθνεώτος τὸ σῶμα ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ταῦτα ἔχον· ἢ
 κατεαγότα εἴ του ἦν μέλη ἢ διεστραμμένα ζῶντος, καὶ
 τεθνεώτος ταῦτα ταῦτα ἔνδηλα. ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, οἷος εἶναι d
 παρεσκευάστο τὸ σῶμα ζῶν, ἔνδηλα ταῦτα καὶ τελευτήσαντος
 ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον. ταῦτόν δὴ μοι δοκεῖ
 τοῦτ' ἄρα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὧς Καλλίκλεις· ἔνδηλα
 πάντα ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τὰ 5
 τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν
 ἐκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ἐπειδὴν
 οὖν ἀφίκωνται παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας
 παρὰ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθυν, ὁ Ῥαδάμανθους ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας e
 θεᾶται ἐκάστου τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτου ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ
 πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου
 ὅτουοῦν βασιλέως ἢ δυνάστου κατεῖδεν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὄν τῆς
 ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν μεστήν ὑπὸ 5
 ἐπιπορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας, ἃ ἐκάστη ἢ πρᾶξις αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο 525
 εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλα-
 ζονείας καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθὺ διὰ τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας τεθράφθαι· καὶ

d 8 οὖν—e 4 κατεῖδεν et a 1 ἐπιπορκιῶν—3 τεθράφθαι· καὶ fragmenta mutila
 P.S.I. 119 (Π²).

Eusebius, *Pr. Ev.* 577D

524 d resp. Themistius, *orat.* 20, 234C, et Julianus, *Symph.* 309C

525 a resp. Plotinus 1. 6. 5. 25 Henry-Schwyzler

c 3 παχύ Hirschig: παχύς BTWF Eus. c 5 μαστιγίας αὖ] ἢ μαστιγίας
 Eus. εἴ τις αὖ F c 6 οὐλὰς secl. Heindorf (habet Ol) c 7-8 ἢ
 κατεαγότα Eus.: κατεαγότα BTWF: κατεαγότα τε V: καὶ κατεαγότα Schanz
 c 8 διεστραμμένου ὄντος F d 1 ταῦτα ταῦτα ἔνδηλα F: ταῦτα ἔνδηλα
 BTW: om. Eus. ἐνὶ δὲ] καὶ ἐνὶ Eus. d 3 prius ἢ Findeisen: ἦν
 BTWF Eus. d 5 πάντα] δὴ ταῦτα revera. F (corr. in marg. f)
 d 6 ἃ om. Eus. d 7 ἔσχεν] ἦν ἔσχεν Eus. ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔσχεν F
 d 8 ἀφίκονται F (corr. f) οἱ μὲν] οἶμαι Eus. e 1 post Ῥαδά-
 μανθυν add. οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς εὐρώπης παρὰ τὸν αἰακόν V e 3 ἢ] ἢ του F
 a 1 ἐκάστῳ Y ἢ om. Eus. a 2 ὑπὸ] καὶ ὑπὸ W a 3 τεθράφθαι
 B Par²: τετράφθαι TWF Eus. et revera P

- ὑπὸ ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ὑβρεως καὶ ἀκρατείας τῶν
 5 πράξεων ἀσυμμετρίας τε καὶ αἰσχροτήτος γέμουσαν τὴν
 ψυχὴν εἶδεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ἀτίμως ταύτην ἀπέπεμψεν εὐθὺ τῆς
 φρουρᾶς, οἳ μέλλει ἐλθοῦσα ἀνατλήναι τὰ προσήκοντα πάθη.
- b Προσῆκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, ὑπ' ἄλλου ὀρθῶς
 τιμωρουμένῳ, ἢ βελτίονι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὀνίνασθαι ἢ παρα-
 δείγματι τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα ἄλλοι ὀρώντες πᾶσχοντα
 ἃ ἂν πᾶσχη φοβούμενοι βελτίους γίγνωνται. εἰσὶν δὲ οἱ
 5 μὲν ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην διδόντες ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ
 ἀνθρώπων οὔτοι οἳ ἂν ἰάσιμα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμάρτωσιν· ὁμως
 δὲ δι' ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ὀδυνῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἡ ὠφέλεια καὶ
 ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Ἄιδου· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄλλως ἀδικίας ἀπαλ-
 c λάττεσθαι. οἳ δ' ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τὰ
 τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παρα-
 δείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὔτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνανται
 οὐδέν, ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίνανται οἱ τούτους
 5 ὀρώντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ
 φοβερώτατα πάθη πᾶσχοντας τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παρα-
 δείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Ἄιδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ,
 τοῖς αἰὲ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νοητέματα.
- d ὦν ἐγὼ φημι ἕνα καὶ Ἀρχέλαον ἔσεσθαι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει
 Πῶλος, καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις ἂν τοιοῦτος τύραννος ᾗ· οἶμαι δὲ
 καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς εἶναι τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἐκ
 τυράννων καὶ βασιλέων καὶ δυναστῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων
 5 πραξάντων γεγονότας· οὔτοι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν μέγιστα καὶ
 usque ad b 1 ὑπ' fragmenta mutila P.S.I. 119 (Π²)

Eusebius, *Pr. Ev.* 578B

b 1 προσῆκει—4 γίγνωνται Gellius 7. 14. 7

b-e cf. Proclum in *Remph.* ii. 184. 15 et i. 168. 29

a 4 ἀκρατείας Y Eus.: ἀκρατίας BWf et ut vid. Π²: ἀκρασίας T a 6 εἶδεν
 TWF Eus.: ἰδεν B: ἰδεῖν Π² αὐτὴν Eus. εὐθὺς W a 7 οἳ] δ F primitus
 b 1 ἐντίμῳ ῥᾶον τι F (corr. f) b 2 τιμωρουμένου f βέλτιον F (corr. f)
 παραδείγματι YV et Gellii dett.: παράδειγμά τι BTW: παραδείγματα F et
 Gellii V: παράδειγμα Eus. OIλ b 3 τοῖς BTW: om. F Eus. Gell. OIλ
 ἄλλοι] ἄλλοι οἱ Gell. b 4 ἃ ἂν πᾶσχη] ἃ πᾶσχει F: om. Gell. βέλτιοι
 (corr. f) γίγνωνται F b 5 δίκην δι- om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f) b 6 οἳ
 ἂν om. F ἁμαρτάνωσιν Eus. b 7 ὠφέλεια W b 8 οὐ] οὐδὲ Eus.
 c 1 alt. τὰ F Eus.: om. BTW c 5 τὰς μεγίστας Eus. c 7 ἐν Ἄιδου]
 ἐδίδου pr. F d 1 λέγει F d 2 ἄλλος Eus. d 3 τούτων F
 Eus.: τοὺς TW: τοὺς τούτων B τῶν παραδειγμάτων secl. ci. Heindorf

ἀνοσιώτατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνουσι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις
καὶ Ὀμηρος· βασιλέας γὰρ καὶ δυνάστας ἐκεῖνος πεποίηκεν
τοὺς ἐν Αἴδου τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον τιμωρουμένους, Τάνταλον καὶ e
Σίσυφον καὶ Τιτυόν· Θερσίτην δέ, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος πονηρὸς
ἦν ιδιώτης, οὐδεὶς πεποίηκεν μεγάλας τιμωρίαις συνεχό-
μενον ὡς ἀνίατον—οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι ἐξῆν αὐτῷ· διὸ καὶ εὐδαιμο-
νέστερος ἦν ἢ οἷς ἐξῆν—ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐκ τῶν 5
δυναμένων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροὶ γιγνόμενοι ἄνθρωποι· 526
οὐδὲν μὲν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγγίγνεσθαι,
καὶ σφόδρα γε ἄξιον ἄγασθαι τῶν γιγνομένων· χαλεπὸν γάρ,
ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ πολλοῦ ἐπαίνου ἄξιον ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐξουσίᾳ
τοῦ ἀδικεῖν γενόμενον δικαίως διαβιῶναι. ὀλίγοι δὲ γίνονται 5
οἱ τοιοῦτοι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλοι γεγόνασιν, οἶμαι δὲ
καὶ ἔσονται, καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ δικαίως
διαχειρίζειν ἃ ἂν τις ἐπιτρέπη, εἰς δὲ καὶ πάντῃ ἐλλόγιμος b
γέγονεν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσι-
μάχου· οἱ δὲ πολλοί, ὦ ἄριστε, κακοὶ γίνονται τῶν δυνα-
στῶν. ὅπερ οὖν ἔλεγον, ἐπειδὴν ὁ Ῥαδάμανθς ἐκεῖνος
τοιοῦτόν τινα λάβῃ, ἄλλο μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδέν, 5
οὔθ' ὅστις οὔθ' ὠντινων, ὅτι δὲ πονηρὸς τις· καὶ τοῦτο
κατιδὼν ἀπέπεμψε εἰς Τάρταρον, ἐπισημνύμενος, ἕαντε
ἰάσιμος ἕαντε ἀνίατος δοκῇ εἶναι· ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος
τὰ προσήκοντα πάσχει. ἐνίοτε δ' ἄλλην εἰσιδὼν ὁσίως c
βεβιωκυῖαν καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας, ἀνδρὸς ιδιώτου ἢ ἄλλου τινός,
μάλιστα μὲν, ἔγωγέ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, φιλοσόφου τὰ
αὐτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ,

a 4 ἐπαίνου—6 δὲ fragmenta mutila P.S.I. 119 (Π²)

Eusebius, *Pr. Ev.* 579A ff. [MSS. I O N]

e 5 ἀλλὰ—b 3 δυναστῶν Aristides, *orat.* xlv, p. 146

a 3 χαλεπὸν—5 διαβιῶναι *ibid.*, p. 149

b 1–3 resp. Plutarchus, *vit. Arist.* 25

e 3 ιδιώτης] ιδιώτης δὲ Eus.

e 4 post αὐτῷ excidisse aliquid ci.

Richards (ἐκβῆναι ἀνιάτῳ suppl. Theiler)

a 1 δυναμένων] αὐτῶν Arist.

ἄνθρωποι et a 2 ἄνδρας om. F rel. spat. (suppl. f)

a 5 γενόμενον

τοῦ ἀδικεῖν Eus.

a 6 ἐνθαδὶ Arist.

a 7 καὶ om. Eus.

καλοὶ] καλλοὶ

Eus. (sed καλοὶ Theod.)

alt. τὴν F: om. BTW Arist. Eus.

b 1 ἃ ἂν]

ἂν Arist.

b 2 ἀριστίδης B

b 3–4 οἱ τε δὲ ἄλλοι, ὦ ἄριστε

Καλλί-

κλεις, ὅσοι καλοὶ γίνονται. τῶν δὲ δικαστῶν, ὅπερ ἔλεγον Eus.

b 8 ἰάσι-

μος ἕαντε om. F (add. in marg. f)

c 3 ἔγωγέ] ἐγώ Eusebii O N, ὡς ἐγώ

Eusebii I, ὡς ἔγωγέ Theod.

c 4 αὐτοῦ] αὐτὰ F

ἡγάσθη τε καὶ ἐς μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψε. ταῦτα δὲ
ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Αἰακός, ἑκάτερος τούτων ῥάβδον ἔχων [δι-
κάζει]. ὁ δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν κάθηται, μόνος ἔχων χρυσοῦν
d σκῆπτρον, ὥς φησιν Ὀδυσσεὺς ὁ Ὀμήρου ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν

χρύσειον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσι.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν λόγων
πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγι-
5 στάτην τὴν ψυχὴν· χαίρειν οὖν ἑάσας τὰς τιμὰς τὰς τῶν
πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀσκῶν πειράσομαι τῷ ὄντι
ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι βέλτιστος ὢν καὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθνήσκω
e ἀποθνήσκω. παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας ἀνθρώ-
πους, καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ σὲ ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ
τούτον τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τούτον, ὃν ἐγὼ φημι ἀντὶ
πάντων τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀγώνων εἶναι, καὶ ὀνειδίζω σοι ὅτι οὐχ
5 οἶός τ' ἔση σαντῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν ἡ δίκη σοι ᾗ καὶ ἡ κρίσις
ᾗν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ ἔλθων παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν ἐκεῖνον,
527 τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης ὑόν, ἐπειδὰν σου ἐπιλαβόμενος ἐκεῖνος ἄγῃ,
χασμήσῃ καὶ ἰλιγγιάσῃς οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε σὺ
ἐκεῖ, καὶ σε ἴσως τυπτήσῃ τις [καὶ] ἐπὶ κόρρῃς ἀτίμως καὶ
πάντως προπηλακιεῖ.
5 Τάχα δ' οὖν ταῦτα μῦθος σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὥσπερ γραδὸς
καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐδέν γ' ἂν ᾗν θαυμαστὸν κατα-
φρονεῖν τούτων, εἰ πῃ ζητοῦντες εἴχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ
ἀληθέστερα εὐρεῖν· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οἵπερ
σοφώτατοί ἐστε τῶν νῦν Ἑλλήνων, σύ τε καὶ Πῶλος καὶ
b Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔχετε ἀποδείξαι ὡς δεῖ ἄλλον τινὰ βίον ζῆν

Eusebius, *Pr. Ev.* 579d

c 7 cf. Proclum *in Remp.* i. 168. 26

a 2 resp. Synesius, *Epist.* 44, p. 658

c 5 *eis revera* F c 6 *ἐκάτερον* W: *ἐκάτερος* δὲ Y δικάζει secl. ci.
Gould: post *ἔχων* virgulam Maas d 3 *ὑπὸ* BTW Eus.: *ὑπό τε* F
d 4 *σκοπῶ* BTWF Eus.: γρ. *ἀσκῶ* T d 5 *τὴν* om. B alt. *τὰς* om. Eus.
d 6 *ἀλήθειαν*] ἀληθῆ aῦ Bury ἀσκῶν F Eus.: *σκοπῶν* BTW e 2 alt. *καὶ*
om. Eus. e 4 *σοι*] *σε* Eus. e 5 *ἔση*] *εἰ* Eus. e 6 *νυνδὴ*] *νῦν*
Eus. ἐκεῖνον F Eus.: om. BTW a 1 *σου*] *σε* Eus. ἐκεῖνος F Eus.:
om. BTW a 2 *σὺ*] *καὶ σὺ* Eus. a 3 *καὶ* ante *ἐπὶ* om. W (secluserat
Cobet) a 5 *σαντὶ* Eus. *γραδὸς*] *ὑπὸ γραδὸς* F Eus. a 6 *γ' ἂν*]
γὰρ W a 7 *εἰ ἐπιζητοῦντες* Eus. a 8-9 *οἵπερ σοφώτατοί*] *ὑπερσοφώ-*
τατοί F a 9 *νῦν* om. P Eus. b 1 *δεῖ*] *δὴ* W βίον τινὰ F

ἢ τοῦτον, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖσε φαίνεται συμφέρων. ἀλλ' ἐν τοσοῦτοις λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων ἐλεγχομένων μόνος οὗτος ἡρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέον ἐστὶν τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ τὸ 5 δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ· ἐὰν δέ τις κατὰ τι κακὸς γίγνηται, κολαστέος ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο δεύτερον ἀγαθὸν μετὰ τὸ εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον διδόναι δίκην· καὶ πᾶσαν κολακείαν καὶ τὴν c περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ περὶ ὀλίγους καὶ περὶ πολλοὺς, φευκτέον· καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον, ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον αἰεὶ, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει.

Ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενος ἀκολούθησον ἐνταῦθα, οἱ ἀφικόμενος 5 εὐδαιμονήσεις καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. καὶ ἕασόν τινά σου καταφρονῆσαι ὡς ἀνοήτου καὶ προπηλακίσαι, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία σύ γε θαρρῶν πατάξαι τὴν ἄτιμον ταύτην πληγὴν· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσῃ, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι d ἥς καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρετὴν. καῖπειτα οὕτω κοινῇ ἀσκήσαντες, τότε ἤδη, ἐὰν δοκῇ χρῆναι, ἐπιθησόμεθα τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἢ ὁποῖον ἂν τι ἡμῖν δοκῇ, τότε βουλευσόμεθα, βελτίους ὄντες βουλευέσθαι ἢ νῦν. αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἔχοντάς 5 γε ὡς νῦν φαινόμεθα ἔχειν, ἔπειτα νεανιεύεσθαι ὡς τὶ ὄντας, οἷς οὐδέποτε ταῦτα δοκεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων· εἰς τοσοῦτον ἤκομεν ἀπαιδευσίας. ὥσπερ e οὖν ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσώμεθα τῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, ὃς ἡμῖν σημαίνει ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἄριστος τοῦ βίου, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἀσκούντας καὶ ζῆν καὶ τεθνάναι. τούτῳ οὖν ἐπώμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρακα- 5 λῶμεν, μὴ ἐκείνῳ, ᾧ σὺ πιστεύων ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖς· ἔστι γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄξιος, ὧ Καλλίκλεις.

usque ad b 6 δημοσίᾳ Eusebius, *Pr. Ev.* 580c

c 3 καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ—4 αἰεὶ Aristides, *orat.* xlv, p. 185

c 3 οὗτος—5 τεθνάναι Iamblichus, *Protrept.*, p. 83. 25 ff.

b 2 ὥσπερ F post ἐκεῖσε add. ἰοῦσι Herwerden συμφέρον F b 3 τοσοῦ-
τοις om. F (add. f) b 6 τὸ εἶναι] τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι Eus. b 8 δίκαιον]
δια***** F (corr. f) c 4 πράξει πάσῃ F c 5 πιθόμενος Cobet
c 6 ὁ F: ὁ σὸς BTW: ὁ σὼς Graux c 7 τινάς F c 8-d 1 ταύτην
τὴν ἄτιμον F d 5-6 ἔχοντας καὶ γε F d 7 δοκεῖ ταυτὰ F e 2 χρη-
σώμεθα BT: χρῆσόμεθα WF e 3 καὶ om. Y Iamb.

COMMENTARY

Prelude, 447 a–449 c

Meeting Callicles, Socrates and Chaerephon learn from him that they have just missed a public declamation or lecture by Gorgias. Callicles offers to arrange a private performance at his house any time they wish; but hearing that the lecturer has called for questions, Socrates puts up Chaerephon to ask one: “What is Gorgias?” The question is intercepted by Polus, who presently embarks on a harangue. Socrates points out that this is no answer, and begs Gorgias himself to submit to interrogation. Gorgias agrees.

Besides setting the stage for the first discussion, this prelude introduces the reader to all the personages of the coming dialogue, and also teaches a first lesson in dialectical method (see on 448 e 2–449 a 4).

From Callicles’ reference to τῶν ἐνδον ὄντων at 447 c 7 it would seem that the initial encounter takes place out of doors—presumably at the entrance to the γυμνάσιον or other public building where Gorgias has been lecturing. But at 447 d 6, when Chaerephon puts his question, we must assume that they have entered the building. The remainder of the dialogue is conducted in the presence of Gorgias’ audience, who at 458 c make a θόρυβος when Gorgias suggests closing the discussion (cf. also 455 c 6, 473 e 5, 487 b 4, 490 b 2). A similar change of scene from outdoors to indoors is explicitly indicated at *Lysis* 206 de and in the prelude to the *Theaetetus*, 143 b. (It is, I think, an error to suppose with the scholiast, as Croiset, Lamb, Rufener, and others still do, that the scene of the lecture, and of the dialogue, is Callicles’ house: for Callicles does not invite them to “come straight in”, as on this hypothesis he naturally would, but to “come and visit him at his house, whenever they please, because Gorgias is staying there”. Still less can we assume a change of scene after the invitation from the place where the lecture was given to Callicles’ house: this is excluded by Gorgias’ words at 458 b 6. The right view was first seen by Schleiermacher.)

447 a 2. οὕτω, sc. too late. There was evidently a saying about the wisdom of being, in the English phrase, ‘first at a feast, last at a fray’, παροιμία πρὸς τὸν ἀπολειπόμενον τῆς θυσίας (schol. vet.). Falstaff was of the same opinion: ‘The latter end of a fray and the beginning of a feast Fits a dull fighter and a keen guest’ (*First Part of King Henry IV*, Act iv, sc. 3). Strictly speaking, one can be late for a battle but hardly for a war; hence Maas suggests deleting Πολέμου καὶ, comparing Plaut. *Men.* 989 *ne sero veniam depugnato proelio*. But to miss the battle is to escape taking part in the war (μεταλαγχάνειν).

a 3. Ἄλλ’ ἦ introduces a surprised question (Denniston, 27). The MSS. mostly confuse it with the quite different ἀλλ’ ἦ, but B correctly

glosses it ἀλλ' ἄρα. κατόπιν ἐορτῆς ἤκομεν: the paroemiographers and the scholia cite κατόπιν ἐορτῆς ἤκεις as used ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπὸ καλοῦ πράγματος ἀπολιμπανομένων. Variants are Παναθηναίων κατόπιν (Apostolius 14. 6) and Πυθίων ὕστερον ἤκεις (ibid. 15. 10).

καὶ ὕστεροῦμεν. Cobet rejected these words as originating in a gloss which was first mistaken for a variant (hence the καὶ), then incorporated in the text. But as Adam pointed out (on *Prot.* 314 a 1), Plato often puts metaphor and interpretation side by side: e.g. *Laches* 194 c 2 χεῖμαζομένοις ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἀποροῦσιν: *Lysis* 209 a 2 ποιμαίνει καὶ θεραπεύει: *Prot.* 314 a 1 κυβεύης τε καὶ κινδυνεύης: *Hipp. ma.* 283 c 3 συνόντας αὐτῇ (sc. τῇ σοφίᾳ) καὶ μανθάνοντας: and *infra* 472 b 6, 479 a 7–8. For proverbial phrases with explanation appended cf. *infra* 499 c 5 τὸ παρὸν εἶ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι κτλ. and *Theaet.* 183 d 8 “Ἰππέας εἰς πεδῖον” προκαλῆ Σωκράτη εἰς λόγους προκαλούμενος, where Naber wished to delete the explanation.

a 5. “A feast indeed, and a very elegant one.” ἐορτῆς could be omitted, as, e.g., ῥήτορα is at 449 a 7, and Hirschig thought it a gloss. Many such ‘superfluous’ words were deleted by Cobet and his school: further examples in the *Gorgias* include 449 c 5 τῆς βραχυλογίας, 455 c 4 ῥητορικούς, 455 e 1 τὰ Ἀθηναίων, 461 d 2 εἴ τι . . . ὠμολογήσθαι, and a good many more. All of them *could* be glosses, but in most cases there is no proof whatever that they are, unless we assume that Plato was incapable of using an unnecessary word (cf. Wohlrab 6 f.). In the present instance, Callicles’ repetition of ἐορτῆς has perhaps a certain point: he implies that what Socrates has missed really *was* a feast—a feast of eloquence. The notion of the verbal banquet is a favourite one with Plato: cf. *Phdr.* 227 b 6 τῶν λόγων ὑμᾶς Λυσίας εἰστία, *Lysis* 211 c, *Rep.* 352 b, 354 ab, *Tim.* 17 a, 27 b. The unlikely story in Olympiodorus and the *Prolegomena in Hermogenem* (Walz, *Rhet. Gr.* iv. 15) that Gorgias’ lecture-days were observed at Athens as public holidays (ἐορταί) is probably founded on nothing more than a misunderstanding of our passage.

πολλὰ . . . καὶ καλὰ . . . ἐπεδείξατο: “gave us a fine and varied display” (Lamb). The term ἐπίδειξις seems to have been introduced by the sophists (cf. *Hipp. ma.* 282 bc) to describe a public demonstration of oratorical skill. Surviving specimens are the *Helena* and *Palamedes* of Gorgias, and Prodicus’ fable of the Choice of Heracles (Xen. *Mem.* 2. 1. 21 ff.). In Thucydides the word is applied contemptuously to a ‘showy’ speech in the Assembly (3. 42. 3).

a 7. Τούτων: “our lateness”.

b 1. Οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, “no matter”. The phrase (and the asyndeton) is colloquial. Cf. *Euthyphro* 3 c τὸ μὲν γελασθῆναι ἴσως οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα: Aristoph. *Frogs* 1215 ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἔσται πρᾶγμα. At *Medea* 451 Eur. allows Jason to use it—the sole tragic instance.

ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι: “for I will cure *who caused it* (καὶ):” the phrasing echoes the oracle given to Telephus, ὁ τρώσας καὶ ἰάσεται (T. could be healed only by the rust from the spear of Achilles which had wounded him). The story was familiar to the Attic public through

Euripides' play: cf. Aristophanes, *Ach.* 430 ff. In Plato's world, as in the eighteenth century, neatness in handling such literary allusions was no small part of the art of conversation.

b 7. Οὐκοῦν κτλ. "In that case, any time you care to visit me at my house—for Gorgias is staying with me, and will put on a performance for you." The omission of the apodosis (ἤκετε or the like) is natural in colloquial Greek as in colloquial English, since the invitation is already sufficiently implied in the ὅταν clause. There is no need to manufacture an apodosis by treating ἤκειν as imperativ (Ast) or the καὶ before ἐπιδείξεται as merely responsive (Schleiermacher, Reinhard); still less to delete the καὶ (Schanz), or alter ἤκειν to ἤκετ' (Cobet) or ὅταν βούλησθε to ὦ τᾶν, βούλεσθε (Hemsterhuis). Some MSS. restore normal syntax at the cost of sense by omitting γὰρ.

c 2. δύναμις, "point" or "function" (Lat. *vis*).

τέχνη has no exact English equivalent: it covers every activity involving expertise, from draught-playing (450 d 7) to the science of astronomy (451 c 5). The conventional rendering "art" may do if we give it the widest possible range and avoid confusing it with "fine art"; otherwise we had better say "skill". Cf. Jaeger ii. 129 f.

c 3. τὴν ἄλλην ἐπιδείξιν: not "the rest of his address" (Cope, Lamb)—for the recent ἐπιδείξις is over, and a conversation could form no part of a future one—but "the other thing, the address" which Callicles has offered to arrange for at his house, ἄλλος being used idiomatically as at 473 d 1 τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων. σὺ, Chaerephon (b 3). Socrates has no taste for listening to ἐπιδείξεις: he gives the reason at *Prot.* 329 a and *Hipp. mi.* 364 b—one cannot interrupt the speaker to ask questions. So when Ion offers to give him one on Homer he hastily interposes with "I must make time to hear you on that another day, but for the moment do you mind answering a question?" (*Ion* 530 d). Cf. also *Euthyphro* 6 c, *Euthyd.* 275 a, and *Prot.* 347 b where Hippias' offer of an ἐπιδείξις is firmly cut short by Alcibiades.

c 5. Οὐδὲν οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, "There's nothing like asking Gorgias himself." A colloquialism (*Ar. Av.* 966, *Lys.* 135); αὐτὸν is emphatic.

c 6. ἐν . . . τῆς ἐπιδείξεως, "one feature of the performance". γοῦν introduces the evidence on which the preceding statement is based (Denniston, 451). Gorgias' habit of acting as a one-man 'brains trust' is mentioned also at *Meno* 70 c, and is doubtless historical fact. According to Cicero (*de fin.* 2. 1) and Philostratus (*Vit. Soph.* 1. 1 = *Vors.* 82 A 1a), he would mount the platform and say to the audience προβάλλετε, "propose a topic". Hippias would issue a similar challenge to his audience (*Hipp. mi.* 363 d, cf. *Prot.* 315 c).

d 1. Ὅστις ἐστίν. The question has an inherent ambiguity which cannot be reproduced in English. Chaerephon takes it to mean "ask him who he is", and is shocked at such an inquiry addressed to such a man. But Socrates explains by an example that he wishes to know what Gorgias' profession is (= c 2 τί ἐστίν ὃ ἐπαγγέλλεται). At *Eur. Ba.* 506 the statement οὐκ οἶσθ' . . . ὅστις εἶ ("You do not know your

position”) is similarly misunderstood by the interlocutor, who replies by giving his name. Cf. also Men. *Samia* 176 ὅψει σεαυτὴν . . . ἥτις εἶ; M. Ant. 8. 52 ὁ δὲ μὴ εἰδὼς πρὸς ὃ τι πέφυκεν οὐκ οἶδεν ὅστις ἐστίν (“what sort of being he is”); and Eur. *Medea* 240 ὅτῳ μάλιστα χρήσεται ξυνευνέτῃ (“just what sort of a mate she will have to deal with”), a line which is often mistakenly emended.

448 a 4. In face of Gorgias’ pose as the bored expert Chaerephon returns an ironically polite reply. Socrates’ devoted companion knows just how easy Socrates’ questions are to answer.

a 5. F’s λαβεῖν is more appropriate than λαμβάνειν, and is confirmed by Olympiodorus (18. 12 Norvin). Cf. *Prot.* 342 a 1 εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν μου πείραν.

a 6. Polus intervenes brusquely: “Look here, will you kindly put your question to *me*.” Νῆ Δία can hardly here mean “Yes”, as the translators mostly have it; for he proceeds to give his reason for *not* wishing Gorgias to be questioned. As Richards saw, νῆ Δία goes with the words that follow, and calls attention to them. Cf. 463 d 6 μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ’ . . ., “Look here, but . . .”, 466 c 3 and 481 b 10. ἐμοῦ, sc. δεῖ (rather than πάρεστι) πείραν λαβεῖν. —The καὶ in the next sentence emphasizes ἀπειρηκέναι (Denniston, 321): “Gorgias seems to me to be in fact tired.”

a 8. In point of sense and usage there is nothing to choose between διελήλυθεν (BTW) and F’s διεξέληλυθε(ν): cf. 505 d 8 διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον and 506 b 1 διεξελθεῖν σε τὸν λόγον. I adopt the latter on the ground that the dropping out of -εξ- is rather more likely than its insertion.

b 1. Τί δὲ τοῦτο; “And what of that?” Cf. 497 e 8, and the fuller phrase τί τοῦτο διαφέρει; at *Prot.* 331 c 3.

b 4-c 1. Socrates’ example was the shoemaker (447 d 3), but Chaerephon tactfully substitutes more polite professions.

b 5. ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἡρόδικος. Ol and the scholia warn us not to confuse this Herodicus—who, like Gorgias, must have been a native of Leontini in Sicily—with the more famous physician of that name, the dietician mentioned several times by Plato, who was of Megarian origin and practised at Selymbria in Thrace (*Prot.* 316 e). The Herodicus mentioned by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1400^b19) as having teased Thrasymachus and Polus about the appropriateness of their names (see on 463 e 2) could well be our man, who must have met these sophists in his brother’s company. Otherwise nothing is known about him. F calls him Prodicus, which is conceivably correct, since a Πρόδικος ὁ ἰατρός (so MSS.) occurs at Aristotle *E.E.* 1243^b22; but it is more likely that the familiarity of the name Prodicus led scribes in both places to read an uncial *H* as a *Π*.

τίνα, “what sort of man”, like ὅστις at 447 d 1. Ol has τί in his paraphrase, but it is not certain that he found it in his text of Plato. Many editors adopt τί to suit the following ὅπερ. τίνα . . . ὅπερ is also possible, and perhaps likelier (τίνα is used below at b 12 and c 2). But no change is strictly necessary. Plato is often careless of exact symmetry in small matters, and the transition from τίνα to ὅπερ

(ὄνομα) is natural enough. Cf. the rather similar transition from *τι* to *τίνα* at *Crat.* 424 a 2-4.

b 11. Ἀριστοφῶν ὁ Ἀγλαοφῶντος ἢ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ. Aristophon's brother is the famous painter Polygnotus: cf. *Ion* 532 e Πολυγνώτου τοῦ Ἀγλαοφῶντος, and the epigram of Simonides (*Anth. Pal.* 9. 700 = Simon. 160 Bergk)

Γράψε Πολύγνωτος, Θάσιος γένος, Ἀγλαοφῶντος
υἱός, περθομένην Ἰλίου ἀκρόπολιν.

Their father Aglaophon was also a painter.

c 4-9. Chaerephon had grasped Socrates' meaning from a single example, but two have failed to enlighten Polus, who has had no practice in dialectic (d 8). Instead of answering Chaerephon's question he embarks on a mannered disquisition about τέχναι in general. Its peculiarities of style mark it as either a quotation or a parody. Most scholars have accepted the view of Ol and the scholiast, who take it for a quotation on the evidence of 462 b 11, where Socrates says he has read a σύγγραμμα in which Polus asserted (according to the usual rendering) that ἐμπειρία created τέχνη—substantially the assertion with which Polus here leads off. But neither the rendering nor the inference from it is at all certain. Ol's master, Syrianus, speaks as if he knew more: he quotes the opening sentence as coming from Πῶλος ἐν τῇ Τέχνῃ; but one may suspect, with Radermacher (*Artium Scriptores* 173), that this is 'mera coniectura'. That Aristotle attributes the doctrine of our passage to Polus need not, of course, mean that he found it elsewhere than in the *Gorgias*. Certainty is impossible; but my own feeling is that parody is more likely in Plato than *verbatim* quotation (I doubt if Lysias' speech in the *Phaedrus* is a speech of Lysias, and I am pretty sure that the myth in the *Protagoras* is not an excerpt from a work by Protagoras). The style is in any case Gorgian to the point of grotesqueness. The scholiast calls attention to the balance of phrase (παρίσωσις) in ἐμπειρία μὲν . . . κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην. (This opposition of τέχνη and τύχη is a commonplace of the period: cf. Eur. *Alc.* 785-6, *I.T.* 89, Agathon frs. 6 and 8, and the many other passages quoted by T. Gomperz in his note on Hipp. π. τέχνης 4, *Wien. Sitzb.* cxx (1889), 118 f.) Observe also the poetic use of τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν for "human life" (cf. Ar. *Rhet.* 1406^b5); and especially the emphatic repetitions, ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπίρως ("experimentally through experiences"), and ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, which recalls ὅσοι δὲ ὅσους περὶ ὅσων at Gorg. *Hel.* 11 and πολλὰ δὲ πολλοῖς πολλῶν *ibid.* 18. This is perhaps the sort of thing Plato meant when he called διπλασιολογία a speciality of Polus (*Phdr.* 267 bc).

After οἱ ἄριστοι Egelie was quite possibly right in adding <ἄριστα>, to make a triad parallel with ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως.

τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν: cf. *Phil.* 58 ab, Gorgias held rhetoric to be μακρῶ ἀρίστη πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν.

d 1. Chaerephon drops out at this point: 'he is like an apprentice teacher who is thrown out of his stride by an unexpected answer'

(Friedländer). Socrates turns to Gorgias. **Καλῶς . . . παρεσκευάσθαι εἰς λόγους**: “to be well equipped in the matter of language”, like *Rep.* 361 a τὴν μεγίστην δόξαν αὐτῷ παρεσκευακέναι εἰς δικαιοσύνην. F’s *περί* is probably a gloss; OI paraphrases, less accurately, by *πρός*.

d 2. ἀλλὰ γάρ, “however”: this combination of particles implies ‘that what precedes is irrelevant, unimportant, or subsidiary’ (Deniston, 101).

d 4. Τί μάλιστα; “Just how?”, “In what particular way?”

d 7–8. “Not if you are yourself disposed to answer; I should much prefer to question *you*.” **σέ**, sc. *ἐροίμην*: corrupted to *σοί* in the first family by the proximity of *ἥδιον*.

d 10. διαλέγεσθαι: τὸ διαλέγεσθαι Hirschig, to make the construction parallel with that of τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν. But Plato does not avoid shifts of construction: cf. on 454 e 7. For *μελετᾶν* c. inf. cf. *Phd.* 67 e 5.

e 2–449 a 4. Socrates gives Polus a first lesson in logic by pointing out that a judgement of value is not a definition (to call rhetoric ‘the noblest of sciences’, or democracy ‘the best system of government’, does not tell us what rhetoric or democracy is). In Plato’s terminology, the question *τί*; must not be confused with the question *ποῖον*; The same point is made at the beginning of the *Meno* (71 b), where Socrates says that until he knows what a thing *is* (*τί ἐστίν*) he cannot know what it *is like* (*ὁποῖόν τι*). This doctrine is already implicit in earlier dialogues: e.g. the *Protagoras* ends with the conclusion that until we know what *ἀρετή* really is we cannot know whether it is teachable (360 e, 361 c). And such considerations may well have helped to prompt the historical Socrates to his untiring quest of definitions. But the generalized distinction between *τί*-questions and *ποῖον*-questions, and the generalized claim that the former are always logically prior, are probably due to Plato. It is certainly he who invented the important word *ποιότης*, “suchness” or quality (*Theaet.* 182 a), thus preparing the way for Aristotle’s doctrine of substance and attribute. (For a penetrating criticism of the Socratic-Platonic *τί*-question see Robinson, chap. v.)

e 6. ἡρώτα: an easy and surely indispensable correction for *ἐρωτᾶ*. Even if *εἴη* is deleted, *ἐρωτᾶ . . . ὄντινα δέοι* is still a false sequence of a type hardly to be paralleled in Attic Greek (cf. Kühner-G. i. 231, Anm. 5). Possibly we should read *τοῦτ’ ἡρώτα* (*τοῦτ’ ἐρωτᾶ* F). *εἴη* is differently placed in the two families, and is omitted altogether by P: hence Burnet took it to be a gloss. But the omission in P is probably fortuitous, since its stable-companion W agrees with BT; and variations in word-order between the two families are of frequent occurrence.

e 7. ὥσπερ: ‘explanatory’ asyndeton is Plato’s regular usage where he adds a comparison to illustrate his meaning, e.g. *Rep.* 413 d ὥσπερ τοὺς πώλους . . . οὕτω, 497 b ὥσπερ ξενικὸν σπέρμα . . . οὕτω καί, and *infra* 451 a 7.

e 8. τὰ ἔμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο, “submitted his previous examples to you”, perhaps with the further idea of “giving you a lead”, as at *Theaet.* 179 e 1.

449 a 6–c 8. In these preliminary exchanges Plato brings out Gorgias' character by a series of small malicious touches. The great man is as free from false modesty as Shaw (a 7, d 7), and enjoys getting in a rather pompous Homeric phrase (a 7). More than once he seems about to embark on a speech, but is hastily headed off by Socrates (a 9, b 4), who finally gets round him by asking for a display (ἐπίδειξις) of his famous conciseness (c 4) and tactfully complimenting him on it (d 5).

a 6. ῥήτορα. The shifts in the connotation of this word have been studied by W. Pilz, *Der Rhetor im attischen Staat* (diss. Leipzig, 1934). Gorgias is called a ῥήτωρ primarily as one who knows the theory of rhetoric; but the term was more often applied to those who practised public speaking, especially in the Assembly (Aristoph. *Ach.* 38, Thuc. 8. 1. 1, etc.), and so came to mean virtually "politician", as it does at 466 d 1, etc. Thus, e.g., Aeschines speaks of Pericles, Themistocles, and Aristides as οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ἐκεῖνοι ῥήτορες (1. 25). The other branch of practical rhetoric was δικανικὴ (511 d 6), pleading in court; but this was often combined with a political career.

a 7. εὖχομαι εἶναι: the stock Homeric formula, e.g. *Il.* 6. 211.

b 2. Ἐπαγγέλλομαι γε δὴ: emphatic assent, "That is just what I do profess." (Limitation, "I certainly *profess* it", would be less in character: cf. Denniston, 245.)

b 4. The ὥστερ clause goes with διατελέσαι (cf. 494 c 4 διατέλει γὰρ ὥστερ ἤρξω), and the participles explain what Socrates means by διαλέγεσθαι.

b 7. ὅπερ ὑπισχνῇ, μὴ ψεύσῃ, "be true to your promise". Editors have found a difficulty here, since Gorgias has so far given no undertaking to answer briefly. (Thompson suggests, after Voegelin, that ὅπερ ὑπισχνῇ may mean "what you *habitually* promise", with reference to Gorgias' claim μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν (c 2), but this ὕστερον πρότερον is scarcely satisfactory.) One or two late MSS. provide the promise by inserting Ναί after ἀποθέσθαι. This is a possibility (Ναί has fallen out at *Meno* 83 c 7 and *Hipp. mi.* 375 e 6), as is Morstadt's ὅπερ <ἂν> ὑπισχνῇ (generic subjunctive with future reference). But it is perhaps sufficient to suppose that Socrates has in mind Gorgias' general undertaking to answer questions (448 a), on the strength of which he now hopes to pin him down to strict 'dialectical' procedure.

b 9. Εἰσὶ μὲν κτλ.: "Some answers require a lengthy exposition." A personal construction is here substituted for the impersonal, from the same tendency which makes a Greek say δίκαιος εἰ εἰπεῖν instead of δίκαιόν ἐστι σέ εἰπεῖν (Kühner-G. ii. 35): cf. *Soph.* 242 b 7 δοκῶ τήνδε . . . τὴν ὁδὸν ἀναγκαιοτάτην ἡμῖν εἶναι τρέπεσθαι. If we restore the impersonal construction, ἐνίας τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι διὰ μακρῶν (λόγων) ποιεῖσθαι, τοὺς λόγους becomes redundant; and it has accordingly been proposed to delete it (Heikel, *Eranos*, xxxiii [1935], 82). Riddell, however, showed that such shifts of construction in Plato often result in an apparent redundancy (*Digest*, §§ 229–30).

c 2. ἔν ἐστιν ὧν φημι: cf. *Phdr.* 267 ab, where we are told that Teisias and Gorgias *συντομίαν τε λόγων καὶ ἄπειρα μήκη περὶ πάντων ἀνηῦρον*. The same dual pretension is attributed to Protagoras at *Prot.* 334 e, 335 b. Such claims were no doubt in fact made: cf. *Δισσοὶ Λόγοι* 8. 1 (*Vors.* ii, p. 415) <τῷ αὐτῷ> ἀνδρὸς καὶ τᾶς αὐτᾶς τέχνας νομίζω κατὰ βραχὺ τε δύνασθαι διαλέγεσθαι . . . καὶ δαμαγορεῖν οἷόν τ' ἤμεν. But as Friedländer says, 'for the sophist these are not two opposed methods, but two different ways of showing his adaptability'. Plato's language seems to imply that the *συντομία* of Protagoras and Gorgias was simply a laconic style, 'putting a thing in the fewest possible words', not a technique of investigation; it does not justify, though it may have suggested, the assertion in *Diog. Laert.* (9. 53 = *Vors.* 80 (74) A 1) that Protagoras τὸ Σωκρατικὸν εἶδος τῶν λόγων πρῶτος ἐκίνησε.

c 5. τῆς βραχυλογίας: Cobet in his usual manner wished to relieve Plato of these superfluous words. But cf. the parallel passage in the *Protagoras*, 335 a 2 τῷ ἐτέρῳ χρῶ τρόπῳ πρὸς με, τῇ βραχυλογίᾳ: and *infra* 460 e 1 ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος φαίνεται, ὁ ῥητορικός, and 520 d 4 εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἀδικίαν. Riddell § 214 gives many further examples.

c 7. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, sc. ὁ βούλει: "Certainly, I will do as you ask." We might expect ποιήσομαι, sc. ἐπιδείξιν τῆς βραχυλογίας, since the word used in the request is commonly echoed in consent (*Denniston*, 17), e.g. *Symph.* 199 bc πάρες . . . — Ἀλλὰ παρίημι.

Part I: Socrates and Gorgias (449 c—461 b)

449 c 9—450 b 5. Socrates puts the question in the form "What is rhetoric about?", and the discussion begins, as in *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Hippias ma.*, etc., with a series of suggested answers, whose inadequacy is successively exposed by Socrates. First answer: Rhetoric is περὶ λόγους (449 e 1). This description is shown to be too wide, since it applies to all τέχναι.

449 d 5. Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν: cf. *Xen. Mem.* 4. 2. 9 Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἄγαμαί γέ σου. Both Plato (*Apol.* 24 e, *Theaet.* 154 d, etc.) and Xenophon make Socrates swear on occasion by Hera, though this seems to have been normally a woman's oath. We may infer that it was a habit of the historical Socrates. In Plato it always accompanies expressions of admiration. Ol offers a fantastic allegorical explanation.

d 7. Πάνυ . . . ἐπιεικῶς: "quite nicely". The old gentleman complacently accepts the compliment.

e 4. λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς: cf. *Meno* 95 c, where we are told that Gorgias claims to make people δεινοὺς λέγειν.

e 5. Οὐκοῦν περὶ ὧν περ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν (sc. ποιεῖ δυνατούς); This proposition is introduced primarily with a view to showing that even such a skill as γυμναστική is in a sense περὶ λόγους (there are 'principles' of physical training which the trainer must understand). But Gorgias' acceptance of it plays an important part later. A modern reader may feel that he should have rejected it and maintained that rhetoric deals only with the formal elements of discourse. But our abstract distinction

between the form and the content of a statement had not yet been drawn, and usage made it particularly difficult to draw in the present case (cf. J. Lohmann, *Gnomon*, xxvi (1954), 451): for in common usage λόγος meant "thought" as well as "speech", and λόγοι accordingly implied *rational* discourse as distinct from mere words (ρήματα). It was precisely this confusion which led rhetoric in practice to usurp the place of philosophy, and thus invite Plato's attack upon it.

450 a 1. νυνδῇ: 449 e 2. λεγομένη, participle of the imperfect. I have preferred F's reading to that of Vind. 109, which has no authority. Cf. *Rep.* 437 c 1 τὰ εἶδη τὰ νυνδῇ λεχθέντα. ποιεῖ (F) is not indispensable (it could be understood from e 5), but it certainly clarifies the sense.

b 1. ἐκάστη αὐτῶν κτλ.: "each art is concerned with the discourse appropriate to its subject-matter." Plato is driven to a cumbrous periphrasis for "subject-matter", since Greek had no word for it until Aristotle invented the technical term ὑποκειμένη ὕλη. The asyndeton is normal in introducing an explanation.

450 b 6–451 a 2. *Having failed to distinguish rhetoric from other τέχναι by its subject-matter, Gorgias now tries to distinguish it by its method. Second answer: rhetoric is "concerned with discourse" in the sense of using discourse as its instrument, whereas other τέχναι deal "practically entirely" in manual technique. Socrates proceeds to correct this loose generalization: rhetoric is not the only τέχνη which uses λόγος as its instrument—the statement is equally true of the mathematical τέχναι and even of the art of playing πεττεία. The definition is thus again too wide.*

450 b 7. ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, not "so to speak", as if apologizing for a metaphor, but "practically", "one might almost say", qualifying a too sweeping statement (Lat. *paene dixerim*).

b 9. κύρωσις, "authority" or "efficacy". Since it is formed from κυρόω, we should expect it to mean "confirmation", as it does at Thuc. 6. 103. 4. Ol knows from οἱ περὶ τὰς λέξεις δεινοί (which probably signifies a collection of Λέξεις Πλατωνικαί) that the word is "not current" (i.e., presumably, in this particular sense), and that the same is true of χειρουργημα (again, we must suppose, in the special sense of manual work). He proceeds to offer as his own conjecture the view that these are Sicilisms, comparing the ἔττω Ζεύς of the Boeotian Cebes at *Phaedo* 62 a. We need not, I think, take this very seriously; they are in any case not colloquial words. But they may perhaps be intended as specimens of the pompous jargon affected by Gorgias. It is worth noticing that Socrates substitutes ἐργασία at c 7 for χειρουργημα, and κῦρος at e 1 for κύρωσις. Cf. *Meno* 76 e 3, where an answer given κατὰ Γοργίαν (c 4) is described as τραγική.

c 7–e 1. Socrates proceeds to a διαίρεσις of τέχναι into those which are mainly or entirely manual, involving little or no λόγος, and those which are mainly or entirely intellectual, involving little or no manual work. As examples of the former class he offers painting and sculpture on the ground that the painter or sculptor can work in silence—thus taking account only of the spoken λόγος and ignoring the intellectual activity of the artist. (This seems to us peculiarly crass; but we

have to remember that, like most Greeks, Plato saw in representational art only mechanical copying. Cf. *Polit.* 277 c, where “drawing, and manual arts generally” are said to be less adequate to the depiction of living subjects than λέξις καὶ λόγος.) His examples of the latter class are the various branches of mathematics and the art of playing πεττεία (see below). A kindred distinction is drawn in the *Charmides* (165 e) between τέχναι like architecture or weaving, which have a material product, and those like computation or geometry, which have not. This is repeated in the *Politicus* (258 de), where the two classes are called respectively practical and cognitive (γνωστικαί), and reappears in Aristotle’s distinction between practical and theoretical τέχναι. But Plato’s fullest and most mature treatment of the τέχναι occurs in the *Philebus* (55 d ff.): there the manual τέχναι are graded as more or less scientific in the degree in which their practice conforms to mathematical law, while the intellectual class are subdivided into ‘pure’ and ‘applied’. In the present passage his analysis is much less precise.

c 7. δῆ, “now” (the ‘progressive’ use, Denniston, 239). δὲ has been thought more appropriate ‘where, as here, a second step in the argument is taken, to be followed by a third, ἕτεραι δέ γε (d 4)’ (Shorey, *Cl. Ph.* 4. 462). But τῶν μὲν . . . and ἕτεραι δέ γε are co-ordinate divisions of πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν (ἐναι δὲ . . . are a subclass within the first main division).

ἐργασία τὸ πολὺ ἐστίν, “The greater part is manual work.” ἐν ἐργασίᾳ (F) is equally possible.

c 10. τὰς τοιαύτας—εἶναι: “Such, I fancy, are the arts you mean (λέγειν) when you say that rhetoric has no connexion with them.” περὶ ᾧς is used very loosely, where we should expect ἐν οἷς. This is so confusing, in view of the quite different use of περὶ at c 1 and earlier, that one must suspect corruption. Schleiermacher conjectured περὶ ᾧ σὺ, which involves a very harsh ellipse of περὶ ἐκεῖνα οὕσας, and Hirschig ὧν, which is transcriptionally improbable. Has the true antecedent πράξεις (cf. b 7) fallen out before περὶ ᾧς?

d 6. ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ: for the distinction between these terms see below on 451 b 3. καὶ πεττευτικὴ γε: “yes, and . . .”, adding an unexpected item to the enumeration: cf. *Crito* 47 b 9 ταύτη ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ἧ ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ δοκῇ. The word πεττευτικὴ has been doubted, without good reason: πεττεία appears again in a list of τέχναι at *Phdr.* 274 d 1, and is cited as an example of a skilled activity at *Charm.* 174 b, *Rep.* 333 b, and *Alc. i* 110 e. Ol thinks that the λόγος-element in πεττευτικὴ consisted in “calling the throws” (in some games which in his day were described by the generic term πεττεία dice were used to determine the possible moves, as in backgammon). But Plato distinguishes the πεττευτικός from the κυβευτικός (*Rep.* 374 c), so he is probably thinking of a game of pure skill like draughts, and the λόγος-element will be planning the moves. To be really good at πεττεία you had to learn it young and take it seriously (*Rep.* loc. cit.); good players were rare

(*Polit.* 292 e); it was “no idle sport, but one full of shrewdness and needing great attention” (Philostratus, *Heroica* 2. 2). See further R. G. Austin, *Antiquity*, xiv (1940), 257 ff.

e 4. Ἄλλ’ οὗ τι τούτων γε: so all primary MSS., including (as it now turns out) F. Nearly all editors since Bekker have read οὗτοι. But cf. *Phdr.* 242 d 10 λέγεται γε δή. — Οὗ τι ὑπό γε Λυσίου (Οὗτοι Heindorf): 272 c 5 οὗ τι νῦν γε οὕτως ἔχω: *Phil.* 52 a 8 οὗ τι φύσει γε: *Ar. Pol.* 1282^a11 ἄλλ’ οὗ τι τῶν εἰδότην γε μάλλον: *Phys.* 258^b22 ἄλλ’ οὗ τί γε πάσας.

e 5. οὐχ ὅτι: “notwithstanding that”. Ignorance of the idiom led to the false correction διότι. τῷ ῥήματι: “in your verbal formulation”, “as you actually put it”. Cf. 489 c 1 εἰάν τις ῥήματι ἀμάρτη, *Rep.* 340 d 5 λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως.

e 6. ὑπολάβοι ἂν τις, “one might retort” (not “suppose”, as at 450 d 3, since it is followed by a question).

e 7. δυσχεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, “to be captious in argument”, like 483 a 2 κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, *Crat.* 430 d 1 ἵνα μὴ μαχώμεθα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. BTW omit the preposition; but Plato never construes δυσχεραίνειν with a dative.

451 a 3–d 8. Socrates shows by examples that the arts which use λόγοι have each its own subject-matter. On this basis he restates his original question: what is rhetoric about? Third answer: “it is about the best and most important of human interests.”

451 a 3. ἴθι νυν: cf. *Soph.* 224 c 9 ἴθι νυν (so BT) συναγάγωμεν. There νυν is glossed δὴ in T to show its non-temporal force, and δὴ has replaced it in W (Burnet reads ἴθι δὴ νῦν, I think wrongly). So here νυν has been replaced by the gloss οὖν in F, and by δὴ in a Paris MS. The same sort of thing has happened at *Alc. i* 114 d 4.

τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἢ ἡρόμην διαπέρανον: “complete your answer in the terms of my question” (the one asked at 449 d 1). Most edd. keep ἦν, but ἐρέσθαι is to ask, not to ask for (αἰτεῖν), and I doubt if the MS. reading can be defended as shorthand for τὴν ἀπόκρισιν τοῦ ἐρωτήματος ὃ ἡρόμην (Lodge). *NHIIH* could easily enough become *NHNH*.

a 4. ῥητορικὴ. F adds the article here and at 454 a 4; but it is often omitted with the names of τέχναι, e.g. at *Symp.* 186 c 5, 187 a 1 (Kühner-G. i. 606 f.).

a 6. ἢ περὶ τί κτλ. English has to remodel this type of sentence, where the interrogative is thrown into a participial or other subordinate clause: trans. “what the subject is, in discourse about which the art of rhetoric has authority”.

b 3. τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν κτλ. τῶν must be partitive, as it is throughout this passage, sc. διὰ λόγου τὸ κύρος ἔχουσῶν τεχνῶν. γνώσις, which gives τῶν a false construction, seems accordingly to be either a mistaken gloss or a corruption of some lost word. Arithmetic is “one of the arts which deal with the even and the odd”; computation (λογιστική) is another (c 2). This is their common genus. The differentia of arithmetic is that it deals with the even and the odd *irrespective of quantity* (“whatever number there may be of each”); of computation, that it “examines the

quantitative relations between numbers, whether odd or even". (That in the case of arithmetic the differentia appears to be included in the genus may be due to textual corruption. Schleiermacher proposed, not very convincingly, to delete τῶν in both question and answer, cf. c 7–8; Hissink, to alter τῶν to ἡ, cf. b 7. I suspect a lacuna in the text after b 4 περιττόν.) According to the distinction here drawn, ἀριθμητική corresponds to what we should call 'theory of numbers', being concerned with the properties of series of integers as such; while statements about particular numbers, like 'five nines are forty-five', which the schoolboy calls 'arithmetic', belong to the practical art of λογιστική (cf. *Hipp. mi.* 366 c). Arithmetic is similarly defined at *Theaet.* 198 a, as θήρα ἐπιστημῶν ἀρτίου τε καὶ περιττοῦ παντός, and computation at *Charm.* 166 a; and these are substantially the definitions which we find in later Greek mathematicians (Heath, *Hist. of Greek Mathematics* i. 13 ff.). I do not see, as Apelt and others do, any reference to the distinction between abstract numbers and numerable concrete objects: that distinction is drawn at *Phil.* 56 d–57 a, but Plato does not use it to differentiate ἀριθμητική from λογιστική; it is a διαίρεσις within each τέχνη, between the 'pure' and the 'applied' branch.

b 7. ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, "like a parliamentary draftsman". The phrase τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ . . . was a stock formula used in drafting amendments, etc., in order to avoid needless repetition. Cf. *Ar. Ath. Pol.* 29. 3 Κλειτοφῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ Πυθόδωρος εἶπεν, προσαναζητῆσαι δὲ τοὺς αἰρεθέντας ἔγραψεν κτλ.

c 8. περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀστρῶν κτλ.: "about the relative speed of movement of sun, moon, and stars". Plato has not yet developed the notion of a "pure" astronomy, corresponding to pure arithmetic, as a general theory of bodies in motion, of which the heavenly bodies would be only one example (*Rep.* 528 e ff.).

d 3. The meaningless τινῶν of BTW is possibly a corruption of a gloss τεχνῶν. The corrector of Parisinus 1811 emended it to τεχνῶν, the second hand in Par. 1808 to τις. The latter reading appears in the older editions, and was retained by Nestle and Croiset; but F is probably right in omitting the word altogether.

d 5. τῶν περὶ τί; We might expect ἡ περὶ τί; (Hissink). But Socrates does not yet insist on a complete and final definition; he is content to find the class to which rhetoric belongs.

d 6. περὶ δ. Burnet and Croiset retain οὗ, but the accusative has been used throughout the preceding examples, and a shift to genitive here seems both pointless and contrary to normal usage. 'λόγος περί τι et λόγος περί τινος ita differunt, ut per accusativum significetur genus quoddam rerum, circa quod ars vel scientia versatur, per genitivum vero res quaedam, de qua sermo est' (Hirschig). Cf. 491 a 4 n. The corruption is evidently due to the influence of the following word οὗτοι.

οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι: i.e. those referred to by Gorgias at 450 b 9; I see no reason to delete οὗτοι with Cobet and Theiler.

d 7. Τὰ μέγιστα—καὶ ἄριστα: with this vague and pompous phrase compare the claim of Gorgias' pupil Isocrates that the art of discourse is πάντων τῶν ἐνόντων ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει πλείστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιον (*Nicocles* 5, cf. also *Paneg.* 3-4). Gorgias, like Polus, confuses τί; with ποῖον;

451 d 9-453 a 7. *Socrates appeals to a popular song, and to the claims advanced by the various professions, to show that there is no agreement about what are "the best human interests". Gorgias must be more specific. Fourth answer: rhetoric is the art of persuading people in civic assemblies (452 e 1); in other words, it is "a manufacturer of conviction" (453 a 2).*

The comparison of various ways of life (βίοι) was a favourite theme with Greek writers. Its development has been studied by R. Joly, 'Le thème philosophique des genres de vie', *Mém. Acad. Roy. Belg.* li (1956), 3 ff., who rightly insists that in various forms it was already familiar before Plato: cf., e.g., Bacchyl. 10. 35 ff. Snell (9. 35 Jebb), Eur. *Médeia* 542 ff., *Antiope* frs. 183-202. Whether it should be called 'old-Pythagorean' is more doubtful: this claim (originated by Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*³, 98 f.) rests on the questionable authority of Heraclides Ponticus, fr. 88 Wehrli; cf. Jaeger, *Berl. Sitzb.* 1928, 395 ff.

451 e 2. ἀνθρώπων could be a gloss (Maas); but cf. the superfluous use of the word at 518 a 7 and c 4. τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν. On the σκολιά—quatrains, either extemporized or traditional, composed in a characteristic metre and sung at the συμπόσιον—see R. Reitzenstein, *Epigramm und Skolion*, chap. i, or Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry*, chap. ix. They are collected in Bergk's *Poetae Lyrici Graeci*, iii. 643 ff, and in Diehl's *Anthologia Lyrica Graeca*, ii². 6. 16. This one is quoted in full by the scholiast, and by Athenaeus and Stobaeus. It ran as follows:

ὕγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ,
 δεύτερον δὲ φυὰν καλὸν γενέσθαι,
 τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως,
 καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων.

The fourth item is omitted by Plato, since it does not depend on any τέχνη. The verses probably reflect aristocratic Greek opinion pretty accurately (cf. *Euthyd.* 279 ab, *Meno* 87 e, *Hipp. ma.* 291 d), though a speaker in a comedy by Anaxandrides (fr. 17) derides them for putting beauty above wealth. Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1394^b11) and Sextus Empiricus (*adv. math.* 11. 49) declare that the ordinary man everywhere puts health first, and the latter quotes a variety of writers from Simonides onward to the same effect. As to personal beauty, we learn from Aeschines (*Timarch.* 145) that Athenian parents prayed that their children might be καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς τὰς ιδέας καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀξίους, and from Aristotle (*E.N.* 1099^b3) that ὁ τὴν ιδέαν παναίσχης cannot be really happy. (Wilamowitz, *Glaube der Hellenen*, ii. 254 f., asserted that the author of the quatrain had more than physical beauty in mind, but Plato does not take it so, and the addition of φυὰν makes it unlikely.) The list is confined to what Aristotle called τὴν ἐκτὸς χορηγίαν: the intellectual goods are conspicuously absent, and only ἀδόλως pays an

implicit tribute to virtue. At the end of his life (*Laws* 661 a) Plato referred to this σκολιόν again, and reaffirmed against it his own belief that all natural good is relative to spiritual good (661 b, 631 bc): the “three best things” are best only for the man who is spiritually healthy; otherwise they can but add to his secret misery.

ε 5. ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ σκολιοῦ. Evidently Plato did not know the author's name; nor did Anaxandrides, who calls him ὁ τὸ σκολιὸν εὐρών ἐκεῖνος, ὅστις ἦν. The scholiast tells us that some ascribed the quatrain to Simonides, others to Epicharmus; the former attribution is found also in Clement of Alexandria and other late sources. But it is unlikely that they were better informed than the Attic writers.

452 a 1. “Οτι, “because”. The supposition introduced by εἰ is carried on by εἰ οὖν . . . ἐροίμην (a 6), and the apodosis is εἴποι ἄν (a 7): cf. above, 451 c 5, εἴ τις . . . ἐμοῦ λέγοντος . . . εἰ φαίη . . . εἴποιμ’ ἄν. As to the text, the same question of principle arises here as at 451 d 3: we have to choose between “Οτι εἴ . . . παρασταῖεν (F) and “Οτι . . . ἄν παρασταῖεν (where the ἄν appears first as a correction in Par. 1808). Most editors have chosen the second; but Burnet and Theiler are surely right in preferring the authority of a primary MS. to what may well be no more than a Byzantine conjecture (see *Introd.*, pp. 50 ff.).

αὐτίκα, “at this moment”. οἱ δημιουργοί: see on 455 b 3.—The gaily imagined competition between doctor, trainer, and business man has a less vivid counterpart in the *Republic*, in the competition of business man, man of action, and philosopher about the pleasure of their respective lives (581 c–e).

a 9. <ῆς γ’> ὑγίεια: sc. τὸ ἔργον ἐστί. The objection to the MS. reading is that Πῶς γὰρ οὐχ ὑγίεια; can only stand for Πῶς γὰρ οὐχ ὑγίεια μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν; and the doctor's first question is then virtually identical with his second. Unless Plato is writing carelessly here, we must either delete ὑγίεια (Hirschig, Sauppe, Theiler) or suppose that something has fallen out. Richards suggested inserting οὔσα before ὦ Σώκρατες or γάρ after ὑγίεια. I have adopted Vahlen's conjecture as the most plausible transcriptionally. This yields a logical progression: the doctor's product is the supreme good because it is health—and what is better than health?

b 2. τᾶν (τοι ἄν) is rare in Plato: besides this passage Denniston (544) reports only *Apol.* 29 a 1 (where, however, T has μεντᾶν and Stobaeus merely ἄν) and *Rep.* 545 c 6 (γέ τοι ἄν). γ’ ἄν would be an easy correction; but Platonic usage rather favours μεντᾶν (as at 461 e 1 and often elsewhere with potential optatives).

ἔχει. Heindorf pointed out what most of his successors have ignored, that Plato's usage decisively supports the indicative here. Cf. *Prot.* 312 c 2 θαυμάζοιμ’ ἄν εἰ οἴσθα, and 315 e 3; *Crat.* 428 b 1; *Rep.* 584 e 7, 585 a 6; *Tim.* 26 b 6; *Hipp. mi.* 364 a 3; *infra* 492 e 8. The optative is used only where the reference is to the future (*Apol.* 24 a 2, *Rep.* 337 c 9), which is hardly the case here.

c 2. παρὰ Γοργία: “in Gorgias' possession” (not, as some translators have taken it, “in Gorgias' belief”).

c 3. **Τί δὲ δῆ;** A surprised question (Denniston, 259). *δῆ* has dropped out in F and originally in T, while in BW it has become *ἄν* (a common uncial error).

d 3. **ὁ φῆς . . . καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ.** When a relative clause is continued by a clause co-ordinate with it which requires repetition of the pronoun in a different case, the relative is regularly replaced, in Greek as in Latin, by a demonstrative (Kühner-G. ii. 432): e.g. *Rep.* 505 *εὖ δὲ διώκει μὲν ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει.*

d 5–8. Gorgias explains that the product of his art is the highest good because it secures to its possessor freedom for himself and control over his fellow citizens, thus introducing the theme of power which will become the central issue in the ‘Second Act’. At the moment Socrates does not challenge this account of the highest good, for which cf. *Thuc.* 3. 45. 6 *περὶ τῶν μεγίστων, ἐλευθερίας ἢ ἄλλων ἀρχῆς.* It probably represents the opinion of the historical Gorgias: cf. *Meno* 73 cd, where we are told that Gorgias defined ἀρετή as capacity for leadership—*ἄρχειν οἷόν τ’ εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων.*

e 1–8. Cf. *Phdr.* 261 a–c, where Socrates describes rhetoric as *ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, οὐ μόνον ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δημόσιοι σύλλογοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἰδίῳ*, and Phaedrus agrees that he has heard it described pretty much in this way, except for the addition of *ἐν ἰδίῳ* (the term being normally restricted to *public* propaganda). The *Phaedrus* passage goes on to hint that the description goes back to Gorgias, and we may believe this to be true (cf. W. Süss, *Ethos*, 21 ff., and Pohlenz, 343 f.). In the *Helena* Gorgias exalts the power of persuasion which *προσιούσα τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐτυπώσατο ὅπως ἐβούλετο*, and speaks of debates *ἐν οἷς εἰς λόγος πολὺν ὄχλον* (cf. *infra* 454 b 6) *ἔτερψε καὶ ἔπεισε, τέχνη γραφεῖς, οὐκ ἀληθεία λεχθεῖς* (§ 13). With *δοῦλον μὲν ἔξεῖς* κτλ. (e 5) cf. *Phil.* 58 ab, where we are told that Gorgias habitually claimed that the art of persuasion was the master-art, *πάντα γὰρ ὑφ’ αὐτῇ δι’ ἐκόντων ἀλλ’ οὐ διὰ βίας ποιοῖτο.*

e 4. **πολιτικὸς σύλλογος:** to describe a court of law as a ‘civic assembly’ is more natural to a Greek than to an Englishman, since Greek juries were very large, and were thought of as representing the whole body of citizens in its judicial capacity.

καίτοι, ‘And in fact’ (*καί+τοι*, not adversative but continuative).

ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει, ‘in virtue of this power’. *ἐν* here approaches the instrumental force which it acquired in Hellenistic Greek, but the notion of inclusion is still present: the orator’s power over the doctor, etc., is part of his general influence over his fellow citizens. Cf. *Lysias* 13. 12 *ἀπέκτειναν ἐν τῇ προφάσει ταύτῃ* (the excuse ‘covered’ the killing).

e 6. **ὁ χρηματιστὴς οὗτος,** ‘that business man of yours’: *οὗτος* conveys a tinge of contempt, as at *Crito* 45 a 8 *οὐχ ὁρᾷς τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας ὡς εὐτελεῖς;* **ἄλλω . . . καὶ οὐχ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοί,** a good example of what Burnet called *a b a* structure, very common in Plato (cf. e.g. 521 d 8).

453 a 2. **πειθοῦς δημιουργός**, ‘a manufacturer of conviction’. The phrase is constantly quoted by writers on rhetoric. Mutschmann (*Hermes*, liii (1918), 440) rightly doubted the assertion of a late and foolish anonymus, the author of the introduction to the scholia on Hermogenes (Walz, *Rhet. Gr.* iv. 19), that it goes back to the first teachers of rhetoric, Tisias and Corax, as well as that of the still later Doxopatres (ibid. ii. 104), who attributes it to Gorgias. On the contrary, the personification is typically Platonic, or Socratic: cf. *Charm.* 174 e, where Socrates calls medicine *ὑγείας δημιουργός*, and *Symp.* 188 d, where *μαντική* is *φιλίας θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων δημιουργός*. Quintilian (2. 15. 4) came across the phrase in a *Τέχνη* current under the name of Isocrates, but he was probably right in questioning the Isocratean authorship of the work.

ἡ πραγματεία—τελευτᾷ: ‘its whole business comes to that, and that is its sum and substance.’

a 5. **ποιεῖν**: Cobet wished to read *ἐμποιεῖν*, but cf. 454 e 5, and *Phdr.* 271 a 2 *πειθὼ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ* (i.e. *ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ*) *ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ*.

a 6. **δοκεῖς ἱκανῶς ὀρίξεσθαι**: ‘you seem to delimit it (mark out its ὅροι) adequately.’ Gorgias mistakenly thinks that the definition is now complete.

453 a 8—454 b 7. *Socrates points out that the definition is still too wide: there are other skills which produce conviction. To describe rhetoric as the manufacturer of conviction is like describing Zeuxis as the figure-painter. We have still to state what sort of conviction rhetoric produces, and on what subject. The second of these demands is met in Gorgias’ fifth answer (454 b 5): rhetoric produces conviction ‘injuries and other mobs’ about questions of right and wrong.*

453 a 8. **ἐγὼ γὰρ . . . καὶ ἐμέ εἶναι**. We expect *ἐγὼ γὰρ . . . εἰμί*, but the verb is treated as if dependent on the parenthetic *ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω* (*εἶδ’ ἴσθ’ ὅτι* is also parenthetic, and does not affect the construction). This is a natural and fairly common type of anacoluthon: cf. *Phil.* 20 d 7 *τόδε γε μὴν, ὡς οἶμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι* (for *ἐστι*) *λέγειν*: *Soph.* 263 d 2 *παντάπασι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ τοιαύτη σύνθεσις . . . γίνεσθαι* (for *γίνεται*) *λόγος ψευδής* (W’s omission of *ὡς* looks like a normalization): *Phdr.* 272 d 3. It is frequent in Herodotus, e.g. 4. 5. 1, and is found also in the dramatists, e.g. *Soph. Trach.* 1238 and *Eur. I.T.* 50 ff. (where Porson’s normalization is, I think, unnecessary and unconvincing).

b 1. **ἄλλος** is logically redundant: cf. on 447 c 3.

b 8. **ὑποπτεύω γε**, ‘I can certainly make a guess at it’: cf. *Theaet.* 164 a 3 *ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μὲν ἱκανῶς γε συννοῶ*. Hirschig deleted the following words *ἦν—περὶ ὧν*, on the ground that *οἶμαι* is illogical (Socrates is guessing what Gorgias thinks, not what he thinks Gorgias thinks). But it is very natural that he should stress his continuing uncertainty, even at the cost of logic.

c 1. **τοῦ ἔνεκα** κτλ. Socrates is addicted to asking himself rhetorical questions, e.g. 457 e 1, 458 a 2, *Prot.* 343 b 3, *Meno* 97 e 5.

c 2. **οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου**. Socrates means that if he presses home his interrogation it is not done to humiliate Gorgias but

in order to lay bare the truth beyond possibility of doubt. Cf. 454 b 8 ff., where the meaning is made clear, and 457 e 4. So at *Charm.* 166 cd Socrates explains that if he presses the argument it is primarily for his own sake, "lest I should suppose myself to know what I do not know", and perhaps for the sake of his friends (the readers?); the refutation of Charmides is incidental. τοῦ λόγου ἔνεκα, "for the sake of the argument", is to be distinguished from λόγου ἔνεκα, "for the sake of talking" (*Laches* 196 c 2).

c 5. εἰ ἐτύγχανόν κτλ.: "if I were asking you what kind of painter Zeuxis is (literally, what Z. is among painters), suppose you had told me, 'He is the figure-painter', might I not fairly inquire, 'What sort of figures does he paint, and where?'" In current usage ζωγράφος had acquired a wide application, covering not only figure-painters (οἱ τὰ ζῶα γράφοντες) but painters of other subjects also. Zeuxis was the most famous painter of the late fifth century; Aristophanes refers to his picture of Eros, *Ach.* 992, and he is probably the same as the Zeuxippus of *Prot.* 318 b, who was 'lionized' by the young people when he first appeared at Athens. On Plato's interest in painting cf. Dorothy Tarrant, *CQ*, xl (1946), 27 f., and especially B. Schweitzer, *Platon und die bildende Kunst der Griechen* (1953).

c 7. τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζώων. There is especial point in asking this question about Zeuxis, since he was distinguished for the originality of his subjects: τὰ δημῶδη καὶ τὰ κοινὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔγραφεν ἢ ὅσα πάνυ ὀλίγα, ἥρωας ἢ θεοὺς ἢ πολέμους, ἀεὶ δὲ καινοποιεῖν ἐπειράτο (Lucian, *Zeuxis*, 3); Lucian goes on to describe his painting of the Centaur's Family.

c 8. καὶ ποῦ; This question has often been condemned as pointless or even meaningless. It cannot mean "In what branch of painting?" or "On what material?". Some editors simply delete the words; but it is not easy to see how they got in, and the silence of Olympiodorus does not prove that his text lacked them. Of the emendations proposed, the neatest are van Heusde's καὶ ποῖ' οὐ and Woolsey's ἢ οὐ. The latter reading, which was suggested also by Deuschle, depends on the assumption that uncial *H* was misread as *II*, just as ἢ οὐδ was misread as *π*ου at *Rep.* 437 d 8, and at Aristotle *E.E.* 1218^a16 ἢ ὥς has become *π*ῶς. Both these proposals would reduce the questions about Zeuxis to one. But to complete the definition of rhetoric Socrates asks throughout for *two* determinants: 453 b 9 τίνα . . . καὶ περὶ τίνων, e 6 ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ περὶ τί, 454 a 8 ποίας δὴ πειθοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς. We expect him, therefore, to ask for two determinants in the case of Zeuxis. Moreover, Gorgias' reply (454 b 5) determines rhetoric (a) by its subject-matter (περὶ τούτων κτλ.) and (b) by the place where it is exercised (ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις κτλ.). The second of these is not in fact new, but Gorgias is at any rate attempting to provide answers to Socrates' double-barrelled question; and it is hardly accidental that his answers correspond to the two questions asked about Zeuxis. I have accordingly not ventured to meddle with καὶ ποῦ. Since Greek painters were chiefly known for their murals, the question has more point than a similar question about a modern artist: Zeuxis could quite reason-

ably be identified as 'the man who painted centaurs and decorated the palace of Archelaus'.

d 5. σοι: dative of the agent with ἀπεκέκριτο, which is passive.

d 11. Οὐ δῆτα negatives ἢ οὐ, and is thus equivalent to a strong affirmative. Cf. 501 c 7.

e 3. Theiler follows Cobet in deleting καὶ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἄνθρωπος. But in the parallel case Socrates will extend his inference from what rhetoric is (454 e 9) to what the ῥήτωρ does (455 a 2), and a similar coupling of the art with its practitioner seems to me quite in order here.

e 7. τῆς διδασκαλικῆς: for the distinction between the "didactic" persuasion of the mathematician and the πιστευτικὴ πειθὼ of the ῥήτωρ see below, 454 de.

τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν ὅσον ἐστίν: not "the amount of an odd or an even number" (Lamb), but "the entire series of odd and even numbers": see on 451 b 3. If the words are so understood we need not delete ὅσον ἐστίν with Kratz, Gercke, and Theiler; but ὅσον should perhaps be corrected to ὅσα (cf. 451 b 4 ὅσα ἂν ἐκάτερα τυγχάνη ὄντα).

454 a 4. ῥητορικῇ: see on 451 a 4.

a 8. τὸν λέγοντα sc. ὅτι πειθοῦς ἐστὶ δημιουργὸς ἢ ῥητορικῇ.

b 6. ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, "exercised on juries and other mobs". Since an Athenian jury usually numbered several hundred persons, it could be described as an ὄχλος (cf. on 452 e 4). But both in Plato and elsewhere the word commonly conveys a tinge of contempt; it would scarcely be employed in this connexion by a good democrat. This is not, however, a point on which Socrates and Gorgias would disagree: at *Euthyd.* 290 a 3 Socrates is made to use similar language—δικαστῶν τε καὶ ἐκκλησιαστῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων κήλησις. Plato thought large juries undesirable in principle, *Laus* 766 d.

b 7. ἄρτι: 452 e 1 ff.

περὶ τούτων ἃ ἐστὶ δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδिका. This is the new element in Gorgias' answer, and it will be the cause of his undoing, as Socrates points out at 460 e. It is obviously true of forensic rhetoric, but its extension to rhetoric in general might well be challenged. At *Phdr.* 261 cd Socrates speaks more accurately: forensic rhetoric is concerned with the just and the unjust, but δημηγορία (the deliberative branch) with the good and the bad, a wider field which includes questions of expediency as well as of rightness; he also recognizes (261 ab) that rhetoric can be exercised ἐν ἰδίῳ, and on trivial matters (the epideictic branch). For the views of the historical Gorgias see on 459 c 6—460 a 4.

454 b 8—455 a 7. Socrates is still not satisfied as to the kind of conviction which rhetoric induces. Gorgias is led to agree that what it induces is not knowledge (which is always true) but belief (which may be either true or false). This is the answer to Socrates' question Ποίας πειθοῦς ἢ ῥητορικῇ ἐστὶν τέχνη; (454 a 8), and enables the final definition to be reached: "rhetoric is a manufacturer of conviction involving belief but not knowledge about right and wrong" (454 e 9).

The distinction between knowledge and opinion, which is the foundation not only of Plato's epistemology but of his metaphysic, is here formally drawn for the first time. He modified his terminology later: from the *Meno* onwards the normal word for opinion is *δόξα*, while *πίστις* becomes in the *Republic* (511 e 1) the name for a subdivision of *δόξα*. The doctrine of the present passage is restated in the new language at *Theaet.* 201 a 8, where we are told that the orators *πείθουσιν οὐ διδάσκοντες ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιοῦντες ἃ ἂν βούλωνται*. But Plato is not rigorous in his use of terms: in a famous sentence of the *Timaeus* (29 c 3), *ὅτι περὶ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία, τοῦτο πρὸς πίστιν ἀλήθεια*, *πίστις* is equivalent to the more usual *δόξα*.

454 b 9–c 5. *ἀλλ' ἵνα κτλ.* This slightly anacoluthic sentence reflects Socrates' slightly embarrassed and apologetic attitude to the distinguished victim of his dialectic (he makes a similar apology to Hippias, *Hipp. mi.* 364 c 8). It is at the same time Plato's apology to the reader for the slow progress of the argument. The *ἵνα* clause depends logically on an "I will explain" which never comes, since Socrates breaks off after *ἐπανερωτῶ*; but the substance of the explanation is contained in the statement introduced by *ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω* (c 1). Translate: "But to prevent your being surprised if presently I ask you a similar question, one to which the answer seems obvious and yet I persist in it—for, as I said (453 c 2), I am questioning you in order to get the argument carried through in a coherent way, not from personal animosity (*σοῦ ἔνεκα*), but for fear we should fall into the habit of guessing at what is meant (*ὑπονοοῦντες*, not 'suspecting each other' as some translate) and snatching the words from each other's mouths; my purpose is that you should develop your own view on your own foundations, quite freely."

θαυμάζης is a conjecture which appears first, so far as I know, in the Malatestianus. *θαυμάζοις*, read by Ol as well as the primary MSS., is perhaps not indefensible (cf. 461 c 7, and Reinhard, 15): it would depend on an implicit "I said what I did". But we should then rather expect *εἰ . . . ἀνεροίμην*, and the confusion is a common one (itacism). —In the *ἐὰν* clause F is most likely right in inserting *καὶ* and *ἔτερον*: we have already had instances of the question *ὃ δοκεῖ δῆλον εἶναι*. —*προαρπάζειν*: cf. Socrates' objection to Alcibiades' *προδρομὰς τοῦ λόγου*, *Alc. i* 114 a 1 (misunderstood in L.S.J. s.v. *προδρομή*). *ὑπόθεσιν*: "foundation", "basic assumption"—here Gorgias' definition of rhetoric. The word need have no technical sense in this passage.

d 8. *ἄρα* is preserved only by Ol. The direct tradition has *γὰρ αὖ*, but *γὰρ* is illogical and *αὖ* pointless (cf. Wilamowitz, ii. 346 n.1). —*ἔστιν* should perhaps be *ἐστὶν*, the subject being *πίστις καὶ ἐπιστήμη*. The unfamiliarity of the dual from Hellenistic times onwards made it particularly liable to corruption: cf. *infra* on 456 b 6, 500 d 2, 524 a 6.

e 1. *τε [γε]*. This combination is decidedly rare (Denniston, 161). Here *γε* has little point, and the omission of *τε* in F suggests that *τε* and *γε* were originally alternative variants, which have been conflated in BTW.

e 5. ποιεῖ ἐν: ἐμποιεῖ Cobet, but cf. 453 a 5 and note.

e 7. πιστεύειν: almost all editors save Burnet have inserted an article, with the Paris corrector, to correspond to τὸ εἰδέναι in e 8 and τὸ πιστεύειν in Gorgias' reply. But the slight shift of construction, due to the interposition of ἀνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, seems not unnatural. Cf. on 448 d 10, and for γίγνεται c. inf., *Rep.* 397 b 8 γίγνεται λέγειν.

455 a 1. πιστευτικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλικῆς. This distinction is repeated in the *Politicus*, where the Eleatic Stranger defines the sphere of rhetoric as τὸ πειστικὸν . . . πλήθους τε καὶ ὄχλου διὰ μυθολογίας ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ διδαχῆς (304 c 10).

a 4. πειστικός μόνον, 'just persuasive'. Bare persuasion is the opposite of teaching, and is tantamount to the induction of πίστις: cf. *Phdr.* 277 e 8 ἀνευ ἀνακρίσεως καὶ διδαχῆς πειθοῦς ἔνεκα and *Theaet.* 201 b 5, where πείσαι is defined as δοξάσαι ποιῆσαι. Many editors write πειστικός with BT and explain it as an adjective specially coined for the occasion from πίστις (so most recently Ammann, *ikos bei Platon* 160); but Plato has just used πιστευτικός for this (a 1). The only other occurrence of πειστικός in Plato is at 493 a 7 (according to BTW), where it seems to offer no acceptable sense (see note). In other Attic writers it is generally regarded as a mere misspelling of πειστικός (see L.S.J. s.v. πειστικός).

a 5. ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. Plato doubtless has in mind the limitation of forensic speeches by the clepsydra: cf. *Theaet.* 201 a ἢ σὺ οἶε δεινούς τινες οὕτω διδασκάλους εἶναι ὥστε . . . δύνασθαι πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς τῶν γενομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν; and Socrates' characteristic explanation of his failure to persuade the jury, ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον διειλέγμεθα (*Apol.* 37 a, cf. 19 a, *Laws* 766 e). But there is implicit a more general criticism of democratic procedures, which put a premium on the ability to get quick results by substituting mass-suggestion for proof.

455 a 8—d 5. Socrates proceeds to draw out the implications of the definition: what are we really (καὶ, 455 a 8) saying about rhetoric when we define it thus? In the first place, we are limiting the field in which the rhetorician can be useful. He is not qualified to advise on technical questions such as the appointment of a medical officer of health, a marine engineer, or any other specialist, or on the details of military policy; for these things need precise knowledge, which is not his province.

The final definition of rhetoric described it in terms both of its form, as πειθοῦς δημιουργὸς πιστευτικῆς, and of its content, as being περὶ τὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ ἄδικον. But, as Pohlenz says (133), from Socrates' point of view this form and this content are incompatible: there is an inner contradiction, which Socrates now exploits to the eventual discomfiture of Gorgias. (Polus will avoid the contradiction by rejecting Gorgias' view of the content: see 461 bc.)

Besides digging a pitfall for Gorgias, this section and the next prepare the ground for Plato's subsequent attack on Athenian democracy. Athens in Plato's day was in the condition in which the United States were until fairly recently: it had no permanent Civil Service. In

consequence, many administrative questions fell to be settled by the Assembly; and this usually meant in practice, as Gorgias is quick to point out (456 a 1), that they were settled by *ρήτορες*, politicians. But it is certainly arguable that the qualities which make a successful politician are not those which make a good administrator. Plato would have preferred the English system of having politicians to talk and civil servants, acting on the advice of specialists, to govern. Cf. 458 e 3–459 c 5 and note; 513 c 4–515 b 5 and note.

455 a 8. ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν: so *Crat.* 428 d 2 ἐπανασκέψασθαι τί καὶ λέγω, “what I am really saying”.

b 2. ἱατρῶν αἵρέσεως. At Athens and elsewhere state physicians (*δημοσιεύοντες*) existed from early times side by side with those in private practice: a sixth-century instance is Democedes, who was engaged first by the Aeginetans at a talent a year, then by the Athenians at 100 minas, finally by Polycrates of Samos at two talents (*Hdt.* 3. 131. 2). Such appointments were made by the Assembly, and candidates were expected to state their qualifications, which would normally include successful experience in private practice: see 514 de and *Xen. Mem.* 4. 2. 5. The nature of the state physician’s duties is not clear. It is commonly believed on the testimony of schol. *Aristoph. Ach.* 1030 and *Suidas* s.v. *δημοσιεύω* that his services were available free of charge to all, but there are difficulties about this view. For the accepted opinion see R. Pohl, *de Graecorum medicis publicis* (diss. Berl., 1905); for the difficulties, L. Cohn-Haft, *Public Physicians of Ancient Greece* (Smith College Studies in History, 42, 1956).

b 3. ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργικοῦ ἔθνους, sc. αἵρέσεως: “the appointment of any other kind of specialist”. A *δημιουργός* is the possessor of any sort of professional or trade skill, manual or intellectual, in contrast with the *ιδιώτης*: he may be a painter, an architect, or a shipbuilder (503 e 5); already in Homer, *Od.* 17. 383 ff., diviners, physicians, carpenters, and minstrels are classified as *δημιουργοί*. On the original meaning of the term see L. R. Palmer, *Achaean and Indo-European* (Inaugural Lecture, 1954), 13; and, *contra*, M. I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*, 57 ff.

b 5. It is tempting to take τὸν τεχνικώτατον as subject of the infinitive (“the most expert must do the choosing”), as the editors of Jowett⁴ suggest. But if Plato had meant this, would he not have used *συμβουλεύειν* rather than *αἰρεῖσθαι*? The actual choice rested with the whole Assembly. I think τὸν τεχν. is object: “they have to choose the most expert” (and that, it is implied, is a matter demanding some knowledge). Cf. *Charm.* 171 bc: it takes a doctor to judge the quality of another doctor; and Aristotle’s discussion of the question, *Pol.* 1282^a7 ff.

b 8. τάξεώς τινος, “some disposition of troops”. So *Xen. Anab.* 2. 1. 7 ἐπιστήμων εἶναι τῶν ἀμφὶ τάξεις.

c 4. ῥητορικούς del. Cobet: see on 447 a 5.

c 5. τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν, “to be concerned for your interests”. So *Soph. El.* 251 τὸ σὸν σπεύδουσ’ ἅμα | καὶ τοῦμόν αὐτῆς. Socrates lures

Gorgias on with a discreet hint at the advantages of a free advertisement.

c 6. τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων, i.e. the people who have attended Gorgias' lecture. The phrase cannot be taken as implying that Socrates is still outside the lecture room; for at 458 b 6 the same people are described as τῶν παρόντων and it is implied that they have been listening to the conversation.

c 7. τινας, σχεδὸν καὶ συχνούς, "some, indeed quite a number". σχεδὸν qualifies συχνούς, and καὶ corrects the first estimate as at *Phaedo* 58 d 1 παρῆσάν τινες, καὶ πολλοί γε.

455 d 6—456 c 6. Gorgias rejects Socrates' suggested restrictions on the power of the ῥήτωρ. Taking up Socrates' examples, he points out that the fortification of Athens was decided by Themistocles and Pericles, not by the engineers; and claims that in making appointments the influence of the ῥήτωρ is usually decisive. In the ῥῆσις which follows, encouraged by Socrates' ironical admiration (456 a 4), he shows by further examples that the trained speaker has more influence, both over individuals and over states, than any expert.

Comparison with the *Protagoras* suggests that Gorgias is here exaggerating a good deal (and that Plato knows it). There Socrates remarks (319 b 5) that on questions involving expertise the Athenians will listen only to qualified specialists, and Protagoras agrees (322 d 5). The same thing is said at *Alc. i* 107 a—c. But there is nevertheless an important kernel of truth in Gorgias' claim: in the conditions of Greek democracy a skilful orator could certainly on occasion exert a disproportionate and dangerous influence (cf. *Introd.*, p. 4). This observation was not new; Euripides, in particular, lays repeated stress on it (see my note on *Bacchae* 266—71). And it was already used in the fifth century as an argument against democracy: cf. Herodotus' contention (5. 97. 2) that it is easier to deceive many than one, for Aristagoras found it easier to deceive thirty thousand Athenian citizens than one Spartan king. The facts of crowd psychology which are set forth in such books as Graham Wallas's *Human Nature in Politics* were not unknown to thoughtful Greeks.

455 d 7. ἀποκαλύψαι, "to unveil": cf. *Prot.* 352 a where the implied comparison is worked out. —δύναμιν: one of the keywords of the dialogue. Whether the orator really exercises "power" will be questioned by Socrates further on (466 b ff.).

e 1. τὰ τεῖχη τὰ Ἀθηναίων. This covers the fortifications of Athens itself and those of the Peiraeus, both of which were constructed on the initiative of Themistocles (*Thuc.* 1. 90. 3, 93. 3). The "others" (τὰ δ'), which are ascribed to Pericles, are the Long Walls (see below, on e 6). Nothing is gained by deleting τὰ Ἀθηναίων with Cobet (cf. on 447 a 5). —Ἀθηναίων has no article; this is the normal practice where the genitive of a proper name stands in the attributive position, e.g. 469 e 4 τὰ γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια.

e 3. ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν: short for ἐκ τῆς τῶν δημιουργῶν (συμβουλῆς). Some would restore τῆς, but Plato may well have preferred to avoid the threefold repetition of ἐκ τῆς.

ε 6. τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους. The original Long Walls, built between 461 and 456, linked Athens with Peiraeus and Phaleron respectively, thus enclosing the city and its two ports within a triangular fortification whose third side was the sea. Later, perhaps because the use of Phaleron as a harbour had been given up, a third wall was built, within and parallel to the north or Peiraeus wall, so as to enclose the military road from Athens to Peiraeus. This is usually thought to be the "middle wall" referred to here and at Plut. *Mor.* 351A (where Cratinus is quoted on the subject). Its date is uncertain, but may be as late as 444-442 (Gomme on Thuc. 1. 107. 1), when Socrates was 25 or more and could well have heard Pericles' speech about it. (Gomme, loc. cit., thinks that τὸ διὰ μέσου τεῖχος is merely "the connecting wall" between Athens and Peiraeus. I have difficulty in accepting this. (a) The expression would be very vague: there was more than one "connecting wall", and Peiraeus has not been mentioned; (b) the traditional view is that of ancient scholars, to judge from Harpocration s.v. and the scholiast; (c) Gomme's view gratuitously foists an anachronism on Plato, since Socrates was a child in 461-456 and could not attend the Assembly. I think the "middle wall" is singled out for mention precisely because it is the only one on whose construction Socrates could have heard Pericles speak. Andocides 3. 7 and Aeschines 2. 174 seem to give it a different name, "the south wall"; but if the southernmost (Phaleron) wall fell into disuse, this would become the natural way of referring to what was originally "the middle wall". The Plutarch passage suggests, if it does not prove, that it was called "the middle wall" by Cratinus.)

The choice of the Long Walls as an example may have been suggested by their rebuilding in 394-393 (the Spartans having destroyed them in 404). What importance Socrates attaches to such achievements will appear later (519 a).

456 a 3. οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας: "the ones who get their proposals carried" (internal accusative). So Aristoph. *Clouds* 432 ἐν τῷ δήμῳ γνώμας οὐδεὶς νικήσει πλείονας ἢ σύ, *Wasps* 594.

a 7. Εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης . . . ὅτι: "If only you knew the whole truth, namely that" For the suppression of the apodosis ("you would be even more surprised") cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 1347 εἰ καὶ τὰ πρὸς τούτοις γ' εἰδείης κακά and *Ion* 961 εἰ παῖδά γ' εἶδες χεῖρας ἐκτείνοντά μοι, both with the same γε. τί δ' εἰ would also be idiomatic (cf., e.g., Aristoph. *Clouds* 1444), and τί could easily fall out after σκοποῦντι (speakers' names being regularly omitted); but it seems unnecessary to alter the text.

b 2. τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ: cf. 448 b 5.

b 4. τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι, the twin horrors of pre-anaesthetic surgery: ὀκόσα φάρμακα οὐκ ἵηται, σίδηρος ἵηται· ὅσα σίδηρος οὐκ ἵηται, πῦρ ἵηται, as the Hippocratic aphorism tersely expresses it (*Aph.* 7. 87). For the patients' reactions cf. 480 c 6, 521 e 8, Heraclitus fr. 58 οἱ γοῦν ἰατροὶ τέμνοντες καίοντες ἐπαιτέονται μηδὲν ἄξιοι μισθὸν λαμβάνειν, and Hippocrates, *de Arte* 7, where we are told that ignorance and fear often

lead patients to resist treatment. Plato thought that a good doctor would himself persuade his patient to accept treatment, not by using rhetoric but by explaining to him the cause of his symptoms and the rational basis of the prescription proposed (*Laws* 720 d, 857 cd). This must have been the more necessary since in the absence of recognized professional qualifications doctors were (not without reason) distrusted: see L. Edelstein, *Περὶ ἀέρων und die Sammlung der hippokratischen Schriften* (Problemata 4, 1931), 89 ff., 103 ff., and W. H. S. Jones, Introduction to Hippocrates (Loeb), vol. ii, pp. xxxvii ff. —Blomfield, on *Agam.* 822 (849), wished to read here *τεμεῖν καὶ καῦσαι*. But cautery was usually alternative to the knife, not additional to it, as the aphorism shows: cf. *Rep.* 406 d 2 *καύσει ἢ τομῇ χρησάμενος*, *Polit.* 293 b 3 *τέμνοντες ἢ καίοντες*.

παρασχεῖν, the *vox propria* for putting oneself in a surgeon's hands: sometimes with *ἑαυτόν* or the like, but usually intransitive as here and at 475 d 7, *Charm.* 176 b 7, *Rep.* 411 a 5, etc. *πιεῖν* is parallel to *παρασχεῖν*, the other infinitives depend on *παρασχεῖν*.

b 6. *καὶ εἰς πόλιν*, in contrast with the persuasion of individuals.

ὅποι. ὅπη of the primary MSS. is probably a mere itacism due to the influence of *βούλει* (cf., e.g., *Rep.* 556 a 5 *ὅπη τις βούλεται*): elsewhere in Plato it seems always to have modal force, which is hardly possible here. Cf. *Soph. Phil.* 481, where Pearson accepts Wakefield's *ὅποι* for *ὅπη*, and *infra* 511 a 4, where the reverse corruption appears in BTW.

ἐλθόντα may perhaps be defended on the principle that a predicate is sometimes made to agree with the more important of two subjects (Kühner-G. i. 79); but Dobree's *ἐλθόντε* is tempting (cf. on 454 d 8). Strict syntax would of course demand a genitive absolute, since *τὸν ἱατρὸν* eventually emerges as the sole subject of *φανῆναι*.

The idea of a comparison between rhetorician and doctor goes back to the historical Gorgias, who says that oratory is to the mind what drugs are to the body (*Hel.* 14), and indeed beyond him—for it is already implied by Aesch. *P.V.* 380 *ὀργῆς νοσοῦσης εἰσὶν ἱατροὶ λόγοι*. The turn which is given to it here is quite in keeping with the general tone of the *Helena* (cf. on 452 e 1–8). What the true relationship of the two skills is, Socrates will explain later (464 b ff.).

b 8. *οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι τὸν ἱατρὸν*, a metaphor from racing, as we might say “the doctor would be left at the post”: cf. Dem. *de corona* 310 *ἐν οἷς οὐδαμοῦ σὺ φανήσῃ γεγονώς, οὐ πρῶτος, οὐ δεύτερος, οὐ τρίτος, κτλ.* and 320 *ἐφαμίλλου τῆς . . . εὐνοίας . . . πᾶσι κειμένης . . . ὑμῶν οὐδεὶς ἦν οὐδαμοῦ*. Plato uses it again at *Phaedo* 72 c 1. It belongs to the language of the people, as appears from its occurrence in an Attic *defixio* where some professional cooks have a curse laid on them *ἐπὶ δικαστηρίου καὶ παρὰ διαιτητῇ ἐὰν ἀντιποιῶσι, μηθαμοῦ φαίνεσθαι μήτε ἐν λόγῳ μήτε ἐν ἔργῳ* (Audollent, *Defixionum Tabellae*, 49. 18).

c 2. *δημιουργόν*: see on 455 b 3.

c 6. *ἐν πλήθει*: cf. 454 b 6 and Isocr. 3. 3 *ρήτορικοὺς μὲν καλοῦμεν τοὺς ἐν τῷ πλήθει λέγειν δυναμένους*.

456 c 6–457 c 3. Gorgias adds that if some orators abuse their power, that is not the fault of the art of rhetoric: we do not blame the boxing-master if one of his pupils uses his skill to knock out his father. (Rhetoric is thus not anti-moral; it is morally neutral, like other technical skills, being ethically what Aristotle later called a δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων.)

This was probably the standpoint of the historical Gorgias, who did not claim to teach ἀρετή (*Meno* 95 c 1), but recognized that rhetoric could be misused: cf. *Hel.* 14, there are speeches which πειθοῖ τινι κακῇ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφαρμάκευσαν, and *infra* on 459 c 6–460 a 4. It was also the standpoint of Isocrates, who uses the same illustration, *Antid.* 252: if those who have learned πυκτεῦν καὶ παγκρατιάζειν prove their skill by knocking down innocent passers-by, we should praise their teachers but execute the pupils who pervert the teaching. This may be a conscious reminiscence of the Gorgias (of which other echoes are recognizable in the *Antidosis*). Or the illustration may go back to Gorgias himself (W. Süss, *Ethos*, 24). —The view that society can afford a morally neutral education is one which Plato repudiates: cf. *Introd.*, p. 10.

c 8. ἀγωνία, “competitive skill”. Gorgias compares the ἀγῶνες of the lawcourts with the competitions in boxing and παγκράτιον at the Games. For lessons in swordsmanship cf. *Laches* 179 e.

d 1. οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ. These words are repeated at d 4, where after the intervening clauses Gorgias resumes his proposition in more precise terms. Findeisen’s proposal to delete the first τούτου ἕνεκα has recently been revived (Helmbold, *Mnem.* 1952, 226). But cf. *Prot.* 311 e 1 τί ὄνομα . . . περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν; ὥσπερ . . . τί τοιοῦτον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν; and the examples quoted by Denniston, *Greek Prose Style*, 98.

d 2. ἔμαθεν: the subject is “the person concerned”, and is implicit in the preceding infinitive χρῆσθαι. This is, as Wackernagel says (*Vorl. über Syntax* i. 113), quite common both in Greek and in Latin. Cf. *Apol.* 29 a τὸ γὰρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι . . . δοκεῖν εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν (sc. ὁ δεδιώς), and *infra* 464 b 1, 469 e 7; Thompson on *Meno* 79 b; Fraenkel on *Agam.* 71. Helmbold (loc. cit.) should not have revived the insertion of τις, which originates with the Paris corrector.

e 3. παρέδοσαν: sc. ταῦτα: “imparted their skills”.

e 4. ἀμυνομένους, μὴ ὑπάρχοντας: “in self-defence, not in aggression”. Cf. *Laws* 879 d 4 μήτε γὰρ ὑπάρχων μήτε ἀμυνόμενος τὸ παράπαν τολμάτω πληγαῖς τὸν τοιοῦτον νουθετεῖν.

457 b 1. ἔμβραχυ περὶ ὅτου ἂν βούληται: “about, in a word, anything he chooses”. F’s ἐν βραχεῖ is a vulgarization: cf. *Hipp. mi.* 365 d 5 ἐρώτα ἔμβραχυ ὅτι βούλει, where again F has ἐν βραχεῖ.

b 3. δύναιτο ἂν, sc. ὁ ρήτωρ: cf. 456 b 6 ff.

b 4. ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ. The term ἀγωνία is used in the narrower sense, which excludes rhetoric. Despite 456 c 8 and d 1 I doubt if it is necessary to insert ἄλλη here (with the copyist of a Florentine MS.) or to delete the whole phrase (as Sauppe suggested).

b 5. The use of *καῖτα* or *κάπειτα* after a participle, where we expect no connective, seems to be an Attic colloquialism. It is frequent in comedy, e.g. Plato comicus fr. 23 K. λαβὼν οὖν τὸν σκύλακα . . . κάπειτα δῆσον αὐτόν, Aristoph. *Clouds* 409, *Birds* 536, 674; and occurs at *Phaedo* 98 c 4 ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγων . . . κάπειτα . . . λέγοι . . . and 67 e 2. Cf. Denniston, 308, 585.

c 1. *δικαία* has very dubious authority (see *Introd.*, pp. 50, 55), but is accepted by almost all editors save Burnet and is certainly the more natural reading. *δικαίου* would have to be taken as a subjective genitive ("with a view to a just man's use"); but we should expect any genitive with *χρεία* in this sense to be objective, as at 480 a 2 and I think everywhere in Plato. The parallel phrase at 456 e 3, ἐπὶ τῷ δικαίως χρῆσθαι, tends to support *δικαία*.

c 2. οὐκ, not μὴ, because the negative coheres closely with ὁρθῶς.

457 c 4—458 e 2. *Interlude.* Before proceeding to convict the great man of inconsistency, Socrates—whose fear of giving offence has already found expression at 453 c 2 and 454 c 2—delivers a little lecture on the nature of dialectic. Its first rule is that you must think impersonally and keep your temper, regardless whether you "win" or not. If Gorgias does not care for the game, Socrates offers him the opportunity of withdrawal (cf. 506 a, *Prot.* 335 bc). This he is at first inclined to accept; but Chaerephon and Callicles press him to continue, and he agrees to do so.

Plato was always careful to distinguish the Socratic dialectic, which aims only at the attainment of truth, from its vulgar counterfeit, the "eristic" or "antilogic", which aims at personal victory and is a mark of ἀπαιδευσία (*Phaedo* 91 a). Cf. *Rep.* 454 a ἔριδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι, and *ibid.* 499 a, where the pursuit of truth is contrasted with τὰ κομψὰ τε καὶ ἐριστικὰ καὶ μηδαμόσε ἄλλοσε τείνοντα ἢ πρὸς δόξαν καὶ ἔριν: Thompson, *Meno*, Excursus V; Robinson, 84 ff.

457 c 4. καὶ σέ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων: "that you, like me, have had experience of many discussions". It has been proposed to alter λόγων into a term descriptive of *persons*, in order to provide a source from which a subject can be supplied for δύνανται in c 6: λογίων (an unplatonic term for "learned men") Madvig; φιλολόγων Schanz; ἀνθρώπων (ἀνῶν) Cobet. The manuscript text is, however, supported not only by 458 d 2 πολλοῖς ἤδη λόγοις παραγενόμενος but by *Tim.* 19 e 2 τὸ δὲ τῶν σοφιστῶν γένος πολλῶν μὲν λόγων . . . ἔμπειρον ἡγοῦμαι. Others have thought that the subject of δύνανται has dropped out: the anonymous scholar who corrected Parisinus E inserted οἱ ἄνθρωποι, Theiler οἱ συνόντες. But it is not really difficult to understand οἱ λέγοντες out of λόγων: cf., e.g., *Laus* 886 c 3 θεογονίαν διεξέρχονται, γενόμεοί τε ὡς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὡμίλησαν, where οἱ θεοί is understood out of θεογονίαν, and other examples in Kühner-G. i. 34 f.

d 3. κατὰ φθόνον . . . τὸν ἑαυτῶν. True philosophical discussion proceeds ἄνευ φθόνων ἐρωτήσεων καὶ ἀποκρίσεων χρωμένων, *Eph. vii* 344 b 6.

d 4. φιλονικοῦντας, not φιλονεικοῦντας. Both spellings are frequent in MSS., but *Rep.* 581 ab and *Ar. Rhet.* 1389^a12 show that Plato and

Aristotle connected the word with *νίκη*, not with *νεῖκος* or its by-form *νείκη*. Cf. Schanz, vol. VI. i, p. vii, and L.S.J. s.v. *φιλονίκος*. —It is at first sight tempting to read *φιλονικούντες* and *ζητούντες*, which appear as variants in the Meermanianus and were read by Hirschig; but the accusatives are confirmed by the parallel with e 4.

d 6. *λοιδορηθέντες*: so Socrates warns the impetuous Laches against *λοιδορία*, *Lach.* 195 a 7. The Athenians were (and are) a quick-tempered people, and discussion must often have degenerated into an exchange of abuse. I see no reason to delete *λοιδορηθέντες τε καὶ* with Hirschig: *λοιδορηθέντες* explains *αἰσχιστα ἀπαλλάττονται*, and what follows shows the effect of the *λοιδορία* on the audience. At *Rep.* 500 b 3 Plato describes such people as *λοιδορουμένους τε αὐτοῖς καὶ φιλαπεχθιμόνως ἔχοντας καὶ αἰεὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων τοὺς λόγους ποιουμένους, ἥκιστα φιλοσοφία πρέπον ποιοῦντας*.

d 7–8. It seems unlikely that Plato used both *περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν* and *ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν* in the same sentence. Cobet deleted the latter words, but they have point: the audience get angry too, not as siding with one of the disputants but “on their own account”, as having wasted their time. Cf. Aristoph. *Lys.* 10 *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν γυναικῶν ἄχθομαι, ὅτι κτλ. περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν*, on the other hand, adds nothing essential (despite *περὶ ἀνθρώπων* at *Rep.* 500 b 4): it may be a gloss on *εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες* (Sauppe), or a variant for *ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν* which has been inserted in the wrong line (cf. 503 e 2–3). —*οἶα* is governed by *ἄχθεσθαι*, like Eur. fr. 757. 4 *καὶ τὰδ' ἄχθονται βροτοί*. —For *ὅτι τοιούτων* Cobet wished to substitute the more idiomatic *οἷων*, but this would be a little clumsy after *οἶα* used in a different sense.

e 2–3. *οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα*: “not quite consistent”. *οὐ πάνυ* is a weak negative, though it is often used ironically in place of a strong one (see Cope's translation, Appendix C). *οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες*: the reference is to 454 b.

e 4. *οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα κτλ.*: “not from jealousy for the discovery of the truth, but from jealousy of you” (Jowett⁴). *φιλονικούντα* should not be deleted, as Headlam suggested: for Socrates can hardly deny that he *λέγει πρὸς Γοργίαν*: what he denies is that he *λέγει φιλονικῶν πρὸς Γοργίαν*. There is no real inconsistency with d 4, where with *φιλονικούντας* we naturally understand *πρὸς ἀλλήλους*.

458 a 1. *καὶ σὺ . . . καὶ ἐγώ*: corresponsive, although one *καὶ* is in the main sentence, the other in a subordinate clause; so *Lysis* 211 a 4 *ἄπερ καὶ ἐμοὶ λέγεις, εἰπὲ καὶ Μενεξένω*, and often in Plato (Denniston, 324).

a 3–4. The shift of construction from *εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω* to *εἴ τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι* nicely expresses the modesty of Socrates' expectations: he refers the case of his being refuted to the present occasion, but the case of “somebody else” being refuted he treats as a remote possibility.

a 5. *μεῖζον γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡγοῦμαι*: cf. 506 c, and *Euthyd.* 304 cd. Democritus is credited with a similar saying: *κρέσσον τὰ οἰκήια ἐλέγχειν ἀμαρτήματα ἢ τὰ θενεῖα* (fr. 60).

a 8. οὐδέν . . . τοσοῦτον κακόν. We have here the first intimation that what is at stake in the discussion is not merely the definition of rhetoric but something much more fundamental, a whole *Weltanschauung*. The warning will be repeated at 472 c and 500 c.

b 7. ἐπεδειξάμην: 447 a 6. πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν: "we shall protract the sitting unduly". Gorgias' consideration for the audience, though reasonable enough, looks like a cover for his own lack of appetite for further discussion; when in the end he consents to continue, he does so only out of shame (d 7).

c 3. θορύβου, here "applause". So at *Prot.* 339 d 10 Protagoras' interpretation of Simonides' poem evokes θόρυβον καὶ ἔπαινον, and Demosthenes speaks of an occasion when θόρυβον καὶ κρότον τοιοῦτον ὡς ἂν ἐπαινοῦντές τε καὶ συνησθέντες ἐποιήσατε (21. 14).

c 5. ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ: "Anyhow, in my own case . . .".

d 1. καὶ μὲν δὴ, like καὶ μὴν, introduces a supporting plea (Denniston, 397): "Yes indeed, and I too . . .".

d 5. τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδέν κωλύει: "there is no objection on my part".

d 7. τὸ λοιπόν, "after all this" (adverbial): cf. *Meno* 99 b 11 οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, εὐδοξία δὴ τὸ λοιπὸν γίνεται.

d 8. αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον ἐρωτᾶν: "after spontaneously offering myself for questioning". Badham and Schanz deleted ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βούλεται, on the ground that Gorgias offered to answer questions (ἀποκρίνεσθαι 447 d 7), not to have questions asked him, and should not here use ἐπαγγέλλομαι in the sense of κελεύω. But cf. *Laches* 189 b 1 σοὶ . . . ἐπαγγέλλομαι καὶ διδάσκειν καὶ ἐλέγχειν ἐμὲ ὅτι ἂν βούλη. —The words καὶ ταῦτα, which in the old editions precede this phrase, come from the Paris corrector. They are idiomatic and could very well be genuine, but the case for thinking that the Paris corrector had independent authority for his readings is not in my opinion strong (see *Introd.*, pp. 52 f.).

458 e 3—459 c 5. Discussion resumed. Socrates fastens on the qualification ἐν ὄχλοις (454 b 6) or ἐν πλῆθει (456 c 6), and points out that this is equivalent to ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν (459 a 4). Gorgias' claim for rhetoric is thus reduced to saying that the amateur is more convincing than the expert in the judgement of amateurs (b 3). Gorgias at first admits this only "in the particular instance" of discussions on public health; but Socrates insists that it is true of all decisions involving technical knowledge. And that, retorts Gorgias (making a virtue of necessity), is the great advantage of rhetoric: acquire this one skill, and you are a match for any professional on his own ground (c 3).

That technical questions are decided by an inexperienced majority on the advice of equally inexperienced politicians is one of Socrates' basic criticisms of Athenian democracy (cf. on 455 a 8—d 5). He appears to have criticized in particular the selection of magistrates by lot, pointing out that no one would trust a navigator or an architect who was selected by this method (*Xen. Mem.* 1. 2. 9, *Ar. Rhet.* 1393^b4—9). Such passages recall Gambetta's description of democracy as a system in which the expert is dictated to by amateurs.

459 a 1. **τοὶ νυνδῇ**. Denniston (*CR*, xlvii [1933], 216, cf. *Part.*² 578) wished to read *τοίνυν νυνδῇ* with F in order to provide a connective. But one may question whether Plato would have tolerated so clumsy a collocation.

a 2. **περὶ τοῦ ὑγίεινοῦ**. These words should not be deleted with Cobet: the trained speaker will be more convincing than the physician "even on questions of public health". The reference is to 456 b 6 ff., where Gorgias imagined the orator and the physician as rival candidates for a medical appointment and thus as disputing *περὶ τοῦ ὑγίεινοῦ*. In adding the restriction *ἐν γε ὄχλῳ* Gorgias seems to forget the case he quoted at 456 b 1, or to treat it as exceptional.

a 4. **τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν**: "your qualification 'in a crowd' means this, namely . . .".

a 7. **γίγνεται**: he "becomes", i.e. turns out to be, as a result of the preceding admission. This use is very common in Plato, e.g. 512 d 5.

b 3. **Ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς . . . ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι**, with reference to the particular case under discussion; whereas *τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν* (a 4) was a general description applicable to all crowds.

b 7. **καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ**: added to lead up to the personification in the next line. If we remove the latter by reading *αὐτὸν* for *αὐτήν* (Beck), we should also delete *καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ* (Cobet). But I see no need for this. The personification is very much in Plato's manner: cf. 460 e 7, 464 c 5 ff., 465 b 1 ff., *Phdr.* 260 d 4 ff., *Rep.* 533 b 8.

c 3. **Οὐκ οὐκ πολλὰ ῥαστώνη . . . γίγνεται**: "Well, doesn't that make things a great deal easier?" In accentuating *οὐκ οὐκ* I follow Denniston (432).

459 c 6–460 a 4. *Socrates asks whether the principle that the orator needs no knowledge of the subject under discussion applies also to the knowledge of right and wrong. Gorgias replies that if his pupils do not possess this knowledge already he is prepared to teach it them—thus appearing to claim by implication that his art has a "normative" function.*

It is this claim which, as Polus points out (461 b), proves to be Gorgias' undoing. It is in principle inconsistent with the line he took at 456 c 6 ff., where he disclaimed all responsibility for possible misuse of rhetorical skill. And it seems more directly inconsistent with the explicit statement at *Meno* 95 c, where his pupil Meno tells us that "Gorgias was never heard to profess that he could teach *ἀρετή*, and indeed ridiculed such professions when advanced by others". This has sometimes been taken as Plato's *amende honorable* for having misrepresented Gorgias in the present passage. Pohlenz (169 ff.) thinks that the aged Gorgias had personally insisted on the correction, comparing the anecdotes in Athenaeus, 505 de (from Herodotus of Babylon?), about Gorgias' repudiation of views attributed to him by Plato. But these look like malicious figments (cf. Düring, *Herodotus*, 73); I should have thought it more probable that the protest, if there was one, came from Isocrates (cf. on 456 c 6–457 c 3) or from some other of Gorgias' Athenian pupils. We should not, however, make too much of the discrepancy between the two dialogues. While we must

accept the statement that Gorgias made no profession of teaching ἀρετή, what he did profess to teach—viz. political leadership (452 d)—may well have been identified with ἀρετή by his pupils. This seems to be implied at *Meno* 73 c, where to the question “What do you and Gorgias think ἀρετή is?” Meno answers τί ἄλλο γ’ ἢ ἄρχειν οἶόν τ’ εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων; And just as in our passage Gorgias accepts (out of αἰσχύνη, 461 b) Socrates’ suggestion that the candidate for leadership must possess or acquire moral insight, so Meno at Socrates’ suggestion adds to his definition of ἀρετή the vital qualification δικαίως (73 d). Both dialogues carry, it seems to me, the same general implication, that Gorgias and his school have failed to think out the relationship between rhetoric and morals. And the criticism may well have been justified. That Gorgias would not have denied all connexion between the two seems implicit in the words which his grandson inscribed on the base of his statue at Olympia (*Vors.* 82 A 8):

Γοργίου ἀσκήσαι ψυχὴν ἀρετῆς ἐς ἀγῶνας
οὐδεὶς πω θνητῶν καλλίον’ εὗρε τέχνην.

There is a like ambiguity in Isocrates’ position: while firmly denying that ἀρετή can be taught, he yet holds that the kind of training he offers can be an aid to its acquisition (*c. soph.* 21, *Antid.* 274, 278). But there were also those who held, like Polus, that the politician need not know τὰ τῷ ὄντι δίκαια (*Phdr.* 259 e–260 a). On the whole subject see Wilamowitz, ii. 145, and L. Bianchi in *Maia* n.s. iv (1953).

459 c 7. αὐτίκα; “presently”. Plato uses the word, like the waiter’s ‘tout de suite’, to mean “not just now”: cf. *Rep.* 420 c νῦν μὲν . . . αὐτίκα δέ, where αὐτίκα introduces a promise which is only fulfilled four books later. The present promise is fulfilled in the conversation with Polus, 466 a ff.

ἐάν . . . πρὸς λόγον ἦ, “if it should prove relevant to our argument”. All MSS. (F included) have πρὸς λόγου, which might perhaps mean “in the interest of our argument”, but in such phrases Plato habitually uses πρὸς λόγον: cf. *Prot.* 351 e 4 ἐάν μὲν πρὸς λόγον δοκῇ εἶναι τὸ σκέμμα: *Phil.* 33 b 11 τοῦτο μὲν ἔτι καὶ εἰς αὐτὴς ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐάν πρὸς λόγον τι ἦ: *ibid.* 42 e 1 οὐδὲν πρὸς λόγον ἐστίν.

d 1–2. Socrates has to use three pairs of antithetic terms to indicate unambiguously the field of morals; by themselves, τὸ δίκαιον and its opposite would be too narrow, while both καλόν and ἀγαθόν would be too wide, not being exclusively ethical predicates: see below, on 474 d 4. The terms are arranged in ‘chiastic’ order, and are quoted in a different order when they reappear at d 4–5, to simulate the irregularity of actual conversation. For the non-repetition of the article with the last pair cf. 498 c 3, *Crito* 47 c 9, etc.

e 6. καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι οὐκ ὄντα. This is added because in Socrates’ view the man who does not possess ethical *knowledge* cannot be truly good, though he may appear good. See below, on 460 a 5–c 6.

460 a 1. ἀποκαλύψας: Socrates, not without malice, picks up Gorgias’ pompous word (455 d 7).

a 4. Either μαθήσεται (BTW) or μαθήσεσθαι (F) is possible: the latter was preferred by Heindorf.

460 a 5–c 6. *Socrates uses Gorgias' admission to obtain the paradoxical conclusion that no one who has been trained in rhetoric can ever will what is morally wrong.*

The argument depends on the assumption that as one who knows how to build is a builder, so the man who knows what is just is just (b 6)—an assumption which Gorgias at once accepts, though to the modern reader it may appear a mere verbal quibble. There is no doubt that it represents the serious view of the historical Socrates: Aristotle says that he ἐπιστήμας ᾧ ἐστὶ εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσθ' ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον· ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μεμαθήκαμεν τὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐσμέν οἰκοδόμοι καὶ γεωμέτραι (*E.E.* 1216^b6); cf. Xen. *Mem.* 3. 9. 5. I have tried to show elsewhere (*The Greeks and the Irrational*, 16 f.) that to a Greek such an opinion appeared less peculiar than it does to us. From Homer onwards moral conduct had been explained in terms of knowledge, not in terms of will—a concept which is completely absent from early Greek thought. This was natural in a society which judged men by their actions, not by their intentions (Oedipus' sin was not the less sin for being committed in ignorance). The ἀγαθός was the man who did things well, and doing things well involved knowing how to do them: cf., e.g., Simonides fr. 5. 3 B. εἰδώς γ' ὀνασίπολιν δίκαν ὑγιῆς ἀνὴρ. Even Aristotle regards φρόνησις as an indispensable condition of moral virtue, though he criticizes Socrates for identifying the two (*E.N.* 1144^b17 ff.). The originality of Socrates lay not in the invention of a private paradox—though he was no doubt the first to press the parallel with the τέχναι—but in making explicit the unconscious presuppositions of traditional Greek thinking about conduct: hence Gorgias accepts his view without a qualm, as does Protagoras at *Prot.* 352 c. It in fact constituted a significant step forward in so far as it raised the question what sort of knowledge makes a man morally good. Evidently not acquaintance with a set of rules such as the craftsman knows (cf. *Charm.* 173 de); and evidently not the superficial 'culture' imparted by Gorgias and his pupils. Plato's answer is most fully given in the passage about "conversion" in the *Republic* (518 b ff.): morals can be securely based only on a certain insight into the nature of the world and man's place in it, which enables a man to see what his true 'interest' is; and this insight can be attained only by an adjustment of the entire personality (σὺν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ, 518 c 8). See further Grube, chap. vii; Jaeger, *Paideia*, ii. 64 ff.; and especially the full and interesting, if not always convincing, discussion by Gould, chaps. i and ii, with the comments of Vlastos, *Philosophical Review*, lxvi (1957), 226 ff. I should accept Gould's description of Socrates' moral ἐπιστήμη as 'a simple, undifferentiated, indeed largely undefined, inward ability of the whole personality' (133). But in calling it 'a purely subjective "faith"' (15) he appears to me to go too far; for a subjective faith can be false, and ἐπιστήμη cannot (454 d). Quite possibly the test of

moral truth for Socrates was that it works—its possession makes a man *εὐδαίμων*. To inquire how and why it works, and what the fact of its working implies for human nature, was Plato's problem; Socrates, as Cornford said, (*C.A.H.* vi. 310), 'had lived by a knowledge that he refused to call knowledge because he could give no account of it'.

a 5. Ἐχε δὴ καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις: "Stop there: I am glad of that statement" (Lamb). The exclamation indicates that Socrates has now got what he wanted, the lever which will overturn Gorgias' position. So 490 b 1 Ἐχε δὴ αὐτοῦ: *Prot.* 349 e 1 Ἐχε δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ· ἄξιον γάρ τοι ἐπισκέψασθαι ὃ λέγεις.

b 4. καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω, sc. ἔχει: cf. 509 c 1. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, "by parity of reasoning", introduces the induction (*ἐπαγωγή*) of a general rule—"whoever has studied a particular subject has the quality conferred on him by his knowledge of that subject". From this general rule Socrates proceeds to the deduction that whoever has learned "just principles" (*τὰ δίκαια*) is just.

b 8-c 4. The text of this passage has long been suspect on the ground of redundancy. In particular, c 4 τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη . . . δίκαιον εἶναι repeats *verbatim* the proposition already established at c 1, ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι. Some scholars have been content to eliminate one or other of these two sentences. But Wilamowitz pointed out that (i) c 1 Οὐκοῦν—2 Φαίνεται γε and (ii) c 3 Οὐδέποτε—5 Ναί seem to be alternative ways of stating the same argument, each of them leading to the conclusion Οὐδέποτε βουλήσεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν, but (ii) being the more strictly logical formulation. Following Hermann, he inferred that (ii) comes from the margin, where a commentator had reduced Plato's loosely worded argument to syllogistic form:

Οὐδέποτε βουλήσεται ὁ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν:

Τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου δίκαιον εἶναι:

Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν.

While certainty is impossible, this seems the best explanation of the redundancy which has been offered; and it has some external confirmation in the testimony of Quintilian, who says that the argument "concludes" (*cluditur*) with the words Οὐκοῦν—δίκαια πράττειν (c 1-2), *ad quod ille quidem* (Gorgias) *conticescit, sed sermonem suscipit Polus*. It may be contended that Quintilian is merely summarizing, and picking out the particular sentence which makes the point he needs; nevertheless his use of *cluditur* does suggest that c 3 Οὐδέποτε—5 Ναί was missing from his text. —Robin in his translation transposes (ii) and (i): this makes the argument run somewhat more smoothly, but does not remove the redundancy. Deuschle objected to the repetition 'Ο δὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά που πράττει . . . τὸν δὲ δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν (b 8-c 2) and deleted the former sentence; here, however, βούλεσθαι adds something which is necessary to Socrates' purpose. Other scholars are dissatisfied with the wording of c 1-2 (in which Quintilian agrees with our MSS.). Stallbaum and Wilamowitz would split it into two

questions, assuming that Gorgias' answer *Nai* has fallen out after *εἶναι*: but there are other cases where Socrates adds a second question without waiting for an answer to the first (F. Levy, *Phil. Wochenschr.* xli (1921), 115). Theiler alters τὸν δὲ δίκαιον to ὄντα δὲ δίκαιον, and this is no doubt what Plato meant; but I am not sure that it is what he wrote.

c 4. ἐκ τοῦ λόγου: "from the (preceding) argument", a Platonic phrase (*Parm.* 147 b 8). F's σοῦ looks like an incorporated gloss.

460 c 7–461 b 2. Socrates points out the discrepancy between the conclusion just arrived at, that the true ῥητορικός will never choose to act immorally, and Gorgias' earlier position that the teacher of rhetoric has no responsibility for its possible immoral use by his pupils. He had suspected an inconsistency all along (461 a 1). But to arrive at the true view would need "a lengthy discussion" (b 1).

Has Gorgias in fact contradicted himself? Robinson says (29) that Socrates has merely produced a refutation (on Socratic premisses) of Gorgias' view, and forced Gorgias to accept it. But the contradiction lies farther back than Robinson recognizes: the statements of Gorgias which in Socrates' opinion "do not harmonize" (461 a 2) are the claim that rhetoric is concerned with right and wrong (454 b) and the denial of the teacher's responsibility (456 c–457 c)—both of them statements which, as we have seen, the historical Gorgias would probably have accepted if he did not actually make them. The purpose of the argument just concluded was to bring out this implicit contradiction. Socrates does not profess to know at this point which view is right: as Shorey says, 'if the dialogue ended here, it would be analogous to one of the minor Socratic dialogues, or to *Republic* I taken by itself, or to the *Protagoras* in the light of its conclusion'. But in the sequel Socrates will argue that an "art of persuasion" which takes no responsibility for its results is no art at all; the true ῥήτωρ must have an explicit moral purpose (504 d).

460 d 2. χρῆται τε καὶ ἀδίκῃ is equivalent to ἀδίκως χρῆται. A gloss to this effect, first mistaken for a variant and then incorporated in the text, is surely responsible for the cumbrous reading of F, χρῆται τε (corrupted to γε) καὶ ἀδίκως χρῆται καὶ ἀδίκῃ, which Burnet surprisingly adopted. A similar gloss κακῶς was added before χρῆται by the Paris corrector, and is reproduced as part of the text in M Flor, etc., and inserted by the second hand in F. —In the next line Cobet wished to delete οὕτως, but cf. *Prot.* 351 c 6.

d 5. τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, sc. ἐγκαλεῖν: the words μηδ' ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως are treated as parenthetical.

e 1. ὁ ῥητορικός: Cobet wished to delete, but the word is needed for clearness (ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος might otherwise be ὁ πύκτης). Cf. on 449 c 5.

e 7. ὅ γ', causal relative (*quippe quod*). Though the antecedent is ἡ ῥητορικὴ, it is attracted to agree in gender with πρᾶγμα. F's εἰ γ' may be thought to point to an original ἡ γ': cf., however, 463 b 3, 463 e 6, and *Laws* 937 d 8 δίκη . . . πῶς οὐ καλόν, ὃ πάντα ἡμέρωκεν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα;

461 a 1. οὕτω . . . ἐκείνους εἶπον τοὺς λόγους, "that was why I said what I did".

a 4. ἐὰν χαίρειν: we should perhaps understand εἶπον (with a shift of construction) rather than ἄξιον εἶη.

a 5 πάλιν αὖ: I have accepted F's reading, as this combination is regularly employed by Plato to emphasize a contradiction (*Prot.* 318 e 1, *Rep.* 507 b 6, etc.).

a 7. μὰ τὸν κύνα: see on 482 b 5.

Part II: Socrates and Polus (461 b—481 b)

461 b 3—462 a 10. *Polus complains that Socrates has trapped Gorgias into a false admission by playing on his αἰσχύνη. Socrates expresses pleasure at the prospect of being corrected—what are young men for, if not to correct their elders?—and offers to let Polus retract any false moves made by Gorgias, bargaining only for the exclusion of μακρολογία.*

Polus represents a new generation, less afraid of the consequences of its own thinking than its elders had been. Yet in the end, when confronted with all that the new way of thinking entails, Polus too will succumb to αἰσχύνη (482 e 2). See *Intro.*, pp. 11 f.

461 b 3. καὶ seems to qualify δοξάζεις rather than σὺ (cf. Wilamowitz, ii. 373; Denniston, 326 f.): "Do you yourself actually believe what you have been saying about rhetoric (viz. that the ῥητορικός can do no wrong)?" Cf. 520 b 4.

b 4—c 3. This sentence caused the older editors much perplexity. But most of the difficulties disappear once it is realised (i) that Polus is 'spluttering with indignation and anacolutha', as Shorey put it; (ii) that οἶει in b 4 means "do you really imagine?", as at 466 e 9, 489 c 4, etc., and is picked up by οἶει in c 2; (iii) that ὅτι (b 4) does not introduce an object-clause (which would be contrary to normal Attic usage after a verb of thinking), but means "because"; (iv) that the clause introduced by ἔπειτα (b 7) is not the apodosis to the preceding causal clause but is parallel to it (ἔπειτα serving as a connective, like εἴτα at *Apol.* 23 c 5); the true apodosis ("that you have won a great victory") is never expressed, though the thought comes out in ἀγαπᾷς (c 1). At c 2 Polus abandons his unmanageable sentence and makes a fresh start; he remembers that he began it with ἢ οἶει, but now gives οἶει a different content. The passage was skilfully analysed by Wilamowitz, who noted the malicious humour with which Plato makes the professor of rhetoric tie himself into verbal knots. Translate: "Or do you imagine—just because Gorgias was ashamed not to concede your further point that the rhetorician knows what is right, honourable, and good, or, if he didn't know it to start with, said that he was himself prepared to teach him, and then by this admission some inconsistency perhaps crept into his statements (which is just what delights you, when you have deliberately entrapped people in questions like that)—for who do you imagine would deny that he knew what was right himself and could teach it to others? I call it a real lack of good breeding to raise such topics."

b 5. μή οὐχὶ . . . εἰδέναι. Both negatives are superfluous. They are used because the infinitive depends on a negative expression, *μὴ προσομολογῆσαι*, which in turn is negated by *ῥσχύνθη* (implying refusal): see Kühner-G. ii. 210. Similarly *μή οὐχὶ* in c 2 is explained by the negative meaning of *ἀπαρνῆσθαι* and the negation implicit in *τίνα οἶει*.

c 1. τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς. Socrates was often accused of gaining his victories by a trick, in the “eristic” manner (cf. *Rep.* 341 a, 487 bc), and of taking pride in them (*Rep.* 336 c 3 *μηδὲ φιλοτιμοῦ ἐλέγχων*).

c 2. αὐτὸν: not Gorgias (as Helmbold takes it) but the supposed speaker. Cf. *Prot.* 323 c: most men assume that they know what is right and can teach it.

c 4. We need not delete *τοὺς λόγους* with Cobet, here or at 494 e 7: the two passages support each other.

c 6. ἐταίρους καὶ υἱεῖς. Confusion of *ἐταῖρος* with *ἕτερος* (which occurs frequently in the MSS. of Plato, e.g. at 510 a 10) led to the omission of *καὶ* in the first family. Schanz thought *υἱεῖς* a gloss on the false reading *ἐτέρους*, and Schwartz proposed *<ἐταίρους οἶον> ἐτέρους υἱεῖς* (*Ind. Lect. Rostock*, 1888); but the *καὶ* is recognized by Ol as well as by F. The motive assigned for begetting sons accords with Greek sentiment, though the ordinary Greek would naturally think of material, not intellectual, support.

c 7. ἐπανορθοῖτε (BTW) is defensible as logically dependent on the past decision implicit in *κτώμεθα*: cf. Goodwin § 323, Kühner-G. ii. 382, *Phil.* 34 c 4 *οὐδὲ χάριν ἅπαντ’ εἴρηται ταῦτ’, ἔστι τόδε . . . ἵνα . . . λάβοιμεν. ἐπανορθώτε* (F) is adopted by the more recent editors and may be right, but looks suspiciously like a normalization.

d 2. δίκαιος δ’ εἶ: “it is but your duty”, cf. *Crat.* 428 a 4 *εὐεργέτει καὶ Σωκράτη τόνδε—δίκαιος δ’ εἶ—καὶ ἐμέ. ἐγὼ σοι ἐθέλω . . . ἀναθέσθαι*, a metaphor from the game of *πεττεία*: cf. Antiphon B 52 Diels *ἀναθέσθαι ὥσπερ πεττὸν τὸν βίον οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀναθέσθαι* is normally to revoke one’s own move (*Charm.* 164 d, *Phaedo* 87 a, etc.); but here the reference is to revoking a move of Gorgias for Polus’ benefit. F’s *σοι* helps to make this sense clear, and is confirmed by the imitation at *Hipparchus* 229 e 3, where it is a question of giving back a move: *ὥσπερ πεττεύων ἐθέλω σοι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀναθέσθαι ὅτι βούλει τῶν εἰρημένων*, followed by *πότερον γὰρ τοῦτό σοι ἀναθῶμαι*; and (230 a 8) *ἀνατίθεται τοίνυν σοὶ τοῦτο*. —Cobet wished to delete the clause *εἰ τί—ὡμολογήσθαι* as superfluous: see on 447 a 5.

e 2. οὐ . . . πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν. For this claim cf. Dem. 9. 3 *ὕμεις τὴν παρρησίαν . . . οὕτω κοινὴν οἴεσθε δεῖν εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὥστε καὶ τοῖς ξένοις καὶ τοῖς δούλοις αὐτῆς μεταδεδώκατε, καὶ πολλοὺς ἂν τις οὐκέτας ἴδοι παρ’ ἡμῖν μετὰ πλείονος ἐξουσίας ὅτι βούλονται λέγοντας ἢ πολίτας ἐν ἐνίαις τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων*: also [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1. 12 *ἰσηγορίαν καὶ τοῖς δούλοις πρὸς τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἐποιήσαμεν καὶ τοῖς μετοίκους πρὸς τοὺς ἀστούς*, Eur. *Hipp.* 421–3, *Ion* 670–2. Plato would have preferred to have less of this *ἰσηγορία*, as appears from *Rep.* 562 b–563 b.

e 3. ἀλλ' ἀντίθες τοι, 'But just look at the other side of it.' Editors have not noticed that this phrase—in which Wilamowitz (ii. 416) detected 'a tragic tone'—comes in fact from a comedy, the *Theria* of Crates (fr. 15. 1 Kock), a play to which Plato perhaps alludes again at *Polit.* 272 bc.

462 a 1. ἀπιέναι. At *Prot.* 335 c Socrates threatens to resort to this last means of self-defence against μακρολογία. Cf. on 447 c 3.

a 3. ἐν τῷ μέρει, 'in your turn' (but ἐν μέρει 'in turn', of two people, cf. 496 b 2).

a 8. καὶ σὺ: like Gorgias (447 c).

462 b 1–e 4. Polus, having chosen the role of questioner, asks Socrates what he thinks rhetoric is. Socrates describes it as 'an empirical skill in producing a particular gratification or pleasure' (c 8), and Polus accepts this as being Socrates' definition until the latter points out that it would apply equally well to cookery.

In this section and the next Plato mocks the rhetorician's ineptitude at the philosopher's game of dialectic. Polus does not know the rules of the game: he is still impatient, as he was in the prelude, to get on from definitions to judgements of value (c 8, cf. on 448 e 2–449 a 4), and from d 8 onwards Socrates has to put the right questions into his mouth (cf. *Crat.* 407 c 9).

b 1. ἐρώτα ἢ ἀποκρίνου: continuous presents—'act as questioner or respondent'.

b 6. ἦντινα τέχνην φημί εἶναι: Polus has already declared that rhetoric is a τέχνη (448 c 9), and the discussion with Gorgias was conducted on that assumption.

b 8. Οὐδεμία: the grounds for this denial will be stated at 465 a. —It is no improvement to read Οὐδεμίαν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν, with Naber (*Mnem.* 1908, 252).

b 10. Deuschle and Theiler delete ἡ ῥητορικὴ: see on 447 a 5.

b 11. Πρῶγμα ὃ φῆς σὺ κτλ. This is usually understood to mean 'Something which you yourself in your treatise assert has created art', and is taken as a reference to Polus' speech at 448 c, which is assumed to be a quotation from the treatise. But the assumption is doubtful (see note ad loc.); nor does Polus actually say at 448 c that ἐμπειρία 'created' τέχνη; nor does he himself recognize the alleged reference. Moreover, the position of the words ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι suggests that they qualify not φῆς but ποιῆσαι. But if so, ὃ can hardly be the subject of ποιῆσαι: we seem obliged to understand σὺ as the subject and translate (with Robin and some others) 'Something of which you claim to have made an art in your treatise'. If, as is likely, the treatise was entitled Τέχνη ῥητορικὴ or Τέχνη τῶν λόγων, the claim would be implicit in the title. Such Τέχναι abounded in the late fifth and early fourth centuries: cf. *Phdr.* 271 c οἱ νῦν γράφοντες τέχνας λόγων, *Isocr.* 13. 19 οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν γενόμενοι καὶ τὰς καλουμένας τέχνας γράψαι τολμήσαντες, *Ar. Rhet.* 1354^a12 οἱ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες.

c 5. εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, 'subject to your correction', a polite formula used also at *Hipp. ma.* 291 a 2, *Rep.* 430 b 4.

c 8. I write *Οὔκουν*, not *Οὐκοῦν*, since Socrates paraphrases the question with the words *ἐρωτᾷς εἰ οὐ καλή μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι* (d 1). Cf. Denniston, 432.

d 10. *Ἀλλὰ τί; φάθι*: "Now say 'What is it then?'" τοῦ Σωκράτους ἔστι τοῦτο λέγοντος, Ol 67. 28—surely rightly. He is correcting the false distribution of parts which appears in all the medieval MSS. and was evidently already creeping in by his day. *Φημί δή*, "All right, I say it", must be spoken by Polus, like *ἐρωτῶ δή* in d 9. The true distribution was perceived by Hirschig (who compared Aristoph. *Knights* 21 f.), adopted by Schanz and Sauppe, and later defended by Friedländer, but Burnet and others have clung to the erroneous medieval tradition, which spoils the humour of the passage.

d 11. *Τίνος*; corresponds to *Τίνος ἐμπειρία*; at c 6. It is a necessary correction for *τίς*; which is evidently a dittography of the immediately preceding *τις*.

e 2. *ἐστίν* should not be altered to *ἐστὸν* (Naber, *Mnem.* 1908, 253); for the answer shows that the construction is *ὁποιοῦα ἐστὶ ταῦτόν καὶ* (*idem ac*) *ρήτορική*;

e 3. *ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς μὲν ἐπιτηδεύσεως μόριον*, "though certainly it is a branch of the same profession". For this concessive use of *ἀλλὰ . . . μὲν* cf. *Rep.* 475 e 2 *οὐδαμῶς, εἶπον, ἀλλ' ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις* and Denniston, 378.

462 e 5–463 e 4. *Polus asks what cookery and rhetoric have in common. Having apologized in advance for any slur which he may seem to cast on Gorgias' profession, Socrates declares that both are forms of κολακεία. What then is the 'differentia' of rhetoric? After another little lecture on dialectical method Socrates says rhetoric is "the counterfeit of one branch of politics" (d 2). This is intentionally obscure; but Polus, being "a young man in a hurry" (e 2), is quite ready to accept it and pass to the question of value, "noble or ignoble?" Gorgias, however, intervenes to ask for an explanation.*

462 e 6. *Μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦ*, "I fear it may sound a little crude." This is the usual way of apologizing for a too blunt, arrogant, or brutally worded assertion: cf. 486 c 2 (Callicles), 508 e 7, *Apol.* 32 d 2, *Euthyd.* 283 e 2, *Rep.* 361 e 1.

e 8. *τοῦτο*, "what I am going to describe", is the predicate. Plato leaves open the possibility (later developed in the *Phaedrus*) that there might be a kind of rhetoric to which his strictures do not apply.

463 a 3. *πράγματος . . . μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν*. The half-humorous device of making rhetoric a subdivision of something less creditable appears also in the *Euthydemus*, where the art of the professional speech-writer (*λογοποιός*) is said to be *τῆς τῶν ἐπωδῶν τέχνης μόριον* (289 e 5). This looks like a first sketch of the idea elaborated in the present passage.

a 5. *μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθεῖς*, "without sparing my feelings". *αἰσχυνθῆς* is better attested, but confusion of the two forms is very easy (itacism) and the participle is perhaps to be preferred as avoiding the asyndeton.

463 a 6–b 1. This sentence defines the whole of which rhetoric forms a part (not rhetoric itself, as Helmbold takes it). It is "a pursuit which

is not scientific, but demands an intuitive and enterprising mind with a natural gift for handling people". *στοχαστικῆς*, literally "good at guessing": its significance in relation to rhetoric is explained by the remark at *Laches* 178 b that some people when consulted will not give an honest answer, *στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ συμβουλευομένου*, "guessing at the wishes of the consultant". Cf. 464 d 2 ff. and Alcidamas, *περὶ σοφιστῶν* 3, *ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐστόχως ἀκολουθεῖν*. At *Phil.* 55 e 7 the word is again associated with *ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή* as a mark of those abilities "which many people call *τέχναι*" but which are not exact sciences since they lack a mathematical basis. —Isocrates, *c. soph.* 17, says of rhetorical composition that to be effective it requires *πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς*. Some scholars have seen a relationship between this and the present passage: it has been thought that Isocrates reproduces a phrase of Gorgias which Plato parodies (Dümmmler, Süss, Pohlenz), or that Plato is parodying Isocrates himself (Sudhaus, Thompson, Nestle, Shorey). But I share the scepticism expressed by Raeder (124 n. 3) and Jaeger (*Paideia* iii. 303 f.). The two contexts are quite different: Socrates is speaking about false *τέχναι* in general, Isocrates about the importance of orderly composition (*τάξις*), a point on which Plato entirely agreed with him (cf. *Phdr.* 268 d, 269 c). On the general relationship between *Gorgias* and *c. sophistas* see *Intro.*, p. 27.

b 1. *κολακείαν* is conventionally translated "flattery", but the Greek term applies to a wider range of actions and also carries a more emphatic implication of moral baseness (cf. 521 b 1–2). Theophrastus defines it as *ὁμιλίαν αἰσχροῦ, συμφέρουσιν δὲ τῷ κολακεύοντι* (*Char.* 2. 1); and Aristotle distinguishes the *κόλαξ* as *ὁ τοῦ ἡδὺς εἶναι στοχαζόμενος ὅπως ὠφέλειά τις αὐτῷ γίνηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων* from the *ἄρεσκος* who makes himself pleasant without ulterior motive (*E.N.* 1127^a7). The *κόλαξ* is what the eighteenth century called a toad-eater or lickspittle and schoolboys call a bumsucker. *κολακεία* is the antithesis of the forthright integrity of word and act practised by Socrates, of whom a speaker in a comedy observes *οὗτος μέντοι πεινῶν οὕτως οὐπώποτ' ἔτλη κολακεῦσαι* (*Ameipsias* fr. 9. 4 Kock). In its political application, which will be developed later in the dialogue, *κολακεία* stands for the time-serving opportunism which panders to public taste instead of trying to educate it.

b 3. *ὁ* is attracted to agree in gender with *ἐν* (*μόριον*), though the real antecedent is *ἡ ὀψοποιική*: cf. on 460 e 7.

b 4. *ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή*, "an empirical knack". Plato uses this phrase to characterize procedures which he thinks unscientific: *Phdr.* 270 b, a scientific rhetoric or medicine will proceed *μὴ τριβῇ μόνον καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ ἀλλὰ τέχνῃ*: *Phil.* 55 e, the unscientific *τέχναι* (so called) proceed *ἐμπειρία καὶ τινι τριβῇ*: *Laws* 938 a, forensic rhetoric *εἵτ' οὖν τέχνῃ* (as its practitioners claim) *εἵτε ἄτεχνός ἐστίν τις ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή*.

b 4–6. For the relationship of the four spurious arts here named see below, 464 cd; for the meaning of *κομμωτικὴν* see on 465 b 4.

Sophistic had already been associated with *κολακεία* by Eupolis in his *Κόλακες*, where Protagoras and other sophists were represented as toadying to the wealthy spendthrift Callias. —ἐπὶ τέτταρσιν πράγμασιν, “corresponding to four classes of objects”.

c 8. Sauppe deleted καὶ ἀπόκριναι on the analogy of 462 d 9; Cobet wished to remove ὅποῖον μόνιον also, on that of 462 d 10. Cf., however, 462 b 3.

d 4. τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχροῦ καλῶ: Socrates equates the two terms, cf. *Tim.* 87 c 4 πᾶν δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν—whereas Polus will maintain that some ignoble actions are good, as being profitable to the agent (474 cd).

d 6. Μὰ τὸν Δία emphasizes the negative statement which follows: cf. 448 a 6 and *Crat.* 423 c 1 Μὰ Δί’ ἄλλ’ οὐκ ἐμοί πω δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι. “Look here, but *even I* don’t grasp your meaning” (a wicked touch on Plato’s part).

e 2. A pun is probably intended; for Herodicus also punned on Polus’ name, remarking αἰὲ σὺ πῶλος εἶ, “you are colt by name and colt by nature” (*Ar. Rhet.* 1400^b20). Cf. the pun on the name Harmonia, *Phaedo* 95 a 4. To be ὀξύς (“hasty”) was thought to be typical of the young: cf. *Thuc.* 6. 12. 2 τὸ πρᾶγμα μέγα εἶναι καὶ μὴ οἶον νεωτέρῳ βουλευσασθαί τε καὶ ὀξέως μεταχειρίσασθαι.

463 e 5–466 a 3. Socrates explains his definition to Gorgias. There are two genuine arts which minister to the body and two which minister to the mind. But each of these four has its spurious imitation (εἰδωλον), which is a form of *κολακεία*. The four spurious arts are distinguishable in two ways from the genuine—by their aim, which is merely pleasure, and by their empirical character, which means that they cannot give any rational account of their procedure (465 a). Socrates proceeds to illustrate their relationship by a series of propositions cast in the form of proportions, and concludes that rhetoric is “the intellectual counterpart of cookery” (465 d 7). The scheme is as follows:

<i>mind-tendance</i> (πολιτική)			<i>body-tendance</i> (ἀνώνυμον)		
	<i>regulative</i>	<i>corrective</i>		<i>regulative</i>	<i>corrective</i>
τέχνη	a νομοθετική	b δικαιοσύνη	c γυμναστική	d ἰατρική	
<i>genuine</i>			c' κομμωτική	d' ὀψοποιική	
<i>spurious</i>	a' σοφιστική	b' ῥητορική			

This passage goes much beyond what is strictly required for the immediate purpose of elucidating the definition of rhetoric as εἰδωλον δικαιοσύνης, or for the analogy between justice and medicine which is developed later (477 e ff.) It is an early example of that interest in systematic classification which is so prominent in *Sophist* and *Politicus*; and it already employs, as those dialogues do, the method of διαίρεσις—which is certainly, however, a Platonic and not a Socratic invention (cf. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, 184 ff.). It has in fact a good deal in common with the final διαίρεσις in the *Sophist* (268 b–d) which reveals the σοφιστής and the δημολογικός (= ῥήτωρ) as closely related

types, each being an ignorant and insincere manufacturer of εἰδωλα by mimicry. But the present διαίρεσις has at least one obvious weakness, in that the “arts of mind-tendance” are concerned with society as a whole, whereas those of body-tendance are concerned with the individual and would seem to have as their true intellectual counterparts education (μουσική, cf. *Rep.* 376 e 3) and psychiatry. In drawing his analogy between rhetorician and pastry-cook Plato ignores this difference: he could do so because of his deeply held conviction that the basic task of the statesman is educational.

Plato was not the first to draw analogies between the arts. But his conclusion stands in sharp opposition to the view of the historical Gorgias, who claimed that rhetoric was to the mind what medicine was to the body (*Hel.* 14); and to the analogy later developed by Isocrates, *Antid.* 180–5, apparently in answer to our passage, between the training of the ῥήτωρ (called by him φιλοσοφία) and that of the athlete (called παιδοτριβική, ἥς ἡ γυμναστική μέρος ἐστί). At *Phdr.* 270 b Plato himself compares rhetoric to medicine; but there, as Ol pointed out (77. 4), the meaning of the term has changed—it stands for a true art, whose object is to produce ἀρετή. —The most important element in the present passage is the distinction of principle which Plato draws between ‘scientific’ and ‘unscientific’ procedures (see on 465 a 2–5). It is one form of that distinction between being and seeming, inner reality and outward appearance, which runs through the whole of the dialogue from this point (cf. Jaeger ii. 132). A ‘shame-culture’ tends to obliterate this distinction, which explains Plato’s continual insistence on it.

463 e 6. τυγχάνει ὄν, sc. ἡ ῥητορική: cf. on 460 e 7.

464 b 1. ἔχει, sc. τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἡ ψυχή: the second member of the relative clause is emancipated from the control of the relative, as at *Meno* 77 e 1 ἃ ὦντο ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτά γε κακά, *Rep.* 533 d 4, and often (cf. on 452 d 3). It is quite wrong to emend to ἔχειν.

b 5. οὕτως, not “correspondingly” but “offhand” (as things are at the moment): cf. 478 a 2 and *Laws* 712 d 3 οὐκ ἔχω σοι φράζειν οὕτως ἥντινα προσαγορεύειν αὐτὴν δεῖ. —τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας . . . γυμναστικῇν. This is the ordinary Greek view; but at *Rep.* 410 b–d Plato maintains that gymnastics are practised mainly for their effect on the mind.

b 7. Aristides’ reading, ἀντίστροφον μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ, is preferred by a number of editors. But I suspect, with Burnet, that it represents an attempt to introduce the sort of formal symmetry to which Plato often shows himself indifferent. (In Bod. misc. 189, which contains both Aristides and the *Gorgias*, the reading of the former has been silently introduced into the latter: this is not ‘confirmation’ of Aristides.)

b 8. Should we read δικαιοσύνην or δικαστικῇν here, and similarly at c 2 and 465 c 5? Both readings are ancient (see App. crit.); and it can equally well be argued that δικαστικῇν is a gloss on δικαιοσύνην (cf. Ol’s gloss at 465 c 4: πρὸς δικαιοσύνην ἀντὶ τοῦ πρὸς δικαστικῇν), or

that the familiar word has been mechanically substituted for the rarer one. At 520 b 3, where Plato recalls the present classification, all MSS. have *δικαστικῆς* (but there Plato may have shrunk from saying that the legislator's science is "nobler than justice"); and *δικαστική* is used for judicial science at *Rep.* 409 e, 410 a, and at *Polit.* 303 e 10 (where it is subordinated to *πολιτική* as it is here). On the other hand, *δικαιοσύνη* also appears as a *τέχνη* in the *Republic* (332 d 2); and Plato may have preferred to avoid *δικαστική* here, because of its association with the questionable procedures of the Athenian law-courts. Moreover, at *Amat.* 137 d 14 Socrates explicitly equates *δικαιοσύνη* with *δικαστική*. It is very doubtful if this dialogue is Plato's; but it looks as though the statement were derived from the *Gorgias*, and if so, the reading *δικαιοσύνη* is at least pre-Alexandrine. (The assertion at *Clit.* 408 b that Socrates identified *δικαστική* and *δικαιοσύνη* with *πολιτική* is based, I think, on *Amat.* 137 d and 138 c, and thus adds nothing to the evidence of the latter.) I retain *δικαιοσύνην*, though with some hesitation.

c 1. *ἐπικοινωνοῦσι* κτλ., "The members of each pair have something in common, as being concerned with the same object." So Aristotle says that the different sciences *ἐπικοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλαις* as using common principles, *An. post.* 77^a26.

c 5–d 3. This extended personification almost assumes the proportions of a miniature myth, presenting, as Schuhl puts it, the relations between disciplines in historical form as a fabulous adventure (*La Fabulation platonicienne*, 43). Plato takes a whimsical pleasure in attributing human behaviour to abstractions: other instances may be seen at 482 a and 505 d 1.

d 1. *ὅπερ ὑπέδου*. The simple accusative here contrasts with the use of *ὑπό* at c 7 and d 3, hence Schanz emended and Sauppe deleted. But the verb is transitive at Aesch. *Eum.* 842, Aristoph. *Wasps* 1158, Hdt. 6. 2, etc.

d 2. *τῷ δὲ αἰεὶ ἡδίστῳ*: "she angles for folly with the bait of present pleasure" (Jowett⁴).

d 3. *δοκεῖν*: the agreement of B² with F and Aristides suggests that this, not *δοκεῖ*, was the reading of the archetype (unless B²'s source is a MS. of Aristides).

d 5–e 2. Socrates parodies the claim made by Gorgias at 456 b: the *κόλαξ* will certainly win his case—before a jury of children or fools. The idea will reappear, with a serious personal application, at 521 e.

465 a 1. *πρὸς σέ*, because this justifies the answer given to Polus' question at 463 d 4. All *κολακεία* is *αἰσχρολόγος*, since it aims solely at giving pleasure and pleasure is not "the Good", i.e. not what humanity really desires (as will be proved at 495 c ff.). Every true *τέχνη*, on the other hand, serves the real interests of its object (*Rep.* 342 bc). Cf. the anti-hedonist argument quoted by Aristotle, *E.N.* 1152^b18, *τέχνη οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς καίτοι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τέχνης ἔργον*.

a 2–5. A *τέχνη* differs from an *ἐμπειρία* in that it is based on a rational principle (*λόγος*), and can thus explain the reasons for its

procedure in every case. This difference is connected with the one just mentioned; for in Plato's view τὸ βέλτιστον is in each case rationally determinable, whereas τὸ ἥδύ is not. Thus in matters of diet a doctor can predict on general principles what will be βέλτιστον, and give a reason for his prediction, if he knows enough about the chemistry of nutrition; but the patient's likes and dislikes are not predictable. Cf. Democritus fr. 69 ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τῶντὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀληθές· ἥδὺ δὲ ἄλλῳ ἄλλο.

Plato's use of the medical term προσφέρειν, "to administer" (cf. *Phdr.* 268 a 10), suggests that in drawing his distinction he had medicine chiefly in mind. And in fact he tells us elsewhere that it is only doctors of the slave class who prescribe τὰ δόξαντα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας without being able to state their reasons (*Laws* 720 c, cf. 857 cd). Hence Pohlenz inferred that the distinction between τέχνη and ἐμπειρία was first developed in the Greek medical schools (134 ff., cf. *Hermes*, liii (1918), 404 ff.). But as Capelle showed (*Hermes*, lvii (1922), 262 ff.), the Hippocratic writings hardly bear out this view. The best Greek physicians certainly realized that ἐμπειρία by itself was not enough: e.g. the *de vet. med.* tells us that it is not enough to say 'Cheese is a dangerous food, since if you eat a lot of it you get a pain'; we must study the nature of the pain, the reasons for it, and what part is injuriously affected (cap. 20, 51. 23 Heiberg: cf. Plato, *Laws* 638 c). But they also recognized that τέχνη is founded on ἐμπειρία, as did Aristotle (*Met.* 981^a2 ἀποβαίνει δ' ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη διὰ τῆς ἐμπειρίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις). The sharp antithesis between the two terms appears nowhere in the Hippocratic corpus; it is typically Platonic, and is probably due to Plato himself. On the general relationship of Greek philosophy to Greek medicine see the recent discussions by Fr. Wehrli, *Mus. Helv.* viii (1951), 36, 177; L. Edelstein, *Bull. Hist. Med.* xxvi (1952), 299; G. Vlastos, *Gnomon*, xxvii (1955), 67. All three warn us against exaggerating the influence of medicine.

a 4. ᾧ προσφέρει (ἦ) ᾧ προσφέρει. This is a well-known crux. If, with Burnet and Croiset, we retain the reading of the MSS., ᾧ προσφέρει ᾧ προσφέρει, we seem driven to take ᾧ προσφέρει both as object of the preceding προσφέρει and as subject of ἐστίν, and ᾧ as instrumental (sc. λόγῳ), translating with Croiset "it has no rational understanding of the nature of the things it applies, by virtue of which (understanding) it applies them". The falsity of this construction is betrayed by its clumsiness, and by comparison with 501 a (see below). But the alternative rendering suggested by Croiset and adopted by Robin and Jowett⁴, "it cannot give any account of the nature of the things it offers to the person to whom it offers them", is surely impossible unless we insert δοῦναι after οὐδένα (Theiler) or in place of it (Hissink). Most scholars have thought that ᾧ προσφέρει ᾧ προσφέρει arose from conflation of alternative readings. One MS. of Aristides has ᾧ προσφέρει only, the rest ᾧ προσφέρει only; and the Byzantine writer Johannes Doxopatres (sacc. xi?), who clearly derived his text from Aristides, appears to have anticipated Cornarius' widely accepted

conjecture *ὦν προσφέρει*. This may be right, but seems again to require the introduction of *δοῦναι* (otherwise we should expect *περὶ ὦν*, cf. *Rep.* 493 c 4 *μηδένα ἔχει λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν*, *ibid.* 544 a 3, *Tim.* 87 c 3). Ast and Stallbaum simply deleted *ὦ προσφέρει*. Perhaps, however, editors have not paid sufficient attention to 501 a, where Socrates recapitulates the present passage. There the medical art is said to study *both* the nature (*φύσις*) of the patient (*οὗ θεραπεύει* = *ὦ προσφέρει*) and the grounds for the treatment (*ὦν πράττει* = *ᾧ προσφέρει*). Cf. also *Phdr.* 268 ab, which shows that a doctor was expected to know not only the effect of each kind of treatment but *to whom* it should be applied (b 7). This suggests that both *ὦ προσφέρει* and *ᾧ προσφέρει* are needed and that a conjunction has dropped out (as *ἡ* would easily do): “it has no rational understanding of the nature of the patient or the prescription.” For *λόγον ἔχειν* in this sense, introducing an indirect question, cf. *Rep.* 475 c 1 *μήπω λόγον ἔχοντα τί τε χρηστόν καὶ μῆ*.

a 6. *ἄλογον πρᾶγμα*: cf. *Symp.* 202 a 6 *ἄλογον γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη*; In Plato’s mature terminology inability *λόγον δοῦναι* is a mark of *δόξα* (cf. on 454 b 8–455 a 7).

a 7. *ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον*: Socrates offers to submit his own contention to the test he has just propounded.

b 1. *Τῇ . . . ἱατρικῇ . . . ὑπόκειται*, “wears the mask of medicine” (not “is subordinate to medicine”, as L.S.J.): *ὑποκεῖσθαι* denotes the state resulting from the act of *ὑποδύναι* (464 c 7). *κολακεία*, pred.: “as the corresponding toadyism”.

b 3. *〈ἡ〉 κακοῦργός τε*: cf. *Rep.* 559 b 3 *ἡ μὲν γέ που τοῦ σίτου (ἐπιθυμία) κατ’ ἀμφοτέρα ἀναγκαία, ἡ τε ὠφέλιμος ἡ τε παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή. ἡ* would fall out (after *-ἡ*) much more easily than *οὔσα*, which the Paris corrector and one MS. of Aristides insert, probably without authority. One or the other would seem to be needed.

b 4. *σχήμασιν* refers to stays, padding, etc. (cf. Alexis fr. 98 Kock); *χρώμασιν* to make-up; *λειότητι* probably to the use of depilatories. The last should perhaps be *λειότησι* “things like smoothness”, to match the generalizing plural *ἐσθήσιν*: cf. *Tim.* 65 c 6 *τραχύτησί τε καὶ λειότησιν*, and for *ἐσθήσιν* *Alc. i* 122 c 1 *πλούτους . . . καὶ τρυφᾶς καὶ ἐσθήτας. ἐσθήσιν* (F, confirming Canter’s conjecture) accounts for the variants *αἰσθήσει* and *ἐσθήτι* better than any other reading (Coraës’ *ἐσθήσει* must be rejected as Hellenistic): the plural, being rare, was not recognized by copyists. Theiler objects that clothes do not alter the appearance of the body itself. But it is doubtful if many women would agree with him, and in fact *κομμωτική* seems to have covered the devices of the *modiste* as well as those of the beauty-specialist. The scholiast on Aristides, p. 438 Dind., explains *κομμωτική* as *τὴν κοσμητικήν, τούτεστι τὴν κουρικὴν καὶ τὴν ὑφαντικήν*. And the priestess in charge of the famous statue of Athena Polias was called *Κομμώ*—surely because she dressed it in its Panathenaic robe. It seems needless, therefore, to fall back on conjectures like *ὀσφρήσει* (H. Schmidt) or *ὀσμήσει* (Theiler).

b 7. ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι, “in mathematical terms”. The Greek mathematicians treated proportion as a part of geometry, not of arithmetic. On the use of mathematical language in the *Gorgias* see Introd., p. 20; and on Plato’s liking for proportion (ἀναλογία) Robinson, 209 ff.

c 1. ὅτι ὁ κομμωτική—μᾶλλον δὲ ᾧδε. I have not ventured to follow Thompson (and most of the later editors) in deleting these words. Their omission in certain MSS. is much more easily accounted for (by homoeoarcton) than their intrusion in others—they certainly stood in the archetype of the first family, as the agreement of P with BT shows. And it seems to me entirely natural that Plato should sum up in a pregnant phrase the relationship between the arts and pseudo-arts concerned with the body, which he has already expounded, before expressing in similar phrases the relationships within the entire group. The first phrase is intelligible in the light of what has preceded it, and so provides a model for the understanding of the others. The words μᾶλλον δὲ ᾧδε, which to Thompson ‘sounded like a gloss’, are similarly used at *Lysis* 214 e 5 to introduce a fresh point.

c 5-7. “However, as I was saying, although these pursuits differ in nature in this way, yet they are so closely related that sophists and orators are confused as persons working in a common sphere on a common subject-matter.” ὅπερ λέγω regularly recalls an earlier statement (as at 454 c 1), and I think Heindorf was right in finding a reference here to 464 c, where legislation and justice are said ἐπικοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις, ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὔσαι. His suspicions of the text, and the objections of Stallbaum and Sauppe, arose from not seeing that the content of ὅπερ λέγω is expressed in the δὲ clause only: the μὲν clause is subordinate in sense (cf. on 512 a 2-b 1), and οὕτω refers to the distinctions drawn in the preceding sentence. The subject of διέστηκεν is ταῦτα, viz. legislation (with its imitation, sophistic) and justice (with its imitation, rhetoric); and τούτων is to be supplied with ὄντων. The likeness between the originals explains why men confuse the imitations (as, e.g., Isocrates does at *Antid.* 155).

c 7. Schanz preferred T’s χρήσονται, but see below on 521 b 7. ἑαυτοῖς might be reciprocal (“they know not what to make of each other”, Thompson), but yields as good or better sense if taken as reflexive: sophists and orators suffer from the deepest sort of ignorance, which is ignorance of oneself and one’s function (cf. *Alc. i* 133 d ff.).

c 8-d 7. Plato is suggesting that just as the body is incapable of distinguishing between the cook and the doctor, so the unphilosophical mind fails to distinguish the sophist and the orator from the statesmen whom they mimic. The sharp Platonic antithesis between mind as the dominant and body as the subject part of man appears here perhaps for the first time: cf. *Meno* 88 e, *Phaedo* 79 e ff., etc.

d 4. τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ᾦν, “the saying of Anaxagoras would prevail far and wide” (Cope). The opening words of Anaxagoras’ book, Ὅμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ᾦν (fr. 1 Diels), which described the chaos that existed before the intervention of νοῦς, became proverbial

for any state in which distinctions are obliterated, like Hegel's 'night in which all cows are black'. Cf. *Phaedo* 72 c.

σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἔμπειρος. Polus as a well-read man will understand the allusion. We need not infer with Ol (76. 28) that he had a special admiration for Anaxagoras; nor do I see any implication that Polus' ideas are as confused as Anaxagoras' chaos.

d 5. Several editors have followed Hirschig in deleting ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. But the words point the application of the proverbial phrase by recalling c 6. ὁμοῦ . . . ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ is not objectionable: Plato likes to reinforce one adverb with another of similar meaning (Schanz, *Nov. Comm.* 12 ff.).

d 6. ὑγιεινῶν might be a gloss on ἱατρικῶν, intended to show that its meaning is "medicinal", not "medical". But the combination ἱατρικὰ καὶ ὑγιεινά occurs at *Polit.* 295 d, 299 c. It is perhaps more likely that the balance of the phrase should be restored by giving ὁψοποιικῶν a companion adjective, such as ἡδέων or πονηρῶν. Mr. Gwilym Owen has, however, called my attention to a similarly unbalanced phrase at *Theaet.* 164 a 6, ὅψις γὰρ καὶ αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταῦτόν ὡμολόγηται, where ὅψις is merely a particular case of αἴσθησις.

e 1. ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι, sc. ἀντίστροφον ῥητορικῆς ἐστίν. This is 'against the rules of the language' (Morstadt), but the words should nevertheless not be deleted: they are needed for clarity. We might insert ῥητορικῆς; but the ellipse is natural enough in conversation. 'Rhetoric is a spiritual cookery, as cookery is a corporeal rhetoric' (Thompson).

e 1-466 a 2. Socrates apologizes for having indulged in μακρολογία, which he condemned at 449 b and 461 d: cf. the similar apology at 519 e. This is perhaps an indication that Plato's Socrates is 'breaking out of the historical mould' (Rudberg), and becoming the mouthpiece for Plato's passionately held positive convictions. Cf., however, *Xen. Mem.* 4. 6. 15, which suggests that Socrates did on occasion give a continuous exposition of a topic.

Observe the fourfold recurrence of the transitional μὲν οὖν, which some copyists tried to mitigate by writing μέντοι at e 3—an expedient condemned by Ol. As des Places says (*Particles de liaison chez Platon*, 92), 'Les trois premiers μὲν οὖν sont de fausses sorties, il entr'ouvre la porte qu'il ouvre pour de bon avec le δέ de 466 a 2.' (The fifth μὲν οὖν, at a 6, is not transitional but adversative, correcting Polus' suggestion.)

466 a 4-467 c 4. *Angered at the belittling of his profession and bored with classifications, Polus asks whether politicians (ῥήτορες: see on 449 a 6) do not in fact exercise more power than anyone else. Socrates answers "No": for they do not do "whatever they want" (ἃ ἂν βούλωνται), but only "whatever seems good to them" (ἃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς). Polus is baffled and enraged by this apparently senseless distinction; in order to explain it, Socrates takes over the part of questioner.*

Polus' question marks the transition from the professional teachers of rhetoric to their pupils, the ῥήτορες, and so to the problem of power-politics which is the second main theme of the dialogue (see *Introd.*,

pp. 2 f.). But there is no breach in the logical continuity. Socrates' argument starts from the definition of rhetoric he has just given. Rhetoric, not being a τέχνη, has no scientific grasp of τὸ βέλτιστον (465 a 2). Therefore the ῥήτωρ as such does not know what is best for him. But all men desire their own good (cf. Xen. *Mem.* 3. 9. 4 f., *Meno* 77 b–78 b). Therefore the ῥήτωρ does not know what he really desires, and so cannot do it: he can only do what *seems* good to him. In other words, the good life depends on a kind of insight which politicians trained on rhetoric do not possess. (For the nature of this insight see *Rep.* 518 b ff., quoted on 460 a 5–c 6.)

466 a 7. τηλικούτος ὢν: Polus is young (463 e 2). τάχα: correctly explained by the gloss in BW, πρεσβύτης γενόμενος (which early editors mistook for part of the text). Cf. the phrase τὸ λήθης γήρας, which Plato quotes at *Phdr.* 276 d. Socrates similarly teases Hippias and Ion on their bad memory (*Hipp. mi.* 369 a, *Ion* 539 e)—though he can pretend on occasion to have a bad memory himself (*Prot.* 334 c, *Meno* 71 c). Plato required a good memory in his pupils (*Rep.* 487 a, *Ep. vii* 344 a); so does the Aristophanic Socrates (*Clouds* 414).

b 1. λόγου τινὸς ἀρχήν, “the starting point of a speech”. Polus' indignant tone suggests to Socrates that the question is merely rhetorical. So again at c 3.

b 3. Οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι, “they are not regarded at all”. For this absolute use of νομίζειν cf. *Lys.* 12. 9 οὔτε θεοὺς οὔτ' ἀνθρώπους νομίζει, and Lucian, *Hermotimus* 24 ταῦτα μὲν οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι παρ' αὐτοῖς. The reason why they are not regarded is presumably that they initiate nothing, but as κόλακες merely reproduce the ideas of the δῆμος (481 e, 513 a–c).

b 8. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, “but of course”, substantiating the condition as at 471 a 4 (Denniston, 394). ἀλλὰ μὴν is common in the same sense, but without δὴ. For confusion of μὲν and μὴν cf., e.g., *Rep.* 443 a 9.

b 11. ἀποκτεινύασιν τε. This is the spelling approved by the ancient grammarians, and in the *Gorgias* it is the prevailing one in BT and (before correction) W. Elsewhere in Plato the spelling ἀποκτινν- often appears even in the best MSS. (see Schanz, *Introd.*, p. vi). —For the power of life and death exercised by the orators at Athens cf. *Rep.* 565 e–566 a, and the debates on the fate of Mytilene, *Thuc.* 3. 36–49.

c 3. Νῆ τὸν κύνα, not assentient, but emphasizing ἀμφιγνοῶ μέντοι: “I swear I just can't decide.” Cf. on 448 a 6 and, for the oath by the dog, on 482 b 5.

c 7. ἔπειτα, “in that case” (L.S.J. s.v. II. 3). δύο ἅμα με ἐρωτᾷς; According to Aristotle, *Soph. El.* 167^b38, it was a common sophistic trick to combine in one sentence two questions requiring different answers. But the deceit is of course unintentional here, since Polus sees no difference between ὃν ἂν βούλωνται and ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς.

c 9. Ἡ οὐχί. As Burnet saw, F's εἰ οὐχί points to this reading (ἦ and εἰ are constantly confused in MSS. of Plato). In the first family the text has been corrupted through the intrusion of a gloss ὅτι, intended to mark the beginning of the quotation.

d 5. δύο ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὰ ἐρωτήματα, "these questions are (really) two". One or two inferior MSS. omit τὰ, perhaps rightly ("these words are two questions").

e 1. ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν qualifies οὐδέν: see on 450 b 7.

e 2. βέλτιστον εἶναι, e 10 βέλτιστα εἶναι, and 467 b 3 βέλτιστα εἶναι are all deleted by Cobet and Theiler. But they support one another, and they are perfectly correct in sense (cf. 468 d 3 οἶόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ). The politician does not indeed grasp τὸ βέλτιστον as an objective norm, but he has a false image of it: as Aristotle put it, *de anima* 433^a27, αἰεὶ κινεῖ μὲν τὸ ὀρεκτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. Cf. on 447 a 5.

e 3. Οὔκουν: on the accentuation see Denniston, 432.

e 6. Μὰ τόν—, "so help me" (Jowett⁴). τὸ ἐλλειπτικῶς ὀμνύειν . . . Ἀττικόν ἐστὶ, Greg. Cor., p. 150 Schaef. It appears in *Anth. Pal.* 12. 201, and occurred in Callimachus (fr. 351 Pfeiffer); but the only other extant Attic example seems to be Aristoph. *Frogs* 1374, where the scholiast observes οὕτως ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις ἐνίοτε μὴ προστιθέναι τὸν θεὸν εὐλαβείας χάριν . . . καὶ Πλάτωνα δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ κεχρησθαι. The same motive is assigned by the scholiast here, by Proclus in *Alc.* 234. 9 Creuzer, and by Suidas s.v. ναὶ μὰ τόν, while Ol thinks that Plato wishes to teach us to avoid swearing. But it is much more likely that Socrates cannot find any oath big enough to express his emphatic denial.

φῆς refers to b 8. ἔφης (MSS.) is questionable Attic (Rutherford, *New Phrynichus*, p. 225, Kühner-B. ii. 211), and is in any case shown to be wrong by the reply Φημί here and at 497 a 1. (Burnet inconsistently corrected to φῆς there but not here.) I know of no other instances of ἔφης in Plato; γ' ἔφης at *Ion* 539 e 7 must be divided γε φῆς, as the context shows.

467 a 1. τὴν ῥητορικὴν: for the omission of οὖσαν cf. *Phaedo* 72 c 1, etc. Cobet deleted the words, but ἔχειν κολακείαν is hardly Greek. —ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας: to prove that politicians have insight entails refuting Socrates' claim that they lack it. I do not see that anything important is gained by writing ἀποδείξας . . . ἐξελέγξεις with Hirschig.

a 4. ἡ δὲ δύναμις ἐστὶν, ὥς σὺ φῆς, ἀγαθόν. This is not a further consequence of leaving Socrates unrefuted (as Burnet's punctuation would suggest). Socrates is recapitulating Polus' admissions: power is good (466 b 6, e 7); but doing ἀ δοκεῖ without insight is bad (e 12). From these premisses he concludes (a 8) that politicians do not possess power, unless Polus can prove against him that they have insight. Heindorf's εἰ δὴ has been widely accepted, but seems to me to spoil the logic: that power is good does not help to prove that what politicians have is bad (cf. H. Schmidt, *Beiträge*, 175).

a 9. ἐξελεγχθῆ . . . ὅτι, "is refuted and convinced that . . .": the ὅτι clause expresses the result of the refutation (cf. 482 b 2, 508 a 8).

b 1. Οὗτος ἀνὴρ—, "Hark at the man!" (Lamb). Probably an aposiopesis, ὥσανεῖ ἔλεγεν Ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος τί πάσχει; (schol. vet.). For the contemptuous use of οὗτος cf. 489 b 7, 505 c 3 (in both places without article, as here, cf. Kühner-G. i. 629).

b 3. ἄρτι: 466 e 1. *τούτου πρόσθεν* is evidently a gloss on it, as its false position at the end of the sentence betrays. On *βέλτιστα εἶναι* see note on 466 e 2.

b 10. Σχέτλιά γε κτλ., "That is really outrageous and monstrous": like the common *ἄτοπα λέγεις*, but much stronger. For the particle, which Ol and Stob. preserve, cf. 473 a 1 *Ἄτοπά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν*.

b 11. κακηγόρει (Naber, *Mnem.* 1908, 254) fits Polus' last remark better than κατηγόρει (MSS. and Ol), and was adopted by Burnet in the second printing of his text. Confusion of the two words is frequent in MSS. of Plato: F has the same mistake at 522 b 8 and at *Meno* 95 a 3; P. Oxy. has it at *Phdr.* 243 a 6 and b 5 (corrected by the second hand at b 5); both A and O have it at *Eph.* ii 310 d 2 (corr. O²).

ἵνα προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ, "to address you in your own style". As ancient writers on rhetoric point out, Socrates alludes to the paronomasia or jingle ὦ λῶστε Πῶλε ("peerless Polus", Lamb), which is in the style of Gorgias and his school. Cf. *Symp.* 185 c *Πανσανίου δὲ παυσανέου διδάσκουσι γάρ με ἴσα λέγειν οὕτως οἱ σοφοί: Hipparchus* 225 c καὶ ὥρα καὶ χώρα—ἵνα τι καὶ ἡμεῖς τῶν σοφῶν ῥημάτων ἐμβάλωμεν, ὧν οἱ δεξιοὶ περὶ τὰς δίκας καλλιποῦνται. At *Rep.* 498 de Socrates thinks it necessary to apologize for the jingle *γενόμενον—λεγόμενον* as being accidental. These examples show that Plato and his pupils found such verbal tricks as distasteful as we do, and suggest that Ritter was wrong in taking *κατὰ σέ* in the present passage to mean merely "as politely as you address me".

467 c 5—468 e 5. *Socrates explains his paradox, in three steps.*

i. *We must distinguish between activities which we pursue as being themselves "good" or "desired" (i.e. as ends) and those which we pursue only as means to something else. The latter are in themselves neither good nor bad but μεταξύ (467 e 2: the later technical word was ἀδιάφορα).*

ii. *We pursue what is μεταξύ only as a means to what is good. Thus all voluntary action is aimed, directly or indirectly, at the presumed good of the agent.*

iii. *Therefore actions which result in harm for the agent do not reflect his will: in such cases he does ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ, but not ἃ βούλεται (468 d 4—7).*

It is plain enough that the actual result of an action may differ from that desired by the agent, and that in such cases the result is not "willed". But Plato's way of putting this obvious truth is open to criticism from several angles.

(a) All action is said to aim at "the good", and it is clear that this signifies "good for the agent" (468 b 6 οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν); it is only in the *Republic* that the aim of action is identified with the Form of the Good (505 d 11). But what is implied by this proposition? If "good" means "desired", it is merely tautologous; but if "good" means more than this (as it certainly did to Plato), its universality is questionable. As Murphy points out (*Interpretation of Plato's Republic*, 47), it can hardly be stretched to cover cases of psychological conflict such as that of Leontius (*Rep.* 439 e). It also seems paradoxical to deny

that some actions are motivated by a disinterested love (or hatred) of another person (cf. Prichard, *Duty and Interest*, 26 ff.). Indeed, if Plato has in mind a *general* conception of the agent's good, it may be doubted whether many of our actions are consciously governed by such a conception. In the *Protagoras*, 358 cd, and *Meno*, 77 c 1, he puts the doctrine in the more plausible form that all men desire "good things" in the plural; cf. *Rep.* 438 a 3, and *infra* 499 e 6.

(b) The perilous distinction between ends and means—whose long and shocking history begins here and at *Lysis* 219 d—is treated as absolute, whereas it is at best relative. Strictly speaking, there are no pure *ἀδιάφορα* in the sphere of action, since every moment of living has some value or un-value in itself, and no pure 'ends', since every event stands in a causal relationship to later events.

(c) The distinction between what people think they want and what they 'really' want was accepted by Aristotle (*E.N.* 3. 4), and reappears in Rousseau and in Hegel. On its implications see Cornford, *C.A.H.* vi. 306, and Gould, chap. iii. It evidently originated in the attempt to understand Socrates' saying that no one does wrong willingly. But it is perhaps only fully intelligible in the light of Plato's later distinction between the 'inner man' who is an immortal rational being and the empirical self which is distorted by earthly experience (cf. *Rep.* 611 b ff.)—or of the psychoanalyst's distinction between the 'original self' and the 'pseudo-self' which often masks or replaces it (cf. Erich Fromm, *The Fear of Freedom*, 177, Eng. ed.). Whatever its theoretical justification, in practice it too easily becomes an excuse for dictation: 'Sooner or later what I "really" want to do turns out to be a polite paraphrase for what you think I ought to want to do' (Barbara Wootton, *Freedom under Planning*, 10). For discussion cf. Isaiah Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty* (Inaugural Lecture, 1958).

Plato similarly says at *Rep.* 577 e that the tyrannical man *ἡκιστα ποιήσει ἂν βουλευθῇ*. But he does not consistently use *βούλεσθαι* in this restricted sense of 'true will': it is used of childish appetites at *Lysis* 207 e 6, and at *Rep.* 445 b 1 *ὁ ἂν βουλευθῇ* equals *ὁ ἂν δοκῇ*: cf. also 511 b 4 below. Nevertheless the Academic *Ὅροι* define *βούλησις* as *ἔφεις μετὰ λόγου ὀρθοῦ*, or *ὄρεξις εὐλογος* (413 c 8), showing that the restricted sense eventually prevailed, as it does in Aristotle, *E.N.* 1136^b6, *Rhet.* 1369^a2, etc.

467 d 5. *πλούτου γὰρ ἔνεκα πλέουσιν*. These words seem purely repetitive; Cobet deleted them, perhaps rightly. They would have more point if we could take them as a question, on the analogy of 474 b 7.

The Greeks did not go on pleasure cruises, or take sea voyages for their health; sailing was still a dangerous business, as Demosthenes' speeches on bottomry sufficiently show, and often highly uncomfortable; Hesiod thought it folly (*Works and Days*, 682 ff.).

e 3. *Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη*, sc. *εἶναι ἥτοι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων*. The answer is not strictly accommodated to the form of the question.

e 4. *σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον*, a conventional list of *ἀγαθά*, exemplifying respectively mental, bodily, and 'external' goods. Plato

himself does not regard either *ὑγίεια* or *πλοῦτος* as necessarily good: cf. *Meno* 87 e–88 a, and *supra* on 451 e 2.

e 7. μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. The phrasing here, as in some other passages of the *Gorgias*, suggests the Theory of Forms but does not entail it: see on 497 e 1. *μετέχειν* was used in ordinary Greek of “sharing in” a quality, e.g. Pindar, *Pyth.* 2. 83 οὐδ’ οἱ μετέχω θράσεος. Cf. *Prot.* 322 d 5 αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν (spoken by Protagoras) and 351 d 7 τὰ ἡδονῆς μετέχοντα ἢ ποιοῦντα ἡδονήν.

468 a 2. καὶ πλεῖν: ‘Ce dernier exemple me semble suspect, après ce qui a été dit 467 d début,’ Robin. One might think of *νεῖν* (suggested to me by Mr. D. A. Russell, cf. 511 c), or even of *πνεῖν*—though we do not choose to breathe, we can choose to breathe no more. But in calm weather sailing may perhaps count as a neutral activity like walking: cf. 511 e 6 ff.

a 5. The spelling *ἐνεκεν* is attested by fourth-century Attic inscriptions (see L.S.J. s.v. *ἐνεκα*). In the MSS. of Plato it is less frequent than *ἐνεκα*, but it is supported here by both direct and indirect tradition. I do not know why Burnet altered it here while keeping it at *Symp.* 210 e 6 (P’s *ἐν ἐκ* is not evidence).

c 2. σφάττειν: “to butcher”, a more brutal term than *ἀποκτεινύναι*, and so one that helps Socrates’ point.

c 3. ἀπλῶς οὕτως, “just like that,” “just for the fun of the thing”. Cf. *Prot.* 351 c 7 οὐκ οἶδα . . . ἀπλῶς οὕτως, ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀποκριτέον ἐστὶν ὡς . . ., “I don’t know if I should answer *without qualification*, in the terms of your question, that . . .”; and the use of *ἀπλῶς*, Lat. *simpliciter*, in formal logic.

c 7. τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνη; Faced with the fatal necessity of admitting that only “good” actions are willed, Polus hesitates or sulks, as he does again at d 6. I see nothing particularly suspicious in the repetition of the phrase, which takes the place of a stage direction.

d 3. τυγχάνει δὲ ὃν κάκιον, “although it is in fact worse”. The words go closely with *οἰόμενος κτλ.*, but are added in paratactic instead of hypotactic form. Cf. 482 b 1 ἃ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις, παρήσθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένοις, “although you actually heard them spoken”.

e 1. ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ, “in the city in question” (whereas *ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει*, 469 e 1, 513 b 1, 517 a 2, is “in the city where we are”, i.e. in Athens).

e 3. ἔλεγον: 466 de.

468 e 6–469 c 7: *Polus, defeated, falls back on an argumentum ad hominem:* “Do you mean to say you are not envious when you see a man killing or robbing whom he pleases?” Socrates replies that such a man is unenviable if his action is just, pitiable if it is unjust; and affirms his own view that suffering injustice is preferable to committing it.

As Ol points out (86. 4), to meet a theoretical argument with an appeal to the personal behaviour of its proponent is “the vulgarity of the corner-boy” (*ιδιωτικὸν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐν τριόδοις ἀνατετραμμένων*). But Polus’ abrupt invocation of the lowest moral standards makes an effective contrast with the view which Socrates proceeds to state. To

most Greeks of the time the latter would appear paradoxical in its loftiness. This is made especially clear by Isocrates, *Panath.* 117 f.: faced with a choice between two evils, to be unjustly enslaved or to rule others unjustly, the Athenians chose the second, ἅπερ ἅπαντες μὲν ἂν οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες ἔλαιντο καὶ βουληθείεν, ὀλίγοι δ' ἂν τινες τῶν προσποιουμένων εἶναι σοφῶν ἐρωτηθέντες οὐκ ἂν φήσειαν. The last words read like a conscious sneer at the *Gorgias*. The average man's view is stated by Meno, αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή . . . τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, καὶ αὐτὸν εὐλαβεῖσθαι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον παθεῖν (*Meno* 71 e, cf. *Rep.* 332 ab with Adam's note, *Xen. Mem.* 2. 3. 14). Democritus is credited with the same opinion as Socrates, but the genuineness of the fragment (45 Diels) is open to serious doubt. Aristotle restates Socrates' view in a form which robs it of its paradox: justice is a mean between suffering and committing wrong, but the latter is the greater ἀδίκημα (*E.N.* 1134^a12). The paradox lies in maintaining not merely that ἀδικεῖσθαι is less unjust than ἀδικεῖν but that it is preferable from the standpoint of enlightened self-interest (which Socrates adopts throughout the dialogue).

468 e 6. Ὡς δὴ, ironical, like Lat. *quasi vero*: so at 499 b 6, Aesch. *Ag.* 1633, Soph. *O.C.* 809, etc. What was originally a comparative clause (the main verb being supplied from the context) has become in effect an independent sentence (Denniston, 229).

469 a 1. ζηλωτόν ἐστιν, sc. τὸ ποιεῖν, or more generally, "his condition". Many editors prefer ζηλωτός, which appears in a rather late Florentine MS. and *may* have been read by Ol. Lodge, however, quoted a similar use of ζηλωτόν, where a masc. might have been expected, at *Laws* 730 c 6. —In a 'shame-culture', to be envied is the especial mark of εὐδαιμονία: it is κάλλιστον, Bacchyl. 10 (9). 47.

a 5. ἐλεεῖν. That criminals are to be pitied rather than hated follows naturally from the view that crime is due to a sickness of the mind and is, properly speaking, involuntary. Cf. 479 e ff., and *Laws* 731 cd.

a 10. ἐλεεινός. Burnet, following Porson, consistently printed ἐλεινός, except in the *Laws*; the evidence of the MSS. is, however, against him, and the uncontracted form occurs in the Cairensis of Menander, *Samia* 156, and in the *Dyscolos*, 297.

b 2. γε πρὸς, "into the bargain". The reading of F and Stobaeus is confirmed by the similar γε πρὸς at 513 b 6, *Meno* 90 e 9, Aesch. *P.V.* 73, etc.

c 2. The slight awkwardness of ἢ "or" followed by ἢ "than" would be mitigated by inserting with Hirschig a corresponsive ἢ after εἴη, where it would easily drop out.

c 5. ἄρτι: 466 b 11.

469 c 8–470 c 8. Socrates illustrates his conception of power by the parable of the Lunatic with the Knife. Would it be reasonable to say that such a man exercised great power? "No," says Polus, "the police would get him." Polus is thus induced to agree that "doing what one thinks fit" cannot be equated with the exercise of power unless the action is "profitable" (ὠφέλιμον, 470 a 10, or ἄμεινον, b 2). But what does "profitable" mean? Socrates affirms that an

action is profitable when it is "right" (δίκαιον, c 2). Polus: "A child could disprove that." Socrates: "I should be grateful to the child."

Plato's lunatic is a familiar figure today, though he has exchanged his knife for deadlier weapons. Conrad in *The Secret Agent* drew the portrait of just such a man, who gratified his craving for power by always carrying a charge of dynamite on his person. Why should we deny that his power is real? Polus' naïve answer evades the problem, and is in fact not always true: the police may fail, or (as in the field of international relations) there may be no police. It is certainly not Plato's answer, as some nineteenth-century scholars mistakenly supposed; it merely serves to convince Polus that his previous assertion was wrong, even on his own crude assumptions. Plato's reply would presumably be that the Man with the Knife cannot at his deepest level will pure destruction for its own sake; his action reflects, not his true personality, but a lunatic distortion of it, and since he does not do what he truly wills, he cannot be said to exercise power—on the contrary, like the τυραννικὸς ἀνὴρ of *Rep.* 573 a-c, he is the slave of his mania.

On the equation of ὠφέλιμον with δίκαιον see below, on 470 c 2.

469 c 8. ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος [τῷ λόγῳ] ἐπιλαβοῦ: "let me state a case, and do you criticize it." Polus has offered a definition of τυραννεῖν (c 5 ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω), which Socrates does not choose to attack directly: instead, he will state an imaginary case of "power" and invite Polus to say what is wrong with it. I incline to think with Hirschig and Theiler that τῷ λόγῳ is a gloss added to show that ἐπιλαβοῦ refers to verbal assault (as at 506 b 8 ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούων ἐπιλαμβάνον) and not to physical arrest (as at 527 a 1). τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ could, I think, only mean "attack me with your (counter-)proposition" (Sauppe); but this is not what Socrates wants, or what the rules of dialectic allow. τοῦ λόγου or τῶν λόγων is possible, though otiose; the former was conjectured by an anonymous scholar in the renaissance MS. V (see *Introd.*, p. 53), and may also have been read by O1 (but the context in O1 is corrupt).

d 1. ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ: at the peak hours for shopping the ἀγορά would be the most crowded place in Athens. Plato perhaps had in mind the murder of Phrynichus in 411, which happened ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ (Thuc. 8. 92. 2). ὑπὸ μάλης: Greeks having no pockets, this was the traditional place for secreting a weapon (Xen. *Hell.* 2. 3. 23 ξιφίδια ὑπὸ μάλης ἔχοντας, etc.).

d 3. εἰάν γε ἄρα. I have preferred the reading of F (which was unknown to Burnet), since the combination γὰρ ἄρα, though it does seemingly occur in Plato, e.g. at *Rep.* 438 a 3, is not free from suspicion (Wilamowitz, ii. 346). ἄρα expresses the speaker's gratified surprise at the realization of his own power.

d 6. τῆς κεφαλῆς, genitive of part affected, like Aristoph. *Ach.* 1180 τῆς κεφαλῆς κατέαγε. κατεαγέειν. The primary MSS. have κατεαγῆναι, a form of the aorist infinitive which Thomas Magister rightly condemns as barbarous. Burnet wrote καταγῆναι, the correct aorist; but

we expect a perfect, parallel to *τεθνάναι* and *διεσχίσθαι*—the right *state* for the victim is having his skull smashed.

e 4. *ἦντινά σοι δοκοῖ*. Many of the older editors read *ἦντιν' ἄν σοι δοκῇ* (with WP); but it is fairly clear that the archetype of the first family had *ἦντιν' ἄν σοι δοκοῖ*, which points to the reading of F.

e 5. *τριήρεις*. αἱ *τριήρεις*, which Burnet by an oversight printed without comment, is a conjecture of Schaefer's, and hardly an indispensable one. Plato varies his use of the article in enumerations (Riddell, § 237 a); and here the fighting ships may be felt as forming a closer unity with the naval dockyards in which they were kept than do the *πλοῖα* (passenger or cargo vessels). Cf. Kühner-G. i. 611. —In the Peloponnesian War people were afraid lest enemy agents should fire the dockyards (cf. Aristoph. *Ach.* 918 ff., and Rennie's note).

e 8. *Οὐ δῆτα οὕτω γε*, "Certainly not in the case you put" (like *ἐνταῦθά γε*, 459 b 6).

470 a 9. [*τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι*] *πάλιν αὖ σοι φαίνεται κτλ.*: "you have come round to the view that if doing what one thinks fit has a profitable result, doing it is a good thing, and this, it appears, is the meaning of 'great power'; otherwise (if it has not a profitable result), doing what one thinks fit seems to you a bad thing, amounting to weakness." *τε* (a 11) means "both"; but whereas we expect Socrates to continue with *καὶ (εἶναι) τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι*, the subordination is dropped in the latter clause (as often in Plato) and replaced by the parenthetic *ὥς ἔοικεν*. The *δὲ* clause reverts to *oratio obliqua*, in a compressed form, equivalent to *τὸ πράττειν ᾧ δοκεῖ φαίνεται σοι κακὸν εἶναι, καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι εἶναι*.

Most editors have followed Thompson in rejecting the bracketed words; they are, however, defended by Friedländer (ii. 259 n. 1) and others. If they are retained, we have a series of statements not about *τὸ πράττειν ᾧ δοκεῖ* but about *τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι* (which must surely be supplied as subject again in the second half of the sentence), culminating in the assertion that in certain conditions great power is lack of power. We cannot, I think, evade this either by translating the last words "even a little power is bad" (Heindorf), unless we read <τὸ> *σμικρὸν δύνασθαι*, or by translating them "it appears to be a bad thing and to signify little" (Marchant, *CR*, xii (1898), 305). In any case, what Socrates is trying to show is not that power is sometimes bad, but that unprincipled politicians do not really exercise power (since what they do is not *ὠφέλιμον* in Socrates' sense). It looks, therefore, as if the words *τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι* were a mistaken gloss designed to indicate the subject to be supplied with *φαίνεται*. —The *third* *δύνασθαι* (after *σμικρὸν*) is ignored by Ol (who quotes and paraphrases only the second half of the sentence). It could be dispensed with, but I have not ventured to follow Thompson in deleting it, or Wilamowitz in deleting *καὶ σμικρὸν* as well.

b 11. [*ταῦτό*] *τοῦτο* looks like a dittography: neither *ταὐτό* nor Ast's *αὐτό* is wanted.

c 2. ὅταν μὲν δικάίως . . . ἄμεινον εἶναι. This criterion, stated also at *Crito* 48 cd, underlies all the apparent paradoxes which Socrates enunciates at 472 d ff. The relativism of late-fifth-century thought had called in question the traditional moral claims of society on the citizen: henceforth the individual, not the πόλις, is the norm. Socrates' reply was that the individual should do what is right, not for the sake of his fellow men or out of deference to current moral standards, but *for his own sake*—a position which he maintains throughout the dialogue.

c 4. Χαλεπόν γε, ironical. οὐχὶ καὶν παῖς . . . : a child is often called as witness to the obvious, *Lysis* 205 c 1, *Euthyd.* 301 c 1, Aesch. *Ag.* 1163, etc.

c 8. ἀλλ' ἔλεγχε, added to explain what the εὐεργεσία is. The words should not be deleted with Naber and Hartmann: κολαζόμενος is similarly added at 505 c 4, καθεύδειν at *Phaedo* 72 c 3, ἀναμνησθῆναι at *Phaedo* 73 b 7.

470 c 9—471 d 2. *Polus cites the case of Archelaus, King of Macedon, a typical ἄδικος εὐδαίμων. After describing Archelaus' career with much gusto, he suggests that if any Athenian had to change places with a Macedonian he would certainly wish to be Archelaus, crimes and all; he is even confident that this would be Socrates' choice.*

The problem of the ἄδικος εὐδαίμων, whose prosperity seemed to make nonsense of the belief in divine justice, had long troubled Greek moralists: cf. Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 270 ff., Solon 13. 25 ff., Theognis 373–80, 733 ff., Pindar fr. 201 Bowra (213 Snell), Euripides fr. 286, and my *Greeks and the Irrational*, 33 f. Some thought that he would be punished in his descendants—a view which Plato substantially rejects, *Laws* 856 c. Others held that he would pay (a) in the next world or (b) in a fresh incarnation. These doctrines Plato came to believe (cf. *Laws* 904 e–5 b), but they are doubtfully Socratic; in the *Gorgias* (a) appears only in the myth, and (b) not at all. The Socratic answer is that this is a pseudo-problem, since there can in reality be no ἄδικοι εὐδαίμονες: no one can lead a life satisfactory to himself unless he obeys certain natural moral laws. Cf. *Apol.* 30 cd.

Archelaus came to the throne in 413, which puts the 'dramatic date' of the dialogue later than do some other indications (see *Introd.*, p. 17). Why did Plato choose Archelaus as his παράδειγμα, regardless of chronological embarrassments? It has been suggested that the career of this ideally bad man in some sense parallels that of Socrates, the ideally good man; they perished in the same year (399), each of them at the hands of his countrymen (cf. *Alc.* ii 141 d). But Plato had, I think, more compelling reasons for his choice. This arch-criminal was an ally of Athens, and an Athenian decree had praised him ὡς ὄντι ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ προθύμῳ ποιεῖν ὅτι δύναται ἀγαθόν (*I.G.* i². 105). Leading poets like Euripides, Agathon, and Timotheus had accepted his hospitality, exchanging the miseries of war-time Athens for what Aristophanes called "the fleshpots of the Happy Land" (μακάρων ἐωχία, *Frogs* 85). So, perhaps, had Thucydides (Wilamowitz, *Hermes*,

xii (1877), 353 ff.), who certainly goes out of his way to praise Archelaus' achievements (2. 100. 2). But Socrates had *refused* a like invitation (Ar. *Rhet.* 1398^a24). In condemning the Macedonian tyrant Plato condemned Athenian public opinion (cf. 472 a 3) and justified his master's attitude—as Antisthenes probably also did in his *Ἀρχέλαος ἡ περὶ βασιλείας* (R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, i. 123–6). It is further possible, though not certain, that through Archelaus Plato strikes indirectly at Gorgias: at any rate Antisthenes' work included an attack on Gorgias (Athen. 220 d), which suggests that the latter backed Archelaus or enjoyed his patronage (Wade-Gery, *CQ*, xxxix (1945), 25 n. 4). But I see no reason to suppose with Joel and Nestle that Plato is consciously alluding to this work of Antisthenes (whose date is entirely unknown).

470 d 1. *χθές καὶ πρόην*, 'only the other day'. *χθές* (F Stob.), not *ἐχθές* (BTW edd.), is the spelling found elsewhere in Plato (and in this phrase at *Laws* 677 d 6).

d 5. *τοῦτον*, 'that fellow': the effect of the pronoun (= Latin *iste*) is uncomplimentary, as at *Crito* 45 a 8 οὐχ ὁρᾷς τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας . . .; and *Crat.* 423 c 4 τοὺς τὰ πρόβατα μιμουμένους τούτους. ὁρᾷς is the regular word for introducing an example (cf. Eur. *Bacch.* 337 and my note there); but Socrates chooses to take it as if it were meant literally, his point being that he has never met Archelaus.

e 1. *αὐτόθεν*, 'offhand', without further inquiry, rather than 'from here in Athens': cf. *Symp.* 213 a 1 ἀλλά μοι λέγετε αὐτόθεν . . . εἰσὶν ἢ μή;

e 4. *τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα*: the King of Persia embodies the popular ideal of supreme *εὐδαιμονία*. He is similarly cited at *Apol.* 40 d 8 and *Euthyd.* 274 a 7. Cf. Ar. *Soph. El.* 173^a26 τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἄδοξον τὸ βασιλέα μὴ εὐδαιμονεῖν.

e 6. *παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει*: the right sort of 'education' (in the widest sense of the word) is for Plato a precondition of *εὐδαιμονία*, and one in which princes are likely to fail. Cf. *Theaet.* 174 de, where we are told that kings and tyrants, like mountain shepherds, lack the leisure to acquire *παιδεία*, *Soph.* 230 de, and *infra* 510 b; also Isocrates, *ad Nic.* 4 f., where the writer may well have the *Gorgias* in mind (Jaeger, *Paideia*, iii. 91 ff.).

e 9. *καλὸν καγαθόν*. This is one of the phrases 'transvalued' by Socrates. It 'was continually used by Socrates and his followers to express their ideal of what a man should be' (Adam on *Rep.* 489 e). Cf. Xen. *Oec.* 6. 12 ff., where Socrates describes his investigations into the meaning of the term. Coined as it had been to express conformity with an aristocratic code of honour, in common usage it ordinarily carried social as well as moral implications, somewhat like those of Eng. 'gentleman', though it might on occasion be applied to 'Nature's gentlemen' (A. W. Gomme, *CQ*, xlvii (1953), 65 ff.). Hence the wealthier classes at Athens could claim, if not a monopoly, at least a predominating share of *καλοκαγαθία* (Thuc. 8. 48. 6, Xen. *Mem.* 3. 5. 19, Isocr. *Antid.* 316). But Socrates deliberately excludes the

social meaning here, and at 515 a 6, by the antithesis with ἄδικον, and he implies its exclusion elsewhere, e.g. *Rep.* 569 a τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ καλῶν καγαθῶν λεγομένων. The true καλὸς καγαθός is for him the philosopher (*Rep.* 489 e). I have not found the phrase applied anywhere else to women; but Socrates held, contrary to the usual Greek view, that the conditions of the good life are the same for both sexes (*Meno* 73 b, cf. *Xen. Symp.* 2. 9, Antisthenes fr. 53 Mullach).

471 a 7. ἐδούλευεν ἄν Ἀλκέτη. The child of a slave woman and a free man was the property of his mother's owner (cf. *Laws* 930 d). Cobet wished to delete Ἀλκέτη, but the Greek ear was less sensitive to repetitions than the modern.

b 3. ξενίσας: to a Greek listener the fact that Archelaus' victim was his guest would add a further touch of horror to an ἐγγενὲς φόνος committed by a slave upon his master.

b 6. ἡφάνισεν: by concealing the bodies: cf. *Hdt.* 3. 126 ἀποκτείνας δέ μιν ἡφάνισε αὐτῷ ἵππῳ.

c 1. [τὸν] Περδίκκου υἱόν. Either this whole phrase is a gloss or we must get rid of τὸν. Bekker's punctuation, τὸν ἀδελφὸν τὸν γνήσιον, τὸν Π. υἱόν, is not satisfactory, since Archelaus as well as the παῖς was a son of Perdiccas. The old scholiast rejects this punctuation in a note which ignores the presence of τὸν: εἰς τὸ "ἀδελφόν" στικτέον, ἵνα τὸ "γνήσιον" πρὸς τὸ "Περδίκκου υἱόν" ἐξακούηται. Most editors write τοῦ for τὸν, perhaps rightly, but without real authority (Burnet was mistaken in attributing this reading to F).

c 2. ἐπτέτη. This spelling is guaranteed by metre at *Aristoph. Frogs* 422, as is δεκέτης at *Soph. Phil.* 715 and *Eur. Andr.* 306. οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐγίγνετο, "to whom the sovereignty was due to come". Archelaus presumably acted as regent (ἐπίτροπος) for the child.

c 8. ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρξάμενος, "yourself included": like *Symp.* 173 d δοκεῖς μοι πάντας ἀθλίους ἡγεῖσθαι πλὴν Σωκράτους, ἀπὸ σαυτοῦ ἀρξάμενος.

471 d 3—472 d 1. Socrates agrees that Polus could call in evidence for his view "almost everybody" in Athens or elsewhere, including the most respected Athenian families. For the other view there is only one witness—Socrates. But dialectical questions are not settled by majority vote. Polus is trying to "eject him from his patrimony, the truth" (b 5) by using the methods of the law-courts. The question of "happiness" is among the most important of human problems, and Socrates has his own method for dealing with it.

As we have seen, in his attitude towards Archelaus the historical Socrates was certainly in a minority, perhaps even in a minority of one. Here, however, he is concerned with something more general, the concept of εὐδαιμονία: he is condemning the standards of a 'shame-culture', which equates happiness with prestige. The condemnation was indeed implicit in Socrates' whole way of life; but the remarkable stress which he lays on his almost complete isolation recalls what is said in the *Seventh Letter* about Plato's feeling of isolation in the years following his master's death. And in his reference to the great Athenian families we may perhaps detect, as Wilamowitz did, the personal

tones of Plato. Plato belonged to such a family, and in these years many family voices must have been raised to "eject him from his patrimony" by persuading him to do what he thought wrong for the sake of a political career (cf. *Introd.*, p. 31).

471 d 3. κατ' ἀρχὰς: 448 d 8. ἐπῆνεσα: the "praise" of course applies only to Polus' attainments in rhetoric; with ἡμεληκέναι we must understand εἶπον. This is a fairly common type of 'zeugma' (cf., e.g., *Thuc.* 8. 50. 5), and I see no reason to doubt the text (save that δοκεῖς should perhaps be ἐδόκεις).

d 6. καὶ ἄν παῖς: 470 c 5.

d 8. πόθεν implies incredulity, as at *Hipp. ma.* 285 e 7, *Menex.* 235 d 1, and often in Aristophanes and Demosthenes, and is answered by καὶ μὴν, "on the contrary" (Denniston 358).

472 a 2. δοκούντων εἶναί τι, "supposed to be somebody". Cf. *Euthyd.* 303 c 8 τῶν σεμνῶν δὴ καὶ δοκούντων τι εἶναι, *Laches* 200 a 8, *Menex.* 247 b 2, *infra* 527 d 6.

a 5-b 3. μαρτυρήσουσί σοι κτλ. Socrates chooses Polus' "witnesses" from different political camps, as if to show that his quarrel is not with one political party, but with Athenian public opinion as such. Nicias, the author of the peace treaty of 421, was an old-fashioned conservative; Aristocrates was a member of the Four Hundred, though he eventually turned against the extreme oligarchs (*Thuc.* 8. 89, 92, *Lysias* 12. 67, *Ar. Ath. Pol.* 33. 2); the house of Pericles were democrats. Nicias perished with the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 413, the year in which Archelaus seized the throne of Macedonia; but nothing in the text compels us to regard these "witnesses" as still alive. Their expensive dedications sufficiently testify to their respect for wealth and prestige—that seems to be Socrates' reason for mentioning them. Cf. below, on 473 e 7. —The tripods dedicated by Nicias and his brothers Eucrates and Diognetus in the precinct of Dionysus Eleuthereus on the slopes of the Acropolis were prizes won by them as choregi. The structure which had supported them, if not the tripods themselves, was still there 500 years later, when Plutarch saw it (*Nicias* 3): cf. Dinsmoor, *A. J. A.* xiv (1910), 478 f.; Pickard-Cambridge, *Theatre of Dionysus*, 29. —A fragmentary choregic dedication by Aristocrates (*I. G.* i². 722 = Dittenberger, *Syll.*³ 53) was discovered at Athens in the last century, but has since been lost. It was found just east of the Agora, but probably stood originally in the precinct of Pythian Apollo: cf. *Thuc.* 6. 54. 6 f., and Photius s.v. Πύθιον· ἱερὸν Ἀπόλλωνος Ἀθήνησιν ὑπὸ Πεισιστράτου γεγονός, εἰς ὃ τοὺς τρίποδας ἐτίθεσαν οἱ τῷ κυκλίῳ χορῷ νικήσαντες τὰ Θαργῆλια. This has usually been thought to be the monument referred to here; Mr. D. M. Lewis, however, tells me that he would date it on epigraphic grounds to the first half of the fifth century and attribute it to the grandfather of Plato's man. In any case F's ἐν Πυθίου (sc. ἱερῷ) is clearly the true reading at b 1: cf. Isaeus 5. 41 ἐν Πυθίου. ἐν Πυθοῖ, the reading of BTW, would mean "at Delphi"; but in good Attic this is expressed by the simple locative Πυθοῖ (*Lysis* 205 c 4, *Thuc.* 5. 18. 10, *Aristoph.*

Lysist. 1131). The inscription has *Σκελίου*, but if Mr. Lewis is right about the date this is inconclusive for the spelling, and *Σκελλίου* is protected by metre at Aristoph. *Birds* 126, and required by metre at Aristoph. fr. 31 Demiańczuk. —The choregia seems to have been, at least in the fourth century, one of the great occasions at Athens for 'conspicuous waste'; Isocrates speaks of choruses in golden cloaks and in general of τῶν περὶ τὰς χορηγίας φιλονικιῶν as a typical form of ἀλαζονεία (*Areop.* 53 f.). On the importance which the Greeks attached to prestige, and to trophies as symbols of prestige, see M. I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*, 132 ff.

b 4. οὐ . . . ἀναγκάζεις, by logical arguments (ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς πίστεσιν οὐ πείθεις, schol. vet.).

b 6. Polus is trying to eject Socrates from his spiritual patrimony by citing false witnesses, just as his counterparts in the law-courts eject honest men from their material patrimony (οὐσία). καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς is added to explain the metaphorical use of τῆς οὐσίας: see on 447 a 3. I do not think Plato intends any play on the philosophical sense of οὐσία as "substance" or reality: Polus might rob Socrates of a true opinion, but could hardly rob him of substantial existence.

c 2. τοὺς δ' ἄλλους . . . χαίρειν ἔῃς. Appeals to current opinion are not admissible in dialectic. Cf. *Laches* 184 e 8 ἐπιστήμη γὰρ οἶμαι δεῖ κρίνεσθαι ἀλλ' οὐ πλῆθει τὸ μέλλον καλῶς κριθήσεσθαι, *Crito* 47 a-d, and *infra* 474 a 7.

c 4. οἶμαι, sc. δεῖν εἶναι, like 474 a 4 τοῦ ἐλέγχου οἶον ἐγὼ οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι: cf. L.S.J. s.v. οἶομαι VI. 3.

c 6-d 1. Plato warns the reader that the matter now at issue is no longer the definition of rhetoric but something far more serious, the fundamental question of human happiness. Cf. 487 e 7, 500 c 1, and *Introd.*, p. 1. The importance of this subject is similarly emphasized in the *Republic*, 352 d, 578 c.

472 d 1-474 c 3. To clarify the issue between Polus and himself, Socrates restates more fully his two contentions: (i) the wicked man is necessarily unhappy; (ii) he is more unhappy if he goes unpunished. Polus responds with a flood of rhetorical derision, and finally bursts out laughing: Socrates' opinions are against all common sense—"ask anybody in the room". Socrates replies that he is very bad at putting questions to the vote, not being a politician, and eventually persuades Polus to accept a dialectical discussion.

Plato continued to maintain these contentions to the end of his life: cf. *Rep.* 392 a-c, *Laws* 660 e-662 c, 728 c. They are therefore quite seriously meant. But in the conversation that now follows their paradoxical character is deliberately emphasized to make the strongest possible contrast with the *ventre à terre* morality of Polus. Cf. below, on 474 c 4-476 a 2 and 477 e 7-479 e 9.

472 d 1. αὐτίκα πρῶτον, "to take first the immediate question". The combination seems not to occur elsewhere, and Hirschig deleted πρῶτον as a gloss; it is, however, picked up by ἐν μὲν τούτῳ at d 6.

d 7. ἄρ', sc. εὐδαίμων ἔσται;—will the proposition still hold good if he is punished?

e 5. *πάντως* is one of the few examples in this dialogue of a true reading preserved only in the indirect tradition (Burnet was mistaken in attributing it to F).

e 7. *διδῶ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνη δίκης* sounds clumsy, and one is tempted to follow Theiler in deleting the first three words. But the fullness is perhaps deliberate: Socrates wants to bring out the two aspects of *δίκη*—as something the delinquent “gives” to those he has wronged and something he “receives” for his own correction.

473 a 3. *φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι*. To rid a man of false opinions is a friendly service: cf. 470 c 6–8.

a 4. *ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν*: 469 b.

b 3. *ἴσως*. The older editors followed TW in attributing this to Polus. But although Polus has an ironical *ἴσως* at 471 c 8, the proper form for an ironical comment would be, as van Prinsterer said, *Ψευδῇ γε ἴσως οἰόμενος*, like *Rep.* 339 b 1 *Σμικρά γε ἴσως*, ἔφη, προσθήκη. For *ἴσως* as a reply cf. 515 d 8.

b 8. *ἐκείνου χαλεπώτερον*: cf. 470 c 4.

b 10. *Οὐ δῆτα . . . ἀλλ’ ἀδύνατον*. Socrates likes to turn the edge of his opponent’s irony by taking it seriously: cf., e.g., *Rep.* 498 d 5 f.

b 12. *ἀδικῶν* is, I think, best taken with *ληφθῆ, τυραννίδι ἐπιβουλεύων* being added to explain the nature of the *ἀδικία*. Socrates’ question at d 4 (*ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι, εἶπες;*) is rather against deleting *ἀδικῶν* with Dobree (*Adversaria*, i. 153) and Schanz, while Findeisen’s *ἀδίκως* would create ambiguity, since it could qualify either verb.

c 4. *ἐπιδῶν* sc. *λωβηθέντας*. *ἐπιδεῖν* is the *vox propria* for witnessing calamities. For this traditional list of tortures cf. *Rep.* 361 e and Aesch. *Eum.* 186–90.

c 5. *εὐδαιμονέστερος*: the comparative is confirmed by d 7.

d 1. *ἄλλων*: cf. on 447 c 3.

d 3. *Μορμολύττη αὖ*: “This time you are trying to make my flesh creep.” *ἀντὶ τοῦ ὡς παιδίον φοβῆ, Ol. Μορμολύκη* or *Μορμώ* was a bogey-woman invoked by mothers and nurses to frighten naughty children, as was done to Erinna (Page, *Greek Lit. Pap.* i. 486), and as Praxinoë does at Theocritus 15. 40; *μορμολύκεια* were masks made in her likeness (*Phaedo* 77 e 7, Epictetus 2. 1. 15). Cf. *Crito* 46 c 3 *οὐδ’ ἂν . . . ὥσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται*, Aristoph. *Birds* 1244 *πότερα Λυδὸν ἢ Φρύγα | ταυτὶ λέγουσα μορμολύττεσθαι δοκεῖς;*

d 9. *ὁ διδούς δίκην . . . ὁ διαφεύγων*. The tense of these participles has been questioned, but they are supported by the similar present participles at 478 e 3 and 479 e 5.

e 2. *ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου*. Socrates takes Polus’ laughter as another rhetorical trick like his *μαρτύρεσθαι* and *μορμολύττεσθαι*. And Gorgias did in fact advise his pupils *τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν διαφθείρειν τῶν ἐναντίων γέλωτι, τὸν δὲ γέλωτα σπουδῇ* (Ar. *Rhet.* 1419^b5, cf. Ol 103. 6).

e 5. *ἐπεὶ* is used colloquially with the imperative, like English ‘for’ (Aristoph. *Wasps* 73, Soph. *El.* 352, Lysias 12. 39). Cf. 474 b 7, where it introduces a question.

e 6. οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν. Socrates was never a practising politician (Xen. *Mem.* 1. 6. 15), and never held any public office other than membership of the βουλή, which was a normal civic duty (Pl. *Apol.* 32 ab). But he trained others for public life (Xen. loc. cit.), and Plato could make him claim to be in a different sense one of the very few true πολιτικοί (521 d 6).

e 7. ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε καὶ ἔδει με ἐπιψηφίζειν. The βουλή consisted of fifty representatives from each of the ten tribes, and each tribal contingent took it in turn to act as an executive committee (πρυτανεύειν). One πρύτανις was chosen daily by lot to act as Chairman (ἐπιστάτης), with the duty of presiding at meetings of the βουλή and the ἐκκλησία and putting questions to the vote (ἐπιψηφίζειν). Socrates' words therefore imply that he was ἐπιστάτης on the occasion referred to.

The Hellenistic critic Herodicus of Babylon, who is quoted by Athenaeus (217 e—218 a = Düring, *Herodicus* 22. 20), assumed that the reference here was to the famous occasion in 406 when eight Athenian generals were put on trial for their failure to pick up survivors after the battle of Arginusae and Socrates as a πρύτανις courageously stood out against the illegal motion for a mass trial. This assumption was generally accepted in the nineteenth century, but was later challenged by Nestle in his edition of the dialogue, Burnet in his note on *Apol.* 32 b 6, Taylor (104), and Hatzfeld, *R.E.A.* 1940, 165 ff. Their arguments are briefly as follows.

(i) Aristocrates, one of the generals who were condemned and executed, has just been spoken of as still alive (472 a 7).

(ii) γέλωτα παρείχον is inappropriate to so grave a moment: 'on ne riait pas le jour des Arginuses' (Hatzfeld).

(iii) Socrates cannot have been ἐπιστάτης on that occasion: for if he had been, (a) he could and would have prevented the motion being put; and (b) Plato must have mentioned it at *Apol.* 32 b, instead of making Socrates claim only that he opposed the motion and voted against it. (Xenophon in the *Memorabilia* does say explicitly that he was ἐπιστάτης, 1. 1. 18, 4. 4. 2; but at *Hellenica* 1. 7. 15, which is probably earlier, his story agrees with the version in the *Apology*. This is explained by the hypothesis that in the interval Xenophon had read the *Gorgias* and misunderstood the present passage in the same way as Herodicus and the nineteenth-century scholars.)

The first two of these arguments seem to me to have little or no weight. 472 a need not imply that Aristocrates is alive (see note above); the appeal to his ἀνάθημα rather suggests that he is not. And it is surely both characteristic of Socrates to make light of his own courage and also appropriate to the context that he should recall the jeering (γέλως) of the angry citizens as a parallel to the γέλως of Polus (e 2). He says with similar irony in the *Republic* that the philosopher preaching to the Prisoners in the Cave γέλωτα ἂν παράσχοι—and adds that they will very likely kill him (517 a). The third argument is the only serious one. It is probably true that Socrates was not ἐπιστάτης on the day in question. But stories are apt to improve with

retelling, as fourth-century orators and historians amply testify. It seems by no means impossible—unless one regards Plato as incapable of error—that, while the *Apology* and the *Hellenica* report the facts correctly, the *Gorgias*, like the *Memorabilia*, reflects a later version of the story (reproduced also by Aelian, *V.H.* 3. 17) in which legend had begun to exaggerate the importance of Socrates' part. Plato would not invent a falsification; but he might well accept it if it was current. In the spurious *Axiochus* (368 d) the continuing process has led to still further embellishments. Thus I can see no decisive ground for rejecting the traditional view of the passage. And certainly nothing could be more apt at this juncture than an allusion to an action which illustrates both Socrates' contempt for majority opinion and the sincerity of his concern for τὸ δίκαιον. A reference to some real ignorance of procedure exhibited by Socrates on some unknown occasion would have much less point.

474 a 1. γέλωτα παρείχον καὶ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν. Α ὕστερον πρότερον: 'the order of expression, following that of thought, reverses the order of occurrence' (Riddell). —Athenaeus' ἡδυνάμην is a gloss on ἠπιστάμην. Cf. schol. *Il.* 16. 142 ἐπίστατο· ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐδύνατο: schol. Aristoph. *Birds* 1432 οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι· ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐ δύναμαι: Hesych. 'Επίσταμαι· δύναμαι.

a 3. ὅπερ . . . ἔλεγον refers to what follows. νυνδὴ: 472 c 4.

a 4. παράδος, sc. τὸν ἔλεγχον: cf. *Phdr.* 273 c 3 τάχ' ἂν ἔλεγχόν πη παραδοίῃ τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ. —πείρασαι. ἐπειρασάμην is sometimes used by Thucydides as the aorist of πειράσμαι, but Plato everywhere else uses the normal Attic form ἐπειράθην (at least twelve instances). Hence Hartman (*Mnem.* li (1923), 285) may have been right in proposing πειράσει (or rather πειράσῃ): the minatory future would be quite appropriate here.

a 7. τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι: not "I do not talk to the vulgar"—for Socrates interrogated all sorts of people (*Apol.* 22 a–d)—but "with people *en masse* I do not even attempt discussion". Dialectic was a game for a small number of players, usually two. Cf. on 472 c 2.

b 2. διδόναι ἔλεγχον: "to offer me a chance of refuting you".

b 7. ἐπεὶ . . . ἀδικεῖν; The subordinating force of ἐπεὶ is no longer felt, and the causal clause is turned into a question: cf. *Soph. Trach.* 139 ἐπεὶ τίς . . . εἶδεν;

474 c 4–476 a 2. *Dialectical discussion resumed. Polus admits that doing wrong is "uglier" or less admirable (αἷσχιον) than suffering it (474 c 8), while still maintaining that to suffer wrong is "worse" (κάκιον). Socrates then uses this admission to prove that doing wrong is worse.*

When we call anything "admirable" (καλόν) we mean that it is either pleasant (ἡδύ) or beneficial (ὠφέλιμον) or both:

Therefore if doing wrong is less admirable than suffering wrong, it is either less pleasant or less beneficial or both:

But it is not less pleasant:

Therefore it is less beneficial:

Therefore it is worse.

The position taken by Polus at 474 c proves fatal to his case, as Callicles will point out at 482 d. In effect, it amounts to divorcing the 'right' from the 'good', morality from the true interest of the individual. It is referred to in the *Republic* (348 e) as a view which was actually held by "some persons"; Isocrates mentions it, *de Pace* 31; Plato discussed it again at *Laws* 660 d–664 b. But a philosophy which admits this divorce is in the end faced with a choice between two extreme doctrines: either it must deny that morality is anything but an illusion (moral nihilism, a view often attributed to Thrasymachus in *Rep.* i), or it must deny that the good of the individual, *qua* individual, has any importance (as some forms of nineteenth-century idealism virtually did). Polus, the spokesman of the current 'shame-culture', is not prepared to take either way out, and is thus impaled on the horns of the dilemma. Both Callicles and Socrates, on the other hand, escape the dilemma by denying the divorce. Callicles holds that the only true morality is the self-realization of the individual; Socrates, that the only true self-realization is necessarily moral.

But while Polus' view is muddled and ultimately untenable, Socrates' formal 'refutation' of it seems to turn merely on the ambiguity of the word *ὠφέλιμον*. When Polus said that doing wrong was less admirable, he clearly meant that it was less *ὠφέλιμον* for the community, and from this it does not immediately follow that it is less *ὠφέλιμον* for the agent, i.e. *κάκιον* in Polus' sense of that term. The underlying thought is, no doubt, that since regard for justice is recognized even by Polus as *καλόν*, as evoking immediate admiration, it must be a necessary constituent of the "good" or happy life. But Plato has obscured this point for the sake of giving his argument the appearance of a formal proof. We must remember that when the *Gorgias* was written the study of logic was still in its earliest infancy (as Aristotle's *Sophistici Elenchi* sufficiently shows). Nevertheless, it is not easy to believe with T. Gomperz and others that Plato was wholly unconscious of the equivocation: cf. Friedländer, ii. 260, and note on 507 a 4–c 7 below. It looks rather as if he was content at this stage to let Socrates repay the Sophists in their own coin, as no doubt Socrates often did. As Friedländer says, the premiss that "doing wrong is not more painful than suffering it" (475 c 3) is in the deeper sense entirely unsocratic: cf. below, 507 e, where the real grounds for Socrates' contention are stated.

474 d 4. *εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων*, "without an eye to some standard", "with no ulterior reference". *καλόν* was a blanket term of approbation, wider in its application than any corresponding English adjective (one could hardly say in English, as Pindar could in Greek, that a man's virtue was as "beautiful" as his person). Socrates suggests that it is not an unanalysable term like 'yellow', but implies that an object reaches a certain standard as measured by one or both of two criteria—*ἡδονή* and *ὠφελία*. Cf. Ar. *Rhet.* 1364^b27 *τὸ γὰρ καλόν ἐστὶν ἥτοι τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν*. This corresponds roughly to the distinction between an aesthetic and a practical or ethical use—a distinction

which was not clearly present to most Greek minds, so that we constantly find moral judgements presented as aesthetic ones. For τὸ καλόν as ὠφέλιμον cf. *Xen. Mem.* 4. 6. 9 and *Rep.* 457 b 4 τὸ μὲν ὠφέλιμον καλόν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερόν αἰσχρόν.

The analysis of the notion of τὸ καλόν is the main subject of the *Hippias major*; and I am inclined to think with H. Gomperz (*Arch. f. Geschichte d. Philosophie*, xvi. 135 f.) and Raeder, 105 n. 1, that the brief treatment of the topic here presupposes that discussion and its result—namely, that neither ὠφέλεια nor ἡδονή nor the combination of both is *by itself* sufficient to explain what we mean by καλόν. Cf. below, on e 5–7. Much the same list of things which can be called καλά appears in both dialogues, and also in the *Symposium*; but there are certain differences.

<i>Hipp. ma.</i> 298 ab	<i>Gorg.</i> 474 d–475 a	<i>Symp.</i> 210 a–d
ἄνθρωποι (and ζῶα, 295 d)	σώματα	σώματα, ψυχαί
ποικίλματα	χρώματα κ. σχήματα	—
ζωγραφήματα, πλάσματα	—	—
φθόγγοι κ. ἡ μουσικὴ σύμπασα	φωναὶ κ. τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν πάντα	—
λόγοι	μαθήματα	ἐπιστήμαι
μυθολογίαι	—	—
ἐπιτηδεύματα	ἐπιτηδεύματα	ἐπιτηδεύματα
νόμοι	νόμοι	νόμοι

It is significant that after the *Hippias major* the representative arts—painting, sculpture, fiction—disappear from the list. This is probably because the pleasure they give is not “pure” (cf. *Phil.* 48 a ff.). But “patterns” survive as “colours and shapes”, together with music (they are not mentioned in the *Symposium*, since they are not objects of ἔρως). This corresponds closely with the doctrine of the *Philebus* (51 b–52 b), where the list of things that give “pure” pleasure consists of colours, shapes, smells (ἡττον θείον γένος ἡδονῶν), musical notes, and μαθήματα. The *Gorgias* thus seems to represent a more developed stage of Plato’s aesthetic than the *Hippias major*. (Evidence to the contrary has been seen in the absence from the *Gorgias* of sensory pleasures other than those of eye and ear; but the reason for this is given at *Hipp. ma.* 299 a 1—the term καλός is never in practice applied to smells, tastes, etc.)

d 7. πρὸς δ’ ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾗ. When καλός signifies practical approval, the approval is always relative to a practical purpose. Thus the Greeks spoke of one man as καλὸς πρὸς δρόμον, “admirable at running”, of another as καλὸς πρὸς πάλην (*Xen. Mem.* 3. 8. 4, Pl. *Hipp. ma.* 295 c 8).

e 5–7. “And again, the case of laws and customs does not, I take it, in so far as they are admirable, fall outside these limits—that they are either beneficial or pleasurable or both.” τὰ καλά is inserted as if by an afterthought, in limiting apposition to τὰ κατὰ κτλ. (not all laws and customs are admirable). But W is possibly right in omitting the

words. Thompson read *καλά* with V. —At *Hipp. ma.* 298 b laws and customs are cited as a case which causes difficulty for the simple theory that *τὸ καλόν* means what gives pleasure to eye or ear. Here the difficulty is met by recognizing the ambiguity of *καλός*.

475 a 3. Polus unconsciously paves the way for Socrates' 'proof' by tacitly substituting *ἀγαθὸν* for *ὠφέλιμον*. Socrates accepts this, and the equation of the two seems to be in fact Socratic: cf. *Prot.* 333 d 9 *ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ ἃ ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*, *Xen. Mem.* 4. 6. 8 *τὸ ἄρα ὠφέλιμον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἂν ὠφέλιμον ᾖ*.

b 1. *ἢ ἀμφοτέροις* may have dropped out here, but it is perhaps a little pedantic to insist on the full formula being repeated each time it occurs.

b 3. *νυνδὴ*: 474 c. BTW have *τὸ νυνδὴ*, a form which seems otherwise to be confined to the later dialogues.

b 7. *ὑπερβάλλον* is causal, and is to be supplied with the following datives: cf. on 477 d 1–3.

d 2. *ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ*: 474 c. The words qualify, I think, *ὑπὸ σοῦ ὁμολογεῖτο* only; *ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων (ὁμολογεῖται)* is a fresh point. The usual phrase is *ἐν τῷ (or τοῖς) ἔμπροσθεν* (477 c 8, etc.), or *ἐν τοῖς (ἐμ)προσθεν λόγοις* (508 e 6, etc.). At *Prot.* 328 e 1 *ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ* means "before the dialogue began"; it is used, however, at *Phaedo* 117 d 3 of an occurrence during the dialogue.

d 4. *κάκιον ἐφάνη*. For the omission of *ὄν*, which Cobet wished to insert here and at 478 e 1, cf. *Prot.* 335 a 7 *βελτίων ἐφαινόμην*, *Symp.* 221 e 2 *φανείην ἂν πάνν γελοῖοι*, *Theaet.* 174 d 1 *γελοῖος φαίνεται*.

d 5. *τοῦ ἥττον*, sc. *κακοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ*.

d 7. *τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχων*. Cf. on 456 b 4; and for the personified *λόγος* *Theaet.* 191 a 4 *τῷ λόγῳ παρέξομεν . . . πατεῖν τε καὶ χρῆσθαι ὅτι ἂν βούληται*, and *infra* 527 e 1.

e 8. *παραβαλλόμενος*: cf. 472 c 4.

476 a 2–477 a 4. *Dialectical proof that it is a greater evil for the wrong-doer to escape punishment than to be punished. Socrates begins by establishing what would now be called 'the interconnexion of the modalities of correlates': if an agent's act is qualified in a certain way, the patient's experience must be qualified in the same way (d 3). He then proceeds to argue:*

If A punishes, B is punished:

Therefore if A punishes justly, B is punished justly:

But what is just is καλόν (in the moral sense: admitted by Polus at 476 b 3):

And what is καλόν in this sense is ὠφέλιμον (477 a 2), i.e. ἀγαθόν:

Therefore it is good for B to be punished.

The modalities of correlates are also discussed at *Rep.* 437 d–438 d. There the example is thirst and drink, and we are forbidden to say "A thirsty man wants a good drink"; it is only the wise man who when thirsty will drink wisely, i.e. drink what is good for him. The principle was probably first stated by Plato (hence the fullness with which it is expounded); I cannot follow Taylor when he asserts that 'both passages presuppose the existence of a good deal of recognized logical doctrine as early as the time of the Archidamian war' (114 n. 2).

Misuse of this principle can give rise to fallacies, as Aristotle recognized (*Rhet.* 1397^a30). The formal fallacy here does not, however, lie in any such misuse, but, as before, in the ambiguity of *ὠφέλιμον* or *ἀγαθόν*. "Good" is thought of, not as relative to persons, but as a quality inhering in certain actions. If the punishing of B is a good action, B's being punished must also be good, since it is the reverse side of the same action, and from this it is illegitimately inferred that being punished is good *for B*. Socrates' real reason for thinking punishment good for B is in fact that it will make him a better man (477 a 5). At *Laws* 859 c–860 c Plato seems to show awareness of the fallacy involved in the present reasoning: it is there pointed out that while just punishment is *καλόν*, as being *δίκαιον*, from the point of view of the patient it is *αἰσχροτάτον*.

476 a 8. An extreme instance of Plato's fondness for postponing interrogative *ἄρα* in order to throw the emphasis on to the words which precede it. Cf. 467 e 7, and Denniston, 49 f. (472 d 7 is, I think, different).

b 2. *καθ' ὅσον δίκαια*. This qualification is necessary, since a righteous man may be *αἰσχρὸς τὸ σῶμα*: cf. *Laws* 859 d.

c 3–d 1. Socrates chooses examples from the field of surgery (*κάειν καὶ τέμνειν*, see on 456 b 4) because he has in mind the analogy between physical and moral health which was implied at 464 b 4 and will be developed at 477 e 7 ff.

c 6. *εἰ τέμνει τις*. This reading is now preserved only by Stobaeus, but there seem to be traces of an erased *σ* in F. Cf. b 7 *εἴ τις τύπτει*, c 3 *εἰ κάει τις*.

d 5. *ὁμολογουμένων*. We might expect *ὠμολογημένων* (as at 477 c 7, etc.) which V obligingly reads. But after *ὁμολογῶ* the present participle is natural enough, and *ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων* occurs at *Crito* 48 b 11.

d 6. *Ἀνάγκη . . . πάσχειν*, sc. *τὸ δίκην διδόναι ἐστίν*. The usual reading *Ἀνάγκη* involves a less natural ellipse of *εἶναι*. Where the iota was left unwritten (as so often both in papyri and in medieval MSS.) the two forms would be indistinguishable. Cf. 515 d 9.

d 8. *ὀρθῶς*. Since B is a wrongdoer, his punishment is *ex hypothesi* "right", i.e. *δίκαιον*, i.e. *καλόν*, i.e. (since it is not *ἡδύ*) *ὠφέλιμον*.

477 a 5–e 6. *It is agreed that the benefit of being punished consists in being relieved of certain "mental evils" (κακίας ψυχῆς, a 7). Socrates then offers a dialectical proof that these are the worst evils.*

They are admitted to be the "ugliest" or most discreditable (αἰσχίστα):

This means that they are either the most painful or the worst (admitted at 475 b 2):

But it is more painful to be poor or ill than to be vicious:

Therefore to be vicious is the worst evil.

This formal argument follows the same lines as its predecessors, and turns on the ambiguity of *κακόν* as they did on the ambiguity of *ὠφέλιμον* or *ἀγαθόν*. Its real basis is the Socratic conviction, which Plato never tires of restating, that the things of the mind are of more worth than the things of the body.

477 a 5. βελτίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται. No proof of this proposition is offered. Socrates *assumes* the remedial theory of punishment (see below, on 477 e 7–479 e 9).

b 1. ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ, “in the state of one’s finances”. The tripartition into external, bodily, and mental evils corresponds to the traditional tripartition of goods.

b 4. αἶσχος, here in the aesthetic sense. Cf. on 451 e 2.

b 7. ἀδικίαν . . . καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ δειλίαν: three cardinal vices corresponding to the virtues δικαιοσύνη, φρόνησις (or σοφία), and ἀνδρεία. The fourth, ἀκολασία, is mentioned below (d 5). ἀμαθία as a vice may surprise the modern reader. But just as φρόνησις is not theoretical wisdom but sound moral judgement, so ἀμαθία is not ignorance of facts or theories, but ignorance of how to behave. This is not specifically Socratic or Platonic: Euripides can make Amphitryon say to Zeus ἀμαθὴς τις εἰ θεός (*Her.* 347, cf. Wilamowitz ad. loc.). At a later stage of his thought Plato indeed found it necessary to distinguish ἄγνοια, the mental counterpart of bodily αἶσχος, from πονηρία, the counterpart of bodily νόσος: while the latter is curable by punishment, the cure for the former is education (*Soph.* 227 d–229 a). But no such distinction is suggested here: ἀμαθία is a vice like the rest, and punishment is the cure for all.

d 1–3. “Then either it is the most painful, and the ugliest because of its greater painfulness, or (it is the ugliest) because of its (greater) hurtfulness, or (it is the ugliest) in both respects.” The sentence has been variously corrupted in the MSS., particularly by the intrusion in BTW of the words ἢ λύπη (originally a gloss on ἀνία?). As restored, it is exactly like 475 b 6 ἦτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστιν καὶ λύπη ὑπερβάλλον αἶσχιον ἂν εἴη ἢ κακῶ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις, save that the last word is here replaced by an accusative of respect (cf. 524 c 2). To delete αἶσχιστον τούτων ἐστὶν with Dobree (*Adversaria*, i. 153) would destroy this parallel and reduce ἀνία ὑπερβάλλον to an otiose repetition of ἀνιαρότατον.

d 6. ἀπὸ τούτων γε: “ex his quidem, quae disputata sunt” (Stallbaum). But the words come in oddly here: Polus’ rejection of the suggestion is based not on Socrates’ arguments but on common experience; and Socrates does not even commit himself as to the correctness of Polus’ answer (e 2 ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος). T. Gomperz (*Wien. Sitzb.* 1900, iii. 17) may have been right in thinking them misplaced; they would certainly fit better with Polus’ next reply.

Ἵπερφυεῖ . . . ὡς μεγάλη, “monstrously great”: for the attraction cf. 496 c 4 ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ. The hurtfulness of mental κακία must be enormous if it outweighs the painfulness of poverty or disease so that mental κακία is recognized as αἶσχιστον.

d 7. κακῶ θαυμασίῳ may be a gloss on the preceding words, incorporated with the help of the usual καὶ. If it is retained it anticipates the next step in the argument (e 3–4). Theiler deletes κακῶ only (as a gloss on βλάβη?): cf. *Crat.* 391 d 6 μέγα τι καὶ θαυμάσιον, *Theaet.* 155 c 8 ὑπερφυῶς ὡς θαυμάζω. But θαυμάσιος is very rarely found as a feminine (L.S.J. quotes only Lucian, *Im.* 19); the word has three

terminations at 469 d 3, and so far as I know everywhere else in Plato.

477 e 7–479 e 9. Socrates works out the analogy between physical and moral health. As medicine is the τέχνη for restoring the former, so justice (or as we say now, penology) is the τέχνη for restoring the latter. In the former sphere, the patient whose disease is recognized and treated is more fortunate than the one who refuses treatment for his “bodily errors” (τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀμαρτημάτων, 479 a 7), though less so than the healthy man. So the delinquent whose moral abnormality is recognized and treated by punishment is more fortunate than the unpunished delinquent, though less so than the honest man. Archelaus is like someone who declines to undergo a necessary operation out of cowardice and medical ignorance, “not knowing what real health is like” (479 b 3). Accordingly, far from being εὐδαίμων, he is ἀθλιώτατος.

The argument depends on the assumption that punishment always has a remedial effect (and that no alternative treatment has). This is unfortunately far from being the case even today: most social workers would, I think, agree that punishment intensifies the delinquent’s resentment against society more often than it removes it. Plato’s implicit reasoning seems to be: punishment is a necessary institution in all societies; but it can be justified morally only if it is remedial: therefore it must always be remedial. This confuses what is with what ought to be. And Socrates himself qualifies it farther on: at 480 b and 525 c he recognizes that delinquency can become incurable (perhaps through not being dealt with in time?), and at 525 b he recognizes that punishment can also be justified as a deterrent to others (as in the case of capital punishment, *Laws* 862 e).

But whatever the logical weaknesses of the present passage, Plato’s medical approach to the problem of delinquency represents an immense moral advance both on the primitive *lex talionis* and on the irrational conception of guilt as an infectious pollution which so deeply influenced early Greek law. In this development Protagoras may have played a part (cf. Glotz, *La Solidarité de la famille en Grèce*, 413–16): we know that he was interested in questions of responsibility (Plut. *Pericles* 36 = Protagoras A 10), and Plato puts into his mouth an explicit condemnation of vindictive punishment, *Prot.* 324 ab. But I suspect that on the positive side Plato’s theory owes more to Socrates than to Protagoras. The remedial conception is closely bound up with the Socratic view that delinquency is in a sense “involuntary”, and the remedial effect is held to reside not merely in the warning that future offences also will be punished, but in recalling the delinquent to his own natural will to good (cf. on 469 c 8–470 c 8) and thus “bringing him into tune again” (*Critias* 106 b δίκη δὲ ὀρθή τὸν πλημμελοῦντα ἐμμελῆ ποιεῖν). The “exemplary” value of punishment as a warning to the offender and to others is a commonplace in the fourth century (e.g. Lysias 22. 20, 27. 5; Isocrates, *Areop.* 20; Dem. *Meid.* 76, 227, *Neaer.* 77); but the Platonic theory goes much deeper. And in its fully developed form it recognizes, as the present passage does not, that the rehabilitation of the delinquent may and in some conditions

should be effected by other means than punishment (*Soph.* 229 a ff., *Laws* 862 d). On the whole subject see Apelt's essay, *Platonische Aufsätze*, 189–202, and Gould, 62–64, 125–8. The medical analogy recurs in Aristotle, e.g. *E.N.* 1104^b17, where punishment is described as a kind of *ιατρεία διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων*, which by a dose of pain cures an excessive inclination to pleasure: cf. Jaeger, *J.H.S.* lxxvii (1957), 54 ff.

478 a 1. πονηρίας, here in its usual narrower sense of moral delinquency (= *ψυχῆς πονηρία*, 477 c 1), as the addition of *ἀδικίας* shows (cf. 470 e 11 *ἄδικον καὶ πονηρόν*). So again at 478 d 5 and 7. The word should not be deleted with Morstadt and Sauppe: Plato does not aim at rigid consistency in his use of terms. — **εἰ μὴ οὕτως εὐπορεῖς**, “If you can’t answer offhand” (cf. 464 b 5). We must assume a pause after Socrates’ question, which explains the asyndeton.

a 7. δικαιοσύνη: here used as the name of the *τέχνη* which administers punishment and is called *δίκη* below. Cf. *Rep.* 332 d 2.

b 3. The origin of the words *ὦν λέγεις* becomes evident if one writes the passage as it would have appeared in a papyrus—

ECTINΩΝΛΕΓΕΙCTINΩΝΛΕΓΕΙC.

Having omitted *TIN* by haplography, the copyist added the correct reading after the incorrect, but the dots used to indicate *delenda* were either overlooked or omitted in the first instance. Findeisen’s *ὦν λέγεις* is much less probable transcriptionally.

b 4. Τίνων is assimilated in case to *τούτων*. Polus’ question seems a little stupid; but he is slow-witted throughout the dialogue.

b 5. διαφέρει sc. *κάλλει*. *δίκη* means to Polus the law-courts, where the rhetorician shines.

b 6. ὠφελίαν, not *ὠφέλειαν*, is the prevalent spelling in B and T, and is always given by A in the dialogues it contains (Schanz, II. ii, p. xi). Both forms are Attic: see L.S.J. s.v. *ὠφέλεια*.

c 1. ἀπαλλάττεται. For the transition from the generalizing plural *οἱ ἰατρευόμενοι* (b 8) to the individual case cf. *Prot.* 324 a 6 *κολάζει τοὺς ἀδικούντας . . . ὅτι ἡδίκησεν*, 319 d, 334 c, Kühner-G. i. 87.

c 2. καὶ ὑγιῇ εἶναι was deleted by Morstadt and Schanz as not strictly logical. But it seems entirely natural that the suffering and its reward should be coupled in this way, giving a form of Plato’s favourite *a b a* or “ring” construction (see on 452 e 6).

c 4. τὴν ἀρχήν, “at all” (frequent in negative sentences). I have followed F in inserting the article, since this seems to be the form preferred by Plato, not only at c 6 below but in this use elsewhere (six instances in Ast, against one of *ἀρχήν* from the spurious *Demodocus*). F may also be right in giving *εὐδαιμονέστερος* in this sentence, as at 473 c 5: cf. d 1 *ἀθλιώτερος* in the parallel comparison.

c 5. ἦν . . . ὥς ἔοικε: used instead of the present, like the common *ἦν ἄρα*, of something which was true all along, though its truth is only now recognized.

c 6. μηδὲ κτήσις = *τὸ μὴ κτήσασθαι* or *εἰ μὴ κτήσαιοτο* (the generalizing *μή* usually accompanied by the article).

d 5. ἦν: the so-called 'philosophic imperfect', used of something whose truth was established in the previous discussion—in this case the propositions that πονηρία (ψυχῆς) is the greatest evil (477 e 4) and that δίκη gets rid of it (478 b 1). πονηρίας was deleted by Morstadt as anticipating the next sentence, but it is really needed here to make the reference clear.

e 1. μέγιστον . . . ἐφάνη: see on 475 d 4.

e 4. ὁ ἔχων [ἀδικίαν]. If ἀδικίαν is retained it anticipates the next step; it is probably a gloss, as its omission by Stobaeus suggests. Dobree and Thompson wished to read κακίαν, which is the word that strict logic requires. But we can understand κακίαν from d 8.

479 a 3. The Athenian politicians (ρήτορες) are invidiously sandwiched between tyrants and δυνάσται. For the latter term cf. note on 492 b 3.

a 8. ἀμαρτημάτων is commonly used of moral error. Plato habitually assimilates delinquency to disease; here, like Butler in *Erewhon*, he half humorously assimilates disease to delinquency. —μηδὲ ἰατρεύεσθαι is added in the usual way to explain the metaphorical use of διδόναι δίκην (cf. on 447 a 3); it should not be deleted with Morstadt. —φοβούμενος ὥσπερ ἀνὴρ παῖς: cf. *Phaedo* 77 d 7 δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παίδων, *Laos* 933 c 1. All fear not rationally founded is childish. For patients refusing treatment see on 456 b 4.

b 7. μὴ ὑγιῶς σώματος, compendiary for ἢ μὴ ὑγιεῖ σώματι συνοικεῖν.

b 8. ψυχῇ συνοικεῖν might seem to imply a distinction between the self and the ψυχή, which is unplatonic (*Phaedo* 115 cd). But the reflexive character of consciousness means that the ψυχή can be its own object, and so its own companion.

c 3. ὅπως ἂν ὦσιν κτλ.: an object-clause parallel to χρήματα and φίλους. Bribery, influence, and eloquence are the three recognized means of escaping justice.

c 5. ἢ βούλει συλλογισώμεθα αὐτά; "Or shall we reckon them up (recapitulate them)?" So at 498 e 10 and *Charm.* 160 d 8 πάντα ταῦτα συλλογισάμενος, "taking all this together". The word has not yet acquired (*pace* L.S.J.) the sense "infer" which it sometimes has in later dialogues (here the inferences have been drawn already), still less the technical sense "infer by syllogism". Cf. Robinson, 21.

c 7. Εἰ σοί γε ἄλλως δοκεῖ. This puzzling reading goes back to antiquity: it is common to both families (Burnet was mistaken about F), and Ol tries to explain it (τοῦτο δὲ Πῶλος λέγει, ὅτι "εἰ δοκεῖ σοι καὶ ἄλλως συλλογίσασθαι, λέγε"). It must be considered along with a similar reply which (as Schanz noticed, *Nov. Comm.* 90) is given in similar circumstances at *Hipp. mi.* 367 d 5, Εἰ ἄλλως γε σὺ βούλει. Both passages are generally assumed to be corrupt. But it seems to me possible that the meaning in both places is "If you are determined to do it in any case (without reference to me)", a formula of grudging acquiescence, like 513 e 1 εἰ βούλει, 514 a 4 εἰ σοι ἥδιον, 516 b 4 ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι. Cf. Hdt. 8. 30. 2 εἰ ἄλλως βουλοίατο, "if they wanted to

on other grounds"; Pl. *Rep.* 495 b 2 ὀλίγης καὶ ἄλλως γιγνομένης, "being in short supply anyhow". This, I imagine, is how Ol understood the phrase, though his words are ambiguous. Alternatively, Bekker and his successors may have been right in deleting ἄλλως in the *Hipp. mi.*, and Schanz and Burnet in deleting it here. In the former place it could quite well be a gloss on the immediately preceding word ἄλλοθι. And here we could perhaps suppose that it stood originally in the margin, calling attention to what follows as "a different version" of the preceding argument (the word is much used in this sense by scholiasts). The older editions read *Ei* μὴ σοί γε ἄλλως δοκεῖ (cf. 462 c 5 εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις) on the dubious authority of Y and V.

c 8. μέγιστον κακόν, predicate. We might expect μέγιστον ὄν, but cf. *Rep.* 329 d 6 νεότης χαλεπὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ συμβαίνει, *Phaedo* 68 e 4 αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὅμοιον τὸ πάθος, and the similar usage with τυγχάνω (502 b 6 etc.).

d 4. Δεύτερον—τὸ ἀδικεῖν is a little surprising after c 8 μέγιστον κακόν . . . τὸ ἀδικεῖν, and it may be that some phrase meaning "punished" has dropped out. The point of comparison is, however, different: τὸ ἀδικεῖν is μέγιστον κακόν compared with sickness or poverty (477 e 6), but δεύτερον compared with ἐμμονή τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

e 3. προσήκειν both asserts the connexion and implies its rightness—"he is, and ought to be, the most miserable of all men" (Jowett).

480 a 1—481 b 5. Return to the original question of the value of rhetoric. Applying to it the results of the preceding discussion, Socrates draws the ironical conclusion that in the case of a man of really enlightened self-interest rhetoric might prove useful (a) to get oneself or one's friends punished when this is necessary to their moral health, (b) to save one's enemies from punishment when one wants to "do them harm".

This is, of course, a comic inversion of vulgar utilitarianism. Polus naturally finds the conclusions ἄτοπα, but is by this time too dazed to resist. Otherwise he might have pointed out that rhetoric can also save an innocent man unjustly accused (even Socrates admits that it is a bad thing to be wronged, 469 c 1). Such would presumably be one of the functions of the "scientific and good rhetor" who is imagined at a later stage of the dialogue (504 d 5), as of that rhetoric mentioned in the *Politicus* (304 a) which "persuades men of what is just". And at *Phil.* 58 c 5 it is in fact conceded that Gorgias' art πρὸς χρεῖαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κρατεῖ. But for the present Plato is interested only in giving his paradox the sharpest possible point. Some moderns have taken the passage more literally than it is meant (cf. below, on 480 e 5—481 a 2).

480 a 1. Εἰέν dismisses the previous argument and marks the return to the problem of the value of rhetoric from which the discussion was diverted by Polus' question at 466 b 4.

a 4. ἀδικήσῃ is the reading of all primary MSS. (Burnet was misinformed about F), as is ποιήσῃ below (b 2). I have not sufficient faith in 'Dawes' canon' (see on 510 a 3—5), even in the restricted form approved by Goodwin (*M.T.* § 364), to alter these sigmatic aorist subjunctives into future indicatives.

ὥς ἱκανὸν κακὸν ἔξοντα, "knowing that he will have plenty of trouble if he does". ἱκανός, properly "sufficient", was used by an ironical μείωσις to mean "more than one wants": e.g. Aristoph. *Peace* 354 ἱκανὸν χρόνον ἀπολλύμεθα καὶ κατατετρίμμεθα, Antiphon, *Tetr.* A. β. 2 ἱκανὰς λύπας . . . προσβέβληκεν. I see no need to delete either ἱκανὸν with Cobet or κακὸν with v. Kleist: the latter is a virtual noun, as at 507 e 3.

b 2. ὕπουλον, properly of a festering sore which has healed superficially and needs lancing. For the metaphorical use cf. Soph. *O.T.* 1396 κάλλος κακῶν ὕπουλον, Thuc. 8. 64, Dem. 18. 307, and *infra* 518 e 4. —ἀνίατον, cf. 525 c. —πῶς λέγομεν, "what is our view?": cf. 513 c 3, *Phaedo* 79 b 12, *Rep.* 377 e 5, etc. —In the next clause μένει should perhaps be μενεῖ (Richards): cf. *Theaet.* 182 c 8.

b 7-c 5. Socrates forbids us to defend our parents or our country when they are in the wrong—which for a Greek is going pretty far—since to do so would be for their ultimate moral harm as well as our own. But he stops short of explicitly recommending—what his logic would justify—that we should denounce them and secure their punishment; he speaks only in general terms of denouncing "friends and relatives" (c 2-3). To press the argument to its last consequences would not only have been odious but would have been hard to square with Socrates' attitude in actual cases—his own (*Crito* 50 e ff.) and that of Euthyphro (*Euthyphr.* 4 e). Plato's mature view on this sort of moral dilemma is stated in the *Seventh Letter*, 331 b-d. There he says that in the case of an erring parent one should neither κολακεύοντα ὑπηρετεῖν nor ἀπεχθάνεσθαι μάτην νουθετοῦντα, still less resort to violence; and he recommends the same attitude towards one's country. But at the date of the *Gorgias* he was perhaps prepared to consider stronger forms of political protest: cf. below, 507 d 4 ff. It should be added that the question εἰ δεῖ τὸν πατέρα κολάζειν was not new. It seems to have been a favourite sophistic theme: cf. Aristoph. *Clouds* 1405 ff., Xen. *Mem.* 1. 2. 49 f., *Cyrop.* 3. 1. 17.

b 9. εἰ μὴ εἴ, "except if", Lat. *nisi si*.

c 1. ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον, "for the opposite purpose", sc. χρήσιμον εἶναι, is explained by what follows and picked up by ἐπὶ τοῦτο at d 4. δεῖν depends directly on ὑπολάβοι. I see no need to delete it with Wecklein and Theiler, or to delete ἐπὶ with Deuschle, for the sake of regularizing the construction. The slight shift seems entirely natural in a colloquial style.

c 3. ἀεὶ, "at any particular time". So regularly in indefinite relative clauses, e.g. *Theaet.* 146 a 2 ὃς ἂν ἀεὶ ἀμαρτάνῃ.

c 6. μύσαντα: patients on the operating table would shut their eyes ἵνα μὴ ὀρώσι πῶς τέμνονται (Ol); hence μύσαντα φέρειν became proverbial, like "to grin and bear it". In Menander fr. 654 Kock the speaker plays on the metaphorical and the literal sense when he advises a husband who has married a plain wife with a big dowry φέρειν μύσαντα. F's εὖ seems necessary, for μύσαντα καὶ ἀνδρείως makes a rather incongruous pair (Bergk conjectured μὴ μύσαντα). Cf. *Crat.*

440 d 4 ἀνδρείως τε καὶ εὖ, Aristoph. *Thesm.* 656 εὖ κἀνδρείως, and *infra* 521 a 7 εὖ καὶ γενναίως.

d 4. F's reading (misreported by Burnet) perhaps represents a conflation of two alternative texts, μὴ φειδόμενον ἀλλ' ἢ καὶ. The second alternative is the reading of BTW; but the first is equally possible (cf. *Laws* 732 d 5 μὴδὲν φειδόμενον ἀλλὰ . . . ἀναμιμνήσκοντα).

e 2. σοι: ethic dative—"you make it agree".

e 3. ἢ κἀκεῖνα. Denial of the consequent involves denying the antecedent *also*. There is no need to emend to ἢ 'κεῖνα with Hirschig and Schanz.

e 5—481 a 2. "And again, reversing the position, supposing it to be right to injure anyone, enemy or not, then, provided one is not oneself being wronged by one's enemy—one has to be careful here—provided, I say, the wrong is done to a third party, one must use every means of word or deed to prevent his being punished or even coming into court." The proviso is necessary since, as Cope put it, if the injustice we encourage were exercised at our own expense it would rather spoil the fun; to be wronged is undesirable even to Socrates (469 c 1–2). Croiset's interpretation of the ἐὰν μόνον clause (e 6), "provided the person one desires to harm is not himself being wronged by an enemy", seems not only obscure in sense but very improbable grammatically: the article indicates that τοῦ ἐχθροῦ has the same reference as the preceding ἐχθρόν.

That one should do good to one's friends, harm to one's enemies, was conventional Greek morality: see the many passages collected by Adam in his notes on *Crito* 49 b and *Rep.* 331 e. The Platonic Socrates emphatically rejects this view, *Crito* 49 b–d, *Rep.* 333 b–336 a, and ἄρα (e 5) marks it as a false assumption here: 'Socrates is assuming the premisses of his opponents in order to lead them to a conclusion from which their common sense will revolt' (Thompson). The passage is a piece of comic fantasy; it is surprising that T. Gomperz should have inferred from it that the *Gorgias* is earlier than the *Crito*, on the ground that here 'Plato is still far removed from the principle of loving one's enemies'.

481 a 3. The missing ἦ is restored in Y and other late MSS., but probably by conjecture, and probably in the wrong place.

a 6–7. Cf. *Laws* 661 c: to live for ever in wickedness, which people imagine as the height of bliss, would in reality be the worst of all possible fates.

Part III: Socrates and Callicles (481 b–522 e)

481 b 6–482 c 3. *Callicles intervenes to inquire whether Socrates is in earnest. If he is, and if his paradoxes are true, all the accepted standards will have to be reversed, and human life will be turned upside down. Socrates replies that Callicles and he have an experience in common—they are both lovers. But whereas Callicles' loves—Δῆμος and δῆμος—require him to change his opinions as often as they change their whims, Socrates is in love with Philosophy, who has no whims and requires of him consistency. He ends with the warning that inner*

disharmony—failure to think out one's position and act on it—is a graver matter than any conflict with current opinion.

On the personality of Callicles see Intród., pp. 12 ff. Being an Athenian and a gentleman, he does not break rudely into the conversation as Polus did at 461 b 3; his question is first addressed as an 'aside' to Chaerephon, who emerges momentarily from the ring of bystanders in his usual character of loyal disciple. The question itself suggests the new level of seriousness on which the discussion will now be pursued: Callicles recognizes the revolutionary implications of Socrates' view—to take it seriously is to stand all existing codes of behaviour on their heads (cf. Taylor, 116). Socrates' reply—couched in playful terms which make the comparison inoffensive—is that in such matters neither he nor Callicles is his own master, but while Callicles, like all politicians in a democracy, has to reflect and justify mass opinion (cf. below, 517 b), Socrates is the servant of truth and must follow the argument wherever it leads him. The penalty of not doing so is an "inharmonious" life, torn by internal conflict (from the words ἐν ᾧ παντὶ τῷ βίῳ, 482 b 6, it is clear that Plato has in mind more than theoretical inconsistency).

The musical metaphor has sometimes been taken as evidence of Pythagorean influence on the dialogue, since the Pythagoreans held that ἀρετή was a ἀρμονία (Diog. L. 8. 33). But in fact it runs through Plato's ethical discussions from first to last. Cf. *Laches* 188 d 3, a man worthy of the name is ἀρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡρμωσμένος οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ παιδιᾶς ὄργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸν βίον (the speaker is Laches, who was certainly no Pythagorean); *Prot.* 326 b 5 πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται (spoken by Protagoras); *Rep.* 591 d 2, the wise man will act always τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕνεκα συμφωνίας (so also 443 de); *Laws* 689 d 4 πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ὦ φίλοι, ἄνευ συμφωνίας γένοιτ' ἂν φρονήσεως καὶ τὸ σμικρότατον εἶδος; What can, I think, be observed is an increasing emphasis as the years advance on the actual disharmony and disunity of human nature, and on the moral life as a striving towards unification (which according to *Epin.* 992 b will be finally realized only after death).

481 b 8. After ὑπερφυῶς it is easy to insert ὥς with Cobet, on the analogy of passages like 496 c 4 (where ὥς has dropped out in T) and 477 d 7. Cf., however, *Prot.* 358 a 4, *Phdr.* 234 c 7, *Phaedo* 76 e 8, in all of which ὑπερφυῶς is used without ὥς to qualify a dependent infinitive as it is here.

b 9. οὐδὲν . . . οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν. Chaerephon echoes, perhaps intentionally, the phrase used by Callicles with reference to Gorgias at 447 c 5. Socrates is his oracle, as Gorgias is the oracle for his Athenian host.

c 1. θῶμεν is a necessary correction for φῶμεν: the latter could not be used with accusative and participle, and no infinitive can be supplied; for θῶμεν cf. *Apol.* 27 c 10 τίθημι γὰρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, "I assume that you agree." The reverse corruption occurs in B at *Crat.* 385 a 2. Aristides seems to have had the true reading, for in what is evidently an

echo of Plato's phrase here he writes ὅρα μὴ παίζοντα μᾶλλον τι θῆ σέ τις ἢ σπουδάζοντα. If so, the corruption established itself between the second century A.D. and the sixth; only φῶμεν is known to Ol, though some MSS. in his day omitted the word altogether.

c 3. ἄλλο τι, *nonne*, as at 470 b 1, 495 c 6, and often. The ἦ of BTW is perhaps an interpolation, as the ἦ of all MSS. at c 6 certainly is.

c 5—d 1. "If people had not certain feelings in common (τὸ αὐτό), some sharing one feeling, some another, but some of us had unique feelings unshared by the rest (ἴδιον ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι), it would not be easy to reveal one's experience (πάθημα, the result of the πάθος) to one's neighbour." Communication is possible only on the basis of some community of experience (cf. *Symp.* 217 e 6 ff.). Socrates is trying to find such common ground in order to make Callicles understand his passion for truth.

d 2. πεπονθότες, ἐρῶντε δύο ὄντε δυοῖν. The shift from plural to dual seems due to the influence of the numeral. Cf. 464 b 3, 478 d 1, 509 c 6, in all of which the dual participle has the numeral attached; A. Cuny, *Le Nombre duel en Grec*, 312. Elsewhere duals lapse into plurals, e.g. *Prot.* 317 e 1: in the early fourth century the dual was already becoming old-fashioned (Wackernagel, *Vorl. über Syntax*, i. 79). πεπονθότε Naber, needlessly.

d 3. ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου. This was a current joke against Socrates (*Prot.* 309 a), and was accepted by him as such; for the real nature of the relationship see *Symp.* 215 a—219 d. The idea of wisdom as an object of passion reappears at *Phaedo* 66 e 2 οὐ . . . φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, and is developed in the *Symposium*. Cf. also the personified φιλοσοφία of *Phaedo* 83 a.

d 4. The repetition of δυοῖν, though logically otiose, seems entirely natural in a colloquial style; its omission by Y looks to me like a pedant's emendation.

d 5. τοῦ Πυριλάμπους, sc. Δήμου. Pyrilampes was Plato's stepfather (see Burnet, *Thales to Plato*, 206 f., 351). He was a personal friend of Pericles (Plut. *Pericles* 13), served his country as ambassador to Persia (*Charm.* 158 a) and as a soldier at Delium (Plut. *gen. Socr.* 581 d), and was famous for his stature and good looks (*Charm.*, loc. cit.). The latter quality was inherited by his son Demos, who was a leading beauty about 422 (Aristoph. *Wasps* 98 and schol.). Demos was evidently a wealthy man, for he served as trierarch (Lysias 19. 25) and maintained for many years a celebrated aviary started by his father (Antiphon fr. 57 Blass *apud* Athen. 397 cd, Plut. *Per.* 13); but a fragment of Eupolis' *Πόλεις* (213 Kock) seems to imply that he was not very clever (hence, perhaps, the difficulty which the clever Callicles had in always agreeing with him).

d 6. ὅτι ἂν φῆ: so F rightly. The archetype of the first family seems to have had ὅπως ἂν φῆ (by anticipation of the next clause) with a correction ὅτι: hence ὅτι ὅπως ἂν φῆ B, which T and W emended to ὅτι ὅπως ἂν ἀντιφῆ, and Bekker to ὅτι ὁπόσ' ἂν φῆ (leaving ὅτι . . . δυναμένου as an anacoluthon). τὰ παιδικὰ, here and at e 5, refers

to both of Callicles' "darlings". In the explanatory sentence which is appended they are treated separately. τε in e 1 is "both", not "and"; the asyndeton is normal.

e 3. λέγεις ἃ ἐκεῖνος βούλεται. The politician in a democracy is in the position of a suitor—or a κόλαξ (463 c), or a διάκονος (517 b)—in relation to the Sovereign People. Cf. Aristoph. *Knights* 732 φιλῶ σ', ὦ Δῆμ', ἐραστής τ' εἰμὶ σός (and the whole scene); *Alc.* i 132 a, where Socrates fears for Alcibiades μὴ δημεραστής ἡμῶν γενόμενος διαφθορῆς; also Sir Henry Maine, *Popular Government*, 33, 38: "The opinions a party professes, and the policy which is the outcome of those opinions, will less and less reflect the individual mind of any leader, but only the ideas which seem to that mind to be most likely to win favour with the greatest number of supporters. . . . The leaders are manifestly listening nervously at one end of a speaking-tube which receives at its other end the suggestions of a lower intelligence." The phrase τὸν Πυριλάμπους νεανίαν has no exact parallel, and Gercke suggested deleting νεανίαν as a gloss. Possibly νεανίαν τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον should be taken together. Cf., however, *Euthyd.* 271 b 1 τὸ Ἀξιόχου μειράκιον.

e 5. βουλευμασιν are perhaps the "proposals" of δῆμος, λόγοις the "assertions" of Δῆμος. In view, however, of βούλεται in e 3 it is tempting to read βουλήμασιν with E and the early editors: the two words are often confused.

482 a 6. ἔμπληκτος, "impulsive", and so inconsistent. Cf. *Lysis* 214 c 8 μηδέποτε ὁμοίους μηδ' αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἔμπλήκτους τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους: Ar. *E.E.* 1240^b17 τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας ἕτερος καὶ ἔμπληκτος.

a 7. ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία ἀεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν: cf. Callicles' complaint at 490 e 9 and Socrates' retort. ἀεὶ, omitted by BTW, was read by Ol, and is restored in Y, probably from F's εἰ. For the genitive cf. [Dem.] 25. 88 οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν οὔτε λόγων οὔτ' ἔργων ἡ νεότης τῷ γήρᾳ.

b 1. See on 468 d 4.

b 2. ἐκείνην ἐξέλεγξον . . . ὥς, "refute her by proving that . . .": cf. on 467 a 9. The content of ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον is τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐστίν—ἔσχατον κακῶν (cf. 479 d 5).

b 5. μὰ τὸν κύνα τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν, a playful allusion to the dog-headed god Anubis. We cannot safely infer from it, as Ol did, that Plato had visited Egypt; the sacredness of the dog in Egypt was already known to Herodotus (2. 66. 4, 67. 1). Nor does the oath itself appear to have any deep religious significance. The tendency to distort *nomina sacra* in swearing is evident in many languages (cf. 'by gum', 'bedad', 'parbleu', etc.). This particular distortion, though a favourite with Socrates, was *not* peculiar to him: Aristophanes puts it in the mouth of a slave (*Wasps* 83). Ancient opinion regarded it as a euphemism: Cratinus seems to have attributed it, along with the similar νῆ τὸν χῆνα (Aristoph. *Birds* 521), to the pious folk of olden times (fr. 231 Kock οἷς ἦν μέγιστος ὄρκος | ἅπαντι λόγῳ κύων, ἔπειτα χῆν, θεοὺς δ' ἐσίγων); Sosicrates similarly ascribed its invention to the virtuous Rhadamanthys (*F gr Hist* 461 F 3). But Socrates can hardly have adopted

it 'out of aversion to any light handling even of the Greek divinities' (Lodge), since he quite often swears frankly by Zeus, Hera, and other deities. And I can find no basis for Burnet's suggestion (on *Apol.* 22 a 1) that it may be 'Orphic'. One should rather compare the light-hearted *μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον* at 489 e 2, and the use in comedy of jocular oaths like *μὰ τὰς κράμβας* (Eupolis fr. 74, cf. Athen. 370 bc).

b 8. *ἀναρμοστεῖν*, 'to be out of tune', is used by Plato at *Rep.* 462 a 7 and elsewhere. If we keep *ἀναρμοστον, εἶναι* must go with it, leaving *οἶμαι . . . κρεῖττον* to stand alone like *ἡγῆ οἶόν τε* at 472 d 2 (unless we suppose *εἶναι* to do double duty in both places). But the position of *τε* is then abnormal: we expect *ἀναρμοστόν τε εἶναι*. The corrector of Florentinus x perceived this; but his remedy—to insert a second *εἶναι* after *τε*—is less neat than van Heusde's.

χορηγοίην. An 'ideal' optative is sometimes found in relative clauses in primary sequence where the main verb states a general rule of obligation or propriety (Goodwin, *M.T.* § 555), as *κρεῖττον εἶναι* may be said to do here. But Richards may have been right in proposing *κᾶν* for *καὶ* in b 7: *ἂν . . . εἶναι* would then be oblique for *ἂν εἴη*, and an optative in the dependent clause would follow normally.

482 c 4—483 c 6. *ῥῆσις of Callicles. He points out that Polus, like Gorgias before him, has fallen a victim to his own αἰσχύνῃ (d 2, e 2). He should never have admitted that committing wrong was more dishonourable (αἰσχίον) than suffering it, but should have distinguished between what is dishonourable by nature (φύσει) and what is so only by convention (νόμῳ). By the former standard the worst dishonour is to suffer wrong. It is only laws and conventions (οἱ νόμοι) which assert the contrary; and they do so because they were created by the weak to protect themselves from the strong, and thus seek to impose a slave-morality upon all.*

Callicles is made to apply the same sort of criticism to Polus' conduct of the argument which Polus had applied to Gorgias at 461 bc. The criticism is a valid one (and is seen by Plato to be valid); neither Gorgias nor Polus had the courage of his convictions, and they could therefore be overthrown by a relatively superficial dialectic. Callicles brings into the field a fresh weapon of formidable destructive power, the distinction between *νόμος* and *φύσις*. The origin and history of this antithesis has been much discussed—most recently and fully by Felix Heinemann in his book *Nomos und Physis* (Reinhardt, Basel, 1945), which includes a bibliography. The English reader will find a useful short account in Barker's *Greek Political Theory*, chap. iv, or in Sinclair's *History of Greek Political Thought*, chaps. iv and v; cf. also A. C. Pearson, *Verbal Scholarship* (inaugural lecture, Cambridge, 1922), 35 ff. The most important ancient source, apart from Plato, is the papyrus fragments of the sophist Antiphon (Diels, *Vors.* 87 [80] B 44); but numerous passages in Euripides, Aristophanes, and Thucydides show that the antithesis was widely canvassed and variously understood in the later years of the fifth century. The consequences drawn from it by Callicles go beyond anything known to have been maintained by Hippias or Antiphon, the two best-known champions of *φύσις*:

see below, on e 5. But they have their counterpart in the comfortable doctrine of the Ἄδικος Λόγος in the *Clouds*, χρῶ τῇ φύσει, σκίρτα, γέλα, νόμιζε μηδὲν αἰσχρόν (1078); in the question τί δ' αἰσχρόν ἦν μὴ τοῖσι χρωμένοις δοκῇ; by which a speaker in Euripides sought to justify incest (*Aeolus* fr. 19); and in the cynicism of the Melian Dialogue. Further parallels are quoted below, on 483 d 2. Such theories have sometimes been dismissed as a passing product of war-time demoralization. But they seem to have had an enduring attraction. From *Laws* 889 e–890 a we learn that in Plato's old age there were still young people who, under the influence of certain unnamed writers, boasted of leading "the natural life" (τὸν κατὰ φύσιν ὀρθὸν βίον), which they defined as "ruling other people instead of being slaves to them as νόμος demands". See, further, notes on 491 a 4–492 c 8.

482 c 4. δοκεῖς μοι: F's reading is confirmed by Ol. —νεανιεύεσθαι κτλ., "to talk with boyish extravagance, like a regular mob-orator". Callicles retorts on Socrates the charge of talking for effect which Socrates had brought against Polus (473 d 3). Cf. *Phdr.* 235 a 6 καὶ ἐφαίνετο (sc. Λυσίας) δὴ μοι νεανιεύεσθαι ἐπιδεικνύμενος ὡς οἷός τε ὦν ταῦτ' ἑτέρως τε καὶ ἑτέρως λέγων ἀμφοτέρως εἰπεῖν ἄριστα.

c 7–d 5. A recapitulation of 461 b 3–c 2. αὐτὸν (d 2) resumes Γοργίαν (c 7): though grammatically superfluous, it is inserted for the sake of clarity. This is a common type of pleonasm in Plato (Riddell, §§ 222–4, Adam on *Rep.* 428 a), e.g. *Laws* 625 a 1 τοῦτον οὖν φαίμεν ἂν . . . αὐτὸν εἰληφέναι. —διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων qualifies φάναι, and is itself explained by the causal ὅτι clause which follows.

d 5. κατεγέλα: 473 e 2. This is the original reading of F—not, as Burnet reported, a correction—and is clearly right; it has been corrupted in the first family by the influence of the preceding infinitives. If καταγελάω is read, the statement is false, and τότε meaningless.

d 7. κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο κτλ.: "this is just where I cannot admire Polus, that he admitted . . ." (474 c 7).

e 1. αὐτὸς . . . συμποδισθεὶς . . . ἐπεστομίσθη: "he in turn got tied up and had his mouth stopped." The metaphor recurs at *Theaet.* 165 e.

e 3. τῷ ὄντι: as Polus had claimed, 461 c 3. εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις κτλ., sc. τοὺς λόγους (cf. 461 c 4, 494 e 7). "You really do bring the talk round to such stale claptrap as this (viz. τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι), . . . notions which are not admirable by nature, but only by convention."

e 5. ὡς τὰ πολλὰ κτλ. So the Platonic Hippias, *Prot.* 337 d, ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται; and so Antiphon, fr. 44 A, col. 2. 26, τὰ πολλὰ τῶν κατὰ νόμον δικαίων πολέμῳ τῇ φύσει κείται. But neither seems to have drawn from the "unnatural" character of νόμος the radical consequences which Callicles proceeds to develop. What consequences Archelaus drew from his doctrine τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ (60 [47] A 1, 2 Diels), we do not know. The artificiality of νόμος was later to become a favourite theme of the eighteenth-century *philosophes*. 'If you propose to become a tyrant over the natural man,' said Diderot,

'do your best to poison him with a theory of morals against nature; impose every kind of fetter on him; embarrass his movements with a thousand obstacles; place phantoms around him to frighten him.' This sounds like Callicles, but Diderot and his friends were far from drawing the Calliclean consequences; it remained for Nietzsche to do that a century later (cf. Appendix).

483 a 2-4. τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν is in explanatory apposition to δ: for the expression cf. *Euthyd.* 293 d 8; for the construction, *Laws* 646 e 11 ὃν δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν τὸν φόβον . . . αἰσχύνῃ, where τὸν φόβον explains ὃν. In ὑπερωτῶν (which occurs only here) the force of the preposition is probably that the act is done unobserved: Socrates silently transfers to the sphere of φύσις what was meant to apply only to the sphere of νόμος, and vice versa. "This in fact (καὶ) is the clever trick you have thought of for cheating in argument: if the speaker has in mind the conventional notions, you slyly assume the natural ones when you question him, and vice versa." For the accusation of κακουργεῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις cf. *Rep.* 341 a.

a 5. αὐτίκα, "to take the nearest example".

a 6. σὺ τὸν λόγον ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν: "you pursued the argument (or, followed up the statement) on the basis of nature." Callicles means that at 474 d ff. Socrates extracted from the admission that committing wrong is less honourable (κατὰ νόμον) than suffering it the illegitimate conclusion that it is less advantageous (κατὰ φύσιν). —λόγον seems a necessary correction for νόμον: Socrates did not in any sense "pursue" convention. The error is an uncial one, prompted by the occurrence of νόμον just above. Cf. *Theaet.* 166 d 8 τὸν δὲ λόγον αὐτὸ μὴ τῷ ῥήματί μου δίωκε. Pseudo-Alexander paraphrases the word by τὰς διαλέξεις (= λόγον?). —The relatively rare form ἐδιώκαθες has been replaced in F by the common ἐδίωκες, which appears as a gloss in Ol and BT and a variant (γρ.) in W.

a 7-8. τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι cannot logically stand in apposition to πᾶν ὅπερ κάκιον, since it is only one particular instance of τὸ κάκιον. The difficulty was observed in antiquity, as pseudo-Alexander shows by reading παναίσχιον (unfortunately a Hellenistic word). I think we must choose between (a) ejecting or emending πᾶν; (b) deleting τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, which could be a marginal gloss; (c) inserting οἶον. I have adopted the last remedy, since the word could very easily have fallen out after -ιον. This still leaves a slight formal irregularity: grammatically νόμῳ δὲ is opposed to φύσει μὲν, but logically νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν (sc. αἰσχρόν ἐστι) forms part of the example. That, however, seems natural enough in a colloquial style.

b 1. τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι stands in explanatory apposition to τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα. Cobet wished to delete the words; but if νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν is retained in the preceding sentence they are needed for clearness.

b 2. ἀνδραπόδου τινός: that the ἀρετή of a slave is different from that of a free man is asserted by Gorgias' pupil Meno (*Meno* 71 e), and may have been asserted by Gorgias himself. But the distinction here drawn between 'Sklavenmoral' and 'Herrenmoral' probably owes

more to men like Critias (see next note). — ὦ κρεῖττόν ἐστιν τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν: for a very different application of this phrase see *Hipp. ma.* 304 e, and cf. *infra*, 512 b 1.

b 4. ἀλλ' οἶμαι κτλ. Hitherto Callicles has used νόμος in the sense of "convention"; now he speaks of οἱ νόμοι, the laws of the state, thus tacitly equating law with convention. Stendhal made the same point more explicitly when he observed that 'les convenances sont, comme les lois, destinées pour les gens médiocres et par des gens médiocres' (*Journal*, v. 64, ed. Debraye-Royer). For a Greek the equivocation was hard to avoid, since the same word expressed both ideas (cf., e.g., Thuc. 2. 37. 3) and the greater part of Greek law was in fact customary, not statutory. Hence the distinction between what is legally enforceable and what is morally right was much less clear-cut among the Greeks than it is with us (cf. Field, 82 f.). Callicles seems to assume the origin of law in a 'social contract' (cf. 492 c 7 συνθήματα)—the theory expounded by Glaucon at *Rep.* 358 e ff. Aristotle connects it with the views of the fourth-century sophist Lycophron: ὁ νόμος συνθήκη καί, καθάπερ ἔφη Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής, ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων (*Pol.* 1280^b10). But the idea is certainly older: something like it is already implicit in Critias fr. 25 Diels (fr. 1 Nauck). We need not suppose with Popper (*The Open Society and its Enemies*, i. 102 f.) that Plato has Lycophron in mind here (see Levinson, *In Defence of Plato*, 418 ff.).

c 1. ἐκφοβοῦντες κτλ. expands τοὺς ψόγους ψέγουσι by explaining the content of the ψόγοι (λέγουσιν ὡς αἰσχυρόν κτλ.). This seems sufficiently to justify the asyndeton, which Y mended by inserting τε, and Hermann, more subtly, by deleting λέγουσιν. Cf. 483 e 4, 485 a 4. —For the thought cf. *Rep.* 366 d 2 ὑπὸ ἀνανδρίας ἢ γήρωσ ἢ τινος ἄλλης ἀσθενείας ψέγει τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ δρᾶν, and *infra*, 492 a.

c 5. ἂν τὸ ἴσον ἔχωσιν: ἰσονομία was the democratic slogan, cf., e.g., *Menex.* 239 a 3, Hdt. 3. 80. 6 πλῆθος δὲ ἄρχον . . . οὖνομα πάντων κάλλιστον ἔχει, ἰσονομίην, Eur. *Supp.* 429–41, *Phoen.* 535–48; G. Vlastos, 'Isonomia', *A.J.P.* lxxiv (1953), 337 ff.; J. W. Jones, *Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks*, 84 ff. The gibe is repeated below, 484 a 1, and at *Rep.* 563 b. Cf. on 508 a 6.

483 c 7–484 c 3. ῥῆσις of Callicles continued. He supports his view that aggression is "the law of nature" (e 3) by citing the evidence of two fields in which man-made law does not operate—animal behaviour and international relations. The same principle holds for the individual in relation to society: when a really strong and noble personality arises, he will break out of bondage like the lion's whelp in the fable, trample upon "paper prescriptions, spells, and charms", and reveal the true "natural justice" (b 1) by making himself master. He adds a quotation from Pindar to show that the poet recognized this law.

This famous passage has been described by Shorey (*What Plato Said*, 154) as 'the most eloquent statement of the immoralist's case in European literature'. 'Immoralist' is perhaps a misleading word; for Callicles believes that to obey the law of nature is not only profitable but right (δίκαιον, d 1: cf. 491 d 1). But the praise is justified: the

affirmation of the individual's "natural right" against a hypocritical society has a superb rhetorical vigour which springs from deep feeling. Notice especially how the accumulating aorist participles in a 2-b 1 build up to the triumphant ἀνεφάνη . . . ἐξέλαμψεν, words suggestive of a religious revelation, just as the present participles in the preceding sentence built up to καταδουλούμεθα. In such writing we may feel the force of Plato's own emotional reactions to democracy, though his practical conclusions were different—for Callicles' "leonine" man he would substitute the "kingly" man who possesses ἐπιστήμη and is therefore entitled to rule ἢ κατὰ γράμματα ἢ παρὰ γράμματα (*Polit.* 296 de, *Laws* 875 cd). We may even conjecture, with Festugière (387) and Jaeger (*Paideia*, ii. 138), that 'in his own character Plato had so much of that unruly will to power as to find, and fight, part of himself in Callicles'; or with Alain (*Idées*, 17) that 'Plato paints *himself* here as he might have been, as he feared to be'.

483 c 9. αὐτὸ cannot stand as an anticipation of ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστιν . . . ἔχειν unless we give it the emphatic force of αὐτὸ τοῦτο, and its position is against this. If the text is sound, we must surely revise the traditional punctuation, take αὐτὸ ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστιν as meaning ὅτι τὸ πλεον ζητεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν δίκαιόν ἐστιν, and regard τὸν ἀμείνω κτλ. not as dependent on δίκαιόν ἐστιν but as epexegetic of αὐτὸ (so, substantially, Stallbaum). But there may well be some corruption. Many editors accept V's αὐ, perhaps rightly (though I fear it is only a conjecture, see *Introd.*, p. 53). It is also possible that αὐτὸ is merely a variant for αὐτῇ which has been introduced from the margin; or again that something is lost (one might consider αὐτὸ <τοῦναντίον>, which would give suitable emphasis to the enunciation of Callicles' thesis). Mr. David Robinson calls my attention to a similarly awkward αὐτό at *Lysis* 218 b 8; there, however, ταυτό is an easy and tempting correction.

d 2. δηλοῖ δὲ κτλ.: "It is evident in many fields that this is so." The verb is best taken as impersonal (cf. *Rep.* 497 c 1). Two τεκμήρια follow, the behaviour of animals and the relations between cities or nations (γένη are races, not families, as the instance of Xerxes shows). Both arguments go back to the fifth century. For animals as the standard of "natural" behaviour cf. Aristoph. *Clouds* 1427 ff. and Hdt. 2. 64; also *Laws* 690 b 7, and Chrysippus' argument that incest is not παρὰ φύσιν since animals freely commit it (Plut. *Sto. rep.* 22 = *S.V.F.* iii. 743), which may go back to Hippias (cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4. 4. 20). For the "natural" character of imperialism cf. Thuc. 5. 105. 2 (quoted below, on e 3) and 4. 61. 5 πέφυκε γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον διὰ παντὸς ἄρχειν τοῦ εἵκοντος. While some thoughtful Greeks would have liked to apply to international relations the standards of private morality (e.g. Isocrates, *de pace* 119), Callicles thinks of these relations as setting the true standard of "natural" conduct. The persistent modern divorce between personal and political morality was foreign to Greek thought (cf. Jaeger i. 323).

d 5. οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται: "'right' has always been assessed in these terms, viz. . . .". The perfect implies that the question is *chose jugée*.

d 7. The second ἢ might more logically be καὶ, which has accordingly been proposed by Herwerden. But Plato often breaks off an enumeration in just this way. Cf. *Apol.* 41 b 7 ἐπὶ πόσω δ' ἂν τις . . . δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι . . . ἢ Ὀδυσσέα ἢ Σίσυφον ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τις εἴποι; *Laws* 944 a 8 ὅποσοι κατὰ κρημνῶν ριφέντες ἀπώλεσαν ὅπλα, ἢ κατὰ θάλατταν, ἢ . . . ἢ μυρί' ἂν ἔχοι τις τοιαῦτα παραμυθούμενος ἐπάδειν. Riddell, § 257; Kühner-G. ii. 434.

e 2. τὴν τοῦ δικαίου should not be deleted with Schleiermacher. Callicles goes out of his way to emphasize that conduct like Xerxes' is not only natural but *just*: cf. d 1, 484 b 1, and *Introd.*, pp. 14 f.

e 3. κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως. Callicles is coining a new and paradoxical phrase, as καὶ μὰ Δία indicates. The nearest approach to it in earlier literature is at *Thuc.* 5. 105. 2, where the principle οὗδ' ἂν κρατῇ ἄρχειν is said to be universally obeyed ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαιᾶς, and is subsequently referred to as a "law" (νόμος). Callicles' coinage is not to be confused either with "natural law" in the Stoic sense (the term seems to be first used in that way by Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1373^b6) or with the modern scientist's "laws of Nature", which are simply observed uniformities. Callicles' "law of Nature" is not a generalization about Nature but a rule of conduct based on the analogy of "natural" behaviour (cf. Taylor on *Tim.* 83 e 4-5). As Socrates shows later, it amounts in practice to domination by instinctive appetites. A speaker in *Philemon*, fr. 93 Kock, says of the animals in the same sense ἦν δ' ἂν εἰσενέγκηται φύσιν | ἕκαστον, εὐθὺς καὶ νόμον ταύτην ἔχει. Aeschines uses χειρῶν νόμος for the rule of brute force (1. 5), and Plutarch makes Brennus speak of it as τῷ πρεσβυτάτῳ τῶν νόμων (*vit. Camill.* 17).

e 4. πλάττοντες κτλ. explains the nature of the current convention, τοῦτον τὸν νόμον ὃν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα, hence the asyndeton (cf. on c 1 above). Several editors have removed the asyndeton by deleting τιθέμεθα and making πλάττοντες govern ὃν, I think mistakenly. As Shorey pointed out (*Cl. Ph.* 4. 462), νόμον πλάττειν is not an appropriate phrase to describe the arbitrary enforcement of a convention. *Laws* 712 b 2 is a false parallel: there πλάττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς νόμους means "to mould imaginary laws". On the other hand, πλάττειν is used of "moulding" the young at *Rep.* 377 c 3 πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς, *Tim.* 88 c 4 τὸν . . . σῶμα ἐπιμελῶς πλάττοντα, *Laws* 671 c 1 παιδεύειν τε καὶ πλάττειν, 789 e 2 τὸ γενόμενον δὲ πλάττειν οἶον κήρινον, ἕως ὕγρον.

e 5. ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες ὥσπερ λέοντας, "catching them young, like lions". This punctuation (Theiler's) seems preferable to Burnet's. There were travelling menageries in Plato's day, where tame lions and bears were exhibited (*Isocr. Antid.* 213). But he is doubtless thinking primarily of the fable of the Lion's Whelp which is told by Aeschylus, *Ag.* 737 ff., and alluded to by Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1431 οὐ χρὴ λέοντος σκύμνον ἐν πόλει τρέφειν. This explains why the comparison is introduced so casually, 'as if in Athens it was the most usual thing in the world for a man to rear a lion-cub, as the Persian king might do (*Hdt.* 3. 32. 1) or a Roman courtesan of the Empire (*Juvenal* 7. 75 ff.) or Marshal Goering' (Fraenkel). Plato has made his picture

by combining the lion-image with that of the chained prisoner, perhaps suggested by Antiphon, who spoke of legal prescriptions as *δεσμὰ τῆς φύσεως* (fr. 44 A, col. 4. 5). The present passage is probably in turn the source of Nietzsche's image of the 'beautiful blond beast' (see Appendix). The lion's whelp figured also in the Socratic dialogue *Zopyrus*, attributed to Phaedo of Elis—see the fragment in Spengel, *Rhet. gr.* ii. 74 f.—but we do not know how the fable was used there.

ε 6. κατεπάδοντές τε καὶ γοητεύοντες, "putting them [the young men, not the lions] under a magician's spell". Similar terms are applied by Socrates to the oratorical 'spell-binders' at Athens, *Euthyd.* 290 a; and by Meno to Socrates himself, *Meno* 80 a.

484 a 1. λέγοντες ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρή ἔχειν. The participle could be dispensed with, but that is not a sufficient reason for deleting it with Cobet. For τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν cf. on 483 c 5 and 508 a 6. Plato is perhaps thinking here of another fable, that of the Congress of the Beasts—so brilliantly used by George Orwell in *Animal Farm*—where the hares proposed that all beasts should have equal rights, τὸ ἴσον . . . πάντας ἔχειν. This fable was told by Antisthenes (*Ar. Pol.* 1284^a15), but may well be part of the traditional stock of animal stories.

α 2. φύσιν ἱκανὴν . . . ἔχων. Plato in his old age spoke in similar terms of the ideal ruler who will be above the law: *Laws* 875 c 4 ταῦτα εἴ ποτέ τις ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἱκανὸς θεία μοῖρα γεννηθεὶς παραλαβεῖν δυνατὸς εἴη.

α 4. διαφυγών is possibly a gloss on *διαρρήξας*, as Morstadt and others have thought. If it goes, its *καὶ* should, I think, go with it. But to my mind it adds something to the picture—the imprisoned lion shakes off his fetters, breaks through the bars of his cage, and runs free. Cf. Polus' picture of the successful tyrant, where *διαφυγών* is the crucial word, 473 c 5. —**γράμματα καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπωδὰς**, "paper prescriptions, spells, and charms". If *γράμματα* meant purely and simply "ordinances", it would hardly be defensible: "ordinances and spells and charms and laws" is an impossible sequence. But anything in writing, from a book to a magic spell, can be called *γράμματα*, and if the text is sound the point must lie in the implied contrast between conventional written rules (including such things as the maxims inscribed at Delphi and the whole mass of inherited gnomonic poetry) and the uninhibited freedom of the "leonine" man. *γράμματα* appear in a similar context in the *Politicus*, where the "kingly" man rules "with the *γράμματα* or against them" (296 e 1), just as the helmsman manages his ship οὐ γράμματα τιθεὶς ἀλλὰ τὴν τέχνην νόμον παρεχόμενος (297 a 1). Valckenaer conjectured *περιάμματα*, "amulets", to keep up the magical metaphor (cf. Polyb. fr. Vat. xxxiii. 15 a πάσης ἐπωδῆς καὶ γοητείας καὶ περιάμματος). Plato's word for amulets, however, is *περίπτα* (*Rep.* 426 b). Cobet proposed *πλάσματα*, "fictions", Richards *γοητεύματα*. But if any change is needed I should prefer Theiler's *ἀγρεύματα*, "snares" (cf. *Gorg. Hel.* 19 τύχης ἀγρεύματα), which answers to *λαμβάνοντες* (483 e 5) as *μαγγανεύματα κ. ἐπωδὰς* to *κατεπαδόντες τε καὶ γοητεύοντες*.

484 b 1-c 3. This fragment of a lost poem by Pindar (fr. 152 Bowra = 187 Turyn = 169 Snell) is partially preserved also by the scholiast on Pindar, *Nem.* 9. 35, and by Aristides; and the completion of the sentence after ἐπεὶ (b 9)—from which Callicles remembers only the one word ἀπριάτας—is supplied by the scholiast on Aristides (iii. 408 Dindorf). It ran

ἐπεὶ Γηρυόνα βόας
Κυκλωπίων ἐπὶ προθύρων Εὐρυσθέος
ἀναιτήτας τε καὶ ἀπριάτας ἔλασεν.

The quotation has been the subject of much controversy. It raises two questions: (i) What did Pindar intend by νόμος? (ii) Did Plato misquote the crucial phrase δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον (which is almost certainly what Pindar wrote, as appears from Aristides and the Pindar scholiast)?

(i) We may translate the lines, "Law, which is king of all, both mortal men and immortals, conducts (?) the uttermost violence with the hand of power, making it just; I judge from the deeds of Heracles, since to the giant-built courtyard of Eurystheus he drove the cattle of Geryon without leave asked or price paid." It is uncertain whether ἄγει as well as δικαιῶν governs τὸ βιαιότατον. Some scholars would understand a vague πάντα as its object; while 488 b 3 suggests that Plato took ἄγει to mean "plunders", as in the phrase ἄγειν καὶ φέρειν. Turyn holds that Pindar wrote ἄγει δίκαιον, but this seems only to increase the difficulty of the text, and his argument from Pindar's usage is not a strong one.

Callicles takes Pindar's νόμος to be what he has just christened νόμον τὸν τῆς φύσεως (483 e 3), i.e. the "right" of the stronger. But we can hardly credit the pious Pindar with this shocking opinion, which seems in any case to belong to a later generation. Nor is it probable that by νόμος he meant merely "custom" (as Puech, Norwood, and others understand it): the deeds of Heracles are no apt symbol of the customary. It is a likelier guess that his νόμος is the law of Fate, which for him is identical with the will of Zeus: cf. fr. 70 Bowra σὲ δ' ἐγὼ . . . αἰνέω μὲν, Γαρυόνα, τὸ δὲ μὴ Διὶ φίλτερον σιγῶμι πάμπαν. This "makes violence just" by making it serve a higher purpose. (Whether behind Pindar's use there lies an 'Orphic' conception of divine law, as Heinimann 67 ff. suggests, seems to me very doubtful: *H. Orph.* 64 is much too late to be trustworthy evidence.) In the controversy about νόμος and φύσις the passage became a familiar quotation, and its meaning was distorted for controversial purposes: Herodotus (3. 38. 4) assumes that by νόμος Pindar meant custom or convention, and so perhaps does Hippias at *Prot.* 337 d, whereas Callicles gives it the opposite sense. Cf. Stier, *Philol.* lxxxiii (1928), 225 ff.; Heinimann, 81 f.; and the very full discussion by M. Gigante in his book *Nomos Basileus* (Naples, 1956).

(ii) Did Plato let Callicles misquote Pindar as well as misunderstand him? All primary MSS. of Plato have at b 7 βιαιῶν τὸ δικαιότατον.

No one doubted that this was a corruption due to copyists until Wilamowitz (ii. 96 ff.) declared that it went back to Plato himself, save for the false accent on βιαιῶν. He had two main arguments.

(a) He showed that Libanius in the fourth century A.D. found in his text of Plato βιαιῶν τὸ δίκαιοτάτον (Libanius paraphrases the words by βιάζεται τὸ δίκαιον, *Apol. Socr.* 87); and pointed out that Libanius went on to accuse the rhetor Polycrates of making Anytus (the speaker in his fictional *Accusation of Socrates*, see *Introd.*, p. 28) *alter the poet's words* in order to justify Pindar. Wilamowitz inferred that it was in fact Plato who misquoted Pindar, and that Polycrates had called attention to the misquotation. (But a different interpretation is possible: see below.)

(b) Wilamowitz further argued that the same misquotation is implied by Plato's words at *Laws* 890 a 4, where he speaks of people who claim εἶναι τὸ δίκαιοτάτον ὅτι ἂν τις νικᾷ βιάζόμενος ("successfully enforces"). (But there is nothing to prove that Plato had the Pindar passage in mind here.)

I cannot accept Wilamowitz's view (as many scholars have done) for the following reasons:

(a) At *Laws* 715 a 1 Plato *did* quote the Pindaric passage again, and quoted it correctly: ἔφαμέν που κατὰ φύσιν τὸν Πίνδαρον ἄγειν δικαιούντα τὸ βιαιότατον, ὡς φάναι. To explain this, Wilamowitz was reduced to the arbitrary hypothesis that in this place the true Pindaric text has been introduced by a learned copyist.

(b) At 488 b 2 Socrates asks πῶς φῆς τὸ δίκαιον ἔχειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; This suits the assumption that Pindar had spoken of the law of nature as "justifying violence"; it does not suit the assumption that he had spoken of it as "violating justice".

(c) Plato can hardly have thought that βιαιῶν τὸ δίκαιοτάτον was Pindaric Greek for "violating justice", though Libanius might: βιαιῶν occurs nowhere else, and should mean "I make violent".

(d) A misquotation put by Plato in the mouth of *Callicles* could afford Polycrates no intelligible ground for an accusation against Socrates.

Variants of Wilamowitz's idea have since been propounded by other scholars, without, I think, enhancing its probability. A. E. Taylor (103 n. 1, 117 n. 2), rejecting the connexion with Polycrates, held that Plato *purposely* made Callicles misquote. But the misquotation would have no dramatic value (and would pass unnoticed by most readers) unless Socrates proceeded to correct it. The words τὸ γὰρ ῥῆμα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι (b 10), to which Taylor appealed, are surely no more than Plato's device for avoiding a long quotation, which in a dialogue would lack verisimilitude; as Proclus says of poetic quotations, οὐκ εἰς μῆκος αὐτὰ ἀποτείνειν προσήκει (*in Alc.* 292. 3 Creuzer). J. Humbert (*Polycratès*, 1930) wished to reverse the relationship between Polycrates and the *Gorgias*: according to him, it was Polycrates who initially misquoted Pindar; then Plato purposely repeated the misquotation—and put it in Callicles' mouth because Callicles is Polycrates! This

fantasy is open to the same objection as Taylor's view, and to others besides: it is consistent neither with the evidence of Libanius nor with what we know of Polycrates (who was *not* a Calliclean φύσις-man, v. Fritz, *Gnomon*, 1933, 93). Nor, again, is there the slightest reason to suppose with Croiset, *Rev. Ét. Gr.* 1921, 125, that in Plato's version the line ran ἄγειν δίκαιοι τὸ βιαιότατον: *Laws* 715 a 1 (quoted above) cannot possibly be the oblique form of this.

All this seems to me to be mare's-nesting. Like Busse, *Hermes*, lxvi (1931), 126 ff., I feel no doubt that Plato quoted Pindar correctly, here as in the *Laws*. The corruption is a 'spoonerism' of a type which occurs elsewhere in the tradition of Plato where two successive words begin with the same sequence of vowel-sounds, e.g. *Alc.* ii 138 a 1. πορευόμενος προσεύξει B for προσευξόμενος πορεύῃ (T *recte*). It is—as we should expect, since it appears in both families of MSS.—older than the time of Libanius, though later than that of Aristides. Finding a different text (probably the correct one) in his copy of Polycrates, Libanius noticed the discrepancy and blamed Polycrates for it. He was in no position to verify the quotation had he wished to, since only the *Epinicians* were still read in his day (cf. Irigoin, *Hist. du texte de Pindare*, 96). That, it seems to me, is all. That the same passage of Pindar was quoted in the *Gorgias* and in Polycrates could be a chance coincidence (as we have seen, the passage was very famous). But so far as it goes the fact tends to support the assumption of some connexion between the two works (see *Intro.*, p. 28), though it does not enable us to determine the nature of the connexion.

c 1. κτήματα, "chattels": we need not give the word the restricted sense of "cattle" (as L.S.J. suggests s.v.) either here or at *Phaedo* 62 b 8.

484 c 4–485 e 2. ῥῆσις of Callicles continued. Turning to the views recently expressed by Socrates, Callicles attributes them to lack of experience in practical affairs. This arises through overmuch study of philosophy, which spoils men by distracting them from the serious business of life. Excellent as a training for the young (παιδείας χάριν, a 4), philosophy is no subject for grown men: an adult has better things to do than to spend his time "whispering with three or four lads in a corner" (485 d 7).

A very similar opinion about the place of philosophy in life was more than once expressed by Isocrates. He too thinks philosophy (in Plato's sense of the term) useful as a παιδεία (*Antid.* 268); it provides the young with a kind of "mental gymnastics" (γυμνασίαν τῆς ψυχῆς, *ibid.* 266), and serves at worst to keep them out of mischief (*Panath.* 27). But for grown men it is unprofitable, as is shown by the fact that philosophers know less about life than their pupils or their slaves (*Panath.* 28, cf. *c. soph.* 7 f.). In such passages Isocrates doubtless had the Academy in mind (cf. Jaeger, *Paideia*, iii. 55 ff.); he speaks with the acidity of a rival educational expert. He himself may have been teaching by 390 or even earlier, but we need not assume that the views here put in Callicles' mouth are derived from Isocrates. They reflect the philistinism of the ordinary practical man, and were probably widespread. Cf. Eur. *Medea* 294–301, and the passages quoted by

Callicles himself from the *Antiope* (485 e 4 ff.); Aristoph. *Frogs* 1491–9; Pl. *Euthyd.* 305 c–e; *Rep.* 487 c–d; Ar. *E.N.* 1141^b3–8; Ennius, *incert. nom. fab.* 13 Ribbeck, *Philosophari est mihi necesse, at paucis: nam omnino haut placet*. Plato must often have had to listen to such advice from friends and relatives who wished to dissuade him from wasting his time on philosophy. And in our own day a similar contempt for ‘intellectuals’ is characteristic of the exponents of *Machtpolitik* on both sides of the Atlantic: as the modern proverb puts it, ‘Those who can, do; those who can’t, teach.’

484 c 4. ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω. So Socrates, when he meets the young Menexenus coming from the Council-chamber, exclaims ironically δῆλα δὲ ὅτι παιδεύσεως καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐπὶ τέλει ἡγή εἶναι, καὶ ὡς ἱκανῶς ἤδη ἔχων ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω ἐπινοεῖς τρέπεσθαι (*Menex.* 234 a).

c 6. ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, ‘at the right age’, i.e. in youth. The word ‘may denote youth, or manhood, or mature life, according to circumstances’ (Thompson). At c 9 πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας is ‘to an advanced age’, far into life: cf. *Apol.* 38 c 6 ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου.

c 7. διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. So Anytus, another practical politician, describes the sophists as διαφθορὰ τῶν συγγιγνομένων (*Meno* 91 c 4).

d 1. καλὸν κάγαθόν καὶ εὐδόκιμον. In a ‘shame-culture’ these expressions are more or less equivalent: a καλὸς κάγαθός is someone who is ‘well thought of’. Contrast Socrates’ use of the term at 470 e 9, where it is opposed to ἄδικον καὶ πονηρόν.

d 3–5. τῶν λόγων—δημοσίᾳ: ‘the language which ought to be used in the dealings of man with man, whether private or public’ (Jowett). συμβόλαια are here business dealings of any description (cf. *Laws* 922 a, *Dem. de cor.* 210). The philosopher’s ignorance of such matters will have practical disadvantages: at *Rep.* 343 d Thrasymachus points out that in a συμβόλαιον between a just and an unjust man the former will come off badly.

e 2. τὰς ὑμετέρας διατριβὰς, ‘your discussions’: καὶ τοὺς λόγους is added, as at *Apol.* 37 d 1, to make the meaning clear. διατριβή can mean either the manner in which time is spent or the place where it is spent: see Burnet on *Euthyphro* 2 a 2 and *Apol.* 33 e 4. Aristophanes speaks of Socrates’ διατριβὴν ἀργόν (*Frogs* 1498). But here there is perhaps an approach to the later sense of a philosophical ‘school’: cf. *Epist.* v 322 a 2 τῶν περὶ τὴν σὴν διατριβὴν ὄντων, Isocr. *Panath.* 19 τοὺς μετεσχηκότας τῆς ἐμῆς διατριβῆς, and Theopompus’ work κατὰ τῆς Πλάτωνος διατριβῆς (Athen. 508 c).

e 3–7. συμβαίνει, ‘proves true’. The quotation which follows is taken, as the scholiast tells us and as οὐπερ ἐμνήσθην at 485 e 5 proves, from a speech by Zethus in the *Antiope* (fr. 183 Nauck²): see below, on 485 e 2–486 d 1. Plato slightly adapts the opening words, as his habit is (cf. Campbell on *Theaet.* 173 e); in the original they may have run, as Valckenaer suggested,

ἐν τούτῳ <γέ τοι>
λαμπρὸς θ’ ἕκαστος καπὶ τοῦτ’ ἐπείγεται.

The quotation reappears, wholly or in part, in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, in the post-Platonic *Alcibiades ii* and the post-Aristotelian *Problemata*, and no less than four times in Plutarch (see *apparatus* of testimonies). Like other familiar quotations it was often quoted inaccurately; the form in which Plato gives it is probably the most correct. For the thought cf. Stob. 2. 31. 41 ὅτω τις ἂν τὸ πλεῖστον τῆς ἡμέρας συνῇ, τοιοῦτον ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι καὶ αὐτὸν τοὺς τρόπους, which may come from the sophist Antiphon (fr. 60 Diels).

e 7. ἵν' αὐτὸς κτλ., "where he is at his best". τυγχάνη, which the majority of MSS. have here and in *Alc. ii*, seems to be either a mere itacism or a mistake due to the common use of ἵνα as a final conjunction. Stallbaum defended it as a generic subjunctive without ἂν, and is followed by Theiler; but with such subjunctives after local ἵνα the ἂν appears never to be omitted, presumably because ambiguity would result.

485 a 4. παιδείας χάριν. Van Heusde and Hartman wished to read παιδιᾶς, in view of the use of παίζειν at b 2, b 4, c 1. But cf. *Prot.* 312 b, where the young Hippocrates is said to have learned literature and music οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ, ὡς δημιουργὸς ("a professional") ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὸν ιδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει, and *Rep.* 487 c. Callicles himself has been present at many philosophical discussions (458 d 1), but he insists on his amateur status.

b 2. ψελλιζομένους καὶ παίζοντας. If παίζειν has its usual meaning "to play games", it makes a rather odd pair with ψελλίζεσθαι, to lisp or mumble, especially in the next line, where the two are antithetic to σαφῶς διαλεγόμενον (b 5). And Callicles would hardly assert that a grown man who played games was unmanly and deserved a beating (c 1-2). Several editors have adopted Morstadt's drastic expedient of deleting the word in all three places, together with ὁρᾶ in c 1. Richards proposed to substitute πταίνειν in all three, meaning "to stumble in speech" (cf. [Ar.] *Probl.* 3. 31 τῶν μεθύοντων ἡ γλώττα πταίνει); but in that case the shift from ἀκούσῃ to ὁρᾶ at c 1 would be hard to explain. I think we must retain the MS. text and give the word its etymological sense of "behaving childishly", as Jowett, Apelt, and Woodhead do.

b 7. δοκεῖ δουλοπρεπές τι εἶναι. The implication seems to be that slave-children exhibited an enforced precocity as a result of being set to work very young, whereas for a child to continue mumbling was ἐλευθέριον, since it showed that his parents could afford not to force him.

c 5. ἐλεύθερόν τινα εἶναι, as having the "liberal" culture proper to a free man. This became a widespread social ideal in the late fifth and early fourth centuries. Cf. *Soph. Phil.* 1006; Damon fr. 6 (*apud* Athen. 628 c); *Xen. Mem.* 2. 8. 4; *Pl. Prot.* 312 b (quoted above, on a 4); *Rep.* 402 c 3 (where we first meet the noun ἐλευθεριότης).

d 3. νυνδῇ, 484 c 8.

d 5. ὁ ποιητής, Homer, *Iliad* 9. 441 οὐδ' ἀγορέων, ἵνα τ' ἄνδρες ἀριπρεπέες τελέθουσι. In Homer an ἀγορά is a place of public assembly, not a market, and it is in this sense that Callicles uses the word—he is

thinking of politics, not of trade. Similarly the Ἄδικος Λόγος in the *Clouds* approves of spending time in the ἀγορά, the Δίκαιος Λόγος disapproves (991, 1055).

d 7. ἐν γωνίᾳ. This became a proverbial taunt at the academic life: cf. Cicero, *de orat.* 1. 57 *in angulis*; Plut. *phil. princip.* 1, 777B; Epictetus, *Diss.* 1. 29. 36, 55, and 2. 13. 26. Despite Taylor (118 n. 1) and Wolfgang Schmid (*Philol.* xcvi (1948), 212), the description does not fit Socrates very well. Xenophon says of him αἰεὶ μὲν ἦν ἐν τῷ φανερώ· πρῶ τε γὰρ εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἦει καὶ πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ φανερός ἦν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν αἰεὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἦν ὅπου πλείστοις μέλλοι συνέσεσθαι (*Mem.* 1. 1. 10). And Plato similarly makes him say εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἄλλοθι (*Apol.* 17 c 8). It is hard to resist the conclusion that Plato is here thinking rather of the philosophical schools (διατριβαί, 484 e 2) which were growing up early in the fourth century, and perhaps of his own decision to spend the rest of his life in creating such a school. Cf. the picture of the ideal philosopher in the *Theaetetus*, who “does not know the way to the ἀγορά” and is wholly ignorant of the laws of his city (*Theaet.* 173 cd)—a picture which, as Cornford observed, is a long way from the humanity of Socrates—and *Introd.*, p. 31.

e 1. ψιθυρίζοντα, a kind of parallel to ψελλιζόμενον (b 3): the philosopher does not dare to speak his mind plainly and in public.

ἐλεύθερον . . . καὶ μέγα καὶ ἱκανόν, “big, bold, and effective”. ἱκανόν has been thought an anticlimax, and various substitutes proposed. Heindorf’s νεανικόν is hardly suitable, in view of d 1 above and 482 c 4 (at 486 a 2 the word belongs to Euripides); but either καλόν (Coraës) or καινόν (Theiler) is no doubt possible. One might also think of ἱταμόν (which Burnet conjectured for ἱκανόν at *Phil.* 52 d 8). I can see nothing much amiss, however, with ἱκανόν if it is taken as meaning that the speaker rises to the height of his opportunity. Cf. 484 a 2 φύσιν ἱκανήν . . . ἔχων, of the “leonine” man: *Symp.* 177 e 4 εἰάν . . . ἱκανῶς καὶ καλῶς εἴπωσιν: *Phil.* 67 a 7 τῆς τοῦ ἱκανοῦ καὶ τελείου δυνάμεως: *Laws* 642 a 3 οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο . . . ποτε σαφές οὐδέ ἱκανόν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπολαβεῖν.

485 e 3—486 d 1. ῥῆσις of Callicles, concluded. In language borrowed from the speech of Zethus in Euripides’ *Antiope* he appeals to Socrates to abandon the philosophical way of life, which will leave him helpless to defend himself if one day he is falsely accused and brought to trial.

Callicles’ elaborate adaptation of Euripides’ words serves not only to give a poetic colouring to his appeal but also to remind the reader that the debate between the practical and the contemplative life was already engaged in the fifth century. The *Antiope* is said to have been among the poet’s latest works (schol. Aristoph. *Frogs* 53); Plato as well as Socrates may quite well have attended the first performance. It was a romantic piece with a happy ending; its main subject was the liberation of Antiope by her sons Amphion and Zethus, who had been brought up as foundlings by a shepherd (for a full account of the plot

see Wecklein, *Philol.* lxxix (1923), 51 ff., or Pickard-Cambridge in Powell and Barber's *New Chapters in Greek Literature*, iii. 105). But the scene for which it was remembered was that in which the brothers discussed their respective ways of life. Traditionally, Zethus was a herdsman, Amphion a musician; but Euripides widened the issue to a general comparison between the practical activity of the man of affairs and the ἀπραγμοσύνη of the artist and, it would seem, of the philosopher (cf. Dio Chrys. 73. 10 ἐνουθέτει τὸν ἀδελφόν, οὐκ ἀξιῶν φιλοσοφεῖν αὐτόν, and Cicero, *de inv.* i. 94 *Amphion apud Euripidem . . . sapientiam laudat*), and thus linked it with a burning contemporary question: cf. Nestle, *Philol.* lxxxi (1925), 129 ff., and Ehrenberg, *J.H.S.* lxvii (1947), 46 ff. It is the introduction of this larger issue which gives point to Callicles' adaptation of the complaint of Zethus. Amphion's reply is summed up in the words (fr. 202)

ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἄδοιμι καὶ λέγοιμί τι
σοφόν, ταρασσών μηδὲν ὦν πόλις νοσεῖ—

a declaration of ἀπραγμοσύνη which corresponds to Socrates' οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν (473 e 6). His attitude was in the end justified by Hermes, who as *deus ex machina* predicted that Amphion's music should build the walls of Thebes (Pap. Petrie 1, lines 84 ff. = Page, *Greek Literary Papyri*, p. 68). And in like manner Socrates will prove to be the only true statesman (521 d). On Euripides as a precursor of Plato in this matter see Festugière, Appendix II, and Snell, *Entdeckung des Geistes*³, 405 f.

485 e 3. When ἐπιεικῶς qualifies an adjective or another adverb it is normally restrictive in sense; in Plato, I think, always so. Cf. *infra* 493 c 3; *Crito* 43 a 10 ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι, "a fair time ago"; *Phaedo* 80 c 5, where ἐπιεικῶς συχνόν is contrasted with πάνν μάλα συχνόν, and 117 c 5. We must therefore translate ἐπιεικῶς φιλικῶς "fairly friendly" (not "very", as Jowett). Richards, finding this expression 'a little lacking in warmth', and comparing Isocr. 15. 4 ἐπιεικῶς ἔχειν πρὸς πάντας, proposed to read <καὶ> φιλικῶς. It is perhaps more probable that φιλικῶς is a gloss on ἐπιεικῶς: cf. *Lex. Cyrill.* ἐπιεικῶς· φιλανθρώπως.

e 5. οὐπερ ἐμνήσθην, 484 e 3. οὐπερ is Zethus, not Euripides.

e 6. The original is reconstructed by Nauck as follows (Eur. fr. 185):—

. . . ἀμελεῖς ὦν <σε φροντίζειν ἐχρῆν>
ψυχῆς φύσιν <γὰρ> ὧδε γενναίαν <λαχὼν>
γυναικομίμῳ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι
. κοῦτ' ἂν ἀσπίδος κύτει
<καλῶς> ὁμιλήσειας οὔτ' ἄλλων ὕπερ
νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιό <τι>.

The missing word at the beginning may well be Ἀμφιον (Luzac); and two further lines can be restored with probability after line 3 (see below, on a 1-3). Lines 4-5, κοῦτ' ἂν—ὁμιλήσειας, are supplied by

Ol, 131. 16; Plato dropped them as unsuited to his purpose. The passage was acutely discussed by Cope in Appendix A to his translation; cf. also H. Schaal, *de Euripidis Antiope* (diss. Berl., 1914), 10 ff.

e 7. φύσιν—μορφώματι, “though your spirit is naturally so noble, you make yourself conspicuous in a schoolboy shape.” μειρακιώδει is Plato’s substitute for Euripides’ word γυναικομίμω, as appears from Philostratus, *vit. Apoll.* 4. 21 γυναικομίμω μορφώματι κατὰ τὸν Εὐριπίδην αἰσχρῶς διαπρέπειν.

διαπρέπεις is ironical, as at Eur. *Alc.* 642 πάντων διαπρέπεις ἀψυχία. Keeping it, we must, I think, introduce a participle to govern φύσιν; for the suggestion that διαπρέπεις is transitive here has no support in usage or analogy, and Philostratus, who had the text of Euripides, clearly did not take it so; nor can φύσιν ψ. ὦδε γενναίαν be treated (with Stallbaum) as an adverbial accusative. διαπρέπεις, read by many editors and erroneously attributed to F by Burnet, is no improvement. The only passage quoted for the sense “pervert” is Stob. 3. 37. 15 (= Eur. fr. 597 Nauck = Critias fr. 22 Diels); and there the MSS. have διαστρέψαι, which Hense, Nauck, and Kranz rightly retain. διαστρέφεις would satisfy sense and grammar here, as Valckenaer saw. But it cannot be worked into any plausible metrical reconstruction; and the independent testimony of Philostratus confirms διαπρέπεις as Euripides’ word.

486 a 1–3. λάκοις is Bonitz’s neat and convincing correction for λάβοις. The latter has been variously translated “find” (Cope), “grasp” or “apprehend” (Croiset, Jowett⁴, Woodhead), or “accept” (Lamb). But the Greek for the first is εὔροις, for the second καταλάβοις, for the third δέξαιτο. The same corruption has occurred (*pace* Fraenkel) at Aesch. *Ag.* 275. λακεῖν is purely poetic, so the word must come from Euripides. βουλαῖσι too points to Euripides: long datives occur occasionally in the MSS. of Plato from the *Republic* onwards, but in his earlier work he seems to avoid them (Ritter, *Unters.* 94) except in quotations (as κενοῖσιν in c 7 below). The exceptionally heavy recurrence of ἄν in this sentence also suggests a poetic source. (For the first ἄν in a 1 Coraës read ἐν, and Bekker deleted the second in a 2; but repetition of ἄν is a rhetorical mannerism with Sophocles and Euripides, e.g. Eur. *Tro.* 1244 ἀφανεῖς ἄν ὄντες οὐκ ἄν ὑμνήθημεν ἄν, and *El.* 534 with Denniston’s note.) The original may perhaps have run

κοῦτ’ ἄν δίκης βουλαῖσι προσθεῖ’ ἄν λόγον
οὔτ’ εἰκὸς ἄν καὶ πιθανὸν <οὐδὲν> ἄν λάκοις.

ἄν being a postpositive, the first line does not violate Porson’s rule, as Thompson’s note would suggest: cf. e.g. *Andr.* 935, 1184, *Bacch.* 1271. ὀρθῶς I take to be Plato’s addition: Socrates, unlike Amphion, has much to say about justice though nothing to the purpose. εἰκὸς and πιθανὸν are terms of rhetoric (*Phdr.* 266 e 3, *Ar. Rhet.* 1355^b33) which Euripides may well have used.

a 5. τοὺς πόρρω ἀεὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας. Cf. *Euthyphro* 4 b 1 πόρρω που ἤδη σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος, and Burnet’s note.

a 7. ἀπάγοι, technical for summary arrest. Some editors write ἀπαγάγοι with V; but cf. 527 a 1 (where Socrates is retorting Callicles' threat). For the helplessness of the philosopher in court cf. 522 b ff. Plato is far from denying the charge; he is proud of it (*Theaet.* 172 c ff.). The danger of *συκοφαντία* was real and serious at Athens; a similar warning is put into Hippias' mouth (*Hipp. ma.* 304 ab).

b 2. ἀναβάς, the regular word for being "had up" at Athens: on its origin see Burnet on *Apol.* 17 d 2.

b 4-5. The rhythm and the poetic word φῶτα betray another quotation from Zethus' speech. Nauck restores the original as (fr. 186)

πῶς γὰρ σοφὸν τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ἥτις εὐφυᾶ
λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτ' ἔθηκε χείρονα;

Either ἥτις or εἴ τις is possible, but the former is the more idiomatic, and is supported by the agreement of F with B.

c 1. περισυλᾶσθαι and **c 2** ζῆν depend, I think, on something like δυνάμενον, to be supplied from μὴ δυνάμενον above (so Cron). Cf. 520 b 7.

c 2-3. ἀγροικότερον: see on 462 e 6. The "coarse" expression is ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα, "giving him a crack on the jaw". The meaning of the phrase was disputed by ancient grammarians (Pollux 2. 40, Harpocration s.v. ἐπὶ κόρρης, etc.). But the evidence cited by Harpocration from Hyperides (fr. 97 Jensen) seems to show that in Attic Greek ῥαπίζειν ἐπὶ κόρρης was synonymous with ῥαπίζειν τὴν γνάθον. Such a blow constituted a major assault (ὑβρις) in Attic law: cf. Dem. *Meidias* 72, 147.

c 4-8. A quotation is again recognizable, from the rhythm and the form κενοῖσιν. But ἐλέγχων, which suits Socrates better than Amphion, is evidently Plato's substitute for another participle; and in the phrase πραγμάτων δ' εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει, "practise the music of affairs", Ol tells us that πραγμάτων replaces another genitive (πολέμων in our text of Ol). The original is reconstituted by Nauck as follows (fr. 188):

ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ·
παῦσαι μελωδῶν, †πολέμων† δ' εὐμουσίαν
ἄσκει· τοιαῦτ' αἶδε καὶ δόξεις φρονεῖν,
σκάπτων, ἄρῶν γῆν, ποιμνίοις ἐπιστατῶν,
ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφείς σοφίσματα,
ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικῆσεις δόμοις.

Lines 3-5, τοιαῦτ'—σοφίσματα, are preserved by Stobaeus, 4. 15. 13; line 6 is quoted by Dio Chrysostom, 73. 10. There are two difficulties about the reconstruction. (a) πολέμων will not scan—to save it, Arnim produced the dreadful line παῦσαι μελῶν, τὴν δὲ πολέμων εὐμουσίαν—and is anyhow unsuitable in sense, since Zethus was a herdsman, not a soldier. Ol's paraphrase, ῥῆψον τὴν λύραν καὶ κέχρησο ὄπλοις (131. 9), which has been quoted in defence of πολέμων, applies to fr. 185, not to fr. 188. In view of line 4 we expect a word like ποιμένων (Iernstedt) or γαπόνων (ci. Nauck). (b) παῦσαι μελωδῶν is inconsistent, at least

formally, with *τοιαῦτ' αἶδε*. The latter has the authority of Stobaeus, whereas the former was borrowed by Nauck from Aristoph. *Birds* (1382), a play which is probably earlier than the *Antiope*. Wilamowitz (ii. 375) was, I think, most likely right in recognizing in the marginal note preserved by T and W, and put into the text by P, the true Euripidean text *παῦσαι ματάζων* (a tragic word, not found in prose before Josephus). As Maas has noticed, Ol seems to have had this text in mind when he wrote in his paraphrase (132. 2) *παῦσαι τούτων ἐξ ὧν ἐν κενοῖς καὶ ματαίοις κατοικήσεις οἴκοις*. On this view, Zethus did not advise his brother to give up music altogether, but to content himself with simple unphilosophic ditties and attend to his livelihood. Cf. fr. 184 *μοῦσάν τιν' ἄτοπον εἰσάγεις, ἀσύμφορον*.

c 5. *ἄσκει, καὶ ἄσκει*. The repetition is unpleasing, and a little suspicious. It could have arisen from incorporation of a false reading *ἄσκει* or *ἄσκεῖν*. καὶ *δόκει*, quoted as a variant by the first hand in W, is not impossible, and ΔΟ could easily be misread as AC; the error has occurred at Ar. *Ath. Pol.* 23. 3. καὶ *σκόπει* Richards, cf. 526 d 4, d 6.

c 8. *τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα*: cf. 484 c 4 and Isocr. *Hel.* 5 *πολὺ κρεῖττόν ἐστι . . . καὶ μικρὸν προέχειν ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις μᾶλλον ἢ πολὺ διαφέρειν ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς καὶ τοῖς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸν βίον ὠφελοῦσιν*. See also *ad Nicoclem* 39, quoted on 487 c 6.

d 1. *βίος*: *βίον ἐνταῦθα καλεῖ τὸν πλοῦτον*, Ol.

486 d 2—488 b 1. *Socrates expresses his delight at having found in Callicles a touchstone by which to test the truth of his own opinions. In a good "touchstone" three qualities are needed, knowledge, goodwill, and frankness. Gorgias and Polus proved deficient in the last (as Callicles has pointed out, 482 c-e), but Callicles has all three. With the help of his admonitions Socrates hopes to resolve "the noblest of all questions" (487 e 7)—the question what use a man should make of his life.*

The quiet tone and gentle irony of this speech stand in effective contrast with the emotive eloquence of Callicles' *ῥήσις*. That Socrates does not really credit Callicles with *ἐπιστήμη* (in the Socratic sense) is evident from 487 b 7: Callicles has enjoyed "*what many Athenians would call a good education*" (cf. *Meno* 90 b 1 *τοῦτον εὖ ἔθρεψεν καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν, ὡς δοκεῖ Ἀθηναίων τῷ πλήθει*). But his other compliments need not be taken as purely ironical. Callicles is not two-faced: he gives Socrates the same advice which he gave to his intimates and has accepted himself, and, as Isocrates says (*Panath.* 54), *σημεῖόν ἐστιν εὐνοίας καὶ φιλίας, ὅταν τινὲς παραινῶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἅπερ ἂν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς συμφέρειν ὑπολάβωσιν*. Cf. his apparently sincere concern for the risks a man like Socrates runs, 511 b 6. Above all, Callicles has the courage of his convictions and does not shrink from accepting and stating the logical consequences of his position (though he will eventually do so, at 494 de). Hence Socrates claims that "our agreement will result in the attainment of truth" (486 e 5, 487 e 6).

This claim, which is apparently *not* ironical, has been thought typical of the excessive value attached by Plato to the Socratic method of elenchus. 'By addressing itself always to this person here and now',

says Mr. Robinson (16), 'elenchus takes on particularity and accidentalness, which are defects. In this respect it is inferior to the impersonal and universal and rational march of a science axiomatized according to Aristotle's precepts.' To this Mr. Gould has replied (19 ff.) that the real test of an ethical *ὁμολογία* is whether it works in action. This may be true in fact, and Socrates may even have thought so; nothing of the kind, however, is stated here (what is said at 488 a 6 ff. is something different). In any case we ought to be clear on two points. (a) In his earlier dialogues Plato was not trying to reproduce the impersonal march of science but to imitate a philosophical conversation, whose *τέλος*, whether attained or not, is necessarily the agreement of the disputants (cf. on 472 b 6). To complain of this limitation is, as Robinson sees, to condemn the dialogue form (which in works like the *Timaeus* Plato virtually abandoned, and largely no doubt for this reason). (b) The claim that a *τέλος* so reached *will be the truth* is not one which Socrates commonly makes; and in making it here he seeks to justify it on special grounds, namely the special qualifications of Callicles. It is assumed, I think, that Socrates and Callicles offer the only two consistent answers to the question *ποῖόν τινα χρὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα*: the incoherence of intermediate views has been exposed in the conversation with Polus. If, then, one party can be induced by argument to reject his original answer, the other answer will be the true one.

486 d 3. ἄσμενον: I have abandoned Burnet's rough breathing, which has no ancient authority and rests on the unproved assumption of a connexion with *ἀνδάνω*. —The touchstone (*λυδία λίθος*), a kind of black quartz or jasper, was used for assaying samples of gold by rubbing them against the touchstone and comparing the streaks which they left on it: cf. Eichholz, *CR*, lix (1945), 52. The vain wish for a touchstone which should reveal the hidden truth about human character is traditional (*Theognis* 119 ff., *Eur. Medea* 516 ff.). Plato's language suggests that he had this idea in mind (cf. 487 a 1 *ψυχῆς περί ὀρθῶς τε ζώσης καὶ μὴ*); but in representing the ideal interlocutor as a touchstone of *intellectual* truth he has given the old fancy a quite new twist.

d 4. ἦ is illogical, but the temptation to change it into αἶ or αἷς should probably be resisted. As Reinhard says (150), the speaker's attention shifts while he is speaking from the general class of touchstones to the concrete experiment in which an individual stone is used. A similar explanation applies to 521 d 1 *περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων δὲ σὺ λέγεις*: compare also the shift from generalizing plural to singular at 478 c 1. At *Theaet.* 209 a 7 we have the reverse transition, *ὥ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενὸς ἡπτόμην τῇ διανοίᾳ*: 'it occurs to Socrates while speaking that the "difference" of one person from another is not one but many' (Campbell). —*τὴν ἀρίστην*, in apposition to *τινα*, 'a specially good one' (and thus able to afford the assurance which he goes on to describe).

d 5. εἴ μοι ὁμολογήσειεν prepares for the application of the comparison at e 5: 'if the stone and I agreed in approving of her training'

(Jowett). For *τεθεραπεύσθαι* cf. the arts *θεραπευουσῶν τὴν ψυχὴν*, 464 c 4.

d 6. ἥδη, "at last"; so also e 6, 487 e 2. The word has dropped out in the MSS. of the first family, but is now confirmed by a papyrus.

d 7. οὐδὲν [μ'] ἔτι δεῖ ἄλλης βασάνου. 'Communes Graeci dixere δεῖ σοι τοῦδε', Porson on Eur. *Or.* 659; and this is the normal usage in Plato, e.g. at *Rep.* 370 d 2. The construction with' accusative and genitive occurs often enough in Euripides, e.g. *Hipp.* 688 δεῖ με δὴ καινῶν λόγων, and twice in Aeschylus, but I know of no other example in Attic prose before Aristotle (who presents a solitary instance, often thought to be corrupt, at *Pol.* 1334^a28). In our passage several late MSS. read *μοι* (doubtless from conjecture), and are followed in this by the majority of editors. They may be right; but it seems to me more likely that the pronoun arose from an accidental dittography of the last letter of οὐδὲν. In the parallel passage below, 487 e 2-3, the pronoun is left unexpressed. That passage also tends to support the genuineness of ἔτι, which the first family omits.

e 2. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ νῦν. Recent editors put the stop after ἐρῶ, but the punctuation of Stallbaum and Thompson is supported by 453 b 5 Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ νῦν.

e 6. ταῦτ', sc. ᾧ ἡ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ δοξάζει. If with Bekker and many editors we write *ᾧ* (= *ᾧ ᾧ*) in e 5, ταῦτ' is *ᾧ ᾧ ὁμολογήσης*. Not much, however, is gained by this (cf. 487 e 1-2 and Cron, *Beiträge* 139); and the crasis, though it occurs in tragedy and Demosthenes, is perhaps open to doubt in Plato. At *Prot.* 352 c 6 the MSS. do not recognize it; at *Crito* 49 e 6 they have *ᾧ ᾧ τις ὁμολογήση. ἐννοῶ γὰρ ὅτι . . . τρία ἄρα . . .*, "For it strikes me that there are in fact three qualities . . ." *ἄρα* marks the observation as one which has just occurred to the speaker (Denniston, 38); for its late position in the sentence (emphasizing the important word *τρία*) cf. 519 b 7, 524 d 4, *Symp.* 177 e 7, *Phil.* 41 b 11 *εἵπομεν . . . ὥς . . . δίχα ἄρα . . .* I see no need to alter it to *ἄττα* (Thompson) or *ἄμα* (Deuschle).

487 a 3. For *εὐνοίαν*—which is almost certainly the true reading, cf. b 7, d 4, e 5—all the primary MSS., as well as Stobaeus, have *δόξαν* (Stallbaum's statement on the subject is false). This curious error is perhaps due to false association, *ἐπιστήμη* and *δόξα* being a familiar pair. (Heindorf attributed it to the influence of schol. BT, which runs *ὅτι τρία ἐστὶν οἷς κρίνεται ψυχὴ, ἐπιστήμη, δόξα ὡς φρονίμου τε καὶ εὖνου, παρρησία*. But the scholion itself looks to me like an attempt to make sense of the reading *δόξαν* by adding explanatory genitives.) The true reading was known to Ol, who enumerates the three qualities as *ἐπιστήμην, εὐνοίαν, παρρησίαν* (133. 14, cf. 15, 17, 22), and probably also to Clement, who lists *ἐπιστήμη, εὖνοια, παρρησία* as the qualities of the divine *Παιδαγωγός*. It was first restored to the text by an unknown scholar who entered it in a fourteenth-century Venice MS., having doubtless found it, as Theiler suggests, in the Venice copy of Ol (Marc. 196).

b 1-2. αἰσχυνηλοτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος, "too bashful, more so than they should be", like **d 1** πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι. For the strictly superfluous μᾶλλον cf. *Polit.* 286 a 7 ῥάων δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττωσιν . . . μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τὰ μείζω (Riddell § 166). I have adopted F's spelling of the adjective, which, though condemned by Thomas Magister, is that of the MSS. everywhere else in Plato (*Charm.* 158 c 6, 160 e 4, *Laws* 665 e 9). —For the parenthetic πῶς γὰρ οὐ; cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 754 τρέφειν ἀνάγκη, πῶς γὰρ οὐ; τρόπῳ φρενός. ὦ γε (Lat. *quippe qui*) then adduces the evidence, referring back to 461 b and 482 d.

b 4. αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἐναντία . . . ἐναντίον. Robin suspected an intentional parody of Gorgian style, like 448 c 7 ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως. The accumulation of pronouns is, however, natural here, and rhetorically effective, while ἐναντία . . . ἐναντίον is perhaps purely accidental.

c 3. Τείσανδρον τὸν Ἀφιδναῖον κτλ. Our information about the owners of these names is scanty, but sufficient to indicate the *milieu* to which Callicles belonged. We know most about Andron son of Androtion. Plato lists him among the young Athenians who attended the 'Congress of Sophists' at Callias' house, and represents him as one of the circle round Hippias (*Prot.* 315 c)—thus suggesting a link between Callicles and the founder of the φύσις doctrine. Andron was a member of the Four Hundred, but when the oligarchic régime collapsed he saved his skin by denouncing his associate Antiphon ([Plut.] *vit. dec. or.* 833E, Harpocration s.v. Ἀνδρων). At a later date he served long periods in jail for failure to pay his debts to the State, and finally broke prison, according to Demosthenes (24. 125), although his son was evidently a man of means (Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, ii. 152). This son, another Androtion, is well known as an author of Attic annals (Ἀτθίς) and a political opponent of Demosthenes, who jeers at him as a καλὸς κάγαθός turned demagogue (22. 47 ff.). He had been trained in Isocrates' school, not in Plato's—which fits the conception of 'philosophy' here attributed to his father. Of Callicles' other friends, Nausicydes is very probably the wealthy miller mentioned by Aristophanes, *Eccl.* 426, and by Socrates in Xenophon, *Mem.* 2. 7. 6; the former passage seems to imply that he ground not only corn but the faces of the poor by charging extortionate prices. Teisandros too (the name is so spelt in inscriptions) appears to have been a wealthy man, if he is identical with the Τε]ισάνδρου τοῦ Κηφισοδώρου Ἀφιδναίου mentioned in an inscription about liturgies, *I.G.* ii². 1929. 22, which its editor dated early in the fourth century (Wilamowitz thought the inscription was later and referred to our man's grandson). The general picture which the evidence suggests is that of a group of ambitious young men, drawn from the *jeunesse dorée* of Athens, who have acquired just enough of the 'new learning' to rid them of inconvenient moral scruples. It certainly does not support Lamb's description of Callicles as 'the typical Athenian democrat'.

c 5. ἐπήκουσα, "I heard", or perhaps "I overheard"; for the latter sense cf. *Theaet.* 155 e 3 μή τις τῶν ἀμνητῶν ἐπακούῃ, Aristoph. *Thesm.* 628, *Men. Dysc.* 821. ὑπήκουσα (F) would imply response (I heard and

heeded, obeyed, answered). —This report of a conversation comes in oddly. It has indeed the appearance of being dragged in; for as evidence of Callicles' *εὐνοια* a reference to 485 e 3 would have sufficed. That Plato is recalling an actual conversation after an interval of some twenty years or more does not seem very likely. It is perhaps less improbable that he is discreetly alluding to a dialogue or other literary source from which his knowledge of the views of this circle was derived. It is even possible that Callicles himself had composed such a dialogue (Naber)—but the range of possibilities is as wide as our ignorance (cf. next note).

c 6. *μὴ . . . εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν*. Cf. Isocrates' contemptuous use of *ἀκριβῶς* ("pedantically"). His advice to Nicocles was *σοφοὺς νόμιζε μὴ τοὺς ἀκριβῶς περὶ μικρῶν ἐρίζοντας ἀλλὰ τοὺς εὖ περὶ τῶν μεγάλων λέγοντας* (2. 39); and in the *Helena* he taunts his rivals with *περὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστασθαι* (10. 5). This may suggest that the 'conversation' had its origin in some pamphlet issued by the Isocratean school. But such views were no doubt widely held (see above, on 484 c 4—485 e 2).

d 2. *διαφθαρέντες*: cf. 484 c 7, and the charge against Socrates of *τοὺς νέους διαφθείρειν*.

d 5. *ὅτι γε οἷος*: sc. *εἶ*, to be supplied from d 4. The clause depends, not on *φῆς* (which would be a solecism unique in Plato), but on the compound expression *αὐτός τε φῆς καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁμολογεῖ*. As Lodge pointed out, the substitution of *λέγεις* for *φῆς* would have resulted in a very clumsy sentence. —Callicles has not specifically stated that he is devoid of *αἰσχύνη*, but he has clearly implied it at 482 d 7 ff.

d 7. *δῆλον ὅτι*: here stereotyped as a virtual adverb, "evidently", as often in Demosthenes. Cf. *οἶδ' ὅτι*, *ἴσθ' ὅτι*.

e 3. *ἂν . . . συνεχώρησας*, 'unreal' past in relation to the (hypothetical) future time when *βεβασανισμένον ἔσται* (e 1). With *συγχωρήσας ἂν* (e 5) the speaker's thoughts revert to the present. We need not delete these latter words with Hirschig; the transition is natural.

e 5. *περιουσία* (F) seems preferable to *παρουσία*: cf. b 1 *αἰσχυνηλοτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος*. The two prefixes are frequently confused in MSS., e.g. at *Rep.* 499 b 5.

e 6. *αὐτὸς φῆς*: 485 e 3.

e 7. *τέλος . . . τῆς ἀληθείας*: not, I think, "the attainment of perfect truth" (Jowett⁴, and most translators), but simply "the attainment of truth" or "truth in the end", like the Homeric *τέλος θανάτοιο*, "death in the end", and like *Tim.* 90 d 5 *τέλος ἔχειν τοῦ . . . ἀρίστου βίου* ("come to fruition of that best life", Taylor). —Socrates' conclusion repeats his enunciation at 486 e 5 ('ring form').

e 9. *ποιόν τινα* (BTW) and *ποιόν ποτε* (Ol) are alternative variants; F conflates them.

488 a 2. *κατὰ τὸν βίον τὸν ἑαυτοῦ*, "in respect of my own way of living".

a 3. *τοῦτο*, object of *ἐξαμαρτάνω*. Socrates applies to himself the principle *οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνει*.

a 6. *ἐάν με* has become *ἐάν μὲν* in the first family, by anticipation of the following *μὲν* (a 7); P's *ἐάν* and f's *ἐάν γε* represent unsuccessful attempts at correction. —For the thought cf. Guyau's remark, 'celui qui n'agit pas comme il pense, pense imparfaitement' (quoted by Cornford, *C.A.H.* vi. 306).

488 b 2–489 b 6. When Callicles speaks of "the better people" (*βελτίους*, *ἀμείνους*), or of "the superior class" (*κρείττους*), does he mean simply the stronger? Callicles agrees that he does, and on this basis Socrates offers a dialectical proof that committing wrong is worse or "uglier" than suffering it, *κατὰ φύσιν* as well as *κατὰ νόμον*:

The masses are stronger κατὰ φύσιν than any individual:

Therefore: The law of the masses is stronger than the individual's will:

Therefore: It is "better", if "better" means stronger:

But the law of the masses is "equal rights for all" (τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν):

Therefore: Any violation of such rights is bad κατὰ φύσιν.

This argument amounts to saying that if might is right it must always be right to obey the Government in power, so long as it can enforce its authority. It thus resembles Hobbes's contention that 'no law can be unjust'; like Hobbes, Plato here presupposes a 'positivist' view of law such as is fashionable in many quarters today. Both Socrates and Callicles assume the Government in power to be democratic, since they are thinking of Athens. But the same argument could be used to prove that one should always obey a dictator, so long as he can enforce his authority. Cf. the illuminating conversation between Pericles and Alcibiades in *Xen. Mem.* 1. 2. 40–46, where Pericles at first asserts the positivist view of law as *ὅσα ἂν τὸ κρατοῦν τῆς πόλεως . . . γράψῃ*, but retracts it when its implications are pointed out. Similarly the present argument leads Callicles to drop the positivist assumption and state his real opinion—which is not that the people in power are *ipso facto* the best, but that the best people, i.e. people like himself, *ought* to have the power. "Ought" is a meaningful word for Callicles, though the values it expresses for him are not the conventional ones.

488 b 2. *καὶ σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος*: 483 d 5, 484 bc.

b 7. *ἔλεγον* is perhaps a gloss, since in phrases of this kind, where both a past (or future) verb and a present one are logically required, Plato and other Attic writers usually omit the former, e.g. *Soph.* 236 e 2 *πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι μεστὰ ἀπορίας ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ καὶ νῦν*.

c 1. *τί ποτε λέγεις*, "what you mean". Burnet preferred *λέγοις* (F). Callicles' meaning was, however, the same then as it is now and is habitually, so the present is not unnatural, and is possibly preferable as the *lectio difficilior*.

c 2–d 1. *πότερον . . . ἢ . . . ἢ . . .* Socrates offers two alternatives, (a) that *κρείττων* and *βελτίων* both mean "stronger", (b) that *κρείττων* means "stronger" but *βελτίων* means "better". He then restates alternative (a) in the words *ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς ὄρος, κτλ.* (c 9–d 1). This is Plato's

favourite *a b a* structure: Badham (*Euthyd.* p. 82) was wrong in proposing to delete the last member.

Callicles has used both words, 483 d 5, e 4, 484 c 2, without defining the sense in which he employs them. Cf. Socrates' demand for an explanation of *κρείττων* at *Rep.* 338 c. In ordinary usage *κρείττων* most often meant "superior in power"; it is in this sense that Thrasymachus uses it, *Rep.* 339 a, and that gods and daemons are *οἱ κρείττους* (*Soph.* 216 b 4, etc.). But one could also be *κρείσσω* *ἐπ' ἀρετήν*, Democr. fr. 181. *βελτίων* on the other hand generally implied either social or moral superiority (or both): for the social sense cf. 512 d 1 and the common use of *οἱ βέλτιστοι* to signify the upper class; for the moral sense, 502 e 8 etc., and *Symp.* 185 b 2 *ἀρετῆς γ' ἔνεκα καὶ τοῦ βελτίων γενέσθαι*.

c 4. *τότε*, 483 d 4. *ἐνδείκνυσθαι* is oblique for an imperfect indicative, as *λέγειν* at 489 b 2 is oblique for *ἔλεγε*. There is therefore no need to read *ἐδόκει*.

c 6. *ὡς—ταῦτόν ὄν*. The doctrine of *τὸ φύσει δίκαιον* implies equation of *βέλτιον* (as well as *κρείττον*) with *ἰσχυρότερον*. Burnet followed F in reading *τὸ ἰσχυρότερον*. But I cannot think this an improvement unless (with Naber) we insert the article before *βέλτιον* also (cf. d 2–3), or else (with Theiler) delete *ταῦτόν*.

d 6. *ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνί*, "for constraining the individual": *ἐπὶ* is used as at *Laws* 853 c 1 *ἐάν τις τοιοῦτος γίγνηται . . . ἀποτροπῆς τε ἔνεκα καὶ γενομένων κολάσεως τιθέναι ἐπ' αὐτοῖς νόμους*. Similarly the late-fifth-century democratic pamphleteer known as Anonymus Iamblichi declares that the united force of the many will always be sufficient to restrain the toughest would-be 'superman' (*Vors.* 89 [82]. 6. 2 ff.).

d 7. *ἄρτι*, 483 e–484 a.

e 2. *που*, "I think", qualifies with a polite show of hesitation the claim that this step in the argument has already been admitted: cf. 476 e 3 *τὰ δὲ δίκαιά που καλὰ ὁμολόγηται* and *Meno* 75 c 4 *σχῆμά που ἔστιν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον*. These parallels suggest that *που* is much the likeliest correction for the enigmatic *πολὺ*. The latter can hardly be defended, since it imports a qualification which has not been admitted and which is wholly irrelevant to the argument. There is an equally puzzling *πολὺ* at *Crat.* 406 a 1, *τὸ δὲ †πολύ†, ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο, . . . κεῖται*, where again an earlier statement is recalled and again Hermann's *που* appears probable; and at *Polit.* 275 e 3 B has *πολὺ* for *που*.

e 7. *ἄρτι*, 484 a 1. *αὖ*: the same phrase has been used at d 6. For *ισότης* as a democratic slogan see on 483 c 5; for Plato's criticism of it, on 508 ab.

489 a 2. *σὺ αὖ*, like Gorgias and Polus (482 c–e: cf. 487 b). Callicles evidently hesitates at this point, seeing the trap.

a 5. *Καλλίκελεις*: the omission of the customary *ὦ* is thought to make the appeal slightly more peremptory (Kühner-G. i. 48); it may perhaps be justified, here and at 521 a 5, by the hortative tone of the context. The instances of its omission are, however, so few in Plato that one may suspect them to be the mere result of oversight (some

are almost certainly due to haplography, as at *Prot.* 358 a 2, e 2, 359 a 2). See E. S. Thompson on *Meno* 98 a 4 (appendix). βεβαιώσμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ, "obtain final reassurance from you": cf. *Rep.* 461 e 8 βεβαιώσασθαι παρὰ τοῦ λόγου.

b 2. λέγειν: see on 488 c 4.

b 3. λέγων ὅτι κτλ. recapitulates 482 e 5–483 a 4; for ἄγων cf. 482 e 3.

489 b 7–491 a 3. Callicles shifts his ground. By "superior" (κρείττους) he did not mean the physically stronger but "the better sort of people" (βελτίους 489 c 2, equated at e 5 with ἀμείνους). Pressed for a definition of the latter, he accepts Socrates' suggestion that they are "the more intelligent people" (τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους). Taking this to mean "the expert", Socrates proceeds to show by elementary and comical examples that the expert in a particular field is not always entitled to the largest share of what that field produces, but only to greater authority in it: the dietician has no claim to a double ration of food. Callicles complains that the examples are irrelevant and vulgar.

In thinking that the φρόνιμος is a better man than the ignorant, and should therefore have more authority, Callicles and Socrates are at one. The word was a comparatively recent coinage (its earliest extant appearance is in the *Ajax*); but it had come to be accepted as a necessary attribute of the ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός: cf. Aristoph. *Lysist.* 547 φιλόπολις ἀρετὴ φρόνιμος, Isocr. *ad Nicoclem* 14, etc. Where they differ is in their conception of the φρόνιμος and of the manner in which he will use his authority. Callicles' conception will be made clear at 491 b. Socrates thinks at once of the τεχνικός, the trained expert who should be, and normally is, supreme in his own sphere. If there were properly trained experts in the art of government, it would be right that they should govern. This fundamental Platonic tenet probably goes back to the historical Socrates: Xenophon represents him as habitually appealing to the analogy of the τέχναι to show βασιλέας καὶ ἄρχοντας . . . εἶναι . . . τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἄρχειν (*Mem.* 3. 9. 10 f.); cf. below, on 513 c 4–515 b 5. But his point here is that control of production is one thing, distribution of the product another—an idea which was later worked out in its extreme form in the *Republic*, where the Guardians are to have all the power but none of the property. Plato was no ordinary Greek 'oligarch': he would have accepted Marx's principle 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his need' (Socrates' examples are comical precisely because they take no account of need). We may compare Jefferson's retort when in the Virginia legislature someone proposed that the eldest son should be entitled to a double share of his father's estate—'Not unless he eats a double allowance of food and does a double amount of work'.

489 b 7. Οὐτοσὶ ἀνὴρ: see on 467 b 1.

b 8. ὀνόματα θηρεύων: "catching at words" (instead of the meaning behind them). In the same sense Socrates speaks of ὀνομάτων θηρεύσεις at *Theaet.* 166 c 1, and Andocides (1. 9) begs his audience μὴ ῥήματα θηρεύειν.

c 1. ῥήματι ἀμάρτη, "makes a slip in expressing himself": cf. 450 e 5.

c 3. **πάλαι**: 488 d 4. Callicles still maintains this, but proceeds to change the meaning of both words.

c 4-7. **ἐὰν συρφετός—ἀνθρώπων**, “if a rabble of slaves and nondescripts get together” (Jowett). Callicles’ use of *συρφετός*, lit. offscourings, scum of the earth, is an index of his acute class-consciousness. **μηδενὸς ἀξίων—ισχυρίσασθαι**, “fit for nothing, save perhaps for the exertion of bodily strength”. I incline to take *τῷ σώματι* together, as Thompson did (and as a reader naturally would), and let *ισχυρίσασθαι* depend, with a change of construction, directly on *ἀξίων*. The German commentators construe *τῷ . . . ισχυρίσασθαι* as an instrumental dative, either “by their bodily strength” (when we should expect a present infinitive) or “by relying on the body” (an unlikely sense in this context). **καὶ οὗτοι φῶσιν ἅττα, ταῦτα εἶναι νόμιμα**, “and if these persons express some opinion, that is law”. *φῶσιν* should not be doubted: Callicles purposely chooses a verb which does not carry the suggestion of properly constituted authority. Heindorf’s *θῶσιν*, recently revived by Bury, has the demerit of doing so; and normal usage would require the middle, as at 483 b 7. But it is hardly credible that *φῶσιν* could be thus used without an object. This is probably best provided by Heindorf’s *ἅττα* for *αὐτὰ*: cf. *Menex.* 236 b 6, where in W and F *ἅττα* has become *ταῦτα*, and for Plato’s slightly contemptuous use of *ἅττα*, *Soph.* 236 e 2 *λέγειν μὲν ἅττα, ἀληθῆ δὲ μή*. Alternatively, one might think of keeping *αὐτὰ ταῦτα* (“their bare words”) and inserting *τι* after *οὗτοι*, where it would easily fall out. The plural pronoun after singular *τις* is very common (Kühner-G. i. 54), e.g. *Laws* 853 c 1, quoted above on 488 d 6.

d 6. **τί ποτε λέγεις**. We have *τίνας λέγεις* at e 3 and 491 c 4, and some editors have insisted on it here. But cf. *Crat.* 424 a 2 *τί ἂν φαίης τὸν τοῦτο δυνάμενον*; followed by *τοῦτον δὲ τίνα*; (a 4).

d 7. **πρᾶότερόν με προδίδασκε κτλ.**: “conduct my education more gently, or I shall give up attending your school.” Cf. *Euthyd.* 302 c 3 *μὴ χαλεπῶς με προδίδασκε* and *Hipp. ma.* 291 b 1 *ἐμὲ οὖν προδίδασκε*. In these passages and some others the force of the prefix is obscure, as it sometimes is in the correlative verb *προμανθάνειν*. The scholiast indeed asserts that it has none: *περιπτεύει ἢ πρόθεσις Ἀπτικῶς*. Lamb translates “be more gentle with me over my *first* lessons”, but this will hardly suit the other passages. Stallbaum thought the sense was *docendo provehere*; Jebb on *Ajax* 163 and Starkie on *Clouds* 476 claimed that the prefix implied a *gradual* advance (it is not clear how). I am inclined to think with Sauppe that here and in the *Euthyd.* and *Hipp. ma.* the sense is *praeundo docere*: Socrates hopes his “teacher” will tell him in advance what to say. Similarly *προμανθάνειν* is to learn a song by heart before singing it (*Clouds* 966) or generally to prepare a lesson in advance (*Theophr. Char.* 19 [7]. 14 J.).

e 2. **Μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον**, a playful distortion of *μὰ τὸν Ζῆνα* (cf. on 482 b 5): since Callicles ‘swears by’ Zethus, Socrates will do the same. For the ellipse of the negative cf. *Alc. i* 109 d 6, where to a similar complaint, *σκόπτεις, ὦ Σώκρατες*, Socrates replies *Μὰ τὸν Φίλιον*: so BT, and so

also, originally, the one primary MS. of Proclus' commentary; the insertion of the οὐ in this last is now known to be the work of a corrector. Cf. also Dem. 18. 208, where citations and later MSS. insert the negative which S omits. In the present passage οὐ similarly appears as a marginal addition in a late MS. There is little reason to think that either Hermogenes, who quotes the oath for another purpose, probably from memory, or Ol, who quotes it in the course of a paraphrase, found οὐ in his text of Plato.

e 6. σὺ αὐτὸς: Callicles himself does what at b 8 he accused Socrates of doing—he plays with words.

490 a 1. Πολλάκις ἄρα κτλ. This could perhaps be an adaptation of a poetic original, such as, e.g.,

κρείσσων γάρ ἐστι πολλάκις τῶν μυρίων
τῶν μὴ φρονούντων εἰς φρονῶν.

Cf. Heraclitus fr. 49 εἰς ἐμοὶ μύριοι, ἐὰν ἄριστος ᾖ, and Eur. fr. 584 εἰς τοὶ δίκαιος μυρίων οὐκ ἐνδίκων | κρατεῖ.

a 4. οὐ ῥήματι θηρεύω, sc. σε (cf. *Euthyd.* 295 d 2 βουλόμενός με θηρεῦσαι τὰ ὀνόματα περιστήσας). The dative is puzzling. The meaning cannot be "I am not trying to catch you by *my* form of expression", as the use of τῷ ῥήματι at 450 e 5 and ῥήματι at 489 c 1 would suggest; for it is Callicles' expressions that are in question. But it may perhaps be "I am not trying to catch you by taking you literally": cf. *Theaet.* 166 d 8 τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ῥήματί μου δίωκε, where even if μου is construed with λόγον the reference is to the speaker's language. Here, however, we expect an accusative, since Socrates is evidently rebutting the charge that he is ὀνόματα θηρεύων (489 b 8); and most editors have introduced one. To interpret the transmitted text as ῥήμά τι seems to me a lame expedient: τι is not wanted, and in such phrases the object is elsewhere always plural (489 b 8, e 6, *Theaet.* 166 c 1, Andocides 1. 9). If an accusative is thought indispensable, I should prefer Badham's ῥημάτια (*Philol.* x (1855), 729) as accounting better for the corruption than ῥήματα (which has only the worthless authority of V). Cf. the contemptuous use of ῥηματίσκια at *Theaet.* 180 a 4.

a 7. βελτίω ὄντα, sc. τινά. An indefinite subject is often left unexpressed (see on 456 d 2): there is therefore no need to change the immediately preceding τὸ into τὸν as proposed by Madvig.

b 1. Ἐχε δὲ αὐτοῦ: see on 460 a 5.

b 2. ἄθροοι and ἄνθρωποι look like alternative readings which have been variously conflated in our MSS. (F's ἀνθρώποι probably represents ἄνθρωποι with ὅοι suprascript). Ol quotes ἀθρόοι only, but *may* of course have had both words in his text of Plato. Of the two, ἀθρόοι is the more likely to have been corrupted, and it is supported by *Rep.* 492 b 5 συγκαθεζόμενοι ἀθρόοι πολλοί. For the redundant expression ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ . . . ἀθρόοι cf. *Laus* 666 e 2 ἀθρόους πώλους ἐν ἀγέλῃ νεμομένους.

c 1. To delete τῶν σιτίων with Hirschig and Theiler is to sacrifice clarity to brevity—a fault of which Plato is seldom guilty.

c 2. τῷ . . . ἄρχειν, “in virtue of his authority”.

c 3. [ἐν] τῷ δὲ ἀναλίσκειν. The word-order is so exceptional as to excite suspicion: the only other instance from Attic prose which Denniston (186) is able to produce is *Laws* 816 c 7 ἐν ταῖς δ’ αὐταῖς ἡδοναῖς. The older editors mostly corrected to ἐν δὲ τῷ, and this proves to be the reading of W; but in face of the agreement of BTP with F it would be unwise to assume that it goes back to the archetype. It may nevertheless be right; but I am more inclined to believe that ἐν was added as a gloss to show that this dative is not causal, like τῷ . . . ἄρχειν above, but instrumental (ἐν is a sign of the instrumental in Hellenistic Greek). Such addition of prepositions to clarify case usage is not infrequent: what I take to be a more certain instance occurs just below (see on c 8).

c 4. ζημιοῦσθαι, to suffer for it in health (cf. 504 e 6 ff.).

c 7. ὦγαθέ. Despite the proximity of ὦ Καλλίκλεις, I see no need to transfer this to Callicles (with Hirschig). It is similarly used in pressing home a point at 471 d 8 πόθεν, ὦγαθέ;

c 8. [περὶ] Σιτία λέγεις. The normal Attic usage is λέγειν περὶ τινος, not περὶ τι. Apart from this place, the only apparent exception to this rule in Plato is, I think, *Phaedo* 109 c 1 τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰωθότων λέγειν, where Burnet in his commentary suggests (as Hirschig did before him) that the last two words have been wrongly added from 108 c 7 τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰωθότων λέγειν. At *Laws* 768 c, quoted by Stallbaum, περὶ δικαστήρια does not go with εἴρηκεν. In the present passage Burnet treated λέγεις as parenthetic and understood δεῖ πλέον ἔχειν with περὶ σιτία. This, however, seems highly artificial, nor can we understand δεῖ πλέον ἔχειν περὶ with ἰατροῦς. The author of the Y recension saw that the fault lay in περὶ, but could think of nothing more plausible transcriptionally than τί δέ. I feel pretty sure that Hirschig and Thompson were right in deleting περὶ, which I take to have been added as a gloss to show that λέγεις is “you talk about” (whereas λέγω in d 1 is “I mean”). We then have a sentence like 491 a 1 σκυτέας . . . λέγων and 518 c 3 διακόνους μοι λέγεις. Cf. the intrusive περὶ in TW at *Hipp. ma.* 285 d 2; for another possible instance see below on 491 a 4. φλυαρίας: for this climax cf. 519 a 3 (which is Socrates’ counter-stroke) and *Phaedo* 66 c 2 ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπύμπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς.

d 2. Socrates asks which step in the preceding argument Callicles repudiates. οὐ picks up Callicles’ οὐ ταῦτα λέγω, and seems to me preferable to οὖν both transcriptionally (since B supports F) and in point of sense.

d 6. Οὐ σιτίων γε. We might expect ἀλλ’ οὐ . . . γε (Cobet), “Yes, but not of food”. But the preceding ἀλλ’ οὐ (used in a different sense) is an obvious reason for avoiding it.

d 10. Ποίων ἱματίων; “What have overcoats to do with it?” Picking up a word and flinging it back with a scornful ποῖος is a frequent repartee in Aristophanes and Plato, e.g. *Clouds* 367 ποῖος Ζεὺς; οὐ μὴ

ληρήσεις; *Charm.* 174 b 4 ποῖον, ἦ δ' ὅς, πεπτευτικόν; *Theaet.* 180 b 8 ποίοις μαθηταῖς; Euripides admits it in a passage of excited stichomythia in the *Helena* (567), and Sophocles once puts it in the mouth of a plebeian character (*Trach.* 427). See further Thompson on *Meno* 80 d.

e 4. φλυαρεῖς ἔχων, "You keep talking nonsense", another colloquial idiom. It seems to occur only in Aristophanes (e.g. *Frogs* 512 ληρεῖς ἔχων), Plato (e.g. *Euthyd.* 295 c 10 ἔχων φλυαρεῖς), and Theocritus (14. 8), apart from imitations in late prose; *Dem.* 23. 35 and *Ar. Met.* 1072^b23, cited by L.S.J. under this head, are probably to be explained otherwise, and at *Hdt.* 8. 38 it is doubtful if ἔχοντας is right. Some scholars explain this intransitive use of ἔχων as derived from the transitive one which they find in phrases like τί δῆτα διατρίβεις ἔχων; (*Aristoph. Eccl.* 1151). So Schanz, *Nov. Comm.* 15 f., Kühner-G. ii. 62. But the word-order in the interrogative phrases is against construing τί with ἔχων, particularly in τί ταῦτ' ἔχων στραγγεύομαι; (*Clouds* 131) and τί ταῦτ' ἔχουσαι 'κεῖνον αἰτιώμεθα; (*Thesm.* 473). It appears preferable to regard ἔχων as intransitive in all these phrases, comparing ἔχε δῆ (460 a 5, etc.), ἔχειν κατὰ χώραν (*Frogs* 793, etc.), πάλαι θαυμάσας ἔχω (*Phaedrus* 257 c 1).

e 6. περὶ γῆν . . . καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν. Cf. *Xen. Oec.* 6. 8 ἐδοκιμάσαμεν δὲ ἀνδρὶ καλῷ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ἐργασίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην κρατίστην γεωργίαν. There the meaning is that farming, unlike the sedentary trades, is an occupation for a gentleman. And this is perhaps implied here, in contrast with the weaver and the shoemaker, although the primary sense is simply "a good farmer".

e 10-11. This is possibly an authentic witticism of the historical Socrates. Xenophon (*Mem.* 4. 4. 6) represents him as giving the same reply to a similar complaint by Hippias, adding "You of course know so much that you never say the same thing twice on the same subject" (to which Hippias complacently answers ἀμέλει, πειρώμαι καινόν τι λέγειν αἰεί). Alternatively, Xenophon may have lifted the witticism from the *Gorgias*; but despite H. Maier, *Sokrates*, 54, there is nothing to prove this. The importance of novelty, either in subject or in treatment, was constantly stressed by the rhetorical schools (e.g. *Isocr. Paneg.* 8), whereas philosophy was αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων (482 a 7, 509 a 4).

491 a 1-2. σκυτέας—οὐδὲν παύη. Cf. Alcibiades' description of Socrates in the *Symposium* (221 e 4), ὄνους γὰρ κανθηλίους λέγει καὶ χαλκέας τινὰς καὶ σκυτοτόμους καὶ βυρσοδέψας, καὶ αἰεὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεται λέγειν, ὥστε ἄπειρος καὶ ἀνόητος ἄνθρωπος πᾶς ἂν τῶν λόγων καταγελάσειεν. Callicles objects to Socrates' "cobblers and dry-cleaners", not because he denies that government is a τέχνη, but because he does not like to have the ἀμείνους compared to anything so low. Similar complaints are made by Hippias at *Hipp. ma.* 288 d 1 ὥς ἀπαίδευτός τις ὅς οὕτω φαῦλα ὀνόματα ὀνομάζειν τολμᾷ ἐν σεμνῷ πράγματι and by Critias at *Xen. Mem.* 1. 2. 37. —ὥς, "as if", with accusative absolute. It is easy to change it to ὥσπερ, but hardly necessary: cf. *Phaedo* 109 d 7 ὥς ("as if") διὰ τούτου οὐρανοῦ ὄντος τὰ ἄστρα χωροῦντα.

491 a 4—492 c 8. Callicles further amends his definition of “the better sort of people”. They are not base technicians: they are men who have applied their intelligence to politics, and who have the courage to enforce their views without “spiritual softness”. Socrates asks if these predestined rulers will rule themselves, i.e. control their passions. Callicles replies that the proper use of courage and intelligence is not to repress the passions (κολάζειν, *e* 9) but to gratify them. Self-indulgence (ἀκολασία) is condemned only by those who lack the means or the spirit to practise it. The man who inherits or achieves power will not be put off by pious talk of “justice” and “self-control” but will satisfy his desires freely—for it is in this that true manhood (ἀρετή, 492 c 5) and true happiness consist.

Callicles’ thesis has now been cleared of misunderstandings: power belongs of right, not to casual majorities, and not to some specialized class of technicians, but to the man who is shrewd enough and bold enough to grasp it. To this he adds a second proposition: the holder of power both will and should aim at his own happiness, which consists in the maximum gratification of all his desires; justice and self-control, the “virtues” of the powerless, will have no attraction for him. The two propositions are interrelated in so far as disregard of ordinary moral standards is necessary both to the attainment of power and to the unrestrained satisfaction of desires. Both have always enjoyed, as Socrates observes (492 d 2), a great deal of unconfessed approval. Open advocacy of either was possibly less common in Plato’s day than it is in ours (when men of the calibre of Nietzsche and Pareto have made the first opinion respectable, and Freud is mistakenly supposed to authorize the second). Yet Glaucon in *Republic* ii assures us, perhaps with some exaggeration, that views of this general type are dinned into his ears by “thousands of people” (358 c). In any case, Callicles’ doctrine of power evidently agrees with the practice of the hard-faced ‘realist’ politicians whom we meet in Thucydides, and his ‘transvaluation of values’ is essentially the same which the historian describes in a celebrated chapter (3. 82. 4 τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ). What is less often noticed is that Isocrates more than once complains of a similar transvaluation—at least in certain circles—in the language of Athenian politics in the fourth century: οὐδὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνιοὶ τινες ἔτι χρῶνται κατὰ φύσιν (Callicles would say κατὰ νόμον), ἀλλὰ μεταφέρουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν καλλίστων πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ φαυλότατα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων (*Antid.* 283). Elsewhere he laments that people are now brought up to consider τὴν μὲν ἀκολασίαν δημοκρατίαν, τὴν δὲ παρανομίαν ἐλευθερίαν, τὴν δὲ παρρησίαν ἰσονομίαν, τὴν δ’ ἐξουσίαν τοῦ ταῦτα ποιεῖν εὐδαιμονίαν (*Areop.* 20, cf. *Panath.* 131). See further the passages quoted below, on 491 e 2, 492 a 4 and b 1; and for other illustrations of the shifting moral values of the time, Murray, *Greek Studies*, chap. vi.

It is clear that Plato himself, while passionately condemning the Calliclean view, perceived an element of truth in its rejection of “bourgeois” values. He could agree with Callicles that the true ruler—if he existed—would have a right to set himself above the law (*Polit.*

296 de, *Laws* 875 cd). He could also agree with him that much of what passes as "virtue" is in fact nothing but timidity or calculating avarice (*Phaedo* 68 d ff., *Rep.* 554 a ff.), and thus τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης (*Phaedo* 69 b 7). This did not, however, prevent him from recognizing the practical usefulness both of law and of δημοτική ἀρετή.

491 a 4. Οὐκ οὖν σὺ ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων; <τίνων> ὁ κρείττων . . . πλεόν ἔχων . . . πλεονεκτεῖ; For the accentuation of οὐκ οὖν see on 459 c 3. The first τίνων is masculine, the second partitive neuter with πλεόν ἔχων. —The MSS. make this one question, ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων ὁ κρείττων . . . πλεονεκτεῖ; That can hardly be correct. Plato elsewhere uses πλεόν ἔχειν with a simple partitive genitive (490 c 1, c 4, d 7, etc.), πλεονεκτεῖν either with partitive genitive (490 e 7) or with a preposition meaning "in respect of" (περὶ c. accus., *Lach.* 183 a 1, *Laws* 802 d 4; κατὰ c. accus., *Euthyphro* 15 a 3; εἰς, 490 d 11). Hirschig may have been right in deleting περὶ, as at 490 c 8; the preposition could perhaps have been added to show that τίνων is neuter, not masc. But the assumption of haplography is easier (cf. 451 d 5, a closely similar case) and, I think, fits the context better. The question οὐκ οὖν σὺ ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων (ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος); then retorts with its emphatic σὺ the preceding words of Callicles—"If we are not talking about these people, it is for you to say about whom we are talking." And if there are two questions, we can better understand Callicles' πρῶτον μὲν (see next note). Cf. also the double question at c 4, τίνας . . . καὶ εἰς ὅτι.

a 7. πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς κρείττους οἳ εἰσὶν introduces the answer to Socrates' first question. The answer to the second, τίνων δικαίως πλεονεκτήσουσιν, is never formally given but is implicit in the tirade which begins at 491 e 5.

b 1-2. οἳ ἄν—οἰκοῖτο. Cf. Meno's summary definition of ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή as ἰκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν (*Meno* 71 e 1), and Alcibiades' definition of τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς as τοὺς δυναμένους ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει (*Alc.* i 125 b 9).

b 4. μαλακίαν τῆς ψυχῆς, "spiritual softness", the characteristic fault of the man who is one-sidedly φιλόσοφος or μουσικός (*Thuc.* 2. 40. 1, *Pl. Rep.* 410 d 4). For Plato, self-indulgence is μαλακία (*Rep.* 556 c 1); but Callicles is thinking of the irresolute or over-scrupulous intellectual.

b 7. σοῦ, sc. κατηγορῶ. The μὲν clause being, as often, subordinate in sense (cf. on 465 c 3-5), its construction is ignored in the δὲ clause.

c 2. ἕτερόν τι ἡκεις ἔχων, "you come along with a fresh idea": cf. 518 a 7 ἡκεις . . . λέγων.

c 4. εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι, a colloquial expression of impatience, "tell me and have done with it". Cf. Eur. *Cyclops* 600 λαμπρὸν πυρώσας ὄμμ' ἀπαλλάχθῃθ' ἄπαξ: *Pl. Crat.* 425 d 7 εἰπόντες ἀπαλλαγῶμεν.

d 4. Τί δὲ αὐτῶν, ὦ ἐταῖρε; Socrates carries on the construction of Callicles' last words: "But (being) what, my friend, in relation to themselves?" i.e. πότερον αὐτῶν ἄρχοντας ἢ ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἀρχομένους; (do they rule their passions or are they ruled by them?). Callicles not unnaturally fails to grasp the meaning of this compressed question, and

exclaims **Τιή τί;** “What on earth (do you mean by that)?” Socrates then adds **Ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους;** but Callicles is still puzzled—he is not sure what Socrates means by these alternatives.

This way of explaining the passage is due to Wilamowitz (ii. 375), and seems to me the best that can be done with the transmitted text. **τιή τί;** occurs in this sense in a fragment of Aristophanes (569. 14); more often we find **τιή;** (*Knights* 126, etc.) or **τιή τί δῆ;** (*Wasps* 1155, etc.). None of these expressions appears elsewhere in Plato (if our MSS. can be trusted on such a point); but the *Gorgias* has many echoes of the language of comedy. Both the scholiast and Ol attribute the disputed words to Callicles, and I believe that Ol read them as **τιή τί;** or **τιή;** though the relevant sentence in his paraphrase has unluckily been corrupted in transmission. Norvin prints (138. 17) **ὁ τοίνυν Καλλικλῆς οὐ νοεῖ τί αὐτῷ λέγει, ἀλλά φησιν, ὅτι ἢ τοῦτο ἀντί του λέγεις;** The latter part of this is nonsense, but is easily corrected to **ἀλλά φησιν ὅτι <Τι>ή; τοῦτο ἀντί του λέγεις;** (where the last four words explain **τιή**).

Editors who attribute the words to Socrates fail, I think, to make anything convincing of them. I find it hard to believe with Theiler that **τί ἢ τί ἀρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους;** could be equivalent to **τί ἀρχοντας ἢ τί ἀρχομένους;** Nor, if it could, would this sense be appropriate to the context: Socrates is asking *whether*, not *in what*, Callicles' rulers will rule themselves. Burnet wrote **Τί δέ; αὐτῶν, ὧ ἐταῖρε, τί; ἢ τι ἀρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους;** But **ἢ τι** is not wanted (**ἢ . . . ἢ** or **ἢ . . . ἢ** is not normally used in Attic prose for **πότερον . . . ἢ**). Nineteenth-century editors mostly cut the knot as did V, by deletions of varying extent. But there is no reason to tamper with **ἀρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους:** **ὑφ' αὐτοῦ ἀρχεσθαι** has the same sense as **ἡττω αὐτοῦ εἶναι**, which is used **ὅταν . . . κρατηθῇ ὑπὸ πλήθους τοῦ χειρόνος μικρότερον τὸ βέλτιον ὄν** (*Rep.* 431 a 7). And merely to delete **τί ἢ τί** without accounting for its presence is a counsel of despair. Hermann boldly emended it to **τί οἶ;**

For the thought, Shorey quoted Rabelais i. 52, ‘Car comment, disoit-il, pourrois-je gouverner aultruy, qui moy-mesmes gouverner ne scaurois?’

d 8. τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ. We might expect **τούτου**, but the pronoun merely anticipates the following infinitive: so [Dem.] 10. 15 **τοῦτο δεῖ . . . ὑπειληφέναι:** Eur. *Supp.* 594 **ἐν δεῖ μόνον μοι, τοὺς θεοὺς ἔχειν.** At *Theaet.* 184 a 8, **δεῖ δὲ οὐδέτερα,** we must, I think, supply **ποιεῖν.**

d 11. ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, “what most people mean by it”. That such expressions were in common use appears from *Rep.* 430 e 6 **κόσμος πού τις, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τινων καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια, ὥς φασι, κρείττω δὲ αὐτοῦ λέγοντες οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινα τρόπον.** Cf. Antiphon soph., *Vors.* 87 (80) B 58, **κρατεῖν τε καὶ νικᾶν αὐτὸς αὐτόν.** This way of speaking interested Plato: in the *Protagoras* (353 c ff.) he makes Socrates discuss the meaning of **ἡττᾶσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν** and explain it away as a matter of faulty moral arithmetic; but in the *Republic* and the *Laws* he cites **κρείττω αὐτοῦ εἶναι** as implying the existence of two conflicting “selves” (*Rep.* 431 a, *Laws* 626 e). He

does not draw this consequence here, but is content to explain *ἐαυτοῦ* as meaning *τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ*.

e 2. *Ὡς ἡδύς εἶ*, "How amusing you are!" So *Euthyd.* 300 a 6, *Rep.* 337 d 6. Timaeus, *Lex. Plat.* *ἡδύς· εὐήθης καὶ ἄφρων. τοὺς ἡλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας*, "You are calling the silly the sober," "When you say 'sober' you mean 'silly'." So *Laches* 195 e 1 *τοὺς μάντεις καλεῖ τοὺς ἀνδρείους*, "when he speaks of the brave he means seers". For this valuation of *σωφροσύνη* cf. *Thuc.* 3. 82. 4 *ἐνομίσθη . . . τὸ σώφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα* and *Pl. Rep.* 560 d 3 *σωφροσύνην ἀνανδρίαν καλοῦντές τε καὶ προπηλακίζοντες ἐκβάλλουσι*. Thrasyarchus similarly describes *δικαιοσύνη* as *γενναία εὐήθεια*, *Rep.* 348 c 12, and Meno identifies *τὸ ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθές* with *τὸ ἡλίθιον*, *Xen. Anab.* 2. 6. 22. At a later date it is a recognized rhetorical device to 'devalue' an opponent's ethical arguments by showing, e.g., that what he calls 'justice' is really cowardice and lack of enterprise (*Rhet. ad Herenn.* 3. 3. 6).

e 3. *Πῶς γάρ [οὔ];—οὐ τοῦτο λέγω*. "How so? As anyone could see, that is *not* what I am saying." I cannot believe with Nestle that the negative before *τοῦτο* is pleonastic. Some editors read *Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—τοῦτο* (or, with B, *οὔτω*) *λέγω*, and punctuate in e 2 *τοὺς ἡλιθίους λέγεις, τοὺς σώφρονας*; "You mean those fools, the temperate?" "Certainly: anyone may know that to be my meaning" (Jowett). But (i) this seems inferior in sense (it ignores Callicles' point entirely); (ii) while either negative could in principle be the result of ditto-graphy, B's *οὔτω* is unidiomatic, and the absence of accent and breathing betrays it as in fact the result of haplography; (iii) the other reading accounts much better for Callicles' emphatic *Πάνυ γε σφόδρα* and the *ἐπεὶ* which follows (see next note).

e 5. *Πάνυ γε σφόδρα*, "It quite certainly *is* what you are saying." For this use of *γε* in contradicting a denial see Denniston, 132. F is perhaps right in repeating *τοῦτο*. *ἐπεὶ* then introduces Callicles' reasons for identifying the *σώφρονες*, as defined by Socrates, with the *ἡλίθιοι* (showing that Socrates has not conceded his point).

492 a 4. *ἀποκρυπτόμενοι τὴν αὐτῶν ἀδυναμίαν*. Glaucon in *Republic* ii similarly argues that those who practise honesty do so *ἀδυναμία τοῦ ἀδικεῖν* (359 b 6); and Plutarch tells us that the many were thought to have invented moral rules *ἀτολμία τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ φόβῳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι* (*Thes.* 6).

a 6. *ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν*: 483 b–484 a.

b 1. *διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν*. For the school to which Callicles belongs "unmanliness" was (and is) the most damning reproach: they pride themselves on being "real he-men" (*ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρες*, *Rep.* 359 b 2). *ἀνανδρία γάρ*, says the Euripidean Eteocles, *τὸ πλεον ὅστις ἀπολέσας | τοῦλασσαν ἔλαβε* (*Phoen.* 509); it is *ἀνανδρον* not to hit back (Antiphon, *Tetral.* A. 1. 8); in the opinion of Meno it is even *ἀνανδρον* to respect one's oath (*Xen. Anab.* 2. 6. 25); and *σωφροσύνη* is nothing but a cover for *ἀνανδρία* (*Thuc.* 3. 82. 4, *Rep.* 560 d 3, quoted above on 491 e 2). The Anonymus Iamblichi (see on 488 d 6) pro-

tests against such opinions: respect for law should not be dismissed as cowardice (*Vors.* 89 [82], 6. 1).

b 2. F's *ῥοοις* is unquestionably the true reading, of which *θεοῖς* is a typical uncial corruption (OC read as ΘΕ, an error which is probable also at Eur. *Heraclid.* 911); the other variants, *δὲ οῖς*, *γε οῖς*, *τοῖς*, are merely inexpert attempts to emend *θεοῖς*. *αὐτοὺς τῇ φύσει ἱκανοὺς*, like Archelaus; cf. *Laws* 875 c 4, quoted on 484 a 2. For the shift from dative to accusative see on 510 e 7–8.

b 3. *ἡ τυραννίδα ἢ δυναστείαν*, "the absolute power of an individual or a group". These are two kinds of *ἀρχή*. *δυναστεία* stands to oligarchy as tyranny does to monarchy (Ar. *Pol.* 1292^b10, 1293^a31); it is group-tyranny, and as such is opposed to the rule of law (Thuc. 4. 78. 3, *Laws* 680 ab). The rule of the Thirty at Athens was a *δυναστεία* (Andocides 2. 27).

b 4. *〈τί ἄν〉* is almost certainly the right supplement, since the loss of the words is accounted for by haplography. It is very doubtful if Plato ever omits *ἄν* with the optative in direct questions: see Thompson on *Meno* 97 c (appendix), Adam on *Rep.* 437 b, Kühner-G. i. 230. And to insert *τί* here with Y and *ἄν* after *κάκιον* with Coraës is to neglect transcriptional probability. —For the thought cf. *Clouds* 1071 ff., and the elaborate defence of hedonism (partly borrowed from this passage?) which Aristoxenus put in the mouth of one Polyarchus (fr. 50 Wehrli = Athen. 545 b ff.).

b 5. *οἷς ἐξὸν . . . ἐπαγάγοιντο*: the relative is accommodated to the immediately following participle, as at *Rep.* 466 a 1 *οἷς ἐξὸν πάντα ἔχειν . . . οὐδὲν ἔχοιεν*. Cf. the related idiom by which a demonstrative replaces a second relative where there is a change of case (452 d 3 note).

b 8. *νόμον τε καὶ λόγον καὶ ψόγον*, "prudish talk of legality". *λόγον* might be a false variant for *ψόγον*, to whose meaning it seems at first sight to add little (in this context it can hardly mean "reason", as Jowett renders it). But its implication is perhaps "mere words" in contrast to *ἔργα*, and the rhyming effect may be deliberate (cf. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style*, 137, who sees in it a parody of a Gorgian mannerism).

c 1. *εἴησαν*. The trisyllabic forms of the optative of *εἶναι* are relatively rare in the MSS. of Plato, but we need not exclude them systematically. 'Rutherford's rigid ostracism of the longer forms in the plural is not justified by the evidence' (Pearson on Sophocles fragm. 222. 7). Cf. *Hipp. ma.* 301 d 8 *εἴημεν* MSS. (*εἶμεν* Burnet), *Laches* 190 a 6 *εἰδείημεν* MSS. (*εἰδεῖμεν* Burnet). Long forms are protected by metre at Eur. *Cycl.* 132, *Ion* 943, *Hel.* 1010.

τοῦ καλοῦ τούτου. It would be rash to assert that *τὸ καλὸν τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης* is not a possible Greek phrase; but since no one has produced a Platonic (or any) parallel for it, I incline to accept Hisink's very easy correction (which was proposed again by Richards). For the contemptuous use of *τούτου* cf. c 6 *ταῦτα τὰ καλλωπίσματα*, 486 c 8 *τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα*, 500 c 4 *τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα*, and notes on 467 b 1, 470 d 5.

c 2. μηδὲν πλέον νέμοντες τοῖς φίλοις. The 'spoils system' was taken for granted in Greek politics. Cf. *Rep.* 362 c 1 πλεονεκτοῦντα . . . τοὺς τε φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν.

c 4. ἦν φῆς σὺ διώκειν: cf. 458 a, 482 e 4, 487 e 7. The ancient admirers of φύσις regularly associate it with ἀλήθεια (just as their modern successors like to call themselves 'realists'): cf. Antiphon soph., fr. 44 A, col. 2; Aeschines 3. 168; Dirlmeier, *Gnomon*, xxviii (1956), 345.

c 6. Since the article marks τὰ καλλωπίσματα and τὰ—ἀνθρώπων as subject, not predicate, the sentence would run more smoothly without ἐστίν, which may well be a gloss or a mechanical repetition from the preceding line; it could also be, as Schanz thought, a mistake for ἄρα arising from confusion of similar *compendia*. Others have deleted one or both of the articles. Cf., however, 474 e 5–7 and *Phaedo* 110 d 7, where the verb is interposed, as here, between phrases which stand in apposition. καλλωπίσματα: embellishments, "fine talk". Cf. Eur. *Cyclops* 316 f.

ὁ πλοῦτος, ἀνθρωπίσκε, τοῖς σοφοῖς θεός,
τὰ δ' ἄλλα κόμπτοι καὶ λόγων εὐμορφίαι.

c 7. συνθήματα: see on 483 b 4.

492 d 1–493 d 4. After complimenting Calicles once more on his candour, Socrates adduces the diametrically opposite view, that happiness consists in liberation from the tyranny of desire. That, says Calicles, would be the happiness of a stone or a corpse. But Socrates thinks the hedonist is in no better case. He quotes the opinion of "a certain wise man" (του . . . τῶν σοφῶν, a 1) that we are in Hades now, and those who suffer most are those condemned perpetually to seek to satisfy insatiable desires. This, said the wise man, was the real meaning of that "ingenious person" (κομψὸς ἀνὴρ, a 5) who told of the uninitiated that in Hades they carry water in a sieve and pour it into a leaking jar. These "uninitiated" are in reality the unwise or thoughtless, and sieve and jar are an image of their leaky souls.

With this allegorized myth (an echo of which appears in Lucretius 3. 936) Socrates opens his counter-attack on Calicles' position. But while the conception of happiness as freedom from desire is no doubt Socratic (see below, on e 3), he disclaims responsibility both for the myth and for its interpretation; and we should accept his disclaimer as indicating that their source lies elsewhere than in the Socratic tradition. Both (i) the nature of the source (or sources) and (ii) the original meaning of the myth have been much discussed.

On (i), the most important contributions are those of R. Hirzel in *Commentationes in honorem Th. Mommseni* (Berlin, 1877), 11 ff., Wilamowitz (ii. 82 ff.), Frank (90 ff., 298 ff.), and I. M. Linforth, 'Soul and Sieve in Plato's *Gorgias*', *Univ. of California Publications in Classical Philology*, 12. 17 (1944). Many of the earlier discussions are vitiated by failure to distinguish between the author of the myth and the immediate informant from whom Socrates professes to have heard of it, although the truth was already perceived by Boeckh in 1819 (*Des Philolaos Bruchstücke*, 183). That the two are distinct is surely clear

from b 7. There $\delta\ \pi\rho\acute{o}s\ \epsilon\mu\acute{\epsilon}\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega\nu$ is the person described at a 1 as $\tau\omicron\nu\ \tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \sigma\omicron\phi\acute{\omega}\nu$, while the subject of $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\iota$ is the $\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ of b 3, who is in turn the $\kappa\omicron\mu\phi\acute{o}\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\eta\rho$ of a 5. This is confirmed by the introduction of $\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha$ ("it seems") at a 5 and b 7, which shows that Socrates is reporting the views of the $\kappa\omicron\mu\phi\acute{o}\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\eta\rho$ at second hand: cf. the use of $\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha$ at *Phaedo* 111 e 5, 112 e 5, etc.

Socrates does not claim to know, and we cannot know, the identity of the $\kappa\omicron\mu\phi\acute{o}\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\eta\rho$. He is not a philosopher but a teller of myths ($\mu\upsilon\theta\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\acute{\omega}\nu$, a 5); this rules out Ol's suggestion of Empedocles. I take him to be the anonymous author of an old religious poem, which told about the sufferings of the uninitiated in Hades. This may well have been a work of the same general type as the poem of which fragments are preserved on the so-called 'Orphic' gold plates. But to label either poem 'Orphic' is to assume more than the evidence strictly warrants. At *Rep.* 363 d 5 ff., where Socrates mentions the belief that in Hades "the impure and unjust" carry water in a sieve, he does not specify its source; and the fear of *post mortem* punishments was by no means confined to 'Orphic sectaries' (cf. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griech. Religion*, i. 651 ff., 767 ff.). Magna Graecia may have been a centre of diffusion of such literature: the majority of the gold plates were found in South Italy, and underworld scenes were a speciality with South Italian vase-painters; the oldest representations of the Watercarriers are on two black-figure vases from this region, reproduced in Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, figs. 164, 165.

We can perhaps be a little more definite about Socrates' informant, the $\sigma\omicron\phi\acute{o}\varsigma$, though he too is nameless. There are a number of places where—probably in order to avoid crediting Socrates with opinions which were in fact not held by him—Plato makes Socrates quote the views of unnamed $\sigma\omicron\phi\omicron\iota$. At 507 e 6 ff. $\omicron\iota\ \sigma\omicron\phi\omicron\iota$ are the authority for certain views about the world-order. At *Meno* 81 a Socrates has heard about transmigration from $\acute{\alpha}\nu\delta\rho\acute{\omega}\nu\ \tau\epsilon\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \gamma\upsilon\gamma\upsilon\alpha\iota\kappa\acute{\omega}\nu\ \sigma\omicron\phi\acute{\omega}\nu\ \pi\epsilon\rho\iota\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\ \theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\ \pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\gamma\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$, who are further described as "priests and priestesses who have studied their subject". And at *Rep.* 583 b we have $\delta\omicron\kappa\acute{\omega}\ \mu\omicron\iota\ \tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \sigma\omicron\phi\acute{\omega}\nu\ \tau\iota\nu\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\kappa\eta\kappa\omicron\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\iota$ that physical pleasures are illusory. In the first two cases the $\sigma\omicron\phi\omicron\iota$ can be identified with confidence as Pythagoreans, and this is probable in the *Republic* passage also (see Adam's appendix ad loc.). Analogy thus favours the expectation that the $\sigma\omicron\phi\acute{o}\varsigma$ of our text will be a Pythagorean, and not (as Linforth thinks) simply a mask for Plato himself. And internal evidence supports it. What the $\sigma\omicron\phi\acute{o}\varsigma$ seems to have done was to read into the old poem an allegorical intention, of which it was probably in fact entirely innocent. It was he who vouched for the interpretation of the sieve as the "leaky" soul and the uninitiated as the "thoughtless", thus transforming a myth about the next world into an allegory of this one: men suffer the torments of Hell here and now, $\delta\iota'\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu\ \tau\epsilon\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\eta\nu$ —words which seem to have little meaning save in the mouth of a Pythagorean (see note on c 3). Now, as Frank pointed out, the Pythagoreans could not accept the traditional underworld literally,

since their astronomy left no room for it; they were therefore driven to allegorize it, as they allegorized Homer. We find Empedocles in fact doing this when he equates our world with "the joyless place" and "the meadow of Ate" (fr. 121, cf. Rohde, *Psyche*, Eng. trans. 403 f., and Jaeger, *Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers*, 148 f.); and later Pythagoreans did the same (Macrobius in *Somn. Scip.* I. 10. 7-17). Our σοφός is thus likely to have been a Pythagorean. His name we do not know, and it is quite possible that Plato did not know it either: Pythagorean writings were often circulated anonymously, or under the Founder's name. If on the other hand he was some one like Archytas, whom Plato met when he visited Magna Graecia, this might explain why Socrates conjectures the original poem to be Sicilian or Italian (so Frank). Socrates does not, however, tell us that the σοφός was himself Sicilian or Italian, and the identification with Archytas remains little more than a guess. Many scholars have thought of Philolaos, on the strength of 'Philolaos' fr. 14, which contains the σῶμα-σῆμα equation; but its authenticity is unfortunately very doubtful (cf. Wilamowitz, 90 ff.; Frank, 301 f.). The σοφός is represented (for what that is worth) as an oral informant, and there is no evidence that Socrates ever met either Philolaos or the much younger Archytas.

(ii) For theories about the original meaning of the Myth of the Watercarriers see Rohde, *Psyche*, Appendix III; Frazer on Pausanias 10. 31. 9; Cook, *Zeus*, iii. 361 ff. The old poem identified them with the uninitiated, and the same identification was explicitly made before the middle of the fifth century in Polygnotus' painting of the Underworld at Delphi (Paus. 10. 31. 9)—which suggests that it was not the peculiar fancy of 'Orphic sectaries'. In this version the water-carrying no doubt represents a frustrated effort to achieve the purifications which these unfortunates had neglected in their lifetime. κοσκίνω ὕδωρ φέρειν was a proverbial ἀδύνατον (Apostolius 9. 91, cf. Xen. *Oec.* 7. 40), and frustrated activity is widely thought to characterize the state of the dead (cf. Tantalus, Sisyphus, Cook iii. 448), as it does the nightmares of the living from which the idea is perhaps derived (F. Boll, *Arch. f. Rel.* xix (1919), 151 ff.). The better-known opinion that the Watercarriers are the Danaids is first attested in the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus* (371 e) and in Plutarch, *Sept. Sap.* 160B, but may of course be older. Here the point is probably that the Danaids are ἄγαμοι: the sieve symbolizes non-consummation; the water may be thought of as intended for the bride-bath (Dieterich, *Nekyia*, 76); cf. the custom of putting a λουτροφόρος on the graves of ἄγαμοι. We cannot be sure which story is the original one. Polygnotus supports the old poem; and on the Palermo lekythos (Harrison fig. 165) some of the Watercarriers are male. But the story of the ἄγαμοι has, as Rohde said, the more primitive and popular flavour, and the association of the sieve-motif with virginity appears in other contexts. A chaste woman can carry water in a sieve (see F. J. Child, *English and Scottish Popular Ballads*, i. 270), and a Vestal Virgin is said to have

established her innocence by performing this feat (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2. 69, Pliny, *N.H.* 28. 12). Other scholars have claimed that the tale of the Watercarriers reflects a rainmaking ritual: so Cook, and so more recently (on archaeological evidence of doubtful relevance) C. F. A. Schaeffer, *Cuneiform Texts of Ras Shamra-Ugarit*, 54 ff. But direct evidence of the use of sieves in rainmaking appears to be wholly lacking.

492 d 1. Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς, used in commendation of frankness, like γενναίως at 475 d 7, 521 a 7. ἐπεξέρχη τῷ λόγῳ, “you develop your thesis” (Lamb): cf. *Rep.* 361 d 8.

d 5. πῶς βιωτέον. Before setting up his counter-attack Socrates restates the real issue: cf. 488 a, 500 c. The ostensible question of rhetoric has vanished into the background.

d 7. ἐτοιμάζειν depends on a verb of obligation implicit in κολαστέον. So *Crito* 51 b 9 ποιητέον . . . ἢ πείθειν.

e 3. λέγονται οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι κτλ. This is presumably an opinion of the historical Socrates: cf. *Lysis* 215 a, on the self-sufficiency of the ἀγαθός, Xen. *Mem.* 1. 2, 14 Σωκράτην ἀπ’ ἐλαχίστων μὲν χρημάτων αὐταρκέστατα ζῶντα, and especially *Mem.* 1. 6, where the sophist Antiphon taunts Socrates with his poor diet and with going barefoot and wearing the same garment winter and summer (§ 2), and Socrates retorts ἐγὼ δ’ ἐνόμιζον τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δ’ ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτῳ τοῦ θεοῦ (§ 10). Similar gibes at Socrates’ asceticism appear in comedy (*Clouds* 103, 363; Ameipsias fr. 9), and this aspect is prominent in the recently published fragments of a work on his life and apophthegms (*Hibeh Papyri* ii. 182). But λέγονται suggests that the ascetic ideal of happiness was not peculiar to Socrates. A comparable doctrine in fact appears in Democritus (fr. 284): ἦν μὴ πολλῶν ἐπιθυμέης, τὰ ὀλίγα τοι πολλὰ δόξει· σμικρὰ γὰρ ὄρεξις πενίην ἰσοοσθενέα πλούτῳ ποιεῖ. From Democritus this line of thought runs through Epicurus (*Kύρ. Δόξ.* 15) to Lucretius (5. 1118); and from Socrates through Antisthenes to the Stoics, who in turn were not without influence on the Christian ideal of the saint.

e 5. Οἱ λίθοι: see on 494 a 8. οἱ νεκροί. That the ascetic ideal amounts to a kind of death-in-life was a popular opinion. Cf. Soph. *Ant.* 1165 ff., where the Messenger opines that a man without pleasure is an ἔμψυχος νεκρός: Aristoph. *Clouds* 504, where Strepsiades is afraid of becoming ἡμιθνής if he joins Socrates’ school; and *Phaedo* 65 a 4 δοκεῖ . . . τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις . . . ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μὴδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰσιν. Menander (?) represents an enthusiastic convert to philosophy as exactly reversing this view: ἐγὼ τὸν ἄλλον, ἄνδρες, ἐτεθνήκειν βίον ἀπανθ’ ὃν ἔζην . . . νῦν δ’ ἐνθάδ’ ἐλθὼν . . . ἀναβεβίωκα (*Pap. Didotiana*, p. 145 Körte). ἄν . . . εἶεν: Schanz’s δὴ . . . εἰσιν seems less suitable as a reply to Socrates’ question, though the confusion of uncial δὴ with ἄν undoubtedly occurs in Plato (cf. 452 c 3): οὕτω = εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοι.

e 7. “On the other hand, the life of the people *you* call happy (492 c 4–6) is also a queer business.” For Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ . . . γε cf.

506 d 5, *Phaedo* 75 a 11 ("And yet").—ὦν seems to have been read by Iamblichus, whose paraphrase is τῶν ἀπεράντους ἔχόντων τὰς ἐπιθυμίας δεινὸς ὁ βίος. And this is much more to the point than ὥς, which gives the vaguer sense "life by your account is a queer business"—for Callicles has been talking not about "life" but about the best life. Cf. 494 e 4 ὁ τῶν κιναιδῶν βίος, οὗτος οὐ δεινός; which refers back to the present passage and supports ὦν. The same corruption seems to me probable at *Phdr.* 274 a 3.

e 10–11. The second line ran in full, as we learn from the scholiast and Sextus Empiricus, τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν κάτω νομίζεται. The same paradox appeared in a passage of Euripides' *Phrixus* (fr. 833):

τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ ζῆν τοῦθ' ὃ κέκληται θανεῖν,
τὸ ζῆν δὲ θνήσκειν ἐστί;

The present quotation is attributed by some of our authorities to the *Phrixus* (of which there were two editions), by others to the *Polyidos*. It would seem to have startled the poet's audience, for Aristophanes twice makes game of it in the *Frogs* (1082, 1477 f.). The underlying idea is usually labelled 'Orphic' or 'Orphic-Pythagorean'; but see next note. Sextus attributes something very like it to Heraclitus, though we cannot be sure how much his paraphrase reads into the original. His words are (*Pyrrh. Hyp.* 3. 230) ὁ δὲ Ἡράκλειτος φησιν ὅτι καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἐστί καὶ ἐν τῷ τεθνάναι· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς ζῶμεν, τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν τεθνάναι καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν τεθάρθαι (cf. 493 a 2–3), ὅτε δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀποθνήσκομεν, τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναβιοῦν καὶ ζῆν. Cf. also Heraclitus frs. 62, 88; and for the later history of the idea, Cumont, *Rev. de Phil.* xlv (1920), 230 ff.

493 a 2–3. τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα. This formulation may be Pythagorean (cf. Empedocles frs. 15, 118) or possibly Heraclitean (cf. Sextus, quoted in the preceding note). That it is *not* Orphic should be quite clear from *Crat.* 400 c: what is there attributed to οἱ ἀμφ' Ὀρφέα is the rival derivation of σῶμα from σῶζω (cf. my *Greeks and the Irrational*, chap. v, n. 87, and L. Moulinier, *Orphée et l'orphisme*, 24 ff.).

a 3–4. τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσὶ. Taylor claimed (120 n. 1) that this shows the Platonic tripartition of the soul to be Pythagorean in origin, as maintained by Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*³, 296 n. 2. But no tripartition is involved here. All that need be assumed is the popular distinction between reason and impulse which is already present, e.g., at Theognis 631 or Aesch. *Pers.* 767, and is referred to by Aristotle, *E.N.* 1102^a26, *de an.* 432^a26. It is worth noticing that the ἐπιθυμητικόν has as yet no name—it has twice to be described by a periphrasis. The tripartition appears first in the *Republic*, and the manner of its introduction at 435 bc strongly suggests that Plato devised it as a counterpart to the three classes in society (cf. Pohlenz 231 ff., Cornford, *CQ.*, 1912, 259 f., N. R. Murphy, *The Interpretation of Plato's Republic*, 29 f.).

There is something to be said for Richards's suggestion that ὅτι ("because") or the like has fallen out after these words, and τῆς

ψυχῆς τοῦτο is resumed in καὶ τοῦτο (a 5). 'The words τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς—κάτω, as they stand, are very pointless as something that Socrates learnt from a wise man along with the doctrine of σῶμα σῆμα. What he learnt is contained in διὰ τὸ—πίθον, a play upon words parallel to the other.' But the objection is hardly decisive.

a 5. κομψὸς ἀνὴρ, "an ingenious person" (Jowett). The epithet no doubt conveys a hint of irony, as often in Plato, e.g. at *Hipp. ma.* 288 d 4, *Rep.* 495 d 4. The phrase Σικελὸς κομψὸς ἀνὴρ occurs in a fragment of Timocreon (fr. 6 B.), but its context there is very different and I see no reason to assume that Plato had Timocreon in mind. It is in fact uncertain, both here and at *Soph.* 242 d 7, whether Plato wrote Σικελός or Σικελικός.

a 6. τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πειστικόν. These words would naturally be taken to mean "its plausible and persuasive character". But in view of οἶον ἀναπείθεσθαι (a 4) the majority of translators and commentators have thought it necessary to give both adjectives a passive sense, "its credulous and suggestible character". I doubt, however, whether the words would have been so understood by any fourth-century reader. It is true that πιθανός is used in the passive sense at *Xen. Cyr.* 2. 2. 10 and perhaps—as I incline to believe, *pace* Professor Fraenkel—at *Aesch. Ag.* 485; but this use is certainly rare in Attic Greek (see Fraenkel's note) and it is not found elsewhere in Plato (though he once uses ἀπίθανος for 'incredulous', *Parm.* 133 c 1), whereas he constantly employs the word in the active sense (cf. 457 a 6, 458 e 7 ff., 479 c 3). And again, while verbal adjectives in -ικός are not *invariably* used by Plato with an active meaning (see Taylor on *Tim.* 58 d 7, and Ammann, *ικος bei Platon*), they are normally so used, and πειστικός means "persuasive" everywhere else (455 a 4, *Polit.* 304 c 10, d 7, *Laws* 723 a 2). Prof. Fraenkel suggests in his note that the adjectives may be antithetical, "both persuasive (πιθανόν) and persuadable"; while Prof. Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek Religion*, 161, reverses the meanings, translating "both persuadable (πιθανόν) and persuasive". But if Plato had intended an antithesis, would he not have chosen less ambiguous terms? And would he not have preferred to write τὸ πιθανόν καὶ τὸ πειστικόν (cf. Denniston, 516, Kühner-G. i. 611)? Little is gained by adopting πιστικόν, which is probably a mere miswriting for πειστικόν (see on 455 a 4): the sense "loyal" which Hirzel and Nestle attributed to it is neither appropriate to the context (cf. c 3) nor attested for Attic Greek. We expect an unambiguously passive word, and I am strongly tempted to write πειστόν: cf. *Tim.* 51 e, where δόξα ἀληθής, in contrast to νοῦς, is said to be ἄλογον and μεταπειστόν: and *Parm.* 135 a 7, where δυσανάπειστος is synonymous with ἀπίθανος at 133 c 1. The passive sense of πιθανόν (which is introduced solely for the sake of the pun on πίσος) would then be explained by the addition of πειστόν. For the use of τε καὶ to tack on an explanation cf., e.g., *Prot.* 314 a 1 ὅρα . . . μὴ . . . κυβεύης τε καὶ κινδυνεύης, and Verdenius's note, *Mnem.* iv. 8 (1955), 274 f.

a 7. ἀμυήτους. I doubt if we are meant to think of this as “unstoppered” (as if from μύειν).

b 2. <συνεῖς> τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ. τὸ ἀκόλ. αὐτοῦ κτλ. cannot stand in apposition to τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς κτλ., since αὐτοῦ—which must then be a partitive genitive—will have nothing to which it can refer; it is hardly credible that it refers κατὰ σύνεσιν to ψυχῆς. It seems that we must either get rid of αὐτοῦ (with Sauppe) or introduce a word to govern τὸ ἀκόλαστον (διὰ Heindorf, but we have διὰ in the next line, and συνεῖς would fall out more easily after εἰσί). Hirschig considered the whole phrase τὸ—στεγανόν to be a gloss, but στεγανόν is hardly a glossator’s word. ὥς depends on an ἔλεγεν implicit in ὠνόμασε (a 7). Madvig wished to make it depend on ἀπεικάσας, and therefore deleted the δ’ in b 1, remarking that this part of the sentence merely explains what precedes, without adding anything fresh. But so far we have only had the equation ‘jar = ἐπιθυμητικόν’; what is added is the equation ‘leaky jar = ἐπιθυμητικόν of the thoughtless’.

b 3. οὗτος: the κομψὸς ἀνὴρ.

b 4. αἰδῆς F and probably Ol (who paraphrases by ἀφανές, 141. 10): αἰδῆς BTP Stob.: ἀηδῆς W Iamb. At *Phaedo* 79 a 4 ff. αἰδῆς (B) is certainly a mere miswriting (itacism) for αἰδής, as the context shows; and so probably here. The derivation of Ἀιδῆς from ἀ-ιδεῖν is implied at *Phaedo* 81 c 10–11, and mentioned as current at *Crat.* 403 a 6 (where again BT have αἰδῆς), though there Socrates prefers to connect the name with αἰεῖ εἰδέναι (404 b 2). αἰδῆς applies better to the underworld Hades than to the terrestrial; but the latter might perhaps be called “invisible” in the sense that we do not perceive ourselves to be in it. The context affords no basis for reading αἰδῆς and linking it with αἰεῖ δεῖν (Pohlenz 147). ἀηδῆς is not, I think, impossible: cf. Empedocles fr. 121. 1, where the terrestrial Hades is called ἀτερπέα χῶρον.

b 5. ἄν seems to weaken the statement by reducing it to a mere conjecture or inference, and in omitting it Stob. is supported by F and Iamblichus. For the irregular sequence (which may have led to the insertion of ἄν) cf. *Hipp. mi.* 365 b 3 ἐν τούτοις δηλοῖ τοῖς ἔπεσιν (sc. Ὁμηρος) . . . ὥς ὁ μὲν Ἀχιλλεὺς εἶη ἀληθής: the verb in each passage, though present in form, has a past reference.

b 6. ἐτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ, κοσκίνῳ. τετρημένῳ does not qualify κοσκίνῳ (as though to distinguish it from sieves without holes), but explains ἐτέρῳ τοιούτῳ. The explanation may have been added by a glossator, as Hirschig thought, but this does not seem to me certain. Cf. *Lysis* 218 d 2 ὥσπερ ἀνθρώποις ἀλαζόσιν λόγοις τισὶν τοιούτοις ψευδέσιν ἐντετυχήκαμεν, where Burnet follows Heindorf in bracketing ψευδέσιν.

b 7. λέγει, “he means” (sc. the κομψὸς ἀνὴρ). ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγων: the σοφός. In a 7 the πίθος symbolized the “leaky” ἐπιθυμητικόν, whereas here the κόσκινον is the “leaky” soul; but we must not press the details of the allegory (which was originally no allegory) too hard.

c 2. τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὥς τετρημένην was deleted by Cobet. But τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων is really required by the sense (not all souls are sieves);

and although Theiler objects that souls are not literally perforated, ὡς τετρημένην seems sufficiently explained by what follows—some souls are “leaky” in the sense that they cannot retain (στέγειν) what they once possessed (see next note). Seneca writes (*Ep.* 99. 5) *si modo non perforato animo hauriebamus*, evidently with this passage in mind.

c 3. δι’ ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ λήθην, “because of its unreliability and forgetfulness”? Both words are slightly odd in this context, yet the phrase does not look to me much like a gloss. ἀπιστίαν is usually translated “incredulity” (which is its regular meaning in Plato); but this directly contradicts οἶον ἀναπείθεσθαι (a 4). Nestle thinks the contradiction is intended: the ἐπιθυμητικόν of the foolish is incredulous, while that of the σώφρονες is open to the suggestions of reason. But μεταπίπτειν ἄνω κάτω is surely a characteristic of *all* appetites, and not a favourable one (cf. 481 d 7). λήθην must, I suppose, be understood as forgetfulness of past satisfactions. My own guess is that in the document Plato is summarizing the words had a specific meaning which Plato does not choose to expound (he breaks off instead with the remark that “all this stuff is a bit odd”). To the allegorizing Pythagorean ἀπιστία meant, I think, lack of faith in the Word of Pythagoras, and λήθη forgetfulness of the soul’s divine origin. These terms are the opposites of the great Pythagorean virtues: the monad was called μνημοσύνη, the decad πίστις (Philolaos *apud* [Iamb.] *Theol. Arithm.* 81. 15 de Falco). Cf. *Phdr.* 248 c, where the soul falls into generation λήθης τε καὶ κακίας πλησθεῖσα, and the river Ἀμέλης, οὗ τὸ ὕδωρ ἀγγεῖον οὐδὲν στέγειν, *Rep.* 621 a. When he wrote the *Gorgias*, Plato was not yet ready to take over this religious doctrine and transpose it into his own terms, but he must have been aware of it; for another probable trace of it see on 525 b 1–526 d 2. (I find that the substance of this suggestion has been anticipated by Carcopino, *La Basilique pythagoricienne* 287.)

ἐπιεικῶς . . . ὑπό τι ἄτοπα, “broadly speaking, a bit on the queer side”. For ἐπιεικῶς cf. 485 e 2; for ὑπό τι, *Phdr.* 242 d 7 ὑπό τι ἀσεβῆ. While ὑπό τι attenuates ἄτοπα, ἐπιεικῶς marks it as a generalization whose truth is only broadly affirmed: cf. *Hipp. Coac.* 140 ἐς τεταρταῖον ἐπιεικῶς, “on the fourth day generally speaking”. Like Thompson, I am inclined to question the alleged concessive use of ἐπιεικῶς (“no doubt”, Germ. *freilich*) both here and elsewhere. Cobet wished to delete ἐπιεικῶς, and Thompson thought of deleting ὑπό τι, but neither looks like a glossator’s word (ἐπιεικῶς is itself a γλῶσσα in Hesychius). A comparable combination is σχεδὸν ἐπιεικῶς (*Phil.* 31 a 2). —This sentence seems to me to tell against Linforth’s view that the allegorical interpretation is Plato’s original contribution: had it been so, he would scarcely have made Socrates describe it in these terms. The words need not, however, imply any doubt on Plato’s part that the myth of the Watercarriers does express an important religious truth: cf. *Tim.* 20 d 7 λόγου μάλα μὲν ἄτοπου, παντάπασί γε μὴν ἀληθοῦς. As Stenzel said, ‘When the method of Socrates is amplified by the

introduction of new and strange doctrines, we see these doctrines in the sceptical perspective of Socrates as the chief speaker; otherwise his true character could not have been retained' (*Plato's Method of Dialectic*, trans. Allan, 14).

c 5. μεταθέσθαι, "to change your move", a metaphor from the game of πεσσοί.

c 6. τοῖς ἀεὶ παροῦσιν, "what it happens to have". Cf. Democritus fr. 191 τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀρκέεσθαι.

d 1. μετατίθεσθαι, "are you converted to the view that . . .?" Cf. *Theaet.* 202 c 7 ἀρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτη; The primary MSS. have μετατίθεσθαι, which has been defended by the parallel with 494 a 3 πείθω τί σε . . . συγχωρήσαι. But the preceding καὶ ("actually"?) is then awkward. An identical corruption must, I think, be assumed at *Laches* 199 d 1, where Burnet accepted the reading of BTW οὕτως αὖ μετατίθεσθαι ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Νικία;

493 d 5–495 b 9. Socrates further illustrates the difference between Callicles' ideal and his own by the apologue of the sound and the leaky jars. Callicles remains unconvinced: without a constant process of replenishment (πλήρωσις) there can be no pleasure, and without pleasure one might as well be a stone. Socrates retorts that if his ideal is "a stone's life", that of Callicles is "a curlew's life", and proceeds to show by shocking examples what Callicles' conception of happiness logically involves. Callicles is momentarily shaken, but "for the sake of consistency" (495 a 5) still maintains the identity of the good and the pleasurable.

Socrates' apologue picks out from the myth of the Watercarriers a single significant element, the leaky jar, and skilfully uses it to enforce the conception of pleasure as πλήρωσις, which was implicit in the myth (as interpreted by the σοφός) and appears to have been formally stated by Empedocles: cf. Aetius 4. 9. 15 (*Vors.* 31 [21] A 95) Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὰς ἡδονὰς γίνεσθαι . . . κατὰ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν. This idea played an important part in subsequent ethical discussions, as we see from Aristotle, *E.N.* 1173^b7 ff. Callicles assumes that *all* pleasure involves πλήρωσις (494 a 6–7), and Socrates does not contradict him; he appears to make the same assumption himself at *Rep.* 585 b, where even intellectual pleasures are explained in these terms. He does, however, at *Rep.* 584 b and *Phil.* 51 a ff. make the vital distinction that certain aesthetic and intellectual pleasures, though occasioned by a πλήρωσις, involve no antecedent consciousness of want (see below, on 495 e 2–497 d 8).

Callicles is a consistent hedonist in refusing to recognise any qualitative distinction between "better" and "worse" pleasures: to do so would be to recognize that "better" means something different from "more pleasant" (cf. *Phil.* 13 bc). Bentham similarly held that 'quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry'. He hastened indeed to add that quantity of pleasure was *not* equal; but of that proposition he offered, and could offer, no proof whatever. This is the theory which at *Rep.* 561 bc Plato sardonically characterized as "democratic": all pleasures have exactly equal rights. Socrates now

attacks it with a *reductio ad absurdum*, showing it to be just as “queer” in its consequences as Socrates’ own view. We may compare Russell’s remark that ‘If we were really persuaded that pigs are happier than human beings, we should not on that account welcome the ministrations of Circe’ (*Human Society in Ethics and Politics*, 117). But such arguments depend for their effect on the opponent’s recognizing the absurdity; and Callicles, though perceptibly shaken, formally declines to do so. A dialectical disproof therefore follows.

493 d 5. ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου, “from the same school”: cf. Aristoph. *Wasps* 526 τὸν ἐκ θήμετέρου γυμνασίου, and Longinus, *de subl.* 4. 4, where Xenophon and Plato are described as ἐκ τῆς Σωκράτους ὄντες παλαιόστρας. Hirzel and others take the present phrase to mean merely “from the same domain of fancy”; and assume (with the scholiast) that the apologue is entirely Socrates’ own invention, or rather Plato’s. But it is surely more natural to see in it an acknowledgement, possibly to Empedocles (see preceding note), though Plato has no doubt used his freedom in adapting his predecessor’s idea to the requirements of his argument.

e 1. ὑγιεῖς, the trade term for “sound” goods, as opposed to σαθροί “faulty” (e 8): see the inscriptional evidence in L.S.J. s.v.

e 3. χαλεπὰ, “difficult (to come by)”. The word is often thought to be a gloss imported from e 7, where πορίζεσθαι is easily supplied to complete its meaning. It is used, however, very much as in the proverb χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ (*Hirsh. ma.* 304 e 8), and is explained by the addition of μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκποριζόμενα.

e 4–6. “The one man, having once got his jars filled, conducts no more supplies to them nor gives them a further thought; his mind is at rest so far as they are concerned.” The middle πληρωσάμενος is used with reference to the agent’s interest. Cope and Lamb were surely mistaken in treating it as reflexive, “having filled himself (from the jars)”; for the jars *are* the desires, or their seat, as in 493 a. ἐποχτεύουσι implies that the liquids are piped into the jars: the imagery of the sieves is dropped. It cannot mean “draws off” (Lamb). Plato uses a different but related image at *Laws* 636 d, where pleasure and pain are two πηγαί, and happiness depends on drawing from each the right amount at the right time.

e 7. εἴη, which Heindorf rightly restored from Iamblichus’ citation, now proves to be in F as well. Its omission in the first family either occasioned or was occasioned by the omission of δ’ after ἀναγκάζοιτο; which the author of the Y recension in turn tried to remedy by inserting καὶ.

494 a 1. ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας. Similarly at *Rep.* 574 a 3 Socrates says of the gratification of uncontrolled desires by the slaves of habit ἀναγκαῖον δὴ πανταχόθεν φέρειν, ἢ μεγάλαις ὠδῖσί τε καὶ ὀδύναις συνέχεσθαι.

a 8. νυνδὴ: 492 e 5. τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν: Taylor aptly compared Hobbes, *Leviathan*, c. xi, ‘Nor can a man any more live, whose desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and Imaginations are at a stand.

. . . So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death.' A stone can symbolize hardness, e.g. *Od.* 23. 103 σοὶ δ' αἰεὶ κραδίη στερεωτέρη ἐστὶ λίθιοι, or stupidity, e.g. *Clouds* 1202, where Strepsiades addresses the audience as λίθοι, ἀριθμός, πρόβατ' ἄλλως, *Pl. Hipp. ma.* 292 d 5, *Euthyd.* 298 a 3-4; or, as here, insensibility in general. So Theognis (?) expects to lie in the earth when he is dead ὥστε λίθος (568); and so Aristotle describes the ἀναίσθητος, who is lacking even in natural desires, as ἀπαθὴς ὥπερ λίθος (*E.E.* 1221^a22). Further examples are collected by Headlam on Herodas 6. 4 and Tarrant on *Hipp. ma.* 292 d.

b 1. πληρωθῆ is an easy and probable correction for πληρώση. The difficulty of the latter is not that we have to supply the indefinite subject implicit in ζῆν (cf. on 456 d 2), but that after πληρωσαμένω (a 6, cf. 493 e 4) we should expect a middle. The Y recension has πληρώσεται, but this does not explain the reading of the other MSS. and looks like mere conjecture.

b 6. Χαραδριοῦ, a bird of messy habits and uncertain identity. Ol and the scholiast inform us that ἄμα τῷ ἐσθίειν ἐκκρίνει, which explains the comparison with the owner of the leaky jars: cf. *Tim.* 73 a, where we are told that man was given an exceptionally slow-working digestive system so that he need not spend all his time eating and excreting. Aristotle, *H.A.* 614^b35, describes the χαραδριός as φαῦλος ('commonplace'?) in plumage and note, nesting in gullies (χαράδραι) and rocky clefts, and seen only by night—by day it "runs away" (ἀποδιδράσκει). We know also that it had conspicuous yellow eyes (see below). On this evidence it is tentatively identified by D'Arcy Thompson, *Glossary of Greek Birds*, 311, following Gesner and Linnaeus, with the stone-curlew, which haunts waste places in Greece, is a twilight feeder, and has large bright-yellow eyes and inconspicuous plumage (we should hardly call its cry commonplace, but it is a more familiar bird in Greece than in England, where it is found chiefly as a summer migrant in the southern counties). It may be added that when disturbed the stone-curlew runs rather than flies away; and that it hides by crouching among the stones, which would account for the proverb χαραδριὸν μιμούμενος, explained in Suidas as ἐπικρυπτόμενος. The "jaundiced" yellow eye of the χαραδριός gave rise to the belief that by staring fixedly into it one could be cured of jaundice (Aelian, *N.A.* 17. 13), and it appears that birds were actually captured and sold for that purpose (Hipponax fr. 48 D. [52 B.], quoted in the scholion here and Suidas s.v.). As D'Arcy Thompson points out, its fame as a healer persists in the *Physiologus* and the medieval bestiaries, and even won it the exalted status of an emblem of Christ.

c 3. πληροῦν seems an almost indispensable correction for πληροῦντα. δυνάμενον without an infinitive is at least awkward, and no one has produced a real Platonic parallel for the surprising accumulation of three asyndetic participles: I have noticed nothing nearer than *Amat.* 137 b 3 πολυπραγμονοῦντα κυπτάζοντα ζῆν.

c 7. κνησιῶντα . . . κνήσθαι, κνώμενον. The unseemly and ridiculous word is deliberately repeated. Plato uses the same example at *Phil.* 46 de to illustrate the type of pleasure which is dependent on an antecedent pain.

d 1. ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος, “a regular mob-orator”: cf. 482 c 5, e 4.

e 1. For the third person singular present optative of verbs in -άω Plato uses either -ῶ, as e.g. at *Tim.* 73 a 1, or -ῶη, e.g. at *Phaedo* 87 c 1. Either is possible here.

e 2-3. εἴαν—ἐρωτᾷ, “if one asks you in succession to this question all those that are linked (with it)”, viz. questions about other parts of the body. If ἐχόμενα is sound, τούτοις goes with ἐφεξῆς: cf. *Tim.* 30 c 2 τὰ τούτοις ἐφεξῆς and *Rep.* 389 e 7 τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα. But it is tempting to read ἐπόμενα (cf. *Rep.* 406 d 5 τὰ τούτοις ἐπόμενα), especially as a similar corruption occurs at *Polit.* 271 b 4. It is also possible that ἐχόμενα is a gloss on τούτοις ἐφεξῆς.

e 3-4. <τὸ> τούτων τοιούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον, “the climax of such horrors”. The article (which would fall out easily by haplography) would seem to be needed, as at *Theaet.* 190 b 4 ἡ καί, τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον, σκόπει εἰ . . . , etc. *Dem.* 2. 31 is not parallel.

e 7. Οὐκ αἰσχύνη κτλ. The unshockable Callicles is shocked at last, i.e. realises that his theory involves conclusions repugnant to ethical common sense. He falls back on the same complaint which he made at 482 e 3. —Cobet wished to delete τοὺς λόγους, but cf. 461 c 4.

e 10. ἀνέδην οὕτω, “recklessly, just like that,” i.e. without qualification: cf. 468 c 3, and *Hipp. mi.* 368 a 8.

495 a 1. μὴ διορίζεται. So Democritus held that happiness depends on διορισμός καὶ διάκρισις τῶν ἡδονῶν, *Vors.* 68 [55] A 167. Plato is quite possibly reproducing Democritus’ argument here: he seems to have used the example of scratching (fr. 127).

a 5-6. ἵνα δὴ μοι κτλ.: “Well, so that my position may not be inconsistent, (as it will be) if I say that the good and the pleasurable are distinct, I say that they are the same.” ἀνομολογούμενος is an adjective formed with ἀ- privative, not the participle of the verb compounded with ἀνά (see L.S.J. s.v.). To avoid misunderstanding it was glossed μὴ ὁμολογούμενος: hence the false reading ἵνα δὴ μοι μὴ ὁμολογούμενος; which appears in F and was already known to Ol.

a 7. Διαφθείρεις . . . τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, like *Prot.* 360 a 6 διαφθεροῦμεν τὰς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογίας. Socrates is thinking of Callicles’ professions of παρρησία at 491 e 7 and elsewhere. That the respondent shall not answer παρὰ τὰ δοκῶντα is a rule of Socratic dialectic: cf. *Rep.* 346 a 3 μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν, and Thompson on *Meno* 83 d.

b 1. Καὶ γὰρ σύ: cf. 481 b 6.

b 4. τὸ πάντως χαίρειν, “pleasure at any price”. ταῦτά . . . τὰ νυνδὴ αἰνιχθέντα πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ, “those various disgusting consequences that we hinted at just now” (494 e). πολλὰ has been thought

an erroneous anticipation of πολλά in b 6, but is not really objectionable: cf. *ἅπαντα* at 494 e 3.

495 c 3–e 2. *Callicles affirms, and Socrates denies, that knowledge and courage are distinct both from each other and from the Good (which Callicles has identified with pleasure).*

Plato's reason for introducing at this point this confrontation of views is not at first sight evident. I think we are in fact asked to remember Callicles' admissions (d 3 *ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα*) just because no immediate use will be made of them—they play no part in the first of the two dialectical arguments which follow. In the second argument, however, 497 d 8–499 b 3, the opinion that *ἀνδρεία* and *φρόνησις* (= *ἐπιστήμη*) are distinct from the Good is shown to be inconsistent with Callicles' earlier statement (491 b) that the *κρείττονες* are the *ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ φρόνιμοι*. Callicles' further opinion that *ἀνδρεία* and *φρόνησις* are distinct from each other seems to be introduced with a view to Socrates' later reduction of all virtues to *σωφροσύνη* (507 a–c), as well as to his general contention that "virtue is knowledge".

495 c 5. *νυνδὴ*: 491 b.

c 6. *ὡς ἕτερον*, sc. *ὄν*. For omission of the participle of *εἶναι* with the accusative absolute cf. *Prot.* 323 b 7 *ὡς ἀναγκαῖον* (sc. *ὄν*) *οὐδένα ὄντιν' οὐχὶ . . . μετέχειν*: *Rep.* 449 c 4 *ὡς . . . παντὶ δῆλον* (sc. *ὄν*) *ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ἔσται*: *Thuc.* 2. 35. 1 *ὡς καλὸν* (sc. *ὄν*) . . . *ἀγορεύεσθαι αὐτόν*. But it must be admitted that in all these places, as in the present passage, *ὄν* could have dropped out with the greatest of ease.

d 1. *ὦ σοφώτατε σύ*, ironical, cf. *Rep.* 339 e 5 *ὦ σοφώτατε Θρασύμαχε*, *Hipp. ma.* 290 d 1 *ὦ σοφὲ σύ*. Callicles thinks he is being asked to admit something glaringly obvious; but on Socrates' principles, if pleasure were the Good, knowledge must be involved as a condition (cf. *Prot.* 357 d).

d 3. *Καλλικλῆς ἔφη Ἀχαρνεύς*: in order to put Callicles' admission as it were 'on record', Socrates playfully throws it into the form of a legal deposition (in which the name of the deponent's deme had to be stated, in order to exclude mistakes of identity). Callicles retorts in the same style. The speaker's father and deme are named with a similar effect of mock solemnity at *Phdr.* 244 a 1, and at *Aristoph. Clouds* 134 *Φεῖδωνος υἱὸς Στρεψιάδης Κικυννόθεν*.

d 5. *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕτερον*. This follows immediately and obviously from Callicles' admission that both *ἐπιστήμη* and *ἀνδρεία* are distinct from *ἡδονή*, granted his assumption that *τὸ ἡδύ* and *τὸ ἀγαθόν* are identical. It is surprising that some editors have (with H. Schmidt) substituted *τοῦ ἡδέος* here for *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*. Socrates' reply at e 1 makes such a reading impossible; for the proposition that knowledge and courage are different from pleasure is surely one which neither Socrates nor anyone else could reasonably reject.

e 1. *Οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ*. All the propositions stated in d 4–5 are in Socrates' view false. For the relationship of *ἐπιστήμη* and *ἀνδρεία* to each other and to the Good cf. 507 bc. *οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς*: when fuller self-knowledge is forced upon him, Callicles will realize the incon-

sistency of his present opinions. Cf. 482 b 5 ff.; and for the claim that in dialectic the defeated party has really refuted himself, *Alc. i* 113 bc.

495 e 2—497 d 8. *First dialectical proof that pleasure is not the Good.*

Good and its opposite are not found simultaneously in the same person:

Pleasure and its opposite are (since διψῶντα πίνειν implies λυπούμενον χαίρειν, 496 e 5):

∴ Pleasure is not the Good.

At 497 a 6 Callicles protests that this is a sophism, and is only persuaded to continue the argument by the personal intervention of Gorgias.

The idea that organic pleasure depends on a return to a normal balance, and so on an antecedent deprivation, is perhaps already implicit in Heraclitus fr. 111 Diels νοῦσος ὑγίειν ἐποίησεν ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, λιμὸς κόρον, κάματος ἀνάπαισιν, though it is possible to understand the fragment otherwise; cf. also Empedocles A 95, quoted on 493 d 5—495 b 9. Plato took it up and developed it from various angles, first here; then at *Rep.* 583 b—585 a, where it is suggested that such pleasures are “unreal”; finally in the *Timaeus* (64 cd) and *Philebus* (31 d—32 b), where organic pleasure is explained in some detail as incidental to the restoration of the natural state (φύσις). In these later dialogues Plato also recognizes a class of unmixed pleasures which involve no consciousness of want, such as the pleasures of smell (*Rep.* 584 b, *Phil.* 51 e, *Tim.* 65 a), certain aesthetic pleasures (*Phil.* 51 a ff.), and the intellectual pleasures (ibid. 52 a ff.). In the *Gorgias* non-organic pleasures are mentioned at 501 e ff., but consideration of them is not required for the purpose of the present argument: against the view that pleasure *as such* is the Good, it is enough to show that some kinds of pleasure cannot be identified with the Good (cf. *Rep.* 505 c). On the whole subject see Taylor’s long note on *Tim.* 64 d 7; Grube, chap. ii; J. Tenkku, ‘The Evaluation of Pleasure in Plato’s Ethics’, *Acta Philos. Fennica* 11 (1956); and for a survey of modern theories (many of which are akin to Plato’s) J. C. Flugel, *Studies in Feeling and Desire*, chap. ii.

Two criticisms have sometimes been directed against the present argument.

(i) As Ol noted (146. 13), it may be objected that in drinking when thirsty the pleasure and pain are not in fact strictly simultaneous: the pain comes first. And in the *Phaedo* (60 b 4) Socrates is made to remark how curious it is that pleasure and pain, though they never arise (παράγινεσθαι) simultaneously, are nevertheless inseparably associated. Ol and the scholiast point out that the two passages are not actually inconsistent: thirst *arises* before it is satisfied by drinking, but it still *persists* during the act of drinking (otherwise the drinking would cease to give pleasure). Nevertheless, the remark in the *Phaedo* looks like an addendum, if not a correction, to the present passage, perhaps provoked by some contemporary criticism: no use is made of it in the argument of the *Phaedo* itself. And in the *Philebus* Plato’s example of simultaneous pleasure and pain is a different one: it is the

state of mind of a man who feels hunger but is *looking forward* to a good dinner (36 b).

(ii) It is often assumed (e.g. Robinson 40) that the present argument can be stated in the form

Contraries cannot belong to a thing simultaneously:

Pleasure and pain can:

∴ Pleasure and pain are not contraries:

But good and bad are contraries:

∴ Pleasure is not the same as good.

Now in the *Republic* Plato tells us that pleasure and pain *are* contraries: 583 c 3 λέγε δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐκ ἐναντίον φαμέν λύπην ἡδονῇ; Καὶ μάλα. And from the Law of Contradiction, formulated earlier in the *Republic* (436 b), it would seem to follow that, being contraries, they cannot be present ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό. This may explain why the example of the thirsty man is dropped in the *Republic* and *Philebus* (the simultaneous pleasure and pain of the man waiting for his dinner are not κατὰ τὸ αὐτό). But Plato does not in fact assert in the present passage that no pair of contraries can belong to a thing simultaneously (though he may be thought to imply it at 495 e 6–7); nor does he draw the conclusion that pleasure and pain are not contraries. I suspect that he had not at this point thought out the logic of contraries, and did not choose to commit himself. All he seems to do in the *Gorgias* is to establish the non-identity of two concepts (Pleasure and Good) by the non-identity of their marks (capacity in the one case, incapacity in the other, for coexistence with its contrary). Jaeger, *Aristotle*, 40, calls attention to a similar type of argument in Aristotle fr. 45 R.³: “Harmony has a contrary: the soul has no contrary: therefore the soul is not a harmony”—a restatement of Plato’s contention at *Phaedo* 93 b–d.

495 e 11. ἀπολαβὼν, “taking it by itself,” i.e. taking it as an instance. Cf. *Rep.* 392 d 9 ἀπολαβὼν μέρος τι πειράσομαί σοι ἐν τούτῳ ὃ βούλομαι δηλῶσαι.

496 a 1. ἄνθρωπος, “a man” (supposed as an example), here and at c 2, whereas at 495 e 8 ὁ ἄνθρωπος is “man”. Callicles’ reply simply acknowledges the fact that there is a disease called ophthalmia.

a 6. Θαυμάσιον . . . γίγνεται, it reveals itself as odd, “it is an odd conclusion”. Cf. 512 d 4 καταγέλαστός σοι ὁ ψόγος γίγνεται, “your scorn reveals itself as ridiculous”. Since it is the conclusion rather than the imaginary situation which is thought of as being odd, I see no need to emend with Sauppe to ἐγίγνετ’ ἄν.

b 2. ἀπόλλυσι. MSS. have ἀπολ(λ)ύει, but Plato seems elsewhere invariably to use the older forms for the present indicative of ὄλλυμι compounds (though he has the participle ἀπολλύον at *Rep.* 608 e 3, beside ἀπόλλυσι at 609 c 2). And the error involved is a very common one in transcribing uncials.

c 6. τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες κτλ.: “You spoke of hunger—did you mean that it was pleasant or unpleasant?” The allusion is to 494 b 7 ff.

Callicles did not there *state* that hunger is unpleasant, though he implied it; and Socrates seems to recognize this by the form of his question, with *πότερον* postponed. λέγεις Richards; but after τὰ ἔμ-προσθεν ὁμολογημένα we expect ἔλεγες.

c 7. αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν: "I mean just being hungry (without eating)."

d 1. Καὶ ἐγώ, sc. λέγω (to be supplied from ἔλεγες, c 7) τὸ πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἢ δὲ εἶναι: "So do I; I quite understand. But still just being hungry is unpleasant, isn't it?" If the reading of the MSS. is sound, this punctuation (Hermann's) is the only possible one. Cf. *Laches* 191 a 5, where to Laches' ἐγὼ γοῦν φημι Socrates replies καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ. It may be objected that *μανθάνω* usually stands first in a reply, as at 474 c 9 etc.; but the objection is hardly decisive. Most modern editors have deleted καὶ ἐγώ as an incorporated variant for ἔγωγε at c 8, or else regarded it, with Stallbaum and Burnet, as a corruption of λέγω, which could stand as the last word of Callicles' preceding sentence (a trifle clumsily, after λέγω has been used in a different sense at c 7). If a correction is needed, I incline to prefer Badham's καλῶ, which would easily become κάγω. For ἀλλ' οὖν . . . γε cf. 506 b 7 and Deniston, 444.

d 6. ἄλλο τι ἢ has come to be felt as a mere *nonne*, as the answer shows. It has been thought that only ἄλλο τι is so used by Plato (as at 495 c 6); and ἢ could well have been added here as a gloss (see on 481 c 3). Cf., however, *Lysis* 222 d 6, where to the question ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνον φίλος; the answer is Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν τούτου κτλ.: "So in this proposition the qualification 'when thirsty' means, I take it, 'when in pain'?" διψῶντα should not be altered to διψῆν (with Heikel): τὸ διψῶντα is normal Greek for "the word διψῶντα".

e 1. Τὸ δὲ πίνειν κτλ. We must still understand τούτου οὐ λέγεις (for drinking is not in all circumstances a pleasure).

e 6. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον [καὶ χρόνον] εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος βούλει. The qualification about "place" is essential if the pleasure-pain relation is to be represented as unique. For clearly a man can be simultaneously in a "good" mental state and a "bad" physical one, or vice versa. But it is nonsense to speak of "a time of soul or body"; and on the other hand it is difficult to separate the genitives from the preceding nouns and treat them as 'genitives of the sphere within which' (Sauppe), nor would they have much point if they did not delimit the meaning of those nouns. Richards proposed to read χρόνον καὶ τόπον and take the genitives exclusively with τόπον. And it is in fact possible that F's exemplar had χρόνον καὶ τρόπον (the first two words being lost in a lacuna in F). But χρόνον is not needed after ἅμα, and it seems to me on the whole likeliest that F's τρόπον is a false variant for τόπον which was first incorporated in the text and then 'corrected' in the archetype of the first family to χρόνον.

e 8. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι διαφέρει. Whether 'organic' pleasure and pain are mental or physical states is irrelevant to Socrates' argument,

and perhaps Plato had not at this time made up his mind on the point. At *Phaedo* 65 a 7 such pleasures are correctly described as αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἶσιν, i.e. as mental, though procured through the body; and at *Phil.* 35 c 6 Socrates says explicitly that there is no such thing as a "bodily desire" (σώματος ἐπιθυμίαν).

497 a 1. φῆς. MSS. have ἔφης, which is betrayed as a false reading not only by its form (see on 466 e 6) but by Callicles' reply.

a 4. γίγνεται, "turns out to be". Cf. on 496 a 6.

a 7. ἀκκίζῃ, "you are playing the simpleton." The verb is derived from Akko, the name of a proverbially stupid woman, and means properly to "sham stupid", then generally to dissemble or be coy. We learn from the scholiast that the comic poet Amphis, who was probably Plato's contemporary, wrote a play about Akko, and that she was mentioned by the earlier comic poet Hermippus (perhaps as Athena's rival in weaving, Wilamowitz, *Hermes*, vii. 141). There was also a different tradition about her which represented her as a bogey-woman, so that nurses used her to frighten naughty children (Chrysippus *apud* Plut. *Sto. Rep.* 15); and some think that this was her original character (Crusius, P.-W. s.v.). καὶ πρόθι γε κτλ., "Just go a bit farther (with the argument)." Cf. *Soph.* 261 b 6 εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἀεὶ προιέναι.

a 9. Τί ἔχων ληρεῖς; For the idiom see on 490 e 4. I have accepted, hesitantly, Badham's correction (*Philol.* x. 730) as the simplest solution of the puzzle created by the words ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς, which the MSS. present as part of Socrates' speech. The corruption is an old one: Proclus had the same reading, and was at some pains to justify Socrates' rudeness. But ὅτι has little or no meaning in the context, and, as Heindorf was the first to see, it is hardly thinkable that the words belong to Socrates. Socrates once accuses *himself* of ληρεῖν (*Charm.* 173 a 3), and often suggests that others may accuse him of it (*Charm.* 176 a, *Theaet.* 171 d, *Phdr.* 260 d), or of φλυαρεῖν (*supra* 470 c 7, *Apol.* 19 c). But he never applies these vulgarly abusive terms to his interlocutors. On the other hand Callicles says φλυαρεῖς ἔχων (490 e 4, cf. 489 b 7, 490 c 8); so does Euthydemus (*Euthyd.* 295 c); Thrasymachus sneers at Socrates' φλυαρία (*Rep.* 336 b), and Hippias at the λήρους καὶ φλυαρίας which Socrates has been quoting (*Hipp. ma.* 304 b). The words must be spoken by Callicles, who is now in a thoroughly bad temper. Merely to excise them, with Thompson and Burnet, is insufficient: ἔχων is too idiomatic for a glossator, and if they originated in a marginal note recalling 490 e 4 we should expect φλυαρεῖς. Badham's correction is the easiest transcriptionally; but it may be urged against it that Callicles' outburst is badly timed, since in the immediately preceding sentence there is nothing to provoke it. Two proposals for transposition of the disputed words are worth considering.

(i) Heindorf suggested deleting ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς here and substituting it for ὅτι λέγεις at b 3. This solution, which has commended itself to Wilamowitz and Theiler, has the merit of providing an excellent cue

for Gorgias' intervention, and after Socrates' question at b 1–2 ἔχων is well motivated. But it is not clear how the words migrated to their present position, nor would λέγεις be an adequate or likely gloss on ἔχων ληρεῖς. The latter objection could be met by retaining ὅτι λέγεις and adding ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς (Hermann); the combination of interrogative with causal ὅτι is, however, distinctly unpleasing.

(ii) Mr. G. E. L. Owen suggests to me that the words should be attached to Callicles' preceding speech (to follow Σώκρατες at a 6). This would give more point to με νουθετεῖς at b 1; and might have caused an explanatory note ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς to be written in the margin opposite νουθετεῖς and subsequently incorporated in the text.

b 4. Μηδαμῶς, "Please don't (go on like that)": no specific verb is to be supplied. A colloquialism, frequent in Aristophanes; cf. *Symp.* 175 b 1 Μηδαμῶς, ἀλλ' ἐᾶτε αὐτόν. Callicles' attempt to evade the conclusion of the argument, coupled with Gorgias' intervention, calls attention to the crucial character of Socrates' disproof of hedonism. At a crisis in the *Hippias minor* Eudicus similarly intervenes and begs Hippias to continue answering καὶ ἡμῶν ἔνεκα καὶ τῶν προειρημένων σοι λόγων (373 c 1).

b 8. οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή: an obscure phrase, usually understood as "the penalty for this (asking petty questions) does not fall on you (but on Socrates)". But this sense of τιμή seems to be exclusively epic (Herwerden wished to emend the word to ζημία), and the mention of a penalty has in any case little relevance. Still less can the words mean "your reputation is not at stake". I feel no doubt that Robin and the revisers of Jowett are right in translating "it is not for you to estimate their value". For τιμή in this sense cf. 526 d 5, and for the force of οὐ σὴ, *Soph. El.* 1470 οὐκ ἐμὸν τόδ', ἀλλὰ σόν, τὸ ταῦθ' ὄραν.

c 1. τὰ μικρά τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα, "your little finicking questions". Cf. Hippias' complaint, *Hipp. ma.* 304 a 4 τί οἶει ταῦτα εἶναι συνάπαντα; κνήσματοί τοί ἐσσι καὶ περιτμήματα τῶν λόγων.

c 3. τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ μικρά, sc. μνηθῆναι. No one could be initiated into the "greater" Mysteries, those performed in autumn at Eleusis, until he had been initiated into the "lesser", which took place at Agrae in Attica in the spring. The latter were considered ὥσπερ προκάθαρσις καὶ προάγνευσις τῶν μεγάλων (schol. *Aristoph. Plut.* 845), although in origin the two may have been, as Nilsson thinks, quite unconnected. Plato has a similar metaphor from grades of initiation at *Symp.* 210a; for a different metaphorical application cf. Mnesimachus fr. 11 (Kock, *C.A.F.* ii. 442) ὕπνος τὰ μικρὰ τοῦ θανάτου μυστήρια.

d 3. ὡμολόγεις: 496 b 5 ff. τί οὖν δὴ; "So what?", answered by ὅτι . . ., "that . . .". Cf. 453 b 4, 515 e 1, *Crat.* 398 a 3, 409 e 3.

d 6. ὡς ἐτέρων ὄντων, "implying that they are distinct". The words are not logically required, in view of πῶς οὖν κτλ., and Deuschle deleted them; but Socrates is hammering his point home to a reluctant Callicles.

497 d 8–499 b 3. *Second dialectical proof that pleasure is not the Good.*

The “good” man is both ἀνδρείος and φρόνιμος (admitted at 491 bc):

∴ The δειλός or ἄφρων is a worse man than the ἀνδρείος or φρόνιμος:

But the δειλός or ἄφρων has as much both of pleasure and of pain as the ἀνδρείος or φρόνιμος, and perhaps more of both (498 b 7):

And on Callicles’ view it is the presence of pleasure and absence of pain that makes a man “good” (498 e 2):

∴ On Callicles’ view the worse man is both as good and as bad as the better man, and perhaps even better than he.

A consistent hedonist would of course refuse to admit the initial premiss. But it was difficult for a Greek not to admit it, since in common speech ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός so often meant simply “a brave man” or “an able man”. And in any case Callicles is not a consistent hedonist: he and the ‘tough-minded’ politicians he represents measure justice and self-control by hedonic standards, but courage and practical intelligence are virtues they really respect. The argument serves to expose his inconsistency. Its essential point is put much more briefly at *Phil.* 55 b, where Socrates shows that hedonism fails to account for the way in which we use the word ἀγαθός: it would require us, for example, to say that a “good” man becomes “bad” when he has a toothache.

497 e 1. ἄθρει δέ introduces the new question (cf. *Rep.* 552 b 6). ἀγαθῶν παρουσία, “owing to the presence in them of good things”. In Callicles’ view these “good things” are pleasures (498 d 3). In later dialogues Plato used παρουσία in a half-technical sense to describe the “presence” of a Form in a particular; but the use of the plural ἀγαθῶν, here and at 498 d 2, is sufficient to show that the Theory of Forms is not presupposed. We find a similar non-technical use of παρῆναι at *Charm.* 158 e 7, εἴ σοι πάρεστιν σωφροσύνη, ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν, and elsewhere.

e 2. [τοὺς] καλοὺς: the article seems to have been added by false analogy with τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς, which is the direct object of καλεῖς, while καλοὺς is the secondary predicate.

e 4. ἄφρονας, “(any) foolish persons”. The article, added by the Paris corrector, is not required. ἄρτι: 491 a 7 ff.

e 8. τί τοῦτο; Cf. on 448 b 1.

498 a 8. Ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε <χαίρειν, ἴσως δ’ ἐκεῖνοί γε> μᾶλλον: “Both rejoice, I think, but perhaps the former more.” The words which I have inserted *exempli gratia* (after Hermann) were suggested to me by Mr. D. A. Russell. They restore what is shown to have been Callicles’ meaning by the recapitulations below, at b 6, c 1, and e 8, and they could easily fall out through homocoteleuton. The sense is correctly reproduced in Ol’s paraphrase, which the commentators have surprisingly ignored. Ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε μᾶλλον (MSS.) is of course nonsense; and it can hardly be defended, with Routh and others since, as intentional nonsense (the joke at *Soph.* 249 d 3 is another matter, being explained by the words κατὰ τὴν τῶν παίδων εὐχὴν). If

with R. G. Bury we write *Μᾶλλον*; and give it to Socrates, εἰ δὲ μὴ, κτλ. remains virtually meaningless; and the same is true if we delete *μᾶλλον* with the scribe of a late Florentine MS. Sauppe altered *μᾶλλον* to *ὁμοίως*, with little transcriptional probability, Madvig to *ἐνάμιλλον*, “neck and neck” (the word is Platonic, but the adverbial use here assumed is not attested). But the distinction between either of these words and *παραπλησίως* was, one would think, hardly worth making: cf. 498 e 4–5, where *παραπλησίως* is opposed, not to “identically”, but to *μᾶλλον* and *ἥττον*.

b 4. *μόνοι* (F) is more correct than *μόνον* (BTW), though the distinction is not invariably observed (just as ‘only’ is sometimes wrongly placed in English).

c 7. [*οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοί*]. These intrusive words probably originated as a variant for *οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τε καὶ οἱ κακοί* in the sentence before (hence the *καὶ* which precedes them in F). They were doubtless inserted in their present place by someone who did not see Socrates’ point and was puzzled by the assertion that “the bad are even better than the good”. An alternative view is that only *οἱ ἀγαθοὶ* is intrusive: this yields the strictly logical conclusion that the bad man is both “better” than the good (because he experiences more pleasure when the enemy retreat) and “worse” (because he experiences more pain when they advance). But the conclusion in the text points the paradox more sharply, and appears to be confirmed by the recapitulation at 499 a 7 where we have *ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸς ὁ κακός* (not *μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ὁ κακός*).

d 3. *καὶ κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν*: short for *καὶ κακοὺς δὲ (εἶναι τοὺς κακοὺς) κακῶν* (*παρουσία*). *τοὺς κακοὺς δὲ*, read by Sauppe and Nestle, comes from the Florentine recension (Introduct., p. 51) and is, I think, a false conjecture: it is easier mentally to supply the subject than the predicate.

e 11. *καὶ δις γάρ* κτλ. The proverb to which Socrates alludes is quoted by the scholiast and the paroemiographers in the elliptical form *δις καὶ τρίς τὸ καλόν* (sometimes with the addition *τὸ δὲ κακὸν οὐδ’ ἅπαξ*). The missing verb was perhaps *ἀναπολεῖν*: cf. *Phil.* 59 e 10 εὖ δ’ ἢ παροιμία δοκεῖ ἔχειν, τὸ καὶ δις καὶ τρίς τό γε καλῶς ἔχον ἐπαναπολεῖν τῷ λόγῳ δεῖν, also two passages which contradict the proverb, Pindar, *Nem.* 7. 104 ταῦτά δὲ τρίς τετράκις ἀμπολεῖν ἀπορία τελέθει and Soph. *Phil.* 1238 δις ταῦτά βούλει καὶ τρίς ἀναπολεῖν μ’ ἔπη; The scholiast compares a phrase of Empedocles (fr. 25), *καὶ δις γάρ ὁ δει καλόν ἐστιν ἐνισπεῖν*. But the addition of *καὶ τρίς* and of *φασιν* shows that Plato is quoting the proverb, not Empedocles’ adaptation of it. He alluded to it again at *Laws* 754 c 2 and 956 e 7 (I cannot agree with Friedländer, *T.A.P.A.* lxix (1938), 375 ff., in seeing a further allusion at *Phaedo* 63 e 1).

499 b 1. *ὁ κακός*, which is the subject of the whole sentence, is postponed for the sake of the juxtaposition with *ἀγαθός*. The scholiast says *ὑπερθετόν τὴν λέξιν οὕτως*. “οὐκοῦν ὁ κακὸς ὁμοίως”, εἶτα τὰ ἐξῆς. I think this is intended merely as a ‘construe’, though it might be

a false variant occasioned by a construing gloss. τὰ πρότερα ἐκεῖνα: the reference must be to the previous *reductio ad absurdum* at 494 e.

499 b 4–500 a 6. Callicles surprises Socrates by declaring that of course, like everybody else, he has always considered some pleasures better than others. After expressing disappointment at what he treats as Callicles' lack of candour, Socrates extracts from him the admissions (i) that "good" pleasures (and pains) are those which are productive of good; (ii) that since all action ought to aim at the good, pleasures are to be sought for the sake of what is good, not what is good for the sake of pleasure; (iii) that discrimination between good and bad pleasures is a matter for an expert (τεχνικός).

Callicles has been forced to abandon the pure-hedonist equation, 'good = pleasurable', as he was previously (489 b) compelled to abandon the pure-immoralist equation, 'good = powerful'. He now shifts his ground from the position of Bentham to that of John Stuart Mill. Pleasures differ in quality as well as in quantity, and their desirability is to be assessed with reference to this quality, 'goodness' or 'badness', and not merely to the degree of pleasure afforded. But who is entitled to act as assessor? In agreeing that he must be a τεχνικός Socrates and Callicles use the language of their age. There was now a τέχνη of everything, from πεισοί to public speaking: must there not be a discoverable τέχνη of conduct, an Art of Living which would give a dependable *scientific* answer to the question πῶς βιωτέον? In various forms this idea haunted Plato throughout his life. In the *Euthyphro* (7 cd) Socrates notes with regret the lack of any criterion for settling ethical disagreements: we have no procedure comparable to the weighing and measuring by which we can settle disputes about quantity. In the *Protagoras* (357 ab) we are told that ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου depends on a right choice of pleasures and pains, and that this demands a τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη—"but what τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη, we will ask another time". That this τέχνη is something other than the empirical skill of the ῥήτωρ, it is the aim of the *Gorgias* to demonstrate. In the *Republic* (580 c–583 a) Plato argued that the man best qualified to discriminate between pleasures, even on the basis of their relative pleasurable-ness, is the philosopher, since he has experienced a wider range of pleasures than anyone else and also possesses the necessary intellectual insight and reasoning power (φρόνησις and λόγος, 582 a 5). And in the *Philebus* he attempted the construction of a scientifically determined *scala bonorum* which constitutes his final answer to the question πῶς βιωτέον. For a full discussion of 'morality as a technique' in Plato see Gould, chap. ii.

499 b 6. ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια: adolescents are apt to take seriously what was meant only in play. In Callicles' view the attitude of Socrates is not fully adult (cf. 482 c 4, 485 a 5, e 7). ὥς δὲ σὺ οἶει, "As if you could imagine": see on 468 e 6.

b 9. ἰοὺ ἰοὺ, an exclamation of surprise, here expressing pained astonishment (not joy, as L.S.J.).—"Really, Callicles, how unscrupulous you are!" I accentuate in accordance with Theodosius' rule, ἰοὺ ἰοὺ ἐπὶ λύπῃς, τὸ ἰοὺ δὲ ἐπὶ χαρᾷς (cf. Chandler, *Greek Accentuation*, § 903).

c 1. τὰ αὐτὰ (F) is clearly the right reading. αὖ (BTW) could be attached only to the δέ clause (a reference to 491 b would be too far-fetched).

c 5. τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν, proverbial for “making the best of what one has got”. The saying was variously ascribed to Pittacus or Epicharmus; it recurs at *Laus* 959 c 7 and in the Epicurean Pap. Herc. 1251, col. 21. 4. In the more specific form τὸ παρὸν εὖ θέσθαι it was used, as Ol tells us, by players at κυβεία, a kind of backgammon, where θέσθαι is to make a move within limits set by the fall of the dice: cf. *Rep.* 604 c 5 ὥσπερ ἐν πτώσει κύβων πρὸς τὰ πεπτωκότα τίθεσθαι τὰ αὐτῶν πράγματα, *Soph. fr.* 947 P. (861 N.), Cratinus fr. 172 K., Headlam and Fraenkel on *Aesch. Ag.* 32. δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον may also allude to a proverb: cf. *Cic. ad Att.* 6. 5. 2 ‘meque obiurgavit vetere proverbio τὰ μὲν διδόμενα.’

d 1. ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι. The identification of τὸ ἀγαθόν with τὸ ὠφέλιμον was common to Socrates and the sophists: cf. *Hipp. ma.* 296 e 7, *Xen. Mem.* 4. 6. 8. But ὠφέλιμος was a highly ambiguous word (cf. on 474 c 4–476 a 2).

d 2. Ὀφέλιμοι δέ γε κτλ. F and Stob. agree in omitting γε. But δέ γε is regularly used by Plato in enumerating premisses (497 a 2, 498 e 1, 506 e 6, etc.; Denniston, 154). —The logical antithesis to ὠφέλιμοι is of course βλαβεραὶ, which E. S. Thompson (on *Meno* 72 d) wished to restore in place of κακαί. But κακαί and βλαβεραί have just been identified, and Plato constantly shows himself indifferent to formal symmetry.

d 5. νυνδὴ: 496 cd. [εἰ] ἄρα: the second of the two questions introduced by ἄρα resumes the first and completes its meaning: for the repetition cf. *Rep.* 565 e 3–566 a 2. εἰ has, despite Stallbaum and Cron, no intelligible construction (Y’s ποιοῦσιν for ποιοῦσαι is a lame attempt to give it one). I take it to be a gloss intended to show that ἄρα is interrogative, not inferential—εἰ being used in Hellenistic Greek to introduce direct questions. Burnet and Theiler were seduced by Sauppe’s tempting ἢ ἄρα, but this combination appears to be foreign to Attic prose (Denniston, 284).

e 6. ἔδοξεν: 468 b. There, however, the formulation was “men do what they do for the sake of the Good”, whereas here we are told that we ought to act for good ends (πρακτέον . . . e 9 δεῖν . . . 500 a 2 δεῖ). The obligation can perhaps be explained in terms of the earlier passage as meaning that we shall further our own true interest if we discover and pursue what we ‘really’ want, our true good, as distinct from what we think we want. But it is difficult to acquit Plato of some vagueness on this subject: see note on 467 c 5–468 e 5.

e 8. Perhaps the earliest clear instance of τέλος in the sense “purpose”, “end of action”, so common in later Greek from Aristotle onwards. Clement appears to attribute this use to Democritus (fr. 4); but he is probably paraphrasing, not quoting.

500 a 1. σύμψηφος—ἐκ τρίτων; “Do you add your vote to ours, and make a third?” (Lamb). ἐκ τρίτων is similarly used at *Symp.* 213 b 5

ἵνα ἐκ τρίτων κατακέηται and Eur. *Orestes* 1178; ἐκ τρίτου at *Tim.* 54 a 7.

a 5. ποῖα . . . καὶ ὅποῖα. For the shift from direct to indirect interrogative cf. *Phil.* 17 b 7-πόσα . . . καὶ ὅποῖα, Jebb on *O.T.* 71.

500 a 7-501 c 8. *Who is the expert (τεχνίτης) in matters of behaviour? Socrates reminds Callicles of the distinction which he drew at 465 a between true arts (τέχναι) and empirical skills (ἐμπειρίαι). After emphasizing that what is at issue is nothing less than the whole conduct of life (ὄντινα χρῆ τρόπον ζῆν, 500 c 3), he restates the distinction in the light of the separation now established between pleasure and good, and obtains Callicles' grudging assent to it.*

Here begins the second part of the discussion with Callicles. Since 488 b we have been concerned with ends—the meaning of “good”, or the nature of the τέλος to which action should be directed—and the original question about rhetoric has been apparently forgotten. Now we return to the problem of its value as a means to the attainment of the good life. We can do so because the distinction between pleasure and good, which at 465 a 2 was merely assumed, has now been established. Rhetoric and the other ἐμπειρίαι thus appear as unreflecting servants of the pleasure-principle; they fail to make the qualitative distinction between pleasures which the good life demands. The new section of the dialogue is prefaced, like the previous one, by a reminder that what is at stake is “the most serious of all questions for a man of sense” (500 c 2, cf. 487 e 7 πάντων δὲ καλλίστη ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις). At *Rep.* 352 d 5 Socrates similarly says to Thrasymachus οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντινα τρόπον χρῆ ζῆν.

500 a 7. αὖ, because Socrates has recalled another passage from this conversation at 499 e 7. In the next line Burnet followed F in introducing a second αὖ. But this looks like an accidental repetition, or else an attempt to make sense of Stobaeus' reading ἔλεγεν γὰρ αὐτὸς, which must itself have originated as a gloss intended to show that ἔλεγον is first person singular, not third person plural.

b 1. παρασκευαί, “contrivances”, skills—a neutral word designed, as the scholiast points out, to cover both ἐμπειρίαι and τέχναι. ἐπιτήδευμα is similarly employed at 463 a 6, πραγματεῖαι at 501 b 3. αὐτὸ τοῦτο, sc. ἡδονήν.

b 4. κατὰ τὸ σῶμα in TW is a good example of an intruded gloss, and illustrates the close relationship of these two MSS. in the *Gorgias*.

b 6. πρὸς Φιλίου, sc. Διός. Callicles has professed himself Socrates' friend (485 e 2, cf. 487 b 7, 499 c 3), and so Socrates now appeals to him “in friendship's holy name” to be serious. In a like mood of exasperation Phaedrus entreats Socrates πρὸς Διὸς φίλιου to be serious about Lysias' speech (*Phdr.* 234 e 1). We also find ναὶ τὸν Φίλιον in affirmation, Aristoph. *Ach.* 730. μήτε . . . παίζειν, with reference to 499 b 5.

c 3-8. ἢ τοῦτο picks up the comparative genitive οὗ. Morstadt and Cobet wished to delete the words, but the construction is a favourite one with Plato: cf. *Laws* 738 e 1 οὗ μείζον οὐδὲν πόλει ἀγαθὸν ἢ γνωρί-

μους αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι, and 811 d 6; *Crito* 44 c 2; *Phaedo* 89 d 2; Riddell, § 163. τοῦτο is then defined as ὄντινα χρή τρόπον ζῆν, and this is further explicated by the alternatives πότερον (χρή ζῆν τὸν βίον) ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ . . . ἢ τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ. The second ἐπὶ, before τόνδε τὸν βίον, results from a confusion of thought (as if παρακλητέον had preceded); the confusion is just possibly Plato's, but more likely to have originated with a copyist or a gloss-writer. There is a rather similar intrusive ἐπὶ at *Phil.* 18 b 1. The final question, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων, is parallel in construction to ὄντινα χρή τρόπον ζῆν.

c 4. τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα, "those 'manly' activities": in this allusion to Callicles' admiration for he-men (cf. note on 492 b 1) we may see a counter-thrust to ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια (499 b 6). For the slightly contemptuous ταῦτα cf. on 467 b 1, 470 d 5, 492 c 1.

d 1. ἄρτι, 495 e—500 a: the διαίρεσις in question is, I think, the same which is described just below, d 6—10. The distinctions made in the conversation with Polus and Gorgias (464 b ff.) are then recalled at e 3 ff.

d 2. εἰ ἔστον τούτῳ διττῷ τῷ βίῳ, "if these two ways of life are really distinct". ἔστιν (MSS.) is doubtfully defensible, since it falls outside the normal limits within which the so-called σχῆμα Πινδαρικόν is used in Attic prose, viz. (a) where ἔστι (γίγνεται) means "there are" ("there arise"), as at *Rep.* 463 a 1 ἔστι μὲν που καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ἄρχοντές τε καὶ δῆμος, and in the common ἔστιν οὓς (like Fr. 'il est des hommes qui'); (b) occasionally where a collection of subjects are mentally unified, as at *Symp.* 188 b 3 καὶ γὰρ πάχνη καὶ χάλαζαι καὶ ἐρυσίβαι . . . γίγνεται. Here there is no collection, and ἔστιν can only be the copula, with τούτῳ τῷ βίῳ as subject. Cf. O. Wilpert, *NJbb.* clv (1897), 504 ff., who concludes that ἔστιν will not do. For the dual cf. *Laws* 662 d 1 δὺ' ἐστόν τινα βίῳ, οἷν δ' ἄνδρῳ ἡδιστος ὢν τυγχάνει, δικαιοτάτος δ' ἕτερος. Its loss may be suspected also at 454 d 8 and 456 b 6, and has certainly occurred at 524 a 6, *Rep.* 442 b 6, and elsewhere.

d 10. Socrates interrupts his sentence to make sure of Callicles' assent to what he has so far said, the ἐπειδὴ clause being thus left hanging. F's δὴ and Flor's γε for δέ represent mistaken attempts to restore 'correct' syntax to the detriment of the sense. The content of the missing main clause is given in e 3—4.

501 a 4. κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως, "quite unscientifically". Here Socrates again breaks his construction, leaving τῆς ἡδονῆς hanging. Had he completed his sentence in its original form he would have said τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν φύσιν οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν ἔσκεπται. As it is, this is expressed in the participial clause οὔτε . . . σκεψαμένη κτλ., with τῆς ἡδονῆς repeated. Flor again tries to mend the grammar, by writing ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς in a 3, and some modern editors have explained τῆς ἡδονῆς as dependent on ἡ ἑτέρα—but it is surely intended as parallel to τούτου οὗ θεραπεύει (a 1). The anacoluthon deliberately simulates the irregularity of conversational speech in real life.

a 6. ἀλόγως is, I think, parallel to ἀτέχνως, and qualifies ἔρχεται, not διαριθμησαμένη: it is explained by the participles which follow, as ἀτέχνως by οὔτε . . . σκεψαμένη κτλ. Findeisen's ἄλογος (sc. ἐστι), with τριβὴ καὶ ἐμπειρία in the next line, would give a structure corresponding to that of the sentence about medicine (ἔσκεπται . . . καὶ λόγον ἔχει . . . δοῦναι) but the change seems unnecessary. ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν διαριθμησαμένη, "making virtually no distinctions (between pleasures)": διακρίνασα, schol.

a 7–b 1. τριβῇ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ κτλ.: "dependent on routine experience, and thus merely preserving a memory of what usually happens—this is the way it provides its pleasures." The cook remembers that these ingredients produced a 'nice' dish last time, but has no notion why. The transmitted text can equally be interpreted as τριβὴ καὶ ἐμπειρία, which the older editors read; but if ἀλόγως is retained the datives are stylistically preferable. μνήμην need not in any case be altered to μνήμη or μνήμη (making σωζομένη passive): for the middle cf. *Theaet.* 163 d 2 μνήμην . . . σωζόμενον.

b 2. With εἶναί τινες we must understand δοκοῦσιν from δοκεῖ.

b 6. ἐκεῖ, in the case of skills which minister to the body. αὐτῇ and αὐτῇ are equally possible and equally authoritative readings, the tradition being ambiguous.

c 5. συγκατατίθεσθαι ἡμῖν . . . τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν, "lay down the same opinion as we do". Since later writers habitually use this verb intransitively with the meaning "assent", Thompson held that τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν was the remains of a gloss, τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἔχεις, written to explain συγκατατίθεσθαι. But it seems more likely that Plato has preserved the original transitive use, derived from the literal sense of καταθέσθαι, "to deposit": cf. Theognis 717 ἀλλὰ χρὴ πάντας γνώμην ταύτην (ταύτῃ Bergk) καταθέσθαι.

501 d 1–502 d 8. *Digression on the social purpose of public musical and dramatic performances. Socrates claims, and Callicles readily agrees, that certain performances aim solely at giving pleasure to an audience, viz. αὐλός-playing (e 1), competitive κιθάρα-playing (e 5), singing to the κιθάρα (a 7), dithyrambic choruses (ibid.), and tragedy (b 1 ff.). These performances thus come under the head of κολακεία (c 2). More specifically, tragedy may be described as a branch of popular rhetoric (ῥητορικὴ δημογορία, 502 d 2), since it employs a verbal medium to gratify mass audiences.*

I have described this section of the dialogue as a digression, since no use is made of it in the subsequent course of the argument. Plato, it seems, has simply taken the opportunity to point out in passing that his condemnation of rhetoric applies equally to certain other types of public performance, and in particular to tragedy, which shares with rhetoric its subservience to the whims of the δῆμος and its incapacity to distinguish between "good" and "bad" pleasures.

The modern reader may well be startled to find Plato speaking of Attic tragedy in terms that a bishop might use in discussing the dangers of commercial television. But if misunderstanding is to be avoided certain points must be made clear.

(i) In stating that the tragic dramatist aims at giving pleasure Socrates is merely echoing a widely held opinion about the proper function of all poetry and music. This is clear from *Laws* 658 e 6, where Plato says that this is the common view and that he agrees with it, συγχωρῶ δὴ τό γε τοσοῦτον καὶ ἐγὼ τοῖς πολλοῖς, δεῖν τὴν μουσικὴν ἡδονῇ κρίνεσθαι, adding, however, the important qualification μὴ μέντοι τῶν γε ἐπιτυχόντων, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἐκείνην εἶναι Μοῦσαν καλλίστην ἣ τις τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένους τέρπει. In this respect Aristotle thought much the same about tragedy: it is rooted in the psychological fact that "everyone enjoys imitations" (*Poet.* 1448^b 10), and its function is to produce its οἰκεία ἡδονή (1453^b 10, etc.). So too Gorgias regarded tragedy as an illusion (ἀπάτη) designed to give pleasure (fr. 23: cf. *Δισσοὶ Λόγοι* 3. 10): hence Callicles has no quarrel with Socrates on this point. Such a view runs counter to the notion—based mainly on a single passage of the *Frogs*, but erected by many Victorian writers into a dogma—that the Greek dramatists wrote their plays in order to inculcate moral 'lessons'. I suppose, however, that nowadays most scholars would agree with Ehrenberg that 'the tragedians were "teachers", not because it was their purpose to teach, but because they could not but do so' (*Sophocles and Pericles*, 20: cf. Snell, *Discovery of the Mind*, chap. v; Gomme, *Greek Attitude to Poetry and History*, chap. iii; Lesky, *Gnomon*, xxviii (1956), 24 f.).

(ii) Socrates' real complaint against the tragic dramatists is not that they are public entertainers but that like the politicians they pander to the prejudices of an ignorant audience (cf. *Rep.* 602 b 2 οἷον φαίνεται καλὸν εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ μηδὲν εἰδόντι, τοῦτο μιμήσεται). Here he is evidently thinking, as 502 d 5–7 shows, not of the necessary characteristics of dramatic art as such, but of the special conditions of the Athenian theatre, with its unselected mass audience and its competitive system. We are sometimes assured that Plato really has in mind the 'degenerate' theatre of the fourth century; but there is nothing in the context to suggest this—the only individuals mentioned by name, Kinesias and Meles, belong to the fifth. And while Plato's charges may well be exaggerated to sustain the parallel between dramatists and politicians, we know far too little of the fifth-century theatre to dismiss them as wholly false. Although Euripides could on occasion enforce unpalatable truths (as in the *Troades*), there are passages in some of his plays where we cannot but suspect him of 'playing to the gallery'; and if a poet of his rank could at times yield to the temptation, it is likely that lesser men offended more often and more grossly. Aristotle's statement that dramatists spoil their plots to please the audience (κατ' εὐχὴν ποιοῦντες τοῖς θεαταῖς, *Poet.* 1453^a 35) may well apply to many poets in the fifth century as well as the fourth. It may be objected that those whom the poet had to please were not the masses but the judges. And Plato in fact thought the Athenian system preferable to the Sicilian, under which the prizes were awarded by popular acclaim, *Laws* 659 b. It does not appear, however, that the judges were selected

for their critical acumen: neither the *Oedipus Rex* nor the *Medea* nor the *Birds* was considered worthy of the first prize. And they were in any case exposed to mass suggestion, even at times to intimidation (*Laws* 659 a, 700 d; *Dem. Meid.* 17).

(iii) Neither here nor in my opinion anywhere else does Plato try to present a 'theory of art', though his admirers have often constructed one for him. His concern, here and elsewhere, is with the educational and social influence of the arts, not with the 'autonomous value' attributed to them by modern theorists. In this he is by no means unique: as Camus has pointed out, all the great revolutionary reformers have distrusted the artist (*L'homme révolté*, 313 ff.). The root of Plato's distrust of poets is that poetry is an *ἄλογον πρᾶγμα*, dependent on an inspiration inaccessible to criticism (*Apol.* 22 c, *Prot.* 347 e, *Ion* 533 d ff.), which nevertheless uses *λόγοι* as its medium (502 c 6), and owing to its charm and prestige is mistaken by some for wisdom (*Laws* 810 e). The poet, in fact, is dangerous because he is liable to be taken for a philosopher (just as the cinema may be thought dangerous to those who accept it as a truthful picture of life instead of a reflection of their own desires). The 'metaphysical' argument against the imitative arts advanced in *Republic* x is a subsidiary invention, of which there is no trace in earlier dialogues. For a balanced account of Plato's opinions on this subject, and a not unsympathetic criticism, see Grube, chap. vi; for a less sympathetic view, Murphy, *Interpretation of Plato's Republic*, chap. xi; for a defence, Tate, *CQ*, xxvi (1932), 161 ff., and W. J. Verdenius, *Mimesis* (Leiden, 1949: in English).

It should be noticed that in the present passage comedy is left unmentioned. Presumably Plato thought that it *did* perform a useful social service by calling attention to abuses, and in particular by mocking the sovereign *δῆμος* itself. He admits comedy in the *Laws* (816 d), though only slaves or foreigners may act in it (since we grow to resemble what we impersonate); whereas tragedy is in effect completely excluded (817 d).

501 d 4. *μηδὲν σκοπούμενον τὸ βέλτιστον* recalls 464 d 1 *τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου οὐδὲν φροντίζει*.

e 1. *τὴν αὐλητικὴν*. The music of the *αὐλός*—conventionally translated "flute", but in fact more akin to the clarinet—was used as an accompaniment in the theatre; but it was especially associated (a) with the wilder sort of evening parties (cf. *Theaet.* 173 d 5 *σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι*) and (b) with the ecstatic dancing practised in the Dionysiac and similar cults (cf. *Ar. Pol.* 1342^b1 ff., Proclus in *Alc.* 198. 5 ff.). It was no doubt on these grounds that the Pythagoreans condemned it as "hybristic" and vulgar (*Iamb. Vit. Pyth.* 111); Pythagoras is even said to have advised his followers to wash their ears after hearing it (Aristides Quintilianus, *de musica*, ii, p. 66 Jahn). Aristotle tells us (*Pol.* 1341^a18 ff.) that in the fifth century it was fashionable for a time to learn to play the *aulos*, but it was later discarded from the educational programme—rightly, he thinks, since this instrument is *οὐκ ἡθικόν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν*. Plato excluded it altogether from his ideal

State, ostensibly on the more technical ground that it was πολυχорδότητον and therefore 'unscientific' (*Rep.* 399 d, cf. *Phil.* 56 a).

e 2. διώκειν and φροντίζειν explain τοιαύτη τις, but seem to depend grammatically on δοκεῖ. Cobet wished to insert <οἷα> before τὴν ἡδονήν.

e 5. ἡ κιθαριστική ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν. The cithara was larger than the lyre, and replaced it in concert performance. We learn from *I.G.* ii. 965 that at the Panathenaea prizes were offered both for the unaccompanied cithara (ψιλή κιθάρις) and for singing to the cithara (κιθαρωδία, cf. 502 a 7). Plato classifies all such performances as pure entertainment, but allows by implication an educational value to the cithara outside the concert room—lyre- or cithara-playing being an accomplishment normally taught to Athenian boys (*Clouds* 964) and prescribed by Plato himself (*Laws* 812 b-e, cf. *Rep.* 399 d). Aristotle informs us (*Pol.* 1341^a9) that the musical competitions resulted in a rising standard of professional skill and a tendency to produce technical 'fireworks' (τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἔργων), which in turn infected the teaching of music, to the detriment of general education. He agrees with Plato that the public performers aimed only at τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ ταύτης φορτικῆς (ibid. 1341^b10). Cf. Isobel Henderson in *New Oxford History of Music*, i. 393-7.

e 8. ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία: the training of dithyrambic choruses, as distinguished from the composition (ποίησις) of the words and music of the dithyramb. Prizes were offered for dithyrambs at the Great Dionysia and at the Panathenaea (for details see Pickard-Cambridge, *Dramatic Festivals of Athens*, 74-79). In the *Laws*, 664 b ff., Plato approved choral training, but of a quite different type, partly modelled on Spartan practice.

e 10. Κινησίαν, a dithyrambic poet, active in the last two decades of the fifth century and at the beginning of the fourth. Pherecrates (?) in the *Cheiron* (fr. 145 Kock) listed him among the poets responsible for the corruption of the dithyramb. Aristophanes introduces him as a character in the *Birds*, where he wants to fetch "airy ditties" from the clouds and obliges with a brief specimen; elsewhere Aristophanes and other comic poets ridiculed his physical peculiarities; Strattis named a whole comedy after him. In singling him out for obloquy, together with his father, Plato was no doubt influenced by his detestation of the 'new music' of which Kinesias was a leading representative; Plato held that musical and civic degeneration went together (*Rep.* 424 c, cf. *Laws* 700 de). But he may also have had other reasons: Kinesias was a notorious free-thinker (see my *Greeks and the Irrational*, 188 f.); and according to Athenaeus 551 de he is to be identified with the Kinesias mentioned by Lysias as having made money by the odious trade of informer. Cf. Maas in *P.-W.* s.v.; Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb, Tragedy, and Comedy*, 59 ff.; Düring, *Eranos*, xliii (1945), 182 ff.

502 a 4. Μέλης was described by Pherecrates in the *Ἄγριοι* (fr. 6 Kock) as the worst κιθαρωδός ever born. Plato can scarcely have heard him sing (he was apparently dead or retired when the *Ἄγριοι*

was produced, in 421–420); but he was familiar with the play (cf. *Prot.* 327 d), and may perhaps have had it in mind when he added *ἡνία γὰρ ἄδων τοὺς θεατάς*.

a 6. For *σκόπει εἰ* (F) cf. 452 c 1, *Laws* 862 a 1. *σκόπει* (BTW) is equally possible; but haplography is always a more probable error transcriptionally than dittography.

b 1. *ἡ σεμνή αὕτη*. *σεμνός* is nearly always ironical in Plato (G. J. de Vries, *Mnem.* 1944, 151 ff.). With similar irony the comic poet Crates spoke of the *σεμνός λόγος* of the tragedians (fr. 24 Kock). *αὕτη* conveys a tinge of contempt, as at 470 d 5 and often.

b 1–4. Text and punctuation are doubtful. As it stands, the construction of the first question must be *τί (ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο) ἐφ' ᾧ ἡ τῆς τραγωδίας ποιήσις ἐσπούδακεν*; But we expect *τί δὲ δὴ* to introduce a question parallel to those asked at 501 e 8 and 502 a 4. And *ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν* is not wanted, in view of *ἡ σπουδὴ* in the next line. There is thus a fairly strong case for deleting the words, which could well be a gloss on *ἡ σπουδὴ*, intended to show that it means here not “zeal” but “object of zeal”. An alternative view (Hermann's) is that we should put the question mark after *τί δὲ δὴ*, not after *ἐσπούδακεν*, and delete *αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδὴ* (words which are marked as superfluous in a Vienna MS.). It is also open to doubt whether Plato could use *ὥς σοι δοκεῖ* as part of a question, to mean merely “in your opinion”; as Heindorf remarked, we should expect him to say *πότερον δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι* κτλ. The likeliest correction is perhaps *ὥς σοι δοκεῖν* (Kratz), despite the absence of an exact parallel: cf. *Rep.* 432 b 3 *ὥς γε οὕτως δόξαι*, Hdt. 8. 30. 2 *ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκέειν* (for which Plato uses *ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν*, *Euthyd.* 273 a, *Meno* 81 a). Theiler tries to cure this trouble along with the other by writing [*ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακε*] *πότερόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα [καὶ ἡ σπουδὴ]*, <*ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν*> *ὥς σοι δοκεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι* κτλ. But the remedy seems too elaborate to be very convincing.

b 6. *τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον*. It is easy, but probably unnecessary, to insert *ὄν*. There are at least a dozen places in Plato where the participle of *εἰμί* is omitted with *τυγχάνω*, and in several of these (*Hipp. ma.* 300 a 2, *Tim.* 61 c 8, *Laws* 918 c 4) its absence cannot be due to haplography. Cf. Adam on *Rep.* 369 b, Kühner-G. ii. 67. The usage should not be labelled ‘poetic’ (Burnet on *Phaedo* 62 a 3); it occurs in Aristophanes (*Eccl.* 1141) and Xenophon (*Hell.* 4. 3. 3, etc.). *τοῦτο δέ*: for the repetition of *μέν* and *δὲ* with the apodosis cf. 512 a 2 ff.; Denniston, 185.

c 2. *νυνδὴ*: 501 c 2.

c 5. “Strip any verse composition of melody, rhythm, and metre—doesn't the residue turn out to be simply speech?” *περιέλοι* is preferable to *περιέλαιτο* both on transcriptional grounds, since the scholion confirms the reading of F and Aristides, and on the grounds of usage: cf. *Soph.* 264 e 3 *τὰ κοινὰ πάντα περιελόντες*, *Polit.* 281 d 2 *πρὶν ἂν καὶ ταύτας αὐτῆς πάσας περιέλωμεν*, in both of which the word describes a mental operation as it does here. *γίννονται* is attracted to agree with the predicate. —This is of course an analysis of the elements of verse,

not a definition of 'poetry' in the modern sense: *ποίησις* meant by usage any composition in verse. Cf. the similar analysis of *μέλος* (in the sense of 'lyric verse') as composed of *λόγου τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ*, *Rep.* 398 d 1. The idea did not originate with Plato: Gorgias had already said *τὴν ποίησιν ἅπασαν καὶ νομίζω καὶ ὀνομάζω λόγον ἔχοντα μέτρον* (*Hel.* 9), belittling poetry in the interests of rhetoric, as Plato does in the interests of philosophy. Aristotle's analysis went deeper. He speaks indeed of *ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ* as the medium of epic and dramatic poetry (*Poet.* 1447^a22); but he treats these as means to an end, and recognizes that the verse form is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a work to qualify as poetry (1447^b2 ff.).

d 2. *ῥήτορεύειν*: Plato is perhaps thinking especially of the set debates, with formal speeches arguing for and against a thesis, which occur frequently in tragedy, particularly in Euripides, and reproduce many features of contemporary rhetorical practice.

d 5. *πρὸς δῆμον τοιοῦτον κτλ.* Cf. *Rep.* 604 e 5 *παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰς θέατρα συλλεγομένοις*, *Laws* 817 c, where tragedy is said *δημηγορεῖν πρὸς παῖδας τε καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὸν πάντα ὄχλον*. Elsewhere in the *Laws*, 658 d, we are told that tragedy is the favourite entertainment of "the educated women and the young men" (boys prefer comedy, old men epic recitation). On the size, composition, and behaviour of Athenian audiences see Pickard-Cambridge, *Dramatic Festivals of Athens*, chap. vi.

502 d 10—503 d 4. *By the same test, political oratory is a form of κολακεία. Callicles demurs: some orators have aimed at the good of their fellow citizens. Pressed for names, he can think of no contemporary who qualifies, but mentions four deceased statesmen who were "good men"—Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Pericles. That, says Socrates, is true only if one accepts the Calliclean definition of goodness as "gratifying one's own and other people's desires".*

Complaints that speakers in the Assembly try to win votes by *πρὸς χάριν δημηγορεῖν* (*Dem.* 3. 3) are frequently made by the orators. Isocrates goes so far as to tell the Athenians that they refuse to listen to anyone *πλὴν τοὺς συναγορεύοντας ταῖς ὑμετέραις ἐπιθυμίαις*, and that they have trained their politicians *μελετᾶν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν οὐ τὰ μέλλοντα τῇ πόλει συνοίσειν, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἀρέσκοντας ὑμῖν λόγους ἐροῦσιν* (*de pace* 3–5). But that was the fourth century. Demosthenes expressly denies that in Pericles' days the speakers flattered their audience (3. 24); and Pericles himself, according to Thucydides (2. 64. 8), did not speak *πρὸς ἡδονήν*. Plato's attack on "the Four Men", as Aelius Aristides calls them, must have shocked his contemporaries far more profoundly than his views on tragedy. The memory of Themistocles and Pericles had indeed been blackened by oligarchic pamphleteers like Stesimbrotus of Thasos (cf. the fragments in *Fgr Hist* ii B, no. 107); but Thucydides had triumphantly vindicated them, and in the fourth century they were revered by all Athenian democrats. Miltiades too was deeply respected, as the man who had saved Athens from the Persians. Cf. on Themistocles and Miltiades Isocr. *de pace* 75, *Dem.* 13. 21 f., 23. 196; on Themistocles and Pericles, Lysias 30. 28, Isocr.

Antid. 233 f.; on Pericles, Isocr. *de pace* 126, *Antid.* 111 ὁ μεγίστην ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ δόξαν εἰληφώς. According to Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 28. 3, the real corruption only set in with Cleon, ὃς δοκεῖ μάλιστα διαφθεῖραι τὸν δῆμον.

Plato postpones stating the grounds for his criticism until he has established what the function of the true statesman is. The reader is kept waiting until 515 c, when we shall return to the subject of the Four Men.

502 e 1. δῆμους τοὺς τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, in contrast with the theatre audience, which is a δῆμος παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων (d 6). Attendance at the Assembly was confined to adult male citizens; yet the speakers treat them like children (e 7: cf. 464 d 5 ff.).

e 6. ἕνεκα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ αὐτῶν ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ κοινοῦ. The 'Old Oligarch' makes a similar complaint: νῦν δὲ λέγων ὁ βουλόμενος ἀναστὰς ἄνθρωπος πονηρὸς ἐξευρίσκει τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις αὐτῷ (*Ath. Pol.* 1. 6). But there the word πονηρὸς gives away the class bias which underlies it.

503 a 2. ἀπλοῦν, answerable by a simple 'Yes' or 'No', like the questions about theatrical performances. The adjective is a secondary predicate, for the unidiomatic relative is rightly omitted by Aristides and (from conjecture?) by Flor: cf. *Phil.* 29 c 9 τοῦτο μὲν οὐδ' ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον ἐρωτᾶς.

a 5. Ἐξαρκεῖ, "Good enough!" (cf. *Hipp. ma.* 302 b 5). Socrates admits the theoretical possibility of a καλὴ ῥητορική directed πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον: see on 504 d 5. εἰ . . . καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν, "if there are *really* two sides to this question" (which in practice Socrates doubts). This seems better than "to this question *also*" (Cope, Lamb, Jowett⁴, etc.), referring to the original dichotomy between genuine and spurious τέχνη. There is certainly no implication that the theatrical arts can ever be anything but κολακεία: that is excluded by ἔτι in a 2, which shows that the previous questions were in Callicles' opinion ἀπλᾶ.

b 2. τί οὐχὶ . . . ἔφρασας . . .; 'The question marks impatience that a thing which is future is not past' (Lodge), and is equivalent to a command, like Eng. "Why not tell me?". So again at 509 e 2, and often in Plato. The usage goes back to Aeschylus (*P.V.* 747 f.) and Herodotus (9. 48. 4). Cf. E. S. Thompson on *Meno* 92 d, Kühner-G. i. 165, P. T. Stevens, *CQ*, xxxi (1937), 184 f.

b 7. αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν, "are reputed": commoner in an unfavourable sense, but here neutral in tone, as at *Theaet.* 169 a 4.

c 3. νεωστὶ is not reconcilable with Plato's other indications of the dramatic date of the dialogue, since Pericles died in 429. See *Introd.*, pp. 17 f. οὐ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας: 455 e 5.

c 4-d 3. This long sentence is loosely and elliptically constructed, and in its last two clauses is defective or corrupt (see next note). With εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο (c 6) we must supply ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, and with ὅτι (c 7) ἡ ἀρετὴ εἴη, to which ἀποτελεῖν κτλ. is the predicate, while the words τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις κτλ. are a parenthetical addition to the ὅτι clause,

referring back to 500 a ff. The sense is “If true virtue is what you originally said it was—viz. satisfying all desires—then yes, the Four were ‘good men’; but if it is what we later agreed it was—viz. satisfying certain desires and not others (and we further agreed that this was a kind of science)—then can you claim that any of the Four was a ‘good man’ (τοιοῦτον in d 2 = ἀγαθόν)?”

d 1–3. τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι (ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν—ἀρ’ ἔχεις φάναι) τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα τούτων τινὰ γεγονέναι; As the text stands in the primary MSS. neither εἶναι nor γεγονέναι has any construction (Stallbaum’s defence of the former as dependent on a ὁμολογεῖτο implicit in ἡναγκάσθημεν ὁμολογεῖν seems to go beyond the probable limits of colloquial anacoluthon). Restoration is guesswork, but we ought to prefer as more economical a guess which explains both troubles by a single mutilation. This condition is satisfied by Sauppe’s οἷε for εἶναι, which is accepted by Theiler and may be right (though τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις with no verb adds another ellipse to a sentence which is already sufficiently elliptical). But I incline to think it more likely that here as at 498 a 8 a complete line of a papyrus roll—containing, perhaps, some 20 letters—has dropped out, probably owing to homoeoteleuton, and carried away the end of the τοῦτο clause and the beginning of the question. Other scholars have tried to cure each trouble separately. (a) Some have altered εἶναι to a finite verb (εἶη ἂν ci. Heindorf, ἐστὶ Vermehren, εἶη ci. Thompson, whom Burnet followed), or simply deleted it (Madvig). Others have tried to get an accusative and infinitive construction by altering τέχνη τις (τέχνης Ast, τέχνην Reinhard, τεχνίτου Deneke). (b) The older editors provided a construction for γεγονέναι by inserting after it the words ἔχεις εἰπεῖν, which rest ultimately on the dubious authority of the Paris corrector and were probably suggested to him by the wording of Callicles’ reply. Burnet, quite properly distrusting such gifts, deleted γεγονέναι and construed the accusatives with οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε πῶς εἶπω, which he assigned to Socrates. I find it hard to believe that this is right, since it involves assigning the rejoinder, Ἀλλ’ εἰ ζήτησς καλῶς, εὐρήσεις, to Callicles. It is surely Socrates who exhorts his companion to further research: cf. 513 c 8: *Apol.* 24 b 1 εἴαντε νῦν εἴαντε αὖθις ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε: *Phaedo* 78 a 7 ζητεῖν δὲ χρή καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ’ ἀλλήλων: *Crat.* 440 d 3 σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρή . . . σκεψάμενον δέ, εἰ εὖρης, μεταδιδόναι καὶ ἑμοί: and *Alc.* i 109 e 5, where to the question ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἂν εὐρεῖν με ἡγή; Socrates replies καὶ μάλα γε, εἰ ζητήσῃς. It should be added that Burnet was mistaken in claiming the authority of W for his way of distributing the parts here. It does, on the other hand, occur in F; but F so frequently indicates a change of speaker at the wrong point that its deviation from BTW carries little weight.

503 d 5–505 b 12. Socrates shows what would be involved if politics were a real τέχνη and politicians were statesmen (504 d 5). Any true craftsman has a mental picture of what he wishes to produce, and tries to impose a corresponding form (εἶδος, 503 e 4) or order (τάξις, 503 e 7) upon his product. Similarly the statesman will seek to impose order on the minds of his fellow citizens with

a view to producing justice and self-control, as a doctor imposes order on his patient's body with a view to producing health. And so long as the body politic is in an unhealthy condition, this will involve repressing (κολάζειν, 505 b 9) the desires of the individual.

Here Socrates begins to develop the positive side of his moral and social doctrine, making use of the analogy between physical and moral health which was worked out at 477 e–479 e. The statesman must have a 'doctor's mandate' (as the doctor, conversely, is ἄρχων κάμνοντος, *Ion* 540 c 1), and must use it ruthlessly to restore the health of a sick society (such as that of Athens). We may see here the first indication of the authoritarian strain in Plato's thinking which was to find fuller expression in the *Republic*, and which grew on him with advancing years, culminating in the elaborate proposals of the *Laws* for 'conditioning' the masses. For the statesman as doctor cf. 518 a, *Rep.* 425 e ff., *Polit.* 297 e ff., *Ep.* vii 330 d–31 a, and the similar view of a modern French sociologist: 'Son rôle est celui du médecin; il prévient l'éclosion des maladies par une bonne hygiène et, quand elles sont déclarées, il cherche à les guérir' (E. Durkheim, *Règles de la méthode sociologique*, 75).

503 d 5. οὕτωςι ἀτρέμα σκοπούμενοι, "just calmly examining". Theiler puts a comma after οὕτωςι, but analogy suggests that it qualifies ἀτρέμα: cf. 468 c 3 and *Prot.* 351 c 7 ἀπλῶς οὕτως: 494 e 10 and *Hipp. mi.* 368 a 8 ἀνέδην οὕτω (οὕτωςι): 506 d 6 οὕτως εἰκῇ: *Crat.* 391 a 1 οὕτως ἐξαίφνης, etc.

e 1. ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τι, "keeping his eye on something". The "something" seems to be a mental image or model of the effects he wants to produce, though its ontological status is left vague. Cf. *Euthyphro* 6 e 4 εἰς ἐκείνην (sc. τὴν ἰδέαν τοῦ ὁσίου) ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι: *Crat.* 389 a–c where the carpenter is said to make a shuttle βλέπων . . . πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι ὃ ἐπεφύκει κερκίζειν (subsequently called an εἶδος and αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν κερκίς): *Rep.* 596 b where he is similarly said to make a bed πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων. The ἰδέα of the last passage would appear to be a transcendent Platonic Form (cf. 597 b), and the terms used in the *Cratylus* passage suggest this also. Nothing, however, requires us to read back the full-blown theory of Forms into the *Euthyphro* or the *Gorgias*, though the striking similarity of language in all four passages is suggestive of the way in which Plato may have been led to it. Cf. *Introd.*, p. 21, n. 1; Wilamowitz, ii. 248; Friedländer, i. 17 ff. Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, surprisingly overlooks the present passage.

e 1–4. "Just as all other craftsmen, with an eye to their own function, each of them applies the measures he applies, not at random but selecting them in order to get the thing he is making to acquire a particular form." The verbs are made to agree with the nearest subject, ἕκαστος, which stands, as often, in partitive apposition to a plural noun: cf. *Rep.* 346 d 5 αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι (τέχναι) οὕτως τὸ αὐτῆς ἐκάστη ἔργον ἐργάζεται. As regards the text,

(i) There has long been general agreement (Burnet is the only

notable exception) that *προσφέρει* must be provided with an object, and that this is best done by adding *ἃ προσφέρει* (Y) or *ἃ ἂν προσφέρῃ* (Hirschig). Cf. e 8 *τίθησιν ὃ ἂν τιθῇ* and 504 d 6 *τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει . . . οὓς ἂν λέγῃ*.

(ii) There is also now general agreement that *πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτῶν* is a variant for *πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον* which has been inserted in the wrong place (if it belonged where it stands in the MSS. we should expect *αὐτοῦ*). We have had a similar case at 457 d 7–8.

(iii) A more doubtful question is whether to delete *βλέποντες* in e 2, so as to take *πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον* with *προσφέρει* (“applies . . . to their own product”). Burnet, Wilamowitz (ii. 251), and Theiler have all accepted this proposal of Sauppe’s (but see, *contra*, Reinhard, *Obs. Crit.* 51, and Friedländer, ii². 323). What the craftsman “keeps his eye on” can hardly (despite *Rep.* 501 b) be his own product, which is still in the making (cf. preceding note). On the other hand, *αὐτῶν* is awkward with the singular *προσφέρει* (Wilamowitz read *ἑαυτοῦ*); and, more important, we expect something corresponding to *ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τι* in the previous sentence. I incline to retain *βλέποντες* and understand *ἔργον* as the craftsman’s task, the *τέλος* he hopes to achieve, a picture of which exists as a *παράδειγμα* in his mind. Plato frequently uses *ἔργον* in this sense, as at 517 c 1 and *Rep.* 335 d 3 *οὐ θερμότητος ἔργον ψύχειν*.

504 a 1. *ἕως ἂν—κεκοσμημένον πρᾶγμα*: “until he has composed the whole into a thing of order and system”. For this sense of *κόσμος*, *κοσμεῖσθαι*, see on 508 a 3. It is interesting that Plato applies his conception of *τέχνη* as purposive organization to painting (*τοὺς ζωγράφους*, e 5) and by implication to the other ‘fine arts’: we may perhaps detect here the germ of Plotinus’ doctrine that what the artist “imitates” is not simply a material model but the *λόγος* or organizing conception which he has in his mind (*Enn.* 5. 8. 1). In the *Phaedrus* the same idea of structural unity is applied to the composition (*συνεστάναι*) of a speech (264 c), and the art of tragedy is described as *τὴν τούτων* (sc. *ρήσεων*) *σύστασιν πρέπουσαν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ συνισταμένην* (268 d 4).

a 3. *οἱ . . . ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ* is illogically but naturally co-ordinated with *οἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα*, although the predicate applies strictly only to the latter. *οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν*: medicine has been mentioned at 500 b 5 and 501 a 1, but the real reference is to 464 b.

c 3. *ἐκείνῳ* (Heindorf) is preferable stylistically to *ἐκεῖνο* (MSS.), and transcriptionally to Burnet’s *ἐκεῖ*. For the dative cf. *Crat.* 385 d 8 *καλεῖν ἐκάστῳ ὄνομα*.

c 4. *Τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις*; Callicles wants to avoid being forced to contradict the view he expressed at 491 e 5. He will renew the suggestion at 505 d 8.

c 7. F’s *γὰρ* (introductory) is confirmed by the papyrus, as is his *γε* at d 1.

d 1–3. In the moral sphere the qualities of *τάξις* and *κόσμος* which are common to all true *τέχναι* respectively take the form of *τὸ νόμιμον*,

which gives rise to the virtue of *δικαιοσύνη*, and *τὸ κόσμιον*, which gives rise to *σωφροσύνη*. The thought would be more clearly expressed if (with Kratz) we substituted *κόσμος* or *κόσμιον* for *νόμος* in d 2. Cf. 506 e 6 ἡ γε κόσμον ἔχουσα κοσμία; . . . ἡ δέ γε κοσμία σώφρων;

d 5. ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκεῖνος, the true statesman referred to at 503 a. In calling him ὁ τεχνικός Socrates appears to contradict his earlier denial that rhetoric is a τέχνη. But he is now contrasting the actual with the ideal, politics as it is with what politics might become if politicians were philosophers. Those who see in the *Phaedrus* a 'correction' of the uncompromising views expressed in the *Gorgias* (Pohlenz 343) or 'a new stage in Plato's developing attitude to rhetoric' (Jaeger, *Paideia*, iii. 185) seem to overlook the present passage. The two dialogues certainly differ widely in emotional tone (see *Introd.*, p. 10, n. 1), but the implication of both is that the only true ῥήτωρ is Socrates himself (cf. 521 d).

d 8. δώσει . . . ἀφαιρήσεται. Socrates is presumably thinking on the one hand of payment for various forms of public service (cf. on 515 e 4-7), on the other of taxation and λειτουργίαι, and is saying that fiscal policy should be governed by social policy and should not be treated as a vote-catching expedient.

d 9. αὐτῷ, as in the similar clause at 503 e 4, ὅπως ἂν εἰδός τι αὐτῷ σχῇ. αὐτοῦ, which Burnet and Theiler retain, is not wanted (τοῖς πολίταις by itself means 'his fellow citizens'), and seems wrongly placed in the emphatic position at the beginning of the clause.

e 1-3. The 'antistrophic' repetitions, γίγνηται . . . ἀπαλλάττηται . . . ἐγγίγνηται . . . ἀπαλλάττηται . . . ἐγγίγνηται . . . ἀπὴ, are designed to give maximum emphasis to the speaker's words. Cf. *Symph.* 212 a 3 τίκτειν οὐκ εἶδωλα ἀρετῆς, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδώλου ἐφαπτομένω, ἀλλ' ἀληθῆ, ἅτε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐφαπτομένω, and Denniston, *Greek Prose Style*, 89.

e 6-9. For the necessity of keeping the moral invalid 'low', like the physical invalid, cf. Aristotle, *E.E.* 1248^b31 ff. We are similarly told at *Soph.* 230 c that the system cannot digest heavy intellectual food until it has been purged of 'obstructions'. As regards the text here,

(i) I have followed the combined authority of F, Iamblichus, and the papyrus in inserting ἡ before σιτία (e 7) and in reading αὐτὸν in e 8. The latter survives also in B, and is a natural sense-construction which later pedantry would be tempted to 'correct'.

(ii) ἔσθ' ὅτι πλέον, 'one jot more', should not in my opinion be altered to ἔσθ' ὅτε πλέον (the old vulgate reading, abandoned by Sauppe, Burnet, and Nestle, but revived by Croiset and Theiler). ἔσθ' ὅτι is the neuter of ἔσθ' ὅστις used adverbially, and Routh long ago quoted the decisive parallels, *Clouds* 1290 τὴν θάλατταν ἔσθ' ὅτι πλείονα νυνὶ νομίζεις ἢ πρὸ τοῦ; and *Theaet.* 209 b 6 αὕτη νῦν ἡ διάνοια ἔσθ' ὅτι μᾶλλον ποιήσει με Θεαίτητον ἢ Θεόδωρον διανοεῖσθαι; ἔσθ' ὅτε would be an understatement: contrast 505 a 8 ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτε, and the unqualified assertion of the Hippocratic *Aphorisms* (2. 10), τὰ μὴ καθαρὰ τῶν σωματῶν ὁκόσω ἂν θρέψῃς μᾶλλον, βλάψεις.

(iii) ἢ τοῦναντίον κτλ. may be translated “or, on the contrary, by a just reckoning, even less (than giving him nothing)”. But we expect the alternative course to be mentioned, and the run of the sentence suggests that πλέον ἢ τοῦναντίον is to be taken together as “more than the opposite method (starvation)”. In that case, however, a connective is required with κατά γε τὸν δίκαιον λόγον: I cannot agree with Stallbaum that it is possible to treat the καὶ before ἔλαττον as a connective. The δίκαιος λόγος is explained by what follows in 505 a 2–3: feeding such a patient not only will not help him to recover, but is, justly considered, a positive cruelty, since it prolongs his sufferings.

505 a 2. Οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι λυσιτελεῖ κτλ. Life is not worth living either with a diseased body or with a diseased mind. Cf. 512 ab, *Crito* 47 e, *Laches* 195 cd, *Rep.* 445 a.

a 8. ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν: see on 450 b 7.

b 4. ἃ ποιῶν (F) is either a misreading of ΑΠΟΩΝ or a gloss on it.

b 12. νυνδῆ: 492 c 4 ff.

505 c 1–506 c 4. *Interlude.* Callicles sulks again and refuses to continue the discussion. As no one volunteers to take his place, Socrates offers to complete the argument alone if the others so wish, hoping that they will check him if he goes wrong. Gorgias accepts the offer on behalf of the assembled company.

This interlude emphasizes the importance of the positive doctrine which Socrates is now about to establish, as Gorgias' previous intervention, at 497 b 4, emphasized the importance of his refutation of hedonism. It also enables Plato to get rid of Callicles for a while, and thus (a) to avoid making him assent to propositions which we know to be against his deepest convictions (cf. on 513 c 5); (b) to let Socrates present a continuous exposition of his point of view (the question-and-answer form is dropped from 507 c onwards). The device may possibly have been suggested to him by something similar in Epicharmus (cf. on e 1). Ingenious and successful though it is, it reveals the underlying tension between Plato the Socratic ‘dramatist’ and Plato the philosopher (cf. on 465 e 1–466 a 2). At *Laws* 893 b–894 a the Athenian similarly acts as respondent to his own questions, on the ground that the subject is too difficult for his companions.

505 c 3. Οὗτος ἀνὴρ: see on 467 b 1; Socrates retorts the way of speaking which Callicles used at 489 b 7. For αὐτὸς Theiler reads αὐτὸ with the Paris corrector and Dobree, perhaps rightly: there is a close parallel at *Phaedo* 73 b 6, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ οἱ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι. κολαζόμενος explains τοῦτο πάσχω κτλ. (cf. 513 c 5, Riddell, § 207); the *Phaedo* passage shows that Hartman was mistaken in proposing to delete it.

c 8. καταλύομεν, “are we breaking off . . . ?” For the present used of a future action which is thought of as already beginning cf. 480 b 2 πῶς λέγομεν . . . ; 513 c 3 λέγομέν τι πρὸς ταῦτα; etc. καταλύωμεν (Flor) and καταλύσομεν (Stephanus) are easy but unnecessary corrections. Cornarius' καταλείφομεν and Buttmann's καταλίπωμεν are based on Y's solecistic καταλείψωμεν, which evidently comes from καταλείπειν in d 1.

c 9. Αὐτὸς γνώση, "That is for you to decide", occurs again at *Phil.* 12 a 8. Ol explains its force correctly as ἀντὶ τοῦ "εἰ τι θέλεις, ποίει· ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ μέλει".

c 10. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους κτλ. Plato has several references to this saying: *Laus* 752 a 2 οὐκ οὐκ δὴ πον λέγων γε ἂν μῦθον ἀκέφαλον ἐκὼν καταλίπομι· πλανώμενος γὰρ ἂν ἀπάντη τοιοῦτος ὢν ἄμορφος φαίνοιτο: *Phdr.* 264 c 3, a λόγος should be like a complete organism, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν: *Tim.* 69 b 1 τελευτὴν ἤδη κεφαλὴν τε τῷ μύθῳ . . . ἐπιθεῖναι: *Phil.* 66 d 1 ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις. Clearly the saying was applied, as the paroemiographers tell us, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτελεῶν λεγόντων, but its origin is obscure. The scholiast, evidently drawing on a Neoplatonic commentary, found a deep philosophical meaning in it. Sauppe saw a reference to the practice of making the head of a statue in a separate piece from the body, Taylor (on *Tim.* 69 b 1) to putting a capital (κεφαλὴ) on a column. But (a) in all five Platonic passages the "head" belongs to a μῦθος or λόγος, (b) statues and columns do not "travel" (περίη, πλανώμενος), (c) οὐδὲ . . . θέμις εἶναι implies a religious or superstitious prohibition. I think the point is simply that it is unlucky to leave a story unfinished. As Professor H. J. Rose has said (*Harv. Theol. Rev.* xxxi (1938), 91, apropos of μῦθος ἐσώθη, *Rep.* 621 b 8), the story is treated 'like a living thing, a guest who has come to entertain the company'; to leave it "headless" would give it offence and might be dangerous.

d 4. Ὡς βίαιος εἶ, "What a tyrant you are!"

e 1. Ἴνα μοι κτλ., like *Lysis* 211 c 2 ἵνα, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καταγέλαστος γένωμαι; τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου, like τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου, 484 e 3. Plato considered Epicharmus "the prince of comedy" (*Theaet.* 152 e 5), perhaps because of the philosophical element in his poetry. The line adapted here is quoted in its original form by Athenaeus (308 c and 362 d = Epicharmus fr. 253 Kaibel, 16 Diels), τὰ πρὸ τοῦ δὴ ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἰς ἐγὼν ἀποχρέω: Plato replaces the un-Attic forms by Attic equivalents. According to Ol, Epicharmus made one speaker take both parts in a dialogue, like Socrates here; but he may be merely guessing.

e 3. οὕτωςι μέντοι ποιήσωμεν. This reading, conjectured by Coraës and since confirmed by F, is almost certainly the true one, as Theiler has seen. Burnet kept the vulgate text εἶναι οὕτως. εἰ μέντοι ποιήσομεν But, as Heindorf pointed out, οὕτως is out of place with εἶναι (we should expect τοῦτο if anything), while it is needed with ποιήσομεν or ποιήσωμεν. Cf. *Crat.* 396 c 6, where ταυτησὶ has become ταύτης εἰ in B.

e 4. F is again alone in preserving the true reading πάντας. For the spelling of φιλονίκως see on 457 d 4.

e 6. ἅπασι goes with ἀγαθόν, not (as Woodhead) with φανερόν: the latter would seem to imply an un-Socratic claim that Socrates knows the truth already.

506 a 1. Coraës's τῶ λόγῳ (the 'parts' of the two disputants) is specious, in view of 505 d 8 and 506 b 1. But cf. *Rep.* 473 a 5 τῷ λόγῳ

διήλθομεν and e 2 λόγῳ διεληλύθαμεν: *Symp.* 195 a 2 λόγῳ διελθεῖν, etc. And only one λόγος, that of Socrates himself, is really in question.

a 3. I have accepted F's πάνυ τι: cf. *Theaet.* 150 c 8 εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφός. Philosophical inquiry is equally incompatible with complete knowledge and with complete ignorance (*Lysis* 218 a, *Meno* 80 e, *Symp.* 204 a).

a 4. ἂν τι φαίνεται λέγων, "if there proves to be something in what he says".

b 3. αὐτοῦ, "by yourself", like αὐτὸς at 505 d 8.

b 4. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, "Well, certainly," conveys assent (Denniston, 394). καὶ αὐτὸς: Socrates means that he too is happy to fall in with the proposal, though he would have preferred to question Callicles. The words thus belong logically to the δὲ clause, the μὲν clause being (as often) treated as subordinate: cf. 465 c 3–5, 491 b 7. When the δὲ clause is reached, however, its construction is changed to an imperative, leaving καὶ αὐτὸς hanging.

b 5. τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφίονος: cf. 485 e 3 ff.

c 1. ἀχθεσθήσομαι. This form of the future is presented by the MSS. at Andocides 3. 21 and (with variants) at Aeschines 3. 242 and Xen. *Cyrop.* 8. 4. 10. Plato, however, elsewhere uses the normal Attic ἀχθέσομαι (*Hipp. ma.* 292 e 3, *Rep.* 603 e 7), which should perhaps, therefore, be restored here (cf. Rutherford, *New Phrynichus*, 194 f.).

c 2. μέγιστος—ἀναγεγραψή: "you shall be recorded in my memory as my greatest benefactor" (Cope). Socrates playfully uses the formal language applicable to an honorific inscription: cf. Hdt. 8. 85. 3 εὐεργέτης βασιλέος ἀνεγράφη, and the letter of Xerxes to Pausanias (Thuc. 1. 129. 3), κείσεται σοι εὐεργεσία ἐν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ οἴκῳ ἐς αἰεὶ ἀνάγραφτος. For the thought cf. 458 a.

506 c 5–507 a 3. Socrates alone. *Dialectical proof that the Good for man depends on self-control.*

All excellence, whether in a tool, an organism, or a mind, depends on a principle of order (τάξις, κόσμος):

But in the human mind this principle of order is self-control (κοσμιότης, σωφροσύνη):

∴ Human excellence, and so the Good for man, depends on self-control.

This recapitulates in a shorter and stricter form the ideas developed in 503 d 5–504 d 4, and thus completes in a positive sense Socrates' refutation of the thesis that the Good is Pleasure. It may be felt that the minor premiss begs the question, or at least that Plato slides rather too easily, with the treacherous help of Greek usage, from κόσμος in the wide sense of τάξις (e 2) to κόσμος in the restricted sense of σώφρων (e 6). But he would no doubt plead in justification that the link between the two meanings is more than verbal: the moral law applies to human action a principle of universal validity (see below, on 507 a 4–c 7). What is important is the recognition that the Good is an *organizing* principle which makes a living creature or an artefact capable of fulfilling its function—the germ of Aristotle's ἐνέργεια

ἀνεμπόδιστος (*E.N.* vii. 13). This may be an extension of something Socratic: cf. *Xen. Symp.* 5. 4 where we are told that things are beautiful ἂν πρὸς τὰ ἔργα ὧν ἕνεκα ἕκαστα κτῶμεθα εὖ εἰργασμένα ἢ ἢ εὖ πεφυκότα πρὸς ᾧ ἂν δεώμεθα—what we now call the ‘functional’ theory of beauty.

506 c 7. ὠμολογήσαμεν: 499 b.

c 9. Τὸ ἡδὺ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ: 500 a.

d 1. ἀγαθὸν δὲ οὐ παρόντος ἀγαθοὶ ἔσμεν. This sounds like the language of the theory of Forms. But see above, on 497 e 1 and 503 e 1. The change from παραγενομένου to παρόντος does not imply the later distinction between pleasure as γένεσις and the Good as οὐσία (*Phil.* 54 c), for we have ἀρετῆς παραγενομένης in d 3.

d 5. ἢ γε ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου κτλ. Cf. *Rep.* 601 d 4 οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὀρθότης ἐκάστου σκεύους καὶ ζώου καὶ πράξεως οὐ πρὸς ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν χρεῖαν ἐστίν, πρὸς ἣν ἂν ἕκαστον ἢ πεποιημένον ἢ πεφυκός; where we have the same threefold application of the functional test to the artefact or tool (σκεῦος), to organic life (here subdivided into σώματος, the human body, and ζώου παντός) and to the sphere of moral action.—For the connexion between τάξις and τέχνη see above, 503 e 5–504 a 5.

d 6. οὐχ οὕτως εἰκὴ κάλλιστα παραγίνεται: ‘is not best produced just by the operation of chance’. For οὐκ εἰκὴ cf. 503 e 1, e 3; for the idiomatic οὕτως, 503 d 5 note, and especially *Hippiarch.* 225 b 10 μὴ μοι οὕτως εἰκὴ . . . ἀλλὰ προσέχων ἐμοὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀπόκρῖναι: *Alc.* ii 143 c 1 οὕτως εἰκὴ ψέγοντας: *ibid.* 143 d 6 οὐδὲ ῥητέον εἶναι οὕτως εἰκὴ. In view of these parallels, or imitations, I feel no doubt that F’s reading is the true one. Many editors, from Stallbaum to Theiler, have printed οὐ τῷ εἰκὴ (BTW Iamb.). But, as Sauppe pointed out, there is no evidence that τῷ εἰκὴ could be used adverbially in place of εἰκὴ: *Phil.* 28 d 6 τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκὴ δύναμιν and *Tim.* 34 c 3 μετέχοντες τοῦ προστυχόντος τε καὶ εἰκὴ are quite different, since there the article turns εἰκὴ into a noun, ‘the random’. Sauppe himself read οὐ τοι εἰκὴ, which is unobjectionable but lacks the authority of any primary MS. κάλλιστα need not, I think, be deleted with Coraës and others, although its implications are ignored in Socrates’ next question. Plato does not deny that excellence *can* arise spontaneously, but thinks there is a better, because more reliable, way of producing it. Cf. *Meno* 99 e 4 ff., where the conclusion is reached that in the political sphere it can only arise θείᾳ μοίρᾳ . . . ἄνευ νοῦ, until a statesman appears who is capable of training others, i.e. until we have a τέχνη of politics comparable to the τέχνη of the toolmaker.

d 8. ἀποδέδοται: ‘is assigned as appropriate’.

e 1. Τάξει ἄρα κτλ. ‘So it is due to a principle of design (τάξις) that excellence is in each case something which has design and harmonious order.’ Cf. 503 e 7, and Santayana’s dictum that ‘Reason adds to the natural materials only the perfect order which it introduces into them’ (*Reason in Religion*, chap. i). ἄρα is, I think, inferential. Iamblichus’ τι softens the tautology of τάξει τεταγμένον and makes the neuter

predicates more natural. Such predicates occur without $\tau\iota$ chiefly in general statements like $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{o}\nu \eta \sigma\omega\phi\rho\omicron\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$ (*Rep.* 364 a 2).

507 a 2. $\omega \phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\epsilon \kappa\alpha\lambda\lambda\acute{\iota}\kappa\lambda\epsilon\iota\varsigma$. Having brought the discussion up to the point where Callicles broke it off, Socrates tries to draw him in, but without success.

507 a 4–c 7. *Socrates alone. He 'proves' formally, in two steps, that the self-controlled man is happy.*

i. *The self-controlled man is also pious, just, and brave:*

\therefore *He is entirely good.*

ii. *The good man $\epsilon\upsilon$ πράττει:*

$\acute{o} \epsilon\upsilon$ πράττων *is happy:*

\therefore *The good man is happy:*

\therefore *By (i) the self-controlled man is happy.*

(i) The reciprocal implication of the virtues (called by the Stoics $\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha\kappa\omicron\lambda\omicron\upsilon\theta\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$) is probably a doctrine of the historical Socrates. It follows naturally from his equation of virtue with knowledge, since the kind of knowledge he had in mind is something which, as Gould says, 'affects a whole personality' (see on 460 a 5–c 6). It is already implicit in the *Laches*, where the attempted definition of courage turns out to be a definition of goodness (199 de). In the *Protagoras* Socrates raises the question whether justice, etc. are distinct "parts" of virtue (329 c), and attempts to show that justice "resembles" piety (330 c ff.). In the *Meno* he reduces all virtues to $\phi\rho\acute{o}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ (88 c, cf. Aristotle, *E.N.* 1144^b17); in the *Republic* he subordinates all to $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$. This last does not mean (as Thompson thought) that the *Republic* is 'more mature' than the *Gorgias*: it means that in a system of mutual implication the part always implies the whole, wherever you choose to start. The moral life is not an addible total of virtuous conduct, as if it were the keeping of so many separate rules, but a system of behaviour controlled by a single $\tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$. It is, I think, relevant to compare Christ's reduction of the Ten Commandments to two. For the Greek they are reducible to one, since his relation to his gods is not governed by a different law from his relation to his neighbour (cf. *Euthyphro* 12 e, quoted below on b 2). But not everyone saw Plato's point. Isocrates, *Enc. Hel.* 1, quotes in a list of foolish theorists people who $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\gamma\epsilon\gamma\eta\rho\acute{\alpha}\kappa\alpha\sigma\iota\nu \dots \delta\iota\epsilon\chi\iota\omicron\upsilon\acute{\nu}\tau\epsilon\varsigma \acute{\omega}\varsigma \alpha\upsilon\alpha\delta\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha \kappa\alpha\iota \sigma\omicron\phi\acute{\iota}\alpha \kappa\alpha\iota \delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta \tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\nu \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota \dots \mu\acute{\iota}\alpha \delta' \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\mu\eta \kappa\alpha\theta' \acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$.

(ii) Plato has taken advantage of the convenient ambiguity of $\epsilon\upsilon$ πράττειν. This phrase, and others of the same type, normally have the 'passive' sense of 'faring well'; but they can also be used of action, e.g. Aesch. *Cho.* 1044, where $\epsilon\upsilon \gamma' \acute{\epsilon}\pi\rho\alpha\zeta\alpha\varsigma$ can only mean "You have acted rightly" (cf. Snell, *Philol. Supp.* 20. i (1928), 10 ff.). Plato similarly exploits the ambiguity at *Charm.* 172 a 1 $\acute{\epsilon}\nu \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\eta \pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\iota \kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\omega}\varsigma \kappa\alpha\iota \epsilon\upsilon$ πράττειν (active) $\alpha\upsilon\alpha\gamma\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\nu \tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \omicron\upsilon\tau\omega \delta\iota\alpha\kappa\epsilon\iota\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma, \tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \delta\acute{\epsilon} \epsilon\upsilon$ πράττοντας (passive) $\epsilon\upsilon\delta\alpha\acute{\iota}\mu\omicron\nu\alpha\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$, and *ibid.* 173 d 3; also at *Euthyd.* 281 c 1 $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\omega \delta\acute{\epsilon} \acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\nu \eta\tau\tau\omicron\nu \acute{\alpha}\nu \kappa\alpha\kappa\acute{\omega}\varsigma \pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\omicron\iota$ (active), $\eta\tau\tau\omicron\nu \delta\acute{\epsilon} \kappa\alpha\kappa\acute{\omega}\varsigma \pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\omega\nu$ (passive) $\acute{\alpha}\theta\lambda\iota\omicron\varsigma \eta\tau\tau\omicron\nu \acute{\alpha}\nu \acute{\epsilon}\eta$. And it is again called

into play at *Rep.* 353 e–354 a and *Alc. i* 116 b. The argument was already criticized in antiquity (see Olympiodorus in *Alc.* 121–3); it is sometimes cited (e.g. by Gomperz and Wilamowitz) as an extreme example of the way in which Plato let himself be taken in by words. No doubt Greeks did often take it for granted that, in Cornford's phrase, 'the structure of the Greek language reflected the structure of the world' (*The Unwritten Philosophy*, 43). But it is not easy to suppose that here and in the passages just quoted Plato was unaware of what he was doing (cf. T. G. Tuckey, *Plato's Charmides*, 74 ff.). The last words of the *Republic*, εὖ πράττωμεν, surely involve a conscious play on the two meanings. And there is certainly such a play in the Platonic Letters, where εὖ πράττειν is used as a salutation in place of the conventional χαίρειν, presumably for the reason stated at the beginning of *Epistle iii*. The idea may well go back to Socrates: cf. *Xen. Mem.* 3. 9. 14, where Socrates defines εὐπραξία—surely in conscious opposition to the normal usage—as τὸ μαθόντα τε καὶ μελετήσαντά τι εὖ ποιεῖν. In the present passage, Plato gives a superficially logical form to what is really an assertion, viz. that, in Aristotle's words, ἀδύνατον καλῶς πράττειν τοῖς μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσιν (*Pol.* 1323^b31), or that, as Lord Grey expressed it, 'to do the right thing is generally the right thing to do'. We may perhaps say with A. Rivier (*Les Horizons métaphysiques du 'Gorgias'*, 18 f.) that Plato's aim is to mark the convergence of his thought with the traditional sentiment enshrined in the Greek language. His real arguments are developed in the next paragraph.

507 a 7. ἄφρων τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος. σώφρων has two 'opposites', corresponding to its two meanings of "sensible" and "self-controlled". The common opposition is σώφρων–ἀκόλαστος: for σώφρων–ἄφρων cf. *Theognis* 430 οὐδεὶς πω τοῦτό γ' ἐπεφράσατο | ᾧ τις σώφρον' ἔθηκε τὸν ἄφρονα. Plato proceeds to take advantage of the ambiguity to show that the σώφρων must possess the other virtues. Cf. the more elaborate 'proof' at *Prot.* 332 a–333 b, which exploits a similar verbal ambiguity, though its logical form is different.

b 2. περὶ δὲ θεοὺς ὅσια: cf. *Euthyphro* 12 e, where τὸ εὖσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον is defined as "that part of right [τὸ δίκαιον] which has to do with the tendance of the gods". The Greeks were apt to think of piety as a contractual relation rather than a state of mind. ὁσιότης is also included in an enumeration of the leading virtues at *Laches* 199 d 8, *Prot.* 325 a 1, 329 c 5, 349 b 2, and *Meno* 78 e 1; its omission in the *Republic* may be due merely to the difficulty of fitting it into the scheme of virtues in relation to social classes.

b 8. καρτερεῖν ὅπου δεῖ: cf. *Laches* 192 d 10 ἡ φρόνιμος ἄρα καρτερία κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη.

c 7. ἐπήγνευς: 492 c.

507 c 8–508 c 3. Socrates, still alone, claims that he has now justified the paradoxes about punishment which he advanced in his conversation with Polus. He introduces two important fresh considerations. (i) The man without moral sense has no place in any community, human or divine: he will be alone and

friendless, and therefore cannot be happy (e 3–6). (ii) The domain of order (κοσμιότης) embraces not only human societies but the entire universe, which is therefore called κόσμος. And its ruling principle is not πλεονεξία, as Callicles supposes, but proportion (ἡ ἰσότης ἢ γεωμετρική, a 6).

The first of these points was later elaborated in the *Republic*, in the terrifying portrait of the τυραννικὸς ἀνὴρ (see especially 578 e–579 c). It has been restated in modern terms by Bertrand Russell, who observes that the three most obvious psychological conditions of happiness are ‘a certain amount of friendly companionship, a certain minimum of security, and a sense of integration [Plato’s κοινωνία] in some herd’ (*Human Nature in Ethics and Politics*, 131). All three are usually lacking to the man in a position of absolute power. It seems to have been Plato’s view throughout his career that man’s natural needs drive him into altruism. According to Aristotle’s poem (fr. 673) he was the first to demonstrate “by his life and by his arguments” that to become good is to become happy.

The second point is Plato’s solution of the νόμος–φύσις controversy (see on 482 c 4–483 c 6). The antithesis is in his view a false one: νόμος is rooted in φύσις; the social and the natural order are expressions of the same divine law—which reveals itself as law because it can be stated in mathematical terms. As Aristotle later put it, ἀκοσμία is παρὰ φύσιν (π. φιλοσοφίας fr. 17). This thought too is further developed in the *Republic*: see especially 500 c 9 θείῳ δὲ καὶ κοσμίῳ ὃ γε φιλόσοφος ὁμιλῶν κόσμιός τε καὶ θεῖος εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ γίγνεται, also *Tim.* 90 cd. Socrates does not, however, claim it as his own; he appeals in our passage to the authority of οἱ σοφοί (e 6), on which the scholiast remarks σοφοὺς ἐνταῦθα τοὺς Πυθαγορείους φησί, καὶ διαφερόντως τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα: so also *Ol.* 166. 15. They think of Empedocles because of the importance in his system of φιλία as a cosmic principle; but there is no compelling reason to suppose that Plato had Empedocles especially in mind (the doctrine of “geometrical equality” is not, so far as we know, Empedoclean). Their identification of the σοφοί with the Pythagoreans has, however, been generally and rightly accepted:

(a) Plato applies this term to the Pythagoreans in a number of other places (see on 492 d 1–493 d 4).

(b) κοινωνία (sense of community) and φιλία were important in the Pythagorean society, not only as an obligation governing the relations of one Pythagorean to another (*Iamb. vit. Pyth.* 237 ff.) but in a much wider sense as a bond between all living things: *Sext. Emp. adv. math.* 9. 127 φασὶ μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς (cf. a 1) εἶναι τινα κοινωνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων: cf. *Meno* 81 c 9 τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενούς οὕσης, where Plato is almost certainly quoting Pythagorean doctrine.

(c) The Pythagoreans are said to have been the first actually to call the universe κόσμος (see on a 3), and they were certainly the first proponents of the idea of a world-order controlled by mathematical laws (τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀριθμόν, *Ar. Met.* 986^a2).

(d) The concept of "geometrical proportion" appears first in the Pythagorean mathematician Archytas (fr. 2). And its political application, though not attested before the *Gorgias*, may well go back to Pythagorean sources (see on a 6).

On the whole subject see further Pohlenz, 152 ff. and Frank, 34 f.

507 d 2. ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν: cf. Hdt. 6. 116 ὡς ποδῶν εἶχον, and *supra*, 451 c 9, πῶς . . . τάχους ἔχει.

d 3. The εἰς αὐτὸν added by Stobaeus is evidently a gloss intended to show the reflexive (middle) force of παρασκευαστέον.

d 5. ἡ πόλις: see on 480 b 7–c 5. εἰ μέλλει εὐδαίμων εἶναι should not be deleted with Herwerden: it is a typical example of Plato's favourite *a b a* or 'ring' structure, recalling at the end of a long sentence the condition expressed at its beginning by τὸν βουλόμενον . . . εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.

e 1. οὕτω πράττειν: sc. δεῖ, understood from the (subordinate) δεῖ at d 7. οὕτω sums up the preceding participial clause πάντα—ἔσεσθαι.

e 3. ἀνήνυτον κακόν, in apposition to ταύτας ἐπιχειροῦντα πληροῦν. For the thought cf. 493 d 6 ff.; for the phrase, *Laws* 714 a 5 (ψυχὴν) ἀνήνυτω καὶ ἀπλήστῳ κακῷ συνεχομένην.

e 4. The doubled ἄν of BTW, being idiomatic, is likely to be genuine, although the papyrus and the indirect tradition agree with F in omitting the second one.

e 5. There can be no friendship without common interests: cf. the proverb κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων and Ar. *Pol.* 1295^b24 ἡ γὰρ κοινωνία φιλικόν. Hence there can be no true friendship between πονηροί (*Lysis* 214 c), or between the good and the bad (*ibid.* 216 b).

508 a 2. δικαιοσύνη, "justness", used here for δικαιοσύνη in order to balance κοσμιότητα, "orderliness"; so also at *Prot.* 331 b 4 in order to make a pair with ὁσιότης.

a 3. τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο—οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν: "that is why they call this universe a world-order, my friend, not a world-disorder." The subject of καλοῦσιν is, I think, οἱ σοφοί, not people in general, since the φασὶ clause is represented as furnishing the ground for the καλοῦσιν clause (Jowett perverts the meaning by interpolating a "that" before καλοῦσιν). Xenophon similarly speaks of ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος, *Mem.* 1. 1. 11, showing that the term was still felt to be technical; by σοφισταί he probably means simply "philosophers". It looks, then, as if Plato considered the use of κόσμος in this sense especially Pythagorean. That it was so is explicitly stated by Aetius (Diels, *Dox. Gr.* 327 = *Vors.* 14 [4] 21): Πυθαγόρας πρῶτος ὠνόμασε τὴν τῶν ὅλων περιοχὴν κόσμον ἐκ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τάξεως. Cf. also Diog. L. 8. 48 τοῦτον (Pythagoras) ὁ Φαβωρίνός φησιν . . . τὸν οὐρανὸν πρῶτον ὀνομάσαι κόσμον καὶ τὴν γῆν στρογγύλην: ὡς δὲ Θεόφραστος, *Παρμενίδην*: ὡς δὲ Ζήνων, *Ἡσίοδον*, where the divergent opinions probably refer only to the shape of the earth (see *Dox. Gr.* 492). Early philosophical uses of the word have recently been discussed by W. Kranz, *Philol.* xciii (1938–9), 430 ff., and in his monograph, *Kosmos* (1955); and by Mr. G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus, the Cosmic Fragments*, 311 ff. The former,

ignoring the doxographical tradition, is prepared to ascribe its use in the sense “world” to the sixth-century Milesians; the latter thinks it was first used for “world-order” late in the fifth century, while the sense “world” is later still (cf. Reinhardt, *Parmenides*, 174 f.). The truth perhaps lies somewhere between these extremes. It is not certain that Anaximander or Anaximenes spoke of *κόσμοι* at all, or that if they did they meant “universes” (cf. Cornford, *CQ*, xxviii (1934), 1 ff.). On the other hand in Heraclitus fr. 30 and Empedocles fr. 26. 5, which are *verbatim* quotations, the abstract sense “order” assigned by Kirk seems to me less natural than the concrete “ordered world”, which is certainly required in Diog. Apoll. fr. 2. This would be consistent (cf. Taylor on *Tim.* 28 b 2–3) with the Pythagorean origin of the use (which in fact occurs in the fragments attributed to Philolaus, for what that is worth). There is nothing in the present passage, or in Xen. *Mem.* I. I. 11, to suggest that it was a complete novelty in Plato’s day, or even in Socrates’ day. (Since writing the above, I find a rather similar view expressed by Vlastos, *A.J.P.* lxxvi (1955), 344 ff.)

a 6. ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ, “proportionate equality”, i.e. the equality of ratios found in what is still called a geometrical progression (e.g. in the series 2-4-8-16 where $\frac{2}{4} = \frac{4}{8} = \frac{8}{16}$). This stands in implied contrast both to numerical equality and to arithmetical progression, where the ratio obtaining between the lower terms of the series is greater than that between the higher terms (e.g. in the series 2-4-6-8 $\frac{2}{4}$ is greater than $\frac{4}{6}$, which is greater than $\frac{6}{8}$). In the fourth century this mathematical contrast was given a political application, and γεωμετρικὴ ἰσότης was said to represent the true principle of distributive justice. The idea is expressed non-mathematically by Isocrates (*Areop.* 21), who says that there are two kinds of equality, one of which assigns τὰὐτὸν ἅπασιν, the other τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστοις. Similarly Plato speaks in the *Laws* (757 bc) of two kinds of equality, numerical equality which is exemplified in the principle of appointment by lot, and another kind, called Διὸς κρίσις, which τῷ μείζονι πλείω, τῷ δ’ ἐλάττονι μικρότερα νέμει. The second is the “geometrical equality”: 16 exceeds 8 by more than 8 exceeds 4. Cf. also *Rep.* 558 c, where democracy is described as “a comfortable anarchic jumble, distributing a sort of equality to equal and unequal alike”. The mathematical analogy is worked out by Aristotle, *E.N.* 1131^b13 and *Pol.* 1301^b29.

In the present passage the term ἰσότης γεωμετρικὴ is introduced without a word of explanation, as if it were already familiar. And it may well be the Pythagorean answer to the democratic slogan of “equality” (which is described in Eur. *Phoen.*, 535 ff., as both a political and a cosmic principle). Cf. Dicaearchus fr. 41 (Plut. *Q. conv.* 8. 2. 2), who says that Plato “mixed Lycurgus [as founder of the aristocratic Spartan constitution] and Pythagoras with Socrates”; and Plut. *de frat. am.* 484b, Solon was thought ὀχλικός, ἀριθμητικὴν καὶ δημοκρατικὴν ἐπείσάγων ἀναλογίαν ἀντὶ τῆς καλῆς γεωμετρικῆς. The discovery of the different mathematical progressions is certainly

Pythagorean (Archytas, fr. 2, cf. Iamb. in *Nicom. Arithm. Introd.* 100. 19 Pistelli = Thomas, *Greek Mathematics*, i. 110). And an elaborate political application appears in an Archytas fragment of disputed authenticity, Stob. 4. 1. 137, where the geometric mean is preferred to the arithmetical, but the best state is said to be governed by the harmonic mean; this may, however, be a later refinement, possibly derived from the *Republic*, where justice in the individual soul is described in terms of the harmonic scale (443 de: see J. S. Morrison, *CQ*, 1956, 154 ff., and 1958, 213 ff.).

a 7. γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελείς: in defending πλεονεξία, the law of grab, Callicles neglects the law of proportion. The words are spoken in jest: the humble status assigned to geometry by Protagoras (*Prot.* 318 e) and Isocrates (*Panath.* 26, etc.) is not in question here.

b 2. The addition of <ἄθλιοι> seems necessary. For its position cf. *Symp.* 205 a 1 κτήσει ἀγαθῶν οἱ εὐδαίμονες εὐδαίμονες and *Laws* 668 a 1 οὐ γὰρ . . . τό γε ἴσον ἴσον.

b 3. τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα: for τί as predicate to a neuter plural cf. *Phaedo* 57 a 5, 58 c 6, *Soph.* 263 d 10. —Jachmann, 252, defends the omission of ἐκεῖνα in the papyrus; but τὰ πρόσθεν by itself would, I think, be too vague. Cf. 499 b 1 τὰ πρότερα ἐκεῖνα.

b 4. σύ με ἥρου: 481 b 6.

b 7. ὧς: 482 de.

c 3. ἔφη Πῶλος: 461 b.

508 c 4–509 c 5. Socrates reverts to Callicles' allegation (486 a–c) that the man who adopts the Socratic position will be helpless in face of attack. Applying the conclusions he has just reached, he claims that the most important kind of self-defence (βοήθεια) is not defence against wrongdoing on the part of others but defence against doing wrong oneself.

This section contains little more than a recapitulation of the theory already stated in the conversation with Polus (480 a–481 b) and already recalled at 507 d. Plato in fact feels the need of some apology for the repetition (πολλάκις ἤδη εἴρηται, d 5). Its justification is that this ethical principle is the foundation of the view of statesmanship which he is now about to develop.

508 c 7. ἐκώσαι (BTW) is supported against σώσαι (FΠ²) by 486 b 6.

c 8. ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ and τοῦ ἐθέλοντος both mean “at the mercy of the first-comer”: cf. for the former *Rep.* 460 a 2 ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀρχουσι, “in the power of the magistrates”; for the latter, *Polit.* 307 e 9 ὄντες . . . τῶν ἐπιτιθεμένων. It is possible, but hardly certain, that one is a gloss on the other. For ὁ βουλόμενος and ὁ ἐθέλων used synonymously (despite Wilamowitz, ii. 375) cf. *Laws* 707 e, where ἐξ ἀπάσης Κρήτης ὁ ἐθέλων is alternative to τὸν βουλόμενον Ἑλλήνων. οἱ ἄτιμοι, “outlaws”, persons deprived of legal protection.

d 1. τὸ νεανικὸν δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, “to use your forcible expression”: δὴ τοῦτο marks the quotation, like τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα (500 c 4). For νεανικὸν see on 482 c 4 and 509 a 3. The epithet hints politely at Socrates' distaste for the phrase, which Callicles himself had called ἀγροικότερον (486 c 2).

d 2. ἐκβάλλειν. Jachmann (234 n 2) prefers ἐκβαλεῖν (*Π*²), as balancing ἀποκτείνειν (which Badham and Schanz changed to a present). But τύπτειν, ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐκβάλλειν, all describe repeatable actions; ἀποκτείνειν, the one unrepeatable act, then comes as a climax (τὸ ἔσχατον).

d 7. τέμνεσθαι has been chosen primarily to suit βαλλάντιον: the cutpurse (βαλλαντιοτόμος) was the Athenian equivalent of the modern pickpocket (Aristoph. *Frogs* 772, Pl. *Rep.* 552 d).

e 6. ἄνω ἐκεῖ looks a little odd in a dialogue, but cf. *Rep.* 603 d 5 ἐν τοῖς ἄνω λόγοις. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις could be a gloss on it, like τούτου πρόσθεν at 467 b 4.

e 7—509 a 1. καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἔστιν, “even though it is rather bad manners to say so”. See on 462 e 6. Most editors reproduce the view of Ol and the scholiast that Socrates is apologizing for the harshness or boldness of his metaphor. But there is nothing ἀγροικον about the metaphor in itself. What needs apology—as Cron saw, *Beiträge*, 174—is the arrogance of the assertion. Cf. *Apol.* 32 d 1 ἐνεδειξάμην ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ’ ὅτιοῦν. The same feeling is expressed by a different phrase at *Phaedo* 87 a, where Cebes says that pre-existence has been conclusively proved εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές ἔστιν εἰπεῖν (so also *Charm.* 158 d 4). —Dionysius I is said by Diodorus to have described his authority over Syracuse as ἀδαμαντίνους δεσμοῖς δεδεμένην. But it seems a little far-fetched to assume, as some do, that Plato is here answering the tyrant’s boast with another. Compare rather *Meno* 97 d ff.: opinions have to be fastened down (δῆσαι) by λογισμός, or they will run away like Daedalus’ robots. I see, however, no ground for claiming with Cauer (*Rh. Mus.* lxxii (1917), 284 ff.) that the present phrase presupposes the discussion in the *Meno*.

509 a 2. ὥς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν οὕτως, “so at least it would appear on the face of it”, leads up to the admission that Callicles or someone else may still upset the arguments. Hirschig should not have deleted the words: cf. *Phaedo* 62 b 1 καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ’ εἶναι ἄλογον· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ’ ἴσως γ’ ἔχει τινὰ λόγον.

a 3. σοῦ τις νεανικώτερος, “some other still more enterprising hero” (Jowett). Cf. Hesychius νεανίας· πολμηρός. The word seems to be applied again to intellectual enterprise at *Rep.* 503 c 4, νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας. But here, as at 508 d 1, Socrates makes ironic use of a term which in current usage could convey either a compliment or the reverse.

a 5. ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ἔχει. This Socratic profession of ignorance comes in oddly after the confident assertion in the preceding sentence. It is as if Plato had belatedly remembered to make his hero speak in character. Cf. *Introd.*, p. 16, n. 2.

a 6. ὧν = ἐκείνων οἷς. The relative is rarely attracted out of the dative, but Plato allows it with ἐντυγχάνω: cf. *Rep.* 531 e 2 ὀλίγοι ὧν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα, *Theaet.* 144 a 1 ὧν δὴ πώποτε ἐνέτυχον . . . οὐδένα, *Prot.* 361 e 2.

a 7. καταγέλαστος retorts a gibe of Callicles, 484 e 1, 485 a 7. ἐγὼ . . . αὖ, in contrast to the Calliclean thesis formulated at 508 c 5-d 4.

b 7. τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν, "the most disgraceful kind of help not to be able to give", i.e. the kind of help which it is most disgraceful not to be able to give. The phrase is an illogical but natural abbreviation for τὴν βοήθειαν ἣν αἰσχιστόν ἐστι μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν. Cf. *Odyssey* 17. 347 αἰδῶς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένῳ ἀνδρὶ παρεῖναι, for αἰδῶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστι . . . παρεῖναι. All the proposed corrections seem to me not only unnecessary but actually harmful. If with Sauppe we write τὴν βοήθειαν αἰσχιστον, we are left with nothing antithetic to δευτέραν and τριτην (c 1); if with Richards we substitute ἀδυναμίαν for βοήθειαν, τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ becomes almost meaningless; if with Morstadt and Theiler we delete the entire phrase τὴν αἰσχίστην—οἰκείοις, we mutilate the passage by robbing it of its characteristic rhetorical fullness. Plato did not know that he was writing for grammarians.

c 3. τοῦ μή. This reading, which is obviously the true one, was restored by the author of the Y recension on the basis of F's τὸ μή.

c 5. Οὐκ ἄλλως. Socrates has appealed repeatedly to Callicles, but this reply is the first sign of life the latter has shown—apart from a cold "Carry on!" at 507 a 4—since he withdrew from the discussion. No doubt his assent here is meant to be limited to the proposition that the greater the evil, the greater the credit of protecting oneself against it. But Socrates has lured him into speech, and as his ill temper passes he slips back into the role of respondent.

509 c 6–511 a 3. *We should, then, if possible, avoid both suffering and committing wrong. But how? Plainly, good intentions by themselves will not save us from the former; nor will they from the latter, since it has been agreed that wrongdoing is always involuntary. We need some special resource or science (δύναμιν τινα καὶ τέχνην, 510 a 4). Unfortunately, the means which can most easily save us from suffering wrong, viz. identifying oneself with the existing régime (τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας, a 9), are precisely those which most easily lead us to commit wrong. This is illustrated by considering what 'keeping in with' a tyrant really involves.*

That successful living demands a special τέχνη has already been agreed at 500 a. Here it is shown that this τέχνη cannot be simply the art of ingratiating oneself with the powerful. Plato, like Lord Acton, holds that 'power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely' (cf. 526 ab): he was driven to invent the educational and social schemes of the *Republic* as a safeguard against the operation of this law.

Is Plato's account of the terms on which one can secure the favour of a tyrant influenced by his experience of the court of Dionysius I at Syracuse? It has been suggested that the τύραννος ἀπαίδευτος of 510 b 7 ff. who distrusts his betters and scorns his inferiors may be modelled on Dionysius, who is described in the Seventh Letter as "trusting nobody" (332 c 3) and as bringing up his son ἀνομιλήτω μὲν

παιδείας, ἀνομιλήτω δὲ συνουσιῶν τῶν προσηκουσῶν (332 d 1). And the βελτίων has been identified with Plato's friend Dion, whose rigorous moral standards made him unpopular at court (327 b 4). Lack of true παιδεία is, however, for Plato characteristic of tyrants in general (see on 470 e 6), and distrust of good men is one of the traits traditionally ascribed to the typical tyrant (see below, on 510 b 9–c 5).

509 d 5. οὐκ ἀδικήσεται. Cobet would seem to have been right in deleting these words: the repetition is not only unnecessary but offensive—if a modern ear can be trusted in such matters.

d 7. Τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; Cf. *Phaedo* 78 d 10 τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν; So already, I think, Aesch. *Eum.* 211 τί γὰρ γυναικὸς ἥτις ἄνδρα νοσφίσῃ; There is presumably an ellipse of a verb of thinking or saying: cf. *Rep.* 459 b 7 τί δὲ ἵππων οἶε; Kühner-G. i. 363.

e 2. μάθη . . . καὶ ἀσκήσῃ. These are the two necessary stages in the acquisition of any practical τέχνη: see on 514 a–c. The μαθήματα and ἀσκήσις requisite for the Art of Living were to be worked out later in the *Republic*. τί οὐκ . . . ἀπεκρίνω . . .; See on 503 b 2. The aorist is clearly required (cf. *Phil.* 54 b 6).

e 4. ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις: 467 c 5–468 e 5, where see note.

510 a 3–5. K. Vretska, *Phil. Woch.* 1933, 507, and Peter von der Mühl, *Philol.* xciii (1939), 490, think that Socrates' assertion here contradicts the conclusion reached at 468 de, which has just been recalled; both therefore propose to delete the present passage (in which Helmbold has followed them). But I can see no contradiction. The answer to Socrates' question at 509 d 7 is surely that the good will is *not* enough to save us from wrongdoing; if it were, no one would do wrong, since we all at bottom will the good. We therefore need a δύναμις and a τέχνη. The δύναμις is not material power but the capacity to understand our true interest; the τέχνη is the Platonic 'moral science' which enables us to distinguish between "good" and "bad" satisfactions (500 a 6, 503 d 1). Plato does not in the *Gorgias* further expound the content or the methods of this τέχνη: it is sufficient for his purpose to show that a certain kind of τέχνη is required, and that politics, in the Calliclean sense, is not such a τέχνη.

Some nineteenth-century editors altered ἀδικήσωμεν to ἀδικήσομεν in obedience to 'Dawes' canon', which laid down that ὅπως and ὅπως μή were not used with a *weak* aorist subjunctive, either active or middle. But this purely empirical rule is now generally abandoned, since there are too many recalcitrant exceptions: cf. e.g. *Laws* 632 c 6 ὅπως . . . ἀποφύγη, *Xen. Anab.* 5. 6. 21 ὅπως ἐκπλεύσῃ, and *Aristoph. Eccl.* 117 ὅπως προμελετήσωμεν, where the subjunctive is protected by metre.

a 7. εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ ἥπερ ἐμοί: cf. *Prot.* 340 b 2 εἰ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ ὅπερ ἐμοί, *Phaedo* 64 c 10 εἰ σοὶ συνδοκῇ ἅπερ ἐμοί. ἥπερ (BW) is also possible, but involves reading τῇδε in the next line without MS. authority.

a 8–10. αὐτὸν is emphatic, "oneself". ἐταῖρον, in the political sense, "a partisan", like *Apol.* 21 a 1 ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἐταῖρος.

a 11. To make up for his recent crossness, Callicles applauds what looks like a 'realist' judgement after his own heart. Cf. Polus at 475 a 2.

b 3. ὅνπερ . . . λέγουσιν, sc. φίλον εἶναι: we need not emend to ὥσπερ (Hirschig) or ὅπερ (Richards). οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοί: at *Lysis* 214 b the proverb is similarly attributed to τοῖς τῶν σοφωτάτων συγγράμμασιν, whose authors are further described as οἱ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τοῦ ὅλου διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες. Plato seems to have in mind some pre-Socratic philosopher who applied the saying to the mutual attraction of like elements, as Empedocles did, fr. 90 (cf. Ar. *E.N.* 1155^b7); Ol thinks of the Pythagoreans, cf. 507 e 6. But the proverb is in fact as old as Homer, *Od.* 17. 218 ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον. No account is taken here of the difficulties raised in the *Lysis*; but it would be unsafe to infer that the *Gorgias* is the earlier dialogue.

b 9–c 5. The reference of τούτῳ (b 9) and the subject of δύναιτο are not clear: is Socrates saying that the better man cannot be a whole-hearted friend to the tyrant, or that the tyrant cannot be a whole-hearted friend to the better man? The older commentators—Heindorf, Stallbaum, Deuschle, Thompson—took the first view, which gives τούτῳ the same reference as τούτου at b 8. The difficulty of this is not so much the change of subject, which is common enough (Kühner-G. ii. 561), as the fact that the argument is concerned with the *tyrant's* attitude, and in particular the breach of parallelism with c 4–5: as contempt is the tyrant's reason for not taking the φαυλότερος seriously as a friend, so we expect his fear to be the reason why he cannot be a whole-hearted friend to the βελτίων. Hence the majority of recent commentators and translators follow Schanz and Sauppe in taking the second view. The difficulty then is that with οὐδ' ἂν οὗτος (c 3) we can no longer supply δύναιτο φίλος γενέσθαι save by assuming an awkward shift from the active to the passive sense of φίλος: we seem driven to adopt Schanz's οὕτως for οὗτος. This may be right; but I am not quite sure that the older interpretation is indefensible. Plato is notoriously careless of exact symmetry (cf., e.g., 516 a 5–7), and the feelings of the βελτίων are not irrelevant: the successful courtier must love the tyrant ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦ νοῦ as being ὁμοήθης (c 8); hypocrisy is not enough (513 b 3).

Fear of good men and distrust of the flattering courtiers are traditional traits in the portrait of the typical tyrant: both of them appear in the argument which Herodotus puts in the mouth of Otanes (3. 80. 4–5); cf. also Eur. *Ion* 626 ff.

τύραννος ὢν,
ὃ τοὺς πονηροὺς ἡδονὴ φίλους ἔχειν,
ἐσθλοὺς δὲ μισεῖ κατθανεῖν φοβούμενος,

and fr. 605; Isocrates, *ad Nicoclem* 4, *Hel.* 32–33; Xen. *Hiero* 5. 1; Ar. *Pol.* 1313^b30; and generally G. Heinzeler, *Das Bild des Tyrannen bei Platon* (Tübing. Beitr., 1927).

c 9. οὗτος . . . τοῦτον. For the rhetorical asyndeton, with repetition of the emphatic word, cf. *Menex.* 248 a 4 οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ σώφρων . . . οὗτος . . . πείσεται τῇ παροιμίᾳ: Aeschines 1. 32 τούτους οὖν ἐξείργει ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος, τούτους ἀπαγορεύει μὴ δημηγορεῖν: and Denniston, *Greek Prose Style*, 108.

d 4. ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει, i.e. ὅπου τύραννός ἐστιν ἄρχων κτλ.: see on 468 e 1.

d 5. μηδεῖς. For μή used in a question with a potential optative cf. Thuc. 6. 18. ἢ τί ἂν λέγοντες εἰκὸς ἢ αὐτοὶ ἀποκνοῖμεν ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἐκεῖ ξυμμάχους σκηπτόμενοι μὴ βοηθοῖμεν; where the governing idea is that of prevention, as it is here (Goodwin, *M.T.* § 292, Kühner-G. ii. 187).

d 6. αὕτη. ἢ αὕτῃ (BTW), which some editors have printed, is a mere result of false word-division.

e 1. ὥς ὁ ὑμέτερος λόγος, “as your party maintain” (Lamb). The reservation shows that Socrates still adheres to the paradoxical view which he defended against Polus, that ῥήτορες and τύραννοι do not exercise “great power”, since they do not do what they truly “will” (466 d).

e 7–8. οἷω τε εἶναι . . . ἀδικοῦντα. The shift of construction is not uncommon: cf. 492 b 2, and *Charm.* 173 b 4 ἄλλο ἂν ἡμῖν τι συμβαίνοι ἢ ὑγιέσιν . . . εἶναι . . . καὶ . . . κινδυνεύοντας . . . σώζεσθαι; F’s ἀδικοῦντι looks like a normalization. For the thought cf. Xen. *Anab.* 2. 6. 21, where we are told that Meno φίλος ἐβούλετο εἶναι τοῖς μέγιστον δυναμένοις, ἵνα ἀδικῶν μὴ διδοίῃ δίκην.

511 a 2. διὰ τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ δεσπότου καὶ δύναμιν. A man’s character may be corrupted not only by imitating a bad model (this was one of Plato’s objections to the theatre) but by the exercise of the resulting power. Some have thought that δύναμιν refers to the tyrant’s power, or to the courtier’s influence over him, but neither of these would be relevant. Deuschle deleted καὶ δύναμιν, presumably because Socrates holds that such persons do not exercise power in the true sense (see above, on 510 e 1). But we may suppose that Socrates is here using his opponents’ language, as he has already done at 510 e 5–6. διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν is similarly used at 525 d 5, and διὰ δύναμιν at *Rep.* 466 c 1.

511 a 4–513 c 3. Callicles objects that the man who declines to identify himself with injustice will get killed for his pains. Socrates replies that this objection reduces the Art of Living to an art of life-saving, comparable to swimming or navigation. But pilots, unlike politicians, make no fuss about their services to humanity (perhaps this is because they realize that some of their passengers would have been better drowned). Again, the military engineer can on occasion save whole cities from destruction; yet Callicles regards him as his social inferior—by what right, if the aim of living is to preserve life? The true measure of value is not quantity but quality of life. And by this test the man who adapts his views to please the holders of power—as Callicles must adapt his to please the Athenian populace—pays too high a price for his security.

The point of this brilliantly written passage is to suggest that the politician as conceived by Callicles, though he thinks himself a gentleman, is really a base mechanic; for he is concerned not with life

but only with its material conditions. The true gentleman is not interested in σώζειν τε καὶ σώζεσθαι (512 d); he knows that the price of safety is the sacrifice of individuality (513 b), and he is not prepared *propter vitam vivendi perdere causas*. Cf. *Crito* 48 b 5 οὐ τὸ ζῆν περι πλείστου ποιητέον ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν, and *Apol.* 28 b ff. Aristotle was of the same opinion: the man who is truly self-respecting (φίλαυτος) will prefer βιώσαι καλῶς ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ πόλλ' ἔτη τυχόντως (*E.N.* 1169^a23). Contrast the valuation attributed by Plato to Hippias, who thinks of σωτηρίαν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ χρημάτων καὶ φίλων as “not the least but the greatest of prizes” (*Hipp. ma.* 304 b). And in the last years of the fifth century many Athenians no doubt found the problem of surviving fully sufficient to occupy their whole attention.

511 a 4. στρέφεις ἐκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους. Callicles feels that he has been had again, and falls back on the old charge of ‘eristic’ cheating. For the phrase cf. *Euthyd.* 276 d 6 διπλᾶ ἔστρεφε τὰ ἐρωτήματα, and the imitation at *Hipparchus* 228 a 9 οὐκ οἶδα ὅπῃ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεις.

a 5. ὁ μιμούμενος sc. τὸν τύραννον: the successful imitator has placed himself in a position ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην (510 e 8). If with Vretska (*Phil. Woch.* 1933, 508 n. 2) and Rufener we took μιμούμενος as passive, the antithesis with τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον (middle) would be destroyed.

b 2. πολλάκις: 466 b 11, 483 b, 486 bc. τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγου πάντων: cf. 472 a 3.

b 4. ἂν βούληται is here used in the popular, not the Socratic sense: Socrates is echoing Callicles’ phrase.

b 6. Οὐκ οὖν τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν; “Isn’t that just (καὶ) the infuriating thing about it?” We need not (with Ast and Stallbaum) construe this as malicious mockery: Callicles feels genuine εὐνοία (487 a 3) towards Socrates and the Socratic man, however mistaken he thinks them.

c 2. τὴν ῥητορικὴν secl. Naber; but see on 447 a 5.

c 3. The participle carries on the construction of Socrates’ sentence, as at 451 c 10, 473 b 2, *Lysis* 204 a 4, and often. συμβουλεύω is a corruption, κελεύω a gloss (supplying the main verb to be understood from c 1) which was later mistaken for a variant and ‘emended’ to κελεύων.

c 5. σεμνή: see on 502 b 1. Swimming was a typically commonplace accomplishment: μήτε νεῖν μήτε γράμματα was a proverbial description of ignorance (*Laws* 689 d 3, Diogenianus 6. 56).

d 1. τὰς ψυχὰς . . . τὰ σώματα. There can be no antithesis here between “souls” and “bodies”, such as we find below at 512 a 1–2: in classical Greek usage σώζειν τὴν ψυχὴν and σώζειν τὸ σῶμα meant exactly the same thing, “to save one’s life” (cf. R. Hirzel, ‘Die Person’, *Sitzb. bay. Akad.* 1914, Abh. 10, p. 31). Some think that Plato is playing ‘humorously’ on the two meanings of ψυχή; others would translate “saves not only lives but property *as well as* lives”, the notion of “lives” being repeated because σώματα καὶ χρήματα is a stock phrase

for “persons and property” (Thuc. 1. 85. 1, etc.). Neither explanation is very convincing. Morstadt thought it necessary to cut the knot by deleting καὶ τὰ σώματα. But I am inclined to think with Thompson that τὰ σώματα are the persons of the passenger’s dependents, the women and children who are mentioned along with the χρήματα at e 2. Cf. the common use of σώματα in later Greek for “slaves” (persons viewed as property).

d 3. ὥσπερ ἡ ῥητορική. Cf. *Epin.* 975 e–976 b, where navigation and rhetoric are classed together, along with strategy and medicine, as arts of βοήθεια which have no secure scientific foundation, since they deal empirically with the incalculable.

d 3–5. προσεσταλμένη, “unassuming”: the term applies properly to one who compresses himself into the smallest possible space, in contrast with the ὀγκώδης or χαῖνος who ‘spreads himself’. Cf. *Lysis* 210 e 3 ταπεινοῦντα καὶ συστέλλοντα, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ σὺ χαυνοῦντα καὶ διαθρύπτοντα: *Men.* 90 a 7 οὐδὲ ὀγκώδης τε καὶ ἐπαχθής, ἀλλὰ κόσμιος καὶ εὐσταλῆς ἀνὴρ. οὐ σεμνύνεται ἐσχηματισμένη: “does not strike solemn attitudes” (from σχῆμα in the sense of “bearing”, e 6). διαπραττομένη refers to habitual activity, διαπραξαμένη to the particular occasions instanced in the ἐάν clauses.

e 1. ἐὰν πάμπλου, sc. πράζεται: “at the very most”. The ellipse is colloquial: cf. *Apol.* 26 d 10 εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς . . . πριαμένοις and *Alc.* i 123 c 6; Eriphus fr. 2 Kock τούτων μὲν ὀβολόν, εἰ πολὺ, τίθημι. —The fares mentioned have been thought impossibly low, especially if they cover, as they seem to do, the transport of the entire family (who would presumably bring their own provisions with them). The fare to Aegina may, however, be compared with the charge of four obols fixed about 445 for the trip from Chalcis to Hestiaeae, which is roughly four times the distance (Hill–Meiggs–Andrewes, *Sources for Greek History*, p. 303). It is ludicrous to assert, as L.S.J. still does, that the obol was worth ‘rather more than three halfpence’. In 409–406 the standard wage of a labourer was a drachma (six obols) a day (*I.G.*¹². 373–4), and even in the fourth century, when prices were a good deal higher, two to four obols a day per person was considered a sufficient allowance for food (see G. Glotz, *Ancient Greece at Work*, 237; A. H. M. Jones, *Athenian Democracy*, 135). These figures suggest, when allowance is made for the different standard of living, that the purchasing power of the drachma at the end of the fifth century must have been, in terms of 1956 values, not the traditional ‘tenpence’, but more like ten shillings. Lucian tells us that in his day the fare to Aegina was four obols *per person* (*Navig.* 15), which illustrates the extent of the intervening inflation.

e 2. γυναῖκας, “womenfolk” (the female slaves and their mistress): cf. *Laws* 650 a 3 θυγατέρας τε καὶ υἱεῖς καὶ γυναῖκας. Theiler follows Naber (*Obs. Crit.* 8, cf. *Mnem.* 1908, 261) in emending to γυναῖκα (and Jowett translates “his wife”). But if Plato had meant simply “wife and children” he would scarcely have interposed χρήματα between them.

e 5. περιπατεῖ, of aimless strolling, "stretches his legs": καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς στοαῖς ἀνακάμπτοντας περιπατεῖν φασιν, οὐκέτι δὲ τοὺς εἰς ἀγρὸν ἢ πρὸς φίλον βαδίζοντας (Dicaearchus fr. 29, *apud* Plut. *an seni* 796c).

512 a 2-b 1. λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ κτλ. The philosophical pilot argues (λογίζεται) that it is not the case that while (μὲν) the incurable physical invalid would be better dead, yet (δὲ) the incurable moral invalid will benefit by remaining alive. What is denied by οὐκ (a 2) is that both these propositions can be true simultaneously (since they contradict each other in principle). But the first is obviously true. Therefore the second is false. This is a favourite type of sentence with Plato: cf. 516 e 3-6, and the examples collected by Thompson on *Meno* 91 e. ἄρα is regularly added to the δέ clause, as it is here (a 5), or sometimes to both clauses, to emphasize the contradiction. And the antithesis is often further strengthened, as it is here, by the duplication of both μὲν and δέ (*Meno* 94 c 7 ff., with Thompson's note, Denniston, 385).

a 5. τῷ τοῦ σώματος τιμωτέρῳ. The superior value of ψυχή is constantly assumed by Plato: cf. *Prot.* 313 a 6, *Symp.* 210 b 7, *Rep.* 445 a 9, *Laws* 727 d 8.

a 7. τοῦτ' οὖν δὲ βιωτέον ἐστίν: not "he deserves to live" (Plato does not believe in vindictive punishment), but "it is to his advantage to live". The meaning would be more unambiguously expressed by βιωτόν, which is used in two other places where Plato reproduces this argument, *Crito* 47 d 9 and *Rep.* 445 b 1. ὀνήσει. ὀνήσειεν (MSS.) is doubtfully defensible (Riddell § 282) as oblique for ὥνησεν, since the tense of the leading verb, λογίζεται, is primary. ἄν could easily have dropped out, but the future is stylistically preferable.

b 2. μοχθηρῷ, not "wretched"—a sense mainly confined to poetry—but "vicious". κακῶς . . . ζῆν, on the other hand, carries the same ambiguity as εὖ πράττειν at 507 c 3-4, and a parallel implication—that the vicious man's way of life is its own punishment (cf. *Theaet.* 176 d-177 a). The thought that some people would *in their own interest* be better dead appears frequently in Plato: cf. *Laches* 195 cd and *Charm.* 164 bc, where the doctor is represented as feeling the same doubts which beset the pilot here; also *Rep.* 409 e-410 a, *Laws* 862 e.

b 5. μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, "not to speak of the pilot" (Goodwin, *M.T.* § 707).

b 7. μή σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι; Not "You would not think of bringing him down to the level of a mere advocate?" (Heindorf, Thompson, etc.), but "You don't regard him as the equal of the advocate?"—to which the answer is assumed to be "No", as the following καίτοι shows. Plato himself thought poorly of lawyers, as being σμικροὶ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχάς: see *Theaet.* 172 c-176 a.

c 1-3. λέγων καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίγνεσθαι: a loose colloquial equivalent for λέγων δεῖν γίγνεσθαι καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τοῦτο. ὥς is probably causal as at 509 e 1, rather than dependent on λέγων (unless with Richards we transpose the clause to follow λέγων). But we might

expect an accusative absolute, *ὡς οὐδὲν τᾶλλα ὄντα*. *ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος*, ‘for he could make an ample case’: his *λόγος* is his ‘brief’. His argument would be that of Dr. Johnson’s shoemaker—‘Mankind could do better without your books than without my shoes’ (Boswell, *Life*, i. 343, Everyman edition).

c 5. *ὡς ἐν ὀνειδεί*. Cf. *Rep.* 590 c 2 *βαναυσία δὲ καὶ χειροτεχνία . . . ὀνειδος φέρει*. To make insulting remarks (*ὀνειδίζειν*) about the trade pursued by an Athenian citizen was expressly forbidden by law (Dem. 57. 30), a prohibition which testifies to the importance of class distinctions at Athens as well as to the resentment they occasioned. On the contempt generally felt by the Greeks for ‘banausic’ occupations see G. Glotz, *Ancient Greece at Work*, 160 ff., and J. Hasebroek, *Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece*, 39 ff. The latter seems right in maintaining that the feeling was not confined to aristocratic circles and ‘reactionary’ philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, but was rooted in the structure of the Greek economy (cf. Hdt. 2. 167). But Plato and Aristotle rationalized it by referring to the injurious physical or moral effects of certain trades on their practitioners (*Rep.* 495 de, *Pol.* 1337^b8 ff.), although the stigma extended in practice even to what we should now call liberal professions. In Hellenistic times the social status of the engineer seems to have improved (Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*, 1234 f.).

c 6–7. The words *τῷ σαντοῦ*, which follow *αὐτὸς* in the older editions, have no better authority than Flor (Introd., pp. 49 ff.) and were doubtless originally intended merely as a gloss. They are probably a correct gloss, since *λαμβάνειν* can be used of the matchmaking parent: cf. Menander, *Perik.* 447 *τῷ γὰρ υἱῷ λαμβάνω τὴν τοῦ Φιλίνου θυγατέρα*. This interpretation helps us to understand the position of *τῷ ὑεὶ αὐτοῦ*, which troubled the logical mind of Cobet: *τῷ ὑεὶ* is an element common to both clauses and has carried *αὐτοῦ* with it. I see no reason to doubt *αὐτὸς*, which Schanz emended to *αὖ*.

d 1. *βελτίων . . . καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων* is a stock phrase (Lysias 10. 23) equivalent in ordinary usage to *εὐγενής . . . καὶ εὐγενῶν* (Soph. *Phil.* 874): cf. on 488 c 2–d 1.

d 4. *ὅποῖός τις ἔτυχεν*: for the omission of *ὧν* see on 502 b 6.

d 8. *μὴ . . . ἐατέον ἐστίν*. *μὴ* is used by Plato in cautious assertion not only with the subjunctive but also (if the reference is to present or past time) with the indicative: cf. *Euthyd.* 298 c 5 *μὴ γάρ . . . τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐ λίνον λίνῳ συνάπτεις*; *Meno* 89 c 5 *ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὁμολογήσαμεν*, with Thompson’s note; Goodwin, *M. T.* § 269, Kühner-G. i. 224, Anm. 7. There is no reason to vary the punctuation or doubt the text, as some nineteenth-century editors did. —Plato was throughout his life concerned, like Epicurus and Lucretius, to relieve men of the oppressive fear of death: cf. *Apol.* 35 a, 40 c–e; *Crito* 43 b; *Phaedo* 77 de; *Crat.* 403 b; *Rep.* 386 ab, 486 b; *Laws* 727 d, 828 d.

e 3. *πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξίν*. Croiset, and more recently J. Labarbe, *L’Homère de Platon*, 263, think that Plato is referring here to the words of Hector at *Iliad* 6. 488, *μοῖραν δ’ οὐ τινά φημι πεφυγμένον*

ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν. In the attribution of the saying to “the women” Croiset discovered a stroke of irony, while Labarbe supposes that by a lapse of memory Plato attributes it to the Trojan women who are mentioned later in the same Homeric passage, at 498 ff. It is surely more natural to assume that Plato has in mind some saying actually current among Athenian women, whether ultimately derived from the Homeric one or not. Cf. Cicero, *nat. deor.* 1. 55 *haec philosophia . . . cui tamquam aniculis . . . fato fieri videantur omnia*. Women were thought to be more superstitious than men: ἅπαντες γὰρ τῆς δεισιδαιμονίας ἀρχηγούς οἴονται τὰς γυναῖκας, says Strabo (7. 3. 4). And their lack of personal freedom may have encouraged fatalism; resignation is the virtue of the helpless—hence, e.g., the fatalistic language of Electra at the beginning of the *Choephorae* (103 f.), and of the φύλαξ in the *Antigone* (235 f.). τὴν εἰμαρμένην: in the Homeric sense of the appointed death-day. Though the word is not found as a noun before Plato, it seems to be drawn from the language of poetry: this is the most natural interpretation of *Phaedo* 115 a 5 ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἤδη καλεῖ, φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, ἡ εἰμαρμένη. And it may be that there is a reminiscence here of some tragic line which had become proverbial, such as εἰμαρμένην <γὰρ> οὐδ’ ἂν εἰς <ποτ’> ἐκφύγοι. The term never stands in Plato, as it did in Stoicism, for a general providence, though at *Politicus* 272 e 6 it seems to be equivalent to the ἀνάγκη of the *Timaeus* (cf. Festugière, *Rev. Ét. Gr.* lviii (1945), 41).

e 5. βιώη is the MS. spelling here and at *Tim.* 89 c 4, as at Aristoph. *Frogs* 177. It is possible that -οίη should be restored in all these places: see Rutherford, *New Phrynichus*, 456, Kühner-B. ii. 192.

513 a 2. τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων. The “tyrant” with whom Callicles must identify himself for security’s sake is suddenly revealed as none other than the Sovereign People whom Callicles despises as much as Socrates does (489 c). Cf. Aristoph. *Knights* 1111 ὦ Δῆμε, καλὴν γ’ ἔχεις | ἀρχήν, ὅτε πάντες ἄν-|θρωποι δεδίασί σ’ ὥσ-|περ ἄνδρα τύραννον, and Aristotle *Pol.* 1274^a5 ὥσπερ τυράννῳ τῷ δήμῳ χαρίζόμενοι. The passage can be read as an indication of Plato’s own reasons for not entering public life (see *Introd.*, p. 31).

a 5-6. τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας, “pulling down the moon”, i.e. causing an eclipse, the typical feat ascribed to Thessalian witches (*Clouds* 749 f., Hor. *Epodes* 5. 45 f., Lucan, *Phars.* 6. 499 ff.), as to witches and magicians in general: cf. Hipp. *morb. sacr.* 1 (Littré, vi. 360), Lucian, *Philops.* 14, *Pap. graec. mag.* xxxiv. 1, etc. Hippolytus gives a recipe for faking the phenomenon, *Ref. haer.* 4. 37. Thessaly was traditionally regarded as the home of witches, perhaps because it was a leading centre of the Hecate cult (Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, ii. 505). The scholiast on *Clouds* 749 tells us that μέχρι νῦν γε φαρμακίδες παρ’ ἡμῖν αἱ Θεσσαλαὶ καλοῦνται, and Pliny (*N.H.* 30. 7) confirms it, referring to Menander’s *Thessala*, which dealt with *ambages feminarum detrahentium lunam*.

σὺν τοῖς φιλάτοις, “at the cost of what we hold most dear”. For σύν meaning “with the help of”, and so “at the cost of”, cf. *Iliad* 4.

161-2 *σύν τε μεγάλῳ ἀπέτισαν, | σύν σφῆσιν κεφαλῇσι*, and Xen. *Cyrop.* 3. 1. 15 *τὰς τιμωρίας ποιεῖσθαι . . . σύν τῇ σῇ ζημίᾳ*. —The reference is to the widespread belief that a witch must pay for her powers either by a mutilation (often blindness) or by the sacrifice of a member of her family. The dictionary of proverbs which goes under the name of Zenobius explains the saying *Ἐπὶ σαυτῷ τὴν σελήνην καθαιρεῖς* by the words *αἱ τὴν σελήνην καθαιροῦσαι Θετταλίδες λέγονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ παίδων* (v.l. *ποδῶν*) *στερίσκεσθαι*. Ps.-Plut. *Prov. Alex.* 113, Suidas s.v. *Ἐπὶ σαυτῷ κτλ.*, and Apostolius 7. 81, all of whom reproduce this information, all have *ποδῶν*, yet *παίδων* seems to be the true reading; for a note in the Bodleian codex of Zenobius (quoted by Leutsch, *Paroem. Graeci*, i. 83) tells us on the authority of Asclepiades (? the mythographer, who was a pupil of Isocrates) that the witches *ἢ καταθύειν τῶν τέκνων ἢ τὸν ἕτερον τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀπολλύειν*. The scholiast on Apoll. Rhod. 4. 59 has a rationalized version of the belief: a certain Aglaonice, a Thessalian lady versed in astronomy, gained a reputation for witchcraft by her skill in predicting eclipses—but at each eclipse a member of her family died suddenly. The blindness of legendary seers and poets has sometimes been understood in the same way, as the price they had to pay for their powers; it may not be irrelevant to recall the dealings of the Muse with Demodocus—*ὀφθαλμῶν μὲν ἄμερσε, δίδου δ' ἡδεῖαν ἀοιδήν* (*Od.* 8. 64).

b 5. *καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία . . . γε πρὸς*: an emphatic addition, as at 469 b 2 and *Meno* 90 e 9 *ναὶ μὰ Δία ἔμοιγε, καὶ ἀμαθία γε πρὸς*. For the joke about Pyrilampes' son see 481 d 5.

b 7. *ὥς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικὸς εἶναι*. It is tempting to delete *πολιτικὸς* as a gloss; but I think the phrase means "in the sense in which you desire to be a statesman" (Cope) and points forward to 521 d, where Socrates claims to be himself almost the only practitioner of statesmanship in the true sense.

b 8. *τῷ αὐτῶν ἦθει*, "in their own spirit". For the dative (which caused Richards to conjecture *ὁμολογουμένων*) cf. *Theaet.* 162 e 8 *πιθανολογία τε καὶ εἰκόσι . . . λεγομένους λόγους*.

c 3. *λέγομέν τι* need not be changed to *λέγωμέν τι* on the weak authority of Y: see on 480 b 2.

513 c 4–515 b 5. *Callicles finds Socrates' arguments more logical than convincing. Socrates attributes this to emotional resistance, and renews his claim that the true function of a statesman is to "improve" his fellow citizens: to give them wealth or power will not help them if they do not know how to use it. This function demands trained practitioners. The State does not employ an architect (514 a–c) or a medical officer of health (514 de) without assuring itself that he has both a proper training and successful experience in private practice. Has Callicles any comparable qualification for the political career on which he is embarking?*

Having dealt with the *βοήθεια* which the statesman owes to himself, Socrates now turns to discuss the *βοήθεια* which he owes to his fellow citizens, returning to the point made at 500 a–501 c, and leading up to his answer to the question raised at 503 c. The view that there

ought to be a specialized training for politics, as for other τέχναι, probably goes back to the historical Socrates. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4. 2. 2 εὖθες ἔφη εἶναι τὸ οἶεσθαι τὰς μὲν ὀλίγου ἀξίας τέχνας μὴ γίγνεσθαι σπουδαίους ἄνευ διδασκάλων ἱκανῶν, τὸ δὲ προεστάναι πόλεως, πάντων ἔργων μέγιστον ὄν, ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου παραγίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, and the saying attributed to Antisthenes that the Athenians might as well elect their donkeys to be horses, since election was apparently enough to turn an ignoramus into a στρατηγός (Diog. L. 6. 8). The problem troubled Plato from an early date (cf. *Prot.* 319 cd), and in the seventh book of the *Republic* he put forward his own proposals for solving it. Aristotle noted that it was still unsolved in practice (*E.N.* 1180^b28 ff.), and it remains unsolved to this day. 'Under all systems of government, under Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy alike, it is a mere chance whether the individual called to the direction of public affairs will be qualified for the undertaking' (Sir Henry Maine, *Popular Government*, 188). And yet 'statecraft, after all, is a difficult art, and it seems unreasonable to leave the choice of those who practise it to accident, to heredity, or to the possession of the wholly irrelevant gifts that take the fancy of the crowd' (Wilfred Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*², 240).

513 c 5. τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος, 'what most people feel', is explained by the words that follow. Cf. *Meno* 95 c 8 ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα· τοτὲ μὲν μοι δοκοῦσιν (οἱ σοφισταὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶναι), τοτὲ δὲ οὐ. We may take this remark and Socrates' comment on it as expressing Plato's recognition that basic moral attitudes are commonly determined by psychological, not logical reasons: as Pascal put it, 'les preuves ne convainquent que l'esprit'; that is why Callicles remains unconvinced to the end. Cf. Alcibiades' confession at *Symp.* 216 a-c.

c 7. Ὁ δήμου γὰρ ἔρως . . . ἀντιστατεῖ μοι. Cf. Socrates' fear that love of the δῆμος—which is in fact love of power—may corrupt Alcibiades, *Alc.* i 132 a.

c 8. The position of ἴσως indicates that something is amiss. Cobet transposed it to precede εἰ, Ast to precede πεισθήσῃ, but it is much more likely that we should get rid of it altogether. Schaefer, who proposed this in a note on Apollonius Rhodius 2. 582, thought the word arose from dittography of -is plus confusion of the rather similar tachygrams for καί and ὥς. But we can account for it more simply as a gloss on the ambiguous word πολλάκις, indicating that in the glossator's opinion εἰ (εἰάν) πολλάκις means *si forte*. If his opinion is correct, we must delete not only ἴσως but (with Burnet) the καί which follows it. Plato does frequently use εἰ (εἰάν) πολλάκις in this sense. But (a) in all the Platonic instances known to me there is an accompanying ἄρα (e.g. *Phaedo* 60 e 3, 61 a 6); (b) *si forte* is less appropriate here than *si saepius*. Socrates knows that a doctrine so revolutionary is unlikely to be accepted at the first hearing: cf. *Phaedo* 105 a 5 οὐ γὰρ χεῖρον πολλάκις ἀκούειν.

d 1-5. δ' οὖν 'leads back to the main topic, which has been temporarily lost sight of' (Denniston, 463). ἔφαμεν: 500 b. ἕκαστον

. . . καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν: “any particular thing, whether bodily or mental” (cf. e 3). ἕκαστον is certainly object, not subject, of θεραπεύειν. But it should perhaps be ἐκάτερον (Hirschig, Theiler): the two words are easily confused. μὴ καταχαριζόμενον: the participles agree with the implied subject of ὀμιλεῖν.

e 2. Ἡ δὲ γε ἑτέρα <γενναιότερα>. As it stands in the MSS., this sentence adds nothing whatever to what has already been said at d 4. We expect a predicate parallel to ἀγεννῆς at d 7. And it appears likely that Aristides had such a predicate in his text of Plato, since his paraphrase of the two sentences runs τὴν μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀγεννῆ καὶ κολακείαν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἑτέραν σπουδαῖον καὶ καλόν (whence Theiler adds καλή, somewhat awkwardly, after θεραπεύομεν). For my supplement cf. *Lysis* 207 c 3 ὁπότερος γενναιότερος, *Polit.* 261 c 8 τό γε τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐστί . . . γενναιότερον.

e 5-7. τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις is governed by ἐπιχειρητέον, while θεραπεύειν is added exegetically. We should not, I think, accept F's τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς πολίτας, which looks like a normalization, especially as Aristides agrees with BTW; and we should certainly not delete θεραπεύειν with Cobet, which would leave ποιοῦντας hanging. Findeisen long ago quoted the decisive parallel, *Rep.* 416 a 6 ἐπιχειρήσαι τοῖς προβάτοις κακουργεῖν. And Riddell § 180 cites a number of instances like *Rep.* 443 b 8 ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν where a noun which belongs in sense to a dependent infinitive is directly governed by the main verb. ὥς . . . ποιοῦντας explains οὕτως, but is accommodated in case to the implied subject of θεραπεύειν. ὥς goes with βελτίστους, not with the participle. Herwerden, *Mnem.* 1907, 123, objecting to the emphatic αὐτοὺς τοὺς πολίτας, proposed to delete τοὺς πολίτας, which could be a gloss. But there may be an implied contrast between “the citizens themselves” and external goods like the χρήματα, etc. of 514 a 2. Cf. *Apol.* 36 c 5 ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον . . . ἐπιμελεῖσθαι . . . τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως.

e 7. ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν: 504 d ff.

514 a 3. θῶμεν is the reading of all MSS. (Burnet was mistaken about F), and should not be altered to φῶμεν with Madvig and many editors on the theory that τίθημι should be followed by accusative and participle. Egelie quoted to the contrary *Rep.* 532 d 6 ταῦτα θέντες ἔχειν ὥς νῦν λέγεται, *Laus* 897 b 4 τιθῶμεν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν; and *supra* 509 a 7. Cf. also *Charm.* 174 a 6 θῶμεν γάρ τινα εἶναι αὐτόν (φῶμεν Schanz), *Lysis* 222 c 4 τὰ γὰρ οἰκείον θήσομεν . . . εἶναι (φήσομεν Schanz), *Hipp. mi.* 367 a 8 θῶμεν ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο, . . . εἶναί τινα ἀνθρώπον ψευδῆ (φῶμεν Schanz).

a 5-8. δημοσίᾳ πράξοντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων, “with the intention of entering the public service of the State”. πράξαντες (BTW) is the wrong tense, and Madvig's τάξαντες (to be construed with ἐπὶ) will not do: he was driven to take δημοσίᾳ, impossibly, with παρεκαλοῦμεν. We must read either πράξοντες (F), or, on the analogy of 521 b 1, πράξοντας (Y). The partitive genitive πραγμάτων is, I think, best taken with the cognate participle (cf. 515 a 2). It is possible that τι has fallen

out, but partitive genitives are construed with transitive verbs elsewhere in Plato: Heindorf compared *Rep.* 445 e 1 *κινήσειεν ἄν τῶν ἀξίων λόγου νόμων*, Stallbaum the even bolder use at *Rep.* 485 b 1, *δηλοῖ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας*. The meaning of ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά is further specified in the words ἡ τειχῶν—οἰκοδομήματα. Theiler's deletion of the first ἐπὶ would be more attractive if it did not involve taking *πραγμάτων* with τὰ οἰκοδομικά.

c 2-3. I see nothing wrong with ἴδια ἡμῶν (though διὰ could of course have fallen out very easily after ἴδια). Plato frequently uses ἴδιος with a genitive pronoun, e.g. *Rep.* 580 d 11 *ὀνόματι προσειπεῖν ἰδίῳ αὐτοῦ*, *Menex.* 247 b 7 *ιδίων αὐτοῦ κτημάτων*. —For the dual requirement of naming one's teacher and submitting a specimen of one's work cf. *Laches* 186 ab.

c 5-7. 'Vellem πολλὰ καὶ abesset', Heindorf: we expect here, if anything, something antithetic to πολλὰ at c 1, c 2. But the point may perhaps be that the more numerous the failures, the more damning: a single failure would prove nothing (Sauppe). οὕτω δὲ ἀνόητον ἦν δῆπου ἐπιχειρεῖν. The exact text is uncertain. δὴ . . . δῆπου may be thought a little suspicious, and in view of the consistent use of ἄν throughout this series of unreal suppositions (cf. especially e 8-9 *ἀνόητον . . . ἄν εἶναι*) we might expect to find it here. It is not, however, indispensable, ἀνόητον ἦν being equivalent in sense to οὐκ ἔδει: see Goodwin, *M.T.* §§ 415-23. It is possible that (i) δὴ should be δέ or δ' ἄν, giving the symmetrical sequence μέν (b 7) . . . μέν (c 3) . . . δέ (c 5) . . . δέ; or (ii) δῆπου should be omitted with F; or (iii) δῆπου should be ἄν που (Schanz), confusion of *AN* and *ΔH* being frequent in Plato (but ἀνόητον ἦν ἄν που is hardly the natural order).

d 3-4. καὶ anticipates the ἄν of d 5. ἐπιχειρήσαντες. Despite the parallel with a 6, the aorist participle seems defensible here: the supposition is that they have "undertaken" a panel practice, just as Callicles ἄρχεται πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα (515 a 2). *δημοσιεύειν*: see on 455 b 2.

d 5-6. Φέρε πρὸς θεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ κτλ. Colloquial: cf. Aristoph. *Birds* 996 *Πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, σὺ δ' εἰ τίς ἀνδρῶν*; and Denniston, 174.

d 8. δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος. Slaves received medical treatment (Xen. *Mem.* 2. 4. 3), but usually, it would seem, from ill-qualified fellow slaves (*Laws* 720 c). At a later date we find a doctor praised for being πᾶσιν ἴσος, κα[ὶ πένησι καὶ] πλουσίοις καὶ δούλοις καὶ ἐλευθέροις (*I.G.* v. 1. 1145, c. 70 B.C.). And in a late poem published by Maas and Oliver, *Bull. Hist. Med.* vii (1939), 321, we read that the physician should be θεὸς οἷα σωτήρ | δμῶων ἀκτεάνων τε καὶ ἀφνειῶν καὶ ἀνάκτων | ἴσος.

e 4-5. ἀνθρώπους should not be deleted with Heindorf and Theiler: what is shocking is not that Socrates and Callicles should behave in this way but that anybody should, although ἐτύχομεν reverts, quite naturally, to the imagined case of Socrates and Callicles. ἰδιωτεύοντα, "in private practice"; not, surely, "as laymen" (Cohn-Haft, *Public Physicians*, 59 n. 19). ὅπως ἐτύχομεν is a euphemism for "badly" (cf. 522 c 2).

e 6. ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμείαν . . . μανθάνειν, “to learn pottery on the big jar”, was proverbial ἐπὶ τῶν παριέντων τὰς πρώτας μαθήσεις καὶ ἀποτομένων τῶν τελευταίων (ps.-Plut. *Proov. Alex.* 112), ὡς εἴ τις μανθάνων κεραμεύειν, πρὶν μαθεῖν πίνακας ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν μικρῶν πλάττειν, πίθῳ ἐγχειροίη (Zenobius 3. 65). Plato had already quoted the phrase in a similar context at *Laches* 187 b, and Aristophanes had used it before him (fr. 469), we do not know in what context. The explanation attributed by Zenobius to Dicaearchus (fr. 100 Wehrli), that it means merely “to learn by relevant experience”, misses the point, as the Platonic passages surely prove. Xenophon, drawing the same parallel between the politician and the doctor, imagines the latter as saying, “I am quite ignorant of medicine, but still I will take the post, πειράσομαι γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν ἀποκινδυνεύων μανθάνειν” (*Mem.* 4. 2. 5).

515 a 2. παρακαλεῖς καὶ ὀνειδίζεις: 485 d ff. Plato may well have his personal problem in mind here (Pohlenz, 163): instead of “learning on the big jar”, he has decided not to enter public life until he has studied the foundations of politics in the Academy. Cf. notes on 471 d 3–472 d 1 and 485 d 7, and *Introd.* p. 31.

b 2. ἄνθρωπον need not be altered to ἀνθρώπων (Hirschig) merely for the sake of symmetry with a 4–5.

b 5. Φιλόνικος εἶ: see on 457 d 4.

515 b 6–517 a 6. Return to the question about the Four Men, raised at 503 c. Did they improve their fellow citizens? Socrates claims that they did not, and that this is shown by the ingratitude with which the Athenians eventually treated each of them. They were neither true statesmen (else the Athenians would not have rejected them) nor successful κόλακες. Athens has never produced a true statesman.

This passage was much criticized in antiquity, as appears not only from Aristides’ extant *Defence of the Four* (*orat.* xlv) but from the ἀπορίαι recorded by Ol (192. 3 ff.) and the somewhat embarrassed apologia which he offers. People asked whether Socrates had made Alcibiades and Critias better men, whether Plato made Dionysius II a better man, and whether the Athenians’ treatment of Socrates did not disprove his claim to be a statesman. To the last point the answer no doubt is that Socrates was not a statesman and did not pretend to know how to teach ἀρετή; if Plato makes him claim to be a true πολιτικός (521 d), it is only in the sense of claiming to know the general principle on which a statesman should act. But the argument of the passage is in any case a weak one. If the masses turn against their leader, this is no proof that they have deteriorated morally: it may be the leader who has deteriorated (as seems probable in the case of Themistocles), or it may prove merely an ingrained fickleness which no statesmanship can cure; Aristophanes represents Demos as fattening his κόλακες only to eat them up later on (*Knights* 1125–40), and Theopompus charged the fourth-century Athenians with a similar ingratitude (fr. 105 J. = *Athen.* 532 ab). Indeed, the attitude of followers to leaders is always and everywhere an ambivalent one, for reasons which Freud explained in his book on *Group Psychology*.

Nor are the facts about the Four Men quite fairly presented. Plato says nothing about the strategy of evacuation which both Themistocles and Pericles imposed on their fellow citizens ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον at the risk of immediate unpopularity; he ignores the subsequent repentance of the Athenians in the cases of Cimon and Pericles; and in regard to Miltiades and Pericles he seems to be guilty of some exaggeration. See the detailed notes below. On the real basis of Plato's criticism cf. *Introd.*, pp. 33 f.

515 b 8. The ethic dative ἡμῖν is, I think, best taken with ἐπιμελήσῃ: "Shall we really (ἄρα) find you concerning yourself with anything else than . . .?"

c 1. The article, marking πολῖται as the subject, "we citizens", proves to be in all the MSS. and should not be deleted with Hirschig and Schanz: the statesman's aim is to produce good *men*, not merely good citizens (cf. d 4).

c 7. πολῖται: we might expect πολιτικοί, but cf. d 10, 517 c 2, 518 b 1.

d 5. Ναί. The old vulgate Ἐποίει, which Theiler has surprisingly revived, has no real authority and seems to me a pedant's correction. F's text was perhaps designed to obviate the difficulty.

d 9. Οὐκ ἴσως δῆ, "There is no 'perhaps' about it": cf. *Laws* 965 c 5 Οὐκ ἴσως, ἀλλ' ὄντως. ἀνάγκη seems preferable to ἀνάγκη, as giving a neater construction: cf. on 476 d 6.

e 2. Οὐδέν. Socrates draws no inference as yet: he has merely established the major premiss of his argument.

e 5-7. Περικλέα . . . εἰς μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον καταστήσαντα. Pericles instituted the δικαστικὸς μισθός, a maintenance allowance of two, later three, obols a day paid to citizens empanelled on juries (*Ar. Ath. Pol.* 27. 3, *Pol.* 1274^a8); perhaps also the στρατιωτικὸς μισθός of three obols a day to soldiers and sailors on active service and the βουλευτικὸς μισθός of a drachma a day for service on the Council. Cleophon's διωβελία came later, while payment for attendance at the Assembly (ἐκκλησιαστικὸς μισθός) and cash payments from the Theoric Fund (if these were distinct from the διωβελία) are fourth-century developments. The social consequences alleged by the critics whom Socrates quotes are much like those alleged today by critics of the Welfare State: the system is said to encourage idleness (ἀργούς) and tempt the masses to make increasing demands on the State (φιλαργύρους). Talkativeness (λάλους) might be a simple consequence of idleness, but it looks rather as if Plato were thinking here of the βουλευτικὸς μισθός, which encouraged regular attendance at Council. (Aristophanes had a different explanation for this characteristic Athenian weakness: he blamed Euripides for it, *Frogs* 954.) A public speaker could be called λαλεῖν ἄριστος, ἀδυνατώτατος λέγειν (*Eupolis* fr. 95). What is not at all clear, as Aristides pointed out, is how Pericles can be said to have made the Athenians "cowardly" (δειλοῦς). The reference can hardly be to his defensive strategy in the Peloponnesian War, which had nothing to do with μισθοφορία. Possibly the payment of citizen armies was felt

by some to degrade them to the mercenary level, and so to deprive them of true courage (cf. Ar. *E.N.* 1116^b15–23); or has Plato got in mind the manning of the navy with non-citizens ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος (Isocr. *de pace* 79) and the employment of foreign mercenary troops (the latter mainly a fourth-century development)?

The accusations of ἀργία and φιλαργυρία are repeated by Isocrates, *de pace* 75, 82 f.; he puts the blame, however, on Hyperbolus and Cleophon. Aristophanes had made merry in the *Knights* (1152 ff.) over the sops offered to Demos, and in the *Wasps* (87 ff., etc.) had caricatured the effects of the δικαστικὸς μισθός. Aristotle too quotes a hostile criticism of the δικαστικὸς μισθός (*Ath. Pol.* 27. 4) and seems in general to take an unfavourable view of the system of payment for public services (*Pol.* 1293^a1–10, 1298^b24–26, 1317^b32–35). In the last century most scholars accepted these complaints at their face value and enlarged on them with gusto. But it is nowadays recognized that, whatever the abuses to which it is liable, payment for public services is an indispensable condition of democracy if it is to be more than a pretence. This was indeed the basis of Aristotle's objection: the payments enabled the poor to take their turn at jury service and to play a real instead of a nominal part in public affairs. For a defence of Pericles' policy see E. M. Walker in *C.A.H.* v. 104–6; for a defence of the system in general, A. H. M. Jones, *Athenian Democracy*, especially chaps. i and iii. The latter concludes that there was no pauperization: 'that the poorer citizens lived on State pay for political services is, even for the fourth century, when the system was most fully developed, demonstrably false' (p. 17).

ε 8. Τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγόντων. 'The lads with the cauliflower ears' are the young oligarchs of the late fifth century, who advertised their political sympathies by adopting Spartan tastes—one of which was, or was thought to be, the taste for boxing—and Spartan fashions in dress. See *Prot.* 342 b 8, where it is said of the 'Laconizers' that they ὦτά τε κατὰ γυννται μιμούμενοι αὐτοὺς, καὶ ἱμάντας περιελίττονται καὶ φιλογυμναστοῦσιν καὶ βραχείας ἀναβολὰς φοροῦσιν. Such young men were no doubt to be found in the Socratic circle: cf. *Birds* 1281 f., where Λακωνομανεῖν and Σωκρατεῖν are predicated of the same group. Socrates does not deny Callicles' charge, nor does he definitely commit himself to the accuracy of the Laconizers' criticisms. He proceeds instead to formulate his own, which he applies not only to Pericles and Themistocles but to the 'grand old men' of the conservatives, Miltiades and Cimon. Plato is in fact careful throughout not to present Socrates as a mere 'party man': cf. on 472 a 5–b 3.

516 a 1–2. ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Περικλέους. The last two words are perhaps a gloss (Hirschig, Theiler), but there is no reason to delete the entire phrase with Cobet: it stresses a relevant point, and the date indicated is almost certainly the correct one. 'The only deposition and trial of Pericles of which we have respectable evidence is his deposition and trial in the autumn of 430 B.C.', Adcock, *C.A.H.* v. 478. He was restored to office in 429, and died in the same year

(Thuc. 2. 65). κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο. Thucydides does not specify the charge; but that it was one of κλοπή (embezzlement of public funds) or ἀδίκιον (malversation) is stated by Plutarch, *Per.* 32, who quotes (but misdates) the decree. Pericles was found guilty and heavily fined. ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ θανάτου ἐτίμησαν looks like an exaggeration. The death penalty was in theory admissible, but there is no other evidence that the jury contemplated it, though no doubt the prosecution may have asked for it as a matter of form (Eduard Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.* iii, § 556).

a 5. ὄνων γοῦν ἂν ἐπιμελητῆς κτλ. The comparison of statesmanship to the tendance of a herd of cattle or other animals (Plato maliciously puts the donkey first) is as old as Homer's ποιμένα λαῶν, but this application of it would seem to be especially Socratic. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1. 2. 32 εἶπέ που ὁ Σωκράτης ὅτι θαυμαστόν οἱ δοκοίη εἶναι, εἴ τις γενόμενος βοῶν ἀγέλης νομεὺς καὶ τὰς βοῦς ἐλάττους τε καὶ χείρους ποιῶν μὴ ὁμολογοίη κακὸς βουκόλος εἶναι, ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστότερον, εἴ τις προστάτης γενόμενος πόλεως καὶ ποιῶν τοὺς πολίτας ἐλάττους τε καὶ χείρους μὴ αἰσχύνεται μηδ' οἷται κακὸς εἶναι προστάτης τῆς πόλεως: also *ibid.* 3. 2. 1, *Oec.* 3. 11, and *Rep.* 343 ab (where the limited validity of the comparison is pointed out by Thrasymachus, perhaps an indication that *Rep.* i is later than *Gorgias*). Some have thought that the idea originated with Antisthenes (Zeller, *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, 325 n. 1 Eng. trans.), or with the Pythagoreans (E. L. Minar, *Early Pythagorean Politics*, 63 f.), on what seems to me in both cases weak evidence. The particular turn which is given to it here makes a significant contrast with Callicles' use of the animal metaphor: Callicles ridiculed the democratic politicians' futile attempt to tame the lion (483 e); Socrates taxes them with precisely the opposite error—they have let the domestic herds run wild (b 1–2).

a 7. ἐαυτὸν has been thought a gloss, since well-disciplined animals do not kick or butt or bite *anyone*, and the next sentence has no corresponding restriction. In Pericles' case, however, the point is that the animals bit *their keeper* (c 7). —The sequence of participles does not match the sequence in which the corresponding animals are mentioned: Plato seems purposely to avoid this sort of trivial symmetry.

b 4. ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι. Cf. 513 e 1, 514 a 4, and *infra* c 8: these repeated qualifications mark Callicles' lack of any inner conviction (see on 513 c 5).

c 3. ὥς ἔφη Ὅμηρος. The reference is apparently to the formulaic phrase ἄγριοι οὐδὲ δίκαιοι (*Od.* 6. 120, 9. 175, 13. 201): if the ungente are unjust, the just are by implication gentle. Alternatively, some phrase like ἡμεροὶ οἳ γε δίκαιοι may have occurred, as Kinkel and T. W. Allen thought, in one of the lost epics which went under Homer's name.

c 7. αὐτόν could be, but need not be, a gloss on ὃν ἤκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο: see on 447 a 5. The preposition is, as usual, not repeated with the relative: cf. 453 e 1, *Apol.* 27 d 9, etc., Kühner-G. i. 550.

d 5. ὁμολόγεις: 515 d.

d 6. ἐξωστράκισαν. Cimon was ostracized in 461, after the failure of his intervention on behalf of the Spartans in the third Messenian war. But if Theopompus and Plutarch are to be believed, instead of allowing his banishment to run to the normal period of ten years the Athenians recalled him in 457 after the battle of Tanagra, ὧν ἔπαθον ἐδμεμνημένοι (Plut. *Cimon* 17; cf. Gomme on Thuc. 1. 112. 1). ὀστράκισμός, unlike φυγή, was not a punishment for misconduct; it was, however, proof of political failure, and to emphasize this Plato adds ἵνα—τῆς φωνῆς.

d 8. Θεμιστοκλέα. The date of Themistocles' ostracism is uncertain (possibly 471), as are the reasons for it. It was followed a year or two later by his condemnation for treason when the Spartans produced evidence that he had been in correspondence with the traitor Pausanias, and by his flight to Persia. To cite his condemnation simply as proof of Athenian ingratitude clearly begs the question of his guilt. Demosthenes, perhaps with this passage in mind, drew a different conclusion from the cases of Cimon and Themistocles: χρηστοὺς μὲν ὄντας ἐτίμων, ἀδικεῖν δ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν οὐκ ἐπέτρεπον (23. 205).

d 9—e 2. τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι, a title of honour which serves to distinguish the victor of Marathon from his uncle the first tyrant of the Chersonese, much as 'Lawrence of Arabia' distinguishes T. E. from D. H. Lawrence. The preposition is attested by the entire tradition, direct and indirect (Burnet was mistaken about F), and need not, I think, be deleted with Thompson, Schanz, and all editors since Burnet. Both *Μαραθῶνι* (locative) and *ἐν Μαραθῶνι* are admissible (Kühner-G. i. 442 f.). For the latter cf. *Laus* 698 e 4 τῆς ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχης (but 699 a 2 τὸ Μαραθῶνι γεγόμενον), 707 c 2, Thuc. 1. 18. 1, 2. 34. 5 τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι. εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν. This was at one time the penalty prescribed by decree for enemies of the people (Xen. *Hell.* 1. 7. 20), and it may have been proposed by the prosecution in the case of Miltiades; but our best authority, Hdt. 6. 136, says only that the charge was a capital one. **διὰ τὸν πρύτανιν:** see on 473 e 7. Miltiades was impeached before the Assembly in 489 (*C.A.H.* iv. 253). None of the other accounts says anything about the πρύτανις: according to Herodotus the Assembly declined to impose the death penalty but fined Miltiades fifty talents. If Plato has not distorted the facts, he has at least selected his details in such a way as to put the conduct of the Athenians in the worst possible light.

e 3. ἔπασχον. The choice of the imperfect instead of the aorist—which is usual in unreal suppositions about the past—is perhaps due to the recurrent character of the events in question: see Goodwin, *M.T.* § 410, Wackernagel, *Vorl. über Syntax*, i. 225 f.

e 3—6. οὐκ οὐκ—ἐκπίπτουσιν. "Anyhow, good drivers do not keep their seat in their first race only to be thrown later in their career, when . . ." What οὐκ οὐκ denies is that the μὲν and the δέ statement can both be true of good drivers: see on 512 a 2—b 1.

e 9. οἱ ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι: 503 bc. This sweeping condemnation of all Athenian statesmen, past and present—which would seem to

include Solon and (despite 526 b) Aristides—is directly contradicted in the *Meno*, where Socrates says ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ἄνυτε, καὶ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν ἐνθάδε ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ γεγονέναι ἔτι οὐχ ἥττον ἢ εἶναι (93 a 5). It is true that there Socrates goes on to point out that the Athenian statesmen have not been able to pass on their professional skill to their sons, which means that they had only true opinion, not scientific knowledge, which means that they were not ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά in the fullest sense. Nevertheless the *Meno* passage looks like a conscious retreat from the extreme position adopted in the *Gorgias* (Pohlenz 181): see *Introd.*, p. 23.

517 a 5–6. τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥητορικῇ, the true political leadership described at 504 d, whose objective is the moral reform of society: if society eventually rejects the leader, this shows, according to Socrates, that the objective has not been achieved. οὐτε τῇ κολακικῇ, presumably because the really expert κόλαξ will model himself so closely on his patron (513 b) that he can never fall into disfavour. Yet Socrates goes on to describe the Four Men as τῶν γε νῦν διακονικώτεροι (b 3), and to describe διακονική (defined at d 2) as bearing the same relation to true statesmanship which the skill of the pastrycook, etc., bears to gymnastic and medicine (517 e–518 a). This would seem to imply that διακονική, in which the Four excelled, is a form of κολακεία (cf. 464 d). Hence there is something to be said for K. Meiser's forgotten suggestion (made in *Blätter für Gymnasialwesen*, 35. 417, but known to me only from H. Gomperz, *Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil.* 1903, 147) that some words are lost before τῇ κολακικῇ: he thought the original text might have run οὐτε <τῇ ἀληθινῇ πολιτικῇ, ἀλλὰ> τῇ κολακικῇ. Alternatively, Plato may have meant to distinguish διακονική from κολακικῇ ῥητορικῇ as loyal service not directed, like the latter, to the personal gain of the διάκονος (cf. 502 e 6 ἔνεκα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ αὐτῶν). But if so he has failed to make the distinction clear; and at 521 a 8–b 1 the two notions seem to be explicitly equated.

517 a 7–518 c 1. Still, says Callicles, there is a great difference in calibre between the Four Men and the politicians of today. Socrates agrees that they were better servants (διάκονοι) than their successors, in the sense that they were better at providing “ships, walls, dockyards, and so forth” (c 2). But the aim of the true statesman is θεραπεία (e 6) not διακονία: he will give the people, not what they think they want, but what is good for them. To mistake the politicians of Athenian history for statesmen is like mistaking the pastrycook for the doctor.

Plato recognizes that what the Four Men did, they did well. The fault, in his view, lay not in their incompetence but in their misconception of the statesman's task, which is primarily educational—he defined it in the *Laws* as τὰς φύσεις τε καὶ ἔξεις τῶν ψυχῶν . . . θεραπεύειν (650 b 6). Milton was of the same opinion, ‘to govern well is to train up a nation in true wisdom and virtue’; and, as Grube points out (264), most modern states do to some extent concern themselves with the moral welfare of their citizens, if only by restricting opportunities for vice. The limiting factor in any proposal for ‘making people good by Act of Parliament’ is of course the difficulty of enforcement.

Plato does not consider this in the *Gorgias*, but in assimilating the relation of statesman and people to that of doctor and patient he points forward to the absolutism of the *Republic* and *Politicus* (cf. notes on 503 d 5–505 b 12 and on 517 b 6 below). His contempt for the Athenian politicians is bitingly expressed in the comparison with the *κάπηλος* (d 7): in return for power they serve the public with the goods it wants, and the customer is always right; cf. *Prot.* 313 c 5, where the same comparison is applied to the sophist. Accordingly at a 2 Socrates flings back Callicles' words *δουλοπρεπές* and *ἀνελεύθερον* (485 b 7, c 6): it is not the philosopher whose occupation is "servile" and "unfit for a gentleman", but the politician, who must cringe like a servant or a shopkeeper. Cf. *Theaet.* 175 e, where the lawyer's skill in flattering juries is classed with bedmaking and cookery as a *δουλικὸν διακόνημα*, also Walter Lippmann's description of present-day democratic politicians as 'insecure and intimidated men'. 'They advance politically only as they placate, appease, bribe, seduce, bamboozle, or otherwise manage to manipulate the demanding and threatening elements in their constituencies. The decisive consideration is not whether the proposition is good but whether it is popular. . . . Politicians rationalize this servitude by saying that in a democracy public men are the servants of the people' (*The Public Philosophy*, 31).

517 a 7–b 1. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ . . . μὴ . . . ἐργάσθαι is equivalent to οὐ μὴ ἐργάσθαι, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. Riddell § 259 rightly compared *Symp.* 203 c 6 πολλοῦ δεῖ ἀπαλός . . . ἀλλὰ (= οὐχ ἀπαλός, πολλοῦ δεῖ, . . . ἀλλὰ) and *Rep.* 378 c 3. A more exact parallel is *Ep.* vii 344 c 2 πολλοῦ δεῖ μὴ γράψας ποτὲ ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰς φθόνον καὶ ἀπορίαν καταβαλεῖ (v.l. καταβάλῃ). In view of these passages it is needless (and no improvement) to write with Madvig πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες· <οὐ> μὴ . . . ἐργάσθαι. Cf. Wackernagel, *Vorl. über Syntax*, ii. 305. ὅστις βούλει stands by relative attraction for ἐκεῖνος ὅντινα βούλει, like Lat. *quivis*. Cf. *Crat.* 432 a 10 τὰ δέκα ἣ ὅστις βούλει ἄλλος ἀριθμός.

b 2. ὥς γε διακόνους εἶναι: limitative, "in their capacity as servants," like Hdt. 4. 81. 1 ὀλίγους ὥς Σκύθας εἶναι (Goodwin, *M.T.* §§ 781–2).

b 6. πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι. The true statesman will not hesitate to use force where necessary. According to *Politicus* 293 a and 296 a–297 b he will use it even against legally sovereign majorities; but that this was not the opinion of the historical Socrates may be inferred from the objection of "the young Socrates" at 293 e, and from *Crito* 52 d, 54 c. See Sinclair, *History of Greek Political Thought*, 174–6.

b 7. ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν: see on 450 b 7.

c 2. πολίτου: πολιτικοῦ Bury and Jaeger (*Paideia*, iii. 310 n. 53); but see on 515 c 7.

c 2–4. ναῦς: the Athenian navy was largely the creation of Themistocles (Hdt. 7. 144, Thuc. 1. 14. 3). The τείχη καὶ νεώρια were due to Themistocles and Pericles (455 de). Demosthenes mentions the dockyards alongside the Propylaea and the Parthenon as an especial source of Athenian civic pride (22. 76); they are said to have cost at least

a thousand talents (Isocr. *Areop.* 66). *τούτων*. One may guess that Plato is here thinking less of the later years of the Peloponnesian War than of the early fourth century, when the Long Walls were rebuilt (394–393) and Conon had set about building up a new Athenian navy (Pohlenz, 165). It is evident that Plato viewed with disfavour these attempts at recreating vanished glories (cf. 519 a). The laudatory reference to them in the *Menexenus*, 245 a 7 *τειχισαμένη καὶ ναυπηγησαμένη*, I take to be part of his mockery of contemporary politicians in that dialogue. It is interesting that many years later, in the *de pace* (64), Isocrates came round to something like Plato's view on this question.

c 6. *εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ περιφερόμενοι*: see *Introd.*, p. 5.

c 7–8. *γούν* introduces the evidence for the preceding statement. F's *τε οὖν* is evidently a misreading of *γε οὖν*, i.e. *γούν*, which the author of the Y recension restored. In the next line F's word order, *διττή τις αὐτῇ*, is the natural one, though the editors have ignored it. *πολλάκις*: 500 d ff., 513 d.

d 2. *ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα* is followed by no antithetic *δέ* clause, the antithesis being expressed instead by *ὅτι ἔστιν τις παρὰ ταύτας ἀπάσας τέχνη* (c 4). *δυνατὸν εἶναι* depends on *ὡμολογηκέναι καὶ ἐγνωκέναι*: for the shift from the *ὡς* construction to the accusative and infinitive cf. *Rep.* 391 c 8 ff., Riddell § 281; for the use of the latter in a relative clause, *Rep.* 490 c 5, Goodwin, *M.T.* § 755. Richards's *τινα* for *εἶναι* is thus needless.

d 4. *ἄλλ' ὦν*, the *textus receptus*, seems to be due to the Paris corrector (*Introd.*, pp. 49 ff.); all the primary MSS. have *ἄλλων ὦν* (Bekker deceived Stallbaum and others about B). One might be tempted to defend *ἄλλων ὦν* if it were not so easily explained by dittography, for Plato occasionally admits inverse attraction, e.g. *Lysis* 221 b 7 *τούτου οὐ· ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ἐρᾷ μὴ φιλεῖν*. The present instance is, however, peculiarly harsh, since *ἄλλων* is coordinate with *ἱμάτια* etc.: the nearest parallel I can find is *Xen. Hiero* 7. 2 *τοιαῦτα ποιοῦσι τοῖς τυράννοις οἱ ἀρχόμενοι καὶ ἄλλον ὄντινα ἂν ἀεὶ τιμῶντες τυγχάνωσι*.

d 5. *διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰκόνων*. The analogy of bodily needs has been used at 490 b–e, and the doctor and the pastrycook have figured at 500 e ff.

d 6–7. *ποριστικὸν εἶναι*, sc. *οἶμαί σε ὡμολογηκέναι*. *ἢ κάπηλον ὄντα ἢ ἔμπορον ἢ δημιουργόν*, retailer, importer, or manufacturer. The last was normally an individual craftsman, not an industrialist. For the distinction between *κάπηλος* and *ἔμπορος* cf. *Rep.* 371 d, *Soph.* 223 d.

e 2. I have ventured to insert <ὄν> in order to restore construction to a sentence which in the MSS. and in the Oxford text is wildly anacoluthic. This seems better both transcriptionally (since the relative would easily fall out by haplography) and, I think, stylistically, than the alternative course of deleting *εἶναι* in d 7 (Rieckher, Sauppe) or changing it to *τινα* (Richards). The accusative and infinitive construction, depending on *ὡμολογηκέναι καὶ ἐγνωκέναι* (c 8), is then continued down to 518 a 5.

e 5. ἡ δὴ τῷ ὄντι ἐστὶν . . . θεραπεία, “which is truly the tendance”, i.e. “which is the true tendance”. But an article may have fallen out after δὴ: cf. *Symph.* 204 c 4 ἐστὶ τὸ ἐραστὸν τὸ τῷ ὄντι καλόν.

e 7–8. ὅτι τε χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν, “what is good and bad”. F’s τε (not τὶ, as Burnet states) explains the false reading τὸ in the first family. For its position cf. *Rep.* 475 c 1 τί τε χρηστὸν καὶ μῆ, and Denniston, 518 f.

518 a 1. ἀγνοεῖν, sc. ὅτι τε χρηστὸν κτλ. Coraës may have been right in reading ταῦτα, which would easily become ταύτας by assimilation to the preceding words; cf., however, 472 c 2 τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους πάντας τούτους. The infinitive is parallel in construction to εἰδέναι (517 e 7).

a 3. ‘Quae tandem, quaeso, haec est σώματος πραγματεία?’ inquired Cobet, with more cogency than usual. One might say of an anatomist, but hardly of a shopkeeper, that he πραγματεύεται τὸ σῶμα, and the phrase is very loosely attached to its context. If it is to be retained we must, I think, write as he did περὶ σῶμα πραγματείας, like 501 b 3 περὶ ψυχὴν . . . πραγματεῖται and 517 d 1 ἡ πραγματεία . . . καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν. But it seems more likely that the words are a gloss explaining that τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας are the other arts concerned with the body. Cf. the similar gloss in TW at 500 b 4.

a 4. δεσποίνας should perhaps be δέσποιναν (Cobet), since at 517 e 4 gymnastic and medicine were treated as a single art. They are distinguished, however, at 464 b, and below at 520 b 3.

a 5–6. ὅτι ἔστιν depends on μανθάνειν. ὅτε λέγω. If ὅτι is retained, ‘pendet τότε, abundat ὅτι λέγω’ (Madvig). τότε μὲν (“sometimes”) might indeed be answered by ἦκεις δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον λέγων. But if ὅτι λέγω meant “what I say”, Plato would not have added ὅτι ἐγὼ λέγω at the end of the sentence; if it meant “that I say”, sc. ὅτι ταῦτά ταῦτα ἔστιν καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν (Heindorf, Stallbaum), the sense would be false, not to speak of the stylistic clumsiness.

a 7–b 1. ἄνθρωποι καλοὶ κάγαθοι . . . πολῖται is a single phrase, “persons who were good and honourable citizens”, like παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους at c 4 below. The addition of ἄνθρωποι conveys a tinge of contempt, whereas ἄνδρες would be complimentary.

b 5–7. Thearion kept a baker’s shop in Athens, which must have been very well known, since Aristophanes introduced it into a tragic parody, ἦκω Θεαρίωνος ἀρτοποιίον | λιπών (fr. 1), and Antiphanes made one of his characters praise its ἄρτους λευκοσωμάτων in impassioned terms (fr. 176 Kock). Of Mithaecus Maximus of Tyre (17. 1) tells us that he was a Syracusan, as great in cookery as Pheidias in sculpture. Aristides (p. 376 Canter) does not know his book, and presumes that Plato encountered it during his first visit to Syracuse. Συρακοσίων τράπεζα was proverbial for its luxury (*Rep.* 404 d, Aristophanes fr. 216, Hor. *Odes* 3. 1. 18, Zenobius 5. 94). For Sarambus, the wine merchant, Plato is probably the only independent authority (he is hardly to be identified with the Plataean Sarabos mentioned by Poseidippus, fr. 29 Kock). —ἀρτοκόπος (earlier ἀρτοποιός) is the old trade name, on which ἀρτοποιὸς (F) is a gloss. It is inscriptionally

attested (*I.G.* i¹. 1018), and in the form *αροποπος* has been recognized by Ventrìs and Chadwick on several Mycenaean tablets (*Documents in Mycenaean Greek*, 389).

518 c 2–519 b 2. *Socrates explains why the Four are thought to be great benefactors. The reason is that the disastrous results of false statesmanship do not show themselves immediately, and are thus not traced to their real authors. The founders of Athenian imperialism are more to blame for the approaching ruin of Athens than “my friend Alcibiades” (a 8); Demos, grown unwholesomely fat through their ministrations, will lose in the end “even the flesh he originally had” (c 7). But if Callicles is not careful he will be made to suffer for it, as will Alcibiades.*

This striking passage is the fruit of Plato’s meditation on the disaster which overwhelmed Athens in 404. Democrats blamed ‘the stab in the back’ administered by men like Alcibiades and Critias; conservatives blamed ‘the demagogues’, Cleon and his successors. In Plato’s view both explanations were superficial: it was the creators of the Athenian *ἀρχή* who set their country on the wrong course, and thus made its ruin inevitable. An English psychologist, analysing the causes of another disastrous war, expressed himself in similar terms. ‘The fact that European civilization could culminate in a disaster so frightful is proof that its development was radically unsound. This is by no means to say that the war could have been avoided by those immediately concerned. That is almost certainly not the case. The war was the consequence of inherent defects in the evolution of civilized life; it was the consequence of human progress being left to chance.’ (Wilfred Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*², 161 f.)

The warning about Alcibiades’ prospective fate is of course a *vaticinatio ex eventu*; and so, probably, is the warning addressed to Callicles himself (see *Introd.*, p. 13). We may compare the closing words of the *First Alcibiades*, ὁρρωδῶ δέ, οὐ τι τῇ σῇ φύσει ἀπιστῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ὁρῶν ῥώμην, μὴ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ κρατήσῃ. In Plato’s opinion the assumptions underlying Athenian policy since the Persian wars had been false assumptions; when that policy broke down it was as futile as it was inevitable that the whole blame should be laid on the men in power at the time. Demosthenes reproaches the Athenians of his day with the same shortsighted judgement: πολλάκις ὑμεῖς οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὑστάτους περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων εἰπόντας ἐν ὀργῇ ποιεῖσθε, ἂν τι μὴ κατὰ γνώμην ἐκβῇ (1. 16, cf. 6. 34).

518 c 2. ὅτι introduces a direct quotation of the imagined words, which continues down to e 1. The omission of the usual ὦ before Ἄνθρωπε was perhaps felt as enhancing the brusqueness of the address; but see on 489 a 5.

c 7. ἀρχαίς, “original”, as *τὰρχαῖα* means “the original sum”, i.e. capital as distinct from interest. Demosthenes expresses a like thought by saying that those who borrow at too high a rate of interest χρόνον ὕστερον καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀπέστησαν (1. 15).

d 5. ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγίειν, “without regard to the rules of health”.

e 4. ὕπουλός ἐστιν: see on 480 b 2.

519 a 3. **φλυαριῶν**: Socrates retorts the word which Callicles had applied at 492 c 7 to the Socratic ideal of *σωφροσύνη* and *δικαιοσύνη*. With this magnificent dismissal of all the glories of Periclean Athens as so much trash cf. *Alc. i* 134 b 7 (perhaps imitated from this passage?), and *Rep.* 515 d 2, where the visions of the Prisoners in the Cave, i.e. the whole experience of most men, are described as *φλυαρίαι*.

a 4. **ἡ καταβολὴ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀσθενείας**, "that crisis of the infirmity", refers back to 518 d 4. *καταβολή* (or *κατηβολή*, *Hipp. mi.* 372 e 1) was used of periodic attacks of fever: cf. *Dem.* 9. 29 ὥσπερ περίοδος ἡ καταβολὴ πυρετοῦ ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς κακοῦ. *ἀσθένεια* is chosen for its double meaning of loss of power and bodily illness; for the latter cf. *Charm.* 155 b 2 and *Thuc.* 2. 49. 1.

a 7–8. **σοῦ . . . ἐπιλήψονται**: Socrates again throws back Callicles' word at him (cf. 486 a 7). **Ἀλκιβιάδου**. In 415 Alcibiades was condemned to death for sacrilege, but *in absentia*, having meanwhile fled to Sparta. He was recalled and made commander-in-chief in 407, but after the defeat at Notium in the next year found it prudent to return to exile. The reader is no doubt meant to imagine the present conversation as taking place before 415, although this is inconsistent with other chronological data (see *Introd.*, pp. 17 f.).

b 2. **συναιτίων**, "accessories" in the language of English law, as distinct from "principals". The more precise conception of *συναίτιον* as *conditio sine qua non* (*Ar. Met.* 1015^a21) is hardly involved here. For the history of the term see Taylor on *Tim.* 46 c 7.

519 b 3–521 a 1. *Politicians have no right to complain of the ingratitude of the people, for if they had succeeded in their proper task of moral reform it would not have turned against them. They are like the sophists who claim to teach virtue, yet complain that their pupils cheat them of their fees at the end of the course. Callicles despises sophists but admires politicians. Yet of these two fraudulent professions that of the sophist is the more respectable, in proportion as the legislator's art which it caricatures is nobler than that of the judge whom the politician apes.*

Plato is here extending—somewhat unfairly—to politicians an old joke against the sophists, which appears also in an early work of Isocrates, *c. soph.* 5 f. It evidently goes back to the time when to teach for money was still an ungentlemanly innovation (cf. *Hipp. ma.* 282 c 6 τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν ἐκείνων οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἠξίωσεν ἀργύριον μισθὸν πράξασθαι . . . οὕτως ἦσαν εὐηθεῖς καὶ ἐλελήθει αὐτοὺς ἀργύριον ὥς πολλοῦ ἄξιον εἶη). Xenophon reports Socrates' opinion that to teach for money was "to sell oneself as a slave", and his surprise that the sophists bargained with their pupils for fees in advance instead of trusting them to show their gratitude to the man who had made them *καλοὺς καγαθοὺς*; Socrates himself expected nothing from his associates except their friendship (*Mem.* 1. 2. 6–8). This is a genuine fifth-century point of view. And Protagoras in fact bowed to it, to the extent of allowing his pupils to pay less than his standard fee (said by *Diog. L.*, 9. 52, to have been 100 *minae*) if they were prepared to state on oath that they did not think his teaching worth so much (*Prot.*

328 bc). In the fourth century things were different: the professional teacher was a recognized and on the whole a respected figure (cf. Jaeger, *Paideia*, iii. 142), though there were still complaints about over-charging (Isocr. *Antid.* 154 f.) and Demosthenes mentions a case where teachers were cheated of their fees (27. 46).

519 b 7. For postponement of ἄρα see on 486 e 6. Here, however, it is rather oddly placed: unless an εἰ (depending on δεινὰ πάσχουσι) has fallen out in front of it, we should expect it to follow the crucial word ἀδίκως.

c 6. ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς [αὐτούς]. I take αὐτούς to be a gloss showing that σφᾶς refers to the subject of the main sentence (as it normally does in Attic Greek). σφᾶς αὐτούς would naturally be understood as referring to the subject of ἀδικοῦσι.

d 1. καὶ . . . τί ἂν ἀλογώτερον εἶη πρᾶγμα . . .; We expect καίτοι (Heindorf, Theiler). The Platonic parallel usually quoted in defence of καί, *Apol.* 29 b 1, is of doubtful value, since there Eusebius had καίτοι (which Burnet adopted). But we may perhaps bring the present instance under the head of 'indignant questions', in which καί often has the force of καίτοι (Denniston, 310, Kühner-G. ii. 247 f.), as in the common καὶ πῶς; Such questions, however, usually occur in dialogue, not as here in mid-speech. τούτου τοῦ λόγου is explained by the accusative and infinitive which follows in apposition to it.

d 4. τούτῳ δ' οὐκ ἔχουσιν. Burnet adopted the late 'correction' ῶ, perhaps from a mistaken respect for f. But Plato frequently neglects relative attraction, e.g. 520 b 5 (where again a late corrector has introduced ῶ), 521 d 1 (where once more we are offered a 'correction'), *Euthyd.* 287 a 3 τούτου δ' πράττει, *Symp.* 200 c 7 αὐτῶν τούτων ᾧ ἔχω, and the many instances quoted by F. L. van Cleef, *de attractionis . . . usu Platónico* 32, 38. In the present case we may perhaps say with Stallbaum 'attractionem omissam esse, ut τούτῳ pronomem vi et gravitate plus polleat'.

d 5. δημηγορεῖν με ἡνάγκασας: see on 465 e 1–466 a 2. If Socrates δημηγορεῖ, as Callicles alleged (482 c 5), that is Callicles' own fault.

e 1. συχνούς τείνω τῶν λόγων. This would naturally mean "I draw out many of my speeches" (like συχνὰς τῶν νήσων, *Hdt.* 3. 39. 4), and so L.S.J. appears to take it. But the sense required by the context is "I draw out my speeches to great length" (cf. συχνὸν λόγον 465 e 3, *Theaet.* 185 e 5, *Phil.* 23 b 5). We may perhaps compare *Prot.* 329 b 1 δολιχὸν (δόλιχον Stephanus) κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. —We might expect ἀποτείνω (Cobet), as at 458 b 7, 465 e 3; cf., however, *Eur. Hec.* 1177 ὥς δὲ μὴ μακροὺς τείνω λόγους, *Aesch. Ag.* 1296, *Cho.* 510.

e 3. πρὸς Φιλίου: see on 500 b 6.

e 7. τῶν φασκόντων παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν. This is Plato's regular way of describing the sophists. Cf. *Prot.* 349 a 2 σοφιστὴν ἐπονομάσας σεαυτόν, ἀπέφηνας παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον, *Μeno* 95 b 9 οἱ σοφισταὶ σοι οὗτοι, οἵπερ μόνοι ἐπαγγέλλονται, δοκοῦσι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι ἀρετῆς; and Pohlenz 195 ff. He represents Protagoras, Hippias, Evenus, Euthydemus, and Dionysodorus as all of them

professing to teach ἀρετή in some sense of the word (*Prot.* 319 a, *Hipp. ma.* 283 c, *Apol.* 20 b, *Euthyd.* 273 d). Gorgias did not (*Meno* 95 c), and Callicles' reply shows that he does not include him among the sophists (cf. *Introd.*, pp. 6 f.).

520 a 1. τί ἂν λέγοις . . . ; 'what is there to be said . . . ?' ἀνθρώπων . . . οὐδενὸς ἀξίων. Callicles' estimate of the sophists coincides with that of Laches (*Laches* 197 d) and of Anytus (*Meno* 91 c). Their profession was thought in the fifth century to be unfit for a gentleman (*Prot.* 312 ab), and their teaching was thought by many people (though not by Plato) to be the root cause of the corruption of the young generation (*Rep.* 492 a). On both grounds 'right-thinking people' considered the term an ὄνειδος (*Xen. Cyneg.* 13. 8). To Callicles the sophists are no doubt obnoxious both on social grounds and as unpractical 'intellectuals' (cf. 484 c ff.); ἀρετή for him is something that needs no teaching (492 c), whereas Gorgias teaches something useful.

a 8. ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον: 465 c.

b 1. τὴν ῥητορικὴν secl. Cobet, but see on 447 a 5. Other words in this passage which *might* be but need not be glosses are c 2 ἄνευ μισθοῦ (secl. Heikel) and d 4 τὴν ἀδικίαν (secl. Cobet, but cf. 449 c 5, 460 e 1).

b 2-3. κάλλιον ἐστὶν . . . νομοθετικὴ δικαστικῆς, on the principle that prevention is better than cure. It hardly follows that an imitation of prevention is better than an imitation of cure, and I suppose this is Helmbold's reason for deleting the sentence; but Plato liked to speak ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι (465 b), and the argument may have seemed to him a good enough stick for beating Callicles. He may well have believed that in fact the 'neutral' education which derived from Gorgias had done more harm than all the teaching of the sophists.

b 4. Logically, as Denniston says (327), καὶ qualifies μόνοις, 'actually the only people'; but μόνοις is put first for emphasis, with resulting displacement of the καὶ. Cf. 461 b 3.

b 5. τῷ πράγματι ὃ αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσι. For πρᾶγμα 'creature' cf. *Prot.* 312 c 4 where it is applied to a sophist.

b 7. κατηγορεῖν, sc. ἀνάγκη ἐῖναι, to be supplied from its opposite, οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν. So at *Phaedrus* 245 d 7, and often.

c 6-d 1. εἰ προοῖτο κτλ.: 'if the trainer should trust his honour instead of agreeing on a fee and getting his money as nearly as possible at the moment of communicating the gift of pace'. For προέσθαι in this sense cf. *Laus* 849 c 8 ὁ δὲ προέμενος ὡς πιστεύων, ἔαντε κομίσσεται καὶ ἂν μή, στεργέτω. At c 7 neither αὐτῷ nor the dative of advantage αὐτῷ (which Sauppe preferred) is really wanted, and I incline to think F is right in omitting the word.

d 1. οὐ γὰρ δὴ rules out, as usual, a theoretically possible alternative (Denniston, 243).

d 4-7. For μόνῳ strict logic would, as Thompson remarked, require μόνην. εἶπερ . . . δύναιτό τις repeats εἴ τις . . . ἀφαιρεῖ in a more sceptical form (*a b a* construction).

e 3-5. ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ ἢ πόλιν. This corresponds closely to Protagoras' definition of his function, *Prot.* 318 e 5 τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. But we need not suppose that Plato is specifically attacking Protagoras here: ἀρετή is defined in much the same terms at *Meno* 73 a and 91 a, and at *Xen. Mem.* 4. 2. 11. Isocrates makes similar professions, *Antid.* 285. μὴ . . . συμβουλεύειν is oblique for οὐ συμβουλεύω, which can be justified as an habitual present, or as a rhetorical substitute for the future (Kühner-G. i. 138, 196). Cf. *Xen. Anab.* 4. 5. 15 οὐκ ἔφασαν πορεύεσθαι, and W. J. Verdenius, *Mnem.* 1958, 242. F, however, has συμβουλεύσειν, perhaps rightly.

e 10. Sauppe deleted ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν, on the ground that one could not speak of ποιεῖν εὐεργεσίαν. But the accusative is an 'internal' one, limiting the meaning of εἶποις.

521 a 2-522 e 8. Callicles tries once more to warn Socrates of the danger he may incur. Socrates replies that he expects to incur it: just because he is one of the few true statesmen in Athens, if not the only one (521 d 6), he will be as helpless in an Athenian court as a doctor accused by a pastrycook before a jury of children. That matters little, so long as he has saved himself from wickedness. And in confirmation he offers to tell Callicles a story.

Here we reach the bitter conclusion of the long debate: Athens has one man who knows what true statesmanship is—and because of his knowledge that man must one day receive his death-sentence at the hands of "a jury of children". In choosing his manner of life Socrates chose also his manner of death, and chose it with his eyes open. It is not an argument calculated to convince a Callicles, and it does not convince him (cf. 522 c). But for Plato the trial of Socrates was, as Friedländer has said, 'the crucial experiment' which tested the worth of the two opposed ways of life and set the final seal of authority on Socrates' mission. That is one reason why he made Socrates predict it here. His secondary purpose is to provide a foil for the myth, in which Socrates will describe another kind of Assize, one more to be dreaded than any earthly law-court.

521 a 2. τὴν is omitted by Y, and has been doubted by some modern critics, but cf. *Phdr.* 263 c 5 ποτέρου δὲ τυγχάνει τοῦ γένους. The article seems to emphasize that Callicles in any case παρακαλεῖ ἐπὶ θεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως: the only question is, which sort of θεραπεία?

a 3-4. τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι . . . ἢ ὥς διακονήσονται: the construction of the second alternative is varied from that of the first under the influence of the intervening ὥς ἰατρὸν.

a 5. ᾧ is preserved, or inserted, in F only, as it is at *Meno* 98 a 4: see on 489 a 5.

b 2-3. Μυσόν . . . καλεῖν, to use the offensive word (κολακεύονται instead of διακονήσονται), "to call a spade a spade". For the offensiveness of the term κόλαξ see on 463 b 1. As apodosis we must understand "so much the worse for you". The meaning would be clearer if we read Μυσόν γε <Μυσόν> καλεῖν (Richards); but in Greek as in other

languages proverbial phrases are often abbreviated to the point of being (to a foreigner) barely intelligible. Ol may be right in saying that this one comes from the *Telephus* of Euripides (cf. on 447 b 1), though his obscure allusion to the context in the play fails to prove it: see Eur. fr. 704, with the comments of E. W. Handley, *Bull. Inst. Class. Stud. London*, Supp. v. (1957), 42. Two related phrases concerning Mysians were *Μυσῶν ἔσχατος*, “the lowest of the low” (*Theaet.* 209 b 8, Magnes fr. 5 Kock), and *Μυσῶν λεία*, “an unresisting prey” (*Dem. de cor.* 72). Neither seems to be directly alluded to here, though Casaubon’s proposal to read *Μυσῶν γε ἥδιον εἶναι λείαν* found favour with some of the older editors. ὥς is causal, and ταῦτα stands for διακονεῖν or κολακεύειν. ποιήσεις: the ‘minatory’ future.

b 4. πολλάκις, 486 b, 511 ab. Cf. *Introd.*, p. 5, on the ‘circular’ or ‘spiral’ structure of the dialogue.

b 7. οὐχ ἔξει ὅτι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς. The deliberative subjunctive is commoner in this phrase, but we need not emend to χρήσεται with Schanz: cf. Eur. *Held.* 439 ὑμῖν δ’ οὐκ ἔχω τί χρήσομαι, where the indicative is protected by metre, and *supra* 465 c 6.

c 3. The reading of the first family might represent δοκεῖ Σωκράτης (Schanz), but more probably comes by haplography from δοκεισωσωκρατες.

c 8. ὄντινούν ἂν ὅτι τύχοι, τοῦτο παθεῖν: “that anything might happen to anybody”. On the insecurity of life at Athens, in the fourth century as well as the late fifth, see Field, 111, 123 ff., and note on 486 a 8 above.

d 1. ὃ σὺ λέγεις. We expect either ὦν (which a late MS. in Florence offers us) or ἄ. But see on 486 d 4.

d 6–8. In μετ’ ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων Gercke saw an allusion to Plato himself and his school; but I suspect that the words are introduced merely to tone down what might otherwise seem an arrogant boast (ἵνα μὴ εἴπω μόνος). πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν formally contradicts Socrates’ earlier statement, οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν (473 e 6), but only formally: Socrates takes no part in politics, but in speaking always πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον he is performing the statesman’s task so far as a private citizen can. One may doubt, however, whether the historical Socrates would have made any such claim. It was probably Plato who first discovered in his master’s teaching the foundation of a new political ideal, but one which could never be realized in Athens. Cf. *Apol.* 31 e–32 a, *Rep.* 492 e, Pohlenz, 159 ff., Jaeger, *Paideia*, ii. 154 ff.

d 8–e 1. οὐ πρὸς χάριν . . . ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον: a b a construction.

e 1. τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα echoes Callicles’ quotation from Euripides at 486 c 6, but with an opposite application.

e 2–3. ὁ αὐτὸς δέ μοι ἦκει λόγος, “The same image applies to me”: cf. *Phdr.* 249 d 4 ἔστι δὴ οὖν δεῦρο ὁ πᾶς ἦκων λόγος . . . ὥς ἄρα . . ., and Eur. *Tro.* 154 ποῖ λόγος ἦκει; Others translate “The same image occurs to me”. The reference is to 464 d.

e 6–522 a 3. The pastrycook's speech is a witty parody of the complaints brought against Socrates at his trial. The customary general charge of acting against the interests of the jury (as representatives of the Athenian people) becomes a charge of acting against the interests of the children (ὕμᾱς αὐτούς). The specific complaint that Socrates διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους in a moral sense becomes a complaint that the doctor διαφθείρει τοὺς νεωτάτους (the youngest among the children) in a physical sense, by operating on them. And just as Socrates causes mental helplessness (ἀπορία) by his questions, so the doctor causes physical helplessness by starving his young patients and choking them with bitter potions. For the ἀπορία induced by Socrates cf. *Meno* 80 a 1 σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν: *Theaet.* 149 a 8 λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅτι . . . ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν. For ἀπορία as helplessness resulting from physical causes cf. *Hipp. Epid.* 5. 42 (v. 232 L.) ἀπορίῃ ξὺν ὀδύνῃ, and the fat man at *Rep.* 556 d 4 whose bad physical condition renders him ἄσθματός τε καὶ ἀπορίας μεστόν.

Those editors who excise large portions of the speech (καὶ αὐτούς—διαφθείρει del. Cobet, Schanz, Sauppe, Theiler; ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ del. Madvig, Schanz, Sauppe, Theiler) seem to me to spoil the wit and destroy the evidently intentional parallel with Socrates' prediction of his own fate at 522 b 7–8. The only correction which is in my view worth considering is Praechter's proposal (*Hermes*, li (1916), 316) to delete the last καὶ in e 7 and take αὐτοὺς τοὺς νεωτάτους together as object of διαφθείρει. This gets rid of the illogical antithesis between "you yourselves" and "the youngest among you". The antithesis is, however, quite intelligible in terms of the real trial, where οἱ νέοι were not members of the jury.

ὅδε . . . ἀνὴρ, "the defendant here". The article is occasionally omitted with a 'deictic' demonstrative: cf. 467 b 1, 489 b 7, 505 c 3, Kühner-G. i. 629. πώματα, not πόματα, is the prevailing form in the MSS. of Plato (Schanz, vol. xii *praef.*, § 2), as in Attic writers generally. οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ . . . ἡνώχουν ὑμᾶς, "unlike me who feasted you", is equivalent to οὐκ ἐνώχων ὑμᾶς ὥσπερ ἐγὼ, ὅς . . . (Kühner-G. ii. 575).

522 a 6. ὑγιεινῶς, "in the interests of health". Contrary to the general rule, the emphatic adverb is here placed last: cf. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style*, 45. One may hesitate between πόσον (F) and ὀπόσον (BTW), in view of a closely similar passage, *Rep.* 578 e 5, where all primary MSS. have ἐν ποίῳ ἂν τι καὶ ὀπόσω φόβῳ οἷε γενέσθαι αὐτόν . . .; In both places 'the proximity of οἷε gives the question a certain semblance of indirectness' (Adam). But was it Plato or the copyists whom the semblance misled? In general, the use of indirect interrogative pronouns in direct questions is common enough in late writers, but wholly foreign to Attic practice (Kühner-G. ii. 517); the handful of instances which the MSS. of Plato present (*Lysis* 212 c 4, *Euthyd.* 271 a 6, 287 b 9, *Meno* 74 d 7) should probably be attributed to infection by later usage. Cf. *Alc.* i 110 c 6 ὀποίῳ BT, but ποίῳ Olympiodorus; and *Charm.* 170 b 12, *Soph.* 236 d 8, where the primary MSS.

are divided. —Doubtful also is the τ which Fuhr elicited from the first letter of B's ποιεῖ . It is, however, supported by the *Republic* passage.

a 9. Οἷεσθαί γε χρή. The MSS. and most editors attribute these words to Callicles. But "*Ἰσως· οἷεσθαί γε χρή*" is as unlikely a reply as "Perhaps; presumably" would be in English. Hirschig suggested deleting *Ἰσως*. In all other Platonic instances, however, the phrase *οἷεσθαί γε χρή* is used by a speaker answering his own question in the affirmative: *Crito* 53 d 1 (in answer to *οὐκ οἶει . . .*); 54 b 1, *Prot.* 325 c 4, *Phaedo* 68 b 2, and similarly *οὐκ οἷεσθαί γε χρή* at *Charm.* 163 b 8 (in answer to *οἶει . . .*). This creates a strong presumption that the words are spoken by Socrates here. Forman and Theiler are quite possibly right in transposing them to the end of Socrates' previous speech. But despite a slight effect of clumsiness in *οἷεσθαί* followed by *οἶει* I think Socrates may speak them in correction of Callicles' grudging "*Ἰσως*", as a similar "*Ἰσως*" is corrected at 515 d 9 and *Laws* 965 c 5.

b 4. οὔτε is answered by **τε** at b 7; the intervening sentence *ἐγὼ—πορίζεται* is logically part of the subordinate clause *ἄς—νομίζουσιν* (cf. on 468 d 4). Within this sentence is a second disjunction (b 6 *οὔτε . . . οὔτε*), and within the *τε* sentence a third (b 9 *οὔτε . . . c 2 οὔτε*). The piling up of negatives emphasizes Socrates' prospective helplessness.

b 8. ἢ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κακηγορεῖν. This was not part of the formal indictment against Socrates, and Gercke saw in it a reply to Polycrates, who accused Socrates of belittling parents to their children (Libanius, *Apol.* 102, cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1. 2. 49). But nothing is said here about the relations of parents and children; it is a quite general charge, and covers insulting remarks about the Athenian people, as *δημοσίᾳ* (b 9) shows. We should rather compare, with Pohlenz (166), the complaint of Anytus at *Meno* 94 e 3, *ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥαδίως μοι δοκεῖς κακῶς λέγειν ἀνθρώπους*, which leads up to a scarcely veiled threat. *πικροὺς λόγους* echoes the *πικρότατα πώματα* of a 1.

c 1–2. ταῦτα . . . λέγω refers to *κακηγορεῖν, ταῦτα . . . πράττω* to *διαφθείρειν. τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο—ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί*: "O gentlemen my judges—to use your word for them". *ὑμέτερον* is addressed to Callicles, and means "used by you *ρήτορες*". This is evidently how Ol took it, for he remarks (216. 6) *ἔθος γὰρ τοῖς ῥήτορσι πανταχοῦ λέγειν τὸ "ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί"** *ἀναγκασθήσομαι οὖν καὶ γώ, μὴ δυνάμενος τὰληθῆ λέγειν, τούτοις κεχρησθαι τοῖς λόγοις*. Socrates refused to admit the right of the jury to be called *δικασταί*: at *Apol.* 40 a 2 he allows the title to those jurors who voted for his acquittal, *ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖην*, but to them only; at 41 a 1 he speaks of *τουτωνὶ τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι. τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο* is like 508 d 1 *τὸ νεανικὸν δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου*, 514 e 6 *τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο*, *Soph.* 233 b 5 *τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο*, in all of which *τοῦτο* refers forward to the words that follow. Almost all editors and translators from Heindorf to Croiset supposed the phrase to be governed by *πράττω* (as Jowett⁴ and others still do), thus missing the allusion; Ast and Apelt are exceptions, but they misunderstood *τὸ ὑμέτερον*. The true

punctuation and interpretation were restored by Paul Maas, *CR*, liii (1939), 58.

c 7-8. **Εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε—ὡμολόγησας**: "Yes, Callicles, so long as he had that one self-defence which you have repeatedly agreed he must have." ἐκεῖνο is explained by εἰ βεβοηθηκώς κτλ. We must write ἐν, not ἐν, since ὑπάρχειν always governs a simple dative. **πολλάκις**: 509 bc, 510 a.

d 2. I think Burnet was right in accepting τῆς βοηθείας from F. αὕτη agrees in gender with the predicate κρατίστη, which is itself attracted into the gender of the partitive genitive βοηθείας: cf. *Rep.* 416 b 5 τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας, *Symph.* 209 a 6 μεγίστη, ἔφη, καὶ καλλίστη τῆς φρονήσεως ἢ περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων τε καὶ οἰκίσεων διακόσμησις, Kühner-G. i. 279. We might expect τῆς ἐαυτῷ βοηθείας, like *Rep.* 496 d 1 τὴν τῷ δικαίῳ βοήθειαν: cf., however, *Apol.* 30 d 7 τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν. τις βοήθεια (BTW) can scarcely be combined either with αὕτη or with κρατίστη, and Cobet's ἡ βοήθεια, which Theiler adopts, fails to account for the MS. readings. The papyrus unfortunately omits the whole sentence.

d 5-6. καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς . . . καὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου. The last is the only ἔλεγχος which Socrates recognizes as valid (471 e ff.).

d 7. **κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐνδεία**. This is the reason which Socrates gives in the *Apology* for his failure to convince the jury: ἀπορία μὲν ἐάλωκα . . . τοῦ μὴ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα οἷ' ἂν ὑμῖν ἤδιστ' ἦν ἀκούειν (38 d 6). We need not delete ῥητορικῆς with Naber: cf. 517 a 5-6.

d 8. **ῥαδίως** seems rightly placed by the first family in the emphatic position at the beginning of the clause. Its position in F and the papyri is probably due to a desire to make clear that it qualifies φέροντα, not ἰδοις. —Socrates' cheerful acceptance of death is everywhere emphasized by Plato: cf. *Crito* 43 b 8 ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρῶως φέρεις: *Phaedo* 63 a 8 ῥαδίως φέρεις ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπων, 117 b, *Apol.* 38 e.

e 1-4. Cf. the passages quoted above on 511 a 4-513 c 3, and for the comparison of death and wrongdoing as things to be avoided, *Apol.* 39 a. But the tone here is strikingly different from the agnosticism of the *Apology* (29 b 5 οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Αἰδου, οὕτω καὶ οἶομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι, 40 c ff.): see *Introd.*, p. 20.

Epilogue. The myth and its consequences (523 a-527 e).

523 a 1-524 a 7. *The myth. It is an ancient law of the gods that the just should go after death to the Isles of the Blest, the unjust to Tartarus. But in the old days men were judged while they yet lived, and by living judges. That led to bad judgements, for they called false witnesses to testify for them, and their souls were veiled from the judges. So Zeus decreed that henceforth souls should be judged naked, stripped of earthly finery and earthly friends, and by judges no less naked. And he appointed his sons Minos and Rhadamanthys and Aeacus to give judgement in the Meadow where the three ways meet.*

This Vision of Judgement is the shortest and simplest, as it is the earliest, of Plato's eschatological myths. It displays none of the quasi-

scientific trappings of the myths in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, but has the directness and vividness of folktale, and keeps something of folktale *naïveté* in its style (e.g. in the story-teller's repeated "says he", c 2, c 3, c 4, d 6). It is presented as something which Socrates has heard from an unnamed informant (524 a 8), like the myth of the Water-carriers (493 a 1) and like the *Phaedo* myth (108 c 7 ὡς ἐγὼ ὑπὸ τινος πέπεισμαι). This is certainly, in part at least, a device to avoid making Socrates responsible for opinions which he did not in fact hold. But it has been thought to indicate a common source for these myths, and this has been supported by pointing to the recurrence in the eschatological myths of certain distinctive details, such as the *λειμών* and the *πρίδος*, which are introduced casually, as if already familiar to the reader. And since some of these details also appear in documents loosely described as 'Orphic' or influenced by 'Orphism', it has been argued, especially by Dieterich (*Nekyia*, 113 ff.), that Plato took over his eschatological picture from an Orphic *Κατάβασις*, a poem describing a visit to the Underworld. This view was for a time very generally accepted, and still has its upholders (cf., e.g., Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek Religion*, chap. v). But in recent years it has been severely criticized, particularly by H. W. Thomas (*Epekeina*, diss. München, 1938), who holds that Plato drew his material from a variety of sources, none of which can safely be labelled 'Orphic'. It is therefore desirable to dissect the present myth and see what is known about the antecedents of each component. In doing so, it will be convenient to take account not only of the myth itself but of Socrates' interpretation and expansion of it (524 a 8–526 d 2).

(i) *Literary reminiscence*. The authority of Homer is appealed to at the outset (523 a 3) and also by Socrates later on (525 d 6, 526 d 1). All these references are, however, concerned with unessential details, and it looks as if Plato had introduced them merely to give an air of orthodoxy to a not wholly orthodox narrative. Other features also are Homeric, but are used in an un-homeric way: i.e. the *λειμών* has changed its character (see iv below) and Tartarus has a more varied population than of old, as have Hesiod's Isles of the Blest (see on 523 b 1, b 3). The charge of Zeus to Prometheus (523 d 5–e 1) comes either from Aeschylus or from the Attic folk-tale which Aeschylus used.

(ii) The *Judgement of the Dead* involves, and is a natural result of, the belief in *post mortem* reward and punishment. That belief is certainly older than Pythagoras or 'Orphism'. The punishment of certain special offenders is referred to at *Iliad* 3. 278 f. and 19. 259 f. and described at *Odyssey* 11. 576 ff.; and a doctrine of reward for initiates and an unpleasant fate for all others was taught at Eleusis by the seventh century at latest (*H. Dem.* 480–2). Nor was the fear of *post mortem* punishment confined in Plato's day to Pythagoreans or 'Orphics' (cf. *Rep.* 330 de; [Dem.] 25. 52; Democritus frs. 199, 297; Nilsson, *Gesch. d. griech. Religion*, i. 651 ff., 767 ff., and *Greek Popular Religion*, 117 ff.; P. Jacobsthal, 'The *Nekyia* Krater in New York',

Metrop. Mus. Studies, v (1934), 117 ff.). The idea of a Judgement, however, appears first in Aeschylus, *Supp.* 230 f., *Eum.* 273 ff., P. Oxy. 2256. 9 (a), and in Pindar's *Second Olympian*, 58 τὰ δ' ἐν τᾷδε Διὸς ἀρχᾷ ἀλιτρά κατὰ γᾶς δικάζει τις. Since in Pindar it is associated with rebirth, and so with Pythagorean (or Orphic) belief, we may probably believe Iamblichus (*vit. Pyth.* 155, 179, cf. Diog. L. 8. 35) that the doctrine of Judgement was taught by Pythagoras (the evidence is quoted in full by L. Ruhl, *de mortuorum iudicio* 45 ff.). Whether it is older than Pythagoras remains an open question. At *Ep. vii* 335 a 3 it is described as a παλαιός τε καὶ ἱερὸς λόγος (see on 523 a 2); at *Laws* 959 b 4, more surprisingly, as part of the πατριος νόμος. The latter passage, together with the name Triptolemus (see next paragraph), suggests to me that the doctrine was taught at Eleusis. Diodorus 1. 92. 3 attributes it to 'Orpheus', but we do not know what his authority was, or what its date.

(iii) The *names of the judges* are missing from our oldest references to the Judgement. In Pindar the judge is an anonymous τις, perhaps identical with the Ζεὺς ἄλλος of Aesch. *Supp.* 231 (i.e. Hades, whose name men fear to pronounce, *Crat.* 403 a 7, Philemon [?] fr. 246. 10 Kock). Minos, Rhadamanthys, and Aeacus first appear as judges at *Apol.* 41 a, where λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν together with Triptolemus "and other demigods who have lived just lives". λέγονται shows that the names are traditional, and the context makes it improbable that Socrates is quoting an exclusively 'Orphic' tradition (Burnet's assumption of 'dicasts who had come under the influence of Orphic ideas' seems an unconvincing expedient). The inclusion of Triptolemus points rather to Eleusis. On the Altamura vase at Naples (late-fourth-century?) and in other south Italian vase-paintings of the Underworld he takes the place of Minos in the triad of judges, perhaps under Attic influence (cf. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, 599 ff.). The other three probably owe their office in Hades primarily to their fame as judges on earth. Minos in Homer continues his earthly function by judging disputes *between* the dead (*Od.* 11. 568 ff.), and this may have been the original conception of all the underworld judges (cf. Rohde, *Psyche* chap. vii, n. 13). Rhadamanthys was considered δίκαιότατος (*Laws* 624 b, cf. 948 b, Eur. *Cycl.* 273 f.); and Aeacus in his lifetime acted as arbitrator in disputes among the gods (*Pind. Isthm.* 8. 26). All three are cited as patterns of justice by Demosthenes, *de cor.* 127. But it may also be relevant that both Rhadamanthys and Aeacus enjoyed a special status in the world of the dead, independent of their judicial function: Rhadamanthys is the earliest known inhabitant of Elysium (*Od.* 4. 564), while Aeacus is Pluto's assessor (*Isocr. Evag.* 15) and holds the keys of Hades ([*Apollod.*] 3. 12. 6, cf. Rohde, loc. cit., and *Pap. Gr. Mag.* iv. 1467). Both, moreover, belong to a very ancient stratum of mythology: Rhadamanthys' name marks him as a Minoan, while Aeacus seems to be an old priest-king—he saves Greece from drought (*Isocr. Evag.* 14, etc.) and persuades Zeus to make men out of ants (*Hesiod* fr. 76). None of the three is known to us as an 'Orphic' figure;

nor does Ar. *E.N.* 1132^b25 prove that the Pythagoreans made Rhadamanthys an underworld judge.

(iv) Certain *topographical details* have been labelled ‘Orphic’.

(a) The λειμών of 524 a 2, which reappears at *Rep.* 614 c 2 (cf. also *Phdr.* 248 c 1), has been associated with the λειμών of the *Frogs* (326, etc.), with the “red-rose meadows” of Pindar fr. 114 Bowra (129 Snell), with the mention of λειμῶνας ἱερούς in the poem of the Gold Plates (Diels, *Vors.* 1 [66] B 20 = Kern, *O.F.* 32 f), with the statement of Diodorus (1. 96. 2 = *O.F.* 293) that “Orpheus” talked about τοὺς τῶν εὐσεβῶν λειμῶνας, and with the καλὸς λειμών in an Orphic fragment quoted by Proclus (*O.F.* 222). But all these have a common source in the “asphodel meadow” of *Od.* 11. 539. And whereas in Aristophanes, Pindar, Diodorus, and the Orphic fragment, and probably also in the poem of the Gold Plates, the Meadow is the home of blessed souls, in Plato (and Plato alone) it is the place of judgement. It is therefore improbable that Plato is here following an Orphic source.

(b) The τριόδος of 524 a 2 is evidently related to the σχίσσεις τε καὶ τριόδους (so Ol, Proclus: περιόδους MSS., Stob.) of *Phaedo* 108 a 4. In the myth of Er the just go to the right, the unjust to the left (*Rep.* 614 c), which has been compared with Aristotle’s statement that the Pythagoreans τὸ δεξιὸν . . . ἀγαθὸν ἐκάλουν (fr. 200 R.³), and with χαῖρε, χαῖρε, δεξιὰν ὁδοιπορῶν in the poem of the Gold Plates (on the new Gold Plate, however, published in *Arch. Eph.* 1950/51, the directions are reversed). But the idea of an infernal crossroads is so natural that we need hardly postulate a special ‘source’ for Plato here.

(v) A feature which is absent from the myth proper, but is added later by Socrates (525 b), is the doctrine of *Purgatory*. We have reason to think this a Pythagorean invention: for the Greek Purgatory, unlike the Catholic one, prepared its victims not for Heaven but for a return to Earth. Plato associates it with reincarnation in the *Phaedo* (113 a, d) and the *Republic* (615 a ff.); and although reincarnation is not mentioned in the *Gorgias*, it is, I think, implicit (see on 493 c 3 and 525 b 1–526 d 2). This suggests that 525 bc is based on Pythagorean doctrine. Some slight confirmation may perhaps be seen in the description of the incurable sinners as ἀνηρτημένους (525 c 7); for when Pythagoras visited Hades he saw the wicked soul of Homer hanging from a tree (Hieronymus of Rhodes *apud* Diog. L. 8. 21, cf. Virg. *Aen.* 6. 740 and Cumont, *Symbolisme funéraire*, 133). The argument is, however, not strictly conclusive; for it is at least possible that Hieronymus’ source is Heraclides Ponticus, who may have got the idea from the *Gorgias* (see I. Lévy, *La Légende de Pythagore*, 80 ff., and Heraclides fr. 75 Wehrli). The beatification of philosophers, briefly referred to at 526 c 3, may also have its roots in Pythagoreanism: see note ad loc.

(vi) There remains a substantial residue of ideas which have no known pedigree and in the absence of contrary evidence are most naturally credited to Plato himself. These include the central idea

that the soul must be judged naked (which seems to imply Plato's epistemology, see on 523 e 3), and the associated fancies of an earlier judgement in the body which did not work (523 b 4 ff.) and of the "scars" on the soul (524 d 3 ff.).

If this analysis is even approximately correct, it will be evident that there is little foundation for Dieterich's view that Plato is simply reproducing an Orphic *Κατάβασις*; for Taylor's assertion (128) that 'the basis of the story seems more strictly Orphic and less Pythagorean' than in the myths of the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*; or even for an opinion like Frutiger's, who thinks it 'conclusively proved' that all the essential elements of the eschatological myths are borrowed from Orphic-Pythagorean tradition (*Mythes de Platon* 260). On the contrary, no single element of the present myth can be called 'Orphic' in the sense that it is known to have figured in a poem attributed in the classical age to Orpheus (nor is this surprising, considering Plato's very low opinion of Orphic books, *Rep.* 364 e-365 a). We do find, especially in the 'interpretative' part, some elements which we have more or less reason to call Pythagorean; but they are mixed with matter which we have no ground for attributing to such a source. Some of this residual matter is traditional, but much of it is probably Plato's own invention.

523 a 1. Ἄκουε δὴ, φασί, " 'Give ear, then', as story-tellers say." A traditional way—as φασί shows, and as Proclus tells us, in *Tim.* i. 80. 8 Diehl—of calling the listener's attention to what follows. Cf. *Theaet.* 201 d, *Tim.* 20 d, and Aristoph. *Knights* 1014 ἄκουε δὴ νυν καὶ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν ἐμοί (introducing an oracle). Dr. Maas cites Choricus of Gaza, 379. 14 Foerster ἄκουε δὴ (φασίν) πρὸς τοῦτο μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, which might encourage the guess that Plato is adapting an iambic trimeter, did not φασίν suggest that Choricus' source is Plato and his trimeter fortuitous.

a 2. ὡς ἀληθῆ . . . ὄντα. In what sense did Plato believe his myths to be "true"? The clearest answer is that given at *Phaedo* 114 d: τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελέλυθα οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί· ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ' ἅπαντα . . . τοῦτο καὶ πρέπει μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεύσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν· καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος. Obviously Plato did not regard Zeus' change of plan as an historical event, or claim to know the exact composition of the Last Tribunal. Nor is he presenting philosophical truth in the guise of an allegory: his eschatological myths describe a world which he admits to be beyond ordinary human knowledge (cf. 527 a); they are the imaginative expression of an insight which could not be expressed save in symbolic terms. What, then, does Socrates mean by his insistence that he regards the present myth as a λόγος? We might say, with Friedländer (i. 42, 189 Eng. trans.) and others, that a Platonic myth is a kind of 'extrapolation', a prolongation into the unknown of the lines established by philosophical argument, λόγος (hence the usual position of the myth at the end of a dialogue). This is true enough, but a passage in the *Seventh Letter* suggests a different view of the meaning of

λόγος here. We are told there that we ought seriously to believe τοῖς παλαιοῖς τε καὶ ἱεροῖς λόγοις, οἳ δὲ μὲν ἡμῖν ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν εἶναι δικαστὰς τε ἴσχειν καὶ τίνειν τὰς μεγίστας τιμωρίας, ὅταν τις ἀπαλλαχθῇ τοῦ σώματος (335 a 2), and that this is the foundation of the thesis that to do wrong is worse than to suffer it. The writer plainly had the *Gorgias* in mind; and if the writer is Plato we must, I think, say that the *Gorgias* myth is called a λόγος because it expresses in imaginative terms a 'truth of religion' (cf. 'Plato and the Irrational', *JHS*, lxxv (1945), 23 f.). Noteworthy also are *Laws* 927 a, where the belief in the vengeance of the dead on the living, called a μῦθος at 865 d, is now described as "contained in true λόγοι"; and 872 de, where the Athenian hesitates whether to call the doctrine of *exact* requital in a future incarnation a μῦθος or a λόγος.

a 3. Ὅμηρος: *Iliad* 15. 187 ff.

a 5. παρέλαβον: "took over", the ordinary word for peaceful inheritance. Plato ignores the shocking story of the revolt of Zeus against his father (*Il.* 14. 203 and Hes. *Theog.* 629 ff.), a story which in his opinion should not be told to the young even if it were true (*Rep.* 378 a).

a 6. ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν, "still to this day". ἐν θεοῖς marks the law as a divine ordinance: we should not excise the words with Deuschle.

b 1. μακάρων νήσους: the abode of the Heroic Race, Hes. *Works and Days* 166 ff.; of good men in general, Pind. *Ol.* 2. 68 ff., Pl. *Rep.* 540 b.

b 2. ἐκτὸς κακῶν: as in the Golden Age men lived κακῶν ἔκτοσθεν, Hes. *Works and Days* 115.

b 3. Τάρταρον. In Homer, only the Titans are in Tartarus, *Il.* 8. 478 ff. But by the fifth century it was open to human sinners, e.g. Orestes fears that he will be sent there (Eur. *Or.* 265). It had a place in Pythagorean belief, as we learn from Aristotle, *Anal. Post.* 94^b33.

b 5. ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων. Diodorus 1. 92 describes as an Egyptian custom a judgement of the dead by human judges on the day of their funeral. But Plato's judgement of the *living* by the living is probably his own invention.

b 7. οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων. The article, preserved only by Plutarch, is indispensable; otherwise Pluto would be described as coming from the Happy Isles instead of from the opposite quarter. ἰόντες qualifies both subjects.

c 1. σφισιν. So Plutarch and Stobaeus. The direct tradition has σφιν, which is foreign to Attic prose; it is doubtful if the 'poetic' character of the myth justifies its adoption here.

c 1-4. Zeus analyses the problem in a series of short sentences connected by γάρ. He must intervene because the judgements are bad. That is because the defendants are "clothed". That is because they are judged before death. Cf. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style*, 61.

c 5. ἡμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματα. A chief reason why people fear death is that their souls will be "naked" in death's kingdom (*Crat.* 403 b 5). Cf. Empedocles fr. 126, where Nature clothes the soul in the "alien tunic of flesh", σαρκῶν ἀλλογνῶτι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι, and Seneca, *Ep.* 92. 13 *corpus animi est velamentum*.

c 7. πολλοὶ μάρτυρες recalls the μάρτυρας πολλοὺς of 471 e 5. Plutarch's omission of μάρτυρες is not a strong reason for deleting the word with Cobet, since it would fall out naturally before μαρτυρήσοντες.

d 4. ἐπίπροσθεν, the *vox propria* for the interposition of an obstacle, used at *Tim.* 40 c 7 to describe the 'occultation' of a planet. Plutarch's ἐπιπρόσθησις is Aristotle's word for such an interposition, but is not Platonic; it looks like a gloss.

d 7-e 1. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν κτλ. "This faculty Prometheus has already (καὶ δὴ) been instructed to remove from them." For the rare use of ὅπως ἂν after a verb of commanding cf. *Phaedo* 59 a 6 παραγγέλλουσιν ὅπως ἂν τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτᾷ, and Burnet's note. αὐτῶν has usually been taken as a possessive genitive depending on τοῦτο ("this faculty of theirs"); but its position suggests that Plato meant it as a genitive of separation with παύση, reversing the normal construction which would be τούτου παύση αὐτούς.—Plato does not tell us why Zeus gave this order; possibly his intention was to discourage death-bed repentances. In Aeschylus, *P.V.* 248 ff., Prometheus claims to have taken this step on his own initiative, in order to give men hope. Plato may be adapting Aeschylus here to suit his own purposes, but it is at least as likely that both are drawing on an old folk-tale about the fatal foreknowledge which men originally possessed (Wilamowitz, i. 227 n.).

e 3. αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα. Cf. *Alc.* i, where true converse is said to be conducted τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν (130 d 9) and Alcibiades is warned that he should see Demos *naked* (132 a 6); also *M. Ant.* 12. 2 ὁ θεὸς πάντα τὰ ἡγεμονικὰ γυμνὰ τῶν ὑλικῶν ἀγγείων καὶ φλοιῶν καὶ καθαρμάτων ὄρᾳ, and for the lucid vision of the dead, Tennyson, *In Memoriam* LI,

There must be wisdom with great Death:
The dead shall look me thro' and thro'.

The implication that the senses are a hindrance, not a help, to clear thinking points forward to the *Phaedo*, where this point is developed at length (66 a ff.) and the conclusion is ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ σώματος) καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα (66 e 1).

e 4-5. ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος: not (as Apelt and Jowett⁴) "upon death without warning", but "immediately upon death", like *Crat.* 396 b 4 ἀκούσαντι ἐξαίφνης "immediately on hearing", and *supra* 520 c 7 ἅμα μεταδιδούς. Cf. Pindar, *Ol.* 2. 57 θανόντων μὲν ἐνθάδ' αὐτίκα . . . ποιναὶς ἔτεισαν. ἔρημον . . . καὶ καταλιπόντα, governed by θεωροῦντα: the soul to be judged has become the person to be judged, owing to the interposition of ἐκάστου.

e 7. πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς: Zeus is omniscient and has already (as at d 7) taken action. —Plutarch and perhaps Ol read πρότερον, but Plato has a preference for the adjective (*Phil.* 67 b 12, etc.).

e 8. δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας. As Ol explains (240. 12 ff.), Plato like many ancient geographers recognises only two continents (cf. Hipp. *Aer.* 12, Isocr. *Paneg.* 179, Sallust, *Jugurth.* 17. 3, How and Wells,

Commentary on Herodotus, Appendix xiii. 5); and he assigns Crete, the homeland of Minos and Rhadamanthys, to Asia.

524 a 2. ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ: see above, p. 375.

a 5. ἐπιδιακρίνειν: "to be a judge of appeals". Plato applies here a principle which he approved in human law, *Laws* 767 a.

a 6. ἀπορήτὸν τι. It has not been noticed that Ol (236. 31) had the true reading here, which was first restored to the direct tradition by the scribe of the Meermanianus, a late MS. in the Bodleian, and was first printed by Findeisen. Its loss was caused by the unfamiliarity of the dual (cf. on 500 d 2).

a 7. τῆς πορείας, the *post mortem* journey, called τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας, *Phaedo* 107 d 5.

524 a 8—525 a 7. Socrates expounds the implications of the myth. The soul, like the body, retains after death the marks of a lifetime's experience. Thus the soul which has lived an evil life will show the resulting scars, and the judges will make no mistake.

Plato here gives a new turn to the old and widespread popular idea that when ghosts appear they show the *physical* scars or mutilations which their bodies suffered during life. Cf. *Odyssey* 11. 40 f.

πολλοὶ δ' οὐτάμενοι χαλκήρεσιν ἐγχείησιν,
ἄνδρες ἀρηϊφατοὶ, βεβρωτῶμένα τεύχε' ἔχοντες.

So Clytemnestra's ghost displays her wounds, Aesch. *Eum.* 103; and so Hector's appears (*Aen.* 2. 270–9) disfigured with blood and dust, *vulneraque illa gerens, quae circum plurima muros accepit patrios*. Here, however, the soul bears the traces not of the body's ignominy but of its own, and thereby stands self-condemned before its Judge: 'les fils de Dieu ne font que rendre un verdict que nous fûmes les premiers à prononcer sur nous' (V. Goldschmidt, *La Religion de Platon*, 78). At *Laws* 904 b–e Plato developed this thought to its logical conclusion: something like a law of spiritual gravitation operates throughout the κόσμος, and causes every soul to pass at death to its own place and kind. Judgment is thus automatic, and the judges are but symbols.

The scars on the soul reappear frequently in later writers: Lucian, *Cataplus* 24 ff., makes elaborate play with them; cf. also Philo, *Spec. Leg.* i. 103; Plutarch, *ser. num. vind.* 22, 564D; Epictetus 2. 18. 11; Tacitus, *Annals* 6. 6; Themistius, *orat.* 20, 234 a. All these probably derive directly or indirectly from Plato. See Cumont, *Symbolisme funéraire*, 133, on the history of the idea.

524 b 2. ὁ θάνατος . . . διάλυσις. Death is similarly defined at *Phaedo* 64 c. As Hackforth there points out, the definition was accepted both by Stoics (Chrysippus, *S.V.F.* ii. 790) and by Epicureans (Lucretius 3. 838 f.): it does not prejudge the question of the soul's survival, which in the *Gorgias* is simply assumed.

b 6. τό τε σῶμα κτλ. This corresponsive τε looks forward to a coming καί, but after the long explanatory excursus c 1 οἶον εἰ—d 3 χρόνον the construction is changed and the corresponding statement about the soul takes the form ταῦτόν δὴ μοι κτλ. There is no need to emend

the text with some nineteenth-century scholars: *Phaedo* 63 c 1, *Rep.* 373 b 2, 463 d 1, are similar cases.

b 7. I see no occasion to delete ἐνδηλα πάντα with Theiler, although the point is made again at d 1 and d 2: Plato wishes to emphasize that just as the marks of a man's physical constitution and physical experience still show to the bodily eye after death, so do the marks of his mental constitution and experience to the spiritual eye (d 4).

c 1. φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφοτέρα. For the shift from dative to accusative of respect cf. *Laches* 187 a 3 ἢ δώροις ἢ χάρισιν ἢ ἀμφοτέρα, and *supra* 477 d 3.

c 3. εἰ παχύ (sc. τὸ σῶμα ἦν), παχύς (sc. ὁ νεκρός). εἰ παχύς (MSS., Eus.) was retained by Burnet and might be defended as a sense construction, but is probably the result of mechanical assimilation to the following παχύς.

c 6. οὐλὰς may be a gloss; but Plato often explains his metaphors (cf. on 447 a 3), and the recurrence of the word at e 5, where it is used of *soul*-scars, rather favours its genuineness.

c 7. A connective is missing in the primary MSS. V's τε is probably a guess, and Eusebius' ἢ may also be one (he is careless about connectives throughout this passage).

d 8. οἱ μὲν . . . παρὰ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθυν. The parallel dealings of Aeacus with the Europeans are left unmentioned owing to the long digression about punishment which intervenes. Rhadamanthys is finally picked up again at 526 b 4, and the mention of Aeacus follows at 526 c 5. V boldly inserts here οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης παρὰ τὸν Αἰακόν, doubtless by conjecture, but there is no reason to think that anything is lost: solitary μὲν is common in Plato (Denniston, 380 f.).

e 1. ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας, "halting them" (L.S.J. s.v. ἐπίστημι A. v). Cf. *Rep.* 617 d 3 where the προφήτης makes the souls queue up, ἐν τάξει διαστήσαι. Naber's ἐπιστάς is needless, and it is wrong to read ἐκείνος, which has point at 526 b 4, but not here.

e 3. τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως: see on 470 e 4.

525 a 4. I have followed Eusebius in writing ἀκρατείας, not ἀκρατίας, as this is elsewhere the prevailing form in the best MSS. of Plato (Schanz II. ii *praef.*, p. xi), as of Attic writers generally. ἀκρασίας (T) is quite foreign to Plato, though used by Ionic writers and by Aristotle.

525 b 1–526 d 2. *Socrates' exposition of the myth, continued. The punishments inflicted by the Last Tribunal are just, for they serve a useful purpose: the sufferings of the curable are for their benefit, since they make them better; those of the incurable serve as a warning to others. The latter class is composed mainly of princes and politicians, as Homer knew; a Thersites could not qualify for membership of it—his opportunities were too limited. Nevertheless here and there an Aristides may resist the temptations of power. Socrates concludes his exposition with a final picture of the Judges discharging their dread office.*

On Plato's theory of punishment see note on 477 e 7–479 e 9. He applies the same principles to the next world as to this one (525 b 7 καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Αἰδου). Divine punishment is never vindictive (*Rep.*

380 b), as it is in Judaeo-Christian theory; it is either remedial (Purgatory) or deterrent (Hell). The latter is justified on the same ground as is the death-penalty at *Laws* 862 e 5, that it is a παράδειγμα τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις. There is, however, an obvious difficulty here. Who are those who benefit by contemplating the infernal παραδείγματα? Not the living, for they cannot see them and they are excluded by Plato's words, τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νοουθήματα (525 c 8). But for the dead the lesson comes, one would suppose, too late. The passage makes sense only on the assumption that these dead will one day return to earth: it presupposes the doctrine of rebirth, which Plato evidently already held when he wrote the *Gorgias* but did not choose to expound in this context (cf. Friedländer, i. 185, Eng. trans.).

A second difficulty is implicit in Plato's social analysis of the population of Tartarus. If it is impossible for a Thersites to enter that exclusive circle, but hard for an Aristides not to enter it, it would seem that those born to power carry an unfair handicap in the race for salvation. Here too the theory of rebirth offered a possible way out, and Plato took it in the myth of the Choice of Lives (*Rep.* 617 d–620 d): to be born in a bad environment is at least partly a matter of bad prenatal choice.

The "incurables" reappear in the myths of the *Phaedo* (113 e) and the *Republic* (615 e). But in the *Phaedrus* myth all souls eventually "regain their wings" (248 e ff.), and there is no mention of eternal punishment in the eschatology of the *Laws*. In late antiquity the doctrine of infinite punishment for finite offences was criticized for its cruelty: κρεῖττον γὰρ λέγειν φθαρτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τοῦτο πρὸς βεβύειν (*Ol* 240. 29). *Ol* tries to meet this by maintaining (on the evidence of the *Phaedrus*) that τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον (525 c 6) means only "for the duration of a world period". But this seems to be a matter on which Plato had second thoughts in later life.

525 b 3. ἄλλοι was deleted by Sauppe, but the repetition seems deliberate: these wretches are beyond reform themselves, they can only contribute to the reform of others (c 3–4).

b 5. δίκην δίδοντες is added to explain ὠφελούμενοι. Richards wished to delete τε καὶ, but cf. 505 c 3 ὠφελούμενος καὶ . . . κολαζόμενος, and Verdenius, *Mnem.* 1955, 274 f., 1958, 224.

d 1. εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει Πῶλος: 471 a–c. Archelaus is the counterpart of Ardiaeus in the myth of the *Republic* (615 c–616 a).

d 3–5. τῶν παραδειγμάτων may be a gloss, but its removal is not indispensable: τοὺς πολλοὺς is quite naturally attracted to the gender of the predicate ἐκ τυράννων κτλ. The clumsy reading of B, τοὺς τούτων—a conflation of τούτων with the false variant τοὺς—is now generally and rightly abandoned. δυναστῶν: see on 492 b 3. We are similarly told at *Rep.* 615 d 6 that most of the "incurables" had been tyrants in life, though there Plato adds ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ἰδιῶταί τινες τῶν μεγάλα ἡμαρτηκότων. In the 'comparison of lives' at *Phaedrus* 248 de the tyrant's life is rated lowest of all.

d 7. Ὁμηρος: *Od.* 11. 576–600.

e 2. Θερασίτην. In the myth of the *Republic* Thersites chooses to be reborn as an ape (620 c 2). There he is not so much the typical petty criminal as the typical buffoon; and so, e.g., Lucian describes him as παγγέλοιος ἄνθρωπος, διάστροφος τὸ σῶμα καὶ λελωβημένος (*adv. indoct.* 7).

e 4. οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι ἐξῆν αὐτῷ, sc. μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώτατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνειν: ἐξῆν picks up the ἐξουσίαν of d 5. I see little reason to suppose with Richards and Theiler that any words are lost, and none for deleting the whole parenthesis as Morstadt and Cobet wished to do. The thought is Platonic: cf. *Crito* 44 d, where we are told that the masses lack the power to do either the greatest harm or the greatest good, and *Rep.* 491 e 5 ἀσθενῇ δὲ φύσιν μεγάλων οὔτε ἀγαθῶν οὔτε κακῶν αἰτίαν ποτὲ ἔσεσθαι. It takes absolute power, united with force of character, to bring out the worst in men. εὐδαιμονέστερος is simply “luckier”; it does not imply that Thersites was εὐδαίμων in the Socratic sense.

e 5. τῶν δυναμένων, “the powerful”: cf. *Meno* 77 b 3, *Thuc.* 6. 39. 2. There is no reason to prefer Aristides’ τῶν αὐτῶν, as Cobet did; Aristides is in fact merely adapting his quotation to the context of his own words. This passage is probably the source of Spenser’s description of the house of Pryde (*Faerie Queene*, 1. 5. 51), ‘But most of all, which in that dongeon lay, | Fell from high Princes courtes, or Ladies bowres’ (quoted by Shorey ad loc.).

526 a 2–3. ἀγαθούς . . . ἄγασθαι. Has Plato in mind here the derivation (possibly correct) of ἀγαθός from the root of ἄγασθαι which he suggests in the *Cratylus* (412 c 1 τό γε “ἀγαθόν” . . . τῷ ἀγαστῷ βούλεται τὸ ὄνομα ἐπικεῖσθαι, and 422 a 5)? —For the extreme rarity of men who can resist the temptations of power cf. *Laws* 691 cd, where Plato’s language is even more pessimistic than it is here. Hence the asceticism imposed on the Guardians in the *Republic*, and hence the resigned conclusion of the *Laws*, that there can be no security save in a society where those in power are δοῦλοι τοῦ νόμου (715 d 5).

a 7. ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν κτλ. restricts the meaning of καλοὶ καγαθοί, like *Apol.* 20 b 1 καλῷ τε καγαθῷ τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν.

b 2. Aristides is claimed as an exception to the rule that power corrupts: he had the virtue of “discharging honestly the duties entrusted to him” (cf. Plutarch, *Aristides* 25, where stories of his honesty are cited from Aeschines Socraticus and Theophrastus). It is not claimed that he was a true statesman in the Platonic sense, and on Plato’s assumptions it could not be; for he too, like Themistocles and Cimon, was ostracized, thus showing that he had failed to “improve” the Athenian people. He also failed to teach the principles of statesmanship to his son, which for Plato is evidence that he did not possess them (*Meno* 94 a).

b 4. ἔλεγον: 524 e.

b 7. ἐπισημηνάμενος κτλ.: “stamping him as curable or incurable”. Cf. the σημεία attached to the souls at *Rep.* 614 c.

ε 3-4 φιλοσόφου . . . οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος. The reference is primarily to the philosopher's refusal to take part in public life, the refusal which Callicles condemned (484 c ff.). Helpless as he may be before a human court, Amphion is likely to come off better than Zethus at the Last Assize. ἀπραγμοσύνη, though viewed with ironic scorn by men like Pericles (Thuc. 2. 63. 2, 64. 4) and Alcibiades (id. 6. 18. 6), appealed increasingly as an ideal both to philosophers and to the man in the street during the troubled years of the late fifth century and throughout the fourth: cf. V. Ehrenberg, 'Polypragmosyne', *JHS*, lxxvii (1947), 46 ff., and Gomme on Thuc. 2. 40. 2. At *Rep.* 433 a 8 τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν is quoted as a popular (and in Plato's view essentially sound) definition of justice. —The beatification of the true "philosopher"—that is to say, of the true contemplative—is a constant feature of Plato's eschatological myths: cf. *Phaedo* 114 c, *Rep.* 619 de, *Phaedrus* 249 a. It may perhaps derive from Pythagorean sources (Boyancé, *Culte des Muses*, 233 ff.; Cumont, *Symbolisme funéraire*, 263 ff.). Cf. Aristophon fr. 12 Kock διαφέρειν δὲ πάμπαν | τοὺς Πυθαγοριστὰς τῶν νεκρῶν· μόνοισι γὰρ | τούτοισι τὸν Πλούτωνα συσσιτεῖν ἔφη | δι' εὐσέβειαν.

ε 6. καὶ ὁ Αἰακός, sc. ποιεῖ. ἑκάτερος τούτων stands in partitive apposition to (ὁ Ῥαδάμανθυς) καὶ ὁ Αἰακός. At the suggestion of Mr. John Gould I have ventured to bracket δικάζει as a grammarian's gloss or supplement. If it is construed with ἑκάτερος (as Burnet, and most editors), we are faced with a most unlikely asyndeton; and Y's remedy of inserting δὲ after ἑκάτερος leaves us with a string of jerky, disconnected statements. It would be preferable, with Dr. Maas, *Hermes*, lx (1925), 492, to put a comma after ἔχων and take ὁ Αἰακός as the subject of δικάζει: but the verb is to my mind awkwardly placed after the parenthetic clause. Other scholars have dealt more drastically with the passage: Heindorf wished to delete all reference to the ῥάβδος and the sceptre; Wilamowitz (ii. 344 n. 5) thought ἑκάτερος—δικάζει an interpolation from some eschatological source; Jachmann (316) thinks it the idle fancy of a 'diaskeuast'. This is surely unjustified. The ῥάβδος is the judge's normal badge of office: cf. *Prot.* 338 a, where Hippias recommends appointing a ῥαβδοῦχον καὶ ἐπιστάτην καὶ πρύτανην: schol. Aristoph. *Peace* 733 ῥαβδοῦχους εἶπε τοὺς κριτὰς τοῦ ἀγῶνος: and especially Pindar, *Ol.* 9. 33, where Hades controls the dead with a ῥάβδος. (Jurymen at Athens carried a similar staff, called βακτηρία, *Dem. de cor.* 210, etc.) As the ordinary badge, the ῥάβδος is quite naturally mentioned in contrast to the golden sceptre of Minos; and both are in place in this final picture of the Judges in all the dignity of their dreadful office.

δ 1. ὥς φησιν Ὀδυσσεύς: *Od.* 11. 569. Plato blandly overlooks the fact that Homer's Minos does not judge the earthly lives of the dead, but judges disputes between them. The apocryphal dialogue *Minos*, perhaps in imitation of this passage, also mentions the sceptre as a special mark of honour assigned by Homer to Minos (319 d).

526 d 3–527 e 7. *The conclusion of the whole matter. Socrates appeals to Callicles and to all the world (526 e 1) to prepare themselves for the divine Assize beside which all mortal issues are trivial. Callicles may think that Assize an old wives' tale. But he and his companions, "the three cleverest men in Greece", have failed to upset Socrates' theses on the relative importance of ἀδικεῖν and ἀδικεῖσθαι and on the proper use of rhetoric. Let us not, then, set out to govern others until we have put our own lives to rights, taking as our guide that doctrine which reveals to us the true rule for living and will bring us happiness both here and hereafter.*

This προτρεπτικός λόγος is the counterpart and the answer to that of Callicles (486 a–d). At 527 a Callicles' words are thrown back one by one in his teeth: ἐπειδάν σου ἐπιλαβόμενος ἐκεῖνος ἄγη (486 a 6–7), χασμήσῃ καὶ ἱλιγγιάσῃς (486 b 1) . . . καὶ σε ἴσως τυπήσῃ τις ἐπὶ κόρῃς (486 c 3)—it is Callicles, not Socrates, who is truly in mortal peril. And the entreaty which follows is couched in a tone of the deepest moral earnestness. No other dialogue of the early group ends in this way (though there are protreptic passages in the *Euthydemus*); but we shall encounter a similar tone at the conclusion of the *Phaedo* myth (114 d–115 a), and in the last words of the *Republic*. The programme of first reforming ourselves and then society may also be said to look forward to those dialogues. The theme of self-reform is given a new and positive development in the *Phaedo*, where it is explained as a process of κάθαρσις or withdrawal from the body (64 c–67 b). And in the *Republic*, where the Platonic Socrates at last ἐπιτίθεται τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, we are shown that the possibility of the Just Society depends on the right moral and intellectual training of the individual—in other words, that the only road to true statesmanship leads through the discipline of the Academy. As a recent writer has put it, adapting Clausewitz, philosophy was for Plato 'the continuation of politics by other means' (V. de Magalhães-Vilhena, *Socrate et la légende platonicienne*, 128).

526 d 5. τὰς τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων is usually translated, with a rather forced interpretation of the genitive, "the honours sought by the many". I should prefer to render "the valuations of the many", as at 497 b 8.

d 6. τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀσκῶν, "practising sincerity". Bury's conjecture τὴν ἀληθῆ αὖ ἀσκῶν (sc. τιμὴν) is at first sight tempting, but cf. 525 a 3 διὰ τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας τεθράφθαι, 526 c 1 ὁσίως βεβιωκυῖαν καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας σκοπῶν (BTW) is adopted by many editors and translators, but gives a less suitable sense: Socrates is vowing himself not to research but to a way of living and dying. It probably came in from σκοπῶ in the preceding sentence (d 4); while, conversely, T's marginal note there, γρ. ἀσκῶ, may have originated in a note γρ. ἀσκῶν on d 6. Cf. 527 d 2 ἀσκῶν ἀρετὴν . . . κοινῇ ἀσκήσαντες and Hdt. 7. 209. 2 τὴν ἀληθείην ἀσκέειν.

e 4. τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀγώνων: primarily in the judicial sense, though the word is applicable to any kind of conflict or contest. Cf. *Rep.* 608 b 4 μέγας γάρ, ἔφην, ὁ ἀγών . . . τὸ χρηστὸν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι.

ὄνειδίζω σοι: the retort to 486 a–d, described at 508 c 4 as ἄ σὺ ἐμοὶ ὄνειδίζεις.

e 6. τὸν δικαστὴν ἐκείνον . . . ἐκείνος ἄγῃ: the pronouns add to the solemnity of the passage, and editors have failed to notice that they have the authority of Eusebius as well as F.

527 a 1. τῆς Αἰγίνης, the eponymous nymph of Aegina, who bore Aeacus to Zeus (Pindar, *Isthm.* 8. 19 ff.).

a 3. [καὶ] ἐπὶ κόρρῃς ἀτίμως: to hit a man on the jaw was an act of ὕβρις (see on 486 c 2–3). W proves to omit the rather awkward καὶ, which Cobet had already deleted. ἀτιμον occurs at 486 c 2, which is against Cobet's further assumption that ἀτίμως is a gloss here: Socrates is throwing back Callicles' words in his face.

a 5. ὥσπερ γραὸς, "like an old wives' tale". Cf. *Rep.* 350 e 2 ὥσπερ ταῖς γραυσὶ ταῖς τοὺς μύθους λεγούσαις, and the proverbial γραῶν ὕθλος, *Theaet.* 176 b 7. Old women were in demand as nursery story-tellers, *Hipp. ma.* 286 a 1.

a 7. εἴ πῃ ζητοῦντες εἴχομεν . . . ἀληθέστερα εὑρεῖν. Cf. *Phaedo* 85 cd: since certainty concerning the fate of the soul is impossible, we should pin our faith either to the strongest human arguments we can find or else to a divine revelation (λόγου θείου τινός). Acceptance of the myth is similarly recommended here, *faute de mieux*; but Socrates really bases his appeal on the preceding ethical arguments, which are independent of the myth, though they lead to the same rule of life.

b 2. ἐκεῖσε . . . συμφέρων, "advantageous for the life yonder". We need not insert <ιοῦσι> (Herwerden) or <ἀφικομένοις> (Richards): the advantage is imagined as a force which originates in this life but reaches forward into the life beyond death. On this 'pregnant' use of local adverbs see Kühner-G. i. 545.

b 3. οὗτος ἡρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος, "this proposition holds its ground"—whereas the generality of propositions skip away from their author like Daedalus' robots (*Euthyphro* 11 b–d, *Meno* 97 d–98 a).

b 5–6. οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι. Plato probably has in mind the well-known line of Aeschylus, οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος, ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει (*Sept.* 592), to which he explicitly refers at *Rep.* 361 b 7 κατ' Αἰσχύλον οὐ δοκεῖν ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐθέλοντα.

c 6. ὥς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. Stallbaum defended ὁ σὸς λόγος (BTW) as meaning "your own admission" (cf. 495 e 1). But it is doubtful if Callicles has admitted the happiness of the good in this life, and he has certainly not admitted their happiness after death (cf. a 5). Neither ὁ σοφὸς λόγος (Münscher) nor ὁ ὁσιος λόγος (Goebel) is at all Platonic. Father H. D. Saffrey has called my attention to a forgotten conjecture which is certainly much neater and more alluring, ὁ σῶς λόγος (Ch. Graux, *Les Articles originaux*, 4 f.), equivalent in sense to ὁ ἡρεμῶν λόγος: cf. *Theaet.* 164 a 1 εἰ σώσομεν τὸν πρόσθε λόγον, 167 d 3 σώζεται γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ λόγος οὗτος, *Rep.* 621 b 8 μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο. But F may well be right in simply omitting the word, which could be a gloss (cf. 460 c 4) or could have arisen out of an accidental dittography, ΩCOCO read as ὥς ὁ σὸς. The phrase ὥς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει recurs

without variation at *Phaedo* 66 e 4, *Rep.* 334 a 9, *Theaet.* 160 c 1, and *supra* 511 b 7.

c 8. **θαρρῶν πατάξαι**, sc. **ἑασόν τινα**. Stephanus read the aor. imper. mid. **πάταξαι** ('get yourself hit'?), and Cobet wished to insert **πάρ-εχε**, but the ellipse presents no real difficulty.

d 3. **τότε ἤδη**, *tum demum*. One is reminded of the disillusioned remark of the Russian liberal Alexander Herzen, 'If only men wanted to liberate not Humanity but themselves, they might do a real service.'

d 6-7. **ὡς τὶ ὄντας**: see on 472 a 2. **οἷς οὐδέποτε ταῦτα δοκεῖ**: this reproach applies of course to Callicles only (cf. 482 ab, 491 b), but Socrates politely includes himself in the condemnation, thus disguising the positive character of his conclusion and giving an illusion of such Socratic *ἀπορία* as we find at the end of the *Protagoras* (361 a-d) or the *Laches* (200 e). Cf. V. Goldschmidt, *Les Dialogues de Platon*, 315.

e 1-2. **ὥσπερ ἡγεμόνι**. The Socratic precept **ἔπεσθαι τῷ λόγῳ** naturally led to the personification of the *λόγος* as a "guide". Here the addition of **παραφανέντι** adds a touch of vividness and perhaps of religious solemnity: the word could be used of the epiphany of a god, and Socrates may be picturing the *λόγος* as a *θεὸς ἡγεμῶν* (Festugière, 384). Cf., however, *Soph.* 231 b 6 **ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ παραφανέντι**, where there is no religious association.

e 6-7. **ἔστι γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄξιος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις**. The last words of the dialogue formally reverse the judgement of Callicles that the principles of morality are *οὐδενὸς ἄξια* (492 c 7). Cf. Jacqueline de Romilly, *Histoire et Raison chez Thucydide*, 44 f.

APPENDIX

Socrates, Callicles, and Nietzsche

THE *Gorgias* is the most 'modern' of Plato's dialogues. The twin problems which it exposes—how to control the power of propaganda in a democracy, how to re-establish moral standards in a world whose traditional standards have disintegrated—these are also the central problems of the twentieth century. The coincidence is not wholly fortuitous. Friedrich Nietzsche, the analyst of the modern disintegration, who foresaw with horror its deadly political consequences yet himself powerfully contributed to it,¹ was also the first to perceive the historical parallel between the moral situation in the late fifth century and the situation he saw developing in his own day. And there can, I think, be little doubt that certain of the most notorious of his own doctrines were in some measure inspired by Plato—not, however, by the philosopher who speaks to us through the mouth of Socrates, but by the anti-Plato in Plato whose *persona* is Callicles. Since this peculiar historical link has received little attention either from the exponents of Nietzsche (so far as I have been able to study them) or from English writers on Plato,² it seems worth while to set forth the evidence for it.

¹ He contributed to it, not by a reasoned attack on the tradition, but by assuming that it had already disintegrated ('God is dead') and by his radical analysis of the consequences. His aim was not mere destruction; he foresaw and sought to avert 'the atomistic Universal State composed of individuals without individuality' (Musarion edition, v. 472); but 'before we can build a shrine we must destroy one', and the destructive elements in his thought have been vastly more influential than the constructive. 'I am dynamite', he wrote when he was on the verge of insanity (*Ecce Homo*, iv. 1), and events have proved that it was no idle boast.

² The kinship between Nietzsche's doctrines and those of Callicles was noticed in passing by Alfred Fouillée as far back as 1902 (*Nietzsche et l'immoralisme*, 96, 187). But I find no reference to it in Oehler's work, *Fr. Nietzsche und die Vorsokratiker*, or in the recent studies of Nietzsche's relation to the Greeks by Alfreda Stallman ('The Influence of the Greeks on Nietzsche', *Class. Studies in honour of W. A. Oldfather*, 1943), H. A. Reyburn (*Nietzsche*, 1948, chapter on 'Presocratic Philosophers'), and W. A. Kaufmann (*Nietzsche*, 1950, chapter on 'Nietzsche's admiration for Socrates'). The connexion has, however, been emphasized by two Greek scholars, W. Nestle and A. Menzel—the former in a paper on 'Fr. Nietzsche und die griechische Philosophie' (*NJbb.* 1912, 554 ff.), the latter in his pamphlet *Kallikles* (Vienna, 1922, pp. 80–84, reprinted in *Sitzb. Wien*, ccx [1930], 245–50). Much of the material for this appendix is borrowed from these two writers, but I have tried to check and supplement it with the help of the excellent indexes now available in vols. xxi–xxiii of the Musarion edition of Nietzsche's *Gesammelte Werke*. I refer to Nietzsche's major works by their English titles and the original chapter and/or paragraph numbers,

'Socrates', said Nietzsche, 'is so close to me that I am nearly always fighting him' ('Wissenschaft und Weisheit im Kampfe', vi. 101 Mus.). This is true. From his schooldays, when Plato's *Symposium* was his favourite book, down to the notes on 'The Problem of Socrates' in *The Twilight of the Idols* Nietzsche was fascinated by the enigmatic figure, but his attitude was always an ambivalent one.¹ He admired Socrates as 'the gadfly on the neck of man' (Basel lectures on *The Study of the Platonic Dialogues*, ii. 11, iv. 404 Mus.), 'the old physician and plebeian who cut ruthlessly into his own flesh as well as the flesh and heart of the "nobility"' (*Beyond Good and Evil*, 212). He admired him also for his 'gay seriousness and mischievous wisdom', and contrasted him favourably in this respect with the Founder of Christianity (*The Wanderer and his Shadow*, 80). But he likewise saw in him the beginning of the decadence of the Greek spirit. In the early *Birth of Tragedy* Socrates is represented as the destroyer of the 'Dionysiac' element on whose fusion with the 'Apolline' tragedy depends. In later works he is denounced as the fountain-head of a false morality, expressed in his identification of reason, virtue, and happiness, 'that most bizarre equation, which had against it all the instincts of the earlier Hellenes' (*Twilight of the Idols*, 2. 4); this 'denaturalization of the moral values' is seen as 'a moment of the deepest perversity in the history of values' (*The Will to Power*, 430).

Nietzsche's attitude to Plato (whom he sharply distinguished from Socrates) was more consistently hostile. In an early lecture he speaks with respect of Plato's sense of mission, his determination not merely to know the world but to change it (ii. 363 Mus.); and later he doubtless viewed with sympathy the proposals of the *Republic* for the establishment of a caste society (cf. *Antichrist*, 57). But he regarded 'Plato's invention of pure intelligence (*Geist*) and the Good-in-itself' as 'the most tedious and dangerous of all errors', a nightmare from which Europe had only recently awakened (Preface to *Beyond Good and Evil*); and he detested the 'antihellenic' asceticism which marked Plato as 'a Christian before Christ' (*Twilight of the Idols*, 10. 2). Plato's judgement on Periclean Athens he cited as a piece of anticultural fanaticism comparable to Savonarola's judgement on Florence or 'the German condemnation of Goethe' (*Will to Power*, 747).

Against Socrates and Plato Nietzsche set 'the Sophists'. In a Basel lecture he had referred with approval to Grote's defence of them (iv. 361 Mus.). But he later condemned Grote for representing them as 'respectable men and models of morality'; on the contrary, 'their which are reproduced in most editions; for minor writings I refer to the volume and page of the Musarion edition.

¹ The anti-Socratic utterances of Nietzsche have been collected by Oehler, the pro-Socratic by Kaufmann. Each, rather naturally, draws a one-sided conclusion.

glory was that they refused to cheat with big words and phrases,' but 'had the courage, which all strong spirits have, to recognize their own unmorality' (*Will to Power*, 429). It seems evident that in this large generalization Nietzsche had in mind men of the stamp of Callicles or Thrasymachus. His words recall the passage where Socrates praises Callicles' frankness in 'saying plainly what others think but do not care to say' (*Gorg.* 492 d); and that Nietzsche in fact considered Callicles a spokesman for 'the Sophists' is made clear in his lectures on Plato (iv. 422 Mus.).

Nietzsche thus came to see in 'the Sophists' forerunners of his own radical moral scepticism. In this he was certainly influenced by his reading of Thucydides, whom he regarded as the supreme exponent of 'the sophistic culture' and the sovereign remedy against the errors of Platonism; Thucydides, he says, 'and perhaps Macchiavelli', are his closest spiritual kin (*Twilight of the Idols*, 10. 2). He twice quotes the Melian dialogue in this connexion (*Human, All-too-Human*, 92; *Will to Power*, 429); and the idea of the 'transvaluation of values' may well have been suggested to him by the famous reflections on Corcyra (Thuc. 3. 82). But there is also evidence that Callicles' speeches in the *Gorgias* had deeply impressed his imagination, although he seems not to have referred to him by name outside the lectures on Plato.

(a) Callicles' vivid image of the lion whom society vainly seeks to tame (483 e-484 a) may fairly be said to haunt the pages of Nietzsche. In *The Genealogy of Morals*, i. 11, he speaks with passionate sympathy of the lion¹ as 'the magnificent blond beast that prowls in search of booty and victory', and then goes on to say that in the contemporary view 'all culture consists in transforming that beast of prey called "Man" into a tame and civilized animal, a domestic pet'. To tame an animal, however, is to denature it, to make it a sick animal; and the same is true of taming a man, which people miscall "reforming" him (*Twilight of the Idols*, 7. 2). In *The Will to Power* (237, 871) 'civilization' is similarly equated with 'animal-taming', which 'needs every sort of chains and torture if it is to maintain itself against the ferocity of the natural beast of prey'. But for Nietzsche, as for Callicles, the blond beast is never finally tamed; he is only waiting his time to break prison (*Genealogy of Morals*, i. 11). And in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* 'the laughing lions' are transformed into a symbol of the new and higher humanity which is to come (iii. 12. 1; iv. 11; iv. 20).

(b) Nietzsche thus, like Callicles, passionately upholds *φύσις* against *νόμος*. And, like Callicles (483 b), he conceives *νόμος* as a kind of social contract made by the weak to give them security against the

¹ Not the Teuton, as is vulgarly believed. Nietzsche did not admire the 'Nordic race'.

strong. 'Society', he says, 'is in origin an organization of the weak to create a balance of power with the forces that threaten them, internal as well as external' (*The Wanderer and his Shadow*, 22).

(c) For Nietzsche, as for Callicles, what νόμος prescribes is a morality of slaves ('Sklavenmoral', *Beyond Good and Evil*, 260, *Genealogy of Morals*, i. 10, cf. *Gorg.* 483 b 2). This is in reality nothing but disguised self-interest or disguised resentment, the expression of the fear and envy which the strong inspire in the weak (cf. *Gorg.* 483 bc, 492 a). Nietzsche's 'weaklings who thought themselves good because they had no claws' (*Zarathustra*, ii. 13) are precisely Callicles' "many" who "praise self-control and justice because of their own lack of manhood" (492 a 8). Such men are 'preachers of equality' (Callicles' τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν, 483 c 5) only because equality is the best they can hope for: 'your secret ambition to be tyrants thus shrouds itself in virtuous words' (*Zarathustra*, ii. 7, cf. *Gorg.* 471 c 8, 492 b).

(d) Yet Callicles is by no means a pure nihilist in ethics, nor is Nietzsche. The Nietzschean sage is 'beyond good and evil (*Böse*)', but he is *not* 'beyond good and bad (*Schlecht*)' (*Genealogy of Morals*, i. 17); *Böse* corresponds to τὸ νόμῳ ἄδικον in Callicles' terminology, *Schlecht* to τὸ φύσει ἄδικον. As Callicles has his own conception of the ἀρετή which befits the Master Class (the βελτίους or κρείττους), so Nietzsche believes in the necessity of a 'Herrenmoral': 'Even to us there still speaks a "Thou shalt"' (Preface to *Dawn of Day*). About the principles of this 'Herrenmoral' he is neither very explicit nor (I think) entirely consistent;¹ but there are certainly places where he seems to use the language of Callicles. For both, the supreme virtue is courage: 'What is good, you ask? Courage is good' (*Zarathustra*, iv. 3. 2, cf. *Gorg.* 491 b 2). For both, courage involves hardness, and softness (μαλακία τῆς ψυχῆς, 491 b 4) is therefore despicable: 'I give you this new law: "Make yourselves hard!"' (*Zarathustra*, iii. 12. 29). In *The Will to Power* Nietzsche comes at times even closer to Callicles, as when he defines the Will to Power in terms of πλεονεξία as a 'Haben- und Mehrhabenwollen', or when he declares that 'the great man is great through giving his desires free play' (933), which looks very like Callicles' prescription τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ κολλάζειν (491 e 8-9). Nietzsche, it is true, holds that the passions must serve the Will (a point Callicles does not make); but they must on no account be 'weakened or extirpated' (ibid.).

It is a strange irony of history that Plato's exposition of the ideas he meant to destroy should thus have contributed to the formidable renaissance of those ideas in our day. Yet so it is: Nietzsche was, in certain aspects of his thought, the illegitimate and undesired offspring

¹ Cf. Reyburn, op. cit., chaps. xxvi-xxviii.

of Plato, as the Nazis were to be in turn the illegitimate and undesired offspring of Nietzsche.¹ We should not, however, exaggerate the importance of the link. Nietzsche was a man of subtler analytic intelligence and more sensitive moral fibre than the Platonic Callicles, and he wrestled with the moral problems of his time at a far deeper level. Callicles would have relished the purely destructive side of his teaching; but he would certainly not have understood concepts like 'sublimation' and 'self-transcendence', while Nietzsche would have rejected with contempt the crude hedonism on which Callicles falls back at 494 a (cf. *Will to Power*, 464-74).

¹ Nietzsche was claimed by the Nazis as their spiritual progenitor, and the claim was for a time uncritically accepted in this country, but its essential falsity is now generally admitted. It was in fact made possible only by a deliberate distortion of the evidence, practised in the first place by his sister, Frau Förster-Nietzsche, and still more grossly at a later date by men like Bäumler and Oehler. No philosopher, not even Plato, has been more cruelly travestied by self-chosen 'interpreters', though it must be admitted that by his oracular and highly metaphorical style Nietzsche laid himself more open than most to genuine misunderstanding.

LIST OF WORKS CITED IN THE INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY BY AUTHOR'S NAME OR OTHER ABBREVIATION

I

Editions, Commentaries, and Translations (in chronological sequence)

Routh	<i>Euthydemus et Gorgias cum notis</i> M. J. Routh (1784).
Findeisen	<i>Gorgias</i> rec. et expl. C. G. Findeisen (1796).
Heindorf	<i>Platonis Dialogi Selecti</i> cura L. F. Heindorf, vol. ii (1805).
Schleiermacher	<i>Platons Werke</i> übers. F. Schleiermacher, vol. II. i (zweite Auflage, 1818).
Ast	<i>Platonis Opera</i> rec. F. Ast (1819-27).
Coraës	<i>Gorgias</i> ed. A. Coraës (Korais), with Xenophon's <i>Memorabilia</i> ('Ελληνική βιβλιοθήκη vol. xv, 1825).
Bekker	<i>Platonis Opera</i> rec. I. Bekker, vol. iii (1826).
Baiter	<i>Platonis Opera</i> rec. Baiter, Orelli, Winckelmann (Zürich 1839).
Hermann	<i>Platonis Dialogi</i> rec. C. F. Hermann, vol. iii (Teubner 1851).
Stallbaum	<i>Gorgias</i> rec. G. Stallbaum, editio tertia (1861: first edition, 1828).
Cope	<i>Gorgias</i> trans. E. M. Cope (1864).
Thompson	<i>Gorgias</i> ed. W. H. Thompson (1871).
Jowett	<i>The Dialogues of Plato</i> trans. B. Jowett, vol. ii (1871).
Hirschig	<i>Gorgias</i> ed. R. B. Hirschig (1873).
Deuschle-Cron	<i>Gorgias</i> erkl. J. Deuschle, dritte Auflage von C. Cron (1876).
Schanz	<i>Platonis Opera</i> ed. M. Schanz, vol. viii (1880).
Lodge	<i>Gorgias</i> edited on the basis of Deuschle-Cron's edition by G. Lodge (Boston 1890).
Sauppe-Gercke	<i>Gorgias</i> erkl. H. Sauppe, herausgegeben von A. Gercke (1897).
Burnet	<i>Platonis Opera</i> rec. J. Burnet, vol. iii (1903: impressio secunda 1909).
Nestle	<i>Gorgias</i> erkl. C. Cron und J. Deuschle, fünfte Auflage neubearbeitet von W. Nestle (1909).
Apelt	<i>Gorgias</i> übers. O. Apelt, zweite Auflage (1922, reprinted 1955).
Lamb	Plato (Loeb Library) vol. v, ed. and trans. W. R. M. Lamb (revised edition, 1932).

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| Croiset | Platon, <i>Œuvres</i> , vol. iii. ii, texte établi et traduit par A. Croiset (Collection Budé, deuxième édition, 1935). |
| Theiler | <i>Gorgias</i> ed. W. Theiler (Editiones Helveticae, n.d.). |
| Rufener | Platon, <i>Werke des Aufstiegs</i> , übers. R. Rufener (1948). |
| Robin | Platon, <i>Œuvres Complètes</i> , trad. L. Robin, vol. i (1950). |
| Helmbold | <i>Gorgias</i> trans. W. C. Helmbold (New York 1952). |
| Woodhead | Plato, <i>Socratic Dialogues</i> , trans. W. D. Woodhead (1953). |
| Jowett ⁴ | <i>The Dialogues of Plato</i> trans. B. Jowett, fourth (radically revised) edition, vol. ii (1953). |

II

Contributions to the History and Criticism of the Text

- H. Alline, *Histoire du texte de Platon* (1915).
- E. Bickel, 'Geschichte und Recensio des Platontextes', *Rheinisches Museum*, xcii (1944), 97 ff.
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- A. J. Egelie, *Observationes criticae in Platonem* (diss. Amsterdam 1902).
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- J. N. Madvig, *Adversaria*, i. 409-13 (1871).
- R. A. Morstadt, 'Emendationen zu Platons Gorgias', Programm Gymn. Schaffhausen 1866.
- S. A. Naber, *Observationes criticae in Platonem* (1861); 'Platonica', *Mnemosyne* 1908, 250 ff.
- G. Pasquali, *Storia della Tradizione e Critica del Testo* (seconda edizione, 1952).
- L. A. Post, *The Vatican Plato and its Relations* (1935).
- Luise Reinhard, *Anakoluthe bei Platon* (1920).
- H. Richards, *Platonica* (1911); 'Notes on Plato', *Classical Quarterly* 9 (1915), 201 f.
- M. Schanz, *Novae Commentationes Platonicae* (1871); *Über den Platocodex der Markusbibliothek in Venedig* (1877: cited as *Platocodex*).
- H. Schmidt, *Beiträge zur Erklärung Platons Dialogen* (1874).
- M. Vermehren, *Platonische Studien* (1870).
- U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 'Textkritik' in *Platon*, ii. 324 ff. (zweite Auflage, 1920).
- M. Wohlrab, *Epistola critica de aliquot locis Gorgiae Platonici* (1863).

III

Works on Plato's Philosophy

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 P. Friedländer, *Platon*: references are to the English translation of vol. i (1958), and to the revised German edition of vol. ii (1957: not yet available in English).
 H. Gauss, *Handkommentar zu den Dialogen Platons*, II. i (1956: not in fact a commentary, despite its title).
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 M. Pohlenz, *Aus Platons Werdezeit* (1913).
 H. Raeder, *Platons philosophische Entwicklung* (1905).
 C. Ritter, *Untersuchungen über Plato* (1888: cited as Ritter, *Unters.*); *Platon, sein Leben, seine Schriften, seine Lehre* (2 vols., 1910-23).
 R. Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic* (second edition, 1953).
 P. Shorey, *What Plato Said* (1933).
 A. E. Taylor, *Plato, the Man and his Work* (third edition, 1929).
 U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Platon* (zweite Auflage, 1920).

IV

General

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| C.A.F. | <i>Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta</i> , ed. T. Kock (1880-8). |
| C.A.H. | <i>Cambridge Ancient History</i> . |
| Denniston | J. D. Denniston, <i>The Greek Particles</i> (second edition, 1954). |
| <i>F gr Hist</i> | <i>Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> , ed. F. Jacoby (1923-). |
| Goodwin, M.T. | W. W. Goodwin, <i>Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb</i> (revised edition, 1897). |
| I.G. | <i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> . |
| Kühner-B. | R. Kühner, <i>Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache</i> , dritte Auflage: Erster Teil, Elementar- und Formenlehre, besorgt von F. Blass (1890-2). |
| Kühner-G. | R. Kühner, <i>Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache</i> , dritte Auflage: Zweiter Teil, Satzlehre, besorgt von B. Gerth (1898-1904). |
| L.S.J. | Liddell and Scott's <i>Greek Lexicon</i> , revised edition by H. Stuart Jones. |
| O.F. | <i>Orphica Fragmenta</i> , ed. O. Kern (1922). |
| Ol | Olympiodori in <i>Platonis Gorgiam Commentaria</i> , ed. W. Norvin (1936). |

P.-W.	Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, <i>Real-Encyclopädie</i> .
Riddell	J. Riddell, 'Digest of Platonic Idioms' (in his edition of the <i>Apology</i> , 1867).
schol.	<i>Scholia Platonica</i> , ed. W. C. Greene (1938).
S.V.F.	<i>Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta</i> , ed. J. von Arnim (1903-24).
T.G.F.	<i>Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta</i> , ed. A. Nauck, editio altera, 1888.
Vors.	<i>Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</i> , ed. H. Diels, siebente Auflage, 1954 (figures in brackets refer to the third edition).

For periodicals I have in general used the abbreviations listed in Liddell-Scott-Jones, *Greek Lexicon*, xxxviii. The following perhaps need explanation:

<i>Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil.</i>	<i>Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.</i>
<i>Arch. f. Rel.</i>	<i>Archiv für Religionswissenschaft.</i>
<i>Bull. Hist. Med.</i>	<i>Bulletin of the History of Medicine.</i>
<i>J. Phil.</i>	<i>Journal of Philology.</i>
<i>Mus. Helv.</i>	<i>Museum Helveticum.</i>
<i>NJbb.</i>	<i>Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum.</i>

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