

C.J. DE VOGEL
GREEK PHILOSOPHY

I

THALES TO PLATO



GREEK PHILOSOPHY I

GREEK PHILOSOPHY

A COLLECTION OF TEXTS

SELECTED AND SUPPLIED WITH
SOME NOTES AND EXPLANATIONS

BY

C. J. DE VOGEL

PH.D., PROFESSOR OF ANCIENT AND MEDIAEVAL
PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF UTRECHT

VOLUME I

THALES TO PLATO

THIRD EDITION



LEIDEN

E. J. BRILL

1963

Copyright 1963 by E. J. Brill, Leiden, Netherlands.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or translated in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm or any other means without written permission from the publisher.

Printed in the Netherlands

CONTENTS

Preface	IX-X
Prooemium	I-3
BOOK I—THE PRESOCRATICS	4-84
CHAPTER I—THE MILESIAN SCHOOL	4-9
1—Thales	4-5
2—Anaximander	6-8
3—Anaximenes	8-9
CHAPTER II—PYTHAGORAS AND THE OLDER PYTHAGOREANS	10-22
CHAPTER III—HERACLITUS	23-30
CHAPTER IV—THE ELEATIC SCHOOL	31-50
1—Its fore-runner: Xenophanes of Colophon	31-35
2—Parmenides of Elea	35-44
3—Zeno	44-49
4—Melissus	49-50
CHAPTER V—PLURALISTS AND ATOMISTS	51-82
1—Empedocles	51-64
2—Anaxagoras	64-70
3—Leucippus and Democritus	70-82
CHAPTER V A—DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA	83-84
BOOK II—MAN IN THE CENTRE OF PHILOSOPHY	85-299
CHAPTER VI—THE SOPHISTS	85-112
1—Introduction	85-86
2—Protagoras	86-92
3—Gorgias	92-97
4—Hippias	97-98
5—Prodicus	98-101
6—Callicles and Thrasymachus, Antiphon and Critias	101-105
7—An average image of Sophistic	105-107
8—The judgment of Socrates and Plato, and that of modern critics	108-112

CHAPTER VII—SOCRATES	113-156
1—The sources	113-115
2—Socrates' life-work according to Plato's <i>Apology</i> , illustrated by the speech of Alcibiades in the <i>Symposium</i> and a passage in the <i>Theaetetus</i> . .	116-124
3—The dialectic method	125-140
4—First principles of the philosophy of Socrates according to the <i>Crito</i>	140-144
5—The story of the youth of Socrates, told by himself	144-148
6—Some additions from <i>Xenophon</i>	148-151
7—A pre-platonic theory of Ideas?	152-154
8—The death of Socrates	154-156
CHAPTER VIII—THE MINOR SOCRATICS	157-169
1—The Megarian School	157-161
2—The Schools of Elis and Eretria	161
3—The Cynics	161-166
4—The School of Cyrene (Cyrenaici)	167-169
CHAPTER IX—PLATO	170-299
1—Preliminary questions	170-171
2—Life and work	171-172
3—The origin of the theory of Ideas	172-178
4—The true sense of the platonic Idea	178-184
5—The <i>Republic</i>	184-218
6—Conclusions and criticism	218-224
7—The crisis in Plato's philosophy: <i>Theaet.</i> and <i>Parm.</i>	224-246
8—The later Platonism: <i>Soph.</i> , <i>Polit.</i> , <i>Phil.</i> , <i>Tim.</i>	246-272
9—The ideal Numbers	272-281
10—The <i>Laws</i>	281-299
Bibliography	300-307
Indices	308-318
Additions to ch. II: Pythagoras and Ancient Pythagoreanism .	319-331
Additions to the Bibliography	332-334

PREFACE

The first volume of *Greek Philosophy* was prepared in the years 1947-'49. In these years, I myself and many other university teachers in this country were in urgent need of a source-book of Greek philosophy. In order to supply this need I started to write this book which, from the beginning, was intended to form a complete history of Greek philosophy, essentially composed by the texts themselves. Marginal notes, short explanations, here and there summaries, served to make the whole readable as a current history, in which of course a thorough knowledge of Greek was presupposed. Modern literature on the subject was taken into account, was frequently mentioned and sometimes discussed. Generally, as to the interpretation, I took an attitude of great discretion, since the essential thing was to have the texts, while discussion had to be left for the greater part either to oral teaching or to the further reading of the literature referred to. Yet, *something*, and I may say as much as possible, has been done.

As may be easily seen throughout the work, personal views are by no means lacking. It could not be otherwise, and, I think, it *should* not.

At present, the big third volume, which is going to complete the work, is ready for the press. I dare to say that the three volumes contain a complete and thoroughly pondered re-interpretation of the whole of Greek philosophy, in which the results of a long and personal contact with the ancient Greek thinkers are expressed, though often in a very condensed form.

Evidently, from the beginning this work was by no means meant for students and professors only. It was done in behalf of all those who wish to study Greek philosophy on the sources, and I am sure it has already been of great profit to many of them, and may hope it will be of still greater profit in the future.

In this second edition a number of small mistakes has been corrected. Moreover, the drawing of the den of Plato (p. 204) Mr. Swillens kindly made for the first edition, has been replaced by another made by miss B. Th. Koppers, which I trust will give a more satisfactory illustration of the text. To the bibliography a page has been added.

Utrecht, May 1957

C. J. DE VOGEL

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

To the third edition I added what seemed to me most needed: half a chapter on Pythagoras and ancient Pythagoreanism. My grounds for this addition are given at the head of that „appendix“ itself. It is placed at the end of the volume.

The additions to the bibliography have been increased. Throughout the volume headlines have been altered so as to serve better for an easy orientation. For the same purpose numbers were added in brackets at the head of the pages, similarly as it was done in the second and third volumes.

Utrecht, Nov. 1962

C. J. d. V.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The fragments of the Presocratic philosophers and of the Sophists have been taken from Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*⁵ (1934-35)¹, those of Plato from the editions in the Collection Budé. For the Laws, which had not yet appeared in that series, I used the Oxford-edition of Burnet. As to the works of Aristotle, the editions of Ross have been used as far as possible (for *Phys.* and *Metaph.*), that of Immisch for the *Politika* and that of Siwek for the *Psychology*. Where I preferred another reading to that of the mentioned editions, the difference has been indicated, at least in cases of any importance.

The figures of the klepsydrae on p. 62 have been taken from W. K. C. Guthrie's edition of Aristotle's *De caelo* in the Loeb Classical Library (p. 228, fig. I and II); that of the cosmic system of Philolaus, with some slight alteration, from W. J. W. Koster, *Fragmenten van Grieksche denkers vóór Socrates*, Zwolle 1934, p. 71.

¹ Cited in this way: Parm., D. 28 B 8, or shortly B 8.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- Bidez, *Eos* = J. Bidez, *Eos ou Platon et l'orient*, Bruxelles 1945.
- Burnet, *E. Gr. Ph.* = J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, London 1892, ²1908, ⁴1945.
- Burnet, *Gr. Phil.* I = J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy, I, Thales to Plato*, London 1914, ²1928.
- Cherniss, *Ar.'s Crit. of Pl.* = H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, vol. I, Baltimore 1944.
- Cherniss, *Riddle* = H. Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1945.
- Diels, *VS* = H. Diels-W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Berlin ⁵1934.
- Dox.* = H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*, Berolini 1879.
- Gigon, *Ursprung* = O. Gigon, *Der Ursprung der Griechischen Philosophie*, Basel 1945.
- Gomperz, *Gr. D.* = Th. Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*, Berlin 1923-25.
- Jaeger, *Theol.* = W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers*, Oxford 1947.
- Joël, *Gesch. d. ant. Phil.* I = K. Joël, *Geschichte der antiken Philosophie*, I, Tübingen 1921.
- De Vogel, *Keerpunt* = C. J. de Vogel, *Een keerpunt in Plato's denken*, Amsterdam 1936.
- Wahl, *Etude sur le Parm.* = J. Wahl, *Etude sur le Parménide de Platon*, Paris 1926.
- Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* = E. Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, Leipzig ⁵1919-23.

PROOEMIUM

1—Arist., *Metaph.* A 3, 983 b²⁰: Θαλῆς μὲν ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης ¹ ἀρχηγὸς φιλοσοφίας ὕδωρ εἶναι φησιν.

The
beginning

Philosophy may be distinguished from non-philosophical thinking by these three points:

Three
criteria

- 1—Philosophers try to give a non-mythological explanation of the world.
- 2—They cultivate science not for gain, nor for their own glory. See our nr. 4.
- 3—From special sciences they pass on to speculative questions.

2—Mythological explanations about the origin of the world and the development of humanity preceded the philosophical explanation. But the mythological view of things did not disappear at once. Traces of it are found in abundance in the fragments of Parmenides and Empedocles, nor are they lacking in Anaximander's fragment. Yet there is a clear difference between these thinkers, to begin with Thales, and the way in which Hesiod and Pherecydes of Syrus explained the world's origin.

Precedings

a. Hes., *Theog.* 116-138, ed. Rzach:

Hesiodus

Ἡ τοι μὲν πρότιστα Χάος γένετ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
Γαῖ' εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ
[ἀθανάτων, οἳ ἔχουσι κάρη νιφέντος Ὀλύμπου,]
Τάρταρά τ' ἡερβέντα μυχῶ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης,
ἥδ' Ἔρος ², δς κάλλιστος ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι,
120 λυσιμελής, πάντων δὲ θεῶν πάντων τ' ἀνθρώπων
δάμναται ἐν στήθεσσι νόον καὶ ἐπίφρονα βουλήν.
ἐκ Χάος δ' Ἐρεβός τε μέλαινά τε Νύξ ἐγένοντο
Νυκτὸς δ' αὖτ' Αἰθήρ τε καὶ Ἡμέρη ἐξεγένοντο,
οὓς τέκε κυσαμένη Ἐρέβει φιλότῃτι μιγεῖσα.
125 Γαῖα δέ τοι πρῶτον μὲν ἐγένετο Ἴσον ἐ' αὐτῇ
Οὐρανὸν ἀστερόενθ', ἵνα μιν περὶ πάντα καλύπτοι,
ὄφρ' εἴη μακάρεσσι θεοῖς ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ.
γένετο δ' Οὐρεα μακρά, θεῶν χαρίεντας ἐναύλους,
[Νυμφέων, αἳ ναίουσιν ἀν' οὐρεα βησσηντα.]
130

¹ τοιαύτης, sc. of that mode of inquiring which seeks for a material ἀρχή as the principle of all things.

² Both Jaeger in his *Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford 1947) and O. Gigon in *Der Ursprung der griech. Phil.* (Basel 1945) have pointed out that this Eros of Hes. reappears in Parmenides' explanation of the world of appearance and in the Philia of Empedocles. For us the decisive point is this: the marked difference of method between those who by Aristotle are called theologoi and the later, even mythologizing, philosophers.

ἡ δὲ καὶ ἀτρύγετον πέλαγος τέκεν, οἷδαμι θυῖον,
 Πόντον, ἅτερ φιλότῃτος ἐφιμέρου· αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
 Οὐρανῷ εὐνηθεῖσα τέκ' Ὀκεανὸν βαθυδίνην,
 Κοῖν τε Κρίον θ' Ὑπερίονά τ' Ἰαπετόν τε
 Θεῖαν τε Ῥεῖαν τε Θέμιν τε Μνημοσύνην τε
 Φοίβην τε χρυσοστέφανον Τηθύν τ' ἐρατεινήν.
 τοὺς δὲ μέθ' ὀπλότατος γένετο Κρόνος ἀγκυλομήτης,
 δεινότατος παίδων· θαλερόν δ' ἤχθηρε τοκῆα.

135

Pherecydes

b. Eudemus, fr. 117 Mullach; Diels-Kranz, 7 A 8: Φερεκύδης δὲ ὁ Σύριος Ζάντα μὲν εἶναι αἰεὶ καὶ Χρόνον καὶ Χθονίαν τὰς τρεῖς πρώτας ἀρχάς . . . τὸν δὲ Χρόνον ποιῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ γόνου ἑαυτοῦ πῦρ καὶ πνεῦμα καὶ ὕδωρ . . . , ἐξ ὧν ἐν πέντε μυχοῖς διηρημένων πολλὴν ἄλλην γεγενᾶν συστήναι θεῶν, τὴν πεντέμυχον καλουμένην, ταῦτόν δὲ ἴσως εἰπεῖν, πεντέκοσμον.

The name
„philosophy”

3—Plato used the name „philosophy” in a clearly technical sense. In a larger sense we find the word the first time with Herod. I 30, where Croesus says to Solon:

a. ξεῖνε Ἀθηναῖε, παρ' ἡμέας γὰρ περὶ σοῦ λόγος ἀφίκεται πολλὸς καὶ σοφίης εἵνεκεν τῆς σῆς καὶ πλάνης, ὥς φιλοσοφῶν (in search of wisdom) γῆν πολλὴν θεωρίης εἵνεκεν ἐπελήλυθας.

b. Cf. Thucydides II 40: φιλοκαλοῦμέν τε μετ' εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἀνευ μάλαχίας.

Isocrates also used the word in its larger sense.

c. The first who gave it a technical meaning seems to have been Pythagoras.

Diog., I 12: φιλοσοφίαν δὲ πρῶτος ὠνόμασε Πυθαγόρας καὶ ἑαυτὸν φιλόσοφον ἐν Σικυῶνι διαλεγόμενος Λέοντι τῷ Σικυωνίων τυράννῳ ἢ Φλιασίῳ, καθὰ φησιν Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς ἅπνου (in the book about the seemingly-dead woman).

Pure theory

4—Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* V 3, 8-9: . . . omnes qui in rerum contemplatione studia ponebant, sapientes et habebantur et nominabantur, idque eorum nomen usque ad Pythagorae manavit aetatem. quem, ut scribit auditor Platonis Ponticus Heraclides, vir doctus in primis, Phliuntem ferunt venisse, eumque cum Leonte, principe Phliasiorum, docte et copiose disseruisse quaedam. cuius ingenium et eloquentiam cum admiratus esset Leon, quaesivisse ex eo, qua maxime arte confideret; at illum: artem quidem se scire nullam, sed esse philosophum. admiratum Leontem novitatem nominis quaesivisse, quinam essent philosophi, et quid inter eos et reliquos interesset; Pythagoram autem respondisse similem sibi videri vitam hominum et mercatum eum, qui haberetur maximo ludorum apparatu totius Graeciae celebritate; nam ut illic alii corporibus exercitatis gloriam et nobilitatem coronae peterent, alii emendi aut vendendi quaestu et lucro ducerentur, esset autem quoddam genus eorum, idque vel maxime ingenium, qui nec plausum nec lucrum quaerent, sed visendi causa venirent studiosque perspicere, quid ageretur et quo modo, item nos quasi in mercatus quandam celebritatem ex urbe aliqua sic in hanc vitam ex alia vita et natura profectos alios gloriae servire, alios pecuniae, raros esse quosdam, qui ceteris omnibus pro nihilo habitis rerum naturam studiose intuerentur; hos se appellare sapientiae studiosos—id est enim philosophos—; et ut illic liberalissimum esset spectare nihil sibi adquirentem, sic in vita longe omnibus studiis contemplationem rerum cognitionemque praestare

5—Wisdom preceded philosophy.

The seven
sages

a. Diog., I 13: σοφοὶ δὲ ἐνομίζοντο οἶδε · Θαλῆς Σόλων Περικλῆς Κλεόβουλος Χείλων Βίας Πιττακός.

b. Cf. Diog., I 40: οὔτε σοφοὺς οὔτε φιλοσόφους αὐτοὺς γεγονέναι, συνετοὺς δὲ τινὰς (wise men) καὶ νομοθετικούς.

c. Plut., *Solon* III, 5: ὅλως ἔοικεν ἢ Θάλῳ μόνου σοφία τότε περαιτέρω τῆς χρείας ἐξικέσθαι τῇ θεωρίᾳ · τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς τοῦνομα τῆς σοφίας ὑπῆρξε.

About four names—Thales, Bias, Pittacus, Solon—all agree; the other three are given with variations.

6—a. D. 10, 3, Cleobulus:

Proverbs

Μέτρον ἄριστον.

φιλήκοον εἶναι καὶ μὴ πολύλαλον.

γαμεῖν ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων · ἐὰν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν κρειττόνων, δεσπότης, οὐ συγγενεὶς κτήση. εὐποροῦντα μὴ ὑπερῆφανον εἶναι, ἀποροῦντα μὴ ταπεινοῦσθαι.

b. Solon:

Μηδὲν ἄγαν.

φίλους μὴ τάχῃ κτῶ, οὓς δ' ἂν κτήσῃ, μὴ τάχῃ ἀποδοκίμαζε.

c. Chilo:

Γινῶθι σαυτόν.

ἢ γλῶσσά σου μὴ προτρεχέτω τοῦ νοῦ.

d. Thales:

Ἐγγύα, πάρα δ' ἄτα.

κακὰ ἐν οἴκῳ κρύπτε.

φθονοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκτίρου.

μέτρῳ χρῶ.

e. Pittacus:

Καιρὸν γινῶθι.

ὁ μέλλεις ποιεῖν, μὴ λέγε · ἀποτυχὼν γὰρ καταγελαστήσῃ.

ἀνέχου ὑπὸ τῶν πλησίον μικρὰ ἐλαττούμενος.

f. Bias:

Οἱ πλεῖστοι ἄνθρωποι κακοί.

εἰς κάτοπτρον, ἔφη, ἐμβλέψαντα δεῖ, εἰ μὲν καλὸς φαίνεται, καλὰ ποιεῖν · εἰ δὲ αἰσχρὸς, τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἐλλιπὲς διορθοῦσθαι τῇ καλοκαγαθίᾳ.

ἄκουε πολλά.

λάλει καίρια.

πέισας λάβε, μὴ βιασάμενος.

ὅτι ἂν ἀγαθὸν πράσσης, θεοῦς, μὴ σεαυτὸν αἰτιῶ.

g. Periander:

Μελέτα τὸ πᾶν.

αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ θνηταί, αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ θάνατοι.

BOOK I

THE PRESOCRATICS

FIRST CHAPTER

THE MILESIAN SCHOOL

1—THALES

date 7—He predicted an eclipse of the sun, probably that of the year 585.

a. Herod. I 74: τὴν δὲ μεταλλαγὴν ταύτην τῆς ἡμέρας Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος τοῖσι Ἴωσι προηγόρευσε ἔσεσθαι.

**a political
adviser**

b. Herod. I 170: χρηστὴ δὲ καὶ πρὶν ἢ διαφθαρῆναι Ἰωνίην Θαλέω ἀνδρὸς Μιλήσιου ἐγένετο (γνώμη), τὸ ἀνέκαθεν γένος ἑόντος Φοίνικος, ὃς ἐκέλευσεν ἐν βουλευτήριον Ἴωνας ἐκτῆσθαι, τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἐν Τέφρῳ.

**engineer
in the army
of Croesus**

c. Herod. I 75: ὡς δὲ ἀπίκετο ἐπὶ τὸν Ἄλυν ποταμὸν ὁ Κροῖσος, τὸ ἐνθεῦτεν, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ λέγω, κατὰ τὰς ἐούσας γεφύρας διεβίβασε τὸν στρατόν, ὡς δὲ ὁ πολλὸς λόγος Ἑλλήνων, Θαλῆς οἱ ὁ Μιλήσιος διεβίβασε.

doctrine

8—a. Arist., *Metaph.* A 3, 983 b⁶: τῶν δὴ πρώτων φιλοσοφησάντων οἱ πλεῖστοι τὰς ἐν ὕλης εἶδει μόνας¹ ᾤθησαν ἀρχὰς εἶναι πάντων· ἐξ οὗ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅπαντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται πρῶτου καὶ εἰς ὃ φθείρεται τελευταῖον, τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ὑπομενούσης τοῖς δὲ πάθεσι μεταβαλλούσης, τοῦτο στοιχεῖον καὶ ταύτην ἀρχὴν φασιν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων. — 983b¹⁸: τὸ μέντοι πλῆθος καὶ τὸ εἶδος τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντες λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ Θαλῆς μὲν ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχηγὸς φιλοσοφίας ὕδωρ εἶναί φησιν (διὸ καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐφ' ὕδατος ἀπεφώνητο εἶναι), λαβὼν ἴσως τὴν ὑπόληψιν ταύτην ἐκ τοῦ πάντων ὁρᾶν τὴν τροφὴν ὑγρὰν οὔσαν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν ἐκ τούτου γιγνόμενον καὶ τούτῳ ζῶν (τὸ δ' ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ πάντων), διὰ τε δὴ τοῦτο τὴν ὑπόληψιν λαβὼν ταύτην καὶ διὰ τὸ πάντων τὰ σπέρματα τὴν φύσιν ὑγρὰν ἔχειν, τὸ δ' ὕδωρ ἀρχὴν τῆς φύσεως εἶναι τοῖς ὑγροῖς.

reasons

b. Aët. I 3, 1 (*Dox.* 276, 13): στοχάζεται δ' ἐκ τούτου πρῶτον ὅτι πάντων τῶν ζώων ἡ γονὴ ἀρχὴ ἔστιν ὑγρὰ οὕσα. οὕτως εἰκὸς καὶ τὰ πάντα ἐξ ὑγροῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν. δεύτερον ὅτι πάντα τὰ φυτὰ ὑγρῷ τρέφεται καὶ

¹ τὰς ἐν ὕλης εἶδει μόνας = τὴν ὕλην μόνην.

καρποφορεῖ, ἀμοιροῦντα δὲ ξηραίνεται. τρίτον ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄστρον ταῖς τῶν ὑδάτων ἀναθυμιάσσει τρέφεται, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ κόσμος.

Gigon, *Der Ursprung d. gr. Phil.* 44 f. thinks that Th. did not teach any qualitative change at all of water into earth, but simply that the earth emerged from the sea.

c. cf. Arist., *De caelo* 294a¹⁰: οἱ δ' ἐφ' ὕδατος κεῖσθαι (sc. λέγουσιν). τοῦτον γὰρ ἀρχαιότατον παρελήφαμεν τὸν λόγον, ὃν φασιν εἰπεῖν Θαλῆν τὸν Μιλήσιον, ὡς διὰ τὸ πλωτὴν εἶναι μένουσαν ὥσπερ ξύλον ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον (καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἐπ' ἀέρος μὲν οὐθὲν πέφυκε μένειν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὕδατος), ὥσπερ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὄντα περὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος τοῦ ὀχοῦντος τὴν γῆν· ('But this is to forget that the same thing may be said of the water supporting the earth as was said of the earth itself.' Guthrie). οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ὕδωρ πέφυκε μένειν μετέωρον, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τινός ἐστιν.

9—a. Arist., *De anima* I 5, 411 a⁷: καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ¹ δέ τινες αὐτὴν **hylozoism** (τὴν ψυχὴν) μεμεῖχθαι φασιν, ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς ᾤηθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι.

b. Arist., *ibid.* I 2, 405 a¹⁹: εἰκοι δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς, ἐξ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι, κινητικὸν τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαβεῖν, εἴπερ τὸν λίθον ἔφη ψυχὴν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὸν σίδηρον κινεῖ.

c. Aët. I 7, 11 (*D.* 11 A 23): Θαλῆς νοῦν τοῦ κόσμου τὸν θεόν², τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἐμψυχον ἅμα καὶ δαιμόνων πλήρες³.

10—Thales represents the purely theoretical attitude of mind, peculiar to philosophers according to Pythagoras: **not for gain**

Arist., *Polit.* I 11, 1259 a⁹; *D.* 11 A 10: ὀνειδιζόντων γὰρ αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν πενίαν ὡς ἀνωφελοῦς τῆς φιλοσοφίας οὔσης, κατανόησαντά φασιν αὐτὸν ἐλαιῶν φορὰν ἐσομένην ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας, ἔτι χειμῶνος ὄντος εὐπορήσαντα χρημάτων ὀλίγων ἀρραβῶνας⁴ διαδοῦναι τῶν ἐλαιουργείων⁵ τῶν τε ἐν Μιλήτῳ καὶ Χίῳ πάντων, ὀλίγου μισθωσάμενον ἅτ' οὐδενός ἐπιβάλλοντος⁶. ἐπειδὴ δ' ὁ καιρὸς ἦκε, πολλῶν ζητουμένων ἅμα καὶ ἐξαίφνης, ἐκμισθοῦντα ὃν τρόπον ἡβούλετο, πολλὰ χρήματα συλλέξαντα ἐπιδειῖξαι, ὅτι ῥάδιόν ἐστι πλουτεῖν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ἢ βούλονται, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτ' ἐστι περὶ ὃ σπουδάζουσιν.

¹ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ = in the universe.

² These are surely not Thales' own words; they are of Stoic origin. Cf. Diels, *Dox.* 128.

³ Plato is commenting the last words in *Leg.* X 899 b: ἄστρον δὴ περί πάντων καὶ σελήνης, ἐνιαυτῶν τε καὶ μηνῶν καὶ πασῶν ὥρῶν περί, τίνα ἄλλον λόγον ἐροῦμεν ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον, ὡς ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μὲν ἢ ψυχὰ πάντων τούτων αἰτιαὶ ἐφάνησαν, ἀγαθαὶ δὲ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν, θεοὺς αὐτάς εἶναι φήσομεν, εἴτε ἐν σώμασιν ἐνοῦσαι, ζῶα ὄντα, κοσμοῦσιν πάντα οὐρανόν, εἴτε ὅπη τε καὶ ὅπως; ἔσθ' ὅστις ταῦτα ὁμολογῶν ὑπομενεῖ μὴ θεῶν εἶναι πλήρη πάντα;

⁴ earnest-money.

⁵ oil-presses.

⁶ bidding higher.

2—ANAXIMANDER

the *ἄπειρον*
as first
principle

11—a. Simpl., *Phys.* 24, 13 (D. 12 A 9, B 1): 'Αναξίμανδρος — ἀρχὴν τε καὶ στοιχεῖον εἴρηκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον, πρῶτος τοῦτο τοῦνομα κομίσας τῆς ἀρχῆς. λέγει δ' αὐτὴν μήτε ὕδωρ μήτε ἄλλο τι τῶν καλουμένων εἶναι στοιχείων, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν τινὰ φύσιν ἄπειρον, ἐξ ἧς ἅπαντας γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανούς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους· ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις ἐστὶ τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεών· διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας¹ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν, ποιητικωτέροις οὕτως ὀνόμασιν αὐτὰ λέγων. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τὴν εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων οὗτος θεασάμενος οὐκ ἠξίωσεν ἐν τι τούτων ὑποκείμενον ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο παρὰ ταῦτα. οὗτος δὲ οὐκ ἀλλοιούμενου τοῦ στοιχείου τὴν γένεσιν ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποκρινομένων τῶν ἐναντίων διὰ τῆς αἰδίου κινήσεως· διὸ καὶ τοῖς περὶ 'Αναξαγόραν τοῦτον ὁ 'Αριστοτέλης συνέταξεν.

reasons

b. Aët. I 3, 3 (D. 12 A 14): 'Αναξίμανδρος δὲ — Μιλήσιός φησι τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον· ἐκ γὰρ τούτου πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ εἰς τοῦτο πάντα φθειρεσθαι. διὸ καὶ γεννᾶσθαι ἀπείρους κόσμους καὶ πάλιν φθειρεσθαι εἰς τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίνεσθαι. λέγει γοῦν διότι ἀπέραντόν ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴδὲν ἐλλείπῃ ἡ γένεσις ἢ ὑφισταμένη.

no
immaterial
principle

12—a. Arist., *Phys.* III, 4, 203 a²: πάντες ὡς ἀρχὴν τινὰ τιθέασιν τῶν ὄντων (τὸ ἄπειρον), οἱ μὲν ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Πλάτων, καθ' αὐτό, οὐκ ὡς συμβεβηκός τινι ἐτέρῳ, ἀλλ' οὐσίαν αὐτὸ ὄν τὸ ἄπειρον... οἱ δὲ περὶ φύσεως ἅπαντες αἰεὶ ὑποτιθέασιν ἑτέραν τινὰ φύσιν τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῶν λεγομένων στοιχείων.

¹ διδόναι... ἀδικίας: rightly interpreted by Burnet, *E. Gr. Ph.* ² p. 60 (fourth ed. p. 57 f.) as a system of compensation (this term is used by L. Robin, *La pensée grecque* 52 f.). Cf. O. Gigon, *Ursprung* p. 82: „Es vollzieht sich ein unaufhörlicher Ausgleich in der Welt selber und ein Austausch des Einen gegen das Andere, wie Licht in Nacht und Nacht in Licht vergeht." Jaeger, *The Theol. of the E. Gr. Phil.* p. 36 points out that Anaximander's explanation of nature is something more than a merely physical explanation: the ἀδικία being a disturbance of a divine order, the natural compensation has the character of a penance. Hence Jaeger speaks here of „the first philosophical theodicy".

The older interpretation of Nietzsche ^a and E. Rohde ^b presupposes a wrong text (without the word ἀλλήλοις). See Diels, *VS.* ⁵ p. 89 note, and Jaeger, *o.c.*, p. 34 f.

^a Fr. Nietzsche, *Phil. im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen*, I (Leipzig, Kroener Verlag), p. 429.

^b Erwin Rohde, *Psyche*, Tübingen⁸ 1921, II, p. 119 n. 1.

Which means that according to Anaximander, being one of the *περί φύσεως ἅπαντες*, the *ἄπειρον* is not a subject, but a predicate: an infinite matter, probably without any qualitative distinction.

b. In one place Aristotle seems to call it a *μίγμα*: (*Metaph.* A 2, 1069 b³⁰: καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ 'Αναξαγόρου ἐν καὶ 'Εμπεδοκλέους τὸ μίγμα καὶ 'Αναξίμανδρου), but Burnet seems to be right in assuming that we ought not to take that very strictly (*E. Gr. Ph.*² 58 ff., 4th ed. p. 55 ff.).

c. Cf. *Simpl., Phys.* 149, 13 D: ὁ μέντοι Πορφύριος—σῶμα μὲν τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀδιορίστως 'Αναξίμανδρον λέγειν φησὶν ἄπειρον οὐ διορίσαντα τὸ εἶδος εἴτε πῦρ εἴτε ὕδωρ εἴτε ἀήρ.

13—*Simpl., Phys.* 150, 20 D: ἕτερος δὲ τρόπος καθ' ὃν οὐκέτι τὴν μεταβολὴν τῆς ὕλης αἰτιῶνται οὐδὲ κατὰ ἀλλοίωσιν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου τὰς γενέσεις ἀποδιδόασιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἔκκρισιν· ἐνούσας γὰρ τὰς ἐναντιότητας ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, ἀπείρῳ ὄντι σώματι, ἐκκρίνεσθαι φησιν 'Αναξίμανδρος, πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἀρχὴν ὀνομάσας τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ἐναντιότητες δὲ εἰσι θερμὸν ψυχρὸν ξηρὸν ὑγρὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα.

how
qualitative
differences
are
explained

Even therefore the *ἀρχή* cannot be limited.

14—*Arist., Phys.* III 4, 203b⁷: τοῦ δὲ ἀπείρου οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχή· εἴη γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῦ πέρας. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀφθαρτον ὡς ἀρχή τις οὐσα· τό τε γὰρ γενόμενον ἀνάγκη τέλος λαβεῖν, καὶ τελευτὴ πάσης ἐστὶ φθορᾶς. διό, καθάπερ λέγομεν, οὐ ταύτης ἀρχή, ἀλλ' αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ περιέχειν ἅπαντα καὶ πάντα κυβερνᾶν, ὥς φασιν ὅσοι μὴ ποιοῦσι παρὰ τὸ ἄπειρον ἄλλας αἰτίας, οἷον νοῦν ἢ φιλίαν. καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ θεῖον· ἀθάνατον γὰρ καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, ὥς φησιν ὁ 'Αναξίμανδρος καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων.

it rules all
and is
immortal

15—[*Plut.*], *Strom.* 2 (D. 12 A 10): μεθ' ὃν (Thales) 'Αναξίμανδρον Θάλητος ἐταῖρον γενόμενον τὸ ἄπειρον φάναι τὴν πᾶσαν αἰτίαν ἔχειν τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεώς τε καὶ φθορᾶς, ἐξ οὗ δὴ φησι τοὺς τε οὐρανούς ἀποκεκρίσθαι καὶ καθόλου τοὺς ἅπαντας ἀπείρους ὄντας κόσμους.

innumerable
worlds

16—a. *Ib.* (D. 12 A 10, l. 33): φησὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ αἰδίου γόνιμον θερμοῦ τε καὶ ψυχροῦ κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου ἀποκριθῆναι καὶ τινα ἐκ τούτου φλογὸς σφαῖραν περιφυῆναι τῷ περὶ τὴν γῆν ἀέρι ὡς τῷ δένδρῳ φλοιόν· ἥστινος ἀπορραγείσης καὶ εἷς τινας ἀποκλεισθείσης κύκλους ὑποστῆναι τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας.

origin of the
sun, moon,
and stars

b. *Aët.* II 20 (D. 12 A 21, l. 10): 'Αναξίμανδρος κύκλον εἶναι ὁκτωκαιεικοσαπλάσιον τῆς γῆς, ἀρματεῖω τροχῷ παραπλήσιον, τὴν ἀψῖδα¹

the sun

¹ fellowe (Dutch: velg).

ἔχοντα κοίλην, πλήρη πυρός, κατὰ τι μέρος ἐκφαίνουσιν διὰ στομίου τὸ πῦρ ὥσπερ διὰ πρηστῆρος αὐλοῦ ¹ καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸν ἥλιον.

the earth
and the stars

c. Hippolyt., *Ref.* I 6 (*D.* 12 A 11, 3): τὴν δὲ γῆν εἶναι μετέωρον ὑπὸ μηδενὸς κρατουμένην, μένουσαν δὲ διὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν πάντων ἀπόστασιν· τὸ δὲ σχῆμα αὐτῆς γυρόν*, στρογγύλον, κίονι** λίθω παραπλήσιον. τῶν δὲ ἐπιπέδων Ϝ μὲν ἐπιβεβήκαμεν, ὁ δὲ ἀντίθετον ὑπάρχει. τὰ δὲ ἄστρα γίνεσθαι κύκλον πυρός, ἀποκριθέντα τοῦ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον πυρός, περιληφθέντα δ' ὑπὸ ἄερος. ἐκπνοὰς δ' ὑπάρξαι πόρους τινὰς αὐλώδεις***, καθ' οὓς φαίνεται τὰ ἄστρα· διὸ καὶ ἐπιφρασσομένων τῶν ἐκπνοῶν τὰς ἐκλείψεις γίνεσθαι. τὴν δὲ σελήνην ποτὲ μὲν πληρουμένην φαίνεσθαι, ποτὲ δὲ μειουμένην παρὰ τὴν τῶν πόρων ἐπίφραξιν ἢ ἀνοιξιν. εἶναι δὲ τὸν κύκλον τοῦ ἡλίου ἐπτακαίεικοσαπλασίονα τῆς σελήνης, καὶ ἀνωτάτῳ μὲν εἶναι τὸν ἥλιον, κατωτάτῳ δὲ τοὺς τῶν ἀπλανῶν ἀστέρων κύκλους.

the sea

d. Aët. III 16, 1 (*Dox.* 381, 15): 'Αναξίμανδρος τὴν θάλασσαν φησιν εἶναι τῆς πρώτης ὑγρασίας λείψανον, ἥς τὸ μὲν πλεῖον μέρος ἀνεξήρανε τὸ πῦρ, τὸ δὲ ὑπολειφθὲν διὰ τὴν ἔκκαυσιν μετέβαλεν.

biological
evolution

17—a. Aët. V 19, 4 (*D.* 12 A 30): 'Αναξίμανδρος ἐν ὑγρῷ γενηθῆναι τὰ πρῶτα ζῷα φλοιοῖς περιεχόμενα ἀκανθώδεσι, προβαίνουσας δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας ἀποβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὸ ξηρότερον καὶ περιρρηγνυμένου τοῦ φλοιοῦ ἐπ' ὀλίγον χρόνον μεταβιῶναι.

b. [Plut.], *Strom. fr.* 2 (*D.* 12 A 10, l. 37): ἔτι φησὶν, ὅτι κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐξ ἁλλοειδῶν ζῶων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐγεννήθη, ἐκ τοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα δι' ἑαυτῶν ταχὺ νέμεσθαι, μόνον δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον πολυχρονίου δεῖσθαι τιθηνήσεως· διὸ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἂν ποτε τοιοῦτον ὄντα διασωθῆναι.

c. Plut., *Symp.* VIII 8, 4 p. 730e (*D.* 12 A 30): ἐν ἰχθύσιν ἐγγενέσθαι τὸ πρῶτον ἀνθρώπους ἀποφαίνεται ('Αναξίμανδρος) καὶ τραφέντας, ὥσπερ οἱ γαλεοί, καὶ γενομένους ἱκανοὺς ἑαυτοῖς βοηθεῖν ἐκβληθῆναι τῇν-καῦτα καὶ γῆς λαβέσθαι.

3—ANAXIMENES

First
principle

18—Aët. I 3, 4 (*D.* 13 B 2): 'Αναξίμενης δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιος ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄν-

¹ As through the nozzle of a pair of bellows (Dutch: pijp van een blaasbalg); cf. πόρους τινὰς αὐλώδεις in the next cited passage: „openings like pipes”, which is, however, not the reading of the Mss., but a probable correction.

* A correction by Roeper, adopted by Diels. Mss.: ὑγρόν.

** Mss. χίονι.

*** A probable correction of Diels. Mss.: τόπους τινὰς ἀερώδεις.

των ἀέρα ἀπεφάνητο, ἐκ γὰρ τούτου πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν πάλιν ἀναλύεσθαι. οἷον ἢ ψυχὴ, φησίν, ἢ ἡμετέρα ἀήρ οὔσα συγκρατεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὄλον τὸν κόσμον πνεῦμα καὶ ἀήρ περιέχει.

19—a. [Plut.], *Strom.* fr. 3 (D. 13 A 6): Ἀναξιμένην δέ φασι τὴν τῶν ὀλων ἀρχὴν τὸν ἀέρα εἰπεῖν, καὶ τοῦτον εἶναι τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄπειρον, ταῖς δὲ περὶ αὐτὸν ποιότησιν ὠρισμένον· γενεᾶσθαι τε πάντα κατὰ τινὰ πύκνωσιν τούτου καὶ πάλιν ἀραιώσιν. τὴν γε μὴν κίνησιν ἐξ αἰῶνος ὑπάρχειν. πλουμένου δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος πρῶτην γεγενῆσθαι λέγει τὴν γῆν πλατεῖαν μάλα. διὸ καὶ κατὰ λόγον αὐτὴν ἐποχεῖσθαι τῷ ἀέρι· καὶ τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστροι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς γενέσεως ἔχειν ἐκ γῆς· ἀποφαίνεται γοῦν τὸν ἥλιον γῆν, διὰ δὲ τὴν ὀξεῖαν κίνησιν καὶ μάλ' ἱκανῶς θερμὴν ταύτην καῦσιν * λαβεῖν.

b. Theophr., *Phys. opin.* fr. 2 ap. *Simplic.*, *Phys.* 24, 26 (D. 13 A 5): Ἀναξιμένης δὲ Εὐρυστράτου Μιλήσιος, ἐταῖρος γεγωνὶς Ἀναξιμάνδρου, μίαν μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν ὑποκειμένην φύσιν καὶ ἄπειρόν φησιν ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος, οὐκ ἀόριστον δὲ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος, ἀλλὰ ὠρισμένην, ἀέρα λέγων αὐτήν· διαφέρειν δὲ μανότητι καὶ πυκνότητι κατὰ τὰς οὐσίας. καὶ ἀραιούμενον μὲν πῦρ γίνεσθαι, πυκνούμενον δὲ ἄνεμον, εἴτα νέφος, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ὕδωρ, εἴτα γῆν, εἴτα λίθους, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐκ τούτων. κίνησιν δὲ καὶ οὗτος αἰδίδιον ποιεῖ, δι' ἣν καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν γίνεσθαι.

c. Hippol., *Refut.* I 7, 4-6 (D. 13 A 7): (4) τὴν δὲ γῆν πλατεῖαν εἶναι ἐπ' ἀέρος ὀχουμένην, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστροι πάντα πύρινα ὄντα ἐποχεῖσθαι τῷ ἀέρι διὰ πλάτος. (5) γεγονέναι δὲ τὰ ἄστροι ἐκ γῆς διὰ τὸ τὴν ἱμάδα ἐκ ταύτης ἀνίστασθαι, ἥς ἀραιουμένης τὸ πῦρ γίνεσθαι, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς μετεωριζομένου τοὺς ἀστέρας συνίστασθαι. εἶναι δὲ καὶ γεώδεις φύσεις ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τῶν ἀστέρων συμπεριφερομένας ἐκεῖνοις.

d. Cf. Aët. II, 13, 10 (D. 13 A 14): Ἀ. πυρίνην μὲν τὴν φύσιν τῶν ἄστρον, περιέχειν δὲ τινὰ καὶ γεώδη σώματα συμπεριφερόμενα τούτοις ἀόρατα.

Though not exactly the same, this reminds us of the so-called „dark companions” in modern astronomy.

20—Theo Smyrn. p. 198, 19 Hiller (D. 13 A 16): Ἀναξιμένης δὲ (πρῶτος εὖρεν) ὅτι ἢ σελήνη ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου ἔχει τὸ φῶς καὶ τίνα ἐκλείπει τρόπον.

* A correction of Diels. Mss. ἱκανῶς θερμότην κίνησιν λαβεῖν; Usener θερμότητος; Zeller θερμότητα (without κίνησιν).

SECOND CHAPTER

PYTHAGORAS AND THE OLDER PYTHAGOREANS

Life of
Pythagoras

21—About the life of Pythagoras very little is known for certain. He lived at Samos and „flourished” in the reign of Polycrates.

a. The oldest testimony about a journey of his to Egypt is found in Isocr., *Busir.* 11, 28: Πυθαγόρας ὁ Σάμιος — ἀφικόμενος εἰς Αἴγυπτον καὶ μαθητὴς ἐκείνων (τῶν ἱερέων) γενόμενος τὴν τ' ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτος εἰς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας ἐκόμισε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὰς ἀγιστείας τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἐπιφανέστερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐσπούδασεν.—

Herod. does not confirm this.

b. Strabo speaks of a journey to Egypt and the Orient, XIV 1, 16 p. 638: ἐπὶ τούτου (Πολυκράτους) Πυθαγόραν ἱστοροῦσιν ἰδόντα φεομένην τὴν τυραννίδα ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἀπελθεῖν εἰς Αἴγυπτον καὶ Βαβυλῶνα φιλομαθείας χάριν. ἐπανιόντα δ' ἐκεῖθεν, ὁρῶντα ἔτι συμμένουσαν τὴν τυραννίδα, πλεύσαντα εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἐκεῖ διατελέσαι τὸν βίον.

c. Diog. VIII 3: εἷτα ἐπανῆλθεν εἰς Σάμον καὶ εὐρὼν τὴν πατρίδα τυραννομένην ὑπὸ Πολυκράτους ἀπῆρεν εἰς Κρότωνα τῆς Ἰταλίας κακεῖ νόμους θεῖς τοῖς Ἰταλιώταις ἐδοξάσθη σὺν τοῖς μαθηταῖς, οἳ περὶ τοὺς τριακοσίους ὄντες ᾤκονόμουν ἀριστα τὰ πολιτικά, ὥστε σχεδὸν ἀριστοκρατίαν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν.

mathemati-
cian and
wonder-
worker

22—Apollon., *Mir.* 6 (excerpt from Arist., *Περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων*) (D. 14, A 7): Τούτοις δὲ ἐπιγενόμενος („after these”, sc. Epimenides, Pherecydes a.o.) Πυθαγόρας Μνησάρχου υἱὸς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον διεπονέϊτο περὶ τὰ μαθήματα καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς, ὕστερον δὲ ποτε καὶ τῆς Φερεκύδου τερατοποιίας οὐκ ἀπέστη.

doctrine

23—a. Porphyrr., *Vit. Pyth.* 19: ἃ μὲν οὖν ἔλεγε τοῖς συνοῦσιν οὐδὲ εἷς ἔχει φράσαι βεβαίως· καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' ἡ τυχοῦσα ἦν παρ' αὐτοῖς σιωπῇ. μάλιστα μέντοι γνώριμα παρὰ πᾶσιν ἐγένετο πρῶτον μὲν ὡς ἀθάνατον εἶναι φησι τὴν ψυχὴν, εἷτα μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς ἄλλα γένη ζώων, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰ γιγνόμενά ποτε πάλιν γίνεταί, νέον δ' οὐδὲν ἀπλῶς ἐστι, καὶ ὅτι πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα ἔμψυχα ὁμογενῇ δεῖ νομίζειν. φαίνεται γὰρ εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα τὰ δόγματα πρῶτος κομίσαι ταῦτα Πυθαγόρας.

the oldest
testimony on
metempsy-
chosis

b. Xenophanes, *D.* 21 B 7:

καί ποτέ μιν συτφελιζομένου σκύλακος παριόντα
φασὶν ἐποικτῖραι καὶ τόδε φάσθαι ἔπος·

‘παῦσαι μὴδὲ ῥάπιζ’, ἐπεὶ ἡ φίλου ἀνέρος ἐστὶν
ψυχὴ, τὴν ἔγνω φθελγξαμένης αἰών.’

c. Eudemus ap. Simpl., *Phys.* 732, 30 D:

εἰ δέ τις πιστεύσειε τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις, ὥστε πάλιν τὰ αὐτὰ ἀριθμῶ, κάγω μυθολογήσω τὸ ῥαβδίον ἔχων ὑμῖν καθημένοις οὔτω, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὁμοίως ἔξει, καὶ τὸν χρόνον εὐλογόν ἐστι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι.

periodical
return of
all things

24—a. Porph., *V.P.* 7 ascribes to P. the habit of μὴ μόνον τῶν ἐμψύχων ἀπέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ μαγείροις καὶ θηράτορσι μηδέποτε πλησιάζειν. Cf. the fragm. from the Middle Comedy, Diels, VS.⁵, 58 E.

abstinence

b. Aristoxenus gives a rationalistic interpretation (*F. H. G.* II, 273, fr. 7): "Ὁ γε μὴν Ἀριστόξενος πάντα μὲν τὰ ἄλλα συγχωρεῖν αὐτὸν ἐσθίειν ἐμψυχα, μόνον δ' ἀπέχεσθαι βοῶς ἀροτήρος καὶ κριοῦ.

c. The tradition that Pythagoras also abstained from beans, is attested by Emped. B 141: δειλοί, πάνδειλοι, κυάμων ἀπο χειρας ἔχεσθαι.

d. But Aristoxenus l.l. says he ate them by preference, because they were purgative: Π. δὲ τῶν ὀσπρίων μάλιστα τὸν κύαμον ἐδοκίμασεν· λειαντικόν τε γὰρ εἶναι καὶ διαχωρητικόν· διὸ καὶ μάλιστα κέχρηται αὐτῷ.

Burnet, *E. Gr. Ph.*² 103 (*94), rightly explains: A. represents "the more enlightened sect of the Order", who rejected the old taboo-practices.

25—Emped., *D.* 31 B 129:

praise of P.

ἦν δέ τις ἐν κείνοισιν ἀνὴρ περιώσια εἰδώς,
ὃς δὴ μήκιστον πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον,
παντοίων τε μάλιστα σοφῶν ἐπιήρανος ἔργων.
ὁππότε γὰρ πάσῃσιν ὀρέζαιτο πραπίδεσσιν,
ῥεῖ' ὃ γε τῶν ὄντων πάντων λεύσσεσκεν ἕκαστον
καὶ τε δέξ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τ' εἴκοσιν αἰώνεσσιν.

According to Neoplatonists these verses refer to Pythagoras. On the authority of Iamblichus this interpretation has been generally accepted. Cp. Jaeger, *Theol.*, p. 151 f.

26—According to Iamblichus the Pythagorean community had a postulate of unfixed duration, a first novitiate of three years, and after that five years of silence.

rules of the
order

a. Iambl., *V.P.* c. 17, Deubner p. 40, l. 16 sqq.: Προσιόντων τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ βουλομένων συνδιατρίβειν, οὐκ εὐθὺς συνεχώρει, μέχρις ἂν αὐτῶν τὴν δοκιμασίαν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ποιήσῃται.

postulate

b. Ib. p. 41, 1: καὶ ὄντινα δοκιμάσειεν οὔτως, ἐφίει τριῶν ἐτῶν ὑπερορᾶσθαι, δοκιμάζων πῶς ἔχει βεβαιότητος.

first
novitiate

silence

c. Ib. p. 4I, 4: μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τοῖς προσιοῦσι προσέταττε σιωπὴν πενταετῇ, ἀποπειρώμενος πῶς ἐγκρατείας ἔχουσιν.

During these five years all property was put into a common stock.

poverty

d. Ib. p. 4I, 8: ἐν δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ τὰ μὲν ἐκάστου ὑπάρχοντα, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν αἱ οὐσίαι, ἐκοινοῦντο, διδόμενα τοῖς ἀποδεδεγμένοις εἰς τοῦτο γνωρίμοις, οἵπερ ἐκαλοῦντο πολιτικοί, καὶ οἰκονομικοί τινες καὶ νομοθετικοὶ ὄντες.

"clothing"
and
profession

e. Ib. p. 4I, 12: αὐτοὶ δὲ, εἰ μὲν ἄξιοι ἐφαίνοντο τοῦ μετασχεῖν δογμάτων, ἔκ τε βίου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιεικείας κριθέντες, μετὰ τὴν πενταετῇ σιωπὴν ἐσωτερικοὶ λοιπὸν ἐγίνοντο καὶ ἐντὸς σινδόνης ἐπήκουον τοῦ Π. μετὰ τοῦ καὶ βλέπειν αὐτόν· πρὸ τούτου δὲ ἐκτὸς αὐτῆς καὶ μηδέποτε αὐτῷ ἐνορῶντες μετεῖχον τῶν λόγων διὰ ψιλῆς ἀκοῆς, ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ διδόντες βάσανον τῶν οἰκείων ἡθῶν.

common
reading

f. Ib. c. 2I, p. 57, 15: μετὰ δὲ τὸδε τὸ δεῖπνον ἐγίνοντο σπονδαί, ἔπειτα ἀνάγνωσις ἐγένετο· ἔθος δ' ἦν τὸν μὲν νεώτατον ἀναγινώσκειν, τὸν δὲ πρεσβύτατον ἐπιστατεῖν ὃ δεῖ ἀναγινώσκειν καὶ ὥς δεῖ.

A. J. Festugière, *Sur une nouvelle édition du „De vita Pythagorica” de Jamblique*, *Revue des Etudes grecques* 1937, p. 487 characterizes this ἀνάγνωσις as "le trait le plus monastique de la journée pythagoricienne",—but certainly not a primitive one! Nor is our knowledge of the famous examination of the conscience due to any ancient source, the Golden Verses being of a much younger date. Yet this may be a primitive feature.

g. Carm. aur. 40 (cf. Cic., *Cato Maior* 38):

μηδ' ὕπνον μαλακοῖσιν ἐπ' ὄμμασι προσδέξασθαι,
πρὶν τῶν ἡμερινῶν ἔργων τρίς ἕκαστον ἐπελθεῖν·
πῇ παρέβην; τί ἔρεξα; τί μοι δέον οὐκ ἐτελέσθη;

purpose of
the Pyth.-life

27—Iambl. *V.P.* 137 (Diels, *VS.* 58 D 2):

ἅπαντα ὅσα περὶ τοῦ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν διορίζουσιν, ἐστόχασται τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὁμιλίας, καὶ ἀρχὴ αὕτη ἐστὶ καὶ βίος ἅπας συντέτακται πρὸς τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ θεῷ καὶ ὁ λόγος οὗτος ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ὅτι γελοῖον ποιοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι ἄλλοθεν ποθεν ζητοῦντες τὸ εὖ ἢ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, καὶ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν βασιλευμένῃ χώρᾳ τῶν πολιτῶν τινα ὑπαρχόν θεραπεύσαι ἀμελήσας αὐτοῦ τοῦ πάντων ἄρχοντος καὶ βασιλεύοντος. τοιοῦτον γὰρ οἶονται ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.

moral
precepts

28—a. Ib. 175 (D. 58 D 3): μετὰ δὲ τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον πλεῖστον ποιεῖσθαι λόγον γονέων τε καὶ νόμου, καὶ τούτων ὑπήκουον αὐτὸν κατα-

σκευάζειν, μὴ πλαστῶς, ἀλλὰ πεπεισμένως. καθόλου δὲ φοντο δεῖν ὑπολαμβάνειν μηδὲν εἶναι μεῖζον κακὸν ἀναρχίας· οὐ γὰρ πεφυκέναι ἀνθρώπον διασφύζεσθαι μηδενὸς ἐπιστατοῦντος.

b. Ib. 196 (D. 58 D 6):

(καὶ ταῦτα δὲ παρέδωκε τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις Πυθαγόρας, ὧν αἴτιος αὐτὸς ἦν). προσεῖχον γὰρ οὗτοι, τὰ σώματα ὡς ἂν <ἀεὶ> ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν διακέχθαι, καὶ μὴ ἥ ὅτε μὲν ρικνὰ, ὅτε δὲ πολύσαρκα· ἀνωμάλου γὰρ βίου φοντο εἶναι δεῖγμα. ἀλλὰ ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν οὐχ ὅτε μὲν ἱλαροί, ὅτε δὲ κατηφεῖς, ἀλλὰ ἐφ' ὁμαλοῦ πρῶως χαίροντες. διεκρούοντο δὲ ὀργάς, ἀθυμίας, ταραχάς· καὶ ἦν αὐτοῖς παράγγελμα, ὡς οὐδὲν δεῖ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων συμπτωμάτων ἀπροσδόκητον εἶναι παρὰ τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα προσδοκᾶν, ὧν μὴ τυγχάνουσιν αὐτοὶ κύριοι ὄντες. εἰ δέ ποτε αὐτοῖς συμβαίῃ ἡ ὀργή ἢ λύπη ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, ἐκποδὼν ἀπηλλάττοντο καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος γενόμενος ἐπειρᾶτο καταπέττειν τε καὶ ἰατρεύειν τὸ πάθος.

This information of Iamblichus is due to Aristoxenus, who had it from the μαθηματικοί, the "more enlightened sect of the Order", of the fourth century. The examination of the conscience is by him explained rationally as a training of the memory (Iambl., *V. P.* 165; D. 58 D 1).

29—We also possess a collection of ἀκούσματα καὶ σύμβολα: the precepts of those Pythagoreans who kept the old traditions. Porphyry a.o. try to explain them morally and allegorically; but they are simple taboos of a primitive character. See Burnet, *E. Gr. Ph.*⁴ p. 96.

taboo-
precepts

a. Diog., VIII 34 sqq. (D. 58 C 3):

ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν κυάμων.
τὰ πεσόντα μὴ ἀναιρεῖσθαι.
ἀλεκτρυόνος μὴ ἄπτεσθαι λευκοῦ.
τῶν ἰχθύων μὴ ἄπτεσθαι ὅσοι ἱεροί.
ἄρτον μὴ καταγνύειν.

b. Porph., V. P. 42 (D. 58 C 6):

ζυγὸν μὴ ὑπερβαίνειν.
μὴ τὸ πῦρ τῇ μαχαίρᾳ σκαλεύειν.
μὴ δ' ἀποδημοῦντα ἐπιστρέφεισθαι.
τάς τε λεωφόρους μὴ βαδίζειν.
μὴ δὲ χελιδόνας ἐν οἰκίᾳ δέχεσθαι.

c. Iambl., *Protr.* 21 (D. ib.):

τάς λεωφόρους ὁδοὺς ἐκκλίνων διὰ τῶν ἀτραπῶν βάδιζε.
πῦρ μαχαίρῃ μὴ σκάλευε.

ὁξίδα ἀπὸ σεαυτοῦ ἀπόστρεφε πᾶσαν.

εἰς μὲν ὑπόδησιν τὸν δεξιὸν πόδα προπάρεχε, εἰς δὲ ποδόνιπτρον
τὸν εὐώνυμον.

στρωμάτων ἀναστάς συνέλισσε αὐτὰ καὶ τὸν τόπον συνστόρνυε.

χύτρας ἔχνος ἀπὸ σποδοῦ ἀφάνιζε.

κυάμων ἀπέχου.

Some of these precepts might seem to be of a positive character and therefore not to belong to the category of the taboo (for instance "Put on your right shoe first", "When the pot is taken off the fire, make disappear the mark of it in the ashes", and "When you rise from the bedclothes", e.q.s.). Yet this is only an appearance, the real sense of these prescripts being a defence or a warning ("not to leave the mark of the pot in the ashes, nor that of the body in the clothes"). W. Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie* II 2, Leipzig 1906, p. 308, rightly remarks that the true and only prescript which is behind the manyfold taboo-defences is this: "Guard against the wrath of the daemons!"

Cp. G. van der Leeuw, *Phaenomenologie der Religion*, Tübingen 1933, p. 25: "Tabu ist Meidung der Tat und des Worts aus Scheu vor der Macht" (sc. of the daemons).

**the Pyth.
catechism**

30—Iambl., *V. P.* 82-83 (D. 58 C 4): πάντα δὲ τὰ οὕτως <καλούμενα> Ἀκουσμάτα διήρηται εἰς τρία εἶδη· τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν τί ἐστι σημαίνει, τὰ δὲ τί μάλιστα, τὰ δὲ τί δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν. τὰ μὲν οὖν τί ἐστι τοιαῦτα, οἷον τί ἐστὶν αἱ μακάρων νῆσοι; — ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη. τί ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς μαντεῖον; — τετρακτὺς . . . τὰ δὲ τί μάλιστα, οἷον τί τὸ δικαιοτάτον; — θύειν. τί τὸ σοφώτατον; — ἀριθμός . . . τί κάλλιστον; — ἀρμονία. τὰ δὲ τί πρακτέον ἢ οὐ πρακτέον τῶν Ἀκουσμάτων τοιαῦτά ἐστιν, οἷον ὅτι δεῖ τεκνοποιεῖσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ ἀντικαταλιπεῖν τοὺς θεραπεύοντας τὸν θεόν· ἢ ὅτι δεῖ τὸν δεξιὸν ὑποδεῖσθαι πρότερον, ἢ ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τὰς λεωφόρους βαδίζειν ὁδούς . . .

**scientific
principles**

31—Our earliest direct testimony about the scientific principles of Pythagoreans are the so-called fragments of Philolaus, probably dating from the fourth century; if the greater part of them is genuine, from the beginning of the fourth century.

Boeckh, *Philolaos*, 1819, pleaded for the genuineness of the whole work. Bywater, *Journ. of Philol.* 1868, p. 21-53, rejected the whole. Burnet agrees with him. Diels admits most fragments as genuine, excepting the fr. 21 and 22. E. Frank, *Plato u. die sog. Pythagoreer*, 1923, argues that the work is composed in the second half of the fourth century, as it contains traces of Theaetetus' theory of the five regular bodies and of the musical theories of that time. R. Mondolfo, *Riv. di Filol.* 1937, p. 233 sqq., tried to refute these arguments and defends the genuineness.

Diog., VIII 85: τοῦτόν φησι Δημήτριος ἐν Ὀμωνύμοις πρῶτον ἐκδοῦναι τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν <βιβλία καὶ ἐπιγράψαι περὶ> φύσεως, ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἦδε (D. 44 B1): ἡ φύσις δ' ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀρμόχθη ἐξ ἀπείρων τε καὶ περαινόντων καὶ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα.

32—a. Philolaus, D. 44 B 4: καὶ πάντα γὰρ μὲν τὰ γινωσκόμενα ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντι · οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε οὐδὲν οὔτε νοηθῆμεν οὔτε γνωσθῆμεν ἄνευ τούτου. number

b. Philolaus, Ib. B 11: γνωμικὰ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἡ τῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ ἀγεμονικὰ καὶ διδασκαλικὰ τῷ ἀπορουμένῳ παντὸς καὶ ἀγνωσμένου παντί. οὐ γὰρ ἡς δῆλον οὐδενὶ οὐδὲν τῶν πραγμάτων οὔτε αὐτῶν ποθ' αὐτὰ οὔτε ἄλλω ποτ' ἄλλο, αἱ μὲν ἡς ἀριθμὸς καὶ ἡ τοῦτω οὐσία. — ψεῦδος δὲ οὐδὲν δέχεται ἡ τῷ ἀριθμῷ φύσις οὐδὲ ἀρμονία · οὐ γὰρ οἰκεῖον αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ. τὰς τῷ ἀπείρῳ καὶ ἀνοήτῳ καὶ ἀλόγῳ φύσιος τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶ.

33—a. Philolaus, Ib. B 6: περὶ δὲ φύσιος καὶ ἀρμονίας ὧδε ἔχει · ἡ harmony μὲν ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων αἰδῖος ἔσσα καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν ἡ φύσις θεῖαν γὰ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίναν ἐνδέχεται γινῶσιν, πλέον γὰρ ἢ ὅτι οὐχ οἶόν τ' ἦν οὐθὲν τῶν ἐόντων καὶ γινωσκόμενον ὑφ' ἀμῶν γὰ γενέσθαι μὴ ὑπαρχούσας τὰς ἐστοῦς τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐξ ὧν συνέστα ὁ κόσμος, καὶ τῶν περαινόντων καὶ τῶν ἀπείρων. ἐπεὶ δὲ ταὶ ἀρχαὶ ὑπάρχον οὐχ ὁμοῖαι οὐδ' ὁμόφυλοι ἔσσαι, ἥδη ἀδύνατον ἡς κα αὐταῖς κοσμηθῆναι¹, εἰ μὴ ἀρμονία ἐπεγένετο, ὥτινιῶν τρόπῳ ἐγένετο. τὰ μὲν ὧν ὁμοῖα καὶ ὁμόφυλα ἀρμονίας οὐδὲν ἐπεδέοντο · τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια μὴδὲ ὁμόφυλα μὴδὲ ἰσοταγῇ² ἀνάγκη τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀρμονίᾳ συγκεκλειῆσθαι, οἷα³ μέλλοντι ἐν κόσμῳ κατέχεσθαι.

b. Nicom., *Arithm.* II 19, p. 115, 2 Hoche: ἀρμονία δὲ πάντως ἐξ ἐναντίων γίνεται · (D. 44 B 10) ἐστὶ γὰρ ἀρμονία πολυμιγέων ἔνωσις καὶ δίχα φρονούντων συμφρόνησις.

It is hardly possible that these lines should belong to presocratic literature. Cp. the participle σωματῶν in B 11, and most of all B 12: καὶ τὰ μὲν τὰς σφαίρας σώματα πέντε ἐντί, τὰ ἐν τῇ σφαίρᾳ πῦρ <καὶ> ὕδωρ καὶ γᾶ καὶ ἀήρ, καὶ ὁ τὰς σφαίρας ὀλκᾶς, πέμπτον.

Yet, number and harmony will have been the fundamental principles of ancient Pythagoreanism, reaching back to the master himself.

34—a. Nicom., *Arithm.* p. 83, 12:

Πρότερον δὲ ἐπιγνωστέον ὅτι ἕκαστον γράμμα Ϝ σημειούμεθα ἀριθμὸν, numbers
represented
as figures

¹ αὐταῖς κοσμηθῆναι: to establish with them a cosmic order.

² Diels reads ἰσοταγῇ, a correction of Heidel. ἰσοταχῇ F.

³ οἷα Diels. ἢ εἰ F; αἱ Meineke.

οἷον τὸ ι, ϛ τὸ δέκα, τὸ κ, ϛ τὰ εἴκοσι, τὸ ω, ϛ τὰ ὀκτακόσια, νόμῳ καὶ συνθήματι ἀνθρωπίνῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ φύσει σημαντικόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ.

Cf. Theo Smyrn., *Expositio*, pp. 31 sqq.

b. Also Iambl., *Introd.* p. 56, 27 Pistelli: ἰστέον γὰρ ὡς τὸ παλαιὸν φυσικώτερον οἱ πρόσθεν ἐσημαίνοντο τὰς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ποσότητας, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ νῦν συμβολικῶς.

Eurytus

35—This is illustrated rather curiously by the example of Eurytus, the disciple of Philolaus.

a. Arist., *Metaph.* N 5 1092 b⁸: οὐθὲν δὲ διώρισται οὐδὲ ὁποτέρως οἱ ἀριθμοὶ αἴτιοι τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τοῦ εἶναι, πότερον ὡς ὄροι, (οἷον αἱ στιγμαὶ τῶν μεγεθῶν, καὶ ὡς Εὐρυτος ἔταττε τίς ἀριθμὸς τίνος, οἷον ὁδὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπου, ὁδὶ δὲ ἵππου. ὥσπερ οἱ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἄγοντες εἰς τὰ σχήματα τρίγωνον καὶ τετράγωνον, οὕτως ἀφομοιῶν ταῖς ψήφοις τὰς μορφὰς τῶν φυτῶν). ἢ ὅτι [δ]¹ λόγος ἡ συμφωνία ἀριθμῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον.

b. Alex. Aphrod. p. 827, 9 explains: κείσθω λόγου χάριν ὄρος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ σὺν ἀριθμός, ὁ δὲ τξ' τοῦ φυτοῦ· τοῦτο θεὶς ἐλάμβανε ψηφίδας διακοσίας πεντήκοντα τὰς μὲν πρασίνας τὰς δὲ μελαίνας, ἄλλας <δὲ> ἐρυθράς καὶ ὅλως παντοδαποῖς χρώμασι κεχρωσμένας· εἶτα περιχρίων τὸν τοῖχον ἀσβέστῳ καὶ σκιαγραφῶν ἄνθρωπον καὶ φυτὸν οὕτως ἐπήγνυ τὰσδε μὲν τὰς ψηφίδας ἐν τῇ τοῦ προσώπου σκιαγραφίᾳ, τὰς δὲ ἐν τῇ τῶν χειρῶν, ἄλλας δὲ ἐν ἄλλοις, καὶ ἀπετέλει τὴν τοῦ μιμουμένου ἀνθρώπου διὰ ψηφίδων ἰσαριθμῶν ταῖς μονάσιν, ἃς ὀρίζειν ἔφασκε τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

the Pyth. proposition

36—This manner of representing numbers suggests geometrical problems. The so-called Pythagorean proposition is an application of it.

Procl. *ad Eucl.* I 47: Τῶν μὲν ἱστορεῖν τὰ ἀρχαῖα βουλομένων ἀκούοντας τὸ θεώρημα τοῦτο εἰς Πυθαγόραν ἀναπεμπόντων ἔστιν εὐρεῖν καὶ βουθυτεῖν λεγόντων αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῇ εὐρέσει.

likeness of numbers and things

37—Aristotle sometimes attributes to Pythagoreans the doctrine that numbers have a great likeness with things of the world, sometimes that, according to them, things *are* numbers, and that number is the essence of all.

¹ δ secl. Bonitz.

a. Arist., *Metaph.* A 5, 985 b²³:

Ἐν δὲ τούτοις καὶ πρὸ τούτων οἱ καλούμενοι Πυθαγόρειοι τῶν μαθημάτων ἀφάμενοι πρῶτοι ταῦτα προήγαγον, καὶ ἐντραφέντες ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰς τούτων ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων ἀρχὰς ᾗθήθησαν εἶναι πάντων. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τούτων οἱ ἀριθμοὶ φύσει πρῶτοι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἐδόκουν θεωρεῖν ὁμοιώματα πολλὰ τοῖς οὖσι καὶ γιγνομένοις, μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν πυρὶ καὶ γῇ καὶ ὕδατι, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τοιονδὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν πάθος δικαιοσύνη, τὸ δὲ τοιονδὶ ψυχὴ καὶ νοῦς, ἕτερον δὲ καιρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς εἰπεῖν ἕκαστον ὁμοίως, ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἐν ἀριθμοῖς ὁρῶντες τὰ πάθη καὶ τοὺς λόγους, — ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἐφαίνετο τὴν φύσιν ἀφωμιῶσθαι πᾶσαν, οἱ δ' ἀριθμοὶ πάσης τῆς φύσεως πρῶτοι, τὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα πάντων εἶναι ὑπέλαβον, καὶ τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀριθμὸν.

b. Cf. *Metaph.* A 6, 987 b¹⁰, where he is comparing Pythagorean doctrine to Plato's theory of the Ideas:

τὴν δὲ μέθεξιν τοῦνομα μόνον μετέβαλεν (Plato) · οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πυθαγόρειοι μιμήσει τὰ ὄντα φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Πλάτων δὲ μεθέξει, τοῦνομα μεταβλών.

38—a. Arist., *Metaph.* A 5, 987 a¹⁴:

τοσοῦτον δὲ προσεπέθεσαν, ὃ καὶ ἰδίον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι τὸ πεπερασμένον καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ ἐν οὐχ ἑτέρας τινὰς ᾗθήθησαν εἶναι φύσεις, οἷον πῦρ ἢ γῆν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν οὐσίαν εἶναι τούτων ὧν κατηγοροῦνται, διὸ καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν πάντων.

number
the essence
of all

b. Cp. *Metaph.* M 6, 1080 b¹⁶:

καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι δ' ἓνα τὸν μαθηματικόν (sc. ἀριθμὸν φασὶν εἶναι), πλὴν οὐ κεχωρισμένον, ἀλλ' ἐκ τούτου τὰς αἰσθητάς οὐσίας συνεστάναι φασὶν · τὸν γὰρ ὅλον οὐρανὸν κατασκευάζουσιν ἐξ ἀριθμῶν.

things
consist of
numbers

c. Cf. also *Metaph.* N 3, 1090 a²⁰:

οἱ δὲ Π. διὰ τὸ ὁρᾶν πολλὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν πάθη ὑπάρχοντα τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς σώμασιν, εἶναι μὲν ἀριθμοὺς ἐποίησαν τὰ ὄντα, οὐ χωριστοὺς δέ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀριθμῶν τὰ ὄντα.

things are
numbers

d. Ib. 1090 a³²⁻³⁵:

κατὰ μέντοι τὸ ποιεῖν ἐξ ἀριθμῶν τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα, ἐκ μὴ ἐχόντων βάρος μὴδὲ κουφότητα ἔχοντα κουφότητα καὶ βάρος, εἰκόλασι περὶ ἄλλου οὐρανοῦ λέγειν καὶ σωμάτων ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν.

criticized
by Ar.

first no
elaborated
theory

39—The Pythagoreans first explained only a few things by numbers.

a. Arist. *M* 4, 1078 b²¹: οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι πρότερον περί τινων ὀλίγων, ὧν τοὺς λόγους εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀνῆπτον, οἷον τί ἐστι καιρὸς ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἢ γάμος.

criticized by
the Peripat.

b. *Magna Mor.* A 1, 1182 a¹¹:

πρῶτος μὲν οὖν ἐνεχείρησε Π. περὶ ἀρετῆς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δέ · τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀνάγων οὐκ οἰκείαν τῶν ἀρετῶν τὴν θεωρίαν ἐποίητο · οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκεις ἴσος.


δεκάς

40—a. Philolaus, D. 44 B 11: θεωρεῖν δεῖ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τῷ ἀριθμῷ καττὰν δύναμιν, ἅτις ἐστὶ ἐν τᾷ δεκάδι · μεγάλα γὰρ καὶ παντελὴς καὶ παντοεργὸς καὶ θείω καὶ ὠρανίῳ βίῳ καὶ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἀρχὰ καὶ ἀγεμῶν κοινωνοῦσα * . . . δύναμις καὶ τᾷς δεκάδος. ἄνευ δὲ τούτας πάντ' ἄπειρα καὶ ἄδηλα καὶ ἀφανῆ.

b. Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* A 5, 986a⁸:

τέλειον ἢ δεκάς εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶσαν εἰληφέναι τὴν τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσιν.

τετρακτύς



41—a Pythagoras is called the inventor of the tetractys, a figure that represents the number ten as the triangle of four. See *Carm. Aur.* 47:


οὐ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρα ψυχᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτύν,
παγὰν ἀενάου φύσιος ῥίζωμά τ' ἔχουσιν.

penta-
gramma

b. Another sacred symbol of Pythagoreans is the pentagram or pentalpha. Schol. Luc., p. 234, 21 Rabe:

τὸ πεντάγραμμον · ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ λεγόμενον πένταλφα σύμβολον ἦν πρὸς ἀλλήλους Πυθαγορείων ἀναγνωριστικὸν καὶ τούτῳ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς ἐχρῶντο.

Later a wellknown magical symbol (Paracelsus in the 16th century; also in Goethe's *Faust*).



two
contrarious
principles

42—Arist. *Metaph.* A 5, 986 a¹⁵:

φαίνονται δὲ καὶ οὗτοι (οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι) τὸν ἀριθμὸν νομίζοντες ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ ὡς ὕλην τοῖς οὐσι καὶ ὡς πάθη τε καὶ ἔξεις, τοῦ δὲ ἀριθμοῦ στοιχεῖα τὸ τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν, τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πεπερασμένον τὸ δ' ἄπειρον, τὸ δ' ἐν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι τούτων (καὶ γὰρ ἄρτιον εἶναι καὶ περιττόν), τὸν δ' ἀριθμὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνός, ἀριθμοὺς δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν ὅλον οὐρανόν. ἕτεροι

* After κοινωνοῦσα Diels indicates a lacuna of 12 letters.

δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων τὰς ἀρχὰς δέκα λέγουσιν εἶναι τὰς κατὰ συστοιχίαν λεγομένας·

πέρας	ἄπειρον,
περιττόν	ἄρτιον,
ἐν	πλήθος,
δεξιόν	ἀριστερόν,
ἄρρεν	θῆλυ,
ῥερεμῶν	κινούμενον,
εὐθύ	καμπύλον,
φῶς	σκότος,
ἀγαθόν	κακόν,
τετράγωνον	ἑτερόμηκες.

ὅνπερ τρόπον ἔοικε καὶ Ἀλκμαίων ὁ Κροτωνιάτης ὑπολαβεῖν, καὶ ἦτοι οὗτος παρ' ἐκείνων ἢ ἐκεῖνοι παρὰ τούτου παρέλαβον τὸν λόγον τοῦτον.

43—Aristotle tells us, Pythagoreans held that there was „boundless breath” outside the heavens, and that it was inhaled by the world.

the
breathing
universe

a. Arist., *Phys.* IV 6, 213 b²²: εἶναι δ' ἔφασαν καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι κενόν, καὶ ἐπεισιέναι αὐτῷ * τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου πνεύματος ὡς ἀναπνέοντι καὶ τὸ κενόν, ὃ διορίζει τὰς φύσεις, ὡς ὄντος τοῦ κενοῦ χωρισμοῦ τινος τῶν ἐφεξῆς καὶ διορίσεως· καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι πρῶτον ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς· τὸ γὰρ κενὸν διορίζει τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν.

b. Cf. *Plac.* II 9, 1. (*Dox.* 338): οἱ ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου ἐκτός εἶναι τοῦ κόσμου κενόν, εἰς δ' ἀναπνεῖ ὁ κόσμος καὶ ἐξ οὗ.

44—a. *Aët.* II 7, 7 (D. 44 A 16): Φιλόλαος¹ πῦρ ἐν μέσῳ περὶ τὸ κέντρον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν τοῦ παντός καλεῖ καὶ Διὸς οἶκον καὶ μητέρα θεῶν, βωμόν τε καὶ συνοχήν² καὶ μέτρον φύσεως· καὶ πάλιν ἕτερον ἀνωτάτῳ, τὸ περιέχον. πρῶτον δ' εἶναι φύσει τὸ μέσον, περὶ δὲ τοῦτο δέκα σώματα θεῶν χορεύειν, [οὐρανόν] <μετὰ τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν> τοὺς ἑπτά πλανήτας, μεθ' οὓς ἥλιον, ὕψ' ὃ σελήνην, ὕψ' ἥ τὴν γῆν, ὕψ' ἥ τὴν ἀντίχθονα, μεθ' ἧς σύμπαντα τὸ πῦρ ἐστίας περὶ τὰ κέντρα τάξιν ἐπέχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀνωτάτῳ μέρος τοῦ περιέχοντος, ἐν ᾧ τὴν εἰλικρίνειαν εἶναι τῶν στοιχείων, ὄλυμπον καλεῖ· τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τὴν τοῦ ὀλύμπου φοράν, ἐν ᾧ τοὺς πέντε πλανήτας

the so-called
cosmology
of Philolaus


¹ Φ., sc. says.

² What keeps all together.

* αὐτῷ is read in one ms, and accepted by Simpl., Prantl, Bonitz and Carteron. The other mss have αὐτό, as is read also by Philop. and Themist., followed by W. D. Ross in his recent edition.

μεθ' ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης τετάχθαι, κόσμον, τὸ δ' ὑπὸ τούτοις ὑποσέληνόν τε καὶ περιγίειον μέρος, ἐν ᾧ τὰ τῆς φιλομεταβόλου γενέσεως, οὐρανόν. καὶ περὶ μὲν τὰ τεταγμένα τῶν μετεώρων γίνεσθαι τὴν σοφίαν, περὶ δὲ τῶν γινομένων τὴν ἀταξίαν τὴν ἀρετὴν¹, τελείαν μὲν ἐκείνην, ἀτελεῖ δὲ ταύτην.

It is highly improbable that it was Philolaus who taught this cosmology. For the arguments see Burnet, *E. Gr. Ph.* 345 f, ⁴ 297 f; W. Wiersma, *Mnem.* 1942, p. 28 f. argues for Hicetas of Syracuse as the author of this cosmology. Cf. M. T. Cardini, *Il cosmo di Filolao*, *Rivista di Storia della Filosofia* (Milano) 1946 (1), 322-333.



The cosmic system of Philolaus.

the
antichthon

b. Arist., *De caelo* II 13, 293 a¹⁸: τῶν πλείστων ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου κεῖσθαι (τὴν γῆν) λεγόντων — ἐναντίως οἱ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, καλούμενοι δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγουσιν. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μέσου πῦρ εἶναι φασι, τὴν δὲ γῆν ἓν τῶν

¹ καὶ περὶ μὲν — τὴν ἀρετὴν - "And that wisdom is referring to the fixed order of the heavenly bodies and phenomena, but virtue to the disorder of things that come into being."

ἄστρον οὖσαν, κύκλῳ φερομένην περὶ τὸ μέσον νύκτα τε καὶ ἡμέραν ποιεῖν. ἔτι δ' ἐναντίαν ἄλλην ταύτη κατασκευάζουσι γῆν, ἣν ἀντίχθονα ὄνομα καλοῦσιν, οὐ πρὸς τὰ φαινόμενα τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ζητοῦντες, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τινὰς λόγους καὶ δόξας αὐτῶν τὰ φαινόμενα προσέλκοντες καὶ πειρώμενοι συγχосμεῖν.

c. Cic., *Acad. pr.* II 123: Hicetas Syracosius, ut ait Theophrastus, caelum, solem, lunam, stellas, supra denique omnia stare censet, neque praeter terram rem ullam in mundo moveri; quae cum circum axem se summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia, quae, si stante terra caelum moveretur.

Hicetas

d. *Aët.* III 13, 3 (D. 51, 5):

Ecphantus

Ἑρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικός καὶ Ἐκφαντος ὁ Πυθαγόρειος κινουῦσι μὲν τὴν γῆν, οὐ μὴν γε μεταβατικῶς, ἀλλὰ τρεπτικῶς, τροχοῦ δίκην ἐνηξονισμένην¹, ἀπὸ δυσμῶν ἐπ' ἀνατολὰς περὶ τὸ ἴδιον αὐτῆς κέντρον.

45—Arist., *De caelo* II 9, 290 b¹²:

the „harmony of the spheres”

φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτων, ὅτι καὶ τὸ φάναι γίνεσθαι φερομένων² ἁρμονίαν, ὡς συμφώνων γινόμενων τῶν ψόφων, κομψῶς μὲν εἴρηται καὶ περιττῶς³ ὑπὸ τῶν εἰπόντων, οὐ μὴν οὕτως ἔχει ἀληθές. δοκεῖ γάρ τισιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τηλικούτων φερομένων σωμάτων γίνεσθαι ψόφον, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν οὔτε τοὺς ὄγκους ἔχοντων ἴσους οὔτε τοιούτῳ τάχει φερομένων · ἡλίου δὲ καὶ σελήνης, ἔτι τε τοσούτων τὸ πλῆθος ἄστρον καὶ τὸ μέγεθος φερομένων τῷ τάχει τοιαύτην φορὰν ἀδύνατον μὴ γίνεσθαι ψόφον ἀμήχανόν τινα τὸ μέγεθος. ὑποθέμενοι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τὰς ταχυτήτας ἐκ τῶν ἀποστάσεων ἔχειν τοὺς τῶν συμφωνιῶν λόγους, ἐναρμόνιον φασὶ γίνεσθαι τὴν φωνὴν φερομένων κύκλῳ τῶν ἄστρον. ἐπεὶ δ' ἄλογον ἐδόκει τὸ μὴ συνακουεῖν ἡμᾶς τῆς φωνῆς ταύτης, αἴτιον τούτου φασὶν εἶναι τὸ γιγνομένοις εὐθύς ὑπάρχειν τὸν ψόφον, ὥστε μὴ διάδηλον εἶναι πρὸς τὴν ἐναντίαν σιγὴν · πρὸς ἄλληλα γὰρ φωνῆς καὶ σιγῆς εἶναι τὴν διάγνωσιν, ὥστε, καθάπερ τοῖς χαλκοτύποις διὰ συνήθειαν οὐθὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ταὐτὸ συμβαίνειν.

This theory of the „harmony of the spheres” survived the Middle Ages. Kepler worked it out into details in his work *Harmonices mundi*. See Heath, *Aristarchus* pp. 105-115 (where the above quoted passage is translated).

46—Alcmaeon of Croton is said to have taught the divinity of the celestial bodies.

divinity of the celestial bodies

¹ Not so, that it goes from one side to the other, but turning itself round an axis, like a wheel fixed in an axle.

² sc. τῶν ἄστρον. ³ with subtilty.

a. Arist., *De anima* I 2, 405 a²⁹:

παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις (Thales, Diogenes and Heraclitus) καὶ Ἀ. ἔοικεν ὑπολαβεῖν περὶ ψυχῆς· φησὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι διὰ τὸ εἰκέναι τοῖς ἀθανάτοις· τοῦτο δ' ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ ὡς αἰετὶ κινουμένη· κινεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ τὰ θεῖα πάντα συνεχῶς αἰετὶ, σελήνην, ἥλιον, τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον.

b. Cic., *De nat. deorum* I 11, 27:

Crotoniates autem A., qui soli et lunae reliquisque sideribus omnibus animoque praeterea divinitatem dedit, non sensit sese mortalibus rebus immortalitatem dare.

c. Clem., *Protr.* 66 (I, 50, 20 St.):

ὁ γὰρ τοι Κροτωνιάτης Ἀ. θεοὺς ᾤετο τοὺς ἀστέρας εἶναι ἐμψύχους ὄντας.

further
history of
the Pyth.
society

47—The synedrion of the Pythagoreans at Croton was burned with the members themselves by the Crotoniates in the years 440-430.

a. Polyb., *Histor.* II 39: Καθ' οὗς γὰρ καιροὺς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν τόποις, κατὰ τὴν μεγάλην Ἑλλάδα τότε προσαγορευομένην, ἐνέπρησαν τὰ συνέδρια τῶν Πυθαγορείων, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ γινομένου κινήματος ὁλοσχεροῦς¹ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας (ἔπερ εἰκός, ὡς ἂν τῶν πρώτων ἀνδρῶν ἐξ ἐκάστης πόλεως οὕτω παραλόγως διαφθαρέντων), συνέβη τὰς κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς τόπους Ἑλληνικὰς πόλεις ἀναπλησθῆναι φόβου καὶ στάσεως καὶ παντοδαπῆς ταραχῆς.

Philolaus
and Lysis

Philolaus was during that time at Thebes (Plato, *Phaedo* 61 d). According to Aristoxenus (Iambl., *V. P.* 250) only two Pythagoreans escaped from Croton. One of them was Lysis, who went to Thebes and afterwards became the master of Epaminondas.

b. Iambl., *V. Pyth.* 250, Deubner p. 134, l. 16 ff.: τῶν δύο τῶν περισωθέντων, ἀμφοτέρων Ταραντίνων ὄντων, ὁ μὲν Ἀρχιππος ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς Τάραντα, ὁ δὲ Λύσις μισήσας τὴν ὀλιγωρίαν ἀπῆρεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ ἐν Ἀχαΐᾳ διέτριβε τῇ Πελοποννησιακῇ, ἔπειτα εἰς Θήβας μετωκίσσατο σπουδῆς² τινος γενομένης, οὐπερ ἐγένετο Ἐπαμινώνδας ἀκροατῆς καὶ πατέρα τὸν Λύσιν ἐκάλεσεν.

¹ A complete riot.

² „Political zeal”, party feelings by which he came into danger.

THIRD CHAPTER

HERACLITUS

48—H. “flourished” round 500 (Diog. IX, 1). He is younger than Pythagoras and Xenophanes, which appears from D. 22 B 40:

date

a. πολυμαθὴν νόον ἔχειν οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην αὐτίς τε Ξενοφάνεα καὶ Ἑκαταῖον.

On the other hand he is older than Parmenides, who clearly combats him in his poem (Parm., D. 28 B 6, vs. 8-9).

b. D. 22 B 121 speaks of the expulsion of Hermodorus: ἄξιον Ἐφεσίοις ἡβηδὸν ἀπάγξασθαι, οἷτινες Ἑρμόδωρον ἄνδρα ἑωυτῶν ὀνήιστον ἐξέβαλον φάντες· ἡμέων μὴδὲ εἰς ὀνήιστος ἔστω, εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλη τε καὶ μετ’ ἄλλων.

This event, according to Zeller, could not have taken place before the downfall of Persian rule. H. consequently cannot have published his work till after 478. Burnet, *E. Gr. Ph.*² 143 sq. rightly argued that the Persians never took their internal selfgovernment from the Ionian cities¹: the accepted view was, as appears from the spurious Letters of Heraclitus, that the expulsion of Hermodorus took place during the reign of Darius.

49—Diog. IX 1, 1-3: (1) Μεγαλόφρων δὲ γέγονε παρ’ ὄντιναοῦν καὶ ὑπερόπτης, ὥς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συγγράμματος αὐτοῦ δηλόν, ἐν ᾧ φησι „πολυμαθὴν” e.q.s.² (2) Ἀξιούμενος δὲ καὶ νόμους θεῖναι πρὸς αὐτῶν ὑπερεῖδε διὰ τὸ ἤδη κεκρατῆσθαι τῇ πονηρᾷ πολιτείᾳ τὴν πόλιν. (3) ἀναχωρήσας δὲ εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος μετὰ τῶν παίδων ἡστραγάλιζεν· περιστάντων δ’ αὐτὸν τῶν Ἐφεσίων, ‘τί, ὦ κάκιστοι, θαυμάζετε;’ εἶπεν· ἢ οὐ κρεῖττον τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ μεθ’ ὑμῶν πολιτεύεσθαι;’ καὶ τέλος μισανθρωπήσας καὶ ἐκπατήσας ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι διητᾶτο, πῶας σιτούμενος καὶ βοτάνας. (5) ἤκουσέ τε οὐδενός, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν ἔφη διζήσασθαι καὶ μαθεῖν πάντα παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ³.

life and
character

50—a. Diog. ib. 5-6: τὸ δὲ φερόμενον αὐτοῦ βιβλίον ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ συνέχοντος⁴ περὶ φύσεως, διήρηται δὲ εἰς τρεῖς λόγους, εἷς τε τὸν περὶ τοῦ

his book

¹ Cp. in the fourth edition p. 130 f.

² The author could also have cited D. B 49: εἷς ἐμοὶ μυρία, ἐὰν ἄριστος ᾖ.

³ B 101: ἐδιζήσάμην ἑμεωυτόν.

⁴ τὸ συνέχον = the chief matter (frequently in *Polyb.*).

παντός καὶ πολιτικὸν καὶ θεολογικόν. (6) ἀνέθηκε δ' αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερὸν, ὡς μὲν τινες, ἐπιτηδεύσας ἀσφαφέστερον γράψαι, ὅπως οἱ δυνάμενοι ¹ <μόνον> προσίοιεν αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ἐκ τοῦ δημώδους εὐκαταφρόνητον ᾗ.

b. Ib.: Θεόφραστος δέ φησιν ὑπὸ μελαγχολίας τὰ μὲν ἡμιτελῆ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἔχοντα γράψαι.

ὁ σκοτεινός 51—He was surnamed ὁ σκοτεινός.

a. Cic., *De fin.* II, 15; Strabo XIV, 25 (τῶν μὲν παλαιῶν Ἡράκλειτός τε ὁ σκοτεινὸς καλούμενος καὶ Ἑρμόδωρος); [Arist.], *De mundo* 5. Livius mentions in the days of Hannibal one „Heraclitus, cui Scotino cognomen erat” (XXIII 39, 3).

b. Arist., *Rhet.* III 5, 1407 b¹⁵ says that it is difficult to punctuate the texts of H.:

Τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστίξαι ² ἔργον ³ διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι ποτέρῳ πρόσκειται, τῷ ὕστερον ἢ τῷ πρότερον, οἷον ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτοῦ τοῦ συγγραμματος. φησὶ γάρ· (D. B 1; our nr. 60 a) „τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ' ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι ἄνθρωποι γίνονται”. ἄδηλον γὰρ τὸ αἰεὶ πρὸς ὁποτέρῳ διαστίξαι.

H. himself seems to be quite conscious of writing an oracular style.

c. D. B 93:

ὁ ἀναξ, οὗ τὸ μαντήριον ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει.

d. D. B 92:

Σίβυλλα δὲ μαινομένῳ στόματι ἀγέλαστα καὶ ἀκαλλώπιστα καὶ ἀμύριστα φηγεγομένη χιλίων ἐτέων ἐξικνεῖται τῇ φωνῇ διὰ τὸν θεόν.

doctrine 52—The doctrine of H. can be gathered from four central texts, illustrated by various images.

i. eternal
change and
movement

a. Plato, *Crat.* 402 a:

λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει, καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς δις ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης.

b. Heracl., D. B 91 (Plut., *De E ap. Delph.* 18, p. 392 B):

„ποταμῷ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι δις τῷ αὐτῷ”, καθ' Ἡράκλειτον, οὐδὲ θνητῆς οὐσίας δις ἄψασθαι κατὰ ἕξιν· ἀλλ' ὁξύτητι καὶ τάχει μεταβολῆς „σκίδνησι καὶ πάλιν συνάγει” ⁴, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ πάλιν οὐδ' ὕστερον, ἀλλ' ἅμα συνίσταται καὶ ἀπολείπει, „πρόσεισι καὶ ἄπεισι”.

¹ οἱ δυνάμενοι - οἱ ἄριστοι.

² to point off.

³ ἔργον, sc. ἐστὶ (it is difficult).

⁴ συνάγει - intrans.

c. D. B 49a:

ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐμβαίνομέν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβαίνομεν, εἰμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν.

d. fr.—*

Στάσις ἐστι τῶν νεκρῶν.

e. B 125:

καὶ ὁ κυκεὼν δίσταται <μῆ> κινούμενος.

53—a. Heracl., D. B 53:

2. war and
elastic
harmony

πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεὺς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἔδειξε τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους.

b. Cf. Arist., *Eth. Eud.* VII 1, 1235 a²⁵:

καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ ποιήσαντι (Hom. Σ 107) · „ὥς ἔρις ἐκ τε θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο” · οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶναι ἁρμονίαν μὴ ὄντος ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, οὐδὲ τὰ ζῶα ἄνευ θήλεος καὶ ἄρρενος, ἐναντίων ὄντων.

c. Heracl., D. B 8 (Arist., *Eth. Nic.* VIII 2, 1155 b⁴: Ἡράκλειτος (φάσκων) τὸ ἀντίζουον συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν καὶ πάντα κατ’ ἔριν γίνεσθαι.

d. Heracl., D. B 51:

οὐ ξυνιαῖσιν ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἑαυτῷ ὁμολογέει · παλίντροπος ** ἁρμονίῃ ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης.

e. [Arist.], *De mundo* 5, 396 b⁷; D. B 10:

ἴσως δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ φύσις γλίχεται καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀποτελεῖ τὸ σύμφωνον, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων · ὥσπερ ἀμέλει τὸ ἄρρεν συνήγαγε πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ καὶ οὐχ ἑκάτερον πρὸς τὸ ὁμόφυλον καὶ τὴν πρώτην ὁμόνοιαν διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων συνῆψεν, οὐ διὰ τῶν ὁμοίων. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ τέχνη τὴν φύσιν μιμουμένη τοῦτο ποιεῖν · ζωγραφία μὲν γὰρ λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων ὠχρῶν τε καὶ ἐρυθρῶν χρωμάτων ἐγκερασμένη φύσεις τὰς εἰκόνας τοῖς προηγουμένοις ἀπετέλεσε συμφώνους, μουσικὴ δὲ ὀξεῖς ἅμα καὶ βαρεῖς μακροὺς τε καὶ βραχεῖς φθόγγους μεῖξασα ἐν διαφόροις φωναῖς μίαν ἀπετέλεσεν ἁρμονίαν, γραμματικὴ δὲ ἐκ φωνηέντων καὶ ἀφώνων γραμμάτων κρᾶσιν ποιησαμένη τὴν ὅλην τέχνην ἀπ’ αὐτῶν συνεστήσατο. ταῦτό δὲ τοῦτο ἦν καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῷ σκοτεινῷ λεγόμενον Ἡρακλείτῳ ·

* Diels puts this fragment under the testimonia (A 6): Aët. I 23, 7 (*Dox.* 320): Ἡ. ἡρεμίαν τε καὶ στάσιν ἐκ τῶν ὅλων ἀνῆρει · ἐστι γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν νεκρῶν.

** Plutarch, *De Is.* 45, 369 a, and Porphyry read παλίντροπος. In most other quotations the mss have παλίντροπος.

„συνάψεις ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον, συνᾷδον διᾷδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα.”

contraries 54—a. Heracl., D. B 67:

‘Ο θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη, χειμῶν θέρος, πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος λιμός· ἄλλοιοῦται δὲ ὥκασπερ πῦρ ὁπότεν συμμιγῇ θυώμασιν, ὀνομάζεται καθ’ ἡδονὴν ἐκάστου ¹.

b. D. B 88:

ταῦτό τ’ ἐνί ² ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκός καὶ τὸ ἐργηγορός καὶ τὸ καθεῦδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνά ἐστι κακεῖνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα.

c. D. B 62:

ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι, ζῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τὸν δὲ ἐκείνων βίον τεθνεῶτες ³.

d. The same principle works in the elements. D. B 76:


Ζῆ πῦρ τὸν γῆς θάνατον καὶ ἀήρ Ζῆ τὸν πυρὸς θάνατον, ὕδωρ Ζῆ τὸν ἀέρος θάνατον, γῆ τὸν ὕδατος.

3. ὁδὸς ἄνω
ὁδὸς κάτω

55—H. says that the upward path and the downward path are the same.

a. D. B 60:

‘Οδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὡυτή.



b. Diog. IX 7 (D. A 1):

ἐκ πυρὸς τὰ πάντα συνεστάναι καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἀναλύεσθαι ⁴. πάντα τε γίνεσθαι καθ’ εἰμαρμένην, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐναντιοδρομίας * ἡρμόσθαι τὰ ὄντα. — (8) πῦρ εἶναι στοιχεῖον καὶ πυρὸς ἀμοιβῆν τὰ πάντα ⁵, ἀραιώσκει καὶ πυκνῶσει γινόμενα. σαφῶς δὲ οὐδὲν ἐκτίθεται. — τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἄγον καλεῖσθαι πόλεμον καὶ ἔριν, τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν ὁμολογίαν καὶ

¹ O. Gigon, *Ursprung* 242, remarks: “The fire in the luxurious Ionian houses is perfumed; it is named after the perfume with which it is mixed.”

² ἐν ἡμῖν ἐστιν.

³ They live mutually each other's death and die each other's life.

⁴ Cp. the theory of the ἐκπύρωσις, our next nrs.

⁵ “All things are given in exchange for fire”. Cf. B 90 (our nr. 58).

* ἐναντιοδρομίας Aët. I 7, 22 (*Dox.* 303). A probable correction of ἐναντιοτροπῆς.

εἰρήνην, καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν ὁδὸν ἄνω κάτω, τὸν τε κόσμον γίνεσθαι κατ' αὐτήν. (9) πυκνούμενον γὰρ τὸ πῦρ ἐξυγραίνεσθαι συνιστάμενόν τε γίνεσθαι ὕδωρ, πηγνύμενον δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς γῆν τρέπεσθαι· καὶ ταύτην ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω εἶναι λέγει. πάλιν τε αὖ τὴν γῆν χεῖσθαι ¹, ἐξ ἧς τὸ ὕδωρ γίνεσθαι, ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὰ λοιπά, σχεδὸν πάντα ἐπὶ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ² ἀνάγων τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης. αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω ὁδός.

56—a. Arist., *Phys.* III 5, 205 a³:

ἐκπύρωσις

Ἡ. φησὶν ἅπαντα γίνεσθαι ποτε πῦρ.

Also *Metaph.* A 10, 1067 a⁴; *De caelo* I 10, 279 b¹⁶; Diog. IX 8:

γεννᾶσθαι τε αὐτὸν (τὸν κόσμον) ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ πάλιν ἐκπυροῦσθαι κατὰ τινὰς περιόδους ἐναλλάξ τὸν σύμπαντα αἰῶνα· τοῦτο δὲ γίνεσθαι καθ' εἰμαρμένην.

b. Theophrastus (*Simpl.*, *Phys.* 24, 4 D, *Dox.* 476) says, that H. fixed these periods on a limited duration:

ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ τάξιν τινὰ καὶ χρόνον ὠρισμένον τῆς τοῦ κόσμου μεταβολῆς κατὰ τινὰ εἰμαρμένην ἀνάγκην*.

c. Cf. *Aët.* II 32, 3 (*Dox.* 364): Ἡ. ἐξ μυρίων ὀκτακισχιλίων ἡλιακῶν (sc. ἐνιαυτῶν. H. makes it consist in 18000 sun-years).

57—Burnet argued (*E. Gr. Ph.* ² 178-183; ⁴ 156-163) that the theory of a periodical conflagration is inconsistent with the texts of H. himself, D. B 30 and 94, and explained them as a later (Stoic and Christian) interpretation. difficulties

Zeller and Diels maintained that H. taught a general conflagration (see Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* I 2, p. 878 n. 2). More recently O. Gigon understood the μέτρα - μέτρα in our next following fr. as indicating a succession of periods³. Cf. *Ursprung*, pp. 215 f., cited sub c.

a. Heracl., D. B 30:

Κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἦν αἰεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ αἰεζώνον, ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα.

μέτρα can mean "partly", and can also mean "periodically".

¹ is dispersed.

² evaporation.

³ *Untersuchungen zu Heraklit*, Basel 1935, p. 73: "Denn nur ein derartig markiertes besonderes Weltgeschehen konnte als vom Schicksalsgesetz bestimmt bezeichnet werden und kaum ein ewig gleichförmiges Fließen."

* ἀνάγκην is athetised by Usener as a gloss.

b. Cf. D. B 94:

Ἡλιος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα· εἰ δὲ μή, Ἑρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουσιν.

Indeed, there is a certain contradiction between the theory of an eternal process of conflagration and that of a periodical catastrophe. May we say that in Arist.'s words in *Phys.* III 5 (ἅπαντα γίνεσθαι ποτε πῦρ) the praesens just marks the perpetual process and consequently excludes a periodical catastrophe? The answer to this question may be found in the next fr.

c. Heracl., D. B 66:

πάντα γάρ, φησί, τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὼν κρινεῖ καὶ καταλήψεται.

Cf. O. Gigon, *Ursprung*, l.c. "Es wird nicht angehen, die Christen und die Stoiker hier in ein und derselben Missdeutung des heraklitischen Feuers als Gericht zusammentreffen zu lassen" e.q.s.

all things
are given in
exchange
for fire

58—Heracl., D. B 90:

πυρός τε ἀνταμοιβή τὰ πάντα φησὶν ὁ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ πῦρ ἀπάντων, ὅ-
κωσπερ χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσός.

the soul

59—a. Heracl., D. B 36:

ψυχῇσιν θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι, ὕδατι δὲ θάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι. ἐκ γῆς δὲ ὕδωρ γίνεται, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ ψυχή.

H. observed drunken people and therefore says:

b. D. B 77:

ψυχῇσιν τέρψιν ἢ θάνατον ὑγρῇσι γενέσθαι.

c. Cf. B 117:

Ἀνὴρ ὁκόταν μεθυσθῇ, ἄγεται ὑπὸ παιδὸς ἀνήβου σφαλλόμενος, οὐκ ἐπαίων ὁκῇ βαίνει, ὑγρὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων.

the dry soul

Soul is the purest manifestation of the cosmic fire. Therefore the dry soul is wisest, as water is the death for souls.

d. D. B 118:

αὔη [ξηρὴ] ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη *.

e. Cf. D. B 85:

Θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπὸν· ὃ γὰρ ἂν θέλῃ ψυχῆς ὠνεῖται.

Anger is an eruption of the fire that is the vital force of the soul. Therefore, "what anger wills is bought at the expense of the soul". Vid. W. J. Verdenius, *A psychological statement of H.*, in *Mnem.* 1942, p. 115-121.

* αὔη [ξηρὴ] Stephanus, Bywater, Burnet. Diels reads αὐγὴ ξηρὴ. In this form the text is cited by Plutarch, Philo, Musonius and Clemens Alex. The mss have not αὐγὴ, but αὐτὴ and αὐτη. Stob. cites αὔη ξηρὴ.

60—a. Heracl., D. B 1:

4. the logos

τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ' ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον· γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείροισιν εἰκόλασι, πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτων, ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγεῖμαι διαιρέων ἕκαστον κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φράζων ὅπως ἔχει. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν, ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὕδοντες¹ ἐπιλανθάνονται.

b. D. B 2 (Sext., *Adv. Math.* VII 133):

διὸ δεῖ ἔπεσθαι τῷ <ξυνῶ, τουτέστι τῷ> κοινῷ· ξυνὸς γὰρ ὁ κοινός. τοῦ λόγου δ' ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὥς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν.

61—Perhaps we must begin with B 101: ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν.

We might then find the result of this inquiry in B 45:

a. ψυχῆς πείρατα ἰὼν οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροιο πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν· in the soul
οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει.

b. Cf. B 115: ψυχῆς ἐστὶ λόγος ἑαυτὸν αὖξων.

62—a. The logos is also a cosmic law. B 31:

in the universe

θάλασσα διαχέεται καὶ μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὁκοῖος πρόσθεν ἦν ἢ γενέσθαι γῆ.

Cf. B 30 and 94 (nr. 57a and b).

b. In this law our judgment must be founded, if it will be true; and also our actions. B 112:

a moral principle

τὸ φρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη, καὶ σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαίοντας.

"to act according to nature, listening to her" (cp. the famous Stoic formula).

c. Cf. B 113:

ξυνὸν ἐστὶ πᾶσι τὸ φρονέειν.

d. And also B 114:

ξὺν νόφ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνῶ πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμῳ πόλις καὶ πολὺ ἰσχυροτέρως. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ· κρατέει γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκέει πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται².

¹ sc. ποιοῦσι.

² it overcomes all.

e. Cf. B 2 (our nr. 60 b) and B 44:

μάχεσθαι χρή τὸν δῆμον ὑπὲρ τοῦ νόμου ὅκωσπερ τείχεος.

Zeus

63—a. Heracl., B 32:

Ἐν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηγνὸς ὄνομα.

b. B 41:

Ἐν τὸ σοφόν, ἐπίστασθαι γνῶμην, ὁτέη ἐκυβέρνησε πάντα διὰ πάντων.

In B 94 (our nr. 57 b) the helpers of Dikè are introduced as maintainers of cosmic order. That order itself is called "logos" in fr. 31 (nr. 62 a). We may conclude that to H. Zeus, Dikè, τὸ σοφόν and logos are the same; perhaps even εἰμαρμένη (see the passage in Diog. IX 7, our nr. 55 b: πάντα τε γίνεσθαι καθ' εἰμαρμένην).

c. Cf. D. B 52:

αἰὼν παῖς ἐστὶ παίζων, πεττεύων · παιδὸς ἢ βασιληΐη.

The eternal process of world-formation and solution into fire (ὁδὸς ἄνω and κάτω) is like child's play of building up and breaking down. Our fr. can hardly mean something else.

God and
man

64—a. D. B 78:

Ἀνὴρ νήπιος ἤκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος ¹ ὅκωσπερ παῖς πρὸς ἀνδρός.

b. B 83:

ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανεῖται καὶ σοφία καὶ κάλλει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν.

criticism of
popular
religion

65—a. D. B 5:

καθαίρονται δ' ἄλλως ² αἵματι μαινόμενοι οἷον εἴ τις ἐς πηλὸν ἐμβὰς πηλῷ ἀπονίζοιτο. μαίνεσθαι δ' ἂν δοκοίη, εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιφράσαιτο οὕτω ποιέοντα. καὶ τοῖς ἀγάλμασι δὲ τουτέοισιν εὐχονται, ὁκοῖον εἴ τις δόμοισι λεσχηνεύοιτο ³ οὐ τι γινώσκων θεοὺς οὐδ' ἥρωας οἵτινές εἰσι.

b. D. B 14:

τὰ νομιζόμενα κατ' ἀνθρώπους μυστήρια ἀνιερωστὶ μυεῦνται.

sense-
perception

66—D. B 107:

κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἔχοντων (if they have barbarous souls).

¹ is looked at by the deity.

² ἄλλως - in vain.

³ λεσχηνεύοιτο - διαλέγοιτο.

FOURTH CHAPTER THE ELEATIC SCHOOL

I—ITS FORE-RUNNER: XENOPHANES OF COLOPHON

67—a. Diog. IX 18:

life

Οὗτος ἐκπεσὼν ¹ τῆς πατρίδος ἐν Ζάγκλῃ τῆς Σικελίας διέτριβε καὶ τῆς εἰς Ἑλέαν ἀποικίας κοινωνήσας ἐδίδασκεν ἐκεῖ, διέτριβε δὲ καὶ ἐν Κατάνῃ. γέγραφε δὲ ἐν ἔπεσι καὶ ἐλεγείας καὶ ἰάμβους καθ' Ἡσιόδου καὶ Ὀμήρου, ἐπικόπτων αὐτῶν τὰ περὶ θεῶν εἰρημένα· ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐρραψώδει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ. ἀντιδοξάσαι τε λέγεται Θαλῇ καὶ Πυθαγόρᾳ, καθάψασθαι δὲ καὶ Ἐπιμενίδου, μακροβιώτατός τε γέγονεν, ὥς που καὶ αὐτὸς φησιν (D. 21 B 8):

(19) ἦδ᾽ ὃν ἑπτὰ τ' ἔασι καὶ ἐξήκοντ' ἐνιαυτοὶ
βληστρίζοντες ² ἐμὴν φροντίδ' ἀν' Ἑλλάδα γῆν·
ἐκ γενετῆς δὲ τότε ἦσαν ἐείκοσι πέντε τε πρὸς τοῖς,
εἵπερ ἐγὼ περὶ τῶνδ' οἶδα λέγειν ἐτύμως. —

(20) ἐποίησε δὲ καὶ Κολοφῶνος κτίσιν καὶ τὸν εἰς Ἑλέαν τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀποικισμὸν, ἔπη δισχίλια. καὶ ἤκμαζε κατὰ τὴν ἐξηκοστὴν ὀλυμπιάδα (540-537).

b. D. 21 B 22:

πᾶρ πυρὶ χρῆ τοιαῦτα λέγειν χειμῶνος ἐν ὥρῃ
ἐν κλίνῃ μαλακῇ κατακείμενον, ἔμπλεον ὄντα,
πίνοντα γλυκὺν οἶνον, ὑποτρώγοντ' ἐρεβίνθους·
τίς πόθεν εἶς ἀνδρῶν; πόσα τοι ἔτε' ἐστί, φέριστε;
πηλίκος ἦσθ', ὅθ' ὁ Μῆδος ἀφίκετο;

68—X. at a symposion. D. B 1, l. 13:

character

χρῆ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν θεὸν ὑμνεῖν εὐφρονας ἀνδρας
εὐφήμες μύθοις καὶ καθαροῖσι λόγοις·

¹ ἐκπεσὼν τ. πατρίδος - X. seems to have left Colophon when it was conquered for Cyrus by Harpagus (545). He will have gone westward with the people of Phocaea, and may have taken part in the colonisation of Elea in 540 (cf. Her. I 162 ff.). The coming of the Medes to Ionia seems to have been the great event of his life. See the fr. 22, under b.

² βληστρίζοντες e.q.s. - "that have tossed my careworn soul up and down the land of Hellas" (Burnet).

- 15 σπείσαντες δὲ καὶ εὐξαμένους τὰ δίκαια δύνασθαι
 πρήσσειν—ταῦτα γὰρ ὧν ἐστὶ προχειρότερον—
 οὐχ ὕβρις πίνειν ὁπόσον κεν ἔχων ἀφίκοιο
 οἴκαδ' ἄνευ προπόλου μὴ πάνυ γηραλέος.
 ἀνδρῶν δ' αἰνεῖν τοῦτον ὃς ἐσθλὰ πίων ἀναφαίνει,
 20 ὥς οἱ μνημοσύνη καὶ τόνος * ἀμφ' ἀρετῆς,
 οὔτι μάχας διέπειν Τιτῆνων οὐδὲ Γιγάντων,
 οὐδὲ <τὰ> ** Κενταύρων, πλάσματα τῶν προτέρων,
 ἢ στάσις σφεδανάς· τοῖς οὐδὲν χρηστὸν ἔνεστιν.
 θεῶν <δὲ> προμηθεῖην αἰὲν ἔχειν ἀγαθόν.

dignity

69—B 2, ll. I-14:

- ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ταχυτῆτι ποδῶν νίκην τις ἄροιτο
 ἢ πενταθλεύων, ἔνθα Διὸς τέμενος
 παρ Πίσαιο ῥοῆσ' ἐν Ὀλυμπίῃ, εἴτε παλαιῶν
 ἢ καὶ πυκτοσύνην ἀλγινόεσσαν ἔχων,
 5 εἴτε τι δεινὸν ἄεθλον ὃ παγκράτιον καλέουσιν,
 ἄστοῖσιν κ' εἴη κυδρότερος προσορᾶν
 καὶ κε προεδρίην φανερὴν ἐν ἀγῶσιν ἄροιτο
 καὶ κεν σῖτ' εἴη δημοσίων κτεάνων
 ἐκ πόλεως καὶ δῶρον ὃ οἱ κειμήλιον εἴη·
 10 εἴτε καὶ ἵπποισιν, ταῦτά κε πάντα λάχοι—
 οὐκ ἔων ἄξιος ὥσπερ ἐγώ. ῥώμης γὰρ ἀμείνων
 ἀνδρῶν ἡδ' ἵππων ἡμετέρη σοφίη.
 ἀλλ' εἰκῇ μάλα τοῦτο νομίζεται, οὐδὲ δίκαιον
 προκρίνειν ῥώμην τῆς ἀγαθῆς σοφίης.

doctrine

70—a. Plato, *Soph.* 242 cd:

μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος¹ φαίνεται μοι διηγεῖσθαι παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν, ὁ μὲν ὡς τρία τὰ ὄντα, πολεμεῖ δὲ ἀλλήλοις ἐνίοτε αὐτῶν ἅττα πη, τοτὲ δὲ καὶ φίλα γιγνόμενα γάμους τε καὶ τόκους καὶ τροφὰς τῶν ἐκγόνων παρέχεται· δύο δὲ ἕτερος εἰπών, ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, συνοικίζει τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδίδωσι· τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν Ἑλεατικὸν ἔθνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἔτι πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὡς ἐνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων, οὕτω διεξέρχεται τοῖς μύθοις.

¹ sc. of the philosophers of a former generation.

* Diels („das Streben um die Tugend"). The reading is doubtful.

** Diels <τε>, others <τὰ>.

b. Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* A 5, 986 b¹⁰:

εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ περὶ τοῦ παντός ὡς ἂν μιᾶς οὔσης φύσεως ἀπεφάναντο, τρόπον δὲ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν πάντες οὔτε τοῦ καλῶς οὔτε τοῦ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν. — Παρμενίδης μὲν γὰρ ἔοικε τοῦ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐνὸς ἅπτεσθαι, Μέλισσος δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην · διὸ καὶ ὁ μὲν πεπερασμένον, ὁ δ' ἄπειρόν φησιν εἶναι αὐτό · Ξενοφάνης δὲ πρῶτος τούτων ἐνίσας (ὁ γὰρ Παρμενίδης τούτου λέγεται μαθητής) οὐθὲν διεσαφῆνισεν, οὐδὲ τῆς φύσεως τούτων οὐδετέρας ἔοικε θιγεῖν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἐν εἶναι φησι τὸν θεόν.

c. Simpl., *Phys.* 22, 22 ff. (D. 21, A 31):

Μίαν δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἦτοι ἐν τὸ ὄν καὶ πᾶν (καὶ οὔτε πεπερασμένον οὔτε ἄπειρον οὔτε κινούμενον οὔτε ἡρεμοῦν) Ξενοφάνην τὸν Κολοφώνιον τὸν Παρμενίδου διδάσκαλον ὑποτίθεσθαι φησιν ὁ Θεόφραστος [*Phys. Op. fr. 5 D. 480*] ὁμολογῶν ἐτέρας εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας τὴν μνήμην ¹ τῆς τούτου δόξης. τὸ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ καὶ πᾶν τὸν θεὸν ἔλεγεν ὁ Ξ., ὃν ἓνα μὲν δείκνυσιν ἐκ τοῦ πάντων κράτιστον εἶναι · πλειόνων γάρ, φησὶν, ὄντων ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν ἀνάγκη πᾶσι τὸ κρατεῖν · τὸ δὲ πάντων κράτιστον καὶ ἄριστον θεός.

d. Hippol., *Ref.* I 14, 2 (D. A 33):

λέγει δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν γίνεται οὐδὲ φθείρεται οὐδὲ κινεῖται καὶ ὅτι ἐν τὸ πᾶν ἐστὶν ἕξω μεταβολῆς. φησὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι αἰδῖον καὶ ἓνα καὶ ὅμοιον πάντῃ καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ σφαιροειδῆ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς μορίοις αἰσθητικόν.

71—Xenoph., D. B 11:

Πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν "Ομηρός θ' Ἡσίοδος τε
ἔσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνειδέα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν,
κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.

he criticizes
the poets

72—a. D. B 23:

εἷς θεὸς ἐν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,
οὐ τι δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίος οὐδὲ νόημα.

God is not
like man

b. D. B 24:

οὐλος ὄρᾱ, οὐλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὐλος δὲ τ' ἀκούει.

c. D. B 25:

'Αλλ' ἀπάνευθε πόνοιο νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει.

d. D. B 26:

αἰεὶ τ' ἐν ταῦτῳ μίμνει κινούμενος οὐδέν
οὐδὲ μετέρχεσθαί μιν ἐπιπρέπει ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ.

¹ μνήμην = the mentioning of this doctrine.

the absurdity
of anthropo-
morphism

73—a. D. B 14:

ἀλλ' οἱ βροτοὶ δοκέουσι γεννᾶσθαι θεοὺς,
τὴν σφετέρην δ' ἐσθῆτα ἔχειν φωνήν τε δέμας τε.

b. Cf. Arist., *Rhet.* II, 23, 1399 b⁶:

Ξενοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσεβοῦσιν οἱ γενέσθαι φάσκοντες τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀποθανεῖν λέγουσιν· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι τοὺς θεοὺς ποτε.

c. D. B 15:

ἀλλ' εἰ χειῖρας ἔχον βόες <ἵπποι τ'> ἢ λέοντες *
ἢ γράψαι χεῖρεςσι καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἅπερ ἄνδρες,
ἵπποι μὲν θ' ἵπποισι, βόες δέ τε βουσὶν ὁμοίως
καὶ <κε> θεῶν ιδέας ἔγραφον καὶ σώματ' ἐποίουσαν
τοιαῦθ' οἷόν περ καὶ οἱ δέμας εἶχον <ἐκαστοι>.

physics

74—We have also some fragments of X. about physics, but they do not represent the most important part of his doctrine. Interesting is, however, the following geological theory.

Hippol. *Ref.* I 14, 5 (D. A 33):

Ὁ δὲ Ξενοφάνης μίξιν τῆς γῆς πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὕγρου λύεσθαι, φάσκων τοιαύτας ἔχειν ἀποδείξεις, ὅτι ἐν μέσῃ γῇ καὶ ὄρεσιν εὐρίσκονται κόγχαι, καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις δὲ ἐν ταῖς λατομίαις λέγει εὐρήσθαι τύπον ἰχθύος καὶ φωκῶν¹, ἐν δὲ Πάρῳ τύπον ἀφύης ἐν τῷ βάθει τοῦ λίθου, ἐν δὲ Μελίτῃ πλάκας συμπάντων θαλασσίων. ταῦτα δὲ φησι γενέσθαι, ὅτε πάντα ἐπηλώθησαν πάλαι, τὸν δὲ τύπον ἐν τῷ πληῶ ξηρανθῆναι. ἀναιρεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πάντας, ὅταν ἡ γῇ κατενεχθεῖσα εἰς τὴν θάλατταν πηλὸς γένηται, εἶτα πάλιν ἄρχεσθαι τῆς γενέσεως· καὶ ταύτην πᾶσι τοῖς κόσμοις γίνεσθαι μεταβολήν.

knowledge

75—a. Xenoph., D. B 18:

οὗτοι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖς παρέδειξαν,
ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον.

¹ φωκῶν - Gomperz proposes φουκῶν: fossils of seals (Dutch: robben. ἀφύη: ansjovis) are palaeontologically impossible; fossils of seaweed are really found in Sicily, not in the stone-pits, but near to them. — This is a nice conjecture, but it will not be true. Next to ἰχθύος φωκῶν fits in much better, nor is there any trace to be discovered of the anchovy (ἀφύη) on Paros.

* Diels 21 B 15 cites the verse in this form. ἀλλ' ἔχον Euseb.; Clem. and Theodor. have: ἀλλ' εἴ τοι χειῖρας εἶχον

b. D. B 34:

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὕτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδέ τις ἔσται
εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·
εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,
αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

c. Cf. Sext., *Adv. Math.* VII (= *Against the Logicians* I) 110:

Ξ. ... φαίνεται μὴ πᾶσαν κατάληψιν ἀναιρεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν τε καὶ ἀδιάπτωτον¹, ἀπολείπειν δὲ τὴν δοξαστήν.

76—K. Reinhardt in his *Parmenides* (Bonn 1916) has been first to defend the hypothesis that Xenoph. was not the master of Parm., but in his later years became his disciple, and that he, borrowing much from Parmenides' philosophy, worked up his own religious ideas unto a system of rational theology. The ps. Aristotelian work *De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia* (cited as MXG) would then contain an important fr. of this work of Xenoph.—This unfortunate theory has been adopted by O. Gigon (*Ursprung* p. 194). It has been rightly refuted by Jaeger, *Theol.*, pp. 52-54.

MXG

2—PARMENIDES OF ELEA

77—Diog. IX 21 (D. 28 A 1):

life

Ξενοφάνους δὲ διήκουσε Παρμενίδης Πύρητος Ἐλεάτης. (τοῦτον Θεόφραστος ἐν τῇ Ἐπιτομῇ Ἀναξιμάνδρου φησὶν ἀκοῦσαι.) ὅμως δ' οὖν ἀκούσας καὶ Ξενοφάνους οὐκ ἠκολούθησεν αὐτῷ. ἐκοινώνησε δὲ καὶ Ἀμεινίᾳ Διοχαίτῃ τῷ Πυθαγορικῷ, ὡς ἔφη Σωτῶν, ἀνδρὶ πένητι μὲν, καλῷ δὲ ἀγαθῷ. ᾧ καὶ μᾶλλον ἠκολούθησε καὶ ἀποθανόντος ἡρῶν ἰδρύσατο γένους τε ὑπάρχων λαμπροῦ καὶ πλούτου, καὶ ὑπ' Ἀμεινίου ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπὸ Ξενοφάνους εἰς ἡσυχίαν² προετράπη. — (23) ἤκμαζε δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐνάτην καὶ ἐξηκοστὴν ὀλυμπιάδα (a. 504-500)³. — λέγεται δὲ καὶ νόμους θεῖναι τοῖς πολίταις, ὡς φησι Σπεύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ φιλοσόφων.

78—Plato, *Theaet.* 183 e:

Παρμενίδης δὲ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, αἰδοῖός τέ μοι εἶναι ἅμα δεινός τε. συμπροσέμειξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτη, καὶ μοι ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον.

Plato's
admiration
for
Parmenides

¹ „infallible”, affording absolute knowledge of the truth.

² εἰς ἡσυχίαν - to a βίος θεωρητικός.

³ (504-500) - cf. Plato, *Parm.* 127 b-c, where P. on the age of 65 is brought together with Zeno, a man of forty, and with Socrates, τότε σφόδρα νέον. If this situation is a historical one, P. must have been some 25 years younger than the date, given by Diog. L., makes him.

**Empedocles
imitates his
style**

79—Diog. VIII 55:

Θεόφραστος Παρμενίδου φησὶ ζηλωτὴν αὐτὸν (Empedocles) γενέσθαι καὶ μιμητὴν ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν · καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνον ἐν ἔπεσι τὸν περὶ φύσεως ἐξενεγκεῖν λόγον¹.

the exordium

80—Parm., D. 28 B 1:

- Ἴπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, ὅσον τ' ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἱκάνοι,
πέμπον, ἐπεὶ μ' ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν πολύφημον ἄγουσαι
δαίμονος, ἣ κατὰ πάντ' ἄστη * φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα.
τῇ φερόμην · τῇ γάρ με πολύφραστοι φέρον Ἴπποι
5 ἄρμα τιταίνουσαι, κοῦραι δ' ὁδὸν ἡγεμόνευον.
ἄξων δ' ἐν χνοιῇσιν ἱ<ει> σύριγγος αὐτὴν
αἰθόμενος (δοιοῖς γὰρ ἐπείγετο δινωτοῖσιν
κύκλοις ἀμφοτέρωθεν), ὅτε σπερχοῖατο πέμπειν
Ἥλιάδες κοῦραι, προλιποῦσαι δώματα Νυκτός,
10 εἰς φάος, ὠσάμεναι κράτων ἅπο χερσὶ καλύπτρας.
ἐνθα πύλαι Νυκτός τε καὶ Ἥματός εἰσι κελεύθων,
καὶ σφας ὑπέρθυρον ἀμφὶς ἔχει καὶ λάινος οὐδός,
αὐταὶ δ' αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοισι θυρέτροις ·
τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύποινος ἔχει κληῖδας ἀμοιβούς.
15 τὴν δὴ παρφάμεναι κοῦραι μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν
πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὥς σφιν βαλανωτὸν ὄχῃα
ἄπτερέως ὥσειε πυλέων ἅπο · ταὶ δὲ θυρέτρων
χάσμι' ἀχανὲς ποίησαν ἀναπτάμεναι, πολυχάλκους
ἄξοντας ἐν σύριγξιν ἀμοιβαδὸν εἰλίξασαι
20 γόμφοις καὶ περόνησιν ἀρηρότε · τῇ ῥα δι' αὐτέων
ἰθὺς ἔχον κοῦραι κατ' ἀμαξιτὸν ἄρμα καὶ Ἴππους.
καὶ με θεὰ πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο, χεῖρα δὲ χειρὶ
δεξιτερὴν ἔλεν, ὧδε δ' ἔπος φάτο καὶ με προσηύδα ·
ὦ κοῦρ', ἀθανάτησι συνήρορος ἡνιόχοισιν,
25 Ἴπποις ταί σε φέρουσιν ἱκάνων ἡμέτερον δῶ,
χαῖρ', ἐπεὶ οὐ τί σε μοῖρα κακὴ προύπεμπε νέεσθαι
τῇνδ' ὁδόν (ἧ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστίν)
ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρεῶ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι,

¹ He too treated physical science in hexameters.

* πάντ' ἄστη Diels, with the ms N.; most mss have πάντ' ἀτῇ. Wilamowitz proposed πάντα τατῇ. Jaeger, *Paideia* I², p. 460, n. 149 renews Meineke's conjecture: κατὰ πάντ' ἀσινῇ ('leads him who knows unscathed wherever he goes'). See also *The Theol. of the E. Gr. Phil.*, p. 98, and p. 225, n. 23.

- 30 ἡμὲν ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμέες ἦτορ
 ἡδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐνὶ πίστις ἀληθής.
 ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεται, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα
 χρῆν δοκιμῶσ' εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα ¹.
 ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἴργε νόημα
 35 μηδὲ σ' ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω,
 νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἡχέεσσαν ἀκουήν ²
 καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἑλεγχον
 ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα ³. μόνος δ' ἔτι θυμὸς ὁδοῖο
 λείπεται. *

81—a. D. B 2 (in former editions 4):

the two ways

- εἰ δ' ἄγ' ἐγὼν ἐρέω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας,
 αἵπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι.
 ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι
 Πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος ('Αληθείη γὰρ ὅπηδεῖ),
 5 ἡ δ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεῶν ἐστι μὴ εἶναι,
 τὴν δὴ τοι φράζω παναπευθέα ἔμμεν ἀταρπὸν.
 οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἐὸν (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστὸν)
 οὔτε φράσαις.

b. D. B 3 (formerly 5):

.... τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι.

¹ Vs. 31 v.: "Yet you will learn these things also, how a man ought to accept (δοκιμῶσαι = δοκιμάσαι, to approve, to take for granted) that the world of appearance is (τὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι), when you go through all."

The construction is correct, the meaning of δοκιμῶσαι, as we understood it, not unusual (cf. Xen., *Mem.* I, 2, 4; Pl., *Ep.* III, 316 c; *Thuc.* II 35 Pericles speaks: ἐπειδὴ τοῖς πάλοι οὕτως ἐδοκιμάσθη ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχειν —).

τὰ δοκοῦντα can surely mean "the world of what seems to be", which may be rendered by "the world of appearance", τὰ φαινόμενα being a later formula for what to P. are τὰ δοκοῦντα.

Wilamowitz (with Simpl.) prefers the reading δοκίμως, which gives a possible translation: ὡς χρῆν τὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι δοκίμως, "how things that seem to be ought to be most probably". Diels rejected this explanation as contrary to Parmenidean metaphysics. Kranz in his fifth edition of the VS follows Wilamowitz.

² Vs 35: "wandering eye or sounding ear".

³ Vs 36: "judge by reason the much disputed proof uttered by me".

* The lines 33—38, cited by Sextus, *Adv. Math.* VII 111, directly after l. 30, are placed by Kranz, *VS*⁵, before the fr. 8. In l. 37 he reads with Karsten, who first proposed this combination, μῦθος instead of θυμός. See the objection of Diels in *VS*⁴, p. 151.

warning
against
two ways

82—D. B 6:

- χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι¹. ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι,
μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· τὰ σ' ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα.
πρώτης γὰρ σ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος <εἴργω>,
αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ' ἀπὸ τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδέν
5 πλάσσονται*, δίκρανοι· ἀμηχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν
στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλακτὸν νόον· οἱ δὲ φοροῦνται
κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοὶ τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα²,
οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταῦτὸν νενόμισται
κοῦ ταῦτόν, πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος³.

the predicates
of true being

83—D. B 8:

- μοῦνος** δ' ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο
λείπεται, ὡς ἔστιν. ταύτῃ δ' ἐπὶ σήματ' ἔασι
πολλὰ μάλ', ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,
ἐστι γὰρ οὐλομελές*** τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἥδ' ἀτέλεστον·
5 οὐδὲ ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν,
ἔν, ξυνεχές· τίνα γὰρ γένναν διζήσεαι αὐτοῦ;
πῇ πόθεν ἀύξηθέν; οὔτ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐάσσω
φάσθαι σ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν· οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ νοητόν
ἐστιν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι. τί δ' ἂν μιν καὶ χρεός ὤρσεν
10 ὕστερον ἢ πρόσθεν, τοῦ μηδενὸς ἀρξάμενον, φῦν;
οὕτως ἢ πάμπαν πέλαιναι χρεῶν ἐστιν ἢ οὐχί.
οὐδὲ ποτ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐφήσει πίστιος ἰσχύς
γίγνεσθαί τι παρ' αὐτό· τοῦ εἵνεκεν οὔτε γενέσθαι

¹ Vs 1: "This you must say and think, that being is".—This translation, also given by Diels, will be the right one.

² Vs 7: ἄκριτα, without judgment.

³ Vs 9: "and in all things there is for them a counterway". He might seem in the last verses to be combating Heraclitus. Yet, the whole passage (l. 4 till the end) rather gives the impression that not one isolated thinker is referred to, but the multitude of men, including the older philosophers. See O. Gigon, *Ursprung* p. 258, and Jaeger, *Theol.* p. 101.

* Diels keeps in his text the form πλάττονται, and notes: verderbt für πλάσσονται = πλάζονται.

** Diels, who took this fr. apart, read μοῦνος. Kranz, who makes it one with the end of the first fr., has to continue after the words ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα: μόνος δ' ἔτι e.q.s.

*** Diels read οὔλον μουνογενές (with Simpl., Clem., Philop.), but Kranz (*VS*⁵) preferred ἐστι γὰρ οὐλομελές (Plut., *Adv. Col.* 1114 c). See his note there (*VS*⁵ I, p. 235).

- οὐτ' ὀλλυσθαι ἀνῆκε Δίκη χαλάσασα πέδησιν,
 15 ἄλλ' ἔχει· ἡ δὲ κρίσις περὶ τούτων ἐν τῷδ' ἔστιν·
 ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· κέκριται δ' οὖν, ὥσπερ ἀνάγκη,
 τὴν μὲν ἔαν ἀνόητον ἀνώνυμον (οὐ γὰρ ἀληθὴς
 ἔστιν ὁδός), τὴν δ' ὥστε πέλειν καὶ ἐτήτυμον εἶναι.
 πῶς δ' ἂν ἔπειτ' ἀπόλοιτο * ἐόν; πῶς δ' ἂν κε γένοιτο;
 20 εἰ γὰρ ἔγεντ', οὐκ ἔστ(ι), οὐδ' εἴ ποτε μέλλει ἔσεσθαι.
 τῶς γένεσις μὲν ἀπέσβεσται καὶ ἄπυστος ὄλεθρος.
 Οὐδὲ διαίρετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστιν ὁμοῖον·
 οὐδέ τι τῇ μᾶλλον, τό κεν εἴργοι μιν συνέχεσθαι¹,
 οὐδέ τι χειρότερον· πᾶν δ' ἔμπλεόν ἐστιν ἐόντος.
 25 τῷ ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστιν, ἐὼν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει². —
 αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν
 ἔστιν ἀναρχον, ἄπαστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὄλεθρος
 τῇλε μαλ' ἐπλάγχθησαν, ἀπῶσε δὲ πίστις ἀληθῆς.
 ταῦτόν τ' ἐν ταύτῳ τε μένον καθ' ἑαυτό τε κεῖται·
 30 χοῦτως ἔμπεδον αὐθι μένει· κρατερὴ γὰρ Ἀνάγκη
 πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει, τό μιν ἀμφὶς ἔεργει.
 οὐνεκεν οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον τὸ ἐὼν θέμις εἶναι·
 ἐστὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιδευές· [μὴ] ἐὼν δ' ἂν παντὸς ἐδεῖτο.
 ταῦτόν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεκὲν ἐστὶ νόημα⁴.
 35 οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐν ᾧ πεφατισμένον ἐστίν,
 εὐρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν. οὐδὲν γὰρ <ῆ> ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται
 ἄλλο πάρεξ τοῦ ἐόντος· ἐπεὶ τό γε Μοῖρ' ἐπέδησεν
 οὔλον ἀκίνητόν τ' ἔμεναι. τῷ πάντ' ὄνομ(α) ἔσται⁵,
 ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ,
 40 γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ ὀλλυσθαι, εἶναί τε καὶ οὐχί,
 καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν, διὰ τε χροά φανὸν ἀμείβειν.
 αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πεῖρας πύματον⁶, τετελεσμένον ἐστί

¹ Vs 23: "and you cannot attribute a higher degree of intensity to any part of it, which might diminish its continuity"

² Vs 25: πελάζει = borders upon.

³ Vs 33: ἐὼν δ' - if it was ἐπιδευές.

⁴ Vs 34: "thinking and the object of thought are the same". οὐνεκεν = οὐ ἕνεκα (not unusual, cf. Hom., *Od.* III 60 f., where Mentor-Athene prays:

δὸς δ' ἔτι Τηλέμαχον καὶ ἐμὲ πρήξαντα νέεσθαι,
 οὐνεκα δεῦρ' ἰκόμεσθα θοῇ σὺν νηὶ μελαίνῃ.).

⁵ Vs 38: τῷ πάντ' ὄνομ' ἔσται - "Therefore it will be nothing but name".

⁶ Vs 42: since it has a furthest limit.

* Thus Kranz (*VS*⁶), with Karsten and Stein. Diels read: ἔπειτα πέλοι τὸ ἐόν.

- πάντοθεν, εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ,
 μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλές πάντῃ¹. τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον
 45 οὔτε τι βαιότερον πέλεναι χρεόν ἐστι τῇ ἢ τῇ.
 οὔτε γὰρ οὐκ ἐὼν * ἔστι, τό κεν παύοι μιν ἰκνεῖσθαι
 εἰς ὁμόν², οὔτ' ἐὼν ἔστιν ὅπως εἴη κεν ἐόντος
 τῇ μᾶλλον τῇ δ' ἥσσον, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστὶν ἄσυλον³.
 οἷ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἴσον, ὁμῶς ἐν πείρασι κύρει.
 50 ἐν τῷ σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἡδὲ νόημα
 ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης· δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας
 μάθανε, κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων.
 μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας⁴ ὀνομάζειν·
 τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεῶν ἐστὶν — ἐν ᾧ πεπλανημένοι εἰσὶν —.
 55 τάντ' αἰὶν δ' ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ' ἔθεντο⁵
 χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τῇ μὲν φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ,
 ἥπιον ὄν, μέγ' ἀραιὸν ** [ἐλαφρόν], ἑωυτῶ πάντοσε τωυτόν,
 τῷ δ' ἐτέρῳ μὴ τωυτόν· ἀτὰρ κάκεινο κατ' αὐτό
 τάντ' αἰ νύκτ' ἀδαῆ, πυκινὸν δέμας ἐμβριθέες τε.
 60 τὸν σοι ἐγὼ διάκοσμον εἰκότα πάντα φατίζω,
 ὥς οὐ μὴ ποτὲ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσῃ⁶.

for the realm
 of δόξα P.
 accepts two
 principles

84—Alex. in *Metaph.* A 3, 984 b³, p. 31, 7 Hayd.:

Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν [fr. 6 D. 482, 5] οὕτως λέγει·
 'τούτῳ δὲ ἐπιγενόμενος Π. Πύρητος ὁ Ἐλεάτης' (λέγει δὲ [καὶ] Ξενοφάνην)
 'ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρως ἦλθε τὰς ὁδοὺς. καὶ γὰρ ὥς αἰδιὸν ἐστὶ τὸ πᾶν ἀποφαίνεται καὶ
 γένεσιν ἀποδιδόναι πειρᾶται τῶν ὄντων, οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ ἀμφοτέρων δοξάζων,
 ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν μὲν ἐν τῷ πᾶν καὶ ἀγέννητον καὶ σφαιροειδὲς ὑπολαμβάνων,

¹ Vs 44: equal to all sides.

² Vs 47: εἰς ὁμόν = to the same point or distance, i.e. to the spherical form.

³ Vs 48: ἄσυλον, inviolable.

⁴ Vs 53: γνώμας κατέθεντο - "Mortals have made up their minds" (Burnet).

⁵ Vs 55 f.: „They have distinguished them as opposite in form, and have assigned to them marks distinct from one another."

⁶ Vs 60 f.: "This whole arrangement I tell you as a probable one, lest ever an opinion of mortals should outstrip you."

* Diels read οὐ τεον, Kranz, VS⁵ οὐκ ἐον (a misprint for ἐὼν).

** Simpl. has μέγ' ἀραιὸν ἐλαφρόν. Diels, followed by Kranz, deleted ἀραιὸν, Karsten ἐλαφρόν. Indeed, if the one is a gloss of the other, ἐλαφρόν could better be a gloss than ἀραιόν, which is an especial presocratic term. We cannot accept the solution recently suggested by W. J. Verdenius (*Mnem.* 1947, p. 286 f.), who proposes to delete ἥπιον, starting from the wrong assumption that ἀραιόν and ἐλαφρόν could not be synonyms.

κατὰ δόξαν δὲ τῶν πολλῶν εἰς τὸ γένεσιν ἀποδοῦναι τῶν φαινομένων δύο ποιῶν τὰς ἀρχάς, πῦρ καὶ γῆν, τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλην τὸ δὲ ὡς αἷτιον καὶ ποιοῦν.'

85—*Aët.* II, 7, 1 (D. 28, A 37):

the cosmic
system of P.

Παρμενίδης στεφάνας εἶναι περιπεπλεγμένας, ἐπαλλήλους, τὴν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἀραιοῦ, τὴν δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πυκνοῦ· μικτάς δὲ ἄλλας ἐκ φωτός καὶ σκότους μεταξὺ τούτων. καὶ τὸ περιέχον δὲ πάσας τείχους δίκην στερεὸν ὑπάρχειν, ὅφ' ὃ πυρώδης στεφάνη, καὶ τὸ μεσαίτατον πασῶν στερεόν, ὅφ' ὃ πάλιν πυρώδης¹. τῶν δὲ συμμιγῶν τὴν μεσαιτάτην² ἀπάσαις <ἀρχήν> τε καὶ <αἰτίαν> κινήσεως




Fig. 1

καὶ γενέσεως ὑπάρχειν, ἦντινα καὶ δαίμονα κυβερνήτην καὶ κληδοῦχον* ἐπονομάζει Δίκην τε καὶ Ἀνάγκην.

b. *Parm.*, D. B 12:

αἱ γὰρ στεινότεραι³ πλῆντο πυρὸς ἀκρήτοιο,

¹ sc. στεφάνη.

² τῶν δὲ συμμιγῶν τὴν μεσαιτάτην - she who dwells in the middle of the mixed zones. See fig. 1.

³ αἱ γὰρ στεινότεραι, sc. στεφάναι.

* κληροῦχον: *Aët.* κληδοῦχον Fülleborn, Diels (see fr. 1, l. 14).

αἱ δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς νυκτός, μετὰ δὲ φλογὸς ἔεται αἷσα·
 ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τούτων δαίμων ἢ πάντα κυβερνᾷ·
 πάντα γὰρ <ἦ> στυγεροῖο τόκου καὶ μίξιος ἄρχει
 πέμπουσ' ἄρσενι θῆλυ μιγῇν τό τ' ἐναντίον αὐτῆς
 ἄρσεν θηλυτέρῳ.

The neoplatonists (Simplicius) let the δαίμων reside in the centre of the whole (fig. 2).




Fig. 2

But this is contrary to the testimony of Diog. L. in IX 21, that P. was the first who put the earth in the centre:

С. πρῶτος δὲ οὗτος τὴν γῆν ἀπέφαινε σφαιροειδῇ καὶ ἐν μέσῳ κεῖσθαι.

Cf. Burnet, *E. Gr. Ph.*² 215-221; fourth ed. p. 188-191. See also Diels, *Parmenides' Lehrgedicht*, p. 105 and 107.

d. A third explanation is given by O. Gigon, *Ursprung*, p. 279 ff. See fig. 3.




Fig. 3

Now, surely, this does not agree with the description of Aëtius, cited under a. As to the idea of a shell of fire ("Feuerschale") around the heaven, G. finds this confirmed by Cic., *De nat. deor.* I 11, 28 (D. A 37):

Nam P. quidem commenticium quiddam: coronae simile efficit (στεφάνην appellat), continentem ardorem et lucis orbem qui cingit caelum, quem appellat deum.—

86—a. Parm., D. B 16:

ὥς γὰρ ἑκάστοι' ἔχει κῤῃσιν μελέων πολυπλάγκτων **,
τῶς νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρίσταται · τὸ γὰρ αὐτό

thinking and
bodily con-
sistence

** In this form the text is cited by Arist. and Theophr. Then νόος must be the subject, which gives a possible construction, yet a rather hard one. Some will read ἑκάστος, which would be easier to understand. However, if any correction is to be proposed, κῤῃσις will do better.

ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονέει μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισιν
καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί· τὸ γὰρ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα¹.

b. Theophr. explains the last words in the following lines (*De sensu* 3, D. A 46):

Παρμενίδης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως οὐδὲν ἀφώρικεν², ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτι δυοῖν ὄντοι στοιχεῖοι κατὰ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἐστὶν ἡ γνῶσις. ἐὰν γὰρ ὑπεραίρη τὸ θερμόν ἢ τὸ ψυχρόν, ἄλλην γίνεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν, βελτίω δὲ καὶ καθαρωτέραν τὴν διὰ τὸ θερμόν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτην δεῖσθαι τινος συμμετρίας· „ὥς γὰρ ἐκάστοτε” — φησὶν — „ἔχει κράσιν μελέων πολυπλάγκτων” κτλ. (4) τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὡς ταῦτ’ ἀπέχει· διὸ καὶ τὴν μνήμην καὶ τὴν λήθη ἀπὸ τούτων γίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς κράσεως. ἂν δ’ ἰσάζωσι τῇ μίξει, πότερον ἔσται φρονεῖν ἢ οὐ, καὶ τίς ἢ διάθεσις, οὐδὲν ἔτι διώρικεν. ὅτι δὲ καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ καθ’ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν φανερόν, ἐν οἷς φησι τὸν νεκρὸν φωτὸς μὲν καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ φωνῆς οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἐκλειψιν τοῦ πυρός, ψυχροῦ δὲ καὶ σιωπῆς καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ ὅλως δὲ πᾶν τὸ ὄν ἔχειν τινὰ γνῶσιν.

3—ZENO

life

87—a. Diog. IX 25 (D. 29 A 1):

Ζήνων Ἐλεάτης. τοῦτον Ἀπολλόδωρός φησιν ἐν Χρονικοῖς φύσει μὲν Τελευταγόρου, θέσει³ δὲ Παρμενίδου. — φησὶ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ εὑρετὴν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι διαλεκτικῆς, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλέα ῥητορικῆς. (26) γέγονε δὲ ἀνὴρ γενναιότατος καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ ἐν πολιτείᾳ. φέρεται γοῦν αὐτοῦ βιβλία πολλῆς συνέσεως γέμοντα.

b. On the book of Zeno see Plato, *Parm.* 128 c:

ἔστι δὲ τό γε ἀληθὲς βοήθειά τις ταῦτα [τὰ γράμματα] τῷ Παρμενίδου λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας αὐτὸν κωμῶδεῖν ὥς, εἰ ἐν ἐστὶ, πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα συμβαίνειν πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐναντία αὐτῷ. ἀντιλέγει δὲ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγοντας καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταῦτα καὶ πλείω, τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὥς ἔτι γελοιότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ πολλὰ ἐστὶν, ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι, εἴ τις ἰκανῶς ἐπεξίλοι. διὰ τοιαύτην δὲ φιλονικίαν ὑπὸ νέου ὄντος ἐμοῦ ἐγράφη, καὶ τις αὐτὸ ἐκλεψε γραφέν, ὥστε οὐδὲ βουλευσασθαι ἐξεγένετο, εἴτ’ ἐξοιστέον αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ φῶς εἶτε μή.

¹ “For what prevails (in the body) is thought”.

² sc. *per* αἰσθήσεων.

³ by adoption.

c. On the subtlety of his dialectic: Plato, *Phaedr.* 261 d:

τὸν οὖν Ἑλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην λέγοντα οὐκ ἴσμεν τέχνη, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι τὰ αὐτὰ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ, μένοντά τε αὖ καὶ φερόμενα;

88—Simpl., *Phys.* 1108, 18 D (D. 29 A 29):

the grain and
the heap

διὰ τοῦτο λύει¹ καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνος τοῦ Ἑλεάτου λόγον, ὃν ἤρετο Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφιστήν. „εἰπέ γάρ μοι,” ἔφη, „ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἄρα ὁ εἰς κέγχρος καταπεσὼν ψόφον ποιεῖ ἢ τὸ μυριοστὸν τοῦ κέγχρου;” τοῦ δὲ εἰπόντος μὴ ποιεῖν, „ὁ δὲ μέδιμνος,” ἔφη, „τῶν κέγχρων καταπεσὼν ποιεῖ ψόφον ἢ οὐ”; τοῦ δὲ ψοφεῖν εἰπόντος τὸν μέδιμνον „τί οὖν,” ἔφη ὁ Ζήνων, „οὐκ ἔστι λόγος² τοῦ μεδίμνου τῶν κέγχρων πρὸς τὸν ἕνα καὶ τὸ μυριοστὸν τὸ τοῦ ἑνός”; τοῦ δὲ φήσαντος εἶναι, „τί οὖν,” ἔφη ὁ Ζήνων, „οὐ καὶ τῶν ψόφων ἔσονται λόγοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ αὐτοί; ὥς γὰρ τὰ ψοφοῦντα, καὶ οἱ ψόφοι· τοῦτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος, εἰ ὁ μέδιμνος τοῦ κέγχρου ψοφεῖ, ψοφήσει καὶ ὁ εἰς κέγχρος καὶ τὸ μυριοστὸν τοῦ κέγχρου.”

89—a. D. 29, B 1, at the end, and B 2 (Simpl., *Phys.* 139, 5 D):

there cannot
be many

Ἐν μέντοι τῷ συγγράμματι αὐτοῦ πολλὰ ἔχοντι ἐπιχειρήματα καθ' ἕκαστον δείκνυσιν, ὅτι τῷ πολλὰ εἶναι λέγοντι συμβαίνει τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν· ὦν ἓν ἐστὶν ἐπιχείρημα, ἐν ᾧ δείκνυσιν ὅτι, „εἰ πολλὰ ἐστὶ, καὶ μεγάλα ἐστὶ καὶ μικρά· μεγάλα μὲν ὥστε ἀπειρα τὸ μέγεθος εἶναι, μικρά δὲ οὕτως ὥστε μηθὲν ἔχειν μέγεθος” (B 1).

Ἐν δὴ τούτῳ δείκνυσιν, ὅτι οὐ μήτε μέγεθος μήτε πάχος μήτε ὄγκος μηθείς ἐστὶν, οὐδ' ἂν εἴη τοῦτο. „εἰ γὰρ ἄλλω ὄντι, φησί, προσγένετο, οὐδὲν ἂν μεῖζον ποιήσειεν· μεγέθους γὰρ μηδενὸς ὄντος, προσγενομένου δέ, οὐδὲν οἶόν τε εἰς μέγεθος ἐπιδουῖναι. καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἤδη τὸ προσγινόμενον οὐδὲν εἴη. εἰ δὲ ἀπογινόμενον τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲν ἔλαττον ἔσται, μηδὲ αὖ προσγινόμενον αὐξήσεται, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ προσγεγνημένον οὐδὲν ἦν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπογενόμενον.” καὶ ταῦτα οὐχὶ τὸ ἐν ἀναιρῶν ὁ Ζήνων λέγει, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἀπείρων, τῷ πρὸ τοῦ λαμβανομένου ἀεὶ τι εἶναι, διὰ τὴν ἐπ' ἀπειρον τομήν· ὁ δὲ δείκνυσιν προδείξας, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔχει μέγεθος ἐκ τοῦ ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ἑαυτῷ ταῦτόν εἶναι καὶ ἓν.

first proof:
the infinitely
small

b. D. B 3 (Simpl., *Phys.* 140, 28 D):

second proof:
ἐκ διχοτομίας

πάλιν γὰρ δεικνύς ὅτι, εἰ πολλὰ ἐστὶ, τὰ αὐτὰ πεπερασμένα ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπειρα, γράφει ταῦτα κατὰ λέξιν ὁ Ζήνων· „εἰ πολλὰ ἐστὶν, ἀνάγκη τοσαῦτα εἶναι

¹ λύει - refutes, sc. Aristotle.

² λόγος - a proportion.

ὅσα ἐστὶ καὶ οὔτε πλείονα αὐτῶν οὔτε ἐλάττονα. εἰ δὲ τοσαῦτά ἐστιν ὅσα ἐστί, πεπερασμένα ἂν εἴη. εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, ἄπειρα τὰ ὄντα ἐστίν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἕτερα ¹ μεταξὺ τῶν ὄντων ἐστί, καὶ πάλιν ἐκείνων ἕτερα μεταξὺ. καὶ οὕτως ἄπειρα τὰ ὄντα ἐστί.” καὶ οὕτως μὲν τὸ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἄπειρον ἐκ τῆς διχοτομίας ἔδειξε.

third proof:
the infinitely
great

c. D. B 1 (Simpl., *Phys.* 140, 34 D) (to be connected with the first proof):

τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέγεθος (sc. ἄπειρον ἔδειξε) πρότερον κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιχείρησιν. προδείξας γὰρ ὅτι, „εἰ μὴ ἔχοι μέγεθος τὸ ὄν, οὐδ’ ἂν εἴη”, ἐπάγει· „εἰ δὲ ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη ἕκαστον μέγεθός τι ἔχειν καὶ πάχος, καὶ ἀπέχειν αὐτοῦ τὸ ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐτέρου. καὶ περὶ τοῦ προύχοντος ² ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ἔξει μέγεθος καὶ προέξει αὐτοῦ τι ³. ὅμοιον δὲ τοῦτο ἅπαξ τε εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀεὶ λέγειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοιοῦτον ἔσχατον ἔσται, ὥστε ἕτερον πρὸ ἐτέρου οὐκ ἔσται*. οὕτως εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ μικρά τε εἶναι καὶ μεγάλα, μικρά μὲν ὥστε μὴ ἔχειν μέγεθος, μεγάλα δὲ ὥστε ἄπειρα εἶναι.”

space

90—a. Simpl., *Phys.* 562, 3 D:

ὁ Ζήνωνος λόγος ἀναιρεῖν ἐδόκει τὸ εἶναι τὸν τόπον ἐρωτῶν οὕτως· „εἰ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος, ἐν τινι ἔσται· πᾶν γὰρ ὄν ἐν τινι· τὸ δὲ ἐν τινι καὶ ἐν τόπῳ. ἔσται ἄρα καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν τόπῳ, καὶ τοῦτο ἐπ’ ἄπειρον. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ὁ τόπος.”

b. Cf. Arist., *Phys.* IV 3, 210 b²²:

ὁ δὲ Ζήνων ἠπόρει, ὅτι εἰ ἔστι τι ὁ τόπος, ἐν τίνι ἔσται, λύειν οὐ χαλεπὸν· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν εἶναι τὸν πρῶτον τόπον, μὴ μέντοι ὡς ἐν τόπῳ ἐκεῖνῳ, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἡ μὲν ὑγίεια ἐν θερμοῖς ὡς ἔξισ, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν ἐν σώματι ὡς πάθος. ὥστ’ οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι.

motion: first
argument

91—a. Arist., *Phys.* VI 9, 239 b⁹:

Τέτταρες δ’ εἰσὶ λόγοι περὶ κινήσεως Ζήνωνος οἱ παρέχοντες τὰς δυσκολίας τοῖς λύουσιν· πρῶτος μὲν ὁ περὶ τοῦ μὴ κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ πρότερον εἰς τὸ ἥμισυ δεῖν ἀφικέσθαι τὸ φερόμενον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τέλος, περὶ οὗ διείλομεν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον λόγοις ⁴.

¹ ἀεὶ γὰρ ἕτερα e.q.s. - For every extent can always again be divided.

² περὶ τοῦ προύχοντος “about what is before it”.

³ προέξει αὐτοῦ τι “there will be something before it”.

⁴ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον λόγοις - i.e. in the next cited passage of *Phys.* VI 2, under b.

* Diels keeps the text of the mss: οὔτε ἕτερον πρὸς ἕτερον οὐκ ἔσται. K. Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socr. Philosophers*, translates: “nor will any part be unrelated to another part.” The corrections ὥστε and πρὸ ἐτέρου are due to Th. Gomperz.

b. Arist., *Phys.* VI 2, 233 a¹¹:

μέγεθος ἅπαν ἐστὶ συνεχές· τὰς αὐτὰς γὰρ καὶ τὰς ἴσας διαιρέσεις ὁ χρόνος διαιρεῖται καὶ τὸ μέγεθος. — 233 a²¹: διὸ καὶ ὁ Ζήνωνος λόγος ψευδὸς λαμβάνει¹ τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τὰ ἀπειρα διελθεῖν ἢ ἀψασθαι τῶν ἀπείρων καθ' ἕκαστον² ἐν πεπερασμένῳ χρόνῳ. διχῶς γὰρ λέγεται καὶ τὸ μῆκος καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἀπειρον, καὶ ὅλως πᾶν τὸ συνεχές, ἥτοι κατὰ διαιρέσιν ἢ τοῖς ἐσχάτοις. τῶν μὲν οὖν κατὰ ποσὸν ἀπείρων οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἀψασθαι ἐν πεπερασμένῳ χρόνῳ, τῶν δὲ κατὰ διαιρέσιν ἐνδέχεται· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ χρόνος οὕτως ἀπειρος. ὥστε ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ πεπερασμένῳ συμβαίνει διέναι τὸ ἀπειρον, καὶ ἄπτεσθαι τῶν ἀπείρων τοῖς ἀπείροις, οὐ τοῖς πεπερασμένοις.

92—a. Arist., *Phys.* VI 9, 239 b¹⁴:

δεύτερος δ' ὁ καλούμενος Ἀχιλλεύς. ἐστὶ δ' οὗτος, ὅτι τὸ βραδύτατον οὐδέποτε καταληφθήσεται θεὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ταχίστου· ἔμπροσθεν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἐλθεῖν τὸ διώκον, ὅθεν ὥρμησε τὸ φεῦγον, ὥστ' αἰεὶ τι πρόχειν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ βραδύτερον.

second
argument:
Achilles

b. Arist. continues (*Phys.* VI 9, 239 b¹⁸):

ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος τῷ διχοτομεῖν, διαφέρει δ' ἐν τῷ διαιρεῖν μὴ δίχα τὸ προσλαμβανόμενον μέγεθος. — 239 b²² ἐν ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ συμβαίνει μὴ ἀφικνεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸ πέρας διαιρουμένον πῶς τοῦ μεγέθους. ἀλλὰ πρόσκειται ἐν τούτῳ ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ ταχίστον τετραγωδημένον³ ἐν τῷ διώκειν τὸ βραδύτατον.

Aristotle's
comment
on this

93—a. Ib. 239 b³⁰:

τρίτος δ' ὁ νῦν ῥηθείς, ὅτι ἡ ὁιστὸς φερομένη ἔστηκεν. συμβαίνει δὲ παρὰ τὸ λαμβάνειν τὸν χρόνον συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ τῶν νῦν· μὴ διδομένου γὰρ τούτου οὐκ ἔσται ὁ συλλογισμός.

third
argument:
the flying
arrow

b. Cf. the beginning of this chapter (239 b⁵):

Ζ. δὲ παραλογίζεται· εἰ γὰρ αἰεὶ, φησὶν, ἡρεμεῖ πᾶν ἢ κινεῖται, <ἡρεμεῖ δ' > ὅταν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον*, ἐστὶ δ' αἰεὶ τὸ φερόμενον ἐν τῷ νῦν, ἀκίνητον τὴν φερόμενην εἶναι ὁιστόν. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ψευδὸς· οὐ γὰρ σύγκειται ὁ χρόνος ἐκ τῶν νῦν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων, ὥστερ οὐδ' ἄλλο μέγεθος οὐδέν.

¹ assumes wrongly. ² severally.

³ that hero in swiftness, sc. ἀφίξεται.

* Zeller deletes ἢ κινεῖται. Diels adds after κινεῖται <οὐδὲν δὲ κινεῖται>, and after ἐν τῷ νῦν <πᾶν δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον ἐν τῷ νῦν>. Carteron <ἡρεμεῖ δ' >. Ross (in his recent edition) follows Zeller.

**fourth
argument**

94—a. Ib. 239 b³³:

τέταρτος δ' ὁ περὶ τῶν ἐν σταδίῳ κινουμένων ἐξ ἐναντίας ἴσων ὄγκων παρ' ἴσους, τῶν μὲν ἀπὸ τέλους τοῦ σταδίου τῶν δ' ἀπὸ μέσου, ἴσῳ τάχει, ἐν ᾧ συμβαίνειν οἴεται ἴσον εἶναι χρόνον τῷ διπλασίῳ τὸν ἡμισυν.


**the comment
of Aristotle**

b. Arist. adds (240 a¹):

ἔστι δ' ὁ παραλογισμὸς ἐν τῷ τὸ μὲν παρὰ κινούμενον τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡρεμοῦν τὸ ἴσον μέγεθος ἀξιοῦν τῷ ἴσῳ τάχει τὸν ἴσον φέρεσθαι χρόνον.

"The mistake of the argument lies in this point, that the same object is supposed to move with the same velocity in the same time along a moving and along a non-moving object."

Alex. draws this figure of it (Simpl., *Phys.* 1016, 14 ff.):



A ὄγκοι ἐστῶτες.

B ὄγκοι κινούμενοι ἀπὸ τοῦ Δ ἐπὶ τὸ Ε.

Γ ὄγκοι κινούμενοι ἀπὸ τοῦ Ε ἐπὶ τὸ Δ.

Δ ἀρχὴ τοῦ σταδίου.

Ε τέλος τοῦ σταδίου.

**the definitive
refutation
of Arist.**

95—In *Phys.* VIII 8, 263a⁴-b⁹ Arist. qualifies his first refutation of the argument ἐκ διχοτομίας as a preliminary one and gives his definitive refutation, which is based upon the distinction between δυνάμει and ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν.

(263 a¹¹) Ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως ἐλύομεν διὰ τοῦ τὸν χρόνον ἄπειρα ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ · οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄτοπον εἰ ἐν ἀπείρῳ χρόνῳ ἄπειρα διέρχεται τις · ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἄπειρον ἐν τε τῷ μήκει ὑπάρχει καὶ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ. Ἄλλ' αὕτη ἡ λύσις πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἐρωτῶντα ἱκανῶς ἔχει (ἡρωτᾶτο γὰρ εἰ ἐν πεπερασμένῳ ἄπειρα ἐνδέχεται διεξελθεῖν ἢ ἀριθμῆσαι) · πρὸς δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὐχ ἱκανῶς. Ἄν γάρ τις, ἀφόμενος τοῦ μήκους καὶ τοῦ ἐρωτᾶν εἰ ἐν πεπερασμένῳ χρόνῳ ἐνδέχεται ἄπειρα διεξελθεῖν, πυκνάνηται ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ χρόνου ταῦτα (ἔχει γὰρ ὁ χρόνος ἀπείρους διαιρέσεις), οὐκέτι ἱκανὴ ἔσται αὕτη ἡ λύσις · ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς λεκτέον, ὅπερ εἵπομεν ἐν τοῖς ἄρτι λόγοις.

10 Ἄν γάρ τις τὴν συνεχῇ διαιρῇ εἰς δύο ἡμίση, οὗτος τῷ ἐνὶ σημείῳ ὡς δυσὶ χρῆται · ποιεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν · οὕτω δὲ ποιεῖ ὁ τε ἀριθμῶν καὶ ὁ εἰς τὰ ἡμίση διαιρῶν. Οὕτω δὲ διαιροῦντος, οὐκ ἔσται συνεχὴς οὐθ' ἡ γραμμὴ οὐθ' ἡ κίνησις · ἡ γὰρ συνεχὴς κίνησις συνεχoῦς ἐστίν · ἐν δὲ τῷ συνεχεῖ ἐνεστί μὲν ἄπειρα ἡμίση, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐντελεχεῖα ἀλλὰ δυνάμει. Ἄν δὲ ποιῇ ἐντελεχεῖα,

15 οὐ ποιήσει συνεχῇ, ἀλλὰ στήσει · ὅπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦντος τὰ ἡμίση φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι συμβαίνει · τὸ γὰρ ἐν σημείῳ ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀριθμεῖν δύο · τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐτέρου τελευτὴ ἡμίσεος, τοῦ δ' ἐτέρου ἀρχὴ ἔσται, ἂν μὴ μίαν ἀριθμῇ τὴν συνεχῇ, ἀλλὰ δύο ἡμισείας.

20 Ὡστε λεκτέον πρὸς τὸν ἐρωτῶντα εἰ ἐνδέχεται ἄπειρα διεξελθεῖν ἢ ἐν χρόνῳ ἢ ἐν μήκει, ὅτι ἐστὶν ὥς, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ. Ἐντελεχεῖα μὲν γὰρ ὄντα οὐκ

ἐνδέχεται, δυνάμει δ' ἐνδέχεται · ὁ γὰρ συνεχῶς κινούμενος κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἄπειρα διελήλυθεν, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ · συμβέβηκε γὰρ τῇ γραμμῇ ἄπειρα ἡμίσεα εἶναι, ἢ δ' οὐσία ἐστὶν ἑτέρα καὶ τὸ εἶναι.

4—MELISSUS

96—Diog. IX 24 (D. 30 A 1):

life

Μέλισσος Ἰθαγένους Σάμιος. οὗτος ἤκουσε Παρμενίδου. — γέγονε δὲ καὶ πολιτικὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἀποδοχῆς¹ παρὰ τοῖς πολίταις ἡξιωμένος · ὄθεν καὶ ναύαρχος² αἰρεθείς ἐτι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐθαυμάσθη ἢ διὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν.

97—a. Melissus, D 30 B 1:

doctrine
what is,
is eternal

αἰεὶ ἦν ὃ τι ἦν καὶ αἰεὶ ἔσται. εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι πρὶν γενέσθαι εἶναι μηδὲν · ὅτε τοίνυν μηδὲν ἦν, οὐδαμὰ ἂν γένοιτο οὐδὲν ἐκ μηδενός.

b. D. 30 B 2:

it is infinite

ὅτε τοίνυν οὐκ ἐγένετο, ἔστι τε καὶ αἰεὶ ἦν καὶ αἰεὶ ἔσται, καὶ ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ τελευτὴν, ἀλλ' ἄπειρόν ἐστιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο, ἀρχὴν ἂν εἶχεν (ἤρξατο γὰρ ἂν ποτε γενόμενον) καὶ τελευτὴν (ἐτελεύτησε γὰρ ἂν ποτε γενόμενον) · ὅτε δὲ μήτε ἤρξατο μήτε ἐτελεύτησεν, αἰεὶ τε ἦν καὶ αἰεὶ ἔσται <καὶ> οὐκ ἔχει ἀρχὴν οὐδὲ τελευτὴν · οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ εἶναι ἀνυστόν ὃ τι μὴ πᾶν ἔστι.

c. D. B 6:

it is one

εἰ γὰρ (sc. ἄπειρον) * εἶη, ἐν εἶη ἂν · εἰ γὰρ δύο εἶη, οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο ἄπειρα εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἔχοι ἂν πείρατα πρὸς ἄλληλα.

98—D. B 7:

immutable
and without
pain

οὕτως οὖν αἰδιόν ἐστι καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ ἐν καὶ ὅμοιον πᾶν. καὶ οὐτ' ἂν ἀπόλοιτο οὔτε μεῖζον γίνοιτο οὔτε μετακοσμέοιτο, οὔτε ἀλγεῖ οὔτε ἀνιᾶται · εἰ γὰρ τι τούτων πάσχοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἐν εἶη. εἰ γὰρ ἑτεροιοῦται, ἀνάγκη τὸ ἐὸν μὴ ὁμοῖον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἀπόλλυσθαι τὸ πρόσθεν ἐόν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν γίνεσθαι. εἰ τοίνυν τριχὶ μιῇ μυρίοις ἔτεσιν ἑτεροῖον γίνοιτο, ὀλεῖται πᾶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ. Ἄλλ' 5 οὐδὲ μετακοσμηθῆναι ἀνυστόν · ὁ γὰρ κόσμος ὁ πρόσθεν ἐὼν οὐκ ἀπόλλυται οὔτε ὁ μὴ ἐὼν γίνεται. ὅτε δὲ μήτε προσγίνεται μηδὲν μήτε ἀπόλλυται μήτε

¹ ἀποδοχῆς = favour.

² ναύαρχος - M. commanded the Samian fleet in the war against Athens a. 441. (Plut., *Pericles* 26: Μέλισσος ὁ Ἰθαγιένους ἀνὴρ φιλόσοφος στρατηγῶν τότε τῆς Σάμου —).

* Kranz <ἄπειρον>.

ἐτεροιοῦται, πῶς ἂν μετακοσμηθὲν τῶν ἐόντων εἴη; εἰ μὲν γάρ τι ἐγίνετο ἐτεροῖον, ἤδη ἂν καὶ μετακοσμηθείη. Οὐδὲ ἀλγεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν πᾶν εἴη ἀλγέον·
 10 οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο αἰεὶ εἶναι χρῆμα ἀλγέον· οὐδὲ ἔχει ἴσῃν δύναμιν τῷ ὑγιεῖ· οὐδ' ἂν ὁμοῖον εἴη, εἰ ἀλγέοι· ἀπογινομένου γάρ τευ ἂν ἀλγέοι ἢ προσγινομένου, κοῦκ ἂν ἔτι ὁμοῖον εἴη. οὐδ' ἂν τὸ ὑγιὲς ἀλγῆσαι δύναιτο· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἂν ὄλοιτο τὸ ὑγιὲς καὶ τὸ ἐόν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὼν γένοιτο. καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀνιᾶσθαι ὡυτὸς λόγος τῷ ἀλγέοντι.

15 Οὐδὲ κενέον ἐστὶν οὐδέν· τὸ γὰρ κενέον οὐδέν ἐστιν· οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη τό γε
 there is no
 void μηδέν. οὐδὲ κινεῖται· ὑποχωρῆσαι γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει οὐδαμῇ, ἀλλὰ πλέων ἐστίν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ κενέον ἦν, ὑπεχώρει ἂν εἰς τὸ κενόν· κενοῦ δὲ μὴ ἐόντος οὐκ ἔχει ὄκη ὑποχωρήσει. πυκνὸν δὲ καὶ ἀραιὸν οὐκ ἂν εἴη· τὸ γὰρ ἀραιὸν οὐκ ἀνυστὸν πλέων εἶναι ὁμοίως τῷ πυκνῷ, ἀλλ' ἤδη τὸ ἀραιὸν γε κενεώτερον γίνεται τοῦ
 20 πυκνοῦ. κρίσιν δὲ ταύτην χρὴ ποιήσασθαι τοῦ πλέω καὶ τοῦ μὴ πλέω· εἰ μὲν οὖν χωρεῖ τι ἢ εἰσδέχεται, οὐ πλέων· εἰ δὲ μήτε χωρεῖ μήτε εἰσδέχεται, πλέων. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν πλέων εἶναι, εἰ κενὸν μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ τοίνυν πλέων ἐστίν, οὐ κινεῖται.

the one has
 no body

99—D. B 9:

Εἰ μὲν οὖν εἴη, δεῖ αὐτὸ ἐν εἶναι· ἐν δ' ἐὼν δεῖ αὐτὸ σῶμα μὴ ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ ἔχοι πάχος, ἔχοι ἂν μόρια καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν εἴη.

FIFTH CHAPTER PLURALISTS AND ATOMISTS

1—EMPEDOCLES

100—Diog. VIII 51 (D. 31 A 1):

life and
person

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, ὥς φησιν Ἰππόβοτος, Μέτωνος ἦν υἱὸς τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους, Ἀκραγαντῖνος. — (52) Ἀπολλόδωρος δ' ὁ γραμματικὸς ἐν τοῖς Χρονικοῖς φησιν ὡς

,,ἦν μὲν Μέτωνος υἱός, εἰς δὲ Θουρίους
αὐτὸν νεωστὶ παντελῶς ἐκτισμένους
<ὁ> Γλαῦκος ἐλθεῖν φησιν.”

— (55) ὁ δὲ Θεόφραστος Παρμενίδου φησὶ ζηλωτὴν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι καὶ μιμητὴν ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι. — (58) φησὶ δὲ Σάτυρος ἐν τοῖς βίοις ὅτι καὶ ἰατρός ἦν καὶ ῥήτωρ ἄριστος. Γοργίαν γοῦν τὸν Λεοντῖνον αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι μαθητὴν. — (59) τοῦτόν φησιν ὁ Σάτυρος λέγειν, ὡς αὐτὸς παρήναι τῷ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ γοητεύοντι. — (67) περὶ δὲ τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ διάφορός ἐστιν λόγος. — (77) τὰ μὲν οὖν Περὶ φύσεως αὐτῶ καὶ οἱ Καθαρμοὶ εἰς ἔπη τείνουσι πεντακισχίλια.

101—In the beginning of his Καθαρμοί E. himself gives the following prophetic
appearance
description of his appearance in Sicily.

a. D. 31 B 112:

ὦ φίλοι, οἳ μέγα ἄστυ κατὰ ξανθοῦ Ἀκράγαντος
ναίετ' ἂν' ἄκρα πόλεος, ἀγαθῶν μελεδήμονες ἔργων,
ξείνων αἰδοῦοι λιμένες, κακότητος ἄπειροι,
χαίρετ' · ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητὸς
5 πωλεῦμαι μετὰ πᾶσι τετιμένος, ὥσπερ ἔοικα,
ταινίαις τε περίστεπτος στέφεσιν τε θαλεροῖς ·
τοῖσιν † ἄμ' † ἂν * ἵκωμαι ἐς ἄστεα τηλεθάοντα,
ἀνδράσιν ἡδὲ γυναιξί, σεβίζομαι · οἳ δ' ἄμ' ἔπονται
μυρίοι ἐξερέοντες, ὅπη πρὸς κέρδος ἀταρπός,
10 οἳ μὲν μαντοσυνέων κεχρημένοι, οἳ δ' ἐπὶ νούσων
παντοίων ἐπύθοντο κλύειν εὐηκέα βάζιν,
δηρὸν δὴ χαλεποῖσι πεπαρμένοι <ἀμφὶ μόγοισιν>**.

* Kranz. Diels read ἄμ' <εὐτ'> ἂν.

** Kranz. χαλεπῇσι . . . <ἀμφ' ὀδύγησι>

and tone

b. D. B II4:

ὦ φίλοι, οἶδα μὲν οὔνεκ' ἀληθείῃ πάρα μύθοις,
οὓς ἐγὼ ἐξερέω· μάλα δ' ἀργαλέη γε τέτυκται
ἀνδράσι καὶ δύσζηλος ἐπὶ φρένα πίστιος ὁρμή.

he dominates
the powers of
nature

c. D. B III:

φάρμακα δ' ὅσσα γεῖσσι κακῶν καὶ γήραος ἄλκαρ
πεύσῃ, ἐπεὶ μούνῳ σοὶ ἐγὼ κρανέω τάδε πάντα.
παύσεις δ' ἀκαμάτων ἀνέμων μένος οἷ τ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν
ὀρνύμενοι πνοιαῖσι καταφθινύουσιν ἀρούρας·

5 καὶ πάλιν, ἣν ἐθέλησθα, παλίντιτα πνεύματ(α) ἐπάξεις·
θήσεις δ' ἐξ ὁμβροιο κελαινοῦ καίριον αὐχμόν
ἀνθρώποις, θήσεις δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐχμοῖο θερείου
ρέύματα δενδρεόθρεπτα, τά τ' αἰθέρι ναιήσονται,
ἄξεις δ' ἐξ Ἀΐδαο καταφθιμένου μένος ἀνδρός.

miracle-
stories

102—a. Diog. VIII 60 (D. A 1):

1. checking
the winds

Φησὶ δὲ καὶ Τίμαιος ἐν τῇ ὀκτωκαιδεκάτῃ κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους τεθναμάσθαι τὸν ἄνδρα, καὶ γὰρ ἐτησίῳ ποτὲ σφοδρῶς πνευσάντων, ὥς τοὺς καρποὺς λυμῆναι, κελεύσας ὄνους ἐκδαρῆναι καὶ ἄσκούς ποιῆσαι περὶ τοὺς λόφους καὶ τὰς ἀκρωρείας διέτεινε πρὸς τὸ συλλαβεῖν τὸ πνεῦμα· λήξαντος δὲ Κωλυσανέμαν κληθῆναι.

2. raising a
dead woman

b. (Ib.) Ἑρακλείδης τε ἐν τῷ περὶ νόσων φησὶ καὶ Πανσανίᾳ ὑφηγήσασθαι αὐτὸν τὰ περὶ τὴν ἄπνουν. — (61) τὴν γοῦν ἄπνουν ὁ Ἑρακλείδης φησὶ τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι, ὥς τριάκοντα ἡμέρας συντηρεῖν ἄπνουν καὶ ἄσφυκτον¹ τὸ σῶμα· ὅθεν εἶπεν αὐτὸν καὶ ἰητρὸν καὶ μάντιν.

3. the purifi-
cation of the
marshes

c. (70) Τοῖς Σελινουντίοις ἐμπεσόντος λοιμοῦ διὰ τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ παρακειμένου ποταμοῦ δυσωδίας, ὥστε καὶ αὐτοὺς φθεῖρεσθαι καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας δυστοκεῖν, ἐπινοῆσαι τὸν Ἑμπεδοκλέα καὶ δύο τινὰς ποταμοὺς τῶν σύνεγγυς ἐπαγαγεῖν ἰδίαις δαπάναις· καὶ καταμίξαντα γλυκῆναι τὰ βεύματα. οὕτω δὲ λήξαντος τοῦ λοιμοῦ καὶ τῶν Σελινουντίων εὐωχομένων ποτὲ παρὰ τῷ ποταμῷ, ἐπιφανῆναι τὸν Ἑμπεδοκλέα· τοὺς δ' ἐξαναστάντας προσκυνεῖν καὶ προσεύχεσθαι καθάπερ ἐθεῶ.

4. his death

103—a. Heracl. Pont. tells (fr. 76 Voss, *Diog. VIII*, 67 f.) that he, after a θυσία with a circle of friends, was snatched up to heaven during the night.

(68) ὥς δὲ ἡμέρας γεννηθείσης ἐξανέστησαν, οὐχ ἠρέθη μόνος. ζητουμένου δὲ καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν ἀνακρινόμενων καὶ φασκόντων μὴ εἶδέναι, εἰς τις ἔφη μέσων νυκτῶν φωνῆς ὑπερμεγέθους ἀκοῦσαι προσκαλουμένης Ἑμπεδοκλέα, εἴτα ἐξαναστὰς ἐωρακέναι φῶς οὐράνιον καὶ λαμπράδων φέγγος, ἄλλο δὲ μὴδέν.

b. Ib. 69 (Heracl. Pont. fr. 77 Voss):

Ἵππόβοτος δὲ φησιν ἐξαναστάντα αὐτὸν ὠδευκέναι ὥς ἐπὶ τὴν Αἴτην, εἴτα παραγενόμενον ἐπὶ τοὺς κρατῆρας τοῦ πυρὸς ἐναλέσθαι καὶ ἀφανισθῆναι, βουλόμενον τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ φήμην βεβαιῶσαι ὅτι γεγόνοι θεός, ὕστερον δὲ γνωσθῆναι, ἀναρριπισθείσης αὐτοῦ μᾶς τῶν κρηπίδων· χαλκᾶς γὰρ εἴδιστο ὑποδεῖσθαι.

¹ without pulsation (σφύζω: beat violently).

c. Cf. Horatius, *A. P.* 464:

deus immortalis haberi
dum cupit Empedocles, ardentem frigidus Aetnam
insiluit.

d. *Diog.* VIII 71:

Τούτοις δ' ἐναντιοῦται Τίμαιος ῥητῶς λέγων, ὥς ἐξεχώρησεν εἰς Πελοπόννησον καὶ τὸ σύνολον οὐκ ἐπανήλθεν.

104—a. Emped., D. 31 B 2:

στενωποὶ μὲν γὰρ παλάμαι¹ κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται·
πολλὰ² δὲ δεῖλ' ἔμπαῖα * τὰ τ' ἀμβλύνουσι μερίμνας.
παῦρον δὲ ζωῆς ἀβίου **³ μέρος ἀθρήσαντες
ὠκύμοροι καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν,
αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες ὅτῳ προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος 5
πάντοσ' ἐλαυνόμενοι, τὸ δ' ὅλον <πᾶς> εὐχεται εὐρεῖν·
οὕτως οὐτ' ἐπιδερκτὰ τὰδ' ἀνδράσιν οὐτ' ἐπακουστὰ
οὔτε νόῳ περιληπτὰ.

rejection of
any theory of
the whole

b. Still stronger D. B 3 (formerly 4):

ἀλλὰ θεοὶ τῶν μὲν μανίην⁴ ἀποτρέψατε γλώσσης,
ἐκ δ' ὁσίων στομάτων καθαρὴν ὀχετεύσατε πηγὴν.
καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα,
ἄντομαι, ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν,
πέμπε⁵ παρ' Εὐσεβείης ἐλάουσ' εὐήνιον ἄρμα. 5
μηδὲ σέ γ' εὐδόξιοιο βιήσεται⁶ ἄνθεα τιμῆς
πρὸς θνητῶν ἀνελέσθαι, ἐφ' ᾧ θ' ὁσίης πλέον εἰπεῖν
θάρσει — καὶ τότε δὴ σοφίης ἐπ' ἄκροισι θαάζειν.
ἀλλ' ἄγ' ἄθρει πάσῃ παλάμῃ⁷ πῇ δῆλον ἕκαστον,
μήτε τιν' ὄψιν ἔχων πίστει πλέον ἢ κατ' ἀκουὴν 10
ἢ ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώματα⁸ γλώσσης,

do not reject
the assistance
of the senses!

¹ στενωποὶ παλάμαι - "For straitened are the organs"—

² π. δὲ δεῖλ' ἔμπαῖα - "many are the woes that burst in on them" (Burnet).

³ ζωῆς ἀβίου - of a life that is no life.

⁴ τῶν μὲν μανίην - the madness of those men, who construct a theory about the whole. Doubtless he thinks of Parmenides.

⁵ ἄντομαι — πέμπε: "I beseech thee, drive my car from the abode of holiness, that I may hear what is lawful for the children of a day."

⁶ μηδὲ σέ γε . . . βιήσεται - "And may not the flowers of a glorious garland, which mortals offer to you, compel you to lift them from the ground, so that you might be forced (ἐφ' ᾧ τε - on condition) to speak in pride more than is lawful."

⁷ παλάμη - αἰσθήσει.

⁸ τρανώματα - clear perceptions.

* δειλεμπέα mss. (Sext., *Math.* VII 123). Diels read δεῖλ' ἔμπαῖα (correction of Emperius).

** ζωῆς ἀβίου is a correction of Scaliger for ζωῆσι βίου. Cf. fr. 15: τὸ δὲ βίον καλέουσι. Burnet adopts this correction. Diels ζωῆς ἰδίου. Kranz δ' ἐν ζωῇσι βίου.

μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὁπόση πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι,
γυίων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ' ἢ δῆλον ἕκαστον.

the four
elements

105—Emped., D. B 6:

τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ριζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε ·
Ζεὺς ἀργῆς "Ηρη τε φερέσβιος ἡδ' Ἀιδωνεύς
Νῆστis θ', ἡ δακρύοις τέγγει κρούνωμα βρότειον.

there is no
coming into
being nor
passing away

106—a. D. B 8:

ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω · φύσις οὐδενὸς ἔστιν ἀπάντων
θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένου θανάτοιο τελευτῇ,
ἀλλὰ μόνον μῖξις τε διάλλαξις τε μιγέντων
ἐστὶ, φύσις¹ δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν.

b. D. B 11:

νήπιοι · οὐ γὰρ σφιν δολιχόφρονές εἰσι μέριμναι,
οἳ δὴ γίγνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἐὼν ἐλπίζουσιν
ἡ τι καταθνήσκειν τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἀπάντη.

c. D. B 12:

ἐκ τε γὰρ οὐδάμ' ἐόντος ἀμήχανόν ἐστι γενέσθαι
καὶ τ' ἐὼν ἐξαπολέσθαι ἀνήυστον καὶ ἄπυστον ·
αἰεὶ γὰρ τῇ γ' ἔσται, ὅπη κέ τις αἰὲν ἐρείδῃ.

d. D. B 15:

οὐκ ἂν ἀνὴρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ μαντεύσαιτο,
ὥς ὄφρα μὲν τε βιώσι, τὸ δὴ βίοντον καλέουσι,
τόφρα μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν καὶ σφιν πάρα δειλὰ καὶ ἐσθλά,
πρὶν δὲ πάγεν τε βροτοὶ καὶ <ἐπεὶ> λύθεν, οὐδὲν ἄρ' εἰσιν.

Love and
Strife

107—a. D. B 17:

δίπλ' ἐρέω · τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἡϋξήθη μόνον εἶναι
ἐκ πλεόνων, τοτὲ δ' αὖ διέφω πλέον' ἐξ ἐνὸς εἶναι.
δοιῇ δὲ θνητῶν γένεσις, δοιῇ δ' ἀπόλειψις ·
τὴν μὲν γὰρ πάντων σύνοδος τίττει τ' ὀλέκει τε,
5 ἡ δὲ πάλιν διαφυομένων θρεφθεῖσα διέπτει.
καὶ ταῦτ' ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερές οὐδαμὰ λήγει,
ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότῃτι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἐν ἅπαντα,
ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ δίχ' ἕκαστα φορεύμενα Νείκεος ἔχθει.
<οὕτως ἢ μὲν ἐν ἐκ πλεόνων μεμάθηκε φύεσθαι> *

¹ φύσις - γένεσις.

* Here not in the mss.; added from B 26, 8.

ἡδὲ πάλιν διαφύντος ἐνὸς πλέον' ἐκτελέθουσι, 10
 τῇ μὲν γίγνονται τε καὶ οὐ σφισιν ἔμπεδος αἰών ·
 ἥ δὲ διαλλάσσοντα διαμπερές οὐδαμὰ λήγει,
 ταύτῃ δ' αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον.
 ἀλλ' ἄγε μύθων κλυθι· μάθη γάρ τοι φρένας αὔξει·
 ὥς γὰρ καὶ πρὶν ἔειπα πιφαύσκων πείρατα μύθων¹, 15
 διπλ' ἐρέω· τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ηὔξήθη μόνον εἶναι
 ἐκ πλεόνων, τοτὲ δ' αὖ διέφυ πλέον' ἐξ ἐνὸς εἶναι,
 πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα καὶ ἡέρος ἄπλετον ὕψος,
 Νεῖκός τ' οὐλόμενον δίχα τῶν, ἀτάλαντον ἀπάντη,
 καὶ Φιλότης ἐν τοῖσιν, ἴση μῆκός τε πλάτος τε· 20
 τὴν σὺ νόφ' ἀέρκευ, μῆδ' ὅμμασιν ἦσο τεθηπώς·
 ἦτις καὶ θνητοῖσι νομίζεται ἔμφυτος ἄρθροις,
 τῇ τε φίλα φρονέουσι καὶ ἄρθμια ἔργα τελοῦσι,
 Γηθοσύνην καλέοντες ἐπώνυμον ἦδ' Ἀφροδίτην·
 τὴν οὐ τις μετὰ τοῖσιν ἐλισσομένην δεδάχηκε 25
 θνητὸς ἀνὴρ· σὺ δ' ἄκουε λόγου στόλον οὐκ ἀπατηλόν.
 ταῦτα γὰρ ἴσα τε πάντα καὶ ἥλικα γένναν ἔασι,
 τιμῆς δ' ἄλλης ἄλλο μέδει, πάρα δ' ἦθος ἐκάστω,
 ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο.
 καὶ πρὸς τοῖς οὐτ' ἄρ' τι ἐπιγίνεται* οὐδ' ἀπολήγει· 30
 εἴτε γὰρ ἐφθείροντο διαμπερές, οὐκέτ' ἂν ἦσαν·
 τοῦτο δ' ἐπαυξήσειε τὸ πᾶν τί κε; καὶ πόθεν ἐλθόν;
 πῇ δέ κε κήξαπόλοιτο, ἐπεὶ τῶνδ' οὐδὲν ἔρημον;
 ἀλλ' αὐτ(ά)² ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι' ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα
 γίγνεται ἄλλοτε ἄλλα καὶ ἡνεκὲς αἰὲν ὁμοῖα. 35

To the last verses cf. fr. D. B 21,⁹⁻¹²: Being cannot perish, separate things can, whereas the elements ("being") remain. So all must come from being:

- b. ἐκ τούτων γὰρ πάνθ' ὅσα τ' ἦν ὅσα τ' ἔστι καὶ ἔσται,
 δένδρεα τ' ἐβλάστησε καὶ ἀνέρες ἡδὲ γυναῖκες,
 θῆρες τ' οἰωνοὶ τε καὶ ὕδατοθρέμμονες ἰχθυῖς,
 καὶ τε θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες τιμῇσι φέριστοι.

108—a. D. B 23:

ὥς δ' ὁπότεν γραφές ἀναθήματα ποικίλλωσιν

quantitative
proportion of
the mixture

¹ Vs 15 πείρατα μύθων - the purpose of my doctrine.

² Vs 34 αὐτὰ - μόνα: "only this exists", nothing exists besides.

* See the note of Kranz on the metrum of this verse.

- 5 ἀνέρες ἀμφὶ τέχνης ὑπὸ μήτιος εὖ δεδαῶτε,
 οἷτ' ἐπεὶ οὖν μάρψωσι πολύχροα φάρμακα χερσίν,
 ἀρμονίῃ μείζαντε τὰ μὲν πλέω, ἄλλα δ' ἐλάσσω,
 ἐκ τῶν εἶδεα πᾶσιν ἀλίγκια πορσύνουσι,
 δένδρεά τε κτίζοντε καὶ ἀνέρας ἡδὲ γυναῖκας
 θῆράς τ' οἰωνούς τε καὶ ὕδατοθρέμμονας ἰχθύς
 καὶ τε θεοὺς δολιχαίωνας τιμῇσι φερίστους·
 οὕτω μὴ σ' ἀπάτη φρένα καινύτω ἄλλοθεν εἶναι
 10 θνητῶν, ὅσσα γε δῆλα γεγάκασιν ἄσπετα, πηγῇν,
 ἀλλὰ τορῶς ταῦτ' ἴσθι, θεοῦ πάρα μῦθον ἀκούσας.

Vs 9 f.: οὕτω - "so let not the error prevail over thy mind, that there is any other source of all the perishable creatures that appear in countless numbers".

b. Cf. B 96¹⁻³:

ἡ δὲ χθὼν ἐπίηρος¹ ἐν εὐστέρνιοις χοάνοις²
 τῷ δύο τῶν ὀκτῶ μερέων λάχε Νήστιδος αἰγλης,
 τέσσαρα δ' Ἡφαίστοιο.

equal things
attract each
other

109—a. D. B 90:

ὡς γλυκὺ μὲν γλυκὺ μάρπτε, πικρὸν δ' ἐπὶ πικρὸν ὄρουσεν,
 ὄξυ δ' ἐπ' ὄξυ ἔβη, δαερὸν δ' ἐποχεῖτο δαηρῶ.

b. E. explains this by his theory of ἀπορροαί, going out from things and penetrating into the pores of others. B 89:

γνούς ὅτι πάντων εἰσὶν ἀπορροαί ὅσος ἐγένοντο. . . .

This is the movement of the elements, described in fr. 17, vs 34: they "run through each other" (δὲ ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα), our nr. 107.

four periods 110—I. All elements are mixed together by Love.

a. D. B 27:

Ἐνθ' οὗτ' Ἡελίοιο διείδεται ὠκέα γυῖα
 οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδ' αἴης λάσιον μένος οὐδὲ θάλασσα·
 οὕτως ἀρμονίης πυκινῶ κρυφῶ ἐστήρικται
 Σφαῖρος κυκλοτερὴς μονίῃ περιηγεί γαίων³.

¹ "the kindly earth" (Burnet).

² "received in its broad vessels".

³ Burnet translates (with Diels): "rejoicing in its circular solitude".

Jaeger suggests that μονίῃ must rather mean "rest" or "repose" (from μένω, not from μόνος). See *Theol.* p. 141, and 237, the notes 57 and 58. Now surely the word can mean this. The epithet περιηγής in that case must mean "circular", not "surrounding", — which is in itself quite possible, yet not convincing in this context.

b. D. B 27 a:

οὐ στάσις οὐδέ τε δῆρις ἀνάισμος ἐν μελέεσσιν.

c. 2. Neikos penetrates into the sphairos. D. B 31:

πάντα γὰρ ἐξείης πελεμίζετο γυῖα θεοῖο ¹.

d. 3. Neikos dominates, Philia has retired completely. Complete separation of the elements. D. B 30:

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ μέγα Νεῖκος ἐνιμελέεσσιν ἐθρέφθη

ἐς τιμάς τ' ἀνόρουσε τελειομένοιο χρόνιοι,

ὅς σφιν ἀμοιβαῖος πλατέος παρ' ἐλήλαται ὄρκου . . .

e. 4. Philia comes back and brings the elements together again; Neikos is passing out. D. B 35:

Αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ παλίνρσος ἐλεύσομαι ἐς πόρον ὕμνων,

τὸν πρότερον κατέλεξα, λόγου λόγον ἐξοχετεύων,

κεῖνον · ἐπεὶ Νεῖκος μὲν ἐνέρτατον ἵκετο βένθος

δίνης, ἐν δὲ μέσῃ Φιλότης στροφάλιγγι γένηται,

ἐν τῇ δὴ τάδε πάντα συνέρχεται ἐν μόνον εἶναι,

οὐκ ἄφαρ, ἀλλὰ θελημὰ συνιστάμεν' ἄλλοθεν ἄλλα.

τῶν δέ τε μισγομένων χεῖτ' ἔθνεα μυρία θνητῶν ·

πολλὰ δ' ἄμεικτ' ἔστηκε κεραιομένοισιν ἐναλλάξ,

ὅσ' ἔτι Νεῖκος ἔρυκε μετάρσιον · οὐ γὰρ ἀμεμφέως

τῶν πᾶν ἐξέστηκεν ἐπ' ἔσχατα τέρματα κύκλου,

ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τ' ἐνέμιμνε, μελέων τὰ δὲ τ' ἐξεβεβήκει.

ὅσσον δ' αἰὲν ὑπεκπροθέοι, τόσον αἰὲν ἐπῆρει

ῥηϊδίφρων Φιλότητος ἀμεμφέος ἄμβροτος ὁρμή ·

αἰψά δὲ θνήτ' ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ' εἶναι,

ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα ² διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους.

τῶν δέ τε μισγομένων χεῖτ' ἔθνεα μυρία θνητῶν,

παντοίαις ιδέησιν ἀρηρότα, θαῦμα ιδέσθαι.

f. D. B 36:

τῶν δὲ συνερχομένων ἐξ ἔσχατον ἵστατο Νεῖκος.

111—a. i. Various parts of animals arise separately. D. B 57:

ἧ πολλαὶ μὲν κόρσαι ἀναύχενες ἐβλάστησαν,

γυμνοὶ δ' ἐπλάζοντο βραχίονες εὐνιδες ³ ὤμων,

ὀμματὰ τ' οἷ' ἐπλανᾶτο πενητεύοντα μετώπων.

forming of
organic
combinations

¹ θεοῖο - he calls the sphairos a god. Cp. Jaeger, *Theol.* p. 141.

² Vs 15 ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα, - "and mixed what was not mixed before".

(By the physician Philumenus ζωρός is also used as the opposite of ἄκρατος).

³ bereft of.

b. 2. Forming of arbitrary combinations. D. B 59:

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κατὰ μεῖζον ἐμίσγετο δαίμονι δαίμων¹,
ταῦτά τε συμπίπτεσκον, ὅπη συνέκυρσεν ἕκαστα,
ἄλλα τε πρὸς τοῖς πολλὰ διηνεκῇ ἐξεγένοντο.

c. The fittest of these survive. See Arist., *Phys.* II 8, 198b²⁹:

ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα συνέβη ὥσπερ καὶ εἰ ἕνεκά του ἐγίνετο, ταῦτα μὲν
ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συστάντα ἐπιτηδεῖως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο
καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ Ἐμπ. λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωρα.

d. D. B 61:

πολλὰ μὲν ἀμφιπρόσωπα καὶ ἀμφίστερνα φύεσθαι
βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωρα, τὰ τ' ἔμπαλιν ἐξανατέλλειν
ἀνδροφυῇ βούκρανα, μεμιγμένα τῇ μὲν ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν,
τῇ δὲ γυναικοφυῇ, σκιεροῖς² ἡσκημένα γυίοις.

e. 3. "Whole-natured forms" in which there is not any distinction of sex or species. D. B 62 vs. 4:

οὐλοφνεῖς μὲν πρῶτα τύποι χθονὸς ἐξανέτελλον,
ἀμφοτέρων ὕδατός τε καὶ ἰδεος * αἴσαν ἔχοντες·
τοὺς μὲν. πῦρ ἀνέπεμπε θέλον πρὸς ὁμοῖον ἰκέσθαι,
οὔτε τί πω μελέων ἐρατὸν δέμας ἐμφαίνοντας
οὔτ' ἐνοπὴν οἶόν τ' ἐπιχώριον ἀνδράσι γυῖον.

f. Cf. Plato, *Symp.* 189e: "Ἐπειτα ὅλον ἦν ἐκάστου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ εἶδος, στρογγύλον νῶτον καὶ πλευράς κύκλῳ ἔχον· χειράς δὲ τέτταρας εἶχε καὶ σκέλη τὰ ἴσα ταῖς χερσὶ· καὶ πρόσωπα δύο ἐπ' αὐχένι κυκλοτερεῖ, ὅμοια πάντη, κεφαλὴν δ' ἐπ' ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς προσώποις ἐναντίους κειμένους μίαν· καὶ ὅτα τέτταρα, καὶ αἰδοῖα δύο, καὶ ἄλλα πάντα ὡς ἀπὸ τούτων ἂν τις εἰκάσειεν.

4. The sexes and species having been separated, new animals no longer arise from the elements, but are produced by generation (Burnet, *E. Gr. Ph.* 2281, 243).

¹ "When Philotes and Neikos closed in with each other on a larger scale".—K. Freeman (like Burnet) translates: "But as the one divinity became more and more mingled with the other"—But, as the forming of human beings, according to B 35 (our nr. 110e), took place in the fourth period, this "mingling" of the two divinities must be understood as a struggle. Diels: "Doch als in grösserem Masse handgemein wurde der eine Daimon mit dem anderen"—

² σκιεροῖς - covered with hair.

* Kranz reads εἰδεος, with Simpl., who means the genit. of the word ἰδος (= sweat). Diels rightly restored the form ἰδεος (transl.: "having a share of both elements, Water and Heat").

g. These four stages are accurately distinguished by Aët. V, 19, 5 (D. 31 A 72):

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὰς πρώτας γενέσεις τῶν ζώων καὶ φυτῶν μηδαμῶς ὀλοκλή-
ρους γενέσθαι, ἀσυμφυέσι δὲ τοῖς μορίοις διεζευγμέναις· τὰς δὲ δευτέρας
συμφομένων τῶν μερῶν εἰδωλοφανεῖς· τὰς δὲ τρίτας τῶν ὀλοφυῶν· τὰς
δὲ τετάρτας οὐκέτι ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων*, ὅλον ἐκ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄλ-
λῃων ἤδη, τοῖς μὲν πυκνωθείσης [τοῖς δὲ καὶ τοῖς ζώοις]** τῆς τροφῆς,
τοῖς δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐμορφίας τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπερεθισμὸν τοῦ σπερματικοῦ κινή-
ματος ἐμποησάσης. τῶν δὲ ζώων πάντων τὰ γένη διακριθῆναι διὰ τὰς ποιὰς
κράσεις.

Burnet, *E. Gr. Ph.*² 280 f. (⁴ 242 f.) ascribes (1) and (2) to the fourth period of the world's history; (3) and (4) to the second, when the union of the sphairos is destroyed by Strife. As to (1), cf. Arist., *De caelo* III 2, 300 b²⁰: καθάπερ Ἐμπ. φησι γίνεσθαι ἐπὶ τῆς φιλότῃτος, sc. when Love is increasing and Strife retiring. So about (2) Simplic. says (*De caelo* 587, 20): ὅτε τοῦ Νείκου ἐπεκράτει λοιπὸν ἡ Φιλότης.

112—a. Theophr., *De sensu* 7 (D. A 86):

perception]

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς — φησὶ τῷ ἐναρμόττειν¹ εἰς τοὺς πόρους τοὺς ἐκάστης (αἰσθήσεως) αἰ-
σθάνεσθαι· διὸ καὶ οὐ δύνασθαι τὰ ἀλλήλων κρίνειν, ὅτι τῶν μὲν εὐρύτεροι πῶς, τῶν δὲ
στενέτεροι τυγχάνουσιν οἱ πόροι πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητόν, ὥς τὰ μὲν οὐχ ἀπτόμενα διευτονεῖν,
τὰ δ' ὅλως εἰσελθεῖν οὐ δύνασθαι.

b. Therefore equal things are known by each other. Emp., D. B 109:

γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὁπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ,
αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα δῖον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ αἰδήλον,
στοργῇ δὲ στοργήν, νεῖκος δέ τε νεῖκει λυγρῷ.

c. Theophr., *l.c.* (D. A 86, l. 30):

vision

πειρᾶται δὲ καὶ τὴν ὅψιν λέγειν, ποία τίς ἐστι· καὶ φησι τὸ μὲν ἐντὸς αὐτῆς
εἶναι πῦρ, τὸ δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ <ὕδωρ καὶ> γῆν καὶ ἀέρα, δι' ὧν διέναι λεπτὸν ὃν
καθάπερ τὸ ἐν τοῖς λαμπτήρσι φῶς. τοὺς δὲ πόρους ἐναλλάξ κεῖσθαι τοῦ τε
πυρὸς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος, ὧν τοῖς μὲν τοῦ πυρὸς τὰ λευκά, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ ὕδατος
τὰ μέλανα γνωρίζειν· ἐναρμόττειν γὰρ ἐκατέροις ἐκάτερα. φέρεσθαι δὲ τὰ
χρώματα πρὸς τὴν ὅψιν διὰ τὴν ἀπορροήν.

d. Emped., D. B 84:

ὥς δ' ὅτε τις πρόοδον νοέων² ὠπλίσσατο λύχρον
χειμερίην διὰ νύκτα, πυρὸς σέλας αἰθομένοιο

¹ τῷ ἐναρμόττειν — sc. τὰς ἀπορροίας. "as the effluences fit into the pores of the sense-organ to which they are related".

² πρόοδον νοέων — μέλλων ἐξιέναι.

* ὁμοίων mss., στοιχείων Diels., *Dox.* 430.

** Secl. Diels.

- ἄψας, παντοίων ἀνέμων λαμπτήρας ἀμοργούς¹,
 οἷ τ' ἀνέμων μὲν πνεῦμα διασκιδνᾷσιν ἀέντων,
 5 φῶς δ' ἔξω διαθρῶσκον, ὅσον ταναώτερον ἦεν²,
 λάμπεσκεν κατὰ βηλὸν³ ἀτειρέσιν ἀκτίνεσσιν·
 ὥς δὲ τότε⁴ ἔν μῆνιγξιν ἐεργμένον ὠγύγιον πῦρ
 λεπτῆσιν <τ'> ὀθόνησι λοχάζετο κύκλοπα κούρην,
 <αἷ> χοάνησι διάντα τετρήατο θεσπεσίησιν·
 10 αἶ δ' ὕδατος μὲν βένθος ἀπέστεγον⁵ ἀμφινάοντος,
 πῦρ δ' ἔξω διέσκον⁶, ὅσον ταναώτερον ἦεν.

In this fr. the eye is compared to the sun (see W. J. Verdenius in *Studia Vollgraff*, p. 155-164) and sight is more an active proceeding than a passive state, as might be deduced from Emp.' general theory of effluences going out from things and penetrating into the pores of the organs. Cf. Plato, *Meno* 76 d, where Gorgias defines colours as ἀπορροή σχημάτων ὅφει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός.

hearing

e. Theophr., *l.c.*, continues (c. 9):

τὴν δ' ἀκοὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν γίνεσθαι ψόφων, ὅταν γὰρ <ὁ ἀήρ> * ὑπὸ τῆς φωνῆς κινηθῇ, ἡχεῖν ἐντός· ὥσπερ γὰρ εἶναι κώδωνα τῶν † ἴσων ἡχων † ** τὴν ἀκοήν, ἣν προσαγορεύει σάρκινον ὕζον· κινουμένην δὲ παίειν τὸν ἀέρα πρὸς τὰ στερεὰ καὶ ποιεῖν ἦχον.

taste and touch

f. Theophr., *l.c.* (D. A 86, p. 302, l. 15):

περὶ δὲ γούσεως καὶ ἀφῆς οὐ διορίζεται καθ' ἑκατέραν οὔτε πῶς οὔτε δι' αἶ γίνονται, πλὴν τὸ κοινὸν ὅτι τῷ ἐναρμόττειν τοῖς πόροις αἰσθησίς ἐστιν.

thinking

113—a. Theophr., *ib.* c. 10:

ὡσαύτως δὲ λέγει⁷ καὶ περὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀγνοίας. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φρονεῖν εἶναι τοῖς ὁμοίοις, τὸ δ' ἀγνοεῖν τοῖς ἀνομοίοις, ὡς ἡ ταῦτόν ἢ παραπλήσιον

¹ ἄψας - ἀμοργούς· λαμπτήρ is a horn-lantern. Burnet puts the comma after αἰθομένοιο and then translates ἄψας... λαμπτήρας: "fastening to it horn plates to keep out all manner of winds". I prefer to construe with Diels πυρὸς σέλας αἰθομένοιο ἄψας, taking λαμπτήρας as an apposition of λύχρον.

² ὅσον ταναώτερον ἦεν - because it is so much finer.

³ λάμπεσκεν κατὰ βηλὸν κτλ. - "shines across the threshold with unyielding beams".

⁴ ὥς τότε — : "so then the primeval fire, wrapped up in membranes (μῆνιγξιν) and delicate tissues, which were pierced through and through with wondrous passages (χοάνησι), hid itself behind the round pupil".

⁵ ἀπέστεγον - keep out.

⁶ let go through.

⁷ Sc. Emped.

* Kranz (Diels read ὁ ἀήρ in stead of γὰρ).

** τῶν ἴσων mss.; Diels reads τῶν εἰσιόντων. Probably the meaning is: "For hearing is a sort of bell ringing inside the ear."

ὄν τῇ αἰσθήσει τὴν φρόνησιν. διαριθμησάμενος γὰρ ὡς ἕκαστον ἐκάστω γνω-
ρίζομεν, ἐπὶ τέλει προσέθηκεν ὡς (D. B 107)

ἐκ τούτων <γὰρ> πάντα πεπήγασιν ἄρμωσθέντα
καὶ τούτοις φρονέουσι καὶ ἤδοντ' ἡδ' ἀνῶνται.

5

διὸ καὶ τῷ αἵματι ¹ μάλιστα φρονεῖν · ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα κεκρᾶσθαι [ἐστὶ]
τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν μερῶν. (II) ὅσοις μὲν οὖν ἴσα καὶ παραπλήσια μέμεικται
καὶ μὴ διὰ πολλοῦ μὴδ' αὖ μικρὰ μὴδ' ὑπερβάλλοντα τῷ μεγέθει, τούτους
φρονιμωτάτους εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀκριβεστάτους, κατὰ λόγον δὲ 10
καὶ τοὺς ἐγγυτάτω τούτων, ὅσοις δὲ ἐναντίως, ἀφρονεστάτους. καὶ ὧν μὲν
μανὰ καὶ ἀραιὰ κεῖται τὰ στοιχεῖα, νωθροὺς καὶ ἐπιπόνους · ὧν δὲ πυκνὰ καὶ
κατὰ μικρὰ τετραυσμένα, τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους ὀξεῖς φερομένους καὶ πολλοῖς
ἐπιβαλλομένους ὀλίγα ἐπιτελεῖν διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα τῆς τοῦ αἵματος φορᾶς.
οἷς δὲ καθ' ἓν τι μόνιον ἢ μέση κρᾶσις ἐστὶ, ταύτῃ σοφοὺς ἐκάστους εἶναι · 15
διὸ τοὺς μὲν ῥήτορας ἀγαθοὺς, τοὺς δὲ τεχνίτας, ὡς τοῖς μὲν ἐν ταῖς χερσί,
τοῖς δὲ ἐν τῇ γλώττῃ τὴν κρᾶσιν οὖσαν. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχειν καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας
δυνάμεις ².

b. D. B 105, vs 3:

αἶμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα.

114—Sextus, *Adv. Math.* VIII (Against the Logicians II) 286:

all creatures
think

ὁ δὲ Ἑμπ. . . . πάντα ἡξίου λογικὰ τυγχάνειν, καὶ οὐ ζῶα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ
φυτὰ, ῥητῶς γράφων (B 110, 10):

πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νόματος αἰσαν.

Emp. in this fr. warns men to strive after other things than wisdom; "for they
long once more to return to their own kind. For know that all things" e.q.s.

¹ τῷ αἵματι μάλιστα φρονεῖν. Cf. the fr. 105 (this nr., sub b).

² καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις. About the whole of this κρᾶσις- theory cp.
Parm. fr. 16, our nr. 86: thinking depends on the κρᾶσις μελέων. Diels explains
Emp. fr. 106 in this way:

πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποισι.

However, τὸ παρεὸν obviously does not mean the bodily consistence of each
moment, but simply: "what is before them". So what he says is this: "For wisdom
(or counsel) groweth to men according to what is before them"; i.e. depends on
things exterior. Aristotle cites the verse in *De Anima* III 3, 427 a²¹, in order to
prove that οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταυτὸν εἶναι φασι, namely
both a physical process, defined by the formula "τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον". Now the
senses are affected by the ἀπορροαὶ of things. Likewise, reasonable powers grow
according to what presents itself to them.

In B 108 Emped. says what Diels found in 106:

ὅσων δ' ἄλλοιτοι μετέφυν, τόσων ἔρ σφισιν αἰεὶ

καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἄλλοια παρίσταται

"As far as men grow to be different (as to their bodily consistence), in that
measure thought also presents itself different to them."

respiration 115—Men breathe according to E. not only through the organs of respiration, but through all the pores of the body, the blood retiring




Fig. 1.




Fig. 2.

These figures are taken from W. K. G. Guthrie's edition of Arist., *De caelo* (Loeb Class. Libr.), p. 228.

to the heart and air going in, and inversely the blood being pushed to the surface of the body and air going out. He illustrates this by the *klepsidra*, a metal vessel with a narrow neck (αὐλός) at the top, and the bottom being pierced with holes: when you dip the instrument into the water, holding your hand on the pipe, the water does not flow in. As soon as you take your hand off, the water enters. Inversely, when the vessel is filled with water and you withdraw it from the water keeping your hand on the opening at the top, the water does not run out. See Arist., *Problem.* XVI 8, 914b⁹ (Diels, V. S. 59 (Anaxagoras) A 69).

Emp., D. B 100:

ᾧδε δ' ἀναπνεῖ πάντα καὶ ἐκπνεῖ· πᾶσι λίφαιμοι
σαρκῶν σύριγγες πύματον κατὰ σῶμα¹ τέτανται,
καὶ σφιν ἐπὶ στομίοις πυκιναῖς τέτρηνται ἀλοξιν
ρίνων ἔσχατα τέθρα² διαμπερές, ὥστε φόνον³ μὲν
5 κεῦθιν, αἰθέρι δ' εὐπορίην διόδοισι τετμηθῆσθαι.
ἐνθεν ἔπειθ' ὁπόταν μὲν ἀπαῖξῃ τέρεν⁴ αἶμα,
αἰθήρ παφλάζων κατατίσσεται οἷδματι μάργῳ,
εὔτε δ' ἀναθρώσκη, πάλιν ἐκπνέει, ὥσπερ ὅταν παῖς
κλεψύδρῃ παίζῃσι * διυπετέος⁵ χαλκοῖο.
10 εὔτε μὲν αὐλοῦ πορθμὸν ἐπ' εὐειδεῖ χερὶ θεῖσα
εἰς ὕδατος βάπτῃσι τέρεν δέμας ἀργυφείοι,
οὐδεὶς ἄγγοσδ' ὑμβρος ἐσέρχεται, ἀλλὰ μιν εἵργει
ἀέρος ὄγκος ἔσωθε πεσὼν ἐπὶ τρήματα πυκνά,

¹ πύματον κατὰ σῶμα - over the surface of their body.

² τέθρα - τέρματα (the surface).

³ φόνον - αἷμα.

⁴ τέρεν - thin.

⁵ διυπετέος - shining.

* παίζῃσι Diels. Kranz παίζουσα (according to the reading of some mss.; others have παίζουσι or παίζῃσι), putting a — after this verse and after 17.

εἰσόκ' ἀποστεγάσῃ πυκινὸν ῥόον¹· αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
 πνεύματος ἑλλείποντος ἐσέρχεται αἷσιμον ὕδωρ.
 ὡς δ' αὐτως, ὅθ' ὕδωρ μὲν ἔχῃ κατὰ βένθεα χαλκοῦ 15
 πορθμοῦ χλωσθέντος βροτέῳ χροῖ ἡδὲ πόροιο,
 αἰθὴρ δ' ἐκτὸς ἔσω λελιγμένος ὄμβρον ἐρύκει,
 ἀμφὶ πύλας ἡθμοῖο δυσηχέος² ἄκρα κρατύνων,
 εἰσόκε χειρὶ μεθῇ, τότε δ' αὖ πάλιν, ἔμπαλιν ἦ πρίν, 20
 πνεύματος ἐμπίπτοντος ὑπεκθέει αἷσιμον ὕδωρ.
 ὡς δ' αὐτως τέρεν αἶμα κλαδασσόμενον διὰ γυίων
 ὀππότε μὲν παλίνορσον ἀπαΐξειε μυχόνδε³,
 αἰθέρος εὐθὺς ῥεῦμα κατέρχεται οἷδματι θύον,
 εὔτε δ' ἀναθρώσκη⁴, πάλιν ἐκπνέει ἴσον ὀπίσσω. 25

116—For the exordium of the „Purification” (”Song of penance”) the Καθαρμοί see D. B 112, our nr. 101a.

a. In B 115 he presents himself as a fallen god:

a fallen god

ἔστιν Ἀνάγκης χρῆμα⁵, θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν,
 αἰδίδιον, πλατέεσσι κατεσφρηγισμένον ὄρκοις·
 εὐτέ τις⁶ ἀμπλακίησι⁷ φόνω⁸ φίλα γυῖα μίηνῃ
 <Νεΐκεϊ θ'> ὃς κ(ε) ἐπίορκον ἀμαρτήσας ἐπομόσση
 δαίμονες οἷτε μακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο, 5
 τρίς μιν μυρίας ὥρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάλησθαι
 φουμένους παντοῖα διὰ χρόνου εἶδεα θνητῶν,
 ἀργαλέας βιότοιο μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους.
 αἰθέριον μὲν γάρ σφε μένος πόντονδε διώκει,
 πόντος δ' ἐς χθονὸς οὐδας ἀπέπτυσσε, γαῖα δ' ἐς αὐγὰς 10
 ἡελίου φαέθοντος, ὃ δ' αἰθέρος ἔμβαλε δίναις·
 ἄλλος δ' ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται, στυγέουσι δὲ πάντες.
 τῶν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης,
 Νεΐκεϊ μαινομένῳ πῖσυνος.

¹ πυκινὸν ῥόον - the compressed stream of air.

² δυσηχέος - ”ill-sounding”, ruckling: the water is pushed to the top by the air ”striving to get in” (ἔσω λελιγμένος) at the bottom, and ”dominates at the top” (ἄκρα κρατύνων).

³ μυχόνδε - ”to the interior”, to the heart.

⁴ ἀναθρώσκη - to the surface of the body.

⁵ χρῆμα - an oracle.

⁶ τις sc. δαίμων, in a loose construction taken up by the word δαίμονες in the vs 5.

⁷ ἀμπλακίησι - sinfully.

⁸ φόνω - αἵματι.

his incarnations

He remembers his own incarnations.

b. D. B 117:

ἤδη γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γενόμενῃ κοῦρός τε κόρη τε
θάμνος τ' οἰωνός τε καὶ ἕξαλος ἔλλοπος¹ ἰχθύς.

warning
against
animal food

117—a. D. B 136:

οὐ παύσεσθε φόνοιον δυσηχέος; οὐκ ἐσοῦσθε
ἀλλήλους δάπτοντες ἀκηδείησι νόοιο;

b. D. B 137:

Μορφὴν δ' ἀλλάξαντα πατὴρ φίλον υἱὸν αἰέρας
σφάζει ἐπευχόμενος μέγα νήπιος· οἱ δ' ² ἀπορεῦνται
λίσσόμενον θύοντες· ὁ δ' αὖ νήκουστος ὁμοκλέων³
σφάζας ἐν μεγάροις κακὴν ἀλεγύνετο δαῖτα.
ὥς δ' αὐτως πατέρ' υἱὸς ἐλών καὶ μητέρα παῖδες
θυμὸν ἀπορραΐσαντες φίλας κατὰ σάρκας ἔδουσιν.

c. D. B 139:

οἴμ' ὅτι οὐ πρόσθεν με διώλεσε νηλεὲς ἤμαρ,
πρὶν σθέντι ἔργα βορᾶς περὶ χεῖλεσι μητίσασθαι.

the gods

118—a. D. B 133:

οὐκ ἔστιν πελάσασθαι⁴ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἐφικτόν
ἡμετέροις ἢ χερσὶ λαβεῖν, ἥπερ τε μεγίστη
πειθοῦς ἀνθρώποις ἀμαξιτός εἰς φρένα πίπτει.

b. D. B 134:

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀνδρομέη κεφαλῇ κατὰ γυῖα κέκασται⁵,
οὐ μὲν ἀπὸ νότοιο δύο κλάδοι αἰσسونται,
οὐ πόδες, οὐ θοὰ γοῦν', οὐ μήδεα λαχνήεντα,
ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος ἔπλετο μοῦνον,
φροντίσι κόσμον ἅπαντα καταΐσσουσα θοῇσιν.

2—ANAXAGORAS

his place in
the history of
philosophy

119—About Anaxagoras we have the testimony of a (younger) contemporary, namely Socrates. In *Ph.* 96a ff. Plato makes him tell his

¹ Explained by Hesych. as "dumb".

² οἱ δ' - the assistants.

³ ὁμοκλέων - (deaf to) his cries.

⁴ "It is not possible to bring the deity near to us, so that he could be reached by our eyes or touched with our hands."—

⁵ κέκασται - he is not equipped with. Cf. Pind., *Ol.* I 27.

own intellectual history: in his youth he was very eager to learn the causes of things, of their coming into being and passing away, and of their existence. The elder philosophers of nature did not furnish him with any satisfactory explanation.

a. Plato, *Phaedo* 97 b:

ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου, τινός, ὡς ἔφη, Ἀναξαγόρου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος καὶ λέγοντος, ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἦσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, τὸν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ, ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ.

But on reading the whole book he is bitterly disappointed. 98 b:

ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος ὥχόμεν φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προϊὼν καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκων ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδὲ τινος αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα.

b. Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* A 3, 984 b¹⁵:

νοῦν δὴ τις εἰπὼν εἶναι καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει τὸν αἴτιον τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς τάξεως πάσης οἷον νήφων ἐφάνη παρ' εἰκῇ λέγοντας τοὺς πρότερον.

c. Ib. A 4, 985 a¹⁸:

Ἀναξαγόρας τε γὰρ μηχανῇ χρῆται τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιίαν, καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστί, τότε παρέλκει αὐτόν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτιᾶται τῶν γιγνομένων ἢ νοῦν.

120—a. Diog. II 6 (D. 59 A 1):

Ἀναξαγόρας Ἡγησιβούλου ἢ Εὐβούλου Κλαζομένιος. — (7) ἤρξατο δὲ φιλοσοφεῖν Ἀθήνησιν ἐπὶ Καλλίου ἐτῶν εἴκοσιν ὧν, ὡς φησι Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγραφῇ· ἐνθα καὶ φασιν αὐτὸν ἔτη διατρῖψαι τριάκοντα. —

life

b. Plut., *Pericl.* 4, 4 (D. 59 A 15):

ὁ δὲ πλεῖστα Περικλεῖ συγγενόμενος καὶ μάλιστα περιθειὲς ὕγκον αὐτῷ καὶ φρόνημα δημαγωγίας ἐμβριθέστερον, ὅλως τε μετεωρίσας καὶ συνεξάρας τὸ ἀξίωμα τοῦ ἥθους, Ἀναξαγόρας ἦν ὁ Κλαζομένιος, ὃν οἱ τότε ἄνθρωποι Νοῦν προσηγόρευον.

his relation
to Pericles

c. Plut., *Pericl.* 32 (D. A 17):

Περὶ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον... καὶ ψήφισμα Διοπίθης ἔγραψεν εἰσαγγέλλεσθαι τοὺς τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων διδά-
De Vogel, Greek Philosophy I

the charge
of ἀσέβεια

σκοντας ἀπερειδόμενος ¹ εἰς Περικλέα δι' Ἀναξαγόρου τὴν ὑπόνοιαν. — Ἀναξαγόραν δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἐξέπεμψε καὶ προὔπεμψεν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως.

d. Cf. Plut., *Nic.* 23, 3 (D. A 18):

Ἀναξαγόραν εἰρχθέντα μόλις περιποιήσατο Περικλῆς.

As to the charge, cp. Plato, *Apol.* 26 d, where Meletus says that Socrates did not acknowledge sun and moon to be gods, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. To which S. answers: Ἀναξαγόρου οἷε κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μ.; e.q.s.

he died at
Lampsacus

121—a. Diog. II 14 (D. A 1):

καὶ τέλος ἀποχωρήσας εἰς Λάμψακον αὐτόθι κατέστρεψεν. ὅτε καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων τῆς πόλεως ἀξιούντων τί βούλεται αὐτῷ γενέσθαι, φάναι τοὺς παῖδας, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἀποθάνῃ μηνί, κατ' ἔτος παίζειν συγχωρεῖν. καὶ φυλάττεται τὸ ἔθος καὶ νῦν.

b. Cf. Arist., *Rhet.* B 23, 1398 b¹⁵: καὶ Λαμψακηνοὶ Ἀναξαγόραν ζέον ὄντα ἔθαψαν καὶ τιμῶσιν ἔτι καὶ νῦν.

being is one

122—A. first of all is influenced by Parmenides.

a. D. B 5:

... γινώσκειν χρή, ὅτι πάντα οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πλείω (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστὸν πάντων πλείω εἶναι), ἀλλὰ πάντα ἴσα αἰεὶ.

infinitely
divisible

b. D. B 3:

οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ μικροῦ ἐστὶ τό γε ἐλάχιστον, ἀλλ' ἔλασσον αἰεὶ (τὸ γὰρ ἐὸν οὐκ ἔστι τομῇ οὐκ εἶναι ²)—ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ μεγάλου αἰεὶ ἐστὶ μεῖζον. καὶ ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ μικρῷ πλήθος, πρὸς ἑαυτὸ δὲ ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρόν.

no coming
into being
nor passing
away

123—D. B 17:

τὸ δὲ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι οὐκ ὁρθῶς νομίζουσιν οἱ Ἕλληνες· οὐδὲν γὰρ χρῆμα γίνεται οὐδὲ ἀπόλλυται, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ἐόντων χρημάτων συμμίσγεται τε καὶ διακρίνεται. καὶ οὕτως ἂν ὁρθῶς καλοῖεν τό τε γίνεσθαι συμμίσγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι διακρίνεσθαι.

In this A. seems to agree with Empedocles. But the latter explains qualitative variety of things by admitting his four elements. A. accounts for the same fact in a very different way.

¹ ἀπερειδόμενος εἰς - directing suspicion against P. by means of A.

² τὸ γὰρ ἐὸν οὐκ ἔστι τομῇ οὐκ εἶναι - "For it cannot be that what is should cease to be by being cut" (Burnet).

τομῇ is a correction of Zeller for the mss-reading τὸ μῆ. Kranz keeps the traditional text τὸ μῆ οὐκ εἶναι; but in his translation he is inclined to adopt the correction of Zeller.

124—a. Simpl., *Phys.* 155, 23 (Anaxag. D. B 1):

qualitative
variety
explained

ὅτι δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας ἐξ ἑνὸς μίγματος ¹ ἄπειρα τῷ πλήθει ὁμοιομερῇ ἀποκρίνεσθαι φησιν πάντων μὲν ἐν παντὶ ἐόντων, ἐκάστου δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν ² χαρακτηριζομένου, δηλοῖ διὰ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν Φυσικῶν λέγων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς · „ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν, ἄπειρα καὶ πλήθος καὶ σμικρότητα · καὶ γὰρ τὸ σμικρὸν ἄπειρον ἦν. καὶ πάντων ὁμοῦ ἐόντων οὐδὲν ἐνδεηλὸν ἦν ὑπὸ σμικρότητος · πάντα γὰρ ἄῃρ τε καὶ αἰθήρ κατεῖχεν, ἀμφοτέρα ἄπειρα ἔοντα · ταῦτα γὰρ μέγιστα ἔνεστιν ἐν τοῖς σύμπασι καὶ πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει ³.”

b. The primitive stage of πάντα ὁμοῦ does still exist in a certain **everything in** sense: “all things have a part of everything in themselves”. D. B 6: **everything**

καὶ ὅτε δὲ ἴσαι μοῖραι εἰσι τοῦ τε μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ σμικροῦ πλήθος, καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη ἐν παντὶ πάντα · οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἔστιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει. ὅτε τοῦλάχιστον μὴ ἔστιν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο χωρισθῆναι, οὐδ' ἂν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅπωςπερ ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ νῦν πάντα ὁμοῦ. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ πολλὰ ἔνεστι καὶ τῶν ἀποκρινομένων ἴσα πλήθος ἐν τοῖς μείζοσι τε καὶ ἐλάσσοσι.

c. Cf. also D. B 4:

τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων χρὴ δοκεῖν ἐνεῖναι πολλὰ τε καὶ παντοῖα ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς συγκρινομένοις, καὶ σπέρματα πάντων χρημάτων καὶ ιδέας παντοίας ἔχοντα καὶ χροιάς καὶ ἡδονάς.

d. In B 10 he puts the question: How is qualitative variety to be explained, if all is one?

πῶς γὰρ ἂν, φησίν, ἐκ μὴ τριχὸς γένοιτο θορίξ καὶ σὰρξ ἐκ μὴ σαρκός;

He has given his answer in B 6: πάντα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει.

e. Cf. B 8:

οὐ κεχώρισται ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ κόσμῳ οὐδὲ ἀποκέκοπται πελέχει οὔτε τὸ θερμὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ οὔτε τὸ ψυχρὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ.

Hence each thing has something of its opposite in it. Cf. D.B 21 about perception (our nr. 133).

125—An especial kind of opposites may prevail, such as cold and **influence of** wet, a separation having been made in the original state of mixture. D.B 2: **Anaximenes**

¹ ἐξ ἑνὸς μίγματος - the original mixture, when “all was ὁμοῦ”, contained all qualitative variety in itself.

² κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν - see our next nr., 125.

³ In this he shows influence of Anaximenes; see our next following nr.

a. καὶ γὰρ ἀήρ τε καὶ αἰθήρ ἀποκρίνονται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ τοῦ περιέχοντος, καὶ τό γε περιέχον ἄπειρόν ἐστι τὸ πλῆθος.

But also in the original state the cold and wet seem to have prevailed according to A., and therefore air and aether (see the fr. 1 at the end: πάντα γὰρ ἀήρ τε καὶ αἰθήρ κατεῖχεν); for "everything bears the stamp of that opposite which prevails" (ἐκάστου κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν χαρακτηριζομένου, 124a). Cf. Anaxagoras D. B 12, at the end:

b. ὅτων πλεῖστα ἐνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἐν ἑκαστὸν ἐστι καὶ ἦν.

no void 126—Arist., *Phys.* IV 6, 213a²² cites A. among those who try to demonstrate that there is no void:

οἱ μὲν οὖν δεικνύναι πειρώμενοι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν (τὸ κενόν), οὐχ ὁ βούλονται λέγειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι κενόν, τοῦτ' ἐξελέγχουσιν, ἀλλ' ἀμαρτάνοντες λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ οἱ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐλέγχοντες. ἐπιδεικνύουσι γὰρ ὅτι ἔστι τι ὁ ἀήρ, στρεβλοῦντες τοὺς ἀσχοὺς καὶ δεικνύντες ὡς ἰσχυρὸς ὁ ἀήρ καὶ ἐναπολαμβάνοντες ἐν ταῖς κλεψύδραις.

**the νοῦς:
separated
from all
other things**

127—Anaxagoras D. B 12:

τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει, νοῦς δέ ἐστιν ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατὲς καὶ μέμεικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν. εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλὰ τεφρὸν ἐμέμεικτο ἄλλω, μετεῖχεν ἂν ἀπάντων χρημάτων, εἰ ἐμέμεικτό τεφρ. ἐν παντὶ γὰρ παντὸς μοῖρα ἐνεστίν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖσι πρόσθεν

5 yet material μοι λέλεκται, καὶ ἂν ἐκώλυεν αὐτὸν τὰ συμμεμειγμένα, ὥστε μηδενὸς χρημάτος κρατεῖν ὁμοίως ὡς καὶ μόνον ἔοντα ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. ἔστι γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἴσχει καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον· καὶ ὅσα γε ψυχὴν ἔχει καὶ τὰ μείζω καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσω,

**cause of
motion**

10 πάντων νοῦς κρατεῖ. καὶ τῆς περιχωρήσιος¹ τῆς συμπάσης νοῦς ἐκράτησεν, ὥστε περιχωρῆσαι τὴν ἀρχήν². καὶ πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ * σμικροῦ ἤρξατο περιχωρεῖν, ἐπὶ ** δὲ πλέον περιχωρεῖ, καὶ περιχωρήσει ἐπὶ πλέον. καὶ τὰ συμμισγόμενά τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα πάντα ἔγνω νοῦς. καὶ ὅποια ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι καὶ ὅποια ἦν, ἅσσα νῦν μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ὅσα νῦν ἐστι καὶ ὅποια ἔσται ***, πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς, καὶ τὴν περιχώρησιν ταύτην, ἣν νῦν
15 περιχωρεῖ τά τε ἄστρα καὶ ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ἡ σελήνη καὶ ὁ ἀήρ καὶ ὁ αἰθήρ οἱ ἀποκρινόμενοι. ἡ δὲ περιχώρησις αὐτῇ ἐποίησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. καὶ ἀποκρίνεται ἀπὸ τε τοῦ ἀραιοῦ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ζοφεροῦ τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ διεροῦ τὸ ξηρόν. μοῖραι δὲ πολλαὶ πολλῶν

¹ περιχώρησις - rotation.

² ὥστε περιχωρῆσαι τὴν ἀρχήν - so that it began to rotate in the beginning.

* του Diels; τοῦ mss.

** ἐπὶ δὲ Diels; ἐπεὶ δὲ mss.

*** καὶ ὅσα νῦν ἐστι — ἔσται Kranz.

εἰσι. παντάπασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνεται οὐδὲ διακρίνεται ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου πλὴν νοῦ. νοῦς δὲ πᾶς ὁμοίος ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ μείζων καὶ ὁ ἐλάττω. ἕτερον δὲ οὐδὲν ἐστίν ὁμοιον οὐδενί, ἀλλ' ὅτων πλείστα ἐν, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἐν ἑκαστὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἦν.

128—a. Simpl., *Phys.* 300, 27 (D. 59 B 13), defends A. against the reproach of Aristotle and his commentator Alexander, that he did not use his νοῦς in his explanation of the world: **forming of the world**

Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν προσχρῆται, δῆλον, εἴπερ τὴν γένεσιν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἔκκρισιν εἶναι φησι, τὴν δὲ ἔκκρισιν ὑπὸ τῆς κινήσεως γίνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως αἴτιον εἶναι τὸν νοῦν. λέγει γὰρ οὕτως 'Α.·', καὶ ἐπεὶ ἤρξατο ὁ νοῦς κινεῖν, ἀπὸ τοῦ κινουμένου παντὸς ἀπεκρίνετο, καὶ ὅσον ἐκίνησεν ὁ νοῦς, πᾶν τοῦτο διεκρίθη· κινουμένων δὲ καὶ διακρινομένων ἡ περιχώρησις πολλῶ μᾶλλον ἐποίει διακρίνεσθαι.

b. Anaxagoras, D. B 16:

Ἀπὸ τούτων ἀποκρινομένων συμπήγνυται γῆ· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῶν νεφελῶν ὕδωρ ἀποκρίνεται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὕδατος γῆ, ἐκ δὲ τῆς γῆς λίθοι συμπήγνυνται ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ· οὗτοι δὲ ἐκχωρέουσι μᾶλλον τοῦ ὕδατος.

129—D. B 4 (for the beginning see our nr. 124 c):

καὶ ἀνθρώπους τε συμπαγῆναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα, ὅσα ψυχὴν ἔχει. καὶ τοῖς γε ἀνθρώποισιν εἶναι καὶ πόλεις συνωκημένας καὶ ἔργα κατεσκευασμένα, ὥσπερ παρ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡέλιόν τε αὐτοῖσιν εἶναι καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὥσπερ παρ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῖσι φύειν πολλά τε καὶ παντοῖα, ὧν ἐκεῖνοι τὰ ὀνήσιστα συνενεγκάμενοι εἰς τὴν οἰκῆσιν χρῶνται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μοι λέλεκται περὶ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν παρ' ἡμῖν μόνον ἀποκριθεῖη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλη.

innumerable worlds

130—a. D. B 11:

ἐν παντὶ παντὸς μοῖρα ἐνεστί, πλὴν νοῦ, ἔστιν οἷσι δὲ καὶ νοῦς ἐν.

We could expect that, according to this view, man would be defined as having the greatest portion of νοῦς within him. However, A. defines him more as *homo faber* than as *homo sapiens*.

organic nature distinguished from anorganic

b. Arist., *De part. anim.* Δ 10, 687 a⁷:

Ἄ. μὲν οὖν φησι διὰ τὸ χεῖρας ἔχειν φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζώων ἀνθρώπων.

131—a. Plut., *Quaest. nat.* I p. 911 D:

ζῶον γὰρ ἔγγειον τὸ φυτὸν εἶναι οἱ περὶ . . . Ἀναξαγόραν . . . οἶονται. —

plants have a soul

b. [Arist.], *De plantis* I 1, 815 a¹⁸:

ὁ μὲν Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ ζῶα εἶναι (τὰ φυτὰ) καὶ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι εἶπε, τῇ τε ἀπορροῇ τῶν φύλλων καὶ τῇ αὐξήσει τοῦτο ἐκλαμβάνων . . . (b¹⁷) καὶ νοῦν καὶ γινῶσιν εἶπεν ἔχειν τὰ φυτά.

perception 132—A. explains perception in a way contrary to Empedocles. Theophr., *De sensu* 27 (D. 59 A 92):

Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ γίνεσθαι μὲν (τὰς αἰσθήσεις) τοῖς ἐναντίοις· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον ἀπαθὲς ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου· καθ' ἑκάστην δ' ἰδίᾳ πειρᾶται διαριθμεῖν. (29) ἄπασαν δ' αἰσθησιν μετὰ λύπης, ὅπερ ἂν δόξειεν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι τῇ ὑποθέσει· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἀνόμοιον ἀπτόμενον πόνον παρέχει.

weakness of the senses 133—a. Sextus, *Adv. Math.* VII 90:

Ὁ μὲν φυσικώτατος Ἀναξαγόρας, ὡς ἀσθενεῖς διαβάλλων τὰς αἰσθήσεις, „ὕπ' ἀφανρότητος αὐτῶν”, φησὶν, „οὐ δυνατοὶ ἔσμεν κρίνειν τάληθές.” τίθησι δὲ πίστιν αὐτῶν τῆς ἀπιστίας τὴν παρὰ μικρὸν τῶν χρωμάτων ἐξαλλαγὴν. εἰ γὰρ δύο λάβοιμεν χρώματα, μέλαν καὶ λευκόν, εἴτα ἐκ θατέρου εἰς θάτερον κατὰ σταγόνα παρεκχέοιμεν, οὐ δυνήσεται ἡ ὄψις διακρίνειν τὰς παρὰ μικρὸν μεταβολάς, καίπερ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὑποκειμένης.

b. In connection with this last fr. we have to understand D. B 21 a: ὄψις γὰρ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα.

3—LEUCIPPUS AND DEMOCRITUS

Leucippus 134—Diog. IX 30 f. and 46 (D. 67 A 1, and 68 A 33):

Λεύκιππος Ἐλεάτης, ὡς δὲ τινες Ἀβδηρίτης, κατ' ἐνίου δὲ Μιλήσιος· οὗτος ἤκουσε Ζήνωνος.—πρῶτός τε ἀτόμους ἀρχὰς ὑπεστήσατο.

(46) Μέγας Διάκοσμος, ὃν οἱ περὶ Θεόφραστον Λευκίππου φασὶν εἶναι.

Aristotle nearly always joins his name with that of Democritus, so that we can hardly distinguish the thoughts of the one from those of the other.

ὄν and μὴ ὄν 135—Arist., *Metaph.* A 4, 985 b⁴:

Λεύκιππος δὲ καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρος αὐτοῦ Δημόκριτος στοιχεῖα μὲν τὸ πλήρες καὶ τὸ κενὸν εἶναι φασί, λέγοντες τὸ μὲν ὄν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πλήρες καὶ στερεὸν τὸ ὄν, τὸ δὲ κενόν [γε καὶ μακρόν]* τὸ μὴ ὄν (διὸ καὶ οὐθὲν μᾶλλον τὸ ὄν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἶναι φασιν, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ κενὸν τοῦ σώματος **, αἷτια δὲ τῶν ὄντων ταῦτα ὡς ὕλην.

* Jaeger argues rightly that these words must be secluded (*Hermes* 52, 1917, pp. 483-486).

** τοῦ κενοῦ τὸ σῶμα Schwegler, followed by W. D. Ross. The mss have τὸ κενὸν τοῦ σώματος. Zeller supplied <ἐλαττον> after τὸ κενόν. Now this gives a good sense; yet it seems not to be necessary to supply or to change anything, the words οὐδὲν μᾶλλον meaning simply “just as well”, so that the terms may be interchanged. A good example of this use is cited by Jaeger, l.c., p. 488. Some interesting parallels in Seneca and the Latin jurists will be adduced by Mr. L. M. de Rijk in *Mnemosyne* 1950.

136—Arist., *De gen. et corr.* I 8, 325 a²³:

difference
from the
Eleatics

Λεύκιππος δ' ἔχειν ᾤθη λόγους, οἵτινες πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν ὁμολογούμενα λέγοντες οὐκ ἀναιρήσουσιν οὔτε γένεσιν οὔτε φθοράν οὔτε κίνησιν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὄντων. ὁμολογήσας δὲ ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς φαινομένοις, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἐν κατασκευάζουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἂν κίνησιν οὔσαν ἄνευ κενοῦ, τό τε κενὸν μὴ ὄν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος οὐθὲν μὴ ὄν φησιν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κυρίως ὄν παμπλήρες ὄν. ἀλλ' εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐχ ἓν, ἀλλ' ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἀόρατα διὰ σμικρότητα τῶν ὄγκων. ταῦτα δ' ἐν τῷ κενῷ φέρεσθαι (κενὸν γὰρ εἶναι), καὶ συνιστάμενα μὲν γένεσιν ποιεῖν, διαλυόμενα δὲ φθοράν.

137—Stob., *Ecl.*, I 4, 7 c (*Dox.* 321):

ἀνάγκη

Λεύκιππος πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην, τὴν δ' αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν εἰμαρμένην. λέγει γὰρ ἐν τῷ Περὶ νοῦ· οὐδὲν χρῆμα μάτην γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης.

138—Cic., *Acad. pr.* II, 37, 118; D. 67 A 8:

Leucippus
and
Democritus

Leucippus plenum et inane; Democritus huic in hoc similis, uberior in ceteris.

139—a. Arist., *De caelo* III 4, 303 a⁴; *De gen. anim.* II 6, 742 b²⁰: Democritus
Δημόκριτος ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης.

b. Diog. IX 41 (D. 68 A 1):

γέγονε δὲ τοῖς χρόνοις, ὡς αὐτός φησιν ἐν τῷ Μικρῷ διακόσμῳ, νέος κατὰ πρεσβύτην Ἀναξαγόραν, ἔτεσιν αὐτοῦ νεώτερος τετταράκοντα.

c. Diog. IX 34 (D. ib.):

οὗτος μάγων τινῶν διήκουσε καὶ Χαλδαίων, Ξέρξου τοῦ βασιλέως τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ ἐπιστάτας καταλιπόντος, ἡνίκα ἐξενίσθη παρ' αὐτῷ, καθά φησι καὶ Ἡρόδοτος¹. παρ' ὧν τά τε περὶ θεολογίας καὶ ἀστρολογίας ἔμαθεν ἔτι παῖς ὢν.

d. Demetr. Magnes ap. Diog. IX 36 (D. 68 A 1, B 116):

δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Ἀθήναζε ἔλθεῖν καὶ μὴ σπουδάσαι γνωσθῆναι δόξης καταφρονῶν. καὶ εἰδέναι μὲν Σωκράτη, ἀγνοεῖσθαι δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ· „ἦλθον γάρ”, φησίν, „εἰς Ἀθήνας, καὶ οὔτις με ἔγνωκεν”.

140—Democr. wrote a great many books, on the most various subjects. Diog. I 16 mentions him among the most voluminous writers: his books

¹ Cp. Hrd. VIII 120; VII 109.

a. πολλά δὲ Ζήνων, πλείω Ξενοφάνης, πλείω Δημόκριτος, πλείω Ἀριστοτέλης, πλείω Χρύσιππος.

Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 90, 32.

b. Diog. enumerates them in IX 46-49:

Τὰ δὲ βιβλία αὐτοῦ καὶ Θρασύλος ἀναγέγραφε κατὰ τάξιν οὕτως, ὥσπερ εἶ
καὶ τὰ Πλάτωνος, κατὰ τετραλογίαν· ἔστι δὲ Ἡθικά¹—Φυσικά¹—ΑΣΥΝ-
τακτα¹—Μαθηματικά¹—Μουσικά¹—Τεχνικά¹—.

and style

c. Cic., *Orat.* 20, 67:

itaque video visum esse nonnullis Platonis et Democriti locutionem,
etsi absit a versu, tamen quod incitatus feratur et clarissimis verborum
luminibus utatur, potius poema putandum quam comicorum poetarum.

the atoms
and the void

141—Simpl., *De Caelo* p. 294, 33 Heiberg:

- ὀλίγα δὲ ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους Περὶ Δημοκρίτου (fr. 208 Rose) παρα-
γραφέντα δηλώσει τὴν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων διάνοιαν. „Δημόκριτος ἡγεῖται
τὴν τῶν αἰδίων φύσιν εἶναι μικρὰς οὐσίας πλήθος ἀπείρους· ταύταις δὲ τόπον
ἄλλον ὑποτίθῃσιν ἄπειρον τῷ μεγέθει· προσαγορεύει δὲ τὸν μὲν τόπον τοῖσδε
5 τοῖς ὀνόμασι, τῷ τε κενῷ καὶ τῷ οὐδενὶ καὶ τῷ ἀπείρῳ, τῶν δὲ οὐσιῶν ἐκά-
στην τῷ τε δένει καὶ τῷ ναστῷ² καὶ τῷ ὄντι. νομίζει δὲ εἶναι οὕτω μικρὰς
τὰς οὐσίας, ὥστε ἐκφυγεῖν τὰς ἡμετέρας αἰσθήσεις. ὑπάρχειν δὲ αὐταῖς παν-
τοίας μορφὰς καὶ σχήματα παντοῖα καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος διαφοράς. ἐκ τούτων
οὖν ἤδη καθάπερ ἐκ στοιχείων γεννᾷ καὶ συγκρίνει τοὺς ὀφθαλμοφανεῖς καὶ
10 τοὺς αἰσθητοὺς ὄγκους. στασιάζειν δὲ καὶ φέρεσθαι ἐν τῷ κενῷ διὰ τε τὴν
ἀνομιότητα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας εἰρημένας διαφοράς, φερομένας δὲ ἐμπίπτειν³
καὶ περιπλέκεσθαι περιπλοκὴν τοιαύτην, ἣ συμψαίνει μὲν αὐτὰ καὶ πλησίον
ἀλλήλων εἶναι ποιεῖ, φύσιν μέντοι μίαν ἐξ ἐκείνων κατ' ἀλήθειαν οὐδ' ἦντι-
ναοῦν γεννᾷ· κομιδῇ γὰρ εὖηθες εἶναι τὸ δύο ἢ τὰ πλείονα γενέσθαι ἂν ποτε
15 ἔν. τοῦ δὲ συμμένειν τὰς οὐσίας μετ' ἀλλήλων μέχρι τινός⁴ αἰτιᾶται τὰς ἐπαλ-
λαγὰς καὶ τὰς ἀντιλήψεις⁵ τῶν σωμάτων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν εἶναι σκαληνά⁶,
τὰ δὲ ἀγκιστρῶδη, τὰ δὲ κοῖλα, τὰ δὲ κυρτά, τὰ δὲ ἄλλας ἀναρίθμους ἔχοντα
διαφοράς· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον οὖν χρόνον σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀντέχεσθαι νομίζει καὶ
συμμένειν, ἕως ἰσχυροτέρα τις ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἀνάγκη παραγενομένη
20 διασείση καὶ χωρὶς αὐτὰς διασπείρη.”

¹ Here follows a series of titles for each group.

² ναστόν = πλήρες.

³ ἐμπίπτειν - sc. ἀλλήλαις.

⁴ μέχρι τινός - sc. χρόνου.

⁵ τ. ἐπαλλαγὰς κ.τ. ἀντιλήψεις - the junction and the seizing of each other.

⁶ σκαληνά - crooked.

142—a. Sext., *Adv. Math.* VII (= *Against the Logicians* I) 135 **primary and secondary qualities**
(Democr. D. 68 B 9, 10, 6, 7):

Δημόκριτος (D. B 9) . . . „νόμῳ . . .”, φησί, „γλυκὺ καὶ νόμῳ πικρόν, νόμῳ θερμόν, νόμῳ ψυχρόν, νόμῳ χροίη· ἔτεῃ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν” (ὅπερ <ἔστι>· νομίζεται μὲν εἶναι καὶ δοξάζεται τὰ αἰσθητά, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄτομα μόνον καὶ τὸ κενόν). (136) ἐν δὲ τοῖς Κρατυντηρίοις, καίπερ ὑπεσχημένος ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὸ κράτος τῆς πίστεως ἀναθεῖναι, οὐδὲν ἤττον εὐρίσκεται τούτων καταδικάζων. φησὶ γάρ· „ἡμεῖς δὲ τῷ μὲν ἔοντι οὐδὲν ἀτρεκέες συνίμεν, μεταπίπτον δὲ κατὰ τε σώματος διαθήκην καὶ τῶν ἐπεισιόντων καὶ τῶν ἀντιστηριζόντων.” καὶ πάλιν φησὶν (B 10)· „ἔτεῃ μὲν νυν ὅτι οἷον ἕκαστον ἔστιν <ἡ> οὐκ ἔστιν οὐ συνίμεν, πολλαχῇ δεδῆλωται.” (137) ἐν δὲ τῷ Περὶ ἰδεῶν (B 6) „γινώσκειν τε χρῆ”, φησὶν, „ἄνθρωπον τῷδε τῷ κανόνι, ὅτι ἔτεῃς ἀπῆλλακται.” καὶ πάλιν (B 7)· „δηλοῖ μὲν δὴ καὶ οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ὅτι ἔτεῃ οὐδὲν ἴσμεν * περὶ οὐδενός, ἀλλ’ ἐπιρρυσμὴ¹ ἑκάστοισιν ἢ δόξιος.”

b. Democr., D. B 117:

his seeming scepticism

ἔτεῃ δὲ οὐδὲν ἴδμεν· ἐν βυθῷ γὰρ ἢ ἀλήθεια.

c. Sext., *o.c.* 138 (D. B 11):

ἐν δὲ τοῖς Κανόσι (D. B 11) δύο φησὶν εἶναι γνώσεις, τὴν μὲν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς διανοίας, ὧν τὴν μὲν διὰ τῆς διανοίας γνησίην καλεῖ προσμαρτυρῶν αὐτῇ τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀληθείας κρίσιν, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων σκοτίην ὀνομάζει ἀφαιρούμενος αὐτῆς τὸ πρὸς διάγνωσιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀπλανές. (139) λέγει δὲ κατὰ λέξιν· „γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι, ἡ μὲν γνησίη, ἡ δὲ σκοτίη· καὶ σκοτίης μὲν τάδε σύμπαντα, ὅψις ἀκοὴ ὁδμὴ γεῦσις ψαῦσις. ἡ δὲ γνησίη, ἀποκεκριμένη δὲ ταύτης.” εἴτα προκρίνων τῆς σκοτίης τὴν γνησίην ἐπιφέρει λέγων· „ὅταν ἢ σκοτίη μηκέτι δύνηται μήτε ὀρῆν ἐπ’ ἑλαττον μήτε ἀκούειν μήτε ὁδμαῖσθαι μήτε γεύεσθαι μήτε ἐν τῇ ψαύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ λεπτότερον <δέξῃ ζητεῖν, τότε ἐπιγίνεται ἢ γνησίη ἅτε ὄργανον ἔχουσα τοῦ νῶσαι λεπτότερον> **.

d. Democr., D. B 125 (Galen., *De medic. empir.* fr. ed. Schoene, 1259, 8):

the senses speak to the reasoning power

ἐποίησε τὰς αἰσθήσεις λεγούσας πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν οὕτως· „τάλαινα φρὴν, παρ’ ἡμέων λαβοῦσα τὰς πίστεις² ἡμέας καταβάλλεις; πτωμά τοι τὸ κατὰ βλημα.”

¹ ἐπιρρυσμὴ - flowing-in (of images). Cp. the next following fr.

² “your evidence”.

* Sextus cites the fr. in this form. Diog. L. IX 72 has ἴδμεν in the parallel fr. 117, see our nr **b**.

** Added by Diels.

the theory of
the εἰδῶλα

143—a. Aët. IV 8, 10 (*Dox.* 395):

Λεύκιππος, Δημόκριτος τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν νόησιν γίνεσθαι εἰδῶλων ἕξωθεν προσιόντων · μηδενὶ γὰρ ἐπιβάλλειν μηδετέραν χωρὶς τοῦ προσπίπτοντος εἰδῶλου.

b. More detailed information is given by Plut., *Symp.* VIII 10, 2, p. 735 a:

φησὶ Δημόκριτος ἐγκαταβυσσοῦσθαι τὰ εἰδῶλα διὰ τῶν πόρων εἰς τὰ σώματα καὶ ποιεῖν τὰς κατὰ τὸν ὕπνον ὅψεις ἐπαναφερόμενα · φοιτᾶν δὲ ταῦτα πανταχόθεν ἀπιόντα καὶ σκευῶν καὶ ἱματίων καὶ φυτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ ζώων ὑπὸ σάλου πολλοῦ καὶ θερμότητος, οὐ μόνον ἔχοντα μορφοειδεῖς τοῦ σώματος

5 ἐκμεμαγμένους ὁμοιότητος . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν κατὰ ψυχὴν κινήματων καὶ βουλευμάτων ἐκάστω καὶ ἡθῶν καὶ παθῶν ἐμφάσεις¹ ἀναλαμβάνοντα συνεφέλκεσθαι, καὶ προσπίπτοντα μετὰ τούτων ὥσπερ ἐμψυχα φράζειν καὶ δια-

explanation
of telepathic
phenomena

στελλεῖν² τοῖς ὑποδεχομένοις τὰς τῶν μεθιέντων αὐτὰ δόξας καὶ διαλογισμούς καὶ ὁρμάς, ὅταν ἐνάρθρους καὶ ἀσυγχύτους φυλάττοντα προσμύξῃ τὰς εἰκόνας.

On the eidola-theory see J. Bidez, *Eos ou Platon et l'Orient*, Bruxelles 1945, p. 135-141.

and of the
evil eye

c. Ib. V 7, 6, p. 682 F:

ἃ (sc. εἰδῶλα) φησιν ἐκεῖνος ἐξιέναι τοὺς φθονοῦντας οὐτ' αἰσθήσεως ἁμοιρα παντάπασιν οὔτε ὁρμῆς, ἀνάπλεά τε τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν προἰεμένων μοχθηρίας καὶ βασκανίας³. μεθ' ἧς ἐμπλασσόμενα καὶ παραμένοντα καὶ συνοικοῦντα τοῖς βασκαينوμένοις ἐπιταράττειν καὶ κακοῦν αὐτῶν τό τε σῶμα καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν.

the gods
explained as
εἰδῶλα

d. Cp. Sext., *Adv. Math.* IX (= *Against the Physicists* I) 19 (D.B 166):

Δημόκριτος δὲ εἰδῶλά τινά φησιν ἐμπελάζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθοποιὰ τὰ δὲ κακοποιὰ · ἐνθεν καὶ εὖχετο „εὐλόγῃων τυχεῖν εἰδῶλων”⁴. εἶναι δὲ ταῦτα μεγάλα τε καὶ ὑπερφυῆ καὶ δύσφθαρτα μὲν, οὐκ ἄφθαρτα δέ, προσημáινειν τε τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις θεωρούμενα καὶ φωνὰς ἀφιέντα. ὅθεν τούτων αὐτῶν φαντασίαν λαβόντες οἱ παλαιοὶ ὑπενόησαν εἶναι θεόν, μηθενὸς ἄλλου παρὰ ταῦτα ὄντος θεοῦ τοῦ ἄφθαρτον φύσιν ἔχοντος.

¹ ἐμφάσεις - images.

² διαστέλλειν - tell accurately.

³ βασκανία - malignity (βασκαίνω = to bewitch).

⁴ J. Bidez, *o.c.*, p. 139 f. says of this prayer: “Sa prière était celle d'un incroyant préoccupé de détourner de lui les songes qui, en suggérant aux hommes des idées fausses sur les dieux, et surtout en les affolant par les frayeurs de la superstition, leur enlèvent ce qu'il appelait l'ἀθαμβία, un équivalent de l'„euthymie” ou bonne humeur d'où est venue la légende du philosophe qui riait toujours.”

144—Diog. IX 45 (D. A 1):

πάντα τε κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι, τῆς δίνης αἰτίας οὔσης τῆς γενέσεως πάντων, ἣν ἀνάγκην λέγει.

purely me-
chanical ex-
planation of
nature

145—Hippolyt., *Ref.* I 13 (D. A 40):

innumerable
worlds

Ἔλεγε δὲ ὡς αἰεὶ κινουμένων τῶν ὄντων ἐν τῷ κενῷ · ἀπείρους δὲ εἶναι κόσμους καὶ μεγέθει διαφέροντας, ἐν τοῖσι δὲ μὴ εἶναι ἥλιον μηδὲ σελήνην, ἐν τοῖσι δὲ μείζω τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τοῖσι πλείω. εἶναι δὲ τῶν κόσμων ἄνισα τὰ διαστήματα, καὶ τῇ μὲν πλείους τῇ δὲ ἐλάττους. καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὔξεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἀκμάζειν, τοὺς δὲ φθίνειν, καὶ τῇ μὲν γίνεσθαι, τῇ δ' ἐκλείπειν * . φθείρεσθαι δὲ αὐτοὺς ὑπ' ἀλλήλων προσπίπτοντας. εἶναι δ' ἐνίοις κόσμους ἐρήμους ζῶων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ παντὸς ὕγροῦ. — (18) ἀκμάζειν δὲ κόσμον, ἕως ἂν μηκέτι δύνῃται ἔξωθέν τι προσλαμβάνειν.

5

146—a. Arist., *De Anima* I 2, 403 b²⁵:

the soul

Τὸ ἔμψυχον δὴ τοῦ ἀψύχου δυοῖν μάλιστα διαφέρειν δοκεῖ, κινήσει τε καὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι. Παρελήφαμεν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν προγενεστέρων σχεδὸν δύο ταῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς · φασὶ γὰρ ἔνιοι καὶ μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτως ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινεῖν. οἰηθέντες δὲ τὸ μὴ κινούμενον αὐτὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖν ἕτερον, τῶν κινουμένων τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπέλαβον εἶναι¹. ὅθεν Δημόκριτος μὲν πῦρ τι καὶ θερμόν φησιν αὐτὴν εἶναι · ἀπείρων γὰρ ὄντων σχημάτων καὶ ἀτόμων τὰ σφαιροειδῆ πῦρ καὶ ψυχὴν λέγει, οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τὰ καλούμενα ξύσματα², ἃ φαίνεται ἐν ταῖς διὰ τῶν θυρίδων ἀκτῖσιν, ὧν τὴν μὲν πανσπερμίαν τῆς ὅλης φύσεως στοιχεῖα λέγει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος. τούτων δὲ τὰ σφαιροειδῆ ψυχὴν, διὰ τὸ μάλιστα διὰ παντὸς δύνασθαι διαδύνειν τοὺς τοιοῦτους ῥυσμούς³, καὶ κινεῖν τὰ λοιπὰ κινούμενα καὶ αὐτά, ὑπολαμβάνοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ παρέχον τοῖς ζώοις τὴν κίνησιν. διὸ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ὅρον εἶναι τὴν ἀναπνοήν · συνάγοντος γὰρ τοῦ περιέχοντος τὰ σώματα καὶ ἐκθλίβοντος τῶν σχημάτων τὰ παρέχοντα τοῖς ζώοις τὴν κίνησιν διὰ τὸ μὴδ' αὐτὰ ἡρεμεῖν μηδέποτε, βοήθειαν γίνεσθαι θύραθεν ἐπεισιόντων ἄλλων τοιούτων ἐν τῷ ἀναπνεῖν · καλῶν γὰρ αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα ἐν τοῖς ζώοις ἐκκρίνεσθαι, συνανείργοντα τὸ συνάγον καὶ πηγνύον · καὶ ζῆν⁴ δὲ ἕως ἂν δύνωνται τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

5

it consists of
round and
very small
atoms

10

15

¹ ὑπέλαβον εἶναι - In this frame Aristotle places Democrit's theory of the soul as consisting of round and very fine atoms. We have to consider this as a reflexion of his, not as a direct report of what D. said.

² ξύσματα - "shavings"; particles, motes in the sunbeams.

³ ῥυσμούς - forms, figures.

⁴ καὶ ζῆν - sc. τὰ ζῶα.

* ἐκλείπειν Ritter; λείπειν mss.

b. Ib., 405 a⁸:

Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ γλαφυρωτέρως¹ εἴρηκεν ἀποφηνάμενος διὰ τί τούτων ἐκάτερον². ψυχὴν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτὸ καὶ νοῦν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι τῶν πρώτων καὶ ἀδιαιρέτων σωμάτων, κινητικὸν δὲ διὰ λεπτομέρειαν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα · τῶν δὲ σχημάτων εὐκίνητότατον τὸ σφαιροειδὲς λέγει · τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν τε νοῦν καὶ τὸ πῦρ.

poetical
inspiration

147—D. seems to have reflected upon poetical inspiration. It is quite possible that he explained it by his theory of εἶδωλα, certain well-organised persons being more open to the εἶδωλα than others. Cf. A. Delatte, *Les conceptions de l'enthousiasme chez les philosophes présocratiques*, Paris 1934, pp. 43 f., 57 f.

a. Democr., D. B 18:

Ποιητὴς δέ, ἄσσα μὲν ἂν γράφῃ μετ' ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ ἱεροῦ πνεύματος, καλὰ κάρτα ἐστίν.

b. B 21:

"Ὅμηρος φύσεως λαχὼν θεαζούσης ἐπέων κόσμον ἐτεκτῆνατο παντοίων.

man a mikro-
kosmos

148—D. B 34:

ἀνθρώπῳ μικρῷ κόσμῳ ὄντι κατὰ τὸν Δ.

An ancient Iranian theory (in the Avesta, and later in the Boundahish).

Cf. Plato, *Phaedr.* 270 c e, and the *Timaeus* passim; also [Hippocr.], π. ἐβδομάδων. See about this question A. Götze, *Persische Weisheit in Griech. Gewande*, in *Zeitschr. f. Indologie und Iranistik*, 1923, pp. 60 ff. and 167 ff.; and J. Bidez, *Eos* etc., p. 135.

The εἶδωλα-theory also occurs with the magians. D. may have been influenced by them (cf. our nr. 139 c).

the highest
thing in life

149—Diog. IX 45 (D. A 1):

Τέλος δ' εἶναι τὴν εὐθυμίαν, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν οὖσαν τῇ ἡδονῇ, ὥς ἔνιοι παρακούσαντες ἐξηγήσαντο, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἣν γαληνῶς καὶ εὐσταθῶς ἡ ψυχὴ διάγει, ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ταραττομένη φόβου ἢ δεισιδαιμονίας ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς πάθους. καλεῖ δ' αὐτὴν καὶ εὐεστώ καὶ πολλοῖς ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι.

Here we have come to the "ethics" of D., if we may give this name to it. We have a rather large collection of γνῶμαι of D., loose proverbs or maxims without any system, conserved in the *Florilegium* of Stob. Natorp, *Die Ethika des Demokr.*, Marburg 1893, tried to discover a systematic principle in them.

¹ γλαφυρωτέρως - more subtly.

² διὰ τί τούτων ἐκάτερον - "why the soul is each of these two things", sc. κινητικὸν καὶ γνωριστικόν.

In these fragments D. appears to us as an ethical humanist, who, in default of a religious or metaphysical principle, was not able to connect his ethics organically with his philosophy of nature.

We find in the ethical fragments of D. two principal themes, from which many of his other apophthegms can be deduced.

150—1—The priority of the spiritual over the corporeal. **two principal themes**

a. Democr. D. B 105:

Σώματος κάλλος ζφῶδες, ἣν μὴ νοῦς ὑπῆ.

b. D. B 187:

ἀνθρώποις ἀρμόδιον ψυχῆς μᾶλλον ἢ σώματος λόγον ποιεῖσθαι · ψυχῆς μὲν γὰρ τελεότης σκήνεος ¹ μοχθηρίην ὀρθοῖ, σκήνεος δὲ ἰσχύς ἄνευ λογισμοῦ ψυχὴν οὐδέν τι ἀμείνω τίθησιν.

2—Pleasure and lack of pleasure is the standard.

c. D. B 4:

Τέρψις καὶ ἀτερπία οὖρος.

Diels supplies <τῶν συμφόρων καὶ τῶν ἀσυμφόρων>, "of what is suitable or expedient and what is not" *

d. D. B 189:

"Ἀριστον ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν βίον διάγειν ὥς πλεῖστα εὐθυμηθέντι καὶ ἐλάχιστα ἀνηθέντι. τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπὶ τοῖς θνητοῖσι ² τὰς ἡδονὰς ποιοῖτο.

From these two chief principles five other groups of maxims may be deduced.

151—1—Happiness does not depend on outward goods.
Besides B 189 (the preceding fr.) we cite:

*εὐθυμία
or εὐεστώ*

a. D. B 170:

Εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς καὶ κακοδαιμονία.

b. He says exactly the same in B 171:

Εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἐν βοσκήμασιν οἰκεῖ οὐδὲ ἐν χρυσῷ · ψυχὴ οἰκητήριον δαίμονος ³.

¹ σκήνεος - σώματος.

² ἐπὶ τ. θνητοῖσι "in mortal things".

³ "The soul is the dwelling-place of a daemon", be it a good or an evil one.

* Natorp <τῶν πρηκτέων καὶ μὴ πρηκτέων>.

c. B 146 (Plut., *De profectionibus in virtute* 10, p. 81 b):

The more advanced in virtue show τὸν λόγον ἐντὸς ἤδη τρεφόμενον καὶ ῥιζούμενον ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ κατὰ Δ. „αὐτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τὰς τέρψιας ἐθιζόμενον λαμβάνειν”.

d. B 40:

οὔτε σώμασιν οὔτε χρήμασιν εὐδαιμονοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ’ ὀρθοσύνη ¹ καὶ πολυφροσύνη ².

e. B 37:

ὁ τὰ ψυχῆς ἀγαθὰ αἰρεόμενος τὰ θεϊότερα αἰρέεται · ὁ δὲ τὰ σκήνεος τὰ ἀνθρωπῆϊα.

f. B 77:

δόξα καὶ πλοῦτος ἄνευ ξυνέσιος οὐκ ἀσφαλέα κτήματα.

μέτρον

152—2—The classic Greek principle of measure.

a. B 191:

Ἀνθρώποισι γὰρ εὐθυμῆ γίνεται μετριότητι τέρψιος καὶ βίου συμμετρίῃ · τὰ δ’ ἐλλείποντα καὶ ὑπερβάλλοντα μεταπίπτειν ³ τε φιλεῖ καὶ μεγάλας κινήσιας ἐμποιεῖν τῇ ψυχῇ, αἱ δ’ ἐκ μεγάλων διαστημάτων ⁴ κινούμεναι τῶν ψυχέων οὔτε εὐσταθέες εἰσὶν οὔτε εὐθυμοί. ἐπὶ τοῖς δυνατοῖς οὖν δεῖ ἔχειν τὴν γνώμην
5 καὶ τοῖς παρεούσιν ἀρκέεσθαι τῶν μὲν ζηλουμένων καὶ θαυμαζομένων ὀλίγην μνήμην ἔχοντα καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ μὴ προσεδρεύοντα, τῶν δὲ ταλαιπωρεόντων τοὺς βίους θεωρεῖν, ἐννοοῦμενον ἃ πάσχουσι κάρτα, ὅπως ἂν τὰ παρεόντα σοὶ καὶ ὑπάρχοντα μεγάλα καὶ ζηλωτὰ φαίνηται, καὶ μηκέτι πλείονων ἐπιθυμέοντι συμβαίνει κακοπαθεῖν τῇ ψυχῇ.

b. B 102:

καλὸν ἐν παντὶ τὸ ἴσον · ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

c. Also in B 3 D. shows a remarkable inclination to the Epicurean attitude of living-to-oneself:

τὸν εὐθυμεῖσθαι μέλλοντα χρὴ μὴ πολλὰ πρήσσειν, μήτε ἰδίῃ μήτε ξυνῇ, μηδὲ ἄσος’ ἂν πράσσει, ὑπὲρ τε δύναμιν αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν ἑωυτοῦ καὶ φύσιν · ἀλλὰ τοσαύτην ἔχειν φυλακὴν ⁵, ὥστε καὶ τῆς τύχης ἐπιβαλλούσης ⁶ καὶ ἐς τὸ πλεόν ὑπηγεομένης τῷ δοκεῖν, κατατίθεσθαι ⁷, καὶ μὴ πλέω προσάπτεσθαι τῶν δυνατῶν. ἡ γὰρ εὐογκίη ἀσφαλέστερον τῆς μεγαλογκίης.

¹ ὀρθοσύνη - straightness of character.

² πολυφροσύνη - many-sidedness.

³ μεταπίπτειν - change suddenly.

⁴ ἐκ μεγάλων διαστημάτων - from one extreme into another.

⁵ ἔχειν φυλακὴν - sc. over himself.

⁶ ἐπιβαλλούσης - intrans.

⁷ κατατίθεσθαι - lay aside.

153—3—Practical wisdom a condition to happiness.

φρόνησις

a. B 175:

οἱ δὲ θεοὶ τοῖσι ἀνθρώποισι διδοῦσι τὰγαθὰ πάντα καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν. πλὴν ὁκόσα κακὰ καὶ βλαβερά καὶ ἀνωφελέα, τάδε δ' οὐκτε> πάλαι οὔτε νῦν θεοὶ ἀνθρώποισι δωροῦνται, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ τοῖσδεσιν ἐμπελάζουσι διὰ νοῦ τυφλότητα καὶ ἀγνώμοσύνην.

b. B 119:

Ἀνθρωποὶ τύχης εἶδωλον ἐπλάσαντο πρόφασιν ἰδίης ἀβουλίας· βαιὰ¹ γὰρ φρονήσει τύχη μάχεται, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα ἐν βίῳ εὐξύνετος ὀξυτερκείη κατιθύνει.

154—4—The later Cynic and Stoic principle of limitation of desires is found in many of the fragments of D. Besides B 191, quoted for the greater part in our nr. 152a, we cite:

limitation of desires

a. B 284:

*Ὦν μὴ πολλῶν ἐπιθυμέης, τὰ ὀλίγα τοι πολλὰ δόξει· σμικρὰ γὰρ ὄρεξις πενήνῃ ἰσοσθενέα πλούτῳ ποιεῖ.

b. B 283:

πενίη πλοῦτος ὀνόματα ἐνδείης καὶ κόρου· οὔτε οὖν πλούσιος <ὁ> ἐνδέων οὔτε πένης ὁ μὴ ἐνδέων.

c. B 286:

εὐτυχής ὁ ἐπὶ μετρίοις χρήμασιν εὐθυμεόμενος, δυστυχής δὲ ὁ ἐπὶ πολλοῖς δυσθυμεόμενος.

d. B 210:

τράπεζαν πολυτελέα μὲν τύχη παρατίθησιν, αὐταρκέα δὲ σωφροσύνη.

e. B 211:

σωφροσύνη τὰ τερπνὰ ἀέξει καὶ ἡδονὴν ἐπιμείζονα ποιεῖ.

f. B 118:

βούλεσθαι μᾶλλον μίαν εὐρεῖν αἰτιολογίαν ἢ τὴν Περσῶν οἱ βασιλείαν γενέσθαι.

a philosopher does not care for power or wealth

155—5—The good lies in the disposition of the heart, not in word or deed.

inner value of the good

a. B 62:

*Ἀγαθὸν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴδὲ ἐθέλειν.

¹ βαιὰ - seldom.

b. B 96:

χαριστικὸς οὐχ ὁ βλέπων πρὸς τὴν ἀμοιβήν, ἀλλ' ὁ εὖ δρᾶν προηρημένος.

c. B 244:

φαῦλον, κἂν μόνος ᾖς, μήτε λέξης μήτ' ἐργάσῃ· μάθε δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων σεαυτὸν αἰσχύνεσθαι.

d. B 264:

μηδὲν τι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους αἰδεῖσθαι ἑωυτοῦ μηδὲ τι μᾶλλον ἐξεργάζεσθαι κακόν, εἰ μέλλει μηδεὶς εἰδῆσιν ἢ οἱ πάντες ἄνθρωποι· ἀλλ' ἑωυτὸν μάλιστα αἰδεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῦτον νόμον τῇ ψυχῇ καθεστάναι, ὥστε μηδὲν ποιεῖν ἀνεπιτήδειον¹.

intellectual
definition
of sin

156—6—We add a sixth principle, not to be deduced from the two chief themes, given under **150**, yet a very Greek one, and fitting in rather well with the whole of Democrit's view of life and morals.

a. B 83:

Ἀμαρτίας αἰτία ἡ ἀμαθία τοῦ κρέσσονος.

Here then we have the famous Socratical maxim: οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνει, and behind it the hotly debated question of the Athenians round the year 400: whether virtue can be taught or not? D. seems to conclude from the above principle that education has some moral effect:

b. B 242:

Πλέονες ἐξ ἀσκήσιος ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται ἢ ἀπὸ φύσιος.

c. See also B 181:

Κρείσσων ἐπ' ἀρετὴν φανεῖται προτροπῇ χρώμενος καὶ λόγου πειθοῖ, ἥπερ νόμῳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ. λάθρη μὲν γὰρ ἀμαρτέειν εἰκὸς τὸν εἰργμένον ἀδικίης ὑπὸ νόμου, τὸν δὲ ἐς τὸ δέον ἡγμένον πειθοῖ οὐκ εἰκὸς οὔτε λάθρη οὔτε φανερώς ἔρδειν τι πλημμελές. διόπερ συνέσει τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ὀρθοπραγέων τις ἀνδρεῖος ἅμα καὶ εὐθύγνωμος γίγνεται.

d. The following point also reminds us of Plato's Socrates (in the Gorgias and Crito):

Democr., D. B 45:

ὁ ἀδικῶν τοῦ ἀδικουμένου κακοδαιμονέστερος.

e. He explains this in the fr. B 174:

Ὁ μὲν εὐθυμος εἰς ἔργα αἰεὶ φερόμενος δίκαια καὶ νόμιμα καὶ ὕπαρ καὶ ὄναρ χαίρει τε καὶ ἔρρωται καὶ ἀνακηδής² ἔστιν· ὃς δ' ἂν καὶ δίκης ἀλογῇ³

¹ ἀνεπιτήδειον - not suitable.

² ἀνακηδής = ἀκηδής.

³ ἀλογῇ - despises.

καὶ τὰ χρηρῆ ἔόντα μὴ ἔρδη, τούτῳ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀτερπείη, ὅταν τευ ἀναμνησθῇ, καὶ δέδοικε καὶ ἑαυτὸν κακίζει.

f. The next fr. again brings us near to the Platonic Socrates: B 160:

Τὸ γὰρ κακῶς ζῆν . . . Δημόκριτος ἔλεγεν οὐ κακῶς ζῆν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺν χρόνον ἀποθνήσκειν.

Yet, if philosophical ethics are a critical reflexion on the essence of moral good, Aristotle was right in calling Socrates, and not Democr., the founder of philosophical ethics,—unless we would attribute this title to Heraclitus, with his theory of the Logos (see our nr. 62 b).

157—Some loose fragments.

a. B. 99:

friendship
the state

ζῆν οὐκ ἄξιος, ὅτῳ μὴδὲ εἷς ἐστὶ χρηστὸς φίλος.

b. B 252:

τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν χρεῶν τῶν λοιπῶν μέγιστα ἡγεῖσθαι, ὅπως ἄξεται εὖ, μήτε φιλονικέοντα παρὰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς μήτε ἰσχὺν ἑαυτῷ περιτιθέμενον παρὰ τὸ χρηστὸν τὸ τοῦ ξυνοῦ. πόλις γὰρ εὖ ἀγομένη μεγίστη ὄρθωσίς ἐστι, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ πάντα ἐνι, καὶ τούτου σφζομένου πάντα σφίζεται καὶ τούτου διαφθειρομένου τὰ πάντα διαφθείρεται.

c. Cf. B 287:

Ἀπορίη ξυνὴ τῆς ἐκάστου χαλεπωτέρη · οὐ γὰρ ὑπολείπεται ἐλπίς ἐπικουρίης.

158—a. B 275:

difficulties
of raising
children

Τεκνοτροφία σφαλερόν · τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιτυχίην¹ ἀγῶνος μεστὴν καὶ φροντίδος κέκτηται, τὴν δὲ ἀποτυχίην² ἀνυπέρθετον ἐτέρῃ ὁδύνῃ.

b. B 276:

οὐ δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι παῖδας κτᾶσθαι · ἐνορῶ γὰρ ἐν παῖδων κτήσει πολλοὺς μὲν καὶ μεγάλους κινδύνους, πολλὰς δὲ λύπας, ὀλίγα δὲ τὰ εὐθελέοντα³ καὶ ταῦτα λεπτά τε καὶ ἀσθενέα.

c. B 277:

ὅτεφ χρηρῆ⁴ τεὰ ἐστὶ παῖδα ποιήσασθαι, ἐκ τῶν φίλων τεύ μοι δοκεῖ ἄμεινον εἶναι. καὶ τῷ μὲν παῖς ἔσται τοιοῦτος, οἷον ἂν βούληται · ἔστι γὰρ ἐκλέξασθαι οἷον ἐθέλει · καὶ ὅς ἂν δοκῇ ἐπιτήδειος εἶναι, κἂν μάλιστα κατὰ φύσιν ἔποιτο. καὶ τοῦτο τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, ὅσον ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἔστι τὸν παῖδα λαβεῖν καταθύμιον ἐκ πολλῶν οἷον ἂν δέη. ἦν δὲ τις ποιῆται ἀπὸ ἑωυτοῦ, πολλοὶ ἔνεισι κίνδυνοι · ἀνάγκη γάρ, ὅς ἂν γέννηται, τούτῳ χρῆσθαι.

¹ τ. ἐπιτυχίην - if you succeed in education.

² τ. ἀποτυχίην - if you do not succeed.

³ εὐθελέοντα - blessings. ⁴ χρηρῆ - χρεία, a need.

tranquillitas
animi

159—His undisturbed peace of mind gives a foretaste of the Stoic ἀπάθεια.

B 216:

Σοφίῃ ἄθαμβος ἄξιη πάντων τιμιωτάτη οὔσα *.

Greek
merriness

160—B 230:

Βίος ἀνεόρταστος μακρὴ ὁδὸς ἀπανδόκευτος.

* Kranz brackets τιμιωτάτη οὔσα as a gloss.

FIFTH CHAPTER A

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

161—Diog. IX 57 (D. 64 A 1):

life and date

Διογένης Ἀπολλοθέμιδος Ἀπολλωνιάτης, ἀνὴρ φυσικὸς καὶ ἄγαν ἐλλόγιμος. ἤκουσε δέ, ὥς φησιν Ἀντισθένης, Ἀναξιμένους. ἦν δὲ τοῖς χρόνοις κατ' Ἀναξαγόραν.

Diog. of Apollonia (in Crete) was a late disciple of Anaximenes. In opposition to Anaxagoras he defends that the primary substance must be one, and therefore he identifies νόησις (what Anaxagoras called νοῦς) with air.

162—Diog. Apoll., D. 64 B 2:

one principle

ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ, τὸ μὲν ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν, πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑτεροιοῦσθαι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι. καὶ τοῦτο εὐδηλον· εἰ γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ ὄντα νῦν, γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀήρ καὶ πῦρ καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα φαίνεται ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ ὄντα, εἰ τούτων τι ἦν ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, ἕτερον δὲν τῇ ἰδίῃ φύσει, καὶ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ὅν μετέπιπτε πολλαχῶς καὶ ἑτεροιοῦτο, οὐδαμῇ οὔτε μίσγεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἡδύνατο, οὔτε ὠφέλησις τῷ ἑτέρῳ <γένεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου> * οὔτε βλάβη, οὐδ' ἂν οὔτε φυτὸν ἐκ τῆς γῆς φῦναι οὔτε ζῶον οὔτε ἄλλο γενέσθαι οὐδέν, εἰ μὴ οὕτω συνίστατο ὥστε τωὐτὸ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ πάντα ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑτεροιούμενα ἄλλοτε ἄλλοιᾶ γίνεται καὶ ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀναχωρεῖ.

163—a. D. B 3 (Simpl., *Phys.* 152, 11):

there is much
νόησις in this
ἀρχή

ἐφεξῆς δὲ δεῖξας ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ταύτῃ νόησις πολλή „οὐ γὰρ ἂν”, φησὶν „οἷόν τε ἦν οὕτω δεδᾶσθαι ἄνευ νοήσιος, ὥστε πάντων μέτρα ἔχειν, χειμῶνός τε καὶ θέρους καὶ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας καὶ ὑετῶν καὶ ἀνέμων καὶ εὐδιῶν· καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, εἴ τις βούλεται ἐννοεῖσθαι, εὐρίσκοι ἂν οὕτω διακείμενα, ὡς ἀνυστὸν κάλλιστα” —

By Dümmler, Dickerman and Theiler *, recently followed by Jaeger, Diog.

* Added by Schorn and Diels.

- * F. Dümmler, *Akademika*, Giessen 1889, p. 96 f.
- S. O. Dickerman, *De argumentis quibusdam ap. Xenoph., Plat., Arist. obviis e structura hominis et animalium petitis*. Diss. Halle 1909.
- W. Theiler, *Zur Geschichte der teleologischen Naturbetrachtung*, Zürich 1925.

is believed to be the source of the teleological explanation of nature, which is by Xenophon, *Mem.* I 4, attributed to Socrates. See Jaeger, *Theol.* pp. 157 ff.—Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.*⁶ I 1, p. 340 n. 2 calls this “ein sehr unsicheres Ergebnis”.

b. D. B 4 (Simpl., ib.):

ἐπάγει ὅτι καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα ἡ τῆς ἀρχῆς ταύτης, ἥτις ἐστὶν ὁ ἀήρ, καὶ ζῆ καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχει καὶ νόησιν, λέγων οὕτως · (B 4) „ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τὰδε
air is spirit μεγάλα σημεῖα · ἄνθρωποι γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα ἀναπνέοντα ζῶει τῷ ἀέρι. καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς καὶ ψυχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ νόησις, ὡς δεδηλώσεται ἐν τῇδε τῇ συγγραφῇ ἐμφανῶς · καὶ ἐὰν τοῦτο ἀπαλλαχθῇ, ἀποθνήσκει καὶ ἡ νόησις ἐπιλείπει.”

and it rules all

164—D. B 5 (Simpl., Phys. 152, 21):

εἶτα μετ’ ὀλίγα σαφῶς ἐπήγαγε · „καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τὸ τὴν νόησιν ἔχον εἶναι ὁ ἀήρ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου πάντας καὶ κυβερνᾶσθαι καὶ πάντων κρατεῖν · αὐτὸ γὰρ μοι τοῦτο θεὸς * δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀφίχθαι καὶ πάντα διατιθέναι καὶ ἐν παντὶ ἐνεῖναι. καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἓν, ὃ τι μὴ μετέχει
5 τούτου. μετέχει δὲ οὐδὲ ἐν ὁμοίως τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ τρόποι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ τῆς νοήσιός εἰσιν · ἔστι γὰρ πολύτροπος, καὶ θερμότερος καὶ ψυχρότερος καὶ ξηρότερος καὶ ὑγρότερος καὶ στασιμώτερος καὶ ὀξυτέρην κίνησιν ἔχων, καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ ἑτεροιώσεις ἐνεῖσι καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ
10 χροῆς ἀπειροί. καὶ πάντων τῶν ζώων δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστίν, ἀήρ θερμότερος μὲν τοῦ ἔξω, ἐν ᾧ ἐσμεν, τοῦ μέντοι παρὰ τῷ ἡλίῳ πολλὸν ψυχρότερος. ὅμοιον δὲ τοῦτο τὸ θερμὸν οὐδενὸς τῶν ζώων ἐστίν (ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλήλοις *), ἀλλὰ διαφέρει μέγα μὲν οὐ, ἀλλ’ ὥστε παραπλήσια εἶναι. οὐ μέντοι γε ἀτρεκέως γε ὅμοιον οὐδὲν οἷόν τε γενέσθαι τῶν ἑτεροιομένων
15 ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ, πρὶν τὸ αὐτὸ γένηται. ἅτε ὦν πολυτρόπου εὐούσης τῆς ἑτεροιώσιος πολύτροπα καὶ τὰ ζῶα καὶ πολλὰ, καὶ οὔτε ἰδέαν ἀλλήλοις εἰκνόμενα οὔτε δίκαιαν οὔτε νόησιν ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἑτεροιώσεων. ὅμως δὲ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ζῆ καὶ ὀρεῖ καὶ ἀκούει, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην νόησιν ἔχει ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πάντα.”

it occupies the whole body

165—Simpl., Phys. 153, 13 (D. B 6):

καὶ ἐφεξῆς δείκνυσιν ὅτι καὶ τὸ σπέρμα τῶν ζώων πνευματῶδες ἐστὶ, καὶ νοήσεις γίνονται τοῦ ἀέρος σὺν τῷ αἵματι τὸ ὅλον σῶμα καταλαμβάνοντος διὰ τῶν φλεβῶν · ἐν οἷς καὶ ἀνατομὴν ἀκριβῆ τῶν φλεβῶν παραδίδωσιν.

This account of the veins by Diog. of Apoll. is inserted by Aristotle in his *Hist. Animalium* III 2, 511 b³⁰ (explained by Panzerbieter, *Diog. Ap.*, Lips. 1830, p. 72).

* αὐτὸ γὰρ μοι τοῦτο θεὸς is a correction of Usener, accepted by Diels. The mss have ἀπὸ γάρ μοι τοῦτο θεός.

** <έν> ἀλλήλοις Kranz.

BOOK II

MAN IN THE CENTRE OF PHILOSOPHY

SIXTH CHAPTER

THE SOPHISTS

I—INTRODUCTION

166—1—At Athens people live outside of the philosophical movement. There was nothing beyond elementary teaching.

**general
conditions**

2—A strong need of intellectual training for public life: the *ekklesia*, *boulè* and *dikastèria*.

3—Relativisation of moral values by acquaintance with foreign nations.

Herod. III 38:

Δαρείος ἐπὶ τῆς ἐωυτοῦ ἀρχῆς καλέσας Ἑλλήνων τοὺς παρεόντας εἶρετο, ἐπὶ κόσῳ ἂν χρήματι βουλοῖατο τοὺς πατέρας ἀποθνήσκοντας κατασιτέεσθαι· οἱ δὲ ἐπ' οὐδενὶ ἔφασαν ἔρδειν ἂν τοῦτο. Δαρείος δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα καλέσας Ἰνδῶν τοὺς καλεομένους Καλλιπίας, οἱ τοὺς γονέας κατεσθίουσι, εἶρετο, παρεόντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ δι' ἑρμηνέος μανθανόντων τὰ λεγόμενα, ἐπὶ τίνι χρήματι δεξιάται' ἂν τελευτῶντας τοὺς πατέρας κατακαίειν πυρὶ. οἱ δὲ ἀμβώσαντες μέγα εὐφημέειν μιν ἐκέλευον. Οὕτω μὲν νυν ταῦτα νενόμισται, καὶ ὁρθῶς μοι δοκείει Πίνδαρος ποιῆσαι „νόμον πάντων βασιλέα” φήσας εἶναι.

Herodot's attitude towards *nómos*:

III 38, beginning:

πανταχῇ ὦν μοι δηλὰ ἐστι ὅτι ἐμάνη μεγάλως ὁ Καμβύσης· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἱροῖσί τε καὶ νομαίοισι ἐπεχείρησε καταγελᾶν. Εἰ γάρ τις προθείη πᾶσι ἀνθρώποισι ἐκλέξασθαι κελύων νόμους τοὺς καλλίστους ἐκ τῶν πάντων νόμων, διασκεψάμενοι ἂν ἐλοῖατο ἕκαστοι τοὺς ἐωυτῶν· οὕτω νομίζουσι πολλόν τι καλλίστους τοὺς ἐωυτῶν νόμους ἕκαστοι εἶναι. Οὐκ ὦν οἰκός ἐστι ἄλλον γε ἢ μαίνόμενον ἄνδρα γέλωτα τὰ τοιαῦτα τίθεσθαι.

Here the opposition of *nómos* to *φύσις* is near, and a less respectful attitude to the *νόμῳ* ὦν can easily be taken.

167—One step further in the same direction brings us to the main thesis of Protagoras:

**the next
stage**

πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὥς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν.

Here man and his conscience have become the primary reality: being itself depends on his judgment.

**traces of
sophistic
culture**

168—1—In Thuc. (Nietzsche calls him "den vollendeten Ausdruck der Sophistenkultur"). See the dialogue of the Melians with the Athenians about right and wrong (Thuc. V 85-113).

2—The dialogues in Attic tragedy, especially Euripides.

3—According to Xenophon (*Mem.* I 2, 40) Pericles disputed with the young Alcibiades on the signification of *nómos*. Plutarch tells us (*Pericles* 36) that Xanthippus, the son of Pericles, reproached his father with the discussions he used to have with the sophists. πεντάθλου γάρ τινος ἀκοντίῳ πατάξαντος Ἐπίτιμον τὸν Φαρσάλιον ἀκουσίως καὶ κατακτείναντος ἡμέραν ὅλην ἀναλῶσαι μετὰ Πρωταγόρου διαπορούντα, πότερον τὸ ἀκόντιον ἢ τὸν βαλόντα μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ἀγωνοθέτας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθότατον λόγον αἰτίους χρῆ τοῦ πάθους ἡγεῖσθαι.

2—PROTAGORAS

date

169—He must have been at least 25 years older than Socrates.

a. Plato, *Prot.* 317 c (Prot. speaks):

καίτοι πολλὰ γε ἔτη ἤδη εἰμι ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ · καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ σύμπαντα πολλὰ μοι ἔστιν · οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ πάντων ἀν ὑμῶν καθ' ἡλικίαν πατὴρ εἶην.

b. Cf. Pl., *Meno* 91 e:

οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἐγγὺς καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότα, τεττεράκοντα ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὄντα.

In the *Theaet.* he is spoken of as one since long dead.

c. Cf. Diog. IX 50:

Πρωταγόρας . . . Ἀβδηρίτης, καθά φησιν Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς ἐν τοῖς περὶ νόμων, ὃς καὶ Θουρίοις νόμους γράψαι φησὶν αὐτόν.

books

170—The book of Prot. which begins with the homo-mensura-thesis, is called Ἀλήθεια by Pl., *Theaet.* 161 c.

Sext., *Adv. Math.* VII 60, calls it Καταβάλλοντες (sc. λόγοι).

Many other titles are cited: Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος, Περὶ θεῶν, Ἀντιλογικά or Ἀντιλογίαι, Τέχνη ἐριστικῶν, Περὶ τῶν μαθημάτων, Περὶ πολιτείας, Περὶ ἀρετῶν a.o.

**the homo-
mensura-
thesis**

171—a. Protagoras, D. 80 B 1 (Sextus, *Math.* VII 60):

πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δ' οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.

We possess two ancient explanations of this thesis, 1—that of Plato in the *Theaet.*, 2—that of Democr. (in Plut., *Adv. Col.*).

b. Pl., *Theaet.* 151 e:

Theaet. has defined ἐπιστήμη as αἴσθησις. Socr. answers: Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρηκέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ' ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. φησὶ γάρ που „πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον” ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, „τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὥς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν”. ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὥς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί · ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε καὶ γώ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Εἰκὸς μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν · ἐπακολουθήσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ. ἄρ' οὐκ ἐνίστε πνέοντος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ῥιγοῖ, ὁ δ' οὐ; καὶ ὁ μὲν ἡρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν; ἢ πεισόμεθα τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ὅτι τῷ μὲν ῥιγοῦντι ψυχρὸν, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὐ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅμοιον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτω ἑκατέρῳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε „φαίνεται” αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅστιν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταῦτόν ἐν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἑκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι.

c. Socr. explains this thesis as fundamentally identical with Heracliteism:

(Ib., 152 C 8) Ἄρ' οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσσοφός τις ἦν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἡνίκατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῃ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ καὶ μάλ' οὐ φαῦλον λόγον, ὥς ἄρα ἐν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ οὐδὲν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἂν τι προσείποις ὀρθῶς οὐδ' ὅποιονοῦν τι, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ὥς μέγα προσαγορεύῃς, καὶ σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρὺ, κοῦφον, σύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὥς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἐνὸς μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὁποιοῦν · ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα ἃ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες · ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτε οὐδέν, αἰεὶ δὲ γίγνεται. καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἐξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου συμφερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς.

d. To this Socr. replies: If this be so, the opinion of every man

is right. Then one man is not cleverer than the other, and there is no reason why Prot. should be our master.

(Ib., 161 d 3) εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐκάστῳ ἀληθὲς ἔσται ὁ ἂν δι' αἰσθήσεως δοξάζῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος βέλτιον διακρινεῖ, μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἔσται ἐπισκέψασθαι ἕτερος τὴν ἐτέρου ὀρθὴν ἢ ψευδῆς, ἀλλ' ὁ πολλάκις εἴρηται, αὐτὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος μόνος δοξάσει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀληθῆ, τί δὴ ποτε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφός, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων διδάσκαλος ἀξιούσθαι δικαίως μετὰ μεγάλων μισθῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροί τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῖν ἦν παρ' ἐκεῖνον, μέτρῳ ὄντι αὐτῷ ἐκάστῳ τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας;

e. Pl. makes Prot. defend himself as follows:

Ib., 166 d-167 a: ἐγὼ γάρ φημι μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ὡς γέγραφα· μέτρον γὰρ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μὴ· μυρίον μέντοι διαφέρειν ἕτερον ἐτέρου αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἄλλα ἔστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα. καὶ σοφίαν καὶ σοφὸν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ λέγω σοφόν, ὃς ἂν τινι ἡμῶν, ὃ φαίνεται καὶ ἔστι κακὰ, μεταβάλλων ποιήσῃ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι. — οἷον γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνήσθητι, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἃ ἐσθίει καὶ ἔστι, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνοντι τάναντία ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται. σοφώτερον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον 166e δεῖ ποιῆσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ δυνατόν· οὐδὲ κατηγορητέον ὡς ὁ μὲν κάμνων ἀμαθής, ὅτι τοιαῦτα δοξάζει, ὁ δὲ ὑγιαίνων σοφός, ὅτι ἄλλοῖα· μεταβλητέον δ' ἐπὶ 167a θάτερα· ἀμείνων γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα ἔξις. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἐτέρας ἔξεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείνω μεταβλητέον. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἱατρὸς φαρμάκοις μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστῆς λόγοις.

f. Finally Socr. turns the thesis of Prot. against himself:

Ib., 170 e 7: Τί δε αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρα; ἄρ' οὐχὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὲν μηδὲ αὐτὸς ᾤετο μέτρον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον μηδὲ οἱ πολλοί, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἷονται, μηδενὶ δὴ 171a εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἣν ἐκεῖνος ἔγραψεν; εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ᾤετο, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος μὴ συνοίεται, οἷσθ' ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὅσῳ πλείους οἷς μὴ δοκεῖ ἢ οἷς δοκεῖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν.

ΘΕΟ. 'Ανάγκη, εἴπερ γε καθ' ἐκάστην δόξαν ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται.

Socrates concludes (171 c 5): Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων, οὐδενὶ ἂν εἴη ἡ Πρωταγόρου 'Αλήθεια ἀληθής, οὔτε τινὶ ἄλλῳ οὔτ' αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ.

Plato gives his own definitive answer to Prot.' thesis in his last great work, *Laws* IV 716 c: *God is the measure of all things, not man* (our nr. 374 b).

g. Democr. interprets the thesis of Prot. in the same way, i.e. he also takes "man" in the individual sense. Plutarch says, the Epicurean Colotes imputed to Democrit the teaching "that nothing is more so than so". Plutarch replies:

"No, it was not Democrit who taught that, but Protagoras; and Democrit has even been so far from teaching this, that he fought against Protagoras who said that."

Plut., *Adv. Coloten* 4, 1108 f:

Ἐγκαλεῖ δ' αὐτῷ πρῶτον, ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἕκαστον εἰπὼν οὐ μᾶλλον τοῖον ἢ τοῖον εἶναι συγχέχυκε τὸν βίον. ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτόν γε Δ. ἀποδεῖ τοῦ νομίζεῖν μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον τῶν πραγμάτων ἕκαστον, ὥστε Πρωταγόρᾳ τῷ σοφιστῇ τοῦτο εἰπόντι μεμαχῆσθαι καὶ γεγραφέναι πολλὰ καὶ πιθανὰ πρὸς αὐτόν.

h. The same explanation is found in Sext. Emp. I 216 ff., VII 389 (his source is Democr.); and in Arist. who follows Plato, e.g. *Metaph.* Γ 5, 1009 a⁶:

ἔστι δ' ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δόξης καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρου λόγος · — εἴτε γὰρ τὰ δοκοῦντα πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, ἀνάγκη πάντα ἅμα ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ εἶναι. πολλοὶ γὰρ τάναντία ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ τοὺς μὴ ταυτὰ δοξάζοντας ἑαυτοῖς διεψεῦσθαι νομίζουσιν · ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι. καὶ εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη τὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι πάντ' ἀληθῆ · τὰ ἀντικείμενα γὰρ δοξάζουσιν ἀλλήλοις οἱ διεψευσμένοι καὶ ἀληθεύοντες. εἰ οὖν ἔχει τὰ ὄντα οὕτως, ἀληθεύουσιν πάντες.

172—This fits in completely with the other main thesis of Protag.: two λόγοι
about each
question

a. Diog. IX 51:

Πρῶτος ἔφη δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις. — (53) καὶ τὸν Ἀντισθένους λόγον τὸν πειρώμενον ἀποδεικνύειν, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, οὗτος πρῶτος διείλεκται, καθά φησι Πλάτων ἐν Εὐθυδήμῳ (286 c).

b. Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* Γ 4, 1007 b¹⁸:

ἔτι εἰ ἀληθεῖς αἱ ἀντιφάσεις ἅμα κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πᾶσαι, δῆλον ὡς ἅπαντα ἔσται ἓν. ἔσται γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τριήρης καὶ τοῖχος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ κατὰ παντός τι ἢ καταφῆσαι ἢ ἀποφῆσαι ἐνδέχεται, καθάπερ ἀνάγκη τοῖς τὸν Πρωταγόρου λέγουσι λόγον. εἰ γὰρ τῷ δοκεῖ μὴ εἶναι τριήρης ὁ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τριήρης · ὥστε καὶ ἔστιν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀντίφασις ἀληθής.

Hence the possibility of τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν.

173—Up to Zeller modern interpreters followed the subjective-individual explanation of Protagoras' thesis, as it is understood in Antiquity. Th. Gomperz was the first to explain it in an objective-general sense, taking "man" in the sense of mankind (*Gr. D.* I⁴ p. 373 f.).

modern
inter-
pretation

Cf. K. Joël, *Gesch. d. ant. Phil.* I, 1923, p. 703-707:

"... die Richtung der Sophistik geht zweifellos auf subjektive Entfaltung

des Individuums, und so ist sicherlich schon Prot. trotz des generellen Ausdrucks auf dem Wege zur individuellen Fassung des Menschen" (706) . . . "Er meint mit dem Menschen in Wahrheit das *Subjekt* der Erkenntnis, das er, gleichgültig ob als generelles oder individuelles oder vielmehr als beides zugleich, erheben will über die Objekte" (707).

the gods 174—Protag., D. 80 B 4 (from Π. θεῶν):

περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι οὐθ' ὥς εἰσὶν, οὐθ' ὥς οὐκ εἰσὶν, οὐθ' ὅποιοί τινες ἰδέαν· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι, ἢ τ' ἀδηλότης καὶ βραχύς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

the myth of

Prot. on
αιδώς and
δίκη

320d

175—Pl., *Prot.* 320 c⁸-323 a:

Ἦν γὰρ ποτε χρόνος, ὅτε θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν, θνητὰ δὲ γένη οὐκ ἦν. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τούτοις χρόνος ἦλθεν εἰμαρμένος γενέσεως, τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς ἔνδον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς μεῖξαντες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῇ κεράννυται. Ἐπειδὴ δ' ἄγειν αὐτὰ πρὸς φῶς ἐμελλον, προσέταξαν Προμηθεὶ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεὶ κοσμησαί τε καὶ νεῖμαι δυνάμεις ἐκάστοις, ὥς πρέπει. Προμηθεὶ δὲ παραιτεῖται Ἐπιμηθεὺς αὐτὸς νεῖμαι· „Νείμαντος δέ μου, ἔφη, ἐπίσκεψαι.” καὶ οὕτω πείσας νέμει. Νέμων δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἰσχὺν ἄνευ τάχους προσήπτεν, τοὺς δ' ἀσθενεστέρους τάχει ἐκόσμει· τοὺς δὲ ὥπλιζε, τοῖς δ' ἄοπλον διδοὺς φύσιν ἄλλην τιν' αὐτοῖς ἐμηχανᾶτο δύναναι εἰς σωτηρίαν. Ἄ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν σμικρότητι ἤμπισχεν, πτηνὸν φυγῇ ἢ κατὰγειον οἰκησιν ἔνεμεν. Ἄ δὲ ἠὔξε μεγέθει, τῷδε αὐτῷ αὐτὰ ἔσφριεν· καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως ἐπανισῶν ἔνεμεν. Ταῦτα δὲ ἐμηχανᾶτο εὐλάβειαν ἔχων, μή τι γένος ἀίστασθαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀλληλοφθοριῶν διαφυγὰς ἐπήρκεσε, πρὸς τὰς ἐκ Διὸς ὥρας εὐμάρειαν ἐμηχανᾶτο ἀμφιεννύς αὐτὰ πυκναῖς τε θριξίν καὶ στερεοῖς δέρμασιν, ἱκανοῖς μὲν ἀμύναι χειμῶνα, δυνατοῖς δὲ καὶ καύματα, καὶ ἐς εὐνὰς ἰοῦσιν ὅπως ὑπάρχοι τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα στρωμνὴ οἰκεία τε καὶ αὐτοφυῆς ἐκάστω, καὶ ὑποδῶν τὰ μὲν ὀπλαῖς, τὰ δὲ [θριξίν καὶ] δέρμασιν στερεοῖς καὶ ἀναίμοις. Τοῦντεῦθεν τροφὰς ἄλλοις ἄλλας ἐξεπόριζεν, τοῖς μὲν ἐκ γῆς βοτάνην, ἄλλοις δὲ δένδρων καρπούς, τοῖς δὲ ῥίζας· ἔστι δ' οἷς ἔδωκεν εἶναι τροφήν ζῶων ἄλλων βοράν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀλιγογονίαν προσῆψε, τοῖς δ' ἀναλίσκομένοις ὑπὸ τούτων πολυγονίαν, σωτηρίαν τῷ γένει πορίζων. Ἄτε δὴ οὖν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφὸς ὢν ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἔλαθεν αὐτὸν καταναλώσας τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς τὰ ἄλογα· λοιπὸν δὴ ἀκόσμητον ἔτι αὐτῷ ἦν τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος, καὶ ἠπόρει, ὃ τι χρῆσαιο. Ἀποροῦντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς ἐπισκεψόμενος τὴν νομήν, καὶ ὁρᾷ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ζῶα ἐμμελῶς πάντων ἔχοντα¹, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον γυμνὸν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ ἄστρωτον καὶ ἄοπλον· ἥδη δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰμαρμένη ἡμέρα παρῆν, ἐν ᾗ ἔδει καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἐξείναι ἐκ γῆς εἰς φῶς. Ἀπορίᾳ οὖν ἐχόμενος ὁ Προμηθεὺς, ἦντινα σωτηρίαν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εὔροι, κλέπτει

¹ ἐμμελῶς πάντων ἔχοντα: ἔχοντα trans., πάντων - genitivus partitivus. "that they had in due order (part) of all things" —

Ἡφαίστου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς τὴν ἔντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρί — ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἦν d
 ἄνευ πυρὸς αὐτὴν κτητὴν τῷ ἢ χρησίμην γενέσθαι — καὶ οὕτω δὴ δωρεῖται
 ἀνθρώπῳ. Τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν ἄνθρωπος ταύτῃ ἔσχεν, τὴν δὲ
 πολιτικὴν οὐκ εἶχεν · ἦν γὰρ παρὰ τῷ Δίῳ. Τῷ δὲ Προμηθεΐ εἰς μὲν τὴν ἀκρό-
 πολιν τὴν τοῦ Διὸς οἴκησιν οὐκέτι ἐνεχώρει εἰσελθεῖν · πρὸς δὲ καὶ αἱ Διὸς
 φυλακαὶ φοβεραὶ ἦσαν · εἰς δὲ τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς καὶ Ἡφαίστου οἴκημα τὸ κοινόν,
 ἐν ᾧ ἐφιλοτεχνεῖτην, λαθὼν εἰσέρχεται, καὶ κλέψας τὴν τε ἔμπυρον τέχνην e
 τοῦ Ἡφαίστου καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς δίδωσιν ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκ τούτου
 εὐπορία μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ βίου γίγνεται, Προμηθεῖα δὲ [δι' Ἐπιμηθεῖα] ὕστερον, 322
 ἥπερ λέγεται, κλοπῆς δίκη μετῆλθεν.

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μετέσχε μοίρας, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ
 συγγένειαν * ζῶων μόνον θεοὺς ἐνόμισεν, καὶ ἐπεχειρεῖ βωμούς τε ἰδρύεσθαι
 καὶ ἀγάλματα θεῶν · ἔπειτα φωνὴν καὶ ὀνόματα ταχὺ διηρθρώσατο τῇ τέχνῃ,
 καὶ οἰκῆσεις καὶ ἐσθῆτας καὶ ὑποδέσεις καὶ στρωμνάς καὶ τὰς ἐκ γῆς τροφὰς b
 ἤϋρετο. Οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι κατ' ἀρχὰς ἄνθρωποι ᾤκουν σποράδην,
 πόλεις δὲ οὐκ ἦσαν · ἀπώλλυντο οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ τὸ πανταχῇ αὐτῶν
 ἀσθενέστεροι εἶναι, καὶ ἡ δημιουργικὴ τέχνη αὐτοῖς πρὸς μὲν τροφήν ἱκανὴ
 βοηθὸς ἦν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν τῶν θηρίων πόλεμον ἐνδεής · πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνην
 οὐπω εἶχον, ἥς μέρος πολεμικῆς. Ἐζήτουν δὴ ἀθροίζεσθαι καὶ σφῶζεσθαι κτί-
 ζοντες πόλεις · ὅτ' οὖν ἀθροισθεῖεν, ἡδίκουν ἀλλήλους ἅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν
 πολιτικὴν τέχνην, ὥστε πάλιν σκεδαννύμενοι διεφθείροντο. Ζεὺς οὖν δείσας c
 περὶ τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, μὴ ἀπόλοιτο πᾶν, Ἐρμῆν πέμπει ἄγοντα εἰς ἀνθρώπους
 αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην, ἵν' εἶεν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί.
 Ἐρωτᾷ οὖν Ἐρμῆς Δία, τίνα οὖν τρόπον δοίῃ δίκην καὶ αἰδῶ ἀνθρώποις ·
 „Πότερον ὥς αἱ τέχναι νενέμηνται, οὕτω καὶ ταύτας νείμω; νενέμηνται δὲ
 ὧδε · εἷς ἔχων ἱατρικὴν πολλοῖς ἱκανὸς ἰδιώταις, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί ·
 καὶ δίκην δὴ καὶ αἰδῶ οὕτω θῶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἐπὶ πάντας νείμω; „Ἐπὶ d
 πάντας”, ἔφη ὁ Ζεὺς, „καὶ πάντες μετεχόντων · οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο πόλεις, εἰ
 ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν μετέχοιεν ὥσπερ ἄλλων τεχνῶν · καὶ νόμον γε θὲς παρ' ἐμοῦ,
 τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν ὥς νόσον πόλεως.” οὕτω
 δὴ, ὧ Σώκρατες, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἱ τε ἄλλοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅταν μὲν περὶ ἀρετῆς
 τεκτονικῆς ἢ λόγος ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς δημιουργικῆς, ὀλίγοις οἴονται μετεῖναι
 συμβουλῆς, καὶ ἕαν τις ἐκτὸς ὧν τῶν ὀλίγων συμβουλευῇ, οὐκ ἀνέχονται, e
 ὥς σὺ φῆς · εἰκότως, ὥς ἐγὼ φημι · ὅταν δὲ εἰς συμβουλὴν πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς
 ἵωσιν, ἦν δεῖ διὰ δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν ἰέναι καὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰκότως ἀπαντος 323
 ἀνδρὸς ἀνέχονται, ὥς παντὶ προσῆκον ταύτης γε μετέχειν τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἢ μὴ
 εἶναι πόλεις. αὕτη, ὧ Σώκρατες, τούτου αἰτία.

* διὰ . . . συγγένειαν secl. Deuschle, followed by A. Croiset.

On the contents of this myth cf. D. Loenen, *Prot. and the Greek community*, Amsterdam 1941¹.

grammatical studies 176—Diog. IX 53:

διεἰλέ τε τὸν λόγον πρῶτος εἰς τέτταρα · εὐχολήν, ἐρώτησιν, ἀπόκρισιν, ἐντολήν.

Among the titles of the lost works of Prot. are named a work *Περὶ ὀρθοεπειας*, and *Περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος*.

3—GORGIAS

life and date 177—a. Plato, *Hipp. Mai.* 282 b:

Γοργίας . . . σοφιστῆς δεῦρο ἀφίκετο δημοσίᾳ οἰκοθεν πρεσβεύων¹, ὡς ἱκανώτατος ὢν Λεοντίνων τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν τε τῷ δήμῳ ἔδοξεν ἄριστα εἰπεῖν καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιδείξειν ποιούμενος καὶ συνὼν τοῖς νέοις χρήματα πολλὰ εἰργάσατο καὶ ἔλαβεν ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως.

b. Diog. VIII 58: ὃν φησιν Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν Χρονικοῖς ἐννέα πρὸς τοῖς ἑκατὸν ἔτη βιώσιναι.

c. Cf. Quintil., *Inst. or.* III 1, 8: Gorgias Leontinus, Empedoclis, ut traditur, discipulus. is beneficio longissimae aetatis, nam centum et novem vixit annos, cum multis simul floruit — et ultra Socratem usque duravit.

his succes as a rhetor 178—Dion. Hal., *De Lys.* 3, p. 458 Rsk.:

Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντῖνος ἐν πολλοῖς πάνυ φορτικὴν τε καὶ ὑπέρογκον ποιῶν τὴν κατασκευὴν καὶ οὐ πόρρω διθυράμβων ἔνια φθεγγόμενος — ἤψατο δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἀθήνησι ῥητόρων ἡ ποιητικὴ τε καὶ τροπικὴ φράσις, ὡς μὲν Τίμαιός φησι, Γοργίου ἄρξαντος, ἡνίκ' Ἀθήναζε πρεσβεύων κατεπλήξατο τοὺς ἀκούοντας τῇ δημηγορίᾳ.

λόγος δυνάστης μέγας 179—Gorg., D. 81, B 11, 8 (from Ἑλένης ἐγκώμιον).

There are four possibilities: Helen did what she did ἢ τύχης βουλήμασι καὶ θεῶν βουλευμάσι καὶ ἀνάγκης ψηφίσμασιν, ἢ βίᾳ ἀρπασθεῖσα, ἢ λόγοις πεισθεῖσα, ἢ ἔρωτι ἀλοῦσα. In none of the four cases is she guilty. Having proved this for the first and second possibility, he continues:

* An objection to the author's main thesis, that both Plato and Aristotle followed the principles of Protagoras in their political theories, has been made by me in the *Museum* 1942, p. 103-105.

¹ πρεσβεύων. This embassy took place in 427. Cf. Diod. XII 53, 1 sqq.

εἰ δὲ λόγος ὁ πείσας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπατήσας, οὐδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο χαλεπὸν ἀπολογήσασθαι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπολύσασθαι ὧδε. λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν, ὃς σμικροτάτῳ σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ θειότατα ἔργα ἀποτελεῖ· δύναται γὰρ καὶ φόβον παῦσαι καὶ λύπην ἀφελεῖν καὶ χαρὰν ἐνεργάσασθαι καὶ ἔλεον ἐπαυξῆσαι.

180—Gorg., D. B 26:

an example
of his art

ἔλεγε δὲ τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἀφανὲς μὴ τυχὸν τοῦ δοκεῖν, τὸ δὲ δοκεῖν ἀσθενὲς μὴ τυχὸν τοῦ εἶναι.

181—Gorg., D. B 3 (Sext., *Adv. Math.* VII 65):

his work
about non-
being

Γοργίας δὲ ὁ Λεοντῖνος ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν τάγματος ὑπῆρχε τοῖς ἀνηρηκόσι τὸ κριτήριον, οὐ κατὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν δὲ ἐπιβολὴν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Πρωταγόραν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ Περὶ φύσεως τρία κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς κεφάλαια κατασκευάζει· ἐν μὲν καὶ πρῶτον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν, δεύτερον ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἀνθρώπῳ, τρίτον ὅτι εἰ καὶ καταληπτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῖ γε ἀνέξοιστον καὶ ἀνερμήνευτον τῷ πέλας.

182—Proof of the first thesis: nothing does exist.

1. nothing can
exist

Sext., I.1. 66:

εἰ γὰρ ἔστι <τι>, ἦτοι τὸ ὄν ἔστιν ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἢ καὶ τὸ ὄν ἔστι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν.

(67) G. first refutes the second possibility (B): that the μὴ ὄν would be. This is impossible for two reasons:

B

a. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστιν, ἔσται τε ἅμα καὶ οὐκ ἔσται.

b. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι, τὸ ὄν οὐκ ἔσται· ἐναντία γὰρ ἔστι ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις.

(68) Then the first possibility (A): καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν ἔστιν. This is excluded for two reasons:

A

I. In this case it ought to be eternal (a), or to come into being (b), or both together (c).

II. It ought to be one (a), or many (b), or both of them (c).

I. a. εἰ γὰρ αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν—, οὐκ ἔχει τινὰ ἀρχήν. (69-70) τὸ γὰρ γινόμενον πᾶν ἔχει τιν' ἀρχήν, τὸ δὲ αἰδιον ἀγέννητον καθεστώς οὐκ εἶχεν ἀρχήν. μὴ ἔχον δὲ ἀρχήν ἀπειρόν ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ ἀπειρόν ἐστιν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ πού ἐστιν, ἕτερον αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν, καὶ οὕτως οὐκέτ' ἀπειρον ἔσται τὸ ὄν ἐμπεριεχόμενόν τι· μεῖζον γὰρ ἐστι τοῦ ἐμπεριεχομένου τὸ ἐμπεριέχον, τοῦ δὲ ἀπείρου οὐδὲν ἐστι μεῖζον, ὥστε οὐκ ἔστι που τὸ ἀπειρον. (70) καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν αὐτῷ περιέχεται. ταῦτόν γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ δύο γενήσεται τὸ ὄν, τόπος τε καὶ σῶμα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ᾧ τόπος ἐστίν, τὸ δ' ἐν αὐτῷ σῶμα. τοῦτο δέ γε ἄτοπον. τοίνυν οὐδὲ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστι τὸ ὄν. ὥστ' εἰ αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, ἀπειρόν ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ ἀπειρόν ἐστιν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐστιν,

εἰ δὲ μηδαμοῦ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν. τοίνυν εἰ αἰδιὸν ἔστι τὸ ὄν, οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὄν ἔστιν.

b. (71) καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ γενητόν εἶναι δύναται τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ γέγονεν, ἦτοι ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος γέγονεν. ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος γέγονεν · εἰ γὰρ ὄν ἔστιν, οὐ γέγονεν ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἤδη · οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος · τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὄν οὐδὲ γεννησά τι δύναται διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὀφείλειν ὑπάρξεως μετέχειν τὸ γεννητικόν τινος. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ γενητόν ἔστι τὸ ὄν.

c. (72) κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ συναμφοτέρον, αἰδιὸν ἅμα καὶ γενητόν · ταῦτα γὰρ ἀναιρετικά ἔστιν ἀλλήλων.

II. (73) καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ ἔστιν, ἢ τοι ἓν ἔστιν ἢ πολλά · οὔτε δὲ ἓν ἔστιν οὔτε πολλά, ὥς παρασταθήσεται · οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ὄν.

a. εἰ γὰρ ἓν ἔστιν, ἦτοι ποσὸν ἔστιν ἢ συνεχές ἔστιν ἢ μέγεθος ἔστιν ἢ σῶμά ἔστιν. ὅτι δὲ ἂν ἢ τούτων, οὐχ ἓν ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ ποσὸν μὲν καθεστῶς διαιρεθήσεται, συνεχές δὲ ὄν τμηθήσεται. ὁμοίως δὲ μέγεθος νοούμενον οὐκ ἔσται ἀδιαίρετον. σῶμα δὲ τυγχάνον τριπλοῦν ἔσται · καὶ γὰρ μῆκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος ἔξει. ἄτοπον δέ γε τὸ μηδὲν τούτων εἶναι λέγειν τὸ ὄν · οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἓν τὸ ὄν.

b. (74) καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ πολλά ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔστιν ἓν, οὐδὲ·πολλά ἔστιν · σύνθεσις γὰρ τῶν καθ' ἓν ἔστι τὰ πολλά, διόπερ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀναιρουμένου συναναιρεῖται καὶ τὰ πολλά.

C

The third possibility: that being would be ὄν and μὴ ὄν at the same time. This is refuted by two arguments, converging to the same point: if ὄν and μὴ ὄν are identic, the ὄν is dragged along with the μὴ ὄν, so that neither exists.

(75) ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ἀμφοτέρα ἔστιν, τό τε ὄν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, εὐεπιλόγιστον. (a) εἴπερ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὄν ἔστι, ταυτόν ἔσται τῷ ὄντι τὸ μὴ ὄν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ εἶναι · καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν ἔστιν. ὅτι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὁμόλογον · δέδεικται δὲ ταὐτὸ τούτῳ καθεστῶς τὸ ὄν · καὶ αὐτὸ τοίνυν οὐκ ἔσται.

(76) (b) οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἴπερ ταυτόν ἔστι τῷ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὄν, οὐ δύναται ἀμφοτέρα εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρα, οὐ ταυτόν, καὶ εἰ ταυτόν, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρα. οἷς ἔπεται τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι.

2. nothing can
be known

183—The second thesis (Sext., l.l. 77):

“Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἢ τι, τοῦτο ἄγνωστόν τε καὶ ἀνεπινόητόν ἔστιν ἀνθρώπῳ, παρακειμένως ὑποδεικτέον.

a. First proof: as being and thinking are correlative, the intelligibility of being is carried away with the non-being of what is thought.

εἰ γὰρ τὰ φρονούμενα, φησὶν ὁ Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, τὸ ὄν οὐ φρονεῖται. — (78) καὶ <μὴν> ὅτι τὰ φρονούμενα οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, συμφανές. — (79) εἰ γὰρ

τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα, πάντα τὰ φρονούμενα ἔστιν, καὶ ὅπη ἂν τις αὐτὰ φρονήσῃ. ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀπεμφαῖνον· [εἰ δέ ἐστι, φαῦλον.] οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν φρονῇ τις ἄνθρωπον ἱπτάμενον ἢ ἄρματα ἐν πελάγει τρέχοντα, εὐθέως ἄνθρωπος ἵπταται ἢ ἄρματα ἐν πελάγει τρέχει. ὥστε οὐ τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα.

b. Second proof: from the correlation of thinking and being follows that non-being cannot be thought.

(80) πρὸς τούτοις εἰ τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα, τὰ μὴ ὄντα οὐ φρονηθήσεται. τοῖς γὰρ ἐναντίοις τὰ ἐναντία συμβέβηκεν, ἐναντίον δέ ἐστι τῷ ὄντι τὸ μὴ ὄν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντως, εἰ τῷ ὄντι συμβέβηκε τὸ φρονεῖσθαι, τῷ μὴ ὄντι συμβήσεται τὸ μὴ φρονεῖσθαι. ἄτοπον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο· καὶ γὰρ Σκύλλα καὶ Χίμαιρα καὶ πολλὰ τῶν μὴ ὄντων φρονεῖται. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὄν φρονεῖται.

c. Third proof: Perception is always "of an ὄν", as it is later said by Plato (*Th.* 152 a 5; cf. our nr 158 b, where follows directly: "Αἰσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ ἐστὶν καὶ ἀψευδής"),—why not thinking?—Answer: Experience is against this.

(81) ὥσπερ τε τὰ ὁρώμενα διὰ τοῦτο ὁρατὰ λέγεται ὅτι ὁρᾶται, καὶ τὰ ἀκουστὰ διὰ τοῦτο ἀκουστὰ ὅτι ἀκούεται, καὶ οὐ τὰ μὲν ὁρατὰ ἐκβάλλομεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀκούεται, τὰ δὲ ἀκουστὰ παραπέμπομεν ὅτι οὐχ ὁρᾶται (ἐκαστον γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας αἰσθήσεως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπ' ἄλλης ὀφείλει κρίνεσθαι), οὕτω καὶ τὰ φρονούμενα καὶ εἰ μὴ βλέποιο τῇ ὕψει μὴδὲ ἀκούοιο τῇ ἀκοῇ ἔσται, ὅτι πρὸς τοῦ οἰκείου λαμβάνεται κριτηρίου. — (82) εἰ οὖν φρονεῖ τις ἐν πελάγει ἄρματα τρέχειν, καὶ εἰ μὴ βλέπει ταῦτα, ὀφείλει πιστεῦειν ὅτι ἄρματα ἔστιν ἐν πελάγει τρέχοντα. ἄτοπον δὲ τοῦτο· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὄν φρονεῖται καὶ καταλαμβάνεται.

184—The third thesis (Sext., 1.1. 83):

καὶ εἰ καταλαμβάνοιτο δέ, ἀνέξοιστον ἐτέρω.

3. nothing can be enunciated

Proof: What we do enunciate, is not the object itself, but a word.

(84) ὃ γὰρ μηνύομεν, ἔστι λόγος, λόγος δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ ὑποκείμενα καὶ ὄντα· οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ὄντα μηνύομεν τοῖς πέλας, ἀλλὰ λόγον, ὃς ἑτερός ἐστι τῶν ὑποκειμένων.

(85) μὴ ὦν δὲ λόγος, οὐκ ἂν δηλωθεῖν ἐτέρω.

185—We have another tradition of this text of G. in the ps. Aristotelian treatise *De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia*. It contains two important passages which are missing in Sextus. On the whole the argumentation in Sextus is clearer, which is the reason why we gave this text, διδασκαλίας χάριν. In the form M.X.G. may be nearer to G. To consult: O. Gigon, *Gorgias*, „Ueber das Nichtsein", *Hermes* 1936, p. 186-213; G. Calogero, *Studi sull' Eleatismo*, Rome 1932, p. 157-222; E. Dupréel, *Les Sophistes*, Neuchâtel 1948, pp. 62-74.

the reading of M.X.G.

186—a. Pl., *Meno* 76 c-d:

Meno has asked Socr. what he calls colour. Socr. will answer the question κατὰ Γοργίαν.

other testimonies about G.

Οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορροάς τινας τῶν ὄντων κατ' Ἐμπεδοκλέα; MEN. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ πόρους, εἰς οὓς καὶ δι' ὧν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ πορεύονται; MEN. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν ἀπορροῶν τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττειν ἐνίοις τῶν πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἢ μείζους εἶναι; MEN. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅψιν καλεῖς τι; MEN. Ἐγώ γε. ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ „σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω”, ἔφη Πίνδαρος. ἔστι γὰρ χροά ἀπορροὴ σχημάτων ὅψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός.

b. Pl., *Gorg.* 449 a:

. . . εἰπὲ τίς ἡ τέχνη (Γοργίου) καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς. μᾶλλον δέ, ὦ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἰπέ, τίνα σε χρὴ καλεῖν ὡς τίνος ἐπιστήμονα τέχνης.

ΓΟΡ. Τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ῥήτορα ἄρα χρὴ σε καλεῖν;

ΓΟΡ. Ἀγαθόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὅ γε εὐχομαι εἶναι, ὡς ἔφη Ὀμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν.

The question of how these two aspects of G. are to be combined with that of the author of the work on non-being, has first been asked by H. Diels, *Sitz. Ber. Berl. Akad.* 1884, p. 343. He explains Π. τοῦ μὴ ὄντος as representing a crisis in the life of Gorgias, who is deemed to have begun as a philosopher of nature and to have ended as a rhetor. Against this theory H. Gomperz, *Rhetorik und Sophistik*, 1913 (beginning) and K. Reinhardt, *Parm. u. die Gesch. d. gr. Phil.*, 1916, p. 39, explained the Π. τοῦ μὴ ὄντος as a mere παίγνιον, of the kind of the Helena and Palamedes.

K. Joël, *Gesch. d. ant. Phil.*, p. 721 ff. rightly argues that the παίγνιον may have an earnest sense. Cf. O. Gigon l.l. and E. W. Beth, *Alg. Ned. Tijdschr. v. Wijsb. en Psychol.* 1941, p. 41-58.

the golden
statue at
Delphi

187—a. Paus. VI 17, 7:

καὶ τὸν Λεοντῖνον Γοργίαν ἰδεῖν ἔστιν· ἀναθεῖναι δὲ τὴν εἰκόνα ἐς Ὀλυμπίαν φησὶν Εὐμόλπος ἀπόγονος τρίτους Δηϊκράτους συνοικήσαντος ἀδελφῇ τῇ Γοργίου.

(X 18, 7) ἐπίχρυσος δὲ εἰκὼν ἀνάθημα Γοργίου τοῦ ἐκ Λεοντίνων αὐτὸς Γ. ἐστίν.

b. Cf. Cic., *De Orat.* III 32, 129:

(G.) cui tantus honos habitus est a Graecia, soli ut ex omnibus Delphis non inaurata statua, sed aurea statueretur.

c. Plin., *N. H.* XXXIII 83:

hominum primus et auream statuam et solidam LXX (?) circiter olympiade G. Leontinus Delphis in templo posuit sibi. tantus erat docendae artis oratoriae quaestus.

and two
epigraphs

Epigr. 875 a, p. 534 Kaibel (beginning 4th century; found at Olympia, 1876):

- d. Χαρμαντίδου Γοργίας Λεοντίνος.
 τῆμ μὲν ἀδελφὴν Δηϊκράτης τῇγ Γοργίου ἔσχεν,
 ἐκ ταύτης δ' αὐτῷ γίγνεται Ἴπποκράτης.
 Ἴπποκράτους δ' Εὐμόλπος, ὃς εἰκόνα τήνδ' ἀνέθηκεν
 δισσῶν, παιδείας καὶ φιλίας ἔνεκα.
- e. Γοργίου ἀσκήσαι ψυχὴν ἀρετῆς ἐς ἀγῶνας
 οὐδεὶς πω θνητῶν καλλίον' εὗρε τέχνην.
 οὐ καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος γυάλοις¹ εἰκὼν ἀνάκειται
 οὐ πλοῦτου παράδειγμ', εὐσεβείας δὲ τρόπων.

4—HIPPIAS

188—a. Pl., *Hipp. Mai.* 281 a:

Hippias of
Elis

Ἴππίας ὁ καλὸς τε καὶ σοφός, ὥς διὰ χρόνου ἡμῖν κατῆρας εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας.
 ΙΠ. οὐ γὰρ σχολή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ γὰρ Ἥλις ὅταν τι δέηται διαπράξασθαι
 πρὸς τινα τῶν πόλεων, αἰεὶ ἐπὶ πρῶτον ἐμὲ ἔρχεται τῶν πολιτῶν αἰρουμένη
 πρεσβυτήν, ἡγουμένη δικαστὴν καὶ ἄγγελον ἱκανώτατον εἶναι τῶν λόγων,
 οἳ ἂν παρὰ τῶν πόλεων ἐκάστων λέγωνται. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν καὶ εἰς ἄλλας
 πόλεις ἐπρέσβευσα, πλείστα δὲ καὶ περὶ πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων εἰς Λακεδαι-
 μονα· διὸ δὴ, ὃ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, οὐ θαμίζω εἰς τοῦσδε τοὺς τόπους.

b. Ib. 282 d-e (Hippias speaks):

ἀφικόμενος δὲ ποτε εἰς Σικελίαν, Πρωταγόρου αὐτόθι ἐπιδημοῦντος καὶ
 εὐδοκιμοῦντος καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ὄντος καὶ πολὺ νεώτερος ὢν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ
 πάνυ πλέον ἢ πενήντην καὶ ἑκατὸν μνᾶς εἰργασάμην, καὶ ἐξ ἐνός γε χωρίου
 πάνυ σμικροῦ, Ἰνυκοῦ, πλέον ἢ εἴκοσι μνᾶς· καὶ τοῦτο ἔλθων οἴκαδε φέρων
 τῷ πατρὶ ἔδωκα, ὥστε ἐκεῖνον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας θαυμάζειν τε καὶ
 ἐκπεπληγῆσθαι. καὶ σχεδὸν τι οἶμαι ἐμὲ πλείω χρήματα εἰργάσθαι ἢ ἄλλους
 σύνδου οὐστinas βούλει τῶν σοφιστῶν.

c. Pl., *Hipp. Min.*, 368 b-d:

he knows all
sciences and
practises all
arts

Πάντως δὲ πλείστας τέχνας πάντων σοφώτατος εἰ ἀνθρώπων, ὥς ἐγώ ποτέ
 σου ἤκουον μεγαλαυχουμένου, πολλὴν σοφίαν καὶ ζηλωτὴν σαυτοῦ διεξιόντος
 ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις. ἔφησθα δὲ ἀφικέσθαι ποτὲ εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ἃ
 εἶχες περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἅπαντα σαυτοῦ ἔργα ἔχων· πρῶτον μὲν δακτύλιον — ἐν-
 τεῦθεν γὰρ ἤρχου — ὃν εἶχες σαυτοῦ ἔχειν ἔργον, ὥς ἐπιστάμενος δακτυλίου
 γλύφειν, καὶ ἄλλην σφραγίδα σὸν ἔργον, καὶ στλεγγίδα καὶ λήκυθον, ἃ αὐτὸς
 εἰργάσω· ἔτι τὰ ὑποδήματα ἃ εἶχες ἔφησθα αὐτὸς σκυτοτομῆσαι, καὶ τὸ ἱμά-

¹ γυάλον - hollow; the vales.

τιον ὑφῆναι καὶ τὸν χιτωνίσκον · καὶ ὃ γε πᾶσιν ἔδοξεν ἀτοπώτατον καὶ σοφίας πλείστης ἐπίδειγμα, ἐπειδὴ τὴν ζώνην ἔφησθα τοῦ χιτωνίσκου, ἣν εἶχες, εἶναι μὲν οἶαι αἱ Περσικαὶ τῶν πολυτελῶν, ταύτην δὲ αὐτὸς πλέξαι · πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ποιήματα ἔχων ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ἔπη καὶ τραγωδίας καὶ διθυράμβους, καὶ καταλογάδην πολλοὺς λόγους καὶ παντοδαποὺς συγκειμένους · καὶ περὶ τῶν τεχνῶν δὴ ὦν ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἐπιστήμων ἀφικέσθαι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ περὶ ῥυθμῶν καὶ ἁρμονιῶν καὶ γραμμάτων ὀρθότητος, καὶ ἄλλα ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ πολλά, ὥς ἐγὼ δοκῶ μνημονεύειν · καίτοι τό γε μνημονικὸν ἐπελαθόμην σου, ὥς ἔοικε, τέχνημα, ἐν ᾧ σὺ οἶε λαμπρότατος εἶναι.

d. Cf. Philostr., *Vit. Soph.* I 11, 1 ff.:

Ἰππίας δὲ ὁ σοφιστὴς ὁ Ἡλεῖος τὸ μὲν μνημονικὸν οὕτω τι καὶ γηράσκων ἔρρωτο, ὥς καὶ πεντήκοντα ὀνομάτων ἀκούσας ἅπαξ ἀπομνημονεύειν αὐτὰ καθ' ἣν ἤκουσε τάξιν, ἐσήγετο δὲ ἐς τὰς διαλέξεις γεωμετρίαν, ἀστρονομίαν, μουσικὴν, ῥυθμούς · (2) διελέγετο δὲ καὶ περὶ ζωγραφίας καὶ περὶ ἀγαλματοποιίας.

(7) εὐδοκιμῶν δὲ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον ἔθελγε τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ λόγοις ποικίλοις καὶ πεφροντισμένοις εὖ.

5—PRODICUS

Prodicus of Ceos 189—Pl., *Hierp. Mai.* 282c:

ὁ ἡμέτερος ἐταῖρος Π. οὗτος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ ἄλλοτε δημοσίᾳ ἀφίκετο, ἀτὰρ τὰ τελευταῖα ἔναγχος ἀφικόμενος δημοσίᾳ ἐκ Κέως λέγων τ' ἐν τῇ βουλῇ πάνυ ἡυδοκίμησεν καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιδείξεις ποιούμενος καὶ τοῖς νέοις συνὼν χρήματα ἔλαβεν θαυμαστά ὅσα.

Synonymics 190—Pl., *Prot.* 337 a-c:

(Critias has spoken) Εἰπόντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα, ὁ Πρόδικος, Καλῶς μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Κριτία · χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τοιοῖσδε λόγοις παραγιγνομένους κοινούς μὲν εἶναι ἀμφοῖν τοῖν διαλεγόμενοι ἀκροατάς, ἴσους δὲ μή. ἔστιν γὰρ οὐ ταῦτόν · κοινῇ μὲν γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι δεῖ ἀμφοτέρων, μὴ ἴσον δὲ νεῖμαι ἑκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν σοφωτέρῳ πλεόν, τῷ δὲ ἀμαθεστέρῳ ἔλαττον. ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς συγχωρεῖν καὶ ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητεῖν μὲν, ἐρίζειν δὲ μή · ἀμφισβητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ καὶ δι' εὐνοίαν οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις, ἐρίζουσιν δὲ οἱ διάφοροί τε καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις. καὶ οὕτως ἂν καλλίστη ἡμῖν ἡ συνουσία γίγνοιτο · ὑμεῖς τε γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτως ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε · εὐδοκιμεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν παρὰ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἄνευ ἀπάτης,

ἐπαινέσθαι δὲ ἐν λόγῳ πολλάκις παρὰ δόξαν ψευδομένων · ἡμεῖς τ' αὖ οἱ ἀκούοντες μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτως εὐφραϊνοίμεθα, οὐχ ἡδοίμεθα · εὐφραϊνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν μανθάνοντά τι καὶ φρονήσεως μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἡδεσθαι δὲ ἐσθιοντά τι ἢ ἄλλο ἡδὺ πάσχοντα αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι. Ταῦτα οὖν εἰπόντος τοῦ Προδίκου πολλοὶ πάνυ τῶν παρόντων ἀπεδέξαντο.

191—a. Schol. Aristoph., *Clouds* 361 (D. 84 B 1):

**Heracles at
the cross-
road**

φέρεται δὲ καὶ Προδίκου βιβλίον ἐπιγραφόμενον Ὡραι, ἐν ᾧ πεποιήκε τὸν Ἑρακλέα τῇ Ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ Κακίᾳ συντυγχάνοντα καὶ καλούσης ἑκατέρας ἐπὶ τὰ ἥθη τὰ αὐτῆς, προσκλίνει τῇ Ἀρετῇ τὸν Ἑρακλέα καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνης ἰδρῶτας προκρῖναι τῶν προσκαίρων τῆς κακίας ἡδονῶν.

b. Pl., *Symp.* 177b:

Phaedrus says to Eryximachus: Is it not terrible that none of the poets ever made a hymn to Eros? εἰ δὲ βούλει αὖ σκέψασθαι τοὺς χρηστοὺς σοφιστάς, Ἑρακλέους μὲν καὶ ἄλλων ἐπαίνους καταλογάδην συγγράφειν, ὥσπερ ὁ βέλτιστος Πρόδικος, — Ἐρωτα δὲ μηδένα πῶ ἀνθρώπων τετολμηκέναι εἰς ταυτηνὴ τὴν ἡμέραν ἀξίως ὑμνῆσαι.

c. Xenoph., *Mem.* II 1, 21-34 transmits to us the contents of this story, according to his own words in a somewhat simplified form (D. 84 B 2):

καὶ Πρόδικος δὲ ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι τῷ περὶ Ἑρακλέους, ὅπερ δὴ καὶ πλείστοις ἐπιδείκνυται, ὡσάντως περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποφαίνεται, ὧδὲ πως λέγων, ὅσα ἐγὼ μέμνημαι. φησὶ γὰρ Ἑρακλέα, ἐπεὶ ἐκ παίδων εἰς ἥβην ὥρματτο, ἐν ᾗ οἱ νέοι ἤδη αὐτοκράτορες γιγνόμενοι δηλοῦσιν εἴτε τὴν δι' ἀρετῆς ὁδὸν τρέφονται ἐπὶ τὸν βίον εἴτε τὴν διὰ κακίας, ἐξελθόντα εἰς ἡσυχίαν καθῆσθαι ἀποροῦντα ποτέραν τῶν ὁδῶν τράπηται· (22) καὶ φανῆναι αὐτῷ δύο γυναῖκας 5
προσιέναι μεγάλας, τὴν μὲν ἐτέραν εὐπρεπῇ τε ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐλευθέριον φύσει, κεκοσμημένην τὸ μὲν χρῶμα καθαρότητι, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα αἰδοῦ, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα σωφροσύνῃ, ἐσθῆτι δὲ λευκῇ, τὴν δ' ἐτέραν τεθραμμένην μὲν εἰς πολυσαρκίαν 10
τε καὶ ἀπαλότητα, κεκαλλωπισμένην δὲ τὸ μὲν χρῶμα ὥστε λευκοτέραν τε καὶ ἐρυθροτέραν τοῦ ὄντος [δοκεῖν] φαίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθο-
τέραν τῆς φύσεως εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα ἔχειν ἀναπεπταμένα, ἐσθῆτα δὲ ἐξ ἥς 15
ἂν μάλιστα ἡ ὥρα διαλάμπει· κατασκοπεῖσθαι δὲ θαμὰ ἑαυτήν, ἐπισκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος αὐτὴν θεᾷται, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῆς σκιάν ἀπο-
βλέπειν. (23) ὥς δ' ἐγένοντο πλησιαίτερον τοῦ Ἑρακλέους, τὴν μὲν πρόσθεν 15
ῥηθεῖσαν ἰέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, τὴν δ' ἐτέραν φθάσαι βουλομένην προσδραμεῖν τῷ Ἑρακλεῖ καὶ εἰπεῖν· Ὁρῶ σε, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἀποροῦντα ποῖαν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ

- τὸν βίον τράπη. ἐὰν οὖν ἐμὲ φίλην ποιησάμενος ἔπη, τὴν ἡδίστην τε καὶ ῥάστην ὁδὸν ἄξω σε, καὶ τῶν μὲν τερπνῶν οὐδενὸς ἄγευστος ἔσει, τῶν δὲ χαλεπῶν ἄπειρος διαβιώσει. (24) πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐ πολέμων οὐδὲ πραγμάτων φροντιεῖς, ἀλλὰ σκοπούμενος αἰεὶ ἔσῃ τί ἂν κεχαρισμένον ἢ σιτίον ἢ ποτὸν εὖροις, ἢ τί
- 5 ἂν ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας τερφθείης, ἢ τίνων ἂν ὁσφραίνόμενος ἢ ἀπτόμενος ἡσθείης, τίσι δὲ παιδικοῖς ὁμιλῶν μάλιστ' ἂν εὐφρανθείης, καὶ πῶς ἂν μαλακώτατα καθεύδοις, καὶ πῶς ἂν ἀπονώτατα τούτων πάντων τυγχάνοις. (25) ἐὰν δὲ ποτε γένηται τις ὑποψία σπάνεως ἀφ' ὧν ἔσται ταῦτα, οὐ φόβος μὴ σε ἀγάγω ἐπὶ τὸ πονοῦντα καὶ ταλαιπωροῦντα τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ταῦτα πορίζεσθαι,
- 10 ἀλλ' οἷς ἂν οἱ ἄλλοι ἐργάζωνται, τούτοις σὺ χρήσει, οὐδενὸς ἀπεχόμενος ὅθεν ἂν δυνατόν ἢ τι κερδᾶναι. πανταχόθεν γὰρ ὠφελεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐμοὶ συνοῦσιν ἐξουσίαν ἐγὼ παρέχω. (26) καὶ ὁ Ἑρακλῆς ἀκούσας ταῦτα · ὦ γύναι, ἔφη, ὄνομα δέ σοι τί ἐστιν; ἡ δὲ · Οἱ μὲν ἐμοὶ φίλοι, ἔφη, καλοῦσί με Εὐδαιμονίαν, οἱ δὲ μισοῦντές με ὑποκνιζόμενοι ὀνομάζουσι Κακίαν. (27) καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἑτέρα γυνὴ
- 15 προσελθοῦσα εἶπε · Καὶ ἐγὼ ἦκω πρὸς σέ, ὦ Ἑράκλεις, εἰδυῖα τοὺς γεννήσαντάς σε καὶ τὴν φύσιν τὴν σὴν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ καταματοῦσα, ἐξ ὧν ἐλπίζω, εἰ τὴν πρὸς ἐμὲ ὁδὸν τράποιο, σφόδρ' ἂν σε τῶν καλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν ἀγαθὸν ἐργάτην γενέσθαι καὶ ἐμὲ ἔτι πολὺ ἐντιμότεραν καὶ ἐπ' ἀγαθοῖς διαπρεπεστέραν φανῆναι. οὐκ ἐξαπατήσω δέ σε προοιμίους ἡδονῆς, ἀλλ' ἥπερ οἱ θεοὶ διέθεσαν
- 20 τὰ ὄντα διηγῆσομαι μετ' ἀληθείας. (28) τῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν οὐδὲν ἄνευ πόνου καὶ ἐπιμελείας οἱ θεοὶ διδῶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ' εἴτε τοὺς θεοὺς ἕλεως εἶναι σοι βούλει, θεραπευτέον τοὺς θεοὺς, εἴτε ὑπὸ φίλων ἐθέλεις ἀγαπᾶσθαι, τοὺς φίλους εὐεργετητέον, εἴτε ὑπὸ τινος πόλεως ἐπιθυμεῖς τιμᾶσθαι, τὴν πόλιν ὠφελητέον, εἴτε ὑπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πάσης ἀξιοῖς ἐπ' ἀρετῇ θαυμάζεσθαι,
- 25 τὴν Ἑλλάδα πειρατέον εὖ ποιεῖν, εἴτε γῆν βούλει σοι καρποὺς ἀφθόνους φέρειν, τὴν γῆν θεραπευτέον, εἴτε ἀπὸ βοσκημάτων οἶει δεῖν πλουτίζεσθαι, τῶν βοσκημάτων ἐπιμελητέον, εἴτε διὰ πολέμου ὀρμᾶς αὐξέσθαι καὶ βούλει δύνασθαι τοὺς τε φίλους ἐλευθεροῦν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς χειροῦσθαι, τὰς πολεμικὰς τέχνας αὐτάς τε παρὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων μαθητέον καὶ ὅπως αὐταῖς δεῖ χρῆσθαι
- 30 ἀσκητέον · εἰ δὲ καὶ τῷ σώματι βούλει δυνατὸς εἶναι, τῇ γνώμῃ ὑπηρετεῖν ἐθιστέον τὸ σῶμα καὶ γυμναστέον σὺν πόνοις καὶ ἰδρωτί. (29) καὶ ἡ Κακία ὑπολαβοῦσα εἶπεν, ὥς φησι Πρόδικος · Ἐννοεῖς, ὦ Ἑράκλεις, ὥς χαλεπὴν καὶ μακρὰν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὰς εὐφροσύνας ἡ γυνὴ σοι αὕτη διηγέεται; ἐγὼ δὲ ῥαδίαν καὶ βραχεῖαν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἄξω σε. (30) καὶ ἡ Ἀρετὴ εἶπεν · ὦ
- 35 τλήμων, τί δὲ σὺ ἀγαθὸν ἔχεις; ἢ τί ἡδὺ οἶσθα μὴδὲν τούτων ἔνεκα πράττειν ἐθέλουσα; ἥτις οὐδὲ τὴν τῶν ἡδέων ἐπιθυμίαν ἀναμένεις, ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἐπιθυμῆσαι πάντων ἐπιμπλάσαι, πρὶν μὲν πεινῆν ἐσθίουσα, πρὶν δὲ διψῆν πίνουσα . . . (31) ἀθάνατος δὲ οὖσα ἐκ θεῶν μὲν ἀπέρριψαι, ὑπὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθῶν ἀτιμάζει · τοῦ δὲ πάντων ἡδίστου ἀκούσματος, ἐπαίνου σεαυτῆς, ἀνήκοος εἶ,

καὶ τοῦ πάντων ἡδίστου θεάματος ἀθέατος· οὐδὲν γὰρ πώποτε σεαυτῆς ἔργον καλὸν τεθέσσαι . . . (34) οὕτω πως διώκει Πρόδικος τὴν ὑπ' Ἀρετῆς Ἑρακλέους παίδευσιν· ἐκόσμησε μέντοι τὰς γνώμας ἔτι μεγαλειότεροις ῥήμασιν ἢ ἐγὼ νῦν.

192—a. Philodem., *De piet.* c. 9, 7, p. 75 G. (D. 84 B 5):

a rational ex-
plication of
religion

Περσαῖος¹ δὲ δῆλός ἐστιν . . . ἀφανίζων τὸ δαιμόνιον ἢ μὴτὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ γινώσκων, ὅταν ἐν τῷ Περὶ θεῶν μὴ ἀπίθανα λέγῃ φαίνεσθαι τὰ περὶ <τοῦ> τὰ τρέφοντα καὶ ὠφελοῦντα θεοὺς νενομίσθαι καὶ τετιμῆσθαι * πρῶτον ὑπὸ Προδίκου γεγραμμένα.

b. Sext., *Adv. Math.* IX 18 (D. ib.):

Πρόδικος δὲ ὁ Κεῖος ἥλιον, φησί, καὶ σελήνην καὶ ποταμούς καὶ κρήνας καὶ καθόλου πάντα τὰ ὠφελοῦντα τὸν βίον ἡμῶν οἱ παλαιοὶ θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν διὰ τὴν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὠφέλειαν, καθάπερ Αἰγύπτιοι τὸν Νεῖλον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν μὲν ἄρτον Δήμητραν νομισθῆναι, τὸν δὲ οἶνον Διόνυσον, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ Ποσειδῶνα, τὸ δὲ πῦρ Ἥφαιστον καὶ ἡδὴ τῶν εὐχρηστούντων ἕκαστον.

6—CALLICLES AND THRASYMACHUS, ANTIPHON AND CRITIAS

193—C. and Thr. are well-known types in Plato's *Gorgias* and *Resp.* I, the first defending against Socrates the thesis that ἀδικεῖν is better than ἀδικεῖσθαι and that nomos has been made in order to defend the weak ones, the latter that δίκαιον is τὸ τοῦ κρεῖττονος συμφέρον.

in Plato's
dialogues

a. Pl., *Gorg.* 483a⁷-484b¹ (Callicles speaks):

Callicles

You, Socrates, are always confounding what is φύσει with what is νόμῳ; as in the question of ἀδικεῖν and ἀδικεῖσθαι.

φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἰσχιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶ τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνδραπόδου τινός, ᾧ κρεῖττόν ἐστι τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, ὅστις ἀδικούμενος καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος μὴ οἷός τέ ἐστιν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν μὴδὲ ἄλλῳ οὐ ἂν κήδηται. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἀνθρωποὶ εἰσι καὶ οἱ πολλοί. πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τοὺς τε νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ τοὺς ψόγους ψέγουσιν· ἐκφοβοῦντες τοὺς ἔρρωμενεστέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλεον ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν πλεον ἔχωσιν, λέγουσιν ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄδικον τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλεον τῶν ἄλλων ζητεῖν ἔχειν· ἀγαπῶσι γάρ, οἶμαι, αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ ἴσον ἔχωσι φαυλότεροι ὄντες.

483 b

c

¹ A disciple of the Stoic Zeno.

* Diels keeps the form τετιμῆσθαι.

Διά ταῦτα δὴ νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἄδικον καὶ αἰσχρὸν λέγεται, τὸ πλεόν ζητεῖν
 εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν· ἡ δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσις αὐτῇ
 d ἀποφαίνει αὐτό, ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλεόν εἶναι καὶ τὸν
 δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει,
 καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν δαίαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς
 γένεσιν, ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ
 πλεόν εἶναι. ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δίκαιῳ χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν
 ἢ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας, ἢ — ἄλλα μυρία ἂν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν· ἀλλ',
 e οἶμαι, οὗτοι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δίκαιου ταῦτα πράττουσιν, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία
 κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως κατὰ τοῦτον, ὃν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα·
 πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων
 λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας, κατεπαύοντες τε καὶ γοητεύοντες καταδουλού-
 484 a μεθα λέγοντες, ὥς τὸ ἴσον χρή εἶναι καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον.
 ἐὰν δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνὴρ, πάντα ταῦτα ἀποσεισάμενος
 καὶ διαρρήξας καὶ διαφυγὼν, καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέτερα γράμματα καὶ μαγγα-
 νεύματα¹ καὶ ἐπωδὰς καὶ νόμους τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας, ἐπαναστὰς ἀνε-
 φάνη δεσπότης ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξέλαμψε τὸ τῆς φύσεως
 δίκαιον.

**Thrasyma-
chus**

b. Pl., *Resp.* 336 b, 338 c:

The conversation ran on Simonides' definition of righteousness as "giving to every man what you owe him", which is explained by Polemarchus as "helping your friends and harming your enemies". Against this Socr. argues that the righteous man never harms anybody. Therefore neither Simonides nor any wise man can have said this. It must be the word of some wealthy man or tyrant who thought himself mighty.

(336 b) Καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ διαλεγόμενων ἡμῶν μεταξὺ ὥρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου, ἔπειτα ὑπὸ τῶν παρακαθημένων διεκωλύετο βουλομένων διακοῦσαι τὸν λόγον· ὥς δὲ διεπαυσάμεθα καὶ ἐγὼ ταῦτ' εἶπον, οὐκέτι ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν, ἀλλὰ συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον ἦκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὥς διαρπασόμενος.

Καὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ ὁ Πολέμαρχος δείσαντες διεπτοήθημεν· ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ μέσον φθεγγόμενος· Τίς, ἔφη, ὑμᾶς πάλαι φλυαρία ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες; — (338c) φημί γὰρ ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον.

**modern
criticism**

194—Modern critics of the past century, though admitting that the portraits of Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias and Prodicus have been drawn by Plato from life, nearly all have held that Plato's Callicles and Thrasymachus were literary types, not historical persons (so Schleiermacher, Zeller, Grote, Th. Gomperz, Natorp, Dümmler, Joël). K. Joël (*Gesch. d. ant. Phil.* I p. 678 f.) even thinks he can prove

¹ μαγγανεύματα - sorcery.

this as to Thr. by comparing the fragments of his own works: „sein egoistischer Radikalismus dort (in Plato's *Resp.*) steht im Widerspruch mit seinem uns wörtlich überlieferten Lob der Gerechtigkeit und seiner Schätzung der Tradition und der „väterlichen Verfassung““ (fr. 1, 8).

a. Thrasymachus, D. 85 B 1 (partly).

Dionys. Halic., *Demosth.* 3 (*Opuscula* I, p. 132, 3 ed. Usener-Radermacher) speaks about Thr. as representing the λέξις μεικτὴ τε καὶ σύνθετος, sc. from the “varied, abundant and ornate style”, of which Thucydides was the great master, and the “simple” style, represented chiefly by Lysias. He illustrates this μεσότης by the following example (παράδειγμα ἐξ ἐνὸς τῶν δημογορικῶν λόγων):

Thrasymachus' own words

ἐβουλόμην μὲν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, μετασχεῖν ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου τοῦ παλαιοῦ [καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων], ἥνίκα σιωπᾶν ἀπέχρη τοῖς νεωτέροις, τῶν τε πραγμάτων οὐκ ἀναγκαζόντων ἀγορεύειν καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ὀρθῶς τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτροπεύοντων. ἐπειδὴ δ' εἰς τοσοῦτον ἡμᾶς ἀνέθετο χρόνον ὁ δαίμων, ὥστε <ἐτέρων μὲν ἀρχόντων> τῆς πόλεως ἀκούειν, τὰς δὲ συμφορὰς <πάσχειν> αὐτούς, καὶ τούτων τὰ μέγιστα μὴ θεῶν ἔργα εἶναι μηδὲ τῆς τύχης, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐπιμεληθέντων, ἀνάγκη δὴ λέγειν· ἡ γὰρ ἀναίσθητος ἢ καρτερώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ἐξαμαρτάνειν ἑαυτὸν ἔτι παρέξει τοῖς βουλομένοις, καὶ τῆς ἐτέρων ἐπιβουλῆς τε καὶ κακίας αὐτὸς ὑποσχέσει τὰς αἰτίας. ἄλλος γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ παρελθὼν χρόνος καὶ ἀντὶ μὲν εἰρήνης ἐν πολέμῳ γενέσθαι καὶ διὰ κινδύνων <ἐλθεῖν> εἰς τόνδε τὸν χρόνον, τὴν μὲν παρελθοῦσαν ἡμέραν ἀγαπῶσι, τὴν δ' ἐπιούσαν δεδιόσι, ἀντὶ δ' ὁμονοίας εἰς ἔχθραν καὶ ταραχὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀφικέσθαι. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑβρίζειν τε ποιεῖ καὶ στασιάζειν, ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐσωφρονοῦμεν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς κακοῖς ἐμάνημεν, αὐτοὺς ἄλλους σωφρονίζειν εἴωθεν. τί δῆτα μέλλοι τις ἂν <ἀ> γινώσκει εἰπεῖν, ὅτῳ γε <γέγονε> λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ νομίζειν ἔχειν τι τοιοῦτον, ὥς μὴδὲν ἔτι τοιοῦτον ἔσται;

praise of the olden times

5

10

15

b. Thr., D. 85 B 8:

οἱ θεοὶ οὐχ ὁρῶσι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθῶν παρεῖδον τὴν δικαιοσύνην· ὁρῶμεν γὰρ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ταύτῃ μὴ χρωμένους.

denial of providence

Which may of course quite well agree with his thesis in Plato's *Resp.*

195—a. The Sophist Antiphon, D. 87 B 44 (Oxyrrh. Pap. XI nr. 1364 Hunt, fr. A col. 1):

Antiphon's theory of a twofold justice

... δικαιοσύνη <οὖν> τὰ τῆς πόλλεως νόμιμα, <ἐν> ἣ ἂν πολιτεύηται τις, μὴ <παρ>αβαίνειν. χρῶτ' ἂν οὖν ἄνθρωπος μάλιστα [θ] ἑαυτῷ ξυμφερόντως δικαιοσύνην, εἰ μετὰ μὲν μαρτύρων τοὺς νόμους μεγάλους ἄγοι, μονούμενος δὲ μαρτύρων τὰ τῆς φύσεως· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν νόμων <ἐπὶ>θετα, τὰ δὲ <τῆς> φύ-

σεως ἀ<ναγ>καῖα· καὶ τὰ <μὲν> τῶν νό<μω>ν ὁμολογη<θέντ>α οὐ φύν<τ>
ἐστί>ν, τὰ δὲ <τῆς φύσ>εως φύν<τα οὐχ> ὁμολογηθέντα.

See on this and the following fragm. Jaeger, *Theol.* p. 185-188.

**Critias' theo-
ry about the
origin of mo-
rality, law
and religion**

b. Critias, D. 88 B 25:

- 5 ἦν χρόνος, ὅτ' ἦν ἄτακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος
καὶ θηριώδης ἰσχύος θ' ὑπὴρέτης,
ὅτ' οὐδὲν ἄθλον οὔτε τοῖς ἐσθλοῖσιν ἦν
οὔτ' αὖ κόλασμα τοῖς κακοῖς ἐγίγνετο.
10 κάπειτά μοι δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι νόμους
θέσθαι κολαστάς, ἵνα δίκη τύραννος ἦ
<ὁμῶς ἀπάντων> τήν θ' ὕβριν δούλην ἔχη·
ἐζημιούτο δ' εἴ τις ἐξαμαρτάνοι.
ἔπειτ' ἐπειδὴ τὰμφανῇ μὲν οἱ νόμοι
15 ἀπεῖργον αὐτοὺς ἔργα μὴ πράσσειν βίᾳ,
λάβρα δ' ἐπρασσον, τηνικαῦτά μοι δοκεῖ
<πρῶτον> πυκνός τις καὶ σοφὸς γνώμην ἀνὴρ [γυνῶναι]
<θεῶν> δέος θνητοῖσιν ἐξευρεῖν, ὅπως
εἴη τι δεῖμα τοῖς κακοῖσι, καὶ λάθρα
20 πράσσωσιν ἢ λέγωσιν ἢ φρονῶσί <τι>.
ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τὸ θεῖον εἰσηγήσατο,
ὥς ἔστι δαίμων ἀφθίτῳ θάλλων βίῳ,
νόμ' τ' ἀκούων καὶ βλέπων, φρονῶν τ' ἄγαν
προσέχων τε ταῦτα, καὶ φύσιν θεῖαν φορῶν,
25 ὃς πᾶν τὸ λεχθὲν ἐν βροτοῖς ἀκούσεται,
<τὸ> δρώμενον δὲ πᾶν ἰδεῖν δυνήσεται.
ἐὰν δὲ σὺν σιγῇ τι βουλευῆς κακόν,
τοῦτ' οὐχὶ λήσει τοὺς θεοὺς· τὸ γὰρ φρονοῦν
<ἄγαν> ἔνεστι. τοῦσδε τοὺς λόγους λέγων
30 διδαγμάτων ἡδιστον εἰσηγήσατο
ψευδεῖ καλύψας τὴν ἀλήθειαν λόγῳ.
ναίειν δ' ἔφασκε τοὺς θεοὺς ἐνταῦθ', ἵνα
μάλιστα ἂν ἐξέπληξεν ἀνθρώπους λέγων,
ὅθεν περ ἔγνω τοὺς φόβους ὄντας βροτοῖς
καὶ τὰς ὀνήσεις τῷ ταλαιπῶρῳ βίῳ,
ἐκ τῆς ὑπερθε περιφορᾶς, ἵν' ἀστραπάς
κατεῖδεν οὔσας, δεινὰ δὲ κτυπήματα
βροντῆς, τὸ τ' ἀστερωπὸν οὐρανοῦ δέμας,
Χρόνου καλὸν ποίκιλμα τέκτονος σοφοῦ,

ὄθεν τε λαμπρὸς ἀστέρος στείχει μύδρος ¹ 35
 ὃ θ' ὑγρὸς εἰς γῆν ὄμβρος ἐκπορεύεται.
 τοίους δὲ περιέστησεν ἀνθρώποις φόβους,
 δι' οὓς καλῶς τε τῷ λόγῳ κατώκισεν
 τὸν δαίμον(α) οὐκ<τος> κἂν πρέποντι χωρίῳ,
 τὴν ἀνομίαν τε τοῖς νόμοις κατέσβησεν. 40

καὶ ὀλίγα προσδιελθὼν ἐπιφέρει·

οὕτω δὲ πρῶτον οἶομαι πεῖσαι τινα
 θνητοὺς νομίζειν δαιμόνων εἶναι γένος.

7—AN AVERAGE IMAGE OF SOPHISTIC

196—An example of the discussions on right and wrong, good and evil etc. at Athens and its environments ± the year 400 is given by the Dissoi logoi, probably of Megarian origin. the Dissoi
logoi

Dissoi logoi (Dialexeis), Diels, VS. 90, c. I, I-5; 3, I-4; 8, I:

a. I (I) δισσοὶ λόγοι λέγονται ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων
 περὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ. τοὶ μὲν γὰρ λέγοντι, ὡς ἄλλο μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν,
 ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κακόν· τοὶ δέ, ὡς τὸ αὐτό ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶη, τοῖς δὲ
 κακόν, καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθόν, τοτὲ δὲ κακόν. (2) ἐγὼ δὲ
 καὶ αὐτὸς τοῖσδε ποτιτίθεμαι· σκέψομαι δὲ ἐκ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ, ᾧ ἐπιμελὲς 5
 βρώσιός τε καὶ πόσιος καὶ ἀφροδισίων· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀσθενοῦντι μὲν κακόν,
 ὑγιαίνοντι δὲ καὶ δεομένῳ ἀγαθόν. (3) καὶ ἀκρασία τοίνυν τούτων τοῖς μὲν
 ἀκρατέσι κακόν, τοῖς δὲ πωλεῦντι ταῦτα καὶ μισθαρνέοντι ἀγαθόν. νόσος τοίνυν
 τοῖς μὲν ἀσθενεῦντι κακόν, τοῖς δὲ ἰατροῖς ἀγαθόν. ὁ τοίνυν θάνατος τοῖς μὲν
 ἀποθανοῦσι κακόν, τοῖς δ' ἐνταφιοπώλαις καὶ τυμβοποιοῖς ἀγαθόν. (4) γε- 10
 ωργία τε καλῶς ἐξενείκασα τῶς καρπῶς τοῖς μὲν γεωργοῖς ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ
 ἐμπόροις κακόν. τὰς τοίνυν ὀλκάδας συντρίβεσθαι καὶ παραθραύεσθαι τῷ
 μὲν ναυκλήρῳ κακόν, τοῖς δὲ ναυπαγοῖς ἀγαθόν. (5) ἔτι <δὲ> τὸν σίδαρον
 κατέσθεσθαι καὶ ἀμβλύνεσθαι καὶ συντρίβεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κακόν, τῷ
 δὲ χαλκῇ ἀγαθόν. καὶ μὲν τὸν κέραμον παραθραύεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κακόν, 15
 τοῖς δὲ κεραμεῦσιν ἀγαθόν. τὰ δὲ ὑποδήματα κατατρίβεσθαι καὶ διαρρηγνυσθαι
 τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κακόν, τῷ δὲ σκυτῇ ἀγαθόν.

b. 3 (I) δισσοὶ δὲ λόγοι λέγονται καὶ περὶ τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ.
 καὶ τοὶ μὲν ἄλλοι ἤμεν τὸ δίκαιον, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἀδίκον· τοὶ δὲ ταυτὸ δίκαιον
 καὶ ἀδίκον· καὶ ἐγὼ τούτῳ πειρασοῦμαι τιμωρέν. (2) καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ψεύ- 20

¹ glowing mass.

- δεσθαι ὡς δίκαιόν ἐστι λεξῶ καὶ ἐξαπατᾶν. τῶς μὲν πολεμίως ταῦτα ποιῆν <καλὸν
 5 καὶ δίκαιον, τῶς δὲ φίλως> αἰσχροὺ καὶ πονηροὺ ἀν ἐξείποιεν · <πῶς δὲ τῶς
 πολεμίως,> τῶς δὲ φιλτάτως οὐ; αὐτίκα τῶς γονέας · αἱ γὰρ δέοι τὸν πατέρα
 ἢ τὰν μητέρα φάρμακον πιῆν ἢ φαγόν, καὶ μὴ θέλοι, οὐ δίκαιόν ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ
 ῥοφήματι¹ καὶ ἐν τῷ ποτῷ δόμεν καὶ μὴ φάμεν ἐνῆμεν; (3) οὐκῶν <δίκαιον>
 10 βιῆσθαι τῶς φιλτάτως δίκαιον. (4) αὐτίκα αἱ τις λυπηθεὶς τι τῶν οἰκητῶν
 καὶ ἀχθεσθεὶς μέλλοι αὐτὸν διαφθεῖρεν ἢ ξίφει ἢ σχοινίῳ ἢ ἄλλῳ τινί, δίκαιόν
 ἐστι ταῦτα κλέψαι, αἱ δύναιτο, αἱ δὲ ὑστερίζαι καὶ ἔχοντα καταλάβοι, ἀφε-
 λῆσθαι βίᾳ;

The writer is speaking about the same subjects that are discussed in the Platonic dialogues: whether virtue can be learned or not (c. 6), and what is the difference between ψευδής and ἀληθής λόγος (c. 4)—here he is using even Platonic terminology, as we shall see later.—He must have known the Socratic method of disputing by means of short questions and answers, as appears from c. 8, 1:

c. <τῷ αὐτῷ> ἀνδρὸς καὶ τᾶς αὐτᾶς τέχνας νομίζω κατὰ βραχύ τε δύ-
 νασθαι διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ <τὰν> ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ
 δικάζειν ἐπίστασθαι ὀρθῶς, καὶ δαμαγορεῖν οἶόν τ' ἤμεν, καὶ λόγων τέχνας
 ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων ὥς τε ἔχει καὶ ὥς ἐγένετο, διδάσκειν.

Plato's Eu-
thydemus

197—In Plato's *Euthyd.* we have a whole series of beautiful examples of σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι, as they are called later by Aristotle.

a. It is impossible to lie. *Euthyd.* 283 e-284 a:

Τί δέ, ἔφη, ὦ Κτήσιππε, ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἶόν τ' εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι;—
 Νή Δία, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι γε. — Πότερον λέγοντα τὸ πρᾶγμα, περὶ οὗ ἀν
 ὁ λόγος ἦ, ἢ μὴ λέγοντα; — Λέγοντα, ἔφη. — Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ λέγει αὐτό, οὐκ
 ἄλλο λέγει τῶν ὄντων ἢ ἐκεῖνο ὅπερ λέγει; — Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος. —
 Ἐν μὴν κάκεῖνό γ' ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων ὃ λέγει, χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων. — Πάνυ γε. —
 Οὐκοῦν ὁ ἐκεῖνο λέγων τὸ ὄν, ἔφη, λέγει; — Ναί. — Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃ γε τὸ ὄν λέγων
 καὶ τὰ ὄντα τᾶληθῇ λέγει · ὥστε ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, εἴπερ λέγει τὰ ὄντα, λέγει
 τᾶληθῇ καὶ οὐδὲν κατὰ σοῦ ψεύδεται.

b. It is impossible to contradict. Ib. 285 e-286 b:

ἢ σύ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, οὐκ οἶει εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν; — Οὐκ οἶει, ἔφη,
 ἀποδείξαις πῶποτε ἀκούσας οὐδενὸς ἀντιλέγοντος ἐτέρου ἐτέρῳ. — Ἀληθῇ
 λέγεις, ἔφη · ἀλλὰ ἀκούων μὲν νυνὶ σοὶ ἀποδείκνυμι, ἀντιλέγοντος Κτησιπίπου
 Διονυσοδώρῳ. — Ἡ καὶ ὑπόσχοις ἀν τούτου λόγον; — Πάνυ, ἔφη. — Τί
 οὖν; ἢ δ' ὅς · εἰσὶν ἐκάστω τῶν ὄντων λόγοι; — Πάνυ γε. — Οὐκοῦν ὥς ἐστιν

¹ ῥόφημα - porridge.

ἐκαστον ἢ ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν; — 'Ὡς ἔστιν. — Εἰ γὰρ μέμνησαι, ἔφη, ὦ Κτήσιππε, καὶ ἄρτι ἐπεδείξαμεν μηδὲνα λέγοντα ὥς οὐκ ἔστι · τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὄν οὐδεὶς ἐφάνη λέγων. — Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο; ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Κτήσιππος · ἡττόν τι ἀντιλέγομεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σύ; — Πότερον οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἀντιλέγομεν ἂν τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος λόγον ἀμφοτέροι λέγοντες, ἢ οὕτω μὲν ἂν δήπου ταῦτά λέγοιμεν; — Συνεχώρει. — 'Ἄλλ' ὅταν μηδέτερος, ἔφη, τὸν τοῦ πράγματος λόγον λέγῃ, τότε ἀντιλέγοιμεν ἂν; ἢ οὕτω γε τὸ παράπαν οὐδ' ἂν μεμνημένος εἴη τοῦ πράγματος οὐδέτερος ἡμῶν; — Καὶ τοῦτο συνωμολόγει. — 'Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὅταν ἐγὼ μὲν τὸν τοῦ πράγματος λόγον λέγω, σὺ δὲ ἄλλου τινὸς ἄλλον, τότε ἀντιλέγομεν; ἢ ἐγὼ λέγω μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα, σὺ δὲ οὐδὲ λέγεις τὸ παράπαν; ὁ δὲ μὴ λέγων τῷ λέγοντι πῶς <ἂν> ἀντιλέγοι;

c. He who knows something, knows everything. Ib. 293 b-d:

(b⁷) φέρε δὴ μοι ἀπόκριναι, ἔφη · ἔστιν ὁ τι ἐπίστασαι; — Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ πολλά, σμικρά γε. — Ἀρκεῖ, ἔφη. ἄρ' οὖν δοκεῖς οἶόν τέ τι τῶν ὄντων τοῦτο, ὃ τυγχάνει ὄν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μὴ εἶναι; — 'Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. — Οὐκοῦν σύ, ἔφης, ἐπίστασαι τι; — 'Εγωγε. — Οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμων εἶ, εἴπερ ἐπίστασαι; — Πάνυ γε, τούτου γε αὐτοῦ. — Οὐδὲν διαφέρει · ἄλλ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη σε ἔχει πάντα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμονά γε ὄντα; — Μὰ Δί', ἔφην ἐγὼ · ἐπεὶ πολλὰ ἄλλ' οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι. — Οὐκοῦν εἴ τι μὴ ἐπίστασαι, οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἶ. — 'Εκείνου γε, ὦ φίλε, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ. — 'Ηττον οὖν τι, ἔφη, οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἶ; ἄρτι δὲ ἐπιστήμων ἐφησθα εἶναι · καὶ οὕτω τυγχάνεις ὦν αὐτὸς οὗτος, ὅς εἰ, καὶ αὖ πάλιν οὐκ εἶ, κατὰ ταῦτά ἄμα.

d. The father of Ktesippos is a dog. Kt. beats his own father. Ib. 298 d⁸-299 a⁵:

Εἰπέ γάρ μοι, ἔστι σοι κύων; — Καὶ μάλα πονηρός, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος. — 'Ἔστιν οὖν αὐτῷ κυνίδια; — Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, ἕτερα τοιαῦτα. — Οὐκοῦν πατήρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ὁ κύων; — 'Εγώ γε τοί εἶδον, ἔφη, αὐτὸν ὀχεύοντα τὴν κύνα. — Τί οὖν; οὐ σός ἐστιν ὁ κύων; — Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. — Οὐκοῦν πατήρ ὦν σός ἐστιν, ὥστε σός πατήρ γίγνεται ὁ κύων καὶ σὺ κυναρίων ἀδελφός;

Καὶ αὖθις ταχὺ ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἵνα μὴ πρότερόν τι εἴποι ὁ Κτήσιππος, καὶ ἔτι γέ μοι μικρόν, ἔφη, ἀπόκριναι · τύπτεις τὸν κύνα τοῦτον; — καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος γελάσας, Νῆ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη · οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι σέ. — Οὐκοῦν τὸν σαυτοῦ πατέρα, ἔφη, τύπτεις; — Πολὺ μέντοι, ἔφη, δικαιότερον τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρα τύπτοιμι, ὃ τι μαθὼν σοφοὺς υἱεῖς οὕτως ἔφυσεν. ἄλλ' ἢ που, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, πόλλ' ἀγαθὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας σοφίας ταύτης ἀπολέλαυκεν ὁ πατήρ ὁ ὑμέτερός τε καὶ ὁ τῶν κυνιδίων.

Cp. the arguments of the Megarian school, and also Plato's *Parmenides*.

8—THE JUDGMENT OF SOCRATES AND PLATO,
AND THAT OF MODERN CRITICS

Socr. and the sophists 198—a. Rejection of an unwarranted condemnation: *Meno* 91 b-92 c.

The Thessalian Meno wishes to learn the πολιτικὴ ἀρετή. Shall not we be right then in sending him "to those who profess themselves to be teachers of virtue and put themselves at the disposal of every one of the Greeks who wants to learn, settling a price for it and claiming that?" Socr. asks. Anytos answers:

Καὶ τίνας λέγεις τούτους, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οἴσθα δῆπου καὶ σύ, ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οἷους οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσι σοφιστάς.

91 c AN. Ἡράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὦ Σώκρατες. μηδὲνα τῶν συγγενῶν μηδὲ οἰκείων μηδὲ φίλων, μήτε ἀστὸν μήτε ξένον, τοιαύτη μανία λάβοι, ὥστε παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντα λωβηθῆναι¹, ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε φανερά ἐστι λώβη τε καὶ διαφθορά τῶν συγγιγνομένων.

ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἄνυτε; οὗτοι ἄρα μόνοι τῶν ἀντιποιουμένων² τι ἐπίστασθαι εὐεργετεῖν τοσοῦτον τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρουσιν, ὅσον οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὠφελοῦσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅ τι ἂν τις αὐτοῖς παραδῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον

d διαφθείρουσιν; καὶ τούτων φανερώς χρήματα ἀξιοῦσι πράττεσθαι; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως σοι πιστεύσω· οἶδα γὰρ ἄνδρα ἓνα Πρωταγόραν πλείω χρήματα κτησάμενον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἢ Φειδίαν τε, ὅς οὕτω περιφανῶς καλὰ ἔργα εἰργάζετο, καὶ ἄλλους δέκα τῶν ἀνδριαντοποιῶν· καίτοι τέρας λέγεις, εἰ οἱ μὲν τὰ υποδήματα ἐργαζόμενοι τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια ἐξακούμενοι οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο λαθεῖν τριάκονθ' ἡμέρας μοχθηρότερα ἀποδιδόντες ἢ

e παρέλαβον τὰ ἱμάτιά τε καὶ υποδήματα, ἀλλ' εἰ τοιαῦτα ποιοῖεν, ταχὺ ἂν τῷ λιμῷ ἀποθάνοιεν, Πρωταγόρας δὲ ἄρα ὅλην τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλάνθανε διαφθείρων τοὺς συγγιγνομένους καὶ μοχθηρότερους ἀποπέμπων ἢ παρελάμβανε πλέον ἢ τετταράκοντα ἔτη· οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἐγγὺς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότα, τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὄντα· καὶ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἔτι εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν ταυτηνὴ εὐδοκίμῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυται· καὶ οὐ μόνον

92 a Πρωταγόρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι, οἱ μὲν πρότερον γεγονότες ἐκείνου, οἱ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες. πότερον δὴ οὖν φῶμεν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εἰδότας αὐτοὺς ἐξαπατᾶν καὶ λωβᾶσθαι τοὺς νέους, ἢ λεληθέναι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς; καὶ οὕτω μαίνεσθαι ἀξιώσωμεν τούτους, οὓς ἐνίοι φασὶ σοφωτάτους ἀνθρώπων εἶναι;

AN. Πολλοῦ γε δέουσι μαίνεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις διδόντες ἀργύριον τῶν νέων· τούτων δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις ἐπιτρέποντες,

b οἱ προσήκοντες· πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα πάντων αἱ πόλεις, ἐῷσαι αὐτοὺς εἰσαφικ-

¹ λωβηθῆναι - bring shame upon himself.

² ἀντιποιεῖσθαι - lay claim to.

νεῖσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἐξελαύνουσαι, εἴτε τις ξένος ἐπιχειρεῖ τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν εἴτε ἄστος.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δέ, ὦ Ἄνυτε, ἡδίκηκέ τις σε τῶν σοφιστῶν, ἢ τί οὕτως αὐτοῖς χαλεπὸς εἶ;

ΑΝ. Οὐδὲ μὰ Δία ἔγωγε συγγέγονα πώποτε αὐτῶν οὐδενί, οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλον ἐάσαιμι τῶν ἐμῶν οὐδένα.

ΣΩ. Ἄπειρος ἄρ' εἰ παντάπασιν τῶν ἀνδρῶν;

ΑΝ. Καὶ εἴην γε.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, εἰδείης περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, εἴτε τι ἀγαθὸν ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴτε φλαῦρον, οὗ παντάπασιν ἄπειρος εἴης;

ΑΝ. Ῥαδίως· τούτους γοῦν οἶδα οἷοί εἰσιν, εἴτ' οὖν ἄπειρος αὐτῶν εἰμι εἴτε μῆ.

ΣΩ. Μάντις εἰ ἴσως, ὦ Ἄνυτε.

b. In *Prot.* 318-319 a Protagoras professes to teach young people the πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ and make them good citizens. Socr. replies: "I thought this could not be taught" and opposes the technical character of all other questions to the apparently non-technical character of giving advice in political questions in the ecclesia (319 b-d). Prot. answers by his myth (our nr. 161a). During this whole dialogue Socr. treats Prot. with due respect. Being forced to continue the conversation, he gives the leading part of it to Prot. (338 d). Prot. then appears to be inferior to Socr. in the art of διαλέγεσθαι,—i.e. he has no problem in his mind, of which he is seeking a solution. Socr. has. He always comes back to the question: what is virtue? Is it one or many? And if many, what is the common essence of the many virtues? Is it knowledge, or not (329 bc, 349 b)?

At the end Prot. very reluctantly agrees that virtue must be knowledge, according to the questions asked by Socr. Truly he does not admit it is (360e). Now by this very denial that virtue could be knowledge, his own teaching of political aretè is made rather problematic.

c. Here the struggle becomes violent.

in the
Gorgias

Gorgias professes himself to be a master in rhetoric. And when Socr. asks what is the object of this science (περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη), he answers: Περὶ λόγους. When Socr. asks again what is the object of these words, he replies: the greatest good for man. Now, what is this?—Then comes the definition:

(452 e) Τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ' οἶόν τ' εἶναι τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ δικαστάς καὶ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτάς καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκκλησιαστάς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ συλλόγῳ παντί, ὅστις ἂν πολιτικὸς σύλλογος γίγνηται.

Thus rhetoric turns out to be πειθοῦς δημιουργός.

Of which πειθῶ?—G. defines more precisely:

(454 b) Ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῆς ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἔστι δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικα.

Socr. distinguishes between *πειθῶ πιστευτική* (effecting a credence without knowledge) and *πειθῶ διδασκαλική* (effecting knowledge). Now rhetoric according to G. effects the first kind of *πειθῶ*,—which proves to be extremely useful.

(456 a) ὅτι ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀπάσας τὰς δυνάμεις συλλαβοῦσα ὑφ' αὐτῇ ἔχει.
— (457 a) δυνατὸς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἅπαντάς ἐστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ περὶ παντὸς λέγειν, ὥστε πιθανώτερος εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσιν¹ ἔμβραχυ περὶ ὅτου ἂν βούληται.

Socr. asks:

(459 a) Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν;

And he concludes (459 bc):


αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν (sc. rhetoric) εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν δέ τινα πειθοῦς ἡρρηκέναι ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδόντων.

G. replies:

Οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥαστώνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν;


But Socr. ascertains a strong resemblance between rhetoric and ὀψοποιική (fine cookery), both of them being species of the same genus: not of τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη, but of ἐμπειρία, which is no true knowledge, but a kind of κολακεία (flattery) (463 a-c).

Scheme (I)



¹ Ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσιν, h.e. ἐν ὄχλῳ.

(II)



Thus philosophy and rhetoric are placed in opposition to one another, just as the service of untruth and delusion is placed in opposition to the service of truth. As two principles of life they are opposite to each other: rhetoric serves injustice, philosophy righteousness; philosophy cares for the soul, rhetoric never cares for it.

(502 d¹⁰-503 a¹) Socr. asks:

Τί δὲ ἢ πρὸς τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ῥητορική καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν δῆμους τοὺς τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, τί ποτε ἡμῖν αὕτη ἐστίν; πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον αἰεὶ λέγειν οἱ ῥήτορες, τούτου στοχαζόμενοι, ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται διὰ τοὺς αὐτῶν λόγους, ἢ καὶ οὗτοι πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις ὠρμημένοι, καὶ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ αὐτῶν ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὥσπερ παῖσι προσομιλοῦσι τοῖς δῆμοις, χαρίζεσθαι αὐτοῖς πειρώμενοι μόνον, εἰ δέ γε βελτίους ἔσονται ἢ χείρους διὰ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν;

And when Callicles hesitates with his answer: "Can you name me anyone of the rhetors who cares for the souls of his fellow-citizens, that they may become as good as possible?"

C. replies: "No, truly, I could name you nobody, at least of the rhetors of the present day."

It turns out that, also from previous generations, nobody can be named.

199—Has Plato been mistaken as to the essence of sophistic?

the truth of
this view
tested

We answer by giving the next three points, following from the two main theses of Protagoras (our nrs 171a and 172a):

- 1—that there is no objective Truth above the human mind and independent of it;
- 2—that there is no sense in seeking science only for the sake of Truth;
- 3—that moral principles are merely a question of human agreement.

Socr. and Plato hold an exactly opposite view to this. They always repeat:
 1—that there is objective Truth, being above the human mind and independent of it;

2—that we ought to seek science only for the sake of Truth;

3—that moral principles are rooted in the transcendental reality of eternal values.

**modern
 affinity with
 Prot. and
 Gorg.**

200—K. Joël, *Gesch. d. ant. Phil.* I 728 f. rightly points to a close resemblance between certain passages in Nietzsche and the ideas—even the words—of Prot. and Gorg.:

„Werte legt erst der Mensch in die Dinge,—Mensch, das ist der Schätzende.”
 „Nichts ist wahr, alles ist erlaubt.”

„Es gibt keine Dinge an sich, und gäbe es solche, so könnten sie nicht erkannt werden.”

Generally speaking, modern thinking follows the trace of the sophists, wherever it tries to explain man and his higher spiritual life out of man himself, cutting him off from his metaphysical background.

SEVENTH CHAPTER

SOCRATES

1—THE SOURCES

201—Points in favour of Plato are:

(1) **Plato**

1—his congeniality.

2—he *wishes* to draw a faithful image of S.

3—he *must* do that before his contemporaries.

4—it is a living and complete image. "Ce n'est pas ainsi qu'on invente".

Against him:

1—he was a poet, who dramatised the subject-matter in his own way.

2—the literary habits of Antiquity on this point.

3—it is impossible to take Plato simply as a historical source, because he makes Socr. defend the theory of Ideas, which, according to Aristotle, is his own.

4—Is his image of S. really complete? Is not Xenophon more trustworthy, just because he is of a simpler mind?

202—E. Renan wrote in the Introduction to his *Vie de Jésus*: "Socrate, qui comme Jésus n'écrivit pas, nous est connu par deux de ses disciples, Xénophon et Platon: le premier répondant, par sa rédaction limpide, transparente, impersonnelle, aux synoptiques; le second rappelant par sa vigoureuse individualité l'auteur du quatrième Evangile. Pour exposer l'enseignement socratique, faut-il suivre les „Dialogues" de Platon ou les „Entretiens" de Xénophon? *Aucun doute à cet égard n'est possible; tout le monde s'est attaché aux „Entretiens", et non aux „Dialogues"*"

(2)
Xenophon

V. Wilamowitz, *Hermes*, 1879, p. 192 f. has been first to call in question the credibility of Xenophon.

K. Joël, *Der echte u. der Xenophontische Sokrates*, 1893 and 1901, showed that Xen. gives not only less than Plato does, but that he gives something else. He attributed this strange element in Xenophon's Socr. to Antisthenes, the Cynic.

H. von Arnim, *Xenophons Memorabilien und Apologie des Sokrates*, Kopenhagen 1923, partly restored the credibility of Xenophon. He is followed by: H. Gomperz, *Die sokratische Frage als geschichtliches Problem*, in *Hist. Zeitschr.* 1924; *Die Anklage gegen Sokrates in ihrer Bedeutung für die Sokratesforschung*, in *N. Jahrb.* 1924; *Psychol. Beobachtungen an griech. Philosophen*, Wien-Zürich 1924: the cynic traits in Xenophon's Socrates must be genuine.

203—A first rate source according to A. E. Taylor in *Varia Socratica* (1911) (3) **Aristophanes** is Aristophanes:

1—Socr. the founder of a scientific institute; 2—the founder of a religious sect of ascetic principles, and believing in the immortality of the soul.

De Vogel, *Greek Philosophy I*

a. *Clouds* 104:

τοὺς ὠχριῶντας, τοὺς ἀνυποδῆτους λέγεις,
ὦν ὁ κακοδαίμων Σωκράτης καὶ Χαιρεφῶν.

Cf. *Clouds* 504 (Pheidippides cries, when Socr. promises him that he will become like Chairephon):

οἴμοι κακοδαίμων, ἡμιθνής γενήσομαι.

b. *Birds* 1555:

πρὸς δὲ τοῖς Σκιάποσιν λί-
μνη τις ἔστ', ἄλλουτος οὐ
ψυχᾶγωγεῖ Σωκράτης.

"Socrates as a president of a séance" (Taylor).

A more moderated view is taken by R. Philippson, *Sokrates' Dialektik in Aristophanes' Wolken*, in Rhein. Mus. 1932: where Aristoph. is confirmed by the testimony of other witnesses (Xenoph., Arist. and partly also by Plato), we must follow his indications; which implies a correction of our view of Socr. in dogmatic direction.

E. Angelopoulos, *Aristophane et ses idées sur Socrate*, Athènes 1933, has seen a true problem, but did not resolve it in the right way.

Cf. my chapter on "The phrontisterion" in *Een keerpunt in Plato's denken*, Amsterdam 1936, p. 56-85.

(4) Aristotle 204—a. *Metaph.* A 6, 987 b¹⁻¹⁰.

Arist. is speaking here about Plato: in his youth Plato stood under Heraclitean influence as a disciple of Cratylus, who taught that all sensible things are in a perpetual flow and that knowledge about them is impossible. Later also he (Plato) took this view of things.

Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἡθικὰ πραγματευομένου, περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐθέν, ἐν μέντοι τούτοις τὸ καθόλου ζητοῦντος καὶ περὶ ὀρισμῶν ἐπιστήσαντος πρώτου τὴν διάνοιαν, ἐκείνον ἀποδεξάμενος διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπέλαβεν ὡς περὶ ἐτέρων τοῦτο γινόμενον καὶ οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τινός· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν κοινὸν ὅρον τῶν αἰσθητῶν τινός, αἰεὶ γε μεταβαλλόντων. Οὕτως μὲν οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ιδέας προσηγόρευσε, τὰ δ' αἰσθητὰ παρὰ ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι πάντα· κατὰ μέθεξιν γὰρ εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συνωνύμων [τοῖς εἶδεσιν].

b. Cf. *Metaph.* M 4, 1078 b²³⁻²⁵; 27-30.

About the origin of the theory of the Ideas. This doctrine was first conceived in reaction against Heracliteism, for of ever changing things no knowledge is possible. Therefore we must admit the existence of ἐτέρας τινὰς φύσεις παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητάς μενούσας.

Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ τᾶς ἡθικὰς ἀρετὰς πραγματευομένου καὶ περὶ τούτων ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου ζητοῦντος πρώτου, —

Follows a long parenthesis: Democr. had confined himself to a few physical principles and defined only θερμόν and ψυχρόν; Pythagoreans also stopped short at a few ideas—καιρός, δίκαιον and γάμος—; these they reduced to numbers.

ἐκεῖνος δ' (ὁ Σωκράτης) εὐλόγως ἐζήτει τὸ τί ἐστίν. συλλογίζεσθαι γὰρ ἐζήτει, ἀρχὴ δὲ τῶν συλλογισμῶν τὸ τί ἐστι — δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἃ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τοὺς τ' ἐπακτικούς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἄμφω περὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης. Ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης τὰ καθόλου οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει οὐδὲ τοὺς ὁρισμούς· οἱ δ' ἐχώρισαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσαν.

the
proprium
of Socrates

These two passages give us a criterium to distinguish between Socr. and Plato in the platonic dialogues.

c. *Eth. Eud.* I 5, 1216 b⁶⁻⁸:

ἐπιστήμας γὰρ ᾧ εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς (ὁ Σωκράτης), ὥσθ' ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον.

virtue is
knowledge

Which is the main thesis of Socr. in the platonic dialogues, f.i. Laches, Hipp. Min., Prot., Gorg., Meno. Cf. Xen., *Mem.* III 9, 5: ἐφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι.

d. *Eth. Nic.* VII 3, 1145 b²¹⁻²⁷:

ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὁρθῶς ἀκρατεύεται τις. ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὐ φασὶ τινες οἷόν τε εἶναι· δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον¹. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν².

οὐδείς ἐκὼν
ἁμαρτάνει

205—K. Joël, who denies the historical value of Xen., deems Arist. our most valuable source for the knowledge of Socr., next to Plato.

H. Maier, *Sokrates*, Berlin 1913, absolutely denies the value of Arist.'s testimony. It depends on Xen. (*Mem.* IV 6), and Xen. depends on Plato.

J. Burnet and A. E. Taylor also deny the independence of Arist.'s testimony: it depends on Plato.

W. D. Ross (*The Metaph. of Arist.*, comm. in A 6 and M 4) rightly maintains that Arist. must have known certain important facts.

Is. van Dijk, *Socrates*, Haarlem 1923, pleaded judiciously for Plato and Arist. against H. Maier.

Th. Deman O.P., *Le témoignage d'Aristote sur Socrate*, Paris 1942, gives a complete collection and discussion of all the texts of Arist. on Socr.

O. Gigon, *Sokrates*, Bern 1947, who denies that we can have any real knowledge about the historical Socr., denies implicitly the value of Arist.'s testimony as well as of Plato's.

modern
judgment
about
Arist.

¹ ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον - cf. Pl., *Prot.* 352 b.

² Cf. Pl., *Prot.* 345 d:

ἐγὼ γὰρ σχεδὸν τι οἶμαι τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡγεῖται οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων ἐκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν οὐδὲ αἰσχρὰ τε καὶ κακὰ ἐκόντα ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσασιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντες ἄκοντες ποιοῦσι.

2—SOCRATES' LIFE-WORK ACCORDING TO PLATO'S APOLOGY,
ILLUSTRATED BY THE SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES IN THE
SYMPOSION AND A PASSAGE IN THE THEAETETUS

**Socr. finds
his calling**

206—Pl., *Apol.* 20 c-24 b:

Socr. denies that he is able to educate men, like Gorgias or Prodicus or Hippias.

- Ἵπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως · „Ἄλλ’, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι
πρᾶγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαὶ σοι αὐτὰι γέγονασιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου, σοῦ γε οὐδὲν
τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου, ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ
λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μὴ τι ἔπραττες ἄλλοιον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. Λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν τί ἐστιν,
20d ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν.” Ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ
λέγων, ἀγὰρ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι τί ποτ’ ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκεν
τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. Ἀκούετε δὴ. Καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν
παίζειν · εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. Ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες
Ἀθηναῖοι, δι’ οὐδὲν ἄλλ’ ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἐσχηκα. Ποίαν
δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνῃ σοφία. Τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω
ταύτην εἶναι σοφός · οὗτοι δὲ τάχ’ ἂν, οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μεῖζω τινὰ ἢ κατ’
e ἀνθρωπὸν σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω · οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν
ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ’ ὅστις φησὶ ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. Καὶ
μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδὲ ἂν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν ·
οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον δν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα
ἀνοίσω. Τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστὶν σοφία, καὶ οἷα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρ-
21a ἔξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που · οὗτος ἐμός τε
ἐταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἐταῖρός τε καὶ συνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν
ταύτην καὶ μεθ’ ὑμῶν κατήλθε. Καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς
ἐφ’ ὃ τι ὀρμήσειεν. Καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφούς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαν-
τεύσασθαι — καὶ ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες — ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ εἰ τις
ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος · ἀνείλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδὲνα σοφώτερον εἶναι. Καὶ
τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὕτοσί μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύ-
τηκεν.
- b Σκέψασθε δὴ ὧν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω · μέλλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν ὅθεν μοι ἡ
διαβολὴ γέγονεν. Ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὕτωςί · „Τί ποτε
λέγει ὁ θεὸς καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν σύν-
οἶδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφός ὢν · τί οὖν ποτε λέγει, φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι;
οὐ γὰρ δήπου ψεύδεται γε · οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ.” Καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν
τί ποτε λέγει · ἔπειτα μόγις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην.
Ἦλθον ἐπὶ τινὰ τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ἐνταῦθα, εἴπερ που, ἐλέγξων
c τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι · „Οὕτοσί ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι,
σύ δ’ ἐμὲ ἔφησθα.” Διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον — ὀνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν ·

ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ — ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῷ, εἶναι δ' οὐ. Κἄπειτα ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι ὅτι οἶοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἶη δ' οὐ. Ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων.

Πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν δ' οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην ὅτι · „Τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι · κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κάγαθόν εἰδέναι · ἄλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἶεται τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς · ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶομαι. Ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι, αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἂ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἶομαι εἰδέναι.” Ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ' ἄλλον ἦα τῶν ἐκείνου δοκούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καὶ μοι ταῦτά ταῦτα ἔδοξε · καὶ ἐνταῦθα κάκεινῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

Μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ἦα, αἰσθανόμενος μὲν — καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς — ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην, ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι · ἴτεον οὖν, σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμὸν τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἅπαντας τοὺς τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι. Καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι — δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τάληθ' ἰλέγειν — ἡ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον · οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δέ, δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι, ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. Δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδειξάιναι ὥσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο.

Μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικούς ἦα ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητάς, τοὺς τε τῶν τραγωδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' αὐτοφῶρῳ καταληψόμενος ἑμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. Ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα ἃ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἂν αὐτοὺς τί λέγοιεν, ἵν' ἅμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. Αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὃ ἄνδρες, τάληθ' ἰλέγειν · ὅμως δὲ ῥητέον. Ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν, ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν. Ἐγνων οὖν αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖεν ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμοδοῖ · καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ, ἴσασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. Τοιοῦτόν τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες · καὶ ἅμα ἡσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τᾶλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν. Ἀπῆα οὖν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι ὥπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνους ἦα · ἑμαυτῷ γὰρ συνήδη οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενῳ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δέ γ' ἤδη ὅτι εὐρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. Καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην, ἀλλ' ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην καὶ μου ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. Ἀλλ', ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταῦτόν μοι ἔδοξαν

ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοὶ· διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἕκαστος ἡξίου καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν· ὥστε
 e με ἑμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησιμοῦ πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτως ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφοτέρω ἀ ἐκείνοι ἐχουσιν ἔχειν. Ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἑμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησιμῷ ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοὶ μὲν ἀπέχθεται
 23a μοι γεγόνاسι καὶ οἶαι χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. Οἴονται γὰρ με ἕκαστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν ἀ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω· τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὧ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησιμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενός· καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτον * λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρῆσθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι
 b ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν <εἰ> εἴποι ὅτι· „Οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὧ ἀνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν.” Ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιῶν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων ἂν τινα οἶμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδὴν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. Καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαι μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν πενίᾳ μυρία εἰμι διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ
 c λατρείαν.

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι, χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται· εἴτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν· κᾶπειτα, οἶμαι, εὐρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότες δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. Ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι
 d ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μιαιώτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους. Καὶ ἐπειδὴν τις αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ ὅ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὅ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν· ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι „τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς” καὶ „θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν” καὶ „τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν”. Τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατὰδηλοι γίνονται προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. Ἄτε οὖν, οἶμαι, φιλό-
 e τιμοὶ ὄντες, καὶ σφοδροί, καὶ πολλοί, καὶ συντεταγμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὄντα καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. Ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητός μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν

* Perhaps better τοῦτο: “he seems to say this of S. and to have used my name to it, taking me as an example.” — (δὲ copulative).

ὕπερ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, "Αὐτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολι-
 τικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων. "Ὡστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, 24a
 θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ οἷός τ' εἶην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν
 οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν γεγонуῖαν. Ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-
 ναῖοι, ἀλήθῃ, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω
 οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος. Καίτοι οἷδα σχεδὸν ὅτι αὐτοῖς τούτοις ἀπεχθάνομαι ὃ καὶ
 τεκμήριον ὅτι ἀληθῇ λέγω, καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ, καὶ τὰ αἷτια
 ταῦτά ἐστιν. Καὶ ἐάν τε νῦν, ἐάν τε αὖθις ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε. b

207—Pl., *Apol.* 28 b-30 c; 30 d-31 c:

"Ἴσως δ' ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις · „Εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπι-
 τήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν;" Ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν
 δίκαιον λόγον ἀντεῖποιμι, ὅτι · „Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἷε δεῖν
 κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός
 ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα
 πράττει καὶ ἄνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. Φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῶ λόγῳ εἶεν
 τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν, οἳ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος c
 υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησεν παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τι ὑπομεῖναι,
 ὥστε, ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἐκτορα ἀποκτείνειν, θεὸς
 οὖσα, οὕτωςί πως, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι · „Ὡ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ
 ἑταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἐκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανῇ · „αὐτίκα γάρ
 τοι, φησί, μεθ' Ἐκτορα πότμος ἐτοῖμος ·" ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου
 καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὀλιγώρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς d
 φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν · „Αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίνῃ δίκην ἐπιθεῖς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι,
 ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, ἄχθος ἀρούρης."
 Μὴ αὐτὸν οἷε φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου;" Οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες
 Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ · οὐ ἂν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ
 ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν
 ὑπολογιζόμενον μῆτε θάνατον μῆτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με e
 οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον οὐς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου καὶ ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν
 Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλῷ, τότε μὲν οὐ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ
 ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὥς ἐγὼ φήθην
 τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς
 ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεῖς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, λίποιμι τὴν
 τάξιν. Δεινὸν τὰν εἶη, καὶ ὥς ἀληθῶς τότε ἂν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστή- 29a
 ριον ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιὼς θάνατον καὶ
 οἴομενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὢν.

Τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφόν

Socr.'
mission a
service to
the god
(Apollo)

- εἶναι μὴ ὄντα · δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. Οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδείς τὸν θάνατον, οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὃν τῶν ἀγαθῶν,
- b δεδίασι δ' ὥς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶ. Καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἢ ἐπονείδιστος ἢ τοῦ οἶσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; Ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδῶς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἀίδου, οὕτω καὶ οἶομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι. Τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν οἶδα. Πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστὶν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι.
- c "Ὡστε οὐδ' εἰ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἡ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἢ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἶόν τ' εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναί με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὥς, εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἡδὴ ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ ὑεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρήσονται · — εἰ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε · „ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφιεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι ἐφ' ᾧ τε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσῃ διατρίβειν
- d μὴδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν · ἐάν δὲ ἄλῳς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανῇ·" — εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίετε, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι · „Ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἔωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἶός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἂν αἰεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷά περ εἴωθα, ὅτι · „ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὢν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνη ἐπιμελοῦ-
- e μενος ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὥς πλεῖστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὥς βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελῇ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις;" Καὶ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητήσῃ καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἅπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐάν μοι μὴ
- 30a δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι ἀρετὴν, φάναι δέ, ὀνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. Ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω ποιήσω, καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀσπῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυτέρω ἔστέ γένει. Ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ ἴστε. Καὶ ἐγὼ οἶομαι οὐδὲν πῶ ὑμῖν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν.
- Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους
- b καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μὴδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὥς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὥς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά · εἰ δὲ τίς μέ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει.

Πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἀφίετέ με ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε, ὥς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω c
πολλάκις τεθνάναι." —

Νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολο- d
γεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἴοιτο, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ
θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν, ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι. Ἐάν γάρ ἐμέ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥαδίως e
ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον
τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥσπερ ἱππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους
δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος · οἷον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ
ὁ θεὸς ἐμέ τῇ πόλει προστεθηκέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα, δς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων
καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἓνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην, πανταχοῦ προσ- 31a
καθίζων. Τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥαδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' ἐάν
ἐμοὶ πειθήσθε, φείσεσθέ μου. Ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως τάχ' ἂν ἀχθόμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ
νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες ἂν με πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ ῥαδίως ἂν
ἀποκτείναιτε · εἴτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτε ἂν, εἰ μή τινα
ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψειε κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. "Οτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὦν
τοιοῦτος οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδοσθαι, ἐνθὲνδε ἂν κατανοήσαιτε ·
οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε τὸ ἐμέ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ b
ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν
ἀεὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ προσιόντα, ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. Καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβά-
νων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην, εἶχον ἂν τινα λόγον · νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ
ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι, τᾶλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες, τοῦτό γε
οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὥς ἐγὼ ποτέ c
τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἥτησα. Ἰκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν
μάρτυρα ὥς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

208—a. Pl., *Symp.* 215 a-216 c:

Alcibiades'
oration
about Socr.

Σωκράτη δ' ἐγὼ ἐπαινεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὕτως ἐπιχειρήσω, δι' εἰκόνων. Οὗτος
μὲν οὖν ἴσως οἰήσεται ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα · ἔσται δ' ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἕνεκα,
οὐ τοῦ γελοίου. Φημὶ γὰρ δὴ ὁμοιότατον αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῖς σιληνοῖς τούτοις,
τοῖς ἐν τοῖς ἐρμογλυφεῖσι καθημένοις, οὐστinas ἐργάζονται οἱ δημιουργοὶ 215b
σύριγγας ἢ αὐλοὺς ἔχοντας, οἱ, διχάδε διοιχθέντες, φαίνονται ἐνδοθεν ἀγάλματα
ἔχοντες θεῶν. Καὶ φημὶ αὖ ἐοικέναι αὐτὸν τῷ σατύρῳ τῷ Μαρσῷ. "Οτι μὲν
οὖν, τό γε εἶδος, ὁμοῖος εἰ τούτοις ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἂν που ἀμφισβητή-
σαις · ὥς δὲ καὶ τᾶλλα ἔοικας, μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε. Ὑβριστὴς εἰ · ἢ οὐ; ἐάν γάρ
μὴ ὁμολογῆς, μάρτυρας παρέξομαι. Ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐλητής; πολὺ γε θαυμασιώτερος
ἐκείνου. Ὁ μὲν γε δι' ὀργάνων ἐκίηλει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος c
δυνάμει, καὶ ἔτι νυνὶ δς ἂν τὰ ἐκείνου αὐλῇ · ἀ γάρ "Ολυμπος ἡῦλει, Μαρσίου

λέγω, τούτου διδάξαντος. Τὰ οὖν ἐκείνου, ἔαντε ἀγαθὸς αὐλητῆς αὐλῇ, ἔαντε φαύλῃ αὐλητρίδι, μόνῃ κατέχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ δηλοῖ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν δεομένους, διὰ τὸ θεῖα εἶναι. Σὺ δ' ἐκείνου τοσοῦτον μόνον διαφέρεις, ὅτι, ἄνευ
 d ὀργάνων, ψιλοῖς λόγοις, ταῦτόν τοῦτο ποιεῖς. Ἡμεῖς γοῦν, ὅταν μὲν τοῦ ἄλλου ἀκούωμεν λέγοντος, καὶ πάνυ ἀγαθοῦ ῥήτορος, ἄλλους λόγους, οὐδὲν μέλει, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδενί · ἐπειδὴν δὲ σοῦ τις ἀκούῃ, ἢ τῶν σῶν λόγων ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ πάνυ φαῦλος ἢ ὁ λέγων, ἔαντε γυνὴ ἀκούῃ, ἔαντε ἀνὴρ, ἔαντε μειράκιον, ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐσμέν καὶ κατεχόμεθα.

Ἐγὼ γοῦν, ὦ ἄνδρες, εἰ μὴ ἔμελλον κομιδῇ δόξειν μεθύειν, εἶπον ὁμόσας ἂν ὑμῖν οἷα δὴ πέπονθα αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τῶν τούτου λόγων καὶ πάσχω ἔτι καὶ νυνί. Ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούω, πολὺ μοι μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κορυβαντιώντων ἢ τε καρδία πηδᾷ, καὶ δάκρυα ἐκχεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων τῶν τούτου · ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλους παμπόλλους τὰ αὐτὰ πάσχοντας. Περικλέους δὲ ἀκούων καὶ ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν ῥητόρων, εὖ μὲν ἡγούμην λέγειν, τοιοῦτον δ' οὐδὲν ἔπασχον, οὐδ' ἐτεθορύβητό μου ἡ ψυχὴ, οὐδ' ἡγανάκτει ὡς ἀνδραποδωδῶς διακειμένου. Ἄλλ' ὑπὸ τουτοῦ τοῦ
 216a Μαρσίου πολλάκις δὴ οὕτω διετέθην, ὥστε μοι δόξαι μὴ βιωτὸν εἶναι ἔχοντι ὡς ἔχω. Καὶ ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔρεῖς ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. Καὶ ἔτι γε νῦν ξύνοιδ' ἐμαυτῷ ὅτι, εἰ ἐθέλοιμι παρέχειν τὰ ὦτα, οὐκ ἂν καρτερήσαιμι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά ἂν πάσχοιμι. Ἀναγκάζει γάρ με ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι, πολλοῦ ἐνδεὲς ὢν αὐτός, ἔτι ἐμαυτοῦ μὲν ἀμελῶ, τὰ δ' Ἀθηναίων πράττω. Βίᾳ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν Σειρήνων, ἐπισχόμενος τὰ ὦτα, οἴχομαι φεύγων, ἵνα μὴ αὐτοῦ κατήμενος
 b παρὰ τούτῳ καταγῆράσω. Πέπονθα δὲ πρὸς τοῦτον μόνον ἀνθρώπων, ὃ οὐκ ἂν τις οἶοιτο ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐνεῖναι, τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι ὄντινοῦν. Ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτον μόνον αἰσχύνομαι · ξύνοιδα γὰρ ἐμαυτῷ, ἀντιλέγειν μὲν οὐ δυναμένῳ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ οὗτος κελεύει, ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἀπέλθω, ἡττημένῳ τῆς τιμῆς τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν · δραπετεύω οὖν αὐτὸν καὶ φεύγω, καί, ὅταν ἴδω, αἰσχύνομαι τὰ ὁμολογημένα.
 c Καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἡδέως ἂν ἴδοιμι αὐτὸν μὴ ὄντα ἐν ἀνθρώποις · εἰ δ' αὖ τοῦτο γένοιτο, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι πολὺ μεῖζον ἂν ἀχθοίμην, ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι χρήσωμαι τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.

It is on this chapter mostly that H. Maier based his interpretation that Socr. was a moral and religious preacher, a missionary, much more than a dialectician (H. Maier, *Sokrates*, Berlin 1913).

Cf. Pl., *Laches*, 187 e (Nicias speaks):

οὐ μοι δοκεῖς εἰδέναι ὅτι, ὅς ἂν ἐγγύτατα Σωκράτους ἢ [λόγῳ ὥσπερ γένει καὶ πλησιάζῃ διαλεγόμενος], ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ, ἔάν ἄρα καὶ περὶ ἄλλου τοῦ πρότερον ἄρξηται διαλέγεσθαι, μὴ παύεσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου περιαγόμενον τῷ λόγῳ, πρὶν ἂν ἐμπέσῃ εἰς τὸ δίδοναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὅντινα τρόπον νῦν τε ζῇ καὶ ὅντινα τὸν παρελθυθότα βίον βεβίωκεν · ἐπειδὴν δ' ἐμπέσῃ, ὅτι οὐ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀφήσει Σωκράτης, πρὶν ἂν βασανίσῃ ταῦτα εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς ἅπαντα.

his
 σωφροσύνη

b. Ib., 216 c-217 a:

Καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν δὴ τῶν αὐλημάτων καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τοιαῦτα πεπόνθασι

ὑπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ σατύρου. Ἄλλα δὲ ἐμοῦ ἀκούσατε ὡς ὁμοίός τέ ἐστιν οἷς ἐγὼ εἵκασα αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ὡς θαυμασίαν ἔχει. Εὖ γὰρ ἴστε ὅτι οὐδεὶς ὑμῶν τοῦτον γινώσκει· ἀλλὰ ἐγὼ δηλώσω, ἐπεὶ περ ἠρξάμην. Ὅρατε γὰρ ὅτι Σωκράτης ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν, καὶ αἰεὶ περὶ τούτους ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκπέπληκται· καὶ αὖ ἄγνοεῖ πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ. Τοῦτο οὐ σιληνῶδες; Σφόδρα γε· τοῦτο γὰρ οὗτος ἔξωθεν περιβέβληται, ὥσπερ ὁ γεγλυμμένος σιληγόνος· ἐνδοθεν δὲ ἀνοιχθεὶς πόσης οἴεσθε γέμει, ὧ ἄνδρες συμπόται, σωφροσύνης; Ἰστε ὅτι, οὔτε εἴ τις καλὸς ἐστὶ, μέλει αὐτῷ οὐδὲν, ἀλλὰ καταφρονεῖ τοσοῦτον ὅσον οὐδ' ἂν εἷς οἰηθείη, οὔτ' εἴ τις πλούσιος, οὔτ' εἴ ἄλλην τινὰ τιμὴν ἔχων τῶν ὑπὸ πλήθους μακαριζομένων· ἡγεῖται δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τὰ κτήματα οὐδενὸς ἄξια, καὶ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν εἶναι· λέγω ὑμῖν. Εἰρωνευόμενος δὲ καὶ παίζων πάντα τὸν βίον πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διατελεῖ· σπουδάζαντος δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀνοιχθέντος, οὐκ οἶδα εἴ τις ἐώρακε τὰ ἐντὸς ἀγάλματα· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἤδη ποτ' εἶδον, καὶ μοι ἔδοξεν οὕτω θεῖα καὶ χρυσᾶ εἶναι καὶ πάγκαλα καὶ θαυμαστά, ὥστε ποιητέον εἶναι ἐν βραχεὶ ὅ τι κελεύει Σωκράτης.

c. Ib., 219 e-220 d:

Ταῦτά τε γὰρ μοι ἅπαντα προυγεγόνει, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα στρατεία ἡμῖν εἰς Ποτείδαιαν ἐγένετο κοινὴ καὶ συνεσιτοῦμεν ἐκεῖ. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοῖς πόνοις οὐ μόνον ἐμοῦ περιῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. Ὅποτ' ἀναγκασθείημεν, ἀποληφθέντες που, οἷα δὴ ἐπὶ στρατείας, ἀσιτεῖν, οὐδὲν ἦσαν οἱ ἄλλοι πρὸς τὸ καρτερεῖν. Ἐν τ' αὖ ταῖς εὐωχίαις μόνος ἀπολαύειν οἷός τ' ἦν τὰ τ' ἄλλα καὶ πίνειν, οὐκ ἐθέλων ὅποτε ἀναγκασθείη, πάντας ἐκράτει καί, ὁ πάντων θαυμαστότατον, Σωκράτη μεθύοντα οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐώρακεν ἀνθρώπων· τούτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ αὐτίκα ὁ ἔλεγχος ἔσσεσθαι. Πρὸς δὲ αὖ τὰς τοῦ χειμῶνος καρτερήσεις (δεινοὶ γὰρ αὐτόθι χειμῶνες), θαυμάσια εἰργάζετο, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ ποτε ὄντος πάγου οἷου δεινοτάτου, καὶ πάντων ἢ οὐκ ἐξιόντων ἐνδοθεν ἢ, εἴ τις ἐξίλοι, ἡμφιεσμένων τε θαυμαστά δὴ ὅσα καὶ ὑποδεδεμένων καὶ ἐνείλιγμένων τοὺς πόδας εἰς πῖλους καὶ ἀρνακίδας, οὗτος δ' ἐν τούτοις ἐξῆει ἔχων ἱμάτιον μὲν τοιοῦτον οἷόν περ καὶ πρότερον εἰώθει φορεῖν, ἀνυπόδητος δὲ διὰ τοῦ κρυστάλλου ῥῆον ἐπορεύετο ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ὑποδεδεμένοι· οἱ δὲ στρατιῶται ὑπέβλεπον αὐτόν, ὡς καταφρονοῦντα σφῶν.

Socr. in the
camp near
Potidaea

220a

b

c

Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ταῦτα·
οἷον δ' αὖ τόδ' ἔρεξε καὶ ἔτλη καρτερὸς ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖ ποτε ἐπὶ στρατείας, ἄξιον ἀκοῦσαι. Ξυννοήσας γὰρ αὐτόθι ἐωθέν τι εἰστήκει σκοπῶν· καί, ἐπειδὴ οὐ προυχώρει αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἀνίει, ἀλλὰ εἰστήκει ζητῶν. Καὶ ἦδη ἦν μεσημβρία, καὶ ἀνθρώποι ἡσθάνοντο, καὶ θαυμάζοντες ἄλλος ἄλλῳ ἔλεγεν ὅτι Σωκράτης ἐξ ἐωθινοῦ φροντίζων τι ἔστηκεν. Τελευτῶντες δὲ τινες τῶν ιδόντων, ἐπειδὴ ἐσπέρα ἦν, δειπνήσαντες (καὶ γὰρ θέρος τότε γε ἦν)

- d χαμεύνῃα ἐξενεγκάμενοι, ἅμα μὲν ἐν τῷ ψύχει καθηῦδον, ἅμα δ' ἐφύλαττον αὐτὸν εἰ καὶ τὴν νύκτα ἐστήξοι. Ὁ δὲ εἰστήκει μέχρις ὥς ἐγένετο καὶ ἥλιος ἀνέσχεν. Ἔπειτα ὥχεται ἀπὼν, προσευξάμενος τῷ ἡλίῳ.

his obstetric art 209—a. Pl., *Theaet.* 149 a-b; 150 b-d; 151 a-b:

Εἶτα, ὦ καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὥς ἐγὼ εἰμι υἱὸς μαίας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαιναρέτης; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦδη τοῦτό γε ἤκουσα. ΣΩ. Ἄρα καὶ ὅτι ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν αὐτὴν τέχνην ἀκήκοας; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι· μὴ μέντοι μου κατείπης πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους. λέληθα γάρ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ταύτην ἔχων τὴν τέχνην· οἱ δέ, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδότες, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν.

- (150b) Τῇ δέ γ' ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆςμαιεύσεως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὑπάρχει ὅσα ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ τε ἀνδρὸς ἀλλὰ μὴ γυναικὸςμαιεύεσθαι καὶ τῷ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τικτούσας ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ σώματα. Μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐνὶ τῇ
c ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ, βασιανίζειν δυνατόν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ πότερον εἰδῶλον καὶ ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἢ διάνοια ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές. Ἐπεὶ τόδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει ὅπερ ταῖς μαίαις· ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἤδη πολλοὶ μοι ὠνεῖδισαν, ὥς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποφαίνομαι περὶ οὐδενός διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, ἀληθές ὀνειδίζουσιν. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τούτου τόδε·μαιεύεσθαι με ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκώλυσεν. εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν
d αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφός, οὐδέ τί μοι ἔστιν εὖρημα τοιοῦτο γεγονόνος τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἔκγονον· οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ συγγιγνόμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται ἐνιοὶ μὲν καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προοιούσης τῆς συνουσίας, ὅσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκη, θαυμαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες, ὥς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσι· καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργές ὅτι παρ' ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν πρόποτε μαθόντες, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ παρ' αὐτῶν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ εὐρόντες τε καὶ τεκόντες.

(151a⁵) πᾶσχουσι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ συγγιγνόμενοι καὶ τοῦτο ταῦτόν ταῖς τικτούσαις· ὠδίνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπίμπλονται νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ κεῖναι· ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὥδινά ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀποπαύειν ἢ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται.

he is like an electric eel

b. Cf. Pl., *Meno* 80 a (Meno speaks):

ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε πρὶν καὶ συγγενέσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν· καὶ νῦν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖς, γοητεύεις με καὶ φαρμάττεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπάδεις, ὥστε μεστὸν ἀπορίας γεγονέναι. καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὁμοιότατος εἶναι τό τε εἶδος καὶ τᾶλλα ταύτῃ τῇ πλατεῖᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ θαλαττίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ αὕτη τὸν ἀεὶ πλησιάζοντα καὶ ἀπτόμενον ναρκᾶν ποιεῖ· καὶ σὺ δοκεῖς μοι νῦν ἐμὲ τοιοῦτόν τι πεποιηκέναι, [ναρκᾶν]. ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα ναρκῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι ἀποκρίνωμαί σοι.

3—THE DIALECTIC METHOD

210—Pl., *Laches* 190 c-199 e.Socr. in
search of a
definition

Two Athenians are consulting the generals Nicias and Lamachus about the education of their sons: is it useful to teach them the practice of arms? Socr. is called in for advice. He reduces the question to that of virtue, the purpose being that the souls of the boys are made better. Now, what is virtue?

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, περὶ ὅλης ἀρετῆς εὐθέως σκοπώμεθα · πλεόν γὰρ ἴσως ἔργον · ἀλλὰ μέρους τινὸς πέρι πρῶτον ἰδωμεν, εἰ ἱκανῶς ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι · καὶ ἡμῖν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ῥάων ἢ σκέψις ἔσται.

ΛΑ. 'Αλλ' οὕτω ποιῶμεν, ὦ Σώκратες, ὡς σὺ βούλει.

190d

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἂν προελοίμεθα τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μερῶν; Ἡ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τοῦτο εἰς ὃ τείνειν δοκεῖ ἢ ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις μάθησις; δοκεῖ δέ που τοῖς πολλοῖς εἰς ἀνδρείαν. Ἡ γάρ;

ΛΑ. Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν πρῶτον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν, ὦ Λάχης, εἰπεῖν, ἀνδρεία τί ποτ' ἐστίν · ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο σκεψόμεθα καὶ ὅτῳ ἂν τρόπῳ τοῖς νεανίσκοις παραγένοντο, καθ' ὅσον οἶόν τε ἐξ ἐπιτηδευμάτων τε καὶ μαθημάτων παραγενέσθαι. Ἀλλὰ πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ὃ λέγω, τί ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία.

first
definition

ΛΑ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκратες, οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν · εἰ γὰρ τις ἐθέλοι ἐν τῇ τάξει μένων ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ μὴ φεύγοι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἀνδρεῖος ἂν εἴη.

ΣΩ. Εὖ μὲν λέγεις, ὦ Λάχης · ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐγὼ αἷτιος, οὐ σαφῶς εἰπὼν, τὸ σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὴ τοῦτο ὃ διανοούμενος ἠρόμην, ἀλλ' ἕτερον.

ΛΑ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκратες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ φράσω, ἐὰν οἶός τε γένωμαι. Ἀνδρεῖός που οὗτος δν καὶ σὺ λέγεις, ὃς ἂν ἐν τῇ τάξει μένων μάχῃται τοῖς πολεμίοις.

191a

ΛΑ. Ἐγὼ γοῦν φημί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ. Ἀλλὰ τί αὖ ὅδε, ὃς ἂν φεύγων μάχῃται τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἀλλὰ μὴ μένων;

ΛΑ. Πῶς φεύγων;

ΣΩ. "Ὡσπερ που καὶ Σκύθαι λέγονται οὐχ ἤττον φεύγοντες ἢ διώκοντες μάχεσθαι, καὶ "Ὀμηρός που ἐπαινῶν τοὺς τοῦ Αἰνείου ἵππους κραιπνὰ μάλ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ἔφη αὐτοὺς ἐπίστασθαι διώκειν ἢ δὲ φέβεσθαι · καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Αἰνεῖαν κατὰ τοῦτ' ἐνεκωμίασε, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ φόβου ἐπιστήμην, καὶ εἶπεν αὐτὸν εἶναι μῆστωρα φόβοιο.

b

ΛΑ. Καὶ καλῶς γε, ὦ Σώκратες · περὶ ἀρμάτων γὰρ ἔλεγε · καὶ σὺ τὸ τῶν Σκυθῶν ἵππέων πέρι λέγεις. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἵππικόν τὸ ἐκείνων οὕτω μάχεται, τὸ δὲ ὀπλιτικόν τό γε τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω.

ΣΩ. Πλήν γ' ἴσως, ὦ Λάχης, τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων. Λακεδαιμονίους γάρ

c φασιν ἐν Πλαταιαῖς, ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τοῖς γεροφόροις ἐγένοντο, οὐκ ἐθέλειν μένοντας πρὸς αὐτοῖς μάχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ φεύγειν, ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐλύθησαν αἱ τάξεις τῶν Περσῶν, ἀναστρεφόμενους ὥσπερ ἱππέας μάχεσθαι καὶ οὕτω νικῆσαι τὴν ἐκεῖ μάχην.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν δ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὅτι ἐγὼ αἷτιος μὴ καλῶς σε ἀποκρίνασθαι, δτι οὐ καλῶς ἠρόμην. Βουλόμενος γάρ σου πυθέσθαι μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ d ὀπλιτικῷ ἀνδρείους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἱππικῷ καὶ ἐν ξύμπαντι τῷ πολεμικῷ εἶδει, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κινδύνους ἀνδρείους ὄντας, καὶ ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσους καὶ ὅσοι πρὸς πενίας ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσιν, καὶ ἔτι αὖ μὴ μόνον ὅσοι πρὸς λύπας ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσιν ἢ φόβους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἡδονὰς δεινοὶ μά- e χεσθαι, καὶ μένοντες καὶ ἀναστρέφοντες ¹ — εἰσὶ γὰρ πού τινες, ὦ Λάχης, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἀνδρεῖοι.

ΛΑ. Καὶ σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνδρεῖοι μὲν πάντες οὗτοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἐν ἡδοναῖς, οἱ δ' ἐν λύπαις, οἱ δ' ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις, οἱ δ' ἐν φόβοις τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐκτίνονται · οἱ δὲ γ', οἶμαι, δειλίαν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις.

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε ὃν ἐκάτερον τούτων, τοῦτο ἐπυνθανόμην. Πάλιν οὖν πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἀνδρείαν πρῶτον, τί ὃν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ταῦτόν ἐστιν · ἢ οὐπω κατα- μανθάνεις δ λέγω;

ΛΑ. Οὐ πάνυ τι.

192a ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὧδε λέγω, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τάχος ἡρώτων τί ποτ' ἐστίν, δ καὶ ἐν τῷ τρέχειν τυγχάνει ὃν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ καθαρίζειν καὶ ἐν τῷ λέγειν καὶ ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, καὶ σχεδόν τι αὐτὸ κεκτήμεθα ², οὗ καὶ πέρι ἄξιον λέγειν, ἢ ἐν ταῖς τῶν χειρῶν πράξεσιν ἢ σκελῶν ἢ στόματός τε καὶ φωνῆς ἢ διανοίας · ἢ οὐχ οὕτω καὶ σὺ λέγεις;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ τοίνυν τίς με ἔροιτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί λέγεις τοῦτο, δ ἐν πᾶσιν b ὀνομάξεις ταχυτῆτα εἶναι; εἴποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι τὴν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πολλὰ διαπραττομένην δύναμιν ταχυτῆτα ἔγωγε καλῶ καὶ περὶ φωνὴν καὶ περὶ δρόμον καὶ περὶ τᾶλλα πάντα.

ΛΑ. Ὅρθῶς γε σὺ λέγων.

ΣΩ. Πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σὺ, ὦ Λάχης, τὴν ἀνδρείαν οὕτως εἰπεῖν, τίς οὐσα δύ-

¹ ἀναστρέφοντες - intrans.

² καὶ σχεδόν τι αὐτὸ κεκτήμεθα - We continue the relative phrase: "and which we possess in nearly every thing that has any importance".

ναμεις ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν ἡδονῇ καὶ ἐν λύπῃ καὶ ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν αὐτὴν εἶναι, ἔπειτα ἀνδρεία κέκληται.

ΛΑ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καρτερία τις εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, εἰ τό γε διὰ πάντων [περὶ ἀνδρείας] πεφυκὸς δεῖ εἰπεῖν.

second
definition

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ, εἴ γε τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινόμεθα ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. c
Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε φαίνεται · οὐ τι πᾶσά γε, ὥς ἐγώ μαι, καρτερία ἀνδρεία σοι φαίνεται · τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐνθένδε · σχεδὸν γάρ τι οἶδα, ὦ Λάχης, ὅτι τῶν πάντων καλῶν πραγμάτων ἡγεῖ σὺ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.

ΛΑ. Εὖ μὲν οὖν ἴσθι ὅτι τῶν καλλίστων.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν μετὰ φρονήσεως καρτερία καλὴ κάγαθή;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἡ μετ' ἀφροσύνης; Οὐ τοῦναντίον ταύτῃ βλαβερά καὶ κακοῦργος;

ΛΑ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καλὸν οὖν τι φήσεις σὺ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃν κακοῦργόν τε καὶ βλαβερόν; d

ΛΑ. Οὐκοῦν δίκαιόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὴν γε τοιαύτην καρτερίαν ἀνδρείαν ὁμολογήσεις εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ περ οὐ καλὴ ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία καλὸν ἐστίν.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἡ φρόνιμος ἄρα καρτερία κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη.

ΛΑ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἰδωμεν δὴ, ἡ εἰς τί φρόνιμος; ἢ ἡ εἰς ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ σμικρά; οἷον εἴ τις καρτερεῖ ἀναλίσκων ἀργύριον φρονίμως, εἰδὼς ὅτι ἀναλώ-
σας πλέον ἐκτῆσεται, τοῦτον ἀνδρεῖον καλοῖς ἄν;

ΛΑ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οἷον εἴ τις ἱατρὸς ὢν, περιπλευμονίᾳ τοῦ ὑέος ἐχομένου ἢ ἄλλου
τινὸς καὶ δεομένου πιεῖν ἢ φαγεῖν δοῦναι, μὴ ἴκμπτοιτο, ἀλλὰ καρτεροῖ; 193a

ΛΑ. Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν οὐδ' αὕτη.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐν πολέμῳ καρτεροῦντα ἄνδρα καὶ ἐθέλοντα μάχεσθαι, φρονί-
μως λογιζόμενον, εἰδότα μὲν ὅτι βοηθήσουσιν ἄλλοι αὐτῷ, πρὸς ἐλάττους δὲ
καὶ φαυλοτέρους μαχεῖται ἢ μεθ' ὧν αὐτός ἐστιν, ἔτι δὲ χωρία ἔχει κρείττω,
τοῦτον τὸν μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης φρονήσεως καὶ παρασκευῆς καρτεροῦντα ἀν-
δρεϊότερον ἂν φαίης ἢ τὸν ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ στρατοπέδῳ ἐθέλοντα ὑπομένειν τε
καὶ καρτερεῖν;

ΛΑ. Τὸν ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. b

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀφρονεστέρα γε ἡ τούτου ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἐτέρου καρτερία.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸν μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἄρα ἵππικῆς καρτεροῦντα ἐν ἵππομαχίᾳ ἦττον
φήσεις ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης.

ΛΑ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸν μετὰ σφενδονητικῆς ἢ τοξικῆς ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς τέχνης καρτεροῦντα.

c ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅσοι δὴ ἐθέλουσιν εἰς φρέαρ καταβαίνοντες καὶ κολυμβῶντες καρτερεῖν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ, μὴ ὄντες δεινοί, ἢ ἐν τινὶ ἄλλῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνδριότερους φήσεις τῶν ταῦτα δεινῶν.

ΛΑ. Τί γὰρ ἂν τις ἄλλο φαίη, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν, εἴπερ οἷοιτό γε οὕτως.

ΛΑ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἶμαι γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν που ἀφρονεστέρας γε, ὦ Λάχης, οἱ τοιοῦτοι κινδυνεύουσιν τε καὶ καρτεροῦσιν ἢ οἱ μετὰ τέχνης αὐτὸ πράττοντες.

ΛΑ. Φαίνονται.

d ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αἰσχροὶ ἢ ἄφρων τόλμα τε καὶ καρτέρησις ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐφάνη ἡμῖν οὔσα καὶ βλαβερά;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δέ γε ἀνδρεία ὠμολογεῖτο καλὸν τι εἶναι.

ΛΑ. Ὡμολογεῖτο γάρ.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δ' αὖ πάλιν φαμέν ἐκεῖνο τὸ αἰσχρόν, τὴν ἄφρονα καρτέρησιν, ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.

ΛΑ. Ἐοίκαμεν.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς οὖν σοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν;

ΛΑ. Μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμοὶ μὲν οὔ.

e ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα που κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον δωριστὶ ἡρμόσμεθα ἐγὼ τε καὶ σύ, ὦ Λάχης· τὰ γὰρ ἔργα οὐ ξυμφωνεῖ ἡμῖν τοῖς λόγοις. Ἔργῳ μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, φαίη ἂν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνδρείας μετέχειν, λόγῳ δ', ὡς ἐγῶμαι, οὐκ ἂν, εἰ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀκούσειε διαλεγομένων.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι οὕτως ἡμᾶς διακεῖσθαι;

ΛΑ. Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν ᾧ λέγομεν πειθώμεθα τό γε τοσοῦτον;

ΛΑ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο, καὶ τίνι τούτῳ;

194a ΣΩ. Τῷ λόγῳ ὃς καρτερεῖν κελεύει. Εἰ οὖν βούλει, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τῇ ζητήσῃ ἐπιμεινόμεν τε καὶ καρτερήσωμεν, ἵνα καὶ μὴ ἡμῶν αὕτη ἢ ἀνδρεία καταγέλαση, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνδρείως αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις αὕτη ἢ καρτέρησις ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία.

ΛΑ. Ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτοιμος, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ προαφίστασθαι· καίτοι ἀήθης γ' εἰμὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων· ἀλλὰ τίς με καὶ φιλονεικία εἵληφεν πρὸς τὰ εἰρη-

b μένα, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγανακτῶ, εἰ οὕτως ἂν νοῶ μὴ οἷός τ' εἰμὶ εἰπεῖν. Νοεῖν

μὲν γὰρ ἔμοιγε δοκῶ περὶ ἀνδρείας ὅ τι ἔστιν, οὐκ οἶδα δ' ὅπῃ με ἄρτι διέφυγεν, ὥστε μὴ ξυλλαβεῖν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτὴν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅ τι ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ φίλε, τὸν ἀγαθὸν κυνηγέτην μεταθεῖν χρὴ καὶ μὴ ἀνιέναι.

ΛΑ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν καὶ Νικίαν τόνδε παρακαλῶμεν ἐπὶ τὸ κυνηγέσιον, εἴ τι ἡμῶν εὐπορώτερός ἐστιν;

ΛΑ. Βούλομαι · πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, ὦ Νικία, ἀνδράσι φίλοις χειμαζομένοις ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἀποροῦσιν c
βοήθησον, εἴ τινα ἔχεις δύναμιν. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἡμέτερα ὀρᾷς ὡς ἄπορα · σὺ δ' εἰπὼν ὅ τι ἡγεῖ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι, ἡμᾶς τε τῆς ἀπορίας ἐκλυσαι καὶ αὐτὸς ἀνοεῖς τῷ λόγῳ βεβαίωσαι.

ΝΙ. Δοκεῖτε τοίνυν μοι πάλαι οὐ καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρίζεσθαι τὴν ἀνδρείαν · ὁ γὰρ ἐγὼ σοῦ ἤδη καλῶς λέγοντος ἀκήκοα, τούτῳ οὐ χρῆσθε.

ΣΩ. Ποίῳ δὴ, ὦ Νικία;

ΝΙ. Πολλάκις ἀκήκοά σου λέγοντος ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὸς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἄπερ d
σοφός, ἀ δὲ ἀμαθής, ταῦτα δὲ κακός.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ μέντοι νῆ Δία λέγεις, ὦ Νικία.

ΝΙ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ἀγαθός, δῆλον ὅτι σοφός ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἦκουσας, ὦ Λάχης;

ΛΑ. Ἐγώ γε, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα γε μανθάνω ὃ λέγει.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ δοκῶ μανθάνειν, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ σοφίαν τινὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν λέγειν. third definition

ΛΑ. Ποίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοφίαν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τόνδε τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς;

ΛΑ. Ἐγώ γε. e

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, αὐτῷ εἰπέ, ὦ Νικία, ποία σοφία ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον · οὐ γὰρ που ἡ γε αὐλητική.

ΝΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἡ κιθαριστική.

ΝΙ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ αὕτη ἢ τίνος ἐπιστήμη;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ εἰπέτω γε τίνα φησὶν αὐτὴν εἶναι.

ΝΙ. Ταύτην ἔγωγε, ὦ Λάχης, τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν.

ΛΑ. Ὡς ἄτοπα λέγει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες βλέψας, ὦ Λάχης;

ΛΑ. Πρὸς ὃ τι; Χωρὶς δῆπου σοφία ἐστὶν ἀνδρείας.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οὐν φησὶ γε Νικίας.

third
definition
completed
195a

ΛΑ. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία · ταῦτά τοι καὶ ληρεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διδάσκωμεν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ λοιδορῶμεν.

ΝΙ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, Λάχης ἐπιθυμεῖν καμὲ φανῆναι
b μὴδὲν λέγοντα, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρτι τοιοῦτος ἐφάνη.

ΛΑ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Νικία, καὶ πειράσομαί γε ἀποφῆναι. Οὐδὲν γὰρ
λέγεις · ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἐν ταῖς νόσοις οὐχ οἱ ἱατροὶ τὰ δεινὰ ἐπίστανται; Ἡ οἱ
ἀνδρεῖοι δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαι; Ἡ τοὺς ἱατροὺς σὺ ἀνδρεῖους καλεῖς;

ΝΙ. Οὐδ' ὅπως οἶμαι.

ΛΑ. Οὐδέ γε τοὺς γεωργοὺς οἶμαι. Καίτοι τά γε ἐν τῇ γεωργίᾳ δεινὰ οὗτοι
d δῆπου ἐπίστανται, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ ἅπαντες τὰ ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν τέχναις
δεινὰ τε καὶ θαρραλέα ἴσασιν · ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον οὗτοι ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσιν.

ΣΩ. Τί δοκεῖ Λάχης λέγειν, ὦ Νικία; Ἔοικεν μέντοι λέγειν τι.

ΝΙ. Καὶ γὰρ λέγει γέ τι, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθές γε.

ΣΩ. Πῶς δὴ;

ΝΙ. Ὅτι οἶεται τοὺς ἱατροὺς πλεόν τι εἰδέναι περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἢ τὸ
ὕγιεινόν [εἰπεῖν οἶόν] τε καὶ νοσῶδες. Οἱ δὲ δῆπου τοσοῦτον μόνον ἴσασιν ·
εἰ δὲ δεινόν τῳ τοῦτο ἐστὶν τὸ ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ κάμνειν, ἡγεῖ σὺ τουτί,
ὦ Λάχης, τοὺς ἱατροὺς ἐπίστασθαι; ἢ οὐ πολλοὺς οἶε ἐκ τῆς νόσου ἄμεινον
d εἶναι μὴ ἀναστῆναι ἢ ἀναστῆναι; τοῦτο γὰρ εἶπέ · σὺ πᾶσι φῆς ἄμεινον εἶναι
ζῆν καὶ οὐ πολλοὺς κρεῖττον τεθνάναι;

ΛΑ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε τοῦτο γε.

ΝΙ. Οἷς οὖν τεθνάναι λυσιτελεῖ, ταῦτά οἶε δεινὰ εἶναι καὶ οἷς ζῆν;

ΛΑ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΝΙ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ σὺ δίδως τοῖς ἱατροῖς γινώσκειν ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ δημιουργῷ
πλὴν τῷ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἐπιστήμονι, ὃν ἐγὼ ἀνδρεῖον καλῶ;

ΣΩ. Κατανοεῖς, ὦ Λάχης, ὃ τι λέγει;

ΛΑ. Ἐγωγε, ὅτι γε τοὺς μάντις καλεῖ τοὺς ἀνδρεῖους · τίς γὰρ δὴ ἄλλος
εἴσεται ὅτῳ ἄμεινον ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι; καίτοι σὺ, ὦ Νικία, πότερον ὁμολογεῖς
e μάντις εἶναι ἢ οὔτε μάντις οὔτε ἀνδρεῖος;

ΝΙ. Τί δέ; μάντις αὖ οἶε προσήκειν τὰ δεινὰ γινώσκειν καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα;

ΛΑ. Ἐγωγε · τί γὰρ ἄλλῳ;

ΝΙ. Ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὦ βέλτιστε · ἐπεὶ μάντιν γε τὰ σημεῖα
μόνον δεῖ γινώσκειν τῶν ἐσομένων, εἴτε τῷ θάνατος εἴτε νόσος εἴτε ἀποβολὴ
196a χρημάτων ἐσται, εἴτε νίκη εἴτε ἥττα ἢ πολέμου ἢ καὶ ἄλλης τινὸς ἀγωνίας ·
ὃ τι δὲ τῳ ἄμεινον τούτων ἢ παθεῖν ἢ μὴ παθεῖν, τί μᾶλλον μάντις προσήκει
κρῖναι ἢ ἄλλῳ ὁτφoῦν;

ΛΑ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοῦτο οὐ μαθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃ τι βούλεται λέγειν ·
οὔτε γὰρ μάντιν οὔτε ἱατρὸν οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα δηλοῖ ὄντινα λέγει τὸν ἀνδρεῖον,
εἰ μὴ εἰ θεόν τινα λέγει αὐτόν εἶναι. Ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν φαίνεται Νικίας οὐκ ἐθέλειν

γενναίως ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι οὐδὲν λέγει, ἀλλὰ στρέφεται ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἐπικρυπ- b
τόμενος τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπορίαν· καίτοι καὶ ἡμεῖς οἳοί τε ἤμεν ἄρτι ἐγὼ τε καὶ
σὺ τοιαῦτα στρέφεσθαι, εἰ ἐβουλόμεθα μὴ δοκεῖν ἐναντία ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς λέγειν.
Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι ἦσαν, εἶχεν ἄν τινα λόγον ταῦτα ποιεῖν·
νῦν δὲ τί ἄν τις ἐν ξυνουσίᾳ τοιᾷδε μάτην κενοῖς λόγοις αὐτὸς αὐτὸν κοσμοῖ;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὦ Λάχης· ἀλλ' ὁρῶμεν μὴ Νικίας οἴεσθαι τι c
λέγειν καὶ οὐ λόγου ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγει. Αὐτοῦ οὖν σαφέστερον πυθώμεθα τί
ποτε νοεῖ· καὶ ἑάν τι φαίνεται λέγων, συγχωρησόμεθα, εἰ δὲ μὴ, διδάξομεν.

ΛΑ. Σὺ τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ βούλει πυθάνεσθαι, πυθάνου· ἐγὼ δ'
ἴσως ἱκανῶς πέπυσμαι.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐδέν με καλύει· κοινὴ γὰρ ἔσται ἡ πύστις ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ.

ΛΑ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι, ὦ Νικία, μᾶλλον δ' ἡμῖν· κοινούμεθα γὰρ ἐγὼ τε καὶ
Λάχης τὸν λόγον· τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐπιστήμην φῆς δεινῶν τε καὶ θαρραλέων εἶναι; d

ΝΙ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐ παντὸς δὴ εἶναι ἀνδρὸς γινῶναι, ὅποτε γε μήτε ἱατρὸς
μήτε μάντις αὐτὸ γινώσεται μηδὲ ἀνδρεῖος ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν
ἐπιστήμην προσλάβῃ· οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες;

ΝΙ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἄρα τῷ ὄντι οὐκ ἂν πᾶσα ὕς γνοίη οὐδ' ἂν ἀνδρεία
γένοιτο.

ΝΙ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Δῆλον δὴ, ὦ Νικία, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὴν Κρομμυωνίαν ὅν πιστεύεις σύ γε e
ἀνδρείαν γεγονέναι. Τοῦτο δὲ λέγω οὐ παίζων, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον οἶμαι τῷ ταῦτα
λέγοντι μηδενὸς θηρίου ἀποδέχεσθαι ἀνδρείαν, ἢ συγχωρεῖν θηρίον τι οὕτω
σοφὸν εἶναι, ὥστε ἂ ὀλίγοι ἀνθρώπων ἴσασι διὰ τὸ χαλεπὰ εἶναι γινῶναι,
ταῦτα λέοντα ἢ πάρδαλιν ἢ τινα κάπρον φάναι εἰδέναι· ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως
λέοντα καὶ ἔλαφον καὶ ταῦρον καὶ πίθηκον πρὸς ἀνδρείαν φάναι πεφυκέναι
τὸν τιθέμενον ἀνδρείαν τοῦθ' ὅπερ σὺ τίθεσαι.

ΛΑ. Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, καὶ εὖ γε λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. Καὶ ἡμῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς 197a
τοῦτο ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Νικία, πότερον σοφώτερα φῆς ἡμῶν ταῦτα εἶναι τὰ θηρία,
ἢ πάντες ὁμολογοῦμεν ἀνδρεῖα εἶναι, ἢ πᾶσιν ἐναντιούμενος τολμᾶς μηδὲ
ἀνδρεῖα αὐτὰ καλεῖν;

ΝΙ. Οὐ γάρ τι, ὦ Λάχης, ἔγωγε ἀνδρεῖα καλῶ οὔτε θηρία οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν
τὸ τὰ δεινὰ ὑπὸ ἀγνοίας μὴ φοβούμενον, ἀλλ' ἄφοβον καὶ μῶρον· ἢ καὶ τὰ παιδία b
πάντα οἶμαι με ἀνδρεῖα καλεῖν, ἢ δι' ἀγνοίαν οὐδὲν δέδοικεν; Ἄλλ', οἶμαι, τὸ
ἄφοβον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον οὐ ταυτόν ἐστιν. Ἐγὼ δὲ ἀνδρείας μὲν καὶ προμηθείας
πάνυ τισὶν ὀλίγοις οἶμαι μετεῖναι, θρασύτητος δὲ καὶ τόλμης καὶ τοῦ ἀφόβου
μετὰ ἀπρομηθείας πάνυ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ

θηρίων. Ταῦτ' οὖν ἃ σὺ καλεῖς ἀνδρεῖα καὶ οἱ πολλοί, ἐγὼ θρασέα καλῶ,
 c ἀνδρεῖα δὲ τὰ φρόνιμα περὶ ὧν λέγω.

ΛΑ. Θεάσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς εὖ ὁδε ἑαυτὸν δῆ, ὡς οἶεται, κοσμεῖ τῷ λόγῳ · οὓς δὲ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ἀνδρείους εἶναι, τούτους ἀποστερεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς.

ΝΙ. Οὐκ οὖν ἔγωγε, ὦ Λάχης, ἀλλὰ θάρρει · φημί γάρ σε εἶναι σοφόν, καὶ Λάμαχόν γε, εἴπερ ἐστὲ ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ ἄλλους γε συχνοὺς Ἀθηναίων.

ΛΑ. Οὐδὲν ἐρῶ πρὸς ταῦτα, ἔχων εἰπεῖν, ἵνα μή με φῆς ὡς ἀληθῶς Αἰ-
 ξωνέα εἶναι ¹.

d ΣΩ. Μηδὲ γε εἴπης, ὦ Λάχης · καὶ γάρ μοι δοκεῖς τοῦδε μὴ ῥηθῆσθαι ὅτι ταύτην τὴν σοφίαν παρὰ Δάμωνος τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἐταίρου ² παρεῖληφεν, ὁ δὲ Δάμων τῷ Προδίκῳ πολλὰ πλησιάζει, ὃς δὲ δοκεῖ τῶν σοφιστῶν κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνόματα διαιεῖν.

ΛΑ. Καὶ γὰρ πρέπει, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοφιστῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον κομψεύεσθαι ἢ ἀνδρὶ ὃν ἡ πόλις ἀξιοῖ αὐτῆς προσεσθάναι.

e ΣΩ. Πρέπει μέντοι, ὦ μακάριε, τῶν μεγίστων προστατοῦντι μεγίστης φρονήσεως μετέχειν · δοκεῖ δέ μοι Νικίας ἀξίος εἶναι ἐπισκέψεως, ὅποι ποτὲ βλέπων τοῦνομα τοῦτο τίθησι τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

ΛΑ. Αὐτὸς τοῖνον σκόπει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μέλλω ποιεῖν, ὦ ἄριστε · μὴ μέντοι οἴου με ἀφήσειν σε τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν καὶ συσκόπει τὰ λεγόμενα.

ΛΑ. Ταῦτα δὴ ἔστω, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι.

198a ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ. Σὺ δέ, Νικία, λέγε ἡμῖν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς · οἶσθ' ὅτι τὴν ἀνδρείαν κατ' ἀρχὰς τοῦ λόγου ἐσκοποῦμεν ὡς μέρος ἀρετῆς σκοποῦντες;

ΝΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω ὡς μόνιον, ὄντων δὲ καὶ ἄλλων μερῶν, ἃ ζύμπαντα ἀρετὴ κέκληται;

ΝΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἅπερ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις; Ἐγὼ δὲ καλῶ πρὸς ἀνδρεία σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἄλλ' ἅττα τοιαῦτα. Οὐ καὶ σὺ;

¹ The inhabitants of the Attic deme Aixone had the name of being slanderous. The Greeks even knew a verb αἰξωνεύομαι (Harpocr., s. v. Αἰξωνή).

² Damon of Oa was the author of a theory on the psychological influence of music, of which we find traces in Plato's *Rep.* III 398 c ff., and IV 424 c. He may be called a fore-runner of Aristoxenus and his predecessors. Plut. (*Per.* 4) calls him the master of Pericles. According to Arist., *Ath. Pol.* 27, 4 it was Damon who advised Pericles to establish the μισθοφορά (payment to the judges).

Diels, VS.⁵ 37 B gives the fragments of Damon's treatise, the *Areopagiticus*. Cp. Arm. J. Janssens, art. *Damoon van Oa* in *Tijdschr. v. Phil.* 1941 p. 499-566 and 649-712. A short account is given by K. Freeman, *The pre-socr. Philosophers*, Oxford 1946, p. 207 f.

ΝΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

b

ΣΩ. Ἐχε δὴ· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ὁμολογοῦμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων σκεψώμεθα, ὅπως μὴ σὺ μὲν ἄλλ' ἅττα ἡγῇ, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἄλλα. Ἄ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς ἡγοῦμεθα, φράσομέν σοι· σὺ δὲ, ἂν μὴ ὁμολογῇς, διδάξεις. Ἡγούμεθα δ' ἡμεῖς δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι α καὶ δέος παρέχει, θαρραλέα δὲ β μὴ δέος παρέχει· δέος δὲ παρέχειν οὐ τὰ γεγονότα οὐδὲ τὰ παρόντα τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ προσδοκώμενα· δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ· ἢ οὐχ οὕτω καὶ σὺ, ὦ Λάχης;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν ἡμέτερα τοίνυν, ὦ Νικία, ἀκούεις, ὅτι δεινὰ μὲν τὰ μέλλοντα c κακὰ φαμεν εἶναι, θαρραλέα δὲ τὰ μὴ κακὰ ἢ ἀγαθὰ μέλλοντα· σὺ δὲ ταύτη ἢ ἄλλη περὶ τούτων λέγεις;

ΝΙ. Ταύτη ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δέ γε τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀνδρείαν προσαγορεύεις;

ΝΙ. Κομιδῇ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον σκεψώμεθα εἰ ξυνδοκεῖ σοὶ τε καὶ ἡμῖν.

ΝΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δὴ φράσω. Δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ ἐμοὶ τε καὶ τῷδε, περὶ ὧν ἐστὶν d ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν εἶναι περὶ γεγονότος, εἰδέναι ὅπῃ γέγονεν, ἄλλη δὲ περὶ γιγνομένων, ὅπῃ γίγνεται, ἄλλη δὲ ὅπῃ ἂν κάλλιστα γένοιτο καὶ γενήσεται τὸ μήπω γεγονός, ἀλλ' ἡ αὐτή. Οἶον περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν εἰς ἅπαντας τοὺς χρόνους οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ <ῆ> ἱατρική, μία οὖσα, ἐφορᾷ καὶ γιγνόμενα καὶ γεγονότα καὶ γενησόμενα ὅπῃ γενήσεται· καὶ περὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς αὖ φυόμενα ἢ e γεωργία ὡσαύτως ἔχει· καὶ δήπου τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοὶ ἂν μαρτυρήσαιτε ὅτι ἡ στρατηγία κάλλιστα προμηθεῖται τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῇ μαντικῇ οἶεται δεῖν ὑπηρετεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἄρχειν, ὡς εἰδυῖα κάλλιον τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα· καὶ ὁ νόμος οὕτω τάττει, 199a μὴ τὸν μάντιν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν στρατηγὸν τοῦ μάντεως· φήσομεν ταῦτα, ὦ Λάχης;

ΛΑ. Φήσομεν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; Σὺ ἡμῖν, ὦ Νικία, ξύμφης περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐσομένων καὶ γιγνομένων καὶ γεγονότων ἐπάτεις;

ΝΙ. Ἐγώ γε· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ ἄριστε, καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία τῶν δεινῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν καὶ θαρραλέων, ὡς φῆς· ἢ γάρ;

b

ΝΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ δεινὰ ὁμολόγηται καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ μέλλοντα κακὰ εἶναι.

ΝΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δέ γ' αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μελλόντων καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων εἶναι.

ΝΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μόνον ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἢ ἀνδρείᾳ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ μελλόντων μόνον περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν ἐπαίει, ἀλλὰ καὶ
c γιγνομένων καὶ γεγονότων καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων, ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιστῆμαι.

ΝΙ. Ἐοικέν γε.

**fourth
definition**

ΣΩ. Μέρος ἄρα ἀνδρείας ἡμῖν, ὦ Νικία, ἀπεκρίνω σχεδόν τι τρίτον· καίτοι ἡμεῖς ἡρωτῶμεν ὅλην δὴ ἀνδρείαν ὅ τι εἴη. Καὶ νῦν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον οὐ μόνον δεινῶν τε καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ἡ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων, ὡς
d νῦν αὖ ὁ σὸς λόγος, ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη. Οὕτως αὖ μετατίθεσθαι ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Νικία;

ΝΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἀπολείπειν ἂν τι ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀρετῆς, εἴπερ εἰδείη τά τε ἀγαθὰ πάντα καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται καὶ γέγονε, καὶ τὰ κακὰ ὡσαύτως; Καὶ τοῦτον οἶει ἂν σὺ ἐνδεᾶ εἶναι σωφροσύνης ἢ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ὁσιότητος, ὅ γε μόνῳ προσήκει καὶ περὶ θεοῦ καὶ περὶ
e ἀνθρώπους ἐξευλαβεῖσθαι τε τὰ δεινὰ καὶ τὰ μή, καὶ τὰγαθὰ πορίζεσθαι, ἐπισταμένῳ ὀρθῶς προσομιλεῖν;

ΝΙ. Λέγειν τί, ὦ Σώκρατες, μοι δοκεῖς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ Νικία, μόριον ἀρετῆς ἂν εἴη τὸ νῦν σοι λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ σύμπασα ἀρετή.

ΝΙ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔφαμέν γε τὴν ἀνδρείαν μόριον εἶναι ἐν τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς.

ΝΙ. Ἐφαμεν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε νῦν λεγόμενον οὐ φαίνεται.

ΝΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

aporia

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἡρῆκαμεν, ὦ Νικία, ἀνδρεία ὅ τι ἐστίν.

ΝΙ. Οὐ φαίνόμεθα.

**difficulties
with the idea
of virtue**

211—Pl., *Prot.* 328 d-334 c; 348 c-361 a.

Socr. has listened *κεκλημένος* to the myth of Protagoras and his further explanations on the possibility of teaching virtue. He is convinced, but has still a little difficulty:

a. L.I. 329 b:

Νῦν οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, σμικροῦ τινος ἐνδεής εἰμι πάντ' ἔχειν, εἴ μοι ἀποκρίναιο τόδε.

Τὴν ἀρετὴν φῆς διδασκτὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπερ ἄλλω τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πειθοίμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι · ὁ δ' ἐθαύμασά σου λέγοντος, τοῦτό μοι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπο- 329c
πλήρωσον. Ἔλεγες γὰρ ὅτι ὁ Ζεὺς τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ πέμψειεν
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ αὐτὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ ἡ δικαιοσύνη
καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἐν τι εἴη συλλήβδην, ἀρετὴ ·
ταῦτ' οὖν αὐτὰ διέλθε μοι ἀκριβῶς τῷ λόγῳ, πότερον ἐν μὲν τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ,
μόρια δὲ αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης, ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν
ἅ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πάντα ὀνόματα τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος · τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἔτι d
ἐπιποθῶ.

— Ἀλλὰ ῥᾶδιον τοῦτό γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι ἐνὸς ὄντος
τῆς ἀρετῆς μόριά ἐστὶν ἅ ἐρωτᾷς. — Πότερον, ἔφη, ὥσπερ προσώπου τὰ
μόρια μόριά ἐστιν, στόμα τε καὶ ῥίς καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα, ἢ ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ
χρυσοῦ μόρια οὐδὲν διαφέρει [τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἐτέρων] ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ὅλου,
ἀλλ' ἢ μεγέθει καὶ σμικρότητι; — Ἐκείνως μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ e
τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πρόσωπον. —

Then Socr. tries to prove that δικαιοσύνη and ὁσιότης, σωφροσύνη and σοφία are
the same. Finally Prot. grants, rather reluctantly, that these four virtues are
ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις (349 d); only the fifth virtue, ἀνδρεία, is very dif-
ferent from them.

Socr. next proceeds to prove that all the five virtues may be reduced to know-
ledge. He first asks Prot. this preliminary question:

b. L.I. 352 b:

Πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην; Πότερον καὶ τοῦτό σοι δοκεῖ ὥσπερ τοῖς πολλοῖς **the ruling**
ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἄλλως; Δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι, οὐκ **function of**
ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν εἶναι · οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ **knowledge**
ὄντος διανοοῦνται, ἀλλ' ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης οὐ τὴν ἐπιστή-
μην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυμόν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην,
ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς διανοοῦμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης
ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. Ἄρ' οὖν 352c
καὶ σοὶ τοιοῦτόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖ, ἢ καλόν τε εἶναι ἢ ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἶον
ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἕνα περ γινώσκει τις τάγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά, μὴ ἂν
κρατηθῇ ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ὥστε ἄλλ' ἅττα πράττειν ἢ ἂν ἐπιστήμη κελεύῃ, ἀλλ'
ἱκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ;

— Καὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἅμα, εἶπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ,
αἰσχροὺς ἐστὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι d
εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων. — Καλῶς γε, ἔφη, ἐγὼ, σὺ λέγων καὶ
ἀληθῶς.

Hence the thesis of Socr. that, when a man knows what is good, he cannot **nobody sins**
do what is wrong. See our nr. 204 c and d. **willingly**

strange con-
sequences of
this thesis

212—In the *Hippias Minor* Socr. defends the thesis that he who lies willingly is better than he who does it unwillingly (ἄκων). For the first is also able to speak the truth about the same subject, the latter is not. Hippias protests violently. But Socr. maintains his thesis; it really seems to him so:

a. Pl., *Hipp. Min.* 372 d:

οἱ βλάπτοντες τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀδικοῦντες καὶ ψευδόμενοι καὶ ἐξαπα-
τῶντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες ἐκόντες ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντες, βελτίους εἶναι ἢ οἱ ἄκοντες.

For example runners who willingly run slowly are better than those who cannot do else. And in wrestling and all other bodily functions it is the same. So it is in the use of lifeless instruments, such as oars. In like manner we can better have a soul with which we may do wrong willingly than one with which we cannot do otherwise.

b. Ib. 375 d-376 b:

ΙΠ. Δεινὸν μεντὰν εἶη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ οἱ ἐκόντες ἀδικοῦντες βελτίους
ἐσονται ἢ οἱ ἄκοντες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεται γέ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

ΙΠ. Οὐκοῦν ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δ' ὦμην, ὦ Ἱππία, καὶ σοὶ φανῆναι. Πάλιν δ' ἀπόκριναι· ἡ
δικαιοσύνη οὐχὶ ἡ δύναμις τίς ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀμφοτέρα; ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη
ἔν γέ τι τούτων εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην;

ΙΠ. Ναί.

375e ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δύναμις ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ἡ δυνατωτέρα
ψυχῇ δικαιοτέρα ἐστὶ; βελτίων γάρ που ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡ τοιαύτη.

ΙΠ. Ἐφάνη γάρ.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ ἐπιστήμη; οὐχ ἡ σοφωτέρα ψυχῇ δικαιοτέρα, ἢ δ' ἀμαθεστέρα
ἀδικωτέρα;

<ΙΠ. Ναί.>

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ ἀμφοτέρα; οὐχ ἡ ἀμφοτέρας ἔχουσα, ἐπιστήμην καὶ δύναμιν,
δικαιοτέρα, ἢ δ' ἀμαθεστέρα ἀδικωτέρα; οὐχ οὕτως ἀνάγκη ἔχειν;

ΙΠ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ δυνατωτέρα καὶ σοφωτέρα αὕτη ἀμείνων οὔσα ἐφάνη καὶ
ἀμφοτέρα μᾶλλον δυναμένη ποιεῖν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, περὶ πᾶσαν
376a ἐργασίαν;

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἄρα τὰ αἰσχρά ἐργάζεται, ἐκοῦσα ἐργάζεται διὰ δύναμιν καὶ
τέχνην· ταῦτα δὲ δικαιοσύνης φαίνεται, ἥτοι ἀμφοτέρα ἢ τὸ ἕτερον.

ΙΠ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸ μὲν γε ἀδικεῖν κακὰ ποιεῖν ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καλὰ.

IN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ δυνατωτέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ψυχὴ, ὅτανπερ ἀδικῇ, ἐκοῦσα ἀδικήσῃ, ἡ δὲ πονηρὰ ἄκουσα;

ΙΠ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ὁ τὴν ἀγαθὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων, κακὸς δὲ ὁ τὴν κακὴν; b

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθοῦ μὲν ἄρα ἀνδρὸς ἐστὶν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖν, κακοῦ δὲ ἄκοντα, εἴπερ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀγαθὴν ψυχὴν ἔχει.

ΙΠ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔχει γε.

ΣΩ. Ὁ ἄρα ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνων καὶ αἰσχροῦ καὶ ἀδικοῦ ποιῶν, ὧς Ἱππία, εἴπερ τίς ἐστιν οὗτος, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλος εἴη ἢ ὁ ἀγαθός.

ΙΠ. Οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως σοι συγχωρήσω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐμοί, ὦ Ἱππία, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον οὕτω φαίνεσθαι νῦν γε ἡμῖν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου. c

To consult: B. J. H. Ovink, *Philosophische Erklärung der platonischen Dialoge Meno u. Hippias Minor*, Amsterdam, 1931, p. 125-201. "Die Schwierigkeit im ersten Teil unsres Dialogs rührt daher, dass die praktische Vernunft von der theoretischen nicht scharf und klar genug unterschieden ist" (*O.c.* p. 166).

213—The same questions return in the *Gorgias* and *Meno*.

In *Gorg.* 466 b Polus contends that the rhetors "have great power in political life" (μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν). Socr. replies: "No, they have not. They do *what seems good to them*—such as having men killed unrighteously—; but not *what they really wish to do*". This difference between ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς and ποιεῖν ἃ βούλονται is explained by him as follows:

**in the
Gorgias**

a. Pl., *Gorg.* 467 c:

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι ὃ ἂν πράττω-
σιν ἐκάσποτε, ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσιν τοῦθ' ὃ πράττουσιν; Οἶον οἱ τὰ
φάρμακα πίνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν τοῦτο βούλεσθαι
ὑπερ ποιοῦσιν, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἕνεκα
πίνουσιν;

**Meno "wish"
in the strict
sense what
is good**

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλεονέτες τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι 467d
οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ ποιοῦσιν ἐκάσποτε· τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε
καὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ πράγματ' ἔχειν; ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, οἶμαι, οὗ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν,
πλουτεῖν· πλούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν.

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων; ἐάν τίς τι πράττῃ ἕνεκά του, οὐ
τοῦτο βούλεται ὃ πράττει, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα πράττει;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

- e ΣΩ. Ἐὰρ' οὖν ἔστιν τι τῶν ὄντων, ὃ οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀγαθόν γ' ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν;

ΠΩΛ. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλούτον καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τάναντία τούτων;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

- 468a ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ ἄρα τοιάδε λέγεις, ἃ ἐνίστε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐνίστε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίστε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα; Οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἢ ἄλλ' ἅττα καλεῖς τὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἔνεκα τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράττουσιν, ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἢ τὰγαθὰ τῶν μεταξὺ;

ΠΩΛ. Τὰ μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

- b ΣΩ. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν, ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσταμεν, ὅταν ἐστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ οὐ;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνουμεν, εἴ τιν' ἀποκτείνουμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλουμεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες.

ΠΩΛ. Φημί.

- c ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὠμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἔνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι, ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὐ ἔνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν;

ΠΩΛ. Μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἀπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐάν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ἦ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερά δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. Τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα, ὥς φῆς σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα, οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ ἢ γάρ; Ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢ οὐ; Τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνεις;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀληθῆ.

- d ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὠμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύραννος ὢν εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὃν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ ἢ γάρ;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐὰρ' οὖν καὶ ἃ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα; Τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνεις;

ΠΩΛ. 'Αλλ' οὐ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.

ΣΩ. "Εστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἀγαθόν τι κατὰ τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν; e

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. 'Αληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι μηδὲ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.

So Polus and Socr. agree with each other on this point:

b. Ib. 509 e⁵:

(ὠμολογήσαμεν) μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄκοντας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν.

again: no-
body does
any wrong
willingly

214—In the *Meno* 86 d-87 c Socr. proceeds by hypothesis in order to answer to the question ἄρα διδακτὸν ἀρετή.

a. Pl., *Meno* 87 c:

Εἰ δέ γ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τις ἡ ἀρετή, δῆλον ὅτι διδακτὸν ἂν εἴη.

again: is
virtue
knowledge?

Socr. and Meno now first agree that virtue = φρόνησις, and therefore that it can be taught. Yet Socr. mentions the difficulty that there are no διδάσκαλοι of virtue; so they must have been mistaken in their definition.

b. Ib. 97 a Meno asks:

MEN. Πῶς δὴ [ὀρθῶς] λέγεις;

ΣΩ. 'Εγὼ ἐρῶ. Εἴ τις εἰδὼς τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν εἰς Λάρισαν ἢ ὅποι βούλει ἄλλοσε βαδίξει καὶ ἄλλοις ἡγοῖτο, ἄλλο τι ὀρθῶς ἂν καὶ εὖ ἡγοῖτο;

it may be
due also to
ὀρθῇ δόξᾳ

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἴ τις ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων ἤ τις ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός, ἐληλυθὼς δὲ μὴ μὴδ' ἐπιστάμενος, οὐ καὶ οὗτος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡγοῖτο; 97b

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἔως γ' ἂν που ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχη περὶ ὧν ὁ ἕτερος ἐπιστήμην, οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμὼν ἔσται οἰόμενος μὲν ἀληθῆ φρονῶν δὲ μὴ τοῦ τοῦτο φρονοῦντος.

MEN. Οὐδὲν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Δόξα ἄρα ἀληθῆς πρὸς ὀρθότητα πράξεως οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμὼν φρονήσεως· καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ νυνδὴ παρελείπομεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς σκέψει ὅποιόν τι εἴη, λέγοντες ὅτι φρόνησις μόνον ἡγεῖται τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν· τὸ δὲ ἄρα καὶ δόξα ἦν ἀληθῆς. c

MEN. "Εοικέ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἥττον ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης.

MEN. Τοσούτω γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων ἀεὶ ἂν ἐπιτυγχάνοι, ὁ δὲ τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν τοτὲ μὲν ἂν τυγχάνοι, τοτὲ δ' οὐ.

ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις; Ὁ ἀεὶ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἀεὶ ἂν τυγχάνοι, ἕωσπερ ὀρθὰ δοξάζοι;

d MEN. Ἀνάγκη μοι φαίνεται · ὥστε θαυμάζω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος, ὅ τι δὴ ποτε πολὺ τιμιώτερα ἢ ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὀρθῆς δόξης, καὶ δι' ὅ τι τὸ μὲν ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἕτερόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν.

ΣΩ. Οἴσθα οὖν δι' ὅ τι θαυμάζεις, ἢ ἐγὼ σοι εἶπω;

MEN. Πάνυ γ' εἶπέ.

ΣΩ. Ὅτι τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἀγάλμασιν οὐ προσέσχηκας τὸν νοῦν · ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἐστιν παρ' ὑμῖν.

e MEN. Πρὸς τί δὲ δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα, ἐάν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ᾖ, ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ δραπετεύει, ἐάν δὲ δεδεμένα, παραμένει.

MEN. Τί οὖν δὴ;

ΣΩ. Τῶν ἐκείνου ποιημάτων λελυμένων μὲν ἐκτῆσθαι οὐ πολλῆς τινος ἀξίον ἐστι τιμῆς, ὥσπερ δραπετὴν ἄνθρωπον · οὐ γὰρ παραμένει · δεδεμένον δὲ πολλοῦ ἀξίον · πάνυ γὰρ καλὰ τὰ ἔργα ἐστίν. Πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα; πρὸς τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθεῖς. Καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον 98a παραμένωσιν, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα καὶ πάντ' ἀγαθὰ ἐργάζονται · πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἀξίαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δῆσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῶ. — Ἐπειδὴν δὲ δεθῶσιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι γίνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι · καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστίν, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῶ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης.

Now, as men can also be good by ὀρθὴ δόξα, it is clear that in this case they cannot teach it others.

Probably this more practical acknowledgement of virtue *θεῖα μοῖρα παραγινομένη* ἀνευ νοῦ οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται is the view of Plato himself.

4—FIRST PRINCIPLES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCRATES ACCORDING TO THE CRITO

215—Socr. is condemned to death. He is in prison, awaiting execution. Friends come and ask him to run away and to flee with them to Thessaly, where he will be well received. Socr. answers as follows:

Socr.'s reply
to Crito Pl., *Crito* 46 b-c; 47 a-48 c; 48 d-49 e:

(46 b) ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, ἢ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ ἀξία, εἰ μετὰ τινος ὀρθότητος εἶη · εἰ δὲ μή, ὅσῳ μείζων, τοσούτω χαλεπωτέρα. Σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ

ἡμᾶς εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή· ὥς ἐγώ, οὐ μόνον νῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεί, τοιοῦτος οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ ὃς ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνεται. Τοὺς δὲ λόγους οὓς ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν ἔλεγον οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπειδὴ μοι ἤδε ἡ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονται μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ οὕπερ καὶ πρότερον· ὧν ἐὰν μὴ 46c βελτίῳ ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι οὐ μὴ σοι συγχωρήσω οὐδ' ἂν πλείω τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἢ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὥσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται δεσμούς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις.

(47a) Σκόπει δὴ· οὐχ ἱκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρὴ τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν, τὰς δ' οὐ, οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν, τῶν δ' οὐ; Τί φῆς; Ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται;

KP. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μή;

KP. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Χρηστὰι δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων;

KP. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο; Γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο 47b πρᾶττων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἐνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἱατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὧν;

KP. Ἐνὸς μόνου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν.

KP. Δῆλα δὴ.

ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον ἢ ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαίοντι, μᾶλλον ἢ ἢ σύμπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις.

KP. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Εἴεν. Ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς c ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαίόντων, ἄρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται;

KP. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο; καὶ ποῖ τείνει καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος;

KP. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα· τοῦτο γὰρ διόλλυσι.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα, ὧ Κρίτων, οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα δῶμεν· καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχυρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡ βουλή ἡμῶν ἐστίν, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἑπεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτὴν ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἐνός, εἴ τίς ἐστὶν ἐπαίων, d ὃν δεῖ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ σύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους; Ὡς

εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. Ἡ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο;

KP. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν βέλτιον γιγνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον διολέσωμεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαϊόντων
e δόξῃ, ἄρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ; Ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, ἢ οὐχί;

KP. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος;

KP. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἄρ' ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένου ὃ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν
48a λωβᾶται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίνησιν; ἢ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων περὶ ὃ ἢ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν;

KP. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τιμιώτερον;

KP. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, πάντῳ ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὃ τι ὁ ἐπαίων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ὁ εἷς καὶ αὐτὴ ἢ ἀλήθεια. Ὡστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγῇ εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. — Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, φαίη γ' ἂν τις, οἷοί τέ εἰσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ

b ἀποκτινύναι.

KP. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα, φαίη γάρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Ἀλλ', ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος ὃν διεληλύθαμεν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι ὁμοίος εἶναι τῷ καὶ πρότερον · καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκοπεῖ εἰ ἔτι μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὐ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

KP. Ἀλλὰ μένει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστιν μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;

KP. Μένει.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ
c ἐνθένδε πειρᾶσθαι ἐξίεναι μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων ἢ οὐ δίκαιον · καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνεται δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐῷμεν.

(48 d) KP. Καλῶς μὲν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες · ὅρα δὲ τί δρῶμεν.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὦ ἀγαθέ, κοινῇ, καὶ εἴ πῃ ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε καί σοι πείσομαι ·

(48 e) Ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐὰν σοι ἱκανῶς λέγῃται, καὶ
49a πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἢ ἂν μάλιστα οἶῃ.

KP. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι.

ΣΩ. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμέν ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ τινι μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὶ δὲ οὐ; ἢ οὐδαμῶς τό γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν, ὥς πολ-
 λάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὡμολογήθη; ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο.
 Ἡ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταῖσδε ταῖς ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις
 ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσὶν, καὶ πάλαι, ὦ Κρίτων, ἄρα τηλικοῖδε γέροντες ἄνδρες πρὸς
 ἀλλήλους σπουδῇ διαλεγόμενοι ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέ-
 ροντες; Ἡ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν, εἴτε φασὶν
 οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή· καὶ εἴτε δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔτι τῶνδε χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἴτε καὶ
 πρότερα, ὅμως τό γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει
 ὃν παντὶ τρόπῳ; Φαμέν, ἢ οὐ;

ΚΡ. Φαμέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδὴ γε
 οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δῆ; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ οὐ;

ΚΡ. Οὐ δεῖ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δαί; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ φασιν, δίκαιον,
 ἢ οὐ δίκαιον;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γὰρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.

ΚΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων οὐδ' ἂν
 ὁτιοῦν πάσχη ὑπ' αὐτῶν. Καὶ ὅρα, ὦ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν ὅπως μὴ
 παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολογῆς· οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει.
 Οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μὴ, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη
 τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν ὀρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλευόμενα. Σκόπει δὲ
 οὖν καὶ σὺ εὖ μάλα πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν
 βουλευόμενοι, ὥς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν
 οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς, ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ
 κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; Ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ· σοὶ δὲ
 εἴ πῃ ἄλλη δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. Εἰ δ' ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθεν, τὸ μετὰ
 τοῦτο ἄκουε.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐμμένω τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ μοι ἀλλὰ λέγε.

Then Socr. proceeds to prove that by taking flight he would do wrong to the laws of the state, which always protected him during his life. Thus, by listening to Crito, he would act against his own firmly established principles. He cannot do that.

First principles of the philosophy of Socrates

- 1—Not to care for the opinion of the crowd, but only for that of the experts.
- 2—Soul is of a higher value than body.
- 3—It is not of first importance to live, but to live well.
- 4—Good, beautiful and righteous are the same.
- 5—We may never do wrong, and in no respect,
- 6—Nor return wrong if anyone has wronged us.

5—THE STORY OF THE YOUTH OF SOCRATES, TOLD
BY HIMSELF

216—Pl., *Phaedo* 96 a-c; 97 b-100 b; 100 c-e:

his interest in the philosophy of nature

96b 'Εγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὢν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν · ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστιν ¹. Καὶ πολλάκις ἑμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον, σκοπῶν πρῶτον τὰ τοιαῦτα · 'Ἀρ', ἐπειδὴν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ ὥς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῷα συντρέφεται; καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμα ἔστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀήρ, ἢ τὸ πῦρ; ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δ' ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὄραν καὶ ὁσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνεται μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης, λαβούσης τὸ ἡρεμεῖν, κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην; Καὶ αὖ τούτων τὰς φθοράς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν τε
c καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἑμαυτῷ ἔδοξα πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφυῆς εἶναι ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα.

Τεκμήριον δέ σοι ἐρῶ ἱκανόν. 'Εγὼ γάρ, ἃ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἠπιστάμην ὡς γε ἑμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, ὥστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸ τοῦ ᾧ μιν εἰδέναι. —

the book of Anaxagoras

97c

'Ἄλλ' ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη, 'Ἀναξαγόρου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἦσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον · καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, τὸν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ · εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιο τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἐκάστου ὅπῃ γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν, ὅπῃ βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἔστιν ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν
d πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν. 'Ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν

Socrates and the philosophy of nature

¹ Together with Xen., *Mem.* IV 7, this chapter explains to us something as to the image that Aristoph. drew of Socr. in his *Clouds*. The young Socr. appears to have been keenly interested in the philosophy of nature. Xenophon, who has to defend him against the accusation of ζητεῖν τὰ μετέωρα, says he disapproved of people learning these things beyond the practical use of them. Yet he adds the words: καίτοι οὐκ ἀπειρός γε αὐτῶν ἦν (IV 7, 3).

ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον · ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι · τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν¹. Ταῦτα δὲ λογιζόμενος ἄσμενος εὐρηκέναι ὥμην διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἑμαυτῷ, τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν, καὶ μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν πότερον ἢ γῆ πλατεῖά ἐστιν ἢ στρογγύλη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσειεν, ἐπεκδιηγῆσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, e λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἄμεινον ἦν τοιαύτην εἶναι · καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτήν, ἐπεκδιηγῆσθαι ὡς ἄμεινον ἦν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι · καὶ εἴ μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοι, παρεσκευάσμεν ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος. Καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἡλίου οὕτω παρεσκευάσμεν ὡσαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρον, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ 98a τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πῇ ποτε ταῦτ' ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πᾶσχειν ἢ πᾶσχει. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὐτὸν ὥμην, φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμηθῆναι, ἄλλην τινὰ αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἔχει · ἐκάστω οὖν αὐτῶν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῇ b πᾶσι, τὸ ἐκάστω βέλτιστον ὥμην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐπεκδιηγῆσθαι ἀγαθόν. Καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ, πάνυ σπουδῇ λαβὼν τὰς βίβλους,

¹ Socrates' marked preference for a teleological interpretation of nature is surely a historical feature. It is attested by Xen., *Mem.* I 4, 4-9 *. Socr. is introduced here talking with Aristodemus, surnamed "the little", who did not sacrifice to the gods nor consult the oracles. Socr. asks him whether there are any men he admires. And when the other mentions to him some poets, a sculptor and a painter, he asks: **his teleological view of nature**

Πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀπεργαζόμενοι εἰδῶλα ἄφρονά τε καὶ ἀκίνητα ἀξιοθαυμαστότεροι εἶναι ἢ οἱ ζῶα ἐμφρονά τε καὶ ἐνεργά; Πολὺ νῆ Δία οἱ ζῶα, εἴπερ γε μὴ τύχη τινί, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ γνώμης ταῦτα γίγνεται. Τῶν δὲ ἀτεχνάμαρτος ἐχόντων ὅτου ἐνεκά ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν φανερώς ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ ὄντων πότερα τύχης καὶ πότερα γνώμης ἔργα κρίνεις; Πρέπει μὲν τὰ ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ γενόμενα γνώμης ἔργα εἶναι. (5) Οὐκ οὐκ δοκεῖ σοι ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποίων ἀνθρώπους ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ προσθεῖναι αὐτοῖς δι' ὧν αἰσθάνονται ἕκαστα; (Follows a description of eyes and ears, the eye-lids and brows, the teeth and the place of the mouth.) ταῦτα οὕτω προνοητικῶς πεπραγμένα ἀπορεῖς πότερα τύχης ἢ γνώμης ἔργα εἶναι; Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἐφη, ἀλλ' οὕτω γε σκοπούμενῳ πάνυ ἔοικε ταῦτα σοφοῦ τινος δημιουργοῦ καὶ φιλοζῶου τεχνήμασι. Τὸ δὲ ἐμφῶσαι μὲν ἔρωτα τῆς τεκνοποιίας, ἐμφῶσαι δὲ ταῖς γειναμέναις ἔρωτα τοῦ ἐκτρέφειν, τοῖς δὲ τραφεῖσι μέγιστον μὲν πόθον τοῦ ζῆν, μέγιστον δὲ φόβον τοῦ θανάτου; Ἀμέλει καὶ ταῦτα ἔοικε μηχανήμασί τινος ζῶα εἶναι βουλευσαμένου. (8) Σὺ δὲ σαυτὸν δοκεῖς τι φρόνιμον ἔχειν, ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμῶς οὐδὲν οἷον φρόνιμον εἶναι; . . . καὶ τάδε τὰ ὑπερμεγέθη καὶ πληθὺς ἀπειρα (he means the heavenly bodies) δι' ἀφροσύνην τινὰ οὕτως οἶει εὐτάκτως ἔχειν; (9) Μὰ Δί' οὐ γὰρ ὁρῶ τοὺς κυρίους, ὥσπερ τῶν ἐνθάδε γιγνομένων τοὺς δημιουργοὺς. Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν σαυτοῦ σὺν ψυχῇ ὁρᾷς, ἢ τοῦ σώματος κυρία ἐστίν · ὥστε κατὰ γε τοῦτο ἔξεστί σοι λέγειν ὅτι οὐδὲν γνώμη, ἀλλὰ τύχη πάντα πράττεις.

* Cp. our note to the nr. 163 a (Diog. of Apoll., fr. 3).

ὡς τάχιστα οἷός τ' ἦ ἀνεγίγνωσκον, ἔν' ὡς τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον.

Socrates'
disillusion

- Ἐκ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος, ὃ ἐταῖρε, ὥχόμενον φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ, προῶν καὶ ἀναγινώσκων, ὁρῶν ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῶ οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδὲ τινὰς αἰτίας
- c ἐπαιτιώμενον εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα. Καὶ μοι ἔδοξεν ὁμοιότατον πεπονθέναι ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις, λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅσα πράττει νῶ πράττει, κάπειτα, ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστων ὧν πράττω, λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διὰ ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὅτι σύγκειται μοι τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὅστων καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὅσῃ ἐστι στερεὰ καὶ διαφυὰς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα,
- d οἷα ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνίσσθαι, περιαμπέχοντα τὰ ὅσῃ μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος ὁ συνέχει αὐτὰ ἀιωρουμένων οὖν τῶν ὅστων ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ξυμβολαῖς χαλῶντα καὶ συντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτεσθαι που ποιεῖ οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη· καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν συγκαμφθεὶς ἐνθάδε κάθημαι. Καὶ αὖ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν, ἐτέρας τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοάς καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τοιαῦτα αἰτιώμενος, ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς
- e αἰτίας λέγειν, ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὖ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἢν ἂν κελεύσωσιν. Ἐπεὶ, νῆ τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγῶ-
- 99a μαι, πάλοι ἂν ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ ὅσῃ ἢ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοὺς ἦν, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ᾧμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι, πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν, ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἥντιν' ἂν τάττη.

- Ἄλλ' αἷτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι, ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν καὶ ὅσῃ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω, οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ' ἦ ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντά μοι, ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι. Ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἃ ποιῶ, καὶ ταῦτα
- b νῶ πράττω ἄλλ' οὐ τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἰρέσει, πολλῇ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ῥαθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγου· τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν τί ἐστι τὸ αἷτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἷτιον οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἴη αἷτιον· ὁ δὲ μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφῶντες οἱ πολλοὶ ὥσπερ ἐν σκότει, ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι προσχρώμενοι, ὡς αἷτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν. Διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μὲν τις, δίνην περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ, ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν· ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ καρδόπῳ πλατεῖα
- c βάθρον τὸν ἀέρα ὑπερείδει. Τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν καῖσθαι, ταύτην οὔτε ζητοῦσιν οὔτε τινὰ οἶονται δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἡγούνται τούτου Ἄτλαντα ἂν ποτε ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἅπαντα ξυνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον ξυνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἶονται. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει μαθητῆς ὅτουοῦν ἥδιστ' ἂν γενοίμην. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην
- d καὶ οὕτ' αὐτὸς εὐρεῖν οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεῦτερον

πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ἢ πεπραγμάτευμαι βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπιδείξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὦ Κέβης; — Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὥς βούλομαι.

— Ἐδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἡ δ' ὅς, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι μὴ πάθοιμι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοποῦμενοι · διαφθείρονται γάρ που ἔνιοι τὰ ὄμματα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν ὕδατι ἢ τινι τοιούτῳ σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. Τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ διανοήθη, καὶ ἔδωκα μὴ παντάπασιν τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθεῖν βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὀμμασι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἀπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. Ἐδοξε δὴ μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀληθειαν. Ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν · οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν ἔργοις. Ἄλλ' οὖν δὴ ταύτη γε ὥρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἔρρωμενέστατον εἶναι ¹, ᾧ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὥς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων · ᾧ δ' ἂν μὴ, ὥς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. Βούλομαι δέ σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ᾧ λέγω · οἶμαι γὰρ σε νῦν οὐ μανθάνειν. — Οὐ, μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα. — Ἄλλ', ἡ δ' ὅς, ὧδε λέγω, οὐδὲν καινόν, ἀλλ' ἅπερ αἰεὶ τε ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων. Ἐρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι, καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ' ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα. —

(100c⁶) Οὐ τοίνυν, ἡ δ' ὅς, ἔτι μανθάνω οὐδὲ δύναιμι τὰς ἄλλας αἰτίας, τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας, γινώσκειν · ἀλλ' ἐὰν τίς μοι λέγῃ διότι καλὸν ἐστὶν ὅτιοῦν, ἡ χρῶμα εὐανθὲς ἔχον ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐῷ, ταράττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι · τοῦτο δὲ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ' ἑμαυτῷ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἶτε παρουσία εἶτε κοινωνία, εἶτε ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη ², οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διςχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλὰ · τοῦτο γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἑμαυτῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι

¹ Xenophon also mentions the method of the hypothesis as an ἴδιον of Socrates. *Mem.* IV 6, 13-14:

Εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγου μηδὲν ἔχων σαφὲς λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως ἤτοι σοφώτερον φάσκειν εἶναι ὃν αὐτὸς λέγει, ἢ πολιτικώτερον ἢ ἀνδρειώτερον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανῆγεν ἂν πάντα τὸν λόγον ὧδε πως · Φῆς σὺ ἀμείνω πολίτην εἶναι ὃν σὺ ἐπαινεῖς ἢ ὃν ἐγώ; — Φημί γάρ οὖν. — Τί οὖν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο πρῶτον ἐπεσκεψάμεθα, τί ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου;

² Cf. this remarkable passage in *Dissoi logoi*, c. 4 (περὶ ἀλάθεος καὶ ψεύδεος), 4-5 (Diels, VS.⁵ 90):

ἔπειτα τοὶ ἐξῆς καθήμενοι αἱ λέγοιμεν 'μύστας εἰμὶ', τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν πάντες ἐροῦμεν, ἀλαθὲς δὲ μόνος ἐγώ, ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰμὶ. (5) δᾶλον ὦν, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅταν μὲν αὐτῷ παρῇ τὸ ψεῦδος, ψεύστας ἐστίν, ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἀλαθὲς, ἀλαθής.

his
deύτερος
πλοῦς

e

100a

b

d

the method
of the
hypothesis

a prela-
tonic theory
of ideas?

- e καὶ ἄλλῳ. Καὶ τούτου ἐχόμενος ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἂν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὅτῳ οὖν ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ καλὰ ἢ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ; — Δοκεῖ. — Καὶ μεγέθει ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μείζω μείζω, καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω; — Ναί. —

6—SOME ADDITIONS FROM XENOPHON

**Socr. and
the religion
of the state**

217—Xenophon defends Socrates against the accusation of introducing new deities.

a. I 1, 2-4:

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὥς οὐκ ἐνόμιζεν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς, ποῖω ποτ' ἐχρήσαντο τεκμηρίῳ; θύων τε γὰρ φανερός ἦν πολλάκις μὲν οἴκοι, πολλάκις δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν τῆς πόλεως βωμῶν, καὶ μαντικῇ χρώμενος οὐκ ἀφανὴς ἦν. διετεθρύλητο γὰρ ὥς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν. ὁ δ' οὐδὲν καινότερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι μαντικὴν νομίζοντες οἰωνοῖς τε χρῶνται καὶ φήμαις καὶ συμβόλοις καὶ θυσίαις. οὗτοί τε γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐ τοὺς ὀρνίθας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας εἰδέναι τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς μαντευομένοις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς θεοὺς διὰ τούτων αὐτὰ σημαίνειν, κακῆϊνος δὲ οὕτως ἐνόμιζεν. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοί φασιν ὑπὸ τε τῶν ὀρνίθων καὶ τῶν ἀπαντῶντων ἀποτρέπεσθαι τε καὶ προτρέπεσθαι ὡς Σωκράτης δ' ὥσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγε τὸ δαιμόνιον γὰρ ἔφη σημαίνειν.

b. Ib. 19:

**his belief in
the providence
of the gods**

Καὶ γὰρ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι θεοὺς ἐνόμιζεν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ὃν τρόπον οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν ὅτι οὗτοί μὲν γὰρ οἶονται τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ μὲν εἰδέναι, τὰ δ' οὐκ εἰδέναι. Σωκράτης δὲ πάντα μὲν ἡγεῖτο θεοὺς εἰδέναι, τὰ τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ τὰ σιγῇ βουλευόμενα, πανταχοῦ δὲ παρεῖναι καὶ σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων.

c. Ib. 9:

**and in
divination**

Ἐφη δὲ δεῖν ἃ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοί, μαθάνειν, ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστί, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυθάνεσθαι. τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ οἷς ἂν ᾤσιν ἔλεω σημαίνειν.

**he is far from
protesting
against the
cult of the
state**

218—a. Xen., *Mem.* I 3, 1:

Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς φανερός ἦν καὶ ποιῶν καὶ λέγων ἥπερ ἡ Πυθία ἀποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτῶσι πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ περὶ θυσίας ἢ περὶ προγόνων

θεραπείας ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τοιούτων · ἢ τε γὰρ Πυθία νόμῳ πόλεως ἀναιρεῖ ποιοῦντας εὐσεβῶς ἂν ποιεῖν, Σωκράτης τε οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ἐποίει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρήγει, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως πῶς ποιοῦντας περιέρχους καὶ ματαίους ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι.

An example of such περιεργία is given by Xenophon himself in *Anab.* III 1, 5-7, where he is rebuked by Socr. for not having asked the Pythia what he ought to have asked, having decided the point in question himself.

b. Pl., *Phaedo* 118 a:

and strict in
his
observances

Ἦδη οὖν σχεδὸν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἥτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος — ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ — εἶπεν, ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγγετο · „ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα · ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε.”

219—a. Xen., *Mem.* I 3, 2:

his prayers

Καὶ εὐχετο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀπλῶς τάγαθὰ διδόναι, ὥς τοὺς θεοὺς κάλλιστα εἰδότας ὅποια ἀγαθὰ ἔστιν.

b. Cf. [Pl.], *Alcib.* II 142 e-143 a (Socr. speaks):

Κινδυνεύει γοῦν, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, φρόνιμός τις εἶναι ἐκεῖνος ὃ ποιητής, ὃς δοκεῖ μοι φίλοις ἀνοήτοις τισὶ χρησάμενος, ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς καὶ πράττοντας καὶ εὐχομένους ἅπερ οὐ βέλτιον ἦν, ἐκείνοις δὲ ἐδόκει, κοινῇ ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων αὐτῶν εὐχὴν ποιήσασθαι · λέγει δὲ πῶς ὥδι —

Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἐσθλά, φησί, καὶ εὐχομένοις καὶ ἀνεύκτοις

ἄμμι δίδου, τὰ δὲ δεινὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις ἀπαλέξειν

κελεύει. Ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καλῶς δοκεῖ καὶ ἀσφαλῶς λέγειν ὃ ποιητής.

c. And *Phaedr.* 279 bc, where Socr. prays, leaving the place of the conversation:

„ὦ φίλε Πάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε θεοί, δοίητέ μοι καλῶ γενέσθαι τάν-δοθεν · ἔξωθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναι μοι φίλια. Πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν · τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἴη μοι ὅσον μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν δύναιτο ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σὺ φρων.” Ἐτ’ ἄλλου του δεόμεθα, ὦ Φαῖδρε; Ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ μετρίως ἡῶται.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ ταῦτα συνεύχου · κοινὰ γὰρ τὰ τῶν φίλων.

220—a. Pl., *Apol.* 31 d:

the daimo-
nion

Ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἢ ὅταν γένηται, αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε.

b. Xen., *Mem.* I 1, 4:

Καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν συνόντων προηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου προσημαίνοντος· καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις μετέμελε.

reaction of
the
Athenians

c. Pl., *Euthyphro* 3 b, where Euth. answers, when Socr. tells him about the accusation of καὶνὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν and not believing in the old ones, —:

Μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαιμόνιον φῆς σαυτῷ ἐκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι. Ὡς οὖν καινοτομοῦντός σου περὶ τὰ θεῖα γέγραπται ταύτην τὴν γραφήν, καὶ ὡς διαβαλὼν δὴ ἔρχεται¹ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς.

d. Cf. Xen., *Mem.* IV 3, 12, where Euthydemus says to Socrates:

Παντάσασιν εἰκόασιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ θεοὶ πολλὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι. — Τὸ δὲ καί, ἥ ἀδυνατοῦμεν τὰ συμφέροντα προνοεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῶν μελλόντων, ταύτῃ αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν συνεργεῖν, διὰ μαντικῆς τοῖς πυθανονομίους φράζοντας τὰ ἀποβησόμενα καὶ διδάσκοντας ἥ ἂν ἄριστα γίγνοιτο; — Σοὶ δ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰκόασιν ἔτι φιλικώτερον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι, εἴ γε μὴδὲ ἐπερωτῶμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ προσημαίνουσί σοι ἅ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἅ μὴ.

e. Cf. Xen., *Apol.* 14. Socrates having spoken about the daimonion, the judges expressed their disapproval by loud interruptions:

Οἱ δικασταὶ ἐθορύβουν, οἱ μὲν ἀπιστοῦντες τοῖς λεγομένοις, οἱ δὲ καὶ φθορῶντες εἰ καὶ παρὰ θεῶν μειζόνων ἢ αὐτοὶ τυγχάνοι.

Socr.' strict
idea of science

221—Xen., *Mem.* I 1, 15:

Ἐσκόπει δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν (the philosophers of nature) καὶ τάδε, ἄρ' ὥσπερ οἱ τάνθρώπεια μανθάνοντες ἡγοῦνται τοῦθ' ὅ τι ἂν μάθωσιν ἑαυτοῖς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτῃ ἂν βούλωνται ποιήσιν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ τὰ θεῖα ζητοῦντες νομίζουσιν, ἐπειδὴν γινῶσιν αἷς ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίγνεται, ποιήσιν, ὅταν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀνέμους καὶ ὕδατα καὶ ὥρας καὶ ὅτου ἂν ἄλλου δέωνται τῶν τοιούτων, ἢ τοιούτον μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐλπίζουσιν, ἀρκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς γινῶναι μόνον ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστα γίγνεται.

the principle
of Cynicism

222—Xen., *Mem.* I 6, 10:

Ἐοικας, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφῇ καὶ πολυτέλειαν

¹ ἔρχεται - sc. Meletus.

εἶναι· ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον κράτιστον, τὸ δ' ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ κράτιστου.

223—Xen., *Mem.* IV 4, 12-14, 19, 25 (a dialogue between Socr. and Hippias): **human law
and divine
law**

Socr. says: φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι.

Hipp.: Ἄρα τὸ αὐτὸ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι; Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνομαί σου μᾶλλον ὁποῖον νόμιμον ἢ ποῖον δίκαιον λέγεις. Νόμους δὲ πόλεως, ἔφη, γινώσκεις; Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Καὶ τίνας τούτους νομίζεις; Ἄ οἱ πολῖται, ἔφη, συνθέμενοι ἅ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ ὧν ἀπέχεσθαι ἐγράψαντο. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, νόμιμος μὲν ἂν εἴη ὁ κατὰ ταῦτα πολιτευόμενος, ἄνομος δὲ ὁ ταῦτα παραβαίνων; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ δίκαια μὲν ἂν πράττοι ὁ τούτοις πειθόμενος, ἄδικα δ' ὁ τούτοις ἀπειθῶν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν τὰ δίκαια πράττων δίκαιος, ὁ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα ἄδικος; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ὁ μὲν ἄρα νόμιμος δίκαιός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ ἄνομος ἄδικος. Καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας· Νόμους δ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πῶς ἂν τις ἡγήσαιτο σπουδαῖον πρᾶγμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς, οὓς γε πολλάκις αὐτοὶ οἱ θέμενοι ἀποδοκιμάσαντες μετατίθενται; Καὶ γὰρ πόλεμον, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, πολλάκις ἀράμεναι αἱ πόλεις πάλιν εἰρήνην ποιοῦνται. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Διάφορον οὖν τι οἶε ποιεῖν, ἔφη, τοὺς τοῖς νόμοις πειθομένους φαυλίζων, ὅτι καταλυθεῖεν ἂν οἱ νόμοι, ἢ εἰ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις εὐτακτοῦντας ψέγοις, ὅτι γένοιτ' ἂν εἰρήνη; ἢ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις ταῖς πατρίσι προθύμως βοηθοῦντας μέμφει; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. —

(19) Ἀγράφους δὲ τίνας οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὦ Ἰππία, νόμους; Τούς γ' ἐν πάσῃ, ἔφη, χώρα κατὰ ταῦτ' ἀνομιζομένους. Ἐχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ἔφη, ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι αὐτοὺς ἔθεντο; Καὶ πῶς ἂν, ἔφη, οἳ γε οὔτε συνελθεῖν ἅπαντες ἂν δυνηθεῖεν οὔτε ὁμόφωνοί εἰσι; Τίνας οὖν, ἔφη, νομίζεις τεθεικέναι τοὺς νόμους τούτους; Ἔγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, θεοὺς οἶμαι τοὺς νόμους τούτους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις θεῖναι· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πρῶτον νομίζεται θεοὺς σέβειν. —

(25) Πότερον οὖν, ὦ Ἰππία, τοὺς θεοὺς ἡγεῖ τὰ δίκαια νομοθετεῖν ἢ ἄλλα τῶν δικαίων; Οὐκ ἄλλα μὰ Δί', ἔφη· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος γέ τις τὰ δίκαια νομοθετήσειεν, εἰ μὴ θεός. Καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἄρα, ὦ Ἰππία, τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ νόμιμον εἶναι ἀρέσκει.

From this text the following three points may be inferred:

1—Socr. did not oppose human law to divine law, but, seeing clearly the relativity of human law, he still maintained its authority.

2—This authority of human law he founded by analogy on divine law.

3—So "righteousness" is the same for men and gods; and consequently our moral principles are not confined to the human sphere, but they are valid for the gods as well.

7—A PRE-PLATONIC THEORY OF IDEAS?

A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, Ch. V, examines the meaning of the words εἶδος and ἰδέα in pre-platonic literature. He tries to prove that, especially in the medical literature of the fifth century, these terms had a rather technical sense.

"forms"-
kinds

224—a. *Thuc.* III 81:

πᾶσά τε ἰδέα κατέστη θανάτου.

b. *Ib.* 82:

Καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἄν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις τῶν ἀνθρώπων ᾗ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡ συ-
χαίτερα καὶ τοῖς εἶδεσι διηλλαγμένα.

c. *Aristoph.*, *Frogs* 384:

Ἄγε νῦν ἑτέραν ὕμνων ἰδέαν τὴν καρποφόρον βασιλείαν,
Δήμητρα θεᾶν, ἐπικοσμοῦντες ζαθέοις μολπαῖς κελαδεῖτε.

platonic ter-
minology in
Hippocr.

225—a. The following passage of Hippocr. is, according to Burnet and Taylor, sufficient to prove the existence of a pre-platonic theory of Ideas, and hence to refute the whole traditional view of Socr. and Plato.

Hippocr., Π. ἀρχαίης ἱητρικῆς c. 15 (I 17 K.):

The author is speaking about the four elements of Empedocles. He wonders how medical men, who base their science (τέχνη) on this theory (ὑπόθεσις), can treat patients in agreement with their theory. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς, οἶμαι, ἐξηυρημένον αὐτό τι ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ ξηρὸν ἢ ὑγρὸν μηδενὶ ἄλλω εἶδει κοινὸν ἐόν.

About the interpretation of this and the following texts cp. C. Gillespie in *Class. Quarterly* 1912, and my work *Een keerpunt in Plato's denken*, pp. 86-100.

b. Cf. Hippocr., o.c. c. 19 (p. 23 K.):

Πέσσεσθαι δὲ καὶ μεταβάλλειν καὶ λεπτόνεσθαι καὶ παχύνεσθαι¹ ἐς χυμῶν εἶδος δι' ἄλλων εἰδέων καὶ παντοίων, . . . πάντων δὲ τούτων ἥκιστα προσήκει θερμῷ ἢ ψυχρῷ πάσχειν².

Taylor explains: εἶδος = element, substance.

¹ These four infinitives are used as substantives.

² The translation "to all these things surely heat and cold are not in the least liable" (W. H. S. Jones) renders the true meaning of the sentence. πάντων δὲ τούτων must be understood as a partitive genitive used as object. A great number of examples of this use is adduced by Nachmanson in *Dragma, Martino P. Nilsson dedicatum*, Lund 1939, pp. 313-325. A good parallel to our text may be found in Plato, *Leg.* 718 a: συμπάντων τούτων ἀποτελοῦντα.

226—For this more technical interpretation Taylor adduces

εἶδος =
substance?

a. *Hippocr.*, π. φύσιος ἀνθρώπου 5 (VI 40 L.).

In a previous chapter the author refuted the theory that the human body would consist of one element (ἐν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον). Now he is speaking about the four elements in the body: αἷμα, φλέγμα, χολή ξανθὴ καὶ μέλαινα.

Καὶ τουτέων πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ νόμον τὰ οὐνόματα διωρίσθαι φημί καὶ οὐδενὶ αὐτέων τωὐτὸ οὐνομα εἶναι, ἔπειτα κατὰ φύσιν τὰς ἰδέας¹ κεχωρίσθαι, καὶ οὔτε τὸ φλέγμα οὐδὲν εἰσικέναι τῷ αἵματι, οὔτε τὸ αἷμα τῇ χολῇ, οὔτε τὴν χολὴν τῷ φλέγματι. — Ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, ὅτε τοσοῦτον διήλλαχται ἀλλήλων τὴν ἰδέην¹ τε καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, μὴ ἐν αὐτὰ εἶναι, εἴπερ μὴ πῦρ τε καὶ ὕδωρ ἐν τε καὶ ταυτόν ἐστιν.

b. Cf. o.c., c. 2 (p. 34 L.).

Here Hippocr. is speaking of those physicians who admit that the human body consists of one element only.

Ἐν γάρ τι εἶναι φασιν, ὃ τι ἕκαστος αὐτέων βούλεται ὀνομάσας, καὶ τοῦτο ἐν ἑὸν μεταλλάσσειν τὴν ἰδέην καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, — καὶ γινέσθαι καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ παντοῖόν τι ἄλλο.

227—a. *Hippocr.*, Π. τέχνης c. 6. (p. 10 L.):

other
instances

διαιτήμασιν ἰώμενοι καὶ ἄλλοισί τε εἶδουσιν.

Taylor: "curing by diet and by other *things*" („substances").

Gillespie: „curing by modes of diet and *other kinds (of treatment)*", such as φάρμακα. — This is surely right.

b. Ib., c. 4 (p. 6 L.):

τὸ τῆς τύχης εἶδος ψῖλον (opposed to the *eidos* of the τέχνη).

Here εἶδος is simple a periphrasis, as we know them from Homer. Transl.: "fate in itself".

c. Ib., c. 2 (p. 4 L.).

The author tries to prove the reality of medical science by the argument that the name supposes an εἶδος. The core of the argumentation is: "what is, can be seen; what is not, cannot be seen. Arts are visible, *ergo* they are real".

Δοκεῖ δὴ μοι τὸ μὲν σύμπαν τέχνη εἶναι οὐδεμία οὐκ ἐοῦσα· καὶ γὰρ ἄλογον τῶν ἐόντων τι ἡγεῖσθαι μὴ ἐόν· ἐπεὶ τῶν γε μὴ ἐόντων τίνα ἂν τις οὐσίην θεησάμενος ἀπαγγεῖλειεν ὥς ἔστιν; εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἔστι γ' ἰδεῖν τὰ μὴ ἐόντα ὥσπερ τὰ ἐόντα, οὐκ οἶδ', ὅπως ἂν τις αὐτὰ νομίσειε μὴ ἐόντα, ἃ γε εἴη καὶ ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδεῖν καὶ γνώμῃ νοῆσαι ὥς ἔστιν. ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐκ ᾔη τοῦτο τοιοῦτον· ἀλλὰ

¹ outward appearance.

τὰ μὲν ἑόντα αἰεὶ ὁρᾶται τε καὶ γινώσκεται, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἑόντα οὔτε ὁρᾶται οὔτε γινώσκεται. γινώσκεται τοίνυν, δεδιδαγμένων ἤδη <τῶν εἰδέων, ἐκάστη> τῶν τεχνέων, καὶ οὐδεμία ἐστὶν ἢ γε ἔκ τινος εἶδος οὐχ ὁρᾶται. οἶμαι δὲ ἔγωγε καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτὰς διὰ τὰ εἶδεα λαβεῖν · ἄλογον γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ εἶδεα βλαστάνειν καὶ ἀδύνατον · τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀνόματα [φύσεως] νομοθετήματά ἐστιν, τὰ δὲ εἶδεα οὐ νομοθετήματα, ἀλλὰ βλαστήματα.

It seems that by this physician ὄν and μὴ ὄν are made dependent on the being or not being of εἶδεα, and that, according to him, things have their names after the εἶδεα.

V. Wilamowitz says (*Platon* II, p. 253): "Wer ihm das beigebracht hatte, der war dem platonischen Gedanken and sogar ihrem Ausdruck, nahe".

Yet, when this author says that there is no τέχνη ἢ γε ἔκ τινος εἶδος μὴ ὁρᾶται, εἶδος means simply "visible form", "appearance". Nevertheless he shows a background of philosophical reflexion. Cf. *Dissoi logoi* 4 (our nr. 216, p. 147, n. 2).

the
testimony of
Proclus

228—We possess just one late testimony about a Pythagorean and a Socratic theory of Ideas.

Proclus in *Plat. Parm.* 128 e:

Ἦν μὲν γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ἡ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν θεωρία, καὶ δηλοῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν Σοφιστῇ τῶν εἰδῶν φίλους προσαγορεύων τοὺς ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ σοφοὺς, ἀλλ' ὃ γε μάλιστα πρεσβεύσας καὶ διαρρήδην ὑποθέμενος τὰ εἶδη Σωκράτης ἐστίν.

This text must be explained as a *platonizing interpretation* of Pythagoreanism and of "Socratism". S. my work, *Een keerpunt in Plato's denken*, p. 100-118.

8— THE DEATH OF SOCRATES

229—Pl., *Phaedo* 116 a-118 end:

116b Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν, ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά τι ὡς λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἶπετο αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. Περιεμένοντες οὖν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τότε δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς συμφορᾶς διεξιόντες ὅση ἡμῖν γεγонуῖα εἴη, ἀτεχνῶς ἡγούμενοι ὥσπερ πατρός στερηθέντες διάξειν ὀρφανοὶ τὸν ἔπειτα βίον. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐλούσατο καὶ ἠνέχθη παρ' αὐτὸν τὰ παιδία (δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ υἱεῖς σμικροὶ ἦσαν, εἷς δὲ μέγας), καὶ αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες ἀφίκοντο, ἐκείναις ἐναντίον τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλεχθεῖς τε καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ παιδία ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ' ἡμᾶς.

Καὶ ἦν ἡδη ἐγγὺς ἡλίου δυσμῶν · χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτριψεν ἔνδον. Ἐλθὼν

δ' ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος, καὶ οὐ πολλὰ ἄττα μετὰ ταῦτα διελέχθη. Καὶ ἤκεν
 ὁ τῶν ἑνδεκα ὑπηρέτης, καὶ στάς παρ' αὐτόν · „ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ κατα-
 γνώσομαι γε σοῦ ὅπερ ἄλλων καταγιγνώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουνσι καὶ κατ- c
 αρῶνται, ἐπειδὴν αὐτοῖς παραγγείλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν
 ἀρχόντων. Σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναιότατον καὶ
 πρῶτατον καὶ ἄριστον ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πώποτε δεῦρο ἀφικομένων · καὶ δὴ
 καὶ νῦν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις, γιγνώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ
 ἐκείνοις. Νῦν οὖν, οἶσθα γὰρ ἃ ἤλθον ἀγγέλλων · χαῖρέ τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς ῥᾶστα
 φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα.” Καί, ἅμα δακρύσας, μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπῆι. Καὶ ὁ d
 Σωκράτης, ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτόν · „Καὶ σύ, ἔφη, χαῖρε · καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα
 ποιήσομεν.” Καὶ ἅμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς · „ὦς ἀστεῖος, ἔφη, ὁ ἄνθρωπος · καὶ παρὰ
 πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προσήει καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίοτε, καὶ ἦν ἀνδρῶν λῶστος ·
 καὶ νῦν, ὡς γενναίως με ἀποδακρύει. Ἄλλ' ἄγε δὴ, ὦ Κρίτων, πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ,
 καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται · εἰ δὲ μή, τριψάτω ὁ ἄνθρωπος.”

Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων · „Ἄλλ' οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτι ἥλιον εἶναι e
 ἐπὶ τοῖς ὅρεσι καὶ οὐπω δεδυκέναι. Καὶ ἅμα ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ ἄλλους πάννυ ὅψε
 πίνοντας ἐπειδὴν παραγγεληὶ αὐτοῖς, δειπνήσαντάς τε καὶ πίνοντας εὖ μάλα
 καὶ συγγενομένους γ' ἐνίοις ὧν ἂν τύχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες. Ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπείγου ·
 ἔτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ.” Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης · „Εἰκότως γε, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐκείνοι
 τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οὐς σύ λέγεις, οἷονται γὰρ κερδανεῖν ταῦτα ποιήσαντες. II7a
 Καὶ ἔγωγε ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσω · οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι κερδαίνειν, ὀλίγον
 ὕστερον πιών, ἄλλο γε ἢ γέλωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ' ἑμαυτῷ, γλιχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν
 καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόοντος. Ἄλλ' ἔθι, ἔφη, πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως
 ποίει..”

Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδί πλησίον ἐστῶτι. Καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξεληθὼν
 καὶ συχνὸν χρόνον διατρίψας ἤκεν ἄγων τὸν μέλλοντα δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον,
 ἐν κύλικι φέροντα τετριμμένον. Ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἄνθρωπον · „Εἶεν,
 ἔφη, ὦ βέλτιστε, σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων, τί χρή ποιεῖν; — Οὐδὲν ἄλλο,
 ἔφη, ἢ πίνοντα περιένειν ἕως ἂν σου βάρος ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γένηται, ἔπειτα κατα- b
 κεῖσθαι · καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει.” Καὶ ἅμα ὥρεξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Σωκράτει.
 Καὶ ὃς λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἴλεως, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας
 οὔτε τοῦ χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰώθει ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέ-
 ψας πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον · „Τί λέγεις, ἔφη, περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ πόματος πρὸς τὸ
 ἀποσπεῖσάι τι, ἔξεστιν ἢ οὔ; — Τοσοῦτον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τρίβομεν ὅσον
 οἴομεθα μέτριον εἶναι πίνειν. — Μανθάνω, ἢ δ' ὅς. Ἄλλ' εὐχεσθαί γέ που τοῖς c
 θεοῖς ἔξεστί τε καὶ χρή, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε εὐτυχῇ γενέσθαι ·
 ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὐχομαί τε καὶ γένοιτο ταῦτα.” Καὶ ἅμ' εἰπὼν ταῦτα, ἐπισχόμενος
 καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπιεν.

Καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπιεικῶς οἰοί τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν ·

ὥς δὲ εἶδομεν πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι · ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀστακτεῖ ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὥστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπέκλαιον ἐμαυτόν, οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκεῖνόν γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ τύχην, οἷου ἀνδρὸς ἐταίρου ἐστερημένος εἶην.

- d 'Ο δὲ Κρίτων, ἔτι πρότερος ἐμοῦ ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἐξάνεστη. 'Απολλόδωρος δέ, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ, οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχυσάμενος κλαίων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν, οὐδένα ὄντινα οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων πλήν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους. 'Εκεῖνος δέ ·
e „Οἶα, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι. 'Εγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτου ἕνεκα τὰς γυναικας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ τοιαῦτα πλημμελοῖεν · καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρή τελευτᾷν. 'Αλλ' ἡσυχίαν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρτερεῖτε.” Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἡσυχύνημέν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύειν.

- 'Ο δὲ περιελθὼν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἔφη τὰ σκέλη, κατεκλίθη ὕπτιος · οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος · καὶ ἅμα, ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ, οὗτος διαλιπὼν χρόνον ἐπεσκόπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη · κἄπειτα, σφόδρα πιέσας αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα, ἤρετο εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο. 'Ο δ' οὐκ ἔφη. Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖθις τὰς κνήμας, 118a καὶ ἐπ' αὐτὰς οὕτως ἡμῖν ἐπεδείκνυτο ὅτι ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πηγνύτο. Καὶ αὐτὸς ἤπτετο, καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχέσεται. "Ἦδη οὖν σχεδὸν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἥτρον ψυχόμενα · καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος, ἕνεκεν ἀλύπτο γάρ, εἶπεν, ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγγετο · „ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ 'Ασκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα · ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε. — 'Αλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων · ἀλλ' ὅρα εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις.” Ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο · ἀλλ' ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυπεν αὐτόν. Καὶ δὲ τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν · ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Κρίτων συνέλαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς.

"Ἦδε ἡ τελευτή, ὦ 'Εχέκρατες, τοῦ ἐταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὥς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.

EIGHTH CHAPTER

THE MINOR SOCRATICS

I—THE MEGARIAN SCHOOL

230—a. Diog. II 106:

Euclides

Εὐκλείδης ἀπὸ Μεγάρων τῶν πρὸς Ἴσθμῳ ἢ Γελῶος κατ' ἐνίους. — οὗτος καὶ τὰ Παρμενίδεια μετεχειρίζετο, καὶ οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ Μεγαρικοὶ προσηγορεύοντο, εἴτ' Ἐριστικοί, ὕστερον δὲ Διαλεκτικοί, ... διὰ τὸ πρὸς ἐρώτησιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν τοὺς λόγους διατίθεσθαι. πρὸς τοῦτόν φησιν ὁ Ἑρμόδωρος ἀφικέσθαι Πλάτωνα καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς φιλοσόφους μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Σωκράτους τελευτήν, δείσαντας τὴν ὁμότητα τῶν τυράννων.

b. Ib.:

Οὗτος ἐν τῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀπεφαίνετο πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον ὅτε μὲν γὰρ φρόνησιν, ὅτε δὲ θεόν, καὶ ἄλλοτε νοῦν καὶ τὰ λοιπά. τὰ δ' ἀντικείμενα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀνήρει μὴ εἶναι φάσκων.

he connects
the Eleatic
ὄν with the
Socratic
ἀγαθόν

231—a. Diog. II 108:

Eubulides

Τῆς δὲ Εὐκλείδου διαδοχῆς ¹ ἐστὶ καὶ Εὐβουλίδης ὁ Μιλήσιος, δς καὶ πολλοὺς ἐν διαλεκτικῇ λόγους ἠρώτησε, τὸν τε ψευδόμενον καὶ τὸν διαλανθάνοντα καὶ Ἥλεκτραν καὶ ἐγκεκαλυμμένον καὶ σωρεῖτην καὶ κερατίνην καὶ φαλακρόν.

b. Cic., *Acad.* II 96:

the liar

Si dicis te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris; dicis autem te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris igitur. — Haec Chrysippea sunt, ne ab ipso quidem dissoluta.

To consult: A. Rüstow, *Der Lügner. Theorie, Geschichte und Auflösung*, Leipzig 1910.

c. Lucianus, Βίων προῶσις 22:

the hidden
one, the
Electra,
the veiled
person

Ἥλεκτραν μὲν ἐκείνην τὴν πάνυ, τὴν Ἀγαμέμνονος, ἣ τὰ αὐτὰ οἶδε τε ἅμα καὶ οὐκ οἶδε· παρεστῶτος γὰρ αὐτῇ τοῦ Ὁρέστου ἔτι ἀγνώτος οἶδε μὲν Ὁρέσ-

¹ Eubulides, Diod. Cronus and Stilpo were at least two generations younger than Euclides. Eubulides and Diodorus polemicize against Aristotle; Stilpo died 290. The elder Stoic philosophers combat the arguments of these thinkers.

την ὅτι ἀδελφὸς αὐτῆς, ὅτι δὲ οὗτος Ὀρέστης ἀγνοεῖ. τὸν δ' αὖ ἐγκεκαλυμμένον καὶ πάνυ θαυμαστὸν ἀκούσῃ λόγον· ἀπόκριναι γάρ μοι, τὸν πατέρα οἴσθα τὸν σεαυτοῦ; Ναί. Τί οὖν; ἦν σοι παραστήσας τινὰ ἐγκεκαλυμμένον ἔρωμαι, τοῦτον οἴσθα; τί φήσεις; Δηλαδὴ ἀγνοεῖν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸς οὗτος ἦν ὁ πατήρ ὁ σός. ὥστε εἰ τοῦτον ἀγνοεῖς, δῆλος εἰ τὸν πατέρα τὸν σὸν ἀγνοῶν.

"the Horns"

d. Diog. II 187:

Εἴ τι οὐκ ἀπέβαλες, τοῦτο ἔχεις, κέρατα δὲ οὐκ ἀπέβαλες· κέρατα ἄρα ἔχεις.

"the heap",
the bald-
headed

e. Diog. VII 82:

Οὐχὶ τὰ μὲν δύο ὀλίγα ἔστιν; οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ τρία; οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα μὲν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ τέσσαρα; καὶ οὕτω μέχρι τῶν δέκα· τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα ἔστι καὶ τὰ δέκα ἄρα.

Cf. the argument of Zeno of Elea about the bushel of corn. By Eubul. the problem is extended to that of the sphere of validity of contradictory predicates: when begins bald-headedness, when wealth, when poverty? Neither quantity nor quality can be thought, according to Megarian logic, no more than relation. Only the category of substance stands firm.

the argu-
ments
against
motion
of Diod.
Cronus

232—The Megarians also deny the Aristotelian categories of ποιεῖν and πάσχειν, denying real motion. Diodorus Cronus, a disciple of Eubulides, renews the arguments of Zeno against motion, pointing them against Aristotle and his definition of space.

Sext., *Adv. Math.* X (= *Against the Physicists* II), 85 f.:

Κομίζεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις ἐμβριθὴς ὑπόμνησις εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν ὑπὸ Διοδώρου τοῦ Κρόνου, δι' ἧς παρίστησιν ὅτι κινεῖται μὲν οὐδὲ ἐν, κεκίνηται δέ. καὶ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μὲν, τοῦτο ἀκόλουθόν ἐστι ταῖς κατ' αὐτὸν τῶν ἀμερῶν ὑποθέσειςιν¹. (86) τὸ γὰρ ἀμερὲς σῶμα ὀφείλει ἐν ἀμερεῖ τόπῳ περιέχεσθαι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μῆτε ἐν αὐτῷ κινεῖσθαι (ἐκπεπλήρωκε γὰρ αὐτόν, δεῖ δὲ τόπον ἔχειν μείζονα τὸ κινούμενον) μῆτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν· οὕτω γάρ ἐστιν ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἵνα καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ κινήθῃ. ὥστε οὐδὲ κινεῖται. κεκίνηται δὲ κατὰ λόγον· τὸ γὰρ πρότερον ἐν τῷδε τῷ τόπῳ θεωρούμενον, τοῦτο ἐν ἐτέρῳ νῦν θεωρεῖται τόπῳ, ὅπερ οὐκ ἂν ἐγεγόνει μὴ κινήθέντος αὐτοῦ.

passing
away turns
out to be
impossible

233—Qualitative change proved to be impossible by the arguments of the heap and the bald-headed. Now also passing away turns out to be impossible.

¹ "This follows from his assumption of indivisibles." Diod. was an atomist.

Sextus, *Adv. Math.* X 347:

Λόγον συνηρώτηκε καὶ ὁ Κρόνος τοιοῦτον. εἰ φθείρεται τὸ τειχίον, ἢ τοι ὅτε ἄπτονται ἀλλήλων οἱ λίθοι καὶ εἰσιν ἡρμοσμένοι φθείρεται τὸ τειχίον ἢ ὅτε διεστᾶσιν · οὔτε δὲ ὅτε ἄπτονται ἀλλήλων καὶ εἰσιν ἡρμοσμένοι φθείρεται τὸ τειχίον οὔτε ὅτε διεστᾶσιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων · οὐκ ἄρα φθείρεται τὸ τειχίον.

234—Both movement and change are explained by Aristotle by means of the notion of *dynamis*: there is a δυνάμει ὂν, which is brought to actuality (ἐνέργεια) by an effecting cause. Diodorus argues against this idea of *dynamis*. there is no „dynamis“ without actuality

Aristotle, *Metaph.* H 3, 1046 b²⁹:

Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἳ φασιν, οἷον οἱ Μεγαρικοί, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι ¹, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ οὐ δύνασθαι, οἷον τὸν μὴ οἰκοδομοῦντα οὐ δύνασθαι οἰκοδομεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν οἰκοδομοῦντα ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ · ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οἷς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν.—“Ὡστε οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι ἐξαιρουσὶ καὶ κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν · ἀεὶ γὰρ τό τε ἐστηκὸς ἐστήξεται καὶ τὸ καθήμενον καθεδεῖται · οὐ γὰρ ἀναστήσεται, ἂν καθεζέται · ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἔσται ἀναστήναι ὃ γε μὴ δύναται ἀναστήναι.

235—When we put it in modern terms, Diod. denied the modal categories: what is possible is to him identical with what is real, what is real with what is necessary. What is not necessary, is to him directly impossible. Diod. denies the modal categories

Epict., *Diss.* II 19, 1:

the κυριεύων

Ὁ κυριεύων λόγος ἀπὸ τοιούτων τινῶν ἀφορμῶν ἠρωτῆσθαι φαίνεται. Κοινῆς γὰρ οὔσης μάχης τοῖς τρισὶ τούτοις πρὸς ἄλληλα, τῷ πᾶν παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τῷ δυνατῷ ἀδύνατον μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τῷ δυνατὸν εἶναι ὃ οὔτ' ἔστιν ἀληθὲς οὔτ' ἔσται, συνιδὼν τὴν μάχην ταύτην ὁ Διόδωρος τῇ τῶν πρώτων δυεῖν πιθανότητι συνεχρήσατο πρὸς παράστασιν τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι δυνατὸν ὃ οὔτ' ἔστιν ἀληθὲς οὔτ' ἔσται.

Cp. E. Zeller, *Ueber den κυριεύων des Megarikers Diodor*, Berlin 1882.

K. Joël, *Gesch. d. ant. Phil.* I, pp. 852-855: Diodorus reduces the hypothetical thesis to a categorical one, and causality to substance; for there is no possibility without its realisation, no potentiality without actuality. There are no germs and no developments. All is fixed and ready. Nothing remains than the judgment of identity.

236—Diog. II 112:

Stilpo

Τῶν δ' ἀπ' Εὐκλείδου ἐστὶ καὶ ... Στίλπων ὁ Μεγαρεύς, διασημότατος

¹ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι - that a thing is possible only when it is realized.

φιλόσοφος.— (113) τοσοῦτον δ' εὐρεσιλογία καὶ σοφιστεία προῆγε¹ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὥστε μικροῦ δεῖσαι πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀφορῶσαν εἰς αὐτὸν μεγαρίσαι.

he denies the
possibility of
predication

237—As a consequence of Diodorus' logic Stilpo denies logical subordination.

Plut., *Adv. Coloten* 23, p. 1120 A:

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ Στίλπωνος τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. εἰ περὶ ἵππου τὸ τρέχειν κατηγοροῦμεν, οὐ φησι ταῦτόν εἶναι τῷ περὶ οὗ κατηγορεῖται τὸ κατηγορούμενον, ἀλλ' ἕτερον μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι τὸν λόγον, ἕτερον δὲ τῷ ἀγαθῷ· καὶ πάλιν τὸ ἵππον εἶναι τοῦ τρέχοντα εἶναι διαφέρειν. ἑκατέρου γὰρ ἀπαιτούμενοι τὸν λόγον οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποδίδομεν ὑπὲρ ἀμφοῖν. ὅθεν ἀμαρτάνειν τοὺς ἕτερον ἑτέρου κατηγοροῦντας. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἵππῳ τὸ τρέχειν, πῶς καὶ σιτίου καὶ φαρμάκου τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ νῆ Δία πάλιν λέοντος καὶ κυνὸς τὸ τρέχειν κατηγοροῦμεν; εἰ δ' ἕτερον, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἄνθρωπον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἵππον τρέχειν λέγομεν.

he denies also
the existence
of ideas

238—Diog. II 1, 19:

Δεινὸς δ' ἄγαν ὦν ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς ἀνῆρει καὶ τὰ εἶδη καὶ ἔλεγε τὸν λέγοντα ἄνθρωπον λέγειν μηδένα· οὔτε γὰρ τόνδε λέγειν οὔτε τόνδε· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον τόνδε ἢ τόνδε; οὐδ' ἄρα τόνδε. καὶ πάλιν· τὸ λάχανον οὐκ ἔστι τὸ δεικνύμενον· λάχανον μὲν γὰρ ἦν πρὸ μυρίων ἐτῶν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τοῦτο λάχανον.

Stilpo on this point agrees with Antisthenes, who said to Plato: "I see the horse, but the horse-ness I don't see" (see our nr. 253).

resemblance
with
Cynicism
and Stoics

239—In his stile of life also Stilpo shows great resemblance with the Cynics and with later Stoics: he is said to have been a disciple of the Cynic Diogenes, and the master of the Stoic Zeno. He seems to hold the ideal of the sage, who is αὐτάρκης and does not even need friends.

Seneca, *Epist.* I 9, 1:

ἀπάθεια

An merito reprehendat in quadam epistula Epicurus eos, qui dicunt sapientem se ipso esse contentum et propter hoc amico non indigere, desideras scire. Hoc obicitur Stilboni ab Epicuro et iis, quibus summum bonum visum est animus inpatiens. (2) In ambiguitatem incidendum est, si exprimere ἀπάθειαν uno verbo cito voluerimus et inpatientiam dicere. Poterit enim contrarium ei, quod significare volumus, intellegi.

¹ Intr.: he surpassed all others.

Nos eum volumus dicere, qui respuat omnis mali sensum: accipietur is, qui nullum ferre possit malum. Vide ergo, num satius sit aut invulnerabilem animum dicere aut animum extra omnem patientiam positum. (3) Hoc inter nos (Stoicos) et illos interest: noster sapiens vincit quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit; illorum ne sentit quidem. Illud nobis et illis commune est: sapientem se ipso esse contentum; sed tamen et amicum habere vult et vicinum et contubernalem, quamvis sibi ipse sufficiat.

2—THE SCHOOLS OF ELIS AND ERETRIA

240—Diog. II 105:

**Phaedo and
Menedemus**

Φαίδων Ἡλείος ... μετεῖχε Σωκράτους. — διάδοχος δ' αὐτοῦ Πλείσταινος* Ἡλείος, καὶ τρίτοι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ οἱ περὶ Μενέδημον τὸν Ἐρετριέα καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδην τὸν Φλειάσιον, μεταγρόντες¹ ἀπὸ Στίλπωνος. καὶ ἕως μὲν τούτων Ἡλειακοὶ προσηγορεύοντο, ἀπὸ δὲ Μενεδήμου Ἐρετριακοί.

241—Diog. II 134:

**M. reasons in
the same way
as Stilpo
about
predication**

καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἐρωτᾷ εἰώθει (ὁ Μενέδημος) · Τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἐτέρου ἕτερόν ἐστι; Ναί. Ἔτερον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ὠφελεῖν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; Ναί. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὠφελεῖν ἐστίν.

242—Diog. II 135:

**he also rejects
the negative
judgments**

Ἀνήρει δέ, φασί, καὶ τὰ ἀποφατικά τῶν ἀξιωματῶν, καταφατικά τιθεῖς · καὶ τούτων τὰ ἀπλᾶ προσδεχόμενος τὰ οὐχ ἀπλᾶ ἀνήρει, λέγων συνημμένα καὶ συμπεπλεγμένα.

3—THE CYNICS

243—Diog. VI 1:

Antisthenes

Ἀντισθένης Ἀντισθένους Ἀθηναῖος. ἐλέγετο δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἰθαγενής · — ἐδόκει γὰρ εἶναι Θράκης μητρός. — οὗτος κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν ἤκουσε Γοργίου

¹ μεταγρόντες - "having changed their mind". A probable correction of Emperius, adopted by Ritter and Preller, *Hist. phil. Gr.* The ms have μεταγόντες, which may be used intransitively in the sense of "taking a different route", changing their course (e.g. Xen., *Cyrop.* 7, 4, 8). Only the praesens does not fit in here.

* Πλείσταινος — a correction of Roeper for Πλείστανος.

τοῦ ῥήτορος · ὅθεν τὸ ῥητορικὸν εἶδος ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις ἐπιφέρει. — (2) ὕστερον δὲ παρέβαλε Σωκράτει καὶ τοσοῦτον ὥνατο αὐτοῦ, ὥστε παρήνει τοῖς μαθηταῖς γενέσθαι αὐτῷ πρὸς Σωκράτην συμμαθητάς. οἰκῶν τ' ἐν Πειραιεῖ καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν τοὺς τετταράκοντα σταδίους ἀνιὼν ἤκουε Σωκράτους, παρ' οὗ καὶ τὸ καρτερικὸν λαβὼν καὶ τὸ ἀπαθὲς ζηλώσας κατῆρξε πρῶτος τοῦ κυνισμοῦ

the principle
of Cynicism

b. The principle of Cynicism is formulated in the words ascribed by Xenophon to Socrates: τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θεοῦ. (S. our nr. 222).

Diog. VI 105 attributes them to the Cynic Diogenes of Sinope:

καθάπερ Διογένης, ὃς ἔφασκε θεῶν μὲν ἴδιον εἶναι μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ θεοῖς ὁμοίων τὸ ὀλίγων χρῆζειν.

Antisth.
makes a
show of it

c. Diog. VI 8:

στρέψαντος αὐτοῦ τὸ διερωγὸς τοῦ τρίβωνος εἰς τὸ προφανές Σωκράτης ἰδὼν φησιν · „ὁρῶ σου διὰ τοῦ τρίβωνος τὴν φιλοδοξίαν”

the name
“Cynics”

d. Ib. 13:

Διελέγετο δ' ἐν τῷ Κυνοσάργει γυμνασίῳ μικρὸν ἄποθεν τῶν πυλῶν · ὅθεν τινὲς καὶ τὴν κυνικὴν φασιν ἐντεῦθεν ὀνομασθῆναι. αὐτός τ' ἐπεκαλεῖτο Ἀπλοκύν.

virtue the
supreme
good

244—a. Diog. VI 104:

Ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς (τοῖς Κυνικοῖς) καὶ τέλος εἶναι τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν, ὡς Ἀντισθένης φησὶν ἐν τῷ Ἑρακλεῖ.

ponos

b. Ib. 2:

Καὶ ὅτι ὁ πόνος ἀγαθόν, συνέστησε¹ (ὁ Ἀντ.) διὰ τοῦ μεγάλου Ἑρακλέους καὶ τοῦ Κύρου, τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐλκύσας².

askesis

c. Diog. VI 70:

Διττὴν δὲ ἔλεγεν (ὁ Διογένης) εἶναι τὴν ἀσκησιν, τὴν μὲν ψυχικὴν, τὴν δὲ σωματικὴν. — εἶναι δ' ἀτελεῖ τὴν ἑτέραν χωρὶς τῆς ἑτέρας. — (71) οὐδὲν γε μὴν ἔλεγε τὸ παράπαν ἐν τῷ βίῳ χωρὶς ἀσκήσεως κατορθοῦσθαι, δυνατὴν δὲ ταύτην πᾶν ἐκνικῆσαι.

¹ συνέστησε - he “exhibited”, illustrated this by the examples of H. and C.

² Antisth. effaced the difference between Greeks and barbarians, free men and slaves, men and women: both have the same virtue and the same spiritual calling. Cf. later the Stoic Musonius Rufus.

245—a. Diog. VI 3:

fierce
rejection of
ήδονή

Ἐλεγέ τε (sc. ὁ Ἀντισθένης) συνεχές· μακρίην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείνην.

b. Stob., *Flor.* 29, 65 (III 640, 5 Hs.):

a more
tempered
saying

Ἀντισθένης· ἡδονὰς τὰς μετὰ τοὺς πόνους διωκτέον, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰς πρὸ τῶν πόνων.

246—a. Diog. VI 103:

they are not
interested in
theoretical
problems

Ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς (τοῖς Κυνικοῖς) τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τρόπον περιαιρεῖν¹... , μόνῃ δὲ προσέχειν τῷ ἡθικῷ. καὶ ὅπερ τινὲς ἐπὶ Σωκράτους, τοῦτο Διοκλῆς ἐπὶ Διογένης ἀναγράφει τοῦτον φάσκων λέγειν· Δεῖ ζητεῖν

ὅτι τοι ἐν μεγάροις κακὸν τ' ἀγαθὸν τε τέτυκται.

παραιτοῦνται² δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα· γράμματα γοῦν μὴ μακρὰν εἶδον ὁ Ἀντισθένης τοὺς σώφρονας γενομένους, ἵνα μὴ διαστρέφοντο³ τοῖς ἄλλοις.

b. Ib. II:

virtue a thing
of deeds, not
of learning

τὴν τε ἀρετὴν τῶν ἔργων εἶναι μήτε λόγων πλείστων δεομένην μήτε μαθημάτων.

c. Ib. 7:

what is most
necessary to
learn

Ἐρωτηθεὶς (ὁ Ἀντισθένης), τί τῶν μαθημάτων ἀναγκαϊότατον, ἔφη „τὸ κακὰ ἀπομαθεῖν”. — (8) ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ —, τί ποιῶν καλὸς κάγαθος ἔσσιτο, ἔφη· „εἰ τὰ κακὰ ἂ ἔχεις ὅτι φευκτά ἐσσι μάθοις παρὰ τῶν εἰδόντων.”

247—a. Yet Antisth. speaks of φρόνησις, which has to him clearly a rational character.

Diog. VI 13:

Τεῖχος ἀσφαλέστατον φρόνησιν· μήτε γὰρ καταρρεῖν μήτε προδίδοσθαι. τεῖχος κατασκευαστέον ἐν τοῖς αὐτῶν ἀναλώτοις λογισμοῖς.

b. Antisth. and the Cynics probably are meant by Plato in *Rep.* VI 505b, where he speaks of the κομψότεροι:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τότε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψότεροις φρόνησις, ... καὶ ὅτι γε ... οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι

¹ περιαιρεῖν - to take away.

² παραιτοῦνται - they reject.

³ διαστρέφοντο - that they might not be confounded by.

οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ἥτις φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι.

the ideal of the sage 248—a. Diog. VI 11:

Αὐτάρκη γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος ..., τὴν τ' ἀδοξίαν¹ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἴσον τῷ πόνῳ. — (105) Ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ λιτῶς βιοῦν, αὐτάρκεσι χρωμένοις σιτίοις καὶ τρίβωσι μόνοις, πλούτου καὶ δόξης καὶ εὐγενείας καταφρονοῦσιν. ἔνιοί τε γοῦν καὶ βοτάναις καὶ παντάπασιν ὕδατι χρῶνται ψυχρῶ σκέπαις τε ταῖς τυχοῦσαις καὶ πίθοις, καθάπερ Διογένης, ὃς ἔφασκε θεῶν μὲν ἴδιον εἶναι μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ θεοῖς ὁμοίων τὸ ὀλίγων χρῆζειν. — τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα² λέγουσιν. — (11) τὸν σοφὸν οὐ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους πολιτεύσεσθαι³, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς. γαμήσειν τε τεκνοποιίας χάριν ταῖς εὐφροεστάταις συνιόντα γυναιξί. καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι δέ· μόνον γὰρ εἰδέναι τὸν σοφὸν τίνων χρὴ ἐρᾶν. ἔλεγε δὲ⁴ καὶ κοινὰς εἶναι δεῖν τὰς γυναῖκας γάμον μηδὲνα νομίζων, ἀλλὰ τὸν πείσαντα τῇ πεισθείσῃ συνεῖναι· κοινούς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τοὺς υἰέας. (73) μηδὲν τε ἄτοπον εἶναι ἐξ ἱεροῦ τι λαβεῖν ἢ τῶν ζώων⁵ τινὸς γεύσασθαι· μηδ' ἀνόσιον εἶναι τὸ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων κρεῶν ἄψασθαι, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐθῶν.

against conventions

cosmopolitism

b. Diog. VI 63:

ἐρωτηθεὶς πόθεν εἴη, „κοσμοπολίτης”, ἔφη (ὁ Διογένης).

Antisth. about politics

249—Stob., *Flor.* 45, 28 (II, p. 192 Hs):

Ἀντισθένης ἐρωτηθεὶς, πῶς ἂν τις προσέλθοι πολιτείᾳ, εἶπε· „καθάπερ πυρί, μήτε λίαν ἐγγύς, ἵνα μὴ καῖς, μήτε πόρρω, ἵνα μὴ ῥιγώσῃς.”

¹ ἀδοξίαν - εὐκλεία being nearly the most important thing in life in the eyes of an ancient Greek, Antisth. teaches man to accept ἀδοξία as a spiritual training. Diog. VI 3 says of him:

ἀκούσας ποτὲ ὅτι Πλάτων αὐτὸν κακῶς λέγει, „βασιλικόν”, ἔφη „καλῶς ποιοῦντα κακῶς ἀκούειν.”

Cf. Marcus Antoninus VI 36: βασιλικόν, εὖ μὲν πράττειν, κακῶς δὲ ἀκούειν.

² ἀδιάφορα - Cp. the later Stoic terminology.

³ πολιτεύσεσθαι - live.

⁴ ἔλεγε δὲ - Here Antisth. is the subject (cp. Xen., *Symp.* 1 v 38), in the next sentence (73) Diogenes.

⁵ ζώων - Wendland proposed ζώωντων. The meaning is doubtless that he did not shrink from eating raw flesh, a consequence of the “back-to-nature”-movement, preached by Antisthenes and his followers.

250—a. Philodem., *De piet.* c. 7a (Diels, *Dox.* 538):

**philosophical
monotheism**

Παρ' Ἀντισθένης δ' ἐν μὲν τῷ Φυσικῷ λέγεται τὸ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι πολλοὺς θεοὺς, κατὰ δὲ φύσιν ἓνα.

b. Clem., *Protr.* 71:

Ἀντισθένης ... θεὸν οὐδενὶ εἰκέναι φησὶν · διόπερ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκμαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκόνης δύναται.

251—Stob., Ecl. II 31, 76 (p. 215, I W.):

**Sages are
near to the
gods**

Ἀντισθένης ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τινος τί διδάξει τὸν υἱόν, εἶπεν · „εἰ μὲν θεοὺς μέλλει συμβιοῦν, φιλόσοφον, εἰ δ' ἀνθρώποις, ῥήτορα.”

252—a. Arist., *Metaph.* Δ 29, 1024 b³²:

**Only its own
notion can be
attributed to
a thing**

διὸ Ἀντισθένης ᾤετο εὐήθως μὴθὲν ἀξιῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ ἐν ἐφ' ἑνός · —

b. Cf. Plato, *Soph.* 251 a:

Λέγομεν ἄνθρωπον δὴ πού πολλ' ἄττα ἐπονομάζοντες, τά τε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετάς, ἐν οἷς πᾶσι καὶ ἑτέροις μυρίοις οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν εἶναι φάμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕτερα ἀπειρα, καὶ τᾶλλα δὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὑποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι λέγομεν. — “Ὅθεν γε, οἶμαι, τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι (i. e. Antisthenes) θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν · εὐθύς γὰρ ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον ὥς ἀδύνατον τά τε πολλὰ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ εἶναι, καὶ δὴ πού χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἐὼντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον. Ἐντυγχάνεις γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὥς ἐγῶμαι, πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακόσιν, ἐνίοτε πρεσβυτέροις ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα τεθναυμακόσι, καὶ δὴ τι καὶ πάσσοφον οἰομένοις τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀνηυρηκέναι.

c. Arist., *Metaph.* Η 3, 1043 b²⁴:

**definition is
impossible**

(The difficulty of Antisth. c.s.) ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἔστιν ὀρίσασθαι (τὸν γὰρ ὅρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν).

d. Cf. Pl., *Theaet.* 201 c:

Ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἶονπερὶ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα καὶ τᾶλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι¹. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ

¹ λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι - “are such that no account can be given of them” (Cornford).

ἕκαστον ὀνομάσαι μόνον εἴη, προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν, οὐθ' ὥς ἔστιν οὐθ' ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν. — δεῖν δέ, εἴπερ ἦν δυνατόν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἶχεν οἰκεῖον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὅτιοῦν τῶν πρώτων ῥηθῆναι λόγῳ, οὐ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἄλλ' ἢ ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον· ὄνομα γὰρ μόνον ἔχειν.

there are no
ideas in
Plato's
sense

253—Simpl., in *Ar. Categ.* 208, 28 Kalbfl.:

Τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἀνήρουν τὰς ποιότητας τελέως, τὸ ποιδν συγχωροῦν-
τες εἶναι, ὥσπερ Ἀντισθένης, ὅς ποτε Πλάτωνι διαμφισβητῶν „ὦ Πλάτων”,
ἔφη, „ἔππον μὲν ὀρῶ, ἱππότητα δὲ οὐχ ὀρῶ”.

4—THE SCHOOL OF CYRENE (CYRENAICI)

Aristippus

254—a. Diog. II 65:

Ἀρίστιππος τὸ μὲν γένος ἦν Κυρηναῖος, ἀφιγμένος δὲ Ἀθήναζε, καθά
φησιν Αἰσχίνης, κατὰ κλέος Σωκράτους.

b. Aristocles ap. Euseb., *Praep. ev.* XIV 18, 31:

Σωκράτους δ' ἐταῖρος Ἀρίστιππος ἦν, ὁ τὴν καλουμένην Κυρηναϊκὴν
σοστηγάμενος αἵρεσιν.

ἡδονή
the supreme
good

255—Diog. II 87:

Δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τέλος εὐδαιμονίας διαφέρειν. τέλος μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὴν
κατὰ μέρος ἡδονήν, εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τὸ ἐκ τῶν μερικῶν ἡδονῶν σύστημα, αἷς
συναριθμοῦνται καὶ αἱ παρῳχηκυῖαι καὶ αἱ μέλλουσαι. (88) εἶναί τε τὴν
μερικὴν ἡδονήν δι' αὐτὴν αἰρετήν, τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐ δι' αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ διὰ
τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἡδονάς. πίστιν δ' εἶναι τοῦ τέλους εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν τὸ ἀπροαι-
ρέτως¹ ἡμᾶς ἐκ παίδων ὀκειῶσθαι πρὸς αὐτήν, καὶ τυχόντας αὐτῆς μηθὲν
ἐπιζητεῖν μηθὲν τε οὕτω φεύγειν ὥς τὴν ἐναντίαν αὐτῇ ἀλληθδόνα.

consequences

1. no degrees
of ἡδονή

256—A. is radical in drawing the consequences from this principle:

a. Diog., ib.:

(87) μὴ διαφέρειν τε ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς, μηδὲ ἡδιόν τι εἶναι.

2. only in the
present

b. Aelian., *Var. hist.* XIV 6:

Πάνυ σφόδρα ἔρρωμένως ἐφκει λέγειν ὁ Ἀρίστιππος παρεγγυῶν μήτε τοῖς

¹ ἀπροαιρέτως - instinctively.

παρελθοῦσιν ἐπικάμνειν μήτε τῶν ἐπιόντων προκαμνειν · εὐθυμίας γὰρ δεῖγμα τὸ τοιοῦτο καὶ ἔλεω διανοίας ἀπόδειξις. προσέταττε δὲ ἐφ' ἡμέρα τὴν γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ αὐτὸ πάλιν τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ τῷ μέρει, καθ' ὃ ἕκαστος ἢ πράττει τι ἢ ἐννοεῖ. μόνον γὰρ ἔφασκεν ἡμέτερον εἶναι τὸ παρόν, μήτε δὲ τὸ φθάνον μήτε τὸ προσδοκώμενον · τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπολωλέναι, τὸ δὲ ἄδηλον εἶναι εἶπερ ἔσται.

c. Diog. II 86:

Δύο πάθη ὑφίσταντο, πόνον καὶ ἡδονήν · τὴν μὲν λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἡδονήν, τὸν δὲ πόνον τραχεῖαν κίνησιν.

3. not something negative

d. Ib. 89:

Ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις, ὡς εἴρηται παρ' Ἐπικούρου, δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς μὴ εἶναι ἡδονή, οὐδὲ ἡ ἀηδονία ἀλγῆδών · ἐν κινήσει γὰρ εἶναι ἀμφοτέρω, μὴ οὐσης τῆς ἀπονίας ἢ τῆς ἀηδονίας κινήσεως, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀπονία οἶονεὶ καθεύδοντός ἐστι κατάστασις.

e. Aristocles ap. Euseb., Praef. ev. XIV 18, 32:

Τρεῖς γὰρ ἔφη (ὁ Ἀρίστιππος) καταστάσεις εἶναι περὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν σύγκρασιν · μίαν μὲν, καθ' ἣν ἀλγοῦμεν, ἐοικυῖαν τῷ κατὰ θάλασσαν χειμῶνι, ἑτέραν δέ, καθ' ἣν ἡδόμεθα, τῷ λείῳ κύματι ἀφομοιούμενοι · εἶναι γὰρ λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἡδονήν, οὐρίῳ παραβαλλομένην ἀνέμῳ · τὴν δὲ τρίτην μέσσην εἶναι κατάστασιν, καθ' ἣν οὔτε ἀλγοῦμεν οὔτε ἡδόμεθα, γαλήνῃ παραπλησίαν οὔσαν.

f. Diog. II 88:

Εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀσχημοτάτων γένηται. — εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις ἄτοπος εἴη, ἀλλ' οὖν ἡ ἡδονὴ δι' αὐτὴν αἰρετὴ καὶ ἀγαθόν.

4. there is no bad ἡδονή

g. Ib. 87:

Πολὺ μέντοι τῶν ψυχικῶν τὰς σωματικὰς ἀμείνους εἶναι, καὶ τὰς ὀχλήσεις χεῖρους τὰς σωματικὰς · ὅθεν καὶ ταύταις κολάζεσθαι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας.

5. physical ἡδονή better than mental, physical suffering worse

h. Ib. 93:

Μηδὲν τε εἶναι φύσει δίκαιον ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει. ὁ μέντοι σπουδαῖος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον πράξει διὰ τὰς ἐπικειμένους ζημίας καὶ δόξας · εἶναι δὲ τὸν σοφόν.

6. moral principles are only νόμῳ

257—His answer to the question τί πλέον ἔχουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι (Diog. II 68): **the prerogative of philosophers**
ἐὰν πάντες οἱ νόμοι ἀναιρεθῶσιν, ὁμοίως βιωσόμεθα.

φρόνησις

258—Thus the sage of Aristippus too is lead by φρόνησις, not in the Socratic sense of a higher knowledge of transcendent values, but of a prudent weighing of ἡδονή and λύπη. Therefore it is not the supreme good, but a means to it.

Diog. II 91:

τὴν φρόνησιν ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι λέγουσιν, οὐ δι' ἑαυτὴν δὲ αἰρετήν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς περιγινόμενα.

practical
attitude
in life

259—a. To those who reproach him for his relation with the hetaire Laïs, he answers (Diog. II 75):

ἔχω, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχομαι· ἐπεὶ τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι ἡδονῶν ἀριστον, οὐ τὸ μὴ χρῆσθαι.

b. Cf. Stob., *Flor.* 17, 18 (p. 493, 14 Hs.):

Ἀριστίππου· κρατεῖ ἡδονῆς οὐχ ὁ ἀπεχόμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ χρώμενος μὲν, μὴ παρεκφερόμενος δέ, ὥσπερ καὶ νεῶς καὶ ἵππου οὐχ ὁ μὴ χρώμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ μετάγων ὅποι βούλεται.

c. Diog. II 66:

Ἦν δὲ ἱκανὸς ἀρμόσασθαι καὶ τόπῳ καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ προσώπῳ καὶ πᾶσαν περίστασιν ἀρμοδίως ὑποκρίνασθαι. διὸ καὶ παρὰ Διονυσίῳ τῶν ἄλλων εὐδοκίμει μᾶλλον αἰεὶ τὸ προσπεσὸν εὖ διατιθέμενος. (68) ἐρωτηθεὶς τί αὐτῷ περιγέγονεν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἔφη· „τὸ δύνασθαι πᾶσι θαρρούντως ὁμιλεῖν”.

d. Ib. 67:

Διὸ ποτε Στράτωνα, οἱ δὲ Πλάτωνα, πρὸς αὐτὸν εἶπεῖν, „σοὶ μόνῳ δέδοται καὶ χλανίδα φορεῖν καὶ ῥάκος”.

e. To a detractor he said (ib. 70):

Τοῦ μὲν κακῶς λέγειν σὺ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἔχεις, τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀκούειν ἐγώ.

f. Once, when Dionysius placed him at the end of the table, he said (ib. 73):

Ἐνδοξότερον τὸν τόπον ἡθέλησας ποιῆσαι;

phenomenism”

260—Sextus, *Adv. Math.* VII 191:

Φασὶν οὖν οἱ Κυρηναῖκοι κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ μόνῃ καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἀδιάψευστα τυγχάνειν, τῶν δὲ πεποιηκότων τὰ πάθη μηδὲν εἶναι κατα-

ληπτὸν μηδὲ ἀδιάψευστον. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκαινόμεθα¹, φασί, καὶ γλυκαζόμεθα, δυνατὸν λέγειν ἀδιαψεύστως καὶ ἀνεξελέγκτως· ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἐμποιητικὸν τοῦ πάθους λευκὸν ἐστὶν ἢ γλυκὺ ἐστὶν, οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἀποφαίνεσθαι. (I92) εἰκὸς γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ λευκοῦ τινα λευκαντικῶς διατεθῆναι καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ γλυκέος γλυκανθῆναι. (I95) ἔνθεν οὐδὲ κριτήριόν φασιν εἶναι κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων. ὁνόματα δὲ κοινὰ τίθεσθαι τοῖς κρίμασιν. (I96) λευκὸν μὲν γάρ τι καὶ γλυκὺ καλοῦσι κοινῶς πάντες, κοινὸν δέ τι λευκὸν ἢ γλυκὺ οὐκ ἔχουσιν· ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἰδίου πάθους ἀντιλαμβάνεται.

261—A later adherent of the Cyrenaic school (not a direct disciple of Aristippus) was Hegesias, surnamed ὁ Πεισιθάνατος. The doctrine of ἡδονή with him ends in a complete pessimism. S. Diog. II 93 f. : **Hegesias**

Οἱ δὲ Ἑγησιακοὶ λεγόμενοι σκοποῦς μὲν εἶχον τοὺς αὐτοὺς, ἡδονὴν καὶ πόνον. — (94) τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὅλως ἀδύνατον εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ σῶμα πολλῶν ἀναπεπλῆσθαι παθημάτων, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν συμπαθεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ ταραττεσθαι, τὴν δὲ τύχην πολλὰ τῶν κατ' ἐλπίδα κωλύειν, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα ἀνυπαρκτον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι. τὴν τε ζωὴν καὶ τὸν θάνατον αἰρετόν².

¹ λευκαινόμεθα - have a sensation of whiteness, the same as λευκαντικῶς διατεθῆναι.

² Sc. ἐπ' ἴσης, equally.

NINTH CHAPTER

PLATO

I—PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS

262—Since there is a certain discrepancy between what we know from Plato's dialogues and what is told about his doctrine by Aristotle, the question arises whether the dialogues do contain the doctrine of Plato. Modern critics often disparage Plato's own literary work, referring to two places in his letters and a third place in the *Phaedrus*.

a. Pl., *Epist.* VII 341 a-d:

341b Πάντα μὲν οὖν οὐτ' ἐγὼ διεξῆλθον οὔτε Διονύσιος ἐδεῖτο · πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτὸς
καὶ τὰ μέγιστα εἰδέναι τε καὶ ἱκανῶς ἔχειν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων
παρακοάς. Ὑστερον δὲ καὶ ἀκούω γεγραφέναι αὐτὸν περὶ ὧν τότε ἤκουσε,
συνθέντα ὡς αὐτοῦ τέχνην, οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ὧν ἀκούει · οἶδα δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων.
Ἄλλους μὲν τινὰς οἶδα γεγραφότας περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων, οἵτινες δέ, οὐδ'
αὐτοὶ αὐτούς. Τοσόνδε γε μὴν περὶ πάντων ἔχω φράζειν τῶν γεγραφότων
c καὶ γραφόντων, ὅσοι φασὶν εἰδέναι περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ σπουδάζω, εἴτ' ἐμοῦ ἀκη-
κοότες εἴτ' ἄλλων εἴθ' ὡς εὐρόντες αὐτοὶ · τούτους οὐκ ἔστιν κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν
δόξαν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἐπαῖναι οὐδέν. Οὐκ οὐκ ἐμόν γε περὶ αὐτῶν ἔστιν
σύγγραμμα οὐδὲ μήποτε γένηται · ῥητὸν γὰρ οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν ὡς ἄλλα μαθή-
ματα, ἀλλ' ἐκ πολλῆς συνουσίας γιγνομένης περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦ συζῆν
d ἐξαίφνης, οἷον ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηδῆσαντος ἐξαφθὲν φῶς, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γενόμενον
αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἤδη τρέφει. Καίτοι τοσόνδε γε οἶδα, ὅτι γεγραφέντα ἢ λεχθέντα ὑπ'
ἐμοῦ βέλτιστ' ἂν λεχθῇ.

b. Pl., *Epist.* II 314 b-c:

Μεγίστη δὲ φυλακὴ τὸ μὴ γράφειν ἀλλ' ἐκμανθάνειν · οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν τὰ γρα-
φέντα μὴ οὐκ ἐκπεσεῖν. διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πώποτ' ἐγὼ περὶ τούτων γέγραφα,
οὐδ' ἔστιν σύγγραμμα Πλάτωνος οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἔσται, τὰ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενα Σωκρά-
τους ἔστιν καλοῦ καὶ νέου γεγονότος.

c. Pl., *Phaedr.* 274 e-275 b:

The Egyptian Theuth, having invented the art of writing and many other arts, comes to explain them to the king Thamous.

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς γράμμασιν ἦν · „Τοῦτο δέ, ὦ βασιλεῦ, τὸ μάθημα, ἔφη ὁ Θεῦθ, σοφωτέρους Αἰγυπτίους καὶ μνημονικωτέρους παρέξει · μνήμης τε γὰρ καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον εὐρέθη.” Ὁ δ' εἶπεν · „ὦ τεχνικώτατε Θεῦθ, ἄλλος μὲν τεκεῖν δυνατὸς τὰ τέχνης, ἄλλος δὲ κρῖναι τίν' ἔχει μοῖραν βλάβης τε καὶ ὠφελείας τοῖς μέλλουσι χρῆσθαι. Καὶ νῦν σύ, πατὴρ ὦν γραμμάτων, δι' εὐνοίαν τούναντίον εἶπες ἢ δύναται. Τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν μαθόντων λήθην μὲν 275a ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει μνήμης ἀμελετησίᾳ, ἅτε διὰ πίστιν γραφῆς ἔξωθεν ὑπ' ἄλλο- τριῶν τύπων, οὐκ ἔνδοθεν αὐτοῦς ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἀναμιμνησκομένους · οὐκ οὖν μνήμης, ἀλλὰ ὑπομνήσεως, φάρμακον εὔρες. Σοφίας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν, οὐκ ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις · πολυήκοοι γὰρ σοι γενόμενοι ἄνευ διδαχῆς πολυγνώμονες εἶναι δόξουσιν, ἀγνώμονες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες, καὶ χαλεποὶ συνεῖναι, b δοξόσοφοι γεγονότες ἀντὶ σοφῶν.”

To consult: J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy* I, Thales to Plato, London 1914, p. 212 and 312 f.

H. Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1945. (Especially the first lecture).

A complete account of the question, since Trendelenburg's treatise *Platonis de ideis et numeris doctrina ex Aristotele illustrata* (1826), is given by Cherniss in the Foreword of his greater work, *Aristotle's criticism of Plato and the Academy*, vol. I, Baltimore 1944.

On the so called “agrapha” see our paragraph on the ideal Numbers. Besides two places in Ar. (*Phys.* IV 2, 209b¹¹⁻¹⁷ and *De anima* I 2, 404b¹⁸⁻²¹) we have the testimony of Pl.'s disciple Hermodorus, cited by Derkyllides (*Simpl.*, in *Ar. Phys.* 247^{30-248¹⁵}), a passage in Sextus Emp., *Adv. Math.* X, the testimony of Theophrastus (*Metaph.* 6b¹¹⁻¹⁴ Ross-Fobes), and that of Aristoxenus (*Harm. Elem.* II, p. 30 Meib.). S. our nrs. 364, 371a-c, 373.

2—LIFE AND WORK

263—About Plato's life we are chiefly informed by his own Letters, of which the VIth, VIIth and VIIIth are now generally accepted. (Burnet accepts them all, Cherniss none; Robin prudently says that the authenticity of *Ep.* VII and VIII is nowadays accepted by most Plato-scholars).

To consult:

E. Howald, *Die Briefe Platons*. Zürich 1928.

H. Gomperz, *Platons Selbstbiographie*. 1928.

F. Novotný, *Platonis Epistulae commentariis illustratae*. Brno 1930.

Glenn R. Morrow, *Studies in the platonic Epistles*. Univ. of Illinois 1935.

G. Pasquali, *Le lettere di Platone*. Firenze 1938.

V. Wilamowitz, *Platon* I. Berlin 1920.

A. E. Taylor, *Plato. The Man and his work*. London, 1948.

L. Robin, *Platon*. Paris 1935, Ch. I.

Certain is the date of the three Sicilian travels ($\pm$ 390, 366, 361), and the founding of the Academy (388/7), when he was 40 years of age.

the Academy Diog. III 5:

Ἐφίλοσόφει δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ, — (ib.) 7 τὸ δ' ἐστὶ γυμνάσιον προάστειον ἀλσῶδες ἀπὸ τίνος ἥρωος ὀνομασθὲν Ἑκαδήμου — (5) εἴτα ἐν τῷ κήπῳ τῷ παρὰ τὸν Κολωνόν.

style 264—Dion. Halic., *De comp. verb.* 25, p. 208 Rsk.:

Ὁ δὲ Πλάτων τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ διαλόγους κτενίζων καὶ βοστρυχίζων καὶ πάντα τρόπον ἀναπλέκων οὐ διέλειπεν ὀγδοήκοντα γεγονῶς ἔτη. πᾶσι γὰρ δήπου τοῖς φιλολόγοις γνῶριμα τὰ περὶ τῆς φιλοπονίας τάνδρὸς ἱστορούμενα τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν δέλτον, ἣν τελευτήσαντος αὐτοῦ λέγουσιν εὑρεθῆναι ποικίλως μετακειμένην τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς πολιτείας ἔχουσαν τήνδε · „Κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος.”

date of the dialogues 265—A general agreement has been reached as to the division of the dialogues into three chronological groups, in which the dialogues may be placed as follows:
I. **Youth**: Apol., Crito, Euthyphro, Laches, Charm., Lysis, Io, Rep. I, Gorgias. Prot. and Hipp. Min. surely belong to this period; they may have been written before the death of Socr.

II. **Maturity**: Menexenus (a manifesto of Plato as the head of the Academy against the rhetors), Meno, Euthyd., Crat., Phaedo, Symp., Rep.; Phaedr., Theaet. and Parm. (these three shortly before the second Sicilian journey, 366).

III. **Old age**: Soph., Polit., Phil., Tim., Critias, Nomoi.

Though some difference of opinion may exist on certain points of detail, the headlines are invariably fixed.

See: the works of v. Wilamowitz, Taylor and Robin, cited under 263.

3—THE ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS

266—In two places Plato speaks directly about the way that led him to the conception of the so called theory of Ideas; in many other places he points indirectly to a third way.

1. the Phaedo a. Pl., *Phaedo* 100 a (S. our nr. 216).

Socrates, having vainly sought in the older philosophy of nature for a reasonable explanation of coming into being and passing away, and of the existence of physical things; having been disappointed lastly by Anaxagoras, undertakes a δεύτερος πλοῦς.

καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἔρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων [όντων], ἃ δ' ἂν μὴ, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ.

b. He explains this himself (100 b, c, 100 e-101 d):

Ἐρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι, καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ' ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα. — φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐδὲ δι' ἓν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω. Τῇ τοιαύτῃ αἰτία συγχωρεῖς; — Συγχωρῶ, ἔφη. —

Οὐδὲ σὺ ἄρα ἂν ἀποδέχοιο εἴ τις τινα φαίη ἕτερον ἐτέρου τῇ κεφαλῇ μεῖζω εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττω τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύριοι ἂν ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μεῖζον πᾶν ἕτερον ἐτέρου οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ μεῖζόν ἐστιν ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μεῖζον, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἔλαττον ἢ σμικρότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔλαττον, διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα, φοβούμενος οἶμαι μὴ τις σοι ἐναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐὰν τῇ κεφαλῇ μεῖζονά τινα φῇς εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μεῖζον μεῖζον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἔλαττον, ἔπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ, σμικρᾷ οὔσῃ, τὸν μεῖζω μεῖζω εἶναι· καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τέρας εἶναι, τὸ σμικρῷ τινι μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι. Ἡ οὐκ ἂν φοβοῖο ταῦτα; Καὶ ὁ Κέβης γελάσας· „Ἐγώ γε, ἔφη. — Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτῶ δυοῖν πλείω εἶναι καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πληθῇ καὶ διὰ τὸ πληθὺς; καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου ἡμίσει μεῖζον εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐ μεγέθει; ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ που φόβος. — Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. — Τί δέ; ἐνὶ ἐνὸς προστεθέντος, τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ, διασχισθέντος, τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἂν λέγειν; Καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῶνς ὅτι οὐκ οἴσθα ἄλλως πως ἕκαστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστου οὔ ἂν μετάσχη, καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς διᾶδος μετάσχεσιν· καὶ δεῖν τούτου μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος δ' ἂν μέλλῃ ἐν ἔσεσθαι. Τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐφῆς ἂν χαίρειν, παρὲς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις.

Σὺ δὲ δεδιὼς ἂν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν σαντοῦ σκιάν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἂν.

Remark I. By this method predication is logically justified; the difficulties of the Megarians have found a solution: Plato's hypothesis explains how the same predicate can be attributed to different subjects (e.g. walking to horse and man), and how contradictory predicates can be attributed to the same subject (e.g. great and little to a man, or knowledge and ignorance).

Solution of Megarean difficulties

Remark II. P. Natorp, *Platos Ideenlehre*, Leipzig^a 1921, p. 154, explains the passage cited under **a** as follows:

Natorp's interpretation

“Also, die „Tatsachen“ selbst sind als wahr allein zu rechtfertigen durch die Begründung in den fundamentalen Setzungen, den logischen “Grund-sätzen” (ὑποθέσεις). Die λόγοι also, in denen die Wahrheit der ὄντα zu gründen, sind die Sätze, die eignen Setzungen des Denkens.—Man darf dieses Prinzip, in dem der *methodische Sinn des Idee* rein und radikal zum Ausdruck kommt, von sonstigem, abweichenden Sprachgebrauch unbeirrt, das *Prinzip des Idealismus* nennen.”

To this interpretation, which takes the *hypothesis* of Plato in a merely logical sense, cp. the following words in the same passage (100b⁵):

c. ὑποθέμενος εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα.

d. Cp. also *Phaedo* 65 d:

(Socr. asks Simmias) φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν; — Φαμέν μέντοι νῆ Δία. — Καὶ αὖ καλὸν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν; — Πῶς δ' οὐ; — Ἦδη οὖν πώποτε τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες; — Οὐδαμῶς, ἢ δ' ἔς. — Ἄλλ' ἄλλη τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφύψω αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ λόγῳ ἀπάντων τῆς οὐσίας ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν.

e. And 79 a⁵-d⁸:

— Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει, ἔφη, δύο εἶδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὁρατόν, τὸ δὲ ἀειδές; — Θῶμεν, ἔφη. — Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀειδές ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὁρατόν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτά; — Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, θῶμεν. — Φέρε δῆ, ἢ δ' ἔς, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν
79b τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχή; — Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη. — Ποτέρῳ οὖν ὁμοιότερον
the soul τῷ εἶδει φαμέν ἂν εἶναι καὶ συγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα; — Παντί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε
δῆλον ὅτι τῷ ὁρατῷ. — Τί δὲ ἡ ψυχή; ὁρατόν ἢ ἀειδές; — Οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων
γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη. — Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῇ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων φύσει λέγομεν ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ οἶει; — Τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. — Τί οὖν
περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὁρατόν ἢ ἀόρατον εἶναι; — Οὐχ ὁρατόν. — Ἀειδές ἄρα; —
Ναί. — Ὁμοιότερον ἄρα ψυχῇ σώματός ἐστι τῷ ἀειδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὁρατῷ. —

c. Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες. — Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ ψυχή,
ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ διὰ τοῦ
ἀκοῦειν ἢ δι' ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δι'
αἰσθήσεως σκοπεῖν τι), τότε μὲν ἔλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ
ταῦτά ἔχοντα, καὶ αὕτη πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ εἰλιγγιᾷ ὥσπερ μεθύουσα,
d ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη; — Πάνυ γε. — Ὅταν δέ γε αὕτη καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῇ,
ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὄν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον,
καὶ, ὡς συγγενῆς οὖσα αὐτοῦ, ἀεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται ὅταν περ αὕτη καθ'
αὐτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπαυται τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀεὶ
κατὰ ταῦτά ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ

πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται; — Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. —

267—In the Socratic dialogues we find Socrates always seeking the common character, the one *eidos*, by which “all that is impious, is impious and all that is pious pious”, etc. ^{2. the ethical problem}

a. Pl., *Euthyphro*, 6 d⁹-e⁶:

ΣΩ. Μέννησαι οὖν ὅτι οὐ τοῦτό σοι διεκελευόμην ἐν τι ἢ δύο με διδάξει τῶν πολλῶν ὁσίων, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ὃ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσια ἐστίν; ἔφησθα γάρ που μιᾷ ιδέᾳ τὰ τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια ἢ οὐ μνημονεύεις;

ΕΥΘ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Ταύτην τοίνυν με αὐτὴν διδάξον τὴν ιδέαν τίς ποτέ ἐστίν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ἦ ὧν ἂν ἢ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τις πράττη φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι, ὃ δ’ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ.

b. Pl., *Meno* 72 a⁶-d¹.

In the preceding lines Meno has answered to Socrates’ question “what is virtue”: “Well, very simple: there is the virtue of a man, that of a woman, that of a child, that of a man of advanced age; that of a free man, and that of a slave; and so on.”

Socr. answers:

ΣΩ. Πολλῇ γέ τιτι εὐτυχίᾳ ἔοικα κεχρῆσθαι, ὦ Μένων, εἰ μίαν ζητῶν ἀρετὴν σμῆνός τι ἀνῆρρηκα ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ κείμενον. Ἀτάρ, ὦ Μένων, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν περὶ τὰ σμῆνη, εἴ μου ἐρομένου μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας ὃ τί ποτ’ ἐστίν, πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἔλεγες αὐτάς εἶναι, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω 72b μοι, εἴ σε ἡρόμην. Ἄρα τούτῳ φῆς πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς εἶναι καὶ διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, τῷ μελίττας εἶναι: Ἡ τούτῳ μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἀλλὰ δέ τῳ, οἷον ἢ κάλλει ἢ μεγέθει ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τῶν τοιούτων; Εἰπέ, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω οὕτως ἐρωτηθεῖς;

MEN. Τοῦτ’ ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἢ μέλιται εἰσίν, ἢ ἑτέρα τῆς ἑτέρας.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν εἶπον μετὰ ταῦτα. Τοῦτο τοίνυν μοι αὐτὸ εἶπέ, ὦ Μένων c ὃ οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ ταυτόν εἰσιν ἅπασαι, τί τοῦτο φῆς εἶναι; εἷχες δῆπου ἂν τί μοι εἰπεῖν;

MEN. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐτὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν. καὶ εἰ πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπαὶ εἰσιν, ἐν γέ τι εἶδος ταυτὸν ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν, δι’ ὃ εἰσιν ἀρεταί, εἰς δὲ καλῶς ποιεῖ ἀποβλέψαντα τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον τῷ ἐρωτήσαντι ἐκεῖνο δηλῶσαι ὃ τυγχάνει οὕσα ἀρετή.

c. Pl., *Parm.* 130 b⁷.

The young Socrates, expounding to Parmenides his theory of Ideas, first of all mentions the Idea of like and unlike, then unity and plurality, rest and motion.

Ἡ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οἷον δικαίου τι εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων αὐτῶν τοιούτων; — Ναί, φάναι.

Thus certainly the reflexion on ethical notions has also been a way to the theory of the Ideas. We may say that the platonic Idea is present, as soon as "the one and common character of the many and concrete things", sought for by Socrates, is not only a "notion", being a product or an instrument of thinking, but a really existing metaphysical entity.

3. the
Cratylus268—a. Pl., *Crat.* 439 c⁶-440 b⁴.

The dialogue discusses the sense of our words and notions. Do words belong to the natural order? Are they φύσει —i.e.: do they have an objective value—, or are they νόμῳ—only founded on human institution? Socr. defends the first thesis. Things have an essence of their own. His eyes fixed on a certain *eidos*, the artisan makes an instrument, for instance a weaver's shuttle. Now, words or names also are instruments. They also must express an "essence"; they are formed in view of an *eidos*. Just like the weaver's shuttle they are made by an expert and tested by the user: the weaver's shuttle is tested by the weaver, words or notions by the dialectician.

At the end of the dialogue Socr. says:

439d Σκέψαι γάρ, ὦ θαυμάσιε Κρατύλε, ὃ ἔγωγε πολλάκις ὀνειρώττω. Πότερον φῶμέν τι εἶναι αὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων οὕτω, ἢ μή;

KP. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Αὐτὸ τοῖνυν ἐκεῖνο σκεψώμεθα, μὴ εἰ πρόσωπόν τι ἐστὶν καλὸν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ δοκεῖ ταῦτα πάντα ρεῖν· ἀλλ' αὐτό, φῶμεν, τὸ καλὸν οὐ τοιοῦτον ἀεὶ ἐστὶν οἷόν ἐστιν;

KP. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οἷόν τε προσειπεῖν αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς, εἰ ἀεὶ ὑπεξέρχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκεῖνο ἐστὶν, ἔπειτα ὅτι τοιοῦτον, ἢ ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἡμῶν λεγόντων ἄλλο αὐτὸ εὐθύς γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπεξίεναι καὶ μηκέτι οὕτως ἔχειν;

KP. Ἀνάγκη.

e ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν εἴη τι ἐκεῖνο ὃ μηδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει; εἰ γάρ ποτε ὡσαύτως ἴσχει, ἐν γ' ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν μεταβαίνει· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ, πῶς ἂν τοῦτό γε μεταβάλλοι ἢ κινῶιτο, μηδὲν ἐξιστάμενον τῆς αὐτοῦ ιδέας;

KP. Οὐδαμῶς.

440a ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἂν γνωσθῇ γε ὑπ' οὐδενός. Ἄμα γὰρ ἂν ἐπιόντος τοῦ γνωσομένου ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλοιον γίγνοιτο, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν γνωσθῇ ἔτι ὁποῖόν γέ τί ἐστιν ἢ πῶς ἔχον. γνῶσις δὲ δήπου οὐδεμία γινώσκει ὃ γινώσκει μηδαμῶς ἔχον.

KP. Ἔστιν ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ γινῶσιν εἶναι φάναι εἰκός, ὦ Κρατύλε, εἰ μεταπίπτει πάντα χρήματα καὶ μηδὲν μένει. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἢ γινῶσις, τοῦ γινῶσις εἶναι μὴ μεταπίπτει, μένει τε ἂν αἰεὶ ἢ γινῶσις καὶ εἴη γινῶσις. Εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος μεταπίπτει τῆς γνώσεως, ἅμα τ' ἂν μεταπίπτει εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος γνώσεως καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γινῶσις · εἰ δὲ αἰεὶ μεταπίπτει, αἰεὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γινῶσις, καὶ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὔτε τὸ γνωσόμενον οὔτε τὸ γνωσθησόμενον ἂν εἴη. b

Here indeed the epistemological question has been asked,—and it is answered with an ontological answer.

b. Cp. Arist., *Metaph.* A 6 and M 4 (S. our nr. 204a and b). A 6, 987 a³²-b⁷:

ἐκ νέου τε γὰρ συνήθης γενόμενος πρῶτον Κρατύλῳ καὶ ταῖς Ἑρακλειτείοις δόξαις, ὡς ἀπάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἰεὶ ῥεόντων καὶ ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὔσης, ταῦτα μὲν καὶ ὕστερον οὕτως ὑπέλαβεν · Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἡθικὰ πραγματευομένου περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐθέν, ἐν μέντοι τούτοις τὸ καθόλου ζητοῦντος καὶ περὶ ὁρισμῶν ἐπιστήσαντος πρώτου τὴν διάνοιαν, ἐκεῖνον ἀποδεξάμενος διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ¹ ὑπέλαβεν ὡς περὶ ἐτέρων τοῦτο γιγνόμενον καὶ οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν · ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν κοινὸν ὄρον τῶν αἰσθητῶν τινος, αἰεὶ γε μεταβαλλόντων.

269—The above cited passage from the *Crat.*, does not allow us to limit the Ideas to geometrical and moral qualities. Certainly Plato admitted the existence of Ideas also of biological genera (e.g. man and horse) and of so-called arte-facta (e.g. table and bed). As to the first category, we know the scoffing of Stilpo and Antisthenes (see our nrs 238 and 253). The Ideas of table and bed are mentioned by Plato himself, *Rep.* 596 ab: of which
objects we
must admit
Ideas

a. Βούλει οὖν ἐνθένδε ἀρξώμεθα ἐπισκοποῦντες, ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας μεθόδου; εἶδος γὰρ πού τι ἐν ἑκάστων εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἑκάστα τὰ πολλὰ, οἷς ταῦτόν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν · ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις; Μανθάνω.

Θῶμεν δὴ καὶ νῦν ὃ τι βούλει τῶν πολλῶν. Οἶον εἰ θέλεις, πολλαὶ πού εἰσι κλῖναι καὶ τράπεζαι.

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

Ἄλλὰ ἰδέαι γέ που περὶ ταῦτα τὰ σκεύη δύο, μία μὲν κλίνης, μία δὲ τραπέζης.

Ναί. —

¹ διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον - "for this reason", explained in the words ἀδύνατον γὰρ e.g.s. De Vogel, Greek Philosophy I

b. Pl., *Parm.* 130 c-e.

The young Socrates has mentioned before Parmenides firstly the Ideas of *ἄνθρωποι* and *ἀνόμενοι*, then *ἐν* and *πλήθος*, *στάσις* and *κίνησις*. Next he agrees that Ideas must be admitted of *καλόν* and *ἀγαθόν* and *πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα*. *Parm.* then asks:

130c Τί δ', ἀνθρώπου εἶδος χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἷοι ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν πάντων, αὐτό τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου ἢ πυρὸς ἢ καὶ ὕδατος;

Ἐν ἀπορίᾳ, φάναι, πολλάκις δὴ, ὦ Παρμενίδη, περὶ αὐτῶν γέγονα, πότερα χρὴ φάναι ὥσπερ περὶ ἐκείνων ἢ ἄλλως.

Ἡ καὶ περὶ τῶνδε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀ καὶ γελοῖα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, οἷον θρίξ καὶ πηλὸς καὶ ῥύπος ἢ ἄλλο τι ἀτιμώτατόν τε καὶ φαυλότατον, ἀπορεῖς εἶτε d χρὴ φάναι καὶ τούτων ἐκάστου εἶδος εἶναι χωρὶς, ὃν ἄλλο αὐτῶν οἷων ἡμεῖς μεταχειριζόμεθα, εἶτε καὶ μὴ;

Οὐδαμῶς, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν γε ἅπερ ὁρῶμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι · εἶδος δέ τι αὐτῶν οἰηθῆναι εἶναι μὴ λίαν ἤ ἄτοπον. Ἦδη μέντοι ποτὲ με καὶ ἔθραξε μὴ τι ἢ περὶ πάντων ταυτὸν · ἔπειτα ὅταν ταύτῃ στῶ φεύγων οἴχομαι, δείσας μὴ ποτε εἰς τιν' ἄβυσθον φλυαρίαν* ἐμπεσὼν διαφθαρῶ · ἐκεῖσε δ' οὖν ἀφικόμενος εἰς ἀ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν εἶδη ἔχειν, περὶ ἐκεῖνα πραγματευόμενος διατρίβω.

e Νέος γὰρ εἶ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ οὐπω σου ἀντίληπται φιλοσοφία ὥς ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις · νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν.

Thus, of all things in nature, be they ever so mean or trifling, Ideas must be admitted by any earnest and consequent philosopher.

4—THE TRUE MEANING OF THE PLATONIC IDEA

Natorp's interpretation 270—Natorp, *Platos Ideenlehre* p. 234 f. explains the above cited passage (*Parm.* 130d) in this way:

If the platonic Idea is understood as Aristotle and (till now) nearly everybody else understood it—i.e. as a metaphysical substance, really existing in a higher Reality—, then indeed we must get into a *βυθὸς φλυαρίας* by admitting Ideas of physical things. But the *methodical signification* of the Idea being once understood, all difficulty is resolved: then, indeed, it is clear that of all things in nature, be they ever so mean or trifling, Ideas must be admitted, the meaning of this being simply that *scientific method must be extended to every thing* *. See our remark (2) to *Phaedo* 100a (our nr. 266a): the Ideas are the logical "Grund-sätze" (hypotheses), in which reality is founded.

* Thus H. Stephanus, followed by A. Diès; others read εἰς τινὰ βυθὸν φλυαρίας. See the apparatus of Diès.

* „Dagegen ist es durchaus kein leeres Geschwätz, wenn es vielmehr so gemeint ist, dass die Methode der Ideen auf alle Gebiete wissenschaftlicher Probleme auszudehnen ist. So aber entspricht es der eignen Ueberzeugung Platos."

271—Plato himself excludes the possibility that Ideas would exist only as a **no psycho-logical idealism** mental reality.

a. Pl., *Parm.* 132 b-c:

Ἀλλά, φάναι ὦ Παρμενίδη, τὸν Σωκράτη, μὴ ¹ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ἢ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκη ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐν γε ἕκαστον εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πάσχοι ἀ νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο.

Τί οὖν; φάναι, ἐν ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν νοημάτων, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός;

Ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἰπεῖν.

Ἀλλά τινός;

Ναί.

Ὅντος ἢ οὐκ ὄντος;

132c

Ὅντος.

Οὐχ ἑνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόημα ἐπὶ νοεῖ, μίαν τινὰ οὕσαν ἰδέαν;

Ναί.

Εἰτα οὐκ εἶδος ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ νοούμενον ἐν εἶναι, αἰεὶ ὃν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν;

Ἀνάγκη αὖ φαίνεται.

Τί δὲ δῆ; εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἢ τᾶλλα ² φῆς τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχειν ἢ δοκεῖ σοι ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, ἢ νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητα εἶναι;

Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο, φάναι, ἔχει λόγον. —

Natorp, o.c. p. 238 comments: Indeed the Idea of Plato does not exist ἐν ψυχῇ (in individual minds); it may be sought for only in the "Bewusstsein überhaupt", i.e. the *method* of unification of a multiplicity. No existence is presupposed here, not even that of thinking minds. "Method is sovereign". The meaning of the Idea is not subjective, but objectivating: it makes the object, it creates the possibility of knowledge *.—

Now surely it does; but not by being a merely logical form of thinking, but by being a metaphysical reality. See *Phaedo* 65d (our nr. 266d) and *Crat.* 439c (our nr. 268a). It is clearly put also in the following words in the *Parm.*

¹ μὴ - It might be that —

² οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἢ — * - "Does not it seem to you that, with the same necessity with which you say that the other things participate of the Ideas, so either — or —."

* „In der Tat unterlag Platos Idee der Gefahr des Subjektivismus nicht. Denn keinerlei Existenz, auch nicht die Existenz denkender „Bewusstseine“, darf oder kann die als Methode verstandene Idee sich voraus setzen. Die Methode ist souverän. Ihr kann im methodischen Aufbau der Erkenntnis nicht Andres vorausgehen. Das ist die „Sicherheit der Grundlage“, an der sie unerschütterlich hält (*Phaedo* 101 D) und darin „sich selber sichert“ (*Staat* 533 C). Damit ist die Subjektive Auffassung der Idee abgewehrt und ihre nicht sowohl objektive als vielmehr objektivierende (den Gegenstand setzende) Bedeutung festgestellt."

* ἀνάγκη ἢ Waddell, Burnet, Diès. The mss have partly ἀνάγκη ἢ (B), partly ἀνάγκη ἢ (T). Proclus reads ἀνάγκη εἰ.

the Ideas not
a mere logic-
al form of
thinking

b. Pl., *Parm.* 132 d:

Ἄλλ', ὦ Παρμενίδη, μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὧδε ἔχειν · τὰ μὲν εἶδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις εἰκέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα, καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς.

Evidently Plato does not mean here by φύσις "visible nature"; he means *the invisible reality* above it. Rightly K. Kuypers * calls this "an extension of the notion of physis". We find the same use of the word in the following passage:

they are
"in nature"

c. Pl., *Resp.* X 597 b.

On the preceding page there has been spoken about the Idea of the bed.

Οὐκοῦν τριτταὶ τινες κλῖναι αὗται γίνονται · μία μὲν ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὔσα, ἣν φαῖμεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι ἢ τίν' ἄλλον;

Οὐδένα, οἶμαι.

Μία δέ γε ἦν ὁ τέκτων.

Ναί, ἔφη.

Μία δὲ ἦν ὁ ζωγράφος · ἢ γάρ;

Ἔστω.

Ζωγράφος δὴ, κλινοποιός, θεός, τρεῖς οὗτοι ἐπιστάται τρισὶν εἶδεσι κλινῶν.

the Phae-
drusmyth

272—In the *Phaedrus* we find the same conception.

Pl., *Phaedr.* 246 a-248 c:

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς ἱκανῶς · περὶ δὲ τῆς ιδέας αὐτῆς ὧδε λεκτέον · οἶον μὲν ἐστὶ, πάντῃ πάντως θείας εἶναι καὶ μακρᾶς διηγήσεως, ᾧ δὲ ἔοικεν, ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἐλάττονος · ταύτῃ οὖν λέγωμεν. Ἐοικέ τῳ δὴ ξυμφύτῳ δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνιόχου. Θεῶν μὲν οὖν ἵπποι τε καὶ ἡνίοχοι πάντες αὐτοὶ τε ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων μέμικται. Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῶν ὁ ἄρχων συνωρίδος ἡνιοχεῖ · εἴτα τῶν ἵππων ὁ μὲν αὐτῷ καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων, ὁ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίων τε καὶ ἐναντίος · χαλεπὴ δὴ καὶ δύσκολος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἡνιοχίσις. Πῇ δὴ οὖν θνητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ζῶον ἐκλήθη, πειρατέον εἰπεῖν. Ψυχὴ πᾶσα παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου · πάντα δὲ οὐρανὸν περιπολεῖ, ἄλλοτε ἐν
c ἄλλοις εἶδεσι γιγνομένη. Τελέα μὲν οὖν οὔσα καὶ ἐπτερωμένη, μετεωροπορεῖ τε καὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον διοικεῖ · ἡ δὲ πεπορωμένη φέρεται ἕως ἄν στερεοῦ τινος ἀντιλάβηται, οὗ κατοικισθεῖσα, σῶμα γήινον λαβοῦσα, αὐτὸ αὐτὸ δοκοῦν κινεῖν διὰ τὴν ἐκείνης δυνάμιν, ζῶον τὸ ξύμπαν ἐκλήθη, ψυχὴ

* *Het Cultuurbegrip der Grieken en het Cultuurideaal van Plato* in *Alg. Ned. Tijdschr. v. Wijsb. en Psychol.*, 1943, p. 91-106.

καὶ σῶμα παγόν, θνητόν τε ἔσχεν ἐπωνυμίαν. Ἀθάνατον δὲ οὐδ' ἐξ ἐνὸς λόγου λελογισμένου· ἀλλὰ πλάττομεν, οὔτε ἰδόντες οὔτε ἱκανῶς νοήσαντες, θεὸν ἀθάνατον τι ζῶον, ἔχον μὲν ψυχὴν, ἔχον δὲ σῶμα, τὸν αἰεὶ δὲ χρόνον ταῦτα d
 ζυμπεφυκότα. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δῆ. ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, ταύτῃ ἐχέτω τε καὶ λεγέσθω· τὴν δὲ αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν πτερῶν ἀποβολῆς, δι' ἣν ψυχῆς ἀπορρεῖ, λάβωμεν. Ἔστι δὲ τις τοιάδε.

Πέφυκεν ἡ πτεροῦ δύναμις τὸ ἐμβριθεῖς ἄγειν ἄνω, μετεωρίζουσα ἢ τὸ τῶν θεῶν γένος οἰκεῖ· κεκοινώνηκε δὲ πῃ μάλιστα τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ θεοῦ. Τὸ δὲ θεῖον καλόν, σοφόν, ἀγαθόν καὶ πᾶν ὃ τι τοιοῦτον· τούτοις δὴ τρέφεται e
 τε καὶ αὖξεται μάλιστα γὰρ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πτέρωμα, αἰσχροῦ δὲ καὶ κακῷ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις φθίνει τε καὶ διόλλυται. Ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεὺς, ἐλαύνων πτηνὸν ἄρμα, πρῶτος πορεύεται, διακοσμῶν πάντα καὶ ἐπι-
 μελούμενος. Τῷ δ' ἔπεται στρατιὰ θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων, κατὰ ἑνδεκα μέρη κεκοσμημένη· μένει γὰρ Ἑστία ἐν θεῶν οἴκῳ, μόνῃ. Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὅσοι ἐν 247a
 τῷ τῶν δώδεκα ἀριθμῷ τεταγμένοι θεοὶ ἄρχοντες ἡγοῦνται, κατὰ τάξιν ἦν ἕκαστος ἐτάχθη. Πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ μακάριοι θέαι τε καὶ διέξοδοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, ὡς θεῶν γένος εὐδαιμόνων ἐπιστρέφεται, πρᾶττων ἕκαστος αὐτῶν τὸ αὐτοῦ· ἔπεται δὲ ὁ αἰεὶ ἐθέλων τε καὶ δυνάμενος, Φθόνος γὰρ ἕξω θεοῦ χοροῦ ἴσταται. Ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρὸς δαῖτα καὶ ἐπὶ θοίνῃν ἴωσιν, ἄκραν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπουράνιον ἀψίδα πορεύονται πρὸς ἄναντες· ἢ δὴ τὰ μὲν θεῶν ὀχήματα, ἰσορ- b
 ρόπως εὐήνια ὄντα, ῥαδίως πορεύεται, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα μόγις· βρίθει γὰρ ὁ τῆς κᾶκῃς ἵππος μετέχων, ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ῥέπων τε καὶ βαρύνων ὥ μὴ καλῶς ἢ τε-
 θραμμένος τῶν ἡνιόχων. Ἐνθα δὴ πόνος τε καὶ ἀγὼν ἔσχατος ψυχῇ πρόκειται. Αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀθάνατοι καλούμεναι, ἡνίκ' ἂν πρὸς ἄκρῳ γένωνται, ἕξω πορευ-
 θεῖσαι, ἔστησαν ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ νώτῳ, στάσας δὲ αὐτὰς περιάγει ἡ περι- c
 φορά· αἱ δὲ θεωροῦσι τὰ ἕξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ.

Τὸν δὲ ὑπερουράνιον τόπον, οὔτε τις ὕμνησέ πω τῶν τῆδε ποιητῆς, οὔτε ποτὲ ὕμνησει κατ' ἀξίαν. Ἐχει δὲ ὧδε· τολμητέον γὰρ οὖν τό γε ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ ἀληθείας λέγοντα. Ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφῆς οὐσία ὄντως οὔσα, ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ θεατῇ νῶ, περὶ ἣν τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστήμης γένος, τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τόπον. Ἀτ' οὖν θεοῦ διάνοια, d
 νῶ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀκηράτῳ τρεφομένη, καὶ ἀπάσης ψυχῆς ὅση ἂν μέλη τὸ προσῆκον δέξασθαι, ἰδοῦσα διὰ χρόνου τὸ ὄν, ἀγαπᾷ τε καὶ θεωροῦσα τάληθῃ τρέφεται καὶ εὐπαθεῖ, ἕως ἂν κύκλῳ ἢ περιφορᾷ εἰς ταῦτον περιενέγκῃ. Ἐν δὲ τῇ περιόδῳ καθορᾷ μὲν αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθορᾷ δὲ σωφροσύνην, καθορᾷ δὲ ἐπιστήμην, οὐχ ἢ γένεσις πρόσσεστιν, οὐδ' ἢ ἐστὶν που ἐτέρα ἐν ἐτέρῳ οὔσα e
 ὧν ἡμεῖς νῦν ὄντων καλοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ ὅ ἐστιν ὄν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὔσαν. Καὶ τᾷλλα ὡσαύτως τὰ ὄντα ὄντως θεασαμένα καὶ ἐστιαθεῖσα, δῶσα πάλιν εἰς τὸ εἶσω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, οἴκαδε ἦλθεν· ἐλθούσης δὲ αὐτῆς ὁ ἡνιόχος

πρὸς τὴν φάτνην τοὺς ἵππους στήσας, παρέβαλεν ἀμβροσίαν τε καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῇ νέκταρ ἐπότισεν.

- 248a Καὶ οὗτος μὲν θεῶν βίος. Αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ψυχαί, ἡ μὲν ἄριστα θεοῖς ἐπομένη ὑπερῆρεν εἰς τὸν ἕξω τόπον τὴν τοῦ ἡνιόχου κεφαλὴν, καὶ συμπερινηνέχθη τὴν περιφοράν, θορυβουμένη ὑπὸ τῶν ἵππων καὶ μόγις καθορώσα τὰ ὄντα · ἡ δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἤρεν, τοτὲ δ' ἔδου, βιαζομένων δὲ τῶν ἵππων τὰ μὲν εἶδεν, τὰ δ' οὐ. Αἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλαι, γλίσχόμεναι μὲν ἅπασαι τοῦ ἄνω, ἔπονται, ἀδυνατοῦσαι δὲ ὑποβρύχια συμπεριφέρονται, πατοῦσαι ἀλλήλας καὶ ἐπιβάλλουσαι, ἐτέρα πρὸ
- b τῆς ἐτέρας πειρωμένη γενέσθαι. Θόρυβος οὖν καὶ ἄμιλλα καὶ ἰδρώς ἔσχατος γίγνεται, οὗ δὴ κακίᾳ ἡνιόχων πολλὰ μὲν χωλεύονται, πολλὰ δὲ πολλὰ πτερὰ θραύονται. Πᾶσαι δέ, πολὺν ἔχουσαι πόνον, ἀτελεῖς τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θεᾶς ἀπέρχονται, καὶ ἀπελθοῦσαι τροφῇ δοξαστῇ χρῶνται. Οὗ δὴ ἔνεχ' ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ τὸ ἀληθείας ἰδεῖν πεδίον οὗ ἐστίν, ἥ τε δὴ προσήκουσα ψυχῆς τῷ ἀρίστῳ νομῇ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖ λειμῶνος τυγχάνει οὔσα, ἥ τε τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις, ὧς ψυχῇ
- c κουφίζεται, τούτῳ τρέφεται.

Now surely this realm of ὄντα in a place above the visible heaven is not a merely logical method („Bewusstsein überhaupt"), presupposing no existence whatsoever. It is a metaphysical reality.

the speech of
Diotima

273—This is strongly confirmed by the following passage.

Pl., *Symp.* 210 a-212 b:

Diotima, a wise woman from Mantinea, will initiate Socrates in the higher mysteries of love.

- „Δεῖ γάρ, ἔφη, τὸν ὀρθῶς ἰόντα ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ἄρχεσθαι μὲν, νέον ὄντα, ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς ἡγῆται ὁ ἡγούμενος, ἐνὸς αὐτὸν σώματος ἑρᾶν καὶ ἐνταῦθα γεννᾶν λόγους καλοὺς, ἔπειτα δὲ αὐτὸν κατανοῆσαι ὅτι τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ ὀφθαλμοῦ σώματι τῷ ἐπὶ ἐτέρῳ σώματι ἀδελφόν ἐστι, καί, εἰ δεῖ διώκειν τὸ ἐπ' εἶδει καλόν, πολλὰ ἄνοια μὴ οὐχ
- 210b ἐν τε καὶ ταῦτόν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς σώμασι κάλλος · τοῦτο δ' ἐννοήσαντα καταστῆναι πάντων τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἑραστήν, ἐνὸς δὲ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο χαλάσαι, καταφρονήσαντα καὶ σμικρὸν ἡγησάμενον. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κάλλος τιμιώτερον ἡγήσασθαι τοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι, ὥστε καὶ ἐάν, ἐπιεικὲς ὦν τὴν ψυχὴν, τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχη, ἐξαρκεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ
- c ἑρᾶν καὶ κήδεσθαι, καὶ τίκτειν λόγους τοιούτους καὶ ζητεῖν οἷτινες ποιήσουσι βελτίους τοὺς νέους, ἵνα ἀναγκασθῇ αὐτὴ θεάσασθαι τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καλόν, καὶ τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ὅτι πᾶν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ συγγενές ἐστίν, ἵνα τὸ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλὸν σμικρόν τι ἡγήσῃται εἶναι. Μετὰ δὲ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐπὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀγαγεῖν, ἵνα ἴδῃ αὐτὴ ἐπιστημῶν κάλλος καί, βλέπων πρὸς
- d πολὺ ἤδη τὸ καλόν, μηκέτι τὸ παρ' ἐνί, ὥσπερ οἰκέτης, ἀγαπῶν παιδαρίου

κάλλος ἢ ἀνθρώπου τινὸς ἢ ἐπιτηδεύματος ἑνός, δουλεύων φαῦλος ἢ καὶ σμικρολόγος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τετραμμένος τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ θεωρῶν, πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τίκτη καὶ διανοήματα ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ, ἕως ἄν, ἐνταῦθα ῥωσθεὶς καὶ αὐξηθεὶς, κατίδῃ τινὰ ἐπιστήμην μίαν τοιαύτην ἣ ἐστὶ καλοῦ τοιοῦδε.

Πειρῶ δέ μοι, ἔφη, τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα. "Ὅς γὰρ ἂν μέχρι
ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτικά παιδαγωγῶν, θεώμενος ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς τὰ
καλά, πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἰὼν τῶν ἐρωτικῶν, ἐξαίφνης κατόψεται τι θαυμαστὸν
τὴν φύσιν καλόν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐ δὴ ἔνεκεν καὶ οἱ ἔμπροσθεν
πάντες πόνοι ἦσαν, πρῶτον μὲν αἰεὶ ὄν, καὶ οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον
οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον, ἔπειτα οὐ τῇ μὲν καλόν, τῇ δ' αἰσχρόν, οὐδὲ
τοτὲ μὲν, τοτὲ δὲ οὐ, οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, οὐδ' ἔνθα
μὲν καλόν, ἔνθα δὲ αἰσχρόν, ὡς τισὶ μὲν ὄν καλόν, τισὶ δὲ αἰσχρόν· οὐδ' αὖ
φαντασθήσεται αὐτῷ τὸ καλόν οἷον πρόσωπόν τι οὐδὲ χεῖρες οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν
ὧν σῶμα μετέχει, οὐδέ τις λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη, οὐδέ που ὄν ἐν ἐτέρῳ
τινι, οἷον ἐν ζῳῳ ἢ ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν οὐρανῷ, ἢ ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μεθ'
αὐτοῦ μονοειδὲς αἰεὶ ὄν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα, τρόπον
τινὰ τοιοῦτον οἷον, γιγνομένων τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἀπολλυμένων, μηδὲν ἐκεῖνο
μήτε τι πλεόν μήτε ἔλαττον γίγνεσθαι μηδὲ πάσχειν μηδέν. "Ὅταν δὴ τις ἀπὸ
τῶνδε, διὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς παιδευαστεῖν ἐπανιών, ἐκεῖνο τὸ καλὸν ἀρχηται καθορᾶν,
σχεδὸν ἂν τι ἄπτοιο τοῦ τέλους. Τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐπὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά
ἰέναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου ἄγεσθαι, ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῶνδε τῶν καλῶν ἐκείνου ἕνεκα
τοῦ καλοῦ, αἰεὶ ἐπανιέναι ὥσπερ ἐπαναβασμοῖς χρώμενον, ἀπὸ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ δύο
καὶ ἀπὸ δυοῖν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐπὶ
τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιτηδεύματων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ μαθήματα,
ἔστ' ἂν ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ μάθημα τελευτήσῃ, ὃ ἐστὶν οὐκ
ἄλλου ἢ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα, καὶ γινῶ αὐτὸ τελευτῶν ὃ ἐστὶ καλόν.

„Ἐνταῦθα τοῦ βίου, ὃ φίλε Σώκρατες, ἔφη ἡ Μαντινικὴ ξένη, εἴπερ που
ἄλλοθι, βιωτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, θεωμένῳ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν. "Ὁ ἐάν ποτε ἴδῃς, οὐ κατὰ
χρυσίον τε καὶ ἐσθῆτα καὶ τοὺς καλοὺς παῖδάς τε καὶ νεανίσκους δόξει σοι
εἶναι, οὓς νῦν ὀρῶν ἐκπέπληξαι καὶ ἔτοιμος εἶ, καὶ σὺ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, ὀρῶντες
τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ξυνόντες αἰεὶ αὐτοῖς, εἴ πως οἶόν τ' ἦν, μήτ' ἐσθίειν μήτε
πίνειν, ἀλλὰ θεᾶσθαι μόνον καὶ ξυνεῖναι. Τί δῆτα, ἔφη, οἶόμεθα, εἴ τῳ γένοιτο
αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἰδεῖν εἰλικρινές, καθαρὸν, ἄμικτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάπλεων σαρκῶν
τε ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ χρωμάτων καὶ ἄλλης πολλῆς φλυαρίας θνητῆς, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ
τὸ θεῖον καλὸν δύναιτο μονοειδὲς κατιδεῖν; Ἄρ' οἶει, ἔφη, φαῦλον βίον γίγνεσθαι
ἐκεῖσε βλέποντος ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐκεῖνο ᾧ δεῖ θεωμένου καὶ ξυνόντος αὐτῷ;
Ἦ οὐκ ἐνθυμεῖ, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐνταῦθα αὐτῷ μοναχοῦ γενήσεται, ὀρῶντι ᾧ ὁρατὸν
τὸ καλόν, τίκτειν οὐκ εἰδῶλα ἀρετῆς ἅτε οὐκ εἰδῶλου ἐφαπτομένου, ἀλλὰ

ἀληθῆ, ἅτε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐφαπτομένῳ · τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ θρεψαμένῳ ὑπάρχει θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι, καὶ εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ;”

Here a contact with true Reality is aimed at, i.e. with Beauty-itself, which is of the substance of God. Now the contemplation of this Beauty, “by the organ by which it must be contemplated”, that is with the spiritual eye of a purified soul, is doubtless of a mystical character.

To this contemplation the education of the philosopher in Plato's Republic is directed

5—THE REPUBLIC

Rep. I **274**—The first book of the *Rep.* is a Socratic dialogue about the notion of justice. It shows the same method of argumentation,—also the same defects. Socrates' view of justice as it is developed in this dialogue in contrast to Thrasymachus, is closely akin to that of the *Gorgias*.

First definition of justice

a. Pl., *Rep.* I 331 e³

(Polemarchus proposes as a definition of justice, what Simonides said about it):

“Ὅτι, ἢ δ' ὅς, τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι δίκαιόν ἐστι. Which is explained by him (334 b) as ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους, βλάπτειν δὲ τοὺς ἐχθρούς.

Socr. proves the meaning of this to be: τοὺς ἀδίκους ἄρα δίκαιον βλάπτειν, τοὺς δὲ δίκαιους ὠφελεῖν.

refuted by Socr.

b. Now Socr. shows that by harming a man you are making him worse, that is less just. He concludes (335 d¹¹):

Οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν ἔργον, ὃ Πολέμαρχε, οὔτε φίλον οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τοῦ ἀδίκου.

interruption of Thrasymachus

275—Here Thrasymachus interrupts and defends the thesis that justice is the interest of the strongest, and that the life of the unjust is “better” (κρείττω) than that of the just.

Socr. argues against him, 1^o that the just man is good and wise, the unjust stupid and bad (350c); 2^o when the unjust man is stupid, he is not “stronger” than the just man who is wise (351a); 3^o he is not happier (352d sq.).

justice the virtue of the soul

a. *Rep.* I 353 b:

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἐκάστῳ ᾧπερ καὶ ἔργον τι προστέτακται;

“All things that have a function to perform, also have a virtue”, for instance eyes and ears etc.

353d

“Ἴθι δὴ, μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε σκέψαι. ψυχῆς ἔστιν τι ἔργον ὃ ἄλλῳ τῶν ὄντων οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ πράξαις, οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε · τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύ-

εσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ἔσθ' ὅτ' ἄλλῃ ἢ ψυχῇ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδοῖμεν καὶ φαῖμεν ἴδια ἐκείνης εἶναι;

Οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ.

Τί δ' αὖ τὸ ζῆν; ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι;

Μάλιστά γ', ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴν φαμέν τινα ψυχῆς εἶναι;

Φαμέν. —

Οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴν γε συνεχωρήσαμεν ψυχῆς εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, κακίαν δὲ ἐ
ἀδικίαν;

Συνεχωρήσαμεν γάρ.

Ἡ μὲν ἄρα δικαία ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἀνὴρ εὖ βιώσεται, κακῶς δὲ ὁ ἄδικος.

Φαίνεται, ἔφη, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε εὖ ζῶν μακάριός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ τάναντία.

354a

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἄρα εὐδαίμων, ὁ δ' ἄδικος ἄθλιος.

b. With the last point cp. the poem of Arist. on the Friendship of **the just man is happy**
Plato, fr. 673 R.:

ὁς μόνος ἢ πρῶτος θνητῶν κατέδειξεν ἐναργῶς
οἰκίῳ τε βίῳ καὶ μεθόδοισι λόγων,
ὡς ἀγαθός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἅμα γίνεται ἀνὴρ ·
οὐ νῦν δ' ἔστι λαβεῖν οὐδενὶ ταῦτα ποτέ.

Remark. The interest of this first book, which certainly dates from the first **interest of this book**
period of Plato's literary work (before 391) is principally this, that the composition
of the *Republic* clearly shows the close and inner connection between the Socratic
seeking for a definition of virtue and Plato's philosophy in his ripe years, in which
he was the head of the Academy.

276—The search for the notion of justice is pursued.

Rep. II

Rep. II, 368 d-369 a:

Ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί, δοκεῖ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιαύτην ποιήσασθαι
ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οἷανπερ ἂν εἰ προσέταξέ τις γράμματα σμικρὰ πόρρωθεν
ἀναγνῶναι μὴ πάνυ ὀξύ βλέπουσιν, ἔπειτά τις ἐνενόησεν ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ γράμματα
ἔστι που καὶ ἄλλοθι μείζω τε καὶ ἐν μείζονι, ἔρμαιον ἂν ἐφάνη, οἶμαι, ἐκεῖνα
πρῶτον ἀναγνόντας οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν τὰ ἐλάττω, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος · ἀλλὰ τί τοιοῦτον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῇ
περὶ τὸ δίκαιον ζητῆσει καθορᾷ;

368e

Ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ. Δικαιοσύνη, φαμέν, ἔστι μὲν ἀνδρὸς ἑνός, ἔστι δὲ που
καὶ ὅλης πόλεως;

Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Οὐκοῦν μεῖζον πόλις ἐνὸς ἀνδρός;

Μεῖζον, ἔφη.

"Ἴσως τοίνυν πλείων ἂν δικαιοσύνη ἐν τῷ μεῖζονι ἐνείη καὶ ῥάων καταμαθεῖν.

369a Εἰ οὖν βούλεσθε, πρῶτον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ζητήσωμεν ποῖόν ἐστιν ἔπειτα οὕτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ ἐκάστω, τὴν τοῦ μεῖζονος ὁμοιότητα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἰδέα ἐπισκοποῦντες.

Ἄλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, καλῶς λέγειν.

the origin of
the state

277—a. Ib., 369 b⁵ 8:

Γίγνεται τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πόλις, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής ἢ τίν' οἶει ἀρχὴν ἄλλην πόλιν οἰκίζειν; Οὐδεμίαν, ἦ δ' ὅς.

the principle
of division of
labour

b. Ib., 370 a-b:

Ἐννοῶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπόντος σοῦ, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῶν φύεται ἕκαστος οὐ πάνυ ὅμοιος ἐκάστω, ἀλλὰ διαφέρων τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλου ἔργου πρᾶξιν ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

"Εμοιγε.

Τί δέ; πότερον κάλλιον πράττοι ἂν τις εἷς ὢν πολλὰς τέχνας ἐργαζόμενος, ἢ ὅταν μίαν εἷς;

"Όταν, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἷς μίαν.

the luxurious
state

278—a. As soon as the limits of what is necessary are transgressed, injustice and evil of every kind creep in.

Ib. 373 d-e:

Οὐκοῦν τῆς τῶν πλησίων χώρας ἡμῖν ἀποτμητέον, εἰ μέλλομεν ἱκανὴν ἔξειν νέμειν τε καὶ ἀροῦν, καὶ ἐκείνοις αὖ τῆς ἡμετέρας, ἐὰν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι ἀφῶσιν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἀπειρον, ὑπερβάντες τὸν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὅρον;

373e Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Πολεμήσομεν δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὦ Γλαύκων; ἢ πῶς ἔσται;

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Καὶ μηδὲν γέ πω λέγωμεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μήτ' εἴ τι κακὸν μήτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν ὁ πόλεμος ἐργάζεται, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὅτι πολέμου αὖ γένεσιν ἡυρήκαμεν, ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα ταῖς πόλεσιν καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ κακὰ γίγνεται, ὅταν γίγνηται.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

φύλακες

b. Ib. 374 e⁶⁻⁸:

Ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον ἂν εἴη, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴπερ οἳ τ' ἐσμέν, ἐκλέξασθαι τίνες τε καὶ ποῖαι φύσεις ἐπιτήδεια εἰς πόλεως φυλακὴν.

These men must have opposite qualities: they must be brave, and at the same time gentle (δεῖ γε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς οἰκείους πρᾶγους αὐτοὺς εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους χαλεπούς). These qualities must be carefully cultivated by education.

279—A severe selection from literature is to be made to this purpose. Myths in which the gods are represented in a way unworthy and untrue, must be rejected.

**selection
from
literature**

a. 378 e-379 c:

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον · ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἐσμὲν ποιηταὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ' οἰκιστὰι πόλεως · οἰκισταῖς δὲ τοὺς μὲν τύπους προσήκει εἰδέναι 379a ἐν οἷς δεῖ μυθολογεῖν τοὺς ποιητάς, παρ' οὓς ἂν ποιῶσιν οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτόν, οὐ μὴν αὐτοῖς γε ποιητέον μύθους.

Ὅρθῳς, ἔφη · ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο, οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας τίνες ἂν εἶεν; Τοιοῖδε πού τινες, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ · οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὢν, ἀεὶ δήπου ἀποδοτέον, ἑάντε τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἔπεσιν ποιῇ ἑάντε ἐν μέλεσιν ἑάντε ἐν τραγωδίᾳ.

Δεῖ γάρ.

Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ὁ γε θεὸς τῷ ὄντι τε καὶ λεκτέον οὕτω;

b

Τί μὴν;

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲν γε τῶν ἀγαθῶν βλαβερόν · ἡ γάρ;

Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

Ἄρ' οὖν ὁ μὴ βλαβερόν βλάπτει;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ὁ δὲ μὴ βλάπτει κακὸν τι ποιεῖ;

Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

Ὁ δὲ γε μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖ οὐδ' ἂν τινος εἴη κακοῦ αἷτιον;

Πῶς γάρ;

Τί δέ; ὠφέλιμον τὸ ἀγαθόν;

Ναί.

Αἷτιον ἄρα εὐπραγίας;

Ναί.

Οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἷτιον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αἷτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον.

Παντελῶς γ', ἔφη.

c

Οὐδ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἂν εἴη αἷτιος, ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἷτιος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος · πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τὰγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα ἄλλον αἷτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἅλλ' ἅττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἷτια, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν.

b. Ib. 380 c-d:

Οὗτος μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, εἷς ἂν εἴη τῶν περὶ θεοῦ νόμων τε καὶ τύπων,

ἐν ᾧ δεήσει τοὺς λέγοντας λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ποιοῦντας ποιεῖν, μὴ πάντων αἴτιον τὸν θεόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, ἀπόχρη.

380d Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ δεύτερος ὁδε; ἄρα γόητα τὸν θεὸν οἶει εἶναι καὶ οἷον ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς φαντάζεσθαι ἄλλοτε ἐν ἄλλαις ιδέαις, τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸν γιγνόμενον, καὶ ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὐτοῦ εἶδος εἰς πολλὰς μορφάς, τοτὲ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀπατῶντα καὶ ποιῶντα περὶ αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα δοκεῖν, ἢ ἀπλοῦν τε εἶναι καὶ πάντων ἥκιστα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ιδέας ἐκβαίνειν;

Adeimantus does not agree with this directly, but after some reflexions he does; for what is good cannot be changed by anything from without, nor can it be changed by itself, every change being a change for the worse.

c. Ib., 382 e-383 a:

Κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἐν τε ἔργῳ καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ, οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας οὔτε κατὰ λόγους οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς, οὔθ' ὕπαρ οὐδ' ὄναρ.

Οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται σοῦ λέγοντος.

Rep. III,
further
selection

280—Stories about terrible things in Hades also must be struck out of the poems, for the guardians must be brave and have no fear of death. In like way no stories about lamenting heroes, nor any "homeric laughter" may be tolerated in our poetry, being unworthy of brave men.

the medical
lie

Rep. III 389 b:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀλήθειάν γε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιητέον. Εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι καὶ τῷ ὄντι θεοῖσι μὲν ἀχρηστον ψεῦδος, ἀνθρώποις δὲ χρήσιμον ὥς ἐν φαρμάκου εἶδει, δῆλον ὅτι τό γε τοιοῦτον ἱατροῖς δοτέον, ιδιώταις δὲ οὐχ ἀπτέον.

Δῆλον, ἔφη.

Τοῖς ἄρχουσιν δὴ τῆς πόλεως, εἴπερ τισὶν ἄλλοις, προσήκει ψεύδεσθαι ἢ πολεμίων ἢ πολιτῶν ἔνεκα ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ τῆς πόλεως, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις πᾶσιν οὐχ ἀπτέον τοῦ τοιούτου.

dramatic
poetry
excluded

281—Dramatic art must be excluded, being against the fundamental principle of our city.

a. Ib. 394 e:

Τόδε τοίνυν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἄθρει πότερον μιμητικούς ἡμῖν δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας ἢ οὐ · ἢ καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἔπεται ὅτι εἷς ἕκαστος ἐν μὲν ἂν ἐπιτήδευμα καλῶς ἐπιτηδεύοι, πολλὰ δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο ἐπιχειροῖ, πολλῶν ἐφαπτόμενος πάντων ἀποτυγχάνοι ἂν. ὥστ' εἶναι που ἐλλόγιμος;

Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει;

b. Ib. 397 d e:

A poet of mixed poetry (partly mimetic, partly not) would not suit in our city.

✓ 'Αλλ' ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν ἀρμόττειν φαίης τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πολιτείᾳ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν διπλοῦς ἀνὴρ παρ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲ πολλαπλοῦς, ἐπειδὴ ἕκαστος ἐν πράττει.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν ἀρμόττει.

To music and the plastic arts the same general principles must be applied. Gymnastics follow the same rule: it is not allowed to be complicated and extreme. Simplicity and soberness are prescribed.

282—Ib. 412 d-e:

the ἄρχοντες

Ἐκλεκτέον ἄρ' ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων φυλάκων τοιούτους ἄνδρας, οἳ ἂν σκοποῦσιν ἡμῖν μάλιστα φαίνωνται παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον ὃ μὲν ἂν τῇ πόλει ἡγήσωνται ζυμφέρειν πάσῃ προθυμία ποιεῖν, ὃ δ' ἂν μή, μηδενὶ τρόπῳ πράττειν ἂν ἐθέλῃν.

Ἐπιτήδειοι γάρ, ἔφη.

Δοκεῖ δὴ μοι τηρητέον αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἡλικίαις, εἰ φυλακικοὶ εἰσι τούτου τοῦ δόγματος καὶ μήτε γοητευόμενοι μήτε βιαζόμενοι ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐπιλανθάνομενοι δόξαν τὴν τοῦ ποιεῖν δεῖν ἅ τῇ πόλει βέλτιστα.

283—Ib. 416 d-417 b:

life of the guardians

“Ορα δὴ, εἶπον ἐγώ, εἰ τοιόνδε τινὰ τρόπον δεῖ αὐτοὺς ζῆν τε καὶ οἰκεῖν, εἰ μέλλουσι τοιοῦτοι ἔσεσθαι· πρῶτον μὲν οὐσίαν κεκτημένον μηδεμίαν μηδένα ἰδίαν, ἂν μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη· ἔπειτα οἴκησιν καὶ ταμιεῖον μηδενὶ εἶναι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον, εἰς δ' οὐ πᾶς ὁ βουλόμενος εἴσεισι· τὰ δ' ἐπιτήδεια, ὅσων δέονται ἄνδρες ἀθλῆται πολέμου σώφρονές τε καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ταξαμένους παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων 416e πολιτῶν δέχεσθαι μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς τοσοῦτον ὅσον μήτε περιεῖναι αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν μήτε ἐνδεῖν· φοιτῶντας δὲ εἰς ξυσσίτια ὥσπερ ἐστρατοπεδευμένους κοινῇ ζῆν· χρυσίον δὲ καὶ ἀργύριον εἶπεῖν αὐτοῖς ὅτι θεῖον παρὰ θεῶν αἰεὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχουσι καὶ οὐδὲν προσδέονται τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου, οὐδὲ ὅσια τὴν ἐκείνου κτήσιν τῇ τοῦ θνητοῦ χρυσοῦ κτήσει ζυμμιγνύντας μιαίνειν, διότι πολλὰ 417a καὶ ἀνόσια περὶ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν νόμισμα γέγονεν, τὸ παρ' ἐκείνοις δὲ ἀκήρατον· ἀλλὰ μόνοις αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει μεταχειρίζεσθαι καὶ ἄπτεσθαι χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου οὐ θέμις, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν ὄροφον ἰέναι οὐδὲ περιάψασθαι οὐδὲ πίνειν ἐξ ἀργύρου ἢ χρυσοῦ. Καὶ οὕτω μὲν σφύζοντό τ' ἂν καὶ σφύζοιεν τὴν πόλιν· ὁπότε δ' αὐτοὶ γῆν τε ἰδίαν καὶ οἰκίας καὶ νομίσματα κτήσονται, οἰκονόμοι μὲν καὶ γεωργοὶ ἀντὶ φυλάκων ἔσονται, δεσπόται δ' ἐχθροὶ ἀντὶ ζυμμάχων τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν γενήσονται, μισοῦντες δὲ δὴ καὶ μισούμενοι καὶ ἐπιβουλευόντες καὶ ἐπιβουλεύομενοι διάξουσι πάντα τὸν βίον, πολὺ πλείω καὶ b

μᾶλλον δεδιότες τοὺς ἔνδον ἢ τοὺς ἔξωθεν πολεμίους, θέοντες ἤδη τότε ἐγγύτατα ὀλέθρου αὐτοὶ τε καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πόλις. Τούτων οὖν πάντων ἕνεκα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φῶμεν οὕτω δεῖν κατεσκευάσθαι τοὺς φύλακας οἰκήσεώς τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ταῦτα νομοθετήσωμεν, ἢ μή;

Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Γλαύκων.

Rep. IV, the
definition of
justice

284—Our city is founded. Where is now justice in it?

a. *Rep.* IV, 427 e-428 a:

Ἐλπίζω τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὐρήσειν αὐτὸ ὧδε. Οἶμαι ἡμῖν τὴν πόλιν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς γε ᾤκισται, τελέως ἀγαθὴν εἶναι.

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι σοφὴ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σώφρων καὶ δικαία.

Δῆλον.

Οὐκοῦν ὅ τι ἂν αὐτῶν εὐρωμεν ἐν αὐτῇ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἔσται τὸ οὐχ ἡυρημένον;

428a Τί μὴν;

Ὡσπερ τοίνυν ἄλλων τινῶν τεττάρων, εἰ ἐν τι ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτῶν ἐν ὁποῦν, ὁπότε πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο ἐγνώμεν, ἱκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν ἡμῖν, εἰ δὲ τὰ τρία πρότερον ἐγνωρίσαμεν, αὐτῷ ἂν τούτῳ ἐγνωρίστο τὸ ζητούμενον· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο ἔτι ἦν ἢ τὸ ὑπολειφθέν.

Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἐπειδὴ τέτταρα ὄντα τυγχάνει, ὡσαύτως ζητητέον;

Δῆλα δῆ.

Wisdom then is proved to reside in the ἄρχοντες, bravery in the φύλακες. Σωφροσύνη turns out to be a certain harmony of the three classes in the city, an unanimity as to which part ought to rule and which to be ruled.

of σωφροσύνη

b. *Ib.*, 432 a⁶⁻⁹:

ὥστε ὀρθότατ' ἂν φαῖμεν ταύτην τὴν ὁμόνοιαν σωφροσύνην εἶναι, χείρονός τε καὶ ἀμείνονος κατὰ φύσιν συμφωνίαν ὁπότερον δεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἐν πόλει καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ ἐκάστω.

of justice in
the city

c. *Ib.*, 433 d⁴-e²; 434 a-c:

What makes a city good, seems to be this:

ὅτι τὸ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος εἷς ὢν ἔπραττεν καὶ οὐκ ἐπολυπραγμόνει.

Δύσκριτον ἔφη· πῶς δ' οὐ;

Ἐνάμιλλον ἄρα, ὡς εἶοικε, πρὸς ἀρετὴν πόλεως τῇ τε σοφίᾳ αὐτῆς καὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἢ τοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν δύναμις.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν δικαιοσύνην τό γε τούτοις ἐνάμιλλον ἂν εἰς ἀρετὴν πόλεως θείης;
Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. —

Ἴδὲ δὴ ἐὰν σοὶ ὅπερ ἐμοὶ ξυνδοκῇ. Τέκτων σκυτοτόμου ἐπιχειρῶν 434a
ἔργα ἐργάζεσθαι ἢ σκυτοτόμος τέκτονος, ἢ τὰ ὄργανα μεταλαμβάνοντες
τάλλήλων ἢ τιμάς, ἢ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπιχειρῶν ἀμφοτέρω πράττειν, πάντα τᾶλλα
μεταλλαττόμενα, ἄρα σοὶ ἂν τι δοκεῖ μέγα βλάψαι πόλιν;

Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη.

Ἄλλ' ὅταν γε, οἶμαι, δημιουργὸς ὢν ἢ τις ἄλλος χρηματιστὴς φύσει, ἔπειτα
ἐπαιρόμενος ἢ πλούτῳ ἢ πλήθει ἢ ἰσχύϊ ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ τοιούτῳ εἰς τὸ τοῦ πολεμικοῦ b
εἶδος ἐπιχειρῇ ἰέναι, ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν τις εἰς τὸ τοῦ βουλευτικοῦ καὶ φύλακος
ἀνάξιος ὢν, καὶ τὰ ἀλλήλων οὔτοι ὄργανα μεταλαμβάνωσι καὶ τὰς τιμάς, ἢ
ὅταν ὁ αὐτὸς πάντα ταῦτα ἅμα ἐπιχειρῇ πράττειν, τότε οἶμαι καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖν
ταύτην τὴν τούτων μεταβολὴν καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνην ὀλεθρον εἶναι τῇ πόλει.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Ἦ τριῶν ἄρα ὄντων γενῶν πολυπραγμοσύνη καὶ μεταβολὴ εἰς ἀλλήλα
μεγίστη τε βλάβη τῇ πόλει καὶ ὀρθότατ' ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο μάλιστα κακουργία. c

Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

Κακουργίαν δὲ τὴν μεγίστην τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πόλεως οὐκ ἀδικίαν φήσεις εἶναι;

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα ἀδικία. Πάλιν δὲ ὧδε λέγωμεν · χρηματιστικοῦ, ἐπικουρικοῦ,
φυλακικοῦ γένους οἰκιοπραγία, ἐκάστου τούτων τὸ αὐτοῦ πράττοντος ἐν
πόλει, τούναντίον ἐκείνου δικαιοσύνη τ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τὴν πόλιν δικαίαν παρέχει;

Shortly put, the definition of justice is:

ἡ τοῦ οἰκείου τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕξις τε καὶ πρᾶξις (433 e¹²).

285—a. Ib., 435 b-c:

justice in the
individual

Ἄλλὰ μέντοι πόλις γε ἔδοξεν εἶναι δικαία ὅτε ἐν αὐτῇ τριττὰ γένη φύσεων
ἐνόντα τὸ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἐπραττεν, σώφρων δὲ αὖ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σοφὴ διὰ
τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων γενῶν ἄλλ' ἅττα πάθη τε καὶ ἕξεις.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

Καὶ τὸν ἕνα ἄρα, ὦ φίλε, οὕτως ἀξιῶσομεν, τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶδη ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ
ψυχῇ ἔχοντα, διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ πάθη ἐκείνοις τῶν αὐτῶν ὀνομάτων ὀρθῶς ἀξιούσθαι
τῇ πόλει.

b. There are three parts in the soul (λογιστικόν, θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν), as there are three classes in the city (βουλευτικόν, ἐπικου-
ρητικόν and χρηματιστικόν). the three
parts in the
soul

Ib. 441 e⁴⁻⁷, 442 a⁴-b³:

Οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει, σοφῶ ὄντι καὶ ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπὲρ ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς προμήθειαν, τῷ δὲ θυμοειδεῖ ὑπηκόω εἶναι καὶ συμμάχῳ τούτου; — Πανύ γε. —

Καὶ τούτῳ δὴ . . . προστήσεσθον τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ, ὃ δὴ πλεῖστον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἐστὶ καὶ χρημάτων φύσει ἀπληστότατον · ὃ τηρήσετον μὴ τῷ πίμπλασθαι τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλουμένων ἡδονῶν πολὺ καὶ ἰσχυρὸν γενόμενον οὐκ αὖ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττει, ἀλλὰ καταδουλώσασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν ἐπιχειρήσῃ ὧν οὐ προσήκον αὐτῷ γένει, καὶ σύμπαντα τὸν βίον πάντων ἀνατρέψῃ.

the four
virtues

c. Ib., 442 b-d:

Καὶ ἀνδρεῖον δὴ, οἶμαι, τούτῳ τῷ μέρει καλοῦμεν ἓνα ἕκαστον, ὅταν αὐτοῦ 442c τὸ θυμοειδὲς διασφύζῃ διὰ τε λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων παραγγελθὲν δεινόν τε καὶ μῆ.

Ὅρθῶς γ', ἔφη.

Σοφὸν δέ γε ἐκείνῳ τῷ σμικρῷ μέρει, τῷ ὃ ἤρχεν τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα παρήγγελλεν, ἔχον αὖ κάκεῖνο ἐπιστήμην ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ ξυμφέροντος ἐκάστω τε καὶ ὅλῳ τῷ κοινῷ σφῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὄντων.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Τί δέ; σώφρονα οὐ τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ ξυμφωνίᾳ τῇ αὐτῶν τούτων, ὅταν τό τε d ἄρχον καὶ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ τὸ λογιστικὸν ὁμοδοξῶσι δεῖν ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ στασιά-ζωσιν αὐτῷ;

Σωφροσύνη γοῦν, ἥ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦτο, πόλεώς τε καὶ ἰδιώτου.

Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ δίκαιός γε, ᾧ πολλάκις λέγομεν, τούτῳ καὶ οὕτως ἔσται.

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.

Τί οὖν; εἶπον ἐγώ · μὴ πῃ ἡμῖν ἀπαμβλύνεται ἄλλο τι δικαιοσύνη δοκεῖν εἶναι ἢ ὅπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐφάνη;

Οὐκ ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.

justice

d. Ib., 443 b¹⁻².

Shortly put, the definition of justice of a man is:

ὅτι αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἕκαστον τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττει ἀρχῆς τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι.

Rep. V,
community
of women
and
children

286—It is an eristical way of argumentation to say that women have a different "nature" from men, and therefore ought to do different work. The "nature" of men and women is different as to procreation; but only in that respect.

a. *Rep.* V 454 e⁶-455 b³; 455 c⁴-e⁸; 456 a⁷-b⁴:

Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο κελεύομεν τὸν τὰ ἐναντία λέγοντα τοῦτο αὐτὸ δι-
δάσκειν ἡμᾶς, πρὸς τίνα τέχνην ἢ τί ἐπιτήδευμα τῶν περὶ πόλεως κατασκευῇν 455a
οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, ἀλλὰ ἑτέρα φύσις γυναικὸς τε καὶ ἀνδρός;

Δίκαιον γοῦν.

Τάχα τοίνυν ἄν, ὅπερ σὺ ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἴποι ἄν καὶ ἄλλος, ὅτι ἐν
μὲν τῷ παραχρῆμα ἱκανῶς εἰπεῖν οὐ ῥᾶδιον, ἐπισκεψαμένῳ δὲ οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν.

Εἴποι γὰρ ἄν.

Βούλει οὖν δεώμεθα τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀντιλέγοντος ἀκολουθῆσαι ἡμῖν, ἐάν
πως ἡμεῖς ἐκείνῳ ἐνδειξώμεθα ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἐπιτήδευμα ἴδιον γυναικὶ πρὸς b
διοίκησιν πόλεως;

Πάνυ γε. —

Οἷσθά τι οὖν ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων μελετώμενον, ἐν ᾧ οὐ πάντα ταῦτα 455c
τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γένος διαφερόντως ἔχει ἢ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν; ἢ μακρολογῶμεν
τὴν τε ὑφ'αντικὴν λέγοντες καὶ τὴν τῶν ποπάνων τε καὶ ἐψημάτων θεραπείαν,
ἐν οἷς δὴ τι δοκεῖ τὸ γυναικεῖον γένος εἶναι, οὗ καὶ καταγελαστότατόν ἐστι d
πάντων ἡττώμενον;

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὅτι πολὺ κρατεῖται ἐν ἅπασιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τὸ γένος
τοῦ γένους. Γυναῖκες μέντοι πολλὰ πολλῶν ἀνδρῶν βελτίους εἰς πολλά · τὸ
δὲ ὅλον ἔχει ὡς σὺ λέγεις.

Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστίν, ὦ φίλε, ἐπιτήδευμα τῶν πόλιν διοικούντων γυναικὸς διότι
γυνή, οὐδ' ἀνδρὸς διότι ἀνὴρ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως διεσπαρμέναι αἱ φύσεις ἐν ἀμφοῖν τοῖν
ζώοιν, καὶ πάντων μὲν μετέχει γυνὴ ἐπιτηδευμάτων κατὰ φύσιν, πάντων
δὲ ἀνὴρ, ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ ἀσθενέστερον γυνὴ ἀνδρός. e

Πάνυ γε.

Ἦ οὖν ἀνδράσι πάντα προστάζομεν, γυναικὶ δ' οὐδέν;

Καὶ πῶς;

Ἄλλ' ἐστὶ γάρ, οἶμαι, ὡς φήσομεν, καὶ γυνὴ ἰατρικὴ, ἢ δ' οὐ, καὶ μουσικὴ,
ἢ δ' ἄμουσος φύσει.

Τί μήν; —

Ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ φυλακικὴ γυνή, ἢ δ' οὐ · ἢ οὐ τοιαύτην καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν 456a
τῶν φυλακικῶν φύσιν ἐξελεξάμεθα;

Τοιαύτην μὲν οὖν.

Καὶ γυναικὸς ἄρα καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις εἰς φυλακὴν πόλεως, πλὴν ὅσα
ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ ἰσχυροτέρα ἐστίν.

Φαίνεται.

Καὶ γυναῖκες ἄρα αἱ τοιαῦται τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἀνδράσιν ἐκλεκτέαι ξυνοικεῖν b
τε καὶ ξυμφυλάττειν, ἐπεὶ περ εἰσὶν ἱκαναὶ καὶ ξυγγενεῖς αὐτοῖς τὴν φύσιν.

Πάνυ γε.

b. Ib., 457 c-d:

Τούτῳ, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἔπεται νόμος καὶ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὥς ἐγῶμαι, ὅδε.

Τίς;

457d Τὰς γυναῖκας ταύτας τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων πάντων πάσας εἶναι κοινάς, ἰδίᾳ δὲ μηδενὶ μηδεμίαν συνοικεῖν · καὶ τοὺς παῖδας αὖ κοινούς, καὶ μήτε γονέα ἔκγονον εἰδέναι τὸν αὐτοῦ μήτε παῖδα γονέα.

Πολύ, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἐκείνου μεῖζον πρὸς ἀπιστίαν καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ πέρι καὶ τοῦ ὠφελίμου.

the greatest
advantage of
this system

287—Ib., 462 a-463 c:

462b Ἔχομεν οὖν τι μεῖζον κακὸν πόλει ἢ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἂν αὐτὴν διασπᾷ καὶ ποιῇ πολλὰς ἀντὶ μιᾶς; ἢ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ὃ ἂν ξυνδῇ τε καὶ ποιῇ μίαν;

Οὐκ ἔχομεν.

Οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης κοινωνία ξυνδεῖ, ὅταν ὅτι μάλιστα πάντες οἱ πολῖται τῶν αὐτῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων παραπλησίως χαίρωσι καὶ λυπῶνται;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

c Ἡ δέ γε τῶν τοιούτων ιδίωσις διαλύει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν περιαλγεῖς, οἱ δὲ περιχαρεῖς γίγνωνται ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς παθήμασι τῆς πόλεως τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει; Τί δ' οὐ;

Ἄρ' οὖν ἐκ τοῦδε τὸ τοιόνδε γίγνεται, ὅταν μὴ ἅμα φθέγγωνται ἐν τῇ πόλει τὰ τοιάδε ῥήματα, τό τε ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν; καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἄλλοτρίου κατὰ ταῦτά;

Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

Ἐν ἧτινι δὴ πόλει πλεῖστοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ ταῦτά τοῦτο λέγουσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν, αὕτη ἄριστα διοικεῖται;

Πολύ γε.

d Καὶ ἥτις δὴ ἐγγύτατα ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἔχει; Οἷον ὅταν πού ἡμῶν δάκτυλός του πληγῇ, πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία ἢ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν τὴν τοῦ ἀρχοντος ἐν αὐτῇ ἡσθετό τε καὶ πᾶσα ἅμα ξυνήλγησεν μέρους πονήσαντος ὅλη, καὶ οὕτω δὴ λέγομεν ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν δάκτυλον ἀλγεῖ · καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ὁπουοῦν τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, περὶ τε λύπης πονοῦντος μέρους καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς ῥατίζοντος;

Ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ, ἔφη · καὶ τοῦτο δ' ἐρωτᾷς, τοῦ τοιούτου ἐγγύτατα ἢ ἄριστα πολιτευομένη πόλις οἰκεῖ.

e Ἐνὸς δὴ, οἶμαι, πάσχοντος τῶν πολιτῶν ὅτιοῦν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἢ τοιαύτη πόλις μάλιστα τε φήσει ἑαυτῆς εἶναι τὸ πάσχον, καὶ ἢ συνησθήσεται ἅπασα ἢ ξυλλυπήσεται.

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, τήν γε εὖνομον.

Ὡρα ἂν εἴη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπανιέναι ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν πόλιν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ λόγου ὁμολογήματα σκοπεῖν ἐν αὐτῇ, εἰ αὐτὴ μάλιστα ἔχει εἴτε καὶ ἄλλη τις μάλλον.

Οὐκοῦν χρή, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν; ἔστι μὲν που καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ἄρχοντές τε καὶ δῆμος, 463a
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ;

Ἔστι.

Πολίτας μὲν δὴ πάντες οὔτοι ἀλλήλους προσερούσι;

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

Ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ πολίτας τί ὁ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις δῆμος τοὺς ἄρχοντας προσαγορεύει;

Ἐν μὲν ταῖς πολλαῖς δεσπότας, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατουμέναις αὐτὸ τοῦνομα τοῦτο, ἄρχοντας.

Τί δ' ὁ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ δῆμος; πρὸς τῷ πολίτας τί τοὺς ἄρχοντάς φησιν εἶναι;

Σωτήράς τε καὶ ἐπικούρους, ἔφη. b

Τί δ' οὔτοι τὸν δῆμον;

Μισθοδότας τε καὶ τροφέας.

Οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἄρχοντες τοὺς δῆμους;

Δούλους, ἔφη.

Τί δ' οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀλλήλους;

Ἐυνάρχοντας, ἔφη.

Τί δ' οἱ ἡμέτεροι;

Ἐμφύλακας.

Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, εἴ τις τινα ἔχει προσειπεῖν τῶν ξυναρχόντων τὸν μὲν ὡς οἰκεῖον, τὸν δ' ὡς ἀλλότριον;

Καὶ πολλούς γε.

Οὐκοῦν τὸν μὲν οἰκεῖον ὡς ἑαυτοῦ νομίζει τε καὶ λέγει, τὸν δ' ἀλλότριον c
ὡς οὐχ ἑαυτοῦ;

Οὕτω.

Τί δὲ οἱ παρὰ σοὶ φύλακες; ἔσθ' ὅστις αὐτῶν ἔχοι ἂν τῶν ξυμφυλάκων νομίσαι τινα ἢ προσειπεῖν ὡς ἀλλότριον;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη · παντὶ γὰρ ᾧ ἂν ἐντυγχάνῃ τις, ἢ ὡς ἀδελφῷ ἢ ὡς ἀδελφῇ ἢ ὡς πατρὶ ἢ ὡς μητρὶ ἢ υἱεῖ ἢ θυγατρὶ ἢ τούτων ἐκγόνοις ἢ προγόνοις νομιεῖ ἐντυγχάνειν.

288—**a.** The value of it does not depend on its practical possibility. the possi-
bility of its
realization
Ib., 472 b-d:

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τόδε χρή ἀναμνησθῆναι, ὅτι ἡμεῖς ζητοῦντες δικαιοσύνην οἷόν ἐστι καὶ ἀδικίαν δεῦρο ἥκομεν.

Χρή· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο; ἔφη.

472c Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἐὰν εὖρωμεν οἶόν ἐστι δικαιοσύνη, ἄρα καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν δίκαιον ἀξιώσομεν μηδὲν δεῖν αὐτῆς ἐκείνης διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἶον δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν; ἡ ἀγαπήσομεν ἐὰν ὅτι ἐγγύτατα αὐτῆς ἢ καὶ πλεῖστα τῶν ἄλλων ἐκείνης μετέχῃ;

Οὕτως, ἔφη· ἀγαπήσομεν.

Παραδείγματος ἄρα ἕνεκα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτό τε δικαιοσύνην οἶόν ἐστι, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τελέως δίκαιον εἰ γένοιτο, καὶ οἷος ἂν εἴη γενόμενος, καὶ ἀδικίαν αὐ καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνους ἀποβλέποντες, οἱοὶ ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνωνται εὐδαιμονίας τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ἀναγκάζομεθα καὶ περὶ ἡμῶν d αὐτῶν ὁμολογεῖν, ὃς ἂν ἐκείνοις ὅτι ὁμοιότητος ἦ, τὴν ἐκείνης μοῖραν ὁμοιότητην ἔξῃ, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτου ἕνεκα, ἵν' ἀποδείξωμεν ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γίνεσθαι.

Τοῦτο μέν, ἔφη, ἀληθὲς λέγεις.

Οἶε ἂν οὖν ἡττόν τι ἀγαθὸν ζωγράφον εἶναι ὃς ἂν γράψας παράδειγμα οἶον ἂν εἴη ὁ κάλλιστος ἄνθρωπος καὶ πάντα εἰς τὸ γράμμα ἱκανῶς ἀποδοὺς μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδείξαι ὡς καὶ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα;

Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

b. Yet it is possible,—on one condition.

Ib. 473 c-e:

Ἐνὸς μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεταβαλόντος δοκοῦμέν μοι ἔχειν δεῖξαι ὅτι μεταπέσοι ἄν, οὐ μέντοι σμικροῦ γε οὐδὲ ῥαδίου, δυνατοῦ δέ.

Τίνος; ἔφη.

Ἐπ' αὐτὸ δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰμι ὃ τῷ μεγίστῳ προσηκάζομεν κύματι. Εἰρήσεται δ' οὖν, εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλῳτι τε ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ κύμα ἐκγελῶν καὶ ἀδοξία κατακλύσειν. Σκόπει δὲ ὃ μέλλω λέγειν.

Λέγε, ἔφη.

473d Ἐὰν μή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ οἱ βασιλεῖς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσοφήσωσι γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταῦτόν ξυμπέσῃ, δυνάμεις τε πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία, τῶν δὲ νῦν πορευομένων χωρὶς ἐφ' ἐκάτερον αἱ πολλαὶ φύσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποκλεισθῶσιν, οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα, ὧ φίλε Γλαύκων, ταῖς πόλεσι, δοκῶ δ' οὐδὲ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ e γένει, οὐδὲ αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία μή ποτε πρότερον φυῇ τε εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ φῶς ἡλίου ἴδῃ, ἦν νῦν λόγῳ διεληλύθαμεν. Ἄλλὰ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ ἐμοὶ πάλαι ὄκνον ἐντίθησι λέγειν, ὁρῶντι ὡς πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν ῥηθήσεται· χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἰδεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλη τις εὐδαιμονήσειεν οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε δημοσίᾳ.

What is a philosopher? 289—To show the truth of this, a definition of “philosopher” should be given.

a. Ib., 475 e⁴:

(We call philosophers) τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας φιλοθεάμονας. Which is explained as follows:

b. Ib., 476 b⁴-d⁷; 479 e¹-480a¹³:

Οἱ μὲν που ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φιλήκοοι καὶ φιλοθεάμονες τάς τε καλὰς φωνὰς ἀσπάζονται καὶ χροᾶς καὶ σχήματα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων δημιουργούμενα, αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀδύνατος αὐτῶν ἡ διάνοια τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀσπᾶσθαι.

Ἐχει γὰρ οὖν δὴ, ἔφη, οὕτως.

Οἱ δὲ δὴ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν δυνατοὶ ἰέναι τε καὶ ὁρᾶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἄρα οὐ σπάνιοι ἂν εἶεν;

476c

Καὶ μάλα.

Ὁ οὖν καλὰ μὲν πράγματα νομίζων, αὐτὸ δὲ κάλλος μήτε νομίζων μήτε ἂν τις ἡγῆται ἐπὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ δυνάμενος ἔπεσθαι, ὅναρ ἢ ὕπαρ δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν; Σκόπει δέ. Τὸ ὀνειρώττειν ἄρα οὐ τότε ἐστίν, ἔαντε ἐν ὕπνῳ τις ἐάντ' ἐγρηγορῶς τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ μὴ ὅμοιον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἡγῆται εἶναι ὃ ἔοικεν;

Ἐγὼ γοῦν ἂν, ἡ δ' ὅς, φαίην ὀνειρώττειν τὸν τοιοῦτον.

Τί δέ; ὁ τάναντία τούτων ἡγούμενός τέ τι αὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ δυνάμενος καθορᾶν καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα, καὶ οὔτε τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτὸ οὔτε αὐτὸ τὰ μετέχοντα ἡγούμενος, ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ αὖ καὶ οὗτος δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν;

d

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ὕπαρ.

Οὐκοῦν τούτου μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς γινώσκοντος γνώμην ἂν ὀρθῶς φαῖμεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ δόξαν ὡς δοξάζοντος;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. —

Τοὺς ἄρα πολλὰ καλὰ θεωμένους, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν μὴ ὁρῶντας μὴδ' ἄλλῳ ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἄγοντι δυναμένους ἔπεσθαι, καὶ πολλὰ δίκαια, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, δοξάζειν φήσομεν ἅπαντα, γινώσκειν δὲ ὧν δοξάζουσιν οὐδέν.

479e

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Τί δὲ αὖ τοὺς αὐτὰ ἕκαστα θεωμένους καὶ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ὄντα; ἄρ' οὐ γινώσκειν, ἀλλ' οὐ δοξάζειν;

Ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τε καὶ φιλεῖν τούτους μὲν ταῦτα φήσομεν ἐφ' οἷς γνῶσις ἐστίν, ἐκείνους δὲ ἐφ' οἷς δόξα; ἡ οὐ μνημονεύομεν ὅτι φωνὰς τε καὶ χροᾶς καλὰς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἔφαμεν τούτους φιλεῖν τε καὶ θεᾶσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ἀνέχεσθαι ὥς τι ὄν;

480a

Μεμνήμεθα.

Μὴ οὖν τι πλημμελήσομεν φιλοδόξους καλοῦντες αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοσόφους; Καὶ ἄρα ἡμῖν σφόδρα χαλεπανοῦσιν ἂν οὕτω λέγωμεν;

Οὐκ, ἂν γέ μοι πείθωνται, ἔφη· τῷ γὰρ ἀληθεῖ χαλεπαίνειν οὐ θέμις.

Τοὺς αὐτὸ ἄρα ἕκαστον τὸ ὃν ἀσπαζομένους φιλοσόφους, ἀλλ' οὐ φιλοδόξους κλητέον;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

**Rep. VI,
definition**

c. *Rep.* VI 484 b:

φιλόσοφοι μὲν οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι, οἱ δὲ μὴ, ἀλλ' ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ παντοίως ἴσχουσιν πλανώμενοι οὐ φιλόσοφοι.

**a practical
difficulty**

290—Adeimantus broaches a difficulty; "Not everybody is perhaps able to contradict you with good arguments, Socrates", he says (VI 487c⁶):

ἐργῶ δὲ ὁρᾶν, ὅσοι ἂν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὁρμήσαντες μὴ τοῦ πεπαιδεῦσθαι
487d ἔνεκα ἀφάμενοι νέοι ὄντες ἀπαλλάττονται, ἀλλὰ μακρότερον ἐνδιατρίψωσιν, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους καὶ πάνυ ἄλλοκότους γιγνομένους, ἵνα μὴ παμπονήρους εἴπωμεν, τοὺς δ' ἐπιεικεστάτους δοκοῦντας ὁμῶς τοῦτό γε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος οὗ σὺ ἐπαινεῖς ἀσχοντας, ἀχρήστους ταῖς πόλεσι γιγνομένους.

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας· Οἷε οὖν, εἶπον, τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας ψεύδεσθαι;

Οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀλλὰ τὸ σοὶ δοκοῦν ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούοιμι.

e Ἀκούοις ἂν ὅτι ἔμοιγε φαίνονται τάληθ' ἡ λέγειν. —

489b Τῆς μέντοι ἀχρηστίας τοὺς μὴ χρωμένους κέλευε (sc. τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας) αἰτιᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς.

**the education
of the philo-
sophers, as it
ought to be**

291—a. *Rep.* VI 497 e-498 c:

Σκόπει δὲ καὶ νῦν ὡς προθύμως καὶ παρακινδυνευτικῶς μέλλω λέγειν, ὅτι τούναντίον ἢ νῦν δεῖ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος τούτου πόλιν ἄπτεσθαι.

Πῶς;

Νῦν μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ καὶ ἀπτόμενοι μεираκία ὄντα ἄρτι ἐκ παίδων τὸ
498a μεταξὺ οἰκονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοῦ πλησιάζαντες αὐτοῦ τῷ χαλεπωτάτῳ ἀπαλλάττονται οἱ φιλοσοφώτατοι ποιούμενοι· λέγω δὲ χαλεπωτάτον τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἔπειτα, ἐὰν καὶ ἄλλων τοῦτο πραττόντων παρακαλούμενοι ἐθέλωσιν ἀκροαταὶ γίγνεσθαι, μεγάλα ἡγοῦνται πάρεργον οἰόμενοι αὐτὸ δεῖν πράττειν· πρὸς δὲ τὸ γῆρας ἐκτός δὴ τινων ὀλίγων ἀποσβέννυνται πολὺ
b μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἑρακλειτείου ἡλίου, ὅσον αὖθις οὐκ ἐξάπτονται.

Δεῖ δὲ πῶς; ἔφη.

Πᾶν τούναντίον· μεираκία μὲν ὄντα καὶ παῖδας μεираκιώδη παιδείαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν μεταχειρίζεσθαι τῶν τε σωμάτων ἐν ᾧ βλαστάνει τε καὶ ἀνδροῦται, εὖ μάλα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφίᾳ κτωμένων· προΐουσης

δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἐν ᾗ ἡ ψυχὴ τελεοῦσθαι ἄρχεται, ἐπιτείνειν τὰ ἐκείνης γυμνάσια · ὅταν δὲ λήγῃ μὲν ἡ ῥώμη, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ στρατειῶν ἐκτὸς γίγνηται, τότε ἤδη ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττειν, ὃ τι μὴ πάρεργον, τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐδαιμόνως βιώσεσθαι καὶ τελευτήσαντας τῷ βίῳ τῷ βεβιωμένῳ τὴν ἐκεῖ μοῖραν ἐπιστήσιν πρέπουσαν.

b. The aptitude of our future rulers must be tested very severely and proved by higher studies.

Ib. 504 c⁹-505 b¹:

Τὴν μακροτέραν τοίνυν, ὧ ἐταῖρε, ἔφην, περιτέον τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐχ ἥττον μανθάνοντι πονητέον ἢ γυμναζομένῳ · ἡ, ὁ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, τοῦ μεγίστου 504d τε καὶ μάλιστα προσήκοντος μαθήματος ἐπὶ τέλος οὐποτε ἤξει.

Οὐ γάρ ταῦτα, ἔφη, μέγιστα, ἀλλ' ἔτι τι μεῖζον δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ὧν διήλθομεν;

Καὶ μεῖζον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων οὐχ ὑπογραφὴν δεῖ ὥσπερ νῦν θεάσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀπεργασίαν μὴ παριέναι · ἡ οὐ γελοῖον ἐπὶ μὲν ἄλλοις σμικροῦ ἀξίοις πᾶν ποιεῖν συντεινομένους ὅπως ὅτι ἀκριβέστατα 504e καὶ καθαρῶτατα ἔξει, τῶν δὲ μεγίστων μὴ μεγίστας ἀξιοῦν εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἀκριβείας;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, [ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα] · ὁ μέντοι μέγιστον μάθημα καὶ περὶ ὃ τι αὐτὸ λέγεις, οἶει τιν' ἂν σε, ἔφη, ἀφείναι μὴ ἐρωτήσαντα τί ἐστίν;

Οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐρώτα. Πάντως αὐτὸ οὐκ ὀλιγάκις ἀκήκοας, νῦν δὲ ἡ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ἢ αὐὶ διανοεῖ ἐμοὶ πράγματα παρέχειν ἀντιλαμβανόμενος. Οἶμαι δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον · ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα μέγιστον μάθημα, πολλάκις ἀκήκοας, ἡ δὲ δίκαια καὶ τᾶλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται. Καὶ νῦν σχεδὸν οἶσθ' ὅτι μέλλω τοῦτο λέγειν, καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ ὅτι αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἴσμεν · εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν, ἄνευ δὲ ταύτης εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα τᾶλλα ἐπισταίμεθα, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ὄφελος, ὥσπερ οὐδ' εἰ κεκτήμεθα τι ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ · —

c. Ib., 505 d¹¹-506 b²:

Ὁ δὲ διώκει μὲν ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει, ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτ' ἐστίν οὐδὲ 505e πίστει χρῆσασθαι μονίμῳ οἷα καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα, διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἀποτυγχάνει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τι ὄφελος ἦν, περὶ δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον οὕτω φῶμεν δεῖν ἐσκοτῶσθαι καὶ ἐκείνους τοὺς βελτίστους ἐν τῇ πόλει, οἷς πάντα ἐγχει- 506a ριοῦμεν;

Ἡμιστά γ', ἔφη.

Οἶμαι γοῦν, εἶπον, δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνοούμενα ὅπη ποτὲ ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν,

the know-
ledge of the
Good

οὐ πολλοῦ τινος ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτῆσθαι ἂν ἑαυτῶν τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦντα μαντεύομαι δὲ μηδὲνα αὐτὰ πρότερον γνώσεσθαι ἱκανῶς.

Καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, μαντεύει.

- b Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία τελῶς κεκοσμήσεται, ἐὰν ὁ τοιοῦτος αὐτὴν ἐπισκοπῇ φύλαξ, ὁ τούτων ἐπιστήμων;
'Ανάγκη, ἔφη.

the Good
compared to
the sun

292—Socr., being unable to answer directly the question of Glauco as to the nature of the Good, uses a parable.

Ib. 508 c-509 c:

'Οφθαλμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἴσθ' ὅτι, ὅταν μηκέτι ἐπ' ἐκεῖνά τις αὐτοὺς τρέπη ὦν ἂν τὰς χροάς τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχῃ, ἀλλὰ ὦν νυκτερινὰ φέγγη, ἀμβλυώτουςί τε καὶ ἐγγύς φαίνονται τυφλῶν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης καθαρᾶς ὕψεως;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

- 508d "Ὅταν δέ γ', οἶμαι, ὦν ὁ ἥλιος καταλάμπει, σαφῶς ὁρῶσι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὄμμασιν ἐνούσα φαίνεται.

Τί μήν;

Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὧδε νόει· ὅταν μὲν οὐ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, εἰς τοῦτο ἀπερείσθαι, ἐνόησέν τε καὶ ἔγνω αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται· ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὸ τῷ σκότῳ κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγνόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον, καὶ ἔοικεν αὐ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι.

"Ἔοικε γάρ.

- e Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδόν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι· αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὐσαν καὶ ἀληθείας, ὡς γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ, οὕτω δὲ καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τούτων ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγήσει· ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ φῶς
509a τε καὶ ὄψιν ἡλιοειδῇ μὲν νομίζειν ὀρθόν, ἥλιον δ' ἡγεῖσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοειδῇ μὲν νομίζειν ταῦτ' ἀμφοτέρα ὀρθόν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι ὁπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὀρθόν, ἀλλ' ἔτι μειζρόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔξιν.

'Αμήχανον κάλλος, ἔφη, λέγεις, εἰ ἐπιστήμην μὲν καὶ ἀλήθειαν παρέχει, αὐτὸ δ' ὑπὲρ ταῦτα κάλλει ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ λέγεις.

Εὐφήμει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' ὧδε μᾶλλον τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ἔτι ἐπισκόπει. Πῶς;

- b Τὸν ἥλιον τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐ μόνον, οἶμαι, τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν παρέχειν φήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ αὔξην καὶ τροφήν, οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν ὄντα.

Πῶς γάρ;

Καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεισθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβεῖα καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.

Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων μάλα γελοίως · "Ἀπολλων, ἔφη, δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς. c

293—The next passage beautifully shows the eager willingness, but non-understanding of the character of this knowledge on the part of Glauco and Socrates

Socr. replies (509 c³):

Σὺ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αἵτιος, ἀναγκάζων τὰ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν.

Καὶ μηδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, παύση, εἰ μὴ τι, ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοιότητα αὐ διεξιὼν, εἴ πη ἀπολείπεις.

'Ἀλλὰ μὴν, εἶπον, συχνά γε ἀπολείπω.

Μηδὲ σμικρὸν τοίνυν, ἔφη, παραλίπης.

Οἶμαι μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολὺ ὅμως δέ, ὅσα γ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι δυνατόν, ἐκὼν οὐκ ἀπολείψω.

Μὴ γάρ, ἔφη.

294—Ib., 509 d-511 e:

Νόησον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, δύο αὐτῶ εἶναι, καὶ βασιλεύειν τὸ μὲν νοητοῦ γένους τε καὶ τόπου, τὸ δ' αὖ ὁρατοῦ, ἵνα μὴ οὐρανοῦ εἰπὼν δόξω σοι σοφίζεσθαι περὶ τὸ ὄνομα. 'Ἀλλ' οὖν ἔχεις ταῦτα διττὰ εἶδη, ὁρατόν, νοητόν;

"Ἐχω.

"Ὡσπερ τοίνυν γραμμὴν δίχα τετμημένην λαβὼν ἄνισα τμήματα, πάλιν τέμνε ἐκάτερον τὸ τμήμα ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τό τε τοῦ ὁρωμένου γένους καὶ τὸ τοῦ νοουμένου, καὶ σοι ἔσται σαφηνεῖα καὶ ἀσαφεῖα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐν μὲν τῷ ὁρωμένῳ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τμήμα εἰκόνες. Λέγω δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιὰς, ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανὰ ξυνέστηκεν, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ κατανοεῖς.

'Ἀλλὰ κατανοῶ.

Τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον τίθει ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικεν, τά τε περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῶα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον γένος.

Τίθημι, ἔφη.

Ἡ καὶ ἐθέλοις ἂν αὐτὸ φάναι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διηρῆσθαι ἀληθεία τε καὶ μή, ὥς τὸ δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστὸν, οὕτω τὸ ὁμοιωθὲν πρὸς τὸ ᾧ ὁμοιωθῇ;

What Socr. can say about it. Two realms: the visible and the intelligible.

these two parts each divided into two

509e

510a

Ἐγώγ', ἔφη, καὶ μάλα.

Σκόπει δὴ αὖ καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ τομὴν ἢ τμητέον.

Πῃ;

Ἦι τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν ὡς εἰκόσιν χρωμένη ψυχὴ ζητεῖν ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν πορευομένη, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τελευτὴν ¹, τὸ δ' αὖ ἕτερον, τὸ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον, ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἰοῦσα καὶ ἀνευ ὧνπερ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων, αὐτοῖς εἶδеси δι' αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη ².

Ταῦτ', ἔφη, ἃ λέγεις, οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἔμαθον.

**the hypothes-
es of
mathematics** Ἄλλ' αὖθις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ῥᾶον γὰρ τούτων προειρημένων μαθήσει. Οἶμαι γάρ σε εἰδέναι ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι τό τε περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γωνιῶν τριττὰ εἶδη καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καθ' ἐκάστην μέθοδον, ταῦτα μὲν ὡς εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἔτι ἀξιούσι περὶ αὐτῶν διδόναι ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν, ἐκ τούτων δ' ἀρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὁρμήσωσι.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε οἶδα.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἶδеси προσχρῶνται καὶ τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται, οὐ περὶ τούτων διανοοῦμενοι, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων πέρι οἷς ταῦτα ἔοικε, τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι καὶ διαμέτρου ³ αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ ταύτης ἦν γράφουσιν, καὶ τᾶλλ' οὕτως, αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα ἃ πλάττουσιν τε καὶ γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασι εἰκόνες εἰσὶν, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ χρώμενοι, ζητοῦντές τε αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν ἃ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Τοῦτο τοίνυν νοητὸν μὲν τὸ εἶδος ἔλεγον, ὑποθέσει δ' ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχὴν χρῆσθαι περὶ τὴν ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἰοῦσαν, ὡς οὐ δυναμένην τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν, εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσιν καὶ ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὡς ἐναργέσι δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετιμημένοις.

¹ I.e.: not giving account of the hypotheses themselves, but achieving the demonstration.

² The division is represented in this way:



³ the diagonal.

Μανθάνω, ἔφη, ὅτι τὸ ὑπὸ ταῖς γεωμετρίαις τε καὶ ταῖς ταύτης ἀδελφαῖς τέχναις λέγεις. b

Τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον μάθανε τμήμα τοῦ νοητοῦ λέγοντά με τοῦτο οὐ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἄπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἴων, ἀψάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὖ ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίῃ, αἰσθητῶ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρώμενος, ἀλλ' εἴδωσιν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἶδη. c

Μανθάνω, ἔφη, ἱκανῶς μὲν οὐ (δοκεῖς γάρ μοι συχνὸν ἔργον λέγειν), ὅτι μέντοι βούλει διορίζειν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων, αἷς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ διανοίᾳ μὲν ἀναγκάζονται, ἀλλὰ μὴ αἰσθήσεσιν αὐτὰ θεᾶσθαι οἱ θεώμενοι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσί σοι, καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς. Διάνοιαν δὲ καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἔξιν, ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦν, ὥς μεταξὺ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν οὔσαν. d

Ἰκανώτατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπεδέξω. Καί μοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα λαβέ, νόησιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτῳ, διάνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν ἀπόδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίαν¹, καὶ τάξον αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον, ὥσπερ ἐφ' οἷς ἐστιν ἀληθείας μετέχειν, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν. e


Μανθάνω, ἔφη, καὶ ξυγχωρῶ καὶ τάττω ὥς λέγεις.


295—Plato illustrates the condition of man and the task education has in this situation, by the famous allegory of the den. Rep. VII, the allegory of the den

Rep. VII 514 a-517 c:

Μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ, εἶπον, ἀπείκασον τοιοῦτῳ πάθει τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας. Ἴδὲ γὰρ ἀνθρώπους οἷον ἐν καταγείῳ οἰκῇσιν σπηλαιώδει, ἀναπεπταμένην πρὸς τὸ φῶς τὴν εἴσοδον ἐχούσῃ μακρὰν παρ' ἅπαν τὸ σπήλαιον, ἐν ταύτῃ ἐκ παίδων ὄντας ἐν δεσμοῖς καὶ τὰ σκέλη καὶ τοὺς αὐχένους, ὥστε μένειν τε αὐτοῦ εἰς τε τὸ πρόσθεν μόνον ὄραν, κύκλῳ δὲ τὰς κεφαλὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἀδυνάτους περιάγειν, φῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς πυρὸς ἄνωθεν the prisoners 514b

¹ The four parts of the line, as divided according to 510b, correspond to four kinds of cognition.





Drawing of miss Dr. B. Th. Koppers, Rotterdam

καὶ πόρρωθεν καόμενον ὀπισθεν αὐτῶν, μεταξύ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ τῶν δεσμωτῶν ἐπάνω ὁδόν, παρ' ἣν ἰδὲ τειχίον παρωκοδομημένον, ὥσπερ τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς πρὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρόκειται τὰ παραφράγματα, ὑπὲρ ὧν τὰ θαύματα δεικνύασιν.

Ὅρῳ, ἔφη.

Ὅρα τοίνυν παρὰ τοῦτο τὸ τειχίον φέροντας ἀνθρώπους σκευὴ τε παντοδαπὰ ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ τειχίου καὶ ἀνδριάντας καὶ ἄλλα ζῶα λίθινά τε καὶ ξύλινα καὶ παντοῖα εἰργασμένα, οἷον εἰκὸς τοὺς μὲν φθεγγομένους, τοὺς δὲ σιγῶντας τῶν παραφερόντων ¹.

the low wall and the moving figures

Ἄτοπον, ἔφη, λέγεις εἰκόνα καὶ δεσμώτας ἀτόπους.

Ὅμοιους ἡμῖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς γὰρ τοιούτους πρῶτον μὲν ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ ἀλλήλων οἶε ἂν τι ἑωρακέναι ἄλλο πλὴν τὰς σκιὰς τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ αὐτῶν τοῦ σπηλαίου προσπιπτούσας;

Πῶς γάρ, ἔφη, εἰ ἀκινήτους γε τὰς κεφαλὰς ἔχειν ἡναγκασμένοι εἶεν διὰ βίου; 515b

Τί δὲ τῶν παραφερομένων; οὐ ταῦτόν τοῦτο;

Τί μήν;

Εἰ οὖν διαλέγεσθαι οἱοί τ' εἶεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐκ αὐτὰ ἡγεῖ ἂν τὰ ὄντα αὐτοὺς νομίζειν ὀνομάζειν, <ὀνομάζοντας> ἅπερ ὀρῶεν;

Ἀνάγκη.

Τί δ' εἰ καὶ ἡχώ τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἐκ τοῦ καταντικρὺ ἔχοι; ὁπότε τις τῶν παριόντων φθέγγαιτο, οἶε ἂν ἄλλο τι αὐτοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ φθεγγόμενον ἢ τὴν παριούσαν σκιάν;

Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

Παντάπασι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο τι νομίζοιεν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ τὰς τῶν σκευαστῶν σκιὰς.

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Σκόπει δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῶν λύσιν τε καὶ ἴασιν τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ τῆς ἀφροσύνης, οἷα τις ἂν εἴη, εἰ φύσει τοιάδε ζυμβαίνει αὐτοῖς· ὁπότε τις λυθείη καὶ ἀναγκάζεται ἐξαίφνης ἀνίστασθαι τε καὶ περιάγειν τὸν αὐχένα καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἀναβλέπειν, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ποιῶν ἀλγοῖ τε καὶ διὰ τὰς μαρμαρυγὰς ἀδυνατοῖ καθορᾶν ἐκεῖνα ὧν τότε τὰς σκιὰς ἑώρα, τί ἂν οἶε αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, εἰ τις αὐτῷ λέγοι ὅτι τότε μὲν ἑώρα φλυαρίας, νῦν δὲ μᾶλλον τι ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πρὸς μᾶλλον ὄντα τετραμμένος ὀρθότερον βλέπει, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν παριόντων δεικνὺς αὐτῷ ἀναγκάζει ἐρωτῶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅ τι ἔστιν οὐκ οἶε αὐτὸν ἀπορεῖν τε ἂν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ τότε ὀρώμενα ἀληθέστερα ἢ τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα;

The prisoners would mistake the shadows for realities.

Πολύ γ', ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν κἄν εἰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς ἀναγκάζοι αὐτὸν βλέπειν, ἀλγεῖν τε ἂν τὰ e

¹ The scene might be represented as in the sketch on p. 204.

δμματα καὶ φεύγειν ἀποστρεφόμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἃ δύναται καθορᾶν, καὶ νομίζειν ταῦτα τῷ ὄντι σαφέστερα τῶν δεικνυμένων;

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

When dragged upwards, they would be dazzled by excess of light.

516a

Εἰ δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐντεῦθεν ἔλκοι τις αὐτὸν βίᾳ διὰ τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάντους, καὶ μὴ ἀνιείη πρὶν ἐξελκύσειεν εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἄρα οὐχὶ ὀδυνᾶσθαι τε ἂν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν ἐλκόμενον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἔλθοι, αὐγῆς ἂν ἔχοντα τὰ δμματα μεστὰ ὄραν οὐδ' ἂν ἐν δύνασθαι τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἀληθῶν;

Οὐ γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, ἐξαίφνης γε.

Συνηθείας δὴ, οἶμαι, δέοιτ' ἂν, εἰ μέλλοι τὰ ἄνω ὄψεσθαι. Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιὰς ἂν ῥᾶστα καθορῶ, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι τὰ τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἶδωλα, ὕστερον δὲ αὐτά· ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν οὐρανὸν νύκτωρ ἂν ῥᾶστον θεάσαιτο, προσβλέπων τὸ τῶν ἄστρον
b τε καὶ σελήνης φῶς, ἥ μεθ' ἡμέραν τὸν ἡλίον τε καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου.

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

At length they would see the sun.

Τελευταῖον δὴ, οἶμαι, τὸν ἡλίον, οὐκ ἐν ὕδασιν οὐδ' ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ ἔδρᾳ φαντάσ-
ματα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ χώρᾳ δύναιτ' ἂν κατιδεῖν καὶ θεάσασθαι οἷός ἐστιν.

Ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη.

Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἂν ἤδη συλλογίζοιτο περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅτι αὐτὸς ὁ τὰς τε ὥρας παρέχων καὶ ἐνιαυτοὺς καὶ πάντα ἐπιτροπεύων τὰ ἐν τῷ ὁρωμένῳ τόπῳ, καὶ
c ἐκείνων ὧν σφεῖς ἐώρων τρόπον τινὰ πάντων αἴτιος.

Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἂν μετ' ἐκεῖνα ἔλθοι.

Τί οὖν; ἀναμιμνησκόμενον αὐτὸν τῆς πρώτης οἰκήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖ σοφίας καὶ τῶν τότε ξυνδесμωτῶν οὐκ ἂν οἶει αὐτὸν μὲν εὐδαιμονίζειν τῆς μεταβολῆς, τοὺς δὲ ἐλεεῖν;

Καὶ μάλα.

Τίμαι δὲ καὶ ἔπαινοι εἴ τινες αὐτοῖς ἦσαν τότε παρ' ἀλλήλων καὶ γέρα τῷ
d ὀξύτατα καθορῶντι τὰ παριόντα, καὶ μνημονεύοντι μάλιστα ὅσα τε πρότερα αὐτῶν καὶ ὕστερα εἰώθει καὶ ἅμα πορεύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ δυνατώτατα ἀπομαντευομένῳ τὸ μέλλον ἤξειν, δοκεῖς ἂν αὐτὸν ἐπιθυμητικῶς αὐτῶν ἔχειν καὶ ζηλοῦν τοὺς παρ' ἐκείνοις τιμωμένους τε καὶ ἐνδυναστεύοντας, ἢ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου ἂν πεπονθέναι καὶ σφόδρα βούλεσθαι „ἐπάρουρον ἐόντα θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ, ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ” καὶ ὅτι οὖν ἂν πεπονθέναι μᾶλλον ἢ ῥεῖν δόξαζειν καὶ ἐκείνῳς ζῆν;

e Οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔγωγε οἶμαι, πᾶν μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι ἂν δέξασθαι ἢ ζῆν ἐκείνῳς.

Καὶ τότε δὴ ἐννόησον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Εἰ πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος καταβάς εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν θάκον καθίζοιτο, ἄρ' οὐ σκότους <ἂν> ἀνάπλεως σχοίη τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, ἐξαίφ-
νης ἤκων ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου;

Καὶ μάλα γ', ἔφη.

Τὰς δὲ δὴ σκιάς ἐκεῖνας πάλιν εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν γνωματεύοντα ¹ διαμιλλᾶσθαι τοῖς αἰεὶ δεσμώταις ἐκεῖνοις, ἐν ᾧ ἀμβλυώττει, πρὶν καταστῆναι ² τὰ ὄμματα, 517a οὗτος δ' ὁ χρόνος μὴ πάνυ ὀλίγος εἴη τῆς συνηθείας, ἅρ' οὐ γέλωτ' ἂν παράσχοι, καὶ λέγοιτο ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀναβάς ἄνω διεφθαρμένος ἤκει τὰ ὄμματα, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἄξιον οὐδὲ πειρᾶσθαι ἄνω ἰέναι; καὶ τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα λύειν τε καὶ ἀνάγειν, εἴ πως ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ δύναιτο λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείνουαι ἄν;

Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη.

Ταύτην τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν εἰκόνα, ᾧ φίλε Γλαύκων, προσαπτέον ἅπασαν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν λεγομένοις, τὴν μὲν δι' ὕψεως φαινομένην ἔδραν τῇ τοῦ δεσμο- 517a τηρίου οἰκῇσιν ἀφομοιούνταν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐν αὐτῇ φῶς τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου δυνάμει τὴν δὲ ἄνω ἀνάβασιν καὶ θέαν τῶν ἄνω τὴν εἰς τὸν νοητὸν τόπον τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνοδον τιθεὶς οὐχ ἁμαρτήσῃ τῆς γ' ἐμῆς ἐλπίδος, ἐπειδὴ ταύτης ἐπιθυμεῖς ἀκούειν. Θεὸς δὲ που οἶδεν εἰ ἀληθὴς οὕσα τυγχάνει. Τὰ δ' οὖν ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα οὕτω φαίνεται, ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόγις ὁρᾶσθαι, ὁφθεῖσα δὲ συλλογιστέα εἶναι ὡς ἄρα πᾶσι πάντων αὕτη ὁρθῶν τε καὶ καλῶν 517a αἰτίαι, ἐν τε ὁρατῷ φῶς καὶ τὸν τοῦτου κύριον τεκοῦσα, ἐν τε νοητῷ αὕτη κυρία ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν παρασχομένη, καὶ ὅτι δεῖ ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐμφρόνως πράξειν ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ.

Εὐνοίομαι, ἔφη, καὶ ἐγώ, ὅν γε δὴ τρόπον δύναμαι.

296—Ib., 517 c-518 b:

"Ἴθι τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τόδε ξυνοιήθητι καὶ μὴ θαυμάσης ὅτι οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐλθόντες οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράττειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω αἰεὶ ἐπείγονται 517a αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ διατρίβειν· εἰκὸς γάρ που οὕτως, εἴπερ αὖ κατὰ τὴν προειρη- μένην εἰκόνα τοῦτ' ἔχει. 517a

Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; τόδε οἶσι τι θαυμαστόν, εἰ ἀπὸ θείων, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, θεωριῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπειά τις ἐλθὼν κακὰ ἀσχημονεῖ τε καὶ φαίνεται σφόδρα γελοῖος ἔτι ἀμβλυώττων καὶ πρὶν ἱκανῶς συνηθῆς γενέσθαι τῷ παρόντι σκότῳ ἀναγκα- 517a ζόμενος ἐν δικαστηρίοις ἢ ἄλλοθι που ἀγωνίζεσθαι περὶ τῶν τοῦ δικαίου σκιῶν ἢ ἀγαλμάτων ὧν αἱ σκιαί, καὶ διαμιλλᾶσθαι περὶ τούτου, ὅπη ποτὲ ὑπολαμβά- νεται ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῇν δικαιοσύνην μὴ πώποτε ἰδόντων;

Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν θαυμαστόν, ἔφη.

'Ἄλλ' εἰ νοῦν γε ἔχοι τις, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, μεμνητ' ἂν ὅτι διτταὶ καὶ ἀπὸ διττῶν 518a γίνονται ἐπιταράξεις ὁμμασιν, ἕκ τε φωτὸς εἰς σκότος μεθισταμένων καὶ ἕκ

¹ measuring the shadows.

² before his eyes have got accustomed to the darkness.

σκότους εἰς φῶς. Ταῦτά δὲ ταῦτα νομίσας γίγνεσθαι καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν, ὁπότε ἴδοι θορυβουμένην τινὰ καὶ ἀδυνατοῦσάν τι καθορᾶν, οὐκ ἂν ἀλογίστως γελῶ, ἀλλ' ἐπισκοποῖ ἂν πότερον ἐκ φανότερου βίου ἤκουσα ὑπὸ ἀληθείας ἐσκότῳται,
 b ἢ ἐξ ἀμαθίας πλείονος εἰς φανότερον ἰοῦσα ὑπὸ λαμπροτέρου μαρμαρυγῆς ἐμπέπλησται, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίσειεν ἂν τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ βίου, τὴν δὲ ἐλεήσειεν, καὶ εἰ γελᾶν ἐπ' αὐτῇ βούλοιτο, ἤττον ἂν καταγέλαστος ὁ γέλως αὐτῷ εἴη ἢ ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνωθεν ἐκ φωτὸς ἡκούση.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, μετρίως λέγεις.

the conse-
quences of it
as to educa-
tion

297—a. Ib., 518 b-d:

Δεῖ δὴ, εἶπον, ἡμᾶς τοιόνδε νομίσαι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ· τὴν παι-
 δεῖαν οὐχ οἶαν τινὲς ἐπαγγελλόμενοι φασιν εἶναι τοιαύτην καὶ εἶναι. Φασὶ δέ
 c πού οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης σφεῖς ἐντιθέναι, οἷον τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς
 ὄψιν ἐντιθέντες.

Φασὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.

Ὁ δέ γε νῦν λόγος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σημαίνει ταύτην τὴν ἐνούσαν ἐκάστου δύναμιν
 ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος, οἷον εἰ ὄμμα μὴ δυνατόν
 ἦν ἄλλως ἢ ζῆν ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι στρέφειν πρὸς τὸ φανὸν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτώδους,
 οὕτω ζῆν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκ τοῦ γιγνομένου περιακτέον εἶναι, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὸ ὄν
 d εἶναι φαμεν τάχαθόν· ἢ γάρ;

Ναί.

Τοῦτου τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτοῦ τέχνη ἂν εἴη, τῆς περιαγωγῆς, τίνα τρόπον
 ὡς ῥᾶστά τε καὶ ἀνυσιμώτατα μεταστραφῆσεται, οὐ τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ
 ὄρᾶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχοντι μὲν αὐτό, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ τετραμμένῳ οὐδὲ βλέποντι οἷ
 ἔδει, τοῦτο διαμηχανήσασθαι.

Ἔοικεν γάρ, ἔφη.

With this passage cp. the doctrine of the anamnesis, expounded in the *Meno*, 81a-86c. Socr. there is replying to the eristical argument that it is impossible to seek (ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ). For you cannot seek for a thing you don't know. He rejects this argument, referring to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, taught by some wise men, priests and priestesses.

this passage
compared to
the doctrine
of anamnesis
in the *Meno*

b. Pl., *Meno* 81 b³⁻⁶; c⁵-d⁵:

Φασὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον καὶ τοτὲ μὲν τελευτᾶν,
 ὁ δὲ ἀποθνήσκειν καλοῦσι, τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι δ' οὐδέποτε·
 δεῖν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ὡς οὐσιώτατα διαβιῶναι τὸν βίον· —

81c Ἄτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός τε οὔσα καὶ πολλάκις γεγонуῖα, καὶ ἑωρα-
 κυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἄιδου πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι οὐ μεμάρ-

θηκεν ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἶόν τ' εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι, ἃ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο. Ἄτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενοὺς οὐσης καὶ μεμαθηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει d ἐν μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα, ὃ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι, τᾶλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, ἐάν τις ἀνδρεῖος ᾗ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνη ζητῶν· τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μαθαίνειν ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἐστίν.

c. Cf. Pl., *Phaedo* 72 e:

κατ' ἐκεῖνόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθὴς ἐστίν, ὃν σὺ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὔσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι, ἃ νῦν ἀναμνηνησκόμεθα.

298—Pl., *Rep.* VII 521 c-d:

Βούλει οὖν τοῦτ' ἤδη σκοπεῶμεν, τίνα τρόπον οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐγγενήσονται, καὶ πῶς τις ἀνάξει αὐτοὺς εἰς φῶς, ὥσπερ ἐξ Ἄιδου λέγονται δὴ τινες εἰς θεοὺς ἀνελθεῖν;

again: how the philosophers ought to be educated

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι; ἔφη.

Τοῦτο δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὁστράκου ἂν εἴη περιστροφή, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τιнос ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινὴν, τοῦ ὄντος οὔσαν ἐπάνοδον, ἣν δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φήσομεν εἶναι.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι τί τῶν μαθημάτων ἔχει τοιαύτην δύναμιν;

251d

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Τί ἂν οὖν εἴη, ὃ Γλαύκων, μάθημα ψυχῆς ὁκλὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν;

In the following pages first of all arithmetic is mentioned as a due training of the mind, being παρακλητικὴ τῆς διανοίας; next geometry, stereometry, astronomy, and lastly musicology (*ἁρμονία*), all on this condition, that abstraction is made of all things sensible. These sciences ought to be seen in mutual correlation.

299—Ib., 531 c⁹-532 d¹:

Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ τούτων πάντων ὧν διεληλύθαμεν μέθοδος ἐὰν μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων κοινωνίαν ἀφίκεται. καὶ ξυγγένειαν, καὶ ξυλλογισθῇ ταῦτα ἢ ἐστὶν ἀλλήλοις οἰκεῖα, φέρειν τι αὐτῶν εἰς ἃ βουλόμεθα τὴν πραγματείαν καὶ οὐκ ἀνόνητα πονεῖσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνόνητα.

531d
mutual correlation of the auxiliary sciences

Καὶ ἐγώ, ἔφη, οὕτω μαντεύομαι. Ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ ἔργον λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες.

Τοῦ προοιμίου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ τίνος λέγεις; ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν ὅτι πάντα ταῦτα προοιμίᾳ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου ὃν δεῖ μαθεῖν; οὐ γὰρ που δοκοῦσί γέ σοι οἱ ταῦτα δεινοὶ διαλεκτικοὶ εἶναι.

e

Οὐ μά τὸν Δί', ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μάλα γέ τινες ὀλίγοι ὧν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα.

De Vogel, *Greek Philosophy* I

Ἄλλ' ἤδη, εἶπον, οἱ μὴ δυνατοὶ ὄντες δοῦναί τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι λόγον εἴσεσθαι ποτέ τι ὧν φαμεν δεῖν εἰδέναι;

Οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε.

dialectic

532a Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, οὗτός ἡδη αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ νόμος ὃν τὸ διαλέγεσθαι περαίνει; ὃν καὶ ὄντα νοητὸν μιμοῖτ' ἂν ἡ τῆς ὀψεως δύναμις, ἣν ἐλέγομεν πρὸς αὐτὰ ἤδη τὰ ζῶα ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποβλέπειν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ <τὰ> ἄστρον τε καὶ τελευταῖον δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν ἥλιον. Οὕτω καὶ ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρῇ ἄνευ πασῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον
b ὁρμᾶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσῃ λάβῃ, ἐπ' αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος τότε ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν; οὐ διαλεκτικὴν ταύτην τὴν πορείαν καλεῖς;

Τί μὴν;

Ἡ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λύσις τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ μεταστροφή ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ εἰδῶλα καὶ τὸ φῶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καταγείου εἰς τὸν ἥλιον ἐπάνοδος, καὶ ἐκεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ζῶα τε καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς ἔτι ἀδυναμία βλέπειν,
c πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἐν ὕδασι φαντάσματα θεῖα καὶ σκίας τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰδῶλων σκίας δι' ἐτέρου τοιούτου φωτὸς ὥς πρὸς ἥλιον κρίνειν ἀποσκιαζομένας, πᾶσα αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία τῶν τεχνῶν ἃς διήλθομεν ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἐπαναγωγὴν τοῦ βελτίστου ἐν ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θέαν, ὥσπερ τότε τοῦ σαφεστάτου ἐν σώματι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ φανοτάτου ἐν τῷ σώματι
d τοιεῖται τε καὶ ὁρατῷ τόπῳ.

**required
qualities of
the philoso-
pher**

300—Ib. 535 c-d:

Τὸ γοῦν νῦν ἀμάρτημα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ ἀτιμία φιλοσοφία διὰ ταῦτα προσπέπτωκεν, ὃ καὶ πρότερον εἶπον, ὅτι οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτῆς ἄπτονται· οὐ γὰρ νόθους ἔδει ἄπτεσθαι, ἀλλὰ γνησίους.

Πῶς; ἔφη.

535d Πρῶτον μὲν, εἶπον, φιλοπονία οὐ χωλὸν δεῖ εἶναι τὸν ἀψόμενον, τὰ μὲν ἡμίσεα φιλόπονον, τὰ δ' ἡμίσεα ἄπονον. Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν τις φιλογυμναστῆς μὲν καὶ φιλόθηρος ᾗ καὶ πάντα τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος φιλοπονήῃ, φιλομαθὴς δὲ μή, μηδὲ φιλήκοος μηδὲ ζητητικός, ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις μισοπονήῃ· χωλὸς δὲ καὶ ὁ τάναντία τούτου μεταβεβληκῶς τὴν φιλοπονίαν.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

**no compul-
sory
education**

301—Ib. 536 d-537 a:

Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν λογισμῶν τε καὶ γεωμετριῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς προπαιδείας, ἣν τῆς διαλεκτικῆς δεῖ προπαιδευθῆναι, παισὶν οὖσι χρὴ προβάλλειν, οὐχ ὥς ἐπάναγκες μαθεῖν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς διδασκῆς ποιουμένους.

Τί δῃ;

"Οτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲν μάθημα μετὰ δουλείας τὸν ἐλεύθερον χρή μανθάνειν. 536e
Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος πόνοι βία πονοῦμενοι χεῖρον οὐδὲν τὸ σῶμα ἀπεργάζονται, ψυχῇ δὲ βίαιον οὐδὲν ἔμμονον μάθημα.

Ἄληθῃ, ἔφη.

Μὴ τοίνυν βία, εἶπον, ὦ ἄριστε, τοὺς παῖδας ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν, ἀλλὰ παίζοντας τρέφε, ἵνα καὶ μᾶλλον οἷός τ' ᾦς καθορᾶν ἐφ' ὃ ἕκαστος πέφυκεν. 537a

Cp. *Laws* VII 804 d, our nr. 384 with n. 3.

302—Ib. 537b-c:

Μετὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκ τῶν εἰκοσιετῶν οἱ προκριθέντες 537c
τιμὰς τε μείζους τῶν ἄλλων οἷσονται, τὰ τε χύδην μαθήματα παισὶν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ γενόμενα τούτοις συνακτέον εἰς σύνοψιν οἰκειότητός τε ἀλλήλων τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος φύσεως.

Μόνη γοῦν, εἶπεν, ἡ τοιαύτη μάθησις βέβαιος, ἐν οἷς ἂν ἐγγένηται.

Καὶ μεγίστη γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πεῖρα διαλεκτικῆς φύσεως καὶ μὴ ὅ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικός διαλεκτικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ οὐ.

303—a. Ib. 537 c⁹-d⁸:

Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δεήσει σε ἐπισκοποῦντα, οἱ ἂν μάλιστα τοιοῦτοι 537c
ἐν αὐτοῖς ὧσι καὶ μόνιμοι μὲν ἐν μαθήμασι, μόνιμοι δ' ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομίμοις, τούτους αὖ, ἐπειδὰν τὰ τριάκοντα ἔτη ἐκβαίνωσιν, ἐκ τῶν προκρίτων προκρινάμενον εἰς μείζους τε τιμὰς καθιστάναι καὶ σκοπεῖν τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει βασανίζοντα, τίς ὁμμάτων καὶ τῆς ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως δυνατὸς μεθιέμενος ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν μετ' ἀληθείας ἰέναι. Καὶ ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολλῆς φυλακῆς ἔργον, ὦ ἑταῖρε.

b. Ib. 539 e-540 a:

Ἀμέλει, εἶπον, πέντε θές. Μετὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καταβιβαστέοι ἔσονται σοι εἰς 539e
τὸ σπῆλαιον πάλιν ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ἀναγκαστέοι ἄρχειν τὰ τε περὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ὅσαι νέων ἀρχαί, ἵνα μὴδ' ἐμπειρίᾳ ὑστερῶσι τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἔτι καὶ ἐν τούτοις βασανιστέοι, εἰ ἐμμενοῦσιν ἐλκόμενοι πανταχόσε ἢ τι καὶ παρακινήσουσι. — Χρόνον δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, πόσον τοῦτον τίθης; — Πεντεκαίδεκα ἔτη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

304—Ib. 540 a-c:

Γενομένων δὲ πεντηκοντουτῶν τοὺς διασωθέντας καὶ ἀριστεύσαντας πάντα 540a
πάντη ἐν ἔργοις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμαις πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἀκτέον, καὶ ἀναγκαστέον ἀνακλινάμενος τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐγὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἀποβλέψαι τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον,

at twenty
years a new
selection is
made

at thirty a
selected
group is
admitted to
the study of
dialectic

for how many
years?

contempla-
tion

καὶ ἰδόντας τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, παραδείγματι χρωμένους ἐκείνῳ, καὶ πόλιν καὶ
 540b ἰδιώτας καὶ ἅπαντοὺς κοσμεῖν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον ἐν μέρει ἐκάστους, τὸ μὲν
 πολὺ πρὸς φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβοντας, ὅταν δὲ τὸ μέρος ἦκη, πρὸς πολιτικοῖς
 ἐπιταλαιπωροῦντας καὶ ἄρχοντας ἐκάστους τῆς πόλεως ἕνεκα, οὐχ ὡς καλόν
 τι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον πράττοντας, καὶ οὕτως ἄλλους αἰεὶ παιδεύσαντας τοιού-
 τους, ἀντικαταλιπόντας τῆς πόλεως φύλακας, εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντας
 c οἰκεῖν· μνημεῖα δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ θυσίας τὴν πόλιν δημοσίᾳ ποιεῖν, ἐὰν καὶ ἡ
 Πυθία συνάναιρῃ, ὡς δαίμοσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς εὐδαίμοσί τε καὶ θεοῖς. — Παγκά-
 λους, ἔφη, τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὧ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ ἀνδριαντοποιοὺς ἀπείργασαι. —
 Καὶ τὰς ἀρχούσας γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὧ Γλαύκων· μηδὲν γάρ τι οἴου με περὶ
 ἀνδρῶν εἰρηκέναι μᾶλλον, ἢ εἰρηκα, ἢ περὶ γυναικῶν, ὅσαι ἂν αὐτῶν ἱκαναὶ
 τὰς φύσεις ἐγγίγνωνται. — Ὅρθῳς, ἔφη, εἴπερ ἴσα γε πάντα τοῖς ἀνδράσι
 κοινωήσουσιν, ὡς διήλθομεν.

305—This is the end of the ideal state. Can it be realized?—Plato answers again: *it can*; and he adds a practical measure, namely:

a practical
measure

Ib. 540 e-541 b: (It can be realized,) whenever the ruling philosophers — send away¹ — etc.

“Ὅσοι μὲν ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρεσβύτεροι τυγχάνωσι δεκετῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, πάντας ἐκπέμψωσιν εἰς τοὺς ἀγρούς, τοὺς δὲ παῖδας αὐτῶν παραλαβόντες ἐκτὸς τῶν νῦν ἡθῶν, ἃ καὶ οἱ γονεῖς ἔχουσι, θρέψωνται ἐν τοῖς σφετέροις τρόποις καὶ νόμοις, οὓσιν οἷοις διεληλύθαμεν τότε· καὶ (συγχωρεῖτε) οὕτω τάχιστα τε καὶ ῥᾶστα πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν, ἣν ἐλέγομεν, καταστᾶσαν αὐτὴν τε εὐδαιμονήσειν καὶ τὸ ἔθνος ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἐγγένηται πλεῖστα ὀνήσειν; — Πολύ γ', ἔφη· καὶ ὡς ἂν γένοιτο, εἴπερ ποτὲ γίνοιτο, δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εὖ εἰρηκέναι.

Rep. X, the
just and the
unjust

306—Rep. X, 613 a-c:

Οὕτως ἄρα ὑποληπτέον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, ἐάντ' ἐν πενίᾳ γίγνηται ἐάντ' ἐν νόσοις ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν, ὡς τούτῳ ταῦτα εἰς ἀγαθὸν τι τελευτήσῃ ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπὸ θεῶν ποτε ἀμελεῖται δὲ ἂν προθυμεῖσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον
 613b δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ.

Εἰκός γ', ἔφη, τὸν τοιοῦτον μὴ ἀμελεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου.

Οὐκοῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου τάναντία τούτων δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι;

Σφόδρα γε.

Τὰ μὲν δὴ παρὰ θεῶν τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἴη νικητήρια τῷ δικαίῳ.

Κατὰ γοῦν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ἔφη.

¹ Before the cited text α ὅταν οἱ ἄρχοντες must be supplied.

Τί δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρ' ἀνθρώπων; ἄρ' οὐχ ὧδε ἔχει, εἰ δεῖ τὸ ὄν τιθέναι; οὐχ οἱ μὲν δεινοὶ τε καὶ ἄδικοι δρῶσιν ὅπερ οἱ δρομῆς ὅσοι ἂν θέωσιν εὖ ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἄνω μή; Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὀξέως ἀποπηδῶσιν, τελευτῶντες δὲ καταγέλαστοι γίγνονται, τὰ ὅτα ἐπὶ τῶν ὤμων ἔχοντες καὶ ἀστεφάνωτοι ἀποτρέχοντες· οἱ δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δρομικοὶ εἰς τέλος ἐλθόντες τὰ τε ἄθλα λαμβάνουσιν καὶ στεφανοῦνται. Οὐχ οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ πολὺ ξυμβαίνει; πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἐκάστης πράξεως καὶ ἑμιλίας καὶ τοῦ βίου εὐδοκιοῦσί τε καὶ τὰ ἄθλα παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φέρονται;

Καὶ μάλα.

307—Ib. 613 e-616 c; 617 d-621 d:

their reward
in the life
hereafter

Ἄ μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ζῶντι τῷ δικαίῳ παρὰ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἄθλα τε καὶ μισθοὶ καὶ δῶρα γίγνεται πρὸς ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οἷς αὐτὴ παρείχετο ἡ δικαιοσύνη, τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἴη.

614a

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, καλὰ τε καὶ βέβαια.

Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πλήθει οὐδὲ μεγέθει πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἃ τελευτήσαντα ἐκάτερον περιμένει· χρὴ δ' αὐτὰ ἀκοῦσαι, ἵνα τελέως ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν ἀπειλήφῃ τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ὀφειλόμενα ἀκοῦσαι.

Λέγοις ἄν, ἔφη, ὥς οὐ πολλὰ ἄλλ' ἥδιον ἀκούονται.

b
the vision
of Er

Ἄλλ' οὐ μέντοι σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Ἀλκίνου γε ἀπόλογον¹ ἔρῳ, ἀλλ' ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός, Ἡρὸς τοῦ Ἀρμενίου, τὸ γένος Παμφύλου· ὅς ποτε ἐν πολέμῳ τελευτήσας, ἀναιρεθέντων δεκαταίων² τῶν νεκρῶν ἤδη διεφθαρμένων, ὕγιής μὲν ἀνιέρθη, κομισθεὶς δ' οἶκαδε μέλλων θάπτεσθαι δωδεκαταῖος ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ κείμενος ἀνέβιω, ἀναβιούς δ' ἔλεγεν ἃ ἐκεῖ ἴδοι. Ἐφη δέ, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ἐκβῆναι, τὴν ψυχὴν πορεύεσθαι μετὰ πολλῶν, καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι σφᾶς εἰς τόπον τινα δαιμόνιον, ἐν ᾧ τῆς τε γῆς δὴ εἶναι χάσματα ἐχομένῳ ἀλλήλοισιν καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὖ ἐν τῷ ἄνω ἄλλα καταντικρῦ. Δικαστὰς δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων καθῆσθαι, οὓς, ἐπειδὴ διαδικάσειαν, τοὺς μὲν δικαίους κελεύειν πορεύεσθαι τὴν εἰς δεξιάν τε καὶ ἄνω διὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, σημεῖα περιάψαντας τῶν δεδικασμένων ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, τοὺς δὲ ἀδίκους τὴν εἰς ἀριστεράν τε καὶ κάτω, ἔχοντας καὶ τούτους ἐν τῷ ὀπίσθεν σημεῖα πάντων ὧν ἔπραξαν. Ἐαυτοῦ δὲ προσελθόντος εἰπεῖν ὅτι δέοι αὐτὸν ἄγγελον ἀνθρώποις γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ καὶ διακελεύειν τὸ οἱ ἀκούειν τε καὶ θεᾶσθαι πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ. Ὅρᾳν δὴ ταύτῃ μὲν καθ' ἐκάτερον τὸ χάσμα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ τῆς γῆς ἀπιούσας τὰς ψυχάς, ἐπειδὴ αὐταῖς δικασθεῖν, κατὰ δὲ τῷ ἐτέρῳ ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἀνιέναι ἐκ τῆς γῆς μεστὰς αὐχμοῦ τε καὶ κόνεως, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐτέρου καταβαίνειν ἐτέρας ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ

d

¹ Long and tedious stories were called by the Greeks Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογοι (from the story told by Odysseus to Alcinous in *Od.* IX—XII). Cf. Arist., *Rhet.* 1417 a¹³ and *Poet.* 1455 a³.

² ten days afterwards.

e καθαράς. Καὶ τὰς αἰεὶ ἀφικνουμένας ὥσπερ ἐκ πολλῆς πορείας φαίνεσθαι ἤκειν, καὶ ἀσμέναις εἰς τὸν λειμῶνα ἀπιούσας οἶον ἐν πανηγύρει κατασκηνῶσθαι, καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τε ἀλλήλας ὅσαι γινώριμαι, καὶ πυνθάνεσθαι τὰς τε ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἡκούσας παρὰ τῶν ἐτέρων τὰ ἐκεῖ καὶ τὰς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ παρ' ἐκειναις, διηγεῖσθαι δὲ ἀλλήλαις τὰς μὲν ὀδυρομένας τε καὶ κλαούσας, ἀναμιμνησκομένας

615a ὅσα τε καὶ οἷα πάθοιεν καὶ ἴδοιεν ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ γῆς πορείᾳ (εἶναι δὲ τὴν πορείαν χιλιέτην), τὰς δ' αὖ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ εὐπαθείας διηγεῖσθαι καὶ θέας ἀμηχάνους τὸ κάλλος. Τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλά, ὧ Γλαύκων, πολλοῦ χρόνου διηγήσασθαι· τὸ

the punish-
ment tenfold
the sin

δ' οὖν κεφάλαιον ἔφη τότε εἶναι, ὅσα πώποτε τινα ἡδίκησαν καὶ ὅσους ἔκαστοι, ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων δίκην δεδωκέναι ἐν μέρει, ὑπὲρ ἐκάστου δεκάκις, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι

b κατὰ ἑκατονταετηρίδα ἑκάστην, ὡς βίου ὄντος τοσούτου τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου, ἵνα δεκαπλάσιον τὸ ἔκτεισμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος ἐκτίνοιεν, καὶ οἶον εἴ τινας πολλοῖς θανάτων ἦσαν αἵτιοι, ἢ πόλεις προδόντες ἢ στρατόπεδα, καὶ εἰς δουλείας ἐμβεβληκότες ἢ τινας ἄλλης κακουχίας μεταίτιοι, πάντων τούτων δεκαπλασίας ἀλγυδόντας ὑπὲρ ἐκάστου κομίσαιντο, καὶ αὖ εἴ τινας εὐεργεσίας εὐηργετηκότες καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ ὅσιοι γεγονότες εἶεν, κατὰ ταῦτά τὴν ἀξίαν κομίζουσιν. Τῶν

c δὲ εὐθύς γενομένων καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον βιούντων πέρι ἄλλα ἔλεγεν οὐκ ἄξια μνήμης. Εἰς δὲ θεοὺς ἀσεβείας τε καὶ εὐσεβείας καὶ γονέας καὶ αὐτόχειρος φόνου μεῖζους ἔτι τοὺς μισθοὺς διηγεῖτο.

the tyrant Ar-
dians

"Ἐφη γὰρ δὴ παραγενέσθαι ἐρωτώμενῳ ἐτέρῳ ὑπὸ ἐτέρου ὅπου εἴη Ἀρδιαῖος ὁ μέγας. Ὁ δὲ Ἀρδιαῖος οὗτος τῆς Παμφυλίας ἐν τινὶ πόλει τύραννος ἐγεγόνει, ἥδη χιλιοστὸν ἔτος εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον, γέροντά τε πατέρα ἀποκτείνας καὶ

d πρεσβύτερον ἀδελφόν, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλά τε καὶ ἀνόσια εἰργασμένος, ὡς ἐλέγετο. "Ἐφη οὖν τὸν ἐρωτώμενον εἰπεῖν, „Οὐχ ἤκει," φάναι, „οὐδ' ἂν ἤξοι δεῦρο."

Ἐθεασάμεθα γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τῶν δεινῶν θαυμάτων· ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς τοῦ στομίου ἦμεν μέλλοντες ἀνίεναι καὶ τὰλλα πάντα πεπονθότες, ἐκεῖνόν τε κατείδομεν ἐξαίφνης καὶ ἄλλους, σχεδὸν τι αὐτῶν τοὺς πλείστους τυράννους· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ἰδιῶται τινας τῶν μεγάλα ἡμαρτηκόντων· οὓς οἰομένους ἥδη ἀνα-

e βήσεσθαι οὐκ ἐδέχετο τὸ στόμιον, ἀλλ' ἐμυκάτο ὅποτε τις τῶν οὕτως ἀνιάτως ἐχόντων εἰς πονηρίαν ἢ μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδωκῶς δίκην ἐπιχειροῖ ἀνίεναι. Ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, ἄγριοι, διάπυροι ἰδεῖν, παρεστῶτες καὶ καταμανθάνοντες τὸ φθέγμα, τοὺς μὲν διαλαβόντες ἤγον, τὸν δὲ Ἀρδιαῖον καὶ ἄλλους συμποδίσαντες

616a χεῖράς τε καὶ πόδας καὶ κεφαλὴν, καταβαλόντες καὶ ἐκδεῖραντες, εἷλκον παρὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐκτὸς ἐπ' ἀσπαλάθων κνάμπτοντες ¹, καὶ τοῖς αἰεὶ παριοῦσι σημαίνοντες ὧν ἕνεκά τε καὶ ὅτι εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμπεσοῦμενοι ἄγοιντο. Ἐνθα δὲ φόβων, ἔφη, πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν σφίσιν γεγονόντων, τοῦτον ὑπερβάλλειν, μὴ γένοιτο ἐκάστῳ τὸ φθέγμα ὅτε ἀναβαίνοι, καὶ ἀσμενέστατα ἕκαστον σιγήσαντος

¹ "carding them on thorns like wool."

ἀναβῆναι. Καὶ τὰς μὲν δὴ δίκας τε καὶ τιμωρίας τοιαύτας τινὰς εἶναι, καὶ αὖ b
τὰς εὐεργεσίας ταύταις ἀντιστρέφους.

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι ἐκάστοις ἐπὶ τὰς ἡμέρας γένοιτο, ἀναστάντας
ἐντεῦθεν δεῖν τῇ ὁγδόῃ πορεύεσθαι, καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι τεταρταίους ὅθεν καθορᾶν
ἔνωθεν διὰ παντός τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς τεταμένον φῶς εὐθύ, οἷον κίονα, μά-
λιστα τῇ ἱριδι προσφερῇ, λαμπρότερον δὲ καὶ καθαρώτερον · εἰς δ' ἀφικέσθαι
προελθόντας ἡμερησίαν ὁδόν, καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτόθι κατὰ μέσον τὸ φῶς ἐκ τοῦ c
οὐρανοῦ τὰ ἄκρα αὐτοῦ τῶν δεσμῶν τεταμένα · εἶναι γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ φῶς ξύνδεσ-
μον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, οἷον τὰ ὑποζώματα τῶν τριήρων, οὕτω πᾶσαν συνέχον τὴν
περιφορὰν · ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἄκρων τεταμένον Ἀνάγκης ἄτρακτον.

the spindle of
Anankè

Next to her he sees the Fates—Lachesis, Clotho and Atropos—daughters of
Necessity, clothed in white robes, each sitting upon a throne.

Σφᾶς οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ἀφικέσθαι, εὐθύς δεῖν ἰέναι πρὸς τὴν Λάχেসιν. 617d
Προφήτην οὖν τινα σφᾶς πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τάξει διαστήσαι, ἔπειτα λαβόντα ἐκ
τῶν τῆς Λαχέσεως γονάτων κλήρους τε καὶ βίων παραδείγματα, ἀναβάντα
ἐπὶ τι βῆμα ὑψηλὸν εἰπεῖν ·

· Ἀνάγκης θυγατρὸς κόρης Λαχέσεως λόγος. Ψυχαὶ ἐφήμεροι, ἀρχὴ ἄλλης
περιόδου θνητοῦ γένους θανατηφόρου. Οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς
δαίμονα αἰρήσεσθε. Πρῶτος δ' ὁ λαχὼν πρῶτος αἰρείσθω βίον ᾧ συνέσται
ἐξ ἀνάγκης. Ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον, ἣν τιμῶν καὶ ἀτιμάζων πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον
αὐτῆς ἕκαστος ἔξει. Αἰτία ἐλομένου · θεὸς ἀναίτιος.”

Lachesis
proclaims
the free
choice of
a life

Ταῦτα εἰπόντα ῥίψαι ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς κλήρους, τὸν δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν πεσόντα
ἕκαστον ἀναιρεῖσθαι πλὴν οὗ ¹, ἧ δὲ οὐκ ἔαν · τῷ δὲ ἀνελομένῳ δῆλον εἶναι
ὁπόστος εἰλήχει. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο αὖθις τὰ τῶν βίων παραδείγματα εἰς τὸ 618a
πρόσθεν σφῶν θεῖναι ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, πολὺ πλείω τῶν παρόντων, εἶναι δὲ παντο-
δαπά · ζῶων τε γὰρ πάντων βίους καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους ἅπαντας ·
τυραννίδας τε γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι, τὰς μὲν διατελεῖς, τὰς δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ δια-
φθειρομένας, καὶ εἰς πενίας τε καὶ φυγὰς καὶ εἰς πτωχείας τελευτώσας · εἶναι
δὲ καὶ δοκίμων ἀνδρῶν βίους, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ εἵδεσιν ² καὶ κατὰ κάλλη καὶ τὴν
ἄλλην ἰσχύν τε καὶ ἀγωνίαν, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ γένεσιν καὶ προγόνων ἀρεταῖς, καὶ b
ἀδοκίμων κατὰ ταῦτα, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ γυναικῶν. Ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν ³ οὐκ ἐνεῖναι
διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλον ἐλομένην βίον ἄλλοιαν γίγνεσθαι · τὰ δ' ἄλλα
ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ πλούτοις καὶ πενίαις, τὰ δὲ νόσοις, τὰ δ' ὑγίαις μεμεῖχθαι,
τὰ δὲ καὶ μεσοῦν τούτων. Ἐνθα δὴ, ὥς ἔοικεν, ὦ φίλε Γλαῦκων, ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος
ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μάλιστα ἐπιμελητέον ὅπως ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τῶν ἄλλων
μαθημάτων ἀμελήσας τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος καὶ ζητητῆς καὶ μαθητῆς ἔσται, c
ἐάν ποθεν οἷός τ' ἦ μαθεῖν καὶ ἐξευρεῖν τίς αὐτὸν ποιήσει δυνατόν καὶ ἐπιστῆ-

the decisive
moment

¹ Er himself.

² outward appearance.

³ any definite character.

- μονα, βίον καὶ χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν διαγιγνώσκοντα, τὸν βελτίω ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν αἰ πανταχοῦ αἰρεῖσθαι, ἀναλογιζόμενον πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέντα καὶ ξυντιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις καὶ διαιρούμενα πρὸς ἀρετὴν βίου πῶς ἔχει, καὶ
- d εἰδέναι τί κάλλος πενία ἢ πλοῦτω κραθὲν καὶ μετὰ ποίας τινὸς ψυχῆς ἔξεως κακὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἐργάζεται, καὶ τί εὐγένειαι καὶ δυσγένειαι καὶ ἰδιωτεῖαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἰσχύες καὶ ἀσθένειαι καὶ εὐμαθίαι καὶ δυσμαθίαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν φύσει περὶ ψυχὴν ὄντων καὶ τῶν ἐπικτήτων τί συγκεραννύμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐργάζεται, ὥστε ἐξ ἀπάντων αὐτῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι συλλογισάμενον αἰρεῖσθαι, πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν ἀποβλέποντα, τὸν τε χεῖρω καὶ τὸν ἀμείνω
- e βίον, χεῖρω μὲν καλοῦντα ὃς αὐτὴν ἐκεῖσε ἄξει, εἰς τὸ ἀδικωτέραν γίγνεσθαι, ἀμείνω δὲ ὅστις εἰς τὸ δικαιωτέραν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα χαίρειν ἑάσει· ἐωράκαμεν γὰρ ὅτι ζῶντί τε καὶ τελευτήσαντι αὕτη κρατίστη αἵρεσις. Ἀδαμαντίνως δὴ δεῖ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν ἔχοντα εἰς Ἄιδου ἰέναι, ὅπως ἂν ἢ καὶ ἐκεῖ ἀνέκπληκτος ὑπὸ πλοῦτων τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν, καὶ μὴ ἐμπεσὼν εἰς τυραννίδας καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας πράξεις πολλὰ μὲν ἐργάσθαι καὶ ἀνῆκεστα κακὰ, ἔτι δὲ αὐτὸς μεῖζω πάθῃ, ἀλλὰ γινῶ τὸν μέσον αἰ τῶν τοιούτων βίον αἰρεῖσθαι, καὶ φεύγειν τὰ ὑπερβάλλοντα ἐκατέρωσε καὶ ἐν τῷδε τῷ βίῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν
- b καὶ ἐν παντὶ τῷ ἔπειτα· οὕτω γὰρ εὐδαιμονέστατος γίγνεται ἄνθρωπος.

Καὶ δὴ οὖν καὶ τότε ὁ ἐκεῖθεν ἄγγελος ἡγγελλε τὸν μὲν προφήτην οὕτως εἰπεῖν· „Καὶ τελευταίῳ ἐπιόντι, ξὺν νῷ ἐλομένῳ, συντόνως ζῶντι κεῖται βίος ἀγαπητός, οὐ κακός. Μῆτε ὁ ἀρχὼν αἰρέσεως ἀμελείτω μῆτε ὁ τελευτῶν ἀθυμείτω.”

- Εἰπόντος δὲ ταῦτα τὸν πρῶτον λαχόντα ἔφη εὐθύς ἐπιόντα τὴν μεγίστην τυραννίδα ἐλέσθαι, καὶ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης τε καὶ λαιμαργίας οὐ πάντα ἱκανῶς
- c ἀνασκεψάμενον ἐλέσθαι, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν λαθεῖν ἐνοῦσαν εἰμαρμένην παίδων αὐτοῦ βρώσεις καὶ ἄλλα κακὰ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν σκέψασθαι, κόπτεσθαι τε καὶ ὀδύρεσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν, οὐκ ἐμμένοντα τοῖς προρρηθεῖσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ προφήτου· οὐ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν αἰτιασθαι τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τύχην τε καὶ δαίμονας καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἀνθ’ ἑαυτοῦ. Εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡκόντων, ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιωκότα, ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετεilh-φότα. Ὡς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἐλάττους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀλίσκομένους
- d τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡκοντας, ἅτε πόνων ἀγυμνάστους· τῶν δ’ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τοὺς πολλούς, ἅτε αὐτοὺς τε πεπονηκότας ἄλλους τε ἐωρακότας, οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς¹ τὰς αἰρέσεις ποιεῖσθαι. Διὸ δὴ καὶ μεταβολὴν τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πολλαῖς τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεσθαι καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ κλήρου τύχην· ἐπεὶ εἴ τις αἰεί,
- e ὁπότε εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε βίον ἀφικνοῖτο, ὑγιῶς φιλοσοφοῖ καὶ ὁ κλῆρος αὐτῷ τῆς αἰρέσεως μὴ ἐν τελευταίοις πίπτει, κινδυνεύει ἐκ τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπαγγελλομένων²

an adamant-
ine faith in
truth and
right
required
619a

habit not
enough
without
philosophy

¹ in a hurry.

² according to this report of Er.

οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε εὐδαιμονεῖν ἄν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐνθὲνδε ἐκεῖσε καὶ δεῦρο πάλιν πορεῖαν οὐκ ἂν χθονίαν καὶ τραχεῖαν πορεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ λείαν τε καὶ οὐρανίαν.

Ταύτην γὰρ δὴ ἔφη τὴν θεὰν ἀξίαν εἶναι ἰδεῖν, ὥς ἕκασται αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡρῶντο τοὺς βίους· ἐλεεινήν τε γὰρ ἰδεῖν εἶναι καὶ γελοίαν καὶ θαυμασίαν· κατὰ συνήθειαν γὰρ τοῦ προτέρου βίου τὰ πολλὰ αἰρεῖσθαι. Ἰδεῖν μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴν ἔφη τὴν ποτε Ὀρφέως γενομένην κύκνου βίον αἰρουμένην, μίσει τοῦ γυναικείου γένους διὰ τὸν ὑπ' ἐκείνων θάνατον οὐκ ἐθέλουσαν ἐν γυναικί γεννηθεῖσαν γενέσθαι· ἰδεῖν δὲ τὴν Θαμύρου ἀηδόνας ἐλομένην· ἰδεῖν δὲ καὶ κύκνον μεταβάλλοντα εἰς ἀνθρωπίνου βίου αἵρεσιν, καὶ ἄλλα ζῶα μουσικὰ ὡσαύτως. Εἰκοστὴν δὲ λαχοῦσαν ψυχὴν ἐλέσθαι λέοντος βίον· εἶναι δὲ τὴν Αἶαντος τοῦ Τελαμωνίου, φεύγουσαν ἀνθρωπον γενέσθαι, μεμνημένην τῆς τῶν ὅπλων κρίσεως. Τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ Ἀγαμέμνωνος· ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ ταύτην τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου γένους διὰ τὰ πάθη ἀετοῦ διαλλάξαι βίον. Ἐν μέσοις δὲ λαχοῦσαν τὴν Ἀταλάντης ψυχὴν, κατιδοῦσαν μεγάλας τιμὰς ἀθλητοῦ ἀνδρός, οὐ δύνασθαι παρελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ λαβεῖν. Μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὴν Ἐπειοῦ τοῦ Πανοπέως εἰς τεχνικῆς γυναικὸς ἰοῦσαν φύσιν· πόρρω δ' ἐν ὑστάτοις ἰδεῖν τὴν τοῦ γελωτοποιοῦ Θερσίτου πίθηκον ἐνδυομένην. Κατὰ τύχην δὲ τὴν Ὀδυσσέως λαχοῦσαν πασῶν ὑστάτην αἰρησομένην ἰέναι, μνήμη δὲ τῶν προτέρων πόνων φιλοτιμίας λελωφυκυῖαν ζητεῖν περιουῶσαν χρόνον πολὺν βίον ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἀπράγμονος, καὶ μόγις εὐρεῖν κείμενόν που καὶ παρημελημένον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ εἰπεῖν ἰδοῦσαν ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν ἔπραξεν καὶ πρώτη λαχοῦσα, καὶ ἀσμένην ἐλέσθαι. Καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ θηρίων ὡσαύτως εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἰέναι καὶ εἰς ἄλλα, τὰ μὲν ἄδικα εἰς τὰ ἄγρια, τὰ δὲ δίκαια εἰς τὰ ἡμερα μεταβάλλοντα, καὶ πάσας μείξεις μείγνυσθαι.

Ἐπειδὴ δ' οὖν πάσας τὰς ψυχὰς τοὺς βίους ἡρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ ἔλαχον ἐν τάξει προσιέναι πρὸς τὴν Λάχεσιν· ἐκείνην δ' ἐκάστῳ ὃν εἴλετο δαίμονα, τοῦτον φύλακα ξυμπέμπειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἰρεθέντων. Ὅν πρῶτον μὲν ἄγειν αὐτὴν πρὸς τὴν Κλωθῶ ὑπὸ τὴν ἐκείνης χεῖρά τε καὶ ἐπιστροφὴν τῆς τοῦ ἀτράκτου δίνης, κυροῦντα ἦν λαχὼν εἴλετο μοῖραν· ταύτης δ' ἐφαψάμενον αὖθις ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς Ἀτρώπου ἄγειν νῆσιν, ἀμετάστροφα τὰ ἐπικλωσθέντα ποιοῦντα· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ δὴ ἀμεταστρεπτὶ ὑπὸ τὸν τῆς Ἀνάγκης ἰέναι θρόνον, καὶ δι' ἐκείνου διεξελθόντα, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι διτῇθον, πορεύεσθαι ἅπαντας εἰς τὸ τῆς Λήθης πεδίον διὰ καύματός τε καὶ πνίγους δεινοῦ· καὶ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτὸ κενὸν δένδρων τε καὶ ὅσα γῇ φύει. Σκηναῖσθαι οὖν σφᾶς ἤδη ἐσπέρας γιγνομένης παρὰ τὸν Ἀμέλγητα ποταμόν, οὗ τὸ ὕδωρ ἀγγεῖον οὐδὲν στέγειν. Μέτρον μὲν οὖν τι τοῦ ὕδατος πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φρονήσει μὴ σφῆζομένους πλέον πίνειν τοῦ μέτρου· τὸν δὲ αἰεὶ πίνοντα πάντων ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ κοιμηθῆναι καὶ μέσας νύκτας γενέσθαι, βροντὴν τε καὶ σεισμὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐξαπίνης ἄλλον ἄλλῃ φέρεσθαι ἄνω εἰς τὴν

how each
soul chooses
a life

620a

b

c

d

each soul
gets a
guardian
angel

621a

b

γένεσιν, ἄττοντας ὥσπερ ἀστέρας. Αὐτὸς δὲ τοῦ μὲν ὕδατος κωλυθῆναι πιεῖν ὅπη μέντοι καὶ ὅπως εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀφίκοιτο, οὐκ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἐξαίφνης ἀναβλέψας ἰδεῖν ἔωθεν αὐτὸν κείμενον ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ.

Καὶ οὕτως, ὦ Γλαῦκων, μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο, καὶ ἡμᾶς ἂν σώσειεν, ἂν πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸν τῆς Λήθης ποταμὸν εὖ διαβησόμεθα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν μιανθισόμεθα· ἀλλ' ἂν ἐμοὶ πειθώμεθα, νομίζοντες ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν καὶ δυνατὴν πάντα μὲν κακὰ ἀνέχεσθαι, πάντα δὲ ἀγαθὰ, τῆς ἀνω ὁδοῦ αἰεὶ ἐξόμεθα καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπιτηδεύομεν, ἵνα καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς φίλοι ὦμεν καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, αὐτοῦ τε μένοντες ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἐπειδὰν τὰ ἄθλα αὐτῆς κομιζώμεθα, ὥσπερ οἱ νικηφόροι περιαιρούμενοι, καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν τῇ χιλιέτει πορεῖα, ἣν διεληλύθαμεν, εὖ πράττωμεν.

6—CONCLUSIONS AND CRITICISM

conclusions 308—We may conclude:

1—The conception of the Ideas as a metaphysical Reality is strongly confirmed by the doctrine of the Republic.

2—Justice as the true disposition of the soul is made by Plato essentially dependent on the contemplation of true Reality. And of this contemplation Plato says in *Ep.* VII 341c: Οὐκ οὐκ ἐμὸν γε περὶ αὐτῶν ἔστιν σύγγραμμα οὐδὲ μήποτε γένηται· ῥητὸν γὰρ οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν ὥς ἄλλα μαθήματα.

Cp. to this passage the dialogue between Glauco and Socrates in 509c (our nr. 293): 'Ἀλλὰ μήν, εἶπον, συχνά γε ἀπολείπω. E.q.s.

3—Justice does not depend on, nor is it effected by our deeds; but, inversely, deeds follow out of the inner disposition of the soul.

4—Individual and community are for Plato so closely connected, that single persons, who are enjoying the highest contemplation, are bound to return to the earth and to the community of men, in order to realize there the ideal of justice, i.e. the imitation of the invisible Reality.

5—Thus, the salvation of the individual and of the community depends wholly on the contemplation of the Highest by a small number of elected spirits.

Cp. A. J. Festugière, *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon*, Paris 1936, p. 451-457.

St. Augustinus on Platonism and Christianity 309—Augustinus, *De vera relig.* 3, supposes a disciple, convinced by Plato of the truth of his doctrine, asking the Master:

Cum haec ergo a magistro sibi persuaderentur, si ex eo quaereret ille discipulus, utrum, si quisquam existeret vir magnus atque divinus, qui talia populis persuaderet credenda saltem si percipere non valerent, —eum divinis honoribus dignum iudicaret, responderet, credo, ille: non posse hoc ab homine fieri, nisi quem forte ipsa Dei Virtus ac Sapientia ab ipsa rerum natura exceptum, nec hominum magisterio, sed intima

illuminatione ab incunabulis illustratum, tanta honestaret gratia, tanta firmitate roboraret, tanta denique maiestate subveheret, ut omnia contemnendo quae pravi homines cupiunt, et omnia perpetiundo quae horrescunt, et omnia faciendo quae mirantur, genus humanum ad tam salubrem fidem summo amore atque auctoritate converteret.—

Now, as this really has happened in the present time, let then those who acknowledge that the Good must be strived after, yield to God.

Ib. 6: Ergo cedant ei a quo factum est, nec curiositate aut inani iactantia impediuntur quominus agnoscant quid intersit inter paucorum tumidas * coniecturas et manifestam salutem correptionemque populorum. Illi enim si reviviscerent quorum isti nominibus gloriantur, et invenirent refertas ecclesias templaque deserta et a cupiditate bonorum temporalium et fluentium ad spem vitae aeternae et bona spiritualia et intelligibilia vocari et currere humanum genus, dicerent fortasse (si tales essent, quales fuisse memorantur): *Haec sunt quae nos persuadere populis non ausi sumus, et eorum potius consuetudini cessimus quam illos in nostram fidem voluntatemque traduximus.*

the
difference
between
phil. and
Chr. faith

310—a. Arist., *Politica* II 2, 1261 a⁹-1262 a²⁴:

Ἐχει δὴ δυσχερείας ἄλλας τε πολλὰς τὸ πάντων εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας κοινάς, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νενομοθετῆσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐ φαίνεται συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων · ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ὃ φησὶ τῇ πόλει δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ὥς μὲν εἴρηται νῦν, ἀδύνατον, πῶς δὲ δεῖ διελεῖν, οὐδὲν διώρισται. λέγω δὲ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν πᾶσαν ὥς ἄριστον ὅτι μάλιστα · λαμβάνει γὰρ ταύτην ὑπόθεσιν ὁ Σωκράτης. καίτοι φανερόν ἐστιν ὥς προϊούσα καὶ γινομένη μία μᾶλλον οὐδὲ πόλις ἔσται · πλῆθος γάρ τι τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, γινομένη τε μία μᾶλλον οἰκία μὲν ἐκ πόλεως, ἄνθρωπος δ' ἐξ οἰκίας ἔσται · μᾶλλον γὰρ μίαν τὴν οἰκίαν τῆς πόλεως φαίμεν ἄν, καὶ τὸν ἕνα τῆς οἰκίας · ὥστ' εἰ καὶ δυνατός τις εἴη τοῦτο δρᾶν, οὐ ποιητέον · ἀναιρήσει γὰρ τὴν πόλιν οὐ μόνον δ' ἐκ πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ εἴδει διαφερόντων · οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων. ἕτερον γὰρ συμμαχία καὶ πόλις · τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ποσῷ χρῆσιμον, καὶ ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εἶδει (βοηθείας γὰρ χάριν ἡ συμμαχία πέφυκεν), ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σταθμός πλεῖον ἐλκύσῃ · διοίσει δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ πόλις ἔθνους, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κώμας ὥσι κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' οἷον Ἀρκάδες · ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ ἐν γενέσθαι, εἶδει διαφέρει. διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς¹ σώζει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον · ἐπεὶ

Aristotle's
criticism of
Plato's Rep.
1. the com-
munity of
women

15

20

25

30

¹ "the principle of compensation" (B. Jowett).

* Others read: timidas.

1261a 35

b 1

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καὶ ἴσοις ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' εἶναι · ἅμα γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε πάντας ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἢ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ κατὰ τινα ἄλλην τάξιν ἢ χρόνον. καὶ συμβαίνει δὴ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὥστε πάντας ἄρχειν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ μετέβαλλον οἱ σκυτεῖς καὶ οἱ τέκτονες καὶ μὴ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεὶ σκυτοτόμοι καὶ τέκτονες ᾗσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ βέλτιον οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν πολιτικὴν, δῆλον ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ βέλτιον ἄρχειν, εἰ δυνατόν · ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ δυνατόν διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν ἴσους εἶναι πάντας, ἅμα δὲ καὶ δίκαιον, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε φαῦλον τὸ ἄρχειν, πάντας αὐτοῦ μετέχειν, τοῦτο δὲ μιμεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἶκιν τὸ θ' ὡς ὁμοίους εἶναι ἔξω ἀρχῆς¹ · οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχουσιν οἱ δ' ἄρχονται κατὰ μέρος, ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι. καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἀρχόντων ἕτεροι ἐτέρας ἄρχουσιν ἀρχάς. φανερόν τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ὡς οὔτε πέφυκε μίαν οὕτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ λέγουσί τινες, καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν ὡς μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅτι τὰς πόλεις ἀναιρεῖ · καίτοι τό γε ἐκάστου ἀγαθὸν σώζει ἕκαστον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον φανερόν ὅτι τὸ λίαν ἐνοῦν ζητεῖν τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄμεινον. οἰκία μὲν γὰρ αὐταρκέστερον ἐνός, πόλις δ' οἰκίας · καὶ βούλεται γ' ἤδη τότ' εἶναι πόλις, ὅταν αὐτάρκη συμβαίῃ τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι τοῦ πλήθους. εἴπερ οὖν αἰρετώτερον τὸ αὐταρκέστερον, καὶ τὸ ἥττον ἐν τοῦ μᾶλλον αἰρετώτερον.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ τοῦτο ἀριστόν ἐστι, τὸ μίαν ὅτι μάλιστ' εἶναι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀποδείκνυσθαι φαίνεται κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πάντες ἅμα λέγωσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐμὸν · τοῦτο γὰρ οἴεται ὁ Σωκράτης σημεῖον εἶναι τοῦ τὴν πόλιν τελέως εἶναι μίαν. τὸ γὰρ πάντες διττόν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς ἕκαστος, τάχ' ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον ὁ βούλεται ποιεῖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἕκαστος γὰρ υἱὸν ἑαυτοῦ φήσει τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ γυναῖκα δὴ τὴν αὐτήν, καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ περὶ ἐκάστου δὴ τῶν συμβαινόντων ὡσαύτως · νῦν δ' οὐχ οὕτω φήσουσιν οἱ κοιναῖς χρώμενοι ταῖς γυναῖξιν καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις, ἀλλὰ πάντες μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος δ' αὐτῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν πάντες μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος δ' αὐτῶν. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν παραλογισμὸς τίς ἐστι τὸ λέγειν πάντας, φανερόν · τὸ γὰρ πάντες καὶ ἀμφοτέρω καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια διὰ τὸ διττόν καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐριστικούς ποιεῖ συλλογισμούς · διὸ ἐστὶ τὸ πάντας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὡδὶ μὲν καλόν, ἀλλ' οὐ δυνατόν, ὡδὶ δ' οὐδὲν ὁμονοητικόν · πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐτέραν ἔχει βλάβην τὸ λεγόμενον. ἤκιστα γὰρ ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνει τὸ πλείστων κοινόν · τῶν γὰρ ἰδίων μάλιστα φροντίζουσιν, τῶν δὲ κοινῶν ἥττον ἢ ὅσον ἐκάστω ἐπιβάλλει · πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς ἐτέρου φροντίζοντος ὀλιγωροῦσι μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς οἰκετικαῖς διακονίαις οἱ πολλοὶ θεράποντες ἐνίοτε χειρὸν ὑπηρετοῦσι τῶν ἐλαττόνων. γίνονται δ' ἐκάστω χίλιοι τῶν πολιτῶν υἱοί, καὶ οὗτοι οὐχ ὡς ἐκάστου, ἀλλὰ

¹ "An approximation to this is that equals should in turn retire from office (τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἶκιν) and should, apart from official position, be treated alike" (B. Jowett). — Text of O. Immisch.

τοῦ τυχόντος ὁ τυχὼν ὁμοίως ἐστὶν υἱός · ὥστε πάντες ὁμοίως ὀλιγορήσουσιν. 1262a
 ἔτι οὕτως ἕκαστος ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εὖ πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἢ κακῶς, ὁπόστος
 τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὧν, οἷον ἐμὸς ἢ τοῦ δεῖνος, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λέγων καθ'
 ἕκαστον τῶν χιλίων, ἢ ὅσων ἢ πόλις ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο διστάζων · ἄδηλον γὰρ 5
 ᾧ συνέβη γενέσθαι τέκνον καὶ σωθῆναι γενόμενον. καίτοι πότερον οὕτω κρεῖττον
 τὸ ἐμὸν λέγειν ἕκαστον τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν προσαγορεύοντας δισχιλίῳ καὶ μυρίῳ,
 ἢ μᾶλλον ὡς νῦν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τὸ ἐμὸν λέγουσιν; ὁ μὲν γὰρ υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ὁ δ'
 ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ προσαγορεύει τὸν αὐτόν, ὁ δ' ἀνεψιόν, ἢ κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ συγγέ- 10
 νειαν, ἢ πρὸς αἵματος, ἢ κατ' οἰκειότητα καὶ κηδεῖαν αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἢ τῶν
 αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἕτερον φράτορα φυλέτην · κρεῖττον γὰρ ἴδιον ἀνεψιὸν
 εἶναι ἢ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον υἱόν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' οὐδὲ διαφυγεῖν δυνατόν τὸ μὴ τινὰς
 ὑπολαμβάνειν ἑαυτῶν ἀδελφούς τε καὶ παῖδας καὶ πατέρας καὶ μητέρας · 15
 κατὰ γὰρ τὰς ὁμοιότητας αἱ γίνονται τοῖς τέκνοις πρὸς τοὺς γεννήσαντας,
 ἀναγκαῖον λαμβάνειν περὶ ἀλλήλων τὰς πίστεις. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ συμβαίνειν
 τινὲς τῶν τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους πραγματευομένων · εἶναι γὰρ τισι τῶν ἄνω
 Λιβύων κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας, τὰ μέντοι γενόμενα τέκνα διαιρεῖσθαι κατὰ τὰς 20
 ὁμοιότητας. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, οἷον ἵπποι καὶ
 βόες, αἱ σφόδρα πεφύκασιν ὅμοια ἀποδιδόναι τὰ τέκνα τοῖς γονεῦσιν, ὥσπερ
 ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλῃ κληθεῖσα Δικαία ἵππος.

b. Ib., 5, 1262 b³⁷-1263 b¹⁴:

2. community
of property

Ἐχόμενον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τίνα τρόπον
 δεῖ κατασκευάζεσθαι τοῖς μέλλουσι πολιτεύεσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν,
 πότερον κοινὴν ἢ μὴ κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν κτῆσιν. τοῦτο δ' ἂν τις καὶ χωρὶς σκέψαιτο
 ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας νενομοθετημένων, λέγω δὲ τὰ περὶ
 τὴν κτῆσιν πότερον καὶν ἢ ἐκεῖνα χωρὶς, καθ' ὃν νῦν τρόπον ἔχει πᾶσι, τὰς τε 1263a
 κτήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιον καὶ τὰς χρήσεις, οἷον τὰ μὲν γήπεδα χωρὶς, τοὺς
 δὲ καρπούς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν φέροντας ἀναλίσκειν (ὅπερ ἔνια ποιεῖ τῶν ἐθνῶν),
 ἢ τοὐναντίον τὴν μὲν γῆν κοινὴν εἶναι καὶ γεωργεῖν κοινῇ, τοὺς δὲ καρπούς 5
 διαιρεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας χρήσεις (λέγονται δὲ τινες καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον
 κοινωνεῖν τῶν βαρβάρων), ἢ καὶ τὰ γήπεδα καὶ τοὺς καρπούς κοινούς · ἐτέρων
 μὲν οὖν ὄντων τῶν γεωργούντων ἄλλος ἂν εἴη τρόπος καὶ ῥᾶων, αὐτῶν δ' αὐτοῖς 10
 διαπονούντων τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις πλείους ἂν παρέχοι δυσκολίας · καὶ γὰρ ἐν
 ταῖς ἀπολαύσεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις μὴ γινομένων ἴσων ἀναγκαῖον ἐγκλήματα
 γίνεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀπολαύοντας μὲν ἢ λαμβάνοντας πολλά, ὀλίγα δὲ πονοῦντας,
 τοῖς ἐλάττω μὲν λαμβάνουσι, πλείω δὲ πονοῦσιν. ὅλως δὲ τὸ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν 15
 τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων χαλεπὸν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν τοιούτων. δηλοῦσι δ' αἱ
 τῶν συναποδήμων κοινωναί · σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι διαφερόμενοι ἐκ τῶν ἐν
 ποσὶ καὶ ἐκ μικρῶν προσκροούντες ἀλλήλοις. ἔτι δὲ τῶν θεραπόντων τούτοις

- 20 μάλιστα προσκρούομεν, οἷς πλεῖστα προσκρώμεθα πρὸς τὰς διακονίας τὰς ἐγκυκλίους. τὸ μὲν οὖν κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις ταύτας τε καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας ἔχει δυσχερείας, ὃν δὲ νῦν τρόπον ἔχει καὶ ἐπικοσμηθὲν ἤθεσι καὶ τάξει νόμων ὀρθῶν, οὐ μικρὸν ἂν διενέγκαι · ἔξει γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαθόν · λέγω δὲ τὸ
- 25 ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ ἐκ τοῦ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίας. δεῖ γὰρ πῶς μὲν εἶναι κοινὰς, ὅλως δ' ἰδίας · αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμέλειαὶ διηρημέναι τὰ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐ ποιήσουσιν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπιδώσουσιν ὡς πρὸς ἴδιον ἐκάστου προσεδρεύοντος · δι' ἀρετὴν δ' ἔσται πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι κατὰ τὴν παροι-
 30 μίαν κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. ἔστι δὲ καὶ νῦν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐν ἐνίαις πόλεσιν οὕτως ὑπογεγραμμένον ὡς οὐκ ὃν ἀδύνατον, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς καλῶς οἰκουμέναις τὰ μὲν ἔστι τὰ δὲ γένοιντ' ἂν · ἰδίαν γὰρ ἕκαστος τὴν κτήσιν ἔχων τὰ μὲν χρή-
 35 σιμα ποιεῖ τοῖς φίλοις, τοῖς δὲ χρῆται κοινοῖς, οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι τοῖς τε δούλοις χρῶνται τοῖς ἀλλήλων ὡς εἰπεῖν ἰδίους, ἔτι δ' ἵπποις καὶ κυσίν, καὶ δεθηῶσιν ἐφοδίω ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῦς κατὰ τὴν χώραν. φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ἰδίας τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινὰς · ὅπως δὲ γίνονται τοιοῦτοι, τοῦ νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἔργον ἰδίον ἔστιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν
 40 ἀμύθητον ὅσον διαφέρει τὸ νομίζειν ἰδίον τι · μὴ γὰρ οὐ μάτην τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὸς ἔχει φιλίαν ἕκαστος, ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῦτο φυσικόν. τὸ δὲ φίλαυτον εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως · οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ φιλεῖν ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ φιλεῖν, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν φιλοχρήματον, ἐπεὶ φιλοῦσί γε πάντες ὡς εἰπεῖν
 5 ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ χαρίσασθαι καὶ βοηθῆσαι φίλοις ἢ ξένοις ἢ ἐταίροις ἡδιστον · ὃ γίνεται τῆς κτήσεως ἰδίας οὔσης. ταῦτά τε δὴ οὐ συμβαίνει τοῖς λίαν ἐν ποιούσι τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοις ἀναιροῦσιν ἔργα δυοῖν ἀρεταῖν φανερώς, σωφροσύνης μὲν τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας (ἔργον γὰρ
 10 καλὸν ἀλλοτρίας οὔσης ἀπέχεσθαι διὰ σωφροσύνην), ἐλευθεριότητος δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις · οὔτε γὰρ ἔσται φανερός ἐλευθέριος ὢν, οὔτε πράξει πρᾶξιν ἐλευθέριον οὐδεμίαν · ἐν τῇ γὰρ χρήσει τῶν κτημάτων τὸ τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος ἔργον ἔστί.

the funda-
mental
mistake

c. Ib., 5, 1263 b²⁹⁻³²:

Αἴτιον δὲ τῷ Σωκράτει τῆς παρακρούσεως χρῆ· νομίζειν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ οὔσαν ὀρθήν. Δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι πως μίαν καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάντως.

Plato's state
can never be
happy

d. Ib., 5, 1264 b¹⁵⁻²⁶:

Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀφαιρούμενος τῶν φυλάκων, ὅλην φησὶ δεῖν εὐδαιμόνα ποιεῖν τὴν πόλιν τὸν νομοθέτην. ἀδύνατον δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὅλην, μὴ τῶν πλείστων ἢ μὴ πάντων μερῶν ἢ τινῶν ἐχόντων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὥνπερ τὸ ἄρτιον · τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τῷ ὅλῳ

υπάρχειν, τῶν δὲ μερῶν μηδετέρῳ, τὸ δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ οἱ φύλακες μὴ εὐδαίμονες, τίνες ἕτεροι; οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἱ γε τεχνῖται καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν βαναύσων. ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτεία περὶ ἧς ὁ Σωκράτης εἴρηκεν, ταύτας τε τὰς ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἐλάττους ἐτέρας.

e. As to the third class, very little is defined about the amount of property. Socr. thought it sufficient for happiness if his traders and handicraftsmen lived temperately. Ar. replies (*Polit.* II 6, 1265a³¹):

happiness
not assured
by

σωφροσύνη

Ἔτι δ' ἔστι σωφρόνως μὲν, τάλαιπώρως δὲ ζῆν.

311—Modern critics mostly agree with O. Apelt, who in the Introd. to his German translation of the Republic*, laid the stress on the moral and spiritual value of Plato's state and denied its practical meaning, with reference to:

Plato's state
a heavenly
example

Pl., *Rep.* IX 592 a-b:

The man of understanding (ὁ νοῦν ἔχων) will only accept such political honours as will not deteriorate his character.

Οὐκ ἄρα, ἔφη, τά γε πολιτικά ἐβελήσει πράττειν, ἐάνπερ τούτου κήδηται.

Νῆ τὸν κύνα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν γε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει καὶ μάλα, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως ἐν γε τῇ πατρίδι, ἐὰν μὴ θεία τις συμβῇ τύχη.

Μανθάνω, ἔφη· ἐν ᾗ νῦν διήλθομεν οἰκίζοντες πόλει λέγεις, τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειμένη, ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ οἶμαι αὐτὴν εἶναι.

Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁρῶντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν. διαφέρει δὲ οὐδὲν εἴτε που ἔστιν εἴτε ἔσται· τὰ γὰρ ταύτης μόνης ἂν πράξειεν, ἄλλης δὲ οὐδεμιᾶς.

Εἰκός γ', ἔφη.

Cf. our nrs 288, 290 and 305.

312—Among modern critics of Plato K. R. Popper must be mentioned with his work *The open society and its enemies*. London 1942, vol. I.

Plato and
the political
problems of
the present
day

Whatever the author's merits may be in other subjects—I am inclined to think they are considerable—it must be said that he remained a perfect stranger to the spirit of Plato's philosophy, and hence has come to the strangest misunderstandings. First he makes the enormous mistake of representing Plato as a man striving after power as such, and thus he makes out of the author of the Republic essentially a τυραννικός ἀνὴρ, such as Plato himself deemed the most miserable of men.

* O. Apelt, *Platon. Der Staat, neu übersetzt und erläutert*, Leipzig⁶ 1923, p. XVII: Der platonische Staat ist nicht gewesen, er ist nicht, und doch: er wird immer sein; nicht als Leitstern für die Politik, wohl aber als ein Antrieb zu sittlicher Erhebung. Und als solchen wollte Platon ihn schliesslich auch nur betrachtet wissen.

Secondly he makes the scarcely smaller mistake of seeing no essential difference between Plato and Aristotle *. May the critical notes of Aristotle, given under our nr. 310d and e, speak for themselves: Ar. deemed that Plato made his guardians unhappy, and hence his whole community; nor did he assure the happiness of his labourers and traders by making them live σωφρόνως

A good interpretation of the Republic is given by R. L. Nettleship, *Lectures on the Republic of Plato*. London 1898, new edition 1937.

An interesting experiment in confronting Plato with the political problems of the present day has been made by R. H. S. Crossman in *Plato to day*, London 1937.

Cf. J. Moreau, *Platon et la crise de la civilisation contemporaine* (Proceedings of the tenth international Congress of Philosophy, Amsterdam 1949, Fasc. II, pp. 1084-87).

7—THE CRISIS IN PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY: THEAETETUS AND PARMENIDES

affinity of
classical
Platonism
with
Parmenides

313—Plato's theory of Ideas, as we have so far learned to understand it, showed a deep spiritual affinity with Parmenides' notion of ὄν, being eternal and absolute, without change and motion. Socr. in the *Theaet.* expresses his deep respect for Parm., and shrinks from contesting his doctrine.

Pl., *Th.* 183 e-184 a:

Μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἳ ἐν ἐστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυρόμενος μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶμεν, ἤττον αἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἓνα ὄντα Παρμενίδην. Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου „αἰδοῖός τέ μοι" εἶναι ἅμα „δεινός τε." συμπροσέμειξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτη, καὶ μοι ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον. φοβοῦμαι οὖν μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα συνιῶμεν, τί τε διανοούμενος εἶπε πολὺ πλεόν λειπώμεθα.

Parm.' doc-
trine refuted
by Plato in
the *Parm.*
and
Sophistes

314—Yet this doctrine is refuted, first in the *Parm.*, then, more explicitly, in the *Soph.* (a conclusive argument why we cannot accept the dating of the *Parm.* as being earlier than the *Theaet.*, a thesis defended by A. Diès ^b and accepted by F. M. Cornford ^c, recently resumed by D. H. Th. Vollenhoven ^d).

* In Holland W. J. W. Koster defended Plato against Popper in *De Gids*, CX (1947), p. 100-110. H. Meyer gave a summary of Popper's work in the same number of this review, p. 87-99.

^b In the Introd. to his edition of the *Parm.*, Paris 1923, p. xii ff.

^c *Plato's Theory of knowledge*, London 1935, p. 1.

^d *Mélanges philosophiques* (Philosophical Essays), Amsterdam 1948, pp. 1-16.

a. Pl., *Parm.* 162 a:

"Ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὄν.

"So it appears that the one, which is not, is".

b. Pl., *Soph.* 241 c-242 a:

The Eleatic stranger asks:

"Ἐξεις οὖν συγγνώμην καὶ καθάπερ νῦν εἶπες ἀγαπήσεις ἐάν πῃ καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ παρασπασώμεθα ¹ οὕτως ἰσχυροῦ λόγου;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐχ ἔξω;

ΞΕ. Τόδε τοίνυν ἔτι μᾶλλον παραιτοῦμαι σε.

241d

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. Μὴ με οἷον πατραλοῖαν ὑπολάβῃς γίγνεσθαι τινα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δῆ;

ΞΕ. Τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἀμυνομένοις ἔσται βασανίζειν, καὶ βιάζεσθαι τό τε μὴ ὄν ὡς ἔστι κατὰ τι καὶ τὸ ὄν αὖ πάλιν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πῃ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον διαμαχετέον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

ΞΕ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ φαίνεται καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο τυφλῷ; τούτων γὰρ μὴτ' ἐλεγχθέντων μὴτε ὁμολογηθέντων σχολῇ ποτέ τις οἶός τε ἔσται περὶ ^e λόγων ψευδῶν λέγων ἢ δόξης, εἴτε εἰδῶλων εἴτε εἰκόνων εἴτε μιμημάτων εἴτε φαντασμάτων αὐτῶν, ἢ καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν τῶν ὅσαι περὶ ταῦτά εἰσι, μὴ καταγέλαστος εἶναι τὰ ἐναντία ἀναγκαζόμενος αὐτῷ λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΞΕ. Διὰ ταῦτα μέντοι τολμητέον ἐπιτίθεσθαι τῷ πατρικῷ λόγῳ νῦν, ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἑατέον, εἰ τοῦτό τις εἴργει δρᾶν ὄκνος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς τοῦτό γε μὴδὲν μῆδαμῇ εἴρξῃ.

315—a. Pl., *Soph.* 246 b.

the εἰδῶν
φίλοι

The position of the εἰδῶν φίλοι as opposed to the materialists is described as follows:

Τοιγαροῦν οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται, νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι.

b. Ib. 248 a-b:

Πρὸς δὴ τοὺς ἐτέρους ἴωμεν, τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν φίλους· σὺ δ' ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ παρὰ τούτων ἀφερμήνευε.

¹ κατὰ βραχὺ παρασπασώμεθα - make a little breach.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ταῦτ' ἔσται.

ΞΕ. Γένεσιν, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν χωρὶς που διελόμενοι λέγετε; ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Καὶ σώματι μὲν ἡμᾶς γενέσει δι' αἰσθήσεως κοινωνεῖν, διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν, ἣν αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά ὡσαύτως ἔχειν φατέ, γένεσιν δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμὲν γὰρ οὖν.

c. These philosophers do not concede that ποιεῖν and πάσχειν belong to being. Thus, as knowing and being known are the one a ποῖημα, the other a πάθος, the fatal consequence is that being cannot be known.

Ib. 248 e-249 b:

Τὴν οὐσίαν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τοῦτον γιγνωσκομένην ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως, καθ' ὅσον γινώσκεται, κατὰ τοσοῦτον κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ πάσχειν, ὃ δὴ φαμεν οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι περὶ τὸ ἡρεμοῦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθῳς.

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ πρὸς Διός; ὥς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν ἢ ῥαδίως πεισθησόμεθα τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι μὴ παρεῖναι, μηδὲ ζῆν αὐτὸ μηδὲ φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ ἅγιον, νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, ἀκίνητον ἑστὸς εἶναι;

249a

ΘΕΑΙ. Δεινὸν μεντᾶν, ὃ ξένε, λόγον συγχωροῦμεν.

movement
introduced in
the realm of
being

ΞΕ. Ἄλλὰ νοῦν μὲν ἔχειν, ζωὴν δὲ μὴ φῶμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΞΕ. Ἄλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀμφοτέρα ἐνόητ' αὐτῷ λέγομεν, οὐ μὴν ἐν ψυχῇ γε φήσομεν αὐτὸ ἔχειν αὐτά;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τί' ἂν ἕτερον ἔχοι τρόπον;

ΞΕ. Ἄλλὰ δῆτα νοῦν μὲν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν, ἀκίνητον μέντοι τὸ παράπαν ἔμψυχον ὃν ἐστάναι;

b

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντα ἔμοιγε ἄλογα ταῦτ' εἶναι φαίνεται.

ΞΕ. Καὶ τὸ κινούμενον δὴ καὶ κίνησιν συγχωρητέον ὥς ὄντα.

According to an obsolete hypothesis, first made by Schleiermacher, the friends of the Ideas were the Megarians. As it is highly improbable that the Megarians admitted a plurality of Ideas, this interpretation will not be true (see v. Wilamowitz, *Platon* II, p. 246; De Vogel, *Keerpunt* p. 199 ff.); nor has that of Burnet and Taylor been more fortunate. Stating the parmenidean character of Platonism in the preceding period, we needs must find a piece of earlier Platonism in the doctrine of the εἰδῶν φίλοι. At the same time we acknowledge a remarkable alteration in the theory of Ideas, as soon as the main-thesis of Parm. has been refuted. The views of later Platonism are prepared in the *Theaet.*, by the analysis of perception.

soul as the
cause of
motion

316—Later platonic views are also found in the *Phaedrus*, firstly in the doctrine of the soul, then in that of diaeresis.

a. Pl., *Phaedr.* 245 c-246 a:

Ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος. Τὸ γὰρ αὐτοκίνητον ἀθάνατον · τὸ δ' ἄλλο κινουὶν καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλου κινούμενον, παῦλαν ἔχον κινήσεως, παῦλαν ἔχει ζωῆς. Μόνον δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ κινουὶν, ἅτε οὐκ ἀπολείπον ἑαυτό, οὔποτε λήγει κινούμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα κινεῖται τοῦτο πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀγέννητον · ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον γίνεσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ μηδ' ἐξ ἑνός · 245d εἰ γὰρ ἔκ του ἀρχῆς γίγνοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνοιτο. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀγέννητόν ἐστιν, καὶ ἀδιαφθορόν αὐτὸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι · ἀρχῆς γὰρ δὴ ἀπολομένης, οὔτε αὐτὴ ποτε ἔκ του, οὔτε ἄλλο ἐξ ἐκείνης γενήσεται, εἴπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δεῖ τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι. Οὕτω δὴ κινήσεως μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινουὶν · τοῦτο δὲ οὔτ' ἀπόλλυσθαι οὔτε γίνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμ- e πεσοῦσαν στῆναι, καὶ μήποτε αὖθις ἔχειν ὅθεν κινήθέντα γενήσεται. Ἀθανάτου δὲ πεφασμένου τοῦ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινουμένου, ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον τοῦτον αὐτόν τις λέγων οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖται. Πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα, ᾧ μὲν ἔξωθεν τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἄψυχον · ᾧ δὲ ἔνδοθεν αὐτῷ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἔμψυχον, ὡς ταύτης οὔσης φύσεως ψυχῆς. Εἰ δ' ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, μὴ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινουὶν ἢ ψυχὴν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγέννητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν ἂν εἴη. 246a

Robin rightly remarks that Plato in his *Phaedr.* is seeking the intermediate stages between the ideal World and that of sensible objects. "Platon est en quête d'un équivalent *philosophique* de ce qu'est *mythiquement* le démonisme; d'où l'importance que prend à ses yeux le problème de l'amour" (*Platon*, p. 127. Cf. p. 117: the visible heaven is such an intermediate stage).

b. Ib. 265 d, e.

Socr. is speaking here about two methods, the "synoptic" method, uniting the many scattered objects under one Idea, and that of diaeresis, dividing the Idea so that it becomes a specified "form". In the words of Plato: **the method of diaeresis, first spoken of in the *Phaedr.***

Εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, ἵνα ἕκαστον ὀριζόμενος δῆλον ποιῇ περὶ οὗ ἂν αἰεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλῃ. —

Τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἶδη δύνασθαι διατέμνειν κατ' ἄρθρα ἣ πέφυκεν, καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγνύναι μέρος μηδέν, κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπῳ χρώμενον.

Robin (o.c. p. 95) rightly qualified the last as a method of ontological synthesis.

317—Theaetetus has defined knowledge as αἴσθησις. Socr. first points out the essential identity of this thesis with that of Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things (See our nr. 171b), then with that of Heraclitus that nothing is and that, out of a process of moving and mixture, all things are always becoming (our nr. 171c). **the Theaet. First part**

a. Pl., *Theaet.* 157 a⁷-b⁸:

Ὡστε ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτὸ **nothing is, all things are becoming**

157b καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τινι¹ ἀεὶ γίνεσθαι, τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἠναγκάσμεθα ὑπὸ συνηθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ. Τὸ δ' οὐ δεῖ, ὥς ὁ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος, οὔτε τι συγχωρεῖν οὔτε του οὔτ' ἐμοῦ οὔτε τόδε οὔτ' ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνομα ὅτι ἂν ἴσῃ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι γιγνόμενα καὶ ποιούμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα ὥς ἂν τί τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐέλεγκτος ὁ τοῦτο ποιῶν.

"Do these things please you, Theaetetus?" Socr. asks. Th. hesitates. Then Socr. asks again:

b. Ib. 157 d⁷⁻¹¹:

Λέγε τοίνυν πάλιν εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει τὸ μὴ τι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ γίνεσθαι ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ πάντα ἃ ἄρτι διῆμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλ' ἐμοίγε, ἐπειδὴ σοῦ ἀκούω οὕτω διεξιόντος, θαυμασίως φαίνεται ὥς ἔχειν λόγον καὶ ὑποληπτέον ἥπερ διελήλυθας.

difficulties

c. Socr. replies, 157 e-158 a:

Μὴ τοίνυν ἀπολίπωμεν ὅσον ἐλλείπον αὐτοῦ. λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ νόσων τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ μανίας, ὅσα τε παρακούειν ἢ παρορᾶν ἢ τι ἄλλο παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται. οἶσθα γάρ που ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμολογουμένως ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὃν ἄρτι διῆμεν λόγον, ὥς παντὸς μᾶλλον ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς αἰσθήσεις ἐν αὐτοῖς γιγνομένας, καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τούναντίον οὐδὲν ὦν φαίνεται εἶναι.

What then is the criterium of true perception? And why one man is deemed more clever than another? (our nr. 171d).—We saw the answer of Prot. (nr. 171e): all perception is true, but not all perceiving subjects are of the same value. Evidently the superiority of those who are wiser does not lie in mere perception.

Prot.' thesis
refuted

d. Ib. 171 bc:

"Ὅταν τῷ τάναντία λέγοντι συγχωρῇ ἀληθῇ αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς συγχωρήσεται μήτε κύνᾳ μήτε τὸν ἐπιτυχόντα ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἐνὸς οὗ ἂν μὴ μάθῃ. Οὐχ οὕτως;

ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως.

the inter-
mezzo

318—In the intermezzo (173c-177c) Plato draws the portrait of the philosopher who does not know the way to the market-place, nor whether any of his fellow-citizens are of high or low birth, or have inherited some blame from their ancestors; who falls in pits, looking to the stars, like Thales, and is laughed at by Thracian servant-girls. But as soon as more important subjects are spoken of—the nature of man in general and justice or injustice itself—then the tables are turned.

¹ τινι - with relation to a (knowing) subject.

Pl., *Theaet.* 175 d⁷-176 b³:

Οὗτος δὴ ἑκατέρου τρόπος, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ὁ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένον, ὃν δὴ φιλόσοφον καλεῖς, ὃ ἀνεμέσσητον εὐήθει δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενὶ εἶναι ὅταν εἰς δουλικά ἐμπέσῃ διακονήματα, οἷον στρωματόδεσμον μὴ ἐπισταμένου συσκευάσασθαι ¹ μηδὲ ὄψον ἡδύναι ἢ θῶπας λόγους · ὁ δ' αὖ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα πάντα δυναμένου τορῶς τε καὶ ὀξέως διακονεῖν, ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐπισταμένου ἐπιδέξια ἐλευθερίως ² οὐδὲ γ' ἁρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντος ὀρθῶς ὑμνῆσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ. 175e

ΘΕΟ. Εἰ πάντας, ὃ Σώκρατες, πείθεις ἃ λέγεις ὥσπερ ἐμέ, πλείων ἂν εἰρήνη καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττω κατ' ἀνθρώπους εἴη. 176a

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' οὐτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὃ Θεόδωρε — ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ αἰεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη — οὐτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἰδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. Διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. Φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν · ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. b

319—a. Pl., *Theaet.* 184 b⁸⁻¹¹, 184 c⁵-185 e²:

Εἰ οὖν τίς σε ὥδ' ἐρωτῇ · „Τῷ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ μέλανα ὁρᾷ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῷ τὰ ὀξεᾶ καὶ βαρέα ἀκούει;” εἴποις ἂν, οἶμαι, „Ὅμμασί τε καὶ ὤσιν.”

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε. —

ΣΟCR. asks again: 'Απόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθότερα, ὃ ὁρῶμεν τοῦτο εἶναι ὀφθαλμούς, ἢ δι' οὗ ὁρῶμεν, καὶ ὃ ἀκούομεν ὦτα, ἢ δι' οὗ ἀκούομεν; 184c

ΘΕΑΙ. Δι' ὧν ἕκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ξμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὃ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ οἷς.

ΣΩ. Δεινὸν γάρ που, ὃ παῖ, εἰ πολλαὶ τινες ἐν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅτι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα συντείνει, ἢ διὰ τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά. d
the soul per-
ceives by
means of the
senses

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὕτω μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκείνως.

ΣΩ. Τοῦδὲ τοι ἕνεκα αὐτὰ σοι διακριβοῦμαι, εἴ τι νιν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐφικνούμεθα λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων ³, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐτέρων αὖ τινῶν, καὶ ἕξεις ἐρωτώμενος πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀνα- e

¹ στρωματόδεσμον—συσκευάσασθαι - “if he cannot tie up bedclothes into a neat bundle” (Cornford).

² ἀναβάλλεσθαι—ἐλευθερίως - “has not learnt to wear his cloak like a gentleman” (Cornford).

³ τοῦδὲ τοι ἕνεκα—λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων - “My object in being so precise is to know whether there is some part of ourselves, the same in all cases, with which we apprehend black or white through the eyes”. (Cornford).

definitive
refutation
of the thesis
that know-
ledge =
αἴσθησις

φέρειν; ἴσως δὲ βέλτιον σὲ λέγειν αὐτὰ ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ σοῦ πολυπραγμονεῖν. Καὶ μοι λέγε· θερμὰ καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ γλυκέα δι' ὧν αἰσθάνη, ἄρα οὐ τοῦ σώματος ἕκαστα τίθης; ἢ ἄλλου τινός;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδενός ἄλλου.

185a ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἐβελήσεις ὁμολογεῖν ἃ δι' ἐτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνη, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι' ἄλλης ταύτ' αἰσθῆσθαι, οἷον ἃ δι' ἀκοῆς, δι' ὄψεως, ἢ ἃ δι' ὀσφews, δι' ἀκοῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐβελήσω;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοῇ, οὐκ ἂν διὰ γε τοῦ ἐτέρου ὀργάνου, οὐδ' αὖ διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι' ἄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χροᾶς πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ διανοῇ, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἐστόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἐκάτερον ἐκατέρου μὲν ἕτερον, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ταῦτόν;

b ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο, ἐκάτερον δέ ἓν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴτε ἀνομοίω εἴτε ὁμοίω ἀλλήλοιον, δυνατὸς εἰ ἐπισκέψασθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτοῖν διανοῇ; οὔτε γὰρ δι' ἀκοῆς οὔτε δι' ὄψεως οἷόν τε τὸ κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν. Ἐτι δὲ καὶ τόδε τεκμήριον περὶ οὗ λέγομεν· εἰ γὰρ δυνατὸν εἶη ἀμφοτέρω σκέψασθαι ἄρ' ἐστὶν ἀλμυρὴ ἢ οὐ, οἷσθ' ὅτι ἕξεις εἰπεῖν ὃ ἐπισκέψῃ, καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε ὄψις οὔτε ἀκοή φαίνεται,

c ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει, ἢ γε διὰ τῆς γλῶττης δυνάμεις;

“being” not
perceived
through the
senses ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. Ἡ δὲ δὴ διὰ τίνος δυνάμεις τό τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις δηλοῖ σοι, ὃ τὸ „ἔστιν” ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ „οὐκ ἔστι” καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἠρωτῶμεν περὶ αὐτῶν; τούτοις πᾶσι ποῖα ἀποδώσεις ὄργανα δι' ὧν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἕκαστα;

nor many
other
general
notions ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν τε καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἓν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ αὐτῶν. Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν ἐρωτᾷς, καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἔπεται,

d διὰ τίνος ποτὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθανόμεθα.

ΣΩ. Ὑπέρευ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἔστιν ἃ ἐρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκратες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν, πλὴν γ' ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν τούτοις ὄργανον ἴδιον ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις, ἀλλ' αὕτη δι' αὐτῆς ἢ ψυχῇ τὰ κοινὰ μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν.

b. Ib. 186 c⁷-d⁵:

ΣΩ. Οἷόν τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ὧς μὴδὲ οὐσίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχῆσει, ποτὲ τούτου ἐπιστήμων ἔσται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἐνὶ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ · οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μὲν, ὡς ἔοικε, δυνατὸν ἄψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον.

knowledge
not in the
impressions,
but in re-
flexion upon
them

320—a. Ib. 186 e¹¹-187 a⁸:

Καὶ μάλιστα γὰρ νῦν καταφανέστατον γέγονεν ἄλλο ὃν αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμη.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ τί μὲν δὴ τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα ἡρχόμεθα διαλεγόμενοι, ἵνα εὖρω-
μεν τί ποτ' οὐκ ἔστ' ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ τί ἔστιν. Ὅμως δὲ τοσοῦτόν γε προβε-
βήκαμεν, ὥστε μὴ ζητεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ
ὀνόματι, ὅτι ποτ' ἔχει ἢ ψυχὴ, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ
τὰ ὄντα.

in search of a
positive
definition

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, δοξάζειν.

b. Ib. 187 b²-e:

Socr. asks: Καὶ λέγε αὖθις τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δόξαν μὲν πᾶσαν εἶπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ψευδὴς
ἔστι δόξα · κινδυνεύει δὲ ἢ ἀληθοῦς δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καὶ μοι τοῦτο ἀπο-
κεκρίσθω.

knowledge
is ἀληθὴς
δόξα

321—a. Ib. 187 d:

ΣΩ. Θράττει μέ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολλάκις, ὥστ' ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ
πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἰπεῖν τί ποτ' ἔστι τοῦτο
τὸ πάθος παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐγγιγνόμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δοξάζειν τινὰ ψευδῆ. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔτι δισταῖζων, πότερον
ἐάσωμεν αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπισκεψώμεθα ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον.

how to ex-
plain the
possibility
of ψευδὴς
δόξα

b. Ib. 188 a-e:

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τόδε γ' ἔσθ' ἡμῖν περὶ πάντα καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἥτοι εἰδέναι
ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι; μανθάνειν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιμανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς ὄντα χαίρειν
λέγω ἐν τῷ παρόντι · νῦν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον ἔστιν οὐδέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο γ' οὐδὲν λείπεται περὶ ἕκαστον
πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἤδη ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν ἢ ὧν τι οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδεν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

188b ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν εἰδότα γε μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ εἰδότα εἰδέναι ἀδύνατον.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ψ. δ.
as thinking
that one
thing is an-
other thing
ΣΩ. Ἐὰρ οὖν ὁ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζων, ἃ οἶδε, ταῦτα οἶεται οὐ ταῦτα εἶναι
ἀλλὰ ἕτερα ἅττα ὧν οἶδε, καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν εἰδὼς ἀγνοεῖ αὐτὰ ἀμφοτέρωθεν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἄρα, ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἡγεῖται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἕτερα ἅττα ὧν μὴ οἶδε,
καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι τῷ μῆτε Θεαίτητον μῆτε Σωκράτη εἰδόντι εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν
λαβεῖν ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης Θεαίτητος ἢ ὁ Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης;

c ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἄν;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ μὴν, ἃ γέ τις οἶδεν, οἶεται πού ἃ μὴ οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐδ'
αὐτὰ μὴ οἶδεν ἃ οἶδεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τέρας γὰρ ἔσται.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν τις ἔτι ψευδῆ δοξάσειεν; ἐκτὸς γὰρ τούτων ἀδύνατόν
ποῦ δοξάζειν, ἐπεὶ πάντ' ἢ ἴσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτοις οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται
δυνατὸν ψευδῆ δοξάσαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Ἐὰρ οὖν οὐ ταύτη σκεπτέον ὁ ζητοῦμεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι
d ἰόντας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ψ. δ.
as thinking
what is not
ΣΩ. Μὴ ἀπλοῦν ἢ ὅτι ὁ τὰ μὴ ὄντα περὶ ὅτου οὖν δοξάζων οὐκ ἔσθ' ὡς οὐ
ψευδῆ δοξάσει, καὶ ὅπως οὖν ἄλλως τὰ τῆς διανοίας ἔχῃ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός γ' αὖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐάν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνακρίνη· „Δυνατὸν
δὲ ὁτῶ οὖν ὁ λέγεται, καὶ τις ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξάσει, εἴτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων
τοῦ εἶτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό”; καὶ ἡμεῖς δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, πρὸς ταῦτα φήσομεν·

e „Ὅταν γε μὴ ἀληθῆ οἴηται οἰόμενος”· ἢ πῶς ἐροῦμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

But this way also turns out to be impossible. For thinking is always thinking
ἐν τι, that is an ὄν.

ψ. δ.
as mistaking
one thing for
another

c. A third way is tried by Socrates. Ib. 189 b¹²-c⁵; d⁷⁻⁹:

ΣΩ. Ἀλλοδοξίαν τινὰ οὕσαν ψευδῆ φαμεν εἶναι δόξαν, ὅταν τις <τι> τῶν
ὄντων ἄλλο αὖ τῶν ὄντων ἀνταλλάξάμενος τῇ διανοίᾳ φῇ εἶναι. Οὕτω γὰρ ὄν
μὲν αἰεὶ δοξάζει, ἕτερον δὲ ἀνθ' ἐτέρου, καὶ ἀμαρτάνων οὐ ἐσκόπει δικαίως ἂν
καλοῖτο ψευδῆ δοξάζων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθοτατά μοι νῦν δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι. —

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν ἄρα κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν ἕτερόν τι ὥς ἕτερον καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐκεῖνο τῇ διανοίᾳ τίθεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι μέντοι. —

d. But Socr. is not content with this answer. He defines thinking in the following way; *Theaet.* 189 e-190 a:

Λόγον δὲν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. "Ὡς γε **thinking is a discourse of the soul, carried on with itself** μὴ εἰδῶς σοι ἀποφαίνομαι. Τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἰνδάλλεται διανοουμένη οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα. "Ὅταν δὲ ὀρίσασα, εἴτε βραδύτερον εἴτε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἐπάξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη φῇ καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. "Ὡστ' ἔγωγε τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, οὐ μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ πρὸς αὐτόν · σὺ δὲ τί;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κἀγώ.

e. Now the third way turns out to be impossible. 190 b-d:

ΣΩ. Ἀναμιμνήσκου δὴ εἰ πώποτ' εἶπες πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον τό τοι καλὸν αἰσχροὺν ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἄδικον δίκαιον. "Ἡ καί, τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον, σκοπεῖ εἰ ποτ' ἐπεχείρησας σεαυτὸν πείθειν ὥς παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν, ἢ πᾶν τούναντίον οὐδ' ἐν ὕπνῳ πώποτε ἐτόλμησας εἰπεῖν πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὥς παντάπασιν ἄρα τὰ περιττὰ ἄρτια ἐστὶν ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλον δέ τινα οἶε ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον τολμῆσαι σπουδῇ πρὸς **190c** ἑαυτὸν εἰπεῖν ἀναπειθόντα αὐτόν ὥς ἀνάγκη τὸν βούν ἔππον εἶναι ἢ τὰ δύο ἓν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ λέγειν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοξάζειν ἐστίν, οὐδεὶς ἀμφοτέρᾳ γε λέγων καὶ δοξάζων καὶ ἐφαπτόμενος ἀμφοῖν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴποι ἂν καὶ δοξάσειεν ὥς τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν. Ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα [περὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου] · **the third way given up** λέγω γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇδε, μηδένα δοξάζειν ὥς τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων.

322—Ib. 191 a-b:

ΣΩ. Οὐ φήσω ἡμᾶς ὀρθῶς ὁμολογῆσαι, ἡνίκα ὁμολογήσαμεν ἃ τις οἶδεν, **the mistake that has been made** ἄδύνατον δοξάσαι ἃ μὴ οἶδεν εἶναι αὐτὰ καὶ ψευσθῆναι · ἀλλὰ πῃ δυνατόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα λέγεις ὃ καὶ ἐγὼ τότε ὑπώπτευσα, ἡνίκ' αὐτὸ ἔφαμεν τοιοῦτον **191b** εἶναι, ὅτι ἐνίος' ἐγὼ γινώσκων Σωκράτη, πόρρωθεν δὲ ὀρῶν ἄλλον δὲ οὐ γινώσκων, ὥς τινος εἶναι Σωκράτη δὲ οἶδα; γίγνεται γὰρ δὴ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ οἶον λέγεις.

the block of
wax in the
mind

323—Socr. now tries to explain the possibility of ψ . δ . by the image of a block of wax, representing memory.

a. Ib. 191 c-e:

ΣΩ. Θές δὴ μοι λόγου ἔνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον, τῷ μὲν μεῖζον, τῷ δ' ἔλαττον, καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου, καὶ σκληροτέρου, ἐνίοις δὲ ὑγροτέρου, ἔστι δ' οἷς μετρίως ἔχοντος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίθημι.

ΣΩ. Δῶρον τοίνυν αὐτὸ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν βουληθῶμεν μνημονεῦσαι ὧν ἂν ἴδωμεν ἢ ἀκούσωμεν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐνοήσωμεν, ὑπέχοντας αὐτὸ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ἐννοίαις, ἀποτυποῦσθαι, ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα ἐνσημαινομένους¹· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἂν ἐκμαγῇ, μνημονεύειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἕως ἂν ἐνῇ τὸ εἶδωλον αὐτοῦ· ὁ δ' ἂν ἐξαλειφθῇ ἢ μὴ οἶόν τε γένηται ἐκμαγῆναι, ἐπιλελῆσθαι τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστω οὕτως.

Now in three cases error will be possible, always with objects both known and perceived, never with objects that are neither known nor perceived.

1—You see two persons known to you approaching at a distance and confound the image of the one with that of the other.

2—You know two persons and see one of them approaching at a distance; you mistake the other for him.

3—You see a person approaching unknown to you, and mistake for him another known to you.

Thus ψ . δ . is the wrong connection of a remembrance and a perception.

b. This might seem to others a good solution of the problem, but Socrates is not satisfied. Ib. 195 c-d:

Οὐ δυσχεραίνω μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δέδοικα ὅτι ἀποκρinoῦμαι ἂν τις ἔρηταί με· ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡϋρηκας δὴ ψευδῇ δόξαν, ὅτι οὔτε ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἔστι πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὔτ' ἐν ταῖς διανοίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ συνάψει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν; φήσω δὲ ἐγὼ οἶμαι καλλωπιζόμενος ὥς τι ἡϋρηκότων ἡμῶν καλόν.

this explana-
tion appears
insufficient

324—Yet this definition of ψ . δ . appears to be insufficient, as there are many cases of error about things that cannot be perceived, such as arithmetical mistakes. Now Socr. by means of another image tries to explain the phenomenon that a person may know and not know at the same time.

difference
between
"having" and
"possessing"

a. Ib. 197 b-d:

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν μοι ταῦτόν φαίνεται τὸ κεκτηῖσθαι τῷ ἔχειν. Οἶον <εἰ> ἰμάτιον

¹ ὥσπερ — ἐνσημαινομένους — "as we might stamp the impression of a seal-ring" (Cornford).

πριάμενός τις καὶ ἐγκρατὴς ὧν μὴ φοροῦ, ἔχειν μὲν οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν αὐτό, κεκτῆσθαι γε μὴν φαῖμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁρθῶς γε.

ΣΩ. "Ορα δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατὸν οὕτω κεκτημένον μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ' 197c ὥσπερ εἴ τις ὀρνίθια ἀγρίας, περιστεράς ἢ τι ἄλλο, θηρεύσας οἴκοι κατασκευασάμενος περιστερεῶνα τρέφοι, τρόπον μὲν γὰρ ἂν ποῦ τινα φαῖμεν αὐτὸν αὐτάς ἀεὶ ἔχειν, ὅτι δὴ κέκτῃται. Ἡ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τρόπον δέ γ' ἄλλον οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτάς παραγεγονέναι, ἐπεὶδὴ ἐν οἰκείῳ περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίους ἐποιήσατο, λαβεῖν καὶ 1 σχεῖν ἐπειδὴν βούλῃται, θηρευσάμενός ἦν ἂν ἀεὶ ἐθέλῃ, καὶ πάλιν ἀφιέναι, καὶ d τοῦτο ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν ὁποσάκις ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ. —

b. Ib. 197 d-e:

the aviary

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὴ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν κήρινόν τι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατεσκευάζομεν οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι πλάσμα, νῦν αὖ ἐν ἐκάστη ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν περιστερεῶνά τινα παντοδαπῶν ὀρνίθων, τὰς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας οὐσας χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, τὰς δὲ κατ' ὀλίγας, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχῃσι πετομένους.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πεποιήσθω δὴ. Ἀλλὰ τί τούντεῦθεν;

197e

ΣΩ. Παιδίῳ μὲν ὄντων φάναι χρὴ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγγεῖον κενόν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων ἐπιστήμας νοῆσαι· ἦν δ' ἂν ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθείρξῃ εἰς τὸν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτὸν μεμαθηκέναι ἢ ηὔρηκέναι τὸ πρᾶγμα οὐ ἦν αὕτη ἢ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι τοῦτ' εἶναι.

c. Ib. 198 d; 199 a-b:

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπεικάζοντες τῇ τῶν περιστερῶν κτήσει τε καὶ θήρᾳ ἐροῦμεν ὅτι διττὴ ἦν ἡ θήρα, ἡ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτῆσθαι ἕνεκα, ἡ δὲ κεκτημένῳ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἃ πάλαι ἐκέκτῃτο. Οὕτως δὲ καὶ ὧν πάλαι ἐπιστῆμαι ἦσαν αὐτῷ μαθόντι καὶ ἠπίστατο αὐτά, πάλιν ἔστι καταμανθάνειν ταῦτα ταῦτα ἀναλαμβάνοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστου καὶ ἴσχοντα, ἦν ἐκέκτῃτο μὲν πάλαι, πρόχειρον δ' οὐκ εἶχε τῇ διανοίᾳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ. —

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μέλει, ὅπῃ 1 τις χαίρει ἔλκων τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μαθάνειν, ἐπεὶδὴ δὲ ὠρισάμεθα ἕτερον μὲν τι τὸ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἔχειν, ὃ μὲν τις ἐκτῇται μὴ κεκτῆσθαι ἀδύνατόν φαμεν εἶναι, ὥστε οὐδέποτε συμβαίνει ὃ τις οἶδεν μὴ εἰδέναι, ψευδῇ μέντοι δόξαν οἶόν τ' εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν; μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν τὴν 199b ἐπιστήμην τούτου οἶόν τε, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν ἀντ' ἐκείνης, ὅταν θηρεύων τινὰ ποῦ ποτ' ἐπιστήμην διαπετομένων ἀνθ' ἑτέρας ἑτέραν ἀμαρτῶν λάβῃ, τότε ἄρα τὰ

ψ. δ.
explained

ένδεκα δώδεκα ὥήθη εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ένδεκα ἐπιστήμην ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβῶν τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἷον φάτταν ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς.

To this way of representing knowledge cp. *Meno* 81b-d and *Rep.* VII 518b-d (our nr. 297).

new difficulties 325—Socr. remarks: if things are so, knowledge would lead to ignorance, and ignorance to knowledge. Theaet. proposes to let pieces of ignorance too flutter about in the aviary. Socr. praises this as a good idea, but requires a new investigation, the question how it is possible to mistake the one thing for the other remaining unsolved.

again: what is knowledge? a. Pl., *Theaet.* 200 d:

τὸ δ' ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον γινῶναι πρὶν ἄν τις ἐπιστήμην ἱκανῶς λάβῃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

The definition of knowledge as ἀληθὴς δόξα cannot be right, true opinion being also the result of persuasion, not of teaching.

true belief with addition of an account b. Ib. 201 c-d: (Socrates said: True opinion and knowledge seem to be different the one from the other).

ΘΕΑΙ. "Ο γε ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκратες, εἰπόντος τοῦ ἀκούσας ἐπελελήσμην, νῦν δ' ἐνοῶ · ἔφη δὲ τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης · καὶ ὧν μὲν μὴ ἐστὶ λόγος, οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὕτως καὶ ὀνομάζων, ἃ δ' ἔχει, ἐπιστητά.

ΣΩ. Ἦ καλῶς λέγεις.

Now, what is this λόγος? Is it the analysis of a thing into its constituting elements? Then only composites can be explained, στοιχεῖα being unaccountable. But a syllable differs from its composing letters; so the composite is as unaccountable as the composing elements.

There are three possible meanings of the term λόγος: (1) the expression of a thought in words; (2) the summing up of elementary parts; (3) the mentioning of the specific difference.

"true belief together with knowledge of a difference" c. Ib. 210 a³⁻⁶; a⁷-b³:

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐρωτηθεῖς, ὥς ἔοικε, τί ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ἀποκρινεῖται ὅτι δόξα ὀρθὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης διαφορότητος. Λόγου γὰρ πρόσληψις τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη κατ' ἐκεῖνον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦ ἔοικεν.

Socr. replies: This is defining knowledge by knowledge.

Καὶ παντάπασί γε εὖηθες, ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης εἴτε διαφορότητος εἴτε ὁτουοῦν. Οὔτε ἄρα αἰσθησις, ὦ

Θεαίτητε, οὔτε δόξα ἀληθῆς οὔτε μετ' ἀληθοῦς δόξης λόγος προσγιγνόμενος ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

The discourse is to be continued.

326—1—The doctrine of the *anamnesis*, expounded in the *Meno* (see our nr. 297) corresponds with the so-called *maieutic art* in *Theaet.* 149a-151b (our nr. 209a): man has to draw knowledge from his own mind.

2—The *anamnesis* on the other hand corresponds with the *eros* in the *Symp.*: the ascent from the many and concrete objects to the Beautiful that is one (see our nr. 273).

3—In *Phaedr.* 249b-d the reduction of the many objects to a unity is called a *ὑπόμνημα*, i.e. a means of rousing something higher in us.

**Plato's
theory of
knowledge
in other
dialogues**

a. Pl., *Phaedr.* 249 b-d:

Δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ξυνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων ἃ ποτ' εἶδεν 249c ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῇ, συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναι φαμεν καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὄν ὄντως. Διὸ δὴ δικαίως μόνῃ πτεροῦται ἢ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια· πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνοις αἰεὶ ἐστὶ μνήμη κατὰ δύναμιν, πρὸς οἷσπερ θεὸς ὢν θεῖός ἐστιν. Τοῖς δὲ δὴ τοιούτοις ἀνὴρ ὑπομνήμασιν ὀρθῶς χρώμενος, τελέους αἰεὶ τελετὰς τελούμενος, τέλεος ὄντως μόνος γίγνεται· ἐξιστάμενος δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων καὶ πρὸς τῷ θεῷ γιγνόμενος, νουθετεῖται μὲν d ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακινῶν¹, ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ λέληθε τοὺς πολλοὺς.

In *Rep.* VII also Plato called the dialectician *συναπτικός* (537c⁷), being the man who sees a unity in multiplicity. See our nr. 302.

b. Cf. *Tim.* 83 c:

τις ὢν δυνατὸς εἰς πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἀνόμοια βλέπειν, ὁρᾷ δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἓν γένος ἐνὸν ἄξιον ἐπωνυμίας πᾶσιν.

4—But the *Phaedr.* also speaks of a way back: πάλιν κατ' εἶδη δύνασθαι διατέμνειν κατ' ἄρθρα ἢ πέφυκεν. (265e, our nr. 316b).

Cf. *Rep.* 511b-e: taking the *ἀνυπόθετον* as his starting-point, the philosopher ought to descend again, that is, he must divide the one Idea into species (see our nr. 294).

This is the *diaeresis*, that is largely applied in the later dialogues *Soph.* and *Polit.* Pl. now tries to define things no longer by their intelligible essence (Idea), but by relations in being. Understanding is not only remembering the Idea, but also trying to find the relations that exist in the intelligible world^a.

This conception of knowledge is prepared in the *Parm.*, where the necessity of relations between the Ideas is proved. This principle is applied in the *Soph.* prepared in the *Parmenides*

¹ ὡς παρακινῶν - intr. "as an excentric person".

^a See the excellent exposition of L. Robin, *Platon*, Ch. IV.

the Theaet.
continued in
the Soph.

The *Soph.* continues directly the problems that have been put in the *Theaet.*: (1) the determination of the highest genera, being those κοινά we cannot grasp with perception (*Th.* 185cd, see our nr. 319a), (2) the question of ψευδῆς δόξα, which is answered in the *Soph.*

Thus surely the *Soph.* is a sequel and a completion of the *Theaet.* But this completion is possible only after the Eleatic ὄν has been criticized in the *Parm.* —

the Parm.
First part

327—The old Parmenides raises three objections against the theory of Ideas.

1—Participation is impossible without division of the Idea.

μέθεξις
implies
division

a. Pl., *Parm.* 131 a-c:

Πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἐκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν ἐν ὄν ἢ πῶς;

Τί γὰρ καλύπει, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ὃ Παρμενίδη, ἐν εἶναι;

131b

Ἐν ἄρα ὄν καὶ ταύτῳ ἐν πολλοῖς χωρὶς οὖσιν ὅλον ἅμα ἐνέσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ χωρὶς ἂν εἴη.

Οὐκ ἂν, εἴ γε, φάναι, οἶον [εἰ] ἡμέρα εἴη, <ἡ> μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὐσα πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ αὐτῆς χωρὶς ἐστίν, εἰ οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ταύτῳ εἴη.

Ἡδέως γε, φάναι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταύτῳ ἅμα πολλαχοῦ ποιεῖς, οἶον εἰ ιστίῳ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους φαίης ἐν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἶναι ὅλον · ἢ οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡγῇ λέγειν;

c

Ἴσως, φάναι.

Ἡ οὖν ὅλον ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ τὸ ιστίον εἴη ἂν, ἢ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐπ' ἄλλῳ; Μέρος.

Μεριστὰ ἄρα, φάναι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη, καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν μέρους ἂν μετέχοι, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν ἐκάστῳ ὅλον, ἀλλὰ μέρος ἐκάστου ἂν εἴη.

Φαίνεται οὕτω γε.

Ἡ οὖν ἐβελήσεις, ὃ Σώκρατες, φάναι τὸ ἐν εἶδος ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μερίζεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἔσται;

Οὐδαμῶς, εἰπεῖν.

Ideas no
νόηματα ἐν
τῇ ψυχῇ

b. The explanation that the Ideas are mere thoughts in a mind is rejected. Ib. 132b-c; s. our nr. 271a.

2—If participation is explained as likeness, a regressus ad infinitum is involved.

the third man

c. Ib. 132 d-133 a:

Τὸ δὲ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἄρ' οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη ἐνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ [εἶδους]

132e μετέχειν;

Ἀνάγκη.

Οὐ δ' ἂν τὰ ὅμοια μετέχοντα ὅμοια ᾗ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος;
Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκ ἄρα οἶόν τέ τι τῷ εἶδει ὅμοιον εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος ἄλλω · εἰ δὲ μή,
παρὰ τὸ εἶδος αἰεὶ ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται εἶδος, καὶ ἂν ἐκεῖνό τῳ ὅμοιον ᾗ, ἕτερον
αὖ, καὶ οὐδέποτε παύσεται αἰεὶ καινὸν εἶδος γιγνόμενον, ἔαν τὸ εἶδος τῷ ἑαυτοῦ
μετέχοντι ὅμοιον γίγνηται.

133a

Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

Οὐκ ἄρα ὁμοιότητι τᾶλλα τῶν εἰδῶν μεταλαμβάνει, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο δεῖ ζητεῖν
ᾧ μεταλαμβάνει.

Ἔοικεν.

It is clear that Plato did not feel himself refuted by this argument, for in the
Tim. again he speaks of the Forms as paradeigmata of things. To consult: F. M.
Cornford, *Pl. and Parm.*, p. 93 ff., and, most of all, the excellent pages of H. Cher-
niss in *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, I, Baltimore 1944, p. 296-299.

3—Separate Forms have their οὐσία πρὸς αὐτάς, just like phenomena
(τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν) exist in relation to each other, not with the Forms. Two
fatal consequences follow:

d. Man cannot have any knowledge of the ideal World.

human know-
ledge of the
Ideas
impossible

Pl., *Parm.* 134 a-c:

Ἡ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη οὐ τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν ἂν ἀληθείας εἴη, καὶ αὖ ἐκάστη
ἡ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐκάστου ἂν ἐπιστήμη συμβαίνοι
εἶναι;

134b

Ἀνάγκη.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτά γε τὰ εἶδη, ὡς ὁμολογεῖς, οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε παρ' ἡμῖν οἶόν
τε εἶναι.

Οὐ γάρ οὖν.

Γιγνώσκεται δέ γε πού ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶδους τοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αὐτὰ τὰ
γένη ἃ ἔστιν ἕκαστα;

Ναί.

Ὁ γε ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἔχομεν.

Οὐ γάρ.

Οὐκ ἄρα ὑπό γε ἡμῶν γιγνώσκεται τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδέν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῆς ἐπι-
στήμης οὐ μετέχομεν.

Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

Ἀγνωστον ἄρα ἡμῖν ἔστι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν δ' ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντα
ἃ δὴ ὡς ιδέας αὐτάς οὐσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν.

c

Κινδυνεύει.

divine
providence
impossible

e. God cannot rule over nor have any knowledge of human things.

Ib. 134 c-e:

“Ορα δὴ ἔτι τούτου δεινότερον τόδε.

Τὸ ποῖον;

Φαίης ἂν που, εἴπερ ἔστιν αὐτό τι γένος ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κάλλος καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτω.

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἂν τινα μᾶλλον ἢ θεὸν φαίης ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην;

Ἀνάγκη.

134d Ἄρ’ οὖν οἷός τε αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν γινώσκειν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων;

Τί γάρ οὔ;

“Οτι, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μήτε ἐκεῖνα τὰ εἶδη πρὸς τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἢν ἔχει, μήτε τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκάτερα.

Ὡμολόγηται γάρ.

e Οὐκοῦν εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη δεσποτεία καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστήμη, οὐτ’ ἂν ἡ δεσποτεία ἡ ἐκείνων ἡμῶν ποτὲ ἂν δεσπόσειεν, οὐτ’ ἂν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡμᾶς γνοίη οὐδὲ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ ὁμοίως ἡμεῖς τε ἐκείνων οὐκ ἄρχομεν τῇ παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀρχῇ οὐδὲ γινώσκομεν τοῦ θείου οὐδὲν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐκεῖνοί τε αὐτὰ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὔτε δεσπότες ἡμῶν εἰσὶν οὔτε γινώσκουσι τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα θεοὶ ὄντες.

Ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν, ἔφη, <ῆ> θαυμαστός ὁ λόγος, εἴ τις τὸν θεὸν ἀποστερήσει τοῦ εἰδέναι.

Conclusion 328—a. Ib. 135 b-c:

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπεν ὁ Παρμενίδης, εἰ γέ τις δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτὸ μὴ ἑάσει εἶδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ νυνδὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, μηδέ τι ὀριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἐκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει, μὴ ἑὼν ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν αἰεὶ εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεῖ. Τοῦ τοιούτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ἡσθῆσθαι.

Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι.

Only, a strong dialectical training is required: the method of Zeno ought to be applied, not only to what is seen, but also to what is intelligible. Then, the consequences must be considered, not only if the hypothesis is taken in the positive form, but also if it is taken in the negative.

b. Ib. 135 e-136 a:

Χρὴ δὲ καὶ τὸδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ ποιεῖν, μὴ μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι, εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι.

329—Thus the discourse of the second part is divided into two sections: **composition of the second part**
I. εἰ ἔν ἐστι, II. εἰ ἔν μὴ ἔστιν.

In both cases the consequences must be considered, (A) as to the one itself, (B) as to the other things.

So we get four logoi. But, each of these being developed in two senses—(a) the one being taken in the absolute, (b) in the relative sense, or inversely—we are getting eight logoi.

In Antiquity they were called *hypotheses*.

We cite: I Aa and b; I Ba and b; II Aa and b; II Ba and b (four antinomies).

The corollary on "becoming in time" (I Ac), added by Plato after his first antinomy as a transition between the thesis and antithesis of I A, is taken by some writers as a separated "logos". Thus J. Wahl in his *Etude* and A. Diès in his edition of the *Parm.* count nine logoi.

330—In the thesis (a) of I A the notion of ἔν is taken in the absolute sense. **I Aa.** No communication with other ideas is then possible. Being itself consequently cannot be predicated of the ἔν^a.

The antithesis takes the ἔν directly as ὄν. Thus it includes a duality, and with this the principle of number is given. Knowledge and perception of the ἔν are possible. **I Ab**

This antithesis is developed in a highly sophistical way, in such a measure that even the earnest sense of the whole second part of our dialogue has been doubted of. However, in the following deductions more and more a reasonable sense is being disclosed. The notion of ἔν is purified of the material conception in the first antinomy; multiplicity is possible as a participation of the one that is. So in the thesis of the second antinomy (I Ba). Here the thesis of the historical *Parm.* is already overcome, the "other things" being thought as not absolutely separated from the one.

331—According to b the one is, according to a it is not. Now, as these two states cannot exist at the same time, a transition between them is necessary. **I Ac**

Ib. 156 c-e:

Πότ' οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ ἐστὸς ὄν οὔτε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει, οὔτε ἐν χρόνῳ ὄν. — Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. — Ἐὰρ οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τότ' ἂν εἴη, ὅτε μεταβάλλει; — Τὸ ποῖον δὴ; — Τὸ ἐξαίφνης. Τὸ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης τοιοῦτόν τι ἔοικε σημαίνειν, ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλον εἰς ἑκάτερον. Οὐ γὰρ ἐκ γε τοῦ ἐστάναι ἐστῶτος ἔτι μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως κινουμένης ἔτι μεταβάλλει. ἀλλὰ ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξύ τῆς κινήσεώς τε καὶ στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὔσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης. **156e**

the "movement"

^a See De Vogel, *Keerpunt*, p. 150 f.; Burnet, *Gr. Phil.*, 264 f.; Cornford, *Plato and Parm.*, p. 115-135; J. Wahl, *Etude sur le Parm.*, p. 114-129. And for the next "hypotheses" the following pages in the same works.

τό τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἐστάναι καὶ τὸ ἐστός ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι. — Κινδυνεύει.

The "transition" being not in time, this "timeless moment" has been rightly explained by Natorp and by N. Hartmann as the continuity of thinking itself ^a.

I Ba

332—a. Pl., *Parm.* 157 b-c:

157C

Οὐκοῦν ἐπέειπερ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός ἐστιν, οὔτε τὸ ἓν ἐστι τᾶλλα · οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός ᾔην. — Ὅρθῳς. — Οὐδὲ μὴν στέρεταιί γε παντάπασι τοῦ ἐνός τᾶλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει πη. — Πῇ δῆ; — "Οτι που τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός μόρια ἔχοντα ἄλλα ἐστίν · εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἂν ἓν εἴη. — Ὅρθῳς. — Μόρια δέ γε, φαμέν, τούτου ἐστίν ὃ ἂν ὅλον ᾔ. — Φαμέν γάρ. — Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅλον ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὐ ἔσται μόρια τὰ μόρια · ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν μορίων οὐ πολλῶν μόριον χρή εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ὅλου.

reality of the
"many"

b. Ib. 158 b-d:

158C

Ἐπεὶ δέ γε πλείω ἐνός ἐστι τὰ τε τοῦ ἐνός μορίου καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἐνός ὅλου μετέχοντα, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη πλήθει ἄπειρα εἶναι αὐτά γε ἐκεῖνα τὰ μεταλαμβάνοντα τοῦ ἐνός; — Πῶς; — Ὡςδε ἴδωμεν. Ἄλλο τι οὐχ ἓν ὄντα οὐδὲ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἐνός τότε, ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ, μεταλαμβάνει; — Δῆλα δῆ. — Οὐκοῦν πλήθει ὄντα, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἓν οὐκ ἓν; — Πλήθει μέντοι. — Τί οὖν; εἰ ἐθέλομεν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀφελεῖν ὥς οἱόι τέ ἐσμεν ὅτι ὀλίγιστον, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἐκεῖνο, εἴπερ τοῦ ἐνός μὴ μετέχοι, πλήθος εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἓν; — Ἀνάγκη. — Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀεὶ σκοποῦντες αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἐτέραν φύσιν τοῦ εἶδους ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς ἀεὶ ὀρῶμεν ἄπειρον ἔσται πλήθει; — Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. — Καὶ μὴν ἐπειδάν γε ἐν ἕκαστον μόριον μόριον γένηται, πέρας ἤδη ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὰ μόρια. — Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. — Τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ τοῦ ἐνός συμβαίνει ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τι γίγνεσθαι ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὃ δὲ πέρας παρέσχε πρὸς ἄλληλα · ἡ δὲ αὐτῶν φύσις καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀπειρίαν. — Φαίνεται. — Οὕτω δὲ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ὅλα καὶ κατὰ μόρια ἄπειρά τέ ἐστι καὶ πέρατος μετέχει. — Πάνυ γε.

II Aa

333—The formal refutation of Parmenides' thesis—the *being* of *non-being*—follows from the thesis of the third antinomy.

the ἐν μὴ ὄν
a positive
subject

a. Ib. 160 b-d:

160C

Τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν; ἄρα τι διαφέρει τῆσδε, εἰ μὴ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν; — Διαφέρει μέντοι. — Διαφέρει μόνον, ἡ καὶ πᾶν τούναντίον ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν εἰ μὴ ἐν μὴ ἔστι τοῦ εἰ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν; — Πᾶν τούναντίον. — Τί δ' εἴ τις

^a Natorp, *Pl. Id.*, p. 263; N. Hartmann, *Platos Logik des Seins*, p. 351-360.

λέγοι εἰ μέγεθος μὴ ἔστιν ἢ σμικρότης μὴ ἔστιν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἄρα ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἂν δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕτερόν τι λέγοι τὸ μὴ ὄν; — Πάνυ γε. — Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕτερον λέγει τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ἴσμεν ὃ λέγει; — Ἰσμεν. — Πρῶτον μὲν ἄρα γνωστόν τι λέγει, ἔπειτα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἐν, εἴτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ προσθεῖς εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι · οὐδὲν <γάρ> ἤττον γινώσκεται, τί τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων. *Η οὐ; — *Ανάγκη. —

b. Ib. 160 d⁴-161 a²; 161 a⁶⁻⁷; b⁴-e²:

determina-
tion of the
ἐν μὴ ὄν

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, ἢ μὴδὲ ὅτι λέγεται γινώσκεσθαι, ὅταν τις εἴπῃ ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν. — *Αληθῆ. — Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἕτερα αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἢ μὴδὲ ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγεσθαι; — Πάνυ γε. — Καὶ ἑτεροιοῦντος ἄρα ἔστιν αὐτῷ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. Οὐ γὰρ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἑτεροιοῦντα λέγει, ὅταν τὸ ἐν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγῃ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνου. — Φαίνεται. — Καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἐκείνου καὶ τοῦ τινὸς καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτῳ καὶ τούτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων μετέχει τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐν · οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἐν ἐλέγετο οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἕτερα, οὐδ' ἐκεῖνῳ ἂν τι ᾖ οὐδ' ἐκείνου, οὐδ' ἂν τι ἐλέγετο, εἰ μήτε τοῦ τινὸς αὐτῷ μετῆν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τούτων. — *Ορθῶς. — Εἶναι μὲν δὴ τῷ ἐνὶ οὐχ οἶόν τε, εἴπερ γε μὴ ἔστι, μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τό γε ἐν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν. —

160e

161a

Καὶ ἀνομοιότης ἄρα ἔστιν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα · τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἕτερα ὄντα ἑτεροῖα καὶ εἴη ἂν. — Ναί. —

Εἰ δὲ δὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνομοιότης ἔστιν αὐτῷ, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἑαυτοῦ ὁμοιότητα αὐτῷ εἶναι; — Πῶς; — Εἰ ἐνὸς ἀνομοιότης ἔστι τῷ ἐνὶ, οὐκ ἂν που περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ὁ λόγος εἴη οἴου τοῦ ἐνός, οὐδ' ἂν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εἴη περὶ ἐνός, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ ἐνός. — Πάνυ γε. — Οὐ δεῖ δέ γε. — Οὐ δῆτα. — Δεῖ ἄρα ὁμοιότητα τῷ ἐνὶ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι. — Δεῖ.

b

c

Καὶ μὴν οὐδ' αὖ ἴσον γ' ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις · εἰ γὰρ εἴη ἴσον, εἴη τε ἂν ἡδὴ καὶ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα. Ταῦτα δ' ἀμφοτέρω ἀδύνατα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν ἐν. — *Αδύνατα. — *Επειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον, ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰλλα ἐκεῖνῳ μὴ ἴσα εἶναι; — *Ανάγκη. — Τὰ δὲ μὴ ἴσα οὐκ ἄνισα; — Ναί. — Τὰ δὲ ἄνισα οὐ τῷ ἀνίσῳ ἄνισα; — Πῶς δ' οὐ; — Καὶ ἀνισότητος δὴ μετέχει τὸ ἐν, πρὸς ᾗν τὰλλα αὐτῷ ἔστιν ἄνισα; — Μετέχει. — *Αλλὰ μέντοι ἀνισότητός γε ἐστὶ μέγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότης. — *Εστι γάρ. — *Εστιν ἄρα καὶ μέγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότης τῷ τοιούτῳ ἐνὶ; — Κινδυνεύει. — Μέγεθος μὴν καὶ σμικρότης αἰετὶ ἀφίστατον ἀλλήλοιν. — Πάνυ γε. — Μεταξὺ ἄρα τι αὐτοῖν αἰετὶ ἔστιν. — *Εστιν. — *Ἐχεις οὖν τι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν μεταξὺ αὐτοῖν ἢ ἰσότητα; — Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο. — *Οὔτε ἄρα ἔστι μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότης, ἔστι καὶ ἰσότης

d

e αὐτῷ μεταξὺ τούτοις οὐσα. — Φαίνεται. — Τῷ δὲ ἐνὶ μὴ ὄντι, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἰσότητος ἂν μετεῖη καὶ μεγέθους καὶ σμικρότητος. — Ἔοικεν.

the one non-
being is

c. Ib. 161 e³-162 b⁸:

Καὶ μὴν καὶ οὐσίας γε δεῖ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πῃ. — Πῶς δὴ; — Ἐχειν αὐτὸ δεῖ οὕτως ὡς λέγομεν · εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν ἡμεῖς λέγοντες τὸ ἐν μὴ εἶναι · εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι ὄντα αὐτὰ λέγομεν. Ἡ οὐχ οὕτως; — Οὕτω μὲν οὖν. — Ἐπειδὴ δὲ φαμεν ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν φάναι καὶ ὄντα
162a λέγειν. — Ἀνάγκη. — Ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὄν · εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὄν, ἀλλὰ πῃ τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, εὐθὺς ἔσται ὄν. — Παντά-
πασι μὲν οὖν. — Δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔχειν μὴ εἶναι, ἵνα τελέως αὖ
εἶναι ᾗ · οὕτως γὰρ ἂν τό τε ὄν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, μετέ-
χοντα τὸ μὲν ὄν οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι ὄν, μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει
b τελέως εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ
εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν αὖ τελέως μὴ ἔσται. — Ἀληθέστατα. — Οὐκοῦν
ἐπεὶ περ τῷ τε ὄντι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τῷ μὴ ὄντι τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστι, καὶ τῷ
ἐνί, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστι, τοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη μετεῖναι εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι. — Ἀνάγκη. —
Καὶ οὐσία δὴ φαίνεται τῷ ἐνί, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν. — Φαίνεται. — Καὶ μὴ οὐσία ἄρα,
εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν. — Πῶς δ' οὐ;

II Ba 334—The consequences of the negative hypothesis for the “other things”, the μὴ ὄν being taken in the relative sense. Pl. here is speaking clearly of phenomenal being.

Ib. 164 b-165 c:

Ἄλλα μὲν που δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι · εἰ γὰρ μὴδὲ ἄλλα ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν περὶ
τῶν ἄλλων λέγοιτο. — Οὕτω. — Εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ λόγος, τά γε ἄλλα
ἕτερα ἐστίν. Ἡ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλεῖς τό τε ἄλλο καὶ τὸ ἕτερον; —
164c Ἐγώ γε. — Ἐτερον δὲ γέ πού φαμεν τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι ἐτέρου, καὶ τὸ ἄλλο δὴ
ἄλλο εἶναι ἄλλου; — Ναί. — Καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄρα, εἰ μέλλει ἄλλα εἶναι, ἔστι
τι οὗ ἄλλα ἔσται. — Ἀνάγκη. — Τί δὴ οὖν ἂν εἴη; τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐνός οὐκ ἔσται
ἄλλα, μὴ ὄντος γε. — Οὐ γάρ. — Ἀλλήλων ἄρα ἐστί · τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐτι
λείπεται, ἢ μηδενὸς εἶναι ἄλλοις. — Ὅρθως. — Κατὰ πλήθη ἄρα ἕκαστα
ἀλλήλων ἄλλα ἐστί · κατὰ ἐν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν οἶά τε εἴη, μὴ ὄντος ἐνός. Ἄλλ'
ἕκαστος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ ὅγκος αὐτῶν ἀπειρός ἐστι πλήθει, καὶ τὸ σμικρότατον
δοκοῦν εἶναι λάβη τις, ὥσπερ ὅναρ ἐν ὑπνῷ φαίνεται ἐξαίφνης ἀντὶ ἐνός δό-
ξαντος εἶναι πολλὰ καὶ ἀντὶ σμικροτάτου παμμέγεθες πρὸς τὰ κερματιζόμενα
ἐξ αὐτοῦ. — Ὅρθότατα. — Τοιούτων δὲ ὅγκων ἄλλα ἀλλήλων ἂν εἴη τᾶλλα,
εἰ ἐνός μὴ ὄντος ἄλλα ἐστίν. — Κομίδῃ μὲν οὖν. — Οὐκοῦν πολλοὶ ὅγκοι

a descrip-
tion of
phenomenal
being

ἔσονται, εἷς ἕκαστος φαινόμενος, ὧν δὲ οὐ, εἴπερ ἓν μὴ ἔσται; — Οὕτω. —
 Καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ εἶναι αὐτῶν δόξει, εἴπερ καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον, πολλῶν ὄντων. — e
 Πάνυ γε. — Καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἄρτια, τὰ δὲ περιττὰ ἓν αὐτοῖς ὄντα οὐκ ἀληθῶς
 φαίνεται, εἴπερ ἓν μὴ ἔσται. — Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. — Καὶ μὴν καὶ σμικρότατόν γε,
 φαιμέν, δόξει ἓν αὐτοῖς ἐνεῖναι · φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς
 ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ὡς σμικρῶν ὄντων. — Πῶς δ' οὐ; — Καὶ ἕσος μὴν τοῖς 165a
 πολλοῖς καὶ σμικροῖς ἕκαστος ὄγκος δοξασθήσεται εἶναι · οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέβαινεν
 ἐκ μείζονος εἰς ἕλαττον φαινόμενος, πρὶν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δόξειεν ἔλθεῖν, τοῦτο
 δ' εἶη ἂν φάντασμα ἰσότητος. — Εἰκός. — Οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον ὄγκον πέρας
 ἔχων, αὐτός γε πρὸς αὐτὸν οὔτε ἀρχὴν οὔτε πέρας οὔτε μέσον ἔχων; — Πῇ δὴ;
 — "Οτι αἰεὶ αὐτῶν ὅταν τίς τι λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὥς τι τούτων ὂν, πρό τε τῆς
 ἀρχῆς ἄλλη αἰεὶ φαίνεται ἀρχή, μετὰ τε τὴν τελευταίαν ἑτέρα ὑπολειπομένη b
 τελευτή, ἓν τε τῷ μεσῷ ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τοῦ μέσου, σμικρότερα δέ, διὰ τὸ μὴ
 δύνασθαι ἑνὸς αὐτῶν ἑκάστου λαμβάνεσθαι, ἅτε οὐκ ὂντος τοῦ ἑνός. — 'Αλη-
 θεέστατα. — Θρούπτεσθαι δὴ οἶμαι κερματιζόμενον ἀνάγκῃ πᾶν τὸ ὂν, ὃ ἂν
 τις λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ · ὄγκος γὰρ που ἄνευ ἑνός αἰεὶ λαμβάνοιτ' ἂν. — Πάνυ
 μὲν οὖν. — Οὐκοῦν τό γε τοιοῦτον πόρρωθεν μὲν ὀρῶντι καὶ ἀμβλὺ ἓν
 φαίνεσθαι ἀνάγκῃ, ἐγγύθεν δὲ καὶ ὀξὺ νοοῦντι πλήθει ἁπειρον ἓν ἕκαστον c
 φανῆναι, εἴπερ στέρεται τοῦ ἑνός μὴ ὂντος; — 'Αναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν.

335—The antitheses, II Ab and Bb, by taking the non-being of the one in the absolute sense, mark frontier-positions of thinking, as a counterpart to I Ab.

the anti-
theses

Ib. 166 b⁷-c² (conclusion of the last antithesis):

II Bb

The ἄλλα being neither ἓν nor πολλά (for this presupposes the one) nor *seeming* such (because they have not the least communion with μὴ ὄντα), nothing can be predicated nor believed of it.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ συλλήβδην εἰ εἴπομεν, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴπομεν; — Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν.

336—The dialogue ends rather abruptly. Plato leaves it to the reader to draw conclusions his conclusions. J. Wahl in his *Etude sur le Parm.* p. 200, adding a slight correction to the conclusions of A. Diès and L. Robin—the last having said "que l'éléatisme est trop étroit et la théorie des Idées trop vague"—formulates them as follows: "— nous préférons dire: "que l'éléatisme et la théorie des idées sont tous deux trop étroits" et insister sur la place de ce que nous appellerions volontiers l'hé-racлитisme des idées dans le platonisme futur, réglé d'ailleurs par les nombres."

F. M. Cornford (in *Pl. and Parm.* p. 245): "It must not be overlooked that, particularly in *Hyp.* II, he has restored, in a modified form, the Pythagorean "evolution" from the One, through the Union of Limit and Unlimited in numbers

and geometrical figures, to sensible things with their limiting form and unlimited matter. He has thus laid down, in outline, the foundations of the ontology which underlies all the later dialogues. Also he has indicated what he will, or what he will not, accept from his great forerunner, Parmenides."


See also the excellent pages of L. Robin, *Platon*, 137-140; and my work, *Keerpunt*, 160-162.

A neoplatonic interpretation is given by M. Wundt, *Platons Parm.*, Stuttgart-Berlin 1935 *; a mathematical approach by A. Speiser, *Ein Parmenideskommentar*, Leipzig 1937.

8—THE LATER PLATONISM: SOPH., POLIT., PHIL., TIM.

diaeresis.
the art of
angling

337—An example of determining a notion by diaeresis. The art of angling (ἀσπαλιευτική). Pl., *Soph.* 219 a-221 c.



¹ μεταβλητική - by barter; χειρωτική - by subduing.


² ἀγωνιστική - by combat; θηρευτική - by hunting.

³ ἐρκοθηρική - with nets; πληκτική - by spearing.

⁴ πυρευτική - by torchlight; ἀγκιστρευτική - with hooks.

* A critical review of it is given by me in *Keerpunt*, p. 250-258.

338—The same method applied to sophistry (σοφιστική) Ib., 221 c-223 b. **sophistry**



Thus the sophist turns out to be a *man-hunter, eager for gain*. Three other schemes of division follow. In a fifth scheme Pl. starts from the view that the sophist is *ἀντιλογικός*. However, as it is impossible to contradict in all things on the ground of knowledge, an *apparent* knowledge must be admitted. Therefore Pl. starts from the notion of *μιμητική*. And this notion presupposes non-being. Hence the question of the possibility of the being of non-being.

Now as a simple fact this follows from the existence of lying and deceit. Thus, not so much the *being* of non-being is the problem of this dialogue, as—much more—the *determination* of the *μὴ ὄν*.

339—We saw that Pl., in his discussion with the *εἰδῶν φίλοι* (see our nr. 315 c), came to the conclusion that “the perfectly real” (*παντελῶς ὄν*) must have movement and life, soul and understanding, and therefore that *κίνησις* must belong to the realm of being. But *στάσις* also must belong to it, thinking being impossible without identity. So being turns out to be both *ἀκίνητα καὶ κεκίνημένα*.

ὄν must be
assumed as a
third kind
next to mo-
tion and rest

a. Ib. 250 a-c:

ΞΕ. Εἶεν δὴ, κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν ἄρ' οὐκ ἐναντιώτατα λέγει; ἀλλήλοις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν εἶναι γε ὁμοίως φῆς ἀμφοτέρα αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκάτερον;

250b ΘΕΑΙ. Φημί γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. Ἄρα κινεῖσθαι λέγων ἀμφοτέρα καὶ ἐκάτερον, ὅταν εἶναι συγχωρῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΞΕ. Ἄλλ' ἐστάναι σημαίνεις λέγων αὐτὰ ἀμφοτέρα εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΞΕ. Τρίτον ἄρα τι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὄν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τιθεῖς, ὡς ὑπ' ἐκείνου τὴν τε στάσιν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν περιεχομένην, συλλαβὼν καὶ ἀπιδὼν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν τῆς οὐσίας κοινωνίαν, οὕτως εἶναι προσεῖπας ἀμφοτέρα;

c ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύομεν ὡς ἀληθῶς τρίτον ἀπομαντεύεσθαι τι τὸ ὄν, ὅταν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν εἶναι λέγωμεν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκ ἄρα κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἐστὶ συναμφοτέρον τὸ ὄν ἀλλ' ἕτερον δὴ τι τούτων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΞΕ. Κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἄρα τὸ ὄν οὔτε ἔστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδόν.

how then to
define being?

b. Ib. 250 c-d:

ΞΕ. Ποῖ δὴ χρὴ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔτι τρέπειν τὸν βουλούμενον ἐναργές τι περὶ αὐτοῦ παρ' ἑαυτῷ βεβαιώσασθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖ γάρ;

250d ΞΕ. Οἶμαι μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἔτι ῥᾶδιον. εἰ γάρ τι μὴ κινεῖται, πῶς οὐχ ἔστηκεν; ἢ τὸ μηδαμῶς ἐστὸς πῶς οὐκ αὖ κινεῖται; τὸ δὲ ὄν ἡμῖν νῦν ἐκτὸς τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀναπέφανται. Ἡ δυνατὸν οὖν τοῦτο;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν ἀδυνατώτατον.

the κοινωνία
τῶν γενῶν

340—Pl. now turns off in another direction. In which sense may we call a thing by many names? (251a) The view of those who deny the possibility of predication is rejected by him as a naïvety (see our nr. 252b). To all who ever spoke about being he then puts the following question.

three
possibilities

a. Ib. 251 d-e:

Πότερον μήτε τὴν οὐσίαν κινήσει καὶ στάσει προσάπτωμεν μήτε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ μηδὲν μηδενί, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄμεικτα ὄντα καὶ ἀδύνατον μεταλαμβάνειν ἀλλήλων οὕτως αὐτὰ ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν λόγοις τιθῶμεν; ἢ πάντα εἰς ταῦτόν συναγάγωμεν

ὥς δυνατὰ ἐπικοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις; ἢ τὰ μὲν, τὰ δὲ μή; τούτων, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τί ποτ' ἂν αὐτοὺς προαιρεῖσθαι φήσομεν;

In the first case being could neither move nor be at rest, and those who choose for this possibility can on no account explain the world. Moreover they needs must contradict themselves.

1. no
κοινωνία
at all

b. Ib. 252 c-d:

ΞΕ. Τῷ τε „εἶναι” που περὶ πάντα ἀναγκάζονται χρῆσθαι καὶ τῷ „χωρὶς” καὶ τῷ „τῶν ἄλλων” καὶ τῷ „καθ' αὐτό” καὶ μυρίοις ἑτέροις, ὧν ἀκρατεῖς ὄντες εἴργεσθαι καὶ μὴ συνάπτειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐκ ἄλλων δέονται τῶν ἐξελεγχόντων, ἀλλὰ τὸ λεγόμενον οἴκοθεν τὸν πολέμιον καὶ ἐναντιωσόμενον ἔχοντες, ἐντὸς ὑποφθεγγόμενον ὥσπερ τὸν ἄτοπον Εὐρυκλέα¹ περιφέροντες ἀεὶ πορεύονται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ λέγεις ὁμοίον τε καὶ ἀληθές.

c. Ib. 252 d:

2. κοινωνία
of all with
all

ΞΕ. Τί δ', ἂν πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἐῷμεν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἐπικοινωνίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦτο μὲν οἶός τε κάγώ διαλύειν.

ΞΕ. Πῶς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅτι κίνησίς τε αὐτῇ παντάπασιν ἴσταιτ' ἂν καὶ στάσις αὖ πάλιν αὐτῇ κινεῖτο, εἴπερ ἐπιγίγνοισθην ἐπ' ἀλλήλοιν.

ΞΕ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γέ που ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνάγκαις ἀδύνατον, κίνησιν τε ἴστασθαι καὶ στάσιν κινεῖσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. Τὸ τρίτον δὴ μόνον λοιπόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

d. Ib. 252 e²-253 a³; 253 a⁸-e³:

3. of some
with some
others

ΞΕ. Ὅτε δὴ τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει τοῦτο δρᾶν, τὰ δ' οὐ, σχεδὸν οἷον τὰ γράμματα πεπονθότ' ἂν εἴη. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων τὰ μὲν ἀναρμοστεῖ που πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὰ δὲ συναρμόττει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ; —

ΞΕ. Πᾶς οὖν οἶδεν ὅποια ὅποιοις δυνατὰ κοινωνεῖν, ἢ τέχνης δεῖ τῷ 253a μέλλοντι δρᾶν ἱκανῶς αὐτό;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τέχνης.

ΞΕ. Ποίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τῆς γραμματικῆς.

¹ Εὐρυκλέα - Eurycles was a ventriloquist (see Aristoph., *Wasps* 1017-1020).

- b ΕΕ. Τί δέ; περὶ τοὺς τῶν ὀξέων καὶ βαρέων φθόγγους ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτως; ὁ μὲν τοὺς συγκεραννυμένους τε καὶ μὴ τέχνην ἔχων γινώσκειν μουσικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ συνιείς ἄμουςος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΕΕ. Καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τεχνῶν καὶ ἀτεχνῶν τοιαῦτα εὐρήσομεν ἕτερα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

- ΕΕ. Τί δ'; ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ γένη πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ ταῦτα μείξεως ἔχειν ὠμολογήκαμεν, ἄρ' οὐ μετ' ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τῶν λόγων πορεύεσθαι τὸν ὀρθῶς μέλλοντα δεῖξειν ποῖα ποίοις συμφωνεῖ τῶν γενῶν καὶ ποῖα ἄλληλα οὐ δέχεται; καὶ δὴ καὶ διὰ πάντων εἰ συνέχοντ' ἅττ' αὐτ' ἐστίν, ὥστε συμμειγνυσθαι δυνατὰ εἶναι, καὶ πάλιν ἐν ταῖς διαιρέσεσιν, εἰ δι' ὅλων ἕτερα τῆς διαιρέσεως αἵτια;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιστήμης δεῖ, καὶ σχεδόν γε ἴσως τῆς μεγίστης;

a new
definition of
philosophy

ΕΕ. Τίν' οὖν αὖ νῦν προσερούμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ταύτην; ἢ πρὸς Διὸς ἐλάθομεν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐμπεσόντες ἐπιστήμην¹, καὶ κινδυνεύομεν ζητοῦντες τὸν σοφιστὴν πρότερον ἀνηυρηκέναι τὸν φιλόσοφον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

- d ΕΕ. Τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μήτε ταῦτὸν εἶδος ἕτερον ἡγήσασθαι μήτε ἕτερον ὃν ταῦτὸν μῶν οὐ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φήσομεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί, φήσομεν.

- ΕΕ. Οὐκοῦν ὃ γε τοῦτο δυνατὸς δρᾶν μίαν ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἐνὸς ἐκάστου κειμένου χωρὶς, πάντη διατεταμένην ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεται, καὶ πολλὰς ἑτέρας ἀλλήλων ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένης, καὶ μίαν αὖ δι' ὅλων πολλῶν ἐν ἐνὶ συνημμένῃ, καὶ πολλὰς χωρὶς πάντη διωρισμένης · τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ἥ τε κοινω-

- e νεῖν ἕκαστα δύναται καὶ ὅπη μὴ, διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

the five most
important
"kinds"

341—Ib. 254 d-255 e:

ΕΕ. Μέγιστα μὲν τῶν γενῶν ἃ νυνδὴ διῆμεν τό τε ὃν αὐτὸ καὶ στάσις καὶ κίνησις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πολύ γε.

ΕΕ. Καὶ μὲν τῷ γε δύο φαμέν αὐτοῖν ἀμείκτω πρὸς ἀλλήλα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΕΕ. Τὸ δέ γε ὃν μεικτὸν ἀμφοῖν · ἐστὸν γὰρ ἄμφω που.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΕΕ. Τρία δὴ γίγνεται ταῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὲν;

¹ εἰς τὴν — ἐπιστήμην - see *Theaet.* 175de (our nr. 301).

ΕΕ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον τοῖν μὲν δυοῖν ἕτερόν ἐστιν, αὐτὸ δ' ἑαυτῷ ταῦτόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

254e

ΕΕ. Τί ποτ' αὖ νῦν οὕτως εἰρήκαμεν τό τε ταῦτόν καὶ θάτερον; πότερα δύο γένη τινὲ αὐτῷ, τῶν μὲν τριῶν ἄλλω, συμμειγνυμένω μὴν ἐκείνοις; ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἰεὶ, καὶ περὶ πέντε ἄλλ' οὐ περὶ τριῶν ὡς ὄντων αὐτῶν σκεπτέον, ἢ τό τε ταῦτόν τοῦτο καὶ θάτερον ὡς ἐκείνων τι προσαγορεύοντες λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦς;

255a

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.

ΕΕ. Ἀλλ' οὐ τι μὴν κίνησίς γε καὶ στάσις οὐθ' ἕτερον οὔτε ταῦτόν ἐστι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΕΕ. Ὅτιπερ ἂν κοινῇ προσείπωμεν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν, τοῦτο οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖν οἶόν τε εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δῆ;

ΕΕ. Κίνησίς τε στήσεται καὶ στάσις αὖ κινηθήσεται· περὶ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρα θάτερον ὅποτερονοῦν γιγνόμενον αὐτοῖν ἀναγκάσει μεταβάλλειν αὖ θάτερον ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως, ἅτε μετασχὼν τοῦ ἐναντίου.

b

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ γε.

ΕΕ. Μετέχετον μὴν ἄμφω ταύτου καὶ θατέρου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΕΕ. Μὴ τοίνυν λέγωμεν κίνησιν γ' εἶναι ταῦτόν ἢ θάτερον, μηδ' αὖ στάσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ γάρ.

ΕΕ. Ἀλλ' ἄρα τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν ὡς ἓν τι διανοητέον ἡμῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.

ΕΕ. Ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν μηδὲν διάφορον σημαίνεται, κίνησιν αὖ πάλιν καὶ στάσιν ἀμφοτέρα εἶναι λέγοντες ἀμφοτέρα οὕτως αὐτὰ ταῦτόν ὡς ὄντα προσερούμεν.

c

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον.

ΕΕ. Ἀδύνατον ἄρα ταῦτόν καὶ τὸ ὄν ἓν εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδόν.

ΕΕ. Τέταρτον δὴ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶν εἶδεσιν εἶδος τὸ ταῦτόν τιθῶμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΕΕ. Τί δέ; τὸ θάτερον ἄρα ἡμῖν λεκτέον πέμπτον; ἢ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὄν ὡς δύο ἅττα ὀνόματα ἐφ' ἐνὶ γένει διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τάχ' ἔν.

ΕΕ. Ἀλλ' οἴμαι σε συγχωρεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα αἰεὶ λέγεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ;

ΕΕ. Τὸ δέ γ' ἕτερον αἰεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον· ἢ γάρ;

d

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ θάτερον μὴ πάμπολυ διεφερέτην · ἀλλ' εἵπερ θάτερον ἀμφοῖν μετεῖχε τοῖν εἶδοῖν ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν, ἦν ἄν ποτέ τι καὶ τῶν ἐτέρων ἕτερον οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον · νῦν δὲ ἀτεχνῶς ἡμῖν ὅτιπερ ἄν ἕτερον ᾗ, συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐτέρου τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεις καθάπερ ἔχει.

ΞΕ. Πέμπτον δὴ τὴν θατέρου φύσιν λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς εἵδεσιν οὔσαν, ἐν οἷς
e προαιρούμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Καὶ διὰ πάντων γε αὐτὴν αὐτῶν φήσομεν εἶναι διεληλυθυῖαν · ἐν ἑκαστον γὰρ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ιδέας τῆς θατέρου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

the μὴ ὄν
defined as
ἕτερον

342—Ib. 256 d-257 b; 257 c-258 e:

ΞΕ. Ἀδεῶς ἄρα τὴν κίνησιν ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος διαμαχόμενοι λέγομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδεέστατα μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν δὴ σαφῶς ἡ κίνησις ὄντως οὐκ ὄν ἐστι καὶ ὄν, ἐπείπερ τοῦ ὄντος μετέχει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Σαφέστατά γε.

ΞΕ. Ἔστιν ἄρα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐπὶ τε κινήσεως εἶναι καὶ κατὰ πάντα τὰ γένη¹. Κατὰ πάντα γὰρ ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένη τοῦ ὄντος
256e ἑκαστον οὐκ ὄν ποιεῖ, καὶ σύμπαντα δὴ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτως οὐκ ὄντα ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν, καὶ πάλιν, ὅτι μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος, εἶναι τε καὶ ὄντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΞΕ. Περὶ ἑκαστον ἄρα τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν, ἄπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικεν.

257a ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὄν αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερον εἶναι λεκτέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΞΕ. Καὶ τὸ ὄν ἄρ' ἡμῖν, ὅσαπέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν · ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ ὄν ἐν μὲν αὐτὸ ἐστίν, ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τᾶλλα οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτό.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδὸν οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν δὴ καὶ ταῦτα οὐ δυσχεραντέον, ἐπείπερ ἔχει κοινωνίαν ἀλλήλοις ἡ τῶν γενῶν φύσις. Εἰ δέ τις ταῦτα μὴ συγχωρεῖ, πείσας ἡμῶν τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν λόγους οὕτω πειθέτω τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα.

¹ Ἔστιν ἄρα ἐξ ἀνάγκης — κατὰ πάντα τὰ γένη — “Thus non-being needs must be (exist), not only in the case of motion but of all the other kinds”.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δικαιότατα εἴρηκας.

ΞΕ. Ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τόδε. b

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. Ὅποτεν τὸ μὴ ὄν λέγωμεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἐναντίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος ἀλλ' ἕτερον μόνον. —

ΞΕ. Τόδε δὲ διανοηθῶμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ. c

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. Ἡ θατέρου μοι φύσις φαίνεται κατακεκερματισθαι καθάπερ ἐπιστήμη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Μία μὲν ἐστὶ που καὶ ἐκείνη, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ γιγνόμενον μέρος αὐτῆς ἕκαστον ἀφορισθὲν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχει τινὰ ἑαυτῆς ἰδίαν· διὸ πολλὰ τέχνηαι τ' εἰσὶ λεγόμεναι καὶ ἐπιστήμαι. d

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως μόρια μιᾶς οὐσης ταυτὸν πέπονθε τοῦτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τάχ' ἄν· ἀλλ' ὅπη δὴ λέγωμεν;

ΞΕ. Ἔστι τῷ καλῷ τι θατέρου μόριον ἀντιτιθέμενον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστιν.

ΞΕ. Τοῦτ' οὖν ἀνώνυμον ἐροῦμεν ἢ τιν' ἔχον ἐπωνυμίαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐχον· ὁ γὰρ μὴ καλὸν ἐκάστοτε φθεγγόμεθα, τοῦτο οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ φύσεως.

ΞΕ. Ἰθὶ νῦν τόδε μοι λέγε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον; e

ΞΕ. Ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐνὸς γένους ἀφορισθὲν καὶ πρὸς τι τῶν ὄντων αὖ πάλιν ἀντιτεθὲν οὕτω συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ καλόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Ὅντος δὴ πρὸς ὃν ἀντίθεσις, ὡς ἔοικ', εἶναι τις συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ καλόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθότατα.

ΞΕ. Τί οὖν; κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἄρα μᾶλλον μὲν τὸ καλὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων, ἤττον δὲ τὸ μὴ καλόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΞΕ. Ὅμοίως ἄρα τὸ μὴ μέγα καὶ τὸ μέγα αὐτὸ εἶναι λεκτέον; 258a

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅμοίως.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μὴ δίκαιον τῷ δικαίῳ κατὰ ταυτὰ θετέον πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν τι μᾶλλον εἶναι θάτερον θατέρου;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΞΕ. Καὶ τᾶλλα δὴ ταύτῃ λέξομεν, ἐπείπερ ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἐφάνη τῶν ὄντων οὕσα, ἐκείνης δὲ οὐσης ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς μηδενὸς ἤττον ὄντα τιθέναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

- ΕΕ. Οὐκοῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ τῆς θατέρου μορίου φύσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος
b πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντικειμένων ἀντίθεσις οὐδὲν ἤττον, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, αὐτοῦ τοῦ
ὄντος οὐσία ἐστίν¹, οὐκ ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ σημαίνουσα ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον,
ἔτερον ἐκείνου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σαφέστατά γε.

ΕΕ. Τίν' οὖν αὐτὴν προσείπωμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὄν, δὲ διὰ τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐζητοῦμεν, αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τοῦτο.

- ΕΕ. Πότερον οὖν, ὥσπερ εἶπες, ἔστιν οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων οὐσίας ἐλλειπό-
μενον, καὶ δεῖ θαρροῦντα ἤδη λέγειν ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὄν βεβαίως ἐστὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν
c ἔχον, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα ἦν μέγα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἦν καλὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ μέγα <μὴ
μέγα> καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν <μὴ καλόν>, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν κατὰ ταῦτόν ἦν τε
καὶ ἔστι μὴ ὄν, ἐνάριθμον τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων εἶδος ἓν; "Ἡ τινα ἔτι πρὸς αὐτό,
ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀπιστίαν ἔχομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδεμίαν.

more than a
mere refuta-
tion of Parm.
has been
reached

ΕΕ. Οἷσθ' οὖν ὅτι Παρμενίδη μακροτέρως τῆς ἀπορρήσεως ἠπιστήκαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δῆ;

ΕΕ. Πλεῖον ἢ 'κεῖνος ἀπεῖπε σκοπεῖν, ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι ζητήσαντες
ἀπεδείξαμεν αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

- d ΕΕ. "Ὅτι ὁ μὲν πού φησιν —

Οὐ γὰρ μὴ ποτε² τοῦτο δαμῆ, εἶναι μὴ ἔοντα,
ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἴργε νόημα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.

- ΕΕ. 'Ἡμεῖς δέ γε οὐ μόνον τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν ἀπεδείξαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
τὸ εἶδος δὲ τυγχάνει ὄν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀπεφηνάμεθα· τὴν γὰρ θατέρου φύσιν
ἀποδείξαντες οὐσάν τε καὶ κατακεκερματισμένην ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρὸς
e ἄλληλα, τὸ πρὸς τὸ ὄν ἕκαστον μόνιον αὐτῆς ἀντιτιθέμενον ἐτολμήσαμεν
εἰπεῖν ὡς αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὄντως τὸ μὴ ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ παντάπασί γε, ὦ ξέने, ἀληθέστατά μοι δοκοῦμεν εἰρηκέναι.

¹ Οὐκοῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, — οὐσία ἐστίν — "So it seems, when a part of the nature of the Different and a part of the nature of the Existent are set in contrast to one another, the contrast is, if it be permissible to say so, as much a reality as Existence itself."

² οὐ γὰρ μὴ ποτε — — "Never this will be reached (realized) by force, that non-beings might be". *Parm.*, D. 28 B 7.

Diels translates:

"Denn unmöglich kann das Vorhandensein von Nichtseiendem zwingend erwiesen werden." So Burnet: "For this shall never be proved, that the things that are not are." The same interpretation is given by Cornford, *Pl. and Parm.*

343—Ib. 263 b⁴⁻¹³; d¹⁻⁴:ψευδὴς λόγος
defined

The λόγος being defined as a σύνθεσις ἐκ ῥημάτων καὶ ὀνομάτων, two examples are given: Θεαίτητος κάθηται, — Θεαίτητος πέτεται. The stranger concludes:

Λέγει δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν περὶ σοῦ. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν; ΞΕ. Ὁ δὲ δὴ ψευδὴς ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων. ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΞΕ. Τὰ μὴ ὄντ' ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει. ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδόν. ΞΕ. Ὅντων δέ γε ὄντα ἕτερα περὶ σοῦ. Πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔφαμεν ὄντα περὶ ἑκάστων εἶναι που, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα. ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὔν. —

Περὶ δὴ σοῦ λεγόμενα, <λεγόμενα> * μέντοι θάτερα ὡς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα, παντάπασιν [ὡς] ἔοικεν ἢ τοιαύτη σύνθεσις ἐκ τε ῥημάτων γιγνομένη καὶ ὀνομάτων ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθῶς γίγνεσθαι λόγος ψευδὴς¹.

344—a. Pl., *Phil.* 15 d-16 a:the difference
between phil.
and eristic in
the Phil.

ΣΩ. Φαμέν που ταῦτόν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ὑπὸ λόγων γιγνόμενα περιτρέχειν πάντη καθ' ἑκάστων τῶν λεγομένων αἰεὶ², καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν. Καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ παύσῃται ποτε οὔτε ἤρξατο νῦν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἔμοι φαίνεται, τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν· ὁ δὲ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ γευσάμενος ἑκάστοτε τῶν νέων, ἡσθεὶς ὡς τινα σοφίας ηὔρηκώς θησαυρόν, ὡς ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιᾷ τε καὶ πάντα κινεῖ λόγον ἄσμενος, τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα κυκλῶν καὶ συμφύρων εἰς ἓν, τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν ἀνειλίττων καὶ διαμερίζων, εἰς ἀπορίαν αὐτὸν μὲν πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα καταβάλλων, δευτέρον δ' αἰεὶ τὸν ἐχόμενον, ἄντε νεώτερος ἄντε πρεσβύτερος ἄντε ἥλιξ ὦν τυγχάνη, φειδόμενος οὔτε πατρὸς οὔτε μητρὸς οὔτε ἄλλου τῶν ἀκουόντων οὐδενός, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῶων, οὐ μόνον³ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπεὶ βαρβάρων γε οὐδενός ἂν φείσαιο, εἴπερ μόνον ἐρμηνέα ποθὲν ἔχοι.

15e

16a

b. Ib. 16 c⁵-17 a⁵ (Socr. describes the true method):

Θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὡς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοί, ποθὲν ἐκ θεῶν

¹ "So what is stated about you, but so that what is different is stated as the same, or what is not as what is,—a combination of verbs and names answering to that description finally seems to be really and truly a false statement."

Now, thought or judgment having been defined as a logos of the soul with itself, by this definition at the same time ψευδὴς δόξα has been defined.

² ταῦτόν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ — τῶν λεγομένων αἰεὶ - "that the one and many become identified by thought, and that now, as in time past, they run about together, in and out of every word which is uttered" (Jowett).

³ ὀλίγου δὲ — οὐ μόνον — - "no human being who has ears is safe from him, hardly even his dog" (Jowett).

* <λεγόμενα> Badham.

seeking the
intermediate
stages
between
unity and
infinity

16d

ἐρρίφη διὰ τινος Προμηθέως ἅμα φανοτάτῳ τινὶ πυρί· καὶ οἱ μὲν παλαιοί, κρείττονες ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγυτέρῳ θεῶν οἰκοῦντες, ταύτην φήμην παρέδωσαν, ὥς ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν αἰ λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς σύμφυτον ἐχόντων. Δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς τούτων οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων αἰεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἐκάστοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν — εὐρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν — ἐὰν οὖν μεταλάβωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἴ πως εἰσί, σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἢ τινα ἄλλον ἀριθμόν, καὶ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων ἕκαστον πάλιν ὡσαύτως, μέχρι περ ἂν τὸ κατ' ἀρχᾶς ἐν μὴ ὅτι ἐν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρά ἐστι μόνον ἰδη-
e τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅποσα· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ προσφέρειν πρὶν ἂν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατῖδῃ τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, τότε δ' ἤδη τὸ ἐν ἕκαστον τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθέντα χαίρειν ἐᾷν. Οἱ μὲν οὖν θεοί, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὕτως ἡμῖν παρέδωσαν σκοπεῖν καὶ μαν-
θάνειν καὶ διδάσκειν ἀλλήλους· οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ἐν μὲν, ὅπως ἂν τύχωσι, [καὶ πολλὰ] θᾶπτον καὶ βραδύτερον ποιοῦσι τοῦ δέοντος, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἄπειρα εὐθύς, τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοῦς ἐκφεύγει, οἷς διακεχώρισται τό τε δια-
λεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐριστικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους.

the true
method
applied to
grammar

c. Ib. 17 b-e (Socr. illustrates this by two examples):

ΣΩ. Φωνὴ μὲν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ που μία διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰοῦσα, καὶ ἄπειρος αὖ πλῆθει, πάντων τε καὶ ἐκάστου.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ οὐδὲν ἐτέρῳ γε τούτων ἐσμέν πω σοφοί, οὔτε ὅτι τὸ ἄπειρον αὐτῆς ἴσμεν οὐθ' ὅτι τὸ ἐν· ἀλλ' ὅτι πόσα τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὅποια, τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ γραμματικὸν ἕκαστον ποιοῦν ἡμῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν ὁ τυγχάνει ποιοῦν, τοῦτ' ἔστι ταυτόν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

and to music

ΣΩ. Φωνὴ μὲν που κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν τέχνην ἐστὶ μία ἐν αὐτῇ.

17c

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Δύο δὲ θῶμεν βαρὺ καὶ ὀξύ, καὶ τρίτον ὁμότονον. Ἡ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐπω σοφὸς ἂν εἴης τὴν μουσικὴν εἰδὼς ταῦτα μόνα, μὴ δὲ εἰδὼς ὥς γ' ἔπος εἰπεῖν εἰς ταῦτα οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ἔση.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε, ἐπειδὴν λάβης τὰ διαστήματα ὅποσα ἐστὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῆς φωνῆς ὀξύτητός τε πέρι καὶ βαρύτητος, καὶ ὅποια, καὶ τοὺς ὅρους τῶν
d διαστημάτων, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων ὅσα συστήματα γέγονεν — ἀ κατιδόντες οἱ πρόσθεν παρέδωσαν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἐπομένους ἐκείνοις καλεῖν αὐτὰ ἀρμονίας, ἐν τε ταῖς κινήσεσιν αὐτοῦ σώματος ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐνόντα πάθη γιγνόμενα, ἀ

δὴ δι' ἀριθμῶν μετρηθέντα δεῖν αὖ φασι ῥυθμούς καὶ μέτρα ἐπονομάζειν, καὶ ἅμα ἐννοεῖν ὡς οὕτω δεῖ περὶ παντὸς ἐνὸς καὶ πολλῶν σκοπεῖν — ὅταν γὰρ αὐτά τε λάβῃς οὕτω, τότε ἐγένου σοφός, ὅταν τε ἄλλο τῶν ἐν ὅτιοῦν ταύτῃ e σκοπούμενος ἔλῃς, οὕτως ἔμφρων περὶ τοῦτο γέγονας · τὸ δ' ἄπειρόν σε ἐκάστων καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις πλῆθος ἄπειρον ἐκάστοτε ποιεῖ τοῦ φρονεῖν¹ καὶ οὐκ ἐλλόγιμον οὐδ' ἐνάρθιμον, ἅτ' οὐκ εἰς ἀριθμὸν οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἀπιδόντα.

d. Ib. 18 a-b. Socr. adds:

ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ὅτιοῦν εἴ τις ποτε λάβοι, τοῦτον, ὥς φαμεν, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀπείρου φύσιν δεῖ βλέπειν εὐθύς ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τινὰ ἀριθμόν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ὅταν τις τὸ ἄπειρον ἀναγκασθῇ πρῶτον λαμβάνειν, μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν εὐθύς, ἀλλ' [ἐπ'] 18b ἀριθμὸν αὖ τινὰ πλῆθος ἕκαστον ἔχοντά τι κατανοεῖν, τελευτᾶν τε ἐκ πάντων εἰς ἓν.

specification
a matter of
counting and
measuring

345—Cf. the theory of a double μετρητική in Pl., *Polit.* 284 e-285 c:

ΞΕ. Δῆλον ὅτι διαιροῦμεν ἂν τὴν μετρητικὴν, καθάπερ ἐρρήθη, ταύτῃ δίχα τέμνοντες, ἐν μὲν τιθέντες αὐτῇς μόριον συμπάσας τέχνας ὁπόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ μήκη καὶ βάθη καὶ πλάτη καὶ παχύτητας πρὸς τοῦναντίον μετροῦσιν, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον, ὁπόσαι πρὸς τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ δέον καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀπωκίσθη τῶν ἐσχάτων.

a double
μετρητική:
both quanti-
tative and
qualitative

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Καὶ μέγα γε ἐκάτερον τμήμα εἶπες, καὶ πολὺ διαφέρων ἀλλήλοιιν.

ΞΕ. Ὅ γὰρ ἐνίστε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἰόμενοι δὴ τι σοφὸν φράζειν πολλοὶ τῶν κομψῶν λέγουσιν, ὡς ἄρα μετρητικὴ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν ὃν τυγχάνει. Μετρήσεως μὲν γὰρ δὴ τινὰ τρόπον πάνθ' ὁπόσα ἐντεχνα μετεῖληφεν · διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ κατ' εἶδη συνειθίσθαι σκοπεῖν διαιρουμένους ταῦτά τε τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα συμβάλλουσιν εὐθύς εἰς ταῦτόν ὅμοια νομί- 285a σαντες, καὶ τοῦναντίον αὖ τούτου δρωσιν ἕτερα οὐ κατὰ μέρη διαιροῦντες, δέον, ὅταν μὲν τὴν τῶν πολλῶν τις πρότερον αἰσθηταὶ κοινωνίαν, μὴ προφ- b ἵστασθαι πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐτῇ τὰς διαφορὰς ἴδῃ πάσας ὁπόσαι περ ἐν εἵδεσι κεῖνται, τὰς δὲ αὖ παντοδαπὰς ἀνομοιότητας, ὅταν ἐν πλήθεσιν ὀφθῶσιν, μὴ δυνατόν εἶναι δυσωπούμενον παύεσθαι πρὶν ἂν σύμπαντα τὰ οἰκεῖα ἐντὸς μιᾶς ὁμοί- c τητος ἔρξας γένους τινὸς οὐσίᾳ περιβάληται. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς περὶ τε τούτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐλλείψεων καὶ ὑπερβολῶν εἰρήσθω · φυλάττωμεν δὲ μόνον ὅτι δύο γένη περὶ αὐτὰ ἐξηγήρηται τῆς μετρητικῆς, καὶ ἃ φαμεν αὐτ' εἶναι μεμνώμεθα.

285a
μετρητική
a universal
art

¹ Constr. σε—ἄπειρον ποιεῖ—τοῦ φρονεῖν—“creates in you a state of infinite ignorance, and makes you obscure and not in the number of famous men, because you never looked for any definite number in anything.”

This theory corresponds with the *meta-mathematical view of being* Aristotle attributed to Pl., and which seems to have been proper to later Platonism. See our next paragraph.

the four
principles
in the Phil.

346—Pl., *Phil.* 23 c-e:

ΣΩ. Πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντὶ διχῇ διαλάβωμεν, μᾶλλον δ', εἰ βούλει, τριχῇ.

ΠΡΩ. Καθ' ὅτι, φράζεις ἄν.

ΣΩ. Λάβωμεν ἅττα τῶν νυνδὴ λόγων.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Τὸν θεὸν ἐλέγομέν· που τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δεῖξαι τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ πέρας;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τούτω δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ δύο τιθώμεθα, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτοι·
d ἐν τι συμμिशρόμενον. Εἰμὶ δ', ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγὼ γελοῖός τις ἱκανῶς * κατ' εἶδη
διστάς καὶ συναριθμούμενος.

ΠΡΩ. Τί φῆς, ὦγαθέ;

ΣΩ. Τετάρτου μοι γένους αὖ προσδεῖν φαίνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τίνος.

ΣΩ. Τῆς συμμειξεως τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν αἰτίαν ὅρα, καὶ τίθει μοι
πρὸς τρισὶν ἐκείνοις τέταρτον τοῦτο.

ΠΡΩ. Μὲν οὖν σοι καὶ πέμπτου προσδεῖται διάκρισιν τινος δυναμένου;

e ΣΩ. Τάχ' ἄν· οὐ μὴν οἶμαι γε ἐν τῷ νῦν ἂν δέ τι δέη, συγγνώμη πού μοι
σὺ μεταδιδώκοντι πέμπτου τι ὄν. **

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

the péras

347—a. Ib. 24 a-d:

24a ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν τὰ δύο ἃ προτίθεμαι ταῦτ' εἶναι ἅπερ νυνδὴ, τὸ μὲν
ἄπειρον, τὸ δὲ πέρας ἔχον· ὅτι δὲ τρόπον τινὰ τὸ ἄπειρον πολλὰ ἐστὶ, πειρά-
σμαι φράζεις. Τὸ δὲ πέρας ἔχον ἡμᾶς περιμενέτω.

ΠΡΩ. Μένει.

ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δὴ. Χαλεπὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμον ὃ κελεύω σε σκοπεῖν,
ὅμως δὲ σκόπει. Θερμοτέρου καὶ ψυχροτέρου πέρι πρῶτον ὅρα πέρας εἴ ποτέ
ti νοήσας ἄν, ἢ τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον ἐν αὐτοῖς οἰκοῦν<τε> τοῖς γένεσιν,
b ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐνοικῆτον, τέλος οὐκ ἂν ἐπιτρεψαίτην γίγνεσθαι· γενομένης γὰρ
τελευτῆς καὶ αὐτῷ τετελευτήκατον.

* The mss have ἱκανός or ἱκανῶς. Diès reads ἱκανῶς and translates: „Je suis, apparemment, bien ridicule, à pousser ainsi jusqu'au bout mes divisions en espèces et mes énumérations.”

** The mss have βίον. τι ὄν is a conjecture of Schleiermacher, adopted by Diès.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀεὶ δέ γε, φαμέν, ἐν τε τῷ θερμότερῳ καὶ ψυχρότερῳ τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον ἐνι.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Ἀεὶ τοίνυν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει τούτῳ μὴ τέλος ἔχειν · ἀτελῇ δ' ὄντε δήπου παντάπασιν ἀπείρῳ γίγνεσθον.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ σφόδρα γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εὖ γε, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, ὑπέλαβες καὶ ἀνέμνησας ὅτι καὶ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο, ὃ σὺ νῦν ἐφθέγξω, καὶ τό γε ἡρέμα τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχετον c
τῷ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον · ὅπου γὰρ ἂν ἐνῆτον, οὐκ ἔατον εἶναι ποσὸν ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' αἰὲ σφοδρότερον ἡσυχαιτέρου καὶ τούναντίον ἐκάσταις πράξεσιν ἐμποιοῦντε τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἕλαττον ἀπεργάζεσθον, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἀφανίζετον. Ὁ γὰρ ἐλέχθη νυνδὴ, μὴ ἀφανίσαντε τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλ' ἑάσαντε αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἐν τῇ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα ἔδρα ἐγγενέσθαι, αὐτὰ ἔρρει ταῦτα d
ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν χώρας ἐν ᾗ ἐνῆν. Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι θερμότερον οὐδὲ ψυχρότερον εἴτην ἂν λαβόντε τὸ ποσόν · προχωρεῖ γὰρ καὶ οὐ μένει τό τε θερμότερον αἰὲ καὶ τὸ ψυχρότερον ὡσαύτως, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔσται καὶ προῖον ἐπαύσατο. Κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀπειρον γίγνοιτ' ἂν τὸ θερμότερον καὶ τούναντίον ἅμα.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες · ἔστι δ', ὅπερ εἶπες, οὐ ῥάδια ταῦτα συνέπεσθαι.

b. Ib., 24 e⁴-25 b⁴:

the apeiron

Νῦν μέντοι ἄθρει τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσεως εἰ τοῦτο δεξιόμεθα σημεῖον, ἵνα μὴ πάντ' ἐπεξιόντες μνησκώμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅπόσ' ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνηται μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον γιγνόμενα καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου 25a
γένος ὡς εἰς ἐν δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα τιθέναι, κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν λόγον ὃν ἔφαμεν ὅσα διέσπασται καὶ διέσχισται συναγαγόντας χρῆναι κατὰ δύναμιν μίαν ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τίνα φύσιν, εἰ μέμνησαι.

ΠΡΩ. Μέμνημαι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα, τούτων δὲ τὰ ἐναντία πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἰσότητα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ πᾶν ὅτιπερ b
ἂν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέτρον ἢ πρὸς μέτρον, ταῦτα σύμπαντα εἰς τὸ πέρας ἀπολογιζόμενοι καλῶς ἂν δοκοῦμεν δρᾶν τοῦτο. Ἡ πῶς σὺ φῆς;

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

c. Ib., 25b⁵-26b⁷:

the third
kind

ΣΩ. Εἴεν · τὸ δὲ τρίτον τὸ μεικτὸν ἐκ τούτων ἀμφοῖν τίνα ιδέαν φήσομεν ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσεις, ὥς οἶμαι.

ΣΩ. Θεὸς μὲν οὖν, ἄνπερ γε ἐμαῖς εὐχαῖς ἐπήκοος γίγνηται τις θεῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Εὖχου δὴ καὶ σκόπει.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶ · καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τις, ὦ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῶν φίλος ἡμῖν νυνδὴ γεγονέναι.

c ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο καὶ τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῆ;

ΣΩ. Φράσω δῆλον ὅτι · σὺ δέ μοι συνακολούθησον τῷ λόγῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Θερμότερον ἐφθεγγόμεθα νυνδὴ πού τι καὶ ψυχρότερον. Ἦ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πρόσθε· δὴ ξηρότερον καὶ ὑγρότερον αὐτοῖς καὶ πλεον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον καὶ μεῖζον καὶ σμικρότερον καὶ ὁπόσα ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τῆς τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον δεχομένης ἐτίθεμεν εἰς ἓν φύσεως.

d ΠΡΩ. Τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ναί. Συμμείγνυ δέ γε εἰς αὐτὴν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν αὐτοῦ πέρατος γένναν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν;

ΣΩ. Ἦν καὶ νυνδὴ, δέον ἡμᾶς καθάπερ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου συνηγάγομεν εἰς ἓν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τοῦ περατοειδοῦς συναγαγεῖν, οὐ συνηγάγομεν. Ἄλλ' ἴσως καὶ νῦν ταῦτ' ὁρᾶσθαι * τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων καταφανὲς ἀκρίβεια γένησεται.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν καὶ πῶς λέγεις;

e ΣΩ. Τὴν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ διπλασίου, καὶ ὁπόση παύει πρὸς ἄλληλα τάναντία διαφόρως ἔχοντα, σύμμετρα δέ καὶ σύμφωνα ἐνθεῖσα ἀριθμὸν ἀπεργάζεται.

ΠΡΩ. Μανθάνω · φαίνεται γάρ μοι λέγειν μειγνῦσι ** ταῦτα γενέσεις τινὰς ἐφ' ἐκάστων αὐτῶν σύμβαίνειν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθῶς γὰρ φαίνομαι.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τοίνυν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις ἢ τούτων ὀρθὴ κοινωνία τὴν ὑγείας φύσιν ἐγέννησεν;

26a ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δὲ ὅξεϊ καὶ βαρεῖ καὶ ταχεῖ καὶ βραδεῖ, ἀπείροις οὖσιν, ἄρ' οὐ ταῦτ' ἐγγιγνόμενα *** ταῦτα ἅμα πέρας τε ἀπεργάσατο καὶ μουσικὴν σύμπασαν τελεώτατα συνεστήσατο;

ΠΡΩ. Κάλιστά γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἓν γε χειμῶσι καὶ πνίγεσιν ἐγγενόμενα **** τὸ μὲν πολὺ

* δράσει Mss; δράσει <ei> Vahlen, Burnet; δράσασι Badham, Diès.

** μειγνῦς Mss; μειγνῦσι Klitsch, followed by Diès. Burnet has μειγνύς.

*** ἐγγιγνόμενα secl. Burnet, who read a full stop after ταῦτα.

**** ἐγγενομένη Burnet.

λίαν καὶ ἀπειρον ἀφείλετο, τὸ δὲ ἔμμετρον καὶ ἄμα σύμμετρον ἀπηργάσατο.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τούτων ὥραί τε καὶ ὅσα καλὰ πάντα ἡμῖν γέγονε, τῶν τε ^b ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν πέρας ἔχόντων συμμειχθέντων;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἄλλα γε δὴ μυρία ἐπιλείπω λέγων, οἷον μεθ' ὑγιείας κάλλος καὶ ἰσχύον, καὶ ἐν ψυχᾷς αὖ πάμπολλα ἕτερα καὶ πάγκαλα.

d. Socrates concludes this passage (26 d):

ἀλλὰ τρίτον φάθι με λέγειν, ἐν τοῦτο τιθέντα τό τούτων ἔκγονον ἅπαν, ^{γένεσις} ^{εἰς οὐσίαν} γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν ἐκ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος ἀπειργασμένων μέτρων.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμαθον.

A comparison to *Phaedo* 79a-d (see our nr. **266e**) will show the difference between the Platonism of that period and later Platonism.

To this important passage see Natorp, *Pl. Ideenl.* p. 225 *.

e. Ib., 26 e:

Ἀλλὰ δὴ πρὸς <τοῖς> τρισὶ * τέταρτόν τι τότε ἔφαμεν εἶναι γένος σκεπτέον · ^{the fourth} ^{kind} κοινὴ δ' ἡ σκέψις. Ὅρα γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τινα αἰτίαν γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοιγε · πῶς γὰρ ἂν χωρὶς τούτου γίγνοιτο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ τοῦ ποιούντος φύσις οὐδὲν πλὴν ὀνόματι τῆς αἰτίας διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ ποιῶν καὶ τὸ αἷτιον ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη λεγόμενον ἓν;

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθως.

In *Phil.* 30a-e Socr. determines that νοῦς must be reckoned to the fourth genus.

348—In this dialogue Philebus defends the thesis that pleasure is the ^{the supreme} ^{good} supreme good for man, Socr. that νοῦς or φρόνησις are far better. At the end neither of these two principles appears to be self-sufficient.

Pl., Phil. 63 a-64 b:

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων λέγωμεν; καὶ πῶς ποιῶμεν;

* "Es ist sehr zu beachten, dass hiermit, zum ersten Mal in dieser Deutlichkeit, das Werden einen ganz positiven Sinn erlangt. Es wird etwas, das fortan ist. Das Werden besagt hier das Hervorgehen, das Entstehen des bestimmten *Seins*; bestimmt nach Massgabe *eines Gesetzes* der Bestimmung, und zwar nicht bloss des universalen Gesetzes der Bestimmung des Unbestimmten überhaupt, sondern allemal eines speziellen Gesetzes von notwendig mathematischer Form, welches ein Wieviel, und zwar ein verhältnismässiges Wieviel, eine Massbeziehung für es festsetzt."

* <τοῖς> Badham.

ΣΩ. Οὐχ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, διερωτᾶν χρή, τὰς ἡδονὰς δὲ αὐτάς καὶ τὰς φρονήσεις διαπυνθανομένους τὸ τοιόνδε ἀλλήλων πέρι.

63b ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. „Ἦ φίλοι, εἴτε ἡδονὰς ὑμᾶς χρή προσαγορεύειν εἴτε ἄλλω ὁτρωοῦν ὀνόματι, μὴν οὐκ ἂν δέξαισθε οἰκεῖν μετὰ φρονήσεως πάσης ἢ χωρὶς τοῦ φρονεῖν;” οἶμαι μὲν πρὸς ταῦτα τόδ’ αὐτάς ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι λέγειν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. „Ὅτι καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ἐρρήθη, „Τὸ μόνον καὶ ἔρημον εἰλικρινὲς
c εἶναι τι γένος οὔτε πάνυ τι δυνατόν οὔτ’ ὠφέλιμον· πάντων γε μὴν ἡγούμεθα γενῶν ἄριστον ἐν ἀνθ’ ἑνὸς συνοικεῖν ἡμῖν τὸ τοῦ γινώσκειν τὰλλὰ τε πάντα καὶ [αὐτὴν] αὐτὴν ἡμῶν τελέως εἰς δύναμιν ἐκάστην.”

ΠΡΩ. „Καὶ καλῶς γε εἰρήκατε τὰ νῦν”, φήσομεν.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς. Πάλιν τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνερωτητέον. „Ἄρ’ ἡδονῶν τι προσδεῖσθε ἐν τῇ συγκράσει;” φαῖμεν ἂν αὐτὸν νοῦν τε καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀνερωτῶντες. „Ποίω”, φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως, „ἡδονῶν;”

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός.

d ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ γ’ ἡμέτερος λόγος μετὰ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὅδε. „Πρὸς ταῖς ἀληθέσιν ἐκείναις ἡδοναῖς”, φήσομεν, „ἄρ’ ἔτι προσδεῖσθ’ ὑμῖν τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς συνοίκους εἶναι καὶ τὰς σφοδροτάτας;” — „Καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες”, ἴσως φαῖεν ἂν, „αἶ γ’ ἐμποδίσματά τε μυρία ἡμῖν ἔχουσι, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐν αἷς οἰκοῦμεν ταράττουσαι διὰ μανικὰς ὠδῖνας*, καὶ γίγνεσθαι τε ἡμᾶς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἐῷσι,

e τὰ τε γιγνόμενα ἡμῶν τέκνα ὡς τὸ πολὺ, δι’ ἀμέλειαν λήθην ἐμποιοῦσαι, παντάπασι διαφθείρουσιν; ἀλλ’ ἅς τε ἡδονὰς ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαρὰς [ἄς] εἶπες, σχεδὸν οἰκείας ἡμῖν νόμιζε, καὶ πρὸς ταύταις τὰς μεθ’ ὑγείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ συμπάσης ἀρετῆς ὁπόσαι καθάπερ θεοῦ ὁπαδοὶ γιγνόμεναι αὐτῇ συνακολουθοῦσι πάντῃ, ταύτας μείγνυ· τὰς δ’ αἰεὶ μετ’ ἀφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης κακίας ἐπομένας πολλή που ἄλογία τῷ νῷ μειγνύναι τὸν βουλόμενον ὅτι καλλίστην ἰδόντα καὶ ἀστασιαστοτάτην μεῖξιν καὶ κράσιν, ἐν ταύτῃ μαθεῖν πειραῖσθαι,

64a τί ποτε ἐν τ’ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τίνα ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ποτε μαντευτέον.” Ἄρ’ οὐκ ἐμφρόνως ταῦτα καὶ ἐχόντως ἑαυτὸν τὸν νοῦν φήσομεν ὑπὲρ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ μνήμης καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς ἀποκρίνασθαι τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὔν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τότε γε ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἂν ποτε γένοιτο οὐδ’ ἂν ἐν.

b ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς μὴ μείξομεν ἀλήθειαν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε τοῦτο ἀληθῶς γίγνοιτο οὐδ’ ἂν γενόμενον εἶη.

* A correction of Diès. The Mss have μανικὰς ἡδονὰς.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀλλ' εἴ τινος ἔτι προσδεῖ τῇ συγκράσει ταύτῃ, λέγετε σὺ καὶ Φίληβος. Ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καθαπερὶ κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἄρξων καλῶς ἐμφύχου σώματος ὁ νῦν λόγος ἀπειργάσθαι φαίνεται ¹.

349—We find Plato's changed view of man and the visible world **the Timaeus** expressed in the *Tim.* also: the ideal World remained the perfect and eternal Example, but the visible world, made as an image of it, as good as possible, is called, like the heavenly bodies, a „visible god”.

a. Pl., *Tim.* 28 c-29 a:

Τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὐρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν · τόδε δ' οὖν ἄλλιν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ αὐτοῦ, πρὸς πότερον τῶν παραδειγμάτων ὁ τεκταινόμενος αὐτὸν ἀπηργάζετο, πότερον πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταῦτά καὶ ὡσάυτως ἔχον ἢ πρὸς τὸ γεγονός. Εἰ μὲν δὴ καλὸς ἐστὶν ὁδε ὁ κόσμος ὃ τε δημιουργὸς ἀγαθός, δῆλον ὡς πρὸς τὸ αἰδῖον ἔβλεπεν · εἰ δὲ ὁ μὴδ' εἰπεῖν τινι θέμις, πρὸς γεγονός. Παντὶ δὴ σαφές ὅτι πρὸς τὸ αἰδῖον · ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονόντων, ὁ δ' ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων.

God made the world after the eternal pattern

b. Ib., 29 d'-30 c¹:

Λέγωμεν δὴ δι' ἥντινα αἰτίαν γένεσιν καὶ τὸ πᾶν τόδε ὁ συνιστὰς συνέστησεν. Ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος · τοῦτου

Being good, he made the world as good as possible.

¹ λόγος probably does not mean here “our words” or “our present argument”; but „the inner proportions of the mixed life”. L. Robin explains this passage as follows •:

• *Platon*, p. 165 f.

“Au moment—où Platon achève de constituer cette vie mixte en laquelle l'homme trouvera son bonheur, il en définit la loi de façon à suggérer, semble-t-il, que cette loi s'étend bien au delà de ce à propos de quoi elle a été établie. La relation qu'elle exprime, ou son *logos* „est, dit-il (64b), comparable à une sorte d'arrangement incorporel, qui devra, en belle manière, commander à un corps animé”. Or le mot que traduit “arrangement”, c'est, on l'a déjà vu (cf. p. 158), *cosmos*. Si donc le principe du bien de l'homme par rapport à sa vie d'ici-bas est un système de relations dont les termes appartiennent à l'ordre de la pensée, autrement dit un *monde spirituel*, cette conception doit valoir pour le macrocosme comme elle vaut pour le microcosme: le système de relations intelligibles qui est le principe du bien pour ce grand vivant qu'est le monde, serait celui que forment entre elles les Idées. Si enfin, à leur tour, les Idées forment elles-mêmes *une sorte de corps* qui ait vie, âme, intellect (cf. *loc. cit.* et p. 154), nous trouverions, pour en *commander* l'organisation, un autre *cosmos* d'une intelligibilité encore plus subtile et plus épurée, l'arrangement que constituent les Nombres idéaux et les Grandeurs idéales (cf. p. 97 sq.). Ainsi toute la hiérarchie de l'Être serait fonction du degré d'„exactitude” dans les proportions des mixtes qui, à partir de la Limite et de l'Illimitation, constituent les diverses réalités.” Cf. our nr. 373.

δ' ἐκτὸς ὧν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ. Ταύτην δὴ γενέσεως καὶ κόσμου μάλιστ' ἂν τις ἀρχὴν κυριωτάτην παρ' ἀνδρῶν φρονίμων ἀποδεχόμενος ὀρθότατα ἀποδέχοιτ' ἂν. Βουλευθεὶς γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὰ μὲν πάντα, φλαῦρον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν, οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, ἡγησάμενος ἐκεῖνο τούτου πάντως ἄμεινον. Θέμις δ' οὐτ' ἦν οὐτ' ἔστιν τῷ ἀρίστῳ δρᾶν ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ κάλλιστον· λογισάμενος οὖν ἠύρισκεν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὁρατῶν οὐδὲν ἀνόητον τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος ὅλον ὅλου κάλλιον ἔσεσθαι ποτε ἔργον, νοῦν δ' αὖ χωρὶς ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον παραγενέσθαι τῷ. Διὰ δὴ τὸν λογισμὸν τόνδε νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, ψυχὴν δ' ἐν σώματι συνιστάς τὸ πᾶν συνετεκταίνετο, ὅπως ὅτι κάλλιστον εἶη κατὰ φύσιν ἄριστόν τε ἔργον ἀπειργασμένος. Οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῶον ἐμψυχον ἐννουν τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν.

350—Ib., 35 a-b:

the creation
of the
world-soul

Τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ αἰ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταύτου φύσεως αὖ περὶ * καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἐτέρου, καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' συνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ· καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα συνεκράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμεικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταῦτόν συναρμόττων βίᾳ. Μειγνύς δὲ μετὰ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἐκ τριῶν ποιησάμενος ἓν, πάλιν ὅλον τοῦτο μοίρας ὅσας προσῆκεν διένειμεν, ἐκάστην δὲ ἐκ τε ταύτου καὶ θατέρου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας μεμειγμένην.

Most modern interpreters, such as Taylor, explain the ἀμερίστος οὐσία = ταῦτόν, and the περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένη μεριστή = θάτερον^a. In this case we have:

the Indivisible substance (sameness)	{	the mixed substance.
the divisible — (difference)		

And these three again are mixed into one.—The words αὖ περὶ, omitted by Sext., Emp. and in Cic.'s translation, must then be dropped. A greater difficulty is that in ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ also the word αὐτῶν must be left out^b. Nor is it quite clear that at the end of this passage ταῦτόν, θάτερον and οὐσία are mentioned as the three equally compounding elements.

In my opinion the true explanation has been given by Cornford^c, who follows Proclus: a mixture is made first out of the Indivisible and the divisible οὐσία;

* αὖ περὶ is bracketed by Burnet and Rivaud.

^a So also C. L. Schepp (Jan Prins) in his admirable Dutch translation of the *Tim.* (Den Haag 1937).

Cp. A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, Oxford 1928, p. 106-136.

^b So Schepp: „en stelde haar uit gelijke deelen samen midden tusschen de ondeelbare soort en de soort die naar lichamen deelbaar is.”

^c Pl.'s *Cosmology*, p. 59 ff.

next two other mixtures are made, the one of ταῦτόν, the other of θάτερον (αὐτὸ περί being left in), viz. a blending out of the indivisible and the divisible kind of each of them (αὐτῶν). So three mixtures appear, which again are mingled into one.

	<i>First mixture</i>		<i>Final mixture</i>	
Indivisible Existence	{	Intermediate Existence	}	Soul.
Divisible Existence				
Indivisible Sameness	{	Intermediate Sameness		
Divisible Sameness				
Indivisible Difference	{	Intermediate Difference		
Divisible Difference				

351—Having spoken of the structure and spiritual motions of the World-Soul, Plato turns to the physical motions of the visible bodies in the heaven. This chapter is prefaced by a description of Time.

Ib. 37 c-e:

Ὡς δὲ κινήθην αὐτὸ καὶ ζῶν ἐνόησεν τῶν αἰδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα ¹ time a mov-
 ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ, ἡγάσθη τε καὶ εὐφρανθεὶς ἔτι δὴ μᾶλλον ὁμοιον πρὸς τὸ ing likeness
 παράδειγμα ἐπενόησεν ἀπεργάσασθαι. Καθάπερ οὖν αὐτὸ τυγχάνει ζῶν αἰδίου of Eternity
 ὄν, καὶ τότε τὸ πᾶν οὕτως εἰς δύναμιν ἐπεχείρησε τοιοῦτον ἀποτελεῖν. 37d
 Ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆφου φύσις ἐτύγχανεν οὕσα αἰώνιος, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῷ γεννητῷ
 παντελῶς προσάπτειν οὐκ ἦν δυνατόν· εἰκὼ δ' ἐπενόει κινήτὸν τινα αἰῶνος
 ποιῆσαι, καὶ διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἐνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν
 ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτον δὲ δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν. Ἡμέρας γὰρ καὶ
 νύκτας καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἐνιαυτούς, οὐκ ὄντας πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι, τότε ἅμα e
 ἐκείνῳ συνισταμένῳ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν μηχανᾶται.

352—Now the heavenly bodies are described. They are living beings and divine; the fixed stars are even called αἶδια. The earth, turning round its axis, is “the guardian and maker of night and day”. the heavenly
 bodies

Ib. 40 b-c:

ἐξ ἧς δὴ τῆς αἰτίας γέγονεν ὅσ' ἀπλανῆ τῶν ἄστρον ζῶα θεῖα ὄντα καὶ
 αἶδια καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἐν ταύτῳ στρεφόμενα ἀεὶ μένει· τὰ δὲ τρεπόμενα καὶ
 πλάνην τοιαύτην ἴσχοντα, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐρρήθη, κατ' ἐκεῖνα γέγο-
 νεν. Γῆν δὲ τροφὸν μὲν ἡμετέραν, εἰλλομένην ² δὲ τὴν περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς 40c

¹ ἄγαλμα - Cornford rightly explains: “a shrine for the everlasting gods”.

² εἰλλομένην - “clinging around the pole which is extended through the universe” (Jowett).

Burnet, and after him Cornford, defends the reading ἰλλομένην, which would mean: “circling around the pole” *. I think Rivaud was right in pointing out that the immovability of the earth is presupposed in Pl.’s whole system of the heavenly bodies ^b.

* Burnet, *E. Gr. Ph.* ⁴ p. 302 ff.; Cornford, *Pl.’s Cosmol.* 120-134; cp. Rivaud in his edition of the *Tim.*, *Introd.* p. 59-63.

^b Schepp translates: (de aarde) “gebald om de as die het Al doorspant”.—

πόλον τεταμένον, φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας ἐμηχανήσατο, πρῶτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν ὅσοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ γεγόνασιν.

the Demi-
urge bids the
visible gods
make the
bodies of man
and animals

353—The Demiurge, having in this way compounded the world-soul and the souls of the stars, thus addresses the “visible gods”.

Ib. 41 a-d:

41b „Θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, δι’ ἐμοῦ γενόμενα ἅλута ἐμοῦ γε μὴ ἐθέλοντος. Τὸ μὲν οὖν δὴ δεθὲν πᾶν λυτόν, τό γε μὴν καλῶς ἀρμοσθὲν καὶ ἔχον εὖ λύειν ἐθέλειν κακοῦ · δι’ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπειπερ γεγέννησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ οὐδ’ ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν, οὔτι μὲν δὴ λυθήσεσθέ γε οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας, τῆς ἐμῆς βουλῆσεως μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριωτέρου λαχόντες ἐκείνων οἷς ὅτ’ ἐγίγνεσθε συνεδεῖσθε. Νῦν οὖν ὁ λέγω πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐνδεικνύμενος, μάθετε. Θνητὰ ἔτι γένη λοιπὰ τρία ἀγέννητα · τούτων δὲ μὴ γενομένων οὐρανὸς ἀτελής ἔσται · τὰ γὰρ ἅπαντ’ ἐν αὐτῷ γένη ζώων οὐχ ἔξει, δεῖ δέ, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἱκανῶς εἶναι. Δι’ ἐμοῦ δὲ ταῦτα γενόμενα καὶ βίου μετασχόντα θεοῖς ἰσάζοιτ’ ἄν · ἵνα οὖν θνητὰ τε ἦ τό τε πᾶν τότε ὄντως ἅπαν ἦ, τρέπεσθε κατὰ φύσιν ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ζώων δημιουργίαν, μιμούμενοι τὴν ἐμὴν δύναμιν περὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν γένεσιν. Καὶ καθ’ ὅσον μὲν αὐτῶν ἀθανάτοις ὁμώνυμον εἶναι προσήκει, θεῖον λεγόμενον ἡγεμονοῦν τε ἐν αὐτοῖς τῶν αἰεὶ δίκη καὶ ὑμῖν ἐθελόντων ἔπεσθαι, σπείρας καὶ ὑπαρξάμενος ἐγὼ παραδώσω · τὸ δὲ d λοιπὸν ὑμεῖς, ἀθανάτῳ θνητὸν προσυφαίνοντες, ἀπεργάζεσθε ζῶα καὶ γεννᾶτε τροφήν τε διδόντες αὐξάνετε καὶ φθίνοντα πάλιν δέχεσθε.”

354—He then makes as many human souls as there are stars, places them each in a star and shows them their destiny.

a. Ib. 41 d⁸-42 a²:

41e Συστήσας δὲ τὸ πᾶν διεῖλεν ψυχὰς ἰσαριθμούς τοῖς ἄστροις, ἐνειμέν θ’ ἐκάστην πρὸς ἕκαστον, καὶ ἐμβιβάσας ὡς ἐς ὄχημα τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἔδειξεν, νόμους τε τοὺς εἰμαρμένους εἶπεν αὐταῖς, ὅτι γένεσις πρώτη μὲν ἔσοιτο τεταγμένη μία πᾶσιν, ἵνα μή τις ἐλαττοῖτο ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, δέοι δὲ σπαρείσας αὐτὰς εἰς τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάσταις ἕκαστα ὄργανα χρόνων φῦναι ζώων τὸ 42a θεοσεβέστατον, διπλῆς δὲ οὐσης τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως, τὸ κρεῖττον τοιοῦτον εἶη γένος ὃ καὶ ἔπειτα κεκλήσοιτο ἀνὴρ.

b. Ib. 42 b-d:

the destiny
of man

Καὶ ὁ μὲν εὖ τὸν προσήκοντα χρόνον βιούς, πάλιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ συννόμου πο-
ρευθεὶς οἴκησιν ἄστρου, βίον εὐδαίμονα καὶ συνήθη ἔξει, σφαλεῖς δὲ τούτων
εἰς γυναικὸς φύσιν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ γενέσει μεταβαλοῖ · μὴ παυόμενός τε ἐν
42c τούτοις ἔτι κακίας, τρόπον δὲ κακύνοιτο, κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς τοῦ τρόπου

γενέσεως εἰς τινὰ τοιαύτην αἰεὶ μεταβαλοῦ θήρειον φύσιν, ἀλλάττων τε οὐ πρό-
τερον πόνων λήξοι, πρὶν τῇ ταύτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίου περιόδῳ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ συνεπιπώ-
μενος τὸν πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ ὕστερον προσφύντα ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος
καὶ γῆς, θορυβῶδη καὶ ἄλογον ὄντα, λόγῳ κρατήσας εἰς τὸ τῆς πρώτης καὶ d
ἀρίστης ἀφίκοιτο εἶδος ἕξεως.

355—Thus there is a pre-established harmony between the souls, and even the bodies, of men and those divine and eternal Beings who are the heavenly bodies. Plato concludes: we must learn to imitate the cosmic order in our own life.

Ib. 47 a-c:

“Ὅφισι δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἑμὸν λόγον αἰτία τῆς μεγίστης ὠφελίας γέγονεν ἡμῖν, ὅτι **we have to imitate the cosmic order**
τῶν νῦν λόγων περὶ τοῦ παντὸς λεγομένων οὐδεὶς ἂν ποτε ἐρρήθῃ μήτε ἄστρα
μήτε ἥλιον μήτε οὐρανὸν ἰδόντων. Νῦν δ’ ἡμέρα τε καὶ νύξ ὀφθεῖσθαι μῆνές τε
καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν περίοδοι καὶ ἰσημερίαι καὶ τροπαὶ μεμηχάνηται μὲν ἀριθμὸν,
χρόνου δὲ ἔννοιαν περὶ τε τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως ζήτησιν ἔδοσαν · ἐξ ὧν ἐπο-
ρισάμεθα φιλοσοφίας γένος, οὗ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν οὐτ’ ἦλθεν οὔτε ἥξει ποτὲ τῷ 47b
θνητῷ γένει δωρηθὲν ἐκ θεῶν. Λέγω δὴ τοῦτο ὁμμάτων μέγιστον ἀγαθόν ·
τᾶλλα δὲ ὅσα ἐλάττω τί ἂν ὑμνοῖμεν, ὧν ὁ μὴ φιλόσοφος τυφλωθεὶς ὀδυρόμενος
ἂν θρηνοῖ μάτην; ἀλλὰ τοῦτο λεγέσθω παρ’ ἡμῶν αὕτη ἐπὶ ταῦτα αἰτία, θεὸν
ἡμῖν ἀνευρεῖν δωρήσασθαι τε ὅψιν, ἵνα τὰς ἐν οὐρανῷ τοῦ νοῦ κατιδόντες
περιόδους χρησαίμεθα ἐπὶ τὰς περιφορὰς τὰς τῆς παρ’ ἡμῖν διανοήσεως, συγγε-
νεῖς ἐκείναις οὐσας, ἀταράκτοις τεταραγμέναις, ἐκμαθόντες δὲ καὶ λογισμῶν c
κατὰ φύσιν ὀρθότητος μετασχόντες, μιμούμενοι τὰς τοῦ θεοῦ πάντως ἀπλανεῖς
οὐσας, τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν πεπλανημένας καταστησαίμεθα.

356—a. Ib. 48 e-49 a:

‘Ἡ δ’ οὖν αὖτις ἀρχὴ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἔστω μεζόνως τῆς πρόσθεν διηρη- **the creation of the universe**
μένη · τότε μὲν γὰρ δύο εἶδη διειλόμεθα, νῦν δὲ τρίτον ἄλλο γένος ἡμῖν δηλωτέον.
Τὰ μὲν γὰρ δύο ἱκανὰ ἦν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν λεχθεῖσιν, ἐν μὲν ὡς παραδείγματος
εἶδος ὑποτεθέν, νοητὸν καὶ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά ὄν, μίμημα δὲ παραδείγματος
δεύτερον, γένεσιν ἔχον καὶ ὁρατόν. Τρίτον δὲ τότε μὲν οὐ διειλόμεθα, νομί- 49a
σαντες τὰ δύο ἕξειν ἱκανῶς · νῦν δὲ ὁ λόγος ἔοικεν εἰσαναγκάζειν χαλεπὸν
καὶ ἀμυδρὸν εἶδος ἐπιχειρεῖν λόγοις ἐμφανίσαι. Τίν’ οὖν ἔχον δύναμιν κατὰ
φύσιν αὐτὸ ὑποληπτέον; τοιάνδε μάλιστα · πάσης εἶναι γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν
αὐτὴν οἷον τιθήνην.

b. The so-called elements have no fixed nature. Unchanging space **space the only fixed nature**
only may be called “this” or “that”.

Ib. 49 e-50 a:

ἐν ᾧ δὲ ἐγγιγνόμενα αἰεὶ ἕκαστα αὐτῶν φαντάζεται καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπόλ-
 50a λυται, μόνον ἐκεῖνο αὖ προσαγορεύειν τῷ τε τοῦτο καὶ τῷ τότε προσχρωμένους
 ὀνόματι, τὸ δὲ ὁποιοῦν τι, θερμὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ καὶ ὅτιοῦν τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ
 πάνθ' ὅσα ἐκ τούτων, μηδὲν ἐκεῖνο αὖ τούτων καλεῖν.

c. Ib. 50 b-d:

the receiving
principle

Ἄλλοτε δὲ αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς τὰ πάντα δεχομένης σώματα φύσεως.
 Ταῦτόν αὐτὴν αἰεὶ προσρητέον· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἑαυτῆς τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἐξίσταται
 50C δυνάμει — δέχεται τε γὰρ αἰεὶ τὰ πάντα, καὶ μορφήν οὐδεμίαν ποτὲ οὐδενὶ
 τῶν εἰσιόντων ὁμοίαν εἴληφεν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς· ἐκμαγεῖον γὰρ φύσει παντὶ
 κεῖται, κινούμενόν τε καὶ διασχηματιζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν εἰσιόντων, φαίνεται δὲ
 δι' ἐκεῖνα ἄλλοτε ἄλλοιον — τὰ δὲ εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα τῶν ὄντων αἰεὶ μιμή-
 ματα, τυπωθέντα ἀπ' αὐτῶν τρόπον τινὰ δύσφραστον καὶ θαυμαστόν, ὃν εἰς
 αὐθις μέτιμεν. Ἐν δ' οὖν τῷ παρόντι χρὴ γέννη διανοηθῆναι τριττά, τὸ μὲν
 d γιγνόμενον, τὸ δ' ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται, τὸ δ' ὅθεν ἀφομοιούμενον φύεται τὸ γιγνόμενον.
 Καὶ δὴ καὶ προσεικάσαι πρέπει τὸ μὲν δεχόμενον μητρί, τὸ δ' ὅθεν πατρί,
 τὴν δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων φύσιν ἐκγόνῳ.

d. Ib. 51a-b:

no "matter"
in the usual
sense

διὸ δὴ τὴν τοῦ γεγονότος ὁρατοῦ καὶ πάντως αἰσθητοῦ μητέρα καὶ ὑποδοχὴν
 μήτε γῆν μήτε ἀέρα μήτε πῦρ μήτε ὕδωρ λέγωμεν, μήτε ὅσα ἐκ τούτων μήτε
 ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα γέγονεν· ἀλλ' ἀνόρατον εἶδος τι καὶ ἄμορφον, πανδεχές, μετα-
 51b λαμβάνον δὲ ἀπορώτατά πη τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ δυσαλωτότατον αὐτὸ λέγοντες οὐ
 ψευσόμεθα.

e. Ib. 51 e-52 b:

the three
kinds

Τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων ὁμολογητέον ἐν μὲν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ ταῦτά εἶδος
 52a ἔχον, ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, οὔτε εἰς ἑαυτὸ εἰσδεχόμενον ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν
 οὔτε αὐτὸ εἰς ἄλλο ποιῶν, ἀόρατον δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἀναισθητον, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νόησις
 εἴληχεν ἐπισκοπεῖν· τὸ δὲ ὁμώνυμον ὁμοίον τε ἐκεῖνῳ δεύτερον, αἰσθητόν,
 πεφορημένον αἰεὶ, γιγνόμενόν τε ἐν τινι τόπῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπολλύμενον,
 δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως περιληπτόν· τρίτον δὲ αὖ γένος ὃν τὸ τῆς χώρας αἰεὶ,
 b φθοράν οὐ προσδεχόμενον, ἔδραν δὲ παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν, αὐτὸ
 δὲ μετ' ἀναισθησίας ἀπτὸν λογισμῷ τινι νόθῳ, μόγις πιστόν, πρὸς δὲ δὴ καὶ
 ὀνειροπολοῦμεν βλέποντες καὶ φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πού τοι ὃν ἅπαν ἐν τινι
 τόπῳ καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινά, τὸ δὲ μήτ' ἐν γῇ μήτε πού κατ' οὐρανὸν
 οὐδὲν εἶναι.

357—a. Ib. 69 c-70 a:

Καὶ τῶν μὲν θείων αὐτὸς γίγνεται δημιουργός, τῶν δὲ θνητῶν τὴν γένεσιν

τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ γεννήμασιν δημιουργεῖν προσέταξεν. Οἱ δὲ μιμούμενοι, παραλα- **the immortal and the mortal soul in man**
βόντες ἀρχὴν ψυχῆς ἀθάνατον τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο θνητὸν σῶμα αὐτῇ περιετόρνευσαν
ὄχημά τε πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἔδωσαν ἄλλο τε εἶδος ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχῆς προσφοκοδόμουν
τὸ θνητόν, δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἐν ἑαυτῷ παθήματα ἔχον, πρῶτον μὲν ἡδονήν, 69d
μέγιστον κακοῦ δέλεαρ, ἔπειτα λύπας, ἀγαθῶν φυγὰς, ἔτι δ' αὖ θάρρος καὶ
φόβον, ἄφρονε συμβούλω, θυμὸν δὲ δυσπαραμύθητον, ἐλπίδα δ' εὐπαράγωγον·
αἰσθήσει δὲ ἀλόγῳ καὶ ἐπιχειρητῇ παντὸς ἔρωτι συγκερασάμενοι ταῦτα, ἀναγ-
καίως τὸ θνητὸν γένος συνέθεσαν. Καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ σεβόμενοι μαινέειν τὸ
θεῖον, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἦν ἀνάγκη, χωρὶς ἐκείνου κατοικίζουσιν εἰς ἄλλην τοῦ
σώματος οἴκησιν τὸ θνητόν, ἰσθμόν καὶ ὄρον διοικοδομήσαντες τῆς τε κεφαλῆς e
καὶ τοῦ στήθους, αὐχένα μεταξὺ τιθέντες, ἵν' εἴη χωρίς. Ἐν δὴ τοῖς στήθεσιν
καὶ τῷ καλουμένῳ θώρακι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς θνητὸν γένος ἐνέδουν. Καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ
μὲν ἄμεινον αὐτῆς, τὸ δὲ χεῖρον ἐπεφύκει, διοικοδομοῦσι τοῦ θώρακος αὖ τὸ
κύτος, διορίζοντες οἶον γυναικῶν, τὴν δὲ ἀνδρῶν χωρὶς οἴκησιν, τὰς φρένας 70a
διάφραγμα εἰς τὸ μέσον αὐτῶν τιθέντες. Τὸ μετέχον οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνδρείας καὶ
θυμοῦ, φιλόνικον ὄν, κατώκισαν ἐγγυτέρω τῆς κεφαλῆς μεταξὺ τῶν φρενῶν τε
καὶ αὐχένος, ἵνα τοῦ λόγου κατήκοον ὄν κοινῇ μετ' ἐκείνου βίᾳ τὸ τῶν ἐπι-
θυμιῶν κατέχει γένος, ὁπότε' ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως τῷ τ' ἐπιτάγματι καὶ λόγῳ
μηδαμῇ πείθεσθαι ἐκὸν ἐθέλοι.

b. Ib. 70 d-71 a:

Τὸ δὲ δὴ σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν ἐπιθυμητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ὅσων ἐνδειαν διὰ **the place of the ἐπιθυμητικόν**
τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἴσχει φύσιν, τοῦτο εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ τῶν τε φρενῶν καὶ τοῦ πρὸς
τὸν ὀμφαλὸν ὄρου κατώκισαν, οἶον φάτνην ἐν ἅπαντι τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ τῇ τοῦ 70e
σώματος τροφῇ τεκτηνάμενοι· καὶ κατέδθησαν δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐνταῦθα ὡς
θρέμμα ἄγριον, τρέφειν δὲ συνημμένον ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ τι μέλλοι ποτὲ θνητὸν
ἔσεσθαι γένος. "Ἰν' οὖν αἰεὶ νεμόμενον πρὸς φάτνην καὶ ὅτι πορρωτάτω τοῦ βου-
λευομένου κατοικοῦν, θόρυβον καὶ βοὴν ὡς ἐλαχίστην παρέχον, τὸ κράτιστον
καθ' ἡσυχίαν περὶ τοῦ πᾶσι κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ συμφέροντος ἐῷ βουλευέσθαι, διὰ 71a
ταῦτα ἐνταῦθ' ἔδωσαν αὐτῷ τὴν τάξιν.

c. Ib. 72 d:

Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς, ὅσον θνητὸν ἔχει καὶ ὅσον θεῖον, καὶ ὅπη καὶ μεθ' **This account is probable; God only knows whether it is true.**
ὧν καὶ δι' αὐτὴν χωρὶς ὥκισθη, τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ὡς εἴρηται, θεοῦ συμφήσαντος τότ'
ἂν οὕτως μόνως διυσχυρίζοιμεθα· τό γε μὴν εἰκὸς ἡμῖν εἰρησθαι, καὶ νῦν καὶ
ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀνασκοποῦσι διακινδυνευτέον τὸ φάναι καὶ πεφάσθαι.

358—Ib. 75 b-c:

Νῦν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν γένεσιν δημιουργοῖς, ἀναλογιζομένοις πότε- **God wished us to live a rational and not a long life**
ρον πολυχρονιώτερον χεῖρον ἢ βραχυχρονιώτερον βέλτιον ἀπεργάσαιντο γένος,

συνέδοξεν τοῦ πλείονος βίου, φαυλοτέρου δέ, τὸν ἐλάττονα ἀμείνονα ὄντα παντὶ πάντως αἰρετέον· ὅθεν δὴ μανῶ μὲν ὁστῶ, σαρξὶν δὲ καὶ νεύροις κεφαλὴν, ἅτε οὐδὲ καμπὰς ἔχουσιν, οὐ συνεστέγασαν. Κατὰ πάντα οὖν ταῦτα εὐαισθητοτέρα μὲν καὶ φρονιμωτέρα, πολὺ δὲ ἀσθενεστέρα παντὸς ἀνδρὸς προσετέθη κεφαλὴ σώματι.

359—Ib. 77 b-c:

the "vegetative soul" in plants

Πᾶν γὰρ οὖν ὅτιπερ ἂν μετάσχη τοῦ ζῆν, ζῶν μὲν ἂν ἐν δίκῃ λέγοιτο ὀρθότατα· μετέχει γέ μὴν τοῦτο δ' οὖν λέγομεν τοῦ τρίτου ψυχῆς εἶδους, δ' μεταξὺ φρενῶν ὁμφαλοῦ τε ἰδρῦσθαι λόγος, ᾧ δόξης μὲν λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ μέτεστιν τὸ μηδέν, αἰσθήσεως δὲ ἡδέας καὶ ἀλγυνῆς μετὰ ἐπιθυμιῶν. Πάσχον γὰρ διατελεῖ πάντα, στραφέντι δ' αὐτῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ περὶ ἑαυτό, τὴν μὲν ἔξωθεν ἀπωσαμένῳ κίνησιν, τῇ δ' οἰκείᾳ χρησαμένῳ, τῶν αὐτοῦ τι λογίσασθαι κατιδόντι φύσει οὐ παραδέδωκεν ἢ γένεσις. Διὸ δὴ ζῆ μὲν ἔστιν τε οὐχ ἕτερον ζῶου, μόνιμον δὲ καὶ κατερριζωμένον πέπηγεν διὰ τὸ τῆς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινήσεως ἔσσεσθαι.

77C

360—a. Ib. 86 b-e:

disease of the soul due to defective bodily constitution

Νόσον μὲν δὴ ψυχῆς ἀνοίαν συγχωρητέον, δύο δ' ἀνοίας γένη, τὸ μὲν μανίαν, τὸ δὲ ἀμαθίαν. Πᾶν οὖν ὅτι πάσχων τις πάθος ὁπότερον αὐτῶν ἴσχει, νόσον προσρητέον, ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας ὑπερβαλλούσας τῶν νόσων μεγίστας θετέον τῇ ψυχῇ· περιχαρὴς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἢ καὶ τάναντία ὑπὸ λύπης πάσχων, σπεύδων τὸ μὲν ἐλεῖν ἀκαίρως, τὸ δὲ φυγεῖν, οὐθ' ὅρᾳ οὔτε ἀκούειν ὀρθὸν οὐδὲν δύναται, λυτᾷ δὲ καὶ λογισμοῦ μετασχεῖν ἥκιστα τότε δὴ δυνατός. Τὸ δὲ σπέρμα ὅτῳ πολὺ καὶ ῥυῶδες περὶ τὸν μυελὸν γίγνεται καὶ καθαπερεὶ δένδρον πολυκαρπότερον τοῦ συμμέτρου πεφυκὸς ἦ, πολλὰς μὲν καθ' ἕκαστον ὠδῖνας, πολλὰς δ' ἡδονὰς κτώμενος ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τόκοις, ἐμμανὴς τὸ πλεῖστον γιγνόμενος τοῦ βίου διὰ τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, νοσοῦσαν καὶ ἄφρονα ἴσχωσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐχ ὡς νοσῶν ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκὼν κακὸς δοξάζεται· τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἀκολασία κατὰ τὸ πολὺ μέρος διὰ τὴν ἐνός γένους ἕξιν ὑπὸ μακρότητος ὁστῶν ἐν σώματι ῥυώδη καὶ ὑγραίνουσιν νόσος ψυχῆς γέγονεν. Καὶ σχεδὸν δὴ πάντα ὁπόσα ἡδονῶν ἀκράτεια καὶ ὄνειδος ὡς ἐκόντων λέγεται τῶν κακῶν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὄνειδίζεται· κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐκὼν οὐδεὶς, διὰ δὲ πονηράν ἕξιν τινὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀπαίδευτον τροφήν ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται κακός, παντὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἐχθρὰ καὶ ἀκοντι προσγίγνεται.

86C

d

e

b. Ib. 87 a-b:

badness must be prevented by education

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ὅταν οὕτως κακῶς παγέντων πολιτεῖται κακαὶ καὶ λόγοι κατὰ πόλεις ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ λεχθῶσιν, ἔτι δὲ μαθήματα μηδαμῇ τούτων

ιατικά ἐκ νέων μανθάνηται, ταύτη κακοὶ πάντες οἱ κακοὶ διὰ δύο ἀκουσιώτατα γιγνόμεθα · ὦν αἰτιατέον μὲν τοὺς φυτεύοντας ἀεὶ τῶν φυτευομένων μᾶλλον καὶ τοὺς τρέφοντας τῶν τρεφομένων, προθυμητέον μὲν, ὅπη τις δύναται, καὶ διὰ τροφῆς καὶ δι' ἐπιτηδευμάτων μαθημάτων τε φυγεῖν μὲν κακίαν, τοῦναντίον δὲ ἐλεῖν. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ τρόπος ἄλλος λόγῳ.

361—Ib. 87 d-88 c:

Πρὸς γὰρ ὑγείας καὶ νόσους ἀρετάς τε καὶ κακίας οὐδεμία συμμετρία καὶ ἀμετρία μείζων ἢ ψυχῆς αὐτῆς πρὸς σῶμα αὐτό · ὦν οὐδὲν σκοποῦμεν οὐδ' ἐννοοῦμεν, ὅτι ψυχὴν ἰσχυράν καὶ πάντη μεγάλην ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἑλαττον εἶδος ὅταν ὀχῇ, καὶ ὅταν αὖ τοῦναντίον συμπαγῆτον τούτῳ, οὐ καλὸν ὅλον τὸ ζῶον — ἀσύμμετρον γὰρ ταῖς μεγίσταις συμμετρίαις — τὸ δὲ ἐναντίως ἔχον πάντων θεαμάτων τῷ δυναμένῳ καθορᾶν κάλλιστον καὶ ἐρασιμώτατον. Οἶον οὖν ὑπερσκελὲς ἢ καὶ τινα ἑτέραν ὑπέρεξιν ἄμετρον ἑαυτῷ τι σῶμα ὃν ἅμα 87e μὲν αἰσχρόν, ἅμα δ' ἐν τῇ κοινωνίᾳ τῶν πόνων πολλοὺς μὲν κόπους, πολλὰ δὲ σπᾶσματα καὶ διὰ τὴν παραφορότητα πτώματα παρέχον μυρίων κακῶν αἴτιον ἑαυτῷ, ταῦτόν δὴ διανοητέον καὶ περὶ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου¹, ζῶον δὲ καλοῦμεν, ὥς ὅταν τε ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ κρείττων οὖσα σώματος περιθύμως ἴσχη, διασείουσα πᾶν αὐτὸ ἐνδοθεν νόσων ἐμπίμπλησι, καὶ ὅταν εἰς τινὰς μαθήσεις 88a καὶ ζητήσεις συντόνως ἴη, κατατήκει, διδασκᾶς τ' αὖ καὶ μάχας ἐν λόγοις ποιουμένη δημοσίᾳ καὶ ἰδίᾳ δι' ἐρίδων καὶ φιλονικίας γιγνομένων διάπυρον αὐτὸ ποιοῦσα σαλεύει, καὶ ῥεύματα ἐπάγουσα, τῶν λεγομένων ἱατρῶν ἀπατῶσα τοὺς πλείστους, τἀναίτια αἰτιαῖσθαι ποιεῖ · σῶμά τε ὅταν αὖ μέγα καὶ ὑπερψυχον σμικρᾷ συμφορῇ ἀσθενεῖ τε διανοία γένηται, διττῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν οὐσῶν φύσει κατ' ἀνθρώπους, διὰ σῶμα μὲν τροφῆς, διὰ δὲ τὸ θειότατον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν b φρονήσεως, αἱ τοῦ κρείττονος κινήσεις κρατοῦσαι καὶ τὸ μὲν σφέτερον αὖξουσαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς κωφὸν καὶ δυσμαθὲς ἀμνημόν τε ποιοῦσαι, τὴν μεγίστην νόσον ἀμαθίαν ἐναπεργάζονται. Μία δὲ σωτηρία πρὸς ἅμφω, μήτε ψυχὴν ἄνευ σώματος κινεῖν μήτε σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς, ἵνα ἀμυνομένῳ γίγνησθον ἰσορρόπῳ καὶ ὑγιῇ. Τὸν δὲ μαθηματικὸν ἢ τινα ἄλλην σφόδρα μελέτην διανοία κατεργα- c ζόμενον καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀποδοτέον κίνησιν, γυμναστικῇ προσομιλοῦντα τόν τε αὖ σῶμα ἐπιμελῶς πλάττοντα τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνταποδοτέον κινήσεις, μουσικῇ καὶ πάσῃ φιλοσοφίᾳ προσχρώμενον, εἰ μέλλει δικαίως τις ἅμα μὲν καλός, ἅμα δὲ ἀγαθὸς ὁρθῶς κεκληῖσθαι.

¹ τὸ συναμφοτέρον - This whole view of man comes very near to that of Aristotle in Περὶ ψυχῆς, as the term συναμφοτέρον is essentially the same as the Aristotelian σύνθετον.

9—THE IDEAL NUMBERS

362—Arist. says in several places that Plato identified the Ideas with Numbers.

Ideas are
numbers

a. Ar., *Metaph.* A 9, 991 b⁹:

ἔτι εἴπερ εἰσὶν ἀριθμοὶ τὰ εἶδη, πῶς αἴτιοι ἔσονται;

b. Ib. 992 b¹⁵⁻¹⁸ (Ar. is speaking here about geometrical figures, τὰ μετὰ τοὺς ἀριθμούς μήκη τε καὶ ἐπίπεδα καὶ στερεά):

ταῦτα γὰρ οὔτε εἶδη οἶόν τε εἶναι (οὐ γὰρ εἰσὶν ἀριθμοί) οὔτε τὰ μεταξὺ (μαθηματικά γὰρ ἐκεῖνα) ¹ οὔτε τὰ φθαρτά, ἀλλὰ πάλιν τέταρτον ἄλλο φαίνεται τοῦτό τι γένος.

c. Ib. A 8, 1073 a¹⁸⁻²¹:

ἀριθμούς γὰρ λέγουσι τὰς ἰδέας οἱ λέγοντες ἰδέας, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὅτε μὲν ὡς περὶ ἀπείρων λέγουσιν, ὅτε δὲ ὡς μέχρι τῆς δεκάδος ὠρισμένων ².

d. Ib. M 7, 1081 a⁵⁻⁸; 12-13:

εἰ μὲν οὖν πᾶσαι συμβληταὶ καὶ ἀδιάφοροι αἱ μονάδες, ὁ μαθηματικὸς γίγνεται ἀριθμὸς καὶ εἷς μόνος, καὶ τὰς ἰδέας οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς ³. — εἰ δὲ μή εἰσὶν ἀριθμοὶ οἱ ἰδέαι, οὐδ' ὅλως οἶόν τε αὐτὰς εἶναι.

e. Ib. M 8, 1083 a¹⁷⁻¹⁹:

ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἴπερ εἰσὶν ἀριθμοὶ αἱ ἰδέαι, οὔτε συμβλητὰς τὰς μονάδας ἀπάσας ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, φανερόν.

Numbers
are Ideas

363—In other places Ar. implies that Numbers were said to be Ideas.

a. Ib. M. 8, 1084 a⁷⁻⁹:

ἔτι εἰ πᾶσα ἰδέα τινός, οἱ δὲ ἀριθμοὶ ἰδέαι, καὶ ὁ ἄπειρος ἔσται ἰδέα τινός, ἢ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ ἄλλου τινός.

¹ Ar. says in *Metaph.* A 6, 987 b¹⁴, Pl. recognized mathematical objects as existing between Forms and sensibles, differing from the last in being eternal and unchangeable, from Forms in there being many of the same kind:

ἔτι δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ εἶδη τὰ μαθηματικά τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναι φησι μεταξὺ, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τῷ ἀίδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δ' εἰδῶν τῷ τὰ μὲν πόλλ' ἄττα ὅμοια εἶναι, τὸ δ' εἶδος αὐτὸ ἐν ἑκάστων μόνον.

² About the last point see our nr. 366 a.

³ Ar. means: the mathematical number is constituted by adding one unity to the other (so here the monads are συμβληταί). But ideal numbers are individual types, not comparable, and therefore unaddible. Cp. our nr. 367.

b. We may mention here also N 3, 1090 b³²⁻³⁶, where is spoken of ὁ τῶν εἰδῶν ἀριθμός (gen. explic.) and εἰδετικός ἀριθμός:

οἱ δὲ πρῶτοι δύο τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ποιήσαντες, τὸν τε τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τὸν μαθηματικὸν ἄλλον, οὐδαμῶς οὐτ' εἰρήκασιν οὐτ' ἔχοιεν ἂν εἰπεῖν πῶς καὶ ἐκ τίνος ἔσται ὁ μαθηματικός. ποιοῦσι γὰρ αὐτὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ εἰδητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ.

c. Also N 5, 1092 b⁸⁻¹⁸, where Ar. wonders how numbers could be the cause of being, or how they could be οὐσίαι.

οὐθὲν δὲ διώρισται οὐδὲ ὁποτέρως οἱ ἀριθμοὶ αἴτιοι τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τοῦ εἶναι, πότερον ὡς ὅροι (οἷον αἱ στιγμαὶ τῶν μεγεθῶν, καὶ ὡς Εὐρυτος ἔταττε τίς ἀριθμὸς τίνος, οἷον ὁδὸς μὲν ἀνθρώπου ὁδὸς δὲ ἵππου, ὥσπερ οἱ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἄγοντες εἰς τὰ σχήματα τρίγωνον καὶ τετράγωνον, οὕτως ἀφομοιωὶν ταῖς ψήφοις τὰς μορφὰς τῶν φυτῶν), ἢ ὅτι [ὁ] λόγος ἡ συμφωνία ἀριθμῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον; τὰ δὲ δὴ πάθη πῶς ἀριθμοί, τὸ λευκὸν καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ θερμόν; ὅτι δὲ οὐχ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ οὐσία οὐδὲ τῆς μορφῆς αἴτιοι, δῆλον· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡ οὐσία, ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς ὕλη.

From this passage a direct identification of numbers with Ideas, and of Ideas with numbers, might be inferred. Yet this inference is not the only one possible. Cp. our nr. 373.

d. Ar. even says *each* number was taught to be an Idea. N 2, 1090 a⁴⁻⁶:

Τῷ μὲν γὰρ ιδέας τιθεμένῳ παρέχονται τιν' αἰτίαν τοῖς οὖσιν, εἴπερ ἕκαστος τῶν ἀριθμῶν ιδέα τις, ἡ δ' ιδέα τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰτία τοῦ εἶναι ὃν δὴ ποτε τρόπον.

Now this cannot have been the theory of Plato. Cp. our nr. 366c.

364—a. Ib. N 4, 1091 b¹³⁻¹⁴:

τῶν δὲ τὰς ἀκινήτους οὐσίας εἶναι λεγόντων οἱ μὲν φασι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. the One =
the Agathon

b. Cf. *Eth. Eud.* I 8, 1218 a²⁴⁻²⁸:

Παράβολος δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ὅτι τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ ἐφίενται· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ἐφίενται λέγονται φανερώς, ἀλλὰ λίαν ἀπλῶς τοῦτό φασι, καὶ ὅρεξιν εἶναι πῶς ἂν τις ὑπόλαβῃ ἐν οἷς ζῶῃ μὴ ὑπάρχει;

c. Aristox., *Harm. Elem.* II, p. 30 Meib.

Aristox. begins his second book by saying that it is perhaps better first to speak of the method of his inquiry, in order to prevent misunderstanding and disappointment.

Καθάπερ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀεὶ διηγείτο τοὺς πλείστους τῶν ἀκουσάντων παρὰ De Vogel, *Greek Philosophy* I

Πλάτωνος τὴν περὶ τὰγαθοῦ ἀκρόασιν παθεῖν. προσιέναι μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον ὑπολαμβάνοντα λήψεσθαι τι τῶν νομιζομένων τούτων ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν οἷον πλοῦτον, ὑγίειαν, ἰσχύν, τὸ ὅλον εὐδαιμονίαν τινὰ θαυμαστήν· ὅτε δὲ φανείησαν οἱ λόγοι περὶ μαθημάτων καὶ ἀριθμῶν καὶ γεωμετρίας καὶ ἀστρολογίας καὶ τὸ πέρας ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ἓν¹, παντελῶς οἶμαι παράδοξόν τι ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς· εἰθ' οἱ μὲν ὑποκατεφρόνουν τοῦ πράγματος, οἱ δὲ κατεμέμφοντο.

365—a. Arist., *Metaph.* A 6, 987 b¹⁸⁻²²:

the
elements of
Forms = the
elements of
all things

Ἐπεὶ δ' αἰτία τὰ εἶδη τοῖς ἄλλοις, τὰκείνων στοιχεῖα πάντων ᾤθηται τῶν ὄντων εἶναι στοιχεῖα. ὥς μὲν οὖν ὕλην τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν εἶναι ἀρχάς, ὥς δ' οὐσίαν τὸ ἓν· ἐξ ἐκείνων γὰρ κατὰ μέθεξιν τοῦ ἐνὸς [τὰ εἶδη] εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς.

the Forms
are formal
cause of
sensibles,
the One
formal cause
of the Forms

b. Ib., 988 a⁸⁻¹¹:

φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι δυοῖν αἰτίαι μόνον κέχρηται (sc. Πλάτων), τῇ τε τοῦ τί ἐστι καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην (τὰ γὰρ εἶδη τοῦ τί ἐστὶν αἰτία τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς δ' εἶδεσι τὸ ἓν).

the ideal
Numbers
limited
to ten

366—a. Ib., A 8, 1073 a¹⁸⁻²¹ = our nr. 362c:

Those who identified Ideas with Numbers *sometimes* treated them as unlimited, *sometimes* as limited by the number ten.

b. Ib. M 8, 1084 a¹². Here Ar., having showed that Number cannot be illimited, continues:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μέχρι τῆς δεκάδος ὁ ἀριθμός, ὥσπερ τινές φασιν, πρῶτον μὲν ταχὺ ἐπιλείπει τὰ εἶδη, —

c. Arist., *Phys.* 206 b³⁰⁻³³.

In this place Ar. distinguishes two kinds of infinite, the infinite "in the direction of increase" (ἐπὶ τὴν αὕξιν), and the infinite "in the direction of reduction" (ἐπὶ τὴν καθάρσιν). He says: "for this reason Plato also made the infinities two in number", referring to the name of τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρόν, by which Plato called the infinite. It is clear, however, that by this name Pl. did not intend to make a distinction between two kinds of infinite; he simply meant by his ἀόριστος δυνάς, which he called also "the great and small": "something that is oscillating

¹ H. Macran, *The harmonics of Aristox.*, Oxford 1902, p. 187, translates: "But when they found that Plato's reasonings were of sciences and numbers, and geometry and astronomy, and of good and unity as predicates of the finite,"—

I should prefer: "and that the Finite is the Good, which is identical with the One"—

"Good" and "one" in Plato's thoughts surely were no predicates of the péras. They were substances, identical with it.

between two extremes" *. Ar., explaining Plato's term in his own way, then states that Pl. did not use his two indefinites:

οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς τὸ ἐπὶ τὴν καθαίρεσιν ἄπειρον ὑπάρχει, ἡ γὰρ μονὰς ἐλάχιστον, οὔτε ἐπὶ τὴν αὐξήν· μέχρι γὰρ δεκάδος ποιεῖ τὸν ἀριθμόν.

Here then is said explicitly that Pl. limited his ideal Numbers to ten. Consequently in *N* 1090a⁶ (our nr. 363 d), where is said that "each number was an Idea, according to the adherents of the hypothesis of Ideas", Plato himself must be excepted. Indeed, the theory here mentioned was taught by Xenocrates.

Hence follows that neither in 1073 a¹⁸⁻²¹, cited under a, "those who identified Ideas with Numbers" may be taken without any distinction as the subject of the following phrase: not his whole school did "sometimes" treat the ideal Numbers as unlimited, "sometimes" as limited; but *some of them* (e.g. Xenocrates) represented the first, *others* (first of all Plato) the last view. Which agrees with 1084a¹⁸, ὥσπερ τινὲς φασιν, cited under b^b.

367—Ar. mentions three characteristics of ideal Numbers:

a. First they are unaddible. M 7, 1083 a³¹⁻³⁵:

the ideal
Numbers
unaddible

εἰ δέ ἐστι τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ, ἀνάγκη μᾶλλον ὥσπερ Πλάτων ἔλεγεν ἔχειν τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς, καὶ εἶναι δυάδα πρῶτην καὶ τριάδα, καὶ οὐ συμβλητοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

See Van der Wielen, *De Ideegetallen*, p. 62; Ross, *Ar.'s Metaph.* II p. 427. Both explain ἀσύμβλητοι as "incomparable". Yet practically this implies the unaddibility.

b. Secondly they contain the relation prior-posterior. Ib. M 6, 1080 b¹¹⁻¹⁴:

οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέρους φασὶν εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς, τὸν μὲν ἔχοντα τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τὰς ιδέας, τὸν δὲ μαθηματικὸν παρὰ τὰς ιδέας καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά, καὶ χωριστοὺς ἀμφοτέρους τῶν αἰσθητῶν.

they contain
the relation
prior-
posterior

c. Cf. Ar., *Eth. Nic.* A 4, 1096 a¹⁷⁻¹⁹:

οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην¹ οὐκ ἐποιοῦν ιδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ιδέαν κατεσκευάζον²

¹ Sc. the theory of Ideas.

² Van der Wielen, *o.c.* p. 66 ff., follows Cook Wilson's interpretation that Pl. did not assume one Idea above the ideal Numbers, these Numbers being individual types, the one independent of and incomparable with the other.

* See Robin, *Platon* p. 144; H. Cherniss, *Ar.'s Crit. of Pl.* I, p. 105.

^b Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1945, p. 26, tries to show an inconsistency in the report of Ar. on this point, but a careful interpretation removes this apparent contradiction. See my article *Problems concerning later Platonism*, in *Mnem.* 1949, pp. 197-216; 299-318.

they are in-
dependent of
each other

d. Hence follows the third characteristic: among the ideal Numbers each following Number is independent of the preceding.

M 6, 1080 a³⁰⁻³⁵:

διὸ καὶ ὁ μὲν μαθηματικὸς ἀριθμεῖται μετὰ τὸ ἐν δύο, πρὸς τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἐνὶ ἄλλο ἔν, καὶ τὰ τρία πρὸς τοῖς δυσὶ τούτοις ἄλλο ἔν, καὶ ὁ λοιπὸς δὲ ὡσαύτως· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ τὸ ἐν δύο ἕτερα ἄνευ τοῦ ἐνὸς τοῦ πρώτου, καὶ ἡ τριάς ἄνευ τῆς δυάδος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ἀριθμός.

Cf. M 7, 1082 b²⁸⁻³⁷, Van der Wielen p. 72 f.

the generati-
on of ideal
numbers

368—The so-called "generation" of ideal Numbers is spoken of by Ar. in a number of places. We cite:

a. *Metaph.* A 6, 987 b³³⁻⁹⁸⁸ a¹:

τὸ δὲ δυάδα ποιῆσαι τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν¹ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἔξω τῶν πρώτων² εὐφυῶς ἐξ αὐτῆς γεννᾶσθαι ὥσπερ ἕκ τινος ἐκμαγείου.

b. Cf. *Metaph.* M 7, 1081 a²³⁻²⁵:

ἅμα γὰρ αἱ ἐν τῇ δυάδι τῇ πρώτῃ³ μονάδες γεννῶνται, εἴτε ὥσπερ ὁ πρῶτος εἰπὼν⁴ ἐξ ἀνίσων (ἰσασθέντων γὰρ ἐγένοντο) εἴτε ἄλλως.

c. Ib. N 4, 1091 a²³⁻²⁵:

τοῦ μὲν οὖν περιττοῦ γένεσιν οὐ φασιν, ὡς δηλονότι τοῦ ἀρτίου οὕσης γενέσεως· τὸν δ' ἄρτιον πρῶτον ἐξ ἀνίσων τινὲς κατασκευάζουσι τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ ἰσασθέντων.

the material
principle

369—a. Pl., *Tim.* 49 a⁵⁻⁶ (the τρίτον γένος; see our nr. 356 a):
πάσης εἶναι γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν αὐτὴν οἷον τιθῆναι.

b. Ib. 50 b-d; 51 a-b; 51 e-52 b. Our nr. 356 b-c.

peras and
apeiron in the
Philebus

370—As we have seen in the preceding paragraph (nr. 347) Pl. in the *Phil.* admits four principles: πέρας and ἄπειρον, the μεικτὸν γένος and the αἰτία of the mixture. The class of the infinite contains all things into which the more and the less enter, the more and less being without limit and measure:

¹ Next to the One and the Ideas.

² "The prime numbers", i.e. the odd numbers (3, 5, 7, 9). Cf. Robin, *La théorie plat. des Id. et des Nombres*, p. 661, n. 266 II; Ross, *Ar.'s Metaph.* I p. 173 ff.

³ In the ideal Number "Two".

⁴ Plato.

a. *Phil.* 24 e-25 b (our nr. 347 b).

The péras is described as containing all things which admit of equality, number and measure:

b. *Ib.* 24 a-d (our nr. 347 a).

To this passage cp. the next nr. 371 a and b.

371—a. *Hermodorus ap. Simpl., Phys.* 247³⁰-248¹⁵:

identification
of the great
and small
with the
ἄπειρον and
with the ὕλη

Ἐπειδὴ πολλαχοῦ μέμνηται τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ὡς τὴν ὕλην μέγα καὶ μικρὸν λέγοντος, ἰστέον ὅτι ὁ Πορφύριος ἱστορεῖ¹ τὸν Δερκυλλίδην ἐν τῷ ια' τῆς Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφίας, ἐνθα περὶ ὕλης ποιεῖται τὸν λόγον, Ἐρμοδώρου τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐταίρου λέξιν παραγράφειν ἐκ τῆς περὶ Πλάτωνος αὐτοῦ συγγραφῆς, ἐξ ἧς δηλοῦται ὅτι τὴν ὕλην ὁ Πλάτων κατὰ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ ἀόριστον ὑποτιθέμενος² ἀπ' ἐκείνων αὐτὴν ἐδήλου τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον ἐπιδεχομένων³, ὧν καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ἐστίν. εἰπὼν γὰρ ὅτι „τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ εἶναι λέγει, ὡς ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἵππον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἕτερα, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν ὡς πρὸς ἐναντία, ὡς ἀγαθὸν κακῶ, τὰ δὲ ὡς πρὸς τι, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν ὡς ὀρισμένα, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἀόριστα” ἐπάγει „καὶ τὰ μὲν ὡς μέγα πρὸς μικρὸν λεγόμενα πάντα ἔχειν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον· ἔστι⁴ γὰρ μᾶλλον * εἶναι μεῖζον καὶ ἑλαττον εἰς ἄπειρον φερόμενα· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ πλατύτερον καὶ στενότερον καὶ βαρύτερον καὶ κουφότερον καὶ πάντα τὰ οὕτως λεγόμενα εἰς ἄπειρον οἰσθήσεται. τὰ δὲ ὡς τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ μένον καὶ τὸ ἡρμοσμένον λεγόμενα οὐκ ἔχειν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων ἔχειν. ἔστι γὰρ μᾶλλον ἄνισον ἀνίσου καὶ κινούμενον κινουμένου καὶ ἀνάρμοστον ἀναρμόστου, ὥστε αὐτῶν ἀμφοτέρων τῶν συζυγιῶν πάντα πλὴν τοῦ ἐνὸς στοιχείου τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον δέδεκται **. ὥστε ἄστατον καὶ ἄμορφον καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ οὐκ ὄν τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγεσθαι κατὰ ἀπόφασιν τοῦ ὄντος. τῷ τοιούτῳ δὲ οὐ προσήκειν οὔτε ἀρχῆς οὔτε οὐσίας, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀκρισίᾳ τινὶ φέρεσθαι⁵—

b. An interesting parallel to this passage of Hermodorus is found in the Xth book *Adv. Math.* of Sextus Empiricus (= *Against the phy-*

a parallel in
Sextus

¹ ἱστορεῖ - says.

² τὴν ὕλην — ὑποτιθέμενος - “admitting that matter is something like the infinite and indeterminate”.

³ αὐτὴν — τῶν ἐπιδεχομένων - sc. εἶναι. “that it belongs to things admitting of a more and a less.”

⁴ ἔστι γὰρ μᾶλλον — “For it is possible to be greater and smaller in a higher degree”.

⁵ “to move in a certain indistinctness.”

* ἔστι γὰρ μᾶλλον editio Aldina. ἔστι ... μᾶλλον (with a lacuna of three letters) F.

** δέδεκται R. Heinze. δεδεγμένον codd.

sicists II), 248-282. Here the same tripartition of being is mentioned as Pythagorean doctrine, but Ph. Merlan and P. Wilpert * rightly pointed out that the whole passage is of Platonic origin.

Sextus, *Adv. math.* X, 263-265:

**tripartition
of being**

Τῶν γὰρ ὄντων, φασί (sc. οἱ Πυθαγορικοί), τὰ μὲν κατὰ διαφορὰν¹ νοεῖται, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐναντίωσιν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι. κατὰ διαφορὰν μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν περιγραφὴν² ὑποκείμενα, οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος, φυτὸν, γῆ, ὕδωρ, ἀήρ, πῦρ · τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστον ἀπολύτως θεωρεῖται καὶ οὐχ ὥς κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν · κατ' ἐναντίωσιν δὲ ὑπάρχειν ὅσα ἐξ ἐναντιώσεως ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον θεωρεῖται, οἷον ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, δίκαιον καὶ ἀδίκον, συμφέρον καὶ ἀσύμμερον, ὅσιον καὶ ἀνόσιον, εὐσεβὲς ἀσεβές, κινούμενον ἡρεμοῦν, τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἐμπερῆ. Πρὸς τι δὲ τυγχάνειν τὰ κατὰ τὴν ὥς πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν νοούμενα, οἷον δεξιὸν ἀριστερόν, ἄνω κάτω, διπλάσιον ἥμισυ. —

The author determines the difference between the second group (τὰ κατ' ἐναντίωσιν) and the third (τὰ πρὸς τι) by two points:

**first point of
difference**

(266-268) ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου φθορὰ γένεσις ἐστὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου, οἷον ἐπὶ ὑγείας καὶ νόσου κινήσεως τε καὶ ἡρεμίας · νόσου τε γὰρ γένεσις ἄρσις ἐστὶν ὑγείας, ὑγείας τε γένεσις ἄρσις ἐστὶ νόσου, καὶ κινήσεως μὲν ὑπόστασις φθορὰ στάσεως, γένεσις δὲ στάσεως ἄρσις κινήσεως. — τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι συνύπαρξιν τε καὶ συναναίρεσιν ἀλλήλων περιεῖχεν · οὐδὲν γὰρ δεξιόν ἐστὶν ἐὰν μὴ καὶ ἀριστερόν ὑπάρχη, οὐδὲ διπλάσιον ἐὰν μὴ καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ προ-υποκέηται οὐ διπλάσιον ἐστίν.

second point

Πρὸς τούτοις ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ὥς ἐπίπαν οὐδὲν θεωρεῖται μέσον, καθάπερ εὐθέως ἐπὶ ὑγείας καὶ νόσου, ζωῆς τε καὶ θανάτου, κινήσεως τε καὶ μονῆς. — ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τί πως ἔχόντων ἔστι τι μέσον · τοῦ γὰρ μείζονος, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ τοῦ μικροτέρου τῶν πρὸς τί πως καθεστώτων μεταξὺ γένοιτ' ἂν τὸ ἴσον, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῦ πλείονος καὶ ἥττονος τὸ ἱκανόν, ὀξέος τε καὶ βαρέος τὸ σύμφωνον. —

¹ κατὰ διαφορὰν - absolutely.

² κατ' ἰδίαν περιγραφὴν - in complete independence.

* Ph. Merlan, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des antiken Platonismus I, Zur Erklärung der dem Aristoteles zugeschriebenen Kategorienschrift*, in *Philologus* 89 (1934), p. 35-53.

P. Wilpert, *Neue Fragmente aus Περὶ τάγαθοῦ*, in *Hermes* (1941), p. 225-250.

See also C. J. de Vogel, *Problems concerning later Platonism*, which has been cited supra.

Then he argues that above these three groups there must stand of necessity a certain genus:

(270) καὶ δὴ τῶν μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ νοουμένων γένος ὑπεστήσαντο Πυθαγορικῶν παῖδες, ὡς ἐπαναβεβηκός, τὸ ἐν . —

(271) τῶν δὲ κατ' ἐναντίωσιν ἔλεξαν ἄρχειν, γένους τάξιν ἐπέχον, τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον. —

(273) τὰ μέντοι γε πρὸς τι ὑφέστηκε γένει τῇ τε ὑπεροχῇ καὶ τῇ ἐλλείψει.

These three genera finally are referred back to two ultimate principles:

(275) οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν ἰσότης τῷ ἐνὶ ὑπάγεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐν πρώτῳ αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ ἐστὶν ἴσον, ἡ δὲ ἀνισότης ἐν ὑπεροχῇ τε καὶ ἐλλείψει βλέπεται. — ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀορίστου δυνάδου λόγον τέτακται, ἐπειδήπερ ἡ πρώτη ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ἐν δυσὶν ἐστί, τῷ τε ὑπερέχοντι καὶ τῷ ὑπερεχομένῳ.

the two
ultimate
principles

(276) ἀνέκυψαν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ πάντων κατὰ τὸ ἀνωτάτῳ ἢ τε πρώτῳ μονάς καὶ ἡ ἀόριστος δυάς. —

c. Cf. *Ar., Phys. IV 2, 209 b*¹¹⁻¹⁷:

Aristotle's
testimony on
the ágrapha

διὸ καὶ Πλάτων τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὴν χώραν ταῦτό φησιν εἶναι ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ · τὸ γὰρ μεταληπτικὸν καὶ τὴν χώραν ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἐκεῖ τε λέγων τὸ μεταληπτικὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγράφοις δόγμασιν, ὅμως τὸν τόπον καὶ τὴν χώραν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεφήνατο. λέγουσι μὲν γὰρ πάντες εἶναι τι τὸν τόπον, τί δ' ἐστίν, οὗτος μόνος ἐπεχείρησεν εἰπεῖν.

About this passage see Cherniss, *Riddle* p. 15 f., and my *Problems concerning later Platonism*.

372—*Arist., De Anima I 2, 404 b*¹⁶⁻²¹:

the εἶδη and
the στοιχεῖα

τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ¹. γινώσκεισθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λεγομένοις² διωρίσθη,

¹ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ - sc. out of the Indivisible and the Divisible, the ταῦτόν and ἕτερον. Cp. πέρας and ἄπειρον in the *Phil.*

² ἐν τοῖς π. φιλ. λεγομένοις. By the same words in *Phys. II 2, 194a*³⁶ *Ar.* refers to his own dialogue *II. φιλ.*; but according to most ancient commentators in this place Plato's lecture on the Good is meant^a.

^a According to Cherniss, here also *Ar.*'s dialogue *II. φιλ.* is referred to, the doctrine of line, plane and body as 2, 3 and 4 being not of *Pl.* but of *Xenocr.* (*Riddle* p. 14 f.; *Ar.'s Crit. of Pl. I, App. IX, 567-570*). This explanation, however, is perfectly impossible: *Ar.* here is speaking clearly of Platonic thoughts. Only at the end of the passage does he mention *Xenocr.*' theory of the soul as differing from the preceding theory.

αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ ζῶον¹ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ ἐνὸς ιδέας καὶ τοῦ πρώτου μήκους² καὶ πλατύς καὶ βάθους, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὁμοιοτρόπως· ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως³, νοῦν μὲν τὸ ἐν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ τὰ δύο· μοναχῶς γὰρ ἐφ' ἐν· τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθμὸν δόξαν, αἴσθησιν δὲ τὸν τοῦ στερεοῦ· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμοὶ τὰ εἶδη αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐλέγοντο, εἰσὶ δ' ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων⁴. Κρίνεται δὲ τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν νῶ, τὰ δ' ἐπιστήμη, τὰ δὲ δόξη, τὰ δ' αἰσθήσει· εἶδη δ' οἱ ἀριθμοὶ οὔτοι τῶν πραγμαμάτων.

the testimony of Theophr. 373—Theophr., *Metaph.* 6 b¹¹⁻¹⁴ (Ross-Fobes):

Πλάτων μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ ἀνάγειν εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς δόξειεν ἂν ἅπτεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων εἰς τὰς ιδέας ἀνάπτων, ταύτας δ' εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμούς, ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς τὰς ἀρχάς. —

It cannot be denied that according to this text the Numbers were a principle superior to the Ideas. Most modern critics share the opinion of Ross, who argues that Ar. says too explicitly that for Pl. the Ideas *were* Numbers: no doubt this means a simple identification. I think Robin is right in following the testimony of Theophr.

¹ αὐτὸ τὸ ζῶον - not the visible universe, which is called a ζῶον by Pl. in *Tim.* 30b; but the invisible, ideal World. So rightly *Themistius* 12, 1 H.: τὸ μὲν οὖν αὐτοζῶον, τουτέστι τὸν κόσμον τὸν νοητόν, ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἐποιοῦν ἀρχῶν, τὰ δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους ἐκ τῶν ὑφειμένων· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ιδέας αὐτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἔχειν.

Cp. Plato, *Soph.* 249a (our nr. 315c) where life and motion, intelligence and soul are attributed to the παντελῶς ὄν. Cp. De Vogel, *Actes Congr. Int. Phil.* 1953, XII, 61 ff.

² τοῦ πρώτου μήκους etc. - Length, breadth, and depth are deduced from the ideal Numbers 2, 3 and 4; see *Metaph.* 992a¹⁰ ff., b¹³ ff., 1085a⁷ ff., and especially 1090b²¹: ποιοῦσι γὰρ (οἱ τὰς ιδέας τιθέμενοι) τὰ μεγέθη ἐκ τῆς ὕλης καὶ ἀριθμοῦ, ἐκ μὲν τῆς δυνάδος τὰ μήκη, ἐκ τριάδος δ' ἴσως τὰ ἐπίπεδα, ἐκ δὲ τῆς τετράδος τὰ στερεὰ ἢ καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν.

Cp. 1036b¹³. So it was said ἐν τοῖς π. φιλ. λεγομένοις, that the kosmos noëtos (αὐτὸ τὸ ζῶον) consists of, or is constituted from, the One itself and the elementary numbers 2, 3 and 4, which form together the ten; τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὁμοιοτρόπως, "and the sensible world in the same way" (the sensible world also depends on the elementary numbers).

It is impossible to attribute this doctrine to Ar.'s π. φιλ. Consequently it must have been later Platonism, and this place as well as *Phys.* IV 2 contains a reference to the ἄγραφα.

³ ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως - Them. supplies: τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τοῦτον λόγον μετήρσαν: "And still in another way they applied this principle", sc. to the faculties of cognition of the soul. These also are reduced to numbers. Shorey calls this "fooleries of Xenocrates", which must not be attributed to Pl. * Cherniss follows him.

⁴ οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμοὶ — ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων - "For the numbers were called the Forms themselves and the principles (of things); but [they were not the last principles:] they are [themselves] constituted from the elements" (Sc. the One and the ἀπειρον or ἀόριστος δυνάς).

* *Amer. Journ. of Philol.* XXII 152.

Pl. himself points in this direction by his hierarchical conception of being, and so does Ar., in saying that the Ideas are as numerous as there are kinds and qualities, whereas the ideal Numbers are limited to ten ^a.

Cp. Pl., *Phil.* 64b (our nr. 348, at the end) and the explanation of L. Robin, cited under the same nr.

10—THE LAWS

374—Some preliminary remarks.

a. Pl., *Leg.* II 664 b-c:

ΑΘ. Τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐμὸν ἂν εἶη λέγειν. Φημὶ γὰρ ἅπαντας δεῖν ἐπάδειν τρεῖς ὄντας τοὺς χοροὺς ¹ ἔτι νέαις οὖσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ ἀπαλαῖς τῶν παίδων, τὰ τε ἄλλα καλὰ λέγοντας πάντα ὅσα διεληλύθαμεν τε καὶ ἔτι διέλθοιμεν ἂν, τὸ δὲ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν τοῦτο ἔστω· τὸν αὐτὸν ἡδιστόν τε καὶ ἄριστον ὑπὸ θεῶν βίον λέγεσθαι φάσκοντες ², ἀληθέστατα ἐροῦμεν ἅμα, καὶ μᾶλλον πείσομεν οὐς δεῖ πείθειν ἢ ἂν ἄλλως πως φθεγγώμεθα λέγοντες.

According to
divine
judgment, the
best life is
also the
happiest.

664c

ΚΛ. Συγχωρητέον ἃ λέγεις.

b. *Leg.* IV 716 c:

ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἶη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ποὺ τις, ὥς φασιν, ἄνθρωπος.

God the
measure of
all things

c. Ib. 717 a-d:

Πρῶτον μὲν, φαμέν, τιμὰς τὰς μετ' Ὀλυμπίους τε καὶ τοὺς τὴν πόλιν ἔχοντας θεοὺς τοῖς χθονίοις ἂν τις θεοῖς ἄρτια καὶ δεῦτερα καὶ ἀριστερὰ νέμων ὀρθότατα τοῦ τῆς εὐσεβείας σκοποῦ τυγχάνοι, τὰ δὲ τούτων ἄνωθεν [τὰ περιττά] καὶ ἀντίφωνα, τοῖς ἐμπρόσθεν ῥηθεῖσιν νυνδὴ. μετὰ θεοὺς δὲ τοῦσδε καὶ τοῖς δαίμοσιν ὃ γε ἔμφρων ὀργιάζοιτ' ἂν, ἤρωσιν δὲ μετὰ τούτους. ἐπακολουθοῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἰδρύματα ἴδια πατρῶων θεῶν κατὰ νόμον ὀργιαζόμενα, γονέων δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα τιμαὶ ζώντων· ὥς θέμις ὀφείλοντα ἀποτίνειν τὰ πρῶτὰ τε καὶ μέγιστα ὀφειλόμενα, χρεῶν πάντων πρεσβύτατα, νομίζειν δέ, ἃ κέκτηται καὶ ἔχει, πάντα εἶναι τῶν γεννησάντων καὶ θρεψαμένων πρὸς τὸ παρέχειν αὐτὰ

honour to
the Gods,
demons and
heroes

717b

honour to
parents

¹ τρεῖς — χοροὺς - sc. children, young men and old men.

² — φάσκοντες - "that the best life is said by the Gods to be also the most happy." I.e. that according to divine judgment virtue and happiness are no separate things.

^a C. J. de Vogel, *Een groot probleem uit de antieke wijsb.*, Utrecht 1947, p. 11-14, *La dernière phase du platonisme in Studia Vollgraff*, Amsterdam 1948, p. 165-178, and *Problems concerning later Plat.*, in *Mnem.* 1949.

εἰς ὑπηρεσίαν ἐκείνοις κατὰ δύναμιν πᾶσαν, ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας, δεύτερα τὰ τοῦ σώματος, τρίτα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀποτίνοντα δανείσματα ἐπιμελείας τε καὶ ὑπερπονούντων ὠδῖνας παλαιὰς ἐπὶ νέοις δανεισθείσας, ἀποδιδόντα δὲ παλαιοῖς ἐν τῷ γήραφ σφόδρα κεχρημένοις. παρὰ δὲ πάντα τὸν βίον ἔχειν τε καὶ ἐσχηκέναι χρὴ πρὸς αὐτοῦ γονέας εὐφημίαν διαφερόντως, διότι κούφων
 d καὶ πτηνῶν λόγων βαρυτάτη ζημία — πᾶσι γὰρ ἐπίσκοπος τοῖς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐτάχθη Δίκης Νέμεσις ἄγγελος — θυμουμένοις τε οὖν ὑπέλκειν δεῖ καὶ ἀποπιμπλάσι τὸν θυμόν, ἐάντ' ἐν λόγοις ἐάντ' ἐν ἔργοις δρώσιν τὸ τοιοῦτον, συγγιγνώσκοντα, ὡς εἰκότως μάλιστα πατήρ ὑεῖ δοξάζων ἀδικεῖσθαι θυμοῖτ' ἂν διαφερόντως.

every law
should have a
preamble

375—a. *Leg. IV 723 c-d; e:*

ΑΘ. Καλῶς μὲν τοίνυν, ὦ Κλεινία, δοκεῖς μοι τό γε τοσοῦτον λέγειν, ὅτι πᾶσιν γε νόμοις ἔστιν προοίμια καὶ ὅτι πάσης ἀρχόμενον νομοθεσίας χρὴ προτιθέναι παντὸς τοῦ λόγου τὸ πεφυκὸς προοίμιον ἐκάστοις — οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔστιν ῥηθισόμενον, οὐδ' ὀλίγον διαφέρων ἢ σαφῶς ἢ μὴ σαφῶς αὐτὰ μνημονεύεσθαι — τὸ μέντοι μεγάλων πέρι λεγομένων νόμων καὶ σμικρῶν εἰ ὁμοίως προοιμιάζεσθαι προστάττοιμεν, οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοιμεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ
 723d ἄσματος οὐδὲ λόγου παντὸς δεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον δρᾶν — καίτοι πέφυκέν γε εἶναι πᾶσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ χρηστέον ἅπασιν — αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ τε ῥήτορι καὶ τῷ μελωδῷ καὶ νομοθέτῃ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε ἐπιτρεπτέον.

ΚΛ. Ἀληθέστατα δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν. ἀλλὰ δὴ μηκέτ', ὦ ξένε, διατριβὴν πλείω τῆς μελλήσεως ποιώμεθα, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον ἐπανέλθωμεν. —

e καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ θεῶν τιμῆς προγόνων τε θεραπείας, καὶ τὰ νυνδὴ λεχθέντα ἱκανά · τὰ δ' ἐξῆς πειρώμεθα λέγειν, μέχρι περ ἂν σοι πᾶν τὸ προοίμιον ἱκανῶς εἰρῇσθαι δοκῇ. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἥδη τοὺς νόμους αὐτοὺς διέξει λέγων.

The prooimi-
on

b. *Leg. V 726-734 e:*

Next to the
gods a man
should hon-
our his own
soul

ΑΘ. Ἀκούοι δὴ πᾶς ὅσπερ νυνδὴ τὰ περὶ θεῶν τε ἤκουε καὶ τῶν φίλων προπατόρων · πάντων γὰρ τῶν αὐτοῦ κτημάτων μετὰ θεοὺς ψυχὴ θεϊότατον, οἰκειότατον ἔν. τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ διττά πάντ' ἐστὶ πᾶσιν. τὰ μὲν οὖν κρείττω καὶ ἀμείνω δεσπόζοντα, τὰ δὲ ἥττω καὶ χεῖρα δοῦλα · τῶν οὖν αὐτοῦ τὰ δεσπόζοντα αἰεὶ προτιμητέον τῶν δουλευόντων. οὕτω δὴ τὴν αὐτοῦ ψυχὴν μετὰ θεοὺς ὄντας
 727a δεσπότης καὶ τοὺς τούτοις ἐπομένους τιμᾶν δεῖν λέγων δευτέραν, ὀρθῶς παρακελεύομαι. τιμᾷ δ' ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἡμῶν οὐδεὶς ὀρθῶς, δοκεῖ δέ · θεῖον γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖν τιμῇ, τῶν δὲ κακῶν οὐδὲν τίμιον, ὃ δ' ἡγούμενος ἢ τισι λόγοις ἢ δώροις αὐτὴν αὖξιν ἢ τισιν ὑπέιξεσιν, μὴδὲν βελτίω δὲ ἐκ χείρονος αὐτὴν ἀπεργαζόμενος, τιμᾶν μὲν δοκεῖ, δρᾶ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδαμῶς. αὐτίκα παῖς εὐθύς γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος πᾶς ἡγεῖται πάντα ἱκανὸς εἶναι γιγνώσκειν, καὶ τιμᾶν

οἴεται ἐπαινῶν τὴν αὐτοῦ ψυχὴν, καὶ προθυμούμενος ἐπιτρέπει πράττειν ὅτι **b**
 ἂν ἐθέλῃ, τὸ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενον ἐστὶν ὡς δρῶν ταῦτα βλάπτει καὶ οὐ τιμᾷ·
 δεῖ δέ, ὡς φαμεν, μετὰ γε θεοὺς δευτέραν. οὐδέ γε ὅταν ἄνθρωπος τῶν αὐτοῦ
 ἐκάστοτε ἀμαρτημάτων μὴ ἑαυτὸν αἷτιον ἡγῇται καὶ τῶν πλείστων κακῶν
 καὶ μεγίστων, ἀλλὰ ἄλλους, ἑαυτὸν δὲ ἀεὶ ἀναίτιον ἐξαίρη, τιμῶν τὴν αὐτοῦ
 ψυχὴν, ὡς δὴ δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ πολλοῦ δεῖ δρᾶν τοῦτο· βλάπτει γάρ. οὐδ' ὁπόταν **c**
 ἡδοναῖς παρὰ λόγον τὸν τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ ἔπαινον χαρίζεται, τότε οὐδαμῶς
 τιμᾷ, ἀτιμᾷ δὲ κακῶν καὶ μεταμελείας ἐμπιμπλὰς αὐτήν. οὐδέ γε ὁπόταν
 αὖ τάναντία τοὺς ἐπαινουμένους πόνους καὶ φόβους καὶ ἀλγηδόνας καὶ λύπας
 μὴ διακονῇ καρτερῶν ἀλλὰ ὑπέικη, τότε οὐ τιμᾷ ὑπέικων· ἄτιμον γὰρ αὐτὴν
 ἀπεργάζεται δρῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα σύμπαντα. οὐδ' ὁπόταν ἡγῇται τὸ ζῆν πάντως **d**
 ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τιμᾷ, ἀτιμᾷ δ' αὐτήν καὶ τότε· τὰ γὰρ ἐν "Αἰδοῦ πράγματα
 πάντα κακὰ ἡγουμένης τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι, ὑπέικει καὶ οὐκ ἀντιτείνει διδάσκων
 τε καὶ ἐλέγχων ὡς οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδ' εἰ τάναντία πέφυκεν μέγιστα εἶναι πάντων
 ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τοὺς ἐκεῖ. οὐδὲ μὴν πρὸ ἀρετῆς ὁπόταν αὖ
 προτιμᾷ τις κάλλος, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν οὐχ ἕτερον ἢ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντως καὶ πάντως
 ἀτιμία. ψυχῆς γὰρ σῶμα ἐντιμότερον οὗτος ὁ λόγος φησὶν εἶναι, ψευδόμενος·
 οὐδὲν γὰρ γηγενὲς Ὀλυμπίων ἐντιμότερον, ἀλλ' ὁ περὶ ψυχῆς ἄλλως δοξάζων **e**
 ἄγνοεῖ ὡς θαυμαστοῦ τούτου κτήματος ἀμελεῖ. οὐδέ γε ὁπόταν χρήματά τις
 ἐρᾷ κτᾶσθαι μὴ καλῶς, ἢ μὴ δυσχερῶς φέρη κτώμενος, δώροις ἄρα τιμᾷ τότε **728a**
 τὴν αὐτοῦ ψυχὴν — παντὸς μὲν οὖν λείπει — τὸ γὰρ αὐτῆς τίμιον ἅμα καὶ
 καλὸν ἀποδίδεται σμικροῦ χρυσοῦ· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ τ' ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς χρυσὸς
 ἀρετῆς οὐκ ἀντάξιος. ὡς δὲ εἶπεῖν συλλήβδην, ὅς ἑπερ ἂν νομοθέτης αἰσχυρὰ
 εἶναι καὶ κακὰ διαριθμούμενος τάττη καὶ τούναντίον ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ, τῶν μὲν
 ἀπέχεσθαι μὴ ἐθέλῃ πάσῃ μηχανῇ, τὰ δὲ ἐπιτηδεύειν σύμπασαν κατὰ δύναμιν,
 οὐκ οἶδεν ἐν τούτοις πᾶσιν πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ψυχὴν θεϊότατον ὃν ἀτιμώτατα καὶ **b**
 κακοσχημονέστατα διατιθεῖς. τὴν γὰρ λεγομένην δίκην τῆς κακουργίας τὴν
 μεγίστην οὐδεὶς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν λογίζεται, ἐστὶν δ' ἡ μεγίστη τὸ ὁμοιοῦσθαι
 τοῖς οὖσιν κακοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ὁμοιούμενον δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς φεύγειν ἀνδρας
 καὶ λόγους καὶ ἀποσχίζεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ προσκολλᾶσθαι διώκοντα κατὰ τὰς
 συνουσίας· προσπεφυκότες δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνάγκη ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν **a**
 πεφύκασι ἀλλήλους οἱ τοιοῦτοι ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. τοῦτο οὖν δὴ τὸ πάθος δίκη **c**
 μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶν — καλὸν γὰρ τό γε δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δίκη — τιμωρία δέ, ἀδικίας
 ἀκόλουθος πάθη, ἧς ὁ τε τυχὼν καὶ μὴ τυγχάνων ἄθλιος, ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἰατρευόμενος,
 ὁ δέ, ἵνα ἕτεροι πολλοὶ σφάζωνται, ἀπολλύμενος. τιμὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἡμῖν, ὡς τὸ ὅλον
 εἰπεῖν, τοῖς μὲν ἀμείνοσιν ἔπεσθαι, τὰ δὲ χείρονα, γενέσθαι δὲ βελτίω δυνατά,
 τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ὡς ἄριστα ἀποτελεῖν.

Ψυχῆς οὖν ἀνθρώπῳ κτῆμα οὐκ ἐστὶν εὐφύτερον εἰς τὸ φυγεῖν μὲν τὸ **d**
 κακόν, ἰχνεῦσαι δὲ καὶ ἐλεῖν τὸ πάντων ἄριστον, καὶ ἐλόντα αὖ κοινῇ συνοικεῖν

*virtue the
most pre-
cious thing
on earth*

the honour
of the body
comes next
after the
honour of
the soul

τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον · διὸ δεύτερον ἐτάχθη τιμῇ, τὸ δὲ τρίτον — πᾶς ἂν τοῦτό γε νοήσειεν — τὴν τοῦ σώματος εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν τιμὴν · τὰς δ' αὖ τιμὰς δεῖ σκοπεῖν, καὶ τούτων τίνες ἀληθεῖς καὶ ὅσαι κίβδηλοι, τοῦτο δὲ νομοθέτου. μὴνύειν δὴ μοι φαίνεται τάσδε καὶ τοιάσδε τινὰς αὐτάς εἶναι, τίμιον εἶναι σῶμα οὐ τὸ καλὸν οὐδὲ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τάχος ἔχον οὐδὲ μέγα, οὐδὲ γε τὸ ὑγιεινόν —

e καίτοι πολλοῖς ἂν τοῦτό γε δοκοῖ — καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰ τούτων γ' ἐναντία, τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἀπάσης ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως ἐφαπτόμενα σωφρονέστατα ἅμα τε ἀσφαλέστατα εἶναι μακρῷ · τὰ μὲν γὰρ χαύνους τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ θρασεῖας ποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ ταπεινάς τε καὶ ἀνελευθέρους. ὥς δ' αὖτως ἡ τῶν χρημάτων καὶ κτημάτων κτῆσις, καὶ τιμῆσεως κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ῥυθμὸν ἔχει · τὰ μὲν ὑπέρογκα γὰρ ἐκάστων τούτων ἔχθρας καὶ στάσεις ἀπεργάζεται ταῖς πόλεσιν καὶ ἰδίᾳ, τὰ δ' ἐλλείποντα δουλείας ὥς τὸ πολὺ. μὴ δὴ τις φιλοχρημονεῖται παίδων γ' ἔνεκα, ἵνα ὅτι πλουσιωτάτους καταλίπη · οὔτε γὰρ ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὖ τῇ πόλει ἄμεινον.

729a ἡ γὰρ τῶν νέων ἀκολάκευτος οὐσία, τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων μὴ ἐνδεής, αὕτη πασῶν μουσικωτάτη τε καὶ ἀρίστη · συμφωνοῦσα γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ συναρμόττουσα εἰς ἅπαντα ἄλυπον τὸν βίον ἀπεργάζεται. παισὶν δὲ αἰδῶ χρηὴ πολλήν, οὐ χρυσὸν καταλείπειν. οἴόμεθα δὲ ἐπιπλήττοντες τοῖς νέοις ἀναισχυντοῦσιν τοῦτο καταλείπειν · τὸ δ' ἔστιν οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ νῦν παρακελεύματος τοῖς νέοις γιγνόμενον, ὃ παρακελεύονται λέγοντες ὥς δεῖ πάντα αἰσχύνεσθαι τὸν νέον. ὁ δὲ ἔμφρων νομοθέτης τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ἂν μᾶλλον παρακελεύοιτο αἰσχύνεσθαι τοὺς νέους, καὶ πάντων μάλιστα εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ποτέ τις αὐτὸν ἴδῃ τῶν νέων ἢ καὶ ἐπα-

principles of
education

b κουση δρῶντα ἢ λέγοντά τι τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, ὥς ὅπου ἀναισχυντοῦσι γέροντες, ἀνάγκη καὶ νέους ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ἀναιδεστάτους · παιδεία γὰρ νέων διαφέρουσα ἔστιν ἅμα καὶ αὐτῶν οὐ τὸ νουθετεῖν, ἀλλ' ἅπερ ἂν ἄλλον νουθετῶν εἴποι τις, φαίνεσθαι ταῦτα αὐτὸν δρῶντα διὰ βίου. συγγένειαν δὲ καὶ ὁμογνίων θεῶν κοινωνίαν πᾶσαν ταύτου φύσιν αἵματος ἔχουσιν τιμῶν τις καὶ σεβόμενος, εὐνους ἂν γενεθλίου θεοὺς εἰς παίδων αὐτοῦ σποράν ἴσχοι κατὰ λόγον. καὶ

c μὴν τό γε φίλων καὶ ἐταίρων πρὸς τὰς ἐν βίῳ ὁμιλίας εὐμενεῖς ἂν τις κτῶτο, μείζους μὲν καὶ σεμνοτέρας τὰς ἐκείνων ὑπηρεσίας εἰς αὐτὸν ἡγούμενος ἢ 'κεῖνοι, ἐλάττους δ' αὖ τὰς αὐτοῦ διανοούμενος εἰς τοὺς φίλους χάριτας αὐτῶν τῶν φίλων τε καὶ ἐταίρων. εἰς μὴν πόλιν καὶ πολίτας μακρῷ ἀριστος ὅστις πρὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπίαισι καὶ ἀπάντων ἀγῶνων πολεμικῶν τε καὶ εἰρηνικῶν νικᾷν

d δέξαιτ' ἂν δόξῃ ὑπηρεσίας τῶν οἴκοι νόμων, ὥς ὑπηρετηκῶς πάντων κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ βίῳ. πρὸς δ' αὖ τοὺς ξένους διανοητέον ὥς ἀγιώτατα συμβόλαια ὄντα · σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντ' ἔστι τὰ τῶν ξένων καὶ εἰς τοὺς ξένους ἀμαρτήματα παρὰ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν εἰς θεὸν ἀνηρητημένα τιμωρὸν μᾶλλον. ἔρρημος γὰρ ὢν ὁ ξένος ἐταίρων τε καὶ συγγενῶν ἐλεεινότερος ἀνθρώποις καὶ θεοῖς · ὁ δυνάμενος οὖν τιμωρεῖν μᾶλλον βοηθεῖ προθυμότερον, δύναται δὲ

respect to
strangers

e 730a διαφερόντως ὁ ξένιος ἐκάστων δαίμων καὶ θεὸς τῷ ξενίῳ συνεπόμενοι Διί.

πολλῆς οὖν εὐλαβείας, ᾧ καὶ σμικρὸν προμηθείας ἔνι, μηδὲν ἀμάρτημα περὶ
 ξένους ἀμαρτόντα ἐν τῷ βίῳ πρὸς τὸ τέλος αὐτοῦ πορευθῆναι. ξενικῶν δ' αὖ
 καὶ ἐπιχωρίων ἀμαρτημάτων τὸ περὶ τοὺς ἰκέτας μέγιστον γίγνεται ἀμάρτημα **and suppli-
 ants**
 ἐκάστοις· μεθ' οὗ γὰρ ἰκετεύσας μάρτυρος ὁ ἰκέτης θεοῦ ἔτυχεν ὁμολογιῶν,
 φύλαξ διαφέρων οὗτος τοῦ παθόντος γίγνεται, ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἀτιμώρητος
 πάθοι ὁ τυχὼν ὧν ἔπαθε.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ γονέας τε καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, περὶ πόλιν τε καὶ **b**
 φίλους καὶ συγγένειαν, ξενικά τε καὶ ἐπιχώρια, διεληλύθαμεν σχεδὸν ὁμιλή-
 ματα, τὸ δὲ ποῖός τις ὢν αὐτὸς ἂν κάλλιστα διαγάγοι τὸν βίον, ἐπόμενον τούτῳ
 διεξελεῖν· ὅσα μὴ νόμος, ἀλλ' ἐπαινος παιδεύων καὶ φόγος ἐκάστους εὐηνίους
 μᾶλλον καὶ εὐμενεῖς τοῖς τεθήσεσθαι μέλλουσιν νόμοις ἀπεργάζεται, ταῦτ'
 ἐστὶν μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ῥητέον. ἀλήθεια δὴ πάντων μὲν ἀγαθῶν θεοῖς ἡγεῖται, **truth the
 beginning of
 all good**
 πάντων δὲ ἀνθρώποις· ἥς ὁ γενήσεσθαι μέλλων μακάριός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἐξ
 ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς μέτοχος εἴη, ἵνα ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον ἀληθῆς ὢν διαβιοῖ. πιστὸς γάρ·
 ὁ δὲ ἄπιστος ᾧ φίλον ψεῦδος ἐκούσιον, ὅτῳ δὲ ἀκούσιον, ἄνους. ὢν οὐδέ-
 τερον ζηλωτόν. ἄφιλος γάρ δὴ πᾶς ὅ γε ἄπιστος καὶ ἀμαθής, χρόνου δὲ προϊόντος
 γνωσθεῖς, εἰς τὸ χαλεπὸν γῆρας ἐρμήϊαν αὐτῷ πᾶσαν κατεσκευάσατο ἐπὶ τέλει
 τοῦ βίου, ὥστε ζώντων καὶ μὴ ἐταίρων καὶ παίδων σχεδὸν ὁμοίως ὀρφανὸν **d**
 αὐτῷ γενέσθαι τὸν βίον. τίμιος μὲν δὴ καὶ ὁ μηδὲν ἀδικῶν, ὁ δὲ μηδ' ἐπιτρέπων **justice is to
 be honoured
 and vindic-
 cated**
 τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν ἀδικεῖν πλέον ἢ διπλάσιος τιμῆς ἄξιός ἐκείνου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 ἑνός, ὁ δὲ πολλῶν ἀντάξιός ἐτέρων, μηνύων τὴν τῶν ἄλλων τοῖς ἄρχουσιν
 ἀδικίαν. ὁ δὲ καὶ συγκολάζων εἰς δύναμιν τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, ὁ μέγας ἀνὴρ ἐν
 πόλει καὶ τέλειος, οὗτος ἀναγορευέσθω νικηφόρος ἀρετῇ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τοῦτον **e**
 ἐπαινον καὶ περὶ σωφροσύνης χρὴ λέγειν καὶ περὶ φρονήσεως, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα
 ἀγαθὰ τις κέκτηται δυνατὰ μὴ μόνον αὐτὸν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοις μεταδιδόναι·
 καὶ τὸν μὲν μεταδιδόντα ὡς ἀκρότατον χρὴ τιμᾶν, τὸν δ' αὖ μὴ δυνάμενον,
 ἐθέλοντα δέ, ἔαν δεύτερον, τὸν δὲ φθονοῦντα καὶ ἐκόντα μηδενὶ κοινωνὸν διὰ
 φιλίας γιγνόμενον ἀγαθῶν τινων αὐτὸν μὲν ψέγειν, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα μηδὲν μᾶλλον **731a**
 διὰ τὸν κεκτημένον ἀτιμάζειν, ἀλλὰ κτᾶσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν. φιλονικεῖτω δὲ
 ἡμῖν πᾶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀφθόνως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοιοῦτος τὰς πόλεις αὔξει, ἀμιλλώ-
 μενος μὲν αὐτός, τοὺς ἄλλους δὲ οὐ κολοῦν διαβολαῖς· ὁ δὲ φθονερός, τῇ τῶν
 ἄλλων διαβολῇ δεῖν οἰόμενος ὑπερέχειν, αὐτός τε ἥττον συντείνει πρὸς ἀρετὴν
 τὴν ἀληθῆ, τοὺς τε ἀνθαμιλλωμένους εἰς ἀθυμίαν καθίστησι τῷ ἀδίκως ψέ-
 γεσθαι, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀγύμναστον τὴν πόλιν ὅλην εἰς ἄμιλλαν ἀρετῆς ποιῶν, **b**
 σμικροτέραν αὐτὴν πρὸς εὐδοξίαν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μέρος ἀπεργάζεται. θυμοειδῆ
 μὲν δὴ χρὴ πάντα ἄνδρα εἶναι, πρῶτον δὲ ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα. τὰ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων
 χαλεπὰ καὶ δυσίατα ἢ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀνίατα ἀδικήματα οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως ἐκ-
 φυγεῖν ἢ μαχόμενον καὶ ἀμυνόμενον νικῶντα καὶ τῷ μηδὲν ἀνιέναι κολάζοντα,
 τοῦτο δὲ ἄνευ θυμοῦ γενναίου ψυχῇ πᾶσα ἀδύνατος δρᾶν. τὰ δ' αὖ τῶν ὅσοι ἀδι- **c**

the unjust
are always
to be pitied,
being not
willingly so

κοῦσιν μὲν, ἱατὰ δέ, γινώσκειν χρή πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ ἄδικος οὐχ ἐκὼν ἄδικος· τῶν γὰρ μεγίστων κακῶν οὐδεὶς οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν ἐκὼν κεκτηῖτο ἂν ποτε, πολὺ δὲ ἤκιστα ἐν τοῖς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ τιμιωτάτοις. ψυχὴ δ', ὡς εἵπομεν, ἀληθεία γέ ἐστιν πᾶσιν τιμιώτατον· ἐν οὖν τῷ τιμιωτάτῳ τὸ μέγιστον κακὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν μὴ ποτε λάβῃ καὶ ζῇ διὰ βίου κεκτημένος αὐτό. ἀλλὰ ἐλεεινὸς μὲν πάντως
d ὁ γε ἄδικος ὁ τὰ κακὰ ἔχων, ἐλεεῖν δὲ τὸν μὲν ἰάσιμα ἔχοντα ἐγχαωρεῖ καὶ ἀνείργοντα τὸν θυμὸν πράττειν καὶ μὴ ἀκραχολοῦντα γυναικείως πικραίνόμενον διατελεῖν, τῷ δ' ἀκράτως καὶ ἀπαραμυθήτως πλημμελεῖ καὶ κακῶ ἐφίεναι δεῖ τὴν ὀργήν· διὸ δὴ θυμοειδῇ πρέπειν καὶ πρᾶόν φαμεν ἐκάστοτε εἶναι δεῖν τὸν ἀγαθόν.

selfishness
the greatest
of evils

Πάντων δὲ μέγιστον κακῶν ἀνθρώποις τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔμφυτον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐστίν, οὐ πᾶς αὐτῷ συγγνώμην ἔχων ἀποφυγὴν οὐδεμίαν μηχανᾶται· τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν ὁ λέγουσιν ὡς φίλος αὐτῷ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος φύσει τέ ἐστιν καὶ ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ δεῖν εἶναι τοιοῦτον. τὸ δὲ ἀληθεία γε πάντων ἀμαρτημάτων διὰ τὴν σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ φιλίαν αἴτιον ἐκάστῳ γίγνεται ἐκάστοτε. τυφλοῦται γὰρ περὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ὁ φιλῶν, ὥστε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ κακῶς κρίνει, τὸ
732a αὐτοῦ πρὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀεὶ τιμᾶν ἡγούμενος· οὔτε γὰρ ἑαυτὸν οὔτε τὰ ἑαυτοῦ χρή τὸν γε μέγαν ἄνδρα ἐσόμενον στέργειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δίκαια, ἔαντε παρ' αὐτῷ ἔαντε παρ' ἄλλῳ μᾶλλον πραττόμενα τυγχάνῃ. ἐκ ταύτου δὲ ἀμαρτήματος τούτου καὶ τὸ τὴν ἀμαθίαν τὴν παρ' αὐτῷ δοκεῖν σοφίαν εἶναι γέγονε πᾶσιν· ὅθεν οὐκ εἰδότες ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέν, οἴόμεθα τὰ πάντα εἰδέναι, οὐκ ἐπιτρέποντες δὲ
b ἄλλοις ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμεθα πράττειν, ἀναγκαζόμεθα ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτοὶ πράττοντες. διὸ πάντα ἄνθρωπον χρή φεύγειν τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν αὐτόν, τὸν δ' ἑαυτοῦ βελτίῳ διώκειν ἀεὶ, μηδεμίαν αἰσχύνην ἐπὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ πρόσθεν ποιούμενον.

necessity of
self-com-
mand

confidence
in God

d

Ἄ δὲ σμικρότερα μὲν τούτων καὶ λεγόμενα πολλάκις ἐστίν, χρήσιμα δὲ τούτων οὐχ ἦττον, χρή λέγειν ἑαυτὸν ἀναμνησκοντα· ὥσπερ γὰρ τινος ἀπορρέοντος ἀεὶ δεῖ τούναντίον ἐπιρρεῖν, ἀνάμνησις δ' ἐστίν ἐπιρροὴ φρονήσεως ἀπολειπούσης. διὸ δὴ γελῶτων τε εἵργεσθαι χρή τῶν ἐξαίσιων καὶ δακρύων, παραγγέλλειν δὲ παντὶ πάντ' ἄνδρα, καὶ ὅλην περιχάρειαν πᾶσαν ἀποκρυπτόμενον καὶ περιωδυνίαν εὐσχημονεῖν πειρᾶσθαι, κατὰ τε εὐπραγίας ἰσταμένου τοῦ δαίμονος ἐκάστου, καὶ κατὰ τύχας οἷον πρὸς ὑψηλὰ καὶ ἀνάντη δαιμόνων ἀνθισταμένων τισὶν πράξεσιν, ἐλπίζειν δ' ἀεὶ τοῖς γε ἀγαθοῖσι τὸν θεὸν ἢ δωρεῖται πόνων μὲν ἐπιπιπτόντων ἀντὶ μειζόνων ἐλάττους ποιήσῃ τῶν τ' αὖ νῦν παρόντων ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον μεταβολάς, περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἐναντία τούτων ἀεὶ πάντ' αὐτοῖς παραγενήσεσθαι μετ' ἀγαθῆς τύχης. ταύταις δὴ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν ἕκαστον χρή ζῆν καὶ ταῖς ὑπομνήσεσι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, μηδὲν φειδόμενον, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ κατὰ τε παιδιὰς καὶ σπουδὰς ἀναμνησκοντα ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἑαυτὸν σαφῶς.

e Νῦν οὖν δὴ περὶ μὲν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, οἷα χρή ἐπιτηδεύειν, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ

ἐκάστου, ποῖόν τινα χρεῶν εἶναι, λέλεκται σχεδὸν ὅσα θεῖά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώπινα νῦν ἡμῖν οὐκ εἴρηται, δεῖ δὲ ἄνθρώποις γὰρ διαλεγόμεθα ἄλλ' οὐ θεοῖς. ἔστιν δὴ φύσει ἀνθρώπειον μάλιστα ἡδοναὶ καὶ λύπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι, ἐξ ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸ θνητὸν πᾶν ζῶον ἀτεχνῶς οἶον ἐξηρτῆσθαι τε καὶ ἐκκρεμάμενον εἶναι σπουδαῖς ταῖς μεγίσταις· δεῖ δὴ τὸν κάλλιστον βίον ἐπαινεῖν, μὴ μόνον ὅτι τῷ σχήματι κρατεῖ πρὸς εὐδοξίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς, ἂν τις ἐθέλῃ γεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ νέος ὧν φυγὰς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γένηται, κρατεῖ καὶ τούτῳ ὃ πάντες ζητοῦμεν, τῷ χαίρειν πλείω, ἐλάττω δὲ λυπεῖσθαι παρὰ τὸν βίον ἅπαντα. ὥς δὲ ἔσται τοῦτο σαφές, ἂν γεύηται τις ὀρθῶς, ἐτοιμῶς καὶ σφόδρα φανήσεται. ἡ δὲ ὀρθότης τίς; τοῦτο ἤδη παρὰ τοῦ λόγου χρή λαμβάνοντα σκοπεῖν· εἴτε οὕτως ἡμῖν κατὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν εἴτε ἄλλως παρὰ φύσιν, βίον χρή παρὰ βίον ἡδίω καὶ λυπηρότερον ὧδε σκοπεῖν. ἡδονὴν βουλόμεθα ἡμῖν εἶναι, λύπην δὲ οὐθ' αἰρούμεθα οὔτε βουλόμεθα, τὸ δὲ μηδέτερον ἀντὶ μὲν ἡδονῆς οὐ βουλόμεθα, λύπης δὲ ἀλλάττεσθαι βουλόμεθα· λύπην δ' ἐλάττω μετὰ μείζονος ἡδονῆς βουλόμεθα, ἡδονὴν δ' ἐλάττω μετὰ μείζονος λύπης οὐ βουλόμεθα, ἴσα δὲ ἀντὶ ἴσων ἐκάτερα τούτων οὐχ ὥς βουλόμεθα ἔχοιμεν ἂν διασφαεῖν. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐστὶν πληθεῖ καὶ μεγέθει καὶ σφοδρότησιν ισότησιν τε, καὶ ὅσα ἐναντία ἐστὶν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς βούλησιν, διαφέροντά τε καὶ μηδὲν διαφέροντα πρὸς αἵρεσιν ἐκάστων. οὕτω δὴ τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης διακεκοσμημένων, ἐν ᾧ μὲν βίῳ ἔνεστι πολλὰ ἐκάτερα καὶ μεγάλα καὶ σφοδρά, ὑπερβάλλει δὲ τὰ τῶν ἡδονῶν, βουλόμεθα, ἐν ᾧ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, οὐ βουλόμεθα· καὶ αὖ ἐν ᾧ ὀλίγα ἐκάτερα καὶ σμικρά καὶ ἡρεμαῖα, ὑπερβάλλει δὲ τὰ λυπηρά, οὐ βουλόμεθα, ἐν ᾧ δὲ τὰναντία, βουλόμεθα. ἐν ᾧ δ' αὖ βίῳ ἰσορροπεῖ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι· τὸν ἰσορροπον βίον ὥς τῶν μὲν υπερβαλλόντων τῷ φίλῳ ἡμῖν βουλόμεθα, τῶν δ' αὖ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς οὐ βουλόμεθα. πάντας δὴ δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι τοὺς βίους ἡμῶν ὥς ἐν τούτοις ἐνδεδεμένοι πεφύκασιν, καὶ δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι ποίους φύσει βουλόμεθα· εἰ δὲ τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄρα φαρὲν βούλεσθαι, διὰ τινα ἄνοιαν καὶ ἀπειρίαν τῶν ὄντων βίων αὐτὰ λέγομεν.

Τίνες δὴ καὶ πόσοι εἰσὶ βίοι, ὧν περί δεῖ προελόμενον τὸ βούλητόν τε καὶ [ἐκούσιον ἀβούλητόν τε καὶ] ἀκούσιον ἰδόντα εἰς νόμον ἑαυτῷ ταξάμενον, τὸ φίλον ἅμα καὶ ἡδὺ καὶ ἄριστόν τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἐλόμενον, ζῆν ὥς οἶόν τ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπον μακαριώτατα; λέγωμεν δὴ σῶφρονα βίον ἕνα εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον ἕνα καὶ ἕνα τὸν ἀνδρεῖον, καὶ τὸν ὑγιεινὸν βίον ἕνα ταξώμεθα· καὶ τούτοις οὖσιν τέτταρσιν ἐναντίους ἄλλους τέτταρας, ἄφρονα, δειλόν, ἀκόλαστον, νοσώδη. σῶφρονα μὲν οὖν βίον ὃ γιγνώσκων θήσῃ πρῶον ἐπὶ πάντα, καὶ ἡρεμαίας μὲν λύπας, ἡρεμαίας δὲ ἡδονάς, μαλακὰς δὲ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἔρωτας οὐκ ἐμμανεῖς παρεχόμενον, ἀκόλαστον δέ, ὃξὺν ἐπὶ πάντα, καὶ σφοδράς μὲν λύπας, σφοδράς δὲ ἡδονάς, συντόνους δὲ καὶ οἰστρώδεις ἐπιθυμίας τε καὶ ἔρωτας ὥς οἶόν τε ἐμμανεστάτους παρεχόμενον, ὑπερβαλλούσας δὲ ἐν μὲν τῷ σῶφρονι

there must
be a right
taste of
pleasure
and pain

733b

c

d

which lives
are the most
happy?

e

the temperate and the rational, the courageous and the healthy

734a

- βίω τὰς ἡδονὰς τῶν ἀχθηδόνων, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ τὰς λύπας τῶν ἡδονῶν
 μεγέθει καὶ πληθίει καὶ πυκνότησιν. ὅθεν ὁ μὲν ἡδίων ἡμῖν τῶν βίων, ὁ δὲ
 b λυπηρότερος ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει κατὰ φύσιν γίνεσθαι, καὶ τὸν γε βουλό-
 μενον ἡδέως ζῆν οὐκέτι παρὲκει ἐκόντα γε ἀκολάστως ζῆν, ἀλλ' ἤδη δῆλον
 ὡς, εἰ τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον ὀρθόν, πᾶς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄκων ἐστὶν ἀκόλαστος· ἢ γὰρ
 δι' ἀμαθίαν ἢ δι' ἀκράτειαν ἢ δι' ἀμφότερα, τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ἐνδεὲς ὢν ζῆ ὁ
 πᾶς ἀνθρώπινος ἕχλος. ταῦτά δὲ περὶ νοσώδους τε καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ βίου διανοητέον,
 ὡς ἔχουσι μὲν ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, ὑπερβάλλουσι δὲ ἡδοναὶ μὲν λύπας ἐν ὑγιείᾳ,
 c λῦπαι δὲ ἡδονὰς ἐν νόσοις. ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ βούλησις τῆς αἰρέσεως τῶν βίων οὐχ
 ἵνα τὸ λυπηρὸν ὑπερβάλλῃ· ὅπου δ' ὑπερβάλλεται, τοῦτον τὸν βίον ἡδίω
 κεκρίκαμεν. ὁ δὲ σῶφρων τοῦ ἀκολάστου καὶ ὁ φρόνιμος τοῦ ἄφρονος, φαῖμεν
 ἄν, καὶ ὁ τῆς ἀνδρείας τοῦ τῆς δειλίας ἐλάττωνα καὶ σμικρότερα καὶ μανότερα
 ἔχων ἀμφότερα, τῇ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκάτερος ἐκάτερον ὑπερβάλλων, τῇ τῆς λύπης
 d ἐκείνων ὑπερβαλλόντων αὐτούς, ὁ μὲν ἀνδρεῖος τὸν δειλόν, ὁ δὲ φρόνιμος τὸν
 ἄφρονα νικῶσιν, ὥστε ἡδίους εἶναι τοὺς βίους τῶν βίων, σῶφρονα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον
 καὶ φρόνιμον καὶ ὑγιεινὸν δειλοῦ καὶ ἄφρονος καὶ ἀκολάστου καὶ νοσώδους,
 καὶ συλλήβδην τὸν ἀρετῆς ἐχόμενον κατὰ σῶμα ἢ καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν τοῦ τῆς
 μοχθηρίας ἐχομένου βίου ἡδίω τε εἶναι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπερέχειν ἐκ περιττοῦ
 κάλλει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ ἀρετῇ καὶ εὐδοξίᾳ, ὥστε τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὸν ζῆν
 e εὐδαιμονέστερον ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοῦ ἐναντίου τῷ παντὶ καὶ ὅλῳ.

impossible
 that a good
 man should
 be very rich

376—*Leg. V 742 e-743 a*:

- σχεδὸν μὲν γὰρ εὐδαίμονας ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι — τοῦτο μὲν
 οὐδ' βούλουτ' ἄν — πλουσίους δ' αὖ σφόδρα καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀδύνατον, οὓς γε δὴ
 πλουσίους οἱ πολλοὶ καταλέγουσι· λέγουσιν δὲ τοὺς κεκτημένους ἐν ὀλίγοις
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων πλείστου νομίσματος ἄξια κτήματα, ἃ καὶ κακὸς τις κεκτήτ'
 743a ἄν. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγε αὐτοῖς ποτε συγχωροίην τὸν
 πλούσιον εὐδαίμονα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ γίνεσθαι μὴ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὄντα· ἀγαθὸν δὲ
 ὄντα διαφόρως καὶ πλούσιον εἶναι διαφερόντως ἀδύνατον.

a general
 word about
 marriage

377—*a. Leg. VI 773 b-d*:

- καὶ κατὰ παντὸς εἰς ἔστω μῦθος γάμου· τὸν γὰρ τῇ πόλει δεῖ συμφέροντα
 μνηστεύειν γάμον ἕκαστον, οὐ τὸν ἡδιστὸν αὐτῷ. φέρεται δὲ πως πᾶς ἀεὶ
 773c κατὰ φύσιν πρὸς τὸν ὁμοιότατον αὐτῷ, ὅθεν ἀνώμαλος ἢ πόλις ὅλη γίνεσθαι
 χρήμασιν τε καὶ τρόπων ἥθεσιν· ἐξ ὧν ἃ μὴ βουλόμεθα συμβαίνειν ἡμῖν, καὶ
 μάλιστα συμβαίνει ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι. ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λόγου μὲν νόμῳ
 προστάττειν, μὴ γαμεῖν πλούσιον πλουσίῳ, μηδὲ πολλὰ δυνάμενον πρᾶττειν
 ἄλλου τοιούτου, θάττους δὲ ἥθεσι πρὸς βραδυτέρους καὶ βραδυτέρους πρὸς
 θάττους ἀναγκάζειν τῇ τῶν γάμων κοινωνίᾳ πορεύεσθαι, πρὸς τῷ γελοῖᾳ

εἶναι θυμὸν¹ ἂν ἐγείραι πολλοῖς · οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον ἐννοεῖν ὅτι πόλιν εἶναι δεῖ δίκην κρατῆρος κεκραμένην, οὐ μαινόμενος μὲν οἶνος ἐγκεχυμένος ζεῖ, κολα- d
ζόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ νήφοντος ἐτέρου θεοῦ καλὴν κοινωνίαν λαβὼν ἀγαθὸν πῶμα
καὶ μέτριον ἀπεργάζεται.

b. Ib. 773 e-774 c:

Περὶ γάμων δὴ ταῦτ' ἔστω παραμύθια λεγόμενα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ ἐμπροσθε
τούτων ῥηθέντα, ὡς χρὴ τῆς ἀειγενοῦς φύσεως ἀντέχεσθαι τῷ παιῖδας παῖδων
καταλείποντα αἰεὶ τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρέτας ἀνθ' αὐτοῦ παραδιδόναι. πάντα οὖν ταῦτα 774a
καὶ ἔτι πλείω τις ἂν εἴποι περὶ γάμων, ὡς χρὴ γαμεῖν, προοιμιαζόμενος ὁρθῶς ·
ἂν δ' ἄρα τις μὴ πείθεται ἐκὼν, ἀλλότριον δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ ἀκοινωνήτον² ἐν τῇ the unmarried
πόλει ἔχη καὶ ἄγαμος ὢν γένηται πεντεκαετριάκοντούτης, ζημιούσθω κατ' ried shall be
ἐνιαυτὸν ἕκαστον, ὁ μέγιστον μὲν τίμημα κεκτημένος ἑκατὸν δραχμαῖς, ὁ δὲ fined and
τὸ δεύτερον ἐβδομήκοντα, τρίτον δὲ ἐξήκοντα, ὁ δὲ τὸ τέταρτον τριάκοντα. dishonoured
τοῦτο δ' ἔστω τῆς Ἥρας ἱερὸν. ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐκτίνων κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν δεκαπλάσιον b
ὀφειλέτω · πραττέσθω δὲ ὁ ταμίης τῆς θεοῦ, μὴ ἐκπράξας δὲ αὐτὸς ὀφειλέτω
καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐθύναις τοῦ τοιοῦτου λόγον ὑπεχέτω πᾶς. εἰς μὲν οὖν χρήματα
ὁ μὴ θέλων γαμεῖν ταῦτα ζημιούσθω, τιμῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν νεωτέρων ἄτιμος
πάσης ἔστω, καὶ μηδεὶς ὑπακούετω μηδὲν αὐτῷ ἐκὼν τῶν νέων · ἐὰν δὲ κολάζειν
τινὰ ἐπιχειρῇ, πᾶς τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ βοηθείτω καὶ ἀμυνέτω, μὴ βοηθῶν δὲ ὁ
παραγενόμενος δειλὸς τε ἅμα καὶ κακὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου πολίτης εἶναι λεγέσθω. c

378—Leg. XI 929 e-930 b:

Ἐὰν δὲ ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνὴ μηδαμῇ συμφέρονται τρόπων ἀτυχία χρώμενοι, δέκα
μὲν ἀνδρας τῶν νομοφυλάκων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων αἰεὶ χρεῶν τοὺς 930a
μέσους, δέκα δὲ τῶν περὶ γάμους γυναικῶν ὡσαύτως · καὶ ἐὰν μὲν δὴ συναλλάτ-
τειν δύνωνται, ταῦτ' ἔστω κύρια, ἐὰν δ' αἱ ψυχαὶ κυμαίνωσιν μειζρόνως αὐτῶν,
ζητεῖν κατὰ δύναμιν οὔτινες ἑκατέρῳ συνοίσουσιν. εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους
μὴ πράεσιν ἤθεσιν κεχρημένους · βαθύτερα δὴ τούτοις καὶ πρᾶότερα τρόπων
ἦθη σύννομα πειρᾶσθαι προσαρμόττειν. καὶ ὅσοι μὲν ἂν ἄπαιδες αὐτῶν ἢ ὀλι-
γόπαιδες ὄντες διαφέρωνται, καὶ παῖδων ἕνεκα τὴν συνοίχῃσιν ποιεῖσθαι · b
ὅσοι δ' ἂν ἱκανῶν ὄντων παίδων, τῆς συγκαταγῆρας ἕνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας
ἀλλήλων τὴν διάζευξιν τε καὶ σύζευξιν ποιεῖσθαι χρεῶν.

379—Leg. VI 777 b-e:

ΑΘ. Τί δ', ὦ Κλεινία; δῆλον ὡς ἐπειδὴ δύσκολόν ἐστι τὸ θρέμμα ἄνθρωπος, ought to be
καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν διόρισιν, τὸ δοῦλόν τε ἔργῳ διηριζέσθαι καὶ ἐλεύθερον treated

¹ θυμὸν - ὀργήν.

² ἀλλότριον καὶ ἀκοινωνήτον - eccentric and unsocial.

καὶ δεσπότῃν, οὐδαμῶς εὐχρηστον ἐθέλειν εἶναι τε καὶ γίγνεσθαι φαίνεται,
 777C χαλεπὸν δὴ τὸ κτῆμα · ἐργῷ γὰρ πολλάκις ἐπιδέδεικται περὶ τὰς Μεσσηνίων
 συχνὰς εἰωθυίας ἀποστάσεις γίγνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ γε τὰς τῶν ἐκ μιᾶς φωνῆς
 πολλοὺς οἰκέτας κτωμένων πόλεις, ὅσα κακὰ συμβαίνει, καὶ ἔτι τὰ τῶν λεγο-
 μένων περιδίνων * τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν γιγνομένων παντοδαπὰ κλωπῶν ἔργα
 τε καὶ παθήματα. πρὸς ἃ τις ἂν πάντα βλέψας διαπορήσειε τί χρὴ δρᾶν περὶ
 ἀπάντων τῶν τοιούτων. δύο δὴ λείπεσθον μόνῳ μηχανά, μήτε πατριώτας
 d ἀλλήλων εἶναι τοὺς μέλλοντας ῥᾶον δουλεύσειν, ἀσυμφώνους τε εἰς δύναμιν ὅτι
 μάλιστα, τρέφειν δ' αὐτοὺς ὀρθῶς, μὴ μόνον ἐκείνων ἕνεκα, πλεόν δὲ αὐτῶν
 προτιμῶντας · ἡ δὲ τροφή τῶν τοιούτων μήτε τινὰ ὕβριν ὑβρίζειν εἰς τοὺς
 οἰκέτας, ἤττον δέ, εἰ δυνατόν, ἀδικεῖν ἢ τοὺς ἐξ ἴσου. διάδηλος γὰρ ὁ φύσει
 καὶ μὴ πλαστῶς σέβων τὴν δίκην, μισῶν δὲ ὄντως τὸ ἄδικον, ἐν τούτοις τῶν
 ἀνθρώπων ἐν οἷς αὐτῷ ῥᾶδιον ἀδικεῖν · ὁ περὶ τὰ τῶν δούλων οὖν ἤθη καὶ
 e πράξεις γιγνόμενός τις ἀμίαντος τοῦ τε ἀνοσίτου πέρι καὶ ἀδίκου, σπείρειν εἰς
 ἀρετῆς ἔκφυσιν ἱκανώτατος ἂν εἴη, ταῦτόν δ' ἔστ' εἰπεῖν τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἅμα
 λέγοντα ἐπὶ τε δεσπότῃ καὶ τυράννῳ καὶ πᾶσαν δυναστείαν δυναστεύοντι
 πρὸς ἀσθενέστερον ἑαυτοῦ.

the middle
state to be
striven after

380—a. *Leg.* VII 792 c-e:

ΑΘ. Οὐ σμικροῦ πέρι νῦν εἶναι νῶν τὸν λόγον. ὅρα δὲ καὶ σύ, συνεπίκρινέ
 τε ἡμᾶς, ὦ Μέγίλλε. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὸς δὴ λόγος οὐθ' ἡδονὰς φησι δεῖν διώκειν
 792d τὸν ὀρθὸν βίον οὐτ' αὖ τὸ παράπαν φεύγειν τὰς λύπας, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἀσπάζεσθαι
 τὸ μέσον, ὃ νυνδὴ προσεῖπον ὡς ἔλεων ὀνομάσας, ἣν δὴ διάθεσιν καὶ θεοῦ
 κατὰ τινα μαντείας φήμην εὐστόχως πάντες προσαγορεύομεν. ταύτην τὴν
 ἕξιν διώκειν φημι δεῖν ἡμῶν καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι θεῖον, μήτ' οὖν αὐτὸν
 προπετῇ πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς γιγνόμενον ὅλως, ὡς οὐδ' ἐκτὸς λυπῶν ἐσόμενον,
 μήτε ἄλλον, γέροντα ἢ νέον, ἔἴη πάσχειν ταῦτόν τοῦθ' ἡμῖν, ἄρρενα ἢ θῆλυον,
 e ἀπάντων δὲ ἥκιστα εἰς δύναμιν τὸν ἀρτίως νεογενῆ · κυριώτατον γὰρ οὖν
 ἐμφύεται πᾶσι τότε τὸ πᾶν ἥθος διὰ ἔθος. ἔτι δ' ἐγωγ', εἰ μὴ μέλλοιμι δόξειν
 παίζειν, φαίην ἂν δεῖν καὶ τὰς φερούσας ἐν γαστρὶ πασῶν τῶν γυναικῶν μάλιστα
 θεραπεύειν ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἐνιαυτόν, ὅπως μήτε ἡδοναῖς τισι πολλαῖς ἅμα καὶ
 μάργοις προσχρήσεται ἢ κούσῃ μὴτε αὖ λύπαις, τὸ δὲ ἔλεων καὶ εὐμενὲς
 πρᾶον τε τιμῶσα διαζήσει τὸν τότε χρόνον.

the Stoic
apatheia
anticipated

b. Cf. *Pl., Phil.* 33 a-b:

ΣΩ. Τῷ τὸν τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐλομένῳ βίον οἷσθ' ὡς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οὐδὲν
 ἀποκωλύει ζῆν.

33b ΠΡΩ. Τὸν τοῦ μὴ χαίρειν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι λέγεις;

* περιδίνου - „banditti.”

ΣΩ. Ἐρρήθη γάρ που τότε ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βίων μηδὲν δεῖν μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρὸν χαίρειν τῷ τὸν τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν βίον ἐλομένῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα οὕτως ἐρρήθη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἂν ἐκείνῳ γε ὑπάρχοι · καὶ ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων ἐστὶ θεϊότατος.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ οὐκ εἰκός γε οὔτε χαίρειν θεοὺς οὔτε τὸ ἐναντίον.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰκός · ἀσχημον γοῦν αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν.

381—Leg. VII 794 d-795 c:

ΑΘ. Ὡς ἄρα τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ τὰ ἀριστερὰ διαφέροντά ἐσθ' ἡμῶν φύσει πρὸς τὰς χρεῖας εἰς ἑκάστας τῶν πράξεων τὰ περὶ τὰς χεῖρας, ἐπεὶ τὰ γε περὶ πόδας τε καὶ τὰ κάτω τῶν μελῶν οὐδὲν διαφέροντα εἰς τοὺς πόνους φαίνεται · τὰ δὲ κατὰ χεῖρας ἀνοίξαι τροφῶν καὶ μητέρων οἶον χωλοὶ γεγόναμεν ἕκαστοι. τῆς φύσεως γὰρ ἑκατέρων τῶν μελῶν σχεδὸν ἰσορροπούσης, αὐτοὶ διὰ τὰ ἔθνη διάφορα αὐτὰ πεποιθήκαμεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρώμενοι. ἐν ὅσοις μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἔργων μὴ μέγα διαφέρει, λύρα μὲν ἐν ἀριστερᾷ χρώμενον, πλήκτρῳ δὲ ἐν δεξιᾷ, πρᾶγμα οὐδέν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα · τοῦτοις δὲ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον καὶ εἰς ἄλλα μὴ δέον οὕτω χρῆσθαι σχεδὸν ἄνοια. ἔδειξεν δὲ ταῦτα ὁ τῶν Σκυθῶν νόμος, οὐκ ἐν ἀριστερᾷ μὲν τόξον ἀπάγων, ἐν δεξιᾷ δὲ οἰστὸν προσαγόμενος μόνον, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἑκατέροις ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα χρώμενος · πάμπολλα δ' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα παραδείγματα ἐν ἡνιοχείαις τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις, ἐν οἷσιν μαθεῖν δυνατόν ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν κατασκευάζουσιν οἱ ἀριστερὰ δεξιῶν ἀσθενέστερα κατασκευάζοντες. ταῦτα δ', ὅπερ εἵπομεν, ἐν μὲν κερατίνους πλήκτροις καὶ ἐν ὀργάνοις τοιούτοις οὐδὲν μέγα · σιδηροῖς δ' εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ὅταν δέῃ χρῆσθαι, μέγα διαφέρει, καὶ τόξοις καὶ ἀκοντίοις καὶ ἑκάστοις τούτων, πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον, ὅταν ὅπλοις δέῃ πρὸς ὅπλα χρῆσθαι. διαφέρει δὲ πάμπλου μαθὼν μὴ μαθόντος καὶ ὁ γυμνασάμενος τοῦ μὴ γεγυμνασμένου. καθάπερ γὰρ ὁ τελέως παγκράτιον ἡσκηκῶς ἢ πυγμὴν ἢ πάλην οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ἀριστερῶν ἀδύνατός ἐστι μάχεσθαι, χωλαίνει δὲ καὶ ἐφέλεκται πλημμελῶν, ὁπόταν αὐτόν τις μεταβιβάζων ἐπὶ θάτερα ἀναγκάζῃ διαπονεῖν, ταῦτόν δὲ τοῦτ', οἶμαι, καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι χρή προσδοκᾶν ὁρθόν, ὅτι τὸν διττὰ δεῖ κεκτημένον, οἷς ἀμύνειτό τ' ἂν καὶ ἐπιτιθεῖτο ἄλλοις, μηδὲν ἀργὸν τούτων μηδὲ ἀνεπιστῆμον ἔαν εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν · Γηρύονου δέ γε εἴ τις φύσιν ἔχων ἢ καὶ τὴν Βριάρεω φύοιτο, ταῖς ἑκατὸν χερσὶν ἑκατὸν δεῖ βέλη ῥίπτειν δυνατόν εἶναι.

children
should be
taught to use
the left hand
as well as
the right

794e

795a

very impor-
tant in war
b

c

382—Ib. 798 b-d:

Τὰς παιδιὰς πάντες διανοοῦνται κινουμένας τῶν νέων, ὅπερ ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, παιδιὰς ὄντως εἶναι καὶ οὐ τὴν μεγίστην ἐξ αὐτῶν σπουδὴν καὶ

Innovation in
children's
plays leads
to revolution

- 798c βλάβην συμβαίνειν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀποτρέπουσιν ἀλλὰ συνέπονται ὑπείκοντες, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται τόδε, ὅτι τούτους ἀνάγκη τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς ἐν ταῖς παιδικαῖς νεωτερίζοντας ἑτέρους ἀνδρας τῶν ἐμπροσθεν γενέσθαι παίδων, γενομένους δὲ ἄλλους, ἄλλον βίον ζητεῖν, ζητήσαντας δέ, ἑτέρων ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ νόμων ἐπιθυμῆσαι, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἤζοντος τοῦ νυνδὴ λεγομένου μεγίστου
d κακοῦ πόλεσιν οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν φοβεῖται.

human things
not of great
importance;
yet we must
be in earnest
about them

383—Ib. 803 b-c; 804 b-c:

Ἔστι δὴ τοῖνυν τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα μεγάλης μὲν σπουδῆς οὐκ ἄξια, ἀναγκαῖόν γε μὴν σπουδάζειν· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ εὐτυχές. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐνταῦθά ἐσμεν, εἴ πως διὰ προσήκοντός τινος αὐτὸ πράττοιμεν, ἴσως ἂν ἡμῖν σύμμετρον ἂν εἴη. λέγω δὲ δὴ τί ποτε; ἴσως μεντὰν τίς μοι τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ὑπολαβὼν ὁρθῶς ὑπολάβοι.

803c ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Φημί χρῆναι τὸ μὲν σπουδαῖον σπουδάζειν, τὸ δὲ μὴ σπουδαῖον μὴ, φύσει δὲ εἶναι θεὸν μὲν πάσης μακαρίου σπουδῆς ἄξιον, ἀνθρωπον δέ, ὅπερ εἵπομεν ἐμπροσθεν, θεοῦ τι παίγιον εἶναι μεμηχανημένον, καὶ ὄντως τοῦτο αὐτοῦ τὸ βέλτιστον γεγονέναι· τούτῳ δὴ δεῖν τῷ τρόπῳ συνεπόμενον καὶ παίζοντα ὅτι καλλίστας παιδικὰς πάντ' ἀνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα οὕτω διαβιῶναι, τούναντίον ἢ νῦν διανοηθέντας. —

804b ΜΕ. Παντάπασι τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ἡμῖν, ὦ ξένε, διαφραυλίζεις.

ΑΘ. Μὴ θαυμάσης, ὦ Μέγилле, ἀλλὰ σύγγνωθί μοι· πρὸς γὰρ τὸν θεὸν ἀπιδὼν καὶ παθὼν εἶπον ὅπερ εἴρηκα νῦν. ἔστω δ' οὖν τὸ γένος ἡμῶν μὴ φαῦλον,

c εἴ σοι φίλον, σπουδῆς δέ τινος ἄξιον.

384—Ib. 804c⁸-d⁶ (There must be schools and places of exercise):

education to
be compul-
sory

Ἐν δὲ τούτοις ¹ πᾶσιν διδασκάλους ἐκάστων πεπεισμένους μισθοῖς οἰκοῦν-
τας ² ξένους διδάσκειν τε πάντα ὅσα πρὸς τὸν πόλεμόν ἐστιν μαθήματα τοὺς
φοιτῶντας ὅσα τε πρὸς μουσικὴν, οὐχ ὃν μὲν ἂν ὁ πατήρ βούληται, φοιτῶντα,
ὃν δ' ἂν μὴ, ἐῷντα τὰς παιδείας, ἀλλὰ τὸ λεγόμενον πάντ' ἀνδρα καὶ παῖδα
κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, ὡς τῆς πόλεως μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν γεννητόρων ὄντας, παι-
δεύτεον ἐξ ἀνάγκης ³.

¹ ἐν δὲ τούτοις - "In these several schools"—

² οἰκοῦντας - there should be dwellings for teachers in the schools.

³ In *Rep.* VII 536 d-537 a (our nr. 301), speaking about the training of his philosophers, Pl. ordained that education should not be forced. But in the above passage of the Laws there is 1st not thought of higher studies, such as the training of the philosophers; 2nd there is no question about the inclination of the children, but of the willing or not-willing of their parents.

385—Ib. 804 d-805 b:

Τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ δὴ καὶ περὶ θηλειῶν ὁ μὲν ἐμὸς νόμος ἂν εἴποι πάντα ὅσαπερ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρρένων, ἴσα καὶ τὰς θηλείας ἀσκεῖν δεῖν· καὶ οὐδὲν φοβηθεῖς εἴποιμ' ἂν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὔτε ἱππικῆς οὔτε γυμναστικῆς, ὥς ἀνδράσι μὲν πρέπον ἂν εἴη, γυναιξὶ δὲ οὐκ ἂν πρέπον. ἀκούων μὲν γὰρ δὴ μύθους παλαιούς πέπεισμαι, τὰ δὲ νῦν ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οἶδα ὅτι μυριάδες ἀναριθμητοὶ γυναικῶν εἰσι τῶν περὶ τὸν Πόντον, ἃς Σαυρομάτιδας καλοῦσιν, αἷς οὐχ ἔππων μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τόξων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅπλων κοινωνία καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἴση προσεταγμένη ἴσως ἀσκεῖται. λογισμὸν δὲ πρὸς τούτοις περὶ τούτων τοιόνδε τινα ἔχω· φημί, εἴπερ ταῦτα οὕτω συμβαίνειν ἐστὶν δυνατά, πάντων ἀνοητότατα τὰ νῦν ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν τόποις γίνεσθαι τὸ μὴ πάσῃ ῥώμῃ πάντας ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐπιτηδεύειν ἀνδρας γυναιξὶν ταυτά. σχεδὸν γὰρ ὀλίγου¹ πᾶσα ἡμίσεια πόλις ἀντὶ διπλασίας οὕτως ἐστὶν τε καὶ γίγνεται ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τελῶν καὶ πόνων· καίτοι θαυμαστὸν ἂν ἀμάρτημα νομοθέτῃ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ γίγνοιτο.

education
the same on
both sexes

804e

805a

the state is
reduced to a
half, if the
training of
women be
neglected

386—Leg. X 885 b:

Θεοὺς ἡγούμενος εἶναι κατὰ νόμους οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτε ἔργον ἀσεβὲς ἡργάσατο ἐκὼν οὔτε λόγον ἀφῆκεν ἄνομον, ἀλλὰ ἐν δὴ τι τῶν τριῶν πάσχων, ἢ τοῦτο, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὐχ ἡγούμενος, ἢ τὸ δεύτερον ὄντας οὐ φροντίζειν ἀνθρώπων, ἢ τρίτον εὐπαράμυθῆτους εἶναι θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς παραγομένους.

three forms
of asébeia

387—Ib. 885 e-886 a:

ΚΛ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ ξένε, δοκεῖ ῥᾶδιον εἶναι ἀληθεύοντας² λέγειν ὥς εἰσὶν θεοί;

ΑΘ. Πῶς;

ΚΛ. Πρῶτον μὲν γῆ καὶ ἥλιος ἄστρα τε καὶ τὰ σύμπαντα, καὶ τὰ τῶν ὠρῶν διακεκοσμημένα καλῶς οὕτως, ἐνιαυτοῖς τε καὶ μηνσὶν διειλημμένα· καὶ ὅτι πάντες Ἕλληνές τε καὶ βάρβαροι νομίζουσιν εἶναι θεούς.

May not the
existence of
gods be
proved by the
cosmical
order and by
the consensus
gentium?

ΑΘ. Φοβοῦμαι γε, μακάριε, τοὺς μοχθηροὺς — οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποτε εἴποιμ' ἂν ὥς γε αἰδοῦμαι — μή πως ἡμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν.

¹ σχεδὸν γὰρ ὀλίγου — - "What actually happens now is that, with the same expenditure and the same effort, almost every state turns out, as near as may be, the *half* of what it might have been—a strange blunder, surely, for a lawgiver to make!" (England).

² ἀληθεύοντας — This is the most significant word in the sentence: "Is it not the easiest thing in the world to speak the truth when you are saying that gods exist?" (England).

Pl. does believe that the existence of the gods can be proved by the order of the universe. Cp. our nr. 394.

388—Ib. 891 b-d; 891 e-892 d:

891b AΘ. — Καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ κατεσπαρμένοι ἦσαν οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι¹ ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀνθρώποις, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τῶν ἐπαμυνούντων λόγων ὡς εἰσὶν θεοί· νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη. νόμοις οὖν διαφθειρομένοις τοῖς μεγίστοις ὑπὸ κακῶν ἀνθρώπων τίνα καὶ μᾶλλον προσήκει βοθηεῖν ἢ νομοθέτην;

ME. Οὐκ ἔστιν.

c AΘ. Ἄλλὰ δὴ λέγε μοι πάλιν, Κλεινία, καὶ σύ — κοινωνὸν γὰρ δεῖ σε εἶναι τῶν λόγων — κινδυνεύει γὰρ ὁ λέγων ταῦτα πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα πρῶτα ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν πάντων εἶναι, καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα αὐτά, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὕστερον. ἔοικεν δὲ οὐ κινδυνεύειν, ἀλλὰ ὄντως σημαίνειν ταῦτα ἡμῖν τῷ λόγῳ.

The error of physical philosophers is that they take matter as the first cause of things.

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

AΘ. Ἄρ' οὖν πρὸς Διὸς οἶον πηγὴν τίνα ἀνοήτου δόξης ἀνηυρήκαμεν ἀνθρώπων ὁπόσοι πώποτε τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἐφύψαντο ζητημάτων; σκόπει d πάντα λόγον ἐξετάζων· οὐ γὰρ δὴ σμικρόν γε τὸ διαφέρον, εἰ φανεῖεν οἱ λόγων ἀπτόμενοι ἀσεβῶν, ἄλλοις τε ἐξάρχοντες, μὴδὲ εὖ τοῖς λόγοις ἀλλ' ἐξημαρτημένως χρώμενοι. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΚΛ. Εὖ λέγεις· ἀλλ' ὅπη, πειρῶ φράζειν.

AΘ. Ἔοικεν τοίνυν ἀηθεστέρων ἀπτεόν εἶναι λόγων.

ΚΛ. Οὐκ ὀκνητέον, ὦ ξένη. —

e AΘ. Λέγοιμ' ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἥδη σχεδὸν οὐκ εἰωθότα λόγον τινὰ τόνδε. ὁ πρῶτον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς αἷτιον ἀπάντων, τοῦτο οὐ πρῶτον ἀλλὰ ὕστερον ἀπεφάνησαν εἶναι γεγονὸς οἱ τὴν τῶν ἀσεβῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λόγοι², ὁ δὲ ὕστερον, πρότερον· ὅθεν ἡμαρτήκασι περὶ θεῶν τῆς ὄντως οὐσίας.

892a ΚΛ. Οὕτω μανθάνω.

AΘ. Ψυχὴν, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ἡγνοχέναι κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ὀλίγου σύμπαντες οἷόν τε ὃν τυγχάνει καὶ δύνανται ἣν ἔχει, τῶν τε ἄλλων αὐτῆς πέρι καὶ δὴ καὶ γενέσεως, ὡς ἐν πρῶτοις ἐστί, σωμάτων ἐμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη, καὶ μεταβολῆς τε αὐτῶν καὶ μετακοσμήσεως ἀπάσης ἄρχει παντὸς μᾶλλον· εἰ δὲ ἐστὶν ταῦτα οὕτως, ἄρ' οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ ψυχῆς συγγενῆ πρότερα ἂν εἴη γεγονότα τῶν σώματι προσηκόντων, οὐσης γ' αὐτῆς πρεσβυτέρας ἢ σώματος;

priority of soul to body

b ΚΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

AΘ. Δόξα δὴ καὶ ἐπιμέλεια καὶ νοῦς καὶ τέχνη καὶ νόμος σκληρῶν καὶ

¹ οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι - impious discourses.

² οἱ τὴν τῶν ἀσεβῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λόγοι - Jowett gives a somewhat free, but clear translation, which explains the passage well. He places οἱ—λόγοι, which is grammatically the subject of ἀπεφάνησαν, in the preceding sentence: "Then I suppose that I must repeat the singular argument of those who manufacture the soul according to their own impious notions; they affirm that!"—

μαλακῶν καὶ βαρέων καὶ κούφων πρότερα ἂν εἶη · καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ μεγάλα καὶ πρῶτα ἔργα καὶ πράξεις τέχνης ἂν γίγνοιτο, ὄντα ἐν πρῶτοις, τὰ δὲ φύσει καὶ φύσις, ἣν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπονομάζουσιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὕστερα καὶ ἀρχόμενα ἂν ἐκ τέχνης εἶη καὶ νοῦ.

ΚΛ. Πῶς οὐκ ὀρθῶς;

ΑΘ. Φύσιν βούλονται λέγειν γένεσιν τὴν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα ¹· εἰ δὲ φανήσεται ψυχὴ πρῶτον, οὐ πῦρ οὐδὲ ἀήρ, ψυχὴ δ' ἐν πρῶτοις γεγεννημένη, σχεδὸν ὀρθότατα λέγοιτ' ἂν εἶναι διαφερόντως φύσει. ταῦτ' ἔσθ' οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἂν ψυχῇν τις ἐπιδείξῃ πρεσβυτέραν οὔσαν σώματος, ἄλλως δὲ οὐδαμῶς.

ΚΛ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο στελλώμεθα;

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

389—Ib., 895 e¹⁰-896 b³:

ΑΘ. ὦι δὴ ψυχὴ τοῦνομα, τίς τούτου λόγος; ἔχομεν ἄλλον πλὴν τὸν νυνδὴ ῥηθέντα, τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν αὐτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν;

ΚΛ. Τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν φῆς λόγον ἔχειν τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν, ἣνπερ τοῦνομα δὲ δὴ πάντες ψυχὴν προσαγορεύομεν;

ΑΘ. Φημί γε · εἰ δ' ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, ἄρα ἔτι ποθοῦμεν μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδεῖχθαι ψυχὴν ταῦτόν ὃν καὶ τὴν πρῶτην γένεσιν καὶ κίνησιν τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ γεγονότων καὶ ἐσομένων καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις, ἐπειδὴ γε ἀνεφάνη μεταβολῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως ἀπάσης αἰτία ἅπασι;

ΚΛ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ ἱκανώτατα δέδεικται ψυχὴ τῶν πάντων πρεσβυτάτη, γενομένη γε ἀρχὴ κινήσεως.

390—a. Ib. 896 d⁵-897 b⁶:

ΑΘ. Ἄρ' οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι ψυχὴν καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχυρῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων, εἴπερ τῶν πάντων γε αὐτὴν θήσομεν αἰτίαν;

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Ψυχὴν δὴ διοικοῦσαν καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς πάντη κινουμένοις μῶν οὐ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάγκη διοικεῖν φάναι;

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Μίαν ἢ πλείους; πλείους · ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σφῶν ἀποκρinoῦμαι. δυοῖν μὲν

c

d

soul the
self-moving
principle
896a

b.

soul the cause
of good and
evil

896e

¹ γένεσιν τὴν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα - England explains: "When they use the term φύσις they mean to describe the way the first things come into being."

Jowett translates, clearer and yet precisely: "Because those who use the term mean to say that nature is the first creative power".

more than
one world-
soul

γέ που ἔλαττον μὴδὲν τιθῶμεν, τῆς τε εὐεργέτιδος καὶ τῆς τάναντία δυναμένης ἐξεργάζεσθαι ¹.

ΚΛ. Σφόδρα ὀρθῶς εἴρηκας.

897a ΑΘ. Εἴεν. ἄγει μὲν δὴ ψυχὴ πάντα τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν ταῖς αὐτῆς κινήσεσιν, αἷς ὀνόματά ἐστιν βούλεσθαι, σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, βουλεύεσθαι, δοξάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐψευσμένως, χαίρουσαν λυπούμενην, θαρροῦσαν φοβουμένην, μισοῦσαν στέργουσαν, καὶ πάσαις ὅσαι τούτων συγγενεῖς ἢ πρωτουργοὶ κινήσεις τὰς δευτερουργοὺς αὖ παραλαμβάνουσαι κινήσεις σωμάτων ἄγουσι πάντα εἰς αὖξιν καὶ φθίσιν καὶ διάκρισιν καὶ σύγκρισιν καὶ τούτοις ἐπομένους θερμότητος ψύξεις, βαρύτητας κουφότητος, σκληρὸν καὶ μαλακόν, b λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν, αὖστηρὸν καὶ γλυκύ, καὶ πᾶσιν οἷς ψυχὴ χρωμένη, νοῦν μὲν προσλαβοῦσα αἰεὶ θεὸν † ὀρθῶς θεοῖς ² †, ὀρθὰ καὶ εὐδαίμονα παιδαγωγεῖ πάντα, ἀνοίᾳ δὲ συγγενομένη πάντα αὖ τάναντία τούτοις ἀπεργάζεται. τιθῶμεν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν, ἢ ἔτι διστάζομεν εἰ ἐτέρως πως ἔχει;

ΚΛ. Οὐδαμῶς.

Is the univer-
se governed
by the good or
by the bad
world-soul?

b. Ib. 897 b⁷- d²:

ΑΘ. Πότερον οὖν δὴ ψυχῆς ἐγκρατὲς οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ πάσης τῆς περιό-
δου γεγονέναι φῶμεν; τὸ φρόνιμον καὶ ἀρετῆς πλήρες, ἢ μηδέτερα κεκτημένον;
c βούλεσθε οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα ὧδε ἀποκρινώμεθα;

ΚΛ. Πῶς;

ΑΘ. Εἰ μὲν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, φῶμεν, ἢ σύμπασα οὐρανοῦ ὁδὸς ἅμα καὶ φορὰ καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ ὄντων ἀπάντων νοῦ κινήσει καὶ περιφορᾷ καὶ λογισμοῖς ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχει καὶ συγγενῶς ἔρχεται, δῆλον ὡς τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν φατέον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς καὶ ἄγειν αὐτὸν τὴν τοιαύτην ὁδὸν ἐκείνην.

ΚΛ. Ὅρθῶς.

d ΑΘ. Εἰ δὲ μανικῶς τε καὶ ἀτάκτως ἔρχεται, τὴν κακὴν.

ΚΛ. Καὶ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς.

In the following passages the author shows that the motion of the universe is akin to that of mind, which is circular.

the souls of
the heavenly
bodies

391—Ib. 898 d-e; 899 a-c:

ΑΘ. "Ἡλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα, εἵπερ ψυχὴ περιάγει πάντα, ἄρ' οὐ καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ;

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

¹ δυναμένης ἐξεργάζεσθαι - Cp. *Rep.* II 379 c (see our nr. 262 a), and *Leg.* 906 a (our nr. 376).

² The words ὀρθῶς θεοῖς do not contain any good sense. Winckelmann proposed ὀρθῶς θέουσα, Apelt ὀρθωθεῖσα.

ΑΘ. Περὶ ἐνὸς δὴ ποιησώμεθα λόγους, οἳ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα ἡμῖν ἄστρο ἀρμόττοντες φανοῦνται.

ΚΛ. Τίνος;

ΑΘ. Ἡλίου πᾶς ἄνθρωπος σῶμα μὲν ὄρα, ψυχὴν δὲ οὐδεὶς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλου σώματος οὐδενὸς οὔτε ζῶντος οὔτε ἀποθνήσκοντος τῶν ζώων, ἀλλὰ ἐλπίς πολλή τὸ παράπαν τὸ γένος ἡμῖν τοῦτο ἀναισθητον πάσαις ταῖς τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεσι περιπεφυκέναι, νοητὸν δ' εἶναι. — 898e

ΑΘ. [Αὐτοῦ δὴ ἄμεινον] ¹ ταύτην τὴν ψυχὴν, εἴτε ἐν ἄρμασιν ἔχουσα ἡμῖν ἥλιον ἄγει φῶς τοῖς ἅπασιν, εἴτε ἔξωθεν, εἴθ' ὅπως εἴθ' ὅπη, θεὸν ἡγεῖσθαι χρεὼν πάντα ἄνδρα. ἢ πῶς; 899a

ΚΛ. Ναί, τὸν γέ που μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἀφιγμένον ἀνοίας. b

ΑΘ. Ἄστρον δὴ πέρι πάντων καὶ σελήνης, ἐνιαυτῶν τε καὶ μηνῶν καὶ πασῶν ὥρῶν πέρι, τίνα ἄλλον λόγον ἐροῦμεν ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον, ὡς ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μὲν ἢ ψυχὰι πάντων τούτων αἰτίαι ἐφάνησαν, ἀγαθαὶ δὲ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν, θεοὺς αὐτάς εἶναι φήσομεν, εἴτε ἐν σώμασιν ἐνοῦσαι, ζῶα ὄντα, κοσμοῦσιν πάντα οὐρανόν, εἴτε ὅπη τε καὶ ὅπως; ἔσθ' ὅστις ταῦτα ὁμολογῶν ὑπομενεῖ μὴ θεῶν εἶναι πλήρη πάντα;

ΚΛ. Οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως, ὦ ξέने, παραφρονῶν οὐδεὶς. c

392—a. Ib. 904 a-c:

Ἐπειδὴ κατεῖδεν ἡμῶν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐμψύχους οὔσας τὰς πράξεις ἀπάσας καὶ πολλὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν ἐν αὐταῖς οὔσαν, πολλὴν δὲ κακίαν, ἀνώλεθρον δὲ ὃν γενόμενον, ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰώνιον, ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, καθάπερ οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες θεοὶ — γένεσις γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ποτε ᾗν ζῶων ἀπολομένου τούτοις θατέρου — καὶ τὸ μὲν ὠφελεῖν αἰεὶ πεφυκός, ὅσον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς, διανοήθη, τὸ δὲ κακὸν βλάπτειν· ταῦτα πάντα συνιδὼν, ἐμηχανήσατο ποῦ κείμενον ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν νικῶσαν ἀρετὴν, ἡττωμένην δὲ κακίαν, ἐν τῷ παντὶ παρέχει μάλιστα ἂν καὶ ῥᾶστα καὶ ἀριστα. μεμηχάνηται δὴ πρὸς πᾶν τοῦτο τὸ ποῖόν τι γιγνόμενον αἰεὶ ποῖαν ἔδραν δεῖ μεταλαμβάνον οἰκίζεσθαι καὶ τίνας ποτὲ τόπους· τῆς δὲ γενέσεως τοῦ ποίου τινὸς ἀφῆκε ταῖς βουλήσεσιν ἑκάστων ἡμῶν τὰς αἰτίας. ὅπη γὰρ ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ καὶ ὁποῖός τις ὦν τὴν ψυχὴν, ταύτην σχεδὸν ἑκάστοτε καὶ τοιοῦτος γίγνεται ἅπας ἡμῶν ὡς τὸ πολὺ. 904b

God assigns to human souls their places in such a way that evil may be overcome

The fashioning of men's characters is left to themselves

b. Ib. 904 e-905 b:

Ὡ παῖ καὶ νεανίσκε ἀμελεῖσθαι δοκῶν ὑπὸ θεῶν, κακίῳ μὲν γιγνόμενον πρὸς τὰς κακίους ψυχάς, ἀμείνω δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀμείνους πορευόμενον, ἐν τε ζωῇ καὶ 905b

divine providence and human responsibility

¹ These words, which cannot be explained well, have been secluded by Schneider. Cp. England, *Laws* II p. 481.

- 905a ἐν πᾶσι θανάτοις πάσχειν τε ἃ προσῆκον δρᾶν ἐστι τοῖς προσφερέσι τοὺς προσφερεῖς καὶ ποιεῖν. ταύτης τῆς δίκης οὔτε σὺ μὴ ποτε οὔτε εἰ ἄλλος ἀτυχῆς γενόμενος ἐπεύξεται περιγενέσθαι θεῶν · ἦν πασῶν δικῶν διαφερόντως ἑταξάν τε οἱ τάξαντες χρεῶν τε ἐξευλαβεῖσθαι τὸ παράπαν. οὐ γὰρ ἀμεληθήσῃ ποτὲ ὑπ' αὐτῆς · οὐχ οὕτω σμικρὸς ὢν δύσῃ κατὰ τὸ τῆς γῆς βάθος, οὐδ' ὑψηλὸς γενόμενος εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀναπτῆσῃ, τείσεις δὲ αὐτῶν τὴν προσήκουσαν
- b τιμωρίαν εἴτ' ἐνθάδε μένων εἴτε καὶ ἐν "Αἶδου διαπορευθεὶς εἴτε καὶ τούτων εἰς ἀγριώτερον ἔτι διακομισθεὶς τόπον.

the gods our
helpers in the
eternal con-
flict between
good and
evil

393—a. Ib. 906 a-b:

Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ συγκεχωρήκαμεν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς εἶναι μὲν τὸν οὐρανὸν πολλῶν μεστὸν ἀγαθῶν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, πλειόνων δὲ τῶν μὴ, μάχῃ δὴ, φαμέν, ἀθάνατός ἐσθ' ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ φυλακῆς θαυμαστῆς δεομένη, σύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν θεοὶ τε ἅμα καὶ δαίμονες, ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ κτῆμα θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων · φθείρει δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀδικία καὶ ὕβρις μετὰ ἀφροσύνης, σφύζει δὲ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη μετὰ φρονήσεως, ἐν ταῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐμπύχοις οἰκοῦσαι δυνάμεσιν, βραχὺ δέ τι καὶ τῇδε ¹ ἂν τις τῶν τοιούτων ἐνοικοῦν ἡμῖν σαφὲς ἴδοι.

906b

conclusion

394—At the end of the 12th book of the *Leg.* Pl. makes his Athenian once more give his two proofs for the existence of Gods.

two proofs for
the existence
of Gods

a. *Leg.* XII 966 d-967 a:

ΑΘ. Ἄρα οὖν ἴσμεν ὅτι δὴ ἐστὸν τὼ περὶ θεῶν ἄγοντε εἰς πίστιν, ὅσα διήλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν;

ΚΛ. Ποῖα;

966e ΑΘ. Ἐν μὲν δὲ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλέγομεν, ὡς πρεσβύτατόν τε καὶ θεϊότατόν ἐστιν πάντων ὧν κίνησις γένεσιν παραλαβοῦσα ἀέναντον οὐσίαν ἐπόρισεν · ἐν δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν φορὰν, ὡς ἔχει τάξεως, ἄστρων τε καὶ ὅσων ἄλλων ἐγκρατῆς νοῦς ἐστὶν τὸ πᾶν διακεκοσμηκώς. ὁ γὰρ ἰδὼν ταῦτα μὴ φαύλως μὴδ' ἰδιωτικῶς, οὐδεὶς οὕτως ἄθεος ἀνθρώπων ποτὲ πέφυκεν, ὃς οὐ τοῦναντίον ἔπαθεν ἢ τὸ προσδοκώμενον ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν.

astronomy
does not tend
to atheism

b. Ib. 967 a-968 a:

967a Οἱ μὲν γὰρ διανοοῦνται τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα μεταχειρισμένους ἀστρονομία τε καὶ ταῖς μετὰ ταύτης ἀναγκαίαις ἄλλαις τέχναις ἀθέους γίγνεσθαι, καθεωρακότας ὡς οἷόν τε γιγνόμενα ἀνάγκαις πράγματ' ἄλλ' οὐ διανοοίαις βουλήσεως ἀγαθῶν πέρι τελουμένων.

¹ καὶ τῇδε - among mankind.

ΚΛ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πῶς ἔχον ἂν εἶη;

ΑΘ. Πᾶν, ὅπερ εἶπον, τοῦναντίον ἔχει νῦν τε καὶ ὅτε ἄψυχα αὐτὰ οἱ διανοούμενοι διανοοῦντο. θαύματα μὲν οὖν καὶ τότε ὑπεδύετο περὶ αὐτά, καὶ ὑπωπτεύετο τὸ νῦν ὄντως δεδογμένον, ὅσοι τῆς ἀκριβείας αὐτῶν ἤπτοντο, b
ὅπως μή ποτ' ἂν ἄψυχα ὄντα οὕτως εἰς ἀκρίβειαν θαυμαστοῖς λογισμοῖς ἂν ἐχρῆτο, νοῦν μὴ κεκτημένα· καὶ τινες ἐτόλμων τοῦτό γε αὐτὸ παρακινδυνεύειν καὶ τότε, λέγοντες ὡς νοῦς εἴη ὁ διακεκοσμηκῶς πάνθ' ὅσα κατ' οὐρανόν. οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ πάλιν ἀμαρτάνοντες ψυχῆς φύσεως ὅτι πρεσβύτερον εἶη σωμάτων, διανοηθέντες δὲ ὡς νεώτερον, ἅπανθ' ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔπος ἀνέτρεψαν πάλιν, ἑαυτοὺς c
δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον· τὸ γὰρ δὴ πρὸ τῶν ὁμμάτων, πάντα αὐτοῖς ἐφάνη, τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν φερόμενα, μεστὰ εἶναι λίθων καὶ γῆς καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων ἀψύχων σωμάτων διανεμόντων τὰς αἰτίας παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου. ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ τότε ἐξεργασμένα πολλὰς ἀθεότητος καὶ δυσχερείας τῶν τοιούτων ἅπτεσθαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ λοιδορήσεις γε ἐπῆλθον ποιηταῖς, τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας κυσὶ ματαίαις ἀπεικάζοντας χρωμέναισιν ὑλακαῖς, ἄλλα τε αὖ ἀνόητ' εἰπεῖν· νῦν δέ, ὅπερ d
εἴρηται, πᾶν τοῦναντίον ἔχει.

ΚΛ. Πῶς;

ΑΘ. Οὐκ ἔστιν ποτὲ γενέσθαι βεβαίως θεοσεβῇ θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα, No man can be truly pious who does not accept the two fundamental principles.
ὅς ἂν μὴ τὰ λεγόμενα ταῦτα νῦν δύο λάβῃ, ψυχὴ τε ὡς ἔστιν πρεσβύτατον ἀπάντων ὅσα γονῆς μετείληφεν, ἀθάνατόν τε, ἄρχει τε δὴ σωμάτων πάντων, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις δὴ, τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον πολλάκις, τόν τε εἰρημένον ἐν τοῖς ἄστροις νοῦν τῶν ὄντων τὰ τε πρὸ τούτων ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα λάβῃ, τὰ τε κατὰ τὴν μούσαν τούτοις τῆς κοινωνίας συνθεασάμενος, χρήσεται πρὸς τὰ τῶν ἡθῶν e
ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ νόμιμα συναρμοττόντως, ὅσα τε λόγον ἔχει, τούτων δυνατὸς ἢ δοῦναι τὸν λόγον· ὁ δὲ μὴ ταῦθ' οἷός τ' ὦν πρὸς ταῖς δημοσίαις ἀρεταῖς 968a
κεκτῆσθαι σχεδὸν ἄρχων μὲν οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο ἱκανὸς ὅλης πόλεως, ὑπηρέτης δ' ἂν ἄλλοις ἄρχουσιν.

A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY

I—GENERAL WORKS

A—TEXT EDITIONS

- Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum* ed. F. W. A. Mullach, Parisiis 1860-67.
Poetarum philosophorum fragmenta ed. H. Diels, Berolini 1901.
Doxographi Graeci ed. H. Diels, Berolini 1879. Editio iterata 1929.
Diogenis Laertii Περὶ βίων, δογμάτων καὶ ἀποφθεγμάτων τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ εὐδοκιμήσαντων ed. H. G. Hübner, Lipsiae 1828-31.
Diogenis Laertii Vitae philosophorum ed. C. G. Cobet, Parisiis 1850.
 Special editions of parts of the work are mentioned by R. Hope, *The Book of Diogenes Laërtius, its Spirit and its Method*, New-York 1930.
 A collection of texts: H. Ritter and L. Preller, *Historia philosophiae Graecae et Romanae ex fontium locis contexta*, Gothae, ¹⁰1934.

B—GENERAL HISTORIES OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY (in alphabetical order)

- A. H. Armstrong, *An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy*, London 1947.
 E. von Aster, *Geschichte der antiken Philosophie*, Berlin-Leipzig 1920.
 E. Bréhier, *Histoire de la Philosophie*, I, *L'Antiquité et le moyen-âge*, Paris 1926-27.
 J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, I, *Thales to Plato*. London 1914, ²1928.
 F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, I, *Greece and Rome*, London 1946.
 F. M. Cornford, *Before and after Socrates*, Cambridge 1932.
 Th. Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*, vol. I, *Naturphilosophen und Sophisten*, Leipzig ⁴1922; II, *Sokrates und Platon*, ⁴1925; III, *Aristoteles und seine Nachfolger*, ⁴1931. Engl. transl. by L. Magnus and G. G. Berry, 4 vol., London ²1913-29.
 K. Joël, *Geschichte der antiken Philosophie*, I, Tübingen 1921.
 B. J. H. Osvink-C. J. de Vogel, *Overzicht der Grieksche Wijsbegeerte*, Zutphen ⁴1943.
 L. Robin, *La pensée grecque*, Paris 1923, ²1948. Engl. transl., *Greek thought*, London 1928.
 F. Sassen, *Geschiedenis van de Wijsbegeerte der Grieken en Romeinen*, Antwerpen-Nijmegen ⁴1949.
 Ueberweg-Praechter, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie des Altertums*, Berlin, ¹²1926.
 Ch. Werner, *La philosophie grecque*, Paris 1938.
 W. Windelband-A. Goedeckemeyer, *Geschichte der Abendl. Philosophie im Altertum*, ⁴1923 (I. von Müller's *Handbuch der klass. Altertumswissenschaft* I).
 E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, 5 vol., Leipzig ⁶1919-23. I, *Allg. Einleitung, Vorsokr. Philosophie*; II, 1. *Sokrates u. die Sokratiker; Plato u. die alte Akademie*; 2. *Aristoteles u. die alten Peripatetiker*; III, 1. u. 2. *Die nacharistotelische Philosophie*.
 E. Zeller-W. Nestle, *Grundriss der Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, Leipzig, ¹⁸1928. Engl. transl. by S. F. Alleyne and E. Abbott, new edition, London 1931.

C—WORKS ON SPECIAL SUBJECTS

- B. Bauch, *Das Substanzproblem in der griechischen Philosophie bis zur Blütezeit*, Heidelberg 1910.
- C. Bäumker, *Das Problem der Materie in der griech. Philosophie*, München 1890.
- J. I. Beare, *Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alcmaeon to Aristotle*, 1906.
- P. Duhem, *Le Système du Monde*, I, *La cosmologie hellénique*, Paris 1913.
- R. Herbertz, *Das Wahrheitsproblem in der griech. Philosophie*, Berlin 1913.
- W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, Berlin 1934, ²1936. Engl. transl. by G. Highet, 3 vol., Oxford 1943-45.
- A. Reymond, *Histoire des Sciences exactes et naturelles dans l'Antiquité Gréco-Romaine*, Paris 1924. Engl. transl. by R. G. de Bray, *History of the Sciences in the Graeco-Roman World*, London 1927.
- A. Rivaud, *Le problème du devenir et la notion de la matière dans la philosophie grecque*, Paris 1906.
- E. Rohde, *Psyche*, Tübingen ⁸1921. Engl. transl. by W. B. Hillis, *Greek Ideas about the Soul*, 1925.
- M. Wundt, *Geschichte der griech. Ethik*, Leipzig 1908-11.

II—PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY

A—TEXT AND TRANSLATIONS

- H. Diels-W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Griechisch und deutsch*, 3 vol., Berlin ⁸1934-37. An English translation of the fragments has been given by K. Freeman, *Ancilla to the Presocratic Philosophers*, Oxford 1948.

B—MODERN WORKS (in chronological order)

- J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, London 1892, ⁴1945.
- A. Rey, *La jeunesse de la science grecque*, Paris 1933.
- P. M. Schuhl, *Essai sur la Formation de la Pensée grecque*, Paris 1934, ¹1949.
- W. Nestle, *Vom Mythos zum Logos, die Selbstentfaltung des griechischen Denkens von Homer bis auf die Sophistik u. Sokrates*, Stuttgart 1940.
- O. Gigon, *Der Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie*, Basel 1945.
- K. Freeman, *The Pre-socratic Philosophers. A companion to Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. Oxford 1946.
- B. Snell, *Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen*, Hamburg 1946.
- W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers*, London 1947.

Heraclitus

- Ferd. Lassalle, *Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunklen von Ephesos*, Berlin 1858.
- G. Burckhardt, *Heraklit*, Zürich 1925.
- J. Solovine, *Héraclite d'Ephèse*, Paris 1931.
- A. M. Frenkian, *Etudes de philosophie présocratique*, I, *Héraclite d'Ephèse*, Paris 1934.
- O. Gigon, *Untersuchungen zu Heraklit*, Leipzig 1935.
- F. J. Brecht, *Heraklit*, Heidelberg 1936.

The Pythagoreans

- A. Chaignet, *Pythagore et la philosophie pythagoricienne*, Paris ¹1874.
- A. Delatte, *Études sur la Littérature Pythagoricienne*. Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes, sect. philol. 217, Paris 1915.

- G. Méautis, *Recherches sur le Pythagorisme*, Neuchâtel 1921.
 E. Frank, *Platon und die sogenannten Pythagoreer*, Halle 1923.
 E. Bollinger, *Die sogenannten Pythagoreer des Aristoteles*, Zürich 1925.
 L. Brunschvicg, *Le rôle du pythagorisme dans l'évolution des idées*, Paris 1937.
 K. Kerényi, *Pythagoras und Orpheus*, Amsterdam-Leipzig 1940.
 V. Caparelli, *Sapienza di Pitagora*, I, Problemi e fonti, 1941.
 J. E. Raven, *Pythagoreans and Eleatics*, Cambridge 1948.

The Eleatics

- K. Reinhardt, *Parmenides u. die Geschichte der griech. Philosophie*, Bonn 1916.
 D. Einhorn, *Xenophanes, ein Beitrag zur Kritik der Grundlagen der bisherigen Philosophiegeschichte*, Wien-Leipzig 1917.
 G. Calogero, *Studi sull' Eleatismo*, Roma 1932.
 K. Riezler, *Parmenides*, Frankfurt a/M 1934.
 A. M. Frenkian, *Etudes de philosophie présocratique*, II, *Empédocle d'Agrigente, Parménide d'Elée*, Paris 1937.
 W. J. Verdenius, *Parmenides, some comments on his poem*, Groningen 1942.
 F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides*, Cambridge 1939 (gives a translation of Parm. with a commentary).
 H. D. P. Lee, *Zeno of Elea. A text with translation and notes*.

Pluralists and atomists

- J. Bidez, *La biographie d'Empédocle*, Gent 1894.
 H. Diels, *Über die Gedichte des Empedocles*, *Sitzungsberichte d. Berl. Akad.* 1898, pp. 396-416.
 W. Nestle, *Der Dualismus des Empedokles*, *Philologus* 65 (1906), pp. 545-57.
 E. Bignone, *Empedocle*, Turino 1916 (transl. with a commentary).
 W. Kranz, *Vorsokratisches*, III, *Die Katharmoi und die Physika des Empedokles*, *Hermes* 70 (1935), pp. 111-19.
 W. Kranz, *Empedokles. Antike Gestalt und romantische Neuschöpfung*, Zürich 1949.
 F. Löwy-Cleve, *Die Philosophie des Anaxagoras*, Wien 1917.
 F. Krohn, *Der Nous bei Anaxagoras*, Münster 1907.
 F. M. Cornford, *Anaxagoras' theory of matter*, in *Class. Quart.* 24 (1930), pp. 14-30; 83-95.
 O. Jöhrens, *Die Fragmente des Anaxagoras*, Diss. Göttingen 1939.
 W. Bröcker, *Die Lehre des Anaxagoras*, in *Kant-Studien* 1943, pp. 176 ff.
 D. Ciurnelli, *La filosofia di Anassagora*, Padova 1947.
 F. M. Cleve, *The philosophy of Anaxagoras*, New-York 1949. See the review of this book by W. J. Verdenius in *Museum* 1949, p. 150.
 A. G. M. van Melsen, *Het wijsgerig verleden der atoomtheorie*, Amsterdam 1941.
 A. Dyroff, *Demokritstudien*, München 1899.
 P. Natorp, *Die Ethika des Demokritos*, Marburg 1893.
 C. Bailey, *The Greek atomists and Epicurus*, Oxford 1928, pp. 64-214.
 H. Langerbeck, *Δόξαι επιρρησική, Studien zu Demokrits Ethik und Erkenntnislehre*, Berlin 1935.
 E. Bignone, *Nuove luci sulla storia dell' atomismo greco*, 1940.
 G. Vlastos, *Ethics and physics in Democritus*, *Philos. Rev.* 1945, pp. 578 ff.; 1946, pp. 53 ff.

III—THE SOPHISTS

A—TEXT

Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, vol. II. Engl. transl. of K. Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-socratic Philosophers*.

B—MODERN WORKS

- G. Grote, *History of Greece* VIII, 1850, pp. 474-544.
 H. Gomperz, *Sophistik u. Rhetorik*, Leipzig-Berlin 1912.
 C. P. Gunning, *De sophistis Graeciae praeceptoribus*, Amsterdam 1915.
 A. Bill, *La morale et la loi dans la philosophie antique*, Paris 1928.
 Joh. Mewaldt, *Kulturkampf der Sophisten*, Tübingen 1928.
 W. Jaeger, *Paideia* 1934, pp. 364-418.
 W. Nestle, *Vom Mythos zum Logos* ²1942, pp. 249-528.
 D. Loenen, *Protagoras and the Greek Community*, Amsterdam 1941.
 O. Gigon, *Gorgias „Über das Nichtsein“*, *Hermes* 71 (1936), pp. 186-213.
 E. W. Beth, *Gorgias van Leontini als wijsgeer*, *Alg. Ned. Tijdschr. v. Wijsb.* 35 (1941-42) pp. 41-58.
 F. Heinimann, *Nomos und Physis*. Diss. Basel 1945.
 H. J. Pos, *De Griekse Sofistiek en onze tijd*, in *De Nieuwe Stem* 1949, pp. 215-234.
 E. Dupréel, *Les Sophistes*. Neuchâtel 1948.

IV—SOCRATES

An analysis of the sources, see our nrs. 201-205.

The "Socratic problem" has been treated by

- A. Diès, *Autour de Platon* I, Paris 1927, pp. 127-243.
 C. J. de Vogel, *Een keerpunt in Plato's denken*, Amsterdam 1936, pp. 23-136.
 A. K. Rogers, *The Socratic Problem*, New-Haven 1933.
 Cp. also: G. Rutberg, *Sokrates und Xenophon*, Uppsala 1939.

W. Schmid, *Das Sokratesbild der Wolken*, in *Philologus* 97, 1948, pp. 209 ff.

More constructive works:

- H. Maier, *Sokrates*, Tübingen 1913.
 Is. van Dijk, *Socrates*, Haarlem 1923, ²1942.
 A. E. Taylor, *Socrates*, London 1932.
 A. J. Festugière, *Socrate*, Paris 1934.
 G. Bastide, *Le moment historique de Socrate*. Paris 1939.

A separate place is taken by

- E. Dupréel, *La légende socratique et les sources de Platon*, Bruxelles 1921 (denies the historical existence of Socrates).
 O. Gigon, *Sokrates*, Bern 1947 (holds that we do not know anything with certainty about Socrates). See on this book C. J. de Vogel, *Une nouvelle approche du problème socratique*, in *Mnemosyne* 1950.

V—THE MINOR SOCRATICS

A—Texts in Mullach, *Fr. Phil. Gr.*, vol. II.

See also Ritter and Preller.

B—MODERN WORKS

- M. C. Mallet, *Histoire de l'Ecole de Mégare et des Ecoles d'Elis et d'Erétrie*, Paris 1845.
 E. Zeller, *Über den κρυπτεών des Megarikers Diodoros*, Berlin 1882.

- F. Dümmler, *Akademika, Beiträge zur Literaturgeschichte der sokratischen Schulen*, Giessen 1889.
- A. Rüstow, *Der Lügner, Theorie, Geschichte u. Auflösung*, Leipzig 1910.
- C. M. Gillespie, *On the Megarians*, in *Archiv f. Gesch. d. Phil.* 24 (1911), pp. 218-41.
- Adolfo Levi, *La dottrina filosofica della scuola di Megara*. Roma 1932. See the review of K. von Fritz in *Gnomon* 1934, pp. 122 ff.
- Article of K. von Fritz in *Pauly Wissowa*, R.E. Suppl. V, pp. 707 ff., s.v. *Megariker*.
- N. Hartmann, *Der megarische u. der aristotelische Möglichkeitsgedanke*. Berl. Akad. 1937.
- D. R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the 6th Century*, London 1937.
- G. Rudberg, *Zur Diogenes-Tradition in Symbolae Osloenses* 14, 1935; *Zum Diogenes-Typus*, ib. 15/16, 1936.
- Sayre Ferrand, *Diogenes of Sinope*, Baltimore 1938.
- R. Höistad, *Cynic hero and Cynic king*. Studies in the Cynic conception of man. Uppsala 1948.
- G. Colosio, *Aristipppo di Cirene filosofo Socratico*, Torino 1925.
- P. J. van Gils, *Quaestiones Euhemerae*, Kerkrade-Heerlen 1902.

VI—PLATO

A—TEXT AND TRANSLATIONS

- Platonis opera* recognovit I. Burnet, Oxonii 1899-1906, 6 vol.
- Platon, *Oeuvres complètes*, texte et traduction française, Paris, „Les belles Lettres”, 1920 ff.: I. *Hippias II*, *Alcibiade I*, *Apologie*, *Euthyphron*, *Criton* par M. Croiset; II. *Hippias I*, *Charmide*, *Laches*, *Lysis*; III. *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Ménon* par A. Croiset; IV. *Phédon*, *le Banquet*, *Phèdre* par L. Robin; V. *Ion*, *Ménexène*, *Euthydème*, *Cratyle* par L. Méridier; VI-VII. *La République* par E. Chambry, introd. par A. Diès; VIII. *Parménide*, *Théétète*, *le Sophiste* par A. Diès; IX. *Le Politique*, *le Philèbe* par A. Diès; X. *Timée et Critias* par A. Rivaud; XIII. *Dialogues suspects*, *Dialogues apocryphes et Lettres* par J. Souilhé.
- English translation of all the dialogues by B. Jowett (1871). New edition at New-York 1946.
- German translation, with notes and a detailed bibliography of each dialogue, by O. Apelt, Phil. Bibl., Leipzig.

B—GENERAL WORKS ON PLATO

- W. Lutoslawsky, *The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*, London 1897, ²1905.
- P. Shorey, *The Unity of Plato's Thought*, Chicago 1903.
- P. Natorp, *Platos Ideenlehre*, Leipzig 1903, ²1921.
- H. Raeder, *Platons philosophische Entwicklung*, Leipzig 1905.
- U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Platon*, 2 vol., Berlin 1919, ²1920, ⁴1948 (only the first vol.).
- C. Ritter, *Platon*, I, 1910; II, 1922.
- A. E. Taylor, *Plato, the man and his work*, London 1926, ⁵1948.
- P. Friedländer, *Platon*, 2 vol., Berlin 1928-1930.
- J. Burnet, *Platonism*, Berkeley (California) 1928.
- A. Diès, *Autour de Platon*, 2 vol., Paris 1927.
- H. Leisegang, *Die Platondeutung der Gegenwart*, Karlsruhe 1929.
- G. C. Field, *Plato and his contemporaries*, Oxford 1930, ²1948.
- P. Shorey, *What Plato said*, Chicago 1933.
- L. Robin, *Platon*, Paris 1935.

- J. D. Bierens de Haan, *Plato's levensleer*, Haarlem 1935.
 R. Schaerer, *La Question platonicienne, Etude sur les rapports de la pensée et de l'expression dans les Dialogues*, Neuchâtel et Paris 1938.
 J. Moreau, *La construction de l'idéalisme platonicien*, Paris 1939.
 R. Demos, *The Philosophy of Plato*, New-York 1939.
 A. Koyré, *Discovering Plato*, New-York 1945.
 V. Goldschmidt, *Les dialogues de Platon, Structure et méthode dialectique*, Paris 1947.
 V. Goldschmidt, *Le paradigme dans la dialectique platonicienne*, Paris 1947.
 We may mention also, as having a bearing on Platonism as a whole:
 J. Stenzel, *Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles*, Leipzig ²1931.
 C. J. de Vogel, *Een keerpunt in Plato's denken*, Amsterdam 1936 (a study on the Parmenides as a crisis in Plato's philosophy).
 A. J. Festugière, *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon*, Paris 1936.
 H. Perls, *Platon, Sa conception du Kosmos*, 2 vol., New-York 1945 (not only a commentary on the Timaeus).
 G. J. de Vries, *Spel bij Plato*, Amsterdam 1949.

C—WORKS ON SPECIAL SUBJECTS

1—Theology and philosophy of religion

- P. E. More, *The religion of Plato*, Princeton 1921.
 A. Diès, *Le Dieu de Platon and La religion de Platon in Autour de Platon II*.
 Fr. Solmsen, *Plato's theology*, Ithaca 1942 (See about this work the review of E. de Strycker in *L'Antiquité classique*, 1947, 1).
 A. E. Taylor, *The „Polytheism" of Plato*, *An apologia*, Mind (N.S.) 1938, pp. 180-199.
 A. J. Festugière, *Contemplation etc.*
 P. Lachize-Rey, *Les idées morales, sociales et politiques de Platon*, Paris 1938.
 R. Schaerer, *Dieu, l'homme et la vie d'après Platon*, Neuchâtel 1944.
 O. Reverdin, *La religion de la cité platonicienne*, Paris 1945.
 V. Goldschmidt, *La religion de Platon*, Paris 1949.

2—On the myths of Plato the best work is:

- P. Frutiger, *Les mythes de Platon*, Paris 1930.
 See also P. Stoecklein, *Über die phil. Bedeutung von Platons Mythen*, *Philologus*, Suppl. Bd. XXX 3, Leipzig 1937.

3—The soul

- L. Robin, *La théorie platonicienne de l'amour*, Paris 1907, ²1933.
 H. Barth, *Die Seele in der Philosophie Platons*, Tübingen 1921.
 J. Moreau, *L'âme du monde, de Platon aux Stoïciens*, Paris 1939.
 J. B. Skemp, *The theory of motion in Plato's later dialogues*, Cambridge 1944.

4—Ideas and Numbers

- L. Robin, *La théorie platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres d'après Aristote*, Paris 1908.
 M. Gentile, *La dottrina platonica delle idee numeri in Aristotele*, 1930.
 J. Stenzel, *Zahl u. Gestalt bei Platon und Aristoteles*, Leipzig, ²1933.
 W. van der Wielen, *De Ideegetallen van Plato*, Amsterdam 1941.
 H. Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1945.

- Cf. H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, I, Baltimore 1944.
 C. J. de Vogel, *La dernière phase du platonisme et l'interprétation de M. Robin*, in *Studia Vollgraff*, Amsterdam 1948.
 C. J. de Vogel, *Problems concerning later Platonism*, in *Mnemosyne*, 1949, pp. 197-216; 299-318.

D—SPECIAL DIALOGUES

- Protagoras*, ed. with commentary by Deuschle-Cron, revised by W. Nestle, ⁷1931.
Gorgias, *A commentary* (Dutch) of B. J. H. Ovink, Leyden 1909.
 An older English edition with a commentary of W. H. Thompson, London 1871.
 A German ed. of Deuschle-Nestle, ⁸1909.
Meno and Hippias Minor, *Philosophische Erklärung* (German) by B. J. H. Ovink, Amsterdam 1929.
 Klara Buchmann, *Die Stellung des Menon in der platonischen Philosophie*, in *Philologus*, Suppl. Bd. 29, 3, Leipzig 1936.
Hippias Maior. On the authenticity of this dialogue: J. Moreau, *Le platonisme de l'H.M.*, in *Rev. des études grecques* 1941, p. 19.
Alcibiades Maior. The authenticity is denied by E. de Strycker, *Platonica* I, *L'authenticité du premier Alcibiade*, in *Les Etudes Classiques* 1942, pp. 135-151.
 Io. Article of W. J. Verdenius, *L'Ion de Platon*, in *Mnemosyne* 1943, pp. 233-262.
Phaedo, ed. with a commentary of J. Burnet, Oxford 1911.
 A German commentary of H. Baumann (with the later proofs for immortality).
 Cf. G. Rodier, *Les preuves de l'immortalité de l'âme dans le Phédon de Platon*, *Année philos.* XVIII, 1908.
 R. Schaerer, *La composition du Phaedon*, in *Revue des Etudes grecques* 1940, pp. 1-50.
Symposion, ed. R. G. Bury, ²1932, Cambridge.
 Important introduction in the edition of L. Robin, Paris 1929.
 Article of G. Daux, *Sur quelques passages du Banquet de Platon*, in *Revue des Etudes grecques*, 1942, p. 236-271 (good remarks on the relation of Plato to Aristoph.).
Republic. Edition with notes and essays by B. Jowett and L. Campbell, 3 vol., Oxford 1894.
 Ed. with a commentary of J. Adam, Cambridge 1902.
 M. Wohlrab, *Der Staat*, Buch I, Leipzig 1893.
 A. Diès, *Introduction* in the edition of the Collection Budé, Paris 1932.
 R. L. Nettleship, *Lectures on the Republic of Plato*, London 1898, new edition 1947.
 New English transl. of F. M. Cornford, Oxford ²1944.
Phaedrus. Ed. with a commentary of W. H. Thompson, London 1868.
 Good introd. of L. Robin in his edition in the Collection Budé, Paris 1933.
Theaetetus. Text with English notes of L. Campbell, Oxford 1883.
 New translation with a commentary of F. M. Cornford, *Plato's theory of knowledge*, Cambridge 1935. ³London 1946. (Theaet. and Soph.).
Parmenides. Introd. of A. Diès (coll. Budé), Paris 1923.
 English transl. of A. E. Taylor, 1934.
 New Engl. transl. with a commentary of F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides*, Cambridge-London 1939.
 J. Wahl, *Etude sur le Parménide de Platon*, Paris 1926.
 M. Wundt, *Platons Parmenides*, Stuttgart 1935.
 C. J. de Vogel, *Een keerpunt in Plato's denken*, Amsterdam 1936.

- Soph. and Politicus*, ed. with notes of L. Campbell, Oxford 1867.
 Introd. of A. Diès (coll. Budé), ed. of *Soph. and Polit.*
 A. Diès, *La définition de l'être et la nature des Idées dans le Sophiste de Platon*, Paris 1909.
 H. Zeise, *Der Staatsmann. Ein Beitrag zur Interpretation des platonischen Politikos*, in *Philol.*, Suppl. Bd. 31, 3, Leipzig 1938.
- Philebus*. Ed. with comm. of R. G. Bury, Cambridge 1897.
 Ed. with introd. by A. Diès (coll. Budé).
 Transl. with comm. of R. Hackforth, *Plato's examination of pleasure*, Cambridge 1944.
- Timaeus*. Ed. with introd. by A. Rivaud (coll. Budé), Paris 1925.
 A. E. Taylor, *A commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, Oxford 1928.
 F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (transl. with a commentary), Cambridge 1937; London 2 1948.
 L. Robin, *Etudes sur la signification et la place de la physique dans la phil. de Platon*, Paris 1919.
- Critias*. A. Delatte, *L'Atlantide de Platon* in *Musée belge* 1922.
 P. Couissin, *L'Atlantide de Platon et les origines de la civilisation*, Aix en Provence 1928.
 J. Bidez, *L'Atlantide. Bull. Acad. roy. belge, classe d. lettres*, 1934, pp. 101-126.
 H. Herter, *Alles u. Neues zu Platons Kritias*, in *Rhein. Mus.* 1943, pp. 236-265.
- Laws*. C. Ritter, *Platos Gesetze, Darstellung d. Inhalts, Kommentar*; 2 vol., Leipzig 1896.
 E. B. England, text with a commentary, 2 vol., Manchester 1921.
 G. J. D. Aalders, *Het 3e boek van Plato's Leges*, Amsterdam 1943.
- Epinomis*. J. Harward, *The Epinomis of Plato*, Oxford 1928.
 H. Raeder, *Platons Epinomis*, Kopenhagen 1938.
 E. des Places, *Les dernières années de Platon*, in *L'Antiquité classique*, 1938, pp. 169-200. Again, in the same Review, 1942, p. 97 ff.: *Une nouvelle défense de l'Epinomis*.
- Letters*, See our nr. 263.

For more detailed bibliographical information the reader may apply to: *Bibliographische Einführungen in das Studium der Philosophie*, herausgegeben von I. M. Bochensky, Bern, Heft 5: O. Gigon, *Antike Philosophie*, which is, however, far from being complete.

INDICES

I—NAMES

- Achilles Nr. **92 a, b**
 Aëtius **85; 111 g**
 Alcibiades (his speech about Socr.) **208**
 Alcmaeon **46**
 Anaxagoras **119-133; 216**
 Anaximander **2; 11-17**
 Anaximenes **18-20; 125**
 Angelopoulos, E., **203**
 Antiphon, the sophist, **195 a**
 Antisthenes **202; 243-253**
 Apelt, O., **311**
 Aristippus **254-260**
 Aristophanes **203; 224 c**
 Aristoteles **2 a, n. 2; 37; 38; 90 b; 91; 92; 93; 94; 95; 146 a, n. 1; 156 f; 165, n. 1; 204; 262; 310; 312; 361, n. 1; 362-368; 371 c; 372**
 Aristoxenus **24 b, d; 28 b; 262; 364 c**
 Arnim, H. von, **202**
 Augustinus (on Platonism and Christianity) **309**

 Beth, E. W., **186 b**
 Bias **5, 6 f**
 Bidez, J., **143 b; d, n. 4**
 Boeckh, A., **31**
 Burnet, J., **11 a, n. 1; 12 b; 24 d; 29; 44 a; 48 b; 57; 85 c; 104 a, n. **; 108 b, n. 1; 110 a, n. 3; 111, sub 4, g; 205; 225 a; 262; 263; 315; 330, n. a; 352, n. 2**

 Callicles **193 a**
 Calogero, G., **185**
 Cardini, M. T., **44 a**
 Cherniss, H., **262; 263; 327 c; 366 c, n. b; 371 c**
 Chilo **5, 6 c**
 Cicero **4; 26 g; 85 d**
 Cleobulus **5; 6 a**
 Colotes **171 g**
 Cornford, F. M., **314; 318; 319 a; 323 a; 327 c; 330, n. a; 336; 350; 351, n. 1; 352, n. 2**
 Cratylus **204 a, b**
 Critias **195 b**
 Croesus **3, 7 c**
 Crossman, R. H. S., **312**

 Damon of Oa **210**, Laches 197 d, with n. 2
 Deman, Th., **205**
 Dercyllides **262; 371 a**
 Democritus **135; 138-160; 171 g-h; 204 b**
 Dickerman, S. O., **163 a**
 Diels, H., **31; 57; 80, n. *; 82, n. 4; 83 vs. 57, n. *; 85 c; 104 a, n. *, **; 110 a, n. 3; 111 b, n. 1; 113 a, n. 2; 186 b**
 Diès, A., **269 b, n. *; 314; 346, n. *, **; 348, p. 262, n. ***
 Diodorus Cronus **232-235**
 Diogenes of Apollonia **161-165**
 Diogenes of Sinope **243 b; 244 c; 246 a; 248 a, b**
 Dionysius Halicarnassensis **194 a; 264**
 Dümmler, F., **163 a; 194**
 Dupréel, E., **185**
 Dijk, Is. van, **205**

 Ecphantus **44 d**
 Electra, the sophism the E., **231 c**
 Empedocles **2; 24 c; 25; 100-118**
 Eubulides **231**
 Euclides of Megara **230**
 Eurytus **35**

 Festugière, A. J., **26 f; 308**
 Frank, E., **31**
 Freeman, K., **89 c, n. *; 111 b, n. 1; 210, p. 132, n. 2**
 Gigon, O., **2 a, n. 2; 8 b; 11 a, n. 1;**

- 54 a, n. 1; 57; 76; 82, n. 2; 85 d;
185; 186 b; 205
Gillespie, C., 225 a; 227 a
Goethe 41 b
Gomperz, H., 186 b; 202
Gomperz, Th., 74, n. 1; 89 c, n. *;
173; 194
Gorgias 100; 112 d; 177-187; 243 a
Grote, G., 194
Guthrie, W. K. G., 8 c; 115

Hartmann, N., 331
Heath, Sir Th., 45
Hegesias 261
Heracles 191
Heraclides Ponticus 44 d; 102 b, c;
103 a, b
Heraclitus 48-66; 82, n. 2; 171 c
Hermodorus, of Ephesus, 48 b
Hermodorus, Platonicus, 262; 371 a
Herodotus 3; 7; 166
Hesiodus 2; 71
Hicetas 44 a, c
Hippias 188
Hippocrates 225-227
Homerus 71; 83 vs. 34, n. 4; (and
other poets) 279; 280
Horatius 103 c

Iamblichus 25; 26-30
Isocrates 3 b

Jaeger, W., 2 a, n. 2; 11 a, n. 1; 25;
76; 80, n. *; 82, n. 2; 110 a, n. 3,
b, n. 1; 163 a; 195 a
Janssens, A. J., 210, p. 132, n. 2
Joël, K., 173; 186 b; 194; 200; 202;
205; 235
Jones, W. H. S., 225 b, n. 2
Jowett, B., 352, n. 2

Karsten, S., 83 vs. 57, n. *
Kepler 45
Koster, W. J. W., 312, n. a
Kranz, W., 104 a, n. **

Leeuw, G. van der, 29
Leucippus 134-138
Livius 51 a
Loenen, D., 175
Lysis 47

Macran, H., 364 c, n. 1
Maier, H., 205
Melissus 96-99; 313
Menedemus 240-242
Merlan, Ph., 371 b
Meyer, H., 312, n. a
Mondolfo, R., 31
Moreau, J., 312

Nachmanson, E., 225 b, n. 2
Natorp, P., 149; 150 c, n. *; 194;
266 b, Remark II; 270; 271; 331;
347 d
Nettleship, R. L., 312
Nietzsche, Fr., 11 a, n. 1; 200

Ovink, B. J. H., 212 b

Paracelsus 41 b
Parmenides 2; 48; 76; 77-86; 104 b,
n. 4; 122; 313; 314; refuted by
Plato 333; 339-342
Periander 5; 6 g
Phaedo 240
Pherecydes 2
Philippson, R., 203
Philolaus 31-33; 40 a; 44; 47
Pittacus 5; 6 e
Plato 3; 9 c, n. 3; 37 b; 78; 87 b, c;
119; 156 d; 171 a-f; 200; 201;
Aristotle's testimony about P. and
Socr. 204 a, b; 262-394
Popper, K. R., 312
Porphyrius 24
Proclus 228
Prodicus 189-192
Protagoras 167-168; 169-176; 198;
211; 317 d
Pythagoras 3 b; 4; 21-43
Pythagoreans 21-47; 48; 204 b;
228; 371 b

Reinhardt, K., 76; 188 b
Renan, E., 202
Rivaud, A., 350, n. *; 352, n. 2
Robin, L., 11 a, n. 1; 263; 265; 316 a,
b; 326 b, n. a; 336; 348, p. 262/3,
n. 1; 366 c, n. a; 373
Rohde, E., 11 a, n. 1
Ross, W. D., 43 a, n. *; 205; 367 a;
373
Rüstow, A., 231 b

- Scaliger, J., 104 a, n. **
 Schepp, C. L. (Jan Prins) 350, n. a, b;
 352, n. b
 Schleiermacher 194; 315
 Sextus Empiricus 262; 371 b
 Simplicius 85 b
 Socrates 77, n. 3; 119; 139 d; 156 a,
 d, f; 198; 201-229; 243 a, b; 246 a
 Solon 3; 5; 6 d
 Speiser, A., 336
 Stilpo 236-239
- Taylor, A. E., 203; 205; 224-227;
 263; 265; 316; 350
 Thales 1; 5; 6 d; 7-10
 Theaetetus 31
 (the dialogue Th. of Plato) 317-325
 Theiler, W., 163 a
 Theophrastus 86 b; 112-113; 262; 373
 Thrasyllus 140 b
 Thrasymachus 193 b; 194
 Thucydides 3 b; 168; 224 a, b
 Timaeus, the historian 102 a; 103 d
 dialogue of Plato 349-361
 Usener, H., 164, n.*
- Verdenius, W. J., 59 e; 83, vs. 57, n. *;
 112 d
 Vogel, C. J. de, 175, n. a; 203 b; 225 a;
 228; 315; 330, n. a; 336; 366 c,
 n. b; 371 b, n. a; 371 c
 Vollenhoven, D. H. Th., 314
- Wahl, J., 329; 330, n. a; 336
 Wendland, P., 248, n. a
 Wielen, W. van der, 376 a, d
 Wiersma, W., 44 a
 Wilamowitz, U. von W.-Moellendorff,
 80, n. *, n. 1; 202; 227 c; 265; 315
 Wilpert, P., 371 b
 Wundt, M., 136
 Wundt, W., 29
- Xenocrates 366 c; 372, n. a
 Xenophanes 48; 67-76
 Xenophon 202; 216, p. 144, n. 1; p.
 145, n. 1; p. 147, n. 1; 217-223
- Zeller, E., 48 b; 57; 122 b, n. 2; 163 a;
 173; 194; 235
 Zeno 77, n. 3; 87-95; 231 e; 232
 the method of Z. 328-329
 Zeus 63 a

II—SUBJECTS

- Abstinence Nr. 24 a-d
 agrapha, of Plato 262; 371
 anamnesis, doctrine of a., 297 b-c; 326
 apatheia s. ἀπάθεια
 asebeia s. ἀσέβεια
 astronomy
 study of a. preparatory to dialectic
 298; it does not tend to atheism
 394 b
 S. also *cosmology*
 atheism s. ἀσέβεια
 atoms 141; 146 a; 232
- Badness 360 a, b; cp. 392 a, b; 393
 bald-headed, argument of the b. 231 e
 Beauty 273
 being
 with Parmenides 80-83
 with Melissus 97-99
 with Anaxagoras 122
 with Democritus 135; 136; 141;
 142 a
 the παντελῶς ὄν in the *Soph.* of Plato,
 315 c
 in Plato's *Parm.* 330-336
 in his *Soph.* 341
 S. also *non-being*, and *coming into*
 being
- body
 soul higher than b. 150 a, b (Demo-
 critus); 215 (in the *Crito*); 266 e
 (in the *Phaedo*);
 creation of the b. in the *Tim.* 353;
 its influence on the soul 360-361
 (*Tim.*); honoured next to the soul
 375 b, p. 284 (*Laws*)
 bodies, the five regular —, 31
- Chaldaeans 139 c
 character
 of man fashioned by himself, 392 a
 children
 difficulty of rearing — 158;
 community of — 286-288; 310 a;

- education of — **381; 382; 385**
- colour
 - definition of — **186 a**
- coming into being
 - denied by Parm. **83**;
 - explained by Emped. as a mixture of the elements, **106 a**;
 - cp. Anaxagoras, **123**; Democr. **141, 144**; Socrates' criticism of these theories, **216**
 - Plato's *γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν*, **347 d**;
 - the theory of the *Tim.*, **356**
- conscience
 - examination of the c., **26 f-g; 28 b**
- consensus gentium
 - proof of the existence of gods, **387**;
 - cp. **394**
- contemplation
 - of Beauty itself **273**, p. 183/4
 - of the Good **304**
- cosmic order
 - a pattern for human thought and action, **355**
 - proof of the existence of God **387, 394**. See also *heavenly bodies*
- cosmology
 - See *world* and *worlds*
 - of Philolaus **44**; of Parmenides **84-85**
- creation **350-356**
- Cynicism **222; 239; 243-253**
- Cyrenaic, the — school, **254-261**
- Daimonion** of Socrates **220**
- definition
 - sought for by Socr., **204 b**;
 - of bravery sought for, **210**;
 - d. impossible **252 c, d**
 - See also *diaeresis*
- Demiurge
 - Maker of the world, **349-356**
- desires
 - limitation of — **154** (Democr.);
 - cp. **222** and **243 b** (principle of Cynicism);
 - d. opposed to will **213 a**
- diaeresis,
 - method of, **316 b; 326 b; 337; 338**
- dialectic
 - invented by Zeno **87 a**;
 - d. method of Socr. **210**;
 - d. opposed to Mathematics **294**, p. 203; **299**, p. 210; **302-304; 340**, p. 250;
- d. opposed to eristic **344 a, b**; the method of d. illustrated by grammar and musicology **344 c**
- Dissoi logoi **196; 261**, p. 147, n. 2; **227 c**
- divination **217 c**
- divorce **378**
- dramatic art
 - excluded by Plato **281**
- Earth
 - with Anaximander **16 c, d**;
 - Anaximenes **19 c**;
 - Philolaus etc. **44 a-d**;
 - Xenophanes **74**
 - in the *Tim.* **352**
- education
 - Democr. on — **156 a-c**;
 - Plato on — **278 b-281; 291-304**;
 - e. not compulsory **301**;
 - should prevent badness **360 b**;
 - principles of — **375 b**, p. 284 sqq.;
 - compulsory **384**;
 - the same on both sexes **385**
- elements
 - the four — **105** (Empedocles);
 - the *ὁμοιομερῆ* of Anaxagoras **124**;
 - with Democr. the atoms and the void, **135-136; 141**;
 - in later Platonism **365 a, b; 371 a, b; 372; 373**; in the *Tim.* **356 b**
- eristic **344 a**
- Examples of — see **196-197**
- eros
 - in Hesiodus **2 a**; cp. Parm., **85 b**, and Emped., **107 a, b**;
 - in Plato's *Symposium*, **273**; cp. **326**
- eschatology **307**
- ethics
 - with Pythagoreans **28**; Heracl. **62 b**;
 - Democr. **149-160**; Prodicus **191**;
 - Antiphon and Critias **195**;
 - in the Socratic dialogues **210-214**;
 - with the Cynics **243-248**;
 - Aristippus **255-259**;
 - Plato **267; 273; 274-308; 348; 355; 375 b-380; 392-393**
- evil
 - caused by soul **390 a, b**
- evil eye **143 c**
- evolution, biological —, **17 a-c**

Fire

54 d; 55-58

free choice of a life **307**, p. 215

Cp. *will and responsibility*

friendship **157 a**

God(s)

with Pythagoreans **27**;

Heraclitus **63-65**;

Xenophanes **70-73**;

Democr. **143 d**; Protagoras **174**;

Prodicus **192**; Critias **195 b**;

Socr. **217-219**; **223**;

in the *Laws* of Plato **374 b** (God the measure of all things); **374 c** (first to be honoured); **375 b**, p. 286 (confidence in —); **387**, **394** (existence of — proved)

good

disposition of the heart **155** (Democr.); in the *Dissoi logoi* **196 a**;

Socr. **215**;

the Good in Plato's *Rep.* VI, **291 a-294**;

contemplation of the Good **304**;

the supreme g. in the *Phil.* **348**;

= the One **364**;

in the universe caused by soul **390 a, b**;

God our helper in the struggle for the g. **392**; **393**

grammar

studied by Protagoras **176**;

Prodicus **190**;

illustration of dialectic **344 c**

great and small, the, **365**; **371**

S. also *μᾶλλον κ. ἥττον* and *ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις*

Happiness

with Democr. **149**; **151-154**;

the just man is happy **274**;

the citizens of Pl.'s Republic not happy **310 d-e**;

the best life = the happiest **374 a**;

375 b, p. 287/8

harmony

33 a-b; of the spheres **45**;

elastic h. **53-54**

heap, argument of the,

with Zeno **88**; Eubulides **231 e**

hearing **112 e**

heavenly bodies

in general **352**; **353-355**;

souls of the — **391**; **394**

S. also *sun, moon, stars*

horns, sophism of the, **231 d**

hylozoism **9**

hypothesis **216**; **266 b-c**; **294**;

in the *Parm.* of Plato **329**

Idea

pre-platonic theory of —s **216**, p.

147, n. 2; **224-228**;

existence of —s denied by Stilpo **238**;

by Antisthenes **253**;

origin of the —s **266-268**;

—s of which objects **269**;

true sense **270-273**;

I. of the Good **291 c-294**;

alteration in the theory of —s **315**;

objections of Parm. against the I. **327**;

—s = Numbers? **362-373**

infinite, see *ἄπειρον*

Justice

with Democr. **156 d-e**;

Antiphon and Critias **195**;

Dissoi logoi **196 b**;

Socrates **204 c**; **215**; **223**;

Plato **274-285**; **306-307**; **375 b**, p. 285

Knowledge

Philolaus on — **32**; Heraclitus **60-**

62; Parmenides **80-83**; **86**;

Democr. **142**; Protagoras **166-167**;

171-172; Gorgias **183**

virtue = k., see *virtue*

Plato's theory of k. **266 a-c**; **268**;

269 b; **270**; **271**; **294-297**

k. = *αἴσθησις*? **317-325**

Labour

division of — **277 b**

S. also *πόνος*

law

origin of — **195 b**

human and divine **223**

the *Laws* of Plato **374-394**

liar, sophism of the, **231 b**

literature

selected on moral principles, **279-281**

Love

moving principle, called φιλότης by Emped. **107 a**; **110 a, e**; **111 b, g**
S. also *eros* and *friendship*

Man

origin of —, **17 b, c**;
Anaxagoras' definition of — **130 b**;
— a mikrokosmos **148**;
— measure of all things **167**; **171**;
body and soul s. there
τὸ συναμφοτέρον **361** (*Tim.* 87 e)
in general superior to women **286 a**
(Rep. V 455 d); **354 a** (*Tim.* 42 a)

many

there cannot be — **89** (Zeno);
in Gorgias' work about non-being
182;
in Plato's *Parm.* **332 b**; **334**;
mathematical determination of the
— **344 a-d**

marriage **377**; **378**

materialism

combated by Plato, **216**; **266**;
388-294

mathematics

with Pythagoreans **31-40**;
preparatory to dialectic **298**;
method of — opposed to dialectic
294;

Megarian School **230-239**; **266 b**,
Remark I; **315 c**

metempsychosis

with Pythag. **23 b**;
with Emped. **116-117**;
with Plato **307**, p. 215 sqq.; **357 a**

middle state

to be strived after, **380 a**;
cp. **348**

miracles, s. *wonder-worker*

mixture

of the four elements in Emped.
106 a; **108 a, b**;
of peras and apeiron in Pl.'s *Phil.*
346; **347 c**;
of pleasure and φρόνησις, ib., **348**;
of the elements for the creation of
the world-soul in the *Tim.*, **350**

monotheism

a tendency towards — in Xenopha-
nes **70 b-d**; **71-73**;
with Antisthenes **250 a**

moon

theory of Anaximander **16 a, c**;
of Anaximenes **19 c**; **20**;
of Philolaus **44 a-d**

morality

origin of — **195 b**. Cp. *Ethics*

motion (movement)

eternal — **52 a-e** (Heracl.);
arguments of Zeno against —, **91-95**;
caused by the νοῦς, **127** (Anaxa-
goras);
arguments of Diodorus Cronus
against — **232**;
introduced in the ideal world of
Plato, **315 c**;
soul the cause of —, **316 a**; **341**;
389-390

musicology

preparatory to dialectic, **298**;
the method of dialectic illustrated
by —, **344 c**. S. also *harmony*

Nature

philosophy of —, **7-165**;
judgment of Socr. about this philo-
sophy, **216**;
teleological interpretation of —,
163 a (Diog. of Apoll.); **216**, p.
145, n. 1 (Socr.)

non-being

with Parm. **80-84**;
with Gorgias **181-185**;
in Plato's *Parm.*, **333-336**;
definition of — in the *Soph.*, **342**

number

with Pythag. **32 a-b**; **34 a-b**; **35**
a-b; **37-41**
ideal Numbers **362-373**

Obstetric art (maieutic)

209 a; **326**

one

Parm.' being is —, **83**; **97-98**;
in Gorgias' work on non-being, **182**;
in Plato's *Parm.*, **330-336**;
the One = the Agathon, **364**

Parents, to be honoured, **374 c**

passing away

denied by Parm. **83**
explained by Emped. as an *exchange*
of what has been mixed, **106 a**;

- cp. Anaxagoras, **123**;
 Democr. **141**;
 Socrates' criticism of these theories, **216**
 pentagramma **41 b**
 perception
 judgment of Heracl. on p., **66**
 p. explained by Parm. **86 a, b**
 Emped. warns not to reject the senses, **104 b**
 he explains p., **112 a, b**
 p. explained by Anaxag. **132**
 his judgment about —, **133**
 judgment of Democr. **142 d**
 of Aristippus **260**
 Plato's analysis of p., **317-325**
 periodical return of all things **23 c**
 periodical conflagration **55 b**; **56-58**
 philosophers
 criteria, **1**; name **3-4**
 judgment of Antisth. about ph., **251**
 of Aristippus **257**
 definition by Plato **289**
 difficulty against this **290**
 education of the ph. **291-304**
 required qualities of the ph. **300**
 portrait of the ph. **318**
 new definition **340 d**, p. 250
 S. also **344 a** (philosophy distinguished from eristical debating)
 philosophy, s. philosopher
 plants
 have a soul, **131**
 play, children's —s, **382**
 pleasure
 with Democr. **150 c**; **152 a**
 despised by Antisth., **245**
 considered as the supreme good by Aristippus, **255-256**
 appreciation in Plato's *Phil.*, **348**;
 Cp. in the *Laws*, **375 b**, p. 287.
 Cp. also the condemnation of rhetoric as *ὀψοποιική* in the *Gorg.*, **198**, p. 110-111. Here a severe judgment on *ἡδονή* is implied.
 poetical inspiration **147**
 politics
 saying of Antisth. about p., **249**
 potentiality (*δύναμις*) **234**; **235**
 predication **237**; **241**; **252**
 principle, s. *ἀρχή*
 four —s in Plato's *Phil.*, **346**
 prior-posterior
 in the ideal Numbers, **367 b**
 property
 community of — among Pythagoreans, **26 d**; in Plato's state, **283**;
 criticized by Aristotle **310 b**
 providence
 denied by Thrasy Machus **194 b**
 Socr.' belief in — **217 b**
 Plato on —, in the *Laws*, **392 a, b**;
 393; **394**
 Qualities
 primary and secondary, **142 a**
 Religion
 popular r. criticized by Heracl., **63-65**
 by Xenophanes **71-73**
 by Empedocles **118 a, b**
 the gods explained as *εἰδωλα* by Democr. **143 d**;
 Protagoras II. *θεῶν* **174**
 r. explained by Prodicus **192**
 by Critias **195 b**
 Socrates' attitude towards r. **217-219**; **223**
 Plato in the *Laws*, **374 b, c**; **375 b**, beginning; cp. **394**
 religious community-life **26-27**
 respiration
 explained by Emped., **115**
 responsibility
 in Plato's *Rep.* X, **307**, p. 215;
 in the *Laws*, **392 a, b**; **393**
 rhetoric
 severely criticized in Plato's *Gorg.*, **198 c**
 relatively appreciated by Antisth., **251**
 Sage, ideal of the, **248**; **251**; **257**;
 cp. **289-290**; **300**; **318**
 sages, the seven, **5-6**
 scepticism, seeming sc. of Democr., **142 b**
 science
 Socrates' idea of —, **221**
 S. also *knowledge*
 sea **16 d**
 selfishness
 judged by Plato as the greatest of evils, **375 b**, p. 286

- senses, s. *perception*
- sensualism
 of Aristippus (perhaps better called
empirical phaenomenism) **260**
- sin
 notion of — in Democr., **156 a-c**;
 cp. Socrates **204 d**; **211**; **212**; **213**
- slaves
 treatment of, **379**
- Sophists **166-200**
 defined in Plato's *Soph.*, **338**
 Sophistic method distinguished
 from dialectic, **344 a**
- soul
 defined by Anaximenes as air, **18**;
 the doctrine of metempsychosis,
23 a, b
 —s of the heavenly bodies **46 a-c**
 (Alcmaeon of Croton)
 cp. Socrates **216**, p. 145, n. 1 (*Mem.*
 I 4, 8), and Plato **391**, **394** (*Laws*
 X and XII)
 Heraclitus' doctrine of the —, **59**
a-e; **61 a-b**;
 Empedocles **116-117** (the doctrine
 of metempsychosis)
 Democritus' doctrine of the s., **146**
a-c; s. superior to body **150 a, b**;
 Socr. in the *Crito* **215**; in the
Phaedo **266 e**;
 tripartition in *Rep.* IV, **285 b**;
 s. cause of motion **316 a** (*Phaedr.*),
 cp. **389** sqq. (*Laws*);
 the s. perceives **319 a** (*Theaet.*);
 creation of the world-s. **350** (*Tim.*);
 of human —s **354**; mortal and
 immortal s. in man **357 a**;
 s. in plants **359** (cp. Anaxagoras,
131 a-b);
 interrelation with the body **360-361**;
 s. to be honoured next to the gods,
375 b, beginning; superior to body
388; self-moving principle **389**
 sqq.; good and bad world-s. **390**;
 —s of the heavenly bodies **391**;
 proof of the existence of gods **394**
- space
 denied by Zeno, **90**; by Melissus, **98**,
 and by Anaxagoras, **126**;
 accepted as true being by Democr.
141, **142 a** (*χενόν*);
 in the *Tim.* **356**
- stars
 theory of Anaximander **16 a, c**
 Anaximenes **19 c-d**
 Pythagoreans **44 a-d**; **45**; **46**
 Plato **352**; **353-355**
- state
 appreciation by Democr. **157 b, c**;
 origin of the —, **175** (Protagoras),
195 (Critias), **277 a** (Plato);
 — of Plato **277 b-284**
- Stoicism
 anticipated by Stilpo **239**;
 cp. Democr. **159**; Plato **380 b**
- strangers
 respect to —, **375 b**, p. 284
- strife (war), s. *νεῖκος* and *πόλεμος*
- summum bonum, s. *τέλος*
- sun
 theory of Anaximander **16 a-c**
 Anaximenes **19 c**
 Philolaus etc. **44 a-d**
 Heraclitus **57 b**
 Anaxagoras **120 d**
 See also *heavenly bodies*
- suppliants
 respect to, **375 b**, p. 285
- synonymic **190**
- Taboo **24 a-d**; **29 a-c**
- taste and touch **112 f**
- teleological interpretation of nature,
 s. *nature*
- theodicy
 Anaximander's fr. called the first
 th. by Jaeger, **11 a**, n. 1
- thinking
 explained by Parm. **86 a, b**
 by Emped. **113 a, b**
 defined by Plato in the *Theaet.*,
321 d
- third man, the argument of the —,
327 c
- time
 defined by Plato in the *Tim.*, **351**
- truth
 in Parm.' fr. 1, vs. 29-30 and 2: **80**;
80 a; also fr. 8, vs. 15-18, 50-51:
83
 "T. lies in an abyss", Democr. **142 b**;
 title of the book of Protagoras, **170**;
 his theses, **171 a**, **172 a**; opposed to
 Socr. and Plato, **199**

- T. the beginning of all good, **375 b**, p. 285
- Virtue
 theory of Heracl. on v., **62 b**
 v. a disposition of the heart, Democr. **155 a-d**; to be cultivated by education, **156 b, c**;
 myth of Protagoras on v., **175**;
 Gorgias as a teacher of v., **187 e**;
 v. = knowledge (Socr.), **204 c, d**;
 a definition of v. is sought for, **210**;
211; **212**; **213-214**
 considered by Antisth. as the supreme good, **244 a**
 a thing of deeds, not of learning, **246 b**
 a question of practical wisdom (Aristippus), **258**
 the four virtues in Plato's *Rep.*, **285 c**
 metaphysical basis of v., **267**; **273**;
308
 to be mixed with pleasure, **348**
 in the *Laws*, **374 a**; **385 b**, p. 283
- vision
 theory of v. by Democr., **112 c, d**
- void
 admitted by the Pythag. **43 a-b**;
 denied by Melissus, **98**; and by Anaxagoras, **126**; accepted by Democr. as truly being, **141**;
142 a
- Wealth, not desired by the philosopher, **10**; **154 f**; impossible for a good man, **376**
- will
 opposed to desire **213 a**
 free to choose a life **307**, p. 215
 free to form the character **392 a**
 free w. and providence of God **392 b**; **393**
- wisdom
 s. *sages*
- women
 in Plato's *Rep.* **286-288**
 community of w. criticized by Aristotle **310**;
 inferior to man **354**;
 education the same on both sexes **385**
- wonder-worker
 Pythagoras **22**
 Empedocles **102-103**
- words, different from things, **184**
 have an objective value **268**
- world
 surrounded by air (Anaximenes) **18**
 fitted together from the Non-limited and the Limiting (Philolaus) **43**
 cosmic system of Philolaus **44**
 an ever-living fire (Heracl.) **57 a**
 cosmic system of Parmenides **84-85**
 forming of the w. (Anaxagoras) **128 a, b**
 Plato's view of the visible w., **349**
 worlds, innumerable, **15** (Anaximander); **129** (Anaxagoras); **145** (Democritus)
 two — **266 e**; **294-297**

III. GREEK WORDS

- Ἀγαθόν s. *good*
 ἀδικία Nr. **11 a**
 ἀδικεῖν and ἀδικεῖσθαι s. *justice*
 ἀδοξία **248 a**
 ἀίδιον **98**;
 the fixed stars called ἀίδια **352**
 αἰδώς **175**
 αἰσθησις s. *perception*
 αἰτία
 seeking for a true — **216**
 fourth principle in the *Phil.* **346**;
347 e
 Ἀκούσματα **29-30**
 ἀνάγκη **85 a**; **144**
 ἀνάμνησις
 Plato's doctrine of —, s. *anamnesis*
 ἀόριστος δυνάς s. μέγα κ. μικρόν
 ἀπάθεια (tranquillitas animi) **159**; cp. **239**; **380 b**
 ἀπειρον
 Anaximander's doctrine of the —, **11-15**;
 Pythagorean doctrine **31**; **32 b, 42**;
 Parmenides' being is — **83**;
 Melissus **97 b**;
 in Plato's *Phil.*, **344**, **346**; **347 b**;
 compared with the agrapha **370-371**
 ἀπορροαί **109 b**; **112 a, c**

ἀριθμός s. *number*

ἀρμονία s. *harmony* and *musicology*
ἀρχή 1, n. 1; 8; 11; 12-15; 162; 163;
hypotheses as ἀρχαί 294, p. 203

ἀσέβεια

Anaxagoras accused o — 120 c;
three formes of —, 386;
astronomy does not lead to —, 394 b

ἀσκησις 244 c

ἀσύμβλητοι

of the ideal Numbers, 367 a

Βασκανία 143 c

βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωρα 111 c

βούλεσθαι 213

S. also *will*

Γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν 347 d

S. also *coming into being*
γνηστή and σκοτή γνῶμη 142 c

Δαιμόνιον s. *daimonion*

δαίμων

with Parmenides 85 b;
guardian angel 307, p. 217;
cult of daemones prescribed by Pla-
to, 374 c

δεκάς 40 a-b;

cp. Plato's doctrine of ideal Numbers
366 c

Διαλέξεις s. λόγος (Δισσοὶ λόγοι)

δημιουργός s. *Demiurge*

διάνοια

technical term in Plato's *Rep.*, 294,
p. 203

δίκαιον, s. *justice*

δίκη 11 a; 57 b; 63 b; 85 a

διχοτομία 89 b; 92 b

S. also *diaeresis*

δόξα

with Parmenides 84-85
ὀρθή δ. (in the *Meno*) 214 b
-αι τῶν ἀνθρώπων (in the *Crito*) 215;
ἀληθής δ. (in the *Theaet.*) 320 b;
325 b, c; Ψευδής δ. 321-324; 326 b

δύναμις

potentiality, denied by Diod. Cronus
234; 235

Εἶδος and ἰδέα

in preplatonic literature 224-228

εἰδῶν φίλοι 315

S. further *Idea*

εἰδωλα 143 a-d

εἰκασία

used by Plato to indicate his fourth
stage of cognition, 294, p. 203

εἰμαρμένη 55 b; 63 b

ἐκπύρωσις 55 b; 56-58

ἐκὼν

οὐδείς — ἀμαρτάνει 204 d; 211; 212;
213

cp. Democr. 156 a

ἐμπειρία 198 c, p. 110

ἐν 83; 97-98; 330-336; 344; 364 a-c

ἐξαίφνης, τὸ, 331

ἐπιθυμητικόν 357 b

ἐπιθυμία s. *desires*

ἐπιρρυσμὴ 142 a

εὐδαιμονία 151 a

εὐδαίμων 275 a, b; cp. 374 a

εὐθυμία 149; 152 a, c

Ἑδονή

rejected by Antisth. 245 a
more temperately 245 b
considered as the supreme good by
Aristippus, 255-259; 261
in Plato's *Phil.* 348; cp. 374 a

Ἴσον 152 b (καλὸν ἐν παντί, Democr.);
in Plato's doctrine of ultimate prin-
ciples, 371 a; 371 b (Sextus, *Adv.*
math. X 271-276)

Καθαρμοί

poem of Empedocles, 100; 101;
116-118

κενόν s. *void*

κίνησις s. *motion*

κλεψύδρα 115

κοινωνία τῶν γενῶν

in Plato's *Soph.*, 340

κομψότεροι 247 b

κυριεύων 235

Λόγος

Heraclitus' doctrine of the —,
60-63;

λ. δυνάστης μέγας (Gorgias) 179;
Δισσοὶ λόγοι, 196; 216, p. 147, n. 2;
227 c

thinking a l. of the soul with itself
321 d

account 325 b

ψευδής λ. 343

Μάγοι 139 cμαιευτική s. *obstetric art.*μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον **371 a**cp. ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις in **371 b**μέγα καὶ μικρόν **365 c**; **371**; **372**μέθεξις **204 a** **327 a**μετρητική **345**; cp. **344**μέτρον **152**μὴ ὄν, s. *non-being***Νάρκη**Socrates compared with a —, **209 b****Νεῖκος**

moving principle in Empedocles,

107 a; **110 c, d, e, f**; **111 b, g****νόησις**with Diog. of Apollonia **163-165**in Plato's *Rep.* VI, **294**, p. 203in the *Phil.* **348**

νοῦς, moving and ruling principle (A-

naxagoras) **119**; **128 a**; in man **130 a**

S. also νόησις

Ὀδὸς ἄνω, κάτω 55ὁμοιομερῆ **124 a**ὄν s. *being***Πεισιθάνατος 261****πέρας**with Pythagoreans **42**in Plato's *Phil.* **346**; **347 a**compared with the *agrapha*, **370-****371****πίστις**used by Plato for his third stage of cognition, **294**, p. 203

ποιεῖν and πάσχειν (categories), denied

by the Megarians **232**;cp. **315 c****πόλεμος 53-54****πολυμαθία 48 a****πόνος 191 c**; **244 b****Ῥητορική 198 c****Σκοτεινός 51**σοφιστικοὶ ἐλεγχοὶ **197**στάσις **52 d**; **339**; **341****στοιχεῖα**

term first used by Aristotle

S. Democr. **135-136**; **141**

the elements in later Platonism

365 a; **372****συνοπτικός 302**; **326 a****σφαῖρος**Empedocles fr. 27: **110 a-c**;cp. Parm. fr. 8, vs. 42-44: **83****σωφροσύνη****153 e**; **211 a**; **248 a, b**; **310 e****Τέλος (summum bonum) 149**; **244 a**;
255**τετρακτὺς 41 a**"Ὑλη, Aristotelian term for *matter*

Aristotle identifies it with Plato's

χώρα and with his principle of the

great and small: **371 c****ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις**-οὐ καλόν Democr.: **152 b****ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις**in later Platonism, **371 b**

cp. μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον

Φιλότης 107 a; **110 a, e**; **111 b, g****φρόνησις 153**; **247**; **258**; **348****Χώρα**in Plato's *Tim.*, **356**compared with the *agrapha*, **317 c**

ADDITIONS TO CHAPTER II

PYTHAGORAS AND ANCIENT PYTHAGOREANISM

There is quite an important piece of evidence, as well attested as any other part of the tradition concerning Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism, which hitherto has been rather generally left out by those who wrote the history or collected the sources of this part of early Greek philosophy. I mean the description of Pythagoras' appearance and behaviour at Croton and in Southern Italy, found in Iamblichus' *V.P.*, and in a shorter form in Porphyry and Diogenes Laertius. It goes back to three authors of the fourth century B.C.: Aristoxenus, Dicaearchus and the Sicilian historian Timaeus of Tauromenium. Of these the latter's testimony is of particular importance, since he wrote from the point of view of the history of Southern Italy and Sicily, and must have known the local tradition about fifth and fourth century Pythagorean life and political activity, still alive in those regions in his days. Moreover, the doctrine attributed to Pythagoras by these 4th century sources on certain peculiar points has its parallels in the fragments of such early Pythagorean authors as Archytas of Tarentum and even Alcmaeon of Croton.

Pythagoras, then, appears to us to have been not only the venerated master of his particular students and members of his congregation (as we might call them). He appears to have preached repeated "missions" to different groups of the population of Croton as a whole, and to have influenced them profoundly. After having thus acquired a great renown of holiness and wisdom, he was consulted more than once by several of the surrounding peoples and cities, gave them advice and sent them lawgivers at their request. His advice was inspired by his insight into the cosmic Law and principle of harmony, founded on numeric ratio. Thus, Pythagoras no doubt anticipated Plato's later doctrine that the philosopher only is called to lead his fellow-men on the way to virtue and to happiness, by virtue of his insight into divine and eternal Truth.

The following texts are given to illustrate the importance and contents of this part of our evidence concerning Pythagoras and early Pythagorean-

ism. I cite them rather amply because they are lacking altogether both in Diels' *V.S.* and in Mrs. Timpanaro's more recent collection of *Pitagorici frammenti*, vol. I.

As an analysis of the sources A. Delatte's works (*Etudes sur la littérature pythagoricienne*, 1916, and *Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne*, 1922) are still of the greatest interest. The subject of "early Pythagorean politics" was taken up more recently by K. von Fritz (1940) and E. L. Minar (1942). Both authors gave some valuable contributions, though in particular the latter was seriously mistaken when separating the so-called Pythagorean "politics" from philosophy. J. S. Morrison, no doubt, was much more fortunately inspired when speaking of "the Origins of Plato's philosopher-statesman" (in *Class. Quarterly* 1958) and pointing to the fact that in Plato's *Gorgias* 507d-508a Pythagorean principles are cited and adopted.

The
unbloody
altar
on Delos

1—Pythagoras considered as Apollo's son. The unbloody altar on Delos is mentioned by Timaeus (Iambl., *V.P.* 25 and 35. Cp. Diog. L. VIII 22).

a. Macrobius, *Sat.* III 6:

Deli ara est Apollinis Γενέτορος, in qua nullum animal sacrificatur, quam Pythagoram velut inviolatam adoravisse produnt.

b. Timaeus fr. 79 (= Censorinus, *De die nat.* 2); Jacoby FGH III B F 147:

Denique Deli ad Apollinis genitoris aram, ut Timaeus auctor est, nemo hostiam caedit.

Pythagoras'
appearance
at Croton

2—Pompeius Trogus' *Epitome*, handed down by Justinus, gives a short account of Pythagoras' appearance and activity at Croton which goes back to Timaeus as well.

Justinus XX 4, 1:

Quibus omnibus instructus Crotona venit populumque in luxuriam lapsum auctoritate sua ad usum frugalitatis revocavit.

3—What is found in Iamblichus *V.P.* 72 on "postulate", "noviciate", the five years silence and community of property in the Pythagorean Society (my ch. II, nr. 26) is testified by Timaeus, too.

a. Timaeus fr. 77 (= Diog. Laert. VIII 10); Jacoby FGH III B, 566 F 13:

Ἐλπε δὲ πρῶτος (sc. Pythagoras), ὥς φησι Τίμαιος, κοινὰ τὰ φίλων εἶναι καὶ φιλίαν ἰσότητα. Καὶ αὐτοῦ οἱ μαθηταὶ κατετίθεντο τὰς οὐσίας εἰς ἓν. πενταετίαν δ' ἡσύχαζον, μόνον τῶν λόγων ἀκούοντες καὶ οὐδέπω Πυθαγόραν ὁρῶντες εἰς ὃ δοκιμασθεῖεν.

b. Scholia in Plat. *Phaedr.* 279 (ed. Hermann, vol. VI, p. 275); Jacoby, ib.:

Φησι γοῦν ὁ Τίμαιος ἐν τῇ Ε οὕτω· προσιόντων δ' οὖν αὐτῷ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ βουλομένων συνδιατρίβειν οὐκ εὐθὺς συνεχώρησεν, ἀλλ' ἔφη δεῖν καὶ τὰς οὐσίας κοινὰς εἶναι τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων. Εἶτα μετὰ πολλὰ φησι καὶ δι' ἐκείνους πρῶτον ῥηθῆναι κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων.

c. Photius, *Lex.* 129 (Jacoby, ib.):

Κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. Τίμαιός φησι ἐν τῇ Θ ταύτην λεχθῆναι κατὰ τὴν Μεγάλην Ἑλλάδα καθ' οὓς χρόνους Πυθαγόρας ἀνέπειθεν τοὺς ταύτην ἐνοικοῦντας ἀδιανέμητα κεκτῆσθαι.

4—Pythagoras addresses the young men of Croton.

First
discourse

Iamblichus, *V.P.* 37-38⁴; 39¹⁻³; 40⁸⁻⁴¹⁴:

καὶ μετ' ὀλίγας ἡμέρας εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸ γυμνάσιον. περιχυθέντων δὲ τῶν νεανίσκων παραδέδοται λόγους τινὰς διαλεχθῆναι πρὸς αὐτούς, ἐξ ὧν εἰς τὴν σπουδὴν παρεκάλει τὴν περὶ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους, ἀποφαίνων ἐν τε τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τῇ φύσει μᾶλλον τιμώμενον τὸ προηγούμενον ἢ τὸ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐπόμενον, οἷον τὴν ἀνατολὴν τῆς δύσεως, τὴν ἔω τῆς ἐσπέρας, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς τελευτῆς, τὴν γένεσιν τῆς φθορᾶς ¹, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς αὐτόχθονας τῶν ἐπηλύδων, ὁμοίως δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀποικίαις τοὺς ἡγεμόνας καὶ τοὺς οἰκιστὰς τῶν πόλεων, καὶ καθόλου τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς τῶν δαιμόνων, ἐκείνους δὲ τῶν ἡμιθέων, τοὺς ἥρωας δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐκ τούτων δὲ τοὺς αἰτίους τῆς γενέσεως τῶν νεωτέρων. ἐπαγωγῆς δὲ ἕνεκα ταῦτα ἔλεγε πρὸς τὸ περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς γονεῖς ἑαυτῶν, οἷς ἔφη τηλικαύτην ὀφείλειν αὐτοὺς χάριν, ἡλικίην ἃν ὁ τετελευτηκῶς ἀποδοίῃ τῷ δυνηθέντι πάλιν αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ φῶς ἀγαγεῖν.

ὅθεν καὶ τὸν Ὀμηρον τῇ αὐτῇ προσηγορίᾳ τὸν βασιλέα τῶν θεῶν αὖξειν, ἢ ὀνομάζοντα πατέρα τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν θνητῶν.

ἀπεφαίνετο δὲ καὶ ταῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμιλίαις οὕτως ἂν χρωμένους ἐπιτυχ-
χάνειν, ὥς μέλλουσι τοῖς μὲν φίλοις μηδέποτε ἐχθροὶ καταστῆναι, τοῖς δὲ ἐχθροῖς ὥς τάχιστα φίλοι γίνεσθαι, καὶ μελετᾶν ἐν μὲν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους εὐκοσμίᾳ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πατέρας εὐνοίαν, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἄλλους φιλανθρωπίᾳ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀδελφούς κοινωνίαν. ἐφεξῆς δὲ ἔλεγε περὶ σωφροσύνης, φάσκων τὴν τῶν νεανίσκων ἡλικίαν πεῖραν τῆς φύσεως λαμβάνειν, καθ' ὃν καιρὸν ἀκμαζούσας ἔχουσι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας.

5—Pythagoras addresses the Crotonian Senate.

Iamblichus, *V.P.* 45⁶⁻⁴⁶⁵; 50⁹⁻¹³:

ὁ δὲ πρῶτον αὐτοῖς συνεβούλευεν ἰδρύσασθαι Μουσῶν ἱερὸν, ἵνα τηρῶσι τὴν

Address
to the
Senate

¹ Cp. Diog. L. VIII, 22.

ὑπάρχουσαν ὁμόνοιαν.¹ ταύτας γὰρ τὰς θεὰς καὶ τὴν προσηγορίαν τὴν αὐτὴν ἀπάσας ἔχειν καὶ μετ' ἀλλήλων παραδεδοσθαι καὶ ταῖς κοιναῖς τιμαῖς μάλιστα χαίρειν, καὶ τὸ σύνολον ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀεὶ χορὸν εἶναι τῶν Μουσῶν, ἔτι δὲ 5 συμφωνίαν, ἁρμονίαν, ῥυθμόν, ἅπαντα περιειληφέναι τὰ παρασκευάζοντα τὴν ὁμόνοιαν.² ἐπεδείκνυε δὲ αὐτῶν τὴν δύναμιν οὐ περὶ τὰ κάλλιστα θεωρήματα μόνον ἀνῆκειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὴν συμφωνίαν καὶ ἁρμονίαν τῶν ὄντων. ἔπειτα ὑπολαμβάνειν αὐτοὺς ἔφη δεῖν κοινῇ παρακαταθήκην ἔχειν τὴν πατρίδα παρὰ τοῦ πληθους τῶν πολιτῶν.³ δεῖν οὖν ταύτην διοικεῖν οὕτως, ὥς μέλλουσι τὴν 10 πίστιν παραδόσιμον τοῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν ποιεῖν.

οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες τό τε Μουσεῖον ἰδρύσαντο καὶ τὰς παλλακίδας, ἃς ἔχειν ἐπιχώριον ἦν αὐτοῖς, ἀφῆκαν καὶ διαλεχθῆναι χωρὶς αὐτὸν ἐν μὲν τῷ Πυθαίῳ πρὸς τοὺς παῖδας, ἐν δὲ τῷ τῆς Ἑρας ἱερῷ πρὸς τὰς γυναῖκας ἡξίωσαν.

To the
women

6—He brings the women to sobriety in dressing.

Iamblichus, *V.P.* 56¹²⁻¹⁶:

διὰ δὲ τῶν εἰς τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἐπαίνων πρὸς τὴν εὐτέλειαν τὴν κατὰ τὸν ἱματισμὸν τηλικαύτην παραδέδοται κατασκευάσαι τὴν μεταβολήν, ὥστε τὰ πολυτελῆ τῶν ἱματίων μηδεμίαν ἐνδύεσθαι τολμᾶν, ἀλλὰ θεῖναι πάσας εἰς τὸ τῆς Ἑρας ἱερὸν πολλὰς μυριάδας ἱματίων.

7—That all this is not just a late fiction of the fourth century A.D., is proved by the following passage from Pompeius Trogus' *Epitome*.

A parallel
in Justinus

a. Justinus XX 4, 6-12:

Laudabat cotidie virtutem et vitia luxuriae casumque civitatum ea peste perditarum enumerabat tantumque studium ad frugalitatem multitudinis provocavit, ut aliquos ex his luxuriatos incredibile videretur.

Matronarum quoque separatam a viris doctrinam et puerorum a parentibus frequenter habuit. Docebat nunc has pudicitiam et obsequia in viros, nunc illos modestiam et litterarum studium. Inter haec velut genetricem virtutem frugalitatem omnibus ingerebat consecutusque disputationum adsiduitate erat, ut matronae auratas vestes ceteraque dignitatis suae ornamenta velut instrumenta luxuriae deponerent eaque omnia delata 10 in Iunonis aedem ipsi deae consecrarent, prae se ferentes vera ornamenta matronarum pudicitiam, non vestes esse.

¹ The feature seems to be authentic. Cp. Porph., *V.P.* 56 f. and Diog. Laert. VIII 40, where it is told that Pythagoras, when persecuted, fled to the temple of the Muses at Metapontum.

² On the Muses as causes of the cosmic harmony also Porph., *V.P.* 31; Plut., *Quaest. conv.* IX 14, 6, 6.

³ The notion of the deposito no doubt underlines the ruler's responsibility towards the community of the citizens as a whole.

The discourses of Pythagoras are also mentioned by Diodorus, b. X, ch. 3 and 24.

b. Cp. also the following fragment of Timaeus concerning the social activity of Pythagoras' wife and daughter.

Timaeus fr. 78 (in Porph., *V.P.* 4); Jacoby III B, 566 F 131:

Τίμαιος δ' ἱστορεῖ τὴν Πυθαγόρου θυγατέρα καὶ παρθένον οὔσαν ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν παρθένων ἐν Κρότῳ καὶ γυναιῖκα τῶν γυναικῶν.

Porph., *V.P.* 18, mentions the four discourses rather shortly, placing the address to the senate first, that to the young men second. He is generally supposed to have his information from Dicaearchus.

8—Aristoxenus describes Pythagoras as the liberator and bringer of peace and concord in Southern Italy and Sicily.

**Political
influence
in Southern
Italy and
Sicily**

a. Iambl., *V.P.* 33⁴-34 (= Porph., *V.P.* 21 f., from Nicomachus) = Aristoxenus, fr. 17 Wehrli:

Λέγεται τοῖνον ὥς ἐπιδημήσας Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ Σικελίᾳ, ἃς κατέλαβε πόλεις δεδουλωμένας ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, τὰς μὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν, τὰς δὲ νεωστί, ταύτας φρονήματος ἐλευθερίου ὑποπλήσας διὰ τῶν ἐφ' ἐκάστης ἀκουστῶν αὐτοῦ ἀνεργύσατο καὶ ἐλευθέρας ἐποίησε, Κρότωνα καὶ Σύβαριν καὶ Κατάνην καὶ 5 Ῥήγιον καὶ Ἰμέραν καὶ Ἀκράγαντα καὶ Ταυρομένιον καὶ ἄλλας τινάς¹, αἷς καὶ νόμους ἔθετο διὰ Χαρώνδα τε τοῦ Καταναίου καὶ Ζαλεῦκου τοῦ Λοκροῦ, δι' ὧν εὐνομώταται καὶ ἀξιοζήλωτοι ταῖς περιοίκοις μέχρι πολλοῦ διετέλεσαν².

¹ Numismatic evidence proves that there existed actually an alliance between Croton and Sybaris in the 6th century, and that after the destruction of Sybaris (510) Croton had the hegemonia over quite a number of cities in Southern Italy until the middle of the fifth century. After that date independent coins are found of many cities which before were found to be allied with Croton. Kahrstedt in *Hermes* LIII (1918) considered the so-called alliance-coins as a proof of military conquest. While K. von Fritz wisely rejects the theory of the existence of a large and centralized Crotonian "Empire", E. L. Minar thinks that Kahrstedt went not far enough. There has been more than "only military conquest". He speaks of *territorial expansion*, which would have extended from Metapontum to Rhegium, and from Laus on the Tyrrhenian to Locri on the Ionian sea. But what about alliance-coins of Croton with Sicilian cities, e.g. a place so far removed as Himera? Does not this rather point to a different interpretation,—to "friendly relations" with such cities as Himera, Catana and Tauromenium? It is quite probable that these relations implied certain economic privileges—the right of landing and of using harbours, which was important for a trading city such as Croton was. It is certain that in each of these cities a number of persons were sympathizing with the Pythagorean principles, and quite possible that Pythagoreans were requested to act as law-givers or advisers. Only, it seems short-sighted just to label them as "oligarchs", and to qualify the whole movement as a "reactionary international", as Minar does.

² When the writer of our passages makes Zaleucus and Charondas to Pythagoreans, he is committing an anachronism. These law-givers belonged to an older

ἀνεῖλε δὲ ἄρδην στάσιν καὶ διχοφωνίαν καὶ ἀπλῶς ἑτεροφροσύνην οὐ μόνον ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν ἀπογόνων δὲ αὐτῶν μέχρι πολλῶν, ὡς ἱστορεῖται, 10 γενεῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθόλου ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ Σικελίᾳ πόλεων πασῶν κατὰ τε ἑαυτάς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας¹. πυκνὸν γὰρ ἦν αὐτῷ πρὸς ἅπαντας πανταχῇ πολλοὺς καὶ ὀλίγους <τὸ τοιοῦτον> ἀπόφθεγμα, χρησιμῶ θεοῦ συμβουλευτικῶ ὅμοιον, ἐπιτομή τις ὥσπερ καὶ ἀνακεφαλαίωσίς τις τῶν αὐτῷ δοκούντων [τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀπόφθεγμα]. „φυγαδευτέον πάσῃ μηχανῇ καὶ περικοπτέον πυρὶ 15 καὶ σιδήρῳ καὶ μηχαναῖς παντοίαις ἀπὸ μὲν σώματος νόσον, ἀπὸ δὲ ψυχῆς ἀμαθίαν, κοιλίας δὲ πολυτέλειαν, πόλεως δὲ στάσιν, οἴκου δὲ διχοφροσύνην, ὁμοῦ δὲ πάντων ἀμετρίαν.”

Simichus

b. The story of Simichus testifies so Pythagoras' moral influence in Magna Graecia.

Porphyrus, *V.P.* 21:

Σίμιχος δ' ὁ Κεντοριπίων τύραννος ἀκούσας αὐτοῦ τὴν τ' ἀρχὴν ἀπέθετο καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τὰ μὲν τῇ ἀδελφῇ τὰ δὲ τοῖς πολίταις ἔδωκεν.

Moral
influence

9—Cp. also Diog. Laert. VIII 16:

ἄλλους τε πολλοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἀπεργάσασθαι καλοὺς τε κάγαθούς ἀνδρας, ἀτὰρ καὶ Ζάλευκον καὶ Χαρώνδαν τοὺς νομοθέτας· ἱκανός τε γὰρ ἦν φιλίας ἐργάτης τὰ τ' ἄλλα καὶ εἴ τινα πύθοιτο τῶν συμβόλων αὐτοῦ κεκοινωνηκότα, εὐθύς τε προσηταιρίζετο καὶ φίλον κατεσκεύαζεν.

Cp. the story on Pythagorean *φιλία* told in 14b.

10—Porphyrus, *V.P.* 22, citing Aristoxenus, says that different tribes in Southern Italy and even Romans came to ask Pythagoras' advice. The same is found in Iamblichus, *V.P.* 241:

προσῆλθον δὲ καὶ ξένοι τῇ Πυθαγορείῳ αἰρέσει καὶ Μεσσαπίων καὶ Λευκαίων καὶ Πευκετίων καὶ Ῥωμαίων.

The
three
hundred

11—Timaeus' testimony on the "threehundred" who formed a political club (ἐταιρεία) within the Pythagorean Society.

generation, even to an earlier century (the 7th). But there appears to have been a tradition, probably of the later fifth or early fourth century, which enlisted these famous old law-givers among the Pythagoreans. Delatte thinks that in those days (after 450-440, when the Pythagoreans had their centre in Rhegium) Pythagorean law-givers adapted the original law of Zaleucus for the newly-founded city of Thurii, and those of Charondas for different Sicilian cities, adding *prooemia* to their laws which are preserved under the names of *Prooemia Zaleoukou* and *Charondou* (below, our nrs. 16 and 17). This is at least a reasonable hypothesis. Cp. Iambl., *V.P.* 130, and my comments to *V.P.* 250, below, under nr. 12.

¹ Cp. in the discourse to the young people (above, nr. 4) the ll. 16-20, and in the address to the senate (nr. 5) ll. 1-6. Below, nr. 14.

a. Justinus XX 4, 14:

Sed CCC ex iuvenibus cum sodalicii iure sacramento quodam nexi separatam a ceteris civibus vitam exercebant, quasi coetum clandestinae coniurationis haberent, civitatem in se converterunt, quae eos, cum in unam domum convenissent, cremare voluit.

b. Cp. Diog. Laert. VIII 3 (my ch. II, nr. 21c).

Here it is suggested that the "threehundred" formed the whole Pythagorean Society which, as such, would have exercised the actual government over the city. Iambl., *V.P.* 30, however, mentions a much larger number. Cp. Iambl., *V.P.* 72, l. 10-12, where it is suggested that a selected group were called πολιτικοί, namely those who were appointed as administrators and law-givers (καὶ οἰκονομικοὶ τινες καὶ νομοθετικοὶ ὄντες). My ch. II, nr. 26d. This is, in fact, much more probable.

12—By the catastrophe (ch. II, nr. 47 a) Pythagorean influence in Southern Italy came to a sudden end.

The end
of Pythag.
influence

Iambl., *V.P.* 250¹⁻⁷:

γενομένου δὲ τοῦτου καὶ λόγον οὐδένα ποιησαμένων τῶν πόλεων περὶ τοῦ συμβάντος πάθους ἐπαύσαντο τῆς ἐπιμελείας οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι. συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο δι' ἀμφοτέρας τὰς αἰτίας, διὰ τε τὴν ὀλιγωρίαν τῶν πόλεων (τοῦ τοιοῦτου γὰρ καὶ τηλικούτου γενομένου πάθους οὐδεμίαν ἐπιστροφὴν ἐποιήσαντο), διὰ τε τὴν ἀπώλειαν τῶν ἡγεμονικωτάτων ἀνδρῶν.

For the rest, Iamblichus' information about the number of survivors is somewhat confused: after having told us that only Archippus and Lysis survived (ch. II, nr. 47b), he goes on saying:

οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἀπέστησαν τῆς Ἰταλίας πλὴν Ἀρχύτου τοῦ Ταραντίνου· ἀθροισθέντες δὲ εἰς τὸ Ῥήγιον ἐκεῖ διέτριβον μετ' ἀλλήλων. προιόντος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τῶν πολιτευμάτων ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον προβαίνοντων . . .

Follows a lacuna. It is not improbable, as was supposed by Delatte, that here it was said that the Pythagoreans got some political influence again; which would give room to the supposed adaptation of Zaleucus' and Charondas' laws (above, 8a, n. 2).

13—Basic Pythagorean principles in social life.

Social
principles

a. Warning against too great prosperity.

Iambl., *V.P.* 85³⁻⁴:

ἀγαθὸν οἱ πόνοι, αἱ δὲ ἡδοναὶ ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου κακόν.

b. Justice is based on the conviction of the universe and mankind being ruled by the gods.

Iambl., *V.P.* 174:

ἔτι τοίνυν ἀνυσιμώτατον πρὸς τὴν τῆς δικαιοσύνης κατάστασιν ὑπελάμβανεν εἶναι τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἀρχήν, ἀνωθέν τε ἀπ' ἐκείνης πολιτεῖαν καὶ νόμους, δικαιοσύνην τε καὶ τὰ δίκαια διέθηκεν (sc. Zalmoxis, here made a Pythagorean). —

Τὸ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡς ἔστι τε καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος οὕτως
 5 ἔχει ὡς ἐπιβλέπειν καὶ μὴ ὀλιγωρεῖν αὐτοῦ, χρήσιμον εἶναι ὑπελάμβανον οἱ
 Πυθαγόρειοι παρ' ἐκείνου μαθόντες ¹. δεῖσθαι γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἐπιστατείας τοιαύτης,
 ἥ κατὰ μὴδὲν ἀνταίρειν ἀξιῶσομεν· τοιαύτην δ' εἶναι τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ γινο-
 μένην, εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ θεῖον τοιοῦτον <οἶον> ἄξιον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ σύμπαντος ἀρχῆς.
 10 ὕβριστικὸν γὰρ δὴ φύσει τὸ ζῶον ἔφασαν εἶναι, ὀρθῶς λέγοντες, καὶ ποικίλον
 κατὰ τε τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν παθῶν·
 δεῖσθαι οὖν τοιαύτης ὑπεροχῆς τε καὶ ἐπανατάσεως, ἀφ' ἧς ἔστι σωφρονισμός
 τις καὶ τάξις.

c. We found the general rule of ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ θεῷ in Iamblichus, *V.P.* 137 (ch. II, nr. 27). Cp. Plato, *Laws* IV 716 c:

ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα.

Pythagorean
 friendship

14—Taking up the principles of concord and harmony, applied to human society (above, in the discourses to the young men and to the senate of Croton, nrs. 4 and 5), Iamblichus expounds the Pythagorean doctrine as follows.

a. Iamblichus, *V.P.* 229-230:

Φιλίαν δὲ διαφανέστατα πάντων πρὸς ἅπαντας Πυθαγόρας παρέδωκε ²,

¹ χρήσιμον εἶναι ὑπελάμβανον—i.e., they considered this a principle which is directly applicable, and *should* be directly applied, to human life, both privately and in public. Cp. 179: καὶ ἄλλην δὲ μέθοδον ἀνεῦρε τοῦ ἀναστέλλειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας.

² φιλία πάντων πρὸς ἅπαντας—Cp. the discourses addressed to the young men (nr. 4, l. 16-20) and to the senate of Croton (nr. 5, l. 1-6), both of which exhorted to ὁμόνοια, φιλία and φιλανθρωπία extending to all fellow-men. Behind this was—and is here—the principle of συμφωνία and ἁρμονία in the cosmos. For this doctrine we can cite an older testimony than Aristoxenus and Timaeus, namely *Archytas*, fr. 3 (in Diels *V.S.*, 47 B 3), where it is said:

δεῖ γὰρ ἡ μαθόντα παρ' ἄλλω ἢ αὐτὸν ἐξευρόντα, ὦν ἀνεπιστάμων ἦσθα, ἐπιστάμονα γενέσθαι. τὸ μὲν ὦν μαθὲν παρ' ἄλλω καὶ ἄλλοτρίᾳ, τὸ δὲ ἐξευρὲν δι' αὐταυτον καὶ ἰδίᾳ· ἐξευρεῖν δὲ μὴ ζητοῦντα ἄπορον καὶ σπάνιον, ζητοῦντα δὲ εὐπορον καὶ ῥᾶδιον, μὴ ἐπιστάμενον δὲ ζητεῖν ἀδύνατον.

στάσιν μὲν ἔπαυσεν, ὁμόνοιαν δὲ αὐξήσεν λογισμὸς εὐρεθείς· πλεονεξία τε γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τούτου γενομένου καὶ ἰσότης ἔστιν· τούτῳ γὰρ περὶ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων διαλασσόμεθα. διὰ τοῦτον οὖν οἱ πένητες λαμβάνοντι παρὰ τῶν δυναμένων, οἳ τε πλοῦσιοι διδόντι τοῖς δεομένοις, πιστεύοντες ἀμφοτέροι διὰ τούτω τὸ ἴσον ἔξειν. κανὼν δὲ καὶ κωλυτὴρ τῶν ἀδικούντων <ἐὼν> τοὺς μὲν ἐπισταμένους λογίζεσθαι πρὶν ἀδικεῖν ἔπαυσε, πείσας ὅτι οὐ δυνασοῦνται λαθεῖν, ὅταν ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἔλθωντι· τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἐπισταμένους, ἐν αὐτῷ δηλώσας ἀδικούντας, ἐκώλυσε ἀδικῆσαι.

No doubt Archytas meant by his λογισμός: the insight into the cosmic law that number determines all relations. He applies this principle directly to human relations.—Here then we have a generally accepted pre-Platonic, Pythagorean text in which mathematical principles are applied to human social and moral relations.

θεῶν μὲν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δι' εὐσεβείας καὶ ἐπιστημονικῆς θεραπείας ¹, δογμάτων δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα ² καὶ καθόλου ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα ³ λογιστικοῦ τε πρὸς τὰ τοῦ ἀλόγου εἶδη διὰ φιλοσοφίας καὶ τῆς κατ' αὐτὴν θεωρίας ⁴, ἀνθρώπων ⁵ δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους πολιτῶν μὲν διὰ νομιμότητος ὕγιους, ἑτεροφύλων δὲ διὰ φυσιολογίας ὀρθῆς, ἀνδρὸς δὲ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἢ τέκνα ἢ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ οἰκείους διὰ κοινωνίας ἀδιαστρόφου ⁵, συλλήβδην δὲ πάντων πρὸς ἅπαντας, καὶ προσέτι

Cp. also Archytas' fr. 2, in which the distinction is made between arithmetical and geometrical proportions in music, a distinction which we find applied to justice in the (probably fourth century) Pythagorean treatise *Περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ νόμου*, as well as by Plato who, in *Laus* VI 757a-d, distinguished the two kinds of justice which later (by Aristotle, *EN* V 1131 b 27 and 1132 a 18) were called distributive and corrective justice, the first requiring geometrical, the latter arithmetical proportions. Plato introduces the distinction as early as in the *Gorgias* 507d-508a. J. S. Morrison (*Class. Quart.* 1958, p. 198 ff.) was right in attributing this to the influence of Archytas.

¹ The *φιλία* θεῶν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους depends for a good deal at least on the behaviour of man: he must make it possible and entertain it by piety and due worship.

² *δογμάτων πρὸς ἄλληλα*—i.e.: we should strive after consequence in thinking.

³ καὶ . . . *ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα*—"and, on the whole, after a good relation between soul and body"; which means: that the soul should rule and dominate.

⁴ *λογιστικοῦ τε πρὸς τὰ τοῦ ἀλόγου εἶδη*—sc. τῆς ψυχῆς. In fact, the early Pythagoreans seem to have distinguished between a rational and an irrational part of the soul. This appears from Philolaus, fr. 13, where we find a division into four parts: the head, the heart, the navel, and the privy parts. The head is said to belong to *νόος*, the heart to *ψυχή καὶ αἰσθησις*, while *ἔμφαλος* and *αἰδοῖον* belong to physical life and procreation. In *Diog. Laert.* VIII 30 (taken from the Pythagorean *ὑπομνήματα* by Alexander Polyhistor; cp. my nr. 1279) we find a tripartition: *νοῦς*, *φρένες*, *θυμός*, of which the *φρένες* are said to be the *proprium* of man, who shares *νοῦς* and *θυμός* with other ζῷα. That in this text the thinking faculty is called *φρένες*, no doubt is a trace of an early usage of language, as was rightly observed by Delatte in his *Commentary on Diog. Laert.* VIII. It is not hazardous to conclude that this division is an early one.

The *terms* of *λογιστικόν* and *ἄλογα εἶδη*, to be sure, were not used by Pythagoras, though he does appear to have made the distinction between a rational and an irrational part of the soul. In this sense Posidonius was right when saying that Pythagoras taught already Plato's tripartition of the soul, found in *Rep.* IV: he actually appears to have given a similar tripartition, though under different names and of a somewhat different meaning. We might render them by the words: Reason—perception—passions.

⁵ "The love of men towards each other" is taken in the most universal sense, and first specified into two groups: (a) of citizens, sc. towards their fellow-citizens, (b) of foreigners towards foreigners, the love of one's fellow-citizens being according to the spirit of a sound law, while loving-kindness towards foreigners, though not prescribed by law, is actually rooted in nature. The word *φυσιολογία* no doubt is late, but the notion itself of a natural kinship connecting man and man may certainly be early. It need not be of Stoic origin, though in the Stoa we find an explicit theory of a natural link connecting all reasonable beings. The Pythagoreans, as will appear from the following lines of our text, rather thought of man as an *animated* being, and as such having a natural link with animals as well.—After the

τῶν ἀλόγων ζῶων τινὰ διὰ δικαιοσύνης καὶ φυσικῆς ἐπιπλοκῆς καὶ κοινότητος ¹,
 σώματος δὲ καθ' ἑαυτὸ θνητοῦ, τῶν ἐγκεκρυμμένων αὐτῷ ἐναντίων δυνάμεων
 10 εἰρήνευσιν τε καὶ συμβιβασμόν, δι' ὑγείας καὶ τῆς εἰς ταύτην διαίτης καὶ σω-
 φροσύνης κατὰ μέμνησιν τῆς ἐν τοῖς κοσμικοῖς στοιχείοις εὐετηρίας ². ἐν πᾶσι
 δὴ τούτοις ἐνός καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατὰ σύλληψιν τοῦ τῆς φιλίας ὀνόματος ὄντος,
 εὐρετῆς καὶ νομοθέτης ὁμολογουμένως Πυθαγόρας ἐγένετο ³, καὶ οὕτω θαυ-
 μαστὴν φιλίαν παρέδωκε τοῖς χρωμένοις ⁴, ὥστε ἔτι καὶ νῦν τοὺς πολλοὺς
 15 λέγειν ἐπὶ τῶν σφοδρότερον εὐνοούντων ἑαυτοῖς ὅτι τῶν Πυθαγορείων εἰσί.

A famous instance of Pythagorean friendship was the story of Damon and Phintias, which Aristoxenus says to have heard from Dionysius himself. Iambl., *V.P.* 235-237. Also Diodorus X 4, 3 (with a slight variation).

An instance
 of Pythag.
 philia

b. We cite another striking instance. Iamblichus, *V.P.* 237 f. (probably from Aristoxenus):

καταχθῆναι γοῦν φασὶ τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν τινὰ μακράν καὶ ἐρήμην ὁδὸν
 βαδίζοντα εἷς τι πανδοχεῖον, ὑπὸ κόπου δὲ καὶ ἄλλης παντοδαπῆς αἰτίας εἰς
 νόσον μακράν τε καὶ βαρεῖαν ἐμπεσεῖν, ὥστ' ἐπιλιπεῖν αὐτὸν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια.
 τὸν μέντοι πανδοχέα, εἴτε οἴκτῳ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἴτε καὶ ἀποδοχῇ ⁵, πάντα
 5 παρασχέσθαι, μῆτε ὑπουργίας τινὸς φεισάμενον μῆτε δαπάνης μηδεμιᾶς. ἐπειδὴ
 δὲ κρείττων ἦν ἢ νόσος, τὸν μὲν ἀποθνήσκειν ἐλόμενον γράψαι τι σύμ-
 βολον ἐν πίνακι καὶ ἐπιστεῖλαι, ὅπως, ἂν τι πάθοι, κριμνάς τὴν δέλτον παρὰ
 τὴν ὁδὸν ἐπισκοπῇ, εἴ τις τῶν παριόντων ἀναγνωρίει τὸ σύμβολον. ⁶ τοῦτον γὰρ

specification of πολῖται and ἐτερόφυλοι various family-relations are mentioned in particular. The term ἀδιάστροφος is Stoic. But evidently one could not infer from this that Pythagoras did not emphasize the natural link of family members and relatives. On the contrary, it is very probable that he did.

¹ "in a word, of all towards all, and moreover he taught a certain love of animals (φιλίαν τινὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῶων) by virtue of justice and of a natural connection and relation". Because he admitted a natural connection between men and animals, Pythagoras could speak here of a moral relation and of moral duties. I take the genitive τῶν ἀλόγων ζῶων as a genitivus objectivus.

² Moreover, he taught people to have "philia of the mortal body in itself",—i.e.: internal harmony. The text is clear if a comma is put after θνητοῦ and συμβιβασμόν, understood as an apposition of φιλίαν.—This "pacification and reconciliation of hidden opposite forces in the body" is said to be realized "by health and the regime that tends to it, i.e. sobriety". It happens "by virtue of an imitation of the harmonious constitution in the physical elements".

³ "In all these cases one single all-embracing name is used, sc. that of *friendship*, and Pythagoras was generally considered as the inventor and organizer of it".

⁴ "He taught those who followed his principles" (τοῖς χρωμένοις).

⁵ ἀποδοχή is used in Hellenistic Greek for "approval" ("being accepted"), "honour". Cp. N.T., I *Tim.* 1, 15: πάσης ἀποδοχῆς ἄξιος. It is found in Polybius as well.

⁶ the pentagramma. Cp. my nr. 41b (ch. II).

ἔφη αὐτῷ ἀποδώσειν τὰ ἀναλώματα, ἅπερ εἰς αὐτὸν ἐποίησατο, καὶ χάριν
 10 ἐκτίσειν ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ. τὸν δὲ πανδοχέα μετὰ τὴν τελευταίην θάψαι τε καὶ ἐπιμε-
 ληθῆναι τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ, μὴ μέντοι γε ἐλπίδας ἔχειν τοῦ κομίσασθαι τὰ
 δαπανήματα, μή τί γε καὶ πρὸς εὖ παθεῖν πρὸς τινος τῶν ἀναγνωριούντων τὴν
 δέλτον. ὅμως μέντοι διαπειρᾶσθαι ἐκπεπληγμένον τὰς ἐντολὰς ἐκτιθέναι τε
 15 τινὰ παριόντα ἐπιστῆναί τε καὶ μαθεῖν τὸν θέντα τὸ σύμβολον, ἐξετάσαι τε τὸ
 συμβάν καὶ τῷ πανδοχεῖ πολλῷ πλέον ἀργύριον ἐκτίσαι τῶν δεδαπανημένων.

15—The Pythagoreans had a theory on education. They studied man in the various stages of his development, and recognized that the periods of transition imply a certain crisis.

Theory of
education

a. Iambl., *V.P.* 201:

ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ τῷ σύμπαντι εἶναι τινὰς ἡλικίας ἐνδεδασμένας (οὕτω γὰρ καὶ λέγειν αὐτοὺς φασιν), ἃς οὐκ εἶναι τοῦ τυχόντος πρὸς ἀλλήλας συνεῖραι· ἐκκρούεσθαι γὰρ αὐτὰς ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, ἐάν τις μὴ καλῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἄγῃ τὸν ἀνθρώπον ἐκ γενετῆς.

b. Aristoxenus ap. Stob., *Ecl.* IV 43, 49 (Wachsmuth p. 15⁹⁻¹⁸):

ἐπιμελητέον δὲ πάσης ἡλικίας ἡγοῦντο καὶ τοὺς μὲν παῖδας ἐν γράμμασι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήμασιν ἀσκεῖσθαι· τοὺς δὲ νεανίσκους τοῖς τῆς πόλεως ἔθεσί τε καὶ νόμοις γυμνάζεσθαι· τοὺς δὲ ἄνδρας ταῖς πράξεσί τε καὶ δημοσίαις λειτουργίαις προσέχειν· τοὺς δὲ πρεσβύτας ἐνθυμήσεσι καὶ κριτηρίοις¹ καὶ 5 συμβουλίαις δεῖν ἐναναστρέφεσθαι μετὰ πάσης ἐπιστήμης ὑπελάμβανον, ὅπως μήτε οἱ παῖδες νηπιάζοιεν μήτε οἱ νεανίσκοι παιδαριεύοιντο μήτε οἱ ἄνδρες νεανιεύοιντο μήτε οἱ γέροντες παραφρονοῖεν².

16—Do not care for the opinion of everybody. Iambl., *V.P.* 200:

περὶ δὲ δόξης τάδε φασὶ λέγειν αὐτοὺς. ἀνόητον μὲν εἶναι καὶ τὸ πάσῃ καὶ παντὸς δόξῃ προσέχειν, καὶ μάλιστα τὸ τῇ παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν γινομένη· τὸ γὰρ καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν ὀλίγοις ὑπάρχειν.

„Aristo-
cratic”
principles?

In Porph., *V.P.* 42, the early Pythagorean maxim of “not walking on highways” (my ch. II, nr. 29c) is explained in this sense: not to care for the opinion of the crowd, but adhere to the views of the πεπαιδευμένοι. Cp. also Porph., *V.P.* 32: Avoid the contact with the masses.

¹ κριτηρίους ἐναναστρέφεσθαι means: to administer justice.

² The system as a whole bears a close resemblance to Plato's, expounded in the *Republic*. Xenophon, *Rep. Laced.*, distinguishes five periods in human life. In appointing tasks to each of them he agrees fairly well with Aristoxenus. Cp. also the early Athenian politeia in Isocrates' *Areopagiticus*, and lastly Aristotle in *Polit.* VII 15 (the end) and VIII 1 ff., where the human life is divided into periods of 7 years.

Before labelling this as an "aristocratic" or "oligarchic" principle, it might be good to remember that exactly this was a basic principle of Socrates, according to the *Crito*, *Protag.*, and *Gorgias*. For the kind of "aristocracy" advocated by Pythagoreans cp. Archytas, fr. 3, cited above, under 14a, n. 1.

17—*Prooemia of Zaleucus and Charondas* are mentioned by Cicero, *De legibus* II 6. The quotations given in *De leg.* II 7 and III 2 correspond with the texts under the heading of Προοίμια Ζαλεύκου and Χαρώνδα Καταναίου preserved in Stobaeus' *Florilegium*. Most modern historians consider them as unauthentic. Only Delatte raised the reasonable question of "why Aristoxenus considered the ancient law-givers Z. and Ch. as Pythagoreans". Was not it because of texts, in which he found early Pythagorean doctrines?—Then, what other texts could these be unless our *Prooemia*?

**Zaleukou
Prooimia**

a. Stobaeus, *Anthologium*, vol. IV ed. Wachsmuth-Hense p. 123 f.:
Ζαλεύκου Προοίμια νόμων.

Τοὺς κατοικοῦντας τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν πάντας πρῶτον πεπεῖσθαι χρὴ καὶ νομίζειν θεοὺς εἶναι ἀναβλέποντας εἰς οὐρανὸν καὶ τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς διακόσμησιν καὶ τάξιν· οὐ γὰρ τύχης οὐδ' ἀνθρώπων εἶναι δημιουργήματα· σέβεσθαι δὲ τούτους καὶ τιμᾶν, ὡς αἰτίους ὄντας ἀπάντων ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν τῶν κατὰ λόγον¹ γιγνομένων. ἕκαστον οὖν ἔχειν καὶ παρασκευάζειν δεῖ τὴν αὐτοῦ ψυχὴν πάντων τῶν κακῶν καθαρὰν· ὡς οὐ τιμᾶται θεὸς ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου φαύλου οὐδὲ θεραπεύεται δαπάναις οὐδὲ τραγωδίαις τῶν ἀναλισκομένων² καθάπερ μοχθηρὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ἀρετῇ καὶ προαιρέσει τῶν καλῶν ἔργων καὶ δικαίων. — ὅσοις δὲ μὴ ῥᾴδιον πρὸς ταῦτα τὴν ὁρμὴν ποιεῖσθαι, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἔχουσιν εὐκίνητον πρὸς ἀδικίαν, ὧδ' ἡμῖν παρηγγέλω πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις πολίταις καὶ συνοίκιοις, μεμνησθαι θεῶν ὡς ὄντων καὶ δίκας ἐπιτεμπόντων τοῖς ἀδίκοις, καὶ τίθεσθαι πρὸ ὁμμάτων τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον, ἐν ᾧ γίνεται τὸ τέλος ἐκάστω τῆς ἀπαλλαγῆς τοῦ ζῆν. πᾶσι γὰρ ἐμπίπτει μεταμέλεια τοῖς μέλλουσι τελευτᾶν, μεμνημένοις ὧν ἡδικήκασι, καὶ ὁρμὴ τοῦ βούλεσθαι πάντα πεπραῆχθαι δικαίως αὐτοῖς. διὸ δεῖ ἕκαστον παρ' ἐκάστην πρᾶξιν αἰεὶ συνοικεῖν τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ὡς δὴ παρόντα· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ δικαίου φροντιεῖν.

**Charondou
Prooemia**

b. Stobaeus, ib., p. 149 f.:
Χαρώνδα Καταναίου Προοίμια νόμων.

Τὼς βουλευομένως καὶ πράσσοντάς τι ἀπὸ θεῶν ἄρχεσθαι χρὴ· τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον, ὥσπερ ἂ παροιμία φατί, τὸν θεὸν ἤμεν αἴτιον πάντων τούτων.

¹ κατὰ λόγον—successively.

² τραγωδία is figuratively used for outward grandeur, pomp. It is found more than once in Plutarch in this sense.

ἔτι δὲ φαύλων πράξεων ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὸν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ζυμβουλίαν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἀδίκου θεὸν κοινωνεῖν ¹.

¹ One should refrain from evil deeds, in particular because one involved God in his deliberation; for God is alien to all evil.

About the possible date of these *Prooemia* above, **8a**, n. 2, and under nr. **12**. H. Thesleff, in his interesting *Introduction to the Pythagorean writings of the Hellenistic period* (Åbo 1961), suggests that the *Prooemia*, because of their superficial Doric flavour, were not originally written in Doric, but rather in the Koinè. He dates them in the 4th-3rd cent., and thinks that they received their Doric colouring in the second century. — After all, it might have happened in the reverse order: they might have been originally Doric writings, and the Koinè form might be due to a later date.

ADDITIONS TO THE BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. GENERAL WORKS

- O. Gigon, *Grundprobleme der antiken Philosophie*, (Sammlung Dalp), Bern 1959.
 O. Neugebauer, *The exact Sciences in Antiquity*,² 1957.

2. EDITIONS

Series: *Testimonianze e Frammenti*.

- M. Untersteiner, *Sofisti*, vol. I-IV, Firenze 1949
 M. Timpanaro-Cardini, *Pitagorici*, vol. I, Firenze 1958
 M. Untersteiner, *Senofane*, Firenze 1958
 M. Untersteiner, *Parmenide*, Firenze 1959

3. PRESOCRATICS

a. The period as a whole.

- Italian translation of Zeller, *Die Phil. der Griechen* I by R. Mondolfo, *La filosofia dei Greci*, parte I, I presocratici, 2 vol., Firenze 1932.
 H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's criticism of Presocratic Philosophy*, Baltimore 1935.
 H. Fraenkel, *Dichtung u. Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* (Philol. Monogr. XIII), New York 1951.
 F. M. Cornford, *Principium sapientiae*, Cambridge 1952.
 E. L. Minar jr., *A survey of recent work in pre-Socratic philosophy*, in: *Class. Weekly* 47 (1954), nr. 12.
 H. Fraenkel, *Wege u. Formen frühgriechischen Denkens*, München 1955.
 W. K. C. Guthrie, *In the beginning*, Ithaca, N.-York, 1957.

b. The Milesians.

- Ch. H. Kahn, *Anaximander and the origins of Greek cosmology*, N.-York 1960.
 A good introduction into Greek philosophy of nature.

c. The Pythagoreans.

On Pythagorean politics:

- A. Delatte, *Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne*, Liège-Paris 1922. Still a work of basic importance.
 K. von Fritz, *Pythagorean politics in Southern Italy*, N.-York 1940.
 E. L. Minar, *Early Pythagorean politics in practice and theory*, Baltimore 1942.
 Important, but commits the error of separating Pythagoras' „politics” from his „philosophy” according to a modern standard.
 See also:

- J. S. Morrison, *Pythagoras of Samos*, in: *Class. Quarterly* 1956, p. 135-156.
 and:

The origin of Plato's philosopher-statesman, in Cl. Qu. 1958, p. 198-218.

- A. Rostagni's work *Il verbo di Pitagora*, Torino 1924, is uncritical (confounds early Pythagoreism with later Neo-Pythagorean texts).

d. The Eleatics.

- A. Lumpe, *Die Philosophie des Xenophanes von Kolophon*. Diss. München, 1952.
 M. Heidegger on Parmenides in: *Was heisst Denken?* Tübingen 1954.

H. Schwabl, *Parmenides, I. Forschungsbericht*, in: *Anzeiger f. d. Altertumswissenschaft* 9 (1956), p. 129-156.
and:

Die Eleaten (Xenophanes, Nachtrag zu Parmenides, Melissos), 1. Forschungsbericht, *Anz. Altertumsw.* 10 (1957) p. 195-226.

J. H. M. M. Loenen, *Parmenides, Melissus, Gorgias*. A reinterpretation of Eleatic philosophy. Assen 1959.
e. Pluralists and Atomists.

M. Timpanaro-Cardini, *La zoogonia di Empedocle e la critica Aristotelica*, in: *Physis*, rivista di storia della scienza vol. II, fasc. I, 1960.

H. Reiche, *Empedocles' mixture, Eudoxan astronomy and Aristotle's connate pneuma*, Amsterdam 1960.

J. Zafiropoulo, *Anaxagore de Clazomène*, I, Le mythe grec traditionnel de Thalès à Platon. II, Théorie et fragments. (Coll. d'Etudes anciennes) Paris 1948.

G. Vlastos, *The physical theory of Anaxagoras*, in: *Philos. Review* 1950, p. 31-57.

4. THE SOPHISTS

M. Untersteiner, *I Sofisti*, Torino 1949. Eng. transl. by K. Freeman, *The Sophists*, Oxford 1954.

W. Vollgraff, *L'oraison funèbre de Gorgias* (Phil. antiqua 4), Leiden 1952.

G. B. Kerferd, *Gorgias on nature or that which is not*, in: *Phronesis* 1955, p. 3-25.

5. SOCRATES

B. Snell, *Das früheste Zeugnis über Sokrates*, in: *Philologus* 97 (1948), p. 125-134.

W. Schmidt, *Das Sokratesbild der Wolken*, ib., p. 209-228.

E. de Strycker S.J., *Socrate et l'au-delà d'après l'Apologie platonicienne*, in: *Les Etudes classiques* 18 (1950), p. 269-284.

—, *Les témoignages historiques sur Socrate*, in: *Mélanges Grégoire II*, Bruxelles 1950, p. 199-230.

C. J. de Vogel, *Une nouvelle interprétation du problème socratique*, in: *Mnemosyne* 1951, p. 30-39.

V. de Magalhães Vilhena, *Le problème de Socrate*, Paris 1951.

—, *Socrate et la légende platonicienne*, Paris 1951.

C. J. de Vogel, *The present state of the Socratic problem*, in: *Phronesis* 1955, p. 26-35.

See also O. Gigon on Vilhena's book in *Gnomon* 1955, p. 259-266.

A. H. Chroust, *Socrates. Man and Myth*. London 1957.

6. MINOR SOCRATICS

O. Gigon, *Kommentar zum ersten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien* (Schweiz. Beiträge zur Altertumswiss. 5) Basel 1953.

—, *Kommentar zum zweiten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien* (id., 7), Basel 1956.

P. M. Schuhl, *Le Dominateur et les Possibles*, Paris 1960.

G. Giannantoni, *I Cirenaici*. Raccolta delle fonti antiche, traduzione e studio introduttivo. Firenze 1958.

A new collection of the fragments on the basis of a critical study. The author thinks Aristippus was not a philosopher, unless in the practical sense.

E. Mannerbach, *Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum fragmenta*, Leiden 1961. The author differs from Giannantoni as to Aristippus.

See also:

C. J. Classen, *Aristippus*, in: *Hermes* 86 (1958), p. 182-192.

7. PLATO

- Sir David Ross, *Plato's theory of the Ideas*, Oxford 1951.
- N. R. Murphy, *A commentary on Plato's Republic*, Oxford 1951.
- J. B. Skemp, *Plato's Statesman*. A translation of the *Politicus* of Plato with introductory essays and footnotes, London 1952.
- R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus*, transl. with introd. and commentary, Cambridge 1952.
- , *Plato's Phaedo*, transl. with introd. and commentary, Cambridge 1955.
- C. J. de Vogel, *On the Neoplatonic character of Platonism and the Platonic character of Neoplatonism*, in: *Mind* 1953, p. 43-64.
- , *Platon a-t-il ou n'a-t-il pas introduit le mouvement dans son monde intelligible?* (Critique des interprétations modernes de *Soph.* 249a et de *Tim.* 31b), in: *Actes du XI^e Congrès International de Phil.*, Bruxelles 1953, vol. XII, p. 61-67.
- Platon, Oeuvres complètes*, t. XI, *Les Lois*, 1^{re} partie, ll. I-II, texte établi et traduit par E. des Places, S.J.; introd. de A. Diès et L. Gernet. 2^{me} partie, ll. III-VI, Paris 1951.
- , t. XII, *Les Lois*, 1^{re} partie, ll. VII-X, texte établi et traduit par A. Diès; 2^e partie. *Les Lois*, ll. XI-XII, texte établi et traduit par A. Diès; *Epinomis* par E. des Places, S.J., Paris 1956.
- Plato, *Gorgias*. A revised text with introduction and commentary by E. R. Dodds, Oxford 1959.
- M. Vanhoutte, *La phil. politique de Platon dans les „Lois”*, Louvain 1954.
- , *La méthode ontologique de Platon*, Louvain-Paris 1956.
- Glenn R. Morrow, *Plato's Cretan City*. A historical interpretation of the Laws. Princeton 1960.
- Ch. Mugler, *La physique de Platon*, Paris 1960.
- N. Gulley, *Plato's theory of knowledge*, London 1962.
- W. G. Runciman, *Plato's later epistemology*, Cambridge 1962.
- W. Klever, ANAMNHΣIΣ en ANATΩTH, Assen 1962.
- An exhaustive bibliography on the years 1950-57 was made by H. Cherniss and published in *Lustrum* 1959/4 and 1960/5 (Göttingen 1960 and '61).

C. J. DE VOGEL
GREEK PHILOSOPHY

II

ARISTOTLE THE EARLY PERIPATETIC
SCHOOL AND THE EARLY ACADEMY

GREEK PHILOSOPHY II

GREEK PHILOSOPHY

A COLLECTION OF TEXTS

WITH NOTES AND EXPLANATIONS

BY

C. J. DE VOGEL

PH.D., PROFESSOR OF ANCIENT AND MEDIAEVAL
PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF UTRECHT

VOLUME II

ARISTOTLE, THE EARLY PERIPATETIC
SCHOOL AND THE EARLY ACADEMY

THIRD EDITION



LEIDEN
E. J. BRILL

1967

*The first edition of this volume was facilitated by a subvention granted by
"The Netherlands Organization for Pure Research" (Z.W.O.)*

First edition	1953
Second edition	1960
Third edition	1967

Copyright 1967 by E. J. Brill, Leiden, Netherlands

*All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced
or translated in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm or
any other means without written permission from the publisher*

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

CONTENTS

BOOK III—ARISTOTLE

CHAPTER	X—LIFE AND WORKS	
	1—Prolegomena: the Aristotelian question	I-2
	2—Life and works of Aristotle	3-10
	3—Date of Aristotle's works according to W. Jaeger	10-15
	4—Reactions and corrections	15-19
CHAPTER	XI—THE EXOTERIC WRITINGS	
	1—The Eudemus or <i>Περὶ ψυχῆς</i>	20-23
	2—The Protrepticus	24-28
	3— <i>Περὶ φιλοσοφίας</i>	28-36
CHAPTER	XII—LOGIC	
	1—The School-writings. Introductory remarks.	37-40
	2—The Categories: terms.	40-42
	3— <i>Περὶ ἐρμηνείας</i> : propositions	42-44
	4—The Prior Analytics: the doctrine of the syllogism	44-54
	5—The Posterior Analytics: the doctrine of demonstration	54-64
	6—The Topics and <i>De Sophisticis elenchis</i>	64-66
CHAPTER	XIII—ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE	
	1—Introductory remarks	67-68
	2—The first book of the Physics.	68-76
	3—The second book of the Physics.	76-93
	4—Definitions of motion, space and time	93-96
	5—The theory of the First Unmoved Mover.	96-101
CHAPTER	XIV—THE METAPHYSICS	
	1—The object of metaphysics	102-110
	2—Plato's theory of Ideas criticized	110-114
	3—Substance	114-124
	4—Potency and actuality.	124-129
	5—Being and truth	130-132

CHAPTER XV—THE PRACTICAL SCIENCES

- 1—The three ethics and their interrelation 133-134
- 2—The Nicomachean Ethics. Formal principles
(Bks I-III 5) 135-157
- 3—The Nicomachean Ethics. A phaenomenology
of virtue 157-181
- 4—The Politics 182-203

CHAPTER XVI—THE PSYCHOLOGY

- 1—Soul and its various functions 204-209
- 2—Sense-perception 209-212
- 3—Thinking 212-216

CHAPTER XVII—RHETORIC AND POETICS

- 1—The Rhetoric 217-224
- 2—Poetics 224-229

BOOK IV—THE EARLY PERIPATETIC SCHOOL AND
THE EARLY ACADEMY

CHAPTER XVIII—THE EARLY PERIPATETIC SCHOOL

- 1—Theophrastus 230-240
- 2—Dicaearchus 241-245
- 3—Aristoxenus 245-248
- 4—Demetrius of Phaleron 248-252
- 5—Strato of Lampsacus 252-259
- 6—Lyco and Aristo of Ceos 259-265
- 7—Aristo of Cos 265-267
- 7a Note on the *Magna Moralia* 267

CHAPTER XIX—THE EARLY ACADEMY

- 1—Speusippus 268-274
- 2—Xenocrates 274-282
- 3—Heraclides Ponticus 282-288
- 4—Eudoxus, Philippus of Opous and the *Epinomis* 288-294
- 5—Polemo, Crates and Crantor 294-300

Bibliography 301-307

Index I—of names 309-313
 II—of subjects 313-321
 III—of Greek words 321-340

PREFACE

To this volume I have few things to add. Those who take the trouble of reading it will easily understand the purpose of the book. I altered my first project so far as to think it better to divide Greek philosophy after Plato into two volumes, so that after this one there will be a third containing the Hellenistic systems and Neoplatonism with its preparation.

I wish to express my gratitude to Professor A. Mansion at Louvain, who kindly read the manuscript of the chapter dealing with Aristotle's philosophy of nature, and to Professor Fr. Wehrli of Zürich, who was so kind as to give me the opportunity of reading his manuscript on Lycon and the two Aristons before it was published, in September 1951, and of discussing certain points with him¹.

I thank also Dr. W. Vollgraff and Dr. L. M. de Rijk, who read the proofs with me, and two English ladies, Mrs. Paap and Mrs. Breuning, who purified the barbarisms of my English text.

Perfection is a thing not easily attained in earthly life. A few misprints are rectified in the Errata. I hope that, for the rest, very few mistakes have crept in.

Utrecht 1952

C. J. d. V.

In the second and third editions a number of small corrections have been made, while the bibliography was extended.

Sept. 1967

C. J. d. V.

¹ The references to Prof. Wehrli's edition of the fragments of Heraclides Ponticus in ch. XIX, 3, were added by himself to the proofs of this work.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

As to the text of Aristotle, I did not follow exclusively one edition. Generally speaking, I used the editions of Sir David Ross of the *Physics*, *Metaphysics* and *Analytica*, that of Minio-Paluello of the *Categories* and *De interpretatione*, Rackham's of the *Ethica Nicomachea*, Immisch for the *Politica*. For the *De anima* I used P. Siwek's edition, of the *Rhetoric* those of M. Dufour and J. H. Freese, of the *Poetics* those of Bywater and of Hardy. Of Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* I used, as is indicated, the edition of Ross-Fobes; where newer editions are lacking, the fragments are taken from Wimmer. For the other Peripatetics I used Wehrli's *Schule des Aristoteles*; for the Academy the indicated sources and the existing collections of the fragments of Speusippus (Lang) and Xenocrates (Heinze).

In the third edition Aristotle's Fragments are cited according to Ross, *Aristotelis fragmenta Selecta*.

BOOK III
ARISTOTLE
TENTH CHAPTER
LIFE AND WORKS

I—PROLEGOMENA: THE ARISTOTELIAN QUESTION

395—Concerning Plato we had to ask the radical question whether **the problem** we really know his doctrine; whether his own works do contain this doctrine, or whether we have to pay more attention to the indications of his disciples. This may be called the Platonic question. It dates from Trendelenburg's work on the ideal Numbers (1826). One might speak of an Aristotelian question too, in the sense of a radical problem of the tradition. Werner Jaeger was the first to raise this matter radically in his *Aristotle* of 1923. The problem is due to the following two points: 1. We have not the complete works of Aristotle at our disposal; 2. the writings which we possess contain older and younger parts, and it would not be difficult to make Aristotle contradict Aristotle.

Ad 1. Of Plato we possess the complete literary works meant for publication. On the other hand, his school-teaching is not directly known to us. With Aristotle, the situation is exactly the reverse: his literary works, which were much read in Antiquity, are lost, while his school-writings are preserved to us. A scholar like Jaeger ascribed to this situation the seeming opposition of character between Plato and Aristotle. This view, however, is only partly justified: it leaves out of account the fact that the lost works of Aristotle all belonged to the period of his youth. This being so, the study of their fragments can teach us something of the development of their author and of the genesis of his philosophy; but they are not to be put on one level with his ripier works. The true Aristotle remains for us the author of the School-writings, more especially of the ripest parts of them, the utility of the older fragments being precisely this, that they give us a standard by which to distinguish the older from the younger parts of his works.

Ad 2. The school-writings of Aristotle, as they are preserved to us, cannot be divided into three chronological periods, as may be done with Plato's works. The mixture of earlier and later parts runs through the whole of them. Now this creates a rather complicated situation. Werner Jaeger was the first to realize this problem clearly and to propose a solution which, although it may be corrected and completed on several points, has given a new approach and new *elan* to the studies of Aristotle.

what has
been reached

396—Three points have been established:

1. The existence of a Platonic period in the thinking of Aristotle has been proved by Jaeger¹.
2. The period between the Academy and the Lyceum, which seemed to be a vacuum as long as the school-writings were all supposed to be written during the latest period², has now been filled up with a large part of them.
3. Our idea of the latest period of Aristotle's activity as a teacher has been considerably changed.

a restriction

397—From the fact that many points in the chronology of the works of Aristotle are not definitely cleared up, it must not be concluded that we cannot yet form for ourselves an idea of the philosophy of Aristotle nor get a true knowledge of it. It must be noted first that the description, given by W. D. Ross in his *Aristotle* of 1923, was made before its author knew the work of Jaeger, which appeared in the same year. This fact is an interesting illustration of the remark which has been made by A. Mansion in his *Introduction à la Physique Aristotélicienne*: that, if one wishes to speak of Aristotle's philosophy of nature, or even of any other part of his philosophy, ethics excepted, the situation is not so unfavourable and problems not so complicated as they might seem to be³.—Why? Mansion said it very clearly in his Introduction cited above: the reason could be this, that in the development of Aristotle's thinking after all the continuity is more important than the difference; which might be seen in the fact that Aristotle himself did little to eliminate all the traces of his earlier opinions that may be seen in the final form of his works⁴.

¹ J. Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles in ihrem Verhältnis zu seinen übrigen Werken*, Berlin 1863, tries to confine the Platonic influence to the literary form of Aristotle's early writings. V. Rose, who collected all these platonizing passages from the Dialogues of Aristotle, went further and concluded that they were spurious (*Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus*, Lipsiis 1863).

² In fact this was the opinion of Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* II 2, ³ p. 155), and also of Bernays.

³ Mansion, *o.c.*, ²1946, p. 7.

⁴ *Ib.*, p. 33/34: "Mais ce qu'il faut noter surtout c'est que, de façon générale, Aristote n'a pas jugé nécessaire de remanier profondément ces rédactions reprises à quelque cours antérieur et ainsi l'adaptation de la doctrine à des vues devenues plus tard classiques chez lui, apparaît par moments comme bien imparfaite. C'est, sans doute, qu'il avait davantage conscience de l'unité et de la continuité de sa pensée, que des étapes diverses et mêmes parfois contradictoires entre elles qu'elle avait parcourues, pour aboutir à son développement ultime."

2—LIFE AND WORKS OF ARISTOTLE

398—Dionys. Halic., *Ep. I ad Ammaeum* 5, p. 727 R.:

life

Ἀριστοτέλης πατὴρ * μὲν ἦν Νικομάχου τὸ γένος καὶ τὴν τέχνην ἀναφέ-
ροντος εἰς Μαχάονα τὸν Ἀσκληπιοῦ¹, μητρὸς δὲ Φαιστίδος, ἀπογόνου τινὸς
τῶν ἐκ Χαλκίδος τὴν ἀποικίαν ἀγαγόντων εἰς Στάγειρα· ἐγεννήθη δὲ κατὰ
τὴν ἐνενηκοστὴν καὶ ἐνάτην ὀλυμπιάδα Διοτρεφοῦς Ἀθήνησιν ἄρχοντας
5 (ol. 99, 1; a. 384)² ... ἐπὶ δὲ Πολυζήλου ἄρχοντος (ol. 103, 2; a. 366/7)
τελευτήσαντος τοῦ πατρὸς ὀκτωκαίδέκατον ἔτος ἔχων εἰς Ἀθήνας ἦλθεν, καὶ
συσταθεὶς Πλάτωνι χρόνον εἰκοσαετῇ διέτριψε σὺν αὐτῷ. ἀποθανόντος δὲ
Πλάτωνος ἐπὶ Θεοφίλου ἄρχοντος (ol. 108, 1; a. 348/7) ἀπῆρε πρὸς Ἑρμίαν
τὸν Ἀταρνέως τύραννον³ καὶ τριετῇ χρόνον παρ' αὐτῷ διατρίψας ** ἐπ'
10 Εὐβούλου ἄρχοντος (ol. 108, 4; a. 345/4) εἰς Μυτιλήνην ἐχωρίσθη⁴. ἐκεῖθεν
δὲ πρὸς Φίλιππον ὤχετο *** κατὰ Πυθόδοτον ἄρχοντα (ol. 109, 2; a. 343/2),

¹ Aristotle's father was the court-physician of Amyntas II, king of Macedonia and father of Philippos.

² Diog. Laert. V 9 gives the same chronology and traces it back to the Chronicle of Apollodorus.

³ Hermias is known to us as one of the addressees of the Sixth Letter of Plato. The two others, Erastus and Coriscus, disciples of Plato and his Academy, doubtless tried to introduce in their native town Scepsis certain political reforms that had been suggested in the Academy. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, 1948, p. 113, sums up the tendency of Plato's Letter in the following words: "Presumably Plato wished to institute a friendship between the two companions and their "neighbour" Hermias, because, while he recognized their noble disposition, he was afraid they might be somewhat doctrinaire. The letter that we possess is the solemn record of this peculiar pact between *Realpolitik* and theoretical schemes of reform."

At the request of this Hermias, who possessed a formidable military power and was practically independent of the Persian Empire, Ar. and Xenocrates established themselves at Assos after the death of Plato, and stayed there for three years. For Aristotle these years were a period of intense work. An important part of his works on logic, physics and metaphysics was written here. Surely Erastus, Coriscus and Hermias attended his lectures. We find the name of Coriscus frequently cited in the *Organon* to illustrate an individual case as opposed to the καθόλου.

⁴ That Aristotle left Assos and settled at Mytilene was probably due to the influence of Theophrastus, who was a native of Lesbos and also an ancient disciple of Plato and the Academy. That, during the years of Assos and Mytilene, Aristotle was already occupied with biological research, may be inferred from the fact that in his biological works localities in Asia Minor and Lesbos are rather frequently mentioned. Consult: Thompson, Translation of the *Historia animalium*, p. VII, and the same, *Aristotle as a biologist*, p. 12.

* πατὴρ is a correction of Van Herwerden. The Mss have υἱός.

** διατρίψας Wolf; Mss τρίψας.

*** ὤχετο Usener; others read ἔχετο.

καὶ διέτριψε χρόνον ὀκταετῇ παρ' αὐτῷ καθηγούμενος Ἀλεξάνδρου¹. μετὰ δὲ τὴν Φιλίππου τελευτὴν ἐπ' Εὐαινέτου ἄρχοντος (ol. III, 2; a. 335/4) ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἀθῆνας ἐσχόλαζεν ἐν Λυκείῳ χρόνον ἐτῶν δώδεκα. τῷ δὲ τρισκαίδεκάτῳ, μετὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτὴν ἐπὶ Κηφισοδώρου ἄρχοντος (ol. II4, 15 2; a. 322) ἀπάρας εἰς Χαλκίδα νόσῳ τελευτᾷ, τρία πρὸς τοῖς ἐξήκοντα βιώσας ἔτη.

three poems
of Aristotle

399—**a.** Olympiodorus in his Commentary on Plato's *Gorgias* has preserved for us the following poem of Aristotle in commemoration of Plato (Fr. 673 Rose):

on Plato

ἐλθὼν δ' ἐς κλεινὸν Κερροπίης δάπεδον
εὐσεβέως σεμνῆς φιλίης ἰδρύσατο βωμὸν
ἀνδρὸς ὃν οὐδ' αἰνεῖν τοῖσι κακοῖσι θέμις·
ὃς μόνος ἢ πρῶτος θνητῶν κατέδειξεν ἑναργῶς
οἰκείῳ τε βίῳ καὶ μεθόδοισι λόγων,
ὥς ἀγαθὸς τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἅμα γίνεται ἀνὴρ·
οὐ νῦν δ' ἔστι λαβεῖν οὐδενὶ ταῦτα ποτέ.

5

The poem has been interpreted by Wilamowitz in *Aristoteles und Athen* II, p. 412-416. He declares the construction βωμὸν φιλίας to be a metaphor that would be tolerable "für backfische, aber nicht für Hellenen", and is most inclined to explain φιλίας as a genitivus causae. "In any case Ar. means that the man about whom he speaks, i.e. Eudemus, founded an altar for Plato for the sake of his friendship" ("um seiner Freundschaft willen dem Platon einen Altar gestiftet hat"). Jaeger protests against the assumption that Plato was formally venerated as a god by his disciples, and I think he is right. Having stated that the dedicator of the altar is unknown to us, he remarks: "a Greek would surely have assumed without question that what was meant was that he set up an altar to most honourable Philia, in honour of the friendship of the man whom bad men may not even praise" (*Aristotle*, p. 108).

¹) Hermias had friendly relations with the Macedonian court (an anti-Persian coalition). It is probable that on his recommendation Philip invited Aristotle to be the praeceptor of the young Alexander.

Of his years at the Macedonian court are doubtless Aristotle's six books on philological problems in Homer (*Ἀπορήματα Ὀμηρικά*), brought to Alexandria by Demetrius of Phaleron. Here they became the foundation of philological studies of the Alexandrian scholars.

For Alexander Aristotle wrote a work *Περὶ μοναρχίας* and another about colonization.

According to a decree of the Delphians, found by Homolle in 1895, Aristotle and his nephew Callisthenes were praised and honoured for having made a list of the Pythionikai (Dittenberger, *Syll.*³, 275). This list, which was a valuable document for the history of Greek literature, must have been made by Ar. in the very last years of his stay at the Macedonian court or during the first year of his second stay at Athens, Callisthenes having gone to Asia in 334. Other similar lists of the victors of the great Dionysia and of those at Olympia are mentioned among the works of Ar.

As to the last four lines of this elegy, cp. the nrs. 275a, b and 374a of our first volume.

b. Fr. 674 Rose (Diog. Laert. V 6), an epigramma dedicated to Hermias of Atarneus, who had been treacherously arrested at a conference, and sent captive to the Great King. The latter, having vainly tried to coerce him into revealing Philip's plans, finally executed him by a *servile supplicium* (crucifixion).

τόνδε ποτ' οὐχ ὁσίως παραβὰς μακάρων θέμιν ἄγνην
ἔκτεινεν Περσῶν τοξοφόρων βασιλεύς,
οὐ φανερώς λόγχῃ φονίους ἐν ἀγῶσι κρατήσας,
ἀλλ' ἄνδρὸς πίστει χρησάμενος δολίου.

on Hermias

c. Fr. 675 Rose (Athenaeus XV, p. 696 A; also Diog. L. V 7). Hymn to Virtue, in honour of Hermias, who died as a martyr for the sake of philosophy.

Hymn to
Virtue

Ἀρετά, πολύμοχθε γένει βροτείῳ,
θήραμα κάλλιστον βίῳ,
σᾶς πέρι, παρθένε, μορφᾶς
καὶ θανεῖν ζαλωτὸς ἐν Ἑλλάδι πότμος
καὶ πόνους τλῆναι μαλεροὺς ἀκάμαντας·
τοῖον ἐπὶ φρένα βάλλεις
καρπὸν ἰσαθάνατον χρυσοῦ τε κρείσσω
καὶ γονέων μαλακαυγήτοιό θ' ὕπνου·
σεῦ δ' ἔνεχ' οἱ Διὸς Ἡρακλῆς Λήδας τε κοῦροι
πολλ' ἀνέτλασαν ἔργοις
σὺν ἀγρεύοντες δύναμιν.
σοῖς δὲ πόθοις Ἀχιλεὺς Αἴας τ' Αἰδαο δόμους ἤλθον·
σᾶς δ' ἔνεκεν φίλιου μορφᾶς καὶ Ἀταρνεὸς ἔντροφος ἀελίου
χῆρωσεν αὐγᾶς·
τοιγὰρ αἰδίδμος ἔργοις, ἀθάνατόν τέ μιν αὐξήσουσι Μοῦσαι
Μναμοσύνας θυγάτρεις, Διὸς ξενίου σέβας αὔξουσιν φιλίας
τε γέρας βεβαίου.

Wilamowitz explained this poem in *Ar. u. Athen* II, p. 405-412; Jaeger in *Aristotle*, p. 117 ff.

πόνους μαλεροὺς ἀκάμαντας - unceasing labours, wearing out.

καρπὸν ἰσαθάνατον. I have adopted the correction of Wilamowitz: ἰσαθάνατον.

Athenaeus has τ' ἀθάνατον, Diog. L. εἰς ἀθάνατον.

The meaning is: ἴσον τῇ ἀθανασίᾳ.

χρυσοῦ τε κρείσσω καὶ γονέων - better than gold and ancestors.

σοῖς δὲ πόθοις - not so much "through longing for thee" as "by enthusiasm for thee" (cp. Gorgias' *Epitaphios*, Diels VS⁵ II 81 B 6, the end, where the orator

says that, "though they have died themselves, ὁ πόθος οὐ συναπέθανεν"; which does not mean "the longing for them"—for this can hardly be called ἀθάνατος —, but "the enthusiasm for noble deeds" ¹).

Διὸς Ξενίου σέβας and γέρας φιλίας may be paraphrased as follows: ὅτι καὶ Δία Ξένιον ἐσέβετο καὶ φιλίαν βέβαιον ἐγέραιρεν.

two kinds
of lectures

400—Ar. used to lecture during the morning hours for a selected group of more advanced disciples, while in the evening he lectured for a larger, non-selected circle of students.

Gellius, *Noct. Att.* XX 5, 1:

Commentationum suarum artiumque, quas discipulis tradebat, Aristoteles philosophus ... duas species habuisse dicitur: alia erant quae nominabat ἐξωτερικά, alia quae appellabat ἀκροατικά. ἐξωτερικά dicebantur quae ad rhetoricas meditationes facultatemque argutiarum civiliumque rerum notitiam conducebant, ἀκροατικά autem vocabantur in quibus philosophia remotior subtiliorque agitabatur quaeque ad naturae contemplationes disceptationesve dialecticas pertinebant. huic disciplinae, quam dixi, ἀκροατικῇ tempus exercendae dabat in Lycio matutinum nec ad eam quemquam temere admittebat, nisi quorum ante ingenium et eruditionis elementa atque in discendo studium laboremque explorasset. illas vero exotericas auditiones exercitiumque dicendi eodem in loco vesperi faciebat easque vulgo iuvenibus sine delectu praebebat; atque eum δειλινὸν περίπατον appellabat, illum alterum supra ἑωθινόν; utroque enim tempore ambulans disserebat. libros quoque suos, earum omnium rerum commentarios, seorsum divisit, ut alii exotERICI dicerentur, partim ACROATICI.

Cp. Cic., *De fin.* V 12; *Ep. ad Att.* IV 16, 2; Strabo XIII 1, 54, p. 609; Plut., *Adv. Coloten* 14, 4, p. 1115.

the fate of
Ar.'s library

401—The library of Aristotle had a highly remarkable fate.

a. Strabo XIII 1, 54, p. 608:

told by
Strabo

‘Ο γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ (βιβλιοθήκην) Θεοφράστῳ παρέδωκεν, ὥπερ καὶ τὴν σχολὴν ἀπέλιπε, πρῶτος ὢν ἴσμεν συναγαγὼν βιβλία καὶ διδάξας τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλέας βιβλιοθήκης σύνταξιν. Θεόφραστος δὲ Νηλεῖ παρέδωκεν, ὁ δ’ εἰς Σικῆψιν κομίσας τοῖς μετ’ αὐτὸν παρέδωκεν, ἰδιώταις ἀνθρώποις, οἱ κατάκλειστα εἶχον τὰ βιβλία οὐδ’ ἐπιμελῶς κείμενα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἤσθοντο τὴν σπουδὴν τῶν Ἀτταλικῶν βασιλέων, ὅφ’ οἷς ἦν ἡ πόλις, ζητούντων βιβλία εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν τῆς ἐν Περγάμῳ βιβλιοθήκης, κατὰ γῆς ἐκρυσψαν ἐν διωρυγί

¹ See the remarkable study of C. W. Vollgraff on the *Epitaphios: L'oraison funèbre de Gorgias*, Leiden 1952, p. 85-87, and the following section (p. 87-169).

τινι.¹ ὑπὸ δὲ νοτίας καὶ σιγῶν² κακωθέντα ὁψέ ποτε ἀπέδοντο οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ
γένους Ἀπελλικῶντι τῷ Τητίῳ πολλῶν ἀργυρίων τά τε Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τὰ
10 τοῦ Θεοφράστου βιβλία· ἦν δὲ ὁ Ἀπελλικῶν φιλόβιβλος μᾶλλον ἢ φιλόσοφος·
διὸ καὶ ζητῶν ἐπανόρθωσιν τῶν διαβρωμάτων³ εἰς ἀντίγραφα καινὰ μετήνεγκε
τὴν γραφὴν ἀναπληρῶν οὐκ εὖ καὶ ἐξέδωκεν ἀμαρτάδων πλήρη τὰ βιβλία.
συνέβη δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν περιπάτων, τοῖς μὲν πάλαι τοῖς μετὰ Θεόφραστον, οὐκ
15 ἔχουσιν ὅλως τὰ βιβλία πλὴν ὀλίγων καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν⁴, μὴδὲν
ἔχειν φιλοσοφεῖν πραγματικῶς, ἀλλὰ θέσεις ληκυθίζειν⁵, τοῖς δ' ὕστερον,
ἄφ' οὗ τὰ βιβλία ταῦτα προῆλθεν, ἄμεινον μὲν ἐκείνων φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἀριστο-
τελίζειν, ἀναγκάζεσθαι μέντοι τὰ πολλὰ εἰκότα λέγειν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν
ἀμαρτιῶν. πολὺ δὲ εἰς τοῦτο καὶ ἡ Ῥώμη προσελάβετο· εὐθύς γὰρ μετὰ τὴν
Ἀπελλικῶντος τελευτὴν Σύλλας ἤρε τὴν Ἀπελλικῶντος βιβλιοθήκην ὁ τὰς
20 Ἀθήνας ἑλὼν· δεῦρο δὲ (εἰς Ῥώμην) κομισθεῖσαν Τυραννίων τε ὁ γραμματικὸς
διεχειρίσατο φιλαριστοτέλης ὢν, θεραπεύσας τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς βιβλιοθήκης, καὶ
βιβλιοπῶλαί τινες γραφεῦσι φαύλοις χρώμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἀντιβάλλοντες, ὅπερ
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει τῶν εἰς πρᾶσιν γραφομένων βιβλίων καὶ ἐνθάδε
καὶ ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ.

b. Plut. *Sulla* 26, 1-2 tells the same story:

and by
Plutarchus

Ἀναχθεὶς δὲ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐξ Ἐφέσου, τριταῖος ἐν Πειραιεῖ καθωρ-
μίσθη· καὶ μυηθεὶς ἐξεῖλεν ἑαυτῷ τὴν Ἀπελλικῶντος τοῦ Τητίου βιβλιοθήκην,
ἐν ἣ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου βιβλίων ἦν, οὕτω τότε
σαφῶς γνωριζόμενα τοῖς πολλοῖς. λέγεται δὲ κομισθείσης αὐτῆς εἰς Ῥώμην
Τυραννίωνα τὸν γραμματικὸν ἐνσκευάσασθαι τὰ πολλὰ, καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ τὸν
Ῥόδιον Ἀνδρόνικον εὐπορήσαντα τῶν ἀντιγράφων εἰς μέσον θεῖναι καὶ ἀνα-
γράψαι τοὺς νῦν φερομένους πίνακας.

¹ "in a cave". Athenaeus I 3 a tells us that, before the arranging of the library at Pergamum, Neleus sold books of Aristotle to Ptolemaeus Philadelphus for the library at Alexandria.

² Moths or worms.

³ διαβρώματα — worm-eaten parchments.

⁴ If this account is true, we must note that the school-writings of Aristotle came very near to being lost for ever, and that the full knowledge of his philosophy barely escaped being confined to the first generation of the School. Up to Cicero Antiquity would have known Aristotle almost exclusively from his exoteric writings. We have some reason to doubt this. Zeller II 2, ³ 138-154. Interesting from this point of view is the list, given by Diog. Laert. V, 22-27, which is probably based on a list made by Hermippus c. 200 B.C. Many of the school-writings of Ar., or parts of them, are mentioned here under other titles.

⁵ θέσεις ληκυθίζειν — declaim commonplace.

**Works of
Aristotle**

402—Aristotle's literary work is divided by Ross into three main sections:

(i) Works of a more or less popular order, which were published by himself;

(2) Memoranda and collections of material, which may have been made by disciples;

(3) scientific works, written by himself.

Nearly the whole existing Corpus Aristotelicum, so far as it is authentic, belongs to the third group.

First group The list of Diog. begins with 19 works which seem to have been all more or less popular and belonged to the Platonic period of Ar. The greater part were dialogues; some of them bore the same titles as certain dialogues of Plato: *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, *Menexenus*, *Symposion*. The dialogue *Eudemos* or *Περὶ ψυχῆς*, written shortly after 354, was modelled closely on the *Phædo*. The *Protrepticus*, addressed to Themison, the prince of Cyprus, also belonged to the period of the Academy. The *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*, still written in the form of a dialogue, was a work of Platonic style but with marked differences in doctrine. It dates from the years of Assos.

Second group Of the second group a large number of titles is mentioned. Of the extant works of Aristotle only book K of the *Metaph.*, and probably the *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία* may be classed among this group.

Third group The so-called school-writings of Ar. Systematically classified the Corpus Aristotelicum contains the following works:

I. On logic, brought together in the *Organon*.

1. Κατηγορίαι (*Categoriae*). Probably authentic ¹.
2. Περὶ ἑρμηνείας (*De interpretatione*). There is no reason to doubt the authenticity.
- 3-4. Ἀναλυτικά πρότερα and ὕστερα (*Analytica priora and posteriora*).
5. Τοπικά (*Topica*).
6. Περὶ σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων (*De sophisticis elenchis*).

II. Philosophy of nature.

1. Φυσικά or Φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις (*Physica*), 8 books.
2. Περὶ οὐρανοῦ (*De caelo*), 4 books.
3. Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, *De generatione et corruptione*, 2 books.
4. Μετεωρολογικά (*Meteorologica*), 4 books, of which the fourth is generally considered as not genuine ².

In the Corpus follows the short book *Περὶ κόσμου* (*De mundo*). It is surely not a work of Aristotle. Probably it dates from the first century B.C. Its philosophy bears the traces of Posidonius.

¹ In modern times the authenticity has been doubted, because the idea of substance in this work differs from that of *Metaph.* ZH. Suzanne Mansion pleaded against the authenticity (*Proceedings of the tenth International Congress of Phil.*, Amsterdam 1949, pp. 1097-1100), L. M. de Rijk defends it (in *Mnemosyne* 1951, pp. 129-159).

² A. Mansion, *Introd.* p. 16, judges the unauthenticity not sufficiently proved.

If we follow the order of the Corpus Aristotelicum, we have to mention first the psychological works, and then the biological.

III. Psychology.

1. Περὶ ψυχῆς (*De anima*), 3 books.
2. The so-called *Parva naturalia*, containing
 - (1) Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν (*De sensu et sensibili*)
 - (2) Περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως (*De memoria et reminiscencia*)
 - (3) Περὶ ὕπνου (*De somno*)
 - (4) Περὶ ἐνυπνίων (*De insomniis*)
 - (5) Περὶ τῆς καθ' ὕπνον μαντικῆς (*De divinatione per somnum*)
 - (6) Περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος (*De longitudine et brevitate vitae*)
 - (7) Περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου (*De vita et morte*)¹
 - (8) Περὶ ἀναπνοῆς (*De respiratione*).

In the Corpus follows here the short treatise Περὶ πνεύματος (*de spiritu*), which may have been written $\pm$ 250. It contains a later doctrine than was known to Aristotle².

IV. Biological works.

1. Περὶ τὰ ζῷα ἱστορίαι (*Historia animalium*), 10 books, of which the tenth is not of Ar. Probably also b. VII, a part of VIII, and b. IX are spurious. A large collection of facts.

The following 4 works give the author's theories based on them.

2. Περὶ ζῶων μορίων (*De partibus animalium*), 4 books.
3. Περὶ ζῶων κινήσεως (*De motu animalium*).
4. Περὶ πορείας ζῶων (*De incessu animalium*).
5. Περὶ ζῶων γενέσεως (*De generatione animalium*), 5 books.

In the Corpus these authentic works of Aristotle are succeeded by a series of treatises which all originate from the Peripatetic School, but not from the Master himself. Among them are the *Problemata*, a large collection of all kinds of problems—mathematical, optical, musical, physiological, medical—; partly they reach back to Ar. himself.

V. Metaphysics.

Τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, 14 books, first collected by Andronicus and placed by him after the Physics, whence they were called by this name. The science we call *metaphysics* is named by Ar. himself πρώτη φιλοσοφία, or also θεολογία.

VI. Ethics.

1. Next follow in the Corpus the 10 books of the Ἠθικά Νικομάχεια (*Ethica Nicomachea*).
2. The 2 books of the Ἠθικά μεγάλα (*Magna moralia*).
3. Four books of the Ἠθικά Εὐδήμεια (*Ethica Eudemia*), namely the books A, B, Γ, H. The books Δ Ε Ζ have been left out, because they are the same as Ε Ζ Η of

¹ The first two chapters of this treatise are headed by the editors Περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρως. Ar. mentions this subject at the beginning of the first chapter, but he does not deal with it here.

² The distinction of veins and arteries, which was unknown to Ar.

the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The last three chapters of the *Eudemian Ethics* (H 13-15) are also separated and headed as a book VIII (Θ), e.g. by W. Jaeger.

These three works, of which only the *Nic. Ethics* are without doubt authentic¹, are followed in the Corpus by a small treatise *Περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν*, which dates probably from the first century B.C. or A.C.

VII. Politics and Economics.

1. Πολιτικά, 8 books.

2. Οἰκονομικά, 3 books, generally not accepted as authentic. The third exists only in a Latin translation.

Of the large collection of 158 politeiai, which was made in the School of Ar. and on his suggestion, only that of the Athenians has been preserved (found on a papyrus in 1890). This document being probably not written by Ar. himself but by a disciple, we had good reason to mention it as belonging to the second group.

VIII. Rhetoric and Poetics.

1. Τέχνη ῥητορική, 3 books, of which the third has been suspected, but is now generally believed to be authentic.

In the Corpus it is succeeded by the *Ῥητορική πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον*, an early Peripatetic work, but not of Ar. himself.

2. *Περὶ ποιητικῆς*, authentic but fragmentary.

3—DATE OF ARISTOTLE'S WORKS ACCORDING TO W. JAEGER

Concerning the chronology of the works of Ar. W. Jaeger has come to the following results:

First period 403—To the first Athenian period (the Academy) belong the *Dialogues* of Ar. (except the *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*) with the *Protrepticus*.—Jaeger fixed no special date either to the *logical treatises* of Ar., or to his *Rhetoric*. But he says somewhere more or less incidentally that Ar.'s logic was formed at an early date, probably still in the Academy². We have good reasons to put the *Rhetoric* in a later period.

In treating the *Metaphysics*, of which the older part must have been written at Assos, Jaeger remarks that at that date the fundamental principles of the *Physics*

¹ The *Magna moralia* are now generally considered as a work of a generation after Aristotle, and are in fact proved to be so by various arguments, lastly by an analysis of the style (K. O. Brink, *Stil und Form der ps. Aristotelischen MM.* Thesis of Berlin 1933). As to the *Eudemian Ethics*, since Jaeger they are generally believed to be an early work of Aristotle, from his platonizing period. In a recent study (*Studien zu den Ethiken des Corpus Ar.*, Paderborn 1940) E. J. Schächer tries to prove that they are not a work of Ar., but of his able disciple Eudemus of Rhodos. The arguments he gives in order to prove this thesis, are for the greater part not conclusive. Yet, in my opinion he has shaken the theory of Jaeger as to the early date of the work in question and opened a new perspective.

² Certainly it is not necessary to deduce that the six works of the *Organum* were all written during the first period, and we can hardly admit that this was the opinion of Jaeger. But he has left the task of stating this point more precisely to others.

were already fixed: the idea of teleology, the principles of form and matter, potency and act. Consequently J. admits that the first books of the *Physics* (*I and II*) were conceived, and probably written, at Athens, under the eyes of Plato. He assumes this explicitly for *De caelo I*, where the hypothesis of aether has been proposed for the first time as a new solution opposed to Platonism.

At Athens was also written the oldest part of the *Politics*, the criticism of Plato's *Republic*: *Pol. II*, 2-3. Ar. wrote it before having read the *Nomoi*. He must have received this work at Assos and, having read it hastily, have added a short review of it to the ch. 3 of *Pol. II*. "Perfectly Platonic" is, according to J., book *III* of the *De anima*, which contains the doctrine of the *noûs*. The actual form of this book may be of a more recent date, the substance of the thought originates from the Academy.

404—The years of Assos, Lesbos and the Macedonian court. At Assos was written the oldest part of the *Metaphysics* ("Urmetaphysik"): the books A (historical survey, Δ (a kind of encyclopaedia of philosophical terms), K 1-8 (treating the same subject-matter as the books B Γ E, but in an earlier form); next the book Λ, the so-called *Theology*, a short survey of the whole metaphysical system, except ch. 8, which is a later addition; finally chapters 9-10 of the book M¹ and the whole book N, in which the theory of the Ideas is shortly criticized and Speusippus' theory of numbers amply².

the middle
period

The books B and Γ are also of an early date, but posterior to K 1-8.

From the same time as *Metaph. A* dates the *dialogue* Περὶ φιλοσοφίας, which contains almost the same criticism of the theory of the Ideas as the first-mentioned book.

From the period of Assos also date the *Eudemian Ethics*. Jaeger characterizes this work as "reformplatonisch". He means by this term, that the author, having given up the theory of Ideas, wishes to found a new, reformed Platonism. The main argument for the early date of this work is that the term φρόνησις is used here in the Platonic meaning of philosophical insight into a transcendent reality, whereas later, in the *Nic. Eth.*, Aristotle uses it to indicate a ἐξὺς πρακτική, even for animals (a kind of instinct for what is or is not harmful to them).

According to J. a part of the *Politica* too was written at Assos, namely the last books, H Θ, containing the ideal state (ἀρίστη πολιτεία), which is opposed to that of Plato. To this part of the work belong the books B³ and Γ⁴. On the other hand, the books Δ E Z are of a much later date: giving an empirical foundation to the best constitution, they belong to the third period of Ar.'s activity. Book A has then been put at the head of the whole, by way of introduction.

As to the *Physics*, we found that J. rather suggests that books I and II were written at Athens during the life of Plato. In this case book VII too, which

¹ These two chapters are an older introduction to the discussion of the theory of numbers.

² In the book N the name of Xenocrates is not mentioned. His theory is criticized by Ar. very sharply in the book M, which for this reason must have been written in a later period, namely in the Lyceum, when Xenocrates was the head of the Academy. During the years of Assos, while Speusippus directed the School of Plato at Athens, Xenocrates was in the company of Ar.

³ A survey of former theories of the state, partly written at Athens (the ch. 2-3) partly at Assos.

⁴ Book Γ treats the notion of πόλις and πολίτης.

belongs to the oldest parts of Ar.'s works, must be dated in the first period. Book Θ¹ being a later addition (to be dated in the third period), we have the impression, though J. does not say so explicitly, that Books III-VI must be placed in the middle period, at Assos or later, but most probably at Assos, because in these years the author was occupied with what is called by J. *speculative physics*.

What he states explicitly is, that *the form in which we have the work De caelo* dates from these years (at least two years after the death of Plato, but not much later). The style is near to that of Περὶ φιλοσοφίας; the theory of the movement of the celestial spheres in B 8 is later than that of the movement of the celestial bodies in II. φλ.

Also the Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, being a work of "speculative physics", is to be dated in this period, probably still at Assos. J. sees these works of physics as being of the same order of ideas as the politics of the ideal state, the ethics based on theology (the *Eudemian Eth.*) and that part of the *Metaphysics* which exhibits the same character ("Urmetaphysik").

**the third
period**

405—Ar.'s second stay at Athens: the years of the Lyceum. There is an important province in the works of Ar. which, according to J., originates without exception from the third period: the *research-work*, as well on the field of history as on that of nature. The only argument for this late dating which J. gives, is, that the expedition of Alexander furnished a great deal of material for zoology as well as for botany².—According to this theory all the biological works of Ar. belong to the last period of his activity.

The *Meteorology* too is dated by J. in the last period. He does so with reference to the work on *the rising of the Nile*, which ends with the triumphant words: Οὐκέτι πρόβλημα ἔστιν· ὥφθη γὰρ φανερώς ὅτι ἐξ ὑετῶν αὖξει.

J. cites these words as characteristic of the experimental method of Ar., as opposed to that of Plato and the Academy, which was still closely followed by Ar. himself in his early, Platonizing works³.

To the third period J. also reckons the whole group of *anthropological-physiological treatises*: *De anima* I and II, the *Parva naturalia* without exception. (Not the doctrine of the nous in *De anima* III, which harmonizes with the early ethics and metaphysics).

J. points especially to the method used in the treatise on *divination by dreams*, which being purely experimental differs *toto coelo* from the point of view in the middle period, in Περὶ φιλοσοφίας⁴.

Finally J. cites the fifth chapter of the *De partibus animalium* I in order to illustrate the purely empirical character of Ar.'s idea of science during this last period⁵. We give the text of this famous chapter.

¹ This book contains a revision of the theory of the Prime Mover.

² In fact, J. opposes the method of research of Ar. and his successors to that of Plato and the Academy, Ar.'s purpose being to study the details, while Plato's was merely the division of notions.—The question is first whether this opposition is justified. We have to remark that, in order to make a division of notions, details must be studied. Secondly, we saw Ar. occupied in Mikrasia and on Lesbos with the collection of material for the *Historia Animalium*.

³ Jaeger, *Aristotle*, p. 331.

⁴ *Ib.*, p. 162 ff., 333 f. In the *De divinatione per somnum* Ar. no longer explains the prevision of the future in the dream state as proceeding from metaphysical regions, but he explains it in a purely natural way, by means of psycho-physiology.

⁵ *Ib.*, p. 337-340.

406—Aristotle, *De part. anim.* I 5, 644 b²²-645 a³⁶:

the beauty
of empirical
research,
expounded
by Ar.

Τῶν οὐσιῶν ὅσαι φύσει συνεστᾶσι, τὰς μὲν ἀγενήτους καὶ ἀφθάρτους εἶναι
τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα, τὰς δὲ μετέχειν γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς. Συμβέβηκε δὲ περὶ
μὲν ἐκείνας τιμίας οὐσας καὶ θείας ἐλάττους ἡμῖν ὑπάρχειν θεωρίας (καὶ γὰρ
26 ἐξ ὧν ἂν τις σκέψαιτο περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι ποθοῦμεν, παντελῶς
ἐστὶν ὀλίγα τὰ φανερά κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν), περὶ δὲ τῶν φθαρτῶν φυτῶν τε καὶ
ζώων εὐποροῦμεν μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν διὰ τὸ σύντροφον· πολλὰ γὰρ περὶ
30 ἕκαστον γένος λάβοι τις ἂν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων βουλόμενος διαπνεεῖν ἱκανῶς.
Ἔχει δ' ἐκάτερα χάριν. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ εἰ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐφαπτόμεθα, ὅμως διὰ
τὴν τιμιότητα τοῦ γνωρίζειν ἥδιον ἢ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ἅπαντα, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν
35 ἐρωμένων τὸ τυχὸν καὶ μικρὸν μόνον κατιδεῖν ἥδιόν ἐστιν ἢ πολλὰ ἕτερα καὶ
545 a μεγάλα δι' ἀκριβείας ἰδεῖν· τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ πλείω γνωρίζειν αὐτῶν
λαμβάνει τὴν τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὑπεροχὴν, ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ πλησιαιτέρα ἡμῶν εἶναι
καὶ τῆς φύσεως οἰκειότερα ἀντικαταλλάττεται τι¹ πρὸς τὴν περὶ τὰ θεῖα
5 φιλοσοφίαν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων διήλθομεν λέγοντες τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν,
λοιπὸν περὶ τῆς ζωϊκῆς φύσεως εἰπεῖν, μηδὲν παραλιπόντας εἰς δύναμιν μήτε
ἀτιμότερον μήτε τιμιώτερον. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ κεχαρισμένοις αὐτῶν πρὸς
τὴν αἴσθησιν κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν ὅμως ἡ δημιουργήσασα φύσις² ἀμυγλάνους
10 ἡδονὰς παρέχει τοῖς δυναμένοις τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν καὶ φύσει φιλοσόφοις.
Καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη παράλογον καὶ ἄτοπον, εἰ τὰς μὲν εἰκόνας αὐτῶν θεωροῦντες
χαίρομεν ὅτι τὴν δημιουργήσασαν τέχνην συνθεωροῦμεν, οἷον τὴν γραφικὴν
ἢ τὴν πλαστικὴν, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν φύσει συνεστώτων μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶμεν τὴν
15 θεωρίαν, δυνάμενοι γε τὰς αἰτίας καθορᾶν. Διὸ δεῖ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν παιδικῶς
τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀτιμωτέρων ζώων ἐπίσκεψιν. Ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἔνεστί
τι θαυμαστόν· καὶ καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος λέγεται πρὸς τοὺς ξένους εἰπεῖν τοὺς
βουλομένους ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ, οἳ ἐπειδὴ προσιόντες εἶδον αὐτὸν θερόμενον πρὸς
20 τῷ ἵπνῳ ἔστησαν (ἐκέλευε γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰσιέναι θαρροῦντας· εἶναι γὰρ καὶ
ἐνταῦθα θεούς), οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὴν ζήτησιν περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ζώων προσιέναι
δεῖ μὴ δυσωπούμενον³, ὥς ἐν ἅπασιν ὄντος τινὸς φυσικοῦ καὶ καλοῦ. Τὸ γὰρ
μὴ τυχόντως ἀλλ' ἐνεκά τινος ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις ἐστὶ καὶ μάλιστα·
25 οὗ δ' ἕνεκα συνέστηκεν ἢ γέγονε τέλους, τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ χώραν εἴληφεν. Εἰ δέ
τις τὴν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων θεωρίαν ἀτιμον εἶναι νενόμικε, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
οἴεσθαι χρὴ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ· οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ἄνευ πολλῆς δυσχερείας ἰδεῖν ἐξ ὧν
συνέστηκε τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος, οἷον αἷμα, σάρκες, ὅστ' αἰ, φλέβες καὶ τὰ
30 τοιαῦτα μόρια. Ὅμοίως τε δεῖ νομίζειν τὸν περὶ οὐτινοσοῦν τῶν μορίων ἢ

¹ ἀντικαταλλάττεται τι - balances somewhat.

² ἡ δημιουργήσασα φύσις - "Nature that created them as an intelligent artist.
See on the meaning of this version our Ch. XIII, § 3, nrs. 499-501.

³ προσιέναι δεῖ μὴ δυσωπούμενον - "we must not recoil with childish aversion".

τῶν σκευῶν διαλεγόμενον μὴ περὶ τῆς ὕλης ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μνήμην, μηδὲ ταύτης χάριν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὅλης μορφῆς, οἷον καὶ περὶ οἰκίας, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλίνθων καὶ πηλοῦ καὶ ξύλων· καὶ τὸν περὶ φύσεως περὶ τῆς συνθέσεως καὶ τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ τούτων ἀ μὴ συμβαίνει χωριζόμενά ποτε τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῶν. 35

Jaeger, l.c., calls this "a programme for research and instruction in the Peripatetic School"¹, which explains to us the spirit that reigns in the works of Ar.'s followers. As to Ar. himself, J. describes the spirit of his later years as opposed to his former conception of metaphysics in the following words: "He no longer speaks of the world of appearances as more knowable to us but to be contrasted with the essence of reality, which is more knowable naturally². He justifies metaphysics now by means of the everlasting longing of the human heart to penetrate the mysteries of the imperishable and invisible world, and is ready to content himself with the merest corner of that hidden truth, while the precedence of real science (ἡ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὑπεροχή) is now clearly assigned to empirical research. This is the praise of devotion to the small, the confession of allegiance to the study that fulfills its highest achievements in the *History of Animals*, the collection of *Constitutions*, the history of the theatre, and the chronicle of the Pythian competitions."—"He (Ar.) organizes and overcomes the manifold (ἄπειρον) of appearances, which Plato simply passes over"³.

the organization of science

407—To the third period of Ar.'s activity belongs also the organization of the writing of a complete *history of the sciences*. *Theophrastus* was charged with the writing of a detailed *History of philosophy* (the Φυσικῶν δόξαι in 18 books), from Thales up to his time. This work has been the basis for all later doxography.

Eudemus of Rhodos had to write a *History of the mathematical sciences* (arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy), probably also of *theology*.

Meno wrote the *History of Medicine*, the Ἱατρικά, known to us by a papyrus-fragment.

J. mentions here, too, the great illustrated work Ἀνατομαί, a collection which was regularly used in the medical lectures of the Lyceum. Ar. often refers to it in his treatises.

the revision of the theory of the First Mover

408—To this last period belongs, finally, the revision of the theory of the First Mover in *Metaph.* A 8. This revision is based on new astronomic theories: Eudoxus admitted 26 celestial spheres, his (indirect) disciple Callippus assumed 33; Ar. himself comes in *Metaph.* A 8 to 47 or 55, and accordingly postulates the existence of the same number of Unmoved Movers. J. thinks this to be an innovation after the original theory, which admitted of only one Unmoved Mover, who alone governs the kosmos which is one, and is called therefore θεός. Thus in

¹ "ein Forschungs- und Unterrichtsprogramm der peripatetischen Schule".

² We shall find this view of Ar. directly at the beginning of his *Physics* (I 1) and of his *Metaphysics* (A 2). See our nrs. **470** and **519** (982a²³⁻²⁵); also *Eth. Nic.* I, 1095b²⁻⁴ (our nr. **566**).

³ "Ar. organisiert und überwindet das Apeiron der Erscheinungen, das Platon überfliegt", Jaeger says. The truth of this statement, however, seems to me doubtful, because Plato in the *Philebus* designed as the especial task of philosophy the determining of "the intermediate stages" between the One and the Apeiron.

chapters A 7 and 9-10, which form a close unity. The 8th chapter is clearly a later addition.

Phys. VIII also gives a revised treatment of the question of the First Mover, and must be of a later date ¹.

409—To complete the image we have to make to ourselves of Ar.'s third period according to Jaeger, we must state the following points.

1. First the empirical books (Δ E Z) of the *Politics* must be reckoned to this last period, as they are based on the material of the 158 constitutions; then also book A, which is an introduction to the whole.

2. J. does not say explicitly that the *Nic. Ethics* are to be placed in this period too. This seems, however, to be an almost inevitable conclusion. First by the character of the work. The empirical books of the *Politics* are characterized by J. as a *phaenomenology of real political life*. Now the *Nic. Ethics* give such a *phaenomenology of moral life*. And secondly, the relation to the *Eudemian Ethics*. We have seen that by J. this work was placed in the middle period. The *Nic. Ethics*, representing a later phasis of Ar.'s thought, then seem almost necessarily to have been written in the third period.

3. Finally the central books of the *Metaphysics*: Z H Θ , containing the doctrine of substance and that of potency and act, and with them the introductory book E. Are they to be placed in the third period?—Such seems to be the opinion of J., though he only says explicitly that book M, which criticizes Xenocrates, must have been written in the years of the Lyceum. The thesis of J., however, is not to say that Ar. *has abandoned metaphysics* during this period and has turned to merely empirical research, but rather that he *has changed his conception of metaphysics*, the object of this science having been first to him supra-sensible being, afterwards the $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \epsilon\nu$, which means: being in all its *nuances*, being in its multiplicity. Now this is in harmony with the spirit of empirical research. Thus it fits well to the third period.

**Parts of the
Politics, Ethics
and *Metaph.*
to be placed
in the third
period**

4—REACTIONS AND CORRECTIONS

410—The work of Jaeger has been generally acknowledged as a study of fundamental importance. Its chronology has been adopted by Ross ², E. Bréhier ³ and Überweg-Praechter ⁴.

**the results
of Jaeger
generally
accepted**

E. Hoffmann wrote in the *Philologische Wochenschrift* of 1924 that J. "had resuscitated the living Aristotle in the flesh". He understands Jaeger in this way that a separation should be made between a metaphysical and an empirical period in the development of Ar.

J. Bidez in *Un singulier naufrage littéraire dans l'Antiquité: à la recherche des épaves de l'Aristote perdu* (Brussels 1938) is occupied with the early works of Ar. in the footsteps of Jaeger.

¹ We treat this question in our Ch. XIII, § 5.

² W. D. Ross remarks in the Introduction to his *Aristotle-Selections* (New-York 1938, p. XIV: "The attempt to trace the development of Ar.'s thought through his works is still in its infancy." Yet the main conclusions of J. are well established in his opinion, and he adopts almost J.'s whole chronology.

³ *Histoire de la Philosophie* I, 1926.

⁴ *Geschichte der Phil.* I, ¹²1926.

E. Bignone uses the traces of the lost works of Ar. for the study of Epicurus.

Jaeger's theory of the revision of the doctrine of the First Mover has found an almost general agreement—up to the very last years ¹. So by *M. J. Lagrange* in his article *Comment s'est transformée la pensée religieuse d'Aristote d'après un livre récent* in *Revue Thomiste* 1926, p. 285 ff., and by *R. Mugnier*, *La théorie du premier Moteur et l'évolution de la pensée aristotélicienne*, Paris 1930.

With the same question deals *M. Bousset*, *Sur la théologie d'Aristote: monothéisme ou polythéisme?* in *Revue Thomiste* 1938, p. 798 ff.

serious
objections of
A. Mansion

411—a. *A. Mansion* of Louvain has been the first to criticize J.'s theories in a more radical way ².

He remarks first that *Metaph. A* must be of a much later date than J. thinks it is, so that the distance of time which lies between ch. 8 and the rest of this book can by no means be so great as J. assumes it to be. Secondly, Ar. has left his *Metaph.* unfinished. This fact implies that he worked at it till the end of his life. It is impossible to accept that the work we have was finished before 335 ³.

Mansion's final judgment on the work of J. is that, in general, his conclusions cannot be accepted as being definitive. "En somme son travail est en grande partie à refaire."

b. After Mansion *Von Ivanka* protested against the separation of a metaphysical and an empirical period, which would have succeeded one another in Ar.'s development ⁴.

Other
protests

412—The objections of Mansion and Von Ivanka were based on a purely historical method. Such is not the case of the protest of *M. de Corte* (in *La doctrine de l'intelligence chez Ar.*, Paris 1934) against the genetic method, applied by Jaeger to the study of Ar. De Corte starts from the Thomistic interpretation of Ar. as being the right one. Now the doctrine of Thomas on the *intellectus agens* as a part—or perhaps rather as a function—of the human soul may have been a real correction of Ar.'s doctrine of the *noûs*; it is, however, more a philosophical than a purely historical interpretation ⁵. But, if the method of W. Jaeger is to be criticized, it should be done on purely historical grounds, not on dogmatic assumptions.

The same remark applies to the work of *P. van Schilfgaard*, *De zielkunde van Aristoteles* (Leiden 1938): the author pleads for a philosophizing interpretation of Ar.,—which means with him, an interpretation in the style of Hegel ⁶.

¹ Since the interesting study of *Ph. Merlan* on Ar.'s Unmoved Movers in *Traditio* of 1946, others too find traces of a plurality of Unmoved Movers in Ar.'s early works. See our nr. 518.

² In the *Revue Néoscholastique de Louvain*, 1927, pp. 307 ff. and 423 ff.

³ In fact, I do not think this to have been the opinion of J. Vid. supra (nr. 409).

⁴ *Scholastik* VII, p. 27 ff.

⁵ *F. Nuyens* remarks rightly that the texts of Ar. point rather to the Averroistic interpretation of the *noûs* as a *substantia separata*.

⁶ Dr. Nuyens wrote a review of this work in *Studiën* 1939, p. 66 f.; I did the same for the *Museum* 1940, p. 149 ff.

413—F. Nuyens, *Ontwikkelingsmomenten in de zielkunde van Aristoteles* (thesis of the University of Amsterdam, 1939), French translation at Louvain 1948 (*L'Evolution de la Psychologie d'Aristote*) has found in the development of the psychology of Ar. a criterion which enables him to a more exact determination of the chronology of Ar.'s works, and so to an important correction of the results of Jaeger.

the work of
Nuyens

Standard is: the conception of the soul as entelechy of a body in *De anima*. Soul and body are then essentially joined. The soul is not a substance, as it was with Plato and in the *Eudemus* of Ar. The question is: what are the intermediate stages between the *Eudemus* and the *De anima*? A special treatise on the soul, dating from the middle period, does not exist. But Ar. speaks repeatedly on the subject more or less incidentally, often in the *Ethics* and *Politics*, less frequently but still in a sufficient measure in the *Metaph.* and in his biological works. Three periods can be distinguished:

the leading
principle

(I) The first is that of an *antagonistic dualism*, in which body and soul are opposed to each other as hostile powers (the *Eudemus*);

(II) A *natural collaboration* of soul and body. The soul does not directly lose its independence. It is a vital power which, being joined to a special organ, lives in the body. It dominates the body and uses it as its instrument (*vitalistic instrumentism*). This conception is characteristic of the middle period. Biological study has influenced the author: in the *Eudemus* psychology was restricted to man, in *De anima* it has become "general", i.e. extending to all living beings;

(III) In the third period the soul is the entelechy of the body. Soul and body are essentially joined; whence follows that the soul comes into being and perishes with the body. It is no longer deemed immortal, as it was in (I).

The problem of the *noûs* is necessarily linked up with that of the soul. In the first period the *noûs* belongs to the soul and is immortal with it; in the second *noûs* and soul are separated, *noûs* is what is not bodily. In the third the *noûs* comes *θύραθεν*: it is immaterial and immortal. It does not belong to the soul.

the problem
of the *noûs*

This criterion leads its author to the following results:

Results

1. *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας* does not belong to the middle period (Assos), as it was dated by Jaeger, but to the first. It is of the same time as the *Protrepticus*¹. In this last work too the theory of Ideas is already criticized.

2. This statement has a further consequence: if *Π. φιλ.* was written in the Academy, then also *De caelo*, *Phys.* I-VII, and *De generatione et corruptione*.

3. The *Categories*, *Topica* and *Π. σοφ. ἐλ.* prove to belong to the first period; *De interpr.*, *Anal. pr.* and *post.* to the second.

4. To the middle period belongs, as it appears from the local references (to the region of Assos and Lesbos) the *Historia Animalium*. Ross had already remarked this. N. concludes: but with this fact the whole construction of Jaeger that the biological works of Ar. all belong to the third period and there mark a new phase in their author's development, collapses.

To the *Hist. anim.* succeeds the *De partibus anim.* In this work the dualism of body and soul is replaced by collaboration. The soul is localized in the heart.

The same view is represented by the *De motu anim.*, and some of the *Parva naturalia*, namely the *De iuv. et sen.*, *De vita et morte* and the *De resp.*

¹ We shall see in our next chapter that this conclusion of Dr. Nuyens cannot be right. This fact surely must exhort us to a certain prudence as to the application of his criterion.

The 6th treatise of the *Parva Nat.* however, the *De long. et brev. vitae*, is nearer to the *De anima*. It forms a transition to the third period. As to the rest of the biological works, only the *De gener. anim.* represents the same view as the *De anima*, and therefore belongs to the final period.

5. Concerning the *Metaph.* N. confirms the early date of the book A, B, K 1-8, M 9-10 and N; also that M 1-9 belongs to the final period. Book Γ has no texts relative to the soul, but E has. The view of the soul in this book is near to that of *De anima*. It must be dated shortly before this work.

N.'s criterion leads to an exact determination of the date of books Z H Θ. These books presuppose the definition of soul in *De anima*. Consequently they belong to the last years of Ar.'s activity. In book Θ, however, are also older traces. So this book, as we have it, is probably a later redaction of an earlier treatise.

Book I gives no indications as to its date.

Concerning A Nuyens confirms the objection of Mansion against Jaeger. Soul and body are considered in this book as form and matter of the living being. This must have been written *after De anima*, i.e. *very late*. Chapter 8 is a later addition, but as to time it is not far removed from the rest.

6. N. determines also the date of the *Nic. Ethics*. Whether this work belongs to the third period, to the beginning of it or to the end, is a question which was left open by Jaeger. Both Mansion and Ross date the work very late. N. comes to other conclusions: the psychology which is presupposed here, is not that of *De anima*; it is much nearer to Plato. For this reason the work must be dated surely ten years before the *De anima*: it may have been written towards the end of the middle period or at the beginning of the third.

7. Also regarding the *Politics* N. comes to an important conclusion. We saw that books IV-VI were reckoned by Jaeger to the third period, and that the first book was added, according to him, afterwards as an introduction to the whole. Now the relation of body and soul appears to be conceived in this book in a clearly mechanical way, and soul is divided into parts as was done by Plato but not in Ar.'s *De anima*. So this first book may have been written *early in the third period*, but by no means very late.

8. N. too cites the fifth chapter of the *De part. anim.* I and comments on it in a somewhat different way from Jaeger: we cannot cite this beautiful chapter as a document in illustration of a "positivistic" period in Ar.'s development. This author never cultivated science at the cost of speculative philosophy. Both go together, up to the end of his activity. The science which he defends here, is according to himself the prerogative of the φιλοσοφοί.

9. Finally the *De anima*. *The third book is not of an early date*, as it was in the opinion of Jaeger, and also of Ross. Its doctrine of the *noûs* is not Platonic; it is no remainder of a former period, but just the result of the psychology of the final period. The work shows a unity of composition; the problem of the *noûs* pervades the whole.

A part of the *Parva naturalia* is closely connected with the *De anima*: *De sensu et sensato*, *De memoria et reminiscentia*, *De somno et vigilia*, *De insomniis* and *De divinatione*. Together with the *De gener. anim.* they belong to the last years.

These then are the results of the work of Dr. Nuyens. The fact that they in their turn must be corrected on several points, does not take away the importance of the work.

Further
results of
this method

414—The chronology of the biological works has been determined more precisely by I. Düring in *Aristotle's De partibus animalium*, Göte-

borg 1943; that of certain treatises of the *Parva naturalia* by H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *Aristotelis De insomniis et de divinatione per somnum*, Leiden 1947. Both authors know the book of Nuyens and make use of his results.

Some objections against the method of Nuyens have been made by **Objections**
G. Verbeke, *L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote*, in *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 1948, pp. 335-351.

Verbeke remarks first that it is impossible to date whole works of Ar. on the ground of a few texts in which the relation soul-body is touched upon. In the same treatise may be earlier and later parts (as Döring proved that the first book of the *De partibus* is of a much earlier date than the following books of this treatise, and Drossaart Lulofs that both in the *De Somno* and in the *De insomniis* there are sections of an earlier and a more advanced date). Secondly he points out that the arguments adduced by N. for the early date of the *Topics* are not conclusive; thirdly that there are serious difficulties as to the chronology of the *Nic. Ethics*, the doctrine of the *noûs* in this last work being much nearer to Plato than is supposed by N.

I myself had to make an objection to N. regarding the early date he attributes to the *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*. Now, because the chronology of the physical treatises is based by N. on that of this dialogue, this point too must be revised.

The main result of the work of N. remains that the biological works of Ar. are of a much earlier date than Jaeger had admitted; that the later books of the *Metaphysics* are of the author's latest years, and consequently that neither the "research"-work of Ar. is to be attributed as a whole to his latest period, nor the metaphysical speculation to a former phase of his development¹.

¹ I have to remark here again that in my opinion Jaeger's theory does not necessarily imply that the last books of the *Metaph.* were written before 335, and that, consequently, the results of Dr. Nuyens on this point are rather a precision than a contradiction of Jaeger's views.

I had the opportunity, after having written the above chapter, to ask Prof. Jaeger himself, when he visited our country in July 1950, whether my impression on this point was right. He confirmed to me that it has never been his intention to make a radical separation between a metaphysical and a "positivistic" period in Ar.'s development. He did not think it possible to date books Z H Θ₂ of the *Metaph.* more precisely, but he did not intend to exclude the possibility that they might have been written very late.

ELEVENTH CHAPTER THE EXOTERIC WRITINGS

1—THE EUDEMUS OR ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ

the theme **415**—Ar. wrote this dialogue shortly after the death of Eudemus of Cyprus, a companion of his in the Academy of Plato, who died in Sicily under the standard of Dio (354). The story of his death is told by Cicero.

a. Cic., *De div.* I 25 (Ross, *Fragm. Sel.*, Eudemus fr. 1):

Quid? singulari vir ingenio Aristoteles et paene divino ipsene errat an alios vult errare, cum scribit Eudemum Cyprium familiarem suum iter in Macedoniam facientem Pheras venisse, quae erat urbs in Thessalia tum admodum nobilis, ab Alexandro autem tyranno crudeli dominatu tenebatur. in eo igitur oppido ita graviter aegrum Eudemum 5 fuisse ut omnes medici diffiderent. ei visum in quiete egregia facie iuvenem dicere fore ut perbreui convalesceret paucisque diebus interitum Alexandrum tyrannum, ipsum autem Eudemum quinquennio post domum esse rediturum. atque ita quidem prima statim scribit Aristoteles consecuta et convaluisse Eudemum et ab uxoris 10 fratribus interfectum tyrannum. quinto autem anno exeunte cum esset spes ex illo somnio in Cyprum illum ex Sicilia esse rediturum, proeliantem eum ad Syracusas occidisse. ex quo ita illud somnium esse interpretatum ut cum animus Eudemi e corpore excesserit, tum domum revertisse videatur.

15

b. Cp. Plut., *Life of Dio*, 22:

Συνέπραττον δὲ (τῷ Δίῳ) καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων ὁ τε Κύπριος Εὐδήμος, εἰς δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀποθανόντα τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς διάλογον ἐποίησε, καὶ Τιμωνίδης ὁ Λευκάδιος.

the soul no harmony **416**—In this dialogue Ar. defends the immortality of the soul and attacks the doctrine that the soul is the harmony of the body. Philoponus, in his commentary of the *De anima*, mentions the following two arguments, used by Ar. in the *Eudemus*.

a. Ross, *Eud. fr.* 7, p. 20:

Τῇ ἀρμονίᾳ, φησίν, ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, ἡ ἀναρμοστία· τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ οὐδὲν ἐναντίον. οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ἀρμονία ἐστίν.

**First
argument**

Jaeger, *Ar.* 41, points to the corresponding logical formula in the *Categ.* 3 b²⁴ ff.: Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον εἶναι. "Substances never have contraries".—Soul, then, is a substance, as is said directly by Plotinus, *Enn.* IV 7, 8: τὸ μὲν (sc. πρότερον, ἡ ψυχὴ) οὐσία, ἡ δὲ ἀρμονία οὐκ οὐσία.

Jaeger, though he does not think the *Categ.* authentic¹, cites another parallel between a Platonic argument (*Phaedo* 93 b-d) why the soul is no harmony, and a formula in the *Categ.* Plato says: the soul is either good, moral and rational, or the opposite. Now these opposed constitutions are a sort of harmony and disharmony of the soul. But the attributes "good" etc. and their opposites admit of a μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. Consequently, if harmony = soul, the soul would admit of degrees,—which is impossible. Cp. *Categ.* 3 b³³-4 a⁹: Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον. E.q.s. "Substance does not admit of degrees".

b. Ross, *ib.*:

Τῇ ἀρμονίᾳ, φησί, τοῦ σώματος ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀναρμοστία τοῦ σώματος, ἀναρμοστία δὲ τοῦ ἐμψύχου σώματος νόσος καὶ ἀσθένεια καὶ αἰσχος· ὦν τὸ μὲν ἀσυμμετρία τῶν στοιχείων ἡ νόσος, τὸ δὲ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν ἡ ἀσθένεια, τὸ δὲ τῶν ὀργανικῶν τὸ αἰσχος. εἰ τοίνυν ἡ ἀναρμοστία νόσος καὶ ἀσθένεια καὶ αἰσχος, ἡ ἀρμονία ἄρα ὑγίεια καὶ ἰσχύς καὶ κάλλος· ψυχὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τοῦτων οὔτε ὑγίεια φημί οὔτε ἰσχύς οὔτε κάλλος· ψυχὴν γὰρ εἶχε καὶ ὁ Θερσίτης αἰσχιστος ὢν. οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀρμονία.

**Second
argument**

c. Simplicius in *Ar.*, *De anima* I 3, says that, according to *Ar.* in the *Eudemus*, the soul is an *eidos*.

**the soul
an *eidos***

Ross, *Eud. fr.* 8:

Καὶ ἐν τῷ Εὐδήμῳ τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς αὐτῷ γεγραμμένῳ διαλόγῳ εἰδός τι ἀποφαίνεται τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι.

J., *l.c.*, remarks that in this period the young *Ar.* was still dependent on Plato in metaphysics, but completely independent of him in the sphere of logic and methodology. "The fundamental attitude embodied in the doctrine of the categories, and the main portions of the doctrine itself, had been developed before *Ar.* dared to shake the metaphysical foundation of Plato's philosophy".

417—a. The story of Midas and Silenus, cited by Plutarch in the *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 27: Silenus, captured by Midas, answers to the question of the king what is the highest good to man (τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ

**the immor-
tality of
the soul**

¹ *Ar.* p. 46, with note 3. I think the arguments adduced by J. on this point not decisive. I am rather inclined to accept the authenticity of the *Categ.* and to explain the doctrine of the πρώτη οὐσία in this treatise as a strong reaction of the author against the theory of the Ideas, which may be placed at the beginning of the years of Assos.

βέλτιστον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τί τὸ πάντων αἰρετώτατον);—he answers after a long silence, μόλις and ἀνακαγχάζων (Ross, Eud. fr. 6, p. 19):

Δαίμονος ἐπιπόνου καὶ τύχης χαλεπῆς ἐφήμερον σπέρμα, τί με βιάζεσθε λέγειν ἃ ὑμῖν ἄρειον μὴ γινῶναι; μετ' ἀγνοίας γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων κακῶν ἀλυπότατος ὁ βίος. ἀνθρώποις δὲ πάμπαν οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι τὸ πάντων ἄριστον οὐδὲ μετασχεῖν τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου φύσεως· ἄριστον γὰρ πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι, τὸ μέντοι μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνυστῶν τὸ γενομένουσ ἀποθανεῖν ὡς τάχιστα. δῆλον οὖν ὡς οὔσης κρείττονος τῆς ἐν τῷ τεθνάναι διαγωγῆς ἢ τῆς ἐν τῷ ζῆν, οὕτως ἀπεφάνητο.

J., *Ar.* p. 48, rightly pointed to the Platonic style and spirit of this answer: Τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι is not merely "not to be born"; it also means "not to enter into Becoming".

the doctrine
of the Ideas
accepted by
Ar.

b. Proclus in Plat. *Remp.*; Ross, Eud. fr. 5:

Λέγει δὲ καὶ ὁ δαιμόνιος Ἀριστοτέλης αἰτίαν δι' ἣν ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἰοῦσα ἡ ψυχὴ δεῦρο ἐπιλανθάνεται τῶν ἐκεῖ θεαμάτων, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἐξιοῦσα μέμνηται ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνταῦθα παθημάτων.

The ἐκεῖ θεάματα are doubtless the Ideas.

c. The same fr.

the life of the
soul without
body normal

Ar. concludes from the above-cited fact that the life of the soul without body is normal and like a state of health, whereas the life in the body is to be considered as abnormal and a state of disease.

Φησὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκ μὲν ὑγείας εἰς νόσον ὀδεύοντας λήθην ἴσχειν τινὰς καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν γραμμάτων ὧν ἐμεμαθήκεισαν, ἐκ νόσου δὲ εἰς ὑγείαν ἰόντα μηδένα πώποτε τοῦτο πάσχειν· εἰκέναι δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀνευ σώματος ζωὴν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατὰ φύσιν οὔσαν <ὑγείᾳ, νόσῳ δὲ τὴν ἐν σώματι>.

the nous
a part of
the soul

418—*a.* That the nous was considered by Ar. during this period as a part of the soul (unlike the later doctrine of the *De anima*), appears from the passage of Simplicius cited supra (416*c*: the soul an *eidos*), Fr. 8 Ross, where he continues (after the words εἰδὸς τι ἀποφαίνεται τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι):

καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐπαινεῖ τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν δεκτικὴν λέγοντας τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐχ ὅλην ἀλλὰ τὴν νοητικὴν ὡς τῶν ἀληθῶν δευτέρως εἰδῶν γνωστικὴν· τῷ γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς κρείττονι νῷ τὰ ἀληθῆ εἶδη σύστοιχα.

The question might be asked here whether the words οὐχ ὅλην *e.g.s.* are still a report of Ar.'s view in the *Eudemus*, or whether they rather contain an explanation of Simplicius. In the first case—which seems to be the right one—this fragment would prove that the doctrine of the nous as the highest part of the human soul, which therefore alone is divine and immortal, originates in the very first period

of Ar.'s thought ¹. This doctrine differs from that of *De anima*, where the *noûs* no longer is regarded as *a part* of the soul, but as a "separated substance" which comes from the outside. We find it explicitly in the *Protr.* (fr. 61 R.), in *Metaph.* Λ 3 and in the *Nic. Ethics*.

b. Ross, *Protr.* 10 c (from Iamblichus, *Protr.* ch. 8, p. 48 ed. Pistelli): **noûs alone immortal**

Οὐδὲν οὖν θεῖον ἢ μακάριον ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πλήν ἐκεῖνό γε μόνον ἄξιον σπουδῆς ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως. τοῦτο γὰρ μόνον ἔοικεν εἶναι τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀθάνατον καὶ μόνον θεῖον. καὶ παρὰ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως δύνασθαι κοινωνεῖν, καίπερ ὦν ὁ βίος ἄθλιος φύσει καὶ χαλεπός, ὅμως οὕτως ὠκονόμηται χαριέντως ὥστε δοκεῖν πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπον. ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ὁ θεός, εἴτε Ἑρμότιμος εἴτε Ἀναξαγόρας εἶπε τοῦτο, καὶ ὅτι ὁ θνητὸς αἰὼν μέρος ἔχει θεοῦ τινός.

c. Ar., *Metaph.* Λ 3, 1070 a²⁴⁻²⁶.

Ar. is speaking here about pre-existing and non pre-existing causes. He says: Motive causes (τὰ μὲν κινοῦντα αἰτία) precede, formal causes (τὰ δὲ ὡς ὁ λόγος) are simultaneous with the thing they produce. It is a further question whether the form survives the thing. In certain cases this is certainly possible, e.g. the *noûs*.

Εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑστερόν τι ὑπομένει, σκεπτέον· ἐπ' ἐνίων γὰρ οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ πᾶσα ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς· πᾶσαν γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἴσως.

d. Cp. Ar., *Eth. Nic.* X 7, 1177 b²⁸⁻³¹.

In the preceding lines the author has spoken of the advantages of the *βίος θεωρητικός*, being that of the activity of the mind (ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια). He then continues:

Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτως βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ἡ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσω δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσούτω καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετῆν. Εἰ δὲ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον.

Now this *noûs* is not only *in* man, but it is *a part* of him, and his chief and best part. So we could even say that man is his *noûs*. 1178 a²⁻⁴:

Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον· ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο ἀλλὰ τινος ἄλλου.

¹ I do not think it is already explicitly present in the *Eudemus*, but it is very near. Certainly Dr. Nuyens is not right in admitting that the limitation of immortality to the *noûs* is a characteristic of the last period of Ar.'s development. Ross and Mansion have rightly pointed out that this doctrine is of very early date.

2—THE PROTREPTICUS

the theme 419—The *Protrepticus* was an exhortation to the philosophic life, the βίος θεωρητικός, such as it was understood in the Academy. It was addressed to Themiso, the prince of Cyprus. Against the pragmatistic conception of knowledge in the school of Isocrates Ar. here fervently defends the beauty and the happiness of the purely contemplative life, which is exercised solely for its own sake. We have the answer from the school of Isocr. in the anonymous *Protrept. ad Demonicum*.

a. Ross, *Protr.* fr. 5, p. 31. The pragmatists speak:

Δεῖ δὴ μὴ λεληθῆναι τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τούτων ἐξετάζειν ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι καὶ πράττειν ἐστὶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ γινώσκειν μόνον· οὔτε γὰρ ὑγιαίνομεν τῷ γνωρίζειν τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὑγιείας ἀλλὰ τῷ προφέρεσθαι τοῖς σώμασιν οὔτε πλουτοῦμεν τῷ γινώσκειν πλοῦτον ἀλλὰ τῷ κεκτῆσθαι πολλὴν οὐσίαν, οὐδὲ τὸ πάντων μέ- 5 γιστον εὖ ζῶμεν τῷ γινώσκειν ἅττα τῶν ὄντων ἀλλὰ τῷ πράττειν εὖ· τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀληθῶς τοῦτ' ἐστίν. ὥστε προσήκει καὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν εἶπερ ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος ἥτοι πρᾶξιν εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ χρήσιμον εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις.

**Ar.'s defence
of the con-
templative
life**

b. Ross, *Protr.* fr. 12 (Iamblichus, *Protr.* c. 9). The Answer of Ar.:

Τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν ἀπὸ πάσης ἐπιστήμης ἕτερόν τι γενέσθαι καὶ δεῖν χρησίμην αὐτὴν εἶναι παντάπασιν ἀγνωοῦντός τινός ἐστιν ὅσον διέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα· διαφέρει γὰρ πλεῖστον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἕτερον ἀγαπώ- 5 μενα τῶν πραγμάτων ὧν ἄνευ ζῆν ἀδύνατον, ἀναγκαῖα καὶ συναίτια λεκτέον, ὅσα δὲ δι' αὐτά, καὶ ἀποβαίνειν μὴδὲν ἕτερον, ἀγαθὰ κυρίως. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τότε 5 μὲν αἰρετὸν διὰ τόδε, τότε δὲ δι' ἄλλο, τοῦτό τε εἰς ἄπειρον οἴχεται προῖόν, ἀλλ' ἴσταται που. γελοῖον οὖν ἤδη παντελῶς τὸ ζητεῖν ἀπὸ παντὸς ὠφέλειαν ἐτέραν παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τί οὖν ἡμῖν ὄφελος καὶ τί χρήσιμον ἐρωτᾶν. ὥς ἀληθῶς γὰρ, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, εἴ τις ἡμᾶς οἶον εἰς μακάρων νήσους τῇ διανοίᾳ κομίσσειεν. ἐκεῖ γὰρ οὐδενὸς χρεῖα οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τινὸς ὄφελος 10 ἂν γένοιτο, μόνον δὲ καταλείπεται τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν, ὅνπερ καὶ νῦν ἐλεύθερόν φαμεν βίον εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, πῶς οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύ- νοιτο δικαίως ὅστις ἡμῶν ἐξουσίας γενομένης ἐν μακάρων οἰκῆσαι νήσοις, ἀδύνατος εἴη δι' ἑαυτόν. οὐκοῦν οὐ μεμπτός ὁ μισθός ἐστι τῆς ἐπιστήμης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐδὲ μικρὸν τὸ γινώμενον ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἀγαθόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τῆς 15 δικαιοσύνης, ὥς φασιν οἱ σοφοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ἐν ἄδου κομιζόμεθα τὰς δωρεάς, οὕτω τῆς φρονήσεως ἐν μακάρων νήσοις, ὥς ἔοικεν. οὐδὲν οὖν δεινόν, ἂν μὴ φαίνεται χρησίμη οὕσα μὴδ' ὠφέλιμος· οὐ γὰρ ὠφέλιμον ἀλλ' ἀγαθὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φαμεν, οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον ἀλλὰ δι' ἑαυτὴν αἰρεῖσθαι αὐτὴν προσήκει. ὥσπερ

20 γὰρ εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν αὐτῆς ἔνεκα τῆς θεᾶς ἀποδημοῦμεν, καὶ εἰ μὴδὲν μέλλοι
 πλεῖον ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἔσεσθαι, αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ θεωρία κρείττων πολλῶν ἐστὶ χρημάτων,
 καὶ τὰ Διονύσια δὲ θεωροῦμεν οὐχ ὥς ληψόμενοι τι παρὰ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν ἀλλὰ
 καὶ προσθέντες, πολλὰς τε ἄλλας θεᾶς ἐλοιμέθα ἂν ἀντὶ πολλῶν χρημάτων,
 οὕτω καὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τοῦ παντὸς προτιμητέον πάντων τῶν δοκούντων εἶναι
 25 χρησίμων. οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐπὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τοὺς μὲν μιμουμένους γύναϊα καὶ
 δούλους τοὺς δὲ μαχομένους καὶ θεόντας δεῖ πορεύεσθαι μετὰ πολλῆς σπουδῆς
 ἔνεκα τοῦ θεάσασθαι αὐτούς, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὄντων φύσιν καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὐκ
 οἶεσθαι δεῖν θεωρεῖν ἀμισθί.

In *Metaph.* A 2, 982 a¹¹⁻²⁸ we shall again find the theme that philosophy alone is exercised for its own sake and not χρήσεώς τινος ἔνεκεν (our nr. 519).

420—a. Ross, *Protr.* fr. 5, p. 33 (Iambl., *Protr.* c. 6).

Phrónēsis is the highest good; therefore philosophy is to be striven after.

Πάντες γὰρ ὁμολογοῦμεν ὅτι δεῖ μὲν τὸν σπουδαιότατον ἄρχειν καὶ τὸν τὴν φύσιν κράτιστον, τὸν δὲ νόμον ἄρχοντα καὶ κύριον εἶναι μόνον· οὗτος δὲ φρόνησις τις καὶ λόγος ἀπὸ φρονήσεώς ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ τίς ἡμῖν κανὼν ἢ ὅρος ἀκριβέστερος τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ὁ φρόνιμος; ὅσα γὰρ ἂν οὗτος ἐλοιτο κατὰ
 5 τὴν ἐπιστήμην αἰρούμενος, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ, καὶ κακὰ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία τούτοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντες αἰροῦνται μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ τὰς οἰκείας ἕξεις, τὸ μὲν γὰρ δικαίως ζῆν ὁ δίκαιος, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ὁ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἔχων, ὁ δὲ σώφρων τὸ σωφρονεῖν, ὁμοίως δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὁ φρόνιμος αἰρήσεται πάντων μάλιστα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι κατὰ
 10 τὴν κυριωτάτην κρίσιν κράτιστόν ἐστι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡ φρόνησις.

phrónēsis
the highest
good

Two remarks must be made here.

I. The sentence that the φρόνιμος is the highest standard of what is good, at once reminds us of the Aristotelian definition of virtue as it is given in the *Eth. Nic.* II 6, 15 (1106 b³⁸-1107 a³): "Virtue is a state of character, concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and as the φρόνιμος would determine it" (our nr. 571b).

Here again the φρόνιμος has the arbitrium of what is good.

II. W. Jaeger has pointed out that the meaning of the term φρόνησις as it is used here differs from that in the *Nic. Eth.*: in the *Protr.*, as in the *Eud. Eth.*, φρόνησις is used in the Platonic sense of the word, which means philosophical Insight, based on the knowledge of a transcendent reality, whereas in the *Nic. Eth.* it means simply *practical wisdom*, which has nothing to do with a transcendent reality, and may be predicated even of animals (*Eth. Nic.* VI 5, 1140 b²⁰). It is no longer directed towards the general, but towards the concrete. In *Eth. Nic.* VI 7, 1141 b³⁻⁵, it is therefore said explicitly that men like Anaxagoras and Thales were not φρόνιμοι, but σοφοί, because they were indifferent to their own advantage, but strove after knowledge of the eternal laws of the universe (our nrs. 590a and 591b).

In the following passage of the *Protr.* we shall see that φρόνιμος and σοφός are here almost identic.

Therefore
philosophy
to be striven
after

b. The same fr. continued.

Οὐ δὴ δεῖ φεύγειν φιλοσοφίαν, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν φιλοσοφία καθάπερ οἰόμεθα κτῆσις τε καὶ χρήσις σοφίας, ἡ δὲ σοφία τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν, οὐ δὲ δεῖ χρημάτων μὲν ἕνεκα πλεῖν ἐφ' Ἡρακλέους στήλας καὶ πολλάκις κινδυνεύειν, διὰ δὲ φρόνησιν μηδὲν πονεῖν μηδὲ δαπανᾶν. ἡ μὲν ἀνδραποδῶδές γε τοῦ ζῆν ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ ζῆν εὖ γλίχεσθαι, καὶ ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν αὐτὸν ἀκολουθεῖν δόξαις ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀξιοῦν ταῖς αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰ μὲν χρήματα ζητεῖν τῶν δὲ καλῶν μηδεμίαν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι τὸ παράπαν.

The formula εὖ ζῆν is used by Ar. in the *Nic. Eth.* I 4, 1095 a¹⁹, as a general and preliminary definition of happiness: both οἱ πολλοί and οἱ χαριέντες (more civilized persons) agree on this point, that they identify happiness (τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν) with τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν.

Again we find the term used thrice in the eleventh chapter of the *Magna Moralia* II.

the theory
of the Ideas
still accepted

421—That the author of the *Protr.* still accepts the metaphysical basis of the theory of the Ideas, appears from the following passage.

a. Ross, *Protr.* fr. 13, p. 48 (Iambl., *Protr.* p. 54 and 55 Pistelli):

Τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν τὰ τε ὄργανα καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους οὐκ ἂν αὐτῶν πρώτων λαβόντες σχεδὸν ἴσασιν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων καὶ πολλοστῶν, τοὺς δὲ λόγους ἐξ ἐμπειρίας λαμβάνουσι. τῷ δὲ φιλοσόφῳ μόνῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἂν αὐτῶν ἀκριβῶς ἡ μίμησις ἐστίν. αὐτῶν γάρ ἐστι θεατής, ἀλλ' οὐ μιμημάτων. — Μόνος γὰρ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν βλέπων ζῆν καὶ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον, καὶ καθάπερ ἂν εἰ κυβερνήτης τις ἀγαθὸς ἐξ αἰδίου καὶ μονίμων ἀναψάμενος τοῦ βίου τὰς ἀρχὰς ὁρμᾷ καὶ ζῆν καθ' ἑαυτόν.

Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 91, rightly remarks that in *Metaph.* A 2, 982 a²⁵ the author no longer speaks of αὐτὰ τὰ πρῶτα, but simply of τὰ πρῶτα:

Ἀκριβέσταται δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσίν.

The omission is not fortuitous: it is a consequence of the rejection of the Ideas, which makes the opposition to μιμήματα disappear.

terminology
compared
with
π. ιδεῶν

b. The expression αὐτὰ τὰ ἀκριβῆ in the *Protr.* is explained by the following passage from the *Περὶ ιδεῶν*.

Ross, *Π. ιδ.* fr. 3, p. 122 (Alex. Aphr. in *Ar. Metaph.* I, 9, 990 b¹⁰):

Ἄλλων δὲ τινων παρὰ τὰ καθ' ἑκαστά εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι, ταῦτα γὰρ ἄπειρά τε καὶ ἀόριστα, αἱ δὲ ἐπιστῆμαι ὁρισμένων. ἔστιν ἄρα τινὰ παρὰ τὰ καθ' ἑκαστα, ταῦτα δὲ αἱ ιδέαι.

Concrete things are ἄπειρα and therefore not knowable; science has as its object "the determinate": τὰ ὁρισμένα. Cp. Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 93. The same term is used in *Protr.* c. 6 (fr. 52 R., p. 60, l. 21 ff.).

422—In this Platonically-minded work Ar. speaks in a tone of great disdain about earthly things.

a. Ross, *Protr.* 10 a (Iambl., *Protr.* c. 8, p. 132 Kiessling):

Disdain of
earthly
things

Γνοίη δ' ἂν τις αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων, εἰ θεωρήσειεν ὑπ' αὐγᾶς¹ τὸν ἀνθρώ-
πειον βίον. εὐρήσει γὰρ τὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι μεγάλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάντα ὄντα
σκιαγραφίαν. ὅθεν καὶ λέγεται καλῶς τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπου καὶ τὸ
μηδὲν εἶναι βέβαιον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἰσχύς τε γὰρ καὶ μέγεθος καὶ κάλλος
5 γέλως ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια. κάλλος γε παρὰ τὸ μηδὲν ὁρᾶν ἀκριβὲς δοκεῖ
εἶναι τοιοῦτον. εἰ γὰρ τις ἐδύνατο βλέπειν καθάπερ τὸν Λυγκέα φασίν, ὃς διὰ
τῶν τοίχων ἑώρα καὶ τῶν δένδρων, πότ' ἂν ἔδοξεν εἶναι τινα τὴν ὄψιν ἀνεκτὸν
ὁρῶν ἐξ οἴων συνέστηκε κακῶν; τιμαὶ δὲ καὶ δόξαι τὰ ζηλούμενα μᾶλλον τῶν
λοιπῶν ἀδιηγήτου γέμει φλυαρίας. τῷ γὰρ καθορῶντι τῶν αἰδίων τι ἡλίθιον
10 περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζειν. τί δ' ἐστὶ μακρὸν ἢ πολυχρόνιον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων;
ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀσθένειαν οἶμαι καὶ βίου βραχύτητα καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται
πολύ.

b. In this spiritual climate life in a body becomes the death of the soul, and death the escape into a higher life. As we saw in the *Eudemus* (fr. 41 R.), the life of the soul without body seemed normal to the author and life with a body abnormal and like a disease (our nr. 417a). Here the imprisonment of the soul in the body is painted in horrible colours as an unnatural state full of awful suffering.

Ross, *Protr.* 10 b (Iambl., *Protr.* 8, p. 134 K.):

the im-
prisonment
of the soul
in a body

Τοῦτο γὰρ θεῖον οἱ ἀρχαιότεροι λέγουσι τὸ φάναι διδόναι τὴν ψυχὴν τιμωρίαν
καὶ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ κολάσει μεγάλων τινῶν ἁμαρτημάτων. πάνυ γὰρ ἡ σύζευξις
τοιοῦτῳ τινι ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς. ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τῇ Τυρρηνίᾳ
φασὶ βασανίζειν πολλάκις τοὺς ἀλισκομένους προσδεσμεύοντας πρὸς ἀντικρὺ
τοῖς ζῶσι νεκροὺς ἀντιπροσώπους ἕκαστον πρὸς ἕκαστον μέρος προσαρμότ-
τοντας, οὕτως ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχὴ διατετάσθαι καὶ προσκεκολληθῆαι πᾶσι τοῖς
αἰσθητικοῖς τοῦ σώματος μέλεσιν.

c. Next follows the fr. 61 R. on the divine character of the *noûs*, which alone is immortal. Our nr. 418b.

Noûs alone
divine and
immortal

423—Dr. Nuyens, Fr. ed. p. 93 ff., has pointed to what seems to him to be some later elements in the *Protr.* of Ar., namely firstly the idea of teleology in nature, and secondly what he calls the instrumental conception of the relation soul-body.

¹ After ὑπ' αὐγᾶς a word has probably dropped out: τοῦ αἰῶνος is possible (after *Tim.* 37 d).

**The principle
of teleology**

a. Ross, *Protr.* 11, p. 43-44 (Iambl., *Protr.* 9, p. 49 Pist.):

Τῶν μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τύχης γινομένων οὐδὲν ἕνεκά του γίγνεται, οὐδ' ἔστι τι τέλος αὐτοῖς· τοῖς δὲ ἀπὸ τέχνης γιγνομένοις ἔνεστι καὶ τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα —, καὶ τοῦτο βέλτιόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ διὰ τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. — Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ κατὰ γε φύσιν ἕνεκά του γίγνεται, καὶ βελτίονος ἕνεκεν αἰεὶ συνίσταται ἢ καθάπερ τὸ διὰ τέχνης· μιμεῖται γάρ οὐ τὴν τέχνην ἢ φύσιν ἀλλὰ αὐτὴ τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῷ βοηθεῖν καὶ τὰ παραλειπόμενα τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν.

b. Ross, *Protr.* 6, *init.* (Iambl., *Protr.* 7, p. 41 Pist.):

Ἔτι τοίνυν τὸ μὲν ἔστι ψυχὴ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ δὲ σῶμα, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχει τὸ δὲ ἄρχεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν χρῆται τὸ δ' ὑποκεῖται ὡς ὄργανον. Ἀεὶ τοίνυν πρὸς τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ χρώμενον συντάττεται ἢ τοῦ ἀρχομένου καὶ τοῦ ὀργάνου χρεία.

This is, according to Dr. N., a conception of the relation soul-body different from that of antagonism, as it was seen in the *Phaedo* and in the *Eudemus*: in principle it is exactly that instrumentism which is characteristic of the middle period of Ar.'s development, and therefore points to a later date of this work.

In fact, this argument of N. is not conclusive. We have to remark that Plato's psychology in the *Republic*, where the rational part of the soul is called the leading part or ἡγεμονικόν, implied this kind of instrumentism; so that the differences, arranged by N. in periods of Ar.'s development, were present at the same time in the thought of Plato. Why could they not be present at the same time in the thought of Aristotle too without there marking a different period?

In the next paragraph we shall find decisive reasons for upholding the early date of the *Protr.*

3—ΠΕΡΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ

**the first
book**

424—In the first book of his Π. φιλ. Ar. seems to have treated of the history of philosophy, including the Orient.

a. In fr. 6 R. he mentions the magi and the dualism of Zarathustra (Diog. Laert. I 8).

**the magi and
Zarathustra
mentioned**

Ἀριστοτέλης δ' ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πρεσβυτέρους εἶναι (τοὺς μάγους) τῶν Αἰγυπτίων· καὶ δύο κατ' αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἀρχάς, ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα καὶ κακὸν δαίμονα, καὶ τῷ μὲν ὄνομα εἶναι Ζεὺς καὶ Ὠρομάσδης, τῷ δὲ Ἀίδης καὶ Ἀρεϊμάνιος.

We know that, in Plato's later years, the Academy was keenly interested in oriental wisdom. The doctrine of Zarathustra was mentioned also in the *Alcib. Mai.*,

which is certainly not a work of Plato but a product of his school in its early years ¹.
See: J. Bidez, *Eos ou Platon et l'Orient*, Brussels 1945. Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 131 ff.

b. The fr. 7 R. mentions the Orphic poems. Ar. distinguishes their doctrine, which is old, from their literary form, which is of a much later date (Philoponus in Ar. *De anima* I 5).

the Orphic poems

— αὐτοῦ μὲν γάρ εἰσι τὰ δόγματα, ταῦτα δὲ φησιν Ὀνομάκριτον ἐν ἔπεσι κατατεῖναι.

Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 129 f., explains this as an instance of the author's view that the same truths reappear in human history several times. Thus in *De caelo* I 3, 270 b¹⁹, where he says, speaking of the name of the "first body" (aether): "It seems too that the name of this first body has been passed down to the present time by the ancients, who thought of it in the same way as we do" ² οὐ γὰρ ἅπαξ οὐδὲ δις ἀλλ' ἀπειράκις δεῖ νομίζειν τὰς αὐτὰς ἀφικνεῖσθαι δόξας εἰς ἡμᾶς.

See also *Metaph.* Λ δ, at the end (1074 b¹⁰): κατὰ τὸ εἶκος πολλάκις εὐρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἐκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων καὶ ταύτας τὰς δόξας (sc. that the first principles are regarded as gods) ἐκείνων οἷον λείψανα περισεσῶσθαι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν.

"While probably each art and each science has often been developed as far as possible and has again perished, these opinions, with others, have been preserved until the present like relics of the ancient treasure" ³.

425—a. In the second book Plato's doctrine of the ideal Numbers was criticized. Fr. 11 R. (Syrianus in Ar. *Metaph.* 12, 9):

Second book

Ὅμολογεῖ μηδὲν εἰρηκέναι πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων (sc. the Platonics before Xenocrates) ὑποθέσεις μηδ' ὅλως παρακολουθεῖν τοῖς εἰδητικοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, εἴπερ ἕτεροι τῶν μαθηματικῶν εἶεν, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ ἐν τῷ β τῶν περὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἔχοντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον „ὥστε εἰ ἄλλος ἀριθμὸς αἱ ιδέαι, μὴ μαθηματικὸς δέ, οὐδεμίαν περὶ αὐτοῦ σύνεσιν ἔχοιμεν ἄν. τίς γὰρ τῶν γε πλείστων ἡμῶν συνήσιν ἄλλον ἀριθμόν”;

b. Acc. to Jaeger this passage belonged to a general criticism of the doctrine of the Ideas. We know, both from Proclus and from Plutarchus, that Ar. criticized this doctrine sharply in his *Dialogues*.

the theory of Ideas criticized

Fr. 10 R. (Proclus ap. Ioann. gramm., *de mundi aetern.* II, 2):

Καὶ κινδυνεύει μηδὲν οὕτως ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖνος (ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης) ἀποποιήσασθαι τῶν Πλάτωνος ὡς τὴν τῶν ιδεῶν ὑπόθεσιν, οὐ μόνον ἐν λογικοῖς . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἡθικοῖς . . . καὶ ἐν φυσικοῖς . . . καὶ ἐν τῇ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πολλῶ πλεόν . . . καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις σαφέστατα κεκραγῶς μὴ δύνασθαι τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ συμπαθεῖν κἄν τις αὐτὸν οἴηται διὰ φιλονεικίαν ἀντιλέγειν.

¹ The arguments adduced by E. de Strycker in *Les Etudes Classiques* of 1942 are decisive.

² Transl. of W. K. C. Guthrie.

³ Transl. of W. D. Ross.

c. Plut., *Adv. Coloten* 14 (same fr. R.).

Τάς γε μὴν ἰδέας περὶ ὧν ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ Πλάτῳ πανταχοῦ κινῶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπάγων ἀπορίαν αὐταῖς ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν, ἐν τοῖς <μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, ἐν τοῖς> φυσικοῖς, διὰ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν διαλόγων, φιλονεικότερον ἐνίοις ἔδοξεν ἢ φιλοσοφώτερον ἔχειν τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ, ὡς προθέμενος τὴν Πλάτωνος ὑπεριδεῖν φιλοσοφίαν· οὕτω μακρὰν ἦν τοῦ ἀκολουθεῖν.

I think Jaeger is right in referring this criticism of Platonism exclusively to the Π. φιλ. Dr. Nuyens defends the thesis that in the *Protr.* too Platonism was criticized. We shall see in one of our next numbers that this opinion of N. is erroneous.

426—This book contained further what is called by Jaeger Ar.'s philosophy of religion.

Two sources
of religious
belief

a. Ross, Π. φιλ. 12 a (Sextus, *Adv. dogm.* III, 20-22):

Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἀπὸ δυοῖν ἀρχῶν ἐννοίαν θεῶν ἔλεγε γεγονέναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀπὸ τε τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν συμβαινόντων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μετεώρων. ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν συμβαινόντων διὰ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὑπνοῖς γινομένους ταύτης ἐνθουσιασμούς καὶ τὰς μαντείας. ὅταν γάρ, φησὶν, ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ καθ' ἑαυτὴν γένηται ἡ ψυχὴ, τότε τὴν ἴδιον ἀπολαβοῦσα φύσιν προμαντεύεται τε καὶ 5 προαγορεύει τὰ μέλλοντα. τοιαύτη δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὸν θάνατον χωρίζεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων. ἀποδέχεται γοῦν καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν Ὀμηρὸν ὡς τοῦτο παρατηρήσαντα· πεποίθηκε γάρ τὸν μὲν Πάτροκλον ἐν τῷ ἀναιρεῖσθαι προαγορεύοντα περὶ τῆς Ἑκτορος ἀναιρέσεως, τὸν δ' Ἑκτορα περὶ τῆς Ἀχιλλέως τελευτῆς. ἐκ τούτων οὖν, φησὶν, ὑπενόησαν οἱ ἄνθρωποι εἶναι τι θεόν, τὸ 10 καθ' ἑαυτὸ εἰκόδες τῇ ψυχῇ πάντων ἐπιστημονικώτατον. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μετεώρων· θεασάμενοι γὰρ μεθ' ἡμέραν μὲν ἥλιον περιπολοῦντα, νύκτωρ δὲ τὴν εὐτακτον τῶν ἄλλων ἀστέρων κίνησιν, ἐνόμισαν εἶναι τινα θεὸν τὸν τῆς τοιαύτης κινήσεως καὶ εὐταξίας αἴτιον. τοιοῦτος μὲν καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης.

The thought is of Plato and the Academy. Cp. *Laws* XII 966 d: our nr. **394a**.

Cosmic order
a proof for
the existence
of God(s)

b. Fr. 12 b R. Sextus (ib. 26-27) expresses this last view in rather picturesque colours. The passage may be taken quite well from Ar.'s Π. φιλ. II.

Ἐνιοὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπαράβατον καὶ εὐτακτον τῶν οὐρανίων κίνησιν παραγενόμενοι φασι τὴν ἀρχὴν ταῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐπεινοίαις ἀπὸ ταύτης γεγονέναι πρῶτον· ὥσπερ γάρ εἴ τις ἐπὶ τῆς Τρωικῆς καθεζόμενος Ἰδῆς ἑώρα τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατείαν μετὰ πολλοῦ κόσμου καὶ τάξεως τοῖς πεδίοις προσιῦσαν „ἱππῆας μὲν πρῶτα σὺν ἵπποισιν καὶ ὄχεσφιν, πεζοὺς δ' ἐξόπιθεν”, πάντως ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος 5 εἰς ἐννοίαν ἦλθε τοῦ ὅτι ἐστὶ τις ὁ διατάσων τὴν τοιαύτην τάξιν καὶ ἐγκελευόμενος τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτὸν κοσμουμένοις στρατιώταις, οἷον Νέστωρ ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν

ἥρώων ὃς ἦδει „κοσμῆσαι ἵππους τε καὶ ἀνέρας ἀσπιδιώτας”· καὶ ὃν τρόπον ὁ
 ἔμπειρος νεὼς ἅμα τῷ θεάσασθαι πόρρωθεν ναῦν οὐρίῳ διωκομένην πνεύματι
 10 καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἰστίοις εὐτρεπιζομένην συνήσιν ὅτι ἔστι τις ὁ κατευθύνων ταύτην
 καὶ εἰς τοὺς προκειμένους λιμένας καταντῶν, οὕτως οἱ πρῶτον εἰς οὐρανὸν
 ἀναβλέψαντες καὶ θεασάμενοι ἥλιον μὲν τοὺς ἀπὸ ἀνατολῆς μέχρι δύσεως
 δρόμους σταδιέοντα, ἀστέρων δὲ εὐτάκτους τινὰς χορείας, ἐπεζήτουν τὸν
 δημιουργὸν τῆς περικαλλοῦς ταύτης διακοσμήσεως, οὐκ ἐκ ταυτομάτου στοχα-
 15 ζόμενοι συμβαίνειν αὐτὴν ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τινος κρείττονος καὶ ἀφθάρτου φύσεως,
 ἥτις ἦν θεός.

427—The same view occurs in the following interesting passage, which shows us Ar.’s transposition of Plato’s allegory of the den.

Cicero, *De Nat. deorum* II 37, 95 (Ross, Π. φιλ. fr. 13):

Ar.’s trans-
position of
the allegory
of the den

Praeclare ergo Aristoteles si essent, inquit, qui sub terra semper
 habitavissent bonis et inlustribus domiciliis quae essent ornata signis
 atque picturis instructaque rebus iis omnibus quibus abundant ii qui
 beati putantur, nec tamen exissent unquam supra terram, acceperant
 5 autem fama et auditione esse quoddam numen et vim deorum, deinde
 aliquo tempore patefactis terrae faucibus ex illis abditis sedibus evadere
 in haec loca quae nos incolimus atque exire potuissent, cum repente
 terram et maria caelumque vidissent, nubium magnitudinem vento-
 rumque vim cognovissent aspexissentque solem eiusque cum magni-
 10 tudinem pulchritudinemque tum etiam efficientiam cognovissent quod
 is diem efficeret tot caelo luce diffusa, cum autem terras nox opacasset
 tum caelum totum cernerent astris distinctum et ornatum lunaeque
 luminum varietatem tum crescentis tum senescentis eorumque omnium
 ortus et occasus atque in omni aeternitate ratos inmutabilesque cursus:
 15 quae cum viderent, profecto et esse deos et haec tanta opera deorum
 esse arbitrarentur. atque haec quidem ille.

We have to state that the rupture with Platonism has become a fact here: the ideal World—a transcendent Reality which alone is truly real and of which sensible things are images—the ideal World of Plato has disappeared. There is just one reality: the sensible world in which we live. Its beauty and order point the philosopher to a divine Maker¹. Surely this is a Platonic thought. But in the later philosophy of Ar. it has disappeared completely: the Prime Mover of *Phys.* VIII and *Metaph.* A is not the Maker of the kosmos as it is said in π. φιλ. II.

the rupture
with
Platonism
a fact

Two conclusions must be drawn from this fact:

1. As in this work of Ar. the theory of the Ideas has been abandoned, while

¹ Surely not in the biblical sense of a Creator, but in the sense all Greeks gave to the term: the “Builder of the Universe” who “made the kosmos”, i.e. who *arranged* formless matter into a kosmos.

it is still accepted in the *Protr.* (our nr. 421a), it is impossible that the dialogue π. φιλ. would be anterior to the *Protr.* Hence the chronology of Jaeger must be right on this point, and it must be stated that the criterion of Nuyens has failed here ¹.

2. As in this work, π. φιλ., Ar. admits of a Demiourgos, who "made the kosmos" in the Greek sense of the term, while in the so-called "theology" of *Metaph.* Λ no trace of this view can be found, it is impossible that this last book was written by its author at a rather early date, such as during the years of Assos or even before them. On the contrary, the chapters Λ 7, 9 and 10 represent a very different mind, and we must suppose that a considerable space of time elapsed between the half-Platonic view of Π. φιλ. and the full-grown Aristotelian view of *Metaph.* Λ. So on this point A. Mansion appears to be right when he dates this book of the *Metaph.* much later than Jaeger does.

On the other hand, on the well-known words of *De caelo* I 4, 271 a³³: „Ο δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μᾶτην ποιοῦσιν" a great light is poured by the present fr. from Π. φιλ. It has been supposed ² that these words are a mere literary form, an expression without any real meaning, because they do not fit in with Ar.'s view of the Prime Mover in *Phys.* VIII and *Metaph.* Λ. True,—but they do fit in excellently with the belief of the young Ar. in Π. φιλ., who, having rejected the theory of the Ideas, still keeps the religious principle of Plato that a divine Mind must be the cause of order in the visible world.

428—The spirit of the *Timaeus* still speaks in the following fragments of Π. φιλ.

the spirit of
the *Timaeus*

a. Fr. 14 R. (Seneca, *Quaest. nat.* VII 30, 1):

Egregie Aristoteles ait numquam nos verecundiores esse debere quam cum de dis agitur. si intramus templa compositi . . . quanto hoc magis facere debemus, cum de sideribus, de eorum natura, de stellis disputamus, ne quid temere, ne quid imprudenter aut ignorantes adfirmemus aut scientes mentiamur.

b. Fr. 18 R. (Ps. Philo, π. ἀφθαρσίας κόσμου, p. 222, 12, Bernays):

Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ μήποτε εὐσεβῶς καὶ ὁσίως ἐνιστάμενος ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀφθαρτον ἔφη τὸν κόσμον εἶναι, δεινὴν δὲ ἀθεότητα κατεγίνωσκε τῶν τὰ ἐναντία διεξιόντων, οἳ τῶν χειροκμήτων οὐδὲν ᾤθησαν διαφέρειν τοσοῦτον ὁρατὸν θεὸν ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὸ ἄλλο τῶν πλανήτων καὶ ἀπλανῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς περιέχοντα πάνθειον.

This fr. belonged to the third book π. φιλ.

A dialectical
proof of the
existence of
God

429—a. A formal proof of the existence of God seems to have been given by Ar. in the so-called *argumentum ex gradibus*.

¹ It is far from me to pretend that this criterion is altogether useless. No, but it should be applied with greater prudence and controlled from other points of view.

² By Mansion in his *Introd. à la Phys. Ar.*

Π. φιλ. fr. 16 R. (Simpl. in Ar. *De caelo* I 9):

Καθόλου γὰρ ἐν οἷς ἐστὶ τι βέλτιον, ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶ τι καὶ ἄριστον. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἄλλο ἄλλου βέλτιον, ἔστιν ἄρα τι καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ εἴη ἂν τὸ θεῖον.

b. Another proof is given in the fr. 17 R.:

A second
proof

Ἡ ἀρχὴ ἢ μία ἢ πολλαί. καὶ εἰ μὲν μία, ἔχομεν τὸ ζητούμενον· εἰ δὲ πολλαί, ἢ τεταγμέναι ἢ ἄτακτοι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἄτακτοι, ἀτακτότερα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ κόσμος ὁ κόσμος ἀλλ' ἀκοσμία, καὶ ἔστι τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μὴ ὄντος. εἰ δὲ τεταγμέναι, ἢ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἐτάχθησαν ἢ ὑπὸ ἑξῶθεν τινὸς αἰτίας. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν ἐτάχθησαν, ἔχουσί τι κοινὸν τὸ συνάπτον αὐτάς κακεῖνο ἢ ἀρχή.

This text reminds us of the final passage of *Metaph.* Λ 8: τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς· "οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη" etc.

430—The fragments 18-26 concern the eternity of the kosmos and the doctrine that the celestial bodies have souls. With the first thesis Ar. is against Plato's doctrine in the *Tim.* (at least as he took it); with the latter he showed himself to be still closely connected with the doctrine of the Academy.

Third book

Cic. *De nat. deorum* I 13, 33 (fr. 26 R.). The Epicurean Velleius is speaking.

difficulties
in Ar.'s
doctrine
of God

Aristotelesque in tertio de philosophia libro multa turbat a magistro suo Platone [non] dissentiens. modo enim menti tribuit omnem divinitatem, modo mundum ipsum deum dicit esse, modo alium quendam praeficit mundo eique eas partes tribuit ut replicatione quadam¹ mundi motum regat atque tueatur. tum caeli ardorem deum dicit esse, non intellegens caelum mundi esse partem, quem alio loco ipse designarit deum. quo modo autem caeli divinus ille sensus in celeritate tanta

¹ I do not think, after all, that by the words *replicatione quadam* Cic. means a *retrograde movement*, such as is meant by Plato in *Politicus* 270 d (τῇ τοῦ παντὸς ἀνελίξει), and by Ar. in *Metaph.* Λ 8, 1074 a² (σφαίρας . . . ἀνελιτούσας). Since the chief aspect of Aristotle's theory of the movement of the celestial bodies is that they move by a motion *returning on itself*, i.e. by a circular movement, I think that the plain and obvious sense of Cicero's words is to state that, sometimes, Ar. admitted a God to whom he attributed the rôle of governing and maintaining the movement of the universe *by a motion returning on itself*.—Festugière, *Le Dieu cosmique* p. 245 f., adopts the interpretation of J. Moreau who suggests that by *replicatione quadam* Cicero meant the movement of the first heaven which turns round in the opposite sense to that of the planets. In fact, since the motion of the first heaven is considered by Ar. as the πρώτη φορά (*De caelo* II 12), one could hardly qualify this as "retrograde" or "reacting", such as the movement of the planets presents itself to us when we compare it with the fixed stars.

conservari potest? ubi deinde illi tot dii, si numeramus etiam caelum deum? cum autem sine corpore idem vult esse deum, omni illum sensu privat, etiam prudentia. quo porro modo moveri carens corpore, aut 10 quo modo semper se movens esse quietus et beatus potest?

That Velleius found some difficulties in Ar.'s theories about the first principle or God, is comprehensible and not without reason. When he says that Ar. called now "Mind" God, now the Universe, or "Someone else" whom he put at the head of it, or even aether (caeli ardorem), we can understand what is behind it. In fact, Ar. admitted one ἀρχή (fr. 17). He called it God and seems to have conceived his idea of an Unmoved Mover at an early date: even if *Metaph.* A 6 and 7 are much later, we have a proof for the existence of a Prime Mover in *Phys.* VII 1, and we see Ar. occupied with the problem of motion in the *De caelo* and *De gen. et corr.* In *De Caelo* II 3 he calls "the heaven" a θεῖον σῶμα which as such must be in eternal movement, i.e. in circular movement. For θεοῦ ἐνέργεια ἀθανασία, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ζωὴ ἀίδιος. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τῷ θεῷ κίνησιν αἰδίου ὑπάρχειν. Now, this being so, it is contradictory to admit of a Prime Mover with the purpose of excluding a regressus ad infinitum, as is argued in *Phys.* I. This contradiction remains even when the celestial bodies are no longer regarded as animated beings having a θεῖον σῶμα which consists of aether, as was taught by Ar. in II. φλ. III (see our next nr.).

In *Metaph.* A 8 we find Ar.'s final doctrine of the celestial spheres which have each an unmoved Mover, the "first heaven" being moved by the First Unmoved Mover, who is placed as the first principle above the others. In the same way we have to imagine that the star gods of II. φλ. were considered by the author as inferior to the first principle. The inconsequence, also of the final doctrine, is that, the circular movement of heaven being considered as a necessary consequence of its divine character, the relation to a Prime Mover becomes problematic.

the divinity
of the celest-
ial bodies

431—a. Cic., *De nat. deorum* II 15, 42 (fr. 21 Ross):

That the stars are animated beings, was proved by Ar. first by the following argument.

Cum igitur aliorum animantium ortus in terra sit, aliorum in aqua, in aere aliorum, absurdum esse Aristoteli videtur in ea parte quae sit ad gignenda animantia aptissima, animal gigni nullum putare. sidera autem aetherium locum obtinent. qui quoniam tenuissimus est et semper agitur et viget, necesse est quod animal in eo gignatur id et 5 sensu acerrimo et mobilitate celerrima esse. quare cum in aethere astra gignantur, consentaneum est in iis sensum inesse et intelligentiam. ex quo efficitur in deorum numero astra esse ducenda.

Plato, *Tim.* 39 e, spoke of the four elements as peopled by living beings. Cp. *Epin.* 984 d, where the fifth element (aether) is mentioned,—an argument for the later date of this dialogue.

We find the argument again in *Philo*, who interprets the inhabitants of the air as angels¹, and finally in *Apuleius*, in the *De deo Socratis* (on the daemonium) VIII 137. He too makes "daemons" out of the inhabitants of the air.

¹ *De gig.* 2, 7-8; *De plantat.* 3, 12; *De somn.* I 22, 135.

Consult: Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 144 ff.

b. Cic. *ib.* 16, 42-43. The stars must have a superior intellect, because they feed themselves on aether, the finest and lightest of elements. they feed themselves on aether

Etenim licet videre acutiora ingenia et ad intellegendum aptiora eorum qui terras incolant eas in quibus aer sit purus ac tenuis quam illorum qui utantur crasso caelo atque concreto. quin etiam cibo quo utare interesse aliquid ad mentis aciem putant. probabile est igitur
5 praestantem intellegentiam in sideribus esse, quae et aetheriam partem mundi incolant et marinis terrenisque umoribus longo intervallo extenuatis alantur.

The same doctrine occurs in Plato, *Laws* V 747 d, and in the *Epin.* 981 e.

c. Cic. *ib.* (16, 43-44). The divinity of the celestial bodies proved by their order and by their movement. their order proves that they are animated beings

Sensum autem astrorum atque intellegentiam maxume declarat ordo eorum atque constantia (nihil est enim quod ratione et numero moveri possit sine consilio), in quo nihil est temerarium nihil varium nihil fortuitum. ordo autem siderum et in omni aeternitate constantia neque
5 naturam significat (est enim plena rationis) neque fortunam, quae amica varietati constantiam respuit. sequitur ergo ut ipsa sua sponte suo sensu ac divinitate moveantur. Nec vero Aristoteles non laudandus in eo quod omnia quae moventur aut natura moveri censuit aut vi aut voluntate; moveri autem solem et lunam et sidera omnia; quae autem
10 natura moverentur, haec aut pondere deorsum aut levitate in sublime ferri, quorum neutrum astris contingeret propterea quod eorum motus in orbem circumque ferretur; nec vero dici potest vi quadam maiore fieri ut contra naturam astra moveantur (quae enim potest maior esse?); restat igitur ut motus astrorum sit voluntarius.

15 Quae qui videat non indocte solum verum etiam impie faciat si deos esse neget.

Cp. Plato, *Laws* X, 888 e sqq. and the *Epin.* 982 a sqq., where is spoken of an ἀρίστη βούλευσις of the stars, by which they accomplish their circular movement. Later Ar. denies this point explicitly, e.g. in the *Nic. Eth.* Γ 5, 1112 a²¹: περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀστέρων οὐδεὶς βουλευέται.

d. Also the doctrine that noûs is of the same substance as the heavenly bodies, viz. aether, appears to have been taught by Aristotle, probably in Π. φιλ. Noûs of the same substance as the heavenly bodies

Cic., *Acad. post.* I, 7, 26 (fr. 27 Ross):

Quintum genus, eo quo essent astra mentesque, singulare eorumque

quattuor (sc. elementorum) quae supra dixi dissimile Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur.

History of the doctrine This doctrine, which appears first with Alcmaeon of Croton (our nr. **46b**; cp. also Socr. in Xen., *Mem.* I 4, our nr. **216**, vol. I p. 145, n. 1, and Plato in *Tim.* 40 b-c, 42 b-d; our nrs. **352** and **354b**) had a remarkable history. It revived in the Arabian doctrine of the *intelligences of the spheres*, the last of which is the "active intellect" of man (*intellectus agens separatus*). Hence the disputations of Western philosophers of the 13th century: *de unitate intellectus* (Albertus Magnus, Bonaventura, Thomas, and again Duns Scotus). In the 16th century we find the doctrine of the consubstantiality of mind with the stars in Jacob Boehme. By his influence it appears again in certain poems of the Dutch 17th century poet Jan Luyken¹.

e. On the influence of Ar.'s II. φλ. in later Antiquity, in particular the doctrine of the heavenly bodies, see the volume of A. J. Festugière, *Le dieu cosmique* (*La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* II), Paris 1949, ch. VIII ff. Also E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, Firenze 1937; J. Moreau, *L'Ame du monde de Platon aux Stoïciens*, Paris 1939; A. J. Festugière, *Epicure et ses Dieux*, Paris 1946, ch. V.

¹ Vid. A. C. M. Meeuwesse, *Jan Luyken als dichter van de Duytse Lier*, diss. Utrecht 1952, p. 234/5 and 271 (the modern author did not understand the doctrine).

TWELFTH CHAPTER

LOGIC

1—THE SCHOOL-WRITINGS. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

432—Strictly speaking Ar.'s logic does not belong to the system of philosophy according to his own intention. Ar. made a systematical division of all human thinking. There is no place for logic in this scheme.

a. Ar., *Metaph.* E 1, 1025 b²⁵:

Ar.'s division
of all human
thinking

παῖσα διάνοια ἢ πρακτικὴ ἢ ποιητικὴ ἢ θεωρητικὴ.

The πράττειν is the province of ethics; it depends on free choice (προαίρεσις). The ποιεῖν aims at the realization of a concrete ἔργον, technical or artistic. Theoretical thinking has "a kind of being" as its object (περὶ γένος τι τοῦ ὄντος ἐστίν). Now, as this genus may have three different species, theoretical thinking contains three main provinces: *physics*, which deals with things which exist separately but are not immovable; *mathematics*, which has to do with things which are immovable but do not exist separately, and the *first philosophy* (called *metaphysics* by a post-aristotelian term) which deals with things which are both immovable and exist separately.

Ar. expresses this view in the following passage.

b. Ar., *ib.*, 1026 a¹³⁻¹⁸, 18¹⁹:

the three
provinces of
theoretical
thinking

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ χωριστὰ μὲν ἄλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἓνια περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δὲ ἴσως ἄλλ' ὥς ἐν ὕλῃ· ἡ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα. — "Ὡστε τρεῖς ἂν εἴεν φιλοσοφαίαι θεωρητικαί, μαθηματικὴ, φυσικὴ, θεολογική.

As to the object of mathematics, Ar.'s formula betrays a certain hesitation: in fact, he is rather inclined to regard mathematical objects as an accident of physical things; and it is clear that, in this case, mathematics are rather near to physics. We have to treat this point in our ch. XIII, § 3.

c. Ar., *ib.*, 1026 a¹⁹⁻²³.

a hierarchy
of sciences

Ar. continues after the lines cited sub b: Οὐ γὰρ ἄδηλον ὅτι εἴ που τὸ θεῖον ὑπάρχει, ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὴν τιμιωτάτην δεῖ περὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον γένος εἶναι. αἱ μὲν οὖν θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αἰρετώταται, αὕτη δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν.

the object of
the first
philosophy

d. Ar., *ib.* 1026 a²⁷⁻³²:

Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἔστι τις ἑτέρα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, ἡ φυσικὴ ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη· εἰ δ' ἔστι τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα καὶ φιλοσοφία πρώτη, καὶ καθόλου οὕτως ὅτι πρώτη ¹. καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἧ ὃν ταύτης ἂν εἴη θεωρησά, καὶ τί ἐστι καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ² ἧ ὃν.

We shall consider this conception of metaphysics more closely in our ch. XIV, § 1.

The place
of logic

433—According to Ar. logic has the character of a propaedeusis to all sciences. He calls it τὰ ἀναλυτικά (the term "logic" is of a later date; it is generally used by Stoic writers in the first century), and Ar. thinks it necessary to study this discipline before exercising any science at all.

a. Ar., *Metaph.* Γ 3, 1005 b²⁻⁵:

"Ὅσα δ' ἐγχειροῦσι τῶν λεγόντων τινὲς περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ὃν τρόπον δεῖ ἀποδέχεσθαι, δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο δρῶσιν· δεῖ γὰρ περὶ τούτων ἥκειν προεπισταμένους ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούοντας ζητεῖν.

"As to the attempts of some of those who discuss the terms on which truth should be accepted"—

Ar. means that the inquiry into the conditions under which beliefs are to be accepted as true, should not be mixed up with questions about the nature of reality. It belongs to logic, which should be studied before one approaches the questions of being, which belong to metaphysics. Ross supposes that with the τινες τῶν λεγόντων Antisthenes and his school are referred to ³.

ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούοντας ζητεῖν - One should not inquire into the formal principles of knowledge which belong to logic while attending lectures on metaphysics.

b. The same principle is displayed in *Metaph.* α 3, 995 a¹²⁻¹⁴:

Διὸ δεῖ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πῶς ἕκαστα ἀποδεκτέον, ὥς ἄτοπον ἅμα ζητεῖν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τρόπον ἐπιστήμης.

Later
division
of phil.

c. Directly after Ar. we find a different division of philosophy. The Stoics take logic as a part of it, dividing philosophy into these three parts: logic, physics (including metaphysics), ethics. See our vol. III.

Logic an
"instrument"

434—Because then logic had the character of an "instrument" for all philosophy and science, the Ancients gave to it the name of *organon*. We find this term used in the following instructive passage of Philoponus.

Philoponus in Ar. *Anal. pr.* 6, 19 Wallies:

Ζητητέον, πότερον μέρος ἐστὶν ἢ ὄργανον ἡ λογικὴ τε καὶ διαλεκτικὴ παραγματεία τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἐπεὶ περ ἐναντίως καὶ διαφόρως δοκεῖ τοῖς παλαιοῖς

¹ "And it must be universal in this way, because it is first".

² "And the attributes which belong to it".

³ See the commentary of Ross on this place, *Metaph.* I, p. 263.

περὶ αὐτῆς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ Στωικοὶ ἀντικρὺς μέρος αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνονται, τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ δύο μέρεσι τῆς φιλοσοφίας αὐτὴν ἀντιδιαίρουσιν· οἱ δὲ Περιπατητικοὶ τουτέστιν οἱ ἀπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους ὄργανον· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, ὧν ἔστι καὶ Πλάτων, καὶ μέρος καὶ ὄργανον φαίνονται λέγοντες.

We may see from this fragment, that the author does not consider logic as the *proprium* of Ar. and the Aristotelian spirit: Plato too was a logician, and Ar. built on the foundations which were laid by him.—This view is confirmed by modern scholars.

See: E. Kapp, *Greek Foundations of traditional Logic*, New-York 1942.

Cp. also the interesting study of R. Schaerer, *La dialectique platonicienne dans ses rapports avec le syllogisme et la méthode cartésienne* in *Revue de Théol. et de Phil.* N.S. t. XXXVI, 1948, p. 24-40.

435—a. The centre of Ar.'s logic is his doctrine of the syllogism. This term occurs in Plato's *Theaet.* 186 d, our nr. **319b**, in the general sense of *thought* or *reflexion*. Ar. uses it technically in the sense of drawing a conclusion from two theses which have been admitted (premisses). He gives his definition in *An. pr.* I 1, 24 b¹⁸:

The *Organon* of Ar. the doctrine of the syllogism

Συλλογισμὸς δὲ ἔστι λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι.

Three of the six works of the *Organon* deal with the syllogism: the prior and posterior *Analytics*, the *Topics*, and as a fourth may be joined to them the *II. σοφ. ἐλ.*, which is closely connected with the *Topics*.

The interrelation of these works is as follows:

In the *pr. Anal.* the syllogism is defined and its various forms are treated. Abstraction is made of the truth of the premisses, so that the conclusion does not need to be true (This is what Ar. calls the *dialectical syllogism*).

The *post. Anal.* give the doctrine of demonstration: they deal with the apodeictic or scientific syllogism, of which the premisses are true.

The *Topics* are a large collection of arguments, not limited at all to the three main forms of the syllogism, but displaying a great multiplicity of forms. The *II. σοφ. ἐλ.* is often considered as a part of the *Topics* and cited as the IXth book of them.

b. Brandis¹ already remarked that the *Topics* would have been written very differently, if their author had had in his mind a clear conception of the syllogism. The greater part of this work must be anterior to the doctrine of the *Analytics*.

the *Topics* anterior to the *Anal.*

This remark has been confirmed by modern critics, such as Fr. Solmsen², P. Gohlke³ and E. Kapp⁴.

¹ *Über die Reihenfolge der Bücher des Aristotelischen Organons*. Abh. der Berl. Akad. 1833.

² *Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik u. Rhetorik*, 1929.

³ *Die Entstehung der ar. Logik*, Berlin 1936.

⁴ *Greek Foundations of traditional Logic*, New-York 1942.

The latter cites the opening phrase of the *Topics* in order to prove that here the doctrine of the syllogism is not presupposed.

Ar., *Top.* I 1, 100 a¹⁸⁻²¹:

Ἡ μὲν πρόθεσις τῆς πραγματείας μέθοδον εὑρεῖν, ἀφ' ἧς δυνησόμεθα συλλογίζεσθαι περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος προβλήματος ἐξ ἐνδόξων, καὶ αὐτοὶ λόγον ὑπέχοντες μὴθὲν ἐροῦμεν ὑπεναντίον.

Next follows: Πρῶτον οὖν ῥητέον τί ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς καὶ τίνες αὐτοῦ διαφοραί, e.q.s. Kapp thinks that this has been added later. It is more probable perhaps that this introductory chapter has been added later by the author and has been adapted by him to the character of the whole work.

the *Categ.* and
π. 'Ερμ.

c. In the Corpus the *Analytics* are preceded by the *Categories* and the *De interpr.*

The *Categ.* begin with an explanation of the terms *homonymous*, *synonymous* and *paronymous*. Chapters 2 and 3 contain more grammatical than philosophical remarks. Ch. 4 gives the list of the ten categories, which are explained in the following chapters.

The *De interpr.* begins with a definition of nouns and verbs, gives remarks upon simple and compound nouns, on indefinites, on declension and conjugation; next on sentences or propositions (general, particular and indefinite; affirmative or negative, and the like).

Now in traditional logic the doctrine of the syllogism is preceded by a first chapter on terms and a second on propositions. Modern historians of philosophy, however, have pointed out that in Ar.'s *Analytics* the doctrine of the *Categories* and *De interpr.* is not presupposed¹. These works may have been added later.

2—THE CATEGORIES: TERMS

aequivocal

436—a. Ar., *Categ.* I a¹⁻³:

Ὅμωνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὃ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον ζῶον ὃ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον.

univocal

b. Ib., I a⁶⁻⁸:

Συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τὸ τε ὄνομα κοινόν, καὶ ὃ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός, οἷον ζῶον ὃ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς.

derivatively
named

c. Ib., I a¹²⁻¹⁵:

Παράνομα δὲ λέγεται ὅσα ἀπὸ τινος διαφέροντα τῇ πτώσει τὴν κατὰ τοῦ-

¹ Thus E. Kapp in *Gr. Foundations* etc. It seems to me very doubtful whether this thesis is right. W. D. Ross says (*Ar.*, p. 21 f.): "The categories—some or all of them—appear in almost every one of Aristotle's works, and the doctrine is everywhere treated as something already established".

νομα προσηγορίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνδρείας ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.

437—a. *Ar., Categ. 2, 1 a¹⁶⁻¹⁹:*

uncombined
and
combined
words

Τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται, τὰ δ' ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν οἷον ἄνθρωπος τρέχει, ἄνθρωπος νικᾷ· τὰ δ' ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς οἷον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, τρέχει, νικᾷ.

b. *Ib. 4, 1 b²⁵⁻² a⁴:*

the ten
categories

Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἦτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρὸς τι ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ κεῖσθαι ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. Ἔστι δὲ οὐσία μὲν ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος· ποσὸν δὲ οἷον δίπληχυ, τρίπληχυ· ποιὸν δὲ οἷον λευκόν, γραμματικόν· πρὸς τι δὲ οἷον διπλάσιον, ἡμισυ, μεῖζον· ποῦ δὲ οἷον ἐν Λυκείῳ¹, ἐν ἀγορᾷ· ποτὲ δὲ οἷον ἐχθές, πέρυσιν· κεῖσθαι δὲ οἷον ἀνάκειται, κάθεται· ἔχειν δὲ οἷον ὑποδέδεται, ὥπλισται· ποιεῖν δὲ οἷον τέμνει, καίει· πάσχειν δὲ οἷον τέμνεται, καίεται.

The same list occurs in *Top.* I 9, 103 b²⁰⁻²³.

In other places κεῖσθαι and ἔχειν are omitted; the other eight are cited as forming a complete list. So in *An. post.* I 22, 83 b¹⁵⁻¹⁸. Cp. *Phys.* V I, 225b⁵⁻⁹; 2, 226 a²³⁻²⁵.

Ross (*Ar.*, p. 22) remarks: "It seems as if he had later come to the conclusion that posture and possession are not ultimate, unanalysable notions".

In *Top.* I 9 instead of οὐσία the term τί ἐστι is used, both in the sense of *substance* and in that of *essence*. In other places *Ar.* uses in the latter sense the term τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι, e.g. *Top.* 8, 103 b⁹⁻¹⁰, where he speaks about the "conversion" or interchange of terms:

Ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ περί τινος κατηγορούμενον ἦτοι ἀντικατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ πράγματος ἢ μὴ· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀντικατηγορεῖται, ὅρος ἢ ἴδιον ἂν εἴη· εἰ μὲν γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι, ὅρος, εἰ δὲ μὴ σημαίνει, ἴδιον.

438—a. *Ar., Categ. 5, 2 a¹¹⁻¹⁹:*

Substance

Οὐσία δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη, ἢ μήτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται μήτ' ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινὶ ἐστὶν, οἷον ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τις ἵππος. δεύτεραι δὲ οὐσαὶ λέγονται, ἐν οἷς εἶδεν αἱ πρώτως οὐσαὶ λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσι, ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τῶν εἰδῶν τούτων γέννη, οἷον ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος ἐν εἶδει μὲν ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, γένος δὲ τοῦ εἶδους ἐστὶ τὸ ζῶον· δεύτεραι οὖν αὗται λέγονται οὐσαὶ, οἷον ὁ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῶον.

According to this passage οὐσία in its first and proper sense means: *the concrete, individual being*.

Now according to book Z of the *Metaph.* substance is not the individual, but the τί ἐστι, i.e. the *essence* or *quiddity*, which is neither purely individual—for it is the intelligible "form" of the concrete being—nor purely universal—for it is bound up with matter. See: A. M. de Vos, *La vraie substance d'après la Métaphysique*

¹ The fact that the Lykeion is mentioned, is used by Jaeger as an argument for the later date of the treatise (*Aristotle*, p 46 n. 3). But cp. Plato, *Euthyd.* 271 a.

d' *Aristote* (in *Proceedings of the tenth internat. Congress of Phil.*, Amsterdam 1949, p. 1094 ff.). For this reason, S. Mansion (ib., p. 1097 ff.) stating that the doctrine of the *Categ.* is the farthest removed from Plato, infers that this treatise is not authentic, as there is no period in Ar.'s development in which we could place it.

L. M. de Rijk argues against this (in *Mnem.* 1951, p. 148 ff. and in *The Categories of being*, p. 51 f.).

Definitions
of substance
in *Metaph.* Δ

b. Both senses are mentioned in Ar.'s book of definitions: *Metaph.* Δ 8, 1017 b¹⁰, ²¹.

Οὐσία λέγεται τὰ τε ἀπλᾶ σώματα ... καὶ ὅλως σώματα ... ὅτι οὐ καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται ἀλλὰ κατὰ τούτων τὰ ἅλλα. ... ἔτι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, οὗ ὁ λόγος ὀρισμός, καὶ τοῦτο οὐσία λέγεται ἐκάστου.

the first
sense in two
other places

c. The first sense is also found in *Metaph.* B 6, 1003 a⁷⁻⁹:

Εἰ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου, οὐκ ἔσονται οὐσίαι· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν τόδε τι σημαίνει ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε, ἢ δ' οὐσία τόδε τι.

d. It seems to occur again in *Metaph.* Z 13, 1038 b³⁴-1039 a²:
"Ἐκ τε δὴ τούτων θεωροῦσι φανερόν ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων¹ οὐσία ἐστὶ, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῇ κατηγορουμένων² τόδε τι, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε.

Ar. is proving here that universals are no substances. Yet it would be too rash to conclude that substances are in his final opinion individual things, even when he gives us some reason to make this inference. He is not yet at his final conclusion.

We have to face the question again in dealing with the metaphysics.

Other char-
acteristics
of substance

439—Besides by the definitions, given under **438a**, the author characterizes substance by the following three points.

a. Substances never have contraries. *Categ.* 5, 3 b²⁴⁻²⁵:
Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον εἶναι.

b. No substance admits of degrees. *Ib.*, 3 b³³⁻³⁴:
Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον.

c. Opposite qualifications can be predicated of it. *Ib.*, 4 a¹⁰⁻¹¹:
Μάλιστα δὲ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ταὐτόν καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ ὃν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν.

3—ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ: PROPOSITIONS

440—Ar., *De interpr.* I, 16 a¹⁻⁸:

Πρῶτον δεῖ θέσθαι τί ὄνομα καὶ τί ῥῆμα, ἔπειτα τί ἐστὶν ἀπόφασις καὶ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφανσις καὶ λόγος.

¹ οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων - no universal attribute.

² οὐδὲν τῶν κοινῇ κατηγορουμένων - no common predicate.

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γράμματα πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί· ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημειᾷ πρώτως, ταῦτά πᾶσι παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα πράγματα ἤδη ταῦτά.

Words are
symbols of
παθήματα

these are
images of
things

In this case a declaration or statement (ἀπόφανσις) does not consist of grasping combinations in reality, but of making combinations of "impressions" (παθήματα) of the soul. These then may be called "notions". But they are ὁμοιώματα of things. A statement will be true when it combines two notions which are an image of two combined elements in reality; it will be untrue in the opposite case. So this passage does not contradict the famous passage in *Metaph.* Θ 10, 1051 b³ (our nr. 557): Ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διηρημένον οἰόμενος διηρησθαι καὶ τὸ συγκείμενον συγκεῖσθαι, ἔψευσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα.

In the same way ἀληθής and ψευδής λόγος are defined by Plato, *Soph.* 263 b-d (our nr. 343). Ar. builds on the foundation which has been laid by Plato.

441—His definitions of *nomen* and *verbum* are new.

a. Ar., *De interpr.* 2, 16 a¹⁹⁻²¹:

definition
of noun

Ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ χρόνου, ἥς μηδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν κεχωρισμένον· ἐν γὰρ τῷ »Κάλλιππος« τὸ »ἵππος« οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ σημαίνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ »καλὸς ἵππος«.

According to the definition of λόγος (see our next nr.) in ch. 4, this word does not only indicate a phrase or sentence; it can also indicate a part of it, an "expression" consisting of words which have a meaning separately. Consequently the τῷ before καλὸς ἵππος ought not to be dropped.

b. Ib. 3, 16 b⁶⁻⁸:

verb

Ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, οὗ μέρος οὐδὲν σημαίνει χωρὶς, καὶ ἔστιν αἰετῶν καθ' ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημειῶν.

442—a. Definition of logos. Ib. 4, 16 b²⁶⁻³⁰; 17 a¹⁻⁷.

phrase or
sentence

Λόγος δέ ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην, ἥς τῶν μερῶν τι σημαντικὸν ἐστὶ κεχωρισμένον, ὡς φάσις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις. λέγω δέ, οἶον »ἄνθρωπος« σημαίνει μὲν τι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀλλ' ἔσται κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις, ἐάν τι προστεθῇ. —

Ἔστι δὲ λόγος ἅπας μὲν σημαντικός, ... ἀποφαντικός δὲ οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεῦδεσθαι ὑπάρχει. οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν δὲ ὑπάρχει, οἶον ἡ εὐχὴ λόγος μὲν, ἀλλ' οὔτε ἀληθὴς οὔτε ψευδής. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι ἀφείσθωσαν· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ ἢ ποιητικῆς οἰκιοτέρα ἢ σκέψις· ὁ δὲ ἀποφαντικός τῆς νῦν θεωρίας.

b. Ib. 5, 17 a⁸⁻¹².

simple
propositions

Ἔστι δὲ εἷς πρῶτος λόγος ἀποφαντικός κατάφασις, εἴτα ἀπόφασις· οἱ δ'

ἄλλοι πάντες συνδέσμων εἷς. ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα λόγον ἀποφαντικὸν ἐκ ῥήματος εἶναι ἢ πτώσεως ῥήματος· καὶ γὰρ ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος, εἴαν μὴ τὸ ἔστιν ἢ ἦν ἢ ἔσται ἢ τοιοῦτον προστεθῇ, οὕτω λόγος ἀποφαντικός.

affirmation,
negation

c. Ib. 6, 17 a^{25, 26}:

Κατάφασις δὲ ἔστιν ἀπόφανσις τινος κατὰ τινος, ἀπόφασις δὲ ἔστιν ἀπόφανσις τινος ἀπὸ τινος.

4—THE PRIOR ANALYTICS: THE DOCTRINE OF THE SYLLOGISM

Division of
propositions:
universal,
particular

443—a. Ar., *An. pr.* I 1, 24 a^{16, 22}:

Πρότασις μὲν οὖν ἔστι λόγος καταφατικός ἢ ἀποφατικός τινος κατὰ τινος. οὗτος δὲ ἢ καθόλου ἢ ἐν μέρει ἢ ἀδιόριστος. λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν τὸ παντὶ ἢ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν, ἐν μέρει δὲ τὸ τινὶ ἢ μὴ τινὶ ἢ μὴ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, ἀδιόριστον δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἄνευ τοῦ καθόλου ἢ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην ἢ τὸ τὴν ἡδονὴν μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν.

What is a
“premiss”

I. „Πρότασις est propositio ad conclusionem inde efficiendam praemissa”.
II. The division of propositions into universal and particular is called a division according to quantity. Ar. makes it first in *De interpr.* 7, where he gives the following examples:

(a) Universal propositions:

Πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός. — Οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός.

(b) Particular propositions:

Τίς ἄνθρωπος λευκός.

Ἔστι Σωκράτης λευκός. } — Οὐκ ἔστι Σωκράτης λευκός.

The division into affirmative and negative propositions, which has been made in *De interpr.* 6, is called in traditional logic a division according to quality.

Traditional scheme:

a. All x is y — Universal affirmative — S a P

e. No x is y — Universal negative — S e P

i. Some x is y — Particular affirmative — S i P

o. Some x is not y — Particular negative — S o P

modality

b. Ar. distinguishes also what is called in traditional logic the *modality* of propositions. In *De interpr.* 12 (beginning) he mentions:

δυνατὸν καὶ μὴ δυνατὸν

ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον

(what may and may not happen: contingent)

ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀναγκαῖον.

The same distinction is made in *An. pr.* I 2, 25 a^{1, 2}:

assertoric,
apodeictic,
problematic


Ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πρότασις ἔστιν ἢ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, —

Again in *An. pr.* I 8, 29 b²⁹⁻³⁰:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἕτερόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, —

c. Between the four kinds of propositions which are mentioned sub a the following relations are possible.

relations
between
propositions



tessera
logica

1. From the truth of the general proposition follows the truth of the subaltern particular ("All men are mortal"—"Some men are mortal"), but not inversely.

In modern terminology the general proposition is also called *superimplicant* to the subaltern particular, while the latter is called *subimplicant* to the former¹.

2. From the untruth of the particular follows the untruth of the subaltern general ("Some Romans are not brave"—"All Romans are not brave"), but not inversely.

3. *Contradictory propositions cannot be both true or both untrue.*

4. *Contrary propositions cannot both be true; they can both be untrue.*

5. *Subcontrary propositions cannot both be untrue; they can both be true.*

The third rule is the fundamental law of thinking, on which all reasoning is built: the *principium contradictionis*.

Principium
contra-
dictionis

Ar. does not formulate it in his *De interpr.*, nor at the beginning of his *Anal.* But the principle itself is presupposed in his whole doctrine of the syllogism. It is mentioned as such in *An. post.* I 11, a chapter which deals with axioms (fundamental theses, which are presupposed without any proof).

444—a. The classical formula of the *principium contradictionis* is found in *Metaph.* Γ 3, 1005 b^{19, 32}:

Τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό. — αὕτη δὴ πασῶν ἐστι βεβαιωτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν. — ἀδύνατον γὰρ ὄντινούν ταῦτόν ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. — διὸ πάντες οἱ ἀποδεικνύντες εἰς ταύτην ἀνάγουσιν ἐσχάτην δόξαν.

b. Cp. *An. post.* I 11, 77 a¹⁰⁻¹¹:

Τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἅμα φάναι καὶ ἀποφάναι οὐδεμία λαμβάνει ἀπόδειξις.

c. *Ib.*, 77 a²²⁻²⁴:

Τὸ δ' ἅπαν φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι ἢ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξις λαμβάνει. καὶ ταῦτα οὐδ' αἰεὶ καθόλου, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἱκανόν, ἱκανὸν δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ γένους.

principium
exclusi tertii

¹ Consult: S. Stebbing, *A modern introduction to logic*, London 1948, p. 58 f.

For instance, a mathematician will not say in general that either the affirmation or the negation is true, but that this or that line is straight or not straight.

This is the so-called *principium exclusi tertii*, another formulation of the principle of contradiction.

apodeictical
and
dialectical
premisses

445—*a. Anal. pr. I 1* continued (24 a²²⁻²⁵):

Διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ἀποδεικτικὴ πρότασις τῆς διαλεκτικῆς, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀποδεικτικὴ λῆψις θατέρου μορίου τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἐστίν (οὐ γὰρ ἐρωτᾷ, ἀλλὰ λαμβάνει ὁ ἀποδεικνύων), ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ ἐρώτησις ἀντιφάσεως ἐστίν.

This passage shows us which method of reasoning was exercised in the Academy and was called *dialectical* by Ar. A dialogue is carried on by two persons. One of them has the part of questioner, the other that of respondent and opponent. The question dealt with is called πρόβλημα. Every proposition can become a "problem": you have just to give the form of an ἀντίφασις to it: "Is it in this or in that way?" E.g.: "Is *two-footed animal* the definition of man, or not?" Or: "Is *animal* the genus of (the species) man, or not?"¹—The simple question "Is two-footed animal the definition of man?" is a proposition. The ἀντίφασις makes a "problem" out of it. Now the questioner makes his partner choose his position: the responder says yes or no. That is: he "grasps one part of the ἀντίφασις". Then the questioner takes the other position. He continues asking. The responder has to see that he does not contradict himself; the questioner tries to get from the answers of his opponent a syllogism for his own thesis.

This, then, is the "reasoning from opinions that are generally accepted about every problem propounded to us" (συλλογίζεσθαι περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος προβλήματος ἐξ ἐνδόξων), as it was said in *Top. I 1* (cited supra, nr. 435b), for which the author said that he was seeking the right method in that work—a method which, in fact, has been found later in the *An. pr.*

b. The same passage continued (24 a²⁵-b¹²):

Οὐδὲν δὲ διοίσει πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τὸν ἐκατέρου συλλογισμόν· καὶ γὰρ 25 ὁ ἀποδεικνύων καὶ ὁ ἐρωτῶν συλλογίζεται² λαβὼν τι κατὰ τινος ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν³. ὥστε ἐστὶ συλλογιστικὴ μὲν πρότασις⁴ ἀπλῶς κατὰφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις τινος κατὰ τινος εἰρημένον τρόπον, ἀποδεικτικὴ δὲ, ἐὰν ἀληθὴς 30 ἢ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεων εἰλημμένη⁵, διαλεκτικὴ δὲ πυνθανομένῳ 24 b μὲν ἐρώτησις ἀντιφάσεως⁶, συλλογιζομένῳ δὲ λῆψις τοῦ φαινομένου καὶ ἐνδόξου, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς εἴρηται.

¹ Examples taken from *Top. I 4*, 101 b²⁸⁻³⁷.

² συλλογίζεται - draws a conclusion.

³ λαβὼν e.q.s. - "by first assuming that some predicate applies or does not apply to some subject" (H. Tredennick).

⁴ συλλογιστικὴ μὲν πρότασις - the premiss of a syllogism.

⁵ διὰ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεων εἰλημμένη - "if it is based on fundamental postulates".—ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεις are unprovable first principles, which are assumed in science: axioms or postulates. Ar. defines them in *An. post. I 2*, 72 a¹⁴.

⁶ ἐρώτησις ἀντιφάσεως - a question to his partner, which of the two possibilities propounded to him the latter will accept.

A definition of *proof* and *dialectical syllogism* is given in *Top.* I 1, directly after the definition of *syllogism*. We have to cite it later.

446—*An. pr.* I 1, 24 b¹⁶⁻¹⁸:

term defined

“Ὅρον δὲ καλῶ εἰς ὃν διαλύεται ἡ πρότασις, οἷον τό τε κατηγορούμενον καὶ τὸ καθ’ οὗ κατηγορεῖται, ἢ προστιθεμένου ἢ διαιρουμένου τοῦ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι.

447—*a.* Ib., 24 b¹⁸⁻²²:

Syllogism defined

Συλλογισμὸς δὲ ἐστὶ λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι. λέγω δὲ τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι τὸ διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν, τὸ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν τὸ μηδενὸς ἔξωθεν ὅρου προσδεῖν πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.

Nearly the same definition occurs in *Top.* I 1.

b. Ib., 24 b²²⁻²⁶:

Perfect and imperfect syllogisms

Τέλειον μὲν οὖν καλῶ συλλογισμὸν τὸν μηδενὸς ἄλλου προσδεόμενον παρὰ τὰ εἰλημμένα πρὸς τὸ φανῆναι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀτελεῖ δὲ τὸν προσδεόμενον ἢ ἐνὸς ἢ πλειόνων, ᾧ ἔστι μὲν ἀναγκαῖα διὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὅρων, οὐ μὴν εἴληπται διὰ προτάσεων.


I.e.: when the premisses have been formulated incompletely, so that something must be added in order to make the form of the syllogism complete.

c. Ib., 24 b²⁶⁻³⁰:

“To be wholly contained in”

Τὸ δὲ ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ καὶ τὸ κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι θατέρου θάτερον ταῦτόν ἐστιν. λέγομεν δὲ τὸ κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι, ὅταν μηδὲν ᾗ λαβεῖν τῶν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, καθ’ οὗ θάτερον οὐ λεχθήσεται· καὶ τὸ κατὰ μηδενὸς ὡσαύτως.

An example of τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι: All men are mortal. Represented in a diagram:



448—*An. pr.* I 2, 25 a¹⁻¹³:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πρότασις ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, τούτων δὲ αἱ μὲν καταφατικαὶ αἱ δὲ ἀποφατικαὶ καθ’ ἐκάστην πρόσρρησιν, πάλιν δὲ τῶν καταφατικῶν καὶ ἀποφατικῶν αἱ μὲν καθόλου αἱ δὲ ἐν μέρει αἱ δὲ ἀδιόριστοι, τὴν μὲν ἐν τῷ ὑπάρχειν καθόλου στερητικὴν ἀνάγκη τοῖς ὅροις ἀντιστρέφειν, οἷον εἰ μηδεμία ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, οὐδ’ ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν ἔσται ἡδονή· τὴν δὲ κατηγορικὴν ἀντιστρέφειν μὲν ἀναγκαῖον,

Conversion of terms

οὐ μὴν καθόλου ἀλλ' ἐν μέρει, οἷον εἰ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι ἡδονήν· τῶν δὲ ἐν μέρει τὴν μὲν καταφατικὴν ἀντιστρέφειν ἀνάγκη κατὰ μέρος 10 (εἰ γὰρ ἡδονὴ τις ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν τι ἔσται ἡδονή), τὴν δὲ στερητικὴν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἄνθρωπος μὴ ὑπάρχει τινὶ ζῳῳ, καὶ ζῳῳ οὐχ ὑπάρχει τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ.

On the modal, qualitative and quantitative division of premisses, see *supra*, 443a, b.

τὴν μὲν ἐν τῷ ὑπάρχειν καθόλου etc. - "It is necessary that in universal attribution the negative premiss should be convertible in its terms".—In these and the following lines rules are given for the conversion of terms in assertoric premisses (ἐν τῷ ὑπάρχειν) ¹.

τὴν δὲ κατηγορικὴν - the (assertoric) affirmative premiss.

In ch. 3 rules are given for the conversion of terms in apodeictic and problematic premisses.

Figures and moods of syllogism

449—*An. pr.* I 4, 25 b²⁶-26 a².

Kapp² writes on this passage:

"It is one of the most impressive passages in Aristotle's writings, unsurpassed in its proud objectivity, when after careful preparation he introduces his syllogistical principle, which has predetermined the history of logic for more than two thousand years".

Syllogism and proof

a. 25 b²⁸⁻³⁰:

Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λέγομεν ἥδη διὰ τίνων καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς γίνεται 26 πᾶς συλλογισμός· ὕστερον δὲ λεκτέον περὶ ἀποδείξεως. πρότερον δὲ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ λεκτέον ἢ περὶ ἀποδείξεως διὰ τὸ καθόλου μᾶλλον εἶναι τὸν συλλογισμόν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμός τις, ὁ συλλογισμός δὲ οὐ πᾶς 30 ἀπόδειξις.

Cp. *Top.* I 1, 100 a²²⁻³³: 'Απόδειξις μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων ³ ὁ συλλογισμός ᾗ, — διαλεκτικός δὲ συλλογισμός ὁ ἐξ ἐνδόξεων συλλογιζόμενος ("which draws its conclusion from probable premisses").

We shall see proof more precisely defined in the *An. post.*

The first Figure

b. 25 b³²⁻²⁶ a²:

"Ὅταν οὖν ὅροι τρεῖς οὕτως ἔχωσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὥστε τὸν ἔσχατον ἐν 32 ὅλῳ εἶναι τῷ μέσῳ καὶ τὸν μέσον ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ πρώτῳ ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη τῶν ἄκρων εἶναι συλλογισμόν τέλειον. καλῶ δὲ μέσον μὲν ὁ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ 35 καὶ ἄλλο ἐν τούτῳ ἐστίν, ὁ καὶ τῇ θέσει γίνεται μέσον· ἄκρα δὲ τὸ αὐτό τε ἐν ἄλλῳ ὄν καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἄλλο ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ Α κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Β καὶ τὸ Β κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Γ, ἀνάγκη τὸ Α κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Γ κατηγορεῖσθαι· πρότερον

Barbara

¹ The above sentence might be translated also as: "The assertoric universal negative premiss is necessarily convertible in its terms".

² *Gr. Foundations* etc., p. 66.

³ πρώτων is defined in *An. post.* I 2 as ἐξ ἀρχῶν οἰκείων.

40 γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς τὸ κατὰ παντὸς λέγομεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν A κατὰ μη-
26 α δενὸς τοῦ B, τὸ δὲ B κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Γ, ὅτι τὸ A οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρξει.

Celarent

Instance of a syllogism of the first Figure:

Example

All men are mortal — (propositio) maior — πρότασις μείζων.
Kings are men — „ minor — „ ἐλάττων.
Therefore Kings are mortal — conclusio — συμπεράσμα.

Each syllogism contains three terms:

the 3 terms

τὰ ἄκρα (the extremes), namely

τὸ πρῶτον (ἄκρον), which is called τὸ μείζων (terminus maior),

τὸ ἔσχατον (ἄκρον), which is called τὸ ἐλάττων (terminus minor),

and τὸ μέσον (middle term, terminus medius), which occurs in both premisses but not in the conclusion.

The minor extreme (kings) is the subject of the conclusion (S),


the major extreme (mortal) is the predicate (P).

The middle term is indicated by M.

So S must be wholly contained in M, and M must be wholly contained in P. **First mood:**

Scheme: $\begin{array}{c} M a P \\ S a M \\ \hline S a P \end{array}$

Diagram:

*Barbara*

Or M must be excluded from P.


Second mood:

Instance: No man is sincere
Philosophers are men
Therefore etc.

Celarent

Scheme: $\begin{array}{c} M e P \\ S a M \\ \hline S e P \end{array}$

Diagram:



c. Two other modes are possible, namely *aii* and *eio* (second premiss particular), which are called by the names *Darii* and *Ferio*.

d. Ar. concludes his exposition of the First Figure thus (ib. 26 b²⁸⁻³³):

8, 29 Δῆλον δὲ . . . ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ συλλογισμοὶ τέλειοί εἰσι. — καὶ ὅτι
31 πάντα τὰ προβλήματα δέκνυνται διὰ τούτου τοῦ σχήματος· καὶ γὰρ τὸ παντὶ
καὶ τὸ μηδενὶ καὶ τὸ τινὶ καὶ τὸ μὴ τινὶ ὑπάρχειν. καλῶ δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον σχῆμα
33 πρῶτον.

Second
Figure450—a. *An. pr.* I 5, 26 b³⁴-27 a³:


“Ὅταν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ μὲν παντὶ τῷ δὲ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχη, ἡ ἑκατέρῳ παντὶ ἢ μηδενί, τὸ μὲν σχῆμα τὸ τοιοῦτον καλῶ δεύτερον, μέσον δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ λέγω τὸ 35 κατηγορούμενον ἀμφοῖν, ἄκρα δὲ καθ’ ὧν λέγεται τοῦτο, μεῖζον δὲ ἄκρον τὸ πρὸς τῷ μέσῳ κείμενον, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ πορρωτέρω τοῦ μέσου. τίθεται δὲ τὸ μέσον ἔξω μὲν τῶν ἄκρων, πρῶτον δὲ τῇ θέσει. τέλειος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔσται 27 a συλλογισμὸς οὐδαμῶς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι, δυνατὸς δ’ ἔσται καὶ καθόλου καὶ μὴ καθόλου τῶν ὄρων ὄντων.

Instance of this figure:
(camestres)

Every living being moves	<i>a</i>
No stone moves	<i>e</i>
No stone is a living being	<i>e</i>

Scheme: $\begin{array}{c} P M \\ S M \\ \hline S P \end{array}$

Diagram:



b. In this figure there will be only negative conclusions. Ib. 28 a⁷⁻⁹:

Δῆλον δὲ . . . ὅτι οὐ γίνεται καταφατικὸς συλλογισμὸς διὰ τούτου τοῦ σχήματος, ἀλλὰ πάντες στερητικοί, καὶ οἱ καθόλου καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος.

Third
Figure451—a. *An. pr.* I 6, 28 a¹⁰⁻²⁰:

Ἐὰν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μὲν παντὶ τὸ δὲ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχη, ἡ ἀμφω παντὶ ἢ μηδενί, 10 τὸ μὲν σχῆμα τὸ τοιοῦτον καλῶ τρίτον, μέσον δ’ ἐν αὐτῷ λέγω καθ’ οὗ ἀμφω τὰ κατηγορούμενα, ἄκρα δὲ τὰ κατηγορούμενα, μεῖζον δ’ ἄκρον τὸ πορρωτέρω τοῦ μέσου, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἐγγύτερον. τίθεται δὲ τὸ μέσον ἔξω μὲν τῶν ἄκρων, ἔσχατον δὲ τῇ θέσει. τέλειος μὲν οὖν οὐ γίνεται συλλογισμὸς οὐδ’ ἐν 15 τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι, δυνατὸς δ’ ἔσται καὶ καθόλου καὶ μὴ καθόλου τῶν ὄρων ὄντων πρὸς τὸ μέσον. καθόλου μὲν οὖν ὄντων, ὅταν καὶ τὸ Π καὶ τὸ P παντὶ τῷ Σ ὑπάρχη, ὅτι τινὲς τῷ P τὸ Π ὑπάρξει ἐξ ἀνάγκης.


Darapti

Instance of this figure:

Every seal is a marine animal	<i>a</i>
Every seal has lungs	<i>a</i>
Some marine animals have lungs	<i>i</i>

Scheme: $\begin{array}{c} M P \\ M S \\ \hline S P \end{array}$

Diagram:



b. In this figure will occur only particular conclusions. Ib., 29 a¹⁴⁻¹⁸:

Φανερόν δὲ . . . ὅτι συλλογίσασθαι τὸ καθόλου διὰ τούτου τοῦ σχήματος οὐκ ἔσται, οὔτε στερεητικὸν οὔτε καταφατικόν.

452—The principal rules of the syllogism have been formulated explicitly by Ar. in the later chapters of the same book.

Rules of the syllogism

a. *An. pr.* I 25, 41 b³⁶⁻³⁷:

Δῆλον δὲ . . . ὅτι πᾶσα ἀπόδειξις ἔσται διὰ τριῶν ὄρων καὶ οὐ πλείονων.

three terms required for demonstration

b. Ib., 42 a³²⁻³³:

Τούτου δ' ὄντος φανεροῦ δῆλον ὡς καὶ ἐκ δύο προτάσεων καὶ οὐ πλείονων· οἱ γὰρ τρεῖς ὅροι δύο προτάσεις.

two premisses required

c. *An. pr.* I 32, 47 a^{39-b 6}:

the middle term in both premisses

39 Ἀνάγκη . . . τὸ μέσον ἐν ἀμφοτέραις ὑπάρχειν (sc. ταῖς προτάσεσιν) ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς σχήμασιν. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν κατηγορῇ¹ καὶ κατηγορηται τὸ μέσον, 47 b ἢ αὐτὸ μὲν κατηγορῇ, ἄλλο δ' ἐκείνου ἀπαρνήται, τὸ πρῶτον ἔσται σχῆμα· ἐὰν δὲ καὶ κατηγορῇ καὶ ἀπαρνήται ἀπὸ τινος, τὸ μέσον²· ἐὰν δ' ἄλλα ἐκείνου κατηγορηται, ἢ τὸ μὲν ἀπαρνήται τὸ δὲ κατηγορηται, τὸ ἔσχατον³. οὕτω 5, 6 γὰρ εἶχεν ἐν ἐκάστῳ σχήματι τὸ μέσον.

d. *An. pr.* I 24, 41 b⁶⁻¹³:

In every syllogism one premiss must be affirmative, and one universal

6 Ἐτι τε ἐν ἅπαντι (sc. συλλογισμῷ) δεῖ κατηγορικόν⁴ τινα τῶν ὄρων εἶναι καὶ τὸ καθόλου ὑπάρχειν· ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ καθόλου ἢ οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμός, ἢ οὐ πρὸς τὸ κείμενον⁵ ἢ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτήσεται⁶. Κεῖσθω γὰρ τὴν μουσικὴν 10 ἡδονὴν εἶναι σπουδαίαν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀξιώσειεν⁷ ἡδονὴν εἶναι σπουδαίαν, μὴ προσθεῖς τὸ »πᾶσαν«, οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμός· εἰ δὲ »τινὰ ἡδονὴν«, εἰ μὲν ἄλλην, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ κείμενον, εἰ δ' αὐτὴν ταύτην, τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λαμβάνει⁸.

453—Syllogisms of the second and third figures must be checked by reducing them to the first.

¹ ἐὰν κατηγορῇ - if it is a predicate.

² τὸ μέσον - you have the middle figure.

³ τὸ ἔσχατον - then you will have the third figure.

⁴ κατηγορικόν - affirmative.

⁵ οὐ πρὸς τὸ κείμενον - the conclusion will be unrelated to the assumption.

⁶ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτεῖσθαι - *petere id quod ab initio ad demonstrandum propositum est*; what is called a *petitio principii*. See our nr. 454.

⁷ ἀξιώσειεν - If we postulate or assume.

⁸ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λαμβάνει - there is a *petitio principii*.

All imperfect
syllogisms
are validated
in the first
figure

a. *An. pr.* I 7, 29 a³⁰⁻³⁹:

Φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἀτελεῖς συλλογισμοὶ τελειοῦνται διὰ τοῦ 30
πρώτου σχήματος. ἢ γὰρ δεικτικῶς ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου περαίνονται πάντες¹.
ἀμφοτέρως δὲ γίνεται τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα, δεικτικῶς μὲν τελειουμένων, ὅτι
διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς² ἐπεραίνοντο πάντες, ἢ δ' ἀντιστροφή τὸ πρῶτον ἐποίει
σχῆμα, διὰ δὲ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου δεικνυμένων, ὅτι τεθέντος τοῦ ψευδοῦς ὁ συλλο- 35
γισμὸς γίνεται διὰ τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος, οἷον ἐν τῷ τελευταίῳ σχήματι,
εἰ τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχει, ὅτι³ τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχει. εἰ γὰρ
μηδενί, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ τὸ Α. ἀλλ' ἦν παντί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

39

In the second and third figures syllogisms are reduced to the first "by means of conversion", i.e. by transposing the terms of one of the premisses. E.g. in a syllogism of the form

$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} M P \\ M S \end{array} \right.$ (third figure) the terms of the second premiss should be converted.

We then get a syllogism of the form $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} M P \\ S M \end{array} \right.$ (first figure).

Every de-
monstration
reducible to
the first
figure

b. *An. pr.* I 23, 41 b¹⁻⁵.

In the preceding passage Ar. has spoken of the procedure of hypothetical proof. Now in this case too a demonstration is to be reached by proving some proposition syllogistically. Ar. continues:

Εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, πᾶσαν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ πάντα συλλογισμὸν ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι β
διὰ τριῶν τῶν προειρημένων σχημάτων. τούτου δὲ δειχθέντος δῆλον ὡς ἅπας
τε συλλογισμὸς ἐπιτελεῖται διὰ τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος καὶ ἀνάγεται εἰς τοὺς
ἐν τούτῳ καθόλου συλλογισμούς.

5

Petitio
principii

454—*An. pr.* II 16, 64 b²⁸⁻⁶⁵ a⁴:

Τὸ δ' ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἔστι μὲν, ὡς ἐν γένει λαβεῖν⁴, ἐν 28
τῷ μὴ ἀποδεικνύειν τὸ προκείμενον, τοῦτο δὲ ἐπισυμβαίνει πολλαχῶς· καὶ
γὰρ εἰ ὅλως μὴ συλλογίζεται, καὶ εἰ δι' ἀγνωστοτέρων ἢ ὁμοίως ἀγνώστων, 31
καὶ εἰ διὰ τῶν ὑστέρων τὸ πρότερον· ἢ γὰρ ἀπόδειξις ἐκ πιστοτέρων τε καὶ
προτέρων ἐστίν. τούτων μὲν οὐκ οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ αἰτεῖσθαι τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς· ἀλλ'
ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν δι' αὐτῶν πέφυκε γνωρίζεσθαι τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλων (αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ 35
δι' αὐτῶν, τὰ δ' ὑπὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς δι' ἄλλων), ὅταν μὴ τὸ δι' αὐτοῦ γνωστὸν
δι' αὐτοῦ τις ἐπιχειρῇ δεικνύειν, τότε αἰτεῖται τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. τοῦτο δ' ἔστι μὲν

¹ περαίνονται πάντες - They (i.e. these syllogisms) are all brought to a conclusion.
δεικτικῶς - by demonstration.

ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου - or by reduction ad impossibile.

² διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς - by means of conversion.

³ ὅτι - we get a syllogism to the effect that —.

⁴ ὡς ἐν γένει λαβεῖν - to take the expression in its widest sense.

οὕτω ποιεῖν ὥστ' εὐθὺς ἀξιῶσαι τὸ προκείμενον, ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ μεταβάντας
 40 ἐπ' ἄλλα ἅττα τῶν πεφυκότων δι' ἐκείνου δεικνυσθαι διὰ τούτων ἀποδεικνύναι
 65 α τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἷον εἰ τὸ Α δεικνύοιτο διὰ τοῦ Β τὸ δὲ Β διὰ τοῦ Γ, τὸ δὲ Γ
 πεφυκὸς εἶη δεικνυσθαι διὰ τοῦ Α· συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτὸ δι' αὐτοῦ τὸ Α δεικνύναι
 4 τοὺς οὕτω συλλογιζομένους.

Strictly speaking there is *petitio principii* when the conclusion is included in one of the premisses.

455—α. *Top.* I 12, 105 a¹³⁻¹⁹:

Induction

Ἐπαγωγὴ δ' (ἐστίν) ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου ἔφοδος, οἷον
 εἰ ἔστι κυβερνήτης ὁ ἐπιστάμενος κράτιστος καὶ ἡνίοχος, καὶ ὅλως ἐστὶν ὁ
 ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ἕκαστον ἄριστος. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἐπαγωγὴ πιθανώτερον καὶ
 σαφέστερον καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν γνωριμώτερον καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς κοινόν¹,
 ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς βιαστικώτερον² καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς ἐνεργέστερον.

b. It is clear from the preceding passage, that induction, by which we conclude a general law from a number of particular cases, is no syllogism. Yet *Ar.* treats it as a kind of syllogism in the following passage.

An. pr. I 23, 68 b¹⁵⁻³⁷:

15 Ἐπαγωγὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς συλλογισμὸς τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου³ dealt with
 θάτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ συλλογίσασθαι⁴, οἷον εἰ τῶν ΑΓ μέσον τὸ Β, διὰ τοῦ
 Γ δεῖξαι τὸ Α τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ ποιούμεθα τὰς ἐπαγωγάς. οἷον ἔστω
 20 τὸ Α μακρόβιον, τὸ δ' ἐφ' ᾧ Β τὸ χολὴν μὴ ἔχον, ἐφ' ᾧ δὲ Γ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον
 μακρόβιον, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος καὶ ἡμίονος. τῷ δὲ Γ ὅλῳ ὑπάρχει τὸ
 Α· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἄχολον μακρόβιον⁵. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ Β, τὸ μὴ ἔχον χολήν, παντὶ
 25 ὑπάρχει τῷ Γ. εἰ οὖν ἀντιστρέφει τὸ Γ τῷ Β καὶ μὴ ὑπερτείνει τὸ μέσον⁶,
 ἀνάγκη τὸ Α τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν· δέδεικται γὰρ πρότερον ὅτι ἂν δύο ἅττα τῷ αὐτῷ
 ὑπάρχη καὶ πρὸς θάτερον αὐτῶν ἀντιστρέφη τὸ ἄκρον, ὅτι τῷ ἀντιστρέφοντι
 29 τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον συγκείμενον· ἡ γὰρ ἐπαγωγὴ διὰ πάντων.

¹ κοινόν - accessible.

² βιαστικώτερον - has more force to overcome opposition.

³ διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου - by one extreme term, sc. the minor extreme, namely concrete cases.

⁴ συλλογίσασθαι - establishing a relation between the other extreme and the middle term.

⁵ This remark is a *petitio principii*. Tredennick has seen rightly that these words cannot be attributed to *Ar.* Ross explains them by suggesting that a copyist has substituted ἄχολον for Γ.

⁶ εἰ μὴ ὑπερτείνει τὸ μέσον - if the middle term is not wider in extension.

⁷ Constr. θάτερον τῶν κατηγορουμένων - the other predicate.

"Ἔστι δ' ὁ τοιοῦτος συλλογισμὸς τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀμέσου προτάσεως· ὧν μὲν 30 γὰρ ἔστι μέσον διὰ τοῦ μέσου ὁ συλλογισμὸς, ὧν δὲ μὴ ἔστι, δι' ἐπαγωγῆς. καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ἀντίκειται ἡ ἐπαγωγή τῷ συλλογισμῷ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τοῦ μέσου τὸ ἄκρον τῷ τρίτῳ δείκνυσιν, ἡ δὲ διὰ τοῦ τρίτου τὸ ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ. φύσει μὲν οὖν πρότερος καὶ γνωριμώτερος ὁ διὰ τοῦ μέσου συλλογισμὸς, 35 ἡμῖν δ' ἐναργέστερος ὁ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς.

"This kind of syllogism is concerned with the first or immediate premiss" (l. 30).

Ar. means to say that induction supplies, without the aid of a middle term, the universal proposition which may stand as major premiss of a demonstrative syllogism. Concretely speaking: by means of some special cases (man, horse and mule) the universal proposition is established.:

Every bileless animal is long-lived.

Now this proposition might be used as the major of the following demonstrative syllogism:

Every bileless animal is long-lived

Man, horse and mule have no bile

Therefore: man, horse and mule are long-lived.

Induction is clearer for us, Ar. says, because it starts from observation; but objectively speaking—φύσει—the syllogism, which proceeds deductively, from the universal to the particular, is clearer and "more knowable".

By his theory of induction Ar. has given an answer to the question which has been left open in the *Pr. Anal.*: How do we get our first premisses?—Consequently we might expect that he would introduce induction as another means of getting knowledge next to the syllogism. In fact, induction has this meaning in *An. post.* I 18 and 31 (vid. infra). Cp. also *An. post.* II 19.—On the other hand, if induction is treated as a syllogism, it is a bad kind of syllogism, and therefore its conclusions cannot be true. For this reason then only the syllogism is treated by Ar. in his doctrine of demonstration, while induction is dealt with in the book on *dialectical* syllogism.

Induction
non-demon-
strative but
dialectical

c. In this sense we have to understand Ar. when he says, in *An. pr.* II 23, 68 b¹⁴:

"Ἀπαντα γὰρ πιστεύομεν ἢ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ ἢ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς.

5—THE POSTERIOR ANALYTICS: THE DOCTRINE OF DEMONSTRATION

The student's
need of
pre-existing
knowledge

456—a. *An. post.* I 1, 71a¹⁻¹¹:

Πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ¹ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται α γνώσεως. φανερόν δὲ τοῦτο θεωροῦσιν ἐπὶ πασῶν· αἱ τε γὰρ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν διὰ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου παραγίνονται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη τεχνῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους οἱ τε διὰ συλλογισμῶν καὶ οἱ δι' 5 ἐπαγωγῆς· ἀμφοτέροι γὰρ διὰ προγινωσκομένων ποιοῦνται τὴν διδασκαλίαν,

¹ διανοητικὴ - "by means of discursive thinking", as opposed to the intuitive "seeing" of the noûs.

οἱ μὲν ¹ λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ ξυνιέντων, οἱ δὲ ² δεικνύντες τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δῆλον εἶναι τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον. ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ οἱ ῥητορικοὶ συμπείθουσιν·
 10 ἢ γὰρ διὰ παραδειγμάτων ³, ὃ ἐστὶν ἐπαγωγή, ἢ δι' ἐνθυμημάτων ⁴, ὅπερ ἐστὶ συλλογισμός.

b. Ib., 71 a¹¹⁻¹⁶.

Its nature

Διχῶς δ' ἀναγκαῖον προγινώσκειν· τὰ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι ἔστι ⁵, προὑπολαμβάνειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ τί τὸ λεγόμενόν ἐστι ⁶, ξυνιέναι δεῖ, τὰ δ' ἄμφω, οἷον ὅτι μὲν ἅπαν ἢ φῆσαι ἢ ἀποφῆσαι ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἔστι ⁷, τὸ δὲ τρίγωνον, ὅτι τοδὶ σημαίνει ⁸, τὴν δὲ μονάδα ἄμφω, καὶ τί σημαίνει καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν.

457—a. *An. post.*, I 2, 71 b⁹⁻¹²:

Knowledge

Ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἰόμεθ' ἕκαστον ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν σοφιστικὸν τρόπον τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅταν τὴν τ' αἰτίαν οἰώμεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐστὶν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστὶ, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ' ἄλλως ἔχειν.

Real knowledge is according to Ar.: (1) knowledge of the causes; (2) knowledge of the necessary, where we can see that it cannot be otherwise. So also in *Metaph.* A 1-2.

In *An. post.* II 1 Ar. says: We can ask ourselves four kinds of questions, namely: τὸ ὅτι, τὸ διότι, εἰ ἔστι and τί ἐστίν. Now the knowledge of the simple fact (τὸ ὅτι) is, according to Ar., not yet true knowledge. We then have to know the διότι, and in such a way, that we see that the thing cannot be otherwise.

The last point means that knowledge in the strict sense of the word is only possible of what is necessary, not of the contingent. See our next cited passage.

b. Ib., I 33, 88 b³⁰⁻³⁵:

Τὸ δ' ἐπιστητὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξαστοῦ καὶ δόξης, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθόλου καὶ δι' ἀναγκαίων, τὸ δ' ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν. ἔστι δὲ τινα ἀληθῆ μὲν καὶ ὄντα, ἐνδεχόμενα δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι περὶ μὲν ταῦτα ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστιν· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἀδύνατα ἄλλως ἔχειν τὰ δυνατὰ ἄλλως ἔχειν.

¹ οἱ μὲν e.q.s. - "In the first case (i.e. with syllogism) we take premisses supposing that they are known and accepted by our opponent".

² οἱ δὲ - "In the other case (i.e. with induction) the universal is exhibited through the fact that the particular is clear".

³ The instance infers the particular from the particular, and therefore is called by Ar. an imperfect form of induction, by which the universal is inferred from the particular (See *An. pr.* II 24).

⁴ In *An. pr.* II 27 enthymema is defined as a syllogism starting from probabilities or signs.

⁵ ὅτι ἔστι - "that the matter in question exists", i.e.: the fact must be assumed.

⁶ τί τὸ λεγόμενόν ἐστι - "the meaning of the term used".

⁷ "E.g. to say that in every question truth lies in the affirmation or negation, that is to assume the fact" (First case).

⁸ Second case: the meaning of the term.

458—a. Ib. I 2, 71 b¹⁶⁻²⁵:

demonstration

Εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἕτερός ἐστι τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τρόπος, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν ¹, φαιμέν ¹⁶ δὲ καὶ δι' ἀποδείξεως εἰδέναι. ἀπόδειξιν δὲ λέγω συλλογισμόν ἐπιστημονικόν. ἐπιστημονικόν δὲ λέγω καθ' ὃν τῷ ἔχειν αὐτὸν ἐπιστάμεθα. εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷον ἔθεμεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν ²⁰ τ' εἶναι καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσονται καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ οἰκεῖαι τοῦ δεικνυμένου ². συλλογισμὸς μὲν γὰρ ἔσται καὶ ἄνευ τούτων, ἀπόδειξις δ' οὐκ ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ ποιήσει ἐπιστήμην.

25

Its conditions examined

b. The same passage continued (71 b²⁵-72 a⁵):

1. The premisses must be true.

Ἀληθῆ μὲν οὖν εἶναι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὃν ἐπίστασθαι, οἷον ὅτι ἡ διά- ²⁵ μετρος σύμμετρος ³.

2. They must be primary and indemonstrable.

Ἐκ πρώτων δ' ἀναποδείκτων, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιστήσεται μὴ ἔχων ἀπόδειξιν αὐ- ²⁶ τῶν· τὸ γὰρ ἐπίστασθαι ὧν ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὸ ἔχειν ἀπόδειξιν ἐστίν.

3. They must be the causes of the conclusion, better known than it, and prior to it.

Αἰτία τε καὶ γνωριμώτερα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ πρότερα, αἷτια μὲν ὅτι τότε ἐπι- ²⁹ στάμεθα ὅταν τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδῶμεν, καὶ πρότερα, εἴπερ αἷτια, καὶ προγινωσκόμενα οὐ μόνον τὸν ἕτερον τρόπον τῷ ζυνιέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ εἰδέναι ⁴ ὅτι ἔστιν.

What is meant by "prior" and "better known".

Πρότερα δ' ἐστὶ καὶ γνωριμώτερα διχῶς· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτὸν πρότερον τῇ φύσει ³³ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον, οὐδὲ γνωριμώτερον καὶ ἡμῖν γνωριμώτερον. λέγω ^{72 a} δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἀπλῶς δὲ πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ πορρώτερον. ἔστι δὲ πορρωτάτω μὲν τὰ καθόλου μάλιστα, ἐγγυτάτω δὲ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα· καὶ ἀντίκειται ταῦτ' ⁵ ἀλλήλοις.

Cp. *Metaph.* Δ 11, 1018 b³²⁻³⁴: Κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸν λόγον τὰ καθόλου πρότερα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν αἰσθησιν τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.

¹ He means: knowledge of the first, non-demonstrated principles. The question is dealt with in I 3, I 10, and most of all in II 19. See our nrs. 459, 460 and 465.

² "Unless these conditions are satisfied, the basic truths will not be appropriate to the conclusion" (G. R. G. Mure).

³ "that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with its side" would be a μὴ ὄν, and as such it cannot be the object of demonstration.

⁴ Not only in the second sense mentioned in 456b, namely that of understanding the term used, but also in the first sense: that of knowledge of the fact.

459—"The premisses must be primary and immediate", i.e. not deducible from other premisses. This leads directly to the question how we can know our first premisses and whether there is another kind of knowledge which does not depend on demonstration. Ar. states first that we have to start necessarily from indemonstrable first principles.

First
principles
indemon-
strable

An. post. I 3, 72 b⁵⁻⁷, 18-25:

- 5 'Ενίοις μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ δεῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπίστασθαι οὐ δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, τοῖς δ' εἶναι μὲν, πάντων μέντοι ἀποδείξεις εἶναι. —
18 'Ημεῖς δὲ φαμεν οὔτε πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικὴν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν
20 ἀμέσων ἀναπόδεικτον. καὶ τοῦθ' ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, φανερόν· εἰ γὰρ ἀνάγκη μὲν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ πρότερα καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἴσταται δὲ ποτε τὰ ἄμεσα, ταῦτ' ἀναπόδεικτα ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ταῦτά τ' οὖν οὕτω λέγομεν, καὶ οὐ μόνον
25 ἐπιστήμην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι τινὰ φαμεν, ἥ τοὺς ὅρους γνωρίζομεν.

Ar. means that beside demonstrative science there exists a higher and more fundamental science, which precedes demonstration, namely the intuitive knowledge of the first principles (*ἀρχαί*) by the *noûs*.

460—Ar. deals with first principles in chapters 10 and 11 of *An. post.* I.

a. *An. post.* I 10, 76 a³¹⁻³²:

Λέγω δ' ἀρχὰς ἐν ἐκάστῳ γένει¹ ταύτας ἃς ὅτι ἔστι μὴ ἐνδέχεται δεῖξαι.

First
principles
defined

b. *Ib.*, 76 a^{37-b16}:

"Ἔστι δ' ὧν χρῶνται ἐν ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις τὰ μὲν ἴδια ἐκάστης ἐπιστήμης τὰ δὲ κοινά, κοινὰ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ἐπεὶ χρήσιμόν γε ὅσον ἐν τῷ
40 ὑπὸ τὴν ἐπιστήμην γένει². ἴδια μὲν οἷον γραμμὴν εἶναι τοιανδί, καὶ τὸ εὐθύ³, κοινὰ δὲ οἷον τὸ ἴσα ἀπὸ ἴσων ἂν ἀφέλῃ, ὅτι ἴσα τὰ λοιπά. ἱκανὸν δ' ἕκαστον
76 b τοῦτων ὅσον ἐν τῷ γένει· ταῦτό γὰρ ποιήσει, καὶ μὴ κατὰ πάντων λάβῃ ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μεγεθῶν μόνον, τῷ δ' ἀριθμητικῷ ἐπ' ἀριθμῶν.

What are
special
ἀρχαί?

"Ἔστι δ' ἴδια μὲν καὶ ἃ λαμβάνεται εἶναι⁴, περὶ ἃ ἡ ἐπιστήμη θεωρεῖ τὰ

¹ ἐν ἐκάστῳ γένει - in every branch of science.

² What Ar. means by the analogous character of the κοινά, is clear from the example given *infra*: "Take equals from equals and equals remain". This rule can only be applied "in the genus which constitutes the province of the science in question"; e.g. geometrical magnitudes cannot be subtracted from numbers, nor numbers from geometrical magnitudes. But "the geometer may apply it to magnitudes and the arithmetician to numbers"; i.e. magnitudes can be subtracted from magnitudes, and numbers from numbers.

³ γραμμὴν εἶναι τοιανδί κ. τὸ εὐθύ - the definitions of line and straight.

⁴ ἃ λαμβάνεται εἶναι - sc. by the special sciences.

ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὐτά¹, ὅλον μονάδας ἢ ἀριθμητική, ἢ δὲ γεωμετρία σημεῖα καὶ 5 γραμμάς. ταῦτα γὰρ λαμβάνουσι τὸ εἶναι καὶ τοδὶ εἶναι. τὰ δὲ τούτων πάθη¹ καθ' αὐτά, τί μὲν σημαίνει ἕκαστον, λαμβάνουσιν, ὅλον ἢ μὲν ἀριθμητικὴ τί περιττὸν ἢ ἄρτιον ἢ τετράγωνον ἢ κύβος, ἢ δὲ γεωμετρία τί τὸ ἄλογον ἢ τὸ κεκλάσθαι ἢ νεύειν², ὅτι δ' ἔστι, δεικνύουσι διὰ τε τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶν 10 ἀποδεδειγμένων. καὶ ἡ ἀστρολογία ὡσαύτως. πᾶσα γὰρ ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τρία ἐστίν, ὅσα τι εἶναι τίθεται (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ γένος, οὗ τῶν καθ' αὐτά παθημάτων ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ), καὶ τὰ κοινὰ λεγόμενα ἀξιώματα, ἐξ ὧν 15 πρῶτων³ ἀποδείκνυσι, καὶ τρίτον τὰ πάθη, ὧν τί σημαίνει ἕκαστον λαμβάνει. 15

In the next paragraph Ar. qualifies these three elements shortly as περὶ ὃ τε δείκνυσι καὶ ᾧ δεικνύσι καὶ ἐξ ὧν, i.e. the subject of the demonstration (περὶ ὃ), its object (ᾧ), and its basis or starting-point (ἐξ ὧν).

**Thesis,
hypothesis
and axiomata**

461—Not all things which are assumed without demonstration are called by Ar. axiomata. He speaks of θέσεις, ὑποθέσεις and ἀξιώματα.

Thesis is what is accepted without proof as basis of a demonstration. *Theseis* are of two kinds: (1) those which posit the meaning of a term (τί σημαίνει). These are definitions (ὀρισμοί). (2) Those which posit also the existence of the matter. These are *hypotheses*.

Axioms are truths which intrude upon the mind. They include existence, but differ from hypotheses by being known from themselves and by being absolutely necessary for whomsoever wishes to learn anything.

An. post. I 2, 72 a¹⁴⁻¹⁷:

Ἀμέσου δ' ἀρχῆς συλλογιστικῆς θέσιν μὲν λέγω ἣν μὴ ἔστι δεῖξαι μὴδ' ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸν μαθησόμενον τι. ἣν δ' ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸν ὁτιοῦν μαθησόμενον, ἀξιῶμα.

From this definition of axiom appears clearly that Ar. does not only think of mathematical axioms, such as "Take equals from equals" etc., but also of the universal laws of logic: the *principium contradictionis* and *exclusi tertii*. We found supra (nr. 444b, c) that they are mentioned in *An. post.* I 11.

See on Ar.'s doctrine of first principles: Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 43 ff.

¹ περὶ ᾧ ἡ ἐπιστήμη θεωρεῖ - the subjects, the existence as well as the meaning of which the science in question assumes, and the essential attributes (τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὐτά) of which it investigates. τὰ ὑπάρχοντα are called later in the same passage τὰ πάθη.

² τὸ κεκλάσθαι ἢ νεύειν - "deflection or verging of lines". "κεκλάσθαι is used of a straight line deflected at a line or surface; νεύειν is used of a straight line tending to pass through a given point when produced" (W. D. Ross, Comm. in *An. post.*, p. 539).

³ ἐξ ὧν πρῶτων ἀποδείκνυσι - "which are the primary premisses of its demonstration".

462—According to Ar. strict science knows not only the fact, but also the cause. Now practically a science often does not know the causes. In this case the science which knows both the facts and the causes is “more precise and prior” to that which only knows the facts. And generally the more abstract science is to be ranked higher than that which studies a more concrete object.

A hierarchy
of sciences

An. post. I 27, 87 a³¹⁻³⁷:

Ἀκριβεστέρα δ' ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης καὶ προτέρα ἢ τε τοῦ ὅτι καὶ διότι ἡ αὐτή, ἀλλὰ μὴ χωρὶς τοῦ ὅτι τῆς τοῦ διότι· καὶ ἡ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς καθ' ὑποκειμένου¹, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ ἀρμονικῆς, καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων τῆς ἐκ προσθέσεως², οἷον γεωμετρίας ἀριθμητικῆς. λέγω δ' ἐκ προσθέσεως, οἷον μονὰς οὐσία ἄθετος, στιγμὴ δὲ οὐσία θετός³. ταύτην ἐκ προσθέσεως.

We shall find the same ideas again in the opening chapters of *Metaph. A*.

463—In ch. 31 of the same book Ar. deals with the question whether science can be reached by sense-perception. As we might expect from his treatment of induction in *An. pr.* II 23, he answers this question in the negative. Strictly speaking the syllogism is in his opinion the only means by which knowledge can be acquired by man. This chapter, however, must be compared with *An. post.* I 18, if we want to understand rightly the author's view of the function of sense-perception with regard to knowledge.

Science and
sense-
perception

a. *An. post.* I 18, 81 a^{38-b} 9:

Sense-
perception
a necessary
condition to
acquiring
knowledge

38 Φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἴ τις αἰσθησις ἐκλέλοιπεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐκλελοιπέναι, ἣν ἀδύνατον λαβεῖν, εἴπερ μαθησόμεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῇ ἢ ἀποδείξει. 40 ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν καθόλου, ἡ δ' ἐπαγωγὴ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος. 81 b ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρῆσαι μὴ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως

¹ A science is μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου when it studies νοητά and ἄνυλα (e.g. arithmetic); it is καθ' ὑποκειμένου when it is concerned with concrete objects (αἰσθητά καὶ ὕλικά). Thus harmonics consider numerical relations ἐν ταῖς χορδαῖς.

² ἡ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων is a science which starts from less undemonstrated principles; i.e. which studies simpler entities. Such a science is, Ar. says, more exact and therefore prior to those sciences which study more complex entities and therefore have to assume more “theses” or “hypotheses”. E.g. arithmetic is prior to geometry, which adds the principles of extension to those of number.

³ The unit is οὐσία ἄθετος: “substance without position”, while the point is οὐσία θετός: “substance with position”.

λεγόμενα¹ ἔσται δι' ἐπαγωγῆς γνώριμα ποιεῖν, ὅτι ὑπάρχει ἐκάστῳ γένει² ἕνια³, καὶ εἰ μὴ χωριστά ἐστίν, ἢ τοιονδὶ ἕκαστον. ἐπαχθῆναι δὲ μὴ ἔχοντας αἰσθησιν ἀδύνατον. τῶν γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστον ἡ αἰσθησις· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἄνευ ἐπαγωγῆς, οὔτε δι' ἐπαγωγῆς ἄνευ τῆς αἰσθήσεως.

8, 9

"It is also clear that the loss of any of the senses entails the loss of a corresponding portion of knowledge".—This sentence indicates the existence of a certain necessary relation between sense-perception and knowledge: the former is a necessary condition to acquiring the latter, for it procures (indirectly) the universals by induction. *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*. Cp. the larger exposition of II 19 (our nr. 465).

The position of *An. pr.* II 23 is sustained: knowledge of the particular is not possible. Therefore, science is only of the universal and by demonstration. But to the question "How do we come to knowledge of the universal?" Ar. answers clearly: by induction. And this is only possible by sense-perception.

No
knowledge
through
sense-
perception

b. *An. post.* I 31, 87 b²⁸-88 a⁸.

In the preceding chapter the author has stated that no science can be acquired by chance conjunctions. He now continues:

Οὐδὲ δι' αἰσθήσεως ἔστιν ἐπίστασθαι. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἡ αἰσθησις τοῦ τοιοῦδε 28 καὶ μὴ τοῦδέ τινος, ἀλλ' αἰσθάνεσθαι γε ἀναγκαῖον τόδε τι καὶ ποῦ καὶ νῦν. τὸ δὲ καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀδύνατον αἰσθάνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ τόδε οὐδὲ νῦν· 30 οὐ γὰρ ἂν ᾖ τὸ καθόλου· τὸ γὰρ αἰεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ καθόλου φαμέν εἶναι. ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ μὲν ἀποδείξεις καθόλου, ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι, φανερόν ὅτι οὐδ' ἐπίστασθαι δι' αἰσθήσεως ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ εἰ ᾖ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ 35 τρίγωνον ὅτι δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει τὰς γωνίας, ἐζητοῦμεν ἂν ἀποδείξιν καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ φασὶ τινες ἡπιστάμεθα· αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη καθ' ἕκαστον, ἢ δ' ἐπιστήμη τῷ τὸ καθόλου γνωρίζειν ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ σελήνης ὄντες ἐωρῶμεν ἀντιφράττουσαν τὴν γῆν, οὐκ ἂν ᾔδειμεν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐκλείψεως. 40 ᾔσθανόμεθα γὰρ ἂν ὅτι νῦν ἐκλείπει, καὶ οὐ διότι ὅλως· οὐ γὰρ ᾖ τοῦ καθόλου 88 a αἰσθησις. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ θεωρεῖν τοῦτο πολλάκις συμβαῖνον τὸ καθόλου ἂν θηρεύσαντες ἀποδείξιν εἴχομεν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα πλειόνων τὸ καθόλου δῆλον. τὸ δὲ καθόλου τίμιον, ὅτι δηλοῖ τὸ αἴτιον· ὥστε περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἢ 5

¹ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγόμενα - By these "products of abstraction" the objects of mathematics are meant. In opposition to Plato and the Pythagoreans Ar. considers them not as existing καθ' αὑτά (separate entities), but as properties of sensible objects. They can be isolated only by abstraction and thus constitute the subjects of mathematical demonstration. Cp. *De anima* III 7, 431 b¹²⁻¹⁹.

² E.g. line or solid.

³ ἕνια - certain properties which can be treated as separate though they are not χωριστά.

καθόλου τιμιωτέρα τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς νοήσεως ¹, ὧσων ἕτερον τὸ αἷτιον ².
περὶ δὲ τῶν πρώτων ἄλλος λόγος.

The end of the passage refers to II 19, where knowledge of non-demonstrated first principles is dealt with.

See on Ar.'s theory of induction: L. Robin, *Aristote*, p. 56 ff., where the instance of the eclipse is cited in order to prove that in Ar.'s opinion "induction is alien to science" (*L'induction est étrangère à la Science*);—a thesis which is right in this sense that induction in itself is no demonstration and therefore does not lead *in itself* to science. It would be wrong, however, if it were taken in the sense that induction has *nothing to do with* science. The above-cited passage clearly shows that such was not the opinion of Ar., and so does the final chapter of the *An. post.* (II 19), with which we have to deal in our nr. 465.

464—The second book of the *An. post.* is concerned with definition. As we found before, of the four questions man can ask himself that of the ὅτι is preliminary to that of the διότι. In the same way that of the εἰ ἔστι leads on to that of the τί ἔστι.

Answering the last question is defining a thing. But true definition is not only nominal (e.g. eclipse is στέρῃσις φωτός); it has to mention also the cause (στέρῃσις φωτὸς ἀπὸ σελήνης ὑπὸ γῆς ἀντιφράξεως). In this sense then A. can say that the τί ἔστι and the διὰ τί are one and the same (*An. post.* II 2, 90 a¹⁵).

a. As we have seen supra, definitions belong, according to Ar., to the first principles, which are assumed in the sciences without proof.

**Definitions
first
principles**

An. post. II 3, 90 b²⁴⁻²⁵, 30-33:

Αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων ὀρισμοί, ὧν ὅτι οὐκ ἔσονται ἀποδείξεις δέδεικται πρότερον ³. —

Ὅρισμός μὲν γὰρ τοῦ τί ἔστι καὶ οὐσίας· αἱ δ' ἀποδείξεις φαίνονται πᾶσαι ὑποτιθέμεναι καὶ λαμβάνουσαι τὸ τί ἔστιν, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τί μονὰς καὶ τί τὸ περιττόν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ὁμοίως.

b. Nominal and causal definitions distinguished.

**Nominal and
causal
definitions**

Ib. II 10, 93 b²⁹⁻³², b³⁸⁻⁹⁴ a⁷:

29 Ὅρισμός δ' ἐπειδὴ λέγεται εἶναι λόγος τοῦ τί ἔστι, φανερόν ὅτι ὁ μὲν τις
32 ἔσται λόγος τοῦ τί σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα ἢ λόγος ἕτερος ὀνοματώδης ⁴, οἷον τί
σημαίνει [τί ἔστιν] τρίγωνον.

¹ What is called here νόησις anticipates the exposition of II 19, where grasping the universal from a multiplicity of concrete *data* is attributed to the νοῦς, a faculty which surpasses discursive thinking.

² περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὧσων - in the case of facts like these which have a cause other than themselves.

³ Our nr. 459.

⁴ λόγος ἕτερος ὀνοματώδης - an equivalent nominal formula.

Ἄλλος δ' ἐστὶν ὁρος λόγος ὁ δηλῶν διὰ τί ἐστίν. ὥστε ὁ μὲν πρότερος σημαί- 38
νει μὲν, δείκνυσιν δ' οὐ, ὁ δ' ὕστερος φανερόν ὅτι ἔσται οἶον ἀποδείξεις τοῦ τί 94 a
ἐστίν, τῇ θέσει ¹ διαφέρων τῆς ἀποδείξεως. διαφέρει γὰρ εἰπεῖν διὰ τί βροντᾶ
καὶ τί ἐστὶ βροντῇ· ἐρεῖ γὰρ οὕτω μὲν ² διότι ἀποσβέννυται τὸ πῦρ ἐν τοῖς
νέφεσι· τί δ' ἐστὶ βροντῇ; ψόφος ἀποσβεννυμένου πυρὸς ἐν νέφεσιν. ὥστε ὁ 5
αὐτὸς λόγος ἄλλον τρόπον λέγεται, καὶ ὥδι μὲν ἀπόδειξις συνεχῆς ³, ὥδι δὲ
ὀρισμός.

Parts of the
definition

c. The formula that definition proceeds *per genus et differentiam* (*specificam*) is not in the *Analytics*, but in the *Topica*.

Top. I 8, 103 b¹⁵:

Ὁ ὀρισμός ἐκ γένους καὶ διαφορῶν ἐστίν.

465—The final chapter of the *An. post.* deals with the question of how we come to the apprehension of first principles.

the
apprehension
of first
principles

An. post. II 19, 99 b¹⁷-100 b¹⁷:

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν, πῶς τε γίνονται γνώριμοι καὶ τίς ἡ γνωρίζουσα ἔξις,
ἐντεῦθεν ἐστὶ δῆλον προαπορήσασιν πρῶτων ⁴.

Difficulties

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐπίστασθαι δι' ἀποδείξεως μὴ γινώσκοντι τὰς 99 b¹⁷
πρώτας ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀμέσους, εἴρηται πρότερον. τῶν δ' ἀμέσων τὴν γνῶσιν,
καὶ πότερον ἢ αὐτὴ ἐστίν ἢ οὐχ ἢ αὐτὴ, διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις, καὶ πότερον ἐπι-
στήμη ἑκατέρου ⁵ ἢ οὐ, ἢ τοῦ μὲν ἐπιστήμη τοῦ δ' ἑτερόν τι γένος, καὶ πότερον
οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι αἱ ἔξεις ἐγγίνονται ἢ ἐνοῦσαι λελήθασιν. εἰ μὲν δὴ ἔχομεν αὐτάς, 25
ἄτοπον ⁶. συμβαίνει γὰρ ἀκριβεστέρας ἔχοντας γνώσεις ἀποδείξεως λανθάνειν.
εἰ δὲ λαμβάνομεν μὴ ἔχοντες πρότερον, πῶς ἂν γνωρίζοιμεν καὶ μανθάνοιμεν
ἐκ μὴ προϋπαρχούσης γνώσεως; ἀδύνατον γάρ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως 30
ἐλέγομεν. φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐτ' ἔχειν οἶόν τε, οὐτ' ἀγνοοῦσι καὶ μηδεμίαν
ἔχουσιν ἔξιν ἐγγίνεσθαι. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἔχειν μὲν τινα δύναμιν, μὴ τοιαύτην δ'
First stage: αἰσθησις
ἔχειν ἢ ἔσται τούτων τιμιωτέρα κατ' ἀκρίβειαν. φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο γε πᾶσιν
ὑπάρχον τοῖς ζώοις. ἔχει γὰρ δύναμιν σύμφυτον κριτικὴν, ἣν καλοῦσιν αἰσθησιν. 35
Ἐνούσης δ' αἰσθησεως τοῖς μὲν τῶν ζώων ἐγγίνεται μονὴ τοῦ αἰσθήματος,

Solution

First stage:
αἰσθησις

¹ τῇ θέσει - in the arrangement of its terms.

² οὕτω μὲν - in the first case.

³ "Demonstration, like a line, is continuous, because its premisses are parts which are conterminous (as linked by middle terms), and there is a movement from premisses to conclusion. Definition resembles rather the indivisible simplicity of a point" (G. R. G. Mure).

⁴ προαπορήσασιν πρῶτων - by raising some preliminary problems.

⁵ πότερον ἐπιστήμη ἑκατέρου - whether there is scientific knowledge of both, sc. as well of the primary premisses as of demonstrative knowledge.

⁶ ἄτοπον - it leads to impossible consequences.

- τοῖς δ' οὐκ ἐγγίνεται. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν μὴ ἐγγίνεται, ἢ ὅλως ἢ περὶ αὐτὴ μὴ ἐγγίνεται, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις γινώσις ἕξω τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι· ἐν οἷς δ' ἔνεστιν αἰσθανομένοις
- 00 a ἔχειν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. πολλῶν δὲ τοιούτων γινομένων ἤδη διαφορά τις γίνεται, ὥστε τοῖς μὲν γίνεσθαι λόγον ἐκ τῆς τῶν τοιούτων μονῆς, τοῖς δὲ μὴ.
- 3 Ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλὰκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομένης ἐμπειρία· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνήμαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐμπειρία μία ἐστίν.
- 6 Ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας ἡ ἐκ παντὸς ἡρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἐνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἐν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης.
- 10 Οὔτε δὴ ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀφωρισμένοι ¹ αἱ ἕξεις, οὐτ' ἀπ' ἄλλων ἕξεων γίνονται γνωστικωτέρων, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως, οἷον ἐν μάχῃ τροπῆς γενομένης ἐνὸς στάντος ἕτερος ἔστη, εἴθ' ἕτερος, ἕως ἐπὶ ἀρχὴν ἦλθεν ². ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ὑπάρχει τοιαύτη οὔσα οἷα δύνασθαι πάσχειν τοῦτο.
- 15 Ὅ δ' ἐλέχθη μὲν πάλαι, οὐ σαφῶς δὲ ἐλέχθη, πάλιν εἴπωμεν. στάντος γὰρ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἐνός ³, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καθόλου (καὶ γὰρ αἰσθάνεται μὲν τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δ' αἰσθησις τοῦ καθόλου ἐστίν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' οὐ
- 00 b Καλλίου ἀνθρώπου) πάλιν ἐν τούτοις ἴσταιται, ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀμερῇ στῇ καὶ τὰ καθόλου ⁴, οἷον τοιονδὶ ζῶον, ἕως ζῶον· καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὡσαύτως ⁵. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγῇ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ αἰσθησις οὕτω τὸ καθόλου ἐμποιεῖ.
- 5 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξεων, αἷς ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν αἰεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ψεῦδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός, ἀληθὴ δ' αἰεὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο γένος ἢ νοῦς, αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ
- 10 τῶν ἀποδείξεων γνωριμώτεραι, ἐπιστήμη δ' ἅπασα μετὰ λόγου ἐστὶ ⁶, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδὲν ἀληθέστερον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦν, νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐκ τε τούτων σκοποῦσι καὶ ὅτι ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ὥστ' οὐδ' ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν
- 15 ἄλλο παρ' ἐπιστήμην γένος ἔχομεν ἀληθές, νοῦς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμης ἀρχή. καὶ

Second
stage:
μνήμη

Third stage:
ἐμπειρία

Fourth stage:
τέχνη
and
ἐπιστήμη

Knowledge
of primary
premises
by induction

Intuition
apprehends
the primary
premises

¹ οὔτε - ἀφωρισμένοι: these states of knowledge are neither innate in a determinate form, nor —.

² ἕως - ἦλθεν: until the original formation has been restored.

³ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἐνός - one of a number of logically indiscriminable particulars.

⁴ τὰ ἀμερῇ - καὶ τὰ καθόλου: "the indivisible concepts, the true universals", i.e. the categories, which are *par excellence* universal and are indivisible because not constituted of genus and differentia. Cp. *Metaph.* M 8, 1084 b¹⁴; Δ 25, 1023 b²⁴ (Note of G. R. G. Mure).

⁵ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὡσαύτως - "which by the same process is a step towards a further generalization" (Mure).

⁶ μετὰ λόγου ἐστὶ: "and all scientific knowledge is discursive" —.

ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴη ἄν, ἡ δὲ πᾶσα ὁμοίως ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πᾶν πρᾶγμα¹.

From this passage it is clear, (1) that indeed in Ar.'s opinion sense-perception is at the basis of all human knowledge (the scholastic adagium: *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*. Cp. Kant, the opening sentence of the Kr. d. r. V.: "Dass alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anfangt, daran ist gar kein Zweifel");

(2) that knowledge is reached only by the function of a higher intellectual faculty, which he calls *noûs* (the *intellectus agens* of the scholastics). This faculty grasps directly the intelligible, which is one, out of the multiplicity of sense data.

Two remarks must be made in this place.

I. When we ask the question how the *noûs* can do this, Ar. answers: *The soul is so constituted as to be capable of this process*. Which means: he traces this function back to the organization of the human mind. Now by this acknowledgement what is called an *apriori*-element is introduced into Ar.'s theory of knowledge.

II. It is not sufficiently clear from the above passage that, according to Ar.'s doctrine, the intelligible appears only at the fourth stage of the process of knowledge. Between *μνήμη* and *ἐμπειρία* he speaks of a *logos* which arises out of the persistence of sense-impressions. By no means could this term be translated here by "notion", a notion being reached, according to Ar.'s account, only after experience, "when the universal has come to rest within the soul", being "one beside the many", and "residing as an identity in all the particular subjects".

Instead of the word *logos*, which is used by Ar. somewhat vaguely in 100 a², he uses later (in the *De anima*) the term *phantasma*, which indicates the sensible image resulting from sense-perception by memory. In this way Thomas Aquinas says: "Phantasma est intelligibile in potentia", and: "Abstrahit intellectus agens species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus"².

III. A third remark must be added. In 100 b¹⁻³ Ar. speaks very shortly of that process of generalization, which he calls elsewhere ἀφαίρεσις. Mathematical abstraction, which is called "abstraction of the second degree" by scholastics, is dealt with in two passages of the *De anima*, namely II 6, 418 a⁷⁻²⁵ and III 1, 425 a¹³⁻²⁰. See our chapter XVI, § 2, nr. 641.

6—THE TOPICS AND DE SOPHISTICIS ELENCHIS

Topica

466—We had to cite the *Topics* several times in dealing with the *Analytics*. On the general character of the work see our nr. **435a, b**.

De soph. el.

467—The Π. σοφ. ἐλ. deals with fallacies.

a—*De soph. el.* I 1, 164 a²⁰⁻²²:

Περὶ δὲ τῶν σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων καὶ τῶν φαινομένων μὲν ἐλέγχων ὄντων δὲ παραλογισμῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐλέγχων λέγωμεν, ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων.

¹ ἡ δὲ πᾶσα - πρὸς τὸ πᾶν πρᾶγμα: "while science as a whole is similarly related as originative source to the whole body of fact" (Mure).

² S. Th. I 85, 1, ad 4.

Καὶ adds a defining expression.

b. Ib., 164 b²⁷-165 a⁴:

What are
ἐλεγχοί

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τινῶν ἐστὶ τεθέντων ὥστε λέγειν ἕτερόν τι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν κειμένων διὰ τῶν κειμένων, ἐλεγχος δὲ συλλογισμὸς μετ' ἀντιφάσεως τοῦ συμπεράσματος. οἱ δὲ ¹ τοῦτο ποιοῦσι μὲν οὐ, δοκοῦσι δὲ διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας.

468—Ar. divides them into two main groups: (1) the *sophismata in dictione* (παρὰ ² τὴν λέξιν), where the deceitfulness appears in the form; (2) *sophismata extra dictionem* (ἔξω τῆς λέξεως), where the fallacy can be seen only when the contents is regarded.

a. *De soph. el.* I 4, 165 b²³⁻²⁴:

Two main
groups

Τρόποι δ' εἰσὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐλέγχειν δύο· οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰσι παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἱ δ' ἔξω τῆς λέξεως.

b. Ib., b ²⁴⁻²⁷:

Sophismata
in dictione

Ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ² ἐμποιοῦντα τὴν φαντασίαν ἐξ τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὁμωνυμία, ἀμφιβολία, σύνθεσις, διαίρεσις, προσωδία, σχῆμα λέξεως.

Ar. explains them in the following pages (165 b³⁰-166 b²⁰).

(1) *Equivocation*: ambiguity in a word. When a term is used in a double sense in a syllogism, this syllogism has not three but four terms (*quaternio terminorum*), which is a breach of one of the first rules of the syllogism.

(2) *Amphiboly*: ambiguity in a sentence, e.g. when we cannot see which word is subject and which is object.

(3) *Composition*: when words are wrongly combined, e.g. "A man can walk while sitting, and can write while not writing".

(4) *Division*: by wrong separation of the words. E.g. 5 is 2 and 3.

(5) *Accent*: wrong interpretation of written words by changing the accent, e.g. pronouncing οὐ in stead of οὔ.

(6) *Figura dictionis*: misunderstanding caused by the grammatical form of a word, e.g. a masculine word with a female ending, etc.

c. Ib., 166 b²¹⁻²⁷:

Extra
dictionem

Τῶν δ' ἔξω τῆς λέξεως παραλογισμῶν εἶδη ἐστὶν ἑπτὰ, ἐν μὲν παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἢ μὴ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πῇ ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ πρὸς τι λέγεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἄγνοιαν, τέταρτον δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον, πέμπτον δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν, ἕκτον δὲ τὸ μὴ αἴτιον ὡς αἴτιον τιθέναι, ἑβδομον δὲ τὸ τὰ πλείω ἐρωτήματα ἐν ποιεῖν.

¹ sc. the sophists.

² An analogy with the expression σοφίσματα παρὰ τὴν λέξιν might be found in *Metaph.* E 4, 1027 b¹⁹: τὸ δὲ ὡς ἀληθὲς ὄν καὶ μὴ ὄν ὡς ψεῦδος, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ σύνθεσιν ἐστὶ καὶ διαίρεσιν,—("since they depend upon"—).

These fallacies are explained in ch. 5.

(1) *Accidens*: whenever any attribute is claimed to belong in a like manner to a thing and to its accident. E.g.: "If Coriscus be different from "man", he is different from himself: for he is a man".

(2) *A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*: whenever an expression used in a particular sense is taken as though it were used absolutely. E.g.: "If what is not is the object of an opinion, then what is not is".

(3) *Ignoratio elenchi*: to give a merely apparent refutation, e.g. by contradicting not really the same attribute but merely the name, or by proving that the attribute cannot be predicated of the subject, but not in the same respect and in the same way in which it was asserted.

(4) *Consequens*: whenever people suppose that the relation of consequens is convertible. E.g. bile is supposed to be honey because honey is attended by a yellow colour; also, since after rain the ground is wet in consequence, we suppose that if the ground is wet, it has been raining.

(5) *Petitio principii*: assumption of the original point to be proved.

(6) *Non causa pro causa*: whenever what is not a cause is inserted in the argument as though the refutation depended on it. I.e.: people try to refute a thesis by refuting a premiss which had not been assumed as such.

(7) *Facere ex pluribus interrogationibus unam*: whenever the plurality is undetected and a single answer is returned as if to a single question. E.g., when part is good and part bad, "Is the whole good or bad?"

Some instances of σοφιστικοί ἐλεγχοί may be found in our nr. 197.

THIRTEENTH CHAPTER

ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

I—INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

469—Ar.'s philosophy of nature is not only found in his physical treatises (*Phys.*, *De caelo*, *De gen. et corr.*, *Meteor.*), in which anorganic nature is treated of, but also in those which deal with organic nature, the biological works. Nature is, according to Ar., principle of motion. Now the theory of motion is expounded by Ar. in his *Phys.*, and books I and II of this work, forming a general introduction to this theory, are at the same time a philosophical introduction to the whole of Ar.'s physical and biological works. On the other hand, the general philosophical principles, which have been expounded in the introductory books of the *Physics*, can be illustrated not only by the cosmological theory of the *De caelo*, by the theory of generation and passing away of beings and their qualities in *De gen. et corr.* and by that of atmospheric phenomena in the *Meteor.*; they can as well be commented on by numerous passages from the biological works. As A. Mansion put it in his excellent *Introduction à la physique aristotélicienne*: "Aristote se commente excellemment lui-même".

Philosophical unity of Ar.'s works on nature

That this whole group of treatises was conceived by Ar. as a unity, can be seen from the introduction to the *Meteorologica*:

Meteor. I 1, 338 a²⁰-b²², 339 a⁵-10.

20 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων τῆς φύσεως καὶ περὶ πάσης κινήσεως φυσικῆς, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἄνω φορὰν διακεκοσμημένων ἄστρον καὶ περὶ τῶν στοιχείων τῶν σωματικῶν, πόσα τε καὶ ποῖα, καὶ τῆς εἰς ἄλλα μεταβολῆς, καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῆς κοινῆς εἴρηται πρότερον. λοιπὸν
25 δ' ἐστὶ μέρος τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης ἔτι θεωρητέον, ὃ πάντες οἱ πρότερον μετεωρολογίαν ἐκάλουν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα συμβαίνει κατὰ φύσιν μὲν, ἀτακτοτέραν μέντοι τῆς τοῦ πρώτου στοιχείου τῶν σωμάτων, περὶ τὸν γειτνιῶντα μάλιστα τόπον τῇ φορᾷ τῶν ἄστρον. — (Follows an enumeration of this kind of phenomena: the Milky Way, comets and shooting stars, ἀέρος κοινὰ πάθη καὶ ὕδατος, 39 a5 winds and earthquakes etc.). Διεληθόντες δὲ περὶ τούτων, θεωρήσωμεν εἴ τι δυνάμεθα κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι περὶ ζῳων καὶ φυτῶν,

καθόλου τε καὶ χωρὶς· σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτων ῥηθέντων τέλος ἂν εἴη γεγονὸς τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡμῖν προαιρέσεως πάσης. ὧδ' οὖν ἀρξάμενοι λέγωμεν περὶ αὐτῶν πρῶτον.

10

Division of the Physics

The opening sentence of this passage (Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων τῆς φύσεως καὶ περὶ πάσης κινήσεως φυσικῆς — εἴρηται πρότερον) points to a division of the *Phys.* into two parts: (1) *on the causes* (bb. I and II), (2) *on motion* (bb. III-VIII). The distinction is not so clearly made by the ancient commentators. It has been re-established by A. Mansion.

2—THE FIRST BOOK OF THE PHYSICS

Introductory chapter

470—*Phys.* I 1, 184 a¹⁰-b¹⁴:

Ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι συμβαίνει περὶ πάσας τὰς μεθόδους, ὧν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἰτία ἢ στοιχεῖα, ἐκ τοῦ ταῦτα γνωρίζειν (τότε γὰρ οἴομεθα γινώσκειν ἕκαστον, ὅταν τὰ αἰτία γνωρίσωμεν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας καὶ μέχρι τῶν στοιχείων), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης πειρατέον διορίσασθαι πρῶτον τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ¹.

15

Πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτά ἡμῖν τε γνῶριμα καὶ ἀπλῶς ². Διόπερ ἀνάγκη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φύσει ἡμῖν δὲ σαφέστερων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα. Ἔστι δ' ²⁰ ἡμῖν πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον· ὕστερον δ' ἐκ τούτων γίνεται γνῶριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαιροῦσι ταῦτα ³. Διὸ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἐπὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα δεῖ προιέναι. Τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον, τὸ δὲ καθόλου ὅλον τί ἐστίν· πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ ²⁵ καθόλου ⁴.

Πέπονθε δὲ ταῦτ' οὗτο τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πρὸς τὸν λόγον· 184 b ὅλον γάρ τι καὶ ἀδιορίστως σημαίνει, οἷον ὁ κύκλος· ὁ δὲ ὀρισμὸς αὐτοῦ διαιρεῖ εἰς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. Καὶ τὰ παιδία τὸ μὲν πρῶτον προσαγορεύει πάντας τοὺς ἀνδρας πατέρας καὶ μητέρας τὰς γυναῖκας, ὕστερον δὲ διορίζει τούτων ἑκάτερον.

One ἀρχή or many?

471—*a. Phys.* I 2, 184 b¹⁵⁻²²:

Ἀνάγκη δ' ἦτοι μίαν εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ πλείους, καὶ εἰ μίαν, ἦτοι ἀκίνητον, ¹⁵ ὡς φησι Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσος, ἢ κινουμένην, ὥσπερ οἱ φυσικοί, οἱ μὲν ἀέρα φάσκοντες εἶναι οἱ δ' ὕδωρ τὴν πρώτην ἀρχὴν· εἰ δὲ πλείους, ἡ πεπερασ-

¹ The principle that we can only be said to have knowledge if we know the causes of a phenomenon, is more than once repeated by Ar. Cp. *Metaph.* A 1, where the difference between ἐμπειρία and τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη is marked in this way, that the first knows only the ὅτι, the latter also the διότι.

² ἀπλῶς - absolutely.

³ διαιροῦσι ταῦτα - "if we analyse them".

⁴ "For the universal comprehends many things within it, like parts".

μένας ἢ ἀπείρους, καὶ εἰ πεπερασμένας πλείους δὲ μίᾱς, ἢ δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρας ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ ἀριθμόν, καὶ εἰ ἀπείρους, ἢ οὕτως ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος, τὸ γένος ἓν, σχήματι δὲ ἢ εἶδει διαφερούσας, ἢ καὶ ἐναντίας.

b. Ib., 184 b²⁵-185 a⁵; ib., a¹²⁻¹⁴:

The Eleatic
thesis
excluded

185 a Τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰ ἐν καὶ ἀκίνητον τὸ ὃν σκοπεῖν οὐ περὶ φύσεώς ἐστι σκοπεῖν· ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τῷ γεωμέτρῃ οὐκέτι λόγος ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀνελόντα τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἐτέρας ἐπιστήμης ἢ πασῶν κοινῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τῷ περὶ ἀρχῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀρχὴ ἐστίν, εἰ ἐν μόνον καὶ οὕτως ἓν ἐστίν. Ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τινὸς ἢ τινῶν ¹.—
'Ἡμῖν δ' ὑποκείσθω τὰ φύσει ἢ πάντα ἢ ἓν αἰνούμενα εἶναι· δῆλον δ' ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς ².

472—a. Ib., 185 a²⁰-b⁵:

Refutation
of the Eleatic
thesis ex
parte entis

0, 21 Ἀρχὴ δὲ οἰκειοτάτῃ πασῶν, ἐπειδὴ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ὃν, ἰδεῖν πῶς λέγουσιν οἱ λέγοντες εἶναι ἐν τὰ πάντα, πότερον οὐσίαν τὰ πάντα ἢ ποσὰ ἢ ποιὰ, καὶ πάλιν πότερον οὐσίαν μίαν τὰ πάντα, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἓνα ἢ ἵππον
25 ἓνα ἢ ψυχὴν μίαν, ἢ ποιὸν ἐν δὲ τοῦτο, οἷον λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν τοιούτων. Ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα διαφέρει τε πολὺ καὶ ἀδύνατα λέγειν. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔσται καὶ οὐσία καὶ ποσὸν καὶ ποιόν, καὶ ταῦτα εἴτ' ἀπολελυμένα ἀπ' ἄλλήλων εἴτε μὴ, πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα. Εἰ δὲ πάντα ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν, εἴτ' οὐσης οὐσίας
30 εἴτε μὴ οὐσης, ἄτοπον, εἰ δὲ ἄτοπον λέγειν τὸ ἀδύνατον. Οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων χωριστόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν· πάντα γὰρ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς οὐσίας λέγεται. Μέλισσος δὲ τὸ ὃν ἄπειρον εἶναι φησιν. Ποσὸν ἄρα τι τὸ ὃν· τὸ γὰρ
185 b ἄπειρον ἐν τῷ ποσῷ, οὐσίαν δὲ ἄπειρον εἶναι ἢ ποιότητα ἢ πάθος οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, εἰ ἅμα καὶ ποσὰ ἄττα εἶεν· ὁ γὰρ τοῦ ἀπείρου λόγος τῷ ποσῷ προσχρῆται, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὐσία οὐδὲ τῷ ποιῷ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν καὶ οὐσία
5 ἐστὶ καὶ ποσόν, δύο καὶ οὐχ ἓν τὸ ὃν· εἰ δ' οὐσία μόνον, οὐκ ἄπειρον, οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἔξει οὐδέν· ποσὸν γὰρ τι ἔσται.

b. Ib., 185 b⁵⁻²⁵:

Refutation
ex parte
unius

5, 6 Ἐτι ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν πολλαχῶς λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὃν, σκεπτέον τίνα τρόπον λέγουσιν εἶναι ἐν τὸ πᾶν. Λέγεται δ' ἐν ἢ τὸ συνεχές ἢ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον ἢ ὦν ὁ λόγος ³ ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ εἰς ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὥσπερ μέθυ καὶ οἶνος. Εἰ μὲν
10 τοίνυν συνεχές, πολλὰ τὸ ἐν· εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ διαίρετόν τὸ συνεχές.

Ἐχει δ' ἀπορίαν περὶ τοῦ μέρους καὶ τοῦ ὅλου, ἴσως δὲ οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ⁴

¹ I.e.: an inquiry into principles—or into *the* first principle—always presupposes a multiplicity.

² Which means: Ar. starts from the concrete reality of movement. A hypothesis which destroys this elementary fact has no sense.

³ λόγος - definition, essence.

⁴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον - relevant to the present argument.

ἀλλ' αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτήν, πότερον ἐν ἡ πλείω τὸ μέρος καὶ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ πῶς ἐν ἡ πλείω, καὶ εἰ πλείω, πῶς πλείω, καὶ περὶ τῶν μερῶν τῶν μὴ συνεχῶν· καὶ εἰ τῷ ὅλῳ ἐν ἑκάτερον ὡς ἀδιαίρετον, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς.

15

Ἄλλὰ μὴν εἰ ὡς ἀδιαίρετον, οὐθὲν ἔσται ποσὸν οὐδὲ ποιόν, οὐδὲ δὴ ἄπειρον τὸ ὄν, ὥσπερ Μέλισσός φησιν, οὐδὲ πεπερασμένον, ὥσπερ Παρμενίδης· τὸ γὰρ πέρας ἀδιαίρετον, οὐ τὸ πεπερασμένον.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν εἰ τῷ λόγῳ ἐν τὰ ὄντα πάντα ὡς λώπιον¹ καὶ ἱμάτιον, τὸν Ἡρα- 20 κλείτου λόγον συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτοῖς· ταῦτόν γὰρ ἔσται ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀγαθῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ὥστε ταῦτόν ἔσται ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος, καὶ οὐ περὶ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα ὁ λόγος ἔσται αὐτοῖς ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μηδέν, καὶ τὸ τοιῶδι εἶναι καὶ τοσῶδι ταῦτόν².

25

Anaxagoras
criticized

473—Having refuted the Eleatic hypothesis, Ar. examines the opinions of older physicists about the principles of physical bodies. Anaxagoras is discussed rather amply (ch. 4). He too admits, as Democritus did, an infinite number of first principles. To this thesis Ar. opposes the remark that the infinite cannot be known. There are several difficulties with the doctrine of Anaxagoras. Ar. concludes that it is better to assume a smaller and finite number of principles, as Empedocles did.

A finite
number of
principles
should be
assumed

Phys. I 4, 188 a^{17,18}:

Βέλτιόν τε ἐλάττω καὶ πεπερασμένα λαβεῖν, ὅπερ ποιεῖ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς.

474—Another correct view of the ancient physicist is, that opposites should be assumed as ἀρχαί. This is done e.g. by those who explained the genesis of the elements by rarefaction and condensation (we know this of Anaximenes, and it is said of Heraclitus too), even by Parm., who assumed two principles relative to the world of doxa, and by Democr. in his doctrine of the πλῆρες καὶ κενόν.

Opposite
principles
should be
assumed

Phys. I 5, 188 a^{26,30}:

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τάναντία πως πάντες ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχάς, δῆλον. Καὶ τοῦτο εὐλόγως· δεῖ γὰρ τὰς ἀρχάς μῆτε ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἶναι μῆτε ἐξ ἄλλων, καὶ ἐκ τούτων πάντα· τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις τοῖς πρώτοις ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, διὰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτα εἶναι μὴ ἐξ ἄλλων, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐναντία μὴ ἐξ ἀλλήλων.

How many
ἀρχαί?

475—A pair of opposites, however, is not sufficient. A third principle should be added, namely a subject, somewhat as the substratum of the contraries.

¹ λώπιον - raiment.

² "There will be no difference between quality and quantity".

a. Phys. I 6, 189 a²¹-b³:

21 Ἐπεὶ δὲ πεπερασμένοι, τὸ μὴ ποιεῖν δύο μόνον ἔχει τινὰ λόγον· ἀπορήσειε
 γὰρ ἂν τις πῶς ἢ ἡ πυκνότης τὴν μανότητα ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν ἢ αὕτη τὴν
 πυκνότητα. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλη ὁποιαοῦν ἐναντιότης· οὐ γὰρ ἡ φιλία τὸ
 25 νεῖκος συνάγει καὶ ποιεῖ τι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ νεῖκος ἐξ ἐκείνης, ἀλλ' ἄμφω
 ἕτερόν τι τρίτον. Ἐνιοὶ δὲ καὶ πλείω λαμβάνουσιν ἐξ ὧν κατασκευάζουσιν
 τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔτι καὶ τὸδε τις ἀπορήσειεν, εἰ μὴ τις
 ἑτέραν ὑποτίθῃσι τοῖς ἐναντίοις φύσιν· οὐθενὸς γὰρ ὁρῶμεν τῶν ὄντων οὐσίαν
 30 τάναντία¹. Τὴν δ' ἀρχὴν οὐ καθ' ὑποκειμένου δεῖ λέγεσθαι τινος. Ἔσται
 γὰρ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὑποκείμενον ἀρχή, καὶ πρότερον δοκεῖ τοῦ κατη-
 γορουμένου εἶναι. Ἔτι οὐκ εἶναί φαμεν οὐσίαν ἐναντίαν οὐσίᾳ². πῶς οὖν ἐκ
 μὴ οὐσίων οὐσία ἂν εἴη; ἢ πῶς ἂν πρότερον μὴ οὐσία οὐσίας εἴη;
 35 Διόπερ εἴ τις τὸν τε πρότερον ἀληθῆ νομίσειεν εἶναι λόγον καὶ τοῦτον, ἀναγ-
 189 b καῖον, εἰ μέλλει διασώσῃν ἀμφοτέρους αὐτούς, ὑποτιθέναι τι τρίτον, ὥσπερ
 φασὶν οἱ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν εἶναι λέγοντες τὸ πᾶν, οἷον ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ ἢ τὸ μεταξὺ
 τούτων.

Three
principles
necessary

Ar. seems here to come near to the conception of the older physicists—*not* Emped.—who admitted some primary element and then differentiated it by rarefaction and condensation. We shall see, however, in the following chapters that his own theory is elaborated in a very different way.

b. Rejection of any theory of four elements.

Ib., 189b¹⁹⁻²⁷:

19, 20 Εἰ δὲ τεττάρων ὄντων δύο ἔσονται ἐναντιώσεις, δεήσει χωρὶς ἑκατέρας
 ὑπάρχειν ἑτέραν τινὰ μεταξὺ φύσιν· εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀλλήλων δύνανται γεννᾶν δύο οὐσαι,
 περίεργος ἂν ἢ ἑτέρα τῶν ἐναντιώσεων εἴη. Ἀμα δὲ καὶ ἀδύνατον πλείους
 εἶναι ἐναντιώσεις τὰς πρώτας. Ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ἓν τι γένος ἐστὶ τοῦ ὄντος, ὥστε
 25 τῷ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μόνον, ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ γένει·
 αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐν ἐνὶ γένει μία ἐναντιώσις ἐστίν, πᾶσαι τε αἱ ἐναντιώσεις ἀνάγεσθαι
 δοκοῦσιν εἰς μίαν.

Not four

476—Ar. now begins to expound his own theory of the principles of “becoming” in the broadest sense. He introduces three principles: *the form* (εἶδος), *privation of the form* (στέρησις), and a *subject* (ὑποκείμενον) or matter (ὕλη). These three principles occur in every form of production.

The three
principles

¹ See the definition of οὐσία in *Categ.* 5, 2 a¹¹⁻¹³ (our nr. 438a).

² *Categ.* 5, 3 b²⁵ (439a).

First the distinction is made between "becoming" in the absolute sense (ἀπλῶς) and "becoming this or that". The first is the coming-into-being of substances, e.g. ἄνθρωπος γίγνεται or τὸ μὴ μουσικόν (what is called in scholastic terminology *generatio simpliciter*), the latter the arising of a certain determination of a subject which already existed (*generatio secundum quid*), e.g. τὸν μὴ μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον γίγνεσθαι μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον. Now in all these cases, Ar. says, there is always some pre-existing subject.

1. The
ὑποκείμενον

a. *Phys.* I 7, 190 a³¹-b¹⁰:

Πολλαχῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τῶν μὲν οὐ γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ τόδε 31
τι γίγνεσθαι, ἀπλῶς δὲ γίγνεσθαι τῶν οὐσιῶν μόνων, κατὰ μὲν τᾶλλα φανερόν
ὅτι ἀνάγκη ὑποκεῖσθαι τι τὸ γιγνόμενον· καὶ γὰρ ποσὸν καὶ ποιὸν καὶ πρὸς
ἕτερον καὶ ποτὲ καὶ ποῦ γίνεται ὑποκειμένου τινὸς διὰ τὸ μόνην τὴν οὐσίαν 35
μηθενὸς κατ' ἄλλου λέγεσθαι ὑποκειμένου, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ τῆς οὐσίας·
ὅτι δὲ καὶ αἱ οὐσίαι καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀπλῶς ὄντα ἐξ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς γίνεται, 190 b
ἐπισκοποῦντι γένοιτ' ἂν φανερόν. Ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔστι τι ὃ ὑποκεῖται, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται
τὸ γιγνόμενον, οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα ἐκ σπέρματος. Γίγνεται δὲ τὰ γιγνό-
μενα ἀπλῶς τὰ μὲν μετασχηματίζει, οἷον ἀνδριάς ἐκ χαλκοῦ, τὰ δὲ προσθέσει, 5
οἷον τὰ αὐξανόμενα, τὰ δ' ἀφαιρέσει, οἷον ἐκ τοῦ λίθου ὃ Ἐρμῆς, τὰ δὲ συνθέσει,
οἷον οἰκία, τὰ δ' ἁλλοιώσει, οἷον τὰ τρεπόμενα κατὰ τὴν ὕλην. Πάντα δὲ τὰ
οὕτω γινόμενα φανερόν ὅτι ἐξ ὑποκειμένων γίνεται. 10

It can not
always be
directly
known

b. We may not conclude from this passage that, according to Ar., the ὑποκείμενον can always be directly stated. At the end of the same chapter he tells us that, sometimes, it can be known only κατ' ἀναλογίαν.

Ib., 191 a⁷⁻¹²:

Ἡ δ' ὑποκειμένη φύσις ἐπιστητὴ κατ' ἀναλογίαν. Ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἀνδριάντα
χαλκὸς ἢ πρὸς κλίνην ξύλον ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν ἐχόντων μορφήν ἢ ὕλη καὶ
τὸ ἄμορφον ἔχει πρὶν λαβεῖν τὴν μορφήν, οὕτως αὕτη πρὸς οὐσίαν ἔχει καὶ τὸ
τόδε τι καὶ τὸ ὄν.

As he himself will explain later: the substratum, being undetermined, is not yet a "being" in the full sense: it is only *potentially* a being. It must be brought to being in the full sense by the determining form.

The term
ὕλη

c. The term ὕλη is not used in this passage. Ar. here speaks of the ὑποκείμενον or ὑποκειμένη φύσις. In the *Metaph.* the term ὕλη is generally used. E.g.:

Metaph. Z 3, 1029 a²⁰⁻²¹:

Λέγω δ' ὕλην ἢ καθ' αὐτὴν μήτε τι μήτε ποσὸν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὥρισταί τὸ ὄν.

d. The classical definition of ὕλη occurs in *Phys. I* 9, 192 a³¹⁻³²: **Its classical definition**

Λέγω γὰρ ὕλην τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον ἐκάστω, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται ἡ ἐνυπάρχοντος μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

"The primary substratum of each thing, an immanent principle from which a thing comes into being in a non-accidental way" (i.e. so that matter persists in the object which comes into being).

See further sub 496.

477. Ar. continues, *Phys. I* 7, 190 b¹⁰⁻²³:

10 "Ὡστε δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τὸ γινόμενον ἅπαν αἰὲν σύνθετόν ἐστι, καὶ ἔστι μὲν τι γινόμενον, ἔστι δὲ τι ὁ τοῦτο γίνεται, καὶ τοῦτο διττόν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἢ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. Λέγω δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι μὲν τὸ ἄμουςον, ὑπο-
15 κεῖσθαι δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀσχημοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἀμορφίαν καὶ τὴν ἀταξίαν τὸ ἀντικείμενον, τὸν δὲ χαλκὸν ἢ τὸν λίθον ἢ τὸν χρυσὸν τὸν ὑποκείμενον.

Φανερόν οὖν ὥς, εἴπερ εἰσὶν αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν φύσει ὄντων, ἐξ ὧν πρῶτων εἰσὶ καὶ γεγόνاسι μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἀλλ' ἕκαστον ὃ λέγεται κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, 20 ὅτι γίγνεται πᾶν ἐκ τε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τῆς μορφῆς· σύγκειται γὰρ ὁ μουσικὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου καὶ μουσικοῦ τρόπου τινά· διαλύσεις γὰρ [τοὺς λόγους] εἰς τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκείνων¹. Δῆλον οὖν ὥς γίνονται ἂν τὰ γιγνόμενα ἐκ τούτων.

2. the form:
μορφή
or εἶδος

For a definition of the different meanings of εἶδος Ar. refers at the end of this book (*Phys. I* 9, 192 a^{34-b1}) to the *Metaph.* Cp. our nr. 497.

478—a. The same passage continued, 190 b²³⁻²⁹:

Ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ἀριθμῷ μὲν ἓν, εἶδει δὲ δύο. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρω-
25 πος καὶ ὁ χρυσὸς καὶ ὅλως ἡ ὕλη ἀριθμητὴ· τόδε γάρ τι μᾶλλον, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίνεται τὸ γινόμενον· ἢ δὲ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ἐναντίωσις συμβεβηκός· ἐν δὲ τὸ εἶδος, οἶον ἡ τάξις ἢ ἡ μουσικὴ ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν οὕτω κατηγορουμένων.

3. The negative aspect of the subject: στέρησις

The third principle is introduced here in very concise terms. The meaning of the passage might be paraphrased as follows.

Things come to be, as it seems, by two principles: form and matter. The subject, however, has two succeeding states, which might be called the terms of the process of becoming: (1) the original state, from which it comes to be, e.g. μὴ μουσικός;

¹ "You can analyze it into the definitions of its elements" (Hardie). About the omission of the first τοὺς λόγους see the commentary of W. D. Ross on this place (p. 493).

(2) the opposite state, that which is to become, namely μουσικός. The first or negative state is called στερήσις (*privatio*), the privation of the form. The subject is in this state; it is identical with it, but *accidentally* (κατὰ συμβεβηκός), for it makes way for the form and thus it does not enter as a constituent element into the being which comes to be. So, in a certain sense, the στερήσις is no real principle of the generated being. E.g. a man is generated. Before there is "something unqualified", which is not-man.

In metaphysics the στερήσις means hardly anything; but in physics, for the explanation of coming to be, it takes a very important place, as important as that of the two other principles.

b. Ar. continues, *ib.* 190 b²⁹-191 a³:

Διὸ ἔστι μὲν ὡς δύο λεκτέον εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἔστι δ' ὡς τρεῖς· καὶ ἔστι μὲν 30 ὡς τάναντία, οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι τὸ μουσικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄμουσον ἢ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἢ τὸ ἡρμοσμένον καὶ τὸ ἀνάρμοστον, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ· ὑπ' ἀλλήλων γὰρ πάσχειν τάναντία ἀδύνατον. Λύεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ ἄλλο εἶναι τὸ ὑποκείμενον· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἐναντίον. "Ὡστε οὔτε πλείους τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ 35 ἀρχαὶ τρόπον τινά, ἀλλὰ δύο ὡς εἰπεῖν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, οὐτ' αὖ παντελῶς δύο διὰ τὸ ἕτερον ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τρεῖς· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ 191 a τὸ ἀμούσῳ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἀσχηματίστῳ καὶ χαλκῷ.

479—In the next chapter Ar. states that his theory is the true solution of the difficulties, which his predecessors were unable to solve.

**Difficulties
of predeces-
sors solved
by this
theory**

a. *Phys.* I 8, 191 a^{23, 34}:

"Ὅτι δὲ μοναχῶς οὕτω λύεται καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀπορία, λέγωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα. Ζητοῦντες γὰρ οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτοι τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν 25 τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἐξετράπησαν οἷον ὁδὸν τινα ἄλλην ἀπωσθέντες ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καὶ φασιν οὔτε γίνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν οὔτε φθεῖρεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν εἶναι γίγνεσθαι τὸ γιγνόμενον ἢ ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὄν γίνεσθαι (εἶναι γὰρ ἤδη) ἐκ τε μὴ 30 ὄντος οὐδὲν ἂν γενέσθαι· ὑποκεῖσθαι γὰρ τι δεῖ. Καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὸ ἐφεξῆς συμβαῖνον αὖξοντες¹ οὐδ' εἶναι πολλά φασιν ἀλλὰ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν. Ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν ταύτην ἔλαβον τὴν δόξαν διὰ τὰ εἰρημένα.

This is the Eleatic aporia: what comes to be must come forth either from being or from non-being. Both are impossible. Ergo —.

Ar. replies: it is possible, namely if both are admitted at the same time and in a special sense. If it is taken in the absolute sense, then, surely, nothing springs from non-being; but *accidentally* it does. For a being springs from στερήσις, which in itself is non-being. It springs from privation accidentally, because the pre-existing non-being is not admitted into the being that becomes.

And in the same way being springs from being, not essentially, but accidentally. For it is not the pre-existing being which is generated in that which comes to be.

¹ τὸ ἐφεξῆς συμβαῖνον αὖξοντες - they exaggerated the consequence of this.

But the new being springs from the pre-existing, as far as the latter contained a non-being in itself, which is now filled with a new determination.

This is expressed by Ar. in the following text.

b. Ib., 191 b¹³⁻²³:

**Solution of
the Eleatic
aporia**

Ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ φαμεν γίγνεσθαι μὲν οὐδὲν ἀπλῶς ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ὅμως
15 μέντοι γίγνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, οἷον κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς στέρησεως,
ὅ ἐστι καθ' αὐτὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐκ ἐνυπάρχοντος ¹ γίγνεται τι. Θαυμάζεται δὲ τοῦτο
καὶ ἀδύνατον οὕτω δοκεῖ, γίγνεσθαι τι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. Ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδ' ἐξ ὄντος
οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν γίγνεσθαι, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, οἷον εἰ ἐκ ζῶου ζῶον γίγνοιτο καὶ ἐκ τινὸς ζῶου τι ζῶον,
20 οἷον εἰ κύων <ἐκ κυνὸς ἢ ἵππος> ἐξ ἵππου γίγνοιτο ². Γίγνοιτο μὲν γὰρ ἂν οὐ
μόνον ἐκ τινὸς ζῶου ὁ κύων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ ζῶου, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ ζῶον· ὑπάρχει γὰρ
ἤδη τοῦτο·

The above solution borrows its terms from logic: the distinction between using a term *essentially* and *accidentally* is referred to in this chapter and illustrated by the instance "The doctor builds a house, not *qua* doctor, but *qua* housebuilder, and turns grey, not *qua* doctor, but *qua* dark-haired" (191 b⁴⁻⁵).

c. Beside this solution Ar. gives a metaphysical one: in his theory of potency and act, which is explained at length in *Metaph.* Θ. The theory is referred to here, perhaps with reference to some older treatise.

**Metaphysical
solution**

Ib., 191 b²⁷⁻²⁹:

Εἰς μὲν δὴ τρόπος οὗτος, ἄλλος δ' ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ταῦτ' ἀλέγειν κατὰ τὴν
δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν· τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἄλλοις διώρισται δι' ἀκριβείας μᾶλλον.

480—In his last chapter of this book Ar. compares his own theory of becoming with that of Plato in the *Timaeus* and shows the superiority of his own theory. He reproaches Plato for not having acknowledged the principle of *στέρησις*: relative non-being, which is *accidentally* identical with matter, but *essentially* different. Because Plato neglected this distinction, he could not solve the difficulties of Eleatic philosophy: he formally attributed to matter a kind of non-being which does not belong to it and seems to reduce it to absolute non-being.

**This theory
compared
with Plato's**

Phys. I 9, 192 a³⁻¹²:

Ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ὕλην καὶ στέρησιν ἑτερόν φαμεν εἶναι, καὶ τούτων τὸ μὲν
5 οὐκ ὄν εἶναι κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὴν ὕλην, τὴν δὲ στέρησιν καθ' αὐτήν, καὶ τὴν

¹ οὐκ ἐνυπάρχοντος - "this not surviving as a constituent of the result".

² About the insertion of the words ἐκ κυνὸς ἢ ἵππος see the comment of Ross on these lines (p. 495 f.).

μὲν ἐγγὺς καὶ οὐσίαν πως, τὴν ὕλην, τὴν δὲ στέρησιν οὐδαμῶς. Οἱ δὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ὁμοίως, ἢ τὸ συναμφοτέρον ἢ τὸ χωρὶς ἐκάτερον. Ὡστε παντελῶς ἕτερος ὁ τρόπος οὗτος τῆς τριάδος καὶ αὐτοῦ. Μέχρι μὲν γὰρ δεῦρο προῆλθον, ὅτι δεῖ τινὰ ὑποκεῖσθαι φύσιν, ταύτην μέντοι μίαν ποιοῦσιν· 10 καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις дуάδα ποιεῖ, λέγων μέγα καὶ μικρὸν αὐτήν, οὐθὲν ἦττον ταῦτο ποιεῖ· τὴν γὰρ ἑτέραν παρεῖδεν.

The meaning of Ar. is clear: by introducing his third principle (the χώρα) in *Tim.* 48 e-50 d, Plato did assume a substratum, but he did not make any distinction between the substratum as a real principle in things (see Ar.'s definition of ὕλη sub 476 d), a potential being, which can be in the full sense and only *per accidens* does not do so now, and, on the other hand, a second principle, which is in itself a non-being, namely the privation of the form which is still to be realized.

To this we might reply, that by Plato χώρα is not introduced at all as "matter" in the sense of a substratum, which is an immanent principle; but only as *space*, wherein coming to be happens to take place. Consequently, Ar. does not introduce a second principle next to Plato's principle of the Great-and-small. He introduces two totally different principles.

It should be granted, certainly, that Plato's description of becoming is difficult to understand and far from clear. On the other hand, Ar.'s hypothesis of a totally unqualified substratum contains certain difficulties. It is, finally, a purely logically construed hypothesis: a theory, which can serve as a basis for the explanation of becoming. But what corresponds with it in the order of reality, remains problematical.

3—THE SECOND BOOK OF THE PHYSICS

481—Ar. now begins to define "physis".

Phys. II I, 192 b⁸⁻²³:

What is
φύσει
and what
is not

Τῶν γὰρ ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φύσει, τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας· φύσει μὲν τὰ τε ζῷα καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ἀπλᾶ τῶν σωμάτων, οἷον γῆ καὶ 10 πῦρ καὶ ἄηρ καὶ ὕδωρ· ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φύσει φαμέν. Πάντα δὲ τὰ ῥηθέντα φαίνεται διαφέροντα πρὸς τὰ μὴ φύσει συνεστῶτα. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ φύσει ὄντα πάντα φαίνεται ἔχοντα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, τὰ μὲν κατὰ τόπον, τὰ δὲ κατ' αὐξήσιν καὶ φθίσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν· κλίνη 15 δὲ καὶ ἱμάτιον, καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ἐστίν, ἢ μὲν τετύχηκε τῆς κατηγορίας ἐκάστης καὶ καθ' ὅσον ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τέχνης, οὐδεμίαν ὁρμὴν ἔχει μεταβολῆς ἐμφυτον, ἢ δὲ συμβέβηκεν αὐτοῖς εἶναι λιθίνοις ἢ γητίνους ἢ μικτοῖς ἐκ 20 τούτων, ἔχει, καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον, ὥς οὐσης τῆς φύσεως ἀρχῆς τινὸς καὶ αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἡρεμεῖν ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει πρῶτως καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκότος.

Definition of
φύσις

"Nature is a principle of motion and rest for the thing in which it is immediately present, in virtue of itself (i.e. *essentially*) and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute" (i.e. *per accidens*).

The latter restriction excludes certain cases where nature comes very near to art. With art namely the cause works from without, with nature from within. But there are some cases where art works from within, e.g. the physician who treats himself. Yet these cases do not fall under the definition of nature, Ar. says, for here art does not belong to the subject essentially, but *per accidens*.

482—a. Ib., 192 b³²⁻³⁴:

Φύσις μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ῥηθέν· φύσιν δὲ ἔχει ὅσα τοιαύτην ἔχει ἀρχήν. Καὶ ἐστὶ πάντα ταῦτα οὐσία· ὑποκείμενον γάρ τι καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις αἰεί.

Natural things are always realized in a subject

"Each of them is a substance; for it is a subject, and nature is always realized in a subject".

Mansion¹ calls this "an expression of peripatetic realism, which indeed attributes a reality to abstract principles, but on condition of finding them in a material substratum, of which they can be separated only by thought".

b. These things, then, and their essential qualities are "according to nature".

What is called κατὰ φύσιν

Ib. 192 b³⁵⁻³⁷:

Κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ταῦτά τε καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ὑπάρχει καθ' αὐτά, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ φέρεσθαι ἄνω· τοῦτο γὰρ φύσις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἔχει φύσιν, φύσει δὲ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν.

483—Ar. now proceeds to explain his theory of the *two aspects of nature*: (1) there is a lower nature, *matter*, which is undetermined and "potential" with relation to the form; (2) a higher nature, *form*, which is intelligible (because determinate) and, by its presence, brings matter to full being (see nr. 484).

Two aspects of nature

a. Ib., 193a¹⁰⁻²¹; 28-30:

Matter

10 Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ οὐσία τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἐνίοις εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχον ἐκάστῳ ἀρρυθμιστον² <ὄν> καθ' ἑαυτό, οἷον κλίνης φύσις τὸ ξύλον, ἀνδριάντος δ' ὁ χαλκός. Σημεῖον δὲ φησιν Ἀντιφῶν³ ὅτι, εἴ τις κατορύξει κλίνην καὶ λάβοι δύναμιν ἢ σηπεδῶν ὥστε ἀνεῖναι βλαστόν, οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι 15 κλίνην ἀλλὰ ξύλον, ὡς τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκός ὑπάρχον, τὴν κατὰ νόμον διάθεσιν καὶ τὴν τέχνην, τὴν δ' οὐσίαν οὔσαν ἐκείνην ἣ καὶ διαμένει ταῦτα πάσχουσα συνεχῶς. Εἰ δὲ καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον πρὸς ἑτερόν τι ταῦτο τοῦτο πέπονθεν, οἷον ὁ μὲν χαλκός καὶ ὁ χρυσοὺς πρὸς ὕδωρ, τὰ δ' ὅσῃ καὶ ξύλα πρὸς

¹ *Introd.*, p. 100.

² τὸ πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχον ἐκάστῳ ἀρρυθμιστον <ὄν> καθ' ἑαυτό - "that immediate constituent of it which taken by itself is without arrangement" (Hardie & Gaye).

³ Diels, VS⁸ 87, B 15. Cf. Zeller I 2⁸, pp. 1324-28.

γῆν¹, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁτιοῦν, ἐκεῖνα² τὴν φύσιν εἶναι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν 20 αὐτῶν. —

“Ἐνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον οὕτως ἡ φύσις λέγεται, ἡ πρώτη ἐκάστω ὑποκειμένη 28 ὕλη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς.

“The immediate material substratum of things which gave in themselves a principle of motion or change”.

Form

b. Ib., 193a³⁰⁻³¹:

“Ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.

“The form and the type, sc. the definable form” (τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον: “which is specified in the definition of the thing”. Hardie and Gaye).

c. In the next passage Ar. explains what he means by this definition.

Ib. 193 a³¹-b⁵:

Matter with-
out form is
not yet
φύσει

“Ὡςπερ γὰρ τέχνη λέγεται τὸ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τὸ τεχνικόν, οὕτω καὶ φύσις 31 τὸ κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται καὶ τὸ φυσικόν. Οὔτε δὲ ἐκεῖ πω φαῖμεν ἂν ἔχειν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην οὐδέν, εἰ δυνάμει μόνον ἐστὶ κλίνη, μή πω δ’ ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τῆς κλίνης, οὐδ’ εἶναι τέχνην, οὔτ’ ἐν τοῖς φύσει συνισταμένοις· τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει 35 σὰρξ ἢ ὅστουν οὔτ’ ἔχει πω τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, πρὶν ἂν λάβῃ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ 193 b τὸν λόγον, ὃ ὀρίζομενοι λέγομεν τί ἐστὶ σὰρξ ἢ ὅστουν, οὔτε φύσει ἐστίν. “Ὡστε ἄλλον τρόπον ἡ φύσις ἂν εἴη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὐτοῖς κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος, οὐ χωριστὸν ὃν ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. 5

“So, in another sense, nature is the form or type of things which have in themselves a principle of motion, a form not separable from them except in thought”.

484—Real things, then, are the composites of these two constituents.

Ib. 193 b⁵⁻⁸:

The
compositum

Τὸ δ’ ἐκ τούτων φύσις μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, φύσει δέ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ μᾶλλον αὐτῇ φύσις τῆς ὕλης· ἕκαστον γὰρ τότε λέγεται ὅταν ἐντελεχέα ᾖ, μᾶλλον ἢ ὅταν δυνάμει.

Relation to
Plato's doc-
trine of
nature

485—A. Mansion, *Introd.* pp. 82-92, explained excellently how this Aristotelian conception of nature is related to that of Plato, especially in his later works, the *Tim.* and *Laws*. Plato was deeply convinced that coming to be and passing away and the existence of things cannot be caused by matter. He sought a reasonable ground for them: “that it is best for things to be as they are” (*Ph.* 96 a ff.), and, seeking this, assumed his “hypothesis” of Ideas. In *Laws* X again Pl. delivers a severe verdict on materialistic philosophy of nature: the regularity of the celestial movement can only be caused by an intelligence, a soul. Therefore, if we mean by

¹ Plato in the *Tim.* derived gold and bronze from water (59 b) and bones (64 c, 73 e) from earth.

² ἐκεῖνα - the stable element.

“nature” what is original and wants no further explanation, we should say that soul is “natural” (φύσει), not the material elements (981 c-892 c; our nr. 388).

In *Tim.* 52 d-53 b Pl. describes the χώρα before the creation of the kosmos as being filled with formless elements, in which irregular forces work and shocks occur. So there exists, according to Plato, some irrational element, next to soul and independent of it. But Pl. does not call this physis. As to Aristotle, he starts from such a physis and calls it by this name. But he does not adopt Plato’s doctrine of soul. Instead of this he gives another explanation: above the irrational nature, called *hylē*, he superposed not soul, but a superior nature, *form*. This form is *not an intelligent principle*, not a thinking and deliberating being, but it is *intelligible*: the rational element in corporeal beings.

Thus it may be said in a certain sense that to Ar. nature is rational; only not in any personal sense.

486—Ar. now asks himself three questions:

Three questions

(1) Where is the border-line between physics and mathematics? For physical bodies contain surfaces and volumes, lines and points, and these are the subject-matter of mathematics.

(2) Where is the place of astronomy? Does it belong to physics, or not?

(3) Since nature has two senses, form and matter, with which is the physicist concerned?

a. *Phys.* II 2, 193 b^{22, 25}:

1. Where is the border-line between phys. and math.?

Ἐπεὶ δὲ διώρισται ποσαχῶς ἡ φύσις λέγεται, μετὰ τοῦτο θεωρητέον τίνι διαφέρει ὁ μαθηματικὸς τοῦ φυσικοῦ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐπίπεδα καὶ στερεὰ ἔχει τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα καὶ μήκη καὶ στιγμάς, περὶ ὧν σκοπεῖ ὁ μαθηματικὸς.

b. *Ib.*, 193 b^{25, 26}:

2. The place of astronomy

Ἐτι ἡ ἀστρολογία ἑτέρα ἢ μέρος τῆς φυσικῆς.

c. *Ib.*, 194 a¹²⁻¹³, 15-11:

3. Which is the object of natural science?

Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡ φύσις διχῶς, τό τε εἶδος καὶ ἡ ὕλη, — ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις, — περὶ ποτέρας τοῦ φυσικοῦ, ἢ περὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀμοφῶν. Ἄλλ’ εἰ περὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀμοφῶν, καὶ περὶ ἑκατέρας. Πότερον οὖν τῆς αὐτῆς ἢ ἄλλης ἑκατέραν γνωρίζειν;

These questions are answered here by Ar. very shortly. They have been broadly treated by Mansion in his fifth chapter (*Introd.*, pp. 122-205).

487—The first question should be understood starting from Platonism.

First question

a. According to Ar. in *Metaph.* A 6 Plato distinguished three degrees of being: αἰσθητά — μαθηματικά — εἶδη, corresponding with three kinds of knowledge. As to the introduction of εἶδη — an imperishable and non-changing kind of being, on which the αἰσθητά depend by μέθεξις —, we

Plato’s tripartition of being

gave the texts of A 6 and M 4 in our nr. 204a and b. In A 6 Ar. continues (987 b^{14,18}):

Ἐτι δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ εἶδη τὰ μαθηματικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναι φησι μεταξὺ, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τῷ ἀτδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δ' εἰδῶν τῷ τὰ μὲν πόλλ' ἄττα ὅμοια εἶναι τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ ἐν ἑκάστων μόνον.

We know this doctrine from Pl., *Rep.* VI, 509-511¹ and VII 533-534: dialectic is placed at the top; it reaches up to true Reality and the Good. Next follows mathematical knowledge, which does not extend to contemplation of the highest Reality, because it cannot render an account of its first principles ("hypotheses"). Finally there is *doxa*, which is no knowledge in the strictest sense and cannot be so, because its object is the ever-changing nature of the sensible things. Plato has come very near to a science of nature. The essential purpose of his theory of Ideas was to explain how rational knowledge of sensible things is possible. But in the strictest sense Pl. denied it up to the end².

b. Ar. gives to physics a place in the system of sciences. True knowledge of physical objects is possible, because they contain an intelligible element within them, which is their essence: the form.

In physical objects this form is essentially joined to matter. In his *Metaph.* we shall see Ar. occupied with the question whether there exists any purely intelligible being, not joined to matter (what Ar. called "separate", χωριστόν). He answers in the affirmative. This, then, is the object of metaphysics, which is called by Ar. "first philosophy" or "theology". So we get the following tripartition of sciences:

Metaph. E I, 1026 a^{13,16}:

Ar.'s tri-
partition of
sciences

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ χωριστὰ μὲν ἄλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἔνια περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δὲ ἴσως ἄλλ' ὥς ἐν ὕλῃ· ἡ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα.

The tripartition itself is Platonic, but Ar. connects it with a different theory of knowledge, namely, his doctrine of abstraction. The objects of mathematics are the result of a further degree of abstraction than are those of physics. Physical objects, which are essentially joined to matter, cannot be separated from it, even in thought; mathematical objects, which are according to Ar. not "separate"

¹ Our nr. 294.

² *Phil.* 59 a-b. In my *Examen critique de l'interprétation traditionnelle du platonisme* (*Revue de Métaph.* 1951, pp. 249-268) I argued that in later platonism the opposition of an unchanging and immovable ideal World to that of ever-changing sensible things has broken down essentially. If it is true that in *Parm.* and *Soph.* motion was introduced by Plato into the ideal World—as I think it was—, this statement should be accepted. It does not take away the fact that, on the point in question, sc. the establishing of the possibility of natural science, Ar. has completed what Plato had begun.

(as Plato thought they are), but "somehow connected with matter", can be separated from it *in abstracto*.

This is what Ar. explains in the next passage of *Phys.* II, ch. 2.

c. *Phys.* II 2, 194 a¹⁻⁷:

Γίγνεται δ' ἂν τοῦτο δῆλον, εἴ τις ἐκατέρων πειρώτο λέγειν τοὺς ὅρους, καὶ αὐτῶν ¹ καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ περιττὸν ἔσται ² καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον, ἔτι δὲ ἀριθμὸς καὶ γραμμὴ καὶ σχῆμα ἄνευ κινήσεως, σᾶρξ δὲ καὶ ὅσπου καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐκέτι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὥσπερ ῥίς σιμὴ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥς τὸ καμπύλον λέγεται.

**Difference
between
phys. and
math. objects**

The latter are defined like "snub nose", not like "curved". σιμόν is with Ar. a classical instance of an accident, and at the same time of a form which is realized in matter. E.g. the next passage.

d. *Metaph.* E 1, 1025 b³⁰⁻³⁴:

Ἔστι δὲ τῶν ὀριζομένων καὶ τῶν τί ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ὥς τὸ σιμόν τὰ δ' ὥς τὸ κοῖλον. διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ὅτι τὸ μὲν σιμόν συνειλημμένον ἐστὶ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης (ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ σιμόν κοίλη ῥίς), ἡ δὲ κοιλότης ἄνευ ὕλης αἰσθητῆς.

488—What is the place of applied mathematics: of astronomy, optics, harmonics? In other places mechanics, too, are mentioned.

**Second
question**

These sciences have to do with natural bodies; they also treat the accidents of them. Therefore Ar. calls them τὰ φυσικώτερα τῶν μαθημάτων. E.g. his work *De caelo* is a truly physical treatise. Yet the method of these sciences is a mathematical one. Where, then, are they to be placed?

Ar. answers: The position of astronomy is similar to that of geometry. Both deal with bodies, but from a special point of view, namely, making abstraction of corporeal reality. In the same way optics are a system of geometrical relations, harmonics of arithmetical propositions, mechanics an application of stereometry. But the method of astronomy is in a certain sense the inverse of that of geometry.

Ar. explains this in the passage following that which has been cited sub 487c.

a. *Phys.* II 2, 194 a⁷⁻¹²:

Δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ φυσικώτερα τῶν μαθημάτων, οἷον ὀπτική καὶ ἁρμονική καὶ ἀστρολογία· ἀνάπαλιν γὰρ τρόπον τιν' ἔχουσι τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ γεωμετρία περὶ γραμμῆς φυσικῆς σκοπεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ φυσική, ἡ δ' ὀπτική μαθηματικὴν μὲν γραμμὴν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ μαθηματική ἀλλ' ἡ φυσική.

**The method
of applied
mathematics**

What he means to say is: astronomy etc. follow a mathematical method, but they have to return to physical reality and there apply the mathematical relations found by abstraction. Cp. *Metaph.* B 2, 997 b¹⁴⁻³⁵, where Ar. argues (against the platonic hypothesis of an intermediate world of mathematical objects, existing separately) that astronomy has to deal with the actual heavens of our world.

¹ αὐτῶν - the subjects.

² ἔσται - to be linked with ἄνευ κινήσεως.

b. On the other hand, Ar. repeatedly teaches that sciences, the object of which is realized in phenomena and which therefore have to do directly with concrete things, are by this very reason less accurate, because the object is more complicated. E.g.

Metaph. A 2, 982 a²⁶⁻²⁸:

Ἀκριβέσταται δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσὶν (αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων¹ ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγομένων², ὅλον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας).

Nearly the same is said in *An. post.* I 27, 87 a³¹ (supra, nr. 462).

Third
question

489—Which "nature" is the object of physics: form or matter?
Ar. answers: both.

Both matter
and form
are the
object of
physics

Phys. II 2, 194 a¹²⁻¹⁵:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ φύσις διχῶς, τό τε εἶδος καὶ ἡ ὕλη, ὥς ἂν εἰ περὶ σιμότητος σκοποῖμεν τί ἐστίν, οὕτω θεωρητέον. Ὡστ' οὐτ' ἄνευ ὕλης τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔτε κατὰ τὴν ὕλην.

Pre-socratic philosophers dealt almost exclusively with matter, e.g. Empedocles and Democritus. To their view Ar. opposes the subordination of matter to form. Hence follows that for the physicist form is of primary importance.

Matter and
form are
the object
of the same
science?

490—Ar. also asks the question whether the two aspects of nature belong to one and the same science or to a different one. He answers that both belong to the same, and illustrates this by the analogy of art; e.g. the building of a house.

First
argument:
the analogy
of art

a. *Phys.* II 2, 194 a²¹⁻²⁷:

Εἰ δὲ ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν, τῆς δὲ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης εἰδέναι τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ὕλην μέχρι τοῦ (ὅλον ἱατροῦ ὑγίειαν καὶ χολὴν καὶ φλέγμα, ἐν οἷς ἡ ὑγίεια, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἰκοδόμου τό τε εἶδος τῆς οἰκίας καὶ τὴν ὕλην, ὅτι πλίνθοι καὶ ξύλα· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), καὶ τῆς φυσικῆς ἂν εἴη τὸ γνωρίζειν ἀμφοτέρως τὰς φύσεις.

Second
argument:
teleology in
nature

b. *Ib.*, 194 a²⁷⁻³⁶; 194 b⁷⁻⁸:

Ἔτι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς αὐτῆς καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἔνεκα³. Ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα· ὦν γὰρ συνεχοῦς τῆς κινήσεως οὕσης ἔστι τι τέλος τῆς κινήσεως, τοῦτο ἔσχατον καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα. Διὸ καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς⁴ γελοῖως

¹ αἱ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων - those which involve fewer principles.

² αἱ ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγόμεναι - those which involve additional principles (Ross).

³ τῆς αὐτῆς (sc. ἐπιστήμης) καὶ - eiusdem ac.

⁴ ὁ ποιητὴς - sc. Euripides, in a play unknown to us.

προήχθη εἰπεῖν »ἔχει τελευτήν, ἥσπερ οὐνεκ' ἐγένετο«. Βούλεται γὰρ οὐ πᾶν εἶναι τὸ ἔσχατον τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον· ἐπεὶ καὶ ποιοῦσιν αἱ τέχναι τὴν ὕλην αἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς αἱ δὲ εὐεργόν¹, καὶ χρώμεθα ὡς ἡμῶν ἕνεκα πάντων ὑπαρχόντων. Ἐσμὲν γάρ πως καὶ ἡμεῖς τέλος· διχῶς γάρ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα². — Ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν τὴν ὕλην τοῦ ἔργου ἕνεκα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ὑπάρχει οὐσα.

c. Ib., 194 b⁸⁻⁹:

Ἔτι τῶν πρὸς τι ἡ ὕλη· ἄλλω γὰρ εἶδει ἄλλη ὕλη.

Which means: Form and matter are correlatives. They claim each other mutually. But form can exist without matter (not in physical objects, but as object of metaphysics), matter cannot without form. Therefore Ar. says that matter belongs to the πρὸς τι.

**Third
argument:
matter and
form are
correlatives**

491—Hence, in the final passage of our chapter the author speaks about metaphysics, as it should be distinguished from physics.

**The border-
line between
phys. and
metaph.**

Phys. II 2, 194 b⁹⁻¹⁵:

Μέχρι δὴ πόσου τὸν φυσικὸν δεῖ εἰδέναι τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ τί ἐστίν; ἡ ὥσπερ ἱατρὸν νεῦρον ἢ χαλκία χαλκόν, μέχρι του; Τινὸς γὰρ ἕνεκα ἕκαστον, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἃ ἐστὶ χωριστὰ μὲν εἶδει, ἐν ὕλῃ δέ. Ἀνθρώπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ καὶ ἡλιος. Πῶς δ' ἔχει τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τί ἐστὶ, φιλοσοφίας τῆς πρώτης διορίσαι ἔργον.

The meaning of this passage is: physics have to do with the *eidos* up to a certain point, namely, until the physicist understands the purpose of each thing. He has not to do with the *eidos* as far as this can exist in itself, not joined to matter. For in that sense the *eidos* is the object of a different science: metaphysics. Physical objects, however, are always form joined to matter. "Man is begotten by man, and by the sun as well".—The author means: physical generation can be explained from itself. A metaphysical man-in-himself is of no use to it. Organic beings generate themselves, "together with the sun"—because the heavenly bodies, especially the sun, have an important part in the physical process of generation.

492—The next chapter (3) deals with the four causes, a subject which is continued in ch. 7 and 8, where the author argues that form is properly the cause of things. Having treated the questions of τύχη and αὐτόματον, which are also considered as causes of things, in chapters 4-6, he applies in his last chapter (9) the principle of the final cause to the problem of

**Chapters
3-9**

¹ Some arts make the matter (from something different), others make it more serviceable (e.g. when iron is melted).

² From *De anima* 415 b² we know what Ar. means by this distinction: τὸ δ' οὐ ἕνεκα διττόν· τὸ μὲν οὐ, τὸ δὲ ὤ. E.g. in one sense health is the οὐ ἕνεκα of the medical art; in another sense the patient is.

the necessity of physical phenomena. This necessity does not proceed from antecedents to consequences, but inversely: the final cause is of primary importance.

This is the main thesis of Ar.'s natural philosophy.

the four causes 493—*Phys.* II 3, 194 b²³-195 a³:

- causa materialis** "Ἐνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον αἷτιον λέγεται τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίνεται τι ἐνυπάρχοντος, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος τῆς φιάλης καὶ τὰ τούτων γένη. 25
- c. formalis** "Ἄλλον δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη, οἷον τοῦ διὰ πασῶν τὰ δύο πρὸς ἓν, καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ¹.
- c. efficiens** "Ἐτι ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἡρεμήσεως, οἷον ὁ βουλευσας 30 αἷτιος, καὶ ὁ πατήρ τοῦ τέκνου, καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον τοῦ μεταβαλλομένου.
- c. finalis** "Ἐτι ὡς τὸ τέλος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον τοῦ περιπατεῖν ἡ ὑγίεια· διὰ τί γὰρ περιπατεῖ; φαμὲν ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ, καὶ εἰπόντες οὕτως οἰόμεθα ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸ αἷτιον. Καὶ ὅσα δὴ κινήσαντος ἄλλου μεταξὺ γίγνεται τοῦ τέλους, 35 οἷον τῆς ὑγείας ἡ ἰσχυασία ἢ ἡ κάθαρσις ἢ τὰ φάρμακα ἢ τὰ ὄργανα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τοῦ τέλους ἕνεκά ἐστι, διαφέρει δ' ἀλλήλων ὡς ὄντα τὰ μὲν ἔργα τὰ δ' ὄργανα.

Instances 494—**a.** *Metaph.* H 4, 1044 a³²-1044 b¹:

"Ὅταν δὴ τις ζητῇ τὸ αἷτιον, ἐπεὶ πλεοναχῶς τὰ αἷτια λέγεται, πάσας δεῖ λέγειν τὰς ἐνδεχομένας αἰτίας. οἷον ἀνθρώπου τίς αἰτία ὡς ὕλη; ἄρα τὰ καταμήνια; τί δ' ὡς κινεῖν; ἄρα τὸ σπέρμα; τί δ' ὡς τὸ εἶδος; τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. τί δ' ὡς οὗ ἕνεκα; τὸ τέλος.

b. *Metaph.* B 2, 996 b⁵⁻⁸:

Ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ πάντα τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς τῶν αἰτίων ὑπάρχειν, οἷον οἰκίας ὅθεν μὲν ἡ κίνησις ἢ τέχνη καὶ ὁ οἰκοδόμος, οὗ δ' ἕνεκα τὸ ἔργον², ὕλη δὲ γῆ καὶ λίθοι, τὸ δ' εἶδος³ ὁ λόγος.

In the last example it is clear that the formal cause is identical with the final, only seen from a different point of view. In a sense the form is the efficient cause, too. For the notion of "house" works as an idea which is present in the mind of the architect and directs his activity.—The

¹ τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ - the parts in the definition.

² Final cause is the ἔργον, i.e. the function of the house: "giving shelter to things and bodies", as is said in the definition of *Metaph.* H 2, 1043 a¹⁶ (ἀγγεῖον σκοπεαστικὸν χρημάτων καὶ σωμάτων), and again in *De anima* I 1, 403 b³.

³ Formal cause is the notion "house", the definition.

same might be remarked as to the first instance, and so it is generally with natural beings. For the form, which is within them, is the cause of their motion (growth), and it is at the same time the end.

This is expressed by Ar. in the next passage.

495—Phys. II 7, 198 a²²⁻²⁹:

Ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ αἰτίαι τέτταρες, περὶ πασῶν τοῦ φυσικοῦ εἰδέναι, καὶ εἰς πάσας ἀνάγκη τὸ διὰ τί ἀποδώσει φυσικῶς, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ εἶδος, τὸ κινήσαν, τὸ οὐ
 25 ἔνεκα. Ἐρχεται δὲ τὰ τρία εἰς ἓν πολλάκις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἓν ἐστὶ, τὸ δ' ὅθεν ἢ κίνησις πρῶτον τῷ εἶδει ταῦτό τοῦτοις· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ. Καὶ ὅλως ὅσα κινούμενα κινεῖ· ὅσα δὲ μή, οὐκέτι φυσικῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντα κίνησιν οὐδ' ἀρχὴν κινήσεως κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀκίνητα ὄντα.

The three
non-material
causes often
coincide

496—We saw the definitions of matter sub 476c, d. Matter there appeared as a perfectly undetermined substratum, which has to receive its determination from the form. So matter is potential, form the actualizing principle.

In other places Ar. makes a distinction between matter in the absolute sense, which is called by the scholastics *materia prima*, and matter on a higher level, called δευτέρα ὕλη by the commentators. The first is perfectly undetermined and potential; the second, though it received a certain (elementary) determination, is still potential in relation to a higher form.

Relative
character of
matter

Thus, prime matter is the substratum of elementary bodies (fire, air, water, earth). In a second stage these elementary substances become in their turn "matter" for some more complicated substance of a superior determination: homogeneous parts are formed (ἡ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν φύσις) in organic beings, e.g. bone and flesh. Then, in the third and last stage, heterogeneous parts are formed (ἡ τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν), such as face and hand.

a. De part. anim. II 1, 646 a¹²⁻²⁴:

Τριῶν δ' οὐσῶν τῶν συνθέσεων πρώτην μὲν ἂν τις θεῖη τὴν ἐκ τῶν κα-
 15 λουμένων ὑπὸ τινων στοιχείων, οἷον γῆς ἀέρος ὕδατος πυρός. ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον ἴσως ἐκ τῶν δυνάμεων λέγειν, καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἐξ ἀπασῶν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν ἐτέροις εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. ὑγρὸν γὰρ καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ὕλη τῶν συνθέτων σωμάτων ἐστίν· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι διαφοραὶ ταύταις ἀκολουθοῦσιν, οἷον
 20 βάρος καὶ κουφότης καὶ πυκνότης καὶ μαλότης καὶ τραχύτης καὶ λειότης καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῶν σωμάτων. δευτέρα δὲ σύστασις ἐκ τῶν πρῶτων ἢ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν φύσις ἐν τοῖς ζώοις ἐστίν, οἷον ὁστοῦ σαρκὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. τρίτη δὲ καὶ τελευταία κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἢ τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν, οἷον προσώπου καὶ χειρὸς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων μορίων.

Therefore, matter is called by Ar. something relative (490 c: τῶν πρὸς τι ἡ ὕλη).

Reaction
of matter
against
form

b. Though matter is essentially passive, it does possess a certain activity. This might be inferred from the existence of monstrosities. In a sense these are natural beings, because they are generated by living beings according to a natural process. Yet they deviate from the normal type. Why?—Ar. replies: Because matter offers resistance to form and prevents it from realizing itself perfectly.

De gen. anim. IV 4, 770 b⁹⁻¹⁷:

"Ἔστι γὰρ τὸ τέρας τῶν παρὰ φύσιν τι, παρὰ φύσιν δ' οὐ πᾶσαν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἰο
ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ· περὶ γὰρ τὴν αἰὲ καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐθὲν γίνεται παρὰ φύσιν,
ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μὲν οὕτω γινομένοις, ἐνδεχομένοις δὲ καὶ ἄλλως,
ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτων ἐν ὅσοις συμβαίνει παρὰ τὴν τάξιν μὲν ταύτην, αἰὲ μέντοι
μὴ τυχόντως, ἤττον εἶναι δοκεῖ τέρας διὰ τὸ καὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι τρόπον ἰ5
τινὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὅταν μὴ κρατήσῃ τὴν κατὰ τὴν ὕλην ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος φύσις.

See Mansion, *Introd.* pp. 114-116.

Matter
a limiting
element
in nature

c. Generally speaking, matter sets bounds to the possibility of production of nature; for not every matter can adopt every determination.

Metaph. H 4, 1044 a¹⁷:

"Ἔστι τις οἰκεία — sc. ὕλη — ἐκάστου.

Form
parallel to
matter

497—Form is used in parallel senses to matter.

Now, "matter" is sometimes used by Ar. to indicate the corporeal object, as our senses can grasp it. Form, then, is *the intelligible type*, which is, opposite to the sensible substratum, the determining element in the order of knowledge.

the essence

Form, therefore, is *the essence*. Ar. often speaks of it with the terms τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, οὐσία and λόγος (notion, definition). Cp. the passage about the four causes (493).

a. Cf. *Metaph.* Δ 2, 1013 a²⁶:

Τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη etc.

Exactly the same words as in *Phys.* II 3.

b. *De gen. et corr.* II 9, 335 b⁶:

ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς ἐκάστου οὐσίας.

In general μορφή indicates a visible form, εἶδος an intelligible form or structure.

498—a. *Nature acts for the sake of an end, and it is itself an end.* **teleology**
This is Ar.'s main thesis as to his doctrine on nature.

Phys. II 2, 194 a²⁸:

Ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα.

This view of nature is closely connected with that of Plato in *Nom. X* and is directed against pre-socratic materialism, especially against Empedocles' doctrine on the forming of organisms (our nr. **111a-d**).

b. Not every thing can claim to be an end, but only that which **The end is what is best**
is best. We saw this in **490b** (194 a³²: Βούλεται γὰρ οὐ πᾶν εἶναι τὸ ἔσχατον τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον).

Again in *Phys. II 3, 195 a^{23,25}:*

Τὰ δ' ὥς τὸ τέλος καὶ ἀγαθὸν τῶν ἄλλων (sc. αἰτία ἐστίν)· τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα βέλτιστον καὶ τέλος τῶν ἄλλων ἐθέλει εἶναι.

The same in *Metaph. Δ 2, 1013 b^{25,27}.*

c. An ἀγαθόν is to Ar. always a certain plenitude of being, never **always a plenitude of being**
a non-being.

De gen. et corr. II 10, 336 b²⁸⁻²⁹:

Βέλτιον τὸ εἶναι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι.

d. Hence a being never can strive after its own extinction, nature **never non-being**
striving always for "what is best", i.e. a fuller development. Ar. therefore finds fault with Platonism, which would lead up to the impossible consequence that "the contrary would strive after its own extinction".

Phys. I 9, 192 a¹⁹⁻²⁰:

Τοῖς δὲ (sc. Πλατωνικοῖς) συμβαίνει τὸ ἐναντίον ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φθορᾶς.

e. Passing-away of individuals should be positively valued, as **Positive value of passing-away**
keeping up the universal order.

De gen. et corr. II 10, 336 b¹⁰:

— ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ καὶ ἡ φθορὰ καὶ ἡ γένεσις ἡ κατὰ φύσιν.

"The natural processes of passing-away and coming-to-be occupy equal periods of time" (Joachim).

499—Ar. gives four arguments for the finality of nature.

a. The first stands against Empedocles' theory of the forming of **First argument for finality**
organisms. Ar. argues: natural facts happen regularly; but what happens regularly, cannot be ascribed to chance.

Phys. II 8, 198 b³⁵-199 a⁸:

Πάντα τὰ φύσει ἢ ἀεὶ οὕτω γίνεται ἢ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, τῶν δ' ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδέν. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδ' ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ὕειν 199 a
πολλάκις τοῦ χειμῶνος, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ὑπὸ κύνᾳ· οὐδὲ καύματα ὑπὸ κύνᾳ, ἀλλ' ἂν
χειμῶνος. Εἰ οὖν ἢ ὥς ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ἢ ἕνεκά του εἶναι, εἰ μὴ οἶόν
τε ταῦτ' εἶναι μήτε ἀπὸ συμπτώματος μήτ' ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου, ἕνεκά του ἂν 5
εἴη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν φύσει γ' ἐστὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ¹, ὥς καὶ αὐτοὶ φαῖεν οἱ ταῦτα
λέγοντες. Ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἕνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γινομένοις καὶ οὖσιν.

**Second
argument**

b. *Ib.*, 199 a⁸⁻¹⁵:

Ἔτι ἐν ὅσοις τέλος ἐστὶ τι, τούτου ἕνεκα πράττεται τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ
ἐφεξῆς. Οὐκοῦν ὥς πράττεται, οὕτω πέφυκε, καὶ ὥς πέφυκεν, οὕτω πράττεται 10
ἕκαστον, ἂν μὴ τι ἐμποδίζῃ. Πράττεται δ' ἕνεκά του· καὶ πέφυκεν ἄρα τούτου
ἕνεκα. Οἶον εἰ οἰκία τῶν φύσει γινομένων ἦν, οὕτως ἂν ἐγίνετο ὥς νῦν ὑπὸ
τῆς τέχνης· εἰ δὲ τὰ φύσει μὴ μόνον φύσει ἀλλὰ καὶ τέχνῃ γίγνοιτο, ὡσαύτως
ἂν γίνοιτο ἢ πέφυκεν. Ἔνεκα ἄρα θατέρου θάτερον. 15

Mansion paraphrases lines 8-12 as follows.

"With all things that have a final term which is their completion, the development leading to that final term is the result of an action which aims at that term as an end. With a natural action, however, corresponds a natural agents, and the nature of this agents shows itself in the character of the development. Therefore, if the development aims at an end, then the nature which is its agents, does too".

**Third
argument**

c. *Ib.*, 199 a¹⁵⁻²⁰:

Ὅλως τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἃ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ
μιμεῖται. Εἰ οὖν τὰ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἕνεκά του, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν
φύσιν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ
φύσιν τὰ ὕστερα πρὸς τὰ πρότερα.

**Fourth
argument**

d. *Ib.*, 199 a²⁰⁻³⁰:

Μάλιστα δὲ φανερόν ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε ζητήσαντα
οὔτε βουλευσάμενα ποιεῖ· ὅθεν διαποροῦσί τινες πότερον νῶ ἢ τι ἀλλῶ ἐργά-
ζονται οἱ τ' ἀράχνη καὶ οἱ μύρμηκες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Κατὰ μικρὸν δ' οὕτω
προϊόντι καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς φαίνεται τὰ συμφέροντα γινόμενα πρὸς τὸ τέλος,
οἶον τὰ φύλλα τῆς τοῦ καρποῦ ἕνεκα σκέπης. Ὡστ' εἰ φύσει τε ποιεῖ καὶ ἕνεκά 25
του ἡ χελιδὼν τὴν νεοττιὰν καὶ ὁ ἀράχνης τὸ ἀράχνιον, καὶ τὰ φυτὰ τὰ φύλλα

¹ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα - e.g. teeth (mentioned in the preceding passage) and other parts of the body, which seem manifestly to have been made for some special use.

ἐνεκα τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τὰς ῥίζας οὐκ ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω ἐνεκα τῆς τροφῆς, φανερόν ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ αἰτία ἡ τοιαύτη ἐν τοῖς φύσει γινομένοις καὶ οὖσιν.

Mansion remarks: It might seem from the third argument, that Ar. conceives of nature, on the analogy of art, as a deliberating and consciously acting being. If this were true, Ar.'s teleology would be anthropomorphist, as it is usually thought to be by modern critics. That it is not so, appears from the fourth argument: to Ar. finality implies neither deliberation nor intelligence. The cosmic order is *intelligible*, but *impersonal*. There is in nature *a coordination of certain activities and certain essences*, in such a manner, that those forms of activity assure to each species a regular development, repeated in innumerable individuals. This, and nothing else, appears to be the meaning of Ar.'s teleological explanation of nature.

Finality is impersonal according to Ar.

500—Nevertheless, a great number of passages might be cited in which Ar. speaks of nature as of an intelligent and consciously acting being¹. We give some instances.

Nature often represented by Ar. as an intelligent being

a. *De gen. anim.* II 6, 744 b¹⁶:

"Ὡςπερ γὰρ οἰκονόμος ἀγαθός, καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐθὲν ἀποβάλλειν εἴωθεν ἐξ ὧν ἔστι ποιῆσαι τι χρηστόν.

b. *De part. anim.* IV 10, 686 a²⁰⁻²⁴:

Τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἐστὶ καμπτός καὶ σφονδύλους ἔχων², οἱ δὲ λύκοι καὶ λέοντες μονόστουν τὸν αὐχένα ἔχουσιν· ἐβλεψε γὰρ ἡ φύσις ὅπως πρὸς τὴν ἰσχὺν χρήσιμον αὐτὸν ἔχωσι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας βοηθείας.

c. *Ib.*, III 8, 670 b^{33-671 a}⁹:

Κύστιν δ' οὐ πάντ' ἔχει τὰ ζῶα, ἀλλ' ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις βουλομένη ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς ἔχουσι τὸν πλεῦμονα ἑναιμον μόνον, τούτοις δ' εὐλόγως. διὰ γὰρ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῆς φύσεως, ἣν ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ μορίῳ τούτῳ, διψητικά τε ταῦτ' ἐστὶ μάλιστα τῶν ζῴων, καὶ δεῖται τροφῆς οὐ μόνον τῆς ξηραῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ὑγραῖς πλείονος, ὥστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ περιττώμα γίνεσθαι πλεῖον καὶ μὴ τοσοῦτον μόνον ὅσον ὑπὸ τῆς κοιλίας πέττεσθαι καὶ ἐκκρίνεσθαι μετὰ τοῦ ταύτης περιττώματος. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν εἶναι τι δεκτικὸν καὶ τούτου τοῦ περιττώματος. διόπερ ὅσα πλεῦμονα ἔχει τοιοῦτον, ἅπαντ' ἔχει κύστιν.

d. *Ib.*, IV 5, 682 a⁶⁻⁸.

Ar. is speaking here about insects which continue to live after they have been

¹ Mansion, p. 261, notes 31-36, cites 20 passages, and in addition the whole treatise on *The Parts of Animals*.

² Sc. αὐχὴν.

cut into pieces. The reason of this is, he says, that in such insects as have long bodies the central organ, which is the seat of perception, consists of several parts.

Βούλεται μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἐν πᾶσι μόνον ἐν ποιεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον¹, οὐ δύναμην δ' ἐνεργείᾳ ποιεῖ μόνον ἔν, δυνάμει δὲ πλείω· δῆλον δ' ἐν ἐτέροις ἐτέρων μᾶλλον.

e. *De gen. anim.* III 2, 753 a⁷⁻¹¹:

"Εοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις βούλεσθαι τὴν τῶν τέκνων αἵσθησιν ἐπιμελητικὴν² παρασκευάζειν· ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν χεῖροσι τοῦτ' ἐμποιεῖ μέχρι τοῦ τεκεῖν μόνον, τοῖς δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν τελέωσιν, ὅσα δὲ φρονιμώτερα, καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐκτροφὴν.

f. *Ib.*, IV 10, 778 a⁴⁻⁹.

In the preceding lines the author has spoken about the influence of the so-called natural periods (day and night, month and year) on the generation of living beings. He continues:

Βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῖς τούτων ἀριθμοῖς³ ἀριθμεῖν τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τὰς τελευτάς, οὐκ ἀκριβοῖ δὲ⁴ διὰ τε τὴν τῆς ὕλης ἀοριστίαν καὶ διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι πολλὰς ἀρχάς, αἱ τὰς γενέσεις τὰς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὰς φθοράς ἐμποδίζουσαι πολλάκις αἷτια τῶν παρὰ φύσιν συμπιπτόντων εἰσίν.

Cp. *Phys.* II 8, 994 b⁴: καὶ τὰ τέρατα ἀμαρτήματα ἐκείνου τοῦ ἐνεκά του.

How to explain this

501—How, then, to explain this?—

Mansion⁵ answers,—and we think he is right—: The theory, expounded in *Phys.* II, is not anthropomorphic, the application is. However, as all those passages are of a later date than *Phys.* II, so that it is not possible to explain them as expressing a more primitive stage in the thought of Ar., while, on the other hand, the author passes extremely severe judgment on Plato in the *Tim.*, we must conclude that the anthropomorphic version is with Ar. rather a form of expression, which should not be taken too literally.

Cp. *De caelo* II 9, 291 a²⁴:

—ὥσπερ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι προνοούσης τῆς φύσεως.

"As if nature foresaw the consequences".—Here it is explicitly indicated, that we have only to do with an image. Wherever, then, the ὥσπερ has not been added, we have yet to understand this kind of expressions metaphorically.

To this, M. adds the argument that anthropomorphic expressions are especially numerous in the fragments of Ar.'s literary works (those of II. φιλ. in *De caelo*).

¹ The said organ.

² τὴν τῶν τέκνων αἵσθησιν ἐπιμελητικὴν - a special sense of care for their young.

³ "by the measure of these periods".

⁴ "but she does not bring this to pass accurately".

⁵ *Introd.*, p. 262-263.

Many instances of the same metaphorical use might be adduced from modern writers, and this not in popular works only.

Cp. in Bergson's *Evolution créatrice* the frequent use of terms like "nature has to triumph over resistances"; she "finds" or "tries different solutions for the same problem"¹; she "operates not in this, but in that way"²; etc.

502—*De caelo* I 4, 271 a³³:

Ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσι.

'God and
nature" in
De caelo I

"God and nature"—almost as synonyms. What does this mean? Mansion answers: Not much, or rather *nothing*. It is just an expression, a metaphor. For it does not harmonize at all with Ar.'s conception of God in his scientific treatises on this subject (see § 5 of this chapter).

Now, certainly, M. is right. Only, when we remember that in the dialogue II. φιλ. the aspect of our visible world and of cosmic order seemed to Ar. a proof for the existence of gods³, it might become clear to us that the author of *De caelo* I, which is of an early date, still adhered to, or at least was not far away from, Plato's religious conviction that a god or a divine Mind must have created the order of the sensible world. We can imagine that, only a few years later, the same author detached himself from this conviction.

503—Chapters 4-6 deal with chance and spontaneity (τύχη and αὐτόματον), which are generally considered as causes of many things in nature.

First, they are said to be neither the cause of things which always come to pass in the same way, nor of those which mostly do so.

The next distinction made by Ar. is that between things which happen τινὸς ἕνεκα and others which do not. Chance and spontaneity occur in the first group. We cite the text.

a. *Phys.* II 5, 196 b¹⁷⁻³²:

Τῶν δὲ γινομένων τὰ μὲν ἕνεκά του γίγνεται, τὰ δ' οὐ· τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν, τὰ δ' οὐ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, ἄμφω δ' ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά του, ὥστε
20 δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς παρὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ ὥς ἐπὶ πολὺ ἔστιν ἓνια περὶ
ἃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἕνεκά του. Ἔστι δ' ἕνεκά του ὅσα τε ἀπὸ διανοίας
ἂν πραχθεῖη καὶ ὅσα ἀπὸ φύσεως.

Τύχη
and
αὐτόματον

Τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ὅταν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γένηται, ἀπὸ τύχης φαμὲν εἶναι.
25 Ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ ὅν ἐστι τὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς, οὕτω καὶ
αἷτιον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, οἷον οἰκίας καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν αἷτιον τὸ οἰκοδομικόν, κατὰ
συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ λευκὸν ἢ τὸ μουσικόν. Τὸ μὲν οὖν καθ' αὐτὸ αἷτιον ὠρισμένον,
τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀόριστον· ἄπειρα γὰρ ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ συμβαίῃ.

¹ Reason (in man) and instinct (in animals) are, according to Bergson, "different solutions for the same problem".

² Not by composition or construction, like a human artisan, but by division. The "method" of nature is put in opposition to the method of man. Yet, nature "operates" after some intelligible method!

³ Our nr. 427.

Καθάπερ οὖν ἐλέχθη, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς ἔνεκά του γιγνομένοις τοῦτο γένηται, 30 τότε λέγεται ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης. Αὐτῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν διαφορὰν τούτων ὕστερον διοριστέον.

So both chance and spontaneity are in the sphere of things which happen ἔνεκά του. I.e.: chance is not against the finality of nature; it is subordinate to it, being an accidental cause.

Instance

b. Ib., 196 b³³-197 a³: an instance of chance.

Οἶον ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀπολαβεῖν τὸ ἀργύριον ἦλθεν ἄν, κομιζομένου τὸν ἔρανον, εἰ ᾗδει ¹. ἦλθε δ' οὐ τοῦτου ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ συνέβη αὐτῷ ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ποιῆσαι τοῦτο τοῦ κομίσασθαι ἔνεκα ². τοῦτο δὲ οὐθ' ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φοιτῶν εἰς τὸ χωρίον οὐτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης· ἔστι δὲ τὸ τέλος, ἡ κομιδή, οὐ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ αἰτίων, ἀλλὰ τῶν προαιρετῶν καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας· καὶ λέγεται γε τότε ἀπὸ τύχης ἐλθεῖν.

Definition of chance

c. Ib., 197 a⁵⁻⁶:

Δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ἡ τύχη αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἔνεκά του.

Automaton a larger notion than tychè

504—a. *Phys.* II 6, 197 a³⁶-b⁸; b¹³⁻¹⁸:

Διαφέρει δ' ὅτι τὸ αὐτόματον ἐπὶ πλεῖόν ἐστι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης πᾶν ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου, τοῦτο δ' οὐ πᾶν ἀπὸ τύχης. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ τύχη καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ 197 b τύχης ἐστὶν ὅσοις καὶ τὸ εὐτυχῆσαι ἂν ὑπάρξειεν καὶ ὅλως πράξις. Διὸ καὶ ἀνάγκη περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ εἶναι τὴν τύχην· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι δοκεῖ ἦτοι ταῦτόν εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἡ εὐτυχία ἢ ἐγγύς, ἢ δ' εὐδαιμονία πράξις τις· εὐπραξία γάρ. 5 "Ὡσθ' ὅπόσοις μὴ ἐνδέχεται πράξαι, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τι ποιῆσαι. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε ἄψυχον οὐδὲν οὔτε θηρίον οὔτε παιδίον οὐδὲν ποιεῖ ἀπὸ τύχης, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει προαίρεσιν· —

Τὸ δ' αὐτόματον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ἀψύχων, οἶον ὁ ἵππος αὐτόματος, φαμέν, ἦλθεν, ὅτι ἐσώθη μὲν ἐλθὼν, οὐ τοῦ σωθῆναι δὲ 15 ἔνεκα ἦλθεν. Καὶ ὁ τρίπους αὐτόματος κατέπεσεν· ἔστη μὲν γὰρ τοῦ καθῆσθαι ἔνεκα, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ καθῆσθαι ἔνεκα κατέπεσεν.

¹ If the reading κομιζομένου is right, we must render: "A man gets back his money from his debtor who (at the very moment the other enters the market) is receiving contributions for a feast. He could have gone to the spot for the purpose of getting back his money, but"—etc.

² If the words τοῦ κομίσασθαι ἔνεκα must be kept here, it is necessary to put a comma after ἐλθεῖν: "But he went for some other reason, and now, (in fact), he has done it for the sake of receiving his money".—The expression of this idea might seem to us rather strange. Bonitz simply ejected τοῦ κομίσασθαι ἔνεκα, and this might appear to the modern reader a highly attractive solution. Yet, I do think it possible that Ar. wrote these words. Cf. 197 b¹⁷ (our next nr.), where he says of the tripod that it "came to stand there so as to serve for a seat", though it did not fall for that use.

b. *Ib.*, 197 b¹⁸⁻²²:

Definition

"Ὡστε φανερόν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἐνεκά του γινομένοις, ὅταν μὴ τοῦ συμβάντος ἐνεκα γένηται οὐ ἔξω τὸ αἴτιον, τότε ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου λέγομεν· ἀπὸ τύχης δέ, τούτων ὅσα ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου γίνεται τῶν προαιρετῶν τοῖς ἔχουσι προαίρεσιν.

505—Finally, is necessity in nature absolute, or is it hypothetical?—

Necessity
in nature

Ar. answers: the material cause is ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ, but the final cause is the real and decisive cause.

a. *Phys.* II 9, 199 b^{34-200 a}¹⁰:

Τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὀότερον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὑπάρχει ἢ καὶ ἀπλῶς; νῦν μὲν
οὐ γὰρ οἴονται τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τὸν τοῖχον ἐξ
ἀνάγκης γεγενῆσθαι νομίζοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρέα κάτω πέφυκε φέρεσθαι τὰ δὲ
κουφὰ ἐπιπολῆς, διὸ οἱ λίθοι μὲν κάτω καὶ τὰ θεμέλια, ἡ δὲ γῆ ἄνω διὰ κου-
φότητα, ἐπιπολῆς δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ξύλα· κουφότατα γάρ.

5 Ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τούτων γέγονεν, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα πλὴν ὡς δι'
ύλην, ἀλλ' ἐνεκα τοῦ κρύπτειν ἅττα καὶ σώζειν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
πᾶσιν, ἐν ὅσοις τὸ ἐνεκά του ἐστίν, οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίαν ἐχόντων τὴν
10 φύσιν, οὐ μέντοι γε διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἢ ὡς ὕλην, ἀλλ' ἐνεκά του.

b. *Ib.*, 200 a³⁰⁻³⁴:

Φανερόν δὴ ὅτι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς τὸ ὡς ὕλη λεγόμενον καὶ αἱ
κινήσεις αἱ ταύτης. Καὶ ἄμφω μὲν τῷ φυσικῷ λεκτέαι αἱ αἰτίαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡ
τινὸς ἐνεκα· αἴτιον γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὕτη τοῦ τέλους.

Mansion¹ concludes: Finality, then, is according to Ar. the normal rule of nature, a necessity of an intelligible character. What is not governed by this law is what we call contingent, and is ascribed to accidental causes. But Ar. is not so much interested in the accidental and contingent as in the regular order of normal phaenomena, by which the universe is sustained in that being which is its agathon.

4—DEFINITIONS OF MOTION, SPACE AND TIME

506—Ar. now tries to define motion. The definition is preceded by some preliminary remarks.

Motion

a. *Phys.* III 1, 200 b¹⁶⁻²¹:

Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ κίνησις εἶναι τῶν συνεχῶν, τὸ δ' ἄπειρον ἐμφαίνεται πρῶτον ἐν
τῷ συνεχεῖ· διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὀριζομένοις τὸ συνεχές συμβαίνει προσχρήσασθαι
πολλάκις τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς τὸ εἰς ἄπειρον διαιρετὸν συνεχές ὄν.
Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄνευ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ καὶ χρόνου κίνησιν ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

¹ *Introd.*, p. 327.

b. Ib., b²⁶⁻²⁸:

"Ἔστι δὴ [τι] τὸ μὲν ἐντελεχεία μόνον¹, τὸ δὲ δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχεία, τὸ μὲν τόδε τι, τὸ δὲ τὸσόνδε, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοῦ ὄντος κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως.

Definition

c. Ib., 201 a¹⁰⁻¹¹:

ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ἥ τοιοῦτον, κίνησις ἐστίν.

the definition
explained

d. Ib., 201 a¹¹⁻¹⁵:

Οἷον τοῦ μὲν ἀλλοιωτοῦ, ἥ ἀλλοιωτόν, ἀλλοιώσεις, τοῦ δὲ αὐξητοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου φθιτοῦ (οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄνομα κοινὸν ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν) αὕξσεις καὶ φθίσεις, τοῦ δὲ γενητοῦ καὶ φθαρτοῦ γένσεις καὶ φθορά, τοῦ δὲ φορητοῦ φορά.

E.g.: something is actually x (stones, wood and mortar), potentially y (a house).
Now motion is: actualizing the y-ness (the building of the house).

Space

507—a. *Phys.* IV 4, 212 a²¹⁻²²: definition.

τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρας ἀκίνητον πρῶτον, τοῦ τ' ἐστίν ὁ τόπος.

Space is
motionless

b. Ib., 212 a¹⁴⁻²⁰:

"Ἔστι δ' ὥσπερ τὸ ἀγγεῖον τόπος μεταφορητός, οὕτω καὶ ὁ τόπος ἀγγεῖον ἀμετακίνητον. Διὸ ὅταν μὲν ἐν κινουμένῳ τι κινῆται καὶ μεταβάλλῃ τὸ ἐντός, οἷον ἐν ποταμῷ πλοῖον, ὡς ἀγγεῖω χρῆται μᾶλλον ἢ τόπῳ τῷ περιέχοντι. Βούλεται δ' ἀκίνητος εἶναι ὁ τόπος· διὸ ὁ πᾶς μᾶλλον ποταμὸς τόπος, ὅτι ἀκίνητος ὁ πᾶς.

Time

508—Preliminary remarks on time.

a. Time has to do with motion, but it is not motion.

Phys. IV 10, 218 b⁹⁻¹⁸:

not=motion

"Ἐπεὶ δὲ δοκεῖ μάλιστα κινήσεις εἶναι καὶ μεταβολή τις ὁ χρόνος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐκάστου μεταβολή καὶ κινήσεις ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μεταβάλλοντι μόνον ἐστίν, ἥ οὐ ἂν τύχῃ ὅν αὐτὸ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος ὁμοίως καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν. "Ἐτι δὲ μεταβολή μὲν ἐστὶ πᾶσα θάπτων καὶ βραδυτέρα, χρόνος δ' οὐκ ἐστίν· τὸ γὰρ βραδὺ καὶ ταχὺ¹⁵ χρόνῳ ὥριται, ταχὺ μὲν τὸ ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολὺ κινούμενον, βραδὺ δὲ τὸ ἐν πολλῷ ὀλίγον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐχ ὥριται χρόνῳ, οὔτε τῷ ποσός τις εἶναι οὔτε τῷ ποιός. "Ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐκ ἐστὶ κινήσεις, φανερόν.

¹ τι is bracketed by Ross; Spengel, Bonitz and Prantl inserted τὸ δὲ δυνάμει after μόνον, a correction which has been adopted by Hardie in his translation.

b. Ib. II, 218 b²¹⁻²³:

Ἄλλα μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ γε μεταβολῆς· ὅταν γὰρ μὴδὲν αὐτοὶ μεταβάλλωμεν τὴν διάνοιαν ἢ λάβωμεν μεταβάλλοντες, οὐ δοκεῖ ἡμῖν γεγονέναι χρόνος.

yet not
without
change

509—a. Time, then, appears to be a certain aspect of motion.

Ib., 219 a²⁻⁴:

Ληπτέον δέ, ἐπεὶ ζητοῦμεν τί ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος, ἐντεῦθεν ἀρχομένοις, τί τῆς κινήσεως ἐστίν. Ἄμα γὰρ κινήσεως αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ χρόνου.

Time an
aspect of
motion

b. Ib., 219 a¹⁰⁻¹⁴:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον κινεῖται ἔκ τινος εἰς τι καὶ πᾶν μέγεθος συνεχές, ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ μεγέθει ἡ κίνησις· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὸ μέγεθος εἶναι συνεχές καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἐστὶ συνεχής, διὰ δὲ τὴν κίνησιν ὁ χρόνος· ὅση γὰρ ἡ κίνησις, τοσοῦτος καὶ ὁ χρόνος αἰεὶ δοκεῖ γεγονέναι.

Motion
goes with
magnitude

c. Ib., 219 a¹⁴⁻²¹:

15 Τὸ δὲ δὴ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τόπῳ πρῶτόν ἐστιν. Ἐνταῦθα μὲν δὴ τῇ θέσει· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τῷ μεγέθει ἐστὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν κινήσει εἶναι τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἐκεῖ. Ἄλλα μὴν καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν αἰεὶ θατέρῳ θάτερον 20 αὐτῶν. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῇ κινήσει, ὃ μὲν ποτε ὄν κινήσις ἐστίν¹. τὸ μέντοι εἶναι αὐτῷ ἕτερον καὶ οὐ κίνησις.

πρότερον
and
ὕστερον

not identical
with motion

d. Ib., 219 a²²⁻²⁵:

Ἄλλα μὴν καὶ τὸν χρόνον γε γνωρίζομεν, ὅταν ὀρίσωμεν τὴν κίνησιν, τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ὀρίζοντες· καὶ τότε φαμὲν γεγονέναι χρόνον, ὅταν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἰσθησιν λάβωμεν.

Yet connect-
ed with the
apprehension
of time

510—a. Ib., 219 b¹⁻²:

Τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

Definition

b. Ib., 219 b⁵⁻⁹:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἀριθμός ἐστι διχῶς (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ τὸ ἀριθμητὸν ἀριθμὸν λέγομεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν), ὃ δὲ χρόνος ἐστὶ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ οὐχ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν. Ἔστι δ' ἕτερον ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν καὶ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον.

the definition
explained

So time is "the countable aspect of movement". If an event comes to pass "in time", this means that it is measurable ("countable") by time.

¹ As to its substratum it is identical with motion; yet it differs from it in essence.

Existence
in time

511—a. *Phys.* IV 12, 221 a⁴⁻⁹:

Καὶ ἔστι τῇ κινήσει τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι τὸ μετρεῖσθαι τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῆς· ἅμα γὰρ τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὸ εἶναι τῇ κινήσει μετρεῖ, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι αὐτῇ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι, τὸ μετρεῖσθαι αὐτῆς τὸ εἶναι.

Δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι, τὸ μετρεῖσθαι αὐτῶν τὸ εἶναι ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου.

Eternal
things are
not in time

b. *Ib.*, 221 b³⁻⁷:

"Ὡστε φανερόν ὅτι τὰ αἰεὶ ὄντα, ἧ αἰεὶ ὄντα, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν χρόνῳ· οὐ γὰρ περιέχεται ὑπὸ χρόνου, οὐδὲ μετρεῖται τὸ εἶναι αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου· σημεῖον δὲ τούτου ὅτι οὐδὲ πάσχει οὐδὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου ὡς οὐκ ὄντα ἐν χρόνῳ.

Rest, too, is
in time

c. *Ib.*, 221 b⁷⁻¹²:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος μέτρον κινήσεως, ἔσται καὶ ἡρεμίας μέτρον κατὰ συμβεβηκός· πᾶσα γὰρ ἡρεμία ἐν χρόνῳ. Οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ τὸ ἐν κινήσει ὄν ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ· οὐ γὰρ κίνησις ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ' ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως· ἐν ἀριθμῷ δὲ κινήσεως ἐνδέχεται εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἡρεμοῦν.

Would there
be time if
there were
no soul?

512—At the end of this book *Ar.* raises the important question whether there would be time if there were no soul, i.e. if there were no knowing subject which could "count" or measure. He replies by saying that, in this case, there would still be movement, which is the "substratum" of time (τοῦτο ὃ ποτε ὄν ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος), but not its measurable aspect, which is "time".

Phys. IV 14, 223 a²¹⁻²⁹:

Πότερον δὲ μὴ οὐσης ψυχῆς εἴη ἂν ὁ χρόνος ἢ οὐ, ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις· ἀδυνάτου γὰρ ὄντος εἶναι τοῦ ἀριθμήσοντος ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀριθμητόν τι εἶναι, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ' ἀριθμός· ἀριθμὸς γὰρ ἢ τὸ ἡριθμημένον ἢ τὸ ἀριθμητόν. Εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἄλλο πέφυκεν ἀριθμεῖν ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ ψυχῆς νοῦς, ἀδύνατον εἶναι χρόνον ψυχῆς 25 μὴ οὐσης, ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦτο ὃ ποτε ὄν ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, οἷον εἰ ἐνδέχεται κίνησιν εἶναι ἄνευ ψυχῆς. Τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν κινήσει ἐστίν· χρόνος δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστίν ἢ ἀριθμητά ἐστιν.

5—THE THEORY OF THE FIRST UNMOVED MOVER

513—*Ar.* starts from the fact of movement in the sensible world. Now whatever is in movement is moved by something else. There must, then, be a First Mover, which is itself unmovable. This first Mover must be eternal, because movement is eternal—and such it is, in Aristotle's opinion, necessarily. It can have no parts nor magnitude, because

in a finite magnitude resides a finite force, and this could not be the cause of eternal motion. The first Movent, then, is incorporeal.

Ar. finally argues that the first Movent must be at the circumference of the world, because here the movement is quickest and therefore nearest to the Source.

We cite the end of Ar.'s exposition, where he resumes his main argument.

Phys. VIII 10, 267 a²¹-b⁹:

the theory of
the Prime
Mover in
Phys. VIII

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀνάγκη κίνησιν εἶναι συνεχῆ, αὕτη δὲ μία ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη δὲ τὴν μίαν μεγέθους τέ τινος εἶναι (οὐ γὰρ κινεῖται τὸ ἀμέγεθες), καὶ ἐνὸς καὶ ὑφ' ἐνός (οὐ γὰρ ἔσται συνεχής, ἀλλ' ἐχομένη ἑτέρα ἑτέρας καὶ διηρημένη),
25 τὸ δὴ κινεῖν εἰ ἐν, ἣ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἣ ἀκίνητον ὄν. Εἰ μὲν δὴ κινούμενον, συνακολουθεῖν δεήσει¹ καὶ μεταβάλλειν αὐτό, ἅμα δὲ κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τινος.
267b Ὡστε στήσεται² καὶ ἥξει εἰς τὸ κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ ἀκινήτου· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἀνάγκη συμμεταβάλλειν, ἀλλ' αἰετὶ δυνήσεται κινεῖν (ἄπονον γὰρ τὸ οὕτω³ κινεῖν) καὶ ὁμαλῆς αὕτη ἡ κίνησις, ἣ μόνῃ ἢ μάλιστα· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει μεταβολὴν
5 τὸ κινεῖν οὐδεμίαν. Δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ κινούμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἔχειν μεταβολήν, ἵνα ὁμοία ἦ ἡ κίνησις.

Ἀνάγκη δὴ ἡ ἐν μέσῳ ἢ ἐν κύκλῳ εἶναι⁴. αὗται γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαί⁵. Ἀλλὰ τάχιστα κινεῖται τὰ ἐγγύτατα τοῦ κινούντος, τοιαύτη δ' ἡ τοῦ ὅλου κίνησις·
9 ἐκεῖ ἄρα τὸ κινεῖν.

514—The conclusion of the preceding passage leaves us with two problems: (1) How can a non-corporeal First Movent have its place at the outside of the universe? (2) How can it impart a physical movement?

To these questions Ar. gives the answer himself in the famous words in *Metaph. A* 7, 1072 b³:

Κινεῖ δὴ ὥς ἐρώμενον.

It works as
a final cause

"It produces motion as being loved" or striven after.

Now this again leaves some difficulties: (1) If there is eternal movement, i.e. circular movement, which is the first and most perfect of motions, why then a First Mover? (2) If this First Mover, whom Ar. calls God (in *Metaph. A*), produces motion "as being loved", then a soul must be attributed to the first heaven; and,

¹ συνακολουθεῖν δεήσει - "it will have to be subject to the same conditions as that which it moves".

² "So we have a series that must come to an end".

³ οὕτω - sc. μὴ συμμεταβάλλον.

⁴ sc. τὸ κινεῖν. ἐν κύκλῳ - at the circumference.

⁵ αἱ ἀρχαί - sc. the first principles from which a sphere is derived. In ch. 8 Ar. has argued that only circular movement can be continuous and infinite.

if more unmoved movers are admitted (as Ar. teaches in Λ 8), so for each heavenly sphere.

The first point might seem to us to be against logic, while the second is against modern science.

the Prime
Mover in
Metaph. Λ

515—What Ar. says further in *Metaph.* Λ , must be seen in connection with his doctrine of matter and form and of potency and act, which is expounded in the books Z- Θ (see our next chapter). We met with these principles in *Phys.* I-II.

(1) Matter is the indefinite, form the determining. In the physical world form and matter are united in the physical objects. But form can exist by itself, not in physical, but in metaphysical reality. The highest being, which as prime cause is at the beginning of all motion, must be pure form without matter.

(2) In order to explain the fact of physical change, Ar. assumes a *potential being*. This is something real (e.g. an acorn can become an oak, never a beech), but it must be brought to full reality (*ἐνέργεια* or *ἐντελέχεια*) by an efficient cause. Therefore the definition of motion, given sub **506c**. God, then, as supreme being, must be full reality or completion, and therefore absolutely necessary.

God as the
absolutely
necessary
being

a. *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072 b^{4.11}:

Εἰ μὲν οὖν τι κινεῖται, ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, ὥστ' εἰ [ἡ] φορὰ πρώτη 4, 5 ἡ ἐνέργεια ἔστιν, ἢ κινεῖται ταύτῃ γε ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν, κατὰ τόπον, καὶ εἰ μὴ κατ' οὐσίαν· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι τι κινουῦν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὄν, ἐνέργεια ὄν, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαμῶς. φορὰ γὰρ ἡ πρώτη τῶν μεταβολῶν, ταύτης δὲ ἡ κύκλῳ· ταύτην δὲ τοῦτο κινεῖ. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἔστιν ὄν· καὶ ἢ ἀνάγκῃ, 10 καλῶς, καὶ οὕτως ἀρχή.

b. As absolutely necessary being, then, it is the First Principle, on which the universe depends.

Ib., 1072 b^{13.14}:

Ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἡρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις.

On this
principle
the universe
depends

One might justifiably call this a monotheistic principle. We find it expressed again at the end of the same book:

c. *Metaph.* Λ 10, 1076 a^{3.4}.

In the preceding lines Ar. rejects the theory of Speusippus, who assumed mathematical number as first principle, instead of the Platonic Ideas and ideal Numbers. He rejects it on the ground, that by this theory a multiplicity of *ἀρχαί* would be introduced.

Τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς.

»Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίῃ· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω«.

516—Ar. now undertakes to describe the life and character of his Prime Mover.

a. *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072 b¹⁴⁻³⁰:The life of
the Prime
Mover

14, 15 Διαγωγῇ δ' ἐστὶν οἷα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν. οὕτω γὰρ αἰεὶ ἐκείνο
(ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον), ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
ἐγγήγορσις αἰσθησις νόησις ἡδιστον¹, ἐλπίδες δὲ καὶ μνήμαι διὰ ταῦτα).
ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα.
20 αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίνεταί θιγγά-
νων² καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταῦτόν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν. τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ
καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων, ὥστ' ἐκείνου μᾶλλον τοῦτο³ δὲ δοκεῖ
ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἡδιστον καὶ ἄριστον. εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ
25 ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς αἰεὶ, θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον.
ἔχει δὲ ὧδε. καὶ ζωὴ δὲ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωὴ⁴, ἐκείνος δὲ ἡ
ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ αἰδῖος. φαμέν
δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῶν αἰδῖον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχῆς καὶ
30 αἰδῖος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.

If the question is asked: what is the relation of this God of Ar. to the world, our answer must be: Certainly not that of Creator to creation. First, Ar. assumes eternal matter; so he does not know creation in the biblical sense of the word. Secondly, his God does not know the world. He only knows Himself, and to Ar. this knowledge does not include any knowledge of the world⁵; on the contrary, it excludes it.

b. Cp. *Metaph.* Λ 9, 1074 b³³⁻³⁵:Νόησις
νόησεως

Αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νόησεως νόησις.

517—We could read chapters 7, 9 and 10 of *Metaph.* Λ as a unity, in which we find one line of thought: the establishment of the principle of the Prime Mover, who is the one ἀρχή on which depends the whole of the universe and nature.

theory of
a multiplicity
of unmoved
movers

Ch. 8 introduces a theory, which might appear to us as harmonizing rather badly with the preceding, namely, that, as there are 47 or 55 celestial spheres, for each of them an unmoved mover should be assumed.

¹ On the value of knowledge and perception in itself cp. *Metaph.* A 1.

² θιγγάνων - in coming into contact with its objects. Cp. nr. 559b (*Metaph.* Θ 10, 1051 b 24 f.).

³ τοῦτο - the actual possession of its object is rather the θεῖον which thought seems to contain in itself, than "that" (ἐκείνου),—sc. than the mere δεκτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ νοητοῦ.

⁴ These words have been chosen by Werner Jaeger as a motto for his *Aristotle*.

⁵ S. Thomas Aquinas, who explained Ar. with great benevolence, found the way to a larger interpretation: directly the divine Mind knows only itself, but in Himself God knows all things. ("Nec sequitur quod omnia alia a se ei sunt ignota; nam intelligendo se intellegit omnia alia.") So also in Brentano, who christianizes Ar. even far more than S. Thomas did.

a. *Metaph.* Λ 8, 1073 a¹⁴⁻¹⁵; a²³-b¹:

Πότερον δὲ μίαν θετέον τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ἢ πλείους, καὶ πόσας, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν ¹. —

15

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, κινεῖν δὲ τὴν πρῶτην αἰτίαν καὶ μίαν κίνησιν· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινου- 25 μενον ἀνάγκη ὑπὸ τινος κινεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινεῖν ἀκίνητον εἶναι καθ' αὐτό, καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν κίνησιν ὑπὸ αἰδίου κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν μίαν ὑφ' ἑνός, ὁρῶμεν δὲ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ παντός τὴν ἀπλὴν φορὰν, ἣν κινεῖν φαμέν τὴν πρῶτην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀκίνητον, ἄλλας φορὰς οὐσας τὰς τῶν πλανήτων αἰδίου (αἰτίαν γὰρ καὶ 30 ἄστατον τὸ κύκλῳ σῶμα· δέδεικται δ' ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ¹ περὶ τούτων), ἀνάγκη καὶ τούτων ἐκάστην τῶν φορῶν ὑπ' ἀκινήτου τε κινεῖσθαι καθ' αὐτὴν καὶ αἰδίου οὐσίας. ἢ τε γὰρ τῶν ἄστρων φύσις αἰδίου οὐσία τις οὐσα, καὶ τὸ κινεῖν 35 αἰτίαν καὶ πρότερον τοῦ κινουμένου, καὶ τὸ πρότερον οὐσίας οὐσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι τοσαύτας τε οὐσίας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν τε φύσιν αἰδίου καὶ ἀκινήτους καθ' αὐτάς, καὶ ἄνευ μεγέθους διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν πρότερον. b

b. The numbers of these substances, then, must be determined by astronomy.

Ib., 1073 b¹⁻⁸:

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν οὐσίαι, καὶ τούτων τις πρῶτη καὶ δευτέρα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ταῖς φοραῖς τῶν ἄστρων, φανερόν· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἤδη τῶν φορῶν ἐκ τῆς οἰκειοτάτης φιλοσοφίας τῶν μαθηματικῶν ἐπιστημῶν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἐκ τῆς 5 ἀστρολογίας· αὕτη γὰρ περὶ οὐσίας αἰσθητῆς μὲν αἰδίου δὲ ποιεῖται τὴν θεωρίαν, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι περὶ οὐδεμιᾶς οὐσίας ², οἷον ἢ τε περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς καὶ τὴν γεωμετρίαν.

c. Astronomical calculation leads Ar. to the following result.

Ib., 1074 a¹⁰⁻¹⁶:

Ὁ δὲ ἀπασῶν ἀριθμὸς τῶν τε φερουσῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνελιττουσῶν ³ ταύτας 10 πεντήκοντά τε καὶ πέντε. εἰ δὲ τῇ σελήνῃ τε καὶ τῷ ἡλίῳ μὴ προστιθεῖται τις ἄς εἴπομεν κινήσεις, αἱ πᾶσαι σφαῖραι ἔσονται ἑπτὰ τε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα. — τὸ μὲν οὖν πλῆθος τῶν σφαιρῶν ἔστω τοσοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ τὰς οὐσίας καὶ τὰς 15 ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀκινήτους [καὶ τὰς αἰσθητάς] τοσαύτας εὐλογον ὑπολαβεῖν.

¹ Cf. *Phys.* VIII 8, 9; *De caelo* I 2, II 3-8.

² Ar. states here without any hesitation, that mathematics have no οὐσίαι as their object. In E 1 (cited sub 487b) the formula is by no means so categorical. Our passage, then, seems to have been written rather late, at any rate at some posterior date than E 1.

³ ἀπασῶν - sc. τῶν σφαιρῶν, both those which move the planets and those which "roll them back", counteracting the motion of certain spheres admitted by Eudoxus and Callippus, so that the first motion is restored. Vid. Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos*, p. 217 ff.

518—This chapter ¹ is generally considered as being of a later date than the rest of book *Λ*. Jaeger, who devotes a whole chapter to this question ², estimates the interval at some twenty years at least; Mansion does not think it so long.

Place of
this theory

The question has been treated lately in an original way by Ph. Merlan in *Traditio* IV (1946), pp. 1-30. The author argues that Ar. was not concerned with the question of monotheism or polytheism at all; that indications for the latter might be found in *Phys.* VIII 6 and in *De caelo* I 9 ³ as well, and that *Metaph.* *Λ* 8 harmonizes perfectly well with its surroundings. This chapter, therefore, should not be considered as a later addition. The unmoved movers of Ar. have taken the place of the ideal Numbers of Plato, as is clearly shown in the beginning of *Λ* 8, where Ar. finds fault with Pl. for not having determined the number of these beings with any satisfying argument.

Metaph. *Λ* 8, 1073 a¹⁴⁻²³:

Πότερον δὲ μίαν θετέον τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ἢ πλείους, καὶ πόσας, δεῖ μὴ
 15 λανθάνειν ⁴ ἀλλὰ μεμνησθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀποφάσεις, ὅτι περὶ πλήθους
 οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν ὅ τι καὶ σαφὲς εἰπεῖν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὰς ιδέας ὑπόληψις οὐδε-
 20 μίαν ἔχει σκέψιν ιδίαν (ἀριθμούς γὰρ λέγουσι τὰς ιδέας οἱ λέγοντες ιδέας,
 20 περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὅτε μὲν ὡς περὶ ἀπείρων λέγουσιν ὅτε δὲ ὡς μέχρι τῆς
 δεκάδος ὠρισμένων ⁵. δι' ἣν δ' αἰτίαν τοσοῦτον τὸ πλήθος τῶν ἀριθμῶν,
 οὐδὲν λέγεται μετὰ σπουδῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς). ἡμῖν δ' ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ
 διωρισμένων λεχτέον.

Then follows the rest of the text given sub **517a**.

Now there can be little doubt that, in *Phys.* VIII too, Ar. admitted of more *ἀκίνητα*. But (1) this book is not of an early date, and (2) chapter 8 of *Metaph.* *Λ* makes the impression of a later addition. So probably Mansion is right in supposing that there is some interval between this chapter and its surroundings, but not as long a one as Jaeger thought.

¹ Except the passage 1074 b³¹⁻³⁸ ("Ὅτι δὲ εἰς οὐρανός, φανερόν E.q.s.), which seems to be an early fragment, embedded in a chapter written rather late in Ar.'s life.

² *Aristotle*, p. 342-367.

³ The reference is to 279a¹⁹⁻²⁴, where Ar. speaks of *τάχαῖ*, i.e. that which is outside the heaven, as being above place and time, immutable and immovable.

⁴ This part of the opening sentence has been cited above, sub **517a**.

⁵ We dealt with this text in **366**.

FOURTEENTH CHAPTER THE METAPHYSICS

I—THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

519—What is the object of metaphysics (in *Metaph.* A indicated by the term σοφία)?—Ar. answers in the opening chapters of this book: Wisdom is knowledge of the first causes.

Metaph. A, 1 and 2, 980 a²¹-983 a²³:

Value of knowledge	Πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει. σημείον δ' ἡ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀγάπησις· καὶ γὰρ χωρὶς τῆς χρείας ἀγαπῶνται δι' αὐτάς, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἢ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἵνα πράττωμεν ἀλλὰ καὶ μηθὲν μέλλοντες πράττειν τὸ ὁρᾶν αἰρούμεθα ἀντὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν ἄλλων. αἷτιον δ' ὅτι μάλιστα ποιεῖ γνωρίζειν ἡμᾶς αὕτη τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ πολλὰς δηλοῖ διαφοράς.
Its genesis ¹	Φύσει μὲν οὖν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα γίγνεται τὰ ζῶα, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης τοῖς μὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται μνήμη, τοῖς δ' ἐγγίγνεται. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα φρονιμώτερα καὶ μαθητικώτερα τῶν μὴ δυναμένων μνημονεύειν ἐστὶ, φρόνιμα μὲν ἄνευ τοῦ μαθάνειν ὅσα μὴ δύναται τῶν ψόφων ἀκούειν (οἷον μέλιττα κἄν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ζώων ἐστι), μαθάνει δ' ὅσα πρὸς τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν.
Difference between experience and science	Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῖς φαντασίαις ζῇ καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος καὶ τέχνη καὶ λογισμοῖς. γίγνεται δ' ἐκ τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνήμαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος μιᾶς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελοῦσιν. καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ἐμπειρία, ἀποβαίνει δ' ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη διὰ τῆς ἐμπειρίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ². ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ὡς φησὶ Πῶλος, ἡ δ' ἀπειρία τύχην. Γίγνεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων ³ μία καθόλου γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων υπόληψις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν υπόληψιν ὅτι Καλλιὰ κάμνοντι τηρὶ τὴν νόσον τοδὶ συνήνεγκε καὶ Σωκράτει καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον οὕτω

¹ The following passage should be compared with *Anal. post.* II 19 (our nr. 465). See also 457a.

² ἀποβαίνει δὲ - τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: "but really science and art come to man *through* experience".

³ τ. ἐμπειρίας ἐννοήματα - empirical notions.

10 πολλοῖς, ἐμπειρίας ἐστίν· τὸ δ' ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῖσδε κατ' εἶδος ἐν ἀφορισθεῖσι, κάμνουσι τῇδὲ τὴν νόσον, συνήνεγκεν, οἷον τοῖς φλεγματώδεσιν ἢ χολώδεσι [ἢ] πυρέττουσι καύσῳ, τέχνης.

Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυχᾶνουσιν¹ οἱ ἐμπειροὶ τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον² 15 ἔχόντων (αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' ἕκαστόν ἐστι γνῶσις ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστόν εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρώπον ὑγιάζει ὁ ἰατροῦν ἄλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ 20 Καλλίαν ἢ Σωκράτην ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων ᾧ συμβέβηκεν³) ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι· ἐὰν οὖν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἔχῃ τις τὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸ καθόλου μὲν γνωρίζῃ τὸ δ' ἐν τούτῳ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀγνοῇ, πολλάκις διαμαρτῆσεται τῆς θεραπείας· θεραπευτὸν γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον)· ἀλλ' ὅμως τό γε εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ 25 ἐπάγειν τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑπάρχειν οἴομεθα μᾶλλον, καὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τεχνίτας τῶν ἐμπεύρων ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὥς κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι μᾶλλον ἀκολουθοῦσαν τὴν σοφίαν πᾶσι· τοῦτο δ' ὅτι οἱ μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν ἴσασιν οἱ δ' οὐ· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειροὶ τὸ ὅτι μὲν ἴσασι, διότι δ' οὐκ ἴσασιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ διότι καὶ τὴν 30 αἰτίαν γνωρίζουσιν.

Science
knows the
causes

Διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ ἕκαστον τιμιωτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον εἰδέναι 98B νομίζομεν τῶν χειροτεχνῶν καὶ σοφωτέρους, ὅτι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ποιουμένων ἴσασιν (τοὺς δ', ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἕνια ποιεῖ μὲν, οὐκ εἰδόμενα δὲ ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ, οἷον καίει τὸ πῦρ — τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄψυχα φύσει τινὲ ποιεῖν τούτων ἕκαστον 5 τοὺς δὲ χειροτέχνους δι' ἔθος), ὥς οὐ κατὰ τὸ πρακτικούς εἶναι σοφωτέρους ὄντας ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν. ὅλως τε σημεῖον τοῦ εἰδόμενου καὶ μὴ εἰδόμενου τὸ δύνασθαι διδάσκειν ἐστίν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν τέχνην τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἡγούμεθα μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμην εἶναι· δύνανται γάρ, οἱ δὲ οὐ δύνανται διδάσκειν.

He who
knows can
teach

10 "Ἐτι δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμίαν ἡγούμεθα εἶναι σοφίαν· καίτοι κυριώταται γ' εἰσὶν αὗται τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γνώσεις· ἀλλ' οὐ λέγουσι τὸ διὰ τί περὶ οὐδενός, οἷον διὰ τί θερμὸν τὸ πῦρ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτι θερμόν. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον εἰκὸς τὸν ὁποιοῦν εὐρόντα τέχνην παρὰ⁴ τὰς κοινὰς αἰσθήσεις θαυμάζεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν 15 ἀνθρώπων μὴ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι τι τῶν εὐρεθέντων ἀλλ' ὥς σοφὸν καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων· πλείονων δ' εὐρισκομένων τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν μὲν

¹ ἐπιτυχᾶνουσιν - "hit the mark", succeed.

² λόγον - theory.

³ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν - Ross rightly remarks that it is "of course not an accident of Callias, as opposed to his essence and his properties, that he is a man". The term is used simply to indicate that it is not directly "man" that the doctor cures, but directly Callias and indirectly man because C. is a man.

⁴ παρὰ - that went beyond the common perceptions of man.

πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν ¹ οὐσῶν, αἰ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τοιούτους ἐκείνων ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας αὐτῶν. 20

Purely
theoretical
science was
invented
last

“Ὅθεν ἤδη πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἥδονην μὴδὲ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὐρέθησαν, καὶ πρῶτον ἐν τούτοις τοῖς τόποις οὐπερ ἐσχόλασαν· διὸ περὶ Αἴγυπτον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ πρῶτον τέχναι συνέστησαν, ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἀφείθη σχολάζειν τὸ τῶν ἱερέων ἔθνος.

Εἴρηται μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς ² τίς διαφορὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν ²⁵ ἄλλων τῶν ὁμογενῶν· οὐ δ’ ἕνεκα νῦν ποιούμεθα τὸν λόγον τοῦτ’ ἐστίν, ὅτι τὴν ὀνομαζομένην σοφίαν ³ περὶ τὰ πρῶτα αἰτία καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ὑπολαμβάνουσι πάντες· ὥστε, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ὁ μὲν ἔμπειρος τῶν ὁποιοῦν ἐχόντων αἰσθησιν εἶναι δοκεῖ σοφώτερος, ὁ δὲ τεχνίτης τῶν ἐμπείρων, χειρο- 30 τέχνου δὲ ἀρχιτέκτων, αἱ δὲ θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ⁴ μᾶλλον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ σοφία περὶ τινὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτίας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, δῆλον.

982a

With what
causes
wisdom is
concerned

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ζητοῦμεν, τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον, ἡ περὶ ποίας αἰτίας καὶ περὶ ποίας ἀρχὰς ἐπιστήμη σοφία ἐστίν. εἰ δὴ λάβοι τις τὰς 5 ὑπολήψεις ἃς ἔχομεν περὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ, τάχ’ ἂν ἐκ τούτου φανερὸν γένοιτο μᾶλλον. ὑπολαμβάνομεν δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπίστασθαι πάντα τὸν σοφὸν ὥς ἐνδέχεται ⁵, μὴ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν· εἰτα τὸν τὰ χαλεπὰ γῶναι δυνά- 10 μενον καὶ μὴ ῥάδια ἀνθρώπων γιγνώσκειν, τοῦτον σοφόν (τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάντων κοινόν, διὸ ῥάδιον καὶ οὐδὲν σοφόν)· ἔτι τὸν ἀκριβέστερον καὶ τὸν διδασκαλικώτερον τῶν αἰτιῶν σοφώτερον εἶναι περὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην· καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν δὲ τὴν αὐτῆς ἕνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν αἰρετὴν οὐσαν μᾶλλον 15 εἶναι σοφίαν ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἕνεκεν, καὶ τὴν ἀρχικωτέραν τῆς ὑπηρετούσης μᾶλλον σοφίαν· οὐ γὰρ δεῖν ἐπιτάττεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ἀλλ’ ἐπιτάττειν, καὶ οὐ τοῦτον ἐτέρῳ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τὸν ἥττον σοφόν.

Τὰς μὲν οὖν ὑπολήψεις τοιαύτας καὶ τοσαύτας ἔχομεν περὶ τῆς σοφίας καὶ 20 τῶν σοφῶν· τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πάντα ἐπίστασθαι τῷ μάλιστα ἔχοντι τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν (οὗτος γὰρ οἶδέ πως πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα) ⁶, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ χαλεπώτατα ταῦτα γνωρίζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὰ μάλιστα καθόλου (πορρωτάτω γὰρ τῶν αἰσθήσεών ἐστιν), ἀκριβέσταται δὲ τῶν ἐπι- 25 στημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσὶν (αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγομένων ⁷, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας)· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διδασκαλικὴ γε ἡ τῶν αἰτιῶν θεωρητικὴ μᾶλλον (οὗτοι γὰρ διδάσκουσιν,

¹ πρὸς διαγωγὴν - πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

² *Eth. Nic.* VI 3, 1139 b¹⁴-1141 b⁸.

³ τ. ὀνομαζομένην σοφίαν - elsewhere called first philosophy.

⁴ τ. ποιητικῶν - those which produce concrete results.

⁵ ὥς ἐνδέχεται - as far as possible.

⁶ πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα - all the instances that fall under the universal.

⁷ We explained this sentence sub 488b.

30 οἱ τὰς αἰτίας λέγοντες περὶ ἐκάστου), τὸ δ' εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτῶν
 ἕνεκα ¹ μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει τῇ τοῦ μάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ (ὁ γὰρ τὸ ἐπί-
 982b στασθαι δι' αὐτὸ αἰρούμενος τὴν μάλιστα ἐπιστήμην μάλιστα αἰρήσεται,
 τοιαύτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ μάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ), μάλιστα δ' ἐπιστητὰ τὰ πρῶτα
 καὶ τὰ αἰτία (διὰ γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκ τούτων τᾶλλα γνωρίζεται ἄλλ' οὐ ταῦτα
 5 διὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων), ἀρχικωτάτη δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρχικὴ τῆς
 ὑπηρετούσης, ἡ γνωρίζουσα τίνος ἕνεκέν ἐστι πρακτέον ἕκαστον· τοῦτο δ'
 ἐστὶ τάγαθόν ἐκάστου, ὅπως δὲ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τῇ φύσει πάσῃ ².

Especially
with the
final cause

Ἐξ ἀπάντων οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην πίπτει τὸ ζητού-
 μενον ὄνομα· δεῖ γὰρ ταύτην τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρητικὴν·
 10 καὶ γὰρ τάγαθόν καὶ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα ἐν τῶν αἰτίων ἐστίν.

“Ὅτι δ' οὐ ποιητικὴ, δῆλον καὶ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοφούντων· διὰ γὰρ
 τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς
 μὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀτόπων ³ θαυμάσαντες, εἴτα κατὰ μικρὸν οὕτω προϊόντες
 15 καὶ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων διαπορήσαντες, οἷον περὶ τε τῶν τῆς σελήνης παθημάτων
 καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον καὶ ἄστρα καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως. ὁ δ'
 ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυμάζων οἴεται ἀγνοεῖν (διὸ καὶ ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφος πῶς
 ἐστίν· ὁ γὰρ μῦθος σύγκειται ἐκ θαυμασίων)· ὥστ' εἴπερ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν
 20 ἄγνοιαν ἐφιλοσόφησαν, φανερόν ὅτι διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἐδίωκον καὶ
 οὐ χρῆσεώς τινος ἕνεκεν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ συμβεβηκός ⁴. σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντων
 ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ πρὸς ῥαστώνην καὶ διαγωγὴν ἡ τοιαύτη φρό-
 νησις ἤρξατο ζητεῖσθαι ⁵. δῆλον οὖν ὡς δι' οὐδεμίαν αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν χρεῖαν
 25 ἑτέραν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος, φαμέν, ἐλευθέρος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου
 ὦν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴν ὡς μόνην οὔσαν ἐλευθέραν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· μόνη γὰρ
 αὕτη αὐτῆς ἕνεκέν ἐστιν.

Phil. no
science with
practical use

Therefore the
only free
science

Διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἂν οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ νομίζοιτο αὐτῆς ἡ κτῆσις· πολλαχῇ γὰρ
 30 ἡ φύσις δούλη τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, ὥστε κατὰ Σιμωνίδην »θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ'
 ἔχοι γέρας«, ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἄξιον μὴ οὐ ζητεῖν τὴν καθ' αὐτὸν ἐπιστήμην ⁶.

¹ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα = pursued for their own sake.

² On the primary importance of the final cause see nrs. 492 ff., 498 ff.

³ τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀτόπων - Alexander of Aphrodisias cites the following examples: why amber attracts chaff-like substances (a question which interested Thales), the nature of the rainbow (discussed by Anaximenes and by other early thinkers), and other meteorological problems.

⁴ τὸ συμβεβηκός - what really has happened; “the facts”.

⁵ I think τῶν must be inserted: in 981 b²⁷ two groups are mentioned, namely (τέχνη) αἱ μὲν πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα, αἱ δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν οὔσαι, the last being partly for the material, partly for the spiritual or mental εὖ ζῆν (καὶ πρὸς ῥαστώνην κ. διαγωγὴν).

⁶ ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἄξιον e.g.s. - The quotation, known to us by Plato's *Protagoras* 341 e, continues: ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἐστὶ μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι (Edmonds, *Lyrici* II, p. 284).— οὐκ ἄξιον - “it is unfitting”. Ar. again refers to this question in *Eth. Nic.* X, at

the most
divine and
honourable

εἰ δὴ λέγουσί τι οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ πέφυκε φθονεῖν τὸ θεῖον, ἐπὶ τούτου συμβῆναι 983a
μάλιστα εἰκὸς καὶ δυστυχεῖς εἶναι πάντας τοὺς περιττοὺς ¹. ἀλλ' οὔτε τὸ θεῖον
φθονερὸν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἄοιδοί,
οὔτε τῆς τοιαύτης ἄλλην χρὴ νομίζειν τιμιωτέραν. ἡ γὰρ θειοτάτη καὶ τιμιωτά- 5
τη· τοιαύτη δὲ διχῶς ἂν εἴη μόνη· ἦν τε γὰρ μάλιστ' ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι, θεία τῶν
ἐπιστημῶν ἐστί, καὶ εἰ τις τῶν θείων εἴη. μόνη δ' αὕτη τούτων ἀμφοτέρων
τετύχηκεν· ὁ τε γὰρ θεὸς δοκεῖ τῶν αἰτίων πᾶσιν ² εἶναι καὶ ἀρχὴ τις, καὶ
τὴν τοιαύτην ἢ μόνος ἢ μάλιστ' ἂν ἔχοι ὁ θεός. ἀναγκαιότεραι μὲν οὖν πᾶσαι 10
ταύτης, ἀμείνων δ' οὐδεμία.

Its final
result

Δεῖ μέντοι πῶς καταστῆναι ³ τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτῆς εἰς τὸυναντίον ἡμῖν τῶν ἐξ
ἀρχῆς ζητήσεων. ἄρχονται μὲν γάρ, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, ἀπὸ τοῦ θαυμάζειν πάντες
εἰ οὕτως ἔχει, καθάπερ <περὶ> τῶν θαυμάτων ταυτόματα ⁴ [τοῖς μήπω τε-
θεωρηκόσι τὴν αἰτίαν] ἢ περὶ τὰς τοῦ ἡλίου τροπὰς ἢ τὴν τῆς διαμέτρου ἀσυμ- 15
μετρίαν ⁵ (θαυμαστὸν γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσι <τοῖς μήπω τεθεωρηκόσι τὴν
αἰτίαν> εἰ τι τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ μὴ μετρεῖται). δεῖ δὲ εἰς τὸυναντίον καὶ τὸ ἄμεινον
κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἀποτελευτῆσαι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὅταν μάθωσιν·
οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως θαυμάσειεν ἄνθρωπος γεωμετρικὸς ὥς εἰ γένοιτο ἡ διάμετρος 20
μετρητή. τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ζητουμένης, εἴρηται, καὶ τίς
ὁ σκοπὸς οὗ δεῖ τυγχάνειν τὴν ζήτησιν καὶ τὴν ὅλην μέθοδον.

520—After having given an account of earlier philosophy (the rest of book A), Ar. now proceeds to state the main problems of metaphysics.

Metaph. B I, 995 a²⁴-996 a¹⁷:

List of
ἀπορίαι

Ἀνάγκη πρὸς τὴν ἐπιζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην ἐπελθεῖν ἡμᾶς πρῶτον περὶ 995a
ὧν ἀπορῆσαι δεῖ πρῶτον· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα τε περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλως ὑπελήφασί 25
τινες, καὶ εἰ τι χωρὶς τούτων τυγχάνει παρεωραμένον. ἐστὶ δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι
βουλομένοις προὔργον τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς· ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις
τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστί, λύειν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν, 30
ἀλλ' ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀπορία δηλοῖ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ πράγματος· ἡ γὰρ ἀπορεῖ,
ταύτη παραπλήσιον πέπονθε τοῖς δεδεμένοις· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως προελ-

the end of ch. 7 (1177 b²⁸): 'Ο δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βλός κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον, where he answers to this objection: Οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινούντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ (nr. 606b).

¹ πάντας τοὺς περιττοὺς - "all those who occupy themselves with things which do not concern them".

² πᾶσιν - of all things.

³ δεῖ καταστῆναι - must end in.

⁴ ταυτόματα - marionettes.

⁵ The incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with the side.

θεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. διὸ δεῖ τὰς δυσχερείας τεθεωρηκέναι πάσας πρότερον,
 τούτων τε χάριν καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ζητοῦντας ἄνευ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρῶτον ὁμοίους
 35 εἶναι τοῖς ποῖ δεῖ βαδίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ' εἴ ποτε τὸ ζητού-
 995b μενον εὔρηκεν ἢ μὴ γιγνώσκειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλος τούτῳ μὲν οὐ δῆλον τῷ δὲ προ-
 ηγορηκότι δῆλον. ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ κρίναι τὸν ὥσπερ ἀντιδίκων
 καὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων λόγων ἀκηκοῦτα πάντων. — ἔστι δ' ἀπορία πρώτη
 5 μὲν περὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς πεφροισμασμένοις διηπορήσαμεν, πότερον μιᾶς ἢ πολλῶν
 ἐπιστημῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰς αἰτίας· καὶ πότερον τὰς τῆς οὐσίας ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας
 ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἰδεῖν μόνον ἢ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐξ ὧν δεικνύουσι πάντες,
 οἷον πότερον ἐνδέχεται ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν ἅμα φάναι καὶ ἀποφάναι ἢ οὐ, καὶ περὶ
 10 τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων· εἴ τ' ἐστὶ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, πότερον μίᾳ περὶ πᾶσας
 ἢ πλείονές εἰσι, καὶ εἰ πλείονες πότερον ἅπασαι συγγενεῖς ἢ τὰς μὲν σοφίας
 τὰς δὲ ἄλλο τι λεκτέον αὐτῶν· καὶ τοῦτο δ' αὐτὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ ζητῆσαι,
 15 πότερον τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας εἶναι μόνον φατέον ἢ καὶ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλας, καὶ
 πότερον μοναχῶς ἢ πλείονα γένη τῶν οὐσιῶν, οἷον οἱ ποιοῦντες τὰ τε εἶδη καὶ
 τὰ μαθηματικὰ μεταξὺ τούτων τε καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. περὶ τε τούτων οὖν,
 καθάπερ φαμέν, ἐπισκεπτέον, καὶ πότερον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία μόνον
 20 ἐστὶν ἢ καὶ περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα καθ' αὐτὰ ταῖς οὐσίαις, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις περὶ
 ταύτου καὶ ἐτέρου καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ ἀνομοίου καὶ ἐναντιότητος, καὶ περὶ προτέρου
 καὶ ὑστέρου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων τῶν τοιούτων περὶ ὧν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ
 πειρῶνται σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων μόνων ποιούμενοι τὴν σκέψιν, τίνος ἐστὶ
 25 θεωρῆσαι περὶ πάντων· ἔτι δὲ τούτοις αὐτοῖς ὅσα καθ' αὐτὰ συμβέβηκεν, καὶ
 μὴ μόνον τί ἐστὶ τούτων ἕκαστον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἅρα ἐν ἐνὶ ἐναντίον· καὶ πότερον αἰ
 ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰ γένη ἐστὶν ἢ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ἐνυπάρχοντα ἕκαστον·
 καὶ εἰ τὰ γένη, πότερον ὅσα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀτόμοις λέγεται τελευταῖα ἢ τὰ πρῶτα,
 30 οἷον πότερον ζῶν ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἀρχή τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ παρὰ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον.
 μάλιστα δὲ ζητητέον καὶ πραγματευτέον πότερον ἐστὶ τι παρὰ τὴν ὕλην αἴτιον
 καθ' αὐτὸ ἢ οὐ, καὶ τοῦτο χωριστὸν ἢ οὐ, καὶ πότερον ἐν ἡ πλείῳ τὸν ἀριθμὸν,
 35 καὶ πότερον ἐστὶ τι παρὰ τὸ σύνολον (λέγω δὲ τὸ σύνολον, ὅταν κατηγορηθῇ
 τι τῆς ὕλης) ἢ οὐθέν, ἢ τῶν μὲν τῶν δ' οὐ, καὶ ποῖα τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων. ἔτι αἰ
 996a ἀρχαὶ πότερον ἀριθμῷ ἢ εἶδει ὀρισμέναι, καὶ αἰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ αἰ ἐν ὑπο-
 κειμένῳ; καὶ πότερον τῶν φθαρτῶν καὶ ἀφθάρτων αἰ αὐταὶ ἢ ἕτεραι, καὶ
 πότερον ἀφθαρτοὶ πᾶσαι ἢ τῶν φθαρτῶν φθαρταί; ἔτι δὲ τὸ πάντων χαλεπώ-
 5 ταν καὶ πλείστην ἀπορίαν ἔχον, πότερον τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὄν, καθάπερ οἱ Πυθαγό-
 ρειοὶ καὶ Πλάτων ἔλεγεν, οὐχ ἕτερόν τί ἐστὶν ἀλλ' οὐσία τῶν ὄντων, ἢ οὐ,
 ἀλλ' ἕτερόν τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησι φιλίαν ἄλλος δὲ τις
 πῦρ ὁ δὲ ὕδωρ ἢ ἀέρα· καὶ πότερον αἰ ἀρχαὶ καθόλου εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα
 10 τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἔτι πότερον ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ κίνησιν·
 καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπορίαν ἂν παράσχοι πολλήν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πότερον οἱ ἀριθμοὶ

the chief
problem

the most
difficult one

καὶ τὰ μήκη καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ αἱ στιγμαὶ οὐσίαι τινές εἰσιν ἢ οὐ, καὶ ἂν εἰ οὐσίαι πότερον κεχωρισμέναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ ἐνυπάρχουσαι ἐν τούτοις; περὶ 15 γὰρ τούτων ἀπάντων οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ εὐπορῆσαι τῆς ἀληθείας ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ διαπορῆσαι τῷ λόγῳ ῥάδιον καλῶς.

These questions are dealt with throughout the following work.

521—There is a science which investigates being as being, and is different from the sciences that investigate special parts of being.

Metaph. Γ Ι, 1003 a^{21,32}:

Philosophy
the science
of being
as such

Ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὐτό. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν οὐδεμιᾶ τῶν ἐν μέρει λεγομένων ἢ αὕτη· οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖ καθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν, ἀλλὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ τι ἀποτεμώμεναι 25 περὶ τούτου θεωροῦσι τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἀκροτάτας αἰτίας ζητοῦμεν, δῆλον ὡς φύσεώς τινος αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καθ' αὐτήν. εἰ οὖν καὶ οἱ τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων ζητοῦντες ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐζήτουν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι μὴ 30 κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἀλλ' ἢ ὄν· διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν τὰς πρώτας αἰτίας ληπτέον.

522—Ar. continues speaking about the manifold senses of the term "to be". As, then, science everywhere deals chiefly with that which is primary, the philosopher has first to do with substances.

Ib. 2, 1003 b^{18,19}:

Therefore
substances
the first
object of
phil.

Πανταχοῦ δὲ κυρίως τοῦ πρώτου ἢ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἐξ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα ἤρτηται, καὶ δι' οὗ λέγονται. εἰ οὖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία, τῶν οὐσιῶν ἂν δέοι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἔχειν τὸν φιλόσοφον.

523—a. The philosopher must also consider the things that are in mathematics called axioms, for these are true of all existing things, and therefore no special science inquires into their truth.

Metaph. Γ 3, 1005 a¹⁹-b²:

Phil. must
also study
the axioms

Λεκτέον δὲ πότερον μιᾶς ἢ ἐτέρας ἐπιστήμης περὶ τε τῶν ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι καλουμένων ἀξιωμάτων καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας. φανερόν δὴ ὅτι μιᾶς τε καὶ τῆς 20 τοῦ φιλοσόφου καὶ ἡ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶ οὐκ ἐπιβλήσις· ἅπανσι γὰρ ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὐσιν ἀλλ' οὐ γένει τινὶ χωρὶς ἰδίᾳ τῶν ἄλλων. καὶ χρῶνται μὲν πάντες, ὅτι τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἢ ὄν, ἕκαστον δὲ τὸ γένος ὄν· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ χρῶνται ἐφ' ὅσον αὐτοῖς 25 ἱκανόν, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅσον ἐπέχει τὸ γένος περὶ οὗ φέρουσι τὰς ἀποδείξεις· ὥστ' ἐπεὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἢ ὄντα ὑπάρχει πᾶσι (τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κοινόν), τοῦ

περὶ τὸ ὄν γνωρίζοντος καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ θεωρία. διόπερ οὐθεὶς τῶν κατὰ
 30 μέρος ἐπισκοπούντων ἐγχειρεῖ λέγειν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ἀληθὴ ἢ μὴ, οὔτε γεω-
 μέτρης οὔτ' ἀριθμητικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῶν φυσικῶν ἐνιοι, εἰκότως τοῦτο δρῶντες·
 μόνοι γὰρ ὄντο περὶ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως σκοπεῖν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος. ἐπεὶ
 35 τοῦ καθόλου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν θεωρητικοῦ καὶ ἡ περὶ τούτων
 ἂν εἴη σκέψις· ἔστι δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσική, ἀλλ' οὐ πρώτη.

b. He must also study the law of contradiction, which is the most fundamental principle of all.

Ib., 1005 b^{5,23}:

5, 6 "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ φιλοσόφου, καὶ τοῦ περὶ πάσης τῆς οὐσίας θεωροῦντος and the law
 ἢ πέφυκεν, καὶ περὶ τῶν συλλογιστικῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν ἐπισκέψασθαι, δῆλον· of contra-
 προσήκει δὲ τὸν μάλιστα γνωρίζοντα περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἔχειν λέγειν τὰς diction
 10 βεβαιωτάτας ἀρχὰς τοῦ πράγματος, ὥστε καὶ τὸν περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ ὄντα τὰς
 πάντων βεβαιωτάτας. ἔστι δ' οὗτος ὁ φιλόσοφος. βεβαιωτάτη δ' ἀρχὴ πασῶν
 περὶ ἣν διαψευσθῆναι ἀδύνατον· γνωριμωτάτην τε γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν
 15 ἣν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὸν ὅτιοῦν ξυνιέντα τῶν ὄντων, τοῦτο οὐχ ὑπόθεσις·
 δὲ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον τῷ ὅτιοῦν γνωρίζοντι, καὶ ἔχειν ἔχοντα ἀναγκαῖον.
 ὅτι μὲν οὖν βεβαιωτάτη ἡ τοιαύτη πασῶν ἀρχή, δῆλον· τίς δ' ἔστιν αὕτη,
 μετὰ ταῦτα λέγωμεν. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον
 20 τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό· — αὕτη δὲ πασῶν ἐστὶ βεβαιωτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν·
 ἔχει γὰρ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν.

In the following chapters of this book the law of contradiction is established by proofs, and objections to it are refuted.

524—In E 1 Ar., having first divided all intellectual work into three main groups—theoretical, practical and productive—¹, next divides the theoretical sciences into three other provinces: physics, mathematics and first philosophy or theology ², the last having the ἀκίνητος οὐσία as its object.

Metaph. E 1, 1026 a¹⁸⁻³²:

20 "Ὡστε τρεῖς ἂν εἴεν φιλοσοφαί θεωρητικαί, μαθηματική, φυσική, θεολογική or theology
 (οὐ γὰρ ἄδῃλον ὅτι εἴ που τὸ θεῖον ὑπάρχει, ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει ὑπάρχει), καὶ has the im-
 τὴν τιμιωτάτην δεῖ περὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον γένος εἶναι. αἱ μὲν οὖν θεωρητικαὶ τῶν mutable sub-
 ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αἰρετώταται, αὕτη δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν. ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἂν stance as its
 object

¹ Our nr. 432a.

² 432b.

τις πότερόν ποθ' ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία καθόλου ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ τι γένος καὶ φύσιν
τινὰ μίαν (οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν γεω- 25
μετρία καὶ ἀστρολογία περὶ τινα φύσιν εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ καθόλου πασῶν κοινή).
εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἔστι τις ἑτέρα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, ἡ φυσικὴ
ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη· εἰ δ' ἔστι τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα καὶ φιλο-
σοφία πρώτη, καὶ καθόλου οὕτως ὅτι πρώτη¹· καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν ταύτης 30
ἂν εἴη θεωρῆσαι, καὶ τί ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ὄν.

There might seem to exist a contradiction between this definition of the object of metaphysics and that of Γ 1 (cited sub 521). Duns Scotus², who had the interpretations of Avicenna and Averroës before him, regarded them as a dilemma: Avicenna, who follows Γ 1, says that *being as such* is the object of metaphysics,—Averroës, according to E 1, teaches that this object is *God and the intelligences*. Duns Scotus, after a long hesitation, takes the part of Avicenna. Aristotle himself, however, seems not to have considered the two views as contradictory: in Γ 2 (cited sub 522) he gives, if not a synthesis, yet a transition from the first to the second.

2—PLATO'S THEORY OF IDEAS CRITICIZED

Chapters
A 6 and 9

525—In *Metaph.* A 6 the author gives an outline of the theory of Ideas: the introduction of supra-sensible Forms as the true object of knowledge, because sensible things are always changing³; the assumption of mathematical objects as existing between Forms and sensibles⁴, and the theory of first principles, the One and the great-and-small, from which the Numbers were deduced⁵. He compares this doctrine with that of the Pythagoreans, from which it is distinguished by a few features, and concludes that Plato knew only the material and the formal cause⁶.

In ch. 9 of the same book he gives a more elaborate criticism of the theory.

First
objection

526—*Metaph.* A 9, 990 a³³-b⁸:

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν (ικανὸν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἄψασθαι τοσοῦτον)· οἱ δὲ τὰς ἰδέας αἰτίας τιθέμενοι πρῶτον μὲν ζητοῦντες τῶνδ' ὄντων λαβεῖν τὰς αἰτίας ἕτερα τούτοις ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐκόμισαν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις

¹ "and it will be universal in this sense, because it is first".

² *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam Aristotelis* I, qu. 1 (Ed. Wadding, t. IV, p. 510-518).

³ Our nr. 204a; cp. 204b and 268a.

⁴ Nr. 362b, with n. 1.

⁵ Nr. 365a.

⁶ 365b.

ἀριθμῆσαι βουλόμενος ἐλαττόνων μὲν ὄντων οἷοιτο μὴ δυνήσεσθαι, πλείω δὲ ποιήσας ἀριθμοίη (σχεδὸν γὰρ ἴσα — ἢ οὐκ ἐλάττω — ἐστὶ τὰ εἶδη τούτοις 5 περὶ ὧν ζητοῦντες τὰς αἰτίας ἐκ τούτων ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα προῆλθον· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ὁμώνυμόν τι ἔστι καὶ παρὰ τὰς οὐσίας, τῶν τε ἄλλων ¹ ἔστιν ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖσδε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰδίοις ²).

527—Ib., 990 b⁸⁻¹⁷:

10 "Ἐτι δὲ καθ' οὓς τρόπους δείκνυμεν ³ ὅτι ἔστι τὰ εἶδη, καθ' οὐθένα φαίνεται τούτων· ἐξ ἐνίων μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι συλλογισμόν, ἐξ ἐνίων δὲ καὶ οὐχ ὧν οἰόμεθα τούτων εἶδη γίγνεται ⁴. κατὰ τε γὰρ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ⁵ εἶδη ἔσται πάντων ὧν ἐπιστῆμαι εἰσί, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν ⁶ καὶ τῶν ἀποφάσεων, κατὰ δὲ τὸ νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος ⁷ τῶν φθαρτῶν· 15 φάντασμα γὰρ τι τούτων ἔστιν. ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων ⁸ οἱ μὲν τῶν πρὸς τι ποιοῦσιν ἰδέας ⁹, ὧν οὐ φαμεν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὸ γένος, οἱ δὲ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον ¹⁰ λέγουσιν.

The proofs
of the theory
examined

528—Ib., 990 b²²⁻³⁴:

"Ἐτι κατὰ μὲν τὴν ὑπόληψιν καθ' ἣν εἶναι φαμεν τὰς ἰδέας οὐ μόνον τῶν οὐσιῶν ἔσται εἶδη ἀλλὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἐτέρων (καὶ γὰρ τὸ νόημα ἐν οὐ μόνον

There should
be only
Ideas of
substances

¹ τῶν τε ἄλλων - "so also in the case of all other groups", i.e. even for those things other than substances.

² τοῖς αἰδίοις - i.e. the heavenly bodies.

³ δείκνυμεν - "we", disciples of Plato.

⁴ "others would prove the existence of Ideas of things of which we Platonists think there are none" (Ross).

⁵ The argument "from the sciences" would imply the existence of Ideas of *artefacta*, which were probably not recognized by the Platonists of Aristotle's time.

The arguments here referred to are given in a very concise form. We need the comments of Alexander of Aphrodisias to understand their sense fully.

⁶ τὸ ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν is the argument for the existence of Ideas from the existence of groups of particulars.

καὶ τῶν ἀποφάσεων - On the positive sense of negations according to Plato, see *Soph.* 257 d-258 b (our nr. 342). W. D. Ross comments: "There was no need to suppose bare negative Ideas; anything that could be explained by participation in a negative Idea could be explained more simply by non-participation in the positive Idea".

⁷ τὸ νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος - the argument from the fact that it is possible to think an object even when the thing has perished. Ar. argues that according to this argument there must be an Idea of each perishable thing.

⁸ οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων - Ross, citing Jackson, explains: Ar. has previously pointed out certain *consequences* of Platonic arguments; he now points out certain *implications actually stated* in Plato's more accurate arguments, though unwelcome to his successors.

⁹ τῶν πρὸς τι - e.g. in the *Phaedo* the Idea of τὸ ἴσον (74 a-77 a).

¹⁰ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον - See on this argument *Parm.* 132 d-133 a (our nr. 327c).

περὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐστί, καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι οὐ μόνον τῆς 25
οὐσίας εἰσὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐτέρων, καὶ ἄλλα δὲ μυρία συμβαίνει τοιαῦτα). κατὰ δὲ
τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰς δόξας τὰς περὶ αὐτῶν, εἴ ἔστι μεθεκτὰ τὰ εἶδη, τῶν
οὐσιῶν ἀναγκαῖον ἰδέας εἶναι μόνον. οὐ γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μετέχονται ¹
ἀλλὰ δεῖ ταύτῃ ἐκάστου μετέχειν ἢ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται ² (λέγω δ' 30
οἷον, εἴ τι αὐτοδιπλασίου μετέχει, τοῦτο καὶ αἰδίου μετέχει, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμ-
βεβηκὸς· συμβέβηκε γὰρ τῷ διπλασίῳ αἰδίῳ εἶναι), ὥστ' ἔσται οὐσία τὰ εἶδη.

529—Ar. now presents his main objection: Forms do not contribute anything to sensible things, nor to our knowledge of them.

Plato's
Ideas are
of no use

a. Ib., 991 a⁸⁻¹⁹:

Πάντων δὲ μάλιστα διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις τί ποτε συμβάλλεται τὰ εἶδη τοῖς
αἰδέσις τῶν αἰσθητῶν ³ ἢ τοῖς γιγνομένοις καὶ φθειρομένοις· οὔτε γὰρ κινή- 10
σεως οὔτε μεταβολῆς οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν αἷτια αὐτοῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὴν
ἐπιστήμην οὐθὲν βοηθεῖ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων (οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσία ἐκεῖνα τούτων· ἐν
τούτοις γὰρ ἂν ᾤν), οὔτε εἰς τὸ εἶναι, μὴ ἐνυπάρχοντά γε τοῖς μετέχουσιν·
οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἴσως αἷτια δόξειεν εἶναι ὡς τὸ λευκὸν μεμιγμένον τῷ λευκῷ, 15
ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος λίαν εὐκίνητος ⁴, δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν πρῶτος Εὐδόξος ⁵
δ' ὕστερον καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἔλεγον (ῥάδιον γὰρ συναγαγεῖν πολλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα
πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην δόξαν).

b. Ib., a¹⁹-b¹:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστί τᾶλλα κατ' οὐθένα τρόπον τῶν εἰωθότων 20
λέγεσθαι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν παραδείγματα αὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ μετέχειν αὐτῶν τᾶλλα κενο-
λογεῖν ἐστί καὶ μεταφορὰς λέγειν ποιητικὰς. τί γὰρ ἐστί τὸ ἐργαζόμενον πρὸς
τὰς ἰδέας ἀποβλέπον ⁶; ἐνδέχεται τε καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ὅμοιον ὅτιοῦν
καὶ μὴ εἰκαζόμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ⁷, ὥστε καὶ ὄντος Σωκράτους καὶ μὴ ὄντος 25
γένοιτ' ἂν οἷος Σωκράτης· ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ εἴ ᾤν ὁ Σωκράτης αἰδῖος.
ἔσται τε πλείω παραδείγματα τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε καὶ εἶδη, οἷον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου

¹ "for participation per accidens does not exist".

² "but a thing must share in its Form as in something not predicated of a subject".

³ τ. αἰδέσις τῶν αἰσθητῶν - as in 526: the heavenly bodies.

⁴ λίαν εὐκίνητος - easily refutable. On the doctrine of Anaxagoras referred to, see our nr. 124.

⁵ Eudoxus of Cnidus, the famous astronomer, who spent long years in Plato's Academy (± 365), seems to have taught that the Ideas are immanent in things, though he held that they are substances. On the last point he did not agree with the (later) theory of Ar.

⁶ These words refer to the Demiurgus in Plato's *Timaeus*.

⁷ "without being copied from it".

τὸ ζῶον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐτοάνθρωπος. ἔτι οὐ μόνον τῶν αἰσθητῶν
 30 παραδείγματα τὰ εἶδη ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῶν, οἷον τὸ γένος, ὡς γένος εἰδῶν¹.
 ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται παράδειγμα καὶ εἰκὼν.

530—Ib., 99i b¹⁻⁹:

"Ἐτι δόξειεν ἂν ἀδύνατον εἶναι χωρὶς τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ οὐ ἡ οὐσία· ὥστε
 πῶς ἂν αἱ ἰδέαι οὐσίαι τῶν πραγμάτων οὔσαι χωρὶς εἶεν; ἐν δὲ τῷ Φαίδωνι οὕτω
 λέγεται, ὡς καὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ γίνεσθαι αἰτία τὰ εἶδη ἔστιν· καίτοι τῶν
 5 εἰδῶν ὄντων ὅμως οὐ γίνεσθαι τὰ μετέχοντα ἂν μὴ ᾗ τὸ κινῆσον, καὶ πολλὰ
 γίνεσθαι ἕτερα, οἷον οἰκία καὶ δακτύλιος, ὧν οὐ φαμεν εἶδη εἶναι· ὥστε δῆλον
 ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ τᾶλλα καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας οἷας καὶ
 τὰ ῥηθέντα νῦν.

How can
 Ideas exist
 separately?

531—Ib., 99i b⁹⁻²¹:

"Ἐτι εἴπερ εἰσὶν ἀριθμοὶ τὰ εἶδη, πῶς αἰτιοὶ ἔσονται; πότερον ὅτι ἕτεροι
 10 ἀριθμοὶ εἰσι τὰ ὄντα, οἷον ὁδὶ μὲν <ὁ> ἀριθμὸς ἀνθρώπος ὁδὶ δὲ Σωκράτης ὁδὶ
 δὲ Καλλίας; τί οὖν ἐκεῖνοι τούτοις αἰτιοὶ εἰσιν; οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ οἱ μὲν αἰτιοὶ οἱ
 δὲ μὴ, οὐδὲν διοίσει. εἰ δ' ὅτι λόγοι ἀριθμῶν² τάνταῦθα, οἷον ἡ συμφωνία,
 δῆλον ὅτι ἔστιν ἕν γε τι ὧν εἰσὶ λόγοι. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἡ ὕλη, φανερόν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ
 15 οἱ ἀριθμοὶ λόγοι τινὲς ἔσονται ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον. λέγω δ' οἷον, εἰ ἔστιν ὁ
 Καλλίας λόγος ἐν ἀριθμοῖς πυρὸς καὶ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος, καὶ ἄλλων
 τινῶν ὑποκειμένων ἔσται καὶ ἡ ἰδέα ἀριθμὸς· καὶ αὐτοάνθρωπος, εἴτ' ἀριθμὸς
 20 τις ὧν εἴτε μὴ, ὅμως ἔσται λόγος ἐν ἀριθμοῖς τινῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀριθμὸς, οὐδ'
 ἔσται τις διὰ ταῦτα ἀριθμὸς.

If Ideas are
 numbers,
 how can they
 be causes?

532—a. Ar. repeats his main objection to the theory of Ideas, and reproaches the Academy for having abandoned the chief task of philosophy: to seek the cause of sensible phenomena.

Ib., 992 a²⁴⁻²⁹:

"Ὅλως δὲ ζητούσης τῆς σοφίας περὶ τῶν φανερῶν³ τὸ αἶτιον, τοῦτο μὲν
 εἰάκαμεν (οὐθὲν γὰρ λέγομεν περὶ τῆς αἰτίας ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς),
 τὴν δ' οὐσίαν οἰόμενοι λέγειν αὐτῶν ἑτέρας μὲν οὐσίας εἶναι φαμεν, ὅπως δ'
 ἐκεῖναι τούτων οὐσίαι, διὰ κενῆς λέγομεν⁴· τὸ γὰρ μετέχειν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον
 εἴπομεν, οὐθὲν ἔστιν.

Ideas do not
 explain
 phenomena

b. Ib., a²⁹-b¹:

Οὐδὲ δὴ ὅπερ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὁρῶμεν ὃν αἶτιον, δι' ὃ καὶ πᾶς νοῦς καὶ

They have
 nothing to do
 with the final
 cause

¹ In the sense of genus of various species.

² λόγοι ἀριθμῶν - ratios of numbers.

³ τ. φανερῶν - sensible things.

⁴ διὰ κενῆς λέγομεν = κενολογοῦμεν (is empty talk).

πάσα φύσις ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας, ἣν φαμεν εἶναι μίαν τῶν ἀρχῶν, οὐθὲν ἄπτεται τὰ εἶδη, ἀλλὰ γέγονε τὰ μαθήματα τοῖς νῦν ¹ ἡ φιλοσοφία, φασκόντων ἄλλων χάριν αὐτὰ δεῖν πραγματεῦσθαι.

3—SUBSTANCE

What "is" in the primary sense is substance

533—a. *Metaph. Z I*, 1028 a¹⁰⁻²⁰, 29-31:

Τὸ ὃν λέγεται πολλαχῶς, καθάπερ διειλόμεθα πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ἰο ποσαχῶς ². σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ μὲν τί ἐστι καὶ τόδε τι ³, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν οὕτω κατηγορουμένων. τοσαυταχῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ ὄντος φανερόν ὅτι τούτων πρῶτον ὃν τὸ τί ἐστίν, ὅπερ σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν (ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἴπωμεν ποῖόν τι τόδε, ἢ ἀγαθὸν λέγομεν ἢ κακόν, ἀλλ' οὐ ¹⁵ τρίπηχυ ἢ ἀνθρώπον· ὅταν δὲ τί ἐστίν, οὐ λευκὸν οὐδὲ θερμὸν οὐδὲ τρίπηχυ, ἀλλὰ ἀνθρώπον ἢ θεόν), τὰ δ' ἄλλα λέγεται ὄντα τῷ τοῦ οὕτως ὄντος τὰ μὲν ποσότητες εἶναι ⁴, τὰ δὲ ποιότητες, τὰ δὲ πάθη, τὰ δὲ ἄλλο τι. — Δῆλον ²⁰ οὖν ὅτι διὰ ταύτην ⁵ κἀκείνων ἕκαστον ἐστίν, ὥστε τὸ πρῶτως ὃν καὶ οὐ τί ὃν ἀλλ' ὃν ἀπλῶς ἡ οὐσία ἂν εἴη.

Substance is primary in definition, in knowledge and in time

b. *Ib.*, 1028 a^{31-b 2}:

Πολλαχῶς μὲν οὖν λέγεται τὸ πρῶτον· ὅμως δὲ πάντως ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ γνώσει καὶ χρόνῳ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων κατηγορημάτων οὐθὲν χωριστόν, αὕτη δὲ μόνη· καὶ τῷ λόγῳ δὲ τοῦτο πρῶτον (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐκάστου λόγῳ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας ἐνυπάρχειν)· καὶ εἰδέναι δὲ τότ' οἴομεθα ἕκαστον ³⁵ μάλιστα, ὅταν τί ἐστίν ὁ ἀνθρώπος γινώμεν ἢ τὸ πῦρ, μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ποιὸν ἢ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ τὸ πού, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων τότε ἕκαστον ἴσμεν, ὅταν τί ἐστὶ τὸ b ποσὸν ἢ τὸ ποιὸν γινώμεν.

The eternal question "What is being" means "What is substance"

c. *Ib.*, 1028 b²⁻⁴:

Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν καὶ αἰεὶ ζητούμενον καὶ αἰεὶ ἀπορούμενον, τί τὸ ὃν, τοῦτό ἐστι τίς ἡ οὐσία.

¹ τοῖς νῦν - The reference is certainly to Speusippus, head of the Academy since the death of Plato.

² Sc. in *Δ* 7.

³ τί ἐστὶ καὶ τόδε τι - It should be noticed that the author, before coming to his definitive conception of οὐσία, in the beginning of this very book uses the term in exactly the same way as it is used in *Categ.* 5 (our nr. 438a), namely, not only in the sense of essence or quiddity (τί ἐστὶ), but also in the sense of the individual being.

⁴ τῷ - εἶναι: "by the fact that they are, some of them, quantities of that which is in this primary sense, others qualities of it", etc.

⁵ διὰ ταύτην - sc. τ. πρῶτην κατηγορίαν.

534—Having first qualified οὐσία as τί ἐστι or as τόδε τι, Ar. now proceeds to ask whether, then, natural bodies and their parts are substances (as he seems inclined to admit ¹), or something else next to them (e.g. Ideas and mathematical objects), or even not these but some other things.

Metaph. Z 2, 1028 b⁸⁻¹⁵:

Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ οὐσία ὑπάρχειν φανερώτατα μὲν τοῖς σώμασιν (διὸ τά τε ζῶα
10 καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῶν οὐσίας εἶναι φαμεν, καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα,
οἶον πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστον, καὶ ὅσα ἢ μόρια
τούτων ἢ ἐκ τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ μορίων ἢ πάντων, οἶον ὃ τε οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ μόρια
αὐτοῦ, ἄστρα καὶ σελήνη καὶ ἥλιος)· πότερον δὲ αὐταὶ μόναι οὐσαὶ εἰσὶν ἢ καὶ
15 ἄλλαι, ἢ τούτων τινὲς ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐθὲν ἕτεραι δὲ τινες, σκεπτέον.

Are natural
bodies and
their parts
substances?

535—a. Four possibilities must be considered.

Metaph. Z 3, 1028 b³³⁻³⁶:

Λέγεται δ' ἡ οὐσία, εἰ μὴ πλεοναχῶς, ἀλλ' ἐν τέτταρσί γε μάλιστα· καὶ γὰρ
τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ γένος οὐσία δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐκάστου, καὶ
τέταρτον τούτων τὸ ὑποκείμενον.

Four
meanings
of the term
"substance"

b. *Ib.*, 1028 b³⁶-1029 a²:

Τὸ δ' ὑποκείμενόν ἐστι καθ' οὗ τὰ ἄλλα λέγεται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ αὐτὸ μηκέτι
κατ' ἄλλου· διὸ πρῶτον περὶ τούτου διοριστέον· μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ εἶναι
οὐσία τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρῶτον.

Can the sub-
stratum be
substance?

c. Now matter is defined as that which is nothing in itself: neither a definite being, nor a quantity nor any other thing by which being is qualified (our nr. **476c**). "For there is something of which each of this is predicated"...

Ib., 1029 a²⁶⁻³³:

Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων θεωροῦσι συμβαίνει οὐσίαν εἶναι τὴν ὕλην· ἀδύνατον δέ· **In fact, this**
καὶ γὰρ τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι ὑπάρχειν δοκεῖ μάλιστα τῇ οὐσίᾳ, διὸ τὸ **consequence**
εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον τῆς ὕλης. τὴν μὲν τοίνυν **is impossible**
30 ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ τὴν ἐκ τε τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς μορφῆς, ἀφετέον, ὅστερα
γὰρ καὶ δῆλη· φανερὰ δὲ πως καὶ ἡ ὕλη· περὶ δὲ τῆς τρίτης σκεπτέον, αὕτη
γὰρ ἀπορωτάτη.

536—Ar. now proceeds to study essence. He begins with some logical remarks.

Substance
as essence

¹ Note the expressions φανερώτατα μὲν and φαμεν.

a. The first question is: What is the τί ἦν εἶναι?

Metaph. Z 4, 1029 b¹³⁻¹⁶:

Meaning of
essence

— ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐκάστου ὃ λέγεται καθ' αὐτό. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ σοὶ εἶναι τὸ μουσικῶς εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ σαυτὸν εἶ μουσικός. ὃ ἄρα κατὰ σαυτὸν.

b. Only those things have an essence whose account is a definition.

It belongs
only to things
which can
be defined

Ib., 1030 a⁶⁻⁷:

— τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐστὶν ὅσων ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ὁρισμός.

E.g. "white man" cannot be defined, because it is a compound of substance and another category, the essence being "just what something is".

Species only
have a
definition

c. *Ib.*, 1030 a⁷⁻¹⁴:

Ὅρισμός δ' ἐστὶν οὐκ ἂν ὄνομα λόγῳ ταῦτ' σημαίνει (πάντες γὰρ ἂν εἶεν οἱ λόγοι ὅροι· ἔσται γὰρ ὄνομα ὁπωοῦν λόγῳ, ὥστε καὶ ἡ Ἰλιάς ὁρισμός ἐσται), ἀλλ' ἐὰν πρώτου τινὸς ἦ· τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα λέγεται μὴ τῷ ἄλλο κατ' ἄλλου 10 λέγεσθαι. οὐκ ἔσται ἄρα οὐδενὶ τῶν μὴ γένους εἰδῶν ὑπάρχον τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τούτοις μόνον (ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ οὐ κατὰ μετοχὴν λέγεσθαι καὶ πάθος οὐδ' ὡς συμβεβηκός).

Other things
only in a
secondary
sense

d. *Ib.*, 1030 a¹⁴⁻³²:

Ἀλλὰ λόγος μὲν ἔσται ἐκάστου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τί σημαίνει, ἐὰν ἦ ὄνομα, ὅτι 15 τὸδε τῷδε ὑπάρχει, ἢ ἀντὶ λόγου ἀπλοῦ ἀκριβέστερος· ὁρισμός δ' οὐκ ἔσται οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. ἢ καὶ ὁ ὁρισμός ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τί ἐστὶ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται; καὶ γὰρ τὸ τί ἐστὶν ἓνα μὲν τρόπον σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τὸδε τι, ἄλλον δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν κατηγορουμένων, ποσὸν ποιὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. ὥσπερ 20 γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐστὶν ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν πρώτως τοῖς δ' ἐπομένως, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τί ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ πῶς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ποιὸν ἐροίμεθ' ἂν τί ἐστὶν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ποιὸν τῶν τί ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος λογικῶς φασὶ τινες εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν, 25 οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ ὄν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ποιόν. — δεῖ μὲν οὖν σκοπεῖν καὶ τὸ πῶς δεῖ λέγειν περὶ ἕκαστον, οὐ μὴν μᾶλλον γε ἢ τὸ πῶς ἔχει· διὸ καὶ νῦν ἐπεὶ τὸ λεγόμενον φανερόν, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ὁμοίως ὑπάρξει πρώτως μὲν καὶ ἀπλῶς τῇ οὐσίᾳ, εἶτα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τί ἐστὶν, οὐχ ἀπλῶς τί ἦν εἶναι 30 ἀλλὰ ποιῶ ἢ ποσῶ τί ἦν εἶναι.

Conclusion

e. So in fact definition and essence belong primarily to substance, secondarily to the other categories.

Ib., 1030 b⁴⁻⁷:

Ἐκεῖνο δὲ φανερόν ὅτι ὁ πρώτως καὶ ἀπλῶς ὁρισμός καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῶν οὐσιῶν ἐστίν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἐστί, πλην οὐ πρώτως.

537—In the next chapter (5) Ar. deals with some difficulties concerning the definition of τὰ οὐχ ἀπλᾶ, ἀλλὰ συνδεδυασμένα, such as σιμότης, where the definition of “snub” always implies a reference to the substance to which it belongs (“nose”). Ultimately all terms in categories other than substance are shown to be in principle of this type, the definition of them being ἐκ προσθέσεως, i.e. involving a reference to the substance to which they belong.

Metaph. Z 5, 1031 a¹⁻⁵:

Δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι μόνης τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρισμός. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν, ἀνάγκη ἐκ προσθέσεως εἶναι, οἷον τοῦ ἡποιοῦ¹ καὶ περιττοῦ· οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ ἀριθμοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ θῆλυ ἄνευ ζφου (τὸ δὲ ἐκ προσθέσεως λέγω ἐν οἷς συμβαίνει δις τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὥσπερ ἐν τούτοις).

The definition of compounds always ἐκ προσθέσεως

538—Ar. now raises the question whether a thing is identical with its essence. He answers: Not always. E.g. not in terms formed by a substance coupled with an accidental predicate, such as “white man”. But in terms καθ’ αὐτό they are the same. E.g. “the Good” itself cannot differ from its essence, nor can “living being”.

a. *Metaph. Z 6, 1031 a¹⁵⁻¹⁸:*

Πότερον δὲ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἕτερον τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον, σκεπτόμεν. ἔστι γάρ τι πρὸ ἔργου πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας σκέψιν· ἕκαστόν τε γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλο δοκεῖ εἶναι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίας, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγεται εἶναι ἢ ἐκάστου οὐσία.

Is each thing = its essence?

b. *Ib., 1031 a¹⁹⁻²⁴:*

Ἐπὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν λεγομένων κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δόξειεν ἂν ἕτερον εἶναι, οἷον λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος ἕτερον καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ τὸ αὐτό, καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ αὐτό· τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὥς φασίν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ.

Not in the case of accidental unities

c. *Ib., 1031 a^{28-b⁴}, b¹¹⁻¹⁵:*

30 Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καθ’ αὐτὰ λεγομένων ἄρ’ ἀνάγκη ταῦτό εἶναι, οἷον εἰ τινες εἰσὶν οὐσίαι ὧν ἕτεραι μὴ εἰσὶν οὐσίαι μηδὲ φύσεις ἕτεραι πρότεροι, οἷας φασὶν
b τὰς ἰδέας εἶναι τινες; εἰ γὰρ ἔσται ἕτερον αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι, καὶ ζῶον καὶ τὸ ζῶν, καὶ τὸ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἔσονται ἄλλαι τε οὐσίαι καὶ φύσεις καὶ ἰδέαι παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας, καὶ πρότεροι οὐσίαι ἐκεῖναι, εἰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐσία ἐστίν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀπολελυμένα ἄλλήλων, τῶν μὲν² οὐκ ἔσται ἐπιστήμη

but in the case of self-subsistent beings

¹ ποιοῦ codd. Bonitz conjectured ἀρτίου.

² τῶν μὲν - the Ideas themselves, e.g. the Good.

τὰ δ' ¹ οὐκ ἔσται ὄντα. — Ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ καλὸν καὶ καλῷ εἶναι, <καὶ> ὅσα μὴ κατ' ἄλλο λέγεται, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ πρῶτα· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν ἂν ὑπάρχη, καὶ μὴ ἢ εἶδη, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως καὶ ἢ εἶδη.

Other
argument
for the
identity

d. Ib., 1031 b¹⁸⁻²²:

Ἐκ τε δὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων ἐν καὶ ταῦτό οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτὸ ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι γε τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἕκαστον τοῦτό ἐστι, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐπίστασθαι, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἔκθεσιν ² ἀνάγκη ἐν τι εἶναι ἄμφο.

The case of
accidental
terms

e. Ib., 1031 b²²⁻²⁸:

(τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεγόμενον, οἷον τὸ μουσικὸν ἢ λευκόν, διὰ τὸ διττὸν σημαίνειν οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὡς ταῦτό τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ᾧ συμβέβηκε λευκὸν καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός ³, ὥστ' ἔστι μὲν ὡς ταυτόν, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ ταυτό τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ αὐτό· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ ταυτό, τῷ πάθει δὲ ταυτό ⁴).

Conclusion

f. Ib., 1032 a⁴⁻⁶:

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ λεγομένων τὸ ἕκαστῳ εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν ἔστι, δῆλον.

Essence and
definition

539—After a digression on the various kinds of becoming (ch. 7-9), Ar. now raises the question as to what belongs to the essence, and therefore to the definition. Should the definition of a whole contain the definitions of the parts?

Whole and
parts

a. *Metaph.* Z 10, 1034 b²⁰⁻²⁸:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ⁵ ἐστὶ, πᾶς δὲ λόγος μέρη ἔχει, ὡς δὲ ὁ λόγος 20 πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὸ μέρος τοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὸ μέρος τοῦ πράγματος ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀπορεῖται ἤδη πότερον δεῖ τὸν τῶν μερῶν λόγον ἐνυπάρχειν ἐν τῷ τοῦ ὅλου λόγῳ ἢ οὐ. ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν γὰρ φαίνονται ἐνόντες ἐνίων δ' οὐ. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κύκλου ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὸν τῶν τμημάτων, ὁ δὲ τῆς συλλαβῆς ἔχει τὸν τῶν 25 στοιχείων· καί τοι διαίρεται καὶ ὁ κύκλος εἰς τὰ τμήματα ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ συλλαβὴ εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα.

¹ τὰ δὲ - the essences.

² It becomes clear by the exhibition of instances.

³ "For both that to which the accidental quality belongs, and the accidental quality, are white" (Ross).

⁴ But it will be the same as the quality "white".

⁵ Ross translates "formula", with reference to *De interpr.* 16 b²⁸ (our nr. 442a).

b. Then, are the parts prior to the whole?

Ib., 1034 b²⁸⁻³²:

Are the parts
prior?

"Ἐτι δὲ εἰ πρότερα τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου, τῆς δὲ ὁρθῆς ἡ ὀξεῖα μέρος καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τοῦ ζώου, πρότερον ἂν εἴη ἡ ὀξεῖα τῆς ὁρθῆς καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. δοκεῖ δ' ἐκεῖνα εἶναι πρότερα· τῷ λόγῳ γὰρ λέγονται ἐξ ἐκείνων ¹, καὶ τῷ εἶναι δὲ ἄνευ ἀλλήλων πρότερα ².

540—Why, then, is man prior to the finger and a circle to its segments, whereas individual letters are prior to the syllable?—Ar. answers: material parts are not prior, parts of the form are.

a. Ib., 1035 a¹⁻¹²:

Material
parts not
prior

Εἰ οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ εἶδος τὸ δ' ἐκ τούτων, καὶ οὐσία ἢ τε ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς καὶ ἡ ὕλη μέρος τινὸς λέγεται, ἐστὶ δ' ὡς οὐ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν ὁ τοῦ εἶδους λόγος ³. οἷον τῆς μὲν κοιλότητος οὐκ ἐστὶ μέρος ⁵ ἡ σάρξ (αὕτη γὰρ ἡ ὕλη ἐφ' ἧς γίγνεται), τῆς δὲ σιμότητος μέρος· καὶ τοῦ μὲν συνόλου ἀνδριάντος μέρος ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ δ' ὡς εἶδους λεγομένου ἀνδριάντος οὐ (λεκτέον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ εἶδος ἔχει ἕκαστον ⁴, τὸ δ' ὑλικὸν οὐδέποτε καθ' αὐτὸ λεκτέον ⁵)· διὸ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κύκλου λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὸν τῶν τμημάτων, ¹⁰ ὁ δὲ τῆς συλλαβῆς ἔχει τὸν τῶν στοιχείων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου μέρη τοῦ εἶδους καὶ οὐχ ὕλη, τὰ δὲ τμήματα οὕτως μέρη ὡς ὕλη ἐφ' ἧς ἐπὶ γίγνεται.

b. So parts of the definition are prior. E.g. the acute angle is not a preceding part of the right angle, but the right angle is logically prior. For the acute angle is defined as being smaller than the right angle.

Ib., 1035 b⁴⁻⁸:

E.g. the
acute angle

"Ὅσα μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λόγου μέρη καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν διαιρεῖται ὁ λόγος, ταῦτα πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἓνα· ὁ δὲ τῆς ὁρθῆς λόγος οὐ διαιρεῖται εἰς ὀξείας λόγον ⁶, ἀλλ' <ὁ> τῆς ὀξείας εἰς ὁρθήν· χρῆται γὰρ ὁ ὀρίζομενος τὴν ὀξεῖαν τῇ ὁρθῇ· »ἐλάττω« γὰρ »ὁρθῆς« ἡ ὀξεῖα.

¹ The parts are explained by reference to the whole (ἐξ ἐκείνων λέγονται).

² "in respect also of the power of existing apart from each other the wholes are prior to the parts" (Ross).

³ ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν etc. - but only the elements of which the formula of the form exists.

⁴ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ εἶδος ἔχει - "the form, or the thing as having form, should be said to be the thing".

⁵ τὸ δ' ὑλικὸν οὐδέποτε - "but the material element by itself must never be said to be so".

⁶ The formula of the right angle does not include the formula of the acute angle.

c. Other examples and conclusion. Ib. 1035 b⁹⁻¹⁴:

Parts of the
definition
prior

Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ κύκλος καὶ τὸ ἡμικύκλιον ἔχουσιν· τὸ γὰρ ἡμικύκλιον τῷ κύκλῳ ὀρίζεται καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τῷ ὄλῳ· »τὸ γὰρ »τοιόνδε μέρος ἀνθρώπου« δάκτυλος. ὥσθ' ὅσα μὲν μέρη ὡς ὕλη καὶ εἰς 2 διαιρεῖται ὡς ὕλην, ὕστερα· ὅσα δὲ ὡς τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον, πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἕνια.

d. Thus in living beings, too: parts of the soul have priority, material parts have not.

So in the case
of living
beings

Ib., 1035 b¹⁴⁻²²:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν ζώων ψυχὴ (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐσία τοῦ ἐμψύχου) ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῷδε σώματι (ἕκαστον γοῦν 15 τὸ μέρος ἐὰν ὀρίζεται καλῶς, οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔργου ὀριεῖται, δὲ οὐχ ὑπάρξει ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως), ὥστε τὰ ταύτης μέρη πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἕνια τοῦ συνόλου ζώου, καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον δὴ ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ σῶμα καὶ τὰ τούτου μόρια ὕστερα ταύτης 20 τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα ὡς εἰς ὕλην οὐχ ἡ οὐσία ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον.

541—To the question whether matter should be admitted into the definition of physical beings, these being essentially composed of form and matter, Ar. answers: no, matter does not enter into the definition.

a. Ib., 1035 b²⁷⁻³¹:

matter the
individuating
principle

Ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ ἵππος καὶ τὰ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, καθόλου δέ ¹, οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία ἀλλὰ σύνολόν τι ἐκ τουδὶ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τησδὶ τῆς ὕλης ὡς καθόλου· καθ' ἕκαστον δ' ἐκ τῆς ἐσχάτης ὕλης ὁ Σωκράτης ἤδη ἔστιν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως.

In the last sentence (καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ e.q.s.) matter is qualified as the principle of individuation: "As to the individual, immediately after the ultimate matter Socrates comes in".

Only parts of
the form are
parts of the
definition

b. Ib., 1035 b³¹-1036 a²:

Μέρος μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ εἶδους (εἶδος δὲ λέγω τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) καὶ τοῦ συνόλου τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ εἶδους καὶ τῆς ὕλης <καὶ τῆς ὕλης> αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ τ ο ὕ λ ὁ - γ ο υ μ έ ρ η τ ά τ ο ὕ ε ἰ δ ο υ ς μ ό ν ο ν έ σ τ ῖ ν , ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐστὶ τοῦ καθόλου· τὸ γὰρ κύκλῳ εἶναι καὶ κύκλος καὶ ψυχῇ εἶναι καὶ ψυχὴ ταυτό.

Concrete
things not
definable

c. Ib., 1036 a²⁻⁸:

Τοῦ δὲ συνόλου ἤδη, οἷον κύκλου τουδὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά τινος ἡ αἰσθητοῦ

¹ τὰ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα etc. - terms which are thus applied to individuals, but universally.

ἡ νοητοῦ — λέγω δὲ νοητοὺς μὲν οἶον τοὺς μαθηματικούς, αἰσθητοὺς δὲ οἶον τοὺς χαλκοὺς καὶ τοὺς ξυλίνους — τούτων δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμός, ἀλλὰ μετὰ νοήσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως γνωρίζονται, ἀπελθόντες δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἐντελεχείας¹ οὐ δῆλον πότερον εἰσὶν ἢ οὐκ εἰσὶν· ἀλλ' αἰεὶ λέγονται καὶ γνωρίζονται τῷ καθόλου λόγῳ.

d. Ib., 1036 a⁸⁻¹²:

Ἡ δ' ὅλη ἀγνωστος καθ' αὐτήν. ὅλη δὲ ἡ μὲν αἰσθητὴ ἔστιν ἡ δὲ νοητὴ, αἰσθητὴ μὲν οἶον χαλκὸς καὶ ξύλον καὶ ὅση κινητὴ ὅλη, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ἢ αἰσθητά, οἶον τὰ μαθηματικά.

ὅλη αἰσθητή
and
ὅλη νοητή

ὅλη νοητή is identified by Alexander with extension.

542—Ar. now proceeds to discuss the question why that, the account of which is a definition, is one.

E.g.: why is "two-footed animal" one and not two? "Man" and "white" are two when the one does not belong to the other, one when it does. But in "two-footed animal" one element does not share in the other; the genus does not share in the differentiae (else it would share in contraries at the same time). And even if it were to share in its differentiae, the same difficulty would arise, for the differentiae of man are more than one: possessed of feet, two-footed, wingless. Why, then, are these one?

Ar. answers: ζῷον is the genus, δῖπουν the differentia. But this difference is to be divided again, and again, until the indivisible species is reached. The last difference will be the substance and definition of the thing.

Metaph. Z 12, 1038 a¹⁶⁻²⁰:

Οὕτως αἰεὶ βούλεται βαδίζειν ἕως ἂν ἔλθῃ εἰς τὰ ἀδιάφορα· τότε δ' ἔσονται τοσαῦτα εἶδη ποδὸς ὅσαι περ αἱ διαφοραὶ, καὶ τὰ ὑπόποδα ζῶα ἴσα ταῖς διαφοραῖς. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, φανερόν ἐστι ἡ τελευταία διαφορὰ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ πράγματος ἔσται καὶ ὁ ὁρισμός.

So the last difference constitutes the unity of the subject of a definition.

543—The author now comes to his conclusions from the preceding points (ch. 13-17).

a. First, the universal cannot be a substance.

Ib. *Z* 13, 1038 b⁸⁻¹⁶:

No universal
a substance

10 Ἦοικε γὰρ ἀδύνατον εἶναι οὐσίαν εἶναι ὅτι οὖν τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων. Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐσία ἐκάστου ἢ ἴδιος ἐκάστῳ, ἢ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἄλλῳ, τὸ δὲ καθόλου κοινόν· τοῦτο γὰρ λέγεται καθόλου δὲ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχειν πέφυκεν. τίνος οὖν οὐσία τοῦτ' ἔσται; ἢ γὰρ πάντων ἢ οὐδενός, πάντων δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε·

First
reason

¹ ἀπελθόντες ἐκ τῆς ἐντελεχείας - as soon as they are no more actuated by νόησις or by αἰσθησις.

ἐνὸς δ' εἴ ἐστι, καὶ τᾶλλα τοῦτ' ἐστι. ὦν γὰρ μία ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐν, καὶ αὐτὰ ἐν.

Second
reason

Ἐτι οὐσία λέγεται τὸ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου, τὸ δὲ καθόλου καθ' ὑποκειμένου 15
τινὸς λέγεται αἰ.

b. No substance can consist of substances.

Ib., 1039 a³⁻¹⁰:

No substance
consists of
substances

Ἀδύνατον γὰρ οὐσίαν ἐξ οὐσιῶν εἶναι ἐνυπαρχουσῶν ὡς ἐντελεχεία. τὰ γὰρ
δύο οὕτως ἐντελεχεία οὐδέποτε ἐν ἐντελεχείᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐὰν δυνάμει δύο ἦ, ἐστὶ 5
ἐν (οἶον ἡ διπλασία ἐκ δύο ἡμισεων δυνάμει γε· ἡ γὰρ ἐντελέχεια χωρίζει),
ὥστ' εἰ ἡ οὐσία ἐν, οὐκ ἐστὶ ἐξ οὐσιῶν ἐνυπαρχουσῶν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν
τρόπον, ὃν λέγει Δημόκριτος ὀρθῶς· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι φησιν ἐκ δύο ἐν ἡ ἐξ
ἐνὸς δύο γενέσθαι.

10

544—The next consequence concerns the theory of Ideas.

Absurd con-
sequences as
to the Ideas

Metaph. Z 14, 1039 a³⁰-b⁶, b¹⁷⁻¹⁹:

Εἰ οὖν ἐστὶ τις ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτὸν τόδε τι καὶ κεχωρισμένον, ἀνάγκη
καὶ ἐξ ὧν, οἶον τὸ ζῶον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, τόδε τι σημαίνειν καὶ εἶναι χωριστὰ
καὶ οὐσίας· ὥστε καὶ τὸ ζῶον. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἵππῳ καὶ τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ σὺ σαυτῷ, πῶς τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς οὐσι χωρὶς ἐν ἐστὶ, καὶ διὰ τί b
οὐ καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ τὸ ζῶον τοῦτο; ἔπειτα εἰ μὲν μεθέξει τοῦ δίποδος
καὶ τοῦ πολυπόδος, ἀδύνατόν τι συμβαίνει, τάναντία γὰρ ἅμα ὑπάρξει αὐτῷ
ἐνὶ καὶ τῷδὲ τινι ὄντι· εἰ δὲ μή, τίς ὁ τρόπος ὅταν εἴπη τις τὸ ζῶον εἶναι δίπουν 5
ἢ πεζόν; ἀλλ' ἴσως σύγκειται καὶ ἄπτεται ἢ μέμικται· ἀλλὰ πάντα ἄτοπα. —

Therefore,
Ideas no
substances

Εἰ δὴ ἀδύνατον οὕτως ἔχειν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν εἶδη αὐτῶν οὕτως ὡς
τινὲς φασιν.

545—Another consequence: concrete individual beings are not definable;
—therefore, the Ideas, which are said to be separate particulars (!),
cannot be defined.

Individual
beings not
definable

a. *Metaph. Z* 15, 1039 b²⁰⁻³¹:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ οὐσία ἑτέρα, τό τε σύνολον καὶ ὁ λόγος (λέγω δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν οὕτως 20
ἐστὶν οὐσία, σὺν τῇ ὕλῃ συνειλημμένος ὁ λόγος, ἡ δ' ὁ λόγος ὅλως), ὅσαι μὲν
οὖν οὕτω λέγονται, τούτων μὲν ἐστὶ φθορά (καὶ γὰρ γενέσεις), τοῦ δὲ λόγου
οὐκ ἐστὶν οὕτως ὥστε φθεῖρεσθαι (οὐδὲ γὰρ γενέσεις, οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ οἰκία
εἶναι ἀλλὰ τὸ τῇδε τῇ οἰκίᾳ), ἀλλ' ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ 25
εἰσὶν· δέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι οὐδεὶς ταῦτα γεννᾷ οὐδὲ ποιεῖ. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τῶν
οὐσιῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα οὔτε ὀρισμός οὔτε ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶν,
ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὕλην ἧς ἡ φύσις τοιαύτη ὥστ' ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ· διὸ
φθαρτὰ πάντα τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αὐτῶν.

30

b. Ib., 1040 a⁸⁻⁹:

Οὐδὲ δὴ ιδέαν οὐδεμίαν ἔστιν ὀρίσασθαι. τῶν γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστον ἡ ιδέα, ὡς φασί, καὶ χωριστή.

Therefore,
no definition
of Ideas

A very strange conclusion, which, really, does not redound to the credit of its author.

546—Two wrong views about substance.

a. *Metaph. Z* 16, 1040 b⁵⁻¹⁰:

5 Φανερόν δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν δοκουσῶν εἶναι οὐσιῶν αἱ πλεῖσται δυνάμεις εἰσί, τὰ τε μόρια τῶν ζώων (οὐθὲν γὰρ κεχωρισμένον αὐτῶν ἔστιν· ὅταν δὲ χωρισθῇ, καὶ τότε ὄντα ὡς ὕλη πάντα) καὶ γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀήρ· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐν
10 ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οἷον σωρός, πρὶν ἢ πεφθῇ καὶ γένηται τι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐν.

Most
so-called
substances
are
potentialities

b. Ib., b 16²⁷:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐν λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ τοῦ ἐνὸς μία, καὶ ὦν μία ἀριθμῶ ἐν ἀριθμῶ¹, φανερόν ὅτι οὔτε τὸ ἐν οὔτε τὸ ὄν ἐνδέχεται οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ στοιχείω εἶναι ἢ ἀρχῇ· ἀλλὰ ζητοῦμεν
20 τίς οὖν ἡ ἀρχή, ἵνα εἰς γνωριμώτερον ἀναγάγωμεν. μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν τούτων² οὐσία τὸ ὄν καὶ ἐν ἢ ἡ τε ἀρχή καὶ τὸ στοιχεῖον καὶ τὸ αἷτιον, οὐπω δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα, εἴπερ μὴδ' ἄλλο κοινὸν μὴδὲν οὐσία· οὐδενὶ γὰρ ὑπάρχει ἡ οὐσία ἀλλ'
25 ἡ αὐτῇ τε καὶ τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτήν, οὗ ἔστιν οὐσία. ἔτι τὸ ἐν πολλαχῇ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἅμα, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν ἅμα πολλαχῇ ὑπάρχει· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπάρχει παρὰ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα χωρίς.

Unity and
being are no
substances

To the question why a thing is, and why it is one, Plato answered: because it participates of being and of unity. Ar. rejects this answer, for the "one" and "being" are no substances. They are κοινά, being predicated of all things.

547—Ar.'s final view of substance: substance is "form" or "quiddity".

a. Ar. now again asks the question: Why is a thing what it is? E.g. why are these stones etc. a house?

Metaph. Z 17, 1041 a²⁶⁻³²:

Διὰ τί ταδί, οἷον πλίνθοι καὶ λίθοι, οἰκία ἔστιν; φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι ζητεῖ τὸ αἷτιον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὡς εἰπεῖν λογικῶς, ὃ ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν ἔστι τίνος ἕνεκα, οἷον ἰσως ἐπ' οἰκίας ἢ κλίνης, ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ τί ἐκίνησε πρῶτον·
30 αἷτιον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἷτιον ἐπὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ζητεῖται καὶ φθεῖρεσθαι, θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι.

Why is a
thing
what it is?

¹ ὦν μία ἀριθμῶ ἐν ἀριθμῶ - as things whose substance is numerically one are numerically one, —

² τούτων - partitively: of these concepts.

b. The question really means: why is this material a certain thing?

Because the
quiddity
belongs to it

Ib., 1041 b⁴⁻⁹:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ ἔχειν τε καὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τὴν ὕλην ζητεῖ διὰ τί <τί> ἐστίν· οἷον οἰκία ταδὶ διὰ τί; ὅτι ὑπάρχει ὁ ἦν οἰκία εἶναι. καὶ ἄνθρωπος τοδὶ, ἢ τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο τοδὶ ἔχον. ὥστε τὸ αἷτιον ζητεῖται τῆς ὕλης (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος) ὧς τί ἐστίν· τοῦτο δ' ἡ οὐσία.

This, then, is Ar.'s final answer to the question: what substance is.

4—POTENCY AND ACTUALITY

548—a. A definition of "potency" in its primary sense ("power") is given in

Primary
sense of the
term
δύναμις

Metaph. Θ 1, 1046 a¹¹:

ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἡ ἄλλο.

"a source of change in another thing, or in the thing itself *qua* other".

b. From this primary sense the author derives (a) the potency of being acted on by another or by the thing itself *qua* other; and (b) insusceptibility to change for the worse by the agency of another thing, etc.

Derived
notions

Ib., 1046 a¹¹⁻¹⁶:

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ παθεῖν ἐστὶ δύναμις, ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πάσχοντι ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς παθητικῆς ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἡ ἄλλο· ἡ δ' ἐξὶς ἀπαθείας τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χειρόν καὶ φθορᾶς τῆς ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἡ ἄλλο ὑπ' ἀρχῆς μεταβλητικῆς. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἔνεστι πᾶσι τοῖς ὄροις ὁ τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως λόγος.

c. Ar. wants to distinguish the notion of "power" of the term δύναμις from the notion of "potentiality". This sense of the term is explained in ch. 6 of the same book,

Potentiality

1048 a³²⁻³⁵:

Λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει (sc. ὑπάρχειν τὸ πράγμα) οἷον ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ Ἑρμῆν καὶ ἐν τῇ ὄλῃ τὴν ἡμίσειαν, ὅτι ἀφαιρεθείη ἄν, καὶ ἐπιστήμονα καὶ τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, ἂν δυνατὸς ᾗ θεωρῆσαι.

549—Ar. continues speaking on potency in the sense of "power".

Rational and
non-rational
powers

Metaph. Θ 2, 1046 a³⁶-b⁹, 15-20:

Ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται, αἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν β δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν ἔσονται ἄλογοι αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου· διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι δυνάμεις εἰσὶν· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαὶ εἰσὶν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἡ ἄλλο. καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι μία

5 ἑνός, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον ἢ δὲ ἰατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγείας.
αἷτιον δὲ ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ
τὴν στέρησιν. — Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη
δύναμις τῷ λόγον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ κινήσεως ἔχει ἀρχήν, τὸ μὲν ὑγεινὸν
17 ὑγίειαν μόνον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ θερμαντικὸν θερμότητα καὶ τὸ ψυκτικὸν ψυχρότητα,
ὁ δ' ἐπιστήμων ἄμφω.

550—The existence of any “potential being” when there is no actuality, is denied by the Megarian school¹. Ar. defends his theory against this attack.

a. *Metaph.* Θ 3, 1046 b^{29,33}:

The attack
of the Mega-
rian school

Εἰσι δὲ τινες οἱ φασιν, οἷον οἱ Μεγαρικοί, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι²,
ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ οὐ δύνασθαι, οἷον τὸν μὴ οἰκοδομοῦντα οὐ δύνασθαι οἰκοδο-
μεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν οἰκοδομοῦντα ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
οἷς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν.

b. *Ib.*, 1046 b³³-1047 a¹⁷:

Absurd
consequences
of this theory

Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐτ' οἰκοδόμος ἐστὶ ἀν μὴ οἰκοδομῇ (τὸ γὰρ οἰκοδόμω
35 εἶναι τὸ δυνατῷ εἶναι ἐστὶν οἰκοδομεῖν), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν.
εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατον τὰς τοιαύτας ἔχειν τέχνας μὴ μαθόντα ποτὲ καὶ λαβόντα, καὶ
1047a μὴ ἔχειν μὴ ἀποβαλόντα ποτέ (ἡ γὰρ λήθη ἢ πάθει τινὶ ἢ χρόνῳ· οὐ γὰρ δὴ
τοῦ γε πράγματος φθαρέντος, αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐστὶν), ὅταν παύσῃται, οὐχ ἔξει τὴν
τέχνην, πάλιν δ' εὐθὺς οἰκοδομήσει πῶς λαβών;

5 Καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα δὴ ὁμοίως· οὔτε γὰρ ψυχρὸν οὔτε θερμὸν οὔτε γλυκὺ οὔτε
ὄλως αἰσθητὸν οὐθὲν ἐστὶ μὴ αἰσθανομένων· ὥστε τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον.³
συμβήσεται λέγειν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' αἰσθησιν ἔξει οὐδὲν ἂν μὴ αἰσθάνηται
μηδ' ἐνεργῇ. εἰ οὖν τυφλὸν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, πεφυκὸς δὲ καὶ ὅτε πέφυκε καὶ ἐτι
10 ὄν, οἱ αὐτοὶ τυφλοὶ ἔσονται πολλάκις τῆς ἡμέρας, καὶ κωφοί.

Ἐπεὶ εἰ ἀδύνατον τὸ ἐστερημένον δυνάμεως, τὸ μὴ γιγνόμενον ἀδύνατον
ἐστὶ γενέσθαι· τὸ δ' ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ὁ λέγων ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἔσεσθαι ψεύσεται
15 (τὸ γὰρ ἀδύνατον τοῦτο ἐσθαι μὴ), ὥστε οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι ἐξαιρουῖσι καὶ κίνησιν
καὶ γένεσιν. αἰεὶ γὰρ τό τε ἐσθαι ἐσθίεται καὶ τὸ καθήμενον καθεδεῖται·
οὐ γὰρ ἀναστήσεται ἂν καθέζεται· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐστὶ ἀναστήναι ὁ γε μὴ
δύναται ἀναστήναι.

Actuality

551—Ar. now proceeds to explain what actuality is.

a. *Metaph.* Θ 6, 1048 a^{30,32, 35}:

¹ See our nrs. 234 and 235.

² ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι - “that there is only δύναμις when there is ἐνέργεια”.

³ τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον - see our nr. 171.

Ἔστι δὴ ἐνέργεια τὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα μὴ οὕτως ὥσπερ λέγομεν δυνάμει ¹. — τὸ δὲ ² ἐνέργεια.

b. The author wishes to explain the thing by instances, not by definition. He apologizes for this method.

**Explained
by instances**

Ib., 1048 a³⁵-b⁵:

Δῆλον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ ὁ βουλόμεθα λέγειν, καὶ οὐ δεῖ ³⁵ παντὸς ὅρον ζητεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν, ὅτι ὡς τὸ οἰκοδομοῦν πρὸς τὸ οἰκοδομικόν ³, καὶ τὸ ἐργηγορὸς πρὸς τὸ καθεῦδον, καὶ τὸ ὀρῶν πρὸς β τὸ μῦον μὲν ὅψιν δὲ ἔχον, καὶ τὸ ἀποκεκριμένον ἐκ τῆς ὕλης πρὸς τὴν ὕλην, καὶ τὸ ἀπειργασμένον πρὸς τὸ ἀνέργαστον. ταύτης δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς θατέρω μορίῳ ἔστω ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀφωρισμένη θατέρω δὲ τὸ δυνατόν. 5

**Difference
between
movement
and actuality**

552—Potential being must be actualized by a moving cause; but movement as such is not really action, or not complete action. It is actuality only when the end is present in it.

Ib., 1048 b¹⁸⁻³⁵:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν πράξεων ὧν ἔστι πέρας οὐδεμία τέλος ἀλλὰ τῶν περὶ τὸ τέλος, οἷον τὸ ἰσχυαίνειν ἢ ἰσχυασία [αὐτό], αὐτὰ δὲ ⁴ ὅταν ἰσχυαίνῃ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐν ²⁰ κινήσει, μὴ ὑπάρχοντα ὧν ἕνεκα ἡ κίνησις ⁵, οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα πρᾶξις ἢ οὐ τελεία γε (οὐ γὰρ τέλος). ἀλλ' ἐκείνη <ῆ> ἐνυπάρχει τὸ τέλος καὶ [ῆ] πρᾶξις. οἷον ὀρᾷ ἅμα <καὶ ἐώρακε>, καὶ φρονεῖ <καὶ πεφρόνηκε>, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν. ἀλλ' οὐ μανθάνει καὶ μεμάθηκεν οὐδ' ὑγιαίνει καὶ ὑγιασταί. εὖ ζῇ καὶ εὖ ²⁵ ἔζηκεν ἅμα, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖ καὶ εὐδαιμόνηκεν. εἰ δὲ μή, ἔδει ἂν ποτε παύεσθαι ὥσπερ ὅταν ἰσχυαίνῃ, νῦν δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ ζῇ καὶ ἔζηκεν. τούτων δὴ <δεῖ> τὰς μὲν κινήσεις λέγειν, τὰς δ' ἐνεργείας. πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἰσχυασία μάθησις βάδισις οἰκοδόμησις. αὗται δὲ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε. οὐ γὰρ ἅμα βαδίζει ³⁰ καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδ' οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ ὠκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν ἢ κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηται, ἀλλ' ἕτερον, καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κεκίνηκεν. ἐώρακε δὲ καὶ ὀρᾷ ἅμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν λέγω, ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν. 35

553—When is one thing the potency of another? E.g. can we say that earth is potentially a man, or even that sperma is?

¹ Here follows the description of the δυνάμει ὧν, cited sub 548c.

² The thing which stands in contrast to this.

³ τὸ οἰκοδομικόν - that which is capable of building.

⁴ αὐτὰ δὲ - the bodies.

⁵ μὴ ὑπάρχοντα etc. - without being already that at which the movement aims.

a. *Metaph.* Θ 7, 1048 b³⁷-1049 a⁵:When does a
thing exist
potentially?

Πότε δὲ δυνάμει ἔστιν ἕκαστον καὶ πότε οὐ, διοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ὅποτε οὖν.
οἶον ἢ γῆ ἄρ' ἔστι δυνάμει ἄνθρωπος; ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅταν ἤδη γένηται
σπέρμα, καὶ οὐδὲ τότε ἴσως; ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ὑπὸ ἰατρικῆς ἅπαν ἂν ὑγιασθεῖη
οὐδ' ἀπὸ τύχης, ἀλλ' ἔστι τι ὁ δυνατόν ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὑγιαῖνον δυνάμει.

b. Ar. distinguished two ways of passing from potentiality into
actuality: (1) ἀπὸ διανοίας, i.e. by art, (2) in natural beings by an immanent
principle (ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔχοντι).

Ib., 1049 a⁵⁻¹²:In products
of art

5 "Ὅρος δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐντελεχείᾳ γιγνομένου ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος,
ὅταν βουλευθέντος γίγνηται μνηθὲνς κωλύοντος τῶν ἐκτός, ἐκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ ὑγια-
ζομένῳ, ὅταν μνηθὲν κωλύῃ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· ὁμοίως δὲ δυνάμει καὶ οἰκία· εἰ
μνηθὲν κωλύει τῶν ἐν τούτῳ καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι οἰκίαν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ὁ δεῖ
10 προσγενέσθαι ἢ ἀπογενέσθαι ἢ μεταβαλεῖν, τοῦτο δυνάμει οἰκία· καὶ ἐπὶ
τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως ὅσων ἔξωθεν ἢ ἀρχῇ τῆς γενέσεως.

c. Ib., 1049 a¹³⁻¹⁸:In natural
beings

Καὶ ὅσων δὴ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔχοντι, ὅσα μνηθὲνς τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐμποδίζοντος
ἔσται δι' αὐτοῦ· οἶον τὸ σπέρμα οὐπω (δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ <πεσεῖν> καὶ μετα-
15 βάλλειν), ὅταν δ' ἤδη διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρχῆς ἢ τοιοῦτον, ἤδη τοῦτο δυνάμει·
ἐκεῖνο δὲ¹ ἐτέρας ἀρχῆς δεῖται, ὥσπερ ἢ γῆ οὐπω ἀνδριάς δυνάμει (μετα-
βαλοῦσα γὰρ ἔσται χαλκός).

554—Actuality is prior to potency in the broadest sense.

a. *Metaph.* Θ 8, 1049 b⁴⁻¹²:Actuality
prior to
potency

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πρότερον διώρισται ποσαχῶς λέγεται², φανερόν ὅτι πρότερον
5 ἐνέργεια δυνάμει ἔστιν. λέγω δὲ δυνάμει οὐ μόνον τῆς ὀρισμένης ἢ λέγεται
ἀρχῇ μεταβλητικῇ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλο, ἀλλ' ὅλως πάσης ἀρχῆς κινητικῆς ἢ
στατικῆς. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἐν ταύτῃ [γίγνεται· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ] γένει τῇ δυνάμει·
10 ἀρχῇ γὰρ κινητικῇ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτό. — πάσης δὴ τῆς
τοιαύτης προτέρα ἔστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ· χρόνῳ δ' ἔστι
μὲν ὥς, ἔστι δὲ ὥς οὐ.

b—First it is logically prior. Ib., 1049 b¹²⁻¹⁷:

i. logically

Τῷ λόγῳ μὲν οὖν ὅτι προτέρα, δῆλον (τῷ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐνεργῆσαι δυνατόν
ἔστι τὸ πρῶτως δυνατόν, οἶον λέγω οἰκοδομικόν τὸ δυνάμενον οἰκοδομεῖν,

¹ ἐκεῖνο δὲ - in the former state.² διώρισται - namely, in Δ 11.

καὶ ὁρατικὸν τὸ ὁρᾶν, καὶ ὁρατὸν τὸ δυνατὸν ὁρᾶσθαι· ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ 15 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὸν λόγον προϋπάρχειν καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν τῆς γνώσεως).

c. Next, it is prior in time in the following sense.

2. in time Ib., 1049 b¹⁷⁻²⁷:

τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πρότερον ὧδε· τὸ τῷ εἶδει τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνεργοῦν πρότερον, ἀριθμῷ δ' οὐ. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὅτι τοῦδε μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ ἤδη ὄντος κατ' ἐνέργειαν 20 καὶ τοῦ σίτου καὶ τοῦ ὀρώντος πρότερον τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ ὕλη καὶ τὸ σπέρμα καὶ τὸ ὁρατικόν, ἀ δυνάμει μὲν ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ σῖτος καὶ ὀρῶν, ἐνεργείᾳ δ' οὐπω· ἀλλὰ τούτων πρότερα τῷ χρόνῳ ἕτερα ὄντα ἐνεργείᾳ ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα ἐγένετο· αἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος γίγνεται τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὃν ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος, 25 οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, μουσικὸς ὑπὸ μουσικοῦ, αἰ κινουντός τινος πρῶτον· τὸ δὲ κινεῖν ἐνεργείᾳ ἤδη ἐστίν.

3. in substance

d. Thirdly, it is prior in substance. Ib., 1050 a⁴⁻¹⁰:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὐσία γε, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τὰ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερα τῷ εἶδει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα (οἷον ἀνὴρ παῖδος καὶ ἄνθρωπος σπέρματος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τὸ δ' οὐ), καὶ ὅτι ἅπαν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος ¹ (ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, τοῦ τέλους δὲ ἔνεκα ἢ γένεσις), τέλος δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἡ δύναμις λαμβάνεται.

Actuality either in the object, or in the agent

555—a. Actuality can either be in the object which is made, or in the agent.

Ib., 1050 a^{30-b3}:

Ὅσων μὲν οὖν ἕτερόν τί ἐστι παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τὸ γιγνόμενον, τούτων μὲν 30 ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν (οἷον ἢ τε οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ καὶ ἡ ὕφανσις ἐν τῷ ὑφαινομένῳ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ὅλως ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ)· ὅσων δὲ μὴ ἐστὶν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια (οἷον ἡ ὄρασις ἐν τῷ ὀρώντι καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ 35 θεωροῦντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, διὸ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ²· ζωὴ γὰρ ποία τίς ἐστίν). ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστίν.

b. In time, one actuality precedes the other, straight back to the First Mover.

the First Mover first actuality

Ib., 1050 b³⁻⁶:

Κατὰ τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον φανερόν ὅτι πρότερον τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐνέργεια δυνά-

¹ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν . . . καὶ τέλος - to a principle, i.e. an end.

² That eudaimonia is an "energy" of the soul, is the starting-point or basis of Ar.'s treatise on the virtues in the *Eth. Nic.* See our nr. 566 (EN I 7, 15, 1098a¹⁵⁻¹⁷).

μεως, και ὥσπερ εἴπομεν¹, τοῦ χρόνου ἀεὶ προλαμβάνει ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα πρὸ ἑτέρας ἕως τῆς τοῦ ἀεὶ κινουῦντος πρώτως.

c. The eternal is always actual. It cannot be potential, for the potential is contingent, and therefore perishable.

Ib., 1050 b⁶⁻¹⁴; 16¹⁷, 18:

Eternal
beings
always
actual

Ἄλλὰ μὴν και κυριωτέρως· τὰ μὲν γὰρ αἰδία πρότερα τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῶν φθαρτῶν, ἔστι δ' οὐθὲν δυνάμει αἰδιον. λόγος δὲ ὅδε· πᾶσα δύναμις ἅμα τῆς ἀντιφάσεώς 10 ἔστιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ δυνατὸν ὑπάρχειν οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρξειεν οὐθενί, τὸ δυνατὸν δὲ πᾶν ἐνδέχεται μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. τὸ ἄρα δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐνδέχεται και εἶναι και μὴ εἶναι· τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα δυνατὸν και εἶναι και μὴ εἶναι. τὸ δὲ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι 14, 16 ἐνδέχεται μὴ εἶναι· τὸ δὲ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι φθαρτόν. — Οὐθὲν ἄρα τῶν ἀφθάρτων ἀπλῶς δυνάμει ἔστιν ἀπλῶς. — Ἐνεργεῖα ἄρα πάντα.

556—a. *Metaph.* Θ 9, 1051 a⁴⁻¹⁵:

The good
actuality
more
valuable
than the
good
potency

Ὅτι δὲ και βελτίων και τιμιωτέρα τῆς σπουδαίας δυνάμεως ἡ ἐνέργεια, 5 ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ὅσα γὰρ κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι λέγεται, ταῦτόν ἐστι δυνατὸν τάναν- 10 τία², οἷον τὸ δύνασθαι λεγόμενον ὑγιαίνειν ταῦτόν ἐστι και τὸ νοσεῖν, και ἅμα³· ἡ αὐτὴ γὰρ δύναμις τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν και κάμνειν, και ἡρεμεῖν και κινεῖσθαι, 10 και οἰκοδομεῖν και καταβάλλειν, και οἰκοδομεῖσθαι και καταπίπτειν. τὸ μὲν οὖν δύνασθαι τάναντία ἅμα ὑπάρχει· τὰ δ' ἐναντία ἅμα ἀδύνατον, και τὰς ἐνε- 15 ργείας δὲ ἅμα ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν (οἷον ὑγιαίνειν και κάμνειν), ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τούτων θάτερον εἶναι ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ δύνασθαι ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρον ἢ οὐδέτερον· 15 ἡ ἄρα ἐνέργεια βελτίων.

b. Ib., 1051 a¹⁵⁻¹⁹:

A bad
actuality
worse than
bad potency

Ἀνάγκη δὲ και ἐπὶ τῶν κακῶν τὸ τέλος και τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι χειρόν τῆς δυνάμεως· τὸ γὰρ δυνάμενον ταῦτὸ ἄμφω τάναντία. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι 10 τὸ κακὸν παρὰ τὰ πράγματα· ὕστερον γὰρ τῇ φύσει τὸ κακὸν τῆς δυνάμεως.

c. From this fact the author draws an important conclusion, namely, that there is no evil among eternal things.

Ib., 1051 a¹⁹⁻²¹:

No evil
among
eternal
things

Οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς και τοῖς αἰδίοις οὐθὲν ἔστιν οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε ἀμάρτημα οὔτε διεφθαρμένον⁴ (και γὰρ ἡ διαφθορά τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν).

¹ Vid. supra (554b, the end).

² "Ὅσα γὰρ etc. - "Everything of which we say that it can do something, is alike capable of contraries" (Ross).

³ και ἅμα - "and it has both potencies at one and the same time".

⁴ διεφθαρμένον - perverted; διαφθορά - perversion.

5—BEING AND TRUTH

557—In the last chapter of *Metaph.* Θ the author gives his definition of truth, which has become so famous in the history of human thought. It is presented as follows.

Metaph. Θ 10, 1051 a²⁴-b⁹:

Definition
of truth

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὄν λέγεται καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὰ σχήματα τῶν κατηγοριῶν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ δυνάμιν ἢ ἐνέργειαν τούτων ἢ τάναντία, τὸ δὲ [κυριώτατα ὄν] b ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, τοῦτο δ' ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ τῷ συγκεῖσθαι ἢ διηρῆσθαι, ὥστε ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διηρημένον οἰόμενος διηρῆσθαι καὶ τὸ συγκείμενον συγκεῖσθαι, ἔψευσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα, πότ' ἐστὶν ἢ οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς 5 λεγόμενον ἢ ψεῦδος; τοῦτο γὰρ σκεπτόν τι λέγομεν. οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἡμᾶς οἴεσθαι ἀληθῶς σε λευκὸν εἶναι εἰ σὺ λευκός, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σὲ εἶναι λευκὸν ἡμεῖς οἱ φάντες τοῦτο ἀληθεύομεν.

558—a. In *Metaph.* E 4 Ar. separated truth from the province of Metaphysics, because truth and falsity are not "in things", but merely a πάθος τῆς διανοίας.

Truth
excluded
from meta-
physics in E 4

E 4, 1027 b²⁵-1028 a¹:

Οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ κακὸν εὐθὺς ψεῦδος, ἀλλ' ἐν διανοίᾳ, περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀπλᾶ καὶ τὰ τί ἐστὶν οὐδ' ἐν διανοίᾳ. — ὅσα μὲν οὖν δεῖ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὸ οὕτως ὄν καὶ μὴ ὄν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτόν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ συμπλοκή ἐστὶν καὶ ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν διανοίᾳ 30 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι, τὸ δ' οὕτως ὄν ἕτερον ὄν τῶν κυρίως ¹ (ἢ γὰρ τὸ τί ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι ποῖον ἢ ὅτι ποσὸν ἢ τι ἄλλο συνάπτει ἢ διαίρει ἡ διάνοια), τὸ μὲν ὡς συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὸ ὡς ἀληθὲς ὄν ἀφετέον — τὸ γὰρ αἷτιον τοῦ μὲν ἀόριστον τοῦ δὲ τῆς διανοίας τι πάθος.

To this view our passage in Θ 10 adds a new element, namely that, with the συμπλοκή in thought, a συμπλοκή in reality must correspond.

The same view has been expressed with some emphasis by Plato, at the end of his *Sophist*, as a solution of the difficulty concerning ψευδὴς δόξα. See our nr. 343.

b. That truth and falsity depend on combination, is also said in *Categ.* 4, at the end. Immediately after having enumerated the ten categories, with a few instances of each, the author continues (*Categ.* 4, 2 a^{4.10}):

¹ τὸ οὕτως ὄν ἕτερον τῶν κυρίως - since which is in this sense is a different sort of "being" from the things that are in the full sense.

Ἐκαστον δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ καταφάσει λέγεται, τῇ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τούτων συμπλοκῇ κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις γίνεται. ἅπαντα γὰρ δοκεῖ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἥτοι ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς εἶναι· τῶν δὲ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδος ἐστίν, οἷον ἀνθρωπος, λευκόν, τρέχει, νικά.

Truth and
falsity
depend on
combination

559—In © 10 Ar. develops the consequences of this view.

Considering first truth and being in the case of "composites" ¹, he states: "Being is being-united; not-being is not-being-united. About things which may be either united or divided the same opinion is at different times false and true; not so with regard to things that must be as they are" (Ross).

a. *Metaph.* © 10, 1051 b⁹⁻¹⁷:

Εἰ δὴ τὰ μὲν αἰεὶ σύγκειται καὶ ἀδύνατα διαιρεθῆναι, τὰ δ' αἰεὶ διήρηται καὶ ἀδύνατα συντεθῆναι, τὰ δ' ἐνδέχεται τάναντία, τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἐστὶ τὸ συγκεῖσθαι καὶ ἐν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι τὸ μὴ συγκεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ πλείω εἶναι· περὶ μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ² ἡ αὐτὴ γίνεται ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθὴς δόξα καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐνδέχεται ὅτε μὲν ἀληθεύειν ὅτε δὲ ψεύδεσθαι· περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐ γίνεται ὅτε μὲν ἀληθὲς ὅτε δὲ ψεῦδος, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ταυτὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ.

Truth and
being in the
case of
composites

Bonitz (*Metaph.* 409) remarked that the meaning of "composites" in this passage is not "quae ex pluribus elementis coaluerunt"—and in this he was right—but "in quibus cum substantia coniungitur accidens aliquod, veluti homo albus, homo sedens, diagonalis irrationalis et similia". Now, if this last point were true, the whole class of composites would consist of ἐνδεχόμενα, and those things which "are always composed" or "cannot be divided" could not belong to them. By σύνθετα then is rather meant: *judgments*, in which a subject is copulated with a predicate, be it accidental or not; so that the "truth" intended here is what is called the *veritas logica* by the schoolmen (adaequatio rei et intellectus).

b. Since being and non-being, truth and falsehood then depend on combination, the question arises: what is being and non-being; what truth and falsity, in the case of incomposites.

Ib., 1051 b¹⁷⁻³⁰:

Περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀσύνθετα τί τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος; οὐ γάρ ἐστι σύνθετον, ὥστε εἶναι μὲν ὅταν συγκέηται, μὴ εἶναι δὲ ἐὰν διηρημένον ᾖ, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκόν <τὸ> ξύλον ἢ τὸ ἀσύμμετρον τὴν διάμετρον· οὐδὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ὁμοίως ἔτι ὑπάρξει καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνων. ἢ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ

Truth and
being in the
case of in-
composites

¹ For the meaning of this term see our explanation under the text. It has been suggested to the author by Mr. L. M. de Rijk, who deals with it in the first chapter of his thesis, *The Categories of being*, Assen 1952.

² τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα - "contingent things", i.e. composed things, consisting of a substance and an accidental attribute, e.g. "white man".

τὸ ἀληθές ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ αὐτό, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ μὲν ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος, τὸ μὲν θιγεῖν¹ καὶ φάναι ἀληθές (οὐ γὰρ ταῦτο κατὰ φασιν καὶ φάσις), τὸ δ' ἀγνοεῖν μὴ θιγγάνειν (ἀπατηθῆναι γὰρ περὶ τὸ τί ἐστὶν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἢ²⁵ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς μὴ συνθετάς οὐσίας, οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι· καὶ πᾶσαι εἰσὶν ἐνεργεῖα, οὐ δυνάμει, ἐγίγγοντο γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐφθεῖροντο, νῦν δὲ τὸ ὄν αὐτὸ οὐ γίγνεται οὐδὲ φθείρεται, ἕκ τινος γὰρ ἂν ἐγίγνετο).³⁰

By *ἀσύνθετα*, as opposed to the *σύνθετον*, is meant: being as the object of thinking, *before* the act of judging; i.e. being as the object of *simple apprehension*. Thought "grasps" a thing without any affirmative or negation. This apprehension is called by Ar. *θιγγάνειν*. Rightly he says that, strictly speaking, there is no question of falsehood in this case: things do not lie (i.e.: they do not cause an untrue image of themselves in our mind). "Truth" may then be spoken of here as far as things are the causes of images in our mind. This is what is called by scholastics *veritas ontologica*.

c. The author concludes: About all things that are essences and "actualities" (i.e. actually existing beings) we cannot err. Either we know them or we do not.

In this case
error is
excluded

Ib., 1051 b³⁰⁻³³:

"Ὅσα δὴ ἐστὶν ὅπερ εἶναι τι καὶ ἐνέργειαι, περὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι ἀλλ' ἢ νοεῖν ἢ μὴ· ἀλλὰ τὸ τί ἐστὶ ζητεῖται περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ τοιαῦτα ἐστὶν ἢ μὴ.

d. So "being" in the sense of truth, and non-being in the sense of falsity, is one group (depending on combination); the other (that of the *ἀσύνθετα*) is "true" only in this sense that it is known, the opposite being not "falsity" or "error", but "ignorance".

Ib., 1051 b^{33-1052 a}:

Τὸ δὲ εἶναι ὡς τὸ ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ ὡς τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν², εἰ σύγκειται, ἀληθές, τὸ δ' εἰ μὴ σύγκειται, ψεῦδος· τὸ δὲ ἓν³, εἴπερ ὄν, οὕτως³⁵ ἐστίν⁴· εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως, οὐκ ἔστιν; τὸ δὲ ἀληθές τὸ νοεῖν ταῦτα· τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος αὐτὸ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἀπάτη, ἀλλὰ ἄγνοια, οὐχ οἷα ἡ τυφλότης· ἢ μὲν γὰρ τυφλότης ἐστὶν ὡς ἂν εἰ τὸ νοητικὸν ὅλως μὴ ἔχοι τις.

560—As to eternal being, something has been said of it in the books on Substance (Z H) and in that on Potency and Actuality. The existence and nature of the unmoved Movers is dealt with in A 6-10. We have treated this part of Ar.'s first philosophy in connexion with *Phys.* VIII (nrs. 515-518).

¹ θιγεῖν - Ar. means by this: an apprehension which is infallible and direct.

² ἐν μὲν - is one group.

³ τὸ δὲ ἓν - the other —.

⁴ οὕτως ἐστίν - it exists in the sense as indicated *supra*.

FIFTEENTH CHAPTER

THE PRACTICAL SCIENCES

I—THE THREE ETHICS AND THEIR INTERRELATION

561—The three Ethics of the Corpus Aristotelicum are first mentioned as works of Ar. by Atticus, a Platonist in the days of Marcus Aurelius, cited by Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.* XV 4, 9, p. 795 d:

Three works
on ethics
attributed
to Ar.

αἱ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ ταῦτα πραγματεῖαι, Εὐδήμειοι τε καὶ Νικομάχιοι καὶ Μεγάλων Ἠθικῶν ἐπιγραφόμεναι . . .

562—a. Five books of Ethics are mentioned in the list of Aristotle's works in Diog. Laert. V 1, 23:

Ἠθικῶν α' β' γ' δ' ε'.

the *Eth. Eud.*

By these five books the *Eudemian Ethics* must have been meant.

b. A work on ethics in ten books is mentioned in the list of Hesychius: the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

the *Eth. Nic.*

From these data we may infer that books Δ Ε Ζ of the *Eud. Eth.*, which are identic with *Eth. Nic.* Ε Ζ Η, belonged to the last work, and not to the *Eud. Eth.*

563—a. That the *Eth. Nic.* were in earlier Antiquity generally considered as a work of Ar., may be inferred from Cic., *De fin.* V 5, 12.

Who is the
author of
these works?

(One should not concede too much space to Fortune, the author says; for in doing so you encroach upon the force and dignity of virtue).

Quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristoteli, sed non video cur non potuerit patri similis esse filius.

b. In later Antiquity traces may be found here and there of the opinion that Eudemus and Nicomachus were the authors of the works named after them. E.g. Diog. Laërt. VIII 88:

φησὶ δ' αὐτὸν — sc. Εὐδοξον — Νικόμαχος ὁ Ἀριστοτέλους τὴν ἡδονὴν λέγειν τὸ ἀγαθόν.

Here a passage from *Eth. Nic.* X is referred to under the name of N.

Difference
in character

564—The reason why these works have been attributed to different authors, may have lain in the fact that they show a remarkably different conception of life. In the *Eud. Eth.* we find a platonic view of life, of a clearly religious character. Philosophy is directed to the contemplation of the highest Being, the Good. And it is this contemplation which endows man with the force and the power of acting virtuously. On the other hand, in the *Nic. Eth.* the bond with religion is severed: moral life depends on itself.

See for this difference Jaeger, *Ar.*, p. 238 ff. Of great importance is the meaning of the term φρόνησις in both works. In the *Eud. Eth.* it means philosophical insight into the highest Being, while in the *Nic. Eth.* it indicates practical wisdom, which is not even limited to man, but may be attributed to animals too. Cp. our nr. **420a**, remark II.

Modern
judgment
about the
authenticity

565—a. The authenticity of the *Eud. Ethics* was first defended by P. von der Mühl (Göttingen thesis, 1909), next by E. Kapp (Freiburg thesis, 1912). W. Jaeger adopted Kapp's results and determined the place of the *Eud. Eth.* as a platonizing work of Ar.'s early years, between the *Protr.* and the *Nic. Eth.*

This view has been generally accepted, e.g. by Ross and by A. Mansion.

Recently E. J. Schächer, *Studien zu den Ethiken des Corpus Aristotelicum*, Paderborn 1940¹, has come back to the ancient hypothesis which makes Eudemus the author of the Ethics named after him. Schächer tries to prove by a comparison of the passages on φίλα, that the *Eud. Eth.* depend on the *Nic.*, not inversely, and that the *Magna Mor.* were written before the *Eud. Eth.*, this work being apparently unknown to the author of the *M. M.* The arguments used by Sch. are for the greater part not conclusive. Yet he has re-opened the discussion on the authenticity of the *Eud. Eth.*, and further inquiry must decide whether his solution is correct.

b. As to the *Magna Mor.*, modern research has led to reliable results: this work dates from the first generation of the Peripatetic School, the years of Theophrastus and before the influence of the Stoa.

The question has been hotly debated by W. Jaeger and H. von Arnim, during the years 1924 - 1929. This discussion has been amply reported by A. Mansion, *Autour des Ethiques attribuées à Aristote*, in the *Revue Néoscholastique de Louvain*, 1931, p. 80-107, 216-236 and 360-380.

E. J. Schächer, in the first of his above-cited Studies, begins with Schleiermacher and deals too with the studies of Brink (an analysis of the style of the *MM*, Berlin thesis, 1933) and Theiler (1934).

If any doubts were still possible as to the date of the *MM*, they have been definitely removed by the thesis of Brink.

¹ *Studien zur Geschichte u. Kultur des Altertums*, herausgeg. von der Görresgesellschaft, XXII. Band, 1. u. 2. Heft.

2—THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS. FORMAL PRINCIPLES
(the Books I-III 5)

566—Ar. qualifies all human action as being directed towards a purpose, and defines the final purpose as *well-being* (eudaemonia), which consists of an activity of the soul in accordance with reason, i.e. in accordance with virtue.

Eth. Nic. I, 1-7, 1094 a¹-1098 a²⁰.

1094a Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ
τινος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ¹. διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφάναντο τἀγαθόν, οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται.
Διαφορὰ δὲ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ'
5 αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά. Ὡν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω
πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα. Πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ
ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἱατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ
πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. "Οἷσαι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν τοιού-
10 των ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἱππικὴν χαλινοποιητικὴ καὶ
ῥσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἱππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσίν, αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις
ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικὴν, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἄλλαι ὑφ' ἑτέρας, — ἐν ἀπάσαις
15 δὴ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αἰρετώτερά τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά. Τούτων
γὰρ χάριν κάκεῖνα διώκεται. Διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ
τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπι-
στημῶν.

All human
activities
aim at
some good

A hierarchy
of ends

Εἰ δὴ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, τὰ ἄλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο,
20 καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον αἰρούμεθα (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἀπειρον, ὥστ'
εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαιὰν τὴν ὁρεξίν), δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ
ἄριστον. — Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνώσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλῃν ἔχει ῥοπὴν,
καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος;
25 Εἰ δ' οὕτω, πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τίνας τῶν
ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων. Δόξειε δ' ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονι-
κῆς. Τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται. Τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν
1094b ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ ποίας ἐκάστους μανθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνας, αὕτη διατάσσει².
ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὐσας, οἷον στρατη-

The supreme
end

It is the
object of
politics

¹ W. D. Ross rightly remarked that, according to the division of πᾶσα διάνοια in *Metaph.* E 1, we might have expected that Ar. would have distinguished between productive and moral activity, the first being ποιητική, the second πρακτική; and that, if this distinction had been made, a very different system of ethics would have resulted.

² Which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and up to what point they should be learned, is a question which has been dealt with at length in the *Republic* of Plato. To a disciple of the Academy it was indeed a major point of politics.

γικὴν οἰκονομικὴν ῥητορικὴν. Χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ νομοθετοῦσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι ¹, 5 τὸ ταύτης τέλος περιέχει ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει, μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σφῆζειν· ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. 10

Different
degrees of
precision in
different
sciences

Ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὔσα· λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην διασαφηθεῖη. Τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις. Τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ 15 πλάνην ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή. Τοιαύτην δὲ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν· ἤδη γὰρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν. Ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων ² λέγοντας παχυλῶς ³ καὶ τύπῳ τάληθές ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ 20 τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεισθαι ⁴. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεῶν ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων· πεπαιδευμένου γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τὰ ἀκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθη- 25 ματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν.

The student
should have
reached
riper years

Ἐκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. Καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, ἀπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος. Διὸ 1095a τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατῆς ὁ νέος· ἀπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. Ἐτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικῶς ὧν ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν 5 οὐ γνώσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις. Διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ἦθος νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἡ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα. Τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνόνητος ἡ γνώσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσι· τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὁρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πράττουσι πολυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ 10 περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι.

What is the
supreme
good?

Καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα, πεφρομιᾶσθω τοσαῦτα· λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλαβόντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνώσις καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινος ὁρέγεται, τί ἐστὶν οὗ λέγομεν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ 15 πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν. Ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν

¹ "What we are to do and what we are to abstain from" has been minutely prescribed in the *Laws* of Plato. Ar. again shows himself a true disciple of the Academy in regarding this point as the normal task of legislation.

² ἐκ τοιούτων - with such premisses.

³ παχυλῶς - roughly.

⁴ It is a basic law of the syllogism that the conclusion cannot contain more than the premisses.

πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες ¹
λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταῦτ' ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν·
20 περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστίν, ἀμφισβητοῦσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς
σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν
ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμὴν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο, πολλὰκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον (νοσήσας
25 μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ πλοῦτον), συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς
μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν· ἐνιοὶ δ' ὦντο παρὰ τὰ
πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τοῖσδε πᾶσιν αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ
τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ. Ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας ματαιώτερον ἴσως ἐστίν,
30 ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. Μὴ λανθᾷ· <sup>A methodical
remark</sup>
νέτω δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ² λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ².
Εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο, καὶ ἐζήτει πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ
1095b τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός ³, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρασ
ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. Ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν
γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς ⁴. Ἰσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων.
5 Διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἡχθαι καλῶς ⁵ τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλων τῶν
πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. Ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο
ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι. Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἢ ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν
ἀρχὰς ῥαδίως ⁶. Ὡ δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου ⁷.

10 οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κακείνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθεται,
ὃς δέ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων
ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὃ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρήσιος ἀνὴρ.

Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν. Τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμο-
15 νίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως εἰκόασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν. Οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτι-

¹ οἱ χαρίεντες - people of superior refinement.

² "Arguments from the first principles" are *deductive* or *apodeictic* arguments; those to the first principles are *inductive*. See our nrs. 447-455.

³ Ross points to *Rep.* VI 511 b, the passage about the ἀνυπόθετον (our nr. 294, p. 203). But in fact, neither Plato's ascent from the hypotheseis, used as ἀρχαί, upward to the ανυποθετον is anything like Aristotle's deductive argument, nor is his descent from the ανυποθετον back to the inferior εἶδη of the same kind as a λόγος ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς with Ar. Mark also the use of the imperfect: ἠπόρει and ἐζήτει. Evidently there are frequent λόγοι ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς in the Socratic dialogues. And whenever things are explained by participation in Ideas, what else is this than a λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν?

⁴ On the distinction between γνωριμώτερα ἡμῖν and γνωριμώτερα ἀπλῶς see our nr. 406, n. 5.

⁵ "must have been brought up in good habits".

⁶ The man who is trained by good habits possesses moral principles implicitly.

⁷ *Erga* 293, 295-297 Rzach.

Three main
types of life

κώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν· διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν. Τρεῖς γάρ
εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ προέχοντες, ὃ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικός καὶ τρίτος ὁ
θεωρητικός¹. Οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀνδραποδῶδεις φαίνονται βοσκη- 20
μάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι, τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς
ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλλω². Οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες³ καὶ πρακτικοὶ
τιμῇ. Τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. Φαίνεται δ' ἐπιπολαιότερον
εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, 25
τάχαθ' οὐκ οἰκεῖν τι καὶ δυσφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα. Ἔτι δ' εἰκότα τὴν
τιμὴν δίδωκεν ἵνα πιστεῦσωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν
φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ' οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι
κατὰ γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρίνεται. Τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτι- 30
κοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. Φαίνεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέ-
χεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις
κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτως ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμο- 1096a
νίσκειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος (ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ
ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν)· τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, ὑπὲρ
οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ποιησόμεθα. Ὁ δὲ χρηματιστής βλαῖός τις 5
ἐστίν⁴, καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ

¹ Ar.'s three βίοι are clearly of Pythagorean origin. Cp. our nr. 4.

² Athenaeus mentions two epitaphs of Sardanapallus (336 a and 530 b, c). The first is: Ἔσθιε, πίνε, παῖζε· ὥς τάλλα τούτου οὐκ ἄξια, sc. τοῦ ἀποκροτήματος (is not worth a snap of the fingers).

The second was probably cited by Ar. in his *Protrept.*, and by this quotation it became famous in Antiquity. It runs:·

Κεῖν' ἔχω δσ' ἔφαγον καὶ ἐφύβρισα καὶ μετ' ἔρωτος
τέρπην' ἔπαθον· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ δλβια πάντα λένονται.

Cic. translates it in *Tusc. Disp.* V 35, 101:·

Haec habeo quae edi quaeque exsaturata libido
hausit; at illa iacent multa et praeclara relictia.

He adds to it these lines of Ar., which Jaeger thinks were taken from the *Protr.*: "Quid aliud, inquit Ar., in bovis, non in regis sepulchro inscriberes? Haec habere se mortuum dicit, quae ne vivus quidem diutius habebat quam fruebatur".

He refers again to it in *De finibus* II 32, 106.

³ See p. 137, note 1.

⁴ The text as we read it contains some difficulties. Modern interpreters mostly supply βλος with χρηματιστής and translate: "The life of money-making is a life of compulsion" or "constraint"; by which they mean either that this life is undertaken only under compulsion (Ross), or that in this life a man cannot follow his natural inclinations, or perhaps both. Yet there remains some doubt as to the question whether the text is sound. We have no other instances of χρηματιστής used adjectively. And even if this is right, I think it would be better to supply the word <βλος> after χρηματιστής, because in copying it could be easily dropped before βλαῖος.

A former generation made some conjectures. G. Ramsauer in his edition of the *Eth. Nic.* of 1878 proposed to write βάναισός τις instead of βλαῖός τις. James Watt,

ἄλλου χάριν. Διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. Φαίνεται δὲ οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ
10 καταβέβληνται.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· τὸ δὲ καθόλου ¹ βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γιγνομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἶδη. Δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ
15 δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν ², ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλο-
σόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντιον φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ³. Οἱ δὲ
κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποιοῦν ιδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον
ἔλεγον ⁴ (διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ιδέαν κατεσκευάζον)· τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν λέγεται
20 καὶ ἐν τῷ τι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία
πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι ⁵ (παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι
τοῦ ὄντος)· ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινὴ τις ἐπὶ τούτων ιδέα. Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τάγαθὸν
ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τι λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ
25 ἐν τῷ ποιῶ αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῶ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι τὸ χρή-
σιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρὸς, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαίτα ⁶ καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον
ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἐν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετο ἐν πάσαις ταῖς
30 κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν μᾶ μόνῃ. Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν μία καὶ ἐπι-

The Good of
Plato
criticized

1. Argu-
ments from
the doctrine
of the
categories

followed by Burnet, read the text as it stands in this way: βίᾳ ὅστις ἐστίν ("the business-man is by compulsion whatsoever he is"). C. M. Mulvany (in *Class. Quart.* XV 1921, p. 85-98) suggests that βίαιος should be explained as βαιός: little, trifling. He translates: "The business-man is a little person"—sc. of minor importance towards happiness.

¹ τὸ δὲ καθόλου - sc. ἀγαθόν. In the conception of Ar. the Platonic Ideas are "universals", which are abstracted from the concrete things or phenomena. In this case "the good" as a universal should be abstracted from many concrete ἀγαθὰ. But this is impossible, Ar. says; since these good things fall under different categories, no κοινόν could be found here.

² τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν - to sink our personal feelings.

³ This maxim, which has become famous by the above words of Ar., has been expressed as clearly and explicitly by Plato in criticizing Homer: 'Ἄλλ' οὐ γὰρ πρὸ γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνὴρ (*Rep.* X, 595 c).

⁴ Plato and his followers do not admit of Ideas of things within which they recognize a priority and a posteriority. Well, Ar. says, this is exactly the case with the categories: substance is prior to the others.—He means priority in the hierarchy of being: like two presupposes the monad and three the dyad; again, like body presupposes the plane, and plane presupposes the line. In the same way to Ar. the more primitive soul has priority of being over the more developed soul: the vegetative soul over the sensitive, the sensitive over the rational. And that is why there does not exist a "soul" in general, which is a reality in itself (*De anima* A 1, 402 b⁵⁻⁸; B 3, 414 a²⁹⁻³⁰). So it is with substance and the other categories: substance can exist without the others, not inversely.

⁵ See the doctrine of the categories in 437b and 438a.

⁶ δίαίτα is used here for the good in the category of place. Heliodorus explains: τόπος ἐν ᾧ εὖ διάγομεν.

στήμη¹, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δ' εἰσὶ πολλὰ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καιροῦ, ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν γὰρ στρατηγικὴ ἐν νόσῳ δ' ἰατρικὴ, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστική. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ 35
 2. "Man" and "man himself" fall under one definition
 ἔν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. 1096b
 Ἡ γὰρ ἀνθρωπος, οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐδ' ἡ ἀγαθόν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ αἰδίου εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, εἴπερ μὴδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ ἐφημέρου. Πιθανώτερον δὲ εἰκόσιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ 5
 αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἐν². οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθήσαι δοκεῖ.
 Distinction between primary and secondary goods
 Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος, τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν ἀμφισβήτησις τις³ ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἐν εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων 10
 ἢ φυλακτικὰ πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ' ἂν τὰ γαθὰ, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα. Χωρίσαντες οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ σκεψώμεθα εἰ 15
 λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. Καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἂν; Ἡ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὀρεῖν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; Ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἂν. Ἡ οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ἰδέας; Ὡστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος⁴. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' 20
 ἐστὶν τῶν καθ' αὐτά, τὸν τὰ γαθοῦ λόγον⁵ ἐν ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφανισθαι δεήσει, καθάπερ ἐν χιόνι καὶ ψιμυθίῳ τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. Τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτῃ ἢ ἀγαθὰ. 25
 Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι <καί> κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν.
 No common good
 Ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; Οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. Ἀλλ' ἄρά γε τῷ ἀφ' ἐνὸς εἶναι ἢ πρὸς ἐν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατὰ ἀναλογίαν⁶; Ὡς
 Whence then the homonymy?

¹ This is a Platonic principle. Cp. *Laches* 198 d-199 a; *Parm.* 134 a.

² ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ - See our nr. 42, the Pythagorean table of opposites.—Ar. means: it is more acceptable to range the one in a series of good things than to identify it with the Good itself.

So this text of the *Eth. Nic.* provides evidence for the identification of the "Ev and the 'Αγαθόν by Plato. Cp. our nr. 364c.

³ ἀμφισβήτησις τις - room for dispute.

⁴ "Ὡστε μάταιον - "In that case the form will be empty".

⁵ λόγον - notion, definition.

⁶ Ar. distinguishes three kinds of homonymy. The first is what is called in scholasticism equivocation: mere identity of names, the notions being different (see our nr. 436a). The second is what is called by Ar. τὸ ἀφ' ἐνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἐν: things are called by the same name because they are related to the same object or the same idea; e.g. we speak of a healthy person (who possesses health), a healthy sleep (which is a symptom of health), a healthy climate (which preserves health), etc.

γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. Ἄλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν
 30 ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν, ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον·
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἐν τι καὶ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον
 ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστόν τι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό ¹, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ
 35 κτητὸν ἀνθρώπων· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖται. Τάχα δὲ τῷ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον
 1097a εἶναι γνωρίζειν αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ παρά-
 δεῖγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ, κἂν εἰδῶμεν, ἐπι-
 τευξόμεθα αὐτῶν. Πιθανότερα μὲν οὖν τινα ἔχει ὁ λόγος, εἰκεν δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστή-
 5 μαις διαφωνεῖν ². πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τιнос ἐφίεμεναι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐπιζητοῦσαι
 παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ ³. Καίτοι βοήθημα τηλικούτον ⁴ τοὺς τεχνίτας
 ἀπαντας ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μὴδ' ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὐλογον. Ἀπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφεληθή-
 σεται ὑφάντης ⁵ ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἢ
 10 πῶς ἱατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν θεαμένος.
 Φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ⁶ ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἱατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν
 ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἱατρεύει.
 15 Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ
 ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη. Φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ
 τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἱατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως. Τί
 οὖν ἐκάστης ἀγαθόν; Ἡ οὐ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; Τοῦτο δὲ ἐν ἱατρικῇ
 20 μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῳ δ' ἄλλο, ἐν
 ἀπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι
 πάντες. Ὡστε εἰ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν

Return to
 our theme:
 what is the
 supreme
 practical
 Good?

In the same way the word "medical" indicates that which is relative to the medical art, the doctor because he possesses it, a treatment because it is a function of it, etc. (*Metaph.* Γ 1, 1003 a³³-b¹¹; Z 4, 1030 a³²-b³). In scholasticism this is called *analogia attributionis*.—This third kind is the *analogia proportionalitatis*. It is defined in *Poet.* 21, 1457 b¹⁸ ff. as a transference from analogy, which is possible "whenever there are four terms so related that the second (B) is to the first (A), as the fourth (D) to the third (C); for one may then metaphorically put D in lieu of B, and B in lieu of D." E.g. old age is to life as evening is to day. Now evening may be called old age of the day, or old age the evening of life.—It seems to be the author's intention to qualify the good as homonymous in the second sense.

¹ "Even if the good is universally predicable, or if there is a Good existing separately and absolute",—

Souilhé rightly remarks that the first and the second part of the sentence are not the same: a thing might be a common predicate but not an Idea. The ἢ then must be understood disjunctively, not in the copulative sense.

² "But it seems to clash with the procedure of the sciences" (Ross).

³ "But they do not trouble about the knowledge of the ideal Good" (Rackham).

⁴ βοήθημα τηλικούτον - sc. if it existed.

⁵ ὑφάντης - as in Plato's *Cratylus*.

⁶ οὕτως - "not in this way", i.e. not in abstracto.

The supreme good = the supreme end ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα. Μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτόν ἀφίχται¹.
τοῦτο δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον.

25

Happiness
the supreme
end

Ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δὲ αἰρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερα, οἷον
πλοῦτον αὐλοὺς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ'
ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται. "Ὡστ' εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἓν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν
εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. Τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν 30
τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἰρετὸν τῶν <καὶ>
καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' αἰρετῶν, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν
αἰεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. Τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ·
ταύτην γὰρ αἰρούμεθα αἰεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο, τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν 1097b
καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτὰ (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαί-
νοντος ἐλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν,
διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. Τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται 5
τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο. Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ
συμβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκὲς εἶναι δοκεῖ. Τὸ δὲ αὐταρκὲς λέγο-
μεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ 10
γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπεὶ δὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
Τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὁρος τις· ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόν-
ους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαῦ-
θις ἐπισκεπτέον, τὸ δ' αὐταρκὲς τίθεμεν ὁ μονούμενον αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον 15
καὶ μηδενοῦ ἐνδεᾶ· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ἔτι δὲ πάντων
αἰρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμουμένην². Συναριθμουμένην γὰρ δῆλον ὡς αἰρετω-
τέραν μετὰ³ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ
προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μεῖζον αἰρετώτερον αἰεὶ. Τέλειον δὴ τι φαίνεται 20
καὶ αὐταρκὲς ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὕσα τέλος.

What is
happiness?

Ἀλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενον τι φαίνεται,
ποθεῖται δ' ἐναργέστερον τί ἔστιν ἔτι λεχθῆναι. Τάχα δὴ γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ' εἰ
ληφθεῖν τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου⁴. "Ὡσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ 25
παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τὰγαθὸν
εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ.

¹ "So the argument has by a different way reached the same point"—i.e. the same as in ch. 1, namely, that the supreme good is identical with the supreme end.

"By a different way"—in ch. 1 the argument was: "Every art and every inquiry etc. aims at some good; therefore, the supreme good is the supreme end, which is aimed at by every human activity". Here the argument runs: "The good and the end are identical in all individual cases; therefore, the supreme good and the supreme end will be also identical" (the stress being laid on τὸ οὐν ἐκάστης ἀγαθὸν and τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων).

² μὴ συναριθμουμένην - "without being counted as one good thing among others" (Ross); i.e. not as a number of a series.

³ μετὰ - by the addition of —

⁴ Cp. Plato, *Rep.* I 353 b sqq. (*Gr.Ph.* nr. 275a).

Πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἔστιν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου
 30 δ' οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἄργον πέφυκεν; ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς
 καὶ ὅλως ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεται τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ
 πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις ἂν ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ; Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν
 κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. Αφοριστέον ἄρα
 1098a τὴν τε θρεπτικὴν καὶ τὴν αὐξητικὴν ζωὴν¹. Ἐπομένη δὲ αἰσθητικὴ τις ἂν εἴη,
 φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὕτη κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῇ καὶ παντὶ ζῳῷ. Λείπεται δὴ
 π ρ α κ τ ι κ ῆ τ ι ς τ ο ὦ λ ό γ ο ν ἔ χ ο ν τ ο ς (τοῦτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς
 5 λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον²). διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης
 τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. Εἰ δ' ἔστιν
 ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ
 λόγου, τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου³,
 10 ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων,
 προστιθεμένης τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον (κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ
 τὸ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ). εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον
 15 ζωὴν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, σπουδαίου δὲ
 ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ καλῶς, ἕκαστον δὲ εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται·
 εἰ δὴ οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεταί κατ'
 ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην
 καὶ τελειοτάτην. Ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. Μία γὰρ χελιδὼν
 ἕαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία
 20 ἡμέρα οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος.

Happiness
to be
defined by
the special
function
of man

Definition

567—Book II deals with moral virtue in general. It is engendered in us not by nature, but by habit. By nature man possesses a capacity to receive virtues; he receives them actually by the habit of right action.

a. *Eth. Nic.* II, 1103 a¹⁴-b²:

Διττῆς δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἡθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὐξησιν, διόπερ
 15 ἔμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ἡ δὲ ἡθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίγνεται⁴, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα ἔσχηκεν μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. — Ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον

The nature
of virtue.
Moral virtue
results from
habit

¹ θρεπτικὴν κ. αὐξητικὴν etc. - See *De anima* II 3, 414 a²⁹-b⁶; 415 a¹-⁷, on the faculties of the soul (our nr. 639).

² This parenthesis has been condemned by Burnet. Rackham follows him somewhat hesitatingly, and declares the sentence to be "an irrelevant anticipation of ch. 13, 9". Souilhé defends it.

³ τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι etc. - "and if we acknowledge the function of an individual (τοῦδε) and of a good individual (τοῦδε σπουδαίου) to be generically the same" (τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ γένει). —

⁴ περιγίγνεται - results from.

ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἡθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθεῖν 20 ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκις ἐθίξῃ τις ἄνω ῥίπτων, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθεῖν. Οὐτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίγνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι 25 αὐτάς, τελειούμενοι δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους. — "Ἐτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον (οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ 30 χρῆσάμενοι ἔσχομεν)· τὰς δὲ ἀρετάς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. "Α γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μαθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα 1103b σώφρονες, τὰ δ' ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι.

b. Since, then, virtue results from habit, and habit is formed by action, it is incumbent on us to exhibit activities of a certain quality.

Practical
consequence

Ib., 1103 b^{22, 25}:

Διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἔξεις. Οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπλου, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

568—How, then, are we to act rightly?—Ar. answers this question by developing his theory that virtue is the mean between two extremes.

Moral
qualities
destroyed
by excess and
by deficiency

a. *Eth. Nic.* II 2, 1104 a¹¹⁻²⁷:

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπ' ἐνδείας καὶ 1104a ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ ¹ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι), ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ὀρώμεν· τὰ τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ 15 καὶ τὰ σιτία πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γιγνόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξει καὶ σφίζει. Οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν. "Ο τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ 20 μηδὲν ὑπομένων δειλὸς γίγνεται, ὃ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πάσας φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγροῖκοι, ἀναισθητός τις· φθείρεται δὴ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς 25 καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σφίζεται.

¹ ὑπὲρ - in illustration of.

b. Not only man *becomes* virtuous by acting in a certain way, but virtue is also exercised by the same actions.

Ib., 1104 a²⁷-b³:

Virtue
exercised in
the actions
by which it
was formed

Ἰ104b Ἄλλ' οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ
ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται· καὶ γὰρ
30 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος· γίνεται
γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα
δύναται ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. Οὕτω δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἐκ τε γὰρ
τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνά-
35 μεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν. Ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἐπιζόμενοι γὰρ
καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ γενό-
μενοι μάλιστα δυνήσόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.

569—Pleasure in acting virtuously is a sign that the virtuous disposition has been acquired. For there is an essential connexion of moral virtue with pleasure and pain.

a. *Eth. Nic.* II 3, 1104 b³-11:

Pleasure
and pain
the test of
virtue

Σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἔξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς
5 ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων
σώφρων, ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων
ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. Περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ
10 λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ. Διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ
δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα.

b. Again, this view leads to a practical consequence.

Ib., 1104 b¹¹-13:

Consequence
for
education

Διὸ δεῖ ἡχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὥς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ
λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν.

570—Against Ar.'s theory that a man becomes virtuous by doing virtuous actions, the objection could be made: How can anyone do just actions when he is not yet just, or temperate when he is not yet temperate? On the contrary, if he does just actions, he is already just.—To this objection Ar. answers: No, only by doing just actions a man is not yet just. Three other conditions must be fulfilled.

a. *Eth. Nic.* II 4, 1105 a¹⁷-33:

How can a
man do just
actions when
he is not just?

Ἰ105a Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους
γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας. Εἰ γὰρ πράττουσιν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ σώ-
he is not just?

φρονα, ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικά καὶ τὰ μου- 20
σικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. "Ἡ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; 'Ενδέ-
χεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου.
Τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς·
τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμματικὴν. "Ἐτι οὐδ' ὅμοιον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ 25
τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει
ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινό-
μενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ 30
πράττων πως ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδῶς, ἔπειτ' ἐὰν προαιρούμενος,
καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως
ἔχων πράττῃ.

Conclusion

b. Ib., 1105 b⁹⁻¹⁸:

Εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ b 10
τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσῃ
γενέσθαι ἀγαθός. 'Αλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον
καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι ὅμοιον τι
ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἱ τῶν ἱατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ' 15
οὐδὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. "Ὡσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἔξουσιν τὸ σῶμα
οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ' οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.

571—Ar. now proceeds to define virtue.

a. Its genus is: a state of character, not a passion, nor a faculty.

Virtue
defined.
Its genus

Eth. Nic. II 5, 1105 b¹⁹-1106 a¹²:

Τί δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐξῆς σκεπτέον. 'Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία 20
ἐστί, πάθη δυνάμεις ἔξεις, τούτων ἂν τι εἴῃ ἡ ἀρετὴ. Λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυ-
μίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως
οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη· δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα,
οἷον καθ' ἃς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι· ἔξεις δὲ καθ' ἃς πρὸς 25
τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνει-
μένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τᾶλλα. Πάθη μὲν
οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐθ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὐθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη
σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἢ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ 30
μὲν τὰ πάθη οὔτε ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβούμενος
οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἀπλῶς ὀργιζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς), κατὰ δὲ 1106
τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα. "Ἐτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ
φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως.
Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς 5
καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαι πως. Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις

είσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἀπλῶς οὔτε κακοί, οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα. Καὶ ἔτι δυνατοὶ μὲν ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ
 10 ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἵπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. Εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθῃ εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἕξεις αὐτάς εἶναι.

b. Its differentia: it is a disposition to choose the mean between two extremes.

Ib. 6, 1106 a¹²-1107 a⁸:

“Ο τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετὴ, εἴρηται· δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν,
 15 ὅτι ἕξεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις. Ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετὴ, οὗ ἂν ἡ ἀρετὴ, αὐτό
 τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ
 ἀρετὴ τὸν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ
 ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρῶμεν. Ὅμοίως ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ
 20 ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπιβάτην καὶ μεῖναι τοὺς πολεμίους. Εἰ δὴ
 τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἡ
 ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ
 τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. Πῶς δὲ τοῦτο ἔσται, ἥδη μὲν
 25 εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδ' ἔσται φανερόν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τίς ἐστὶν ἡ
 φύσις αὐτῆς. Ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον
 τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τὸ δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δὲ
 ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως. Λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον
 30 τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν, πρὸς
 ἡμᾶς δὲ ὁ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει· τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἓν, οὐδὲ ταῦτὸν πᾶσιν.
 Οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἐξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ
 35 πρᾶγμα· ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ ὑπερέχεται· τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν
 ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. Τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ
 1106b δέκα μναὶ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτῃς ἐξ μνᾶς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ
 ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ
 ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολὺ. Ὅμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ πάλης. Οὕτω δὴ πᾶς
 5 ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἑλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ
 τοῦθ' αἰρεῖται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Εἰ δὴ πᾶσα
 ἐπιστήμη οὕτως τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο
 10 ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὔτε
 ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὥς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως φθει-
 ρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σωζούσης), εἰ δὴ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῶνται, ὥς λέγομεν,
 πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες ἐργάζονται, ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ
 15 ἀμείνων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη στοχαστική. Λέγω δὲ τὴν
 ἠθικὴν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶ περὶ πάθῃ καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ
 καὶ ἑλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. Οἷον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι

Its
differentia

Virtue in
general

Virtue of man

It seeks the
mean

καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὀλως ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον 20
καὶ ἡττον, καὶ ἀμφοτέρω οὐκ εὖ, τὸ δὲ ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ
ἐνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. Ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ
πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις 25
ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται· ταῦτα δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς.
Μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ, στοχαστικὴ γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου. Ἐτι τὸ μὲν
ἀμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἔστιν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι¹
εἵκαζον, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς· διὸ 30
καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥᾶδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπὸν, ῥᾶδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν
δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν. Καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις,
τῆς δὲ ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης.

ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί².

35

Definition of
moral virtue

Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετικὴ, ἐν μεσότητι
οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρό- 1107a
νιμος ὀρίσειε. Μεσότης δὲ δύο κακίων, τῆς μὲν καθ'
ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· καὶ ἐτι τῶ τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν
τὰς δὲ ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δὲ
ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὐρίσκειν καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι. Διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν 5
λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον
καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.

572—This definition applied to the particular virtues.

Eth. Nic. II 7, 1107 a³³-1108 b¹⁰:

Table of moral
virtues as
means
between two
extremes

Περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης· τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ 1107b
μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δ' ἐν τῇ θαρρεῖν ὑπερ-
βάλλων θρασύς, ὁ δὲ τῇ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλον τῇ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων
δειλός. Περὶ ἡδονᾶς δὲ καὶ λύπας οὐ πάσας, ἡττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας, 5
μεσότης μὲν σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. Ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς
ἡδονᾶς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδὲ οἱ τοιοῦτοι,
ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι. Περὶ δὲ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευ-
θεριότης, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία. Ἐναντίως δ' ἐν 10
αὐταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσιν καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει
ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει, ὁ δὲ ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν
δὲ προέσει ἐλλείπει. [Νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίῳ λέγομεν, ἀρκούμενοι

¹ See our nr. 42, the table of Pythagorean opposites.

² A quotation of unknown origin.

15 αὐτῷ τούτῳ · ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν διορισθήσεται. Περὶ δὲ τὰ
 χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι διαθέσεις εἰσὶ, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγα-
 λοπρεπὴς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου · ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὁ δὲ περὶ μικρά),
 ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία¹ καὶ βαναυσία, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια · διαφέρουσι
 20 δ' αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται.]
 Περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις
 λεγομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία · ὥς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέ-
 25 πειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, <τῷ> περὶ μικρά διαφέρουσιν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ πρὸς
 τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν μεγάλην, αὕτη περὶ μικράν οὖσα · ἔστι γὰρ
 ὥς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἥττον, λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων
 30 ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνώνυμος. Ἀνώ-
 νυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πληρὴ ἡ τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλοτιμία. [Ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται
 οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας², καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον
 καλοῦμεν ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον
 1108a ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. Διὰ τίνα δ' αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς
 ῥηθήσεται · νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑψηλῆς τρόπον.
 Ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ
 5 ἀνώνυμων ὄντων αὐτῶν, τὸν μέσον πρᾶον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα
 καλέσομεν · τῶν δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὀρ-
 γιλότης, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀοργητός τις, ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις ἀοργησία. [Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ
 10 ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσαι μὲν τίνα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι
 δ' ἀλλήλων · πᾶσαι μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶ περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν, διαφέρουσι
 δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἔστι περὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ · τούτου δὲ τὸ
 μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δ' ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. Ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων,
 15 ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα οὐτ'
 ὀρθὰ οὐτ' ἐπαινετὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα,
 πειρατέον δ', ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας
 ἕνεκα καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου³. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής
 20 τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, ἡ δὲ προσποίησις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον
 ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἴρων.
 Περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδύ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτρα-
 25 πελία, ἡ δὲ ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων
 ἀγροϊκός τις καὶ ἡ ἔξις ἀγροϊκία · περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδύ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν
 ὥς δεῖ ἡδύς ὢν φίλος⁴ καὶ ἡ μεσότης φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς

¹ ἀπειροκαλία - tastelessness.

² ἐπιδικάζονται etc. - the extreme characters lay claim to the middle place.

³ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου (ἕνεκα) - so that we may be easily followed.

⁴ φίλος - amiable.

Means in
the passions

ἐνεκα, ἄρεσκος ¹, εἰ δὲ ὠφελείας τῆς αὐτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δύσερις τις καὶ δύσκολος. Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ 30 πάθη μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ αἰδῶς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον, ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἢ ὁ μηδὲν ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ μέσος 35 αἰδήμων. Νέμεσις ² δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην 1108b καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινόμενας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβάλλον τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλεῖπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι 5 ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν. Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς μεσότητες εἰσὶν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν. 10

The author presented this table to his students in a διαγραφή. It may have been a scheme such as this:

<i>province</i>	<i>excess</i>		<i>mean</i>		<i>defect</i>
φόβοι κ. θάρρη	<θράσος> θρασύς	←	ἀνδρεία <ἀνδρείος>	→	<δειλία> δειλός
ἡδοναί κ. λύπαι	ἀκολασία <ἀκόλαστος>	←	σωφροσύνη <σώφρων>	→	<ἀναισθησία> ἀναισθητος
δόσεις κ. λήψεις χρημάτων	ἄσωτία <ἄσωτος>	←	ἐλευθεριότης <ἐλευθέριος>	→	ἀνελευθερία ἀνελεύθερος
id. (περὶ μεγάλα)	{ ἀπειροκαλία } { βαναυσία }	←	μεγαλοπρέπεια μεγαλοπρεπής	→	μικροπρέπεια μικροπρεπής
	ἀπειρόκαλος, βάνουσος				
τίμη κ. ἀτιμία (μεγάλα)	χαυνότης χαῦνος	←	μεγαλοψυχία μεγαλόψυχος	→	μικροψυχία μικρόψυχος
id. (μικραί)	φιλοτιμία φιλότιμος	←	<normal attitude> towards honour	→	ἀφιλοτιμία ἀφιλότιμος
ὀργή	ὀργιλότης ὀργίλος	←	πραότης πραός	→	ἀοργησία ἀόργητος
τὸ ἀληθές τὸ ἐν τῇ λόγων κ. πράξεων κοινωνία	ἀλαζονεία ἀλαζών	←	ἀλήθεια ἀληθής	→	εἰρωνεία εἴρων
τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν παιδιᾷ	βωμολοχία βωμολόχος	←	εὐτραπέλια εὐτράπελος	→	ἀγροικία ἀγροϊκος
τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ	<ἀρέσκεια ἢ κολα- κεία> ἄρεσκος ἢ κόλαξ	←	φιλία	→	δύσερις, δύσκολος
τὰ περὶ τὰ πάθη	— καταπλήξ	←	αἰδῶς αἰδήμων	→	<ἀναισχυντία> ἀναισχυντος
id., sc. λύπη κ. ἡδονή, αἰ ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινόμεναι	φθονός	←	νέμεσις νεμεσητικὸς	→	ἐπιχαιρεκακία ἐπιχαιρέκακος

¹ ἄρεσκος - obsequious.

² νέμεσις - righteous indignation. In this instance the application of the theory of the mean is very unfortunate.

573—a. By this theory the author is led to a remarkable consequence, namely, that the opposition between the extremes (being two vices) is sharper than that between virtue and vice.

Eth. Nic. II 8, 1108 b¹¹⁻¹⁵, 26³⁰.

1108b Τριῶν δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς
δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, μιᾶς δ' ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινται
πως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντία εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ μέση
15, 26 ταῖς ἄκραις. — Οὕτως δὲ ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων, πλείστη ἐναντιότης
ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀκροῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον· πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστη-
κεν ἀλλήλων ἢ τοῦ μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μεγάλου
30 ἢ ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου.

The
opposition
between the
extremes is
the sharpest

b. Sometimes the excess, sometimes the defect is more opposed to the mean.

Ib., 1108 b³⁵-1109 a¹⁹:

1109a Πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις, ἐφ' ὧν δὲ
ἡ ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρεία μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολή οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἡ δειλία
ἔλλειψις οὔσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἐνδεia οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἡ
5 ἀκολασία ὑπερβολή οὔσα. Διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἐξ
αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον
τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον, οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον
10 εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἢ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον δ' ἡ δειλία,
ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλεῖον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα
δοκεῖ εἶναι. Μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ
ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς ᾧ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμέν πως, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία
15 τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. Οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ
εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. Ταῦτ' οὖν
μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ᾧ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολή οὔσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

574—In the next chapter Ar. gives some practical rules for attaining the mean.

a. *Eth. Nic.* II 9, 1109 a³⁰⁻³³:

30 Δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου,
καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ

Three rules
for
attaining
the mean

τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔργε
νῆα¹.

33 τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀμαρτωλότερον τὸ δ' ἥττον.

¹ *Odys.* 12, 219.

b. Ib., b¹⁻⁷:

Σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἃ καὶ αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν· ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα ιι09b πεφύκαμεν. Τοῦτο δ' ἔσται γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινόμενης περὶ ἡμᾶς. Εἰς τοῦναντίον δ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπάγοντες 5 τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἤξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν.

c. Ib., b⁷⁻¹²:

Ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. "Ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην¹, τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· ἵο οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπόμενοι ἤττον ἀμαρτησόμεθα.

Conditions of responsibility for action 575—In book III, ch. 1-5, the conditions of responsibility for action are defined. First, the action must be voluntary (ἐκούσιον), i.e. done (1) not under compulsion, and (2) with knowledge of the circumstances.

The voluntary and involuntary

a. *Eth. Nic.* III 1, ιι09 b³⁰-ιι10 a⁴:

Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὐσης, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκούσιοις 30 ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκούσιοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρὸς τε τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις.

35

Δοκεῖ δὲ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γιγνόμενα. Βίαιον δὲ οὗ ἡ ιι10a ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ἡ μηδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες.

Compulsary acts

b. Ib., ιι10 b¹⁻⁵, 9-11:

Τὰ δὴ ποῖα φατέον βίαια; ἢ ἀπλῶς μὲν, ὅπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἢ καὶ ιι10b ὁ πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλληται; "Α δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἰρετά, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἐκούσια. — Εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη 5. 9 βίαια εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη οὕτω βίαια· τούτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν.

Acts done through ignorance are involuntary only when regretted

c. Ib., ιι10 b¹⁸⁻²⁴:

Τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἐκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράξας ὅτιοῦν, μηδὲν τι δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ 20 τῇ πράξει, ἐκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὃ γε μὴ ἤδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός γε. Τοῦ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἐκὼν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον.

¹ *Il.* III 156-160.

d. Ib., IIIIO b³⁰-IIIII a⁶:Knowledge of
the circum-
stances
required

Τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὰ συμφέροντα. Οὐ γὰρ ἦ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἀγνοία αἰτία του ἀκούσιου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου (ψέγονται γὰρ διὰ γε ταύτην), ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ αἱ
 1111a ἡ πρᾶξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει. Ἴσως οὖν οὐ χειρόν διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί, τίς τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ,
 5 καὶ ἔνεκα τίνος οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἡρέμα ἢ σφόδρα.

e. Ib., IIIII a^{22, 29}, b¹⁻³:Voluntary
acts

Ὅντος δ' ἀκούσιου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι' ἀγνοίαν, τὸ ἐκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἶδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. Ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς
 25 λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν. Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζῶων ἐκουσίως πράξει, οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες· εἰτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἐκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἐκουσίως τὰ δ' αἰσχροῦ ἀκουσίως; Ἡ γελοῖον ἐνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος; — δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἤττον
 1111b ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα, ὥστε καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας· ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

576—Moral virtue further implies that the action is done by choice.

a. *Eth. Nic.* III 2, IIIII b⁴⁻¹⁰:

Choice

Διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἐκούσιου καὶ τοῦ ἀκούσιου, περὶ προαιρέσεως ἔπεται
 5 διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἥθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. — Ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταῦτόν δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἐκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκούσιου καὶ παῖδες καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα κοινωνεῖ,
 10 προαιρέσεως δ' οὐ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὐ.

b. Ib., IIIIIb 10-19:

It is neither
desire nor
passion

Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βούλησιν ἢ τινα δόξαν οὐκ εὐόκασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν. Οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἡ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός. Καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὐ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς
 15 δ' ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὐ. Καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. Καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυπηροῦ οὔθ' ἡδέος. — Θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἤττον· ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ.

c. Ib., IIIIIb 19-30:

Neither wish

20 Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησίς γε, καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον. Προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη ἂν ἡλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας. Καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἔστι καὶ περὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς δι' αὐτοῦ πραχθέντα ἂν, οἷον ὑποκριτὴν τινα νικᾶν

ἡ ἀθλητήν· προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι ἂν δι' 25 αὐτοῦ. "Ἐτι δὲ ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα. Προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαμέν. Προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἀρμόζει· ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. 30

nor opinion

d. Ib. IIII b³⁰-III2 a¹¹:

Οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν 30, 31 ἥττον περὶ τὰ αἰδία καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· καὶ τῷ ψευδεῖ καὶ ἀληθεῖ διαίρεται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον. — "Ὅλως μὲν οὖν δόξη ταυτὸν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδεὶς· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τινί. Τῷ γὰρ προαι- III2a ρεῖσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ ποιοὶ τινές ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὐ. Καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστίν ἢ τί τι συμφέροι ἢ πῶς· λαβεῖν δὲ ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν. Καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις 5 ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὐ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς. Καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἃ μάλιστα ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἃ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν. Δοκοῦσί τε οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαι τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ' ἔνιοι δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον, διὰ κακίαν δ' αἰρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἃ δεῖ. 10

Choice defined

e. Ib., III2 a¹³⁻¹⁷:

Τί οὖν ἡ ποιὸν τί ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδέν; Ἐκ οὐ σι ο ν μὲν δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δὲ ἐκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν. Ἄλλ' ἄρά γε τὸ π ρ ο β ε β ο υ - 15 λ ε υ μ έ ν ο ν ; Ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. Ὑποσημαίνειν δ' ἔοικεν καὶ τούνομα ὡς ὃν πρὸ ἐτέρων αἰρετόν.

577—Choice having been defined as "the Voluntary preceded by deliberation", the question arises: on which objects does deliberation bear. Ar. answers: (1) We deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done; (2) not about ends, but about means.

Not every thing is object of deliberation

a. *Eth. Nic.* III 3, III2 a¹⁸⁻³⁴:

Βουλευόνται δὲ πότερα πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βουλευτόν ἐστίν, ἡ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; Λεκτέον δὲ ἴσως βουλευτόν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλευσάιτ' ἂν τις ἡλίθιος 20 ἢ μαινόμενος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. — Περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι. — Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, αἰεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταῦτά γινομένων, εἴτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ φύσει ἢ διὰ τινὰ αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν. — 25 Οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμβρων. — Οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον θησαυροῦ εὐρέσεως. — Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκῦθαι ἄριστα πολιτεύοιντο οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλεύεται. Οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν τούτων οὐδὲν δι' ἡμῶν. — Βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ' 30

ἡμῖν καὶ πρακτῶν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά. Αἰτίαι γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. Τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι βουλευόμενοι περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν.

b. Ib., III 2 b¹¹⁻²¹:

We deliberate
not about
ends, but
about means

III 2b Βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. Οὔτε γὰρ ἱατρὸς βουλευεται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν
15 ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τέλος τι, πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσιν, καὶ διὰ πλείονων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥᾶστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἑνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κάκεινο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἷτιον, ὃ
20 ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικεν ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα.

578—After these preliminaries choice can be defined more precisely.

Eth. Nic. III 3, III 3 a⁹⁻¹²:

Final
definition
of choice

Ὅντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὁρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτική ὁρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐκ τοῦ βουλευσάσθαι γὰρ κρίναντες ὁρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν.

579—a. Since, then, good and bad actions depend on choice, virtue and vice are in our power.

Eth. Nic. III 5, III 3 b³⁻¹⁶:

We are
responsible
for good and
for bad
actions

III 3b Ὅντος δὴ βουλητοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς
5 τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἐκούσιοι. Αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα. Ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. Ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μὴ, καὶ τὸ ναί· ὥστε εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν
10 ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχροὺς ὃν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχροὺς ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Εἰ δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῦς καὶ κακοῦς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι. Τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὥς

15 οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μάκαρ¹

ἔοικεν τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ δὲ ἀληθεῖ. Μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἐκούσιον.

¹ With this ancient Greek wisdom (the verse may be of Solon) the Socratic maxim that "nobody does wrong willingly" is implicitly condemned. Cp. our nr. 204c, d.

This is
presupposed
by legislation

b. Ib., III3 b²¹⁻³⁰:

Τούτοις δ' ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἐκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν· κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶντας μοχθηρά, ὅσοι 25 μὴ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἢς μὴ αὐτοὶ αἵτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὥς τοὺς μὲν προτρέψοντες τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες. Καίτοι ὅσα μῆτε ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μῆτε ἐκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν, ὥς οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου ὃν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ πεινῆν ἢ ὀτιοῦν ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἤττον πεισόμεθα αὐτά.

29, 30

580—a. The truth that character is formed by action is not contradicted by the fact that a vice once formed cannot be thrown off at will.

Ib., III4 a⁹⁻³¹:

Vice cannot
be thrown
off at will,
but is formed
voluntarily

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομι- 10 δῇ ἀναισθήτου· ἔτι δὲ ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἀδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἀδικος, ἐκὼν ἀδικος ἂν εἴη. Οὐ μὲν ἐάν γε βούληται, ἀδικος ὧν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ νοσῶν ὑγίης, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἐκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς 15 βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς· τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ' αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ βαλεῖν καὶ ῥῦψαι· ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γίνεσθαι, διὸ ἐκόντες εἰσὶν· γενομένοις 20 δ' οὐκέτι ἔξεστιν μὴ εἶναι.

Οὐ μόνον δὲ αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἐκούσιοι εἰσὶν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώ- ματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ ἀμέλειαν. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ πῆρωσιν· 25 οὐθελς γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσειεν τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεήσει· τῷ δὲ ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμήσῃ. Τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακιῶν αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὐ. Εἰ δ' οὕτως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακιῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἴεν. 30

The objec-
tion that
conduct is
determined
by innate
character

b. Ib., III4 a^{31-b²⁵}:

Εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας III4b οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὁποῖός ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος αὐτῷ τῆς ἑξεῶς ἐστὶ πῶς αἷτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πῶς αὐτὸς αἷτιος, εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς αὐτῷ αἷτιος τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὐτῷ τὸ ἄριστον 5 ἔσεσθαι, ἢ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφσεις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φῦναι δεῖ ὥσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ἢ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἰρήσεται, καὶ ἐστὶν εὐφυῆς ὃ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν (τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὁ παρ'

10 ἐτέρου μὴ οἶόν τε λαβεῖν μὴδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἶον ἔφου τοιοῦτον ἔξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ
καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἢ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη εὐφυῖα), εἰ δὴ ταῦτ'
ἐστὶν ἀληθὴ, τί μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἐστὶ ἐκούσιον; Ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως,
τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὅπωςδὴποτε φαίνεται καὶ κεῖται,
15 τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀναφέροντες πράττουσιν ὅπωςδὴποτε. Εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος
μὴ φύσει ἐκάστω φαίνεται οἷονδὴποτε, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ παρ' αὐτόν ἐστιν, εἴτε τὸ
μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἐκούσιως τὸν σπουδαῖον ἢ ἀρετὴ
ἐκούσιόν ἐστιν, οὐθὲν ἤττον καὶ ἢ κακία ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη. Ὅμοιως γὰρ καὶ
20 τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δι' αὐτόν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. Εἰ οὖν,
ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἐκούσιοι εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἔξεων συναίτιοι πως
αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοὶ τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακαί
25 ἐκούσιοι ἂν εἴεν· ὁμοίως γάρ.

c. Ib., III 4 b³⁰-III 5 a³:

Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἐκούσιοι εἰσι καὶ αἱ ἔξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων
ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοι ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἔξεων δὲ
III 5a τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἢ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστικῶν·
ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτως χρῆσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκούσιοι.

Actions and
states of cha-
racter not in
the same
sense
voluntary

3—THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS. A PHENOMENOLOGY OF VIRTUE
(Books III 6-X)

581—Ar.'s treatment of courage gives a good instance of his method in defining moral virtues. It has been rightly remarked by Ross that this method is the reverse of that followed by Plato. Plato tends to interpret every virtue so widely that it is essentially identified with virtue as a whole—we have seen this in the *Laches* concerning courage (our nr. 210), and again in the *Republic* concerning justice (nrs. 284-285)—; by Ar. the spheres of the particular virtues are narrowed as much as possible.

a. *Eth. Nic.* III 6, III 5 a⁶⁻³⁵:

Καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας.

"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἤδη φανερόν γεγέννηται, φοβούμεθα δὲ δηλονότι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὀρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. Φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα
10 τὰ κακά, οἶον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι· ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἶον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπιεικῆς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φοβούμενος
15 ἀναίσχυντος. Λέγεται δ' ὑπὸ τινων ἀνδρεῖος κατὰ μεταφοράν· ἔχει γὰρ τι ὁμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· ἄφοβος γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. Πενίαν δὲ ἴσως οὐ δεῖ

Courage
defined

φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι' αὐτόν· ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος ἀνδρεῖος, λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοιότητα. Ἐνιοὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευθέριοι εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων 20 ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχουσιν. Οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται ἢ φθόνον ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλός ἐστιν· οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρεῖος. Περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; Ἡ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; Οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος τῶν δεινῶν. Φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ 25 θάνατος· πέρας γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι. Δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι, οἷον ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσοις. Ἐν τίσιν οὖν; Ἡ ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις; Τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. Ὁμολογοὶ δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ 30 καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. Κυρίως δὲ ἡ λέγειται· ἂν ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεής, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον. 35

b. Ib. 7, III5 b¹⁵⁻²⁴:

Its motive
is its own
nobility

Γίνεται δὴ τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν ἡ μὲν ὅτι ὁ οὐ δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι III5 οὐχ ὅτε, ἡ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἂν δεῖ b15 καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος (κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος· τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν, καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ 20 ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν· τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος· ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει. Καλοῦ δὲ ἔνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

Again, W. D. Ross¹ has made an interesting remark here: in his actual treatment of the virtues, he says, Ar. somewhat forgets his formal view; (namely, that all human action aims at an end other than itself); he nowhere attempts to deduce the necessity of any single virtue from the supreme end to be attained. He treats the agent as being moved to action by the contemplation of the "fineness" of the good act itself, and thus becomes in his detailed treatment an intuitionist.

582—a. The sphere of temperance is limited to the pleasures of touch and taste, but especially to those of touch.

Temperance *Eth. Nic.* III 10, III7 b²⁰-III8 b¹:

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω (τί δ' ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπω I117 γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων)· μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν. b20 Δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὐταὶ εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης

¹ Aristotle, p. 204/5.

25 ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν (ἤττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως
 περὶ τὰς λύπας ἐστίν)· ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. Περὶ ποίας
 οὖν τῶν ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. Διηρήσθωσαν δὴ καὶ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ αἱ
 30 ψυχικαί, οἷον φιλοτιμία φιλομαθία· ἐκάτερος γὰρ τούτων χαίρει, οὐ φιλητικός
 ἐστίν, οὐδὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας. Οἱ δὲ περὶ
 τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται· ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ'
 οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικαὶ εἰσιν. Τοὺς γὰρ φιλομούθους καὶ διηγητικούς
 35 καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκολάστους δ'
 1118a οὐ λέγομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπουμένους ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἢ φίλοις. Περὶ δὲ τὰς σω-
 ματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτας· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς
 διὰ τῆς ὕψεως, οἷον χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε
 5 ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται· καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις,
 καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν. Ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς
 γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένως χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθεις ἀκολάστους λέγει,
 οὐδὲ τοὺς ὡς δεῖ σώφρονας. Οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὁσμήν, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός·
 10 τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μήλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμιαμάτων ὁσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολά-
 στους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς μύρων ἢ ὀψων· χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι,
 ὅτι διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμητῶν. Ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ
 τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πεινώσι, χαίροντας ταῖς τῶν βρωμάτων ὁσμαῖς· τὸ δὲ
 15 τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστου. Τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμητὰ ταῦτα. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ
 οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοις κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
 Οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὁσμαῖς τῶν λαγῶν αἱ κύνες χαίρουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει, τὴν
 20 δ' αἰσθήσιν ἢ ὁσμὴ ἐποίησεν· οὐδὲ ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοός, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ,
 ὅτι δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἥσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ φαίνεται·
 ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα, ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἔξει. Περὶ τὰς
 τοιαύτας δὲ ἡ ἡδονὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία
 ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα κοινωνοῦν, ὅθεν ἀνδραπο-
 25 δώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· αὐταὶ δ' εἰσὶν ἀφῆ
 καὶ γεῦσις. Φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι·
 τῆς γὰρ γεύσεως ἐστὶν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς οἶνους δο-
 κιμάζοντες καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύοντες· οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ οἱ γε
 30 ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἢ γίνεται πᾶσα δι' ἀφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν
 ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις. Διὸ καὶ ἠϋξάτο τις ὀσφογάτος ὧν τὸν
 φάρυγγα αὐτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γινέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόμενος τῇ ἀφῇ.

b. Ib., II, 1118 b²⁷⁻²⁸, 1119 a⁵⁻¹¹:

Excess and
defect

1119a Ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν, δῆλον. —
 5 Ἐλλείποντες δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἤττον ἢ δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται.
 Οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὴ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία. Καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα διακρίνει

τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὐ· εἰ δέ τῳ μηθὲν ἐστὶν ἡδὺ μηδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου, πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι. Οὐ τέτευχε δ' 10 ὀνόματος ὁ τοιοῦτος διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι.

W. D. Ross¹ remarks on this passage: "Apart from the excessive narrowness of the conception of temperance, the main point to be noted here is the breakdown of the doctrine of the mean".

583—The crown of virtues is, according to Ar., that particular virtue which he calls "greatness of soul". It is described as follows.

Greatness
of soul

Eth. Nic. IV 3, 1123 a³⁴-1125 a¹⁶:

Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μέγαν μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν. Διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν 1123b ἕξιν σκοπεῖν. Δοκεῖ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μέγαν ἄνθρωπον ἄξιον ἄξιον ὦν· ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἡλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν² οὐδεὶς ἡλίθιος οὐδ' ἀνόητος. Μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος. (ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξίων ἑαυτὸν σώφρων, μεγαλόψυχος 5 δ' οὐ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ)· ὁ δὲ μέγαν ἑαυτὸν ἀξίων ἀνάξιον ὦν χαῦνος (ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἀξίος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος)· ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἀξίος μικρόψυχος, ἐάν τε μέγαν ἐάν τε μετρίων, ἐάν τε καὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος 10 ὦν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ· καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μέγαν ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ μὴ τοσούτων ἦν ἄξιος;

Ἔστι δὲ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος (τοῦ γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ)· οἱ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. 15

Εἰ δὲ δὴ μέγαν ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὦν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἐν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη. Ἡ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ· μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν θεήμεν ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὐ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἄθλον· τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμὴ (μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο 20 τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν)· περὶ τιμᾶς δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχος ἐστὶν ὡς δεῖ. Καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλιστα οἱ μεγάλοι ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς· κατ' ἀξίαν δέ. Ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλόψυχου ἀξίωμα. Ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς 25 ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τὸν γε μεγαλόψυχον.

Ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη· μειζόνος γὰρ αἰεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος. Τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. Καὶ δόξειεν δ' <ἂν> εἶναι μεγαλόψυχον τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη ἀρετῇ 30

¹ Aristotle, p. 207.

² τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν - sc. ἀξιούντων ἑαυτούς.

It is related
to honour
and
disgrace

μέγα. Οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἀρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ φεύγειν παρασείσαντι¹, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα πράξει αἰσχροῦ ὧ γ' οὐδὲν μέγα; Καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκοποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνεται· ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὢν.

35 Οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος φαῦλος ὢν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἄθλον ἢ τιμὴ, καὶ
 1124a ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. "Εοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος τις εἶναι
 τῶν ἀρετῶν· μεῖζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. Διὰ τοῦτο
 χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας.

A crown of
the virtues

5 Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμᾶς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν
 ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως ἡσθήσεται, ὥς τῶν οἰκείων
 τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἄξια τιμὴ·
 οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀποδέχεται γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μεῖζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν· τῆς δὲ
 10 παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγωρήσει, οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος·
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας, οὐ γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν.

Attitude
towards
honour

Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμᾶς, οὐ μὴν
 ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν μετρίως
 15 ἔξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὔτε εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς ἔσται οὔτε ἀτυχῶν περί-
 λυπος. Οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχει ὥς μέγιστον ὄν (αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ
 πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμὴν ἐστὶν αἰρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν
 βούλονται)· ὧ δὴ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστιν, τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. Διὸ ὑπερόπται
 20 δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν.

towards
other
external
goods

Οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπερο-
 χῇ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. Διὸ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλο-
 25 ψυχότερους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τινῶν. Κατ' ἀλήθειαν δὲ ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος
 τιμητέος· ὧ δ' ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς. Οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ
 τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς
 μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται. "Ανευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα, ὑπερόπται

30 δὲ καὶ ὕβρισταί οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται. "Ανευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ
 ῥᾶδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν
 1124b ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅ τι ἂν τύχῳσιν πρᾶτ-
 τουσιν. Μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν
 ἐν οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πρᾶττουσιν, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν
 5 ἄλλων. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς),
 οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως.

Οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν, μεγαλο-
 κίνδυνος δέ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδῆς τοῦ βίου ὥς οὐκ ἄξιον ὄν πάντως ζῆν.
 10 Καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος δὲ αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος,
 τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένου. Καὶ ἀντευεργετικὸς πλείονων· οὕτω γὰρ προσοφλήσει ὁ

towards
danger

in conferring
and receiving
benefits

¹ παρασείσαντι - "swinging his arms by his side".

ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθώς. Δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημονεύειν οὓς ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, <ὕφ'> ὧν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὐ· ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούει, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν 15 Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Δίῳ· οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἃ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ. Μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόγις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνόν, τῶν 20 δὲ ῥάδιον, καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν, ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. Καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι ¹, ἢ οὐ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν ἄλλ' ἢ ὅπου τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστών. 25

in speaking
and acting
openly

Ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερόμισον εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον· τὸ γὰρ λαυθάνειν φοβούμενου. Καὶ μέλειν τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης, καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν φανερώς· παρρησιαστῆς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν. Διὸ καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι' εἰρωνείαν· εἰρωνά δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς. Καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ 30 δύνασθαι ζῆν ² ἀλλ' ἢ φίλον· δουλικόν γάρ, διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες θητικοὶ 1125a καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. Οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός· οὐδὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. Οὐδὲ μνησίκακος· οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. Οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος ³· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὐτοῦ 5 ἔρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἑτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῇται μέλει αὐτῷ οὔθ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγωνται, οὐδ' αὖ ἐπαινετικός ἐστίν· διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι' ὕβριν. Καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικός καὶ δεητικός· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα. Καὶ ὅλος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ 10 καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον.

Outward
appearance

Καὶ κίνησις δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικός ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα σπουδάζων, οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μηδὲν μέγα οἰόμενος· ἢ δ' ὀξυφωνία καὶ ἡ ταχυτής διὰ τούτων. 15

We share the impression of Ross, who states that "as a whole the picture is an unpleasing one".

Justice

584—Book V of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is devoted to justice. Contrary to Plato, Ar. follows the common use of language. Doing so, he distinguishes two main senses of the terms "just" and "unjust".

Two senses
of the terms
"just" and
"unjust"

Eth. Nic. V I, 1129 a³²-b¹:

Δοκεῖ δὲ ὁ τε παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ἄνιστος, ὥστε

¹ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι - he does not strive after the things commonly held in honour.

² ζῆν πρὸς ἄλλον - living at the will of another.

³ ἀνθρωπολόγος - a gossip.

δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἔσται ὃ τε νόμιμος καὶ ὁ ἴσος. Τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον.

585—In the first sense “justice” is perfect virtue, containing all other virtues and displayed in society.

Ib., 1129 b¹¹-1130 a⁸:

Justice in
the general
sense

Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ νόμιμος δίκαιος, δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστὶ πῶς δίκαια· τὰ τε γὰρ ὠρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων δίκαιον εἶναι φαμέν. Οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ
15 ἀπάντων, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις, ἢ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον· ὥστε ἓνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικά καὶ φυλακτικά εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ. Προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ
20 λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ρίπτειν τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν μηδὲ ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν
25 κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων, ὀρθῶς μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὀρθῶς, χειρὸν δ' ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος¹. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐστὶν τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἢ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὐθ' ἔσπερος οὔτε ἑῷος οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοι φαμεν

30 ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετῇ ἐνι².

Καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετὴ, ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις ἐστίν, τελεία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὐτὸν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς
1130a ἕτερον ἀδυνατοῦσιν. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι »ἀρχὰ ἀνδρα δείξει«· πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ ἄρχων. Διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερον
5 ἐστίν· ἄλλω γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῶ. Κάκιστος μὲν οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ, ἄριστος δ' οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλ' ὁ πρὸς ἕτερον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν.

586—a. There also exists a sort of “justice” in a special sense, which is a part of virtue in general.

Eth. Nic. V 2, 1130 a¹⁴⁻³⁴:

Justice in
the special
sense

Ζητοῦμεν δὲ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην. Ἔστι γὰρ τις, ὡς φαμέν.

¹ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος - if it has been made at random.

² Theognis, 147.

Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος. Σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν 15 γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μὲν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ ῥίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπότητα ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι' ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δέ γε τινὰ (ψέγομεν γάρ) 20 καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. Ἔστιν ἄρα γε ἄλλη τις ἀδικία ὡς μέρος τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἀδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον. Ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα μοιχεύει καὶ προσλαμβάνων, ὁ δὲ προστιθεὶς καὶ ζημιούμενος δι' ἐπιθυ- 25 μίαν, οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης, ἐκεῖνος δ' ἀδικος, ἀκόλαστος δ' οὐ. Δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν. Ἔτι περὶ μὲν τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἀδικήματα γίγνεται ἡ ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπὶ τινι μοχθηρίᾳ αἰεί, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν, ἐπ' ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλιπεν τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν, εἰ 30 ἐπάταξεν, ἐπὶ ὀργήν, εἰ δὲ ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπ' ἀδικίαν. Ὡστε φανερόν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἐν μέρει.

1. distributive, b. Justice in this sense is divided into two kinds: (1) distributive,
2. corrective (2) corrective.

Ib., 1130 b³⁰-1131 a¹:

Τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου ἐν μὲν ἔστιν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἔστιν καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου), ἐν δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν.

Corrective
justice
subdivided

c. Corrective justice again is subdivided into two divisions.

Ib., 1131 a¹⁻⁹:

Τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσιά ἐστιν τὰ δὲ 1131a ἀκούσια, ἐκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶσις, ὦνή, δανεισμός, ἐγγύη, χρῆσις, παρακαταθήκη, μίσθωσις (ἐκούσια δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων 5 τούτων ἐκούσιος), τῶν δὲ ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπὴ, μοιχεία, φαρμακεία, προαγωγεία¹, δουλαπατία, δολοφονία, ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία, δεσμός, θάνατος, ἀρπαγή, πῆρωςις, κακηγορία, προπηλακισμός.

587—In a certain sense justice may be called a mean between two extremes. First distributive justice is considered.

Justice
a mean

Eth. Nic. V 3, 1131 a⁹⁻³²:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ τ' ἀδικος ἄνισος καὶ τὸ ἀδικὸν ἄνισον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μέσον τί ἐστὶ 10 τοῦ ἀνίσου. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον· ἐν ᾧ γὰρ πράξει ἐστὶ τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἴσον. Εἰ οὖν τὸ ἀδικὸν ἄνισον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ

¹ Prostitution.

ἀνευ λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τι ἂν εἴη.
 15 Ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσὶν. Ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τε καὶ
 ἴσον εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ τισίν, καὶ ἥ μὲν μέσον, τινῶν (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πλεῖον
 καὶ ἑλαττον), ἥ δ' ἴσον ἐστὶ, δυσὶν, ἥ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν. Ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον
 ἐν ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τέτταρσιν· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, δύο ἐστὶ, καὶ
 20 ἐν οἷς [τὰ πράγματα], δύο. Καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς· ὥς γὰρ
 ἐκεῖνα ἔχει, τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω κάκεῖνα ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἔξουσιν, ἀλλ'
 ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἡ ἴσοι μὴ ἴσα ἢ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχωσι καὶ
 25 νέμονται. Ἐτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦτο δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς
 ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν
 λέγουσι πάντες ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ
 πλοῦτον, οἱ δὲ εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ' ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετὴν. Ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον
 30 ἀνάλογόν τι. Τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ' ὅλως
 ἀριθμοῦ· ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις.

a sort of
proportion

E.g.: the wages of A and B should be in proportion to the merits of A and B.
 Thus $\alpha : \beta = \gamma : \delta$, and $\alpha : \gamma = \beta : \delta$. Now $\alpha : \beta = (\alpha + \gamma) : (\beta + \delta)$.
 This is called geometrical proportion.

588—Next, corrective justice is to be dealt with. Here the proportion is *arithmetical*, the same being rendered for the same.

Eth. Nic. V 4, 1131 b²³-1132 a¹⁹:

In corrective
justice the
proportion is
arithmetical

25 Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ' ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν τῷ διορθωτικόν,
 ὃ γίγνεται ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασιν καὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. Τοῦτο
 δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ προτέρου. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον
 τῶν κοινῶν αἰεὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ τὴν εἰρημένην (καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων
 30 κοινῶν ἐὰν γίγνηται ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσι
 πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα· καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ δικαίῳ τούτῳ
 τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν)· τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιον ἐστὶ μὲν ἴσον
 1132a τι, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν
 ἀριθμητικὴν. Οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἰ ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον ἀπεστέρησεν ἢ φαῦλος
 ἐπιεικῇ, οὐδ' εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικὴς ἢ φαῦλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβους τὴν
 5 διαφορὰν μόνον βλέπει ὁ νόμος (καὶ χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις), εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὁ δ'
 ἀδικεῖται, καὶ εἰ ὁ μὲν ἔβλαψεν ὁ δὲ βέβλαπται. Ὡστε τὸ ἄδικον τοῦτο ἄνισον
 ὃν ἰσάζειν πειρᾶται ὁ δικαστής· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἡ
 καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ, διήρηται τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις εἰς ἄνισα· ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται
 10 τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους. (Λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ
 τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ εἰ μὴ τισὶν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι,
 καὶ ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι· ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία
 τὸ δὲ κέρδος.) Ὡστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δὲ

In this case,
too, justice
is a mean

κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλεόν τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ 15
πλεόν τοῦ κακοῦ δὲ ἔλαττον κέρδος, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον ζημία· ὧν ἦν μέσον τὸ
ἴσον, ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον
ζημίας καὶ κέρδους.

589—'Επιείκεια and the ἐπιεικές. *Eth. Nic.* V 10, 1137 a³¹-b²⁷:

Equity

Περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἡ μὲν ἐπιείκεια πρὸς δικαιο-
σύνην τὸ δὲ ἐπιεικές πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, ἐχόμενον ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν· οὕτε γὰρ ὡς
ταῦτόν ἀπλῶς οὕτε ὡς ἕτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοπούμενοις, καὶ ὅτε μὲν τὸ
ἐπιεικές ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες 35
μεταφέροντες ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπιεικέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες, ὅτε δὲ 1137b
τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικές παρὰ τὸ δίκαιόν τι ὄν
ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν· ἡ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἡ τὸ ἐπιεικές οὐ δίκαιον, εἰ
ἄλλο· ἡ εἰ ἄμφω σπουδαῖα, ταῦτόν ἐστιν. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει 5
διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπιεικές, ἔχει δὲ ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐδὲν
ὑπεναντίον ἑαυτοῦς· τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικές δικαίου τινὸς ὄν βέλτιόν ἐστι δίκαιον,
καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο τι γένος ὄν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου. Ταῦτόν ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ
ἐπιεικές, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαῖον ὄντοιν κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπιεικές. Ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν 10
ἀπορίαν ὅτι τὸ ἐπιεικές δίκαιον μὲν ἐστὶν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀνόρ-
θωμα νομίμου δικαίου. Αἷτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς, περὶ ἐνίων δὲ
οὐχ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. Ἐν οἷς οὖν ἀνάγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου,
μὴ οἷόν τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεόν λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ 15
ἀμαρτανόμενον. Καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἥττον ὀρθῶς· τὸ γὰρ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ
νόμῳ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν· εὐθὺς γὰρ
τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστὶν. Ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ 20
δ' ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἡ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης
καὶ ἡμαρτεν ἀπλῶς εἰπών, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθέν, ὃ καὶ ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς
εἶπεν ἐκεῖ παρών, καὶ εἰ ἥδει, ἐνομοθέτησεν. Διὸ δίκαιον μὲν ἐστὶν, καὶ βέλτιον
τινος δικαίου, οὐ τοῦ ἀπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀμαρτήματος. Καὶ 25
ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπ' ἀνόρθωμα νόμου, ἡ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ
καθόλου.

The intellec-
tual virtues
treated in
book VI

590—According to the definition of virtue given sub 571b, the φρό-
νιμος has the arbitrium in determining the μεσότης. Therefore, the in-
tellectual virtues, σοφία and φρόνησις, have to be dealt with, too. They
are treated in *Eth. Nic.* VI.

The author distinguishes two faculties in the rational part of the soul, namely
the ἐπιστημονικόν (which has to do with that which is of necessity, and therefore
eternal and invariable), and the λογιστικόν (a deliberating faculty, which has to
do with the contingent). The latter has a task towards practical action, since
choice must be preceded by deliberation.

There are five qualities by which the soul reaches truth: ἐπιστήμη, τέχνη, φρόνησις, νοῦς and σοφία. The first having been defined as demonstrative knowledge of the necessary and eternal, and the second as a rational quality, concerned with producing, which reasons truly (ἐξίς μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική), φρόνησις is considered in the following passage.

a. *Eth. Nic.* VI 5, 1140 a²⁴⁻³³, b²⁰⁻²¹:

What is
φρόνιμος

1140a Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς
25 φρονίμους. Δοκεῖ δὲ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς
βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα,
οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα
πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως¹. Σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοὺς περὶ τι φρονίμους
30 λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μὴ ἐστι τέχνη.
"Ὡστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός.

Βουλεύεται δ' οὐθίς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχο-
b 20 μένων αὐτῷ πράττειν. — "Ὡστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἔξιν εἶναι
μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακ-
τικῇ.

φρόνησις
defined

b. It is neither an art, nor a purely intellectual quality.

Ib., 1140 b²¹⁻³⁰:

It is neither
an art.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετὴ, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν. Καὶ ἐν μὲν
τέχνῃ ὁ ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνων αἰρετώτερος², περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν ἤττον, ὥσπερ καὶ
περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετὴ τίς ἐστι καὶ οὐ τέχνη.

25 Διοῦν δ' ὄντοι μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον ἔχοντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετὴ, nor a purely
τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ· ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. intellectual
'Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἔξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι λήθη τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης quality
30 ἔξεως ἐστι, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.

In this passage Ar. rightly distinguishes practical reason from theoretical, as we shall again find in his definition of wisdom (our next nr.). By this distinction he is correcting Plato, who—doubtlessly by the ethico-religious character of his contemplation of the Ideas—mixed them willingly.

¹ Book X, where the contemplative life is treated, makes clear what the author means by the above formula: "to be able to deliberate well about what is good and advantageous for himself, not in some one department, e.g. what is good for his health or strength, but what is expedient as a means to the good life in general", this is the mark of a man who possesses practical wisdom. For this man acknowledges that the contemplative life is the supreme good for man, because it makes him most happy (by "contemplative life" being meant a life of scientific research).

² In Plato's *Hippias Minor* Socrates came to the strange conclusion that the man who does wrong willingly is better than the one who does it unwillingly (our nr. 212). To this famous theory Ar. replies: *In art*, indeed, the man who errs willingly is to be preferred; in φρόνησις, which is half an intellectual, half a practical quality, less. And so it is in the case of the other virtues. See our explanation of the text.

591—Again, νοῦς having been defined in the next chapter (6) as “knowledge” of the first principles from which science proceeds” (cp. our nr. 465), wisdom is treated in the following passage.

Wisdom

a. *Eth. Nic.* VI 7, 1141 a⁹⁻²⁰:

Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, 1141a
οἷον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν 10
οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν· εἶναι δέ
τινας σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ’ ἄλλο τι σοφοὺς, ὥσπερ Ὀμηροῦς
φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ

τὸν δ’ οὐτ’ ἄρ σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὐτ’ ἀροτῆρα 15
οὐτ’ ἄλλως τι σοφόν.

a combina-
tion of intui-
tive Reason
and Science

ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἀν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σοφία. Δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν
μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. “Ὡς τε
εἴη ἀν ἡ σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν
ἐχούσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων.” 20

“The highest objects” were to Ar., at least in the visible world, the heavenly
bodies, which he calls τὰ αἰδία τῶν αἰσθητῶν. They are far superior to man. Therefore,
Ar. stresses the speculative character of wisdom, which is illustrated by the instances
of Thales and Anaxagoras (our next cited passage).

Speculative
character of
wisdom

b. *Ib.*, b 3-8:

Διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιοῦτους σοφοὺς μὲν, φρονίμους δ’ 1141b
οὐ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέροντα ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ 5
μὲν καὶ θαυμαστά καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτοὺς φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ’,
ὅτι οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν.

592—As such, then, wisdom ought to be superior to phronesis, which
has a practical character. And yet, phronesis, being practical, is directly
concerned with those things which can make man happy, and could,
therefore, seem to be more important. What, then is the relation of wisdom
to phronesis?

Relation of
phronesis
to wisdom

Eth. Nic. VI 12, 1144 a¹⁻⁹:

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγομεν ὅτι καθ’ αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἰρετάς αὐτὰς εἶναι, 1144a
ἀρετάς γ’ οὐσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου¹, καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μηδὲν
μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. “Ἐπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ’
ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν². μέρος γὰρ οὐσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς 5

¹ ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου - he means: of each of the two faculties of the rational
soul, sc. the ἐπιστημονικόν and the λογιστικόν.

² “In the sense in which healthiness is the cause of health”, i.e. wisdom is the
formal cause of happiness.

τῷ ἔχασθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα. Ἐπεὶ τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἡθικὴν ἀρετὴν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον.

593—Since, then, man becomes good by doing good actions—if, at least, he does them by choice and for the sake of the good—, practical wisdom, which has the leading part in choice, plays a prominent rôle in the genesis of virtue. But this is not all. Whenever a man is virtuous, he possesses practical wisdom; for there is no true virtue without *phrónesis*.

In the following passage Ar. explains the relation of practical wisdom (*phrónesis*) to virtue (in the proper sense) by comparing it to that of a certain intellectual ability (*δαινότης*), which is the capacity for doing the things that conduce to the aim we propose, to natural virtue. "Cleverness" is not identical with practical wisdom, but practical wisdom implies it. Now natural virtue is related in the same way to Virtue in the proper sense.

a. *Eth. Nic.* VI 13, 1144 b^{1.32}:

Relation of
phrónesis to
moral virtue

1144b Σκεπτόεν δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει, ὥς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δαινότητα (οὐ ταῦτ' ὁ μὲν, ὁμοιον δέ), οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν. Πᾶσιν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἡθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ τᾶλλα ἔχομεν εὐθύς ἐκ 5 γενετῆς· ἀλλ' ὁμως ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπάρχειν. Καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἔξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὔσαι. Πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ὀρᾶσθαι, ὅτι 10 ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ ἄνευ ὀψεως κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει, ἢ δ' ἔξις ὁμοία οὔσα τότε ἔσται κυρίως ἀρετὴ. Ὡστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν εἶδη, δαινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ 15 ἡθικοῦ δύο ἐστὶ, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως.

Διόπερ τινὲς φασιν πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐζήτησε τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ὥετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. Σημεῖον δέ· 20 καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, ὅταν ὀρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετὴν, προστιθέασιν τὴν ἔξιν, εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἐστὶ, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. Ἐοίκασι δὲ μαντεύεσθαι πως ἅπαντες ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἔξις ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ 25 τὴν φρόνησιν. Δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἔξις ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν. Ὁρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησις ἐστὶν. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ὥετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας),

Not all the
virtues are
phrónesis,
but none of
them is
without it

ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. Δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἶόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι 30 κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς.

b. Nevertheless, this does not prove that phrónesis is superior to wisdom.

Phrónesis
not superior
to wisdom

Ib., 1145 a⁶⁻⁸:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία γ' ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς ὑγιείας ἢ ἱατρικῆς.

594—Selfrestraint (ἐγκράτεια) and Unrestraint (ἀκρασία) are treated in Book VII, ch. 1-10. The last five chapters of this book (11-15) deal with ἡδονή, a much-discussed subject in the Academy in the later years of Plato. A summary of these discussions is given by Ar. in the following passage.

Three main
views about
pleasure

a. *Eth. Nic.* VII 11, 1152 b⁸⁻¹²:

Τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ' αὐτὸ οὔτε κατὰ 1152b συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτόν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς δ' ἐναι μὲν εἶναι, 10 αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι· ἐτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν.

Of these three views, the first is that of Speusippus; the second is Plato's view in the *Philebus*. The third appears at the end of this dialogue. It is represented by Ar. in book X, *infra*.

b. For the first thesis it is argued that pleasure is not a good because it is a process (namely the filling of a void).

An argument
for the first
thesis

Ib., 1152 b¹²⁻¹⁴:

Ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσις ἐστὶν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή¹, οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενῆς τοῖς τέλεσιν, οἶον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις οἰκία.

c. The same argument is adduced for the third view.

and for the
third

Ib., 1152 b²²⁻²³:

Ὅτι δ' οὐ τᾷριστον ἢ ἡδονή, ὅτι οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις.

595—To this argument Ar. opposes that pleasure is neither a process nor always linked up with a process; it is an activity and an end.

This
argument
refuted

Eth. Nic. VII 12, 1153 a⁷⁻¹⁵:

Οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἑτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινές φασι τὸ τέλος 1153a τῆς γενέσεως. Οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι

¹ γένεσις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή - "a conscious process towards a natural state" (Rackham).

10 καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἑτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. Διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐν ἐρ-
γείαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐξέως¹, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπό-
διστον.

Definition
of pleasure

596—a. To the view of Speusippus that no pleasure is a good, Ar. opposes the thesis that pleasure as such is a good.

Eth. Nic. VII 13, 1153 b¹⁻⁷:

Pleasure
a good

1153b Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κακόν, ἡ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική. Τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ φευκτόν τι καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. Ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. Ὡς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος
5 ἔλυσεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τῷ ἐλάττωσι καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον². οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν.

b. But not only pleasure as such is a good; against the third view mentioned in ch. 11 Ar. now argues (1) that *some pleasure* may be the supreme Good, and (2) that in fact the supreme Good will be a certain kind of pleasure.

Ib., 1153 b⁷⁻¹³:

The supreme
Good a cer-
tain kind of
pleasure

10 Τῆριστον τ' οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονὴν τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἐνίαι φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐνίων φαύλων οὐσῶν. Ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἐκάστης
10 ἑξέως εἰσὶν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ἢ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἰρετωτάτην εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἡδονή. Ὡστε εἴη ἂν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἀπλῶς.

c. This theory is confirmed by the fact that all animals and all human beings pursue pleasure.

Ib., 1153 b²⁵⁻²⁶:

This theory
confirmed by
experience

25 Καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ' ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν ἡδονὴν σημειῖον τι τοῦ εἶναι πῶς τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν.

The argument is of Eudoxus of Cnidus, who according to *Eth. Nic.*

¹ "an activity of our natural state".

² The argument of Speusippus is more fully exhibited in X 2, 5: "They say, if pain is an evil, it does not follow that pleasure is a good; for evil can also be opposed to evil and to a thing which is neither good nor evil"—(if we follow the reading of Hackforth, who bracketed the word ἄμφω. According to the traditional text the meaning of the last words is: "and both are opposed to the neutral state"—which is of course, true, but not exactly *ad rem*).

X 2, held that "pleasure is the Good", because "all creatures, rational and irrational alike, seek to obtain it". To this account Ar. adds the remark that the argument was believed more because of the excellence of Eudoxus' character than for its own sake. "For he (E.) had the reputation of being a man of exceptional temperance, and hence he was not suspected of upholding this view because he was a lover of pleasure, but people thought it must really be true" ¹.

597—Pleasure is treated again by Ar. in book X, ch. 1-5. The later exhibition goes further than that of book VII. We find the author's final view of pleasure in the following passage.

Pleasure is
not a process

a. *Eth. Nic.* X 4, 1174 a¹¹⁻²³, b⁵⁻⁶, b¹⁰⁻¹³:

Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ² περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθω· τί δ' 1174a
ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. Δοκεῖ
γάρ ἡ μὲν ὄρασις καθ' ὄντινον χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐνδεῆς οὐδενὸς 15
ὃ εἰς ὕστερον γενόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος· τοιούτῳ δ' ὅμοιον καὶ ἡ
ἡδονή. "Ὅλον γάρ τί ἐστι, καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἥς
ἐπὶ πλείῳ χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος. Διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησις
ἐστὶν. Ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ 20
τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὐ ἐφίεται, ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ· ἐν δὲ τοῖς
μέρεσι τοῦ χρόνου πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἶδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων.
— Τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὅτῳ χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. — Ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον b 5, 6
καὶ ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τῆς ἡδονῆς ³. Οὐ γὰρ πάντων 10
ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι
γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονάδος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσις·
οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς· ὅλον γὰρ τι.

neither the
result of a
process

b. Positively, pleasure is defined as something which accompanies and completes activity.

Definition
of pleasure

Eth. Nic. X 4, 1174 b¹⁴⁻³⁴:

Αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργούσης, τελείως δὲ τῆς εὖ διακει-
μένης πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν (τοιούτον γὰρ μάλιστ' εἶναι 15
δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνέργεια· αὐτὴν δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστί, μὴθὲν διαφερέ-
τω), καθ' ἕκαστον δὴ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἁρίστα διακειμένου πρὸς
τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν· αὕτη δ' ἂν τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ ἡδίστη. Κατὰ 20

¹ Translation of Rackham.

² τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα - the current opinions.

³ τῆς ἡδονῆς is a necessary correction, first made by Ramsauer and adopted by W. D. Ross and H. Rackham. The mss. have τὴν ἡδονήν.

πᾶσαν γὰρ αἰσθησὶν ἐστὶν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δ' ἢ τελειοτάτη, τελειοτάτη δ' ἢ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν. Τελειοῦ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἢ ἡδονή. Οὐ τὸν
 25 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἢ τε ἡδονή τελειοῦ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἱατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν. Καθ' ἐκάστην δ' αἰσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δῆλον· φαμέν γὰρ ὁράματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα. Δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα, ἐπειδὴν ἢ τε αἰσθησις ἢ κρατίστη καὶ
 30 πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῇ· τοιούτων δ' ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, αἰεὶ ἔσται ἡδονή ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ ποιήσοντος καὶ τοῦ πεισμένου. Τελειοῦ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἢ ἡδονή οὐχ ὥς ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, οἶον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἢ ὥρα.

598—Consequences of this definition are:

a. Pleasures differ in kind, since activities differ.

1175a *Eth. Nic. X 5, 1175 a²⁰⁻²⁸:*

Consequences of this definition

20 "Ανευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοῦ ἢ ἡδονή. "Οθεν δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρειν. Τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει ὑφ' ἐτέρων οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι. Οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἶον ζῶα καὶ
 25 δένδρα καὶ γραφή καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ οἰκία καὶ σκεῦος. Ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς διαφερούσας τῷ εἶδει ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἶδει τελειοῦσθαι. Διαφέρουσι δ' αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων κατ' εἶδος· καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί.

b. Activities have their own pleasures which stimulate them.

Ib., 1175 a^{28-b¹}:

30 Φανείη δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συμφκειῶσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκάστην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἢν τελειοῦ. Συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἢ οἰκεία ἡδονή. Μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρῖνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες, οἶον γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες τῷ γεωμετρεῖν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς
 35 τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ. Συναύξουσι δὴ αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύξοντα οἰκεῖα. Τοῖς ἐτέροις δὲ τῷ εἶδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει.

599—Good pleasures are those in which the φρόνιμος takes a delight.

What are good pleasures?

1176a *Eth. Nic. X 5, 1176 a¹⁵⁻²²:*

15 Δοκεῖ δ' ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάστου μέτρον ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός, ἢ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶεν ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς

οὗτος χαίρει. Τὰ δὲ τούτῳ δυσχερῇ εἴ τῳ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· 20
πολλὰ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ
τούτοις καὶ τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις.

600—In Books VIII and IX friendship is dealt with.

The author proceeds to determine its conditions by answering these two questions: (1) Is friendship only possible between good men? (2) Is it of one kind or of more than one?

Friendship
defined

Eth. Nic. VIII 2, 1155 b¹⁷-1156 a⁵:

Τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερόν γγνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ· δοκεῖ 1155b
γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον.
Δόξειε δ' ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὥστε φιλητὰ ἂν 20
εἴη τάγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλη. Πότερον οὖν τάγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὐτοῖς
ἀγαθόν; Διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοτε ταῦτα. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. Δοκεῖ δὲ
τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος, καὶ εἶναι ἀπλῶς μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλητόν,
ἐκάστω δὲ τὸ ἐκάστω. Φιλεῖ δὲ ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὄν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινό- 25
μενον. Διοίσει δ' οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητόν φαινόμενον.

Τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται
φιλία. Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνων ἀγαθοῦ (γελοῖον γὰρ
ἴσως τῷ οἶνῳ βούλεσθαι τάγαθὰ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ σφῆζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα 30
αὐτὸς ἔχη). τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τάγαθὰ
ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. Τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τάγαθὰ
εὐνοῦς λέγουσιν, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου
γίγνηται· εὐνοίαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονηθῶσιν φιλίαν
εἶναι. Ἡ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσιν; Πολλοὶ γὰρ
εἰσιν εὖνοι οἷς οὐχ ἐωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· 35
τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκείνων τις πάθος πρὸς τοῦτον. Εὖνοι μὲν οὖν οὗτοι 1156a
φαίνονται ἀλλήλοις· φίλους δὲ πῶς ἂν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν
ἑαυτοῖς; Δεῖ ἄρα εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τάγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας
δι' ἐν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.

5

So friendship is defined by four characteristics:

(1) it is goodwill (εὖνοια), (2) mutual (ἐν ἀντιπεπονηθῶσι), (3) known to the other (μὴ λανθάνουσα), (4) for the sake of the other (τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τάγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα).

By the last characteristic, strictly speaking, friendships of utility and of pleasure are excluded. They may be called friendship only by analogy, or (as Ar. calls it in the next chapter) *accidentally*.

The point is discussed by Schächter in his work cited sub 565a, where he compares the passages on φιλία in the three Aristotelian treatises on ethics.

601—a. According to the three kinds of φιλητά, three species of friendship are distinguished

Eth. Nic. VIII 3, 1156 a⁶⁻²⁴:

Three species
of friendship

1156a Διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἶδει· καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις ἄρα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. Τρία
δὴ τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἶδη, ἰσάριθμα τοῖς φιλητοῖς· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀντι-
φιλήσεις οὐ λανθάνουσα. Οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τάγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις
10 ταύτῃ ἢ φιλοῦσιν. Οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ'
αὐτοὺς φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ γίγνεται τι αὐτοῖς παρ' ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
οἱ δι' ἡδονήν. Οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιούς τινες εἶναι ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέλους, ἀλλ'
ὅτι ἡδεῖς αὐτοῖς. Οἱ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν
15 στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονήν διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἡδύ, καὶ οὐχ ἢ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν
<ὅσπερ ἐστίν>, ἀλλ' ἢ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς. Κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι
αὐταὶ εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐστὶν ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φιλούμενος, ταύτῃ φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ἢ
20 μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν ὁμοίων· ἐὰν γὰρ μηκέτι ἡδεῖς ἢ χρήσιμοι ᾖσιν, παύονται
φιλοῦντες. Τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γίγνεται. Ἀπολυθέντος
οὖν δι' ὃ φίλοι ἦσαν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλία, ὥς οὕσης τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἐκεῖνα.

b. Friendships of utility occur most frequently between the old.

Ib., 1156 a^{24, 26}:

Friendships
of utility

25 Μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταις ἡ τοιαύτη δοκεῖ φιλία γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ τὸ
ἡδὺ οἱ τηλικοῦτοι διώκουσιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον).

c. Friendships of pleasure seem to occur mostly between the young.

Ib. 1156 a³¹⁻³⁵:

Friendships
of pleasure

Ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι' ἡδονήν εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι ζῶσι,
καὶ μάλιστα διώκουσι τὸ ἡδὺ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπιπτού-
35 σης καὶ τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα. Διὸ ταχέως γίγονται φίλοι καὶ παύονται.

d. The perfect kind of friendship is that which is based on virtue.

Ib., 1156 b⁷⁻¹²:

Perfect
friendship

1156b Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων. Οὗτοι γὰρ
τάγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις ἢ ἀγαθοί, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ εἰσι καθ' αὐτοὺς·
10 οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τάγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἔνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι (δι' αὐτοὺς
γὰρ οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός)· διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία
ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ᾖσιν, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον.

e. Friendships of virtue occur rarely, those of utility or pleasure are frequent.

1158a *Eth. Nic. VIII 6, 1158 a¹⁰⁻¹⁸:*

Perfect
friendship
occurs
rarely

10 Πολλοῖς δ' εἶναι φίλον κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
ἐρᾶν πολλῶν ἅμα· εἰσιν γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτον δὲ πρὸς ἓνα πέφυκε

γίνεσθαι, πολλοὺς δ' ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν σφόδρα οὐ ῥάδιον, ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. Δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχά- 15 λεπον. Διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι.

602—Self-love the type of and basis for love of others.

Self-love
the basis for
friendship

Eth. Nic. IX 4, 1166 a^{1,33}:

Τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίαι ὀρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ 1166a τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι. Τιθέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλούμενον καὶ πράττοντα τάγαθὰ ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλούμενον εἶναι καὶ ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων 5 οἱ προσκεκρουκότες ¹. οἱ δὲ τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταῦτ' αἰρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγοῦντα καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας οὐμβαίνει. Τούτων δὲ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ὀρίζονται. Πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρχει, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ἢ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν 10 εἶναι. "Εοικεν δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἐκάστων ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι. Οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν. Καὶ βούλεται δὴ ἑαυτῷ τάγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ 15 γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τάγαθόν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἔνεκα· τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ. Καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σφύζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ᾧ φρονεῖ· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι. "Εκαστος δ' ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τάγαθὰ, γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται πάντ' ἔχειν [ἐκεῖνο 20 τὸ γενόμενον] ² (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τάγαθόν), ἀλλ' ὧν ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστίν. Δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι, ἢ μάλιστα. Συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνήμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί· αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδεῖαι. Καὶ 25 θεωρημάτων δ' εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ. Συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθ' ἑαυτῷ· πάντοτε γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοτε ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν. Τῷ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν [μὲν] ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς ἑαυτόν (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος 30 ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναι τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οἷς ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει.

603—a. An objection to this view is mentioned in ch. 8 of the same book, 1168 a^{28,35}:

An objection
to this view

Ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ἢ ἄλλον τινά. Ἐπι-
τιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχυρῷ φιλαύτους ἀπο-

¹ Those who have quarrelled.

² Secl. Vermehren, followed by Rackham.

30 καλοῦσι· δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν
μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον (ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ οἶον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄφ'
ἑαυτοῦ πράττει), ὁ δὲ ἐπεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ, μᾶλλον
35 διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλου ἔνεκα, τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ παρήσιν.

b. Ar.'s reply to this objection. Ib., 1168 a³⁵-1169 a¹⁵:

Aristotle's
reply

1168b Τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διαφωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγως. Φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν
μάλιστα τὸν μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλόμενος ὃ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ
ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς εἴσεται. Ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῷ πρὸς
5 αὐτόν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάντα οἷς ὁ φίλος ὀρίζεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ
πάντα τὰ φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει. Καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι
ὁμογλωσσόουσιν, οἶον τὸ »μία ψυχὴ«¹ καὶ »κοινὰ τὰ φίλων« καὶ »ἰσότης
φιλότης« καὶ »γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον«². πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὐτόν μάλιστ'
10 ἂν ὑπάρχοι· μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος αὐτῷ, καὶ φιλητέον δὴ μάλιστα ἑαυτόν. Ἀπο-
ρεῖται δ' εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεῶν ἔπασθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντων τὸ πιστόν.

Ἴσως οὖν τοὺς τοιοῦτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν καὶ διορίζειν ἐφ' ὅσον
ἐκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν. Εἰ δὴ λάβοιμεν τὸ φίλαυτον πῶς ἐκάτεροι
15 λέγουσιν, τάχ' ἂν γένοιτο δῆλον. Οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους
καλοῦσι τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς
ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασιν περὶ
αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητά ἐστιν. Οἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται
20 χαρίζονται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς.
Τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ
φαύλου ὄντος. Δικαίως δὲ τοῖς οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδίζεται. Ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ
τοιαῦθ' αὐτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας εἰθῆσαι λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἄδηλον·
25 εἰ γὰρ τις αἰεὶ σπουδάζοι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ
σώφρονα ἢ ὅποια οὖν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, καὶ ὅλως αἰεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ
περιποιεῖτο, οὐδεὶς ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαυτον οὐδὲ ψέξει. — Δόξεις δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος
μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαυτος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαθὰ,
30 καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ
πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ
ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζόμενος.
35 Καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μή, ὡς τούτου
1169a ἐκάστου ὄντος καὶ πεπραγέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἐκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου
μάλιστα. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ὁ
ἐπεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ. Διὸ φίλαυτος μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος
5 τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ

¹ "Friends have one soul between them". Euripides, *Orestes*, 1046.

² "Charity begins at home" (Ross).

πάθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. Τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἀμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τ' ἂν πάντ' εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστω μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, 10 εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. — Ὡστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει, τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ· βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοισι πάθεσιν ἐπόμενος.

15

604—The question whether friendship is necessary for happiness, is answered by Ar. in the affirmative.

Is friendship
necessary for
happiness?

Eth. Nic. IX 9, 1169 b³⁻¹³, b¹⁸⁻²², 1170 a¹¹⁻¹³:

Ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰ δεῖσεται φίλων ἢ μὴ. Οὐθὲν 1169b γὰρ φασὶ δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς 5 τάγαθὰ· αὐτάρκεις οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἢ δι' αὐτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· ὅθεν

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;

ἔοικεν δ' ἀτόπῳ τὸ πάντα ἀπονέμοντας τάγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι. — Εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλον ἐστὶ 10 τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, καὶ ἔστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον δ' εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους ὀθνείων, τῶν εὖ πεισομένων δεῖσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. — Ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔλοιτ' ἂν 16 καθ' αὐτὸν τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν ἀγαθὰ· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. Καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ' ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει. Δῆλον δ' 20 ὡς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπεικῶν κρεῖττον ἢ μετ' ὀθνείων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων συνημερεῦειν· δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων. — Γίνοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἄσκησίς τις τῆς 1170a ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θεογνίς φησιν. 12, 13

605—Having dealt with the problem of ἡδονή in the first part of Book X, the author speaks of the happy life in the following chapters (6-8).

Happiness
an activity
chosen for its
own sake

a. Recapitulation of preceding statements on the character of happiness.

Eth. Nic. X 6, 1176 a¹⁰-b⁹:

Εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ 1176a εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. Ἀναλαβοῦσι δὲ τὰ προειρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος. Εἴπομεν δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοι ἂν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς 35

76 βένεργειάν τινα θετόν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ
 μέν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἰρεται αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαι-
 μονίαν τῶν καθ' αὐτάς αἰρετῶν τινα θετόν καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς γὰρ
 5 ἐνδεῆς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης. Καθ' αὐτάς δ' εἰσιν αἰρεται ἀφ' ὧν μὴδὲν
 ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν
 πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι' αὐτὰ αἰρετῶν.

Cp. to this definition that of I 7 (our nr. 566, at the end).

b. Is not play an activity chosen for its own sake?—To this question Ar. answers that play can never be an absolute end, only a means for further activity.

Is not play
 chosen for
 its own sake?

Ib., 1176 b¹⁰⁻¹¹, b³²⁻¹¹⁷⁷ a¹:

10 Καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἕτερα αὐτάς αἰροῦνται. — Σπουδά-
 32 ζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἡλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ λίαν παιδικόν· παίζειν
 δ' ὅπως σπουδάζει, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὁρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ. Ἀναπαύσει γὰρ
 35 ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιὰ, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. Οὐ δὲ
 τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας.

c. Serious things contribute more to happiness.

The happy
 life is
 serious

Ib., 1177 a¹⁻⁶:

177a Δοκεῖ δ' ὁ εὐδαίμων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ἀλλ'
 οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. Βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοιῶν καὶ τῶν μετὰ
 παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν
 5 ἐνέργειαν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικώτερα ἡδὴ.

606—a. Perfect happiness is that activity which exercises the highest virtue, i.e. that of the highest function of man, i.e. the intellect.

Eth. Nic. X 7, 1177 a¹²⁻¹⁸:

Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὐλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην·
 αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. Εἴτε δὲ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν
 15 δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῶν
 ὧν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκειάν
 ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. "Ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ, εἴρηται.

Perfect hap-
 piness lies in
 contempla-
 tion

b. The reasons for this statement are given in the next passage.

Reasons

Ib., 1177 a^{20-b}, b²⁶⁻¹¹⁷⁸ a⁸:

20 Κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ
 τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ ᾧ ὁ νοῦς. "Ἐτι δὲ συνεχεστάτη· θεωρεῖν τε γὰρ δυνάμεθα
 συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν. Οἰόμεθα τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεῖχθαι
 τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἥδιστη δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολο-

(1) It is the
 activity of
 the nous

γούμενως ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστάς ἡδονάς ἔχειν καθαριότητι 25
καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὐλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδίῳ τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι.

(2) most self-
sufficient

“Ἡ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ’ ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ
πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς δὲ
τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει 30
καὶ μεθ’ ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος,
ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ’ αὐτὸν ὧν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος ᾖ,
μᾶλλον· βέλτιον δ’ ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλ’ ὅμως αὐταρκέστατος.

(3) an end in
itself

Δόξαί τ’ ἂν αὐτὴ μόνῃ δι’ αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς γίνεται 1177b
παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἢ πλεῖον ἢ ἕλαττον περιποιούμεθα
παρὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν. Δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ
ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵνα εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν. 5

(4) a divine
life

‘Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ’ ἀνθρώπον· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρωπός 26
ἐστὶν οὕτως βιώσεται, ἀλλ’ ἡ θεῖον τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσῳ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο
τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετῆν. Εἰ δὲ θεῖον
ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον 30
βίον. Οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινούντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπον ὄντα
οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ’ ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν
πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὀγκῳ μικρὸν ἐστί, 1178a
δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει. Δόξειε δ’ ἂν καὶ εἶναι
ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον· ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ’ ἂν, εἰ μὴ τὸν
αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο ἀλλὰ τινος ἄλλου. Τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἀρμόσει καὶ νῦν·
τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἐκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἡδιστόν ἐστιν ἐκάστῳ. Καὶ 5
τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀνθρώπος. Οὗτος
ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.

Cp. *Metaph.* A 2, 982 b²⁸⁻³² (our nr. 519).

c. The life of moral virtue takes the second place.

Moral virtue
ranged as
secondary

Ib. c. 8, 1178 a⁹⁻¹⁴:

Δευτέρως δ’ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετῆν· αἱ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρω-
πικαί· δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους 10
πράττομεν ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρεῖαις καὶ πράξεις παντοίαις ἐν τε τοῖς
πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἐκάστῳ, ταῦτα δ’ εἶναι φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρω-
πικά.

607—Further reasons for superiority of the contemplative life.

Contempla-
tion needs
few external
goods

a. *Eth. Nic.* X 8, 1178 a²³⁻³⁴:

Δόξειε δ’ ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ’ ἕλαττον δεῖσθαι τῆς
ἡθικῆς. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεῖα καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον 25
διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ πολιτικός, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· μικρὸν γὰρ ἂν τι διαφέρει·

πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει. Τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀναποδόσεις (αἱ 30 γὰρ βουλήσεις ἄδηλοι, προσποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν), τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας. Πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις;

b. Ib. 1178 b⁷⁻²³:

1178b Ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρητικὴ τίς ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανεῖται. Τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας 10 εἶναι· πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεῶν αὐτοῖς; Πότερα τὰς δικαίας; Ἡ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; Ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους, ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερά καὶ κινδυνεύοντας ὅτι καλόν; Ἡ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; Τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν; Ἀποπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς 15 νόμισμα ἢ τι τοιοῦτον. Αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν; Ἡ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσιν φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας; Διεξιούσι δὲ πάντα φαίνονται ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτούς, 20 καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμῖωνα. Τῷ δὲ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία; Ὡστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη. Καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἡ ταύτη συγγενεστάτη εὐδαιμονικωτάτη.

The sole activity conceivable in God

c. Ib., 1178 b²⁴⁻³²:

Σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς τοιαύτης 25 ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοιωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. Ἐφ' ὅσον δὲ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ 30 εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὕτη γὰρ καθ' αὐτὴν τιμία. Ὡστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.

It distinguishes man from the animals

d. The man who lives for the intellect must be dearest to the Gods and therefore happiest.

Final conclusion

Ib., 1179 a²²⁻³²:

1179a Ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν· εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, 25 ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὐλογον χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ 30 καλῶς πράττοντας. Ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τῷ σοφῷ μάλιστ' ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. Θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα. Τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε καὶ οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.

4—THE POLITICS

608—In Aristotle's opinion the supreme science in the province of practical reason is not ethics, but politics, since its object is to secure the well-being, not of the individual, but of a whole community or state (*Eth. Nic.* I 2, our nr. 566).

The first Book of the Politics inquires into the structure and the aims of the state.

Family
the germ-cell
of the state

a. *Polit.* I 2, 1252 a²⁶⁻³⁴, b⁹⁻¹²:

Ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀνευ ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, 1252a
οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς γενέσεως ἕνεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως,
ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι, οἷον
αὐτό, τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἕτερον), ἄρχον δὲ φύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν 30
σωτηρίαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπότην
φύσει, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον ταῦτα τῷ σώματι ποιεῖν ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δοῦλον·
διὸ δεσπότη καὶ δούλῳ ταῦτό συμφέρει. — Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν δύο κοινω- 34
νιῶν οἰκία πρώτη, καὶ ὁρθῶς Ἡσίοδος εἶπε ποιήσας »οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα b 10
γυναῖκά τε βοῦν τ' ἀροτῆρα« · ὁ γὰρ βοῦς ἀντ' οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησιν ἐστίν.

b. *Ib.*, 1252 b¹⁵⁻¹⁶, 27-30:

Structure of
the state,
and its aim

Ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκιῶν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἕνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου
κώμη. — Ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις, ἥδη πάσης ἔχουσα
πέρας τῆς αὐταρκειᾶς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὕσα
δὲ τοῦ εὔ ζῆν.

The state
exists by
nature

609—a. *Ib.*, 1252 b³⁰-1253 a⁴:

Διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστίν, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι. τέλος γὰρ αὕτη 30
ἐκείνων, ἥ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐστὶ τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθεί-
σης, ταύτην φαμέν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου, ἵππου, οἰκίας.
ἔτι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον· ἡ δ' αὐτάρκεια καὶ τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. 1253a
ἐκ τούτων οὖν φανερόν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι ἄνθρωπος φύσει
πολιτικὸν ζῶον, καὶ ὁ ἀπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἤτοι φαῦλός ἐστιν ἢ
κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος.

Man a
political
animal

b. *Ib.*, 1253 a⁷⁻¹⁸:

Διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶον πάσης μελίτης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου
ζώου μᾶλλον, δῆλον. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγον δὲ
μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζώων· ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος ἐστὶ 10
σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει ζῶοις (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν
ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ ἔχειν αἰσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις),

ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ
 15 δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον· τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον,
 τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθησιν
 ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν.

610—Since the slave is a part of the household, slavery must be discussed first.

a. *Polit.* I 4, 1253 b²³⁻³³, 1254 a¹⁻², 5-8:

The slave
 a living
 tool

1253b Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κτῆσις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας
 25 (ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον καὶ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν), ὥσπερ δὲ ταῖς ὠρι-
 μέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὄργανα, εἰ μέλλει ἀπο-
 τελεσθῆσθαι τὸ ἔργον, [οὕτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ] τῶν δ' ὀργάνων τὰ μὲν
 ἄψυχα τὰ δὲ ἔμψυχα (οἶον τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ὁ μὲν οἶαξ ἄψυχον ὁ δὲ πρῶρεὺς
 30 ἔμψυχον· ὁ γὰρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὀργάνῳ εἶδει ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν), οὕτω καὶ
 <τῷ οἰκονομικῷ> τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον πρὸς ζωὴν ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ κτῆσις πλῆθος
 ὀργάνων ἐστί, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτῆμά τι ἔμψυχον. καὶ ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων
 1254a πᾶς ὑπηρέτης. — Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ὄργανα ποιητικὰ ὄργανά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ
 5 κτῆμα πρακτικόν. — Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἡ ποίησις εἶδει καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις, καὶ
 δέονται ἀμφοτέραι ὀργάνων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διαφοράν.
 ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποίησις ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν
 πρᾶξιν.

b. *Polit.* I 5, 1254 a¹⁷⁻²⁴, b¹⁶⁻²³:

Some men
 are slaves
 by nature

Πότερον δ' ἐστὶ τις φύσει τοιοῦτος ἢ οὐ, καὶ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ δίκαιόν
 τινι δουλεύειν ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα δουλεία παρὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ, μετὰ ταῦτα σκεπτέον.
 20 οὐ χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν γινομένων καταμαθεῖν. τὸ
 γὰρ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων
 ἐστί. καὶ εὐθύς ἐκ γενετῆς ἔνια διέστηκε τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ
 b 16 ἄρχειν. — Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεστᾶσιν ὅσον ψυχῇ σώματος καὶ ἀνθρωπος
 θηρίου (διακρίνεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὅσων ἐστὶν ἔργον ἡ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις,
 καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν βέλτιστον), οὗτοι μὲν εἰσι φύσει δοῦλοι, οἷς βέλτιόν
 20 ἐστὶν ἄρχεσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. ἐστὶ γὰρ φύσει
 δοῦλος ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι (διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστίν) καὶ ὁ κοινωνῶν λόγου
 τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν.

c. *Ib.*, 1254 b²⁷-1255 a¹:

Βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων
 καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν, τὰ δ' ὀρθὰ καὶ

ἄχρηστα πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον 30 (οὗτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διηρημένος εἷς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν χρεῖαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνικὴν),
Exceptions συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τοῦναντίον, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματα ἔχειν ἐλευθέρων
 τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχάς· ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὥς εἰ τοσοῦτον γένοιτο διάφοροι
 τὸ σῶμα μόνον, ὅσον αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους πάντες φαῖεν 35
 ἂν ἀξιόους εἶναι τούτοις δουλεύειν. εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦτ' ἀληθές, πολὺ
 δικαιότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο διωρίσθαι· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ῥάδιον ἰδεῖν τό
 τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος.

611—In the final chapter of this Book the author raises the question whether the slave can have virtue. He treats it in a larger framework: the same question namely must be asked concerning women and children, since they too are ἀρχόμενοι, though in another sense than slaves.—Ar. gives the answer of Gorgias, who said that the virtue of a woman is different from that of a man, and the virtue of slaves different from that of free-born people (Plato, *Meno* 72 a; our nr. 267b).

Can the
 slave have
 virtue?

Polit. I 13, 1259 b²¹-1260 a², a¹⁰⁻²⁸, 33, 36.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δούλων ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις, πότερον ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τις 1259b
 δούλου παρὰ τὰς ὀργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς ἄλλη τιμιωτέρα τούτων, οἷον
 σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἔξεων,
 ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία παρὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ὑπηρεσίας. ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν ἀμφο- 25
 τέρως· εἴτε γὰρ ἔστιν, τί διοίσουσι τῶν ἐλευθέρων; εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, ὄντων
 ἀνθρώπων καὶ λόγου κοινωνούντων ἄτοπον. σχεδὸν δὴ ταῦτόν ἐστι τὸ ζητού-
 μενον καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς καὶ παιδός, πότερα καὶ τούτων εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, καὶ δεῖ 30
 τὴν γυναῖκα εἶναι σώφρονα καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν, καὶ παῖς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκό-
 λαστος καὶ σώφρων, ἢ οὐ; καὶ καθόλου δὴ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ
 ἀρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἄρχοντος, πότερον ἢ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἑτέρα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ
 ἀμφοτέρους μετέχειν καλοκαγαθίας, διὰ τί τὸν μὲν ἄρχειν δεοὶ ἂν τὸν δὲ ἄρχεσθαι 35
 καθάπαξ; (οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οἷόν τε διαφέρειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄρ-
 χεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν εἶδει διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οὐδέν)· εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν
 δεῖ τὸν δὲ μὴ, θαυμαστόν. εἴτε γὰρ ὁ ἄρχων μὴ ἔσται σώφρων καὶ δίκαιος,
 πῶς ἄρξει καλῶς; εἴθ' ὁ ἀρχόμενος, πῶς ἀρχήσεται καλῶς; ἀκόλαστος γὰρ 40
 ὦν καὶ δειλὸς οὐδὲν ποιήσει τῶν προσηκόντων. — Καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ 1260a
 μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχει διαφερόντως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει
 τὸ βουλευτικόν. τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἄκυρον, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ'
 ἀτελές. ὁμοίως τοῖνυν ἀναγκαιῶς ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἡθικὰς ἀρετὰς ὑποληπτέον, 15
 δεῖν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἐκάστω πρὸς τὸ
 αὐτοῦ ἔργον. διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἡθικὴν ἀρετὴν (τὸ γὰρ
 ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων), τῶν δ' ἄλλων

20 ἕκαστον, ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, οὐδ' ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρεία ἡ δ' ὑπηρετικὴ, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος
 25 μᾶλλον ἐπισκοποῦσιν. καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς ὅτι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετὴ, ἢ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων· πολὺ γὰρ ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως
 33 ὀριζομένων. — "Ἐθεμεν δὲ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα χρήσιμον εἶναι τὸν δοῦλον, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀρετῆς δεῖται μικρᾶς, καὶ τοσαύτης ὅπως μήτε δι' ἀκολασίαν μήτε διὰ δειλίαν ἐλλείψῃ τῶν ἔργων.

Only of an
inferior kind

612—a. Property is considered by Ar. as an indispensable substratum of the household, and there is a kind of acquisition which he called natural.

Polit. I 8, 1256 a¹⁻⁵, 10.²¹, b⁶⁻¹⁰, 26.³⁴:

Property and
acquisition

1256a "Ὅλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τὸν
 ὑψηλῆς τρόπον, ἐπεὶ περὶ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἦν. πρῶτον
 μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις πότερον ἢ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἐστὶν
 5. 10 ἢ μέρος τι ἢ ὑπηρετικὴ. — "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οἰκονομικὴ τῇ χρηματιστικῇ,
 δῆλον (τῆς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πορίσασθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ χρήσασθαι· τίς γὰρ ἔσται ἡ χρη-
 σομένη τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρὰ τὴν οἰκονομικὴν;)· πότερον δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς
 15 ἐστὶ τι ἢ ἕτερον εἶδος, ἔχει διαμφισβήτησιν· εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ
 θεωρῆσαι πόθεν χρήματα καὶ κτήσις ἔσται, . . . ἢ δὲ κτήσις πολλὰ περιείληφε
 μέρη καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος, ὥστε πρῶτον ἢ γεωργικὴ πότερον μέρος τι τῆς οἰκονομικῆς
 ἢ ἕτερόν τι γένος; καὶ καθόλου ἢ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ κτήσις. Ἀλλὰ
 20 μὴν εἶδῃ γε πολλὰ τροφῆς, διὸ καὶ βίοι πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
 εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ζῆν ἄνευ τροφῆς, ὥστε αἱ διαφοραὶ τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους
 b πεποιήκασι διαφέροντας τῶν ζώων. — "Ὡς ἂν ἡ χρεια συναναγκάζῃ, τοῦτον
 τὸν τρόπον διάγουσιν. ἢ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη κτήσις ὑπ' αὐτῆς φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως
 9. 10 διδομένη πᾶσιν, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθύς, οὕτω καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν.
 26, 27 — "Ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος ἐστὶν, καθὸ
 δεῖ ἥτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχει, ὧν ἐστὶ θησαυρισμὸς χρημά-
 30 των πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαίων καὶ χρησίμων εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας. καὶ
 ἔοικεν ὁ γ' ἀληθινὸς πλοῦτος ἐκ τούτων εἶναι. ἢ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης κτήσεως
 αὐτάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν οὐκ ἄπειρός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ Σόλων φησὶ ποιήσας
 »πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται«· κεῖται γὰρ ὥσπερ
 34 καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις.

A certain
kind is
natural

b. Wealth pursued for its own sake is unnatural.

Another is
unnatural

Ib. I 9, 1256 b⁴⁰-1257 a²¹. a³¹⁻³⁴, a⁴¹-b⁸, b²³⁻²⁴, b³⁰⁻³¹:

"Ἔστι δὲ γένος ἄλλο κτητικῆς, ἣν μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν,

χρηματιστικήν, δι' ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πέρας εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως. ἦν ὥς 1257a
 μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ λεχθείσῃ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν· ἔστι δ'
 οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ εἰρημένῃ οὔτε πόρρω ἐκείνης. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν φύσει ἡ δ' οὐ φύσει
 αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐμπειρίας τινὸς καὶ γίνεται μᾶλλον. λάβωμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς 5
 τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐντεῦθεν. ἐκάστου γὰρ κτήματος διττὴ ἡ χρῆσις ἔστιν, ἀμφοτέραι
 δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡ δ' οὐκ οἰκεία
 τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον ὑποδήματος ἢ τε ὑπόδεσις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητική. ἀμφοτέραι
 γὰρ ὑποδήματος χρήσεις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀλλαττόμενος τῷ δεομένῳ ὑποδήματος 10
 ἀντὶ νομίσματος ἢ τροφῆς χρῆται τῷ ὑποδήματι ἢ ὑπόδημα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν οἰκείαν
 χρῆσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκεν γέγονε. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων κτημάτων. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ πάντων, ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον 15
 ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείω τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω τῶν ἱκανῶν ἔχειν τοὺς
 ἀνθρώπους. ἢ καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι φύσει τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἡ καπηλική·
 ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλλαγὴν. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ
 πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οἰκία) φανερόν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἔργον αὐτῆς, 20
 ἀλλ' ἤδη πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας οὔσης. — Ξενικωτέρας γὰρ γενομένης τῆς 31
 βοηθείας τῷ εἰσάγεσθαι ὧν ἐνδεεῖς καὶ ἐκπέμπειν ὧν ἐπλεόναζον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 ἡ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρῆσις. — Πορισθέντος οὖν ἤδη νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς 1257b
 ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς θάτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλικόν, τὸ
 μὲν πρῶτον ἀπλῶς ἴσως γινόμενον, εἶτα δι' ἐμπειρίας ἤδη τεχνικώτερον,
 πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλείστον ποιήσει κέρδος. διὸ δοκεῖ ἡ χρηματισ- 5
 τικὴ μάλιστα περὶ τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, καὶ ἔργον αὐτῆς τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρῆσαι
 ποθεν ἔσται πλῆθος χρημάτων· ποιητικὴ γὰρ εἶναι τοῦ πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων.
 — Καὶ ἄπειρος δὴ οὗτος ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς. — 23, 24
 Τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς οὐ χρηματιστικῆς ἔστι πέρας· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς οἰκονομικῆς 30, 31
 ἔργον.

613—Of the second Book the first part (ch. 1-8) is concerned with ideal commonwealths, particularly with Plato's (see our nr. **310**). In the second part (ch. 9-12) the best existing states are discussed (Sparta, Crete and Carthage), and a word is said about the most famous lawgivers.

614—The first part of the third Book (ch. 1-5) is devoted to the citizen and his relations to the state.

a. The citizen is defined as the man who has political power, however acquired.

Definition *Polit.* III 1, 1275 a²²⁻²³:

of a citizen

Πολίτης δ' ἀπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς.

b. Since constitutions differ from one another, the citizens corresponding to each form of constitution will also be different. Hence the definition of a citizen should be formulated more precisely.

Ib., 1275 a³⁸⁻³⁹, b³⁻²¹:

1275b Τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὁρῶμεν εἶδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, . . . ὥστε καὶ τὸν πολίτην ἕτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν καθ' ἑκάστην πολιτείαν. διόπερ ὁ λεχθεὶς 5 ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μάλιστα' ἐστὶ πολίτης, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐνδέχεται μὲν, οὐ μὴν ἀναγκαῖον. <ἐν> ἐνίαις γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι δῆμος, οὐδ' ἐκκλησίαν νομίζουσιν ἀλλὰ συγκλήτους, καὶ τὰς δίκας δικάζουσι κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι 10 τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικάζει τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας, οἱ δὲ γέροντες τὰς φονικάς, ἑτέρα δ' ἴσως ἀρχὴ τις ἑτέρας. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδὸνα· πάσας γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τινες κρίνουσι τὰς δίκας. ἀλλ' ἔχει γὰρ διόρθωσιν ὁ τοῦ πολίτου διορισμός. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις οὐχ ὁ ἀόριστος ἄρχων ἐκκλησιαστής 15 ἐστὶ καὶ δικαστής, ἀλλὰ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὠρισμένος· τούτων γὰρ ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τισὶν ἀποδίδεται τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ δικάζειν ἢ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τινῶν. τίς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν· ὅ γ' ἄρ' ἐξ οὐσίας κοι- 20 νωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς, πολίτην ἢ δη- 20 λόμενον εἶναι ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἱκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν.

This definition corrected

The author remarks, that this definition is better than the usual formula, which defines the citizen as one of whom both the parents are citizens. For this formula cannot possibly apply to the first inhabitants or founders of a state.

615—Similarly the state is defined by reference to the distribution of political power: when the mode of distribution is changed, a new state comes into existence.

a. In *Polit.* III 3 the question is raised: what exactly is the identity of the state, 1276 a¹⁷⁻²⁰:

What is the identity of the state?

. . . Πῶς ποτὲ χρὴ λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἄλλ' ἑτέραν; ἢ μὲν οὖν ἐπιπολαιότατ' ἢς ἀπορίας ζητήσις περὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν.

b. Ib., 1276 b¹⁻¹³:

Ar.'s reply

1276b Εἴπερ γὰρ ἐστὶ κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις, ἔστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, γινομένης ἑτέρας τῷ εἶδει καὶ διαφερούσης τῆς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν καὶ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν. ὥσπερ γε καὶ χορὸν ὅτε μὲν κωμικὸν 5 ὅτε δὲ τραγικὸν ἕτερον εἶναι φαμεν, τῶν αὐτῶν πολλάκις ἀνθρώπων ὄντων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἑτέραν, ἂν εἶδος ἕτερον ἢ τῆς συνθέσεως, οἷον ἁρμονίαν τῶν αὐτῶν φθόγγων ἑτέραν εἶναι λέγομεν, ἂν

ὅτε μὲν ἦ Δώριος ὅτε δὲ Φρύγιος. εἰ δὴ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, φανερόν ὅτι μάλιστα λεκτέον τὴν αὐτὴν πόλιν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας· ὄνομα δὲ καλεῖν ἰοῦ ἕτερον ἢ ταῦτόν ἐξεστι καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων αὐτὴν καὶ πάμπαν ἑτέρων ἀνθρώπων.

616—a. The question may be raised whether a good citizen is always a good man. Ar. answers in the negative: the good citizen has some special ἀρετή for some particular purpose; he has not, as such, the ἀρετή which is proper to the good man.

The good
citizen may
be not a good
man

Polit. I 4, 1276 b²⁸⁻³⁴:

Τῶν πολιτῶν, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων, ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστί, κοινωνία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία· διὸ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς 30 τὴν πολιτείαν. εἴπερ οὖν ἐστὶ πλείω πολιτείας εἴδη, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν· τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φαμὲν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν.

b. So in general the virtue of the good man and the good citizen is not the same. In one particular case however they are identical, namely in the good ruler.

The good
ruler always
a good man

Ib., 1277 a¹²⁻¹⁷:

Διότι μὲν τοῖνον ἀπλῶς οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων· ἀλλ' ἄρα ἐστὶ τινὸς 1277a ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου; φαμὲν δὴ τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον 15 εἶναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθύς ἑτέραν εἶναι λέγουσί τινες τοῦ ἄρχοντος.

c. The good citizen knows both how to rule and how to obey. Practical wisdom only is characteristic of the ruler.

The virtue of
the subject
and the virtue
of the ruler

Ib., 1277 b¹³⁻²¹, 25-32:

Δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ 1277b ἄρχειν, καὶ αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου, τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπ' 15 ἀμφοτέρα. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ ἀγαθοῦ ἄμφω, καὶ εἰ ἕτερον εἶδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀρχικῆς. καὶ γὰρ ἀρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐ μία ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀρετὴ, οἷον δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' εἴδη ἔχουσα καθ' ἃ ἄρξει καὶ ἄρζεται, ὥσπερ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἑτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία. — 20

Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἀρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη. τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖον 25, 26 εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δὲ γε οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθής· ὥσπερ αὐλοποιὸς γὰρ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, ὁ δ' ἄρχων αὐλητής ὁ χρώμενος. Πότερον μὲν οὖν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς 30 ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου ἢ ἑτέρα, καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἑτέρα, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων.

617—Constitutions are good or bad according as the common welfare is, or is not, their aim. There are three good constitutions: Monarchy, Aristocracy and Polity. Of bad ones there are also three: Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy.

Polit. III 7, 1279 a²²-b¹⁰:

Classifica-
tion of con-
stitutions

1279a Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τὰς πολιτείας ἐπισκέψασθαι, πόσαι
τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τίνες εἰσὶ, καὶ πρῶτον τὰς ὁρθὰς αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ παρεκβάσεις
25 ἔσονται φανεραὶ τούτων διορισθεισῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ τὸ πολίτευμα
σημαίνει ταυτόν, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι
κύριον ἢ ἓνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς πολλούς· ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἷς ἢ οἱ ὀλίγοι ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ
πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι, ταύτας μὲν ὁρθὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὰς πολι-
30 τείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἢ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ τῶν ὀλίγων ἢ τοῦ πλῆθους παρεκβάσεις.
ἢ γὰρ οὐ πολίτας φατέον εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας, ἢ δεῖ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος.
καλεῖν δ' εἰώθαμεν τῶν μὲν μοναρχιῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποβλέπουσαν
συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν πλειόνων δ' ἐνὸς ἀριστοκρατίαν
35 (ἢ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν, ἢ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς
κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῆς), ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον,
καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία. συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως·
40 ἓνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ ὀλίγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ' ἤδη χαλεπὸν
1279b ἢκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν (ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικὴν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐν
πλήθει γίγνεται· διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολε-
μοῦν καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα). παρεκβάσεις δὲ τῶν εἰρη-
5 μένων τυραννὶς μὲν βασιλείας, ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας, δημοκρατία δὲ
πολιτείας. ἢ μὲν γὰρ τυραννὶς ἐστὶ μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρ-
χοῦντος, ἢ δ' ὀλιγαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἢ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμ-
10 φέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τῷ κοινῷ λυσιτελοῦν οὐδεμία αὐτῶν.

618—a. Against this classification the objection might be made that in a state the majority of the citizens might be wealthy and the minority poor. In this case the distinction which has been made between oligarchy and democracy would not hold good.

Polit. III 8, 1279 b²⁰-26:

An objection
to this clas-
sification

20 Πρώτη δ' ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διορισμὸν ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ εἴεν οἱ πλείους ὄντες
εὐποροὶ κύριοι τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν ἢ κύριον τὸ πλῆθος,
ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν ἂν εἴ που συμβαίνοι τοὺς ἀπόρους ἐλάττους μὲν εἶναι τῶν
εὐπόρων, κρείττους δ' ὄντας κυρίους εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας, ὅπου δ' ὀλίγον κύριον
25 πλῆθος, ὀλιγαρχίαν εἶναι φασιν, οὐκ ἂν καλῶς δόξειεν διωρίσθαι περὶ τῶν
πολιτειῶν.

b. To this objection Ar. replies: not number, but wealth or poverty of the rulers is the specific difference of these constitutions.

Ar.'s answer
to this
objection

Ib., 1279 b³⁴⁻³⁶, b³⁹-1280 a⁶:

"Εοικε τοίνυν ὁ λόγος ποιεῖν δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὀλίγους ἢ πολλοὺς εἶναι κυρίους συμβεβηκός ἐστιν, . . . ᾧ δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἢ τε δημοκρατία καὶ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἀλλήλων, πενία καὶ πλοῦτός ἐστιν, καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν, ὅπου ἂν ἄρχωσι διὰ 1280a πλοῦτον ἂν τ' ἐλάττους ἂν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅπου δ' οἱ ἄποροι, δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἵπομεν, τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς. εὐποροῦσι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγοι, τῆς δὲ ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσι 5 πάντες. δι' ἧς αἰτίας ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι τῆς πολιτείας.

619—a. The next chapter deals with the principles of the distribution of power in democratic and in oligarchic states, i.e. with the conception of justice on both sides.

Justice
according to
democratic
and oligar-
chic princi-
ples

Polit. III 9, 1280 a⁷⁻¹⁶, 22-25:

Ληπτέον δὲ πρῶτον τίνας ὅρους λέγουσι τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας, καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τό τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικόν. πάντες γὰρ ἄπτονται δικαίου τινός, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τινὸς προέρχονται, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν τὸ κυρίως 10 δίκαιον. οἷον δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι ¹, καὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἴσοις· καὶ τὸ ἄνισον δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι ², καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνίσοις· οἱ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀφαιροῦσι, τὸ οἷς, καὶ κρίνουσι κακῶς. τὸ δ' αἴτιον ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρίσις· σχεδὸν δ' οἱ πλεῖστοι φαῦλοι κριταὶ περὶ τῶν οἰκείων. 15 — Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂν κατὰ τι ἄνισοι ᾤσιν, οἷον χρήμασιν, ὅλως οἷονται ἄνισοι 22 εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἂν κατὰ τι ἴσοι, οἷον ἐλευθερίᾳ, ὅλως ἴσοι. τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον οὐ λέγουσιν.

25

Ar.'s own
view

b. The standard should be: the true aim of the state. I.e.: the citizens have a claim to power according to their contribution to the εὖ ζῆν.

Ib., 1280 b³⁹-1281 a⁸:

Τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους χάριν. πόλις δὲ ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους <χάριν>. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὥς 1281a φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἄρα πράξεων χάριν θετέον

¹ "Ὅτι δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι is the democratic view of justice. Ar. says: It is, but not for everybody—only for equals.

² Oligarchs, on the other hand, hold that inequality is justice, namely, that political rights should be unequal and proportionate to wealth. To this view Ar. opposes again: granting that inequality is just, it is so not for everybody, but only for unequals. And by what standards are the qualifications of the persons concerned to be judged?—This is what Ar. calls "the main point", the κυριώτατον, and on this point most people are in error.

εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ συζῆν. διόπερ ὅσοι συμβάλλονται
5 πλεῖστον εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, τούτοις τῆς πόλεως μέτεστι πλεῖον ἢ
τοῖς κατὰ μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ γένος ἴσοις ἢ μείζοσι κατὰ δὲ τὴν πολιτικὴν
ἀρετὴν ἀνίσοις, ἢ τοῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον ὑπερέχουσι κατ' ἀρετὴν δ' ὑπερεχομένοις.

620—Monarchy is only desirable in one case.

Polit. III 17, 1287 b⁴¹-1288 a²⁹:

Monarchy
desirable
only in an
exceptional
case

288a 'Ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε ¹ φανερόν ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ ἴσοις οὔτε
συμφέρον ἐστὶν οὔτε δίκαιον ἓνα κύριον εἶναι πάντων, οὔτε μὴ νόμων ὄντων,
ἀλλ' αὐτόν ὡς ὄντα νόμον, οὔτε νόμων ὄντων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε μὴ
5 ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθόν, οὐδ' ἂν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀμείνων ἦ, εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά. τίς δ' ὁ
τρόπος, λεκτέον· εἰρηται δὲ πως ἤδη καὶ πρότερον. πρῶτον δὲ διοριστέον τί τὸ
βασιλευτόν ² καὶ τί τὸ ἀριστοκρατικόν καὶ τί τὸ πολιτικόν ³. βασιλευτόν μὲν
οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι πλῆθος ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν γένος ὑπερέχον κατ' ἀρετὴν πρὸς
10 ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικὴν, ἀριστοκρατικόν δὲ πλῆθος [ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν πλῆθος]
ἄρχεσθαι δυνάμενον τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ⁴ ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡγεμονικῶν
πρὸς πολιτικὴν ἀρχὴν, πολιτικόν δὲ πλῆθος [ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε ἐγγίγνεσθαι πλῆθος]
πολεμικὸν δυνάμενον ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ' ἀξίαν διανεμόντα
15 τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς. ὅταν οὖν ἡ γένος ὅλον ἦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἓνα τινὰ συμβῇ
διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν τοσοῦτον ὥσθ' ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν
ἄλλων πάντων, τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικόν καὶ κύριον πάν-
των καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἓνα τοῦτον. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται πρότερον, οὐ μόνον
20 οὕτως ἔχει κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ὃ προφέρειν εἰώθασιν οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες
οἱ τε τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς καὶ οἱ τὰς ὀλιγαρχικὰς καὶ πάνιν οἱ τὰς δημοκρατικὰς·
πάντη γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ ὑπεροχὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν ⁵. οὔτε γὰρ κτείνειν ἢ φυγαδεύειν οὐδ' ὀστρακίζειν δὴ που
25 τὸν τοιοῦτον πρέπον ἐστίν, οὔτ' ἀξιοῦν ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε
τὸ μέρος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῷ δὲ τὴν τηλικαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχοντι τοῦτο
συμβέβηκεν. ὥστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ κύριον εἶναι
μὴ κατὰ μέρος τοῦτον ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς.

621—In the first part of Book IV (ch. 1-10) the main types of constitutions are dealt with.

a. There are four kinds of democracy, the fourth of which is a perversion. True democracy is described as follows.

¹ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε - sc. about just and unjust, in ch. 9 (619a).

² βασιλευτόν - fit for being ruled by a king.

³ πολιτικόν - fit for what is called by Ar. a polity (constitutional government).

⁴ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν secl. Immisch.

⁵ Sc. according to the right of merit, expounded in ch. 9 (619b).

Democracy *Polit.* IV 4, 1291 b³⁰-1292 a⁴:

Δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πρώτη μὲν ἢ λεγομένη μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον. 1291b
 ἴσον γάρ φησιν ὁ νόμος ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης δημοκρατίας τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον¹ ὑπερέχειν
 τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους, μηδὲ κυρίους εἶναι ὅποτερουσούν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίους
 ἀμφοτέρους. εἴπερ γὰρ ἐλευθερία μάλιστα² ἐστὶν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καθάπερ ὑπο- 35
 λαμβάνουσί τινες, καὶ ἰσότης, οὕτως ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, κοινωνούντων ἀπάντων
 μάλιστα τῆς πολιτείας ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείων ὁ δῆμος, κύριον δὲ τὸ δόξαν
 τοῖς πλείοσιν, ἀνάγκη δημοκρατίαν εἶναι ταύτην. ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος δημοκρατίας
 τοῦτο. [ἄλλο δὲ] τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι, βραχέων δὲ τούτων 40
 ὄντων· δεῖ δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ ἐξουσίαν εἶναι μετέχειν καὶ τὸν ἀποβάλλοντα μὴ
 μετέχειν· ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ μετέχειν ἅπαντας τοὺς πολίτας ὅσοι 1292a
 ἀνυπεύθυνοι, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον· ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ πᾶσι μετ-
 εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐὰν μόνον ᾖ πολίτης, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον.

Its perversion b. The fourth kind. *Ib.*, 1292 a⁴⁻¹³, 15, 18, 30-37:

"Ἐτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τᾶλλα μὲν εἶναι ταῦτά, κύριον δ' εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος 5
 καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ᾖ ἢ ἄλλα μὴ ὁ νόμος.
 συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κατὰ νόμον δημο-
 κρατουμέναις οὐ γίνεται δημαγωγός, ἀλλ' οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσιν ἐν
 προεδρίᾳ· ὅπου δ' οἱ νόμοι μὴ εἰσὶ κύριοι, ἐνταῦθα γίνονται δημαγωγοί. μόναρ- 10
 χος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἷς ἐκ πολλῶν· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κύριοι εἰσιν
 οὐχ ὥς ἕκαστος ἀλλὰ πάντες. — 'Ο δ' οὖν τοιοῦτος δῆμος, ἅτε μόναρχος ὢν, 13, 15
 ζητεῖ μοναρχεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ νόμου, καὶ γίνεται δεσποτικός, ὥστε
 οἱ κόλακες ἐντιμοί, καὶ ἐστὶν ὁ τοιοῦτος δῆμος ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχιῶν τῇ
 τυραννίδι. — Εὐλόγως δὲ ἂν δόξειεν ἐπιτιμᾶν ὁ φάσκων τὴν τοιαύτην εἶναι 18, 30
 δημοκρατίαν οὐ πολιτείαν. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἄρχουσιν, οὐκ ἐστὶ πολιτεία.
 δεῖ γὰρ τὸν μὲν νόμον ἄρχειν πάντων, τῶν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα τὰς ἀρχὰς, καὶ ταύτην
 πολιτείαν κρίνειν. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐστὶ δημοκρατία μία τῶν πολιτειῶν, φανερόν
 ὡς ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις, ἐν ᾗ ψηφίσμασι πάντα διοικεῖται, οὐδὲ δημοκρατία 35
 κυρίως· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ψήφισμα εἶναι καθόλου.

622—Of oligarchies, too, there are four kinds, of which the fourth is the worst.

Oligarchy *Polit.* IV 5, 1292 a³⁹-b¹⁰:

Ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ εἶδη ἐν μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς τηλικούτων
 ὥστε τοὺς ἀπόρους μὴ μετέχειν πλείους ὄντας, ἐξεῖναι δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ μετέχειν 40

¹ The expression μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ means simply "as much as" and is in practice often used in places where μηδὲν ἤττον ἢ could be logically expected. Some striking examples of this use have been adduced by L. M. de Rijk in *Mnemosyne* 1950, pp. 314-318.

1292b τῆς πολιτείας, ἄλλο δέ, ὅταν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μακρῶν ὧσιν αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἰρῶνται αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας (ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ πάντων τούτων τοῦτο ποιῶσι, δοκεῖ τοῦτ' εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατικόν, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ τινῶν ἀφωρισμένων, ὀλιγαρχικόν)·
 5 ἕτερον εἶδος ὀλιγαρχίας, ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ πατρὸς εἰσῆ, τέταρτον δ', ὅταν ὑπάρχη τό τε νῦν λεχθὲν καὶ ἄρχη μὴ ὁ νόμος ἀλλ' οἱ ἄρχοντες. καὶ ἔστιν ἀντί-
 στροφος αὕτη ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὥσπερ ἡ τυραννὶς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις καὶ
 10 περὶ ἧς τελευταίας εἶπαμεν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις· καὶ καλοῦσι
 10 δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν δυναστείαν.

623—a. Of aristocracy in the strict sense there is but one form.

Polit. IV 7, 1293 b¹⁻⁷:

Aristocracy

1293b Ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ ἧς διήλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις
 λόγοις (τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς
 ὑπόθεσιν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν¹ μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν·
 5 ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ πολίτης ἀγαθός ἐστιν, οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις
 ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσὶ τὴν αὐτῶν).

b. *Ib.*, 1293 b⁷⁻¹⁹:

Mixed forms

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἰσὶ τινες αἱ πρὸς τε τὰς ὀλιγαρχουμένας ἔχουσι διαφορὰς [καὶ
 καλοῦνται ἀριστοκρατίαι] καὶ πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην πολιτείαν. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ
 10 μόνον πλουτίνδην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀριστίνδην αἰροῦνται τὰς ἀρχάς, αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία
 διαφέρει τε ἀμφοῖν καὶ ἀριστοκρατικῇ καλεῖται. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιουμέναις
 κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀρετῆς εἰσὶν ὅμως τινὲς οἱ εὐδοκιμοῦντες καὶ δοκοῦντες εἶναι
 15 ἐπιεικεῖς. ὅπου οὖν ἡ πολιτεία βλέπει εἰς τε πλοῦτον καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ δῆμον,
 οἷον ἐν Καρχηδόνι, αὕτη ἀριστοκρατικὴ ἐστίν, καὶ ἐν Αἰῷ εἰς τὰ δύο μόνον,
 οἷον ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων, εἰς τε ἀρετὴν καὶ δῆμον καὶ ἔστι μίξις τῶν δύο τούτων,
 δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς. Ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν πρώτην τὴν
 ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ταῦτα δύο εἶδη.

624—"Polity" or constitutional government.

Polit. IV 8, 1293 b³¹⁻³⁸, 1294 a¹⁵⁻²⁵:

"Polity"

Νῦν δὲ δεικτέον ἡμῖν περὶ πολιτείας. φανερωτέρα γὰρ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς
 διωρισμένων τῶν περὶ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία ὡς
 ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν μίξις ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας. Εἰώθασι δὲ καλεῖν τὰς μὲν
 35 ἀποκλινούσας ὡς πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν
 μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατίας διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀκολουθεῖν παιδείαν καὶ εὐγένειαν τοῖς
 1294a εὐπορωτέροις. — Ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πλείστοις πόλεσι τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος

¹ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινα ἀγαθῶν - good according to some arbitrary standard.

καλεῖται¹. μόνον γὰρ ἡ μίξις στοχάζεται τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, 16 πλοῦτου καὶ ἐλευθερίας² σχεδὸν δὲ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις οἱ εὐποροὶ τῶν καλῶν ἀγαθῶν δοκοῦσι κατέχειν χώραν· ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία ἐστὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητοῦντα τῆς ἰσότητος τῆς πολιτείας, ἐλευθερία πλοῦτος ἀρετή (τὸ γὰρ τέταρτον, ὃ καλοῦσιν 20 εὐγένειαν, ἀκολουθεῖ τοῖς δυσὶν· ἡ γὰρ εὐγένειά ἐστὶν ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετή), φανερόν ἐστι τὴν μὲν τοῖν δυοῖν μίξιν, τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πολιτείαν λεκτέον, τὴν δὲ τῶν τριῶν ἀριστοκρατίαν μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων (παρὰ τὴν ἀληθινὴν καὶ πρώτην).

25

625—Tyranny, too, must have its place. Two moderate forms of it have been considered before, in dealing with monarchy. A third kind, which is the extreme, is added here.

Tyranny *Polit.* IV 10, 1295 a¹⁻⁴, 7-23:

Moderate forms

Περὶ δὲ τυραννίδος ἦν ἡμῖν λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ὥς ἐνούσης πολυλογίας περὶ 1295a αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὅπως λάβῃ τῆς μεθόδου τὸ μέρος ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταύτην τίθεμεν τῶν πολιτειῶν τι μέρος. — Τυραννίδος δ' εἶδη δύο μὲν διείλομεν ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας 7, 8 ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πῶς αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν, διὰ τὸ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι ἀμφοτέρως ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς (ἐν τε γὰρ τῶν 10 βαρβάρων τισὶν αἰροῦνται αὐτοκράτορας μονάρχους, καὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις "Ἕλλησιν ἐγίγνοντό τινες μόναρχοι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, οὓς ἐκάλουν αἰσυμνήτας), ἔχουσι δὲ τινὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλας αὗται διαφοράς, ἦσαν δὲ διὰ μὲν 15 τὸ κατὰ νόμον βασιλικαὶ καὶ διὰ τὸ μοναρχεῖν ἐκόντων, τυραννικαὶ δὲ διὰ τὸ δεσποτικῶς ἄρχειν κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν γνώμην· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος τυραννίδος, ἥπερ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ τυραννίς, ἀντίστροφος οὕσα τῇ παμβασιλείᾳ. τοιαύτην δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τυραννίδα τὴν μοναρχίαν, ἥτις ἀνυπεύθυνος ἄρχει τῶν ὁμοίων 20 καὶ βελτιόνων πάντων πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῆς συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. διόπερ ἀκούσιος· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐκὼν ὑπομένει τῶν ἐλευθέρων τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρχήν.

The strict form

626—Books VII and VIII are devoted to a description of the best state. The material conditions (size of the population, extent and nature of the territory, site of the city and national character of the population) having been determined, the author proceeds to treat the internal structure of the state. First he distinguishes its members (the citizens) from those who are necessary as its servants, but not a part of it.

¹ The text is probably not sound. Immisch reads καλλωπίζεται instead of καλεῖται. Ross retains καλεῖται and translates: "Now in most states the form called polity exists".

² Ross explains rightly: "for the fusion goes no further than the attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich".

a. *Polit.* VII 8, 1328 a²¹-b²³:

Not all the
necessary
elements
are parts of
the state

1328a 'Ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων οὐ ταῦτά ἐστι μόρια
τῆς ὅλης συστάσεως ὧν ἄνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πόλεως μέρη
θετέον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς
25 ἐξ ἧς ἔν τι τὸ γένος (ἐν γάρ τι καὶ κοινὸν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ταῦτ' οἷς κοινωνοῖς, ἂν
τε ἴσον ἂν τε ἄνισον μεταλαμβάνωσιν) · οἷον εἴτε τροφή τοῦτό ἐστιν εἴτε χώρας
πληθὸς εἴτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν. ὅταν δ' ἡ τὸ μὲν τούτου ἔνεκεν τὸ δ'
30 οὐ ἔνεκεν, οὐθὲν ἔν γε τούτοις κοινὸν ἄλλ' ἢ τῷ μὲν ποιῆσαι τῷ δὲ λαβεῖν ·
λέγω δ' οἷον ὀργάνῳ τε παντὶ πρὸς τὸ γιγνόμενον ἔργον καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς ·
οἰκίᾳ γὰρ πρὸς οἰκοδόμον οὐθέν ἐστιν ὃ γίγνεται κοινόν, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τῆς οἰκίας
χάριν ἢ τῶν οἰκοδόμων τέχνη. διὸ κτήσεως μὲν δεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶν
35 ἢ κτήσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως. πολλὰ δ' ἔμψυχα μέρη τῆς κτήσεώς ἐστιν. ἢ δὲ
πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἐστὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἔνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ἀρίστης.
ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἀριστον, αὕτη δὲ ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις τις
τέλειος, συμβέβηκε δὲ οὕτως ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι μετέχειν αὐτῆς τοὺς δὲ
40 μικρὸν ἢ μηδὲν, δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' αἷτιον τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πόλεως εἶδη καὶ διαφοράς
καὶ πολιτείας πλείους · ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ δι' ἄλλων ἕκαστοι τοῦτο θηρεύοντες
1328b τοὺς τε βίους ἐτέρους ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰς πολιτείας. Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πόσα
ταυτὶ ἐστὶν ὧν ἄνευ πόλις οὐκ ἂν εἴη · καὶ γὰρ ἃ λέγομεν εἶναι μέρη πόλεως,
ἐν τούτοις ἂν εἴη διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν.

5 Ληπτέον τοίνυν τῶν ἔργων τὸν ἀριθμὸν · ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἔσται δῆλον. πρῶτον
μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τροφήν, ἔπειτα τέχνας (πολλῶν γὰρ ὀργάνων δεῖται τὸ
ζῆν), τρίτον δὲ ὅπλα (τοὺς γὰρ κοινωνοῦντας ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν
ὅπλα πρὸς τε τὴν ἀρχήν, τῶν ἀπειθούντων χάριν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν ἀδικεῖν
10 ἐπιχειροῦντας), ἔτι χρημάτων τινὰ εὐπορίαν, ὅπως ἔχωσι καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ'
αὐτοὺς χρείας καὶ πρὸς πολεμικάς, πέμπτον δὲ καὶ πρῶτον τὴν περὶ τὸ θεῖον
ἐπιμέλειαν, ἣν καλοῦσιν ἱερατείαν, ἕκτον δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πάντων ἀναγκαίό-
τατον κρίσιν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

15 Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὧν δεῖται πᾶσα πόλις ὡς εἶπεῖν (ἢ γὰρ πόλις
πληθὸς ἐστὶν οὐ τὸ τυχὸν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ζωὴν αὐτάρκες, ὡς φαμεν, ἐὰν δέ τι τυγ-
χάνη τούτων ἐκλείπον, ἀδύνατον ἀπλῶς αὐτάρκη τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι αὐτήν) ·
20 ἀνάγκη τοίνυν κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας ταύτας συνεστάναι πόλιν · δεῖ ἄρα γεωργῶν
τ' εἶναι πληθὸς, οἱ παρασκευάσουσι τὴν τροφήν, καὶ τεχνίτας, καὶ τὸ μάχιμον,
καὶ τὸ εὐπορον, καὶ ἱερεῖς, καὶ κριτὰς τῶν δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων.

The
necessary
functions

Six
correspond-
ing classes

b. *Ib.* 9, 1328 b²⁴-1329 a³⁹:

Has
everybody
to share in
all of these
occupations?

Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λοιπὸν σκέψασθαι πότερον πᾶσι κοινωνητέον πάντων
25 τούτων (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἅπαντας εἶναι καὶ γεωργοὺς καὶ τεχνίτας καὶ
τοὺς βουλευομένους καὶ δικάζοντας), ἢ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλους

ὑποθετόν, ἥ τὰ μὲν ἴδια τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν. οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ ταῦτὸ πολιτεία. καθάπερ γὰρ εἵπομεν, ἐνδέχεται καὶ πάντας κοινωνεῖν πάντων 30 καὶ μὴ πάντας πάντων ἀλλὰ τινὰς τινῶν. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας ἐτέρας· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μετέχουσι πάντες πάντων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τούναντίον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἡ πόλις ἂν εἴη μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων, τὴν δ' εὐδαι- 35 μονίαν ὅτι χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εἶρηται πρότερον, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων ὥς ἐν τῇ κάλλιστα πολιτευομένῃ πόλει καὶ τῇ κεκτημένῃ δικαίους ἀνδρας ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, οὔτε βάνανσον βίον οὔτ' ἀγοραῖον δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς πολίτας (ἀγεννῆς γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος βίος καὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑπεναντίος), 40 οὐδὲ δὴ γεωργοὺς εἶναι τοὺς μέλλοντας ἔσσεσθαι (δεῖ γὰρ σχολῆς καὶ πρὸς τὴν 1329a γένεσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικὰς).

Mechanics, traders and husbandmen excluded from citizenship

The citizens will be warriors and rulers

Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ κρῖνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐνυπάρχει καὶ μέρη φαίνεται τῆς πόλεως μάλιστα ὄντα, πότερον ἕτερα <ἐτέροις> καὶ ταῦτα θετόν ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀποδοτέον ἅμω; 5 φανερόν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, διότι τρόπον μὲν τινα τοῖς αὐτοῖς τρόπον δὲ τινα καὶ ἐτέροις. ἥ μὲν γὰρ ἐτέρας ἀκμῆς ἐκάτερον τῶν ἔργων, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῖται φρονήσεως τὸ δὲ δυνάμεως, ἐτέροις· ἥ δὲ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τοὺς δυναμένους βιάζεσθαι καὶ καλύειν, τούτους ὑπομένειν ἀρχομένους αἰεὶ, ταύτῃ δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς. 10 οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὅπλων κύριοι καὶ μένειν ἢ μὴ μένειν κύριοι τὴν πολιτείαν. λείπεται τοίνυν τοῖς αὐτοῖς μὲν ἀμφοτέροις ἀποδιδόναι τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην, μὴ ἅμα δέ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ πέφυκεν ἡ μὲν δύναμις ἐν νεωτέροις, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἐν πρεσ- 15 βυτέροις εἶναι, ἔοικεν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νενεμῆσθαι συμφέρειν καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι· ἔχει γὰρ αὕτῃ ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν.

They will possess land

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ περὶ τούτους <εἶναι>. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εὐπορίαν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πολίταις, πολῖται δὲ οὗτοι. τὸ γὰρ βάνανσον οὐ μετέχει τῆς 20 πόλεως, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐθέν γένος ὃ μὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς δημιουργόν ἐστιν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, εὐδαίμονα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέψαντας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι 25 τούτων, εἴπερ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους [ἦ] περιοίκους.

and be priests

Λοιπὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν καταριθμηθέντων τὸ τῶν ἱερέων γένος. φανερὰ δὲ καὶ ἡ τούτων τάξις. οὔτε γὰρ γεωργὸν οὔτε βάνανσον ἱερέα καταστατέον (ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν πρέπει τιμᾶσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς)· ἐπεὶ δὲ διήρηται τὸ πολιτικὸν εἰς 30 δύο μέρη, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ τε ὀλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικόν, πρέπει δὲ τὴν τε θεραπείαν ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας, τούτοις ἂν εἴη τὰς ἱερωσύνας ἀποδοτέον.

Ἔῶν μὲν τοίνυν ἄνευ πόλις οὐ συνίσταται καὶ ὅσα μέρη πόλεως, εἴρηται 35

(γεωργοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τεχνῖται καὶ πᾶν τὸ θητικόν, ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τό τε ὀπλιτικόν καὶ βουλευτικόν, καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ τούτων ἕκαστον, τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος).

627—a. Marriage and procreation ought to be regulated by strict laws.

Polit. VII 16, 1334 b²⁹-1335 a¹, a¹¹⁻¹⁷, 28³⁵.

**Laws about
marriage
and
procreation**

334b Εἴπερ οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὁρᾶν δεῖ ὅπως βέλτιστα τὰ σώματα
30 γίνηται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν, τότε καὶ
ποίους τινὰς ὄντας χρῆ ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν γαμικὴν ὁμιλίαν. Δεῖ δ'
ἀποβλέποντα νομοθετεῖν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν πρὸς αὐτούς τε καὶ τὸν τοῦ
35 ζῆν χρόνον, ἵνα συγκαταβαίνωσι ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ μὴ
διαφωνῶσιν αἱ δυνάμεις τοῦ μὲν ἔτι δυναμένου γεννᾶν τῆς δὲ μὴ δυναμένης,
ἣ ταύτης μὲν τοῦ δ' ἀνδρὸς μή (ταῦτα γὰρ ποιεῖ καὶ στάσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ
διαφοράς)· ἔπειτα καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν τέκνων διαδοχὴν, δεῖ γὰρ οὔτε λίαν ὑπο-
40 λείπεσθαι ταῖς ἡλικίαις τὰ τέκνα τῶν πατέρων (ἀνόνητος γὰρ τοῖς μὲν πρεσ-
βυτέροις ἢ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, ἢ δὲ παρὰ τῶν πατέρων βοήθεια τοῖς
335a τέκνοις) οὔτε λίαν πάρεργος εἶναι. — "Ἔστι δ' ὁ τῶν νέων συνδυασμὸς φαῦλος
12 πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν· ἐν γὰρ πᾶσι ζώοις ἀτελῇ τὰ τῶν νέων ἔκγονα καὶ θηλυ-
τόκα μᾶλλον καὶ μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον ταῦτο τοῦτο συμβαίνειν
15 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. τεκμήριον δέ· ἐν ὅσαις γὰρ τῶν πόλεων ἐπιχωριάζεται
τὸ νέους συζευγνύναι καὶ νέας, ἀτελεῖς καὶ μικροὶ τὰ σώματά εἰσιν. — Διὸ
28 τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττει περὶ τὴν τῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτῶν ἡλικίαν συζευγνύναι, τοὺς
δ' ἐπτά καὶ τριάκοντα ἢ μικρόν. ἐν τοσοῦτῳ γὰρ ἀκμάζουσιν τε τοῖς σώμασι
30 σύζευξις ἔσται, καὶ πρὸς τὴν παῦλαν τῆς τεκνοποιίας συγκαταβήσεται τοῖς
χρόνοις εὐκαίρως· ἔτι δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἔσται τῆς
ἀκμῆς, ἐὰν γίγνηται κατὰ λόγον εὐθὺς ἢ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἤδη καταλελυμένης τῆς
35 ἡλικίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτῶν ἀριθμόν.

b. Deformed infants ought to be exposed, and the number of children should be limited by procuring abortion in the case of excess, before sense and life have begun.

Ib., 1335 b¹⁹⁻²⁶:

**Exposure of
infants and
abortion in
special cases**

b 20 Περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως καὶ τροφῆς τῶν γιγνομένων ἔστω νόμος μηδὲν πεπηρω-
μένον τρέφειν· διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων, (ἡ γὰρ τάξις ¹ τῶν ἐθῶν κωλύει μηθὲν
ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γιγνομένων) ὥρισθαι δὴ δεῖ τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πλῆθος, ἐὰν
δέ τισι γίγνηται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αἰσθῆσιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ
25 ζωὴν, ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἀμβλωσιν· τὸ γὰρ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ μὴ διωρισμένον τῇ
αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ ζῆν ἔσται.

¹ ἡ γὰρ τάξις - Wallies. The Mss have: ἐὰν ἡ τάξις - κωλύη.

c. Adultery during the time of procreation should be punished with a loss of privileges.

Adultery
punished

Ib., 1335 b³⁸-1336 a²:

Περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον (sc. ὀμιλίας), ἔστω μὲν ἀπλῶς μὴ καλὸν ἀπτόμενον φαίνεσθαι μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς, ὅταν ἢ καὶ προσαγορευθῇ πόσις· περὶ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς τεκνοποιίας ἐάν τις φαίνεται τοιοῦτόν τι δρῶν, ἀτιμία ζημιούσθω πρεπούση πρὸς τὴν ἀμαρτίαν.

628—On these and on the following points Ar. is not far from the ideas of his master, Plato.

Physical training of infants and young children should be prescribed by law. Moral education of children up till the age of five years is to be placed under state-supervision.

Education
of young
children
settled by law

Polit. VII 17, 1336 a³⁰-b¹⁶, b²⁰-23:

Καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων, ποίους τινὰς ἀκούειν δεῖ τοὺς τηλικούτους, 1336a ἐπιμελὲς ἔστω τοῖς ἄρχουσιν οὓς καλοῦσι παιδονόμους. πάντα γὰρ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα προοδοποιεῖν πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον διατριβάς· διὸ τὰς παιδιάς εἶναι δεῖ τὰς πολλὰς μιμήσεις τῶν ὕστερον σπουδαζομένων. τὰς δὲ διατάσεις τῶν παίδων καὶ κλαυθμούς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις· 35 συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὐξήσιν· γίγνεται γὰρ τρόπον τινὰ γυμνασία τοῖς σώμασιν· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις ποιεῖ τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῖς πονοῦσιν, ὃ συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις διατεινομένοις. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ τοῖς παιδονόμοις τὴν τούτων διαγωγὴν τὴν τ' ἄλλην, καὶ ὅπως ὅτι ἤκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται. ταύτην γὰρ 40 τὴν ἡλικίαν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἑπτὰ ἐτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον οἴκοι τὴν τροφὴν ἔχειν. 1336b εὐλογον οὖν ἀπολαύειν ¹ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων καὶ τῶν ὁραμάτων ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τηλικούτους ὄντας. ὅλως μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, εἴπερ ἄλλο τι, δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν (ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὅτι οὖν τῶν αἰσchrῶν 5 γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς)· μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νέων, ὅπως μήτε λέγωσι μήτε ἀκούωσι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον. ἐάν δέ τις φαίνεται τι λέγων ἢ πράττων τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων, τὸν μὲν ἐλεύθερον μήπω δὲ κατακλίσεως ἡξιωμένον ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις [ἀτιμίαις] κολάζειν καὶ πληγαῖς, τὸν δὲ πρεσβύτερον τῆς ἡλικίας 10 ταύτης ἀτιμίαις ἀνελευθέροις ἀνδραποδωδίας χάριν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐξορίζομεν, φανερόν ὅτι καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἢ γραφάς ἢ λόγους ἀσχήμονας. ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν ἔστω τοῖς ἄρχουσι μηθὲν μήτε ἀγαλμα μήτε γραφὴν εἶναι 15 τοιούτων πράξεων μίμησιν. — Τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους οὗτ' ἰάμβων οὔτε κωμωδίας 20 θεατὰς ἑατέον, πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν ἐν ἣ καὶ κατακλίσεως ὑπάρξει κοινωνεῖν ἤδη καὶ μέθης καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων γιγνομένης βλάβης ἀπαθεῖς ἢ παιδεία ποιήσει πάντας.

¹ The codd. indicated by Immisch as II² have ἀπελάυνειν.

629—In Book VIII the treatment of ideal education is continued.

a. That education should be regulated by law and should be a public affair, is generally accepted; but people by no means agree as to what subjects are to be taught.

**General
remarks on
education**

Polit. VIII 2, 1337 a³³-b³:

1337a "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν νομοθετητέον περὶ παιδείας καὶ ταύτην κοινὴν ποιητέον,
35 φανερόν· τίς δ' ἐστὶν ἡ παιδεία καὶ πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν.
νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητεῖται περὶ τῶν ἔργων. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτά πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσι
δεῖν μαθάνειν τοὺς νέους οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν ἄριστον,
οὐδὲ φανερόν πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν πρέπει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς
40 ἥθος· ἕκ τε τῆς ἐμποδῶν παιδείας ταραχώδης ἡ σκέψις καὶ δῆλον οὐδὲν πό-
τερον ἀσκεῖν δεῖ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ τὰ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ τὰ
1337b περιττά (πάντα γὰρ εἴληφε ταῦτα κριτάς τινας)· περὶ τε τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν
οὐθέν ἐστιν ὁμολογούμενον (καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθύς πάντες
τιμῶσιν, ὥστ' εὐλόγως διαφέρονται καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀσκήσιν αὐτῆς).

**Present dis-
agreement**

b. Vulgar occupations should be excluded, and likewise all paid employments.

Ib., 1337 b⁴-16:

"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δεῖ διδάσκεσθαι τῶν χρησίμων, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ὅτι
5 δὲ οὐ πάντα, διηρημένων τῶν τε ἐλευθέρων ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθέρων, φανερόν
ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων δεῖ μετέχειν ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων ποιήσει τὸν μετέχοντα μὴ
βάνουσιν. βάνουσιν δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ
10 μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀχρηστον
ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ τὰς
τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ὅσαι τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι χειρὸν διακεῖσθαι βαναύσους
καλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας. ἀσχολον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν
καὶ ταπεινὴν.

**Vulgar
occupations
excluded**

630—There might be some doubt as to the paedagogical value of one of the four traditional branches of education, namely music. Ar. defends it, on this ground, that it is highly important that people should be able to use leisure well.

Polit. VIII 3, 1337 b²³-35:

"Ἔστι δὲ τέτταρα σχεδὸν ἃ παιδεύειν εἰώθασι, γράμματα καὶ γυμναστικὴν
25 καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ τέταρτον ἔνιοι γραφικὴν, τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν καὶ γραφικὴν
ὥς χρησίμους πρὸς τὸν βίον οὔσας καὶ πολυχρήστους, τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν
ὥς συντείνουσιν πρὸς ἀνδρείαν· τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἥδη διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις.
νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὥς ἡδονῆς χάριν οἱ πλεῖστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς

**4 traditional
disciplines**

**Difficulties
concerning
music**

ἐταξαν ἐν παιδείᾳ διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν ζητεῖν, ὅπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται, μὴ 30
μόνον ἀσχολεῖν ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς. αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων,
ἵνα καὶ πάλιν εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς. εἰ γὰρ ἄμφω μὲν δεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ αἰρετόν
τὸ σχολάζειν τῆς ἀσχολίας καὶ τέλος, ζητητέον τί ποιοῦντας δεῖ σχολάζειν. 35

631—The author warns against a one-sided physical training:

Gymnastics
and athletics

a. *Polit.* VIII 4, 1338 b⁹⁻¹⁶:

Νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσαι τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν παίδων αἱ 1338b
μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἔξιν ἐμποιοῦσι, λωβώμεναι τὰ τε εἶδη καὶ τὴν αὖξησιν τῶν 10
σωμάτων, οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἡμαρτον τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, θηριώδεις δ'
ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρείαν μάλιστα συμφέρον. καίτοι,
καθάπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, οὔτε πρὸς μίαν οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην βλέποντα 15
ποιητέον τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν.

b. Our leading principle should be, that what is noble, not what is brutal, ought to have the first place.

The leading
principle

Ib., 1338 b²⁹⁻³⁴:

“Ὡστε τὸ καλὸν ἄλλ’ οὐ τὸ θηριώδες δεῖ πρωταγωνιστεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ λύκος 30
οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων ἀγωνίσαιτο ἂν οὐθένα καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
ἄνθρωπος ἀγαθός, οἱ δὲ λίαν εἰς ταῦτα ¹ ἀνέντες τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων
ἀπαιδαγωγήτους ποιήσαντες βαναύσους κατεργάζονται κατὰ γε τὸ ἀληθές.

632—The question of the paedagogical value of music is more amply treated in chapters 5 and 6.

What is
exactly the
paedagogical
value of
music?

a. *Polit.* VIII 4, 1339 a¹¹⁻²⁶:

Περὶ δὲ μουσικῆς ἔνια μὲν διηπορήκαμεν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ πρότερον, καλῶς δ’ 1339a
ἔχει καὶ νῦν ἀναλαβόντας αὐτὰ προαγαγεῖν, ἵνα ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον γένηται ²
τοῖς λόγοις οὓς ἂν τις εἴπειεν ἀποφαινόμενος περὶ αὐτῆς. οὔτε γὰρ τίνα ἔχει
δύναμιν ῥάδιον περὶ αὐτῆς διελεῖν, οὔτε τίνος δεῖ χάριν μετέχειν αὐτῆς, πότερον 15
παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀναπαύσεως, καθάπερ ὕπνου καὶ μέθης (ταῦτα γὰρ καθ’ αὐτὰ
μὲν οὔτε τῶν σπουδαίων, ἄλλ’ ἡδέα, καὶ ἅμα παύει μέριμναν, ὡς φησιν Εὐριπί-
δης· διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν αὐτὴν καὶ χρῶνται πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμοίως, ὕπνῳ καὶ μέθῃ 20
καὶ μουσικῇ· τιθέασι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄρχησιν ἐν τούτοις), ἢ μᾶλλον οἰητέον πρὸς
ἀρετὴν τι τείνειν τὴν μουσικὴν, ὡς δυναμένην, καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστικὴ τὸ σῶμα
ποιόν τι παρασκευάζει, καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τὸ ἦθος ποιόν τι ποιεῖν, ἐθίζουσιν
δύνασθαι χαίρειν ὀρθῶς, ἢ πρὸς διαγωγὴν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν 25
(καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τρίτον θετέον τῶν εἰρημένων).

¹ ταῦτα - sc. gymnastics.

² ἵνα ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον γένηται etc. - “that our remarks may serve as a prelude to further discussions on the subject”.

b. Ib., 1339 a²⁶-b¹⁰:

Should
children be
taught to
perform
music
themselves?

“Οτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τοὺς νέους μὴ παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα παιδεύειν, οὐκ ἄδηλον (οὐ γὰρ παίζουσι μανθάνοντες· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἢ μάθησις)· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγὴν ¹ γε 30 παισὶν ἀρμόττει καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδιδόναι ταῖς τοιαύταις (οὐθενὶ γὰρ ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος). ἀλλ’ ἴσως ἂν δόξειεν ἢ τῶν παίδων σπουδὴ παιδιᾶς εἶναι χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν. ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τίνος ἂν ἕνεκα δέοι μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθάπερ οἱ τῶν Περσῶν καὶ Μήδων 35 βασιλεῖς, δι’ ἄλλων αὐτὸ ποιοῦντων μεταλαμβάνειν τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς μαθήσεως; καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον βέλτιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεποιημένους ἔργον καὶ τέχνην τῶν τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἐπιμελουμένων ὅσον πρὸς μάθησιν μόνον. εἰ δὲ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα διαπονεῖν αὐτούς, καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄψων πραγματεῖαν 40 αὐτούς ἂν δέοι παρασκευάζειν· ἀλλ’ ἄτοπον.

Τὴν δ’ αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ εἰ δύναται τὰ ἥθη βελτίω ποιεῖν· ταῦτα γὰρ 1339b τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἑτέρων ἀκούοντας ὁρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν, ὥσπερ οἱ Λάκωνες; ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐ μανθάνοντες ὁμῶς δύνανται κρίνειν ὁρθῶς, ὥς φασι, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν. ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς 5 λόγος καὶ εἰ πρὸς εὐημερίαν καὶ διαγωγὴν ἐλευθέριον χρηστέον αὐτῇ· τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἑτέρων χρωμένων ἀπολαύειν; σκοπεῖν δ’ ἔξεστι τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν· οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἀεῖδει καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς. ἀλλὰ καὶ βαναύσους καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιοῦτους καὶ τὸ πράττειν 10 οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύοντος ἢ παίζοντος.

c. Ib., 1339 b¹⁰-27:

Music can
serve three
purposes:
1. relaxation

Ἀλλ’ ἴσως περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· ἡ δὲ πρώτη ζητησίς ἐστι 15 πότερον οὐ θετέον εἰς παιδείαν τὴν μουσικὴν ἢ θετέον, καὶ τί δύναται τῶν διαφορηθέντων τριῶν, πότερον παιδείαν ἢ παιδιᾶν ἢ διαγωγὴν. εὐλόγως δ’ εἰς πάντα τάττεται καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν. ἡ τε γὰρ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεώς ἐστι, τὴν δ’ ἀνάπαυσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἡδεῖαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ἱατρεία τίς ἐστίν), καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν ὁμολογουμένως δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν (τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐστίν)· τὴν δὲ 20 μουσικὴν πάντες εἶναι φάμεν τῶν ἡδίστων, καὶ ψιλὴν οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ μελωδίας (φησὶ γὰρ καὶ Μουσαῖος εἶναι »βροτοῖς ἡδιστον ἀεδεῖν«· διὰ καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας καὶ διαγωγὰς εὐλόγως παραλαμβάνουσιν αὐτὴν ὥς δυναμένην εὐφραίνειν), ὥστε καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι παιδεύεσθαι δεῖν αὐτὴν τοὺς 25 νεωτέρους. ὅσα γὰρ ἀβλαβῆ τῶν ἡδέων, οὐ μόνον ἀρμόττει πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν.

d. Ib., 1339 b⁴²-1340 a²³, a⁴⁰-b¹³:

2. the
forming of
the
character

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ζητητέον μή ποτε τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκε, τιμωτέρα δ’ αὐτῆς

¹ διαγωγή is used to indicate intellectual enjoyment.

ἡ φύσις ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην χρεῖαν, καὶ δεῖ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς 1340a μετέχειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, ἥς ἔχουσι πάντες αἰσθησιν (ἔχει γὰρ ἡ μουσικὴ τὴν ἡδονὴν φυσικὴν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις καὶ πᾶσιν ἤθεσιν ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶ προσφιλέης), 5 ἀλλ' ὁρᾶν εἴ πῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἥθος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν. τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη δῆλον, εἰ ποιοὶ τινες τὰ ἥθη γιγνόμεθα δι' αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γιγνόμεθα ποιοὶ τινες, φανερόν διὰ πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἐτέρων, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν Ὀλύμπου μελῶν· ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμολογουμένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνθουσιαστικάς, 10 ὁ δ' ἐνθουσιασμός τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἥθους πάθος ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν μουσικὴν τῶν ἡδέων, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν, δεῖ δηλονότι μακθάνειν καὶ συνεθί- 15 ζεσθαι μὴθὲν οὕτως ὥς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἥθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· ἐστὶ δὲ ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὀργῆς καὶ πραότητος, ἔτι δ' ἀνδρείας καὶ 20 σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡθικῶν (δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων· μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι τοιούτων). —

Εὐθύς γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσις. ὥστε ἀκούοντας ἄλλως διατί- 40 θεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας ὁδυρτικώτερος καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον, οἷον πρὸς τὴν μιζολυδιστί 1340b καλουμένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς τὰς ἀνειμένους, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότως μάλιστα πρὸς ἐτέραν, οἷον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἡ δωριστί μόνη τῶν ἀρμονιῶν, ἐνθουσιαστικούς δ' ἡ φρυγιστί. ταῦτα γὰρ καλῶς λέγουσιν 5 οἱ περὶ τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφηκότες· λαμβάνουσι γὰρ τὰ μαρτύρια τῶν λόγων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἥθος ἔχουσι στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας). ἐκ μὲν οὖν 10 τούτων φανερόν ὅτι δύναται ποιεῖν τι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος ἡ μουσικὴ παρασκευάζειν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι προσακτέον καὶ παιδευτέον ἐν αὐτῇ τοὺς νέους.

About the third purpose of learning music, which was called διαγωγή, Ar. does not speak explicitly. But we may admit that this function of music is implied in the first purpose, or perhaps even in the second.

e. Finally an answer is given to the question whether children should be taught to perform music themselves.

Children
should
learn to per-
form music
themselves

Polit. VIII 6, 1340 b²⁰⁻³³:

Πότερον δὲ δεῖ μακθάνειν αὐτοὺς ἄδοντάς τε καὶ χειρουργοῦντας ἢ μὴ, καθά- 20 περ ἡπορήθη πρότερον, νῦν λεκτέον. οὐκ ἄδηλον δὴ ὅτι πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν πρὸς τὸ γίγνεσθαι ποιούς τινας, ἐάν τις αὐτὸς κοινωνῇ τῶν ἔργων· ἐν γὰρ τι

τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἢ χαλεπῶν ἐστὶ μὴ κοινωνήσαντας τῶν ἔργων κριτὰς γενέσθαι
 25 σπουδαίους. ἅμα δὲ καὶ δεῖ τοὺς παῖδας ἔχειν τινὰ διατριβήν, καὶ τὴν Ἀρχύτου
 πλαταγὴν¹ οἶεσθαι γενέσθαι καλῶς, ἣν διδόασιν τοῖς παιδίοις, ὅπως χρώμενοι
 ταύτῃ μὴδὲν καταγνύωσι τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν· οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἡσυχά-
 30 ζειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τοῖς νηπίοις ἀρμόττουσα τῶν παιδίων, ἣ δὲ παιδεία
 πλαταγὴ τοῖς μείζοσι τῶν νέων. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν παιδευτέον τὴν μουσικὴν οὕτως
 ὥστε καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἔργων, φανερόν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων.

¹ τὴν Ἀρχύτου πλαταγὴν - "the rattle of Archytas" seems to have been a popular toy in the days of Aristotle.

SIXTEENTH CHAPTER THE PSYCHOLOGY

I—SOUL AND ITS VARIOUS FUNCTIONS

The aporiai **633**—In his first book *De anima*, according to his usual method, Ar. begins by stating the *aporiai*.

a. Is soul a substance, or to which of the other categories does it belong? Is it potential, or rather an actuality?

1. Is soul a substance?

De anima I 1, 402 a²²-b¹:

Πρῶτον δ' ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον διελεῖν ἐν τίνι τῶν γενῶν καὶ τί ἐστὶ, λέγω δὲ 402a
πότερον τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ καὶ τις ἄλλη τῶν διαίρεθειςῶν
κατηγοριῶν, ἔτι δὲ πότερον τῶν ἐν δυνάμει ὄντων ἢ μᾶλλον ἐντελέχειά τις· 25
διαφέρει γὰρ οὗ τι μικρόν.

b. Can soul be defined in one general formula?

2. Is there one definition of soul?

Ib., 402 b¹-⁸:

Σκεπτόμενον δὲ καὶ εἰ μεριστὴ ἢ ἀμερὴς, καὶ πότερον ὁμοειδὴς ἅπαντα ψυχὴ 402b
ἢ οὐ· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὁμοειδὴς, πότερον εἶδει διαφέρουσιν ἢ γένει. νῦν μὲν γὰρ οἱ
λέγοντες καὶ ζητοῦντες περὶ ψυχῆς περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μόνης εἰκόασιν ἐπι-
σκοπεῖν. εὐλαβητέον δ' ὅπως μὴ λανθάνῃ πότερον εἷς ὁ λόγος αὐτῆς ἐστὶ, 5
καθάπερ ζῶου, ἢ καθ' ἐκάστην ἕτερος, οἷον ἵππου, κυνός, ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ,
τὸ δὲ ζῶον τὸ καθόλου ἦτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἢ ὕστερον.

c. Are there any affections of the soul in itself?

3. Is soul capable of separate existence?

Ib., 403 a³-¹⁶:

Ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς, πότερόν ἐστι πάντα κοινὰ καὶ τοῦ 403a
ἔχοντος ἢ ἐστὶ τι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον αὐτῆς· τοῦτο γὰρ λαβεῖν μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, 5
οὐ ῥᾶδιον δέ. φαίνεται δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείστων οὐθέν ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν
οὐδὲ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι. μάλιστα
δ' εἰσὶν ἴδιον τὸ νοεῖν· εἰ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας,
οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τι τῶν τῆς 10
ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ παθημάτων ἴδιον, ἐνδέχεται· ἂν αὐτὴν χωρίζεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴθὲν

ἔστιν ἴδιον αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη χωριστή, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ τῷ εὐθεῖ, ἥ εὐθύ, πολλά
 συμβαίνει, οἷον ἅπτεσθαι τῆς χαλκῆς σφαίρας κατὰ στιγμήν, οὐ μέντοι γ' ἄψεται
 15 οὕτω χωρισθὲν τὸ εὐθύ· ἀχώριστον γάρ, εἴπερ ἀεὶ μετὰ σώματός τινός ἐστιν.

d. Aristotle decides the question in the negative, and concludes that, since all the affections of soul involve a body, the study of soul must belong to the science of nature.

Ib., a 16-28:

ἽΕοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, θυμός, πρᾶτης,
 φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν· ἅμα γὰρ τοῦτοις
 πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ ποτὲ μὲν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐναργῶν παθημάτων
 20 συμβαινόντων μὴδὲν παροξύνεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐνίοτε δ' ὑπὸ μικρῶν καὶ
 ἀμαυρῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὀργᾷ τὸ σῶμα καὶ οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥσπερ ὅταν ὀργίζεται.
 ἔτι δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον φανερόν· μνηστὴς γὰρ φοβεροῦ συμβαινόντος ἐν τοῖς
 25 λόγοις ἐνυλοὶ εἰσιν. ὥστε οἱ ὅροι τοιοῦτοι οἷον τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι κινήσεις τις τοῦ
 τοιοῦδὲ σώματος ἢ μέρους ἢ δυνάμεως ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἐνεκα τοῦδε. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα
 ἤδη φυσικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ ψυχῆς, ἢ πάσης ἢ τῆς τοιαύτης.

634—The problem of the affections of the soul is treated again in relation with the problem of its movement. In this passage the author states that it would be better not to say that “the soul is angry” etc., but the man.

a. *De An.* I 4, 408 a³⁴-b¹⁸:

Εὐλογώτερον δ' ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις περὶ αὐτῆς ὡς κινουμένης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα
 408b ἀποβλέψας. φαμὲν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν λυπεῖσθαι χαίρειν, θαρρεῖν φοβεῖσθαι, ἔτι
 δὲ ὀργίζεσθαι τε καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ διανοεῖσθαι· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινήσεις
 εἶναι δοκοῦσιν. ὅθεν οἰηθεῖται τις ἂν αὐτὴν κινεῖσθαι. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον.
 5 εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ χαίρειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι κινήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ
 ἕκαστον κινεῖσθαι τούτων, τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαι ἐστὶν ὑπὸ ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι
 ἢ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ τὴν καρδίαν ὠδὶ κινεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἴσως ἢ
 10 ἕτερόν τι, (τούτων δὲ συμβαίνει τὰ μὲν κατὰ φοράν τινῶν κινουμένων, τὰ δὲ
 κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν, ποῖα δὲ καὶ πῶς, ἕτερός ἐστι λόγος)· τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὀργίζεσθαι
 τὴν ψυχὴν ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑφαίνειν ἢ οἰκοδομεῖν. βέλτιον
 γὰρ ἴσως μὴ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλεεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν
 15 ἄνθρωπον τῇ ψυχῇ· τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ὡς ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῆς κινήσεως οὔσης, ἀλλ' ὅτε
 μὲν μέχρι ἐκείνης, ὅτε δ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης, οἷον ἢ μὲν αἰσθησις ἀπὸ τῶνδ', ἢ
 δ' ἀνάμνησις ἀπ' ἐκείνης ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις κινήσεις ἢ μονάς.

Is the soul
 the subject
 of its
 affections?

b. The case of mind is different.

Mind is impassible

Ib., 408 b^{18,30}:

‘Ο δὲ νοῦς ἔοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι οὐσία τις οὐσα, καὶ οὐ φθείρεσθαι. μάλιστα γὰρ ἐφθίρετ’ ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ γήρα ἀμαυρώσεως, νῦν δ’ ἴσως ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθη- 20 τηρίων συμβαίνει· εἰ γὰρ λάβοι ὁ πρεσβύτης ὄμμα τοιονδί, βλέπει ἂν ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ νέος. ὥστε τὸ γῆρας οὐ τῷ τὴν ψυχὴν τι πεπονθέναι, ἀλλ’ ἐν ᾧ, καθάπερ ἐν μέθαις καὶ νόσοις. καὶ τὸ νοεῖν δὴ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν μαραίνεται ἄλλου τινὸς 25 ἔσω φθειρομένου, αὐτὸ δὲ ἀπαθές ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκείνου πάθη, ἀλλὰ τοῦδ’ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο, ἢ ἐκεῖνο ἔχει. διὸ καὶ τούτου φθειρομένου οὔτε μνημονεύει οὔτε φιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου ἦν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὃ ἀπόλωλεν· ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἴσως θειότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές ἐστιν.

The unity of the soul

635—*De an.* I 5, 411 b⁵⁻¹⁴:

Λέγουσι δὴ τινες μεριστὴν αὐτὴν, καὶ ἄλλω μὲν νοεῖν ἄλλω δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν. τί 5 οὖν δὴ ποτε συνέχει τὴν ψυχὴν, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε σῶμα· δοκεῖ γὰρ τούναντίον μᾶλλον ἢ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνέχειν· ἐξεληθούσης γοῦν διαπνεύεται καὶ σήπεται. εἰ οὖν ἕτερόν τι μίαν αὐτὴν ποιεῖ, ἐκεῖνο μάλιστ’ ἂν εἴη ψυχὴ. δεήσει δὲ πάλιν κάκεῖνο ζητεῖν πότερον ἐν ἡ πολυμερές. εἰ μὲν γὰρ 10 ἔν, διὰ τί οὐκ εὐθέως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἔν; εἰ δὲ μεριστόν, πάλιν ὁ λόγος ζητήσει τί τὸ συνέχον ἐκεῖνο, καὶ οὕτω δὴ πρόεισιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀπειρον.

636—After having discussed in the first Book the views of his predecessors, Ar. now proceeds to define soul in a general formula.

De an. II I, 412 a^{3-b}:

Definition of soul

Τὰ μὲν δὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερον παραδεδομένα περὶ ψυχῆς εἰρήσθω· πάλιν 412a δ’ ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ἐπανίωμεν, πειρώμενοι διορίσαι τί ἐστι ψυχὴ καὶ τίς 5 ἂν εἴη κοινότατος λόγος αὐτῆς. λέγομεν δὴ γένος ἐν τι τῶν ὄντων τὴν οὐσίαν, ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλην, ὁ καθ’ αὐτὸ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι τόδε τι, ἕτερον δὲ μορφήν καὶ εἶδος, καθ’ ἣν ἡδὴ λέγεται τόδε τι, καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἐκ τούτων. ἐστι δ’ ἡ μὲν ὕλη δύναμις, τὸ δ’ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια, καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς, τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, 10 τὸ δ’ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. οὐσίαι δὲ μάλιστ’ εἶναι δοκοῦσι τὰ σώματα, καὶ τούτων τὰ φυσικά· ταῦτα γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχαί. τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν τὰ μὲν ἔχει ζωὴν, τὰ δ’ οὐκ ἔχει· ζωὴν δὲ λέγομεν τὴν δι’ αὐτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν. ὥστε πᾶν σῶμα φυσικὸν μετέχον ζωῆς οὐσία ἂν εἴη, οὐσία δ’ 15 οὕτως ὡς συνθέτη. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ σῶμα καὶ τοιονδί τοῦτο, ζωὴν γὰρ ἔχον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ σῶμα ψυχὴ· οὐ γὰρ ἐστι τῶν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τὸ σῶμα, μᾶλλον δ’ ὡς ὑποκείμενον καὶ ὕλη. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει 20 ζωὴν ἔχοντος. ἢ δ’ οὐσία ἐντελέχεια. τοιούτου ἄρα σώματος ἐντελέχεια.

The form of a natural body

αὕτη δὲ λέγεται διχῶς, ἡ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δ' ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. φανερόν οὖν
 ὅτι ὡς ἐπιστήμη· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὑπάρχειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ὕπνος καὶ ἐγρήγορσις
 25 ἔστιν, ἀνάλογον δ' ἡ μὲν ἐγρήγορσις τῷ θεωρεῖν, ὁ δ' ὕπνος τῷ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ
 ἐνεργεῖν· προτέρα δὲ τῇ γενέσει ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐπιστήμη. διὸ ἡ ψυχὴ ἔστιν
 ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν
 412b ἔχοντος. τοιοῦτο δέ, ὃ ἂν ᾖ ὀργανικόν. ὄργανα δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν μέρη,
 ἀλλὰ παντελῶς ἀπλᾶ, οἷον τὸ φύλλον περικαρπίου σκέπασμα, τὸ δὲ περικάρπιον
 καρποῦ· αἱ δὲ ῥίζαι τῷ στόματι ἀνάλογον· ἄμφω γὰρ ἔλκει τὴν τροφήν. εἰ δὲ
 5 τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δεῖ λέγειν, εἴη ἂν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη
 σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ. διὸ καὶ οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν εἰ ἐν ἡ
 ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν κηρὸν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα, οὐδ' ὅλως τὴν ἐκάστου
 ὕλην καὶ τὸ οὐ ἢ ὕλη· τὸ γὰρ ἐν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐπεὶ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, τὸ κυρίως
 ἡ ἐντελέχεια ἔστιν.

First
entelechy

637—This definition implies (1) that soul is the essence of a natural body, (2) that it is not separable from body.

a. *De an.* II 1, 412 b⁹⁻¹⁵:

Soul is the
essence of
a natural
body

10 Καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ· οὐσία γὰρ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.
 τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι τῷ τοιῶδι σώματι, καθάπερ εἴ τι τῶν ὀργάνων φυσικὸν
 ᾗν σῶμα, οἷον πέλεκυς· ᾗν μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὸ πελέκει εἶναι ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ
 ψυχὴ τοῦτο· χωρισθείσης δὲ ταύτης οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πέλεκυς ᾗν, ἀλλ' ἡ ὁμωνύμως.
 15 νῦν δ' ἐστὶ πέλεκυς.

b. *Ib.*, 413 a⁴⁻⁵:

Not
separable
from body

"Οτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ χωριστὴ τοῦ σώματος, ἡ μέρη τινὰ αὐτῆς,
 εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν, οὐκ ἄδηλον.

638—Soul is characterized by life. Now this term has various meanings, of which the most general is self-nutrition and growth.

a. *De an.* II 2, 413 a²⁰⁻³¹:

Life

20 Λέγομεν οὖν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τῆς σκέψεως, διωρίσθαι τὸ ἐμψυχον τοῦ
 ἀψύχου τῷ ζῆν. πλεοναχῶς δὲ τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου, καὶ ἐν τι τούτων ἐνυπάρχει
 μόνον, ζῆν αὐτὸ φαμεν, οἷον νοῦς, αἴσθησις, κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἡ κατὰ τόπον,
 25 ἔτι κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τροφήν καὶ φθίσις τε καὶ αὔξεισις. διὸ καὶ τὰ φερόμενα πάντα
 δοκεῖ ζῆν· φαίνεται γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντα δύναμιν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, δι'
 ἧς αὔξεισιν τε καὶ φθίσιν λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τοὺς ἐναντίους τρόπους· οὐ γὰρ ἄνω
 μὲν αὔζεται, κάτω δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἐπ' ἄμφω καὶ πάντῃ ἐκτρέφεται καὶ
 30 ζῆν διὰ τέλους, ἕως ἂν δύνηται λαμβάνειν τροφήν.

Its most
general
sense

b. *Ib.*, 413 b¹⁻⁴:

Animals
characterized
by sensation

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴσι, τὸ δὲ ζῶον διὰ

τὴν αἰσθησιν πρώτως· καὶ γὰρ τὰ μὴ κινούμενα μὴδ' ἀλλάττοντα τόπον, ἔχοντα δ' αἰσθησιν ζῶα λέγομεν καὶ οὐ ζῆν μόνον.

Mind, or the
thinking
power

c. Ib., 413 b²⁴⁻²⁷:

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδὲν πω φανερὸν, ἀλλ' εἰκε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ αἰδίδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ.

639—A survey of the various psychic powers.

The five
psychic
powers

a. *De an.* II 3, 414a^{29-b⁶, b¹⁶⁻¹⁹}:

Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ λεχθεῖσαι τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι, καθάπερ 414a εἶπομεν, τοῖς δὲ τινὲς αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ μία μόνη. δυνάμεις δ' εἶπομεν θρεπτικόν, 30 ὀρεκτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, κινήτικόν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν. ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικόν μόνον, ἑτέροις δὲ τοῦτό τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν. εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν· ὀρεξίς μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις, 414b τὰ δὲ ζῶα πάντ' ἔχουσι μίαν γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν ἀφήν· ἥ δ' αἰσθησις ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη καὶ τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷς δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ ἡ 5 ἐπιθυμία· τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὀρεξίς αὕτη. — Περὶ δὲ φαντασίας ἄδηλον, ὕστερον 16 δ' ἐπισκεπτέον. ἐνίοις δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινήτικόν, ἑτέροις δὲ καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ νόῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον ἐστὶν ἢ τιμώτερον.

b. The higher power cannot exist apart from the lower, the lower can exist apart from the higher power.

Ib., 415 a¹⁻¹²:

The higher
ones presup-
pose the
lower

Ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ τὸ αἰσθητικόν οὐκ ἐστὶν· τοῦ δ' αἰσθητικοῦ 415a χωρίζεται τὸ θρεπτικόν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. πάλιν δ' ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ ἀπτικοῦ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμία ὑπάρχει, ἀφή δ' ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχει· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ζώων οὔτ' ὄψιν οὔτ' ἀκοὴν ἔχουσιν οὔτ' ὁσμῆς αἰσθησιν. καὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν 5 δὲ τὰ μὲν ἔχει τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινήτικόν, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔχει. τελευταῖον δὲ καὶ ἐλάχιστον λογισμὸν καὶ διάνοιαν· οἷς μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχει λογισμὸς τῶν φθαρτῶν, τούτοις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα, οἷς δ' ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, οὐ πᾶσι λογισμός, ἀλλὰ 10 τοῖς μὲν οὐδὲ φαντασία, τὰ δὲ ταύτῃ μόνῃ ζῶσιν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοῦ ἕτερος λόγος.

640—The nutritive soul.

The nutritive
soul

a. *De an.* II 4, 415 a²²⁻²⁵:

Ὡστε πρῶτον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ γεννήσεως λεκτέον· ἡ γὰρ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτῃ δυνάμει ἐστὶ ψυχῆς καθ' ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν.

b. This first soul ought to be named the reproductive soul.

Ib., 416 b^{20,25}:

20 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τρία, τὸ τρεφόμενον καὶ ὃ τρέφεται καὶ τὸ τρέφον, τὸ μὲν τρέφον
ἐστὶν ἡ πρώτη ψυχὴ, τὸ δὲ τρεφόμενον τὸ ἔχον ταύτην σῶμα, ὃ δὲ τρέφεται, ἡ
τροφή. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους ἅπαντα προσαγορεύειν δίκαιον, τέλος δὲ τὸ
25 γεννηῖσθαι οἶον αὐτό, εἴη ἂν ἡ πρώτη ψυχὴ γεννητικὴ οἶον αὐτό.

Cp. *De gen. an.* II 4, 740 b³⁴-741 a³: Ἡ γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ὕλη ἣ αὐξάνεται
35 καὶ ἐξ ἧς συνίσταται τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστε καὶ ἡ ποιοῦσα δύναμις ταὐτὸ τῷ ἐξ
ἀρχῆς. μείζων δὲ αὕτη ἐστίν. εἰ οὖν αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ, αὕτη ἐστὶ
καὶ ἡ γεννώσα· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις ἡ ἐκάστου, ἐνυπάρχουσα καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς
41a καὶ ἐν ζώοις πᾶσιν. τὰ δ' ἄλλα μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχει τοῖς δ' οὐχ
ὑπάρχει τῶν ζώων.

2—SENSE-PERCEPTION

641—Distinction between special and common objects of the senses.

De an. II 6, 418 a^{10,20}:

10 . . . τὸ μὲν ἰδίον ἐστὶν ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πασῶν. λέγω δ'
ἰδίον μὲν ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἐτέρᾳ αἰσθῆσαι αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται
ἀπατηθῆναι, οἶον ὄψις χρώματος καὶ ἀκοὴ ψόφου καὶ γεῦσις χυμοῦ. ἡ δ' ἀφή
πλείους μὲν ἔχει διαφορὰς· ἀλλ' ἐκάστη γε κρίνει περὶ τούτων, καὶ οὐκ ἀπατᾶται
15 ὅτι χρῶμα οὐδ' ὅτι ψόφος, ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κεχρωσμένον ἢ ποῦ, ἢ τί τὸ ψοφοῦν ἢ
ποῦ. τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα λέγεται ἴδια ἐκάστου, κοινὰ δὲ κίνησις, ἡρεμία, ἀριθμός,
σχῆμα, μέγεθος· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν ἴδια, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάσαις. καὶ
20 γὰρ ἀφῇ κινήσις τίς ἐστὶν αἰσθητὴ καὶ ὅψει.

Special and
common
sensibles

The same distinction is made by S. Thomas Aquinas, who speaks of *sensibilia propria* and *communia* in *S. th.* I, qu. 17, art. 2, and in qu. 78, art. 3.

642—The object of sight.

a. Ib., II 7, 418 a²⁷-b³:

Οὗ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ὄψις, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁρατόν. ὁρατὸν δ' ἐστὶ χρῶμα μὲν,
καὶ ὃ λόγῳ μὲν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀνώνυμον δὲ τυγχάνει ὄν¹. δῆλον δὲ ἔσται ὃ λέ-
γομεν προελθοῦσι μάλιστα. τὸ γὰρ ὁρατόν ἐστι χρῶμα. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ
30 καθ' αὐτὸ ὁρατοῦ· καθ' αὐτό δὲ οὐ τῷ λόγῳ², ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχει τὸ αἷτιον
τοῦ εἶναι ὁρατόν. πᾶν δὲ χρῶμα κινητικόν ἐστι τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς,
418b καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις. διόπερ οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἄνευ φωτός, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ
ἐκάστου χρῶμα ἐν φωτὶ ὁρᾶται.

The object
of sight

¹ He alludes to phosphorescing objects, which can be seen only in darkness.

² It is visible, not by its essence, but per accidens.

Light

b. What is light. Ib., 418 b³⁻¹³, b¹⁸⁻²⁰:

Διὸ περὶ φωτὸς πρῶτον λεκτέον τί ἐστίν. ἔστι δὴ τι διαφανές. διαφανές δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔστι μὲν ὁρατόν, οὐ καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ ὁρατόν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' 5 ἀλλότριον χρῶμα. τοιοῦτον δὲ ἔστιν ἄηρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν στερεῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὕδωρ οὐδ' ἡ ἄηρ, διαφανές, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐστὶ φύσις ὑπάρχουσα ἢ αὐτὴ ἐν τούτοις ἀμφοτέροις καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰδίῳ τῷ ἄνω σώματι ¹. φῶς δὲ ἐστίν ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια, τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἡ διαφανές. δυνάμει δὲ ἐν ᾧ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ σκότος. 10 τὸ δὲ φῶς οἶον χρῶμά ἐστὶ τοῦ διαφανοῦς, ὅταν ἡ ἐντελεχεία διαφανές ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἢ τοιοῦτου οἶον τὸ ἄνω σῶμα· καὶ γὰρ τούτῳ τι ὑπάρχει ἐν καὶ ταυτόν. —

Darkness

Δοκεῖ τε τὸ φῶς ἐναντίον εἶναι τῷ σκότει· ἔστι δὲ τὸ σκότος στέρῃσις τῆς 18 τοιαύτης ἑξέως ἐκ διαφανοῦς, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ τούτου παρουσία τὸ φῶς ἐστίν.

Sound

643—a. *De an.* II 8, 419 b⁹⁻¹³:

Γίνεται δ' ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ψόφος αἰετίνος πρὸς τι καὶ ἐν τινι· πληγὴ γὰρ ἐστίν ἡ ποιοῦσα. διὸ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἐνὸς ὄντος γενέσθαι ψόφον· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ τύπτον καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον· ὥστε τὸ ψοφοῦν πρὸς τι ψοφεῖ· πληγὴ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φορᾶς.

Voice

b. Ib., 420 b^{13-421 a⁴}:

Φωνὴ δ' ἐστὶ ζώου ψόφος, καὶ οὐ τῷ τυχόντι μορίῳ. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πᾶν ψοφεῖ 420b τύπτοντός τινος καὶ τι καὶ ἐν τινι, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἄηρ, εὐλόγως ἂν φωνοίη ταῦτα 15 μόνα ὅσα δέχεται τὸν ἄερα. ἥδη γὰρ τῷ ἀναπνεομένῳ καταχρῆται ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ δύο ἔργα, καθάπερ τῇ γλώττῃ ἐπὶ τε τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ τὴν διάλεκτον, ὣν ἡ μὲν γεῦσις ἀναγκαῖον (διὸ καὶ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχει), ἡ δ' ἐρμηνεία ἐνεκεν τοῦ εὔ, οὕτω καὶ τῷ πνεύματι πρὸς τε τὴν θερμότητα τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀναγκαῖον (τὸ δ' αἰτίον ἐν 20 ἐτέροις εἰρήσεται) καὶ πρὸς τὴν φωνήν, ὅπως ὑπάρχει τὸ εὔ.

How produced

Ὅργανον δὲ τῇ ἀναπνοῇ ὁ φάρυγξ· οὗ δ' ἐνεκα καὶ τὸ μόριόν ἐστὶ τοῦτο, πλεῦμων· τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ μορίῳ πλείστον ἔχει τὸ θερμὸν τὰ πεζὰ τῶν ἄλλων. δεῖται δὲ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν τόπος πρῶτος. διὸ ἀναγκαῖον 25 εἶσω ἀναπνεομένου εἰσιέναι τὸν ἄερα, ὥστε ἡ πληγὴ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μορίοις ψυχῆς πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην ἀρτηρίαν φωνὴ ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ζώου ψόφος φωνή, καθάπερ εἶπομεν (ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ 30 ψοφεῖν καὶ ὡς οἱ βήττοντες), ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἔμψυχόν τε εἶναι τὸ τύπτον καὶ μετὰ φαντασίας τινός· σημαντικὸς γὰρ δὴ τις ψόφος ἐστίν ἡ φωνή· καὶ οὐ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος, ὥσπερ ἡ βήξ, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τύπτει τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀρτηρίᾳ πρὸς 421a αὐτήν. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι φωνεῖν ἀναπνέοντα πρὸς αὐτήν. σημεῖον

¹ He means his fifth element, the aether, which constitutes the celestial sphere, in which the heavenly bodies move.

δὲ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι φωνεῖν ἀναπνέοντα μὴδ' ἐκπνέοντα, ἀλλὰ κατέχοντα· κινεῖ γὰρ τούτῳ ὁ κατέχων. φανερόν δὲ καὶ διότι οἱ ἰχθύες ἄφωνοι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσι φάρυγγα.

Why fish
are mute

644—Intelligence is, according to Ar., dependent on the sense of touch.

De an. II 9, 421 a²⁰⁻²⁶:

Intelligence
and the sense
of touch

20 Ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις (sc. αἰσθήσεσι) λείπεται (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) πολλῶν τῶν ζώων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀφὴν πολλῶ τῶν ἄλλων διαφερόντως ἀκριβοῦς. διὸ καὶ φρονιμώτατόν ἐστι τῶν ζώων. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων παρὰ τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο εἶναι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἀφυεῖς, παρ' ἄλλο δὲ μὴδέν· οἱ 25 μὲν γὰρ σκληρόσαρκοι ἀφυεῖς τὴν διάνοιαν, οἱ δὲ μαλακόσαρκοι εὐφυεῖς.

645—Why man smells only when he inhales.

De an. II 9, 421 b⁸-422 a⁶:

Smell in
man and in
other
animals

421b Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ὀσφρησις διὰ τοῦ μεταξύ, οἷον ἀέρος ἢ ὕδατος· καὶ γὰρ τὰ 10 ἔνυδρα δοκοῦσιν ὁσμῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁμοίως καὶ ἔναιμα καὶ ἄναιμα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἔνια πόρρωθεν ἀπαντᾷ πρὸς τὴν τροφήν ὑποσμία γινόμενα, διὸ καὶ ἄπορον φαίνεται, εἰ πάντα μὲν ὁμοίως ὁσμεῖται, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος 15 ἀναπνέων, μὴ ἀναπνέων δὲ ἄλλ' ἐκπνέων ἢ κατέχων τὸ πνεῦμα οὐκ ὁσμεῖται, οὔτε πόρρωθεν οὔτ' ἐγγύθεν, οὐδ' ἂν ἐπὶ τοῦ μυκτῆρος ἐντὸς τεθῇ· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ' αὐτῷ τιθέμενον τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἀναίσθητον εἶναι κοινὸν πάντων· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄνευ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἴδιον τῶν ἀνθρώπων· δῆλον δὲ πειρωμένοις. 20 ὥστε τὰ ἄναιμα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀναπνέουσιν, ἑτέραν ἂν τιν' αἰσθησιν ἔχοι παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας. ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἴπερ τῆς ὁσμῆς αἰσθάνεται· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ὀσφραν- τοῦ αἰσθησις καὶ δυσώδους καὶ εὐώδους ὀσφρησίς ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ φθειρόμενα φαίνεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ὁσμῶν ὥς ὥνπερ ἄνθρωπος, οἷον ἀσφάλτου καὶ 25 θείου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ὀσφραίνεσθαι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀναπνέοντα. ἔοικε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διαφέρειν τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, ὥσπερ τὰ ὄμματα πρὸς τὰ τῶν σκληροφθάλμων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει φράγμα 30 καὶ ὥσπερ ἔλυτρον τὰ βλέφαρα, ἃ μὴ κινήσας μὴδ' ἀνασπᾶσας οὐχ ὁρᾷ· τὰ δὲ σκληρόφθαλμα οὐδὲν ἔχει τοιούτον, ἀλλ' εὐθέως ὁρᾷ τὰ γινόμενα ἐν τῷ δια- φανεῖ· οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον τοῖς μὲν ἀκάλυφτος εἶναι, 422a ὥσπερ τὸ ὄμμα, τοῖς δὲ τὸν ἀέρα δεχομένοις ἔχειν ἐπικάλυμμα, ὃ ἀναπνεόντων ἀποκαλύπτεσθαι, διευρυνομένων τῶν φλεβίων καὶ τῶν πόρων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ ἀναπνέοντα οὐκ ὁσμεῖται ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ὀσφρανθῆναι ἀναπνεύ- 5 σαντα, τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ ἀδύνατον.

646—Taste and touch do not take place through an interposed foreign body.

Taste and
touch

De an. II 10, 422 a⁸⁻¹⁰:

Τὸ δὲ γευστὸν ἐστὶν ἀπτὸν τι· καὶ τοῦτ' αἴτιον τοῦ μὴ εἶναι αἰσθητὸν διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἄλλοτρίου ὄντος σώματος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἀφή.

647—General description of a "sense".

"Sense"
in general

De an. II 12, 424 a¹⁷⁻²⁴:

Καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἰσθησίς ἐστι τὸ 424a δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, οἷον κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἢ 20 τὸ χαλκοῦν σημεῖον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ χρυσὸς ἢ χαλκός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ αἰσθησίς ἐκάστου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῶμα ἢ χυμὸν ἢ ψόφον πάσχει, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ ἕκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλ' ἢ τοιονδί, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον¹.

3—THINKING

648—In his third Book *De anima* Ar. deals with *noûs* or the thinking power. The first stage superior to the senses, namely that faculty by which we distinguish the object of one sense from that of the other, is discussed in the following passage.

The "sensus
interior"

De an. III 2, 426 b⁸⁻²¹:

Ἐκάστη μὲν οὖν αἰσθησίς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ ἐστίν, ὑπάρχουσα ἐν 426b τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἢ αἰσθητήριον, καὶ κρίνει τὰς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ δια- 10 φοράς, οἷον λευκὸν μὲν καὶ μέλαν ὅψεις, γλυκὺ δὲ καὶ πικρὸν γεῦσις. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον κρίνομεν, τίνι καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι διαφέρει; ἀνάγκη δὴ αἰσθῆσαι· αἰσθητὰ γὰρ ἐστίν. ἢ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σὰρξ οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ 15 ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἦν ἀπτόμενον αὐτοῦ κρίνειν τὸ κρῖνον. οὔτε δὴ κεχωρισμένοις ἐνδέχεται κρίνειν ὅτι ἕτερον τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐνὶ τινι ἄμφω δῆλα εἶναι. οὕτω μὲν γὰρ καὶ εἰ τοῦ μὲν ἐγὼ τοῦ δὲ σὺ αἰσθοιο, δῆλον ἂν εἴη ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων. δεῖ δὲ τὸ ἐν λέγειν ὅτι ἕτερον· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ 20 γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ. λέγει ἄρα τὸ αὐτό.

The problem was first formulated by Plato, *Theaet.* 185a². S. Augustine, in *De libero arbitrio* II 3, 8, qualifies that faculty by which we judge "quid ad quemque sensum pertineat, et quid inter se vel omnes vel quidam eorum communiter habent", as a *sensus interior*, and distinguishes it from reason, because animals too possess it. "Namque aliud est quo videt bestia, aliud quo ea quae videndo sentit, vel vitat vel appetit: ille enim sensus in oculis est, ille autem intus in ipsa anima".

¹ According to its "form" or formulable essence.

² Our nr. 319a.

649—Difference between thinking and perceiving.

a. Thinking and perceiving identified by the ancients.

De an. III 3, 427 a¹⁹-b⁵:

Thinking
and
perceiving

427a Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὥσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαι τι εἶναι (ἐν ἀμφο-
20 τέροις γὰρ τούτοις κρίνει τι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων), καὶ οἷ γε ἀρχαῖοι
τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτὸν εἶναι φασιν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς
εἴρηκε ¹.

»πρὸς παρεδὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποισιν.«

25 καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις· ὅθεν

«σφίσιν αἰεὶ

καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἄλλοῖα παρίσταται . . . »

τὸ δ' αὐτὸ τούτοις βούλεται καὶ τὸ Ὀμήρου »τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστίν« ². πάντες
γὰρ οὗτοι τὸ νοεῖν σωματικὸν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν καὶ αἰσθά-
νεσθαι τε καὶ φρονεῖν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀρχὰς λόγοις
427b διωρίσαμεν· καίτοι ἔδει ἅμα καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἡπατῆσθαι αὐτοὺς λέγειν, οἰκειότερον
γὰρ τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἐν τούτῳ διατελεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ· διὸ ἀνάγκη ἦτοι,
ὥσπερ ἔνιοι λέγουσι, πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀνομοίου
5 θίξιν ἀπάτην εἶναι, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐναντίον τῷ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ γνωρίζειν.

b. Thinking is different from perceiving. It is partly imagination, partly judgment.

Ib., 427 b²⁷⁻²⁹:

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἕτερον τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν φαντασία
δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψις, περὶ φαντασίας διορίσαντας οὕτω περὶ θατέρου
λεκτέον.

650—Imagination.

Imagination

a. It is neither sense, nor opinion.

Ib., 428 a⁵⁻²², b⁹⁻¹⁰:

428a "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις, δῆλον ἐκ τῶνδε. αἴσθησις μὲν γὰρ ἦτοι
δύναμις ἢ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ὄψις καὶ ὄρασις, φαίνεται δὲ τι καὶ μηδετέρου ὑπάρ-
χοντος τούτων, οἷον τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις. εἴτα αἴσθησις μὲν αἰεὶ πάρεστι, φαντασία
10 δ' οὐ. εἰ δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ αὐτό, πᾶσιν ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῖς θηρίοις φαντασίαν
ὑπάρχειν· δοκεῖ δ' οὐ. οἷον μύρμηκι ἢ μελίττῃ ἢ σκώλῃ. εἴτα αἰ μὲν ἀληθεῖς
αἰεὶ, αἰ δὲ φαντασθαί γίνονται αἰ πλείους ψευδεῖς. ἔπειτ' οὐδὲ λέγομεν, ὅταν

Neither
sense

¹ Emped. fr. 106 and 108 (*Gr. Ph.* I p. 61 n. 2, to nr. 113a).

² From *Od.* XVIII 136 ff.

ἐνεργῶμεν ἀκριβῶς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, ὅτι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅταν μὴ ἐναργῶς αἰσθανώμεθα· τότε ἢ ἀληθῆς ἢ ψευδής. καὶ ὅπερ δὲ 15 ἐλέγομεν πρότερον, φαίνεται καὶ μύουσιν ὁράματα. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν αἰε ἀληθεύοντων οὐδεμία ἔσται, οἷον ἐπιστήμη ἢ νοῦς· ἔστι γὰρ φαντασία καὶ ψευδής. λείπεται ἄρα ἰδεῖν εἰ δόξα· γίνεται γὰρ δόξα καὶ ἀληθῆς καὶ ψευδής.

nor opinion ἀλλὰ δόξη μὴν ἔπεται πίστις (οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δοξάζοντα οἷς δοκεῖ μὴ 20 πιστεύειν), τῶν δὲ θηρίων οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει πίστις, φαντασία δ' ἐν πολλοῖς. — Οὐτ' ἄρα ἐν τι τούτων ἐστὶν οὐτ' ἐκ τούτων ἡ φαντασία.

b. What is imagination.

What it is Ib., 428 b¹⁰⁻¹⁷, 428 b³⁰-429 a⁴:

Ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶ κινήεντος τουδὲ κινεῖσθαι ἕτερον ὑπὸ τούτου, ἡ δὲ φαν- 428b τασία κίνησίς τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίνεσθαι ἀλλ' αἰσθανο- μένοις καὶ ὧν αἰσθησίς ἐστιν, ἔστι δὲ γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἴη ἂν αὕτη ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πολλὰ 15 κατ' αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ. —

Definition Εἰ οὖν μηθὲν μὲν ἄλλο ἔχοι ἢ τὰ εἰρημένα ἡ φαντασία, τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ 30 λεχθέν, ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γιγνο- 429a μένης. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὄψις μάλιστα αἰσθησίς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τοῦ φάους εἰ- ληφεν, ὅτι ἄνευ φωτὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν.

651—The thinking part of the soul.

Thinking *De an.* III 4, 429 a¹⁰⁻¹³:

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ γινώσκει τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ, εἴτε χωριστοῦ ὄντος εἴτε καὶ μὴ χωριστοῦ κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον, σκεπτέον τίν' ἔχει διαφορὰν, καὶ πῶς ποτὲ γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν.

A passive faculty a. Ib., 429 a¹³⁻²⁹:

Εἰ δὴ ἐστὶ τὸ νοεῖν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἡ πάσχειν τι ἂν εἴη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ 429a ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. ἀπαθὲς ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι, δεκτικὸν δὲ τοῦ εἶδους καὶ δυνάμει 15 τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο¹, καὶ ὁμοίως ἔχειν, ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, οὕτω τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰ νοητά. ἀνάγκη ἄρα, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῇ, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἵνα γνωρίζῃ· παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ κωλύει τὸ ἀλλότριον καὶ ἀντιφράττει· ὥστε μὴδ' αὐτοῦ 20 εἶναι φύσιν μηδεμίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ταύτην, ὅτι δυνατόν. ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς

¹ The mind "becomes its objects" in actual knowledge. Therefore, the thinking power must be *potentially* identical with its possible objects. *Animus est quodammodo omnia*, as it is formulated later by S. Thomas Aquinas.

νοῦς (λέγω δὲ νοῦν ὃ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἢ ψυχὴ) οὐθὲν ἐστὶν ἐνεργεία
 25 τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν. διὸ οὐδὲ μεμῖχθαι εὐλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι· ποιός τις
 γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτο, ἢ ψυχρὸς ἢ θερμὸς, ἢ καὶ ὄργανόν τι εἴη, ὥσπερ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ·
 νῦν δ' οὐθὲν ἐστὶν. καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν¹, πλὴν
 ὅτι οὔτε ὅλη ἄλλ' ἢ νοητικὴ, οὔτε ἐντελεχεία ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἶδη.

b. Since in the above passage thinking is qualified as a passive process, while on the other hand *noûs* is described as being ἀπαθής and ἀμιγής, an objection might arise.

Ib., 429 b²²⁻²⁶:

Objection

Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις, εἰ ὁ νοῦς ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ μηθενὶ μηθὲν
 ἔχει κοινόν, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, πῶς νοήσει, εἰ τὸ νοεῖν πάσχειν τί
 ἐστὶν. ἢ γὰρ τι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχειν.

c. Ar. replies, 429 b²⁹-430 a²:

Reply

... τὸ μὲν πάσχειν κατὰ κοινόν τι διήρηται πρότερον, ὅτι δυνάμει πῶς
 ἐστὶ τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἐντελεχεία οὐδέν, πρὶν ἂν νοῇ. δεῖ δ' οὕτως ὥσπερ
 430a ἐν γραμματείῳ ὃ μηθὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχεία γεγραμμένον, ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ
 τοῦ νοῦ.

652—Mind is not *only* a passive faculty.

De an. III 5, 430 a¹⁰⁻²⁵:

Active
mind

10 Ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τι τὸ μὲν ὕλη ἐκάστω γένει (τοῦτο
 δὲ ὁ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκεῖνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἷτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα,
 οἶον ἢ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταῦτα
 τὰς διαφοράς. καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα
 15 ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔξις τις, οἶον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γὰρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει
 ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα. καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθής καὶ
 ἀμιγής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὦν ἐνεργείᾳ. αἰ γὰρ τιμιώτερον τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ
 20 ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι·
 ἢ δὲ κατὰ δυνάμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἐνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐ χρόνῳ· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτε
 μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ. χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον
 25 νοῦς φθαρτός, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ.

Cp. the next nr.

653—With this description of the νοῦς ποιητικός, as it is called later, we might compare the following passage from the *De gen. anim.*, where

¹ The formula τόπος εἰδῶν does not occur in Plato's Dialogues, but it expresses fairly well his view of the soul.

it is argued that no material activity can exist apart from a body, and consequently, that no bodily activity could enter from outside. Exception is to be made for *noûs* exclusively, for only *noûs* has no connexion with any bodily activity.

**Noûs enters
from outside**

De gen. an. II 3, 736 b²²⁻²⁹:

"Ὅσων γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀρχῶν ἡ ἐνέργεια σωματική, δῆλον ὅτι ταύτας ἄνευ σώματος ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν, οἷον βαδίζειν ἄνευ ποδῶν· ὥστε καὶ θύραθεν εἰσιέναι ἀδύνατον. οὔτε γὰρ αὐτάς καθ' αὐτάς εἰσιέναι οἷον τε ἀχωρίστους οὔσας, οὔτ' 25 ἐν σώματι εἰσιέναι· τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα περίττωμα μεταβαλλούσης τῆς τροφῆς ἐστίν. λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια.

SEVENTEENTH CHAPTER RHETORIC AND POETICS

I—THE RHETORIC

654—Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is closely related with his logical writings, at least with the *Topics* and *Analytics*. This does not imply, however, that it should belong to the same period of Aristotle's life. Not only the political event mentioned in II 23, points to a date after 339¹; indeed, chapters like 12-14 of the same book can hardly be the work of a young man.

a. Against Plato's *Gorgias* Aristotle defends that rhetoric is a τέχνη, which ought to have a special method.

Rhet. I 1, 1354 a¹⁻¹¹:

354a 'Η ῥητορική ἐστὶν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ². ἀμφοτέραι γὰρ περὶ τοιοῦτων εἰσὶν ἃ κοινὰ τρόπον τινὰ ἀπάντων ἐστὶ γνωρίζειν καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιστήμης ἀφωρισμένης. διὸ καὶ πάντες τρόπον τινὰ μετέχουσιν ἀμφοῖν· 5 πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς καὶ ἐξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειροῦσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πολλῶν οἱ μὲν εἰκῇ ταῦτα δρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν ἀπὸ ἕξεως. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται, δῆλον ὅτι εἴη ἂν αὐτὰ καὶ ὁδοποιεῖν· δι' ὃ γὰρ ἐπιτυχάνουσιν οἱ τε διὰ συνήθειαν καὶ οἱ 10 ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου, τὴν αἰτίαν θεωρεῖν ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἤδη πάντες ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν τέχνης ἔργον εἶναι.

Rhetoric the
counterpart
of dialectic

b. Against existing treatises on "the Art of Speech", composed by professional rhetors, he complains that their authors always neglected the argumentative element of rhetoric, which is, in fact, its essential part.

Ib., 1354 a¹¹⁻¹⁸:

Νῦν μὲν οὖν οἱ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες ὀλίγον πεπορίκασιν αὐτῆς μόριον· αἱ γὰρ πίστεις ἔντεχνόν ἐστι μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα προσθήκαι, οἱ 15 δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων³ οὐδὲν λέγουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, περὶ

Defect of
existing
treatises

¹ See M. Dufour's Introduction to Ar.'s *Rhetoric*, Paris 1932, p. 14 f.

² On the meaning of the term *dialectic* in Aristotle see our nr. 435 sub a and b, and the text of *Top.* I 1 cited there.

³ The *enthymema* has been defined by Ar. in the *Anal. Pr.* II 27, 70 a¹⁰⁻¹¹, as a syllogism from probabilities or signs.

δὲ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τὰ πλεῖστα πραγματεύονται· διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργή καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν.

655—The use of rhetoric.

a. As means of producing conviction.

Use of
rhetoric

Rhet. I 1, 1355 a²⁰⁻²⁹:

Χρήσιμος δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ διὰ τε τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττω τάληθῃ καὶ 20
τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥστε ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον αἱ κρίσεις γίνωνται,
ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἄξιον ἐπιτιμήσεως. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς
ἐνίους οὐδ' εἰ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἔχοιμεν ἐπιστήμην, ῥάδιον ἀπ' ἐκείνης πείσαι 25
λέγοντας· διδασκαλίας γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος, τοῦτο δὲ
ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς πίστεις καὶ τοὺς λόγους,
ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς ἐλέγομεν περὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντεύξεως ¹.

b. Rhetoric has to draw opposite conclusions.

Rhetoric as
ἀντιλογικὴ
τέχνη

Ib., 1355 a²⁹⁻³⁸:

Ἔτι δὲ τάναντία δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, 30
οὐχ ὅπως ἀμφοτέρω πράττωμεν (οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν) ἀλλ' ἵνα μήτε
λανθάνῃ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις μὴ δικαίως αὐτοὶ
λύειν ἔχωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶν οὐδεμία τάναντία συλλογίζεται, ἡ
δὲ διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόναι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν· ὁμοίως γάρ εἰσιν ἀμφοτέραι 35
τῶν ἐναντίων. τὰ μέντοι ὑποκείμενα πράγματα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ
τάληθῃ καὶ τὰ βελτίω τῇ φύσει εὐσυλλογιστότερα καὶ πιθανώτερα ὥς ἀπλῶς
εἰπεῖν.

c. Its possible abuse is no argument against it.

Why
admissible

Ib., 1355 a^{38-b7}:

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον, εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν
ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ δ' οὐκ αἰσχρὸν· ὁ μᾶλλον ἰδίον ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου τῆς τοῦ σώματος 1355b
χρείας. εἰ δ' ὅτι μεγάλη βλάβειεν ἂν ὁ χρώμενος ἀδίκως τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει
τῶν λόγων, τοῦτό γε κοινόν ἐστι κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ἀρετῆς, καὶ
μάλιστα κατὰ τῶν χρησιμωτάτων, οἷον ἰσχύος ὑγείας πλούτου στρατηγίας· 5
τούτοις γὰρ ἂν τις ὠφελήσειε τὰ μέγιστα χρώμενος δικαίως καὶ βλάβειεν
ἀδίκως.

¹ The reference is to *Top.* I 2, 101 a²⁶⁻²⁷ ff., where it is said that the subject treated in this book (namely, dialectic) is useful for three purposes: for intellectual training, for causal encounters (πρὸς τὰς ἐντεύξεις) and for the philosophical sciences.

d. Its function is not only to persuade, but to see the possible ways of persuading people about any given subject.

Ib., 1355 b⁹⁻¹⁴:

Its true
function

10 ... καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος, φανερόν, καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ πείσαι ἔργον αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἰδεῖν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πιθανὰ περὶ ἕκαστον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις πάσαις· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς τὸ ὑγιᾶ ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μέχρι οὗ ἐνδέχεται, μέχρι τούτου προαγαγεῖν· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἀδυνάτους μεταλαβεῖν ὑγιείας ὁμως θεραπεῦσαι καλῶς.

656—Rhetoric, then, is defined by Ar. in the following formula.

Rhet. I 2, 1355 b²⁵⁻²⁶:

Definition
of rhetoric

Ἔστω δὴ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν.

657—a. There are three modes of persuasion.

Ib., 1356 a^{1-10, 14-17, 19-20}:

Three modes
of
persuasion

356a Τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἶδη ἐστίν· αἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἡθελῆναι τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναι πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ, διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι. διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἡθελῆναι, ὅταν λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γὰρ ἐπεικέσει πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θᾶττον, περὶ πάντων μὲν ἀπλῶς, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς μὴ ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παντελῶς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τὸ προδοδεχάσθαι ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα. — Διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυπούμενοι καὶ χαίροντες ἢ φιλοῦντες καὶ μισοῦντες· πρὸς δὲ καὶ μόνον πειρᾶσθαι φαμεν πραγματεῦσθαι τοὺς νῦν 7, 19 τεχνολογοῦντας. — Διὰ δὲ τῶν λόγων πιστεύουσιν, ὅταν ἀληθὲς ἢ φαινόμενον δείξωμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα πιθανῶν.

b. These then being the means of effecting persuasion, rhetoric is necessarily related with dialectic and ethics.

Ib., a²⁰⁻²⁷:

Relation of
rhetoric with
dialectic and
ethics

20 Ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ πίστεις διὰ τούτων εἰσὶ, φανερόν ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ τρία ἐστὶ λαβεῖν τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι δυναμένου καὶ τοῦ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὰ ἡθελῆναι καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τρίτον τοῦ περὶ τὰ πάθη, τί τε ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν παθῶν καὶ ποιόν τι, καὶ 25 ἐκ τίνων ἐγγίνεται καὶ πῶς. ὥστε συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἶον παραφυῆς τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἡθελῆναι πραγματείας, ἣν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσ-αγορεύειν πολιτικὴν.

658—That rhetoric “proves opposites” (655b), might be illustrated excellently by the final chapter of this book, from which we cite the following passages.

On combat-
ing and
defending
written laws

a. *Rhet.* I 15, 1375 a²¹-b²⁶:

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων καλουμένων πίστεων ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τῶν εἰρημένων 1375a
ἐπιδραμεῖν· ἴδιαι γὰρ αὐταὶ τῶν δικανικῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν, νόμοι
μάρτυρες συνθῆκαι βάσανοι ὄρκος. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ νόμων εἴπωμεν, πῶς 25
χρηστέον καὶ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα καὶ κατηγοροῦντα καὶ ἀπολογοῦ-
μενον. φανερόν γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μὲν ἐναντίος ἦ ὁ γεγραμμένος τῷ πράγματι, τῷ
κοινῷ νόμῳ χρηστέον καὶ τοῖς ἐπεικέσιν ὡς δικαιότεροις. καὶ ὅτι τὸ γνώμη
τῇ ἀρίστη τοῦτ' ἐστί, τὸ μὴ παντελῶς χρῆσθαι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις. καὶ ὅτι τὸ 30
μὲν ἐπεικὲς αἰεὶ μένει καὶ οὐδέποτε μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ὁ κοινός (κατὰ φύσιν γὰρ
ἐστίν), οἱ δὲ γεγραμμένοι πολλάκις· ὅθεν εἴρηται τὰ ἐν τῇ Σοφοκλέους Ἀντι-
γόνη (ἀπολογεῖται γὰρ ὅτι ἔθαψε παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Κρέοντος νόμον, ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ
τὸν ἄγραφον).

35

οὐ γὰρ τί νῦν γε ἀχθές, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ποτε.

1375b

ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἔμελλον ἀνδρὸς οὐδενός.

καὶ ὅτι τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀληθές τι καὶ συμφέρον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ δοκοῦν· ὥστ' οὐ
νόμος ὁ γεγραμμένος· οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ νόμου. καὶ ὅτι ὥσπερ 5
ἀργυρογνώμων ὁ κριτής ἐστιν, ὅπως διακρίνῃ τὸ κίβδηλον δίκαιον καὶ τὸ
ἀληθές. καὶ ὅτι βελτίονος ἀνδρὸς τὸ τοῖς ἀγράφοις ἢ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις χρῆσθαι
καὶ ἐμμένειν. καὶ εἴ που ἐναντίος νόμῳ εὐδοκιμοῦντι ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ· οἷον
ἐνίστε ὁ μὲν κελεύει κύρια εἶναι ἄττ' ἂν συνθῶνται, ὁ δ' ἀπαγορεύει μὴ συν- 10
τίθεσθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον. καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος, ὥστε στρέφειν καὶ ὁρᾶν ἐφ' ὁποτέραν
τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἐφαρμόσει ἢ τὸ συμφέρον, εἴτα τούτῳ χρῆσθαι. καὶ
εἰ τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἐφ' οἷς ἐτέθη ὁ νόμος μηκέτι μένει, ὁ δὲ νόμος, πειρατέον
τοῦτο δηλοῦν καὶ μάχεσθαι ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν νόμον. ἐὰν δὲ ὁ γεγραμμένος ἢ 15
πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, τότε γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστη λεκτέον ὅτι οὐ τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον
ἐνεκα δικάζειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἵνα, ἐὰν ἀγνοήσῃ τί λέγει ὁ νόμος, μὴ ἐπιорκῇ.
καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν αἰρεῖται οὐδεὶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτῷ. καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν δια-
φέρει ἢ μὴ κεῖσθαι ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι. καὶ ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις οὐ λυσιτελεῖ 20
παρασοφίζεσθαι τὸν ἱατρόν· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτο βλάπτει ἢ ἁμαρτία τοῦ ἱατροῦ
ὅσον τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι ἀπειθεῖν τῷ ἄρχοντι. καὶ ὅτι τὸ τῶν νόμων σοφώτερον ζητεῖν
εἶναι, τοῦτ' ἐστίν ὁ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινουμένοις νόμοις ἀπαγορεύεται. καὶ περὶ μὲν 25
τῶν νόμων οὕτω διωρίσθω.

Arguments
about
witnesses

b. *Ib.*, 1376 a¹⁷-b³¹:

Πιστώματα δὲ περὶ μαρτυριῶν μάρτυρας μὲν μὴ ἔχοντι, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων 1376a
δεῖ κρίνειν καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστη, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπατῆσαι

20 τὰ εἰκότα ἐπὶ ἀργυρίῳ, καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἁλίσκεται τὰ εἰκότα ψευδομαρτυριῶν.
 ἔχοντι δὲ πρὸς μὴ ἔχοντα, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπόδικα τὰ εἰκότα, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει
 μαρτυριῶν, εἰ ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἱκανὸν ἦν θεωρῆσαι. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μαρτυρίαι αἱ μὲν
 περὶ αὐτοῦ αἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, καὶ αἱ μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος αἱ δὲ
 25 περὶ τοῦ ἡθους, ὥστε φανερόν ἐστι οὐδέποτ' ἔστιν ἀπορῆσαι μαρτυρίας χρησίμης·
 εἰ μὴ γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ πράγματος ἢ αὐτῷ ὁμολογουμένης ἢ τῷ ἀμφισβητοῦντι
 ἐναντίας, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἡθους ἢ αὐτοῦ εἰς ἐπιείκειαν ἢ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος εἰς
 30 φαυλότητα. τὰ δ' ἄλλα περὶ μάρτυρος ἢ φίλου ἢ ἐχθροῦ ἢ μεταξὺ, ἢ εὐδοκιμοῦντος
 ἢ ἀδοξοῦντος ἢ μεταξὺ, καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦται διαφοραί, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν λεκτέον
 ἐξ οἷων περ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγομεν.

Περὶ δὲ τῶν συνθηκῶν τσαύτη τοῦ λόγου χρῆσις ἐστὶν ὅσον αὖξιν ἢ καθαιρεῖν **On contracts**
 376b ἢ πιστὰς ποιεῖν ἢ ἀπίστους, ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχῃσι, πιστὰς καὶ κυρίας, ἐπὶ δὲ
 τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος τοῦναντίον. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πιστὰς ἢ ἀπίστους κατασκευάζειν
 οὐδὲν διαφέρει τῆς περὶ τοὺς μάρτυρας πραγματείας· ὅποιοι γὰρ ἂν τινες ὦσιν οἱ
 5 ἐπιγεγραμμένοι ἢ φυλάττοντες τούτοις αἱ συνθήκαι πισταὶ εἰσιν. ὁμολογουμένης
 δ' εἶναι τῆς συνθήκης, οἰκειάς μὲν οὔσης αὖξητέον· ἢ γὰρ συνθήκη νόμος ἐστὶν
 ἴδιος καὶ κατὰ μέρος, καὶ αἱ μὲν συνθήκαι οὐ ποιοῦσι τὸν νόμον κύριον, οἱ δὲ νόμοι
 10 τὰς κατὰ τὸν νόμον συνθήκας. καὶ ὅλως αὐτὸς ὁ νόμος συνθήκη τις ἐστίν, ὥστε
 ὅστις ἀπιστεῖ ἢ ἀναιρεῖ συνθήκην, τοὺς νόμους ἀναιρεῖ. ἔτι δὲ πράττεται τὰ πολλὰ
 τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἐκούσια κατὰ συνθήκας, ὥστε ἀκύρων γιγνομένων
 ἀναιρεῖται ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρεῖα τῶν ἀνθρώπων. καὶ τᾶλλα δὲ ὅσα ἀρμόττει,
 15 ἐπιπολῆς ἰδεῖν ἐστίν. ἂν δ' ἐναντία ἢ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων, πρῶτον μὲν,
 ἅπερ ἂν τις πρὸς νόμον ἐναντίον μαχέσαιτο, ταῦθ' ἀρμόττει· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τοῖς
 μὲν νόμοις, ἂν μὴ ὀρθῶς κείμενοι ὦσιν ἀλλ' ἐξαμάρτωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, οὐκ οἴομεθα
 δεῖν πείθεσθαι, ταῖς δὲ συνθήκαις ἀναγκαῖον. εἴθ' ὅτι τοῦ δικαίου ἐστὶ βρα-
 20 βευτῆς ὁ δικαστής· οὐκ οὖν τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ἀλλ' ὥς δικαιοτέρον. καὶ τὸ μὲν
 δίκαιον οὐκ ἔστι μεταστρέφαι οὔτ' ἀπάτη οὔτ' ἀνάγκη (πεφυκὸς γὰρ ἐστίν),
 συνθήκαι δὲ γίγονται καὶ ἐξαπατηθέντων καὶ ἀναγκασθέντων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
 σκοπεῖν εἰ ἐναντία ἐστὶ τι νῦν γεγραμμένων νόμων ἢ τῶν κοινῶν, καὶ τῶν
 25 γεγραμμένων ἢ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἢ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις, ἔπειτα εἰ ἄλλαις συνθήκαις
 ὑστέραις ἢ προτέραις· ἢ γὰρ αἱ ὑστεραι κύριαι, ἄκυροι δ' αἱ πρότεραι, ἢ αἱ
 πρότεραι ὀρθαί, αἱ δ' ὑστεραι ἡπατήκασιν, ὅποτέρως ἂν ἢ χρήσιμον. ἔτι δὲ τὸ
 30 συμφέρον ὁρᾶν, εἰ πῇ ἐναντιοῦται τοῖς κριταῖς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· καὶ γὰρ
 ταῦτα εὐθεώρητα ὁμοίως.

659—Since persuasion is also concerned with the state of mind of the hearers, practical psychology has its part in rhetoric. In book II, ch. 2-11, Ar. treats the various emotions, in ch. 12-14 the various types of human character in different ages.

The young
man

a. The young man's character. *Rhet.* II 12, 1389 a²-b¹².

Οἱ μὲν οὖν νέοι τὰ ἤθη εἰσὶν ἐπιθυμητικοί, καὶ οἷοι ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσιν. 1389a
καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν μάλιστα ἀκολουθητικοί εἰσι ταῖς περὶ τὰ
ἄφροδίσια, καὶ ἀκρατεῖς ταύτης. εὐμετάβολοι δὲ καὶ ἀψίκοροι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυ- 5
μίας, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, ταχέως δὲ παύονται· ὀξεῖται γὰρ αἱ βουλήσεις
καὶ οὐ μεγάλαι, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν καμνόντων δίψαι καὶ πεῖναι. καὶ θυμικοὶ καὶ
ὀξύθυμοι καὶ οἷοι ἀκολουθεῖν τῇ ὀρμῇ. καὶ ἥττους εἰσὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ· διὰ γὰρ 10
φιλοτιμίαν οὐκ ἀνέχονται ὀλιγωρούμενοι, ἀλλ' ἀγανακτοῦσιν, ἂν οἴωνται
ἀδικεῖσθαι. καὶ φιλότιμοι μὲν εἰσι, μᾶλλον δὲ φιλόνοικοι· ὑπεροχῆς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ
ἢ νεότης, ἡ δὲ νίκη ὑπεροχὴ τις. καὶ ἄμφω ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοχρήματοι·
φιλοχρήματοι δὲ ἥκιστα διὰ τὸ μήπω ἐνδείας πεπειραῖσθαι, ὥσπερ τὸ Πιττακοῦ 15
ἔχει ἀπόφθεγμα εἰς Ἀμφιάραον¹. καὶ οὐ κακοῦθεις ἀλλ' εὐήθεις διὰ τὸ μήπω
τε θεωρηκέναι πολλὰς πονηρίας. καὶ εὐπιστοὶ διὰ τὸ μήπω πολλὰ ἐξηπατῆσθαι.
καὶ εὐέλπιδες· ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ οἰνωμένοι, οὕτω διάθερμοι εἰσιν οἱ νέοι ὑπὸ τῆς
φύσεως· ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μήπω πολλὰ ἀποτετυχηκέναι. καὶ ζῶσι τὰ πλεῖστα 20
ἐλπίδι· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίς τοῦ μέλλοντός ἐστιν ἡ δὲ μνήμη τοῦ παροικομένου,
τοῖς δὲ νέοις τὸ μὲν μέλλον πολὺ τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς βραχύ· τῇ γὰρ πρώτῃ
ἡμέρᾳ μεμνησθαι μὲν οὐδὲν οἴονται, ἐλπίζειν δὲ πάντα. καὶ εὐεξαπάτητοί εἰσι 25
διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον· ἐλπίζουνσι γὰρ ῥαδίως. καὶ ἀνδρειότεροι· θυμώδεις γὰρ καὶ
εὐέλπιδες, ὧν τὸ μὲν μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ θαρρεῖν ποιεῖ· οὔτε γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος
οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, τό τε ἐλπίζειν ἀγαθόν τι θαρραλέον ἐστίν. καὶ αἰσχυνηγλοί·
οὐ γὰρ πω καλὰ ἕτερα ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ πεπαιδευνται ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου 30
μόνον. καὶ μεγαλόψυχοι· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου πω τεταπείνωνται, ἀλλὰ
τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄπειροί εἰσιν, καὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν αὐτὸν μεγάλων μεγαλοψυχία· τοῦτο
δ' εὐέλπιδος. καὶ μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται πράττειν τὰ καλὰ τῶν συμφερόντων·
τῷ γὰρ ἤθει ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λογισμῷ, ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέ- 35
ροντος ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ τοῦ καλοῦ. καὶ φιλόφιλοι καὶ φιλέταιροι μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων
ἡλικιῶν διὰ τὸ χαίρειν τῷ συζῆν καὶ μήπω πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον κρίνειν μηδέν, 1389b
ὥστε μηδὲ τοὺς φίλους. καὶ ἅπαντα ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ σφοδρότερον ἁμαρτάνουσι
παρὰ τὸ Χιλώνειον². πάντα γὰρ ἄγαν πράττουσιν· φιλοῦσί τε γὰρ ἄγαν
καὶ μισοῦσιν ἄγαν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ὁμοίως. καὶ εἰδέναι πάντα οἴονται καὶ 5
διεσχυρίζονται· τοῦτο γὰρ αἰτιόν ἐστι καὶ τοῦ πάντα ἄγαν. καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα
ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς ὕβριν καὶ οὐ κακουργίαν. καὶ ἐλεητικοὶ διὰ τὸ πάντας χρηστοὺς καὶ
βελτίους ὑπολαμβάνειν· τῇ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀκακίᾳ τοὺς πέλας μετροῦσιν, ὥστ' ἀνάξια 10
πάσχειν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν αὐτούς. καὶ φιλογέλωτες, διὸ καὶ εὐτράπελοι· ἡ γὰρ
εὐτραπελία πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις ἐστίν. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν νέων τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἥθος.

¹ The word of Pittacus is unknown to us.

² Μηδὲν ἄγαν.

b. The character of elderly men. *Rhet.* II 13, 1389 b¹³-1390 a²⁸:

Οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ παρηκμαχότες σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις τὰ
 15 πλεῖστα ἔχουσιν ἦθη· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλὰ ἔτη βεβιωκέναι καὶ πλείω ἐξηπατῆσθαι
 καὶ ἡμαρτηκέναι, καὶ τὰ πλείω φαῦλα εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὔτε διαβεβαιοῦν-
 ται οὐδέν, ἥττον τε ἄγαν ἅπαντα ἢ δεῖ. καὶ οἶονται, ἴσασι δ' οὐδέν. καὶ ἀμφισβη-
 20 οῦντες προστιθέασιν αἰεὶ τὸ ἴσως καὶ τάχα, καὶ πάντα λέγουσιν οὕτω, παγίως
 οὐδέν. καὶ κακοήθεις εἰσίν· ἔστι γὰρ κακοήθεια τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ὑπολαμβά-
 νειν πάντα. ἔτι δὲ καχύποπτοί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν, ἀπιστοὶ δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν.
 καὶ οὔτε φιλοῦσι σφόδρα οὔτε μισοῦσι διὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν Βίαντος ὑπο-
 25 θήκην καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς μισήσοντες καὶ μισοῦσιν ὡς φιλήσοντες. καὶ μικρόψυχοι
 διὰ τὸ τεταπεινωθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου· οὐδενὸς γὰρ μεγάλου οὐδὲ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ
 τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. καὶ ἀνελεύθεροι· ἐν γὰρ τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἢ
 οὐσία, ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἴσασιν ὡς χαλεπὸν τὸ κτήσασθαι καὶ
 30 ῥάδιον τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν. καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ πάντα προφοβητικοί· ἐναντίως γὰρ
 διακίενται τοῖς νέοις· κατεψυγμένοι γὰρ εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ θερμοί. ὥστε προ-
 ωδοποίηκε τὸ γῆρας τῇ δειλίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ φόβος κατάψυξις τις ἐστίν. καὶ
 φιλόζωοι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῇ τελευταίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἀπόντος εἶναι
 35 τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ οὐ δὲ ἐνδεεῖς, τούτου μάλιστα ἐπιθυμεῖν. καὶ φίλαυτοι
 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ· μικροψυχία γὰρ τις καὶ αὕτη. καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ζῶσιν,
 ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸ καλόν, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, διὰ τὸ φίλαυτοί εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον
 1390a αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἀπλῶς. καὶ ἀναίσχυντοι μᾶλλον ἢ αἰσχυντηλοί·
 διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ φροντίζειν ὁμοίως τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ὀλιγωροῦσι
 τοῦ δοκεῖν. καὶ δυσέλπιδες διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· τὰ γὰρ πλείω τῶν γιγνομένων
 5 φαῦλά ἐστιν· ἀποβαίνει γοῦν τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον· καὶ ἔτι διὰ τὴν δειλίαν.
 καὶ ζῶσι τῇ μνήμῃ μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἐλπίδι· τοῦ γὰρ βίου τὸ μὲν λοιπὸν ὀλίγον τὸ
 δὲ παρεληλυθὸς πολὺ, ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐλπίς τοῦ μέλλοντος ἢ δὲ μνήμη τῶν παροι-
 10 χόμενων. ὅπερ αἴτιον καὶ τῆς ἀδολεσχίας αὐτοῖς. διατελοῦσι γὰρ τὰ γενόμενα
 λέγοντες· ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι γὰρ ἤδονται. καὶ οἱ θυμοὶ ὀξεῖς μὲν εἰσιν ἀσθενεῖς
 δέ, καὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι αἱ μὲν ἐκλελοιπασιν αἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς εἰσίν, ὥστε οὐτ' ἐπιθυ-
 15 μητικοὶ οὔτε πρακτικοὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ κέρδος. διὸ καὶ
 σωφρονικοὶ φαίνονται οἱ τηλικούτοι· αἷ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀνείκασι, καὶ δουλεύ-
 ουσι τῷ κέρδει. καὶ μᾶλλον ζῶσι κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἦθος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος τὸ δ' ἦθος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν. καὶ τὰ δίκηματα ἀδικοῦσιν
 εἰς κακουργίαν, οὐκ εἰς ὕβριν. ἐλεητικοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ γέροντές εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ
 20 ταῦτο τοῖς νέοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν, οἱ δὲ δι' ἀσθένειαν· πάντα
 γὰρ οἶονται ἐγγὺς εἶναι αὐτοῖς παθεῖν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἐλεητικόν. ὅθεν ὀδυρτικοὶ
 εἰσι, καὶ οὐκ εὐτράπελοι οὐδὲ φιλογέλοιοι· ἐναντίον γὰρ τὸ ὀδυρτικὸν τῷ
 φιλογέλῳ. τῶν μὲν οὖν νέων καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τὰ ἦθη τοιαῦτα· ὥστ'
 25 ἐπεὶ ἀποδέχονται πάντες τοὺς τῷ σφετέρῳ ἦθει λεγομένους λόγους καὶ τοὺς

ὁμοίους, οὐκ ἄδηλον πῶς χρώμενοι τοῖς λόγοις τοιοῦτοι φανοῦνται καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ λόγοι.

**Men in
their prime**

c. The character of men in their prime. II 14, 1390 a²⁹-b¹³:

Οἱ δὲ ἀκμάζοντες φανερόν ὅτι μεταξὺ τούτων τὸ ἥθος ἔσονται, ἐκατέρων ἀφαιροῦντες τὴν ὑπερβολήν, καὶ οὔτε σφόδρα θαρροῦντες (θρασύτης γὰρ τὸ 3ο τοιοῦτον) οὔτε λίαν φοβούμενοι, καλῶς δὲ πρὸς ἄμφω ἔχοντες, οὔτε πᾶσι πιστεύοντες οὔτε πᾶσιν ἀπιστοῦντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς κρίνοντες μᾶλλον. καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντες μόνον οὔτε πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄμφω. καὶ οὔτε πρὸς φειδῶ οὔτε πρὸς ἀσωτίαν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀρμόττον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 1390b πρὸς θυμὸν καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν. καὶ σώφρονες μετ' ἀνδρείας καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι μετὰ σωφροσύνης. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νέοις καὶ τοῖς γέρονσι διήρηται ταῦτα· εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν νέοι ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ ἀκόλαστοι, οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι σώφρονες καὶ δειλοί· ὥς δὲ 5 καθόλου εἰπεῖν, ὅσα μὲν διήρηται ἡ νεότης καὶ τὸ γῆρας τῶν ὠφελίμων, ταῦτα ἄμφω ἔχουσιν, ὅσα δ' ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἢ ἐλλείπουσι, τούτων τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ ἀρμόττον. ἀκμάζει δὲ τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἀπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα ἐτῶν μέχρι τῶν πέντε 10 καὶ τριάκοντα, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ περὶ τὰ ἐνὸς δεῖν πεντήκοντα. περὶ μὲν οὖν νεότητος καὶ γήρωος καὶ ἀκμῆς, ποίων ἡθῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, εἰρήσθω τσαῦτα.

2—POETICS

660—The different kinds of poetry defined as various modes of imitation.

**General
definition
of poetry**

Poet. I, 1447 a¹³-18:

Ἐποποιία δὴ καὶ ἡ τῆς τραγωδίας ποίησις, ἔτι δὲ κωμωδία καὶ ἡ διθυραμβο- 1447a ποιητικὴ καὶ τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἢ πλείστη καὶ κιθαριστικῆς, πᾶσαι τυγχάνουσιν 15 οὔσαι μιμήσεις τὸ σύνολον. διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων τρισίν· ἡ γὰρ τῷ γένει ἐτέροις μιμεῖσθαι, ἡ τῷ ἔτερα, ἡ τῷ ἐτέρως καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον.

**Means of
imitation**

661—a. The means of imitation. Ib., 1447 a¹⁸-b²⁰, b²³-29:

Ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι πολλὰ μιμοῦνται τινες ἀπεικάζοντες, οἱ μὲν διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνηθείας, ἕτεροι δὲ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς, οὕτω κἂν 20 ταῖς εἰρημέναις τέχναις· ἅπασαι μὲν ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν ἐν ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ, τούτοις δ' ἡ χωρὶς ἡ μεμιγμένοις, οἷον ἁρμονίᾳ μὲν καὶ ῥυθμῷ χρώμεναι μόνον ἢ τε αὐλητικὴ καὶ ἡ κιθαριστικὴ, κἂν εἴ τινες ἕτεραι τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι τοιαῦται τὴν δύναμιν, οἷον ἡ τῶν συρίγγων. αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ 25 ῥυθμῷ μιμοῦνται χωρὶς ἁρμονίας οἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι διὰ τῶν σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν μιμοῦνται καὶ ἡθῆ καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις. ἡ δὲ ἐποποιία μόνον τοῖς λόγοις φιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις, καὶ τούτοις εἴτε μιγνῦσα μετ' ἀλλήλων, εἴθ' ἐνὶ τινι γένει χρωμένη τῶν μέτρων τυγχάνουσα μέχρι τοῦ 1447b

10 νῦν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὀνομάσαι κοινὸν τοὺς Σώφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου
 μίμους καὶ τοὺς Σωκρατικούς λόγους, οὐδὲ εἴ τις διὰ τριμέτρων ἢ ἐλεγείων
 ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινῶν τῶν τοιούτων ποιοῖτο τὴν μίμησιν· πλὴν οἱ ἄνθρωποι γε
 συνάπτοντες τῷ μέτρῳ τὸ ποιεῖν ἐλεγειοποιούς τοὺς δὲ ἐποποιούς ὀνομάζουσιν,
 15 οὐχ ὥς τοὺς κατὰ μίμησιν ποιητάς ἀλλὰ κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον προσαγορεύοντες.
 καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἱατρικὸν ἢ φυσικόν¹ τι διὰ τῶν μέτρων ἐκφέρωσιν, οὕτω καλεῖν
 εἰώθασιν. οὐδὲν δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν Ὀμήρῳ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ μέτρον·
 διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητὴν. —
 23 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. εἰσὶ δέ τινες αἱ πᾶσι χρῶνται
 τοῖς εἰρημένοις, λέγω δὲ οἶον ῥυθμῷ καὶ μέλει καὶ μέτρῳ, ὥσπερ ἢ τε τῶν
 διθυραμβικῶν ποιήσεις καὶ ἡ τῶν νόμων καὶ ἡ τε τραγωδία καὶ ἡ κωμωδία·
 διαφέρουσι δέ, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἅμα πᾶσιν αἱ δὲ κατὰ μέρος. ταύτας μὲν οὖν λέγω
 29 τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν τεχνῶν, ἐν οἷς ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν.

b. The objects represented. Ib., 2, 1448 a¹⁻¹⁴, 16¹⁹:

Objects

448a Ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους
 ἢ φαύλους εἶναι (τὰ γὰρ ἤθη σχεδὸν αἰεὶ τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖ μόνοις· κακίᾳ
 γὰρ καὶ ἀρετῇ τὰ ἤθη διαφέρουσι πάντες), ἤτοι βελτίονας ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἢ χείρονας
 5 ἢ καὶ τοιούτους, ὥσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς· Πολύγνωτος μὲν γὰρ κρείττους, Παύσων
 δὲ χείρους, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἵκαζεν. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν
 ἐκάστη μιμήσεων ἔξει ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς, καὶ ἔσται ἐτέρα τῷ ἑτέρα μιμεῖσθαι
 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὀρχήσῃ καὶ αὐλήσῃ καὶ κιθαρίσῃ ἔστι γενέσθαι
 10 ταύτας τὰς ἀνομοιότητας, καὶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δὲ καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν, οἶον
 Ὀμηρος μὲν βελτίους, Κλεοφῶν δὲ ὁμοίους, Ἡγῆμων δὲ ὁ Θάσιος <ὁ> τὰς
 14, 16 παρῳδίας ποιήσας πρῶτος . . . χείρους. — Ἐν δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ διαφορᾷ καὶ ἡ
 τραγωδία πρὸς τὴν κωμωδίαν διέστηκεν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ χείρους ἢ δὲ βελτίους
 μιμεῖσθαι βούλεται τῶν νῦν.

c. The manner in which each kind of object is represented.

Poet. 3, 1448 a¹⁹⁻²⁵:

Manner of
representation

Ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτῃ διαφορὰ τὸ ὡς ἕκαστα τούτων μιμήσαιο ἂν τις.
 20 καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς² καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα
 ἢ ἑτερόν τι γιγνόμενον, ὥσπερ Ὀμηρος ποιεῖ, ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ με-
 ταβάλλοντα, ἢ πάντας ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργούντας τοὺς μιμουμένους.
 ἐν τρισὶ δὴ ταύταις διαφοραῖς ἡ μίμησίς ἐστιν, ὡς εἵπομεν κατ' ἀρχάς, ἐν οἷς
 25 τε καὶ α καὶ ὦς.

¹ An almost certain correction of Heinsius, adopted by newer editors (Bywater, Hardy). The Ms A (Bekker's A^o) has μουσικόν.

² ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς - by the same means.

Origin of
poetry in
general

662—a. The origin of poetry in general and why men take a delight in it.

Poet. 4, 1448 b⁴⁻¹⁵:

Ἑοίκασι δὲ γεννηῆσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτία δύο τινές, καὶ αὗται 1448b
φυσικαί. τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ, καὶ 5
τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις
ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας.
σημεῖον δὲ τούτου τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων· ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὀρώμεν, 10
τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων
τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι μανθάνειν
οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως· ἄλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ
κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ.

15

Origin of
tragedy

b. The origin of tragedy. *Ib.*, 1449 a⁹⁻²⁹:

Γενομένης δ' οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς ¹ (καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ ἡ κωμῳδία, 1449a
καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξαρχόντων τὸν διθύραμβον, ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τὰ φαλλικά,
ἃ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐν πολλαῖς τῶν πόλεων διαμένει νομιζόμενα), κατὰ μικρὸν ἡϋξήθη
προαγόντων ὅσον ἐγίγνετο φανερόν αὐτῆς, καὶ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα
ἡ τραγωδία ἐπαύσατο, ἐπεὶ ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν. καὶ τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν 15
πλῆθος ἐξ ἐνός εἰς δύο πρῶτος Αἰσχύλος ἤγαγε, καὶ τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ ἡλάττωσε,
καὶ τὸν λόγον πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν· τρεῖς δὲ καὶ σκηνογραφίαν
Σοφοκλῆς. ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων καὶ λέξεως γελοίας, διὰ τὸ ἐκ
σατυρικοῦ μεταβαλεῖν, ὅψε ἀπεσεμνύνθη, τό τε μέτρον ἐκ τετραμέτρου ἱαμβεῖον 20
ἐγένετο· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τετραμέτρω ἐχρῶντο διὰ τὸ σατυρικὴν καὶ ὀρχηστι-
κωτέραν εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν, λέξεως δὲ γενομένης ² αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις τὸ οἰκεῖον μέτρον
εὔρεν· μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτικὸν τῶν μέτρων τὸ ἱαμβεῖόν ἐστιν. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου· 25
πλεῖστα γὰρ ἱαμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐξάμετρα δὲ
ὀλιγάκις καὶ ἐκβαίνοντες τῆς λεκτικῆς ἀρμονίας. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεισοδίων πλήθη
καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὥς ἕκαστα κοσμηθῆναι λέγεται.

Comedy

663—a. Comedy. *Poet.* 5, 1449 a³²⁻³⁷:

Ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, μίμησις φαυλοτέρων μὲν, οὐ μέντοι
κατὰ πᾶσαν κακίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοῖον μόριον. τὸ γὰρ γελοῖον
ἐστὶν ἀμάρτημά τι καὶ αἷσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, οἷον εὐθύς τὸ γελοῖον 35
πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἄνευ ὀδύνης.

¹ "It certainly began in improvisations" (Bywater).

² "As soon as a spoken part came in" (Bywater).

b. Epic poetry. Ib., 1449 b⁹⁻²⁰:

Epic poetry

449b Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐποποιία τῇ τραγωδίᾳ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ <διὰ> μέτρου μεγάλου¹ μίμησις
 10 εἶναι σπουδαίων ἡκολούθησεν· τῷ δὲ τὸ μέτρον ἀπλοῦν ἔχειν καὶ ἀπαγγελίαν
 εἶναι, ταύτῃ διαφέρουσιν. ἔτι δὲ τῷ μήκει· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα περᾶται
 ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου εἶναι ἢ μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν, ἡ δὲ ἐποποιία ἀόριστος τῷ
 15 χρόνῳ, καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει. καίτοι τὸ πρῶτον ὁμοίως ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις
 τοῦτο ἐποιοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσιν. μέρη δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ταῦτά, τὰ δὲ ἴδια τῆς
 τραγωδίας. διόπερ ὅστις περὶ τραγωδίας οἶδε σπουδαίας καὶ φαύλης, οἶδε καὶ
 περὶ ἐπῶν· ἃ μὲν γὰρ ἐποποιία ἔχει, ὑπάρχει τῇ τραγωδίᾳ, ἃ δὲ αὐτῇ, οὐ πάντα
 20 ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ.

664—a. The famous definition of tragedy. *Poet.* 6, 1449 b²⁴⁻³¹:Definition
of tragedy

Ἔστιν οὖν τραγωδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας, μέγεθος
 25 ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ, χωρὶς ἐκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων
 καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων
 παθημάτων κάθαρσιν.

Λέγω δὲ ἡδυσμένον μὲν λόγον τὸν ἔχοντα ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ μέλος,
 30 τὸ δὲ χωρὶς τοῖς εἶδεσι τὸ διὰ μέτρων ἔνια μόνον περαίνεσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα
 διὰ μέλους.

There has been much discussion on the meaning of the κάθαρσις τῶν παθημάτων spoken of in this definition. The best interpretation has been given by F. W. Trench, *The place of κάθαρσις in Aristotle's aesthetics*, in *Hermathena*, Dublin 1938, p. 110-134. He argues that, in Aristotle's view, the παθήματα are not as such bad and abnormal, but should be ordered and brought to serenity, which is accomplished through melody, rhythm, art-form. Like Pythagoras and Plato before him, Ar. believed in the influence of music and rhythm on the emotions.

This paper seems not to have been known to Fr. Dirlmeier, who, in *Hermes* 1940, p. 81-92, *Κάθαρσις παθημάτων*, tries again to prove that the genitive παθημάτων is a *separativus*. See also W. J. Verdenius in *Autour d' Aristote*, Louvain 1955, p. 367-373.

Further recent literature on the subject:

M. Kommerell, *Lessing und Aristoteles* (Frankfurter wissenschaftl. Beiträge. Kulturwiss. R. 2) Frankfurt a.M. 1940.

A. Tumarkin, *Die Kunsttheorie von Aristoteles im Rahmen seiner Philosophie*, in *Museum Helveticum* 1945, p. 108-122.

For editions and further literature, see Bibliography p. 302, 303 and 306.

b. Of the formative elements of tragedy action is the first essential.

Formative
elements:
1. actionIb., 1450 a¹⁶⁻²⁵, a³⁸-b²⁰:

450a Ἡ γὰρ τραγωδία μίμησις ἐστὶν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ πράξεως καὶ βίου καὶ
 εὐδαιμονίας <καὶ κακοδαιμονίας· ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονία> καὶ ἡ κακοδαιμονία ἐν
 πράξει ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρᾶξις τις ἐστίν, οὐ ποιότης. εἰσὶ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰ

¹ Text of Bywater. The codex A has μέχρι μόνου μέτρου μεγάλου, B μέχρι μόνου μέτρου μετὰ λόγου. Other editors read: μέχρι μὲν τοῦ μετὰ μέτρου.

ἤθη ποιοί τινες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις εὐδαίμονες ἢ τούναντίον. οὐκ οὖν ὅπως 20
τὰ ἤθη μιμῆσονται πράττουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἤθη συμπεριλαμβάνουσι διὰ τὰς
πράξεις. ὥστε τὰ πράγματα καὶ ὁ μῦθος τέλος τῆς τραγωδίας· τὸ δὲ τέλος
μέγιστον ἀπάντων. ἔτι ἄνευ μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τραγωδία, ἄνευ δὲ 24, 25
ἡθῶν γένοιτ' ἄν. —

2. Other elements

Ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ οἶον ψυχὴ ὁ μῦθος τῆς τραγωδίας, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἤθη. 38
παραπλήσιον γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γραφικῆς· εἰ γὰρ τις ἐναλείψει τοὺς καλλι-
στοις φαρμάκοις χύδην, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειεν καὶ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα. 1450b
ἐστὶ τε μίμησις πράξεως, καὶ διὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τῶν πραττόντων. τρίτον
δὲ ἡ διάνοια. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν δύνασθαι τὰ ἐνόντα καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα, 5
ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων¹ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ
ἀρχαῖοι πολιτικῶς ἐποιοῦν λέγοντας, οἱ δὲ νῦν ῥητορικῶς. ἐστὶ δὲ ἥθος μὲν
τὸ τοιοῦτον ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὅποια τις, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἐστὶ δῆλον ἢ
προαίρεται ἢ φεύγει (διόπερ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἥθος τῶν λόγων ἐν οἷς μὴδ' ὅλως 10
ἐστὶν ὃ τι προαίρεται ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων). διάνοια δέ, ἐν οἷς ἀποδεικνύουσι τι
ὥς ἐστὶν ἢ ὥς οὐκ ἐστὶν, ἢ καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται. τέταρτον δὲ τῶν ἐν
λόγῳ² ἡ λέξις· λέγω δέ, ὥσπερ πρότερον εἴρηται, λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τῆς
ὀνομασίας ἐρμηνείαν, ὃ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμμέτρων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἔχει τὴν 15
αὐτὴν δύναμιν. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν [πέντε] ἡ μελοποιία μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων.
ἡ δὲ ὄψις ψυχᾶ γωγικὸν μὲν, ἀτεχνότατον δὲ καὶ ἥκιστα οἰκείον τῆς ποιητικῆς·
ἡ γὰρ τῆς τραγωδίας δύναμις καὶ ἄνευ ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν ἐστὶν. ἔτι δὲ
κυριωτέρᾳ περὶ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τῶν ὅψεων ἢ τοῦ σκευοποιοῦ τέχνη τῆς 20
τῶν ποιητῶν ἐστὶν.

665—**a.** A story or plot must be of some length.

Length of the story

Poet. 7, 1451 a⁹⁻¹⁵:

Ὅ δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ὅρος, αἰ μὲν ὁ μείζων μέχρι τοῦ 1451a
σύνδηλος εἶναι καλλίων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος, ὥς δὲ ἀπλῶς διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν,
ἐν ὅσῳ μεγέθει κατὰ τὸ εἶκος ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων συμβαίνει
εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἢ ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταβάλλειν, ἱκανὸς
ὅρος ἐστὶ τοῦ μεγέθους. 15

b. Unity of the plot.

Its unity

Poet. 8, 1451 a¹⁶⁻³⁵:

Μῦθος δ' ἐστὶν εἷς, οὐχ ὥσπερ τινὲς οἴονται, ἐὰν περὶ ἓνα ἦ· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ
ἄπειρα τῶ ἐνὶ συμβαίνει, ἐξ ὧν ἐνίων οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἓν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ πράξεις
ἐνὸς πολλαὶ εἰσιν, ἐξ ὧν μία οὐδεμία γίνεται πρᾶξις. διὸ πάντες εἰκόασιν

¹ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων - in the speeches in tragedy.

² ἐν λόγῳ corr. Bywater. Mss. τῶν μὲν λόγων.

20 ἀμαρτάνειν, ὅσοι τῶν ποιητῶν Ἡρακλεῖδα καὶ Θησηεῖδα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιή-
 ματα πεποιήκασιν· οἶονται γὰρ ἐπεὶ εἷς ἦν ὁ Ἡρακλῆς, ἓνα καὶ τὸν μῦθον εἶναι
 25 προσήκειν. ὁ δ' Ὅμηρος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διαφέρει, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καλῶς
 εἶναι, ἥτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν· Ὀδύσσειαν γὰρ ποιῶν οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἅπαντα
 ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη, οἷον πληγῆναι μὲν ἐν τῷ Παρνασσῷ, μανῆναι δὲ προσποιή-
 30 σασθαι ἐν τῷ ἄγερμῳ, ὣν οὐδὲν θατέρου γενομένου ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἢ εἰκὸς θάτερον
 γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μίαν πράξιν, οἷαν λέγομεν, τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν συνέστησεν,
 30 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἰλιάδα. χρὴ οὖν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις μιμητικαῖς ἢ
 μία μίμησις ἐνός ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν μῦθον, ἐπεὶ πράξεως μίμησις ἐστι, μιᾶς
 τε εἶναι καὶ ταύτης ὅλης, καὶ τὰ μέρη συνεστάναι τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως
 ὥστε μετατιθεμένου τινὸς μέρους ἢ ἀφαιρουμένου διαφέρεισθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι
 τὸ ὅλον· ὁ γὰρ προσὸν ἢ μὴ προσὸν μηδὲν ποιεῖ ἐπίδηλον, οὐδὲ μόνον τοῦ
 35 ὅλου ἐστίν.

666—Why poetry is more philosophical and of more serious importance than history.

Poet. 9, 1451 a³⁶-b⁷:

Φανερόν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητοῦ
 ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἷα ἂν γένοιτο, καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.
 1451b ὁ γὰρ ἱστορικὸς καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς οὐ τῷ ἢ ἔμμετρα λέγειν ἢ ἄμμετρα διαφέρουσιν·
 εἴη γὰρ ἂν τὰ Ἡροδότου εἰς μέτρα τεθῆναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἤττον ἂν εἴη ἱστορία
 τις μετὰ μέτρου ἢ ἄνευ μέτρων· ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρει, τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενό-
 5 μενα λέγειν, τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο. διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον
 ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἢ δ' ἱστορία τὰ
 καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει.

Poetry
superior to
history

BOOK IV

THE EARLY PERIPATETIC SCHOOL AND THE EARLY ACADEMY

EIGHTEENTH CHAPTER THE EARLY PERIPATETIC SCHOOL

I—THEOPHRASTUS

Life and
work

667—a. The man and his work. *Diog. L. V* 35, the end - 36, the beginning.

Τοῦ δὴ Σταγειρίτου γεγόνασι μὲν πολλοὶ γνώριμοι, διαφέρων δὲ μάλιστα Θεόφραστος, περὶ οὗ λεκτέον. — Θεόφραστος Μελάντα Ἑρέσιος. — Οὗτος πρῶτον μὲν ἤκουσεν Ἀλκίππου τοῦ πολίτου ἐν τῇ πατρίδι, εἴτ' ἀκούσας Πλάτωνος μετέστη πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην· καὶ κείνου εἰς Χαλκίδα ὑποχωρήσαντος αὐτὸς διεδέξατο τὴν σχολὴν Ὀλυμπιάδι τετάρτῃ καὶ δεκάτῃ καὶ ἑκατοστῇ.

b. Cp. *Simpl., Phys.* 964, ³⁰ Diels:

Τὸν κορυφαῖον τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐταίρων Θεόφραστον.

c. Prosperity of the School under Theophr. *Diog. L. V* 37:

Ἀπῆντων τ' εἰς τὴν διατριβὴν αὐτοῦ μαθηταὶ πρὸς δισχιλίους.

d. He is greatly honoured, both at Athens and abroad.

Diog. L. ib., 37 and 41:

Κάσανδρος γοῦν αὐτὸν ἀπεδέχετο καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ἐπεμψεν ἐπ' αὐτόν· τοσοῦτον δ' ἀποδοχῆς ἤξιοῦτο παρ' Ἀθηναίους, ὥστ' Ἀγωνίδης τολμήσας ἀσεβείας αὐτὸν γράφασθαι, μικροῦ καὶ προσῶφλεν. — Καὶ αὐτόν, ὡς ὁ λόγος, Ἀθηναῖοι πανδημεὶ παρέπεμψαν ποσὶ, τὸν ἄνδρα τιμήσαντες.

Writings

668—*Diog. L. V* 42:

Καταλέλειπε δὲ βιβλία καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι μάλιστα πάμπλειστα.

His numerous works covered the whole field of Aristotle's studies: logic, science, metaphysics, ethics, politics, rhetoric, poetics. Preserved are his two standard works on botany, the *Περὶ φυτῶν ἱστορίας* and *Περὶ φυτῶν αἰτιῶν*, several small treatises

on various subjects of science, fragments of his great *History of philosophy* (Φυσικῶν δόξαι), and of other works. The treatise *Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν* was a part of the *Φυσικῶν δόξαι*, and the *Characters* belonged probably to a greater work on ethics.

669—Empirical basis of scientific theories.

**Empirical
basis**

a. *De caus. plant.* I 1, 1:

Εὐθὺς γὰρ χρὴ συμφωνεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους τοῖς εὐρημένους.

b. Applying this principle throughout his work, he states in the same book, 17, 6:

Ἐκ δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα θεωροῦσι σύμφωνος ὁ λόγος τῶν γιγνομένων.

c. Cf. *De caus. plant.* II 3, 5:

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα μᾶλλον εὐποροῦμεν· ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις δίδωσιν ἀρχάς.

670—Sense-perception provides thought with material, either to use directly or indirectly, by solving the difficulties which perception presents to it.

a. *Metaph.* VIII 19 ed. Ross-Fobes:

Τὸ δὲ ὅτι πολλαχῶς, φανερόν· ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς θεωρεῖ καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ζητεῖ· τάχα δ' ἀληθέστερον εἰπεῖν ὥς ὑποβάλλει τῇ διανοίᾳ τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς ξητοῦσα, τὰ δ' ἀπορίαν ἐνεργαζομένην, δι' ἧς, καὶ μὴ δύνηται προβαίνειν, ὅμως ἐμφαίνεται τι φῶς ἐν τῷ μὴ φωτὶ ζητούντων ἐπὶ πλέον. —

Ib. 25: Μέχρι μὲν οὖν τινὸς δυνάμεθα δι' αἰτίου θεωρεῖν, ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων λαμβάνοντες.

b. Cf. *Clem. Alex., Strom.* II 362 D:

Θεόφραστος δὲ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀρχὴν εἶναι πίστεώς φησιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ ταύτης αἰ ἀρχαὶ πρὸς τὸν λόγον τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐκτείνονται.

671—The phenomenology of plants teaches him that empirical facts should not be artificially forged into a theory.

**Perception
more reliable
than theory**

a. *Hist. plant.* I 3, 5:

Speaking of the difficulty of the classification of plants, he says:

Διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ὥσπερ λέγομεν οὐκ ἀκριβολογητέον τῷ ὄρω ἀλλὰ τῷ τύτῳ ληπτέον τοὺς ἀφορισμούς.

b. Cf. *De caus. plant.* II 4, 8:

Ἄλλ' ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ ἀκριβὲς μᾶλλον ἴσως αἰσθητικῆς δεῖται συνέσεως, λόγῳ δὲ οὐκ εὐμαρὲς ἀφορίσαι.

672—Logic.

**Conversion
of propo-
sitions**

a. Theophr. changes Aristotle's indirect proof of the conversion of universal negative propositions into a direct proof.

Alex. Aphrod. in *Ar. Anal. pr.* 31, ⁴⁻¹⁰ Wallies:

Θεόφραστος μὲν καὶ Εὐδημος ἀπλούστερον ἔδειξαν τὴν καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν ἀντιστρέφουσιν αὐτῇ· τὴν γὰρ καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν ὠνόμασε καθόλου στερητικὴν. Τὴν δὲ δεῖξιν οὕτω ποιοῦνται· κείσθω τὸ Α κατὰ μηδενὸς τοῦ Β· εἰ κατὰ μηδενὸς, ἀπέξευκται τοῦ Β τὸ Α καὶ ἐχώρισται· τὸ δὲ ἀπεξευγμένον ἀπεξευγμένου ἀπέξευκται· καὶ τὸ Β ἄρα παντὸς ἀπέξευκται τοῦ Α· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κατὰ μηδενὸς αὐτοῦ. Οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἐκεῖνοι.

The same is told by Philoponus in *An. pr.* 48¹¹⁻¹⁸ W.

b. Theophr. maintains (against Ar.) the convertibility of universal negative propositions of possibility.

Alex. in *An. pr.* 220, ⁹⁻¹⁶ W.:

Θεόφραστος μέντοι καὶ Εὐδημος, ὥς καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐμνημονεύσαμεν, ἀντιστρέφειν φασὶ καὶ τὴν καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν αὐτῇ, ὥσπερ ἀντέστρεφε καὶ ἡ ὑπάρχουσα ¹ καθόλου ἀποφατικὴ καὶ ἡ ἀναγκαία. "Ὅτι δὲ ἀντιστρέφει, δεικνύσιν οὕτως· εἰ τὸ Α τῷ Β ἐνδέχεται μηδενί, καὶ τῷ Β τὸ Α ἐνδέχεται μηδενί· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ Α τῷ Β μηδενί, ὅτε ἐνδέχεται μηδενί, τότε ἐνδέχεται ἀπεξεῦχθαι τὸ Α πάντων τῶν τοῦ Β· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ', ἔσται τότε καὶ τὸ Β τοῦ Α ἀπεξευγμένον· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ Β τῷ Α ἐνδέχεται μηδενί.

On the logic of modality in Theophr. see Bochensky, *La logique de Théophraste*, Fribourg (Suisse) 1947, ch. V.

**Moods of the
syllogism**

673—a. To Aristotle's four moods of the first figure of the syllogism Theophr. added five others.

Alex., *An. pr.* 69, ³⁸⁻⁷⁰, ¹ W.:

Θεόφραστος δὲ προστίθησιν ἄλλους πέντε τοῖς τέτταρσι τούτοις οὐκέτι τελείους οὐδ' ἀναποδείκτους ὄντας, ὧν μνημονεύσει καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, τῶν μὲν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ προελθόντων, τῶν δὲ ἐν τῷ μετὰ τοῦτο τῷ δευτέρῳ κατ' ἀρχάς.

Bochensky, o.c., p. 56-65, in treating these new moods, states that Theophr. developed Ar.'s indications in a formalistic sense.

b. Later we find the five moods of Theophr. in Boëthius, *De syllogismo categorico*, Patrol. Lat. LXIV, 814 c:

¹ ὑπάρχων is a species of ἀναγκαῖον, what the schoolmen call the *necessarium ex suppositione*. Cp. Bochensky o.c., p. 73.

Quattuor in prima figura modos in Analyticis suis Aristoteles posuit. Ceteros vero quinque modos Theophrastus et Eudemus addiderunt, quibus Porphyrius, gravissimae vir auctoritatis, visus est consensisse, qui sunt huiusmodi.

Follows a description of the new moods.

674—According to Theophr., in syllogisms in which the premisses are of different modality, the conclusion follows the weaker premiss. **Modality**

a. Alex., *An. pr.* 124, ⁸⁻²¹ W.:

Οἱ δὲ γε ἐταῖροι αὐτοῦ (sc. Ἀριστοτέλους) οἱ περὶ Εὐδημόν τε καὶ Θεόφραστον οὐχ οὕτως λέγουσι, ἀλλὰ φασιν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ἐξ ἀναγκαίας τε καὶ ὑπαρχούσης συζυγίαις, ἐὰν ὧσι συγκεῖμεναι συλλογιστικῶς, ὑπάρχον γίνεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα, τοῦτο λαμβάνοντες ἐκ τε τοῦ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς τὸ συμπέρασμα αἰεὶ τῷ ἐλάττονι καὶ χείρονι τῶν κειμένων ἐξομοιοῦσθαι. ἂν τε γὰρ ἐκ καταφατικῆς καὶ ἀποφατικῆς προτάσεως, συνάγεται ἀποφατικὸν τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἂν τ' ἐκ καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους, ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν ταῖς μίξεσιν ἔχειν· ὑπάρχον γὰρ γίνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ἐξ ἀναγκαίας καὶ ὑπαρχούσης συμπλοκαῖς τῷ ἐλάττον εἶναι τὸ ὑπάρχον τοῦ ἀναγκαίου. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο δεικνύουσιν. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ Β τῷ Γ ὑπάρχει μὲν παντί, οὐ μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἐνδέχεται ποτε αὐτὸ καὶ ἀποζευχθῆναι αὐτοῦ· ὅτε δὴ τὸ Β τοῦ Γ ἀπέζευσται, τότε καὶ τὸ Α αὐτοῦ ἀποζευχθήσεται· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτῷ ὑπάρξει.

b. Again, if one of the premisses is possible, the conclusion will be possible. Alex., *An. pr.* 173, ³²⁻¹⁷⁴, ³ W.:

Θεόφραστος μὲν οὖν καὶ Εὐδημος οἱ ἐταῖροι αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐξ ἐνδεχομένης καὶ ὑπαρχούσης μίξει φασὶν ἔσεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐνδεχόμενον, ὁποτέρᾳ ἂν τῶν προτάσεων ἐνδεχομένη ληφθῇ· χεῖρον γὰρ πάλιν τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος.

Cf. Philoponus, *An. pr.* 205, ¹³⁻¹⁵ W. See: Bochensky o.c., p. 79 ff. on "the rule of the *peiores*".

675—a. According to Philoponus, Theophr. and Eudemus introduced the doctrine of hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms.

Philop., *An. pr.* 242, ¹⁴⁻²¹ W.:

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης τοσοῦτον εἰπὼν περὶ τῶν ὑποθετικῶν ἐπαύσατο καὶ οὐδὲν ἡμᾶς περὶ αὐτῶν ἐδίδαξεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πᾶσαν σπουδὴν περὶ τοῦ κατηγορικοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ἐποιήσατο, ἅτε δὴ τούτων μὲν τελείων ὄντων καὶ μηδενὸς ἔξωθεν δεομένων, τῶν δὲ ὑποθετικῶν δεομένων τῶν κατηγορικῶν, εἴπωμεν

**Hypothetical
syllogisms**

ἡμεῖς βραχέα περὶ αὐτῶν. Ἰστέον γὰρ ὅτι πολυστίχους πραγματείας περὶ τούτων κατεβάλλοντο οἱ τε μαθηταὶ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους, οἱ περὶ Θεόφραστον καὶ Εὐδήμον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ ἔτι οἱ Στωϊκοί.

Is this statement true? Is it true that Theophr., Eudemus and other disciples of Ar. dealt explicitly with hypothetical syllogisms?—The following text of Alexander seems to contradict this communication of Philoponus.

b. Alex., *An. pr.* 389, ³² - 390, ³:

Λέγει (sc. Ἀριστοτέλης) καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως περαίνεσθαι, περὶ ὧν ὑπερτίθεται μὲν ὡς ἐρῶν ἐπιμελέστερον, οὐ μὲν φέρεται αὐτοῦ σύγγραμμα περὶ αὐτῶν. Θεόφραστος δ' αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις Ἀναλυτικοῖς μνημονεύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ Εὐδήμος καὶ τινες ἄλλοι τῶν ἐταίρων αὐτοῦ.

Bochensky o.c., p. 110, concludes that, if Theophr. "mentions" these syllogisms, he did not treat them at length.

As to the frequent combination of the names of Theophr. and Eudemus, Bochensky (o.c., p. 125) suggests that Ar. discussed these questions in his School more abundantly than it is done in his written treatises, and that both Theophr. and Eud. represented the views of Ar. in the latest phase of his teaching.

676—Metaphysics.

the First Principle

a. Theophr. admits, with Ar., one first principle of all.

Metaph. I 6 Ross-Fobes:

Μέχρι μὲν δὴ τούτων οἷον ἄρτιος ὁ λόγος ἀρχὴν τε ποιῶν μίαν πάντων καὶ 5α 5
τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποδιδούς, ἔτι δὲ μὴ διαιρετὸν μηδὲ ποσὸν τι λέγων
ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς ἐξαίρων εἰς κρείττω τινὰ μερίδα καὶ θειοτέραν· οὕτω γὰρ μᾶλλον 10
ἀποδοτέον ἢ τὸ διαιρετὸν καὶ μεριστὸν ἀφαιρετέον. Ἀμα γὰρ ἐν ὑψηλοτέρῳ
τε καὶ ἀληθινωτέρῳ λόγῳ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἢ ἀπόφασις.

b. His objections to the Aristotelian theory of the Prime Mover.

Ib., II 7-9:

Τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη λόγου δεῖται πλείονος περὶ τῆς ἐφέσεως, ποία καὶ 15
τίνων. Ἐπειδὴ πλείω τὰ κυκλικὰ καὶ αἱ φοραὶ τρόπον τινὰ ὑπεναντίαι, καὶ τὸ
ἀνῆνυτον καὶ οὐ χάριν ἀφανές. Εἴτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κινοῦν, ἄτοπον τὸ μὴ πάντα τὴν
αὐτὴν· εἴτε καθ' ἕκαστον ἕτερον αἶ τ' ἀρχαὶ πλείους, ὥστε τὸ σύμφωνον αὐτῶν 20
εἰς ὄρεξιν ἰόντων τὴν ἀρίστην οὐδαμῶς φανερόν. Τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ πλήθος τῶν
σφαιρῶν τῆς αἰτίας μείζονα ζητεῖ λόγον· οὐ γὰρ <ἀρκεῖ> ὅ γε τῶν ἀστρολόγων.
Ἀπορον δὲ καὶ πῶς ποτε φυσικὴν ὄρεξιν ἐχόντων οὐ τὴν ἡρεμίαν διώκουσιν
ἀλλὰ τὴν κίνησιν. — Εἰ δ' ἡ ἔφεσις, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου, μετὰ ψυχῆς, 25, 28
εἰ μὴ τις λέγοι καθ' ὁμοιότητα καὶ μεταφορὰν, ἔμψυχ' ἂν εἴη τὰ κινούμενα.
Ψυχῇ δ' ἅμα δοκεῖ καὶ κίνησις ὑπάρχειν· ζωὴ γὰρ τοῖς ἔχουσιν, ἀφ' ἧς καὶ αἰ 5b

5 ὁρέξεις πρὸς ἕκαστον, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς ζώοις, ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις καίπερ ἐν
τῷ πάσχειν οὔσαι δι' ἐτέρων ὁμῶς ὡς ἐμφύχοις γίνονται. Εἰ δ' οὖν τῆς κυ-
κλικῆς αἵτιον τὸ πρῶτον οὐ τῆς ἀρίστης ἂν εἴη· κρείττων γὰρ ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ
10 πρῶτη δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἢ τῆς διανοίας ἀφ' ἧς καὶ ἡ ὁρεξις.

677—His difficulties about the teleological explanation of nature.

a. How should we conceive the first principles? What is the reason of everything? How far does the ordering of the world reach, and why does it stop at a certain point?

Difficulties
about
teleology

Ib., IV 14-15:

6b Πῶς δέ ποτε χρὴ καὶ ποίας τὰς ἀρχὰς ὑποθέσθαι τάχ' ἂν ἀπορήσειέ τις,
25 πότερον ἀμόρφους καὶ οἷον δυναμικὰς ὥσπερ ὅσοι πῦρ καὶ γῆν, ἢ μεμορφωμένας
ὡς μάλιστα δεόν ταύτας ὠρίσθαι καθάπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ φησὶν· τοῖς γὰρ τιμιω-
7a τάτοις οἰκειότατον ἢ τάξεις καὶ τὸ ὠρίσθαι. Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς λοιπαῖς σχεδὸν
ἔχειν οὕτω καθάπερ ἐν γραμματικῇ καὶ μουσικῇ καὶ ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς.
Συνακολουθεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχάς. "Ἐτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς τέχνας ὁμοίως
5 αἵπερ τὴν φύσιν μιμοῦνται· καὶ τὰ ὄργανα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τὰς ἀρχάς. Οἱ μὲν
οὖν ἀμόρφους πάσας, οἱ δὲ μόνον τὰς ὑλικὰς· οἱ δ' ἀμφοτέρας ἐμμόρφους, καὶ
τὰς τῆς ὕλης, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν τὸ τέλεον <ᾧ>· οἷον γὰρ ἐξ ἀντικειμένων τὴν ἅπασαν
10 οὐσίαν. "Αλογον δὲ κάκεῖνο δόξειεν ἂν εἰ ὁ μὲν ὅλος οὐρανὸς καὶ ἕκαστα τῶν
μερῶν ἅπαντ' ἐν τάξει καὶ λόγῳ καὶ μορφαῖς καὶ δυνάμεσι καὶ περιόδοις, ἐν δὲ
ταῖς ἀρχαῖς μὴθὲν τοιοῦτον ἄλλ' ὥσπερ σάρμα¹ εἰκῇ κεχυμένων ὁ κάλλιτοςτος,
15, 19 φησὶν 'Ἡράκλειτος, [ὁ] κόσμος. — Χαλεπὸν δὲ πάλιν αὖ τὸ τοὺς λόγους ἐκά-
στοις περιθεῖναι πρὸς τὸ ἐνεκά του συνάγοντας ἐν ἅπασι καὶ ἐν ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς
καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ πομφόλυγι· πλὴν εἰ συμβαίνει τῇ ἀστέρων τάξει καὶ μεταβολῇ
7b μορφὰς παντοίας καὶ ποικιλίας γίνεσθαι τῶν τε περὶ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὴν γῆν.
ᾧ δὴ μέγιστόν τινες παράδειγμα ποιοῦνται τὰ περὶ τὰς ὥρας τὰς ἐτείους ἐν
5 αἷς καὶ ζώων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ καρπῶν γενέσεις οἷον γεννῶντος τοῦ ἡλίου. Καὶ
ταῦτα μὲν ἐνταῦθα που ζητεῖ τὴν σκέψιν, ἀφορισμὸν ἀπαιτοῦντα μέχρι πόσου
τὸ τεταγμένον, καὶ διὰ τί πλέον ἀδύνατον ἢ εἰς τὸ χεῖρον μετάβασις.

b. It is sometimes difficult to decide whether a thing exists for a certain purpose or by chance. Many things do not exist for a purpose, and there is much more evil than good.

Ib., IX 28-32:

10a Ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ πάνθ' ἐνεκά του καὶ μὴθὲν μάτην, ἄλλως <θ'> ὁ ἀφορισμὸς οὐ
ῥάδιος καθάπερ πλεονάκις λέγεται (πόθεν δ' ἄρξασθαι χρὴ καὶ εἰς ποῖα
25 τελευτᾶν;), καὶ δὴ ἕνια τῷ μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν οὕτως, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν συμπτωματικῶς

¹ Corr. Diels. Mss. σάρξ.

τὰ δ' ἀνάγκη τινὶ καθάπερ ἐν τε τοῖς οὐρανίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν γῆν πλείοσιν. Τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα αἱ ἐφοδοὶ καὶ ἀνάρροισι θαλάττης [ἢ τίνος αἱ προχωρήσεις] ¹ ἢ 10b ἀναξηράνσεις καὶ ὑγρότητες καὶ ὅλως πρὸς ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο μεταβολαὶ καὶ φθοραὶ καὶ γενέσεις, [ἢ αἱ μὲν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ γῇ ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται πρὸς ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο μεθισταμένων] ² καὶ ἕτερα δ' οὐκ ὀλίγα παρόμοια τούτοις; 5 "Ἐτι δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ζώοις τὰ μὲν ὥσπερ μάταια καθάπερ τοῖς ἄρρεσιν οἱ μαστοὶ καὶ τοῖς θήλεσιν ἢ πρόσεις εἴπερ μὴ συμβάλλεται, καὶ πώγωνος δ' ἐνίοις ἢ ὅλως τριχῶν ἔκφυσις ἐν τισι τόποις. . . . καὶ ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα λάβοι 10, 16 τις ἂν τοιαῦτα. Καὶ τὸ μέγιστον δὴ καὶ μάλιστα δοκοῦν περὶ τὰς τροφὰς καὶ γενέσεις τῶν ζώων. οὐθενὸς γὰρ ταῦθ' ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ συμπτώματα καὶ δι' ἑτέρας ἀνάγκας. "Ἐδει γὰρ εἴπερ τούτων χάριν αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά καὶ ὡσαύτως. — 20 'Απλῶς μὲν ὅτι τὴν φύσιν <εἰκὸς> ἐν ἅπασιν ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ ἐφ' ὧν 11a 5 ἐνδέχεται μεταδιδόναι τοῦ αἰεὶ καὶ τοῦ τεταγμένου. ὥς δ' αὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων ὁμοίως. ὅπου γὰρ οἶόν τε τὸ βέλτιον, ἐνταῦθα οὐδαμοῦ παραλείπει, οἶον τὸ ἔμπροσθεν τὴν φάρυγγα τοῦ οἰσοφάγου, τιμιώτερον γάρ. καὶ ἐν τῇ μέσῃ 10 κοιλίᾳ τῆς καρδίας τὴν κρᾶσιν ἀρίστην, ὅτι τὸ μέσον τιμιώτατον. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσα κόσμου χάριν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό γ' ἐμφαίνει διότι πολὺ τὸ οὐχ ὑπακούον οὐδὲ δεχόμενον τὸ εὖ, μᾶλλον δὲ πολλῷ πλεῖον. 15 ὀλίγον γὰρ τι τὸ ἔμψυχον, ἄπειρον δὲ τὸ ἄψυχον. καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐμψύχων ἀκαριαίου ³ καὶ βέλτιον τὸ εἶναι. τὸ δ' ὅλον σπάνιον τι καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις τὸ ἀγαθόν, πολὺ δὲ πλεονέκτης εἶναι τὸ κακόν. 20

678—Yet he accepts the Aristotelian teleology and professes its principle explicitly.

a. *De caus. plant.* I 1, 1:

ἡ γὰρ φύσις οὐδὲν ποιεῖ μάτην, ἥκιστα δὲ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ κυριωτάτοις.

b. Cf. *ib.* I 16, 11:

ἡ δὲ (sc. φύσις) αἰεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ὁρμᾷ.

Theophr.'s
theology

679—a. Cicero reproached Theophr. with the same "inconsistency" in theology which he disapproved of in Aristotle.

Cic., *N.D.* I 13, 35:

Nec vero Theophrasti inconstantia ferenda est; modo enim menti divinum tribuit principatum, modo caelo, tum autem signis sideribusque caelestibus.

Cp. on Aristotle *ib.* § 33 (our nr. 430). The same is said by Minucius Felix, *Oct.* XIX 9.

¹ Secl. Ross.

² Secl. Usener.

³ Corr. Ross. Transl.: "of animate things themselves there is only a minute part whose existence is actually better than its non-existence would be" (Ross-Fobes).

b. He considered atheism as an abnormality and a great sin.

Simpl. in Epict. *Enchir.* 38, IV 357 Schweigh.:

Πάντες γὰρ ἄνθρωποι . . . νομίζουσι εἶναι θεὸν πλὴν Ἀκροθοϊτῶν, οὓς ἱστορεῖ Θεόφραστος ἀθέους γενομένους ὑπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀθρόως καταποθῆναι.

680—a. The divine order of the universe was to him at the same time Fate and Nature.

Fate and
Nature

Alex. Aphrod., *De an.*, at the end:

Φανερώτατα δὲ Θεόφραστος δείκνυσι ταῦτόν ὃν τὸ καθ' εἰμαρμένην τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἐν τῷ Καλλισθένει.

b. Like Plato, he seems to have spoken of ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ.

Julianus, *Or.* VI, 185 a Spanh.:

Ἀλλὰ καὶ Πυθαγόρας οἷ τε ἀπ' ἐκείνου μέχρι Θεοφράστου τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ φασί. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης· ὁ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ποτέ, τοῦτο ὁ θεὸς ἀεί.

the contem-
plative life

Cf. Cic. in *De fin.* V 4, 11, who says, referring to Ar. and Theophr.: Vitae autem degendae ratio maxime quidem illis placuit quies, in contemplatione et cognitione posita rerum, quae quia deorum erat vitae simillima, sapiente visa est dignissima.

681—He corrects Ar.'s conception of movement: movement occurs in every category, not only in that of substance, quantity, quality and place.

Movement

Theophr. fr. 19 Wimmer (Simpl., *Phys.* 860, 19-23 D.):

Θ. ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ Φυσικῶν καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον γένος τῶν κατηγοριῶν τὴν κίνησιν θεωρεῖσθαι φησι γράφων οὕτως· περὶ δὲ κινήσεως τὸν μὲν καθόλου καὶ κοινὸν λόγον οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀποδοῦναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, ὥς ἐνέργειά τις ἐστὶν ἀτελής τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἢ τοιοῦτον καθ' ἕκαστον γένος τῶν κατηγοριῶν.

682—a. He opposes Ar.'s definition of space.

Space

Fr. 21 Wimmer (Simpl., *Phys.* 604, 4-11 D.):

Θ. ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς ἀπορεῖ πρὸς τὸν ἀποδοθέντα τοῦ τόπου λόγον ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ σῶμα ἔσται ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ, ὅτι κινούμενος ἔσται ὁ τόπος, ὅτι οὐ πᾶν σῶμα ἐν τόπῳ, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἀπλανής, ὅτι ἐὰν συναχθῶσιν αἱ σφαῖραι, καὶ ὅλος ὁ οὐρανὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἐν τόπῳ, ὅτι τὰ ἐν τόπῳ ὄντα μηδὲν αὐτὰ μετακινήθέντα, ἐὰν ἀφαιρεθῇ τὰ περιέχοντα αὐτά, οὐκέτι ἔσται ἐν τόπῳ.

b. He tries to define it himself by the order and place of the bodies in relation to each other.

Fr. 22 Wimmer (Simpl., *Phys.* 639, ¹⁵⁻²²):

Καὶ Θ. ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς φαίνεται τὴν ἔννοιαν ταύτην ἐσχηκῶς περὶ τοῦ τόπου ἐν οἷς φησὶν ὡς ἐν ἀπορίᾳ προάγων τὸν λόγον· μήποτε οὐκ ἔστι καθ' αὐτὴν οὐσία τις ὁ τόπος ἀλλὰ τῇ τάξει καὶ θέσει τῶν σωμάτων λέγεται κατὰ τὰς φύσεις καὶ δυνάμεις· ὁμοίως δ' ἐπὶ ζώων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ ὅλως τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν, εἴτε ἐμψύχων εἴτε ἀψύχων, ἔμμορφον δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἐχόντων· καὶ γὰρ τούτων τάξις τις καὶ θέσις τῶν μερῶν ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν. Διὸ καὶ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτοῦ χώρᾳ λέγεται τῷ ἔχειν τὴν οἰκείαν τάξιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν ἕκαστον ἐπιποθήσειεν ἂν καὶ ἀπαιτήσκει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χώραν καὶ θέσιν.

**Eternity
of the kosmos**

683—He defends the eternity of the universe against the Stoic Zeno.

[Philo], *De aetern. mundi* 117, p. 510 Mangey:

Θεόφραστος μέντοι φησὶ τοὺς γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν τοῦ κόσμου κατηγοροῦντας ὑπὸ τεττάρων ἀπατηθῆναι τῶν μεγίστων, γῆς ἀνωμαλίας, θαλάττης ἀναχωρήσεως, ἑκάστου τῶν τοῦ ὅλου μερῶν διαλύσεως, χερσαίων φθορᾶς κατὰ γένη ζώων.

The following chapters (23-27) contain Theophr.' arguments against these four points.

**Thinking
a movement
of the soul**

684—Theophr. explains thinking as a movement of the soul.

Simpl., *Phys.* 964, ²⁹⁻⁹⁶⁵, ⁶ D.:

Ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸν κορυφαῖον ἀρέσκει τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐταίρων τὸν Θεόφραστον ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Περὶ κινήσεως αὐτοῦ λέγοντα ὅτι »αἱ μὲν ὀρέξεις καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ ὄργαι σωματικαὶ κινήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσιν, ὅσαι δὲ κρίσεις καὶ θεωρίαι, ταύτας οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ἕτερον ἀναγαγεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ τὸ τέλος, εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ὁ νοῦς κρεῖττον τι καὶ θεϊότερον, ἅτε δὴ ἔξωθεν ἐπεισιῶν καὶ παντέλειος«. — Καὶ τούτοις ἐπάγει· »Ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τούτων σκεπτέον, εἴ τινα χωρισμὸν ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ὅρον, ἐπεὶ τό γε κινήσεις εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ὁμολογούμενον«.

685—a. In ethics, he shares Ar.' view of eudaemonia as the final end.

Eudaemonia

Cic., *De fin.* V 29, 86:

Omnis auctoritas philosophiae, ut ait Theophrastus, consistit in beata vita comparanda; beate enim vivendi cupiditate incensi omnes sumus.

**Definition
of the good**

b. With Ar., he defines the good as that which is praiseworthy in itself.

Cic., *De legibus* I 13, 37 f.:

Ad republicas firmandas et ad stabiliendas vires, sanandos populos,

omnis nostra pergit oratio. Quocirca vereor committere ut non bene provisae et diligenter explorata principia ponantur: nec tamen ut omnibus probentur — nam id fieri non potest —, sed ut iis qui omnia recta atque honesta per se expetenda duxerunt, et aut nihil omnino in bonis numerandum nisi quod per se ipsum laudibile esset, aut certe nullum habendum magnum bonum nisi quod vere laudari sua sponte posset, his omnibus — (and, among others, Theophr.' name is mentioned here) his omnibus haec quae dixi probantur.

686—a. He attributes some value to outward circumstances of life.

**Value of
outward
circum-
stances**

Cic., *Tusc.* V 9, 24:

(Theophrastus) cum statuisset verba, tormenta, cruciatus, patriae everisiones, exilia, orbitates magnam vim habere ad male misereque vivendum, non est ausus elate et ample loqui, cum humiliter demisseque sentiret. — Vexatur autem ab omnibus ¹ primum in eo libro quem scripsit de vita beata, in quo multa disputat, quam ob rem is qui torqueatur, qui crucietur, beatus esse non possit.

b. He considers marriage as an impediment to the life of a scholar. **Marriage**

Hieronymus, *Adv. Jovin.* I 47:

Fertur aureolus Theophrasti liber de nuptiis, in quo quaerit an vir sapiens ducat uxorem. Et cum definisset, si pulchra esset, si bene morata, si honestis parentibus, si ipse sanus ac dives, sic sapientem aliquando inire matrimonium, statim intulit: „Haec autem in nuptiis raro universa concordant. Non est ergo uxor ducenda sapienti. Primum enim impediri studia philosophiae, nec posse quemquam libris et uxori pariter inservire.

687—Theophr.' Characters.

a. III, 'Ἀδολεσχίας.

Garrulity

Ἡ δὲ ἀδολεσχία ἐστὶ μὲν διήγησις λόγων μακρῶν καὶ ἀπροβουλευτῶν, ὁ δὲ ἀδολέσχης τοιοῦτός τις οἶος, ὃν μὴ γινώσκει, τοῦτ' παρακαθεζόμενος πλησίον πρῶτον μὲν τῆς αὐτοῦ γυναικὸς εἰπεῖν ἐγκώμιον, εἴτα, ὃ τῆς νυκτὸς εἶδεν ἐνύπνιον, τοῦτο διηγῆσασθαι, εἴθ' ὧν εἶχεν ἐπὶ τῷ δείπνῳ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα 5 διεξελεῖν· εἴτα δὴ προχωροῦντος τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν ὡς πολὺ πονηρότεροί εἰσιν οἱ νῦν ἄνθρωποι τῶν ἀρχαίων, καὶ ὡς ἄξιοι <οὐ> γεγόνασιν οἱ πυροὶ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ, καὶ ὡς πολλοὶ ἐπιδημοῦσι ξένοι, καὶ τὴν θάλατταν ἐκ Διονυσίων πλώϊμον εἶναι, καὶ εἰ ποιήσειεν ὁ Ζεὺς ὕδωρ πλεῖον, τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ βελτίω ἔσεσθαι,

¹ Doubtless, most by the Stoics; hardly by the Peripatetics.

καὶ ὃν ἀγρὸν εἰς νέωτα γεωργήσῃ, καὶ ὥς χαλεπὸν ἔστι τὸ ζῆν, καὶ ὥς Δάμιππος μυστηρίοις μεγίστην δᾶδα ἔστησεν, καὶ πόσοι εἰσὶ κίονες τοῦ Ὀριδείου, 10 καὶ »χθὲς ἤμεσα«, καὶ »τίς ἐστὶν ἡμέρα τήμερον;« καὶ ὥς Βοηδρομιῶνος μὲν ἔστι τὰ μυστήρια, Πυανοψιῶνος δὲ Ἀπατούρια, Ποσιδεῶνος δὲ <τὰ> κατ' ἀγροῦς Διονύσια· καὶ ὑπομένη τις αὐτόν, μὴ ἀφίστασθαι.

The officious
man

b. XIII, Περιεργίας.

Ἀμέλει <ή> περιεργία δόξει εἶναι προσποιήσις τις λόγων καὶ πράξεων μετ' εὐνοίας, ὃ δὲ περιεργὸς τοιοῦτός τις <οἷος> ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι ἃ μὴ δυνήσεται· καὶ ὁμολογουμένου τοῦ πράγματος δικαίου εἶναι ἀνταναστὰς ἐλεγχθῆναι· καὶ πλείω δὲ ἐπαναγκάσαι τὸν παῖδα κεράσαι ἢ ὅσον δύνανται οἱ παρόντες ἐκπιεῖν· καὶ διείργειν τοὺς μαχομένους, καὶ οὓς οὐ γινώσκει· καὶ ἀτραποῦ 5 ἡγήσασθαι, εἰτα μὴ δύνασθαι εὐρεῖν οἷ πορεύεται· καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν προσελθὼν ἐρωτῆσαι πότε μέλλει παρατάττεσθαι, καὶ τί μετὰ τὴν αὖριον παραγγελεῖ· καὶ προσελθὼν τῷ πατρὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἡ μήτηρ ἤδη καθεύδει ἐν τῷ δωματίῳ· καὶ ἀπαγορεύοντος τοῦ ἱατροῦ ὅπως μὴ δώσει οἶνον τῷ μαλακισμένῳ, φήσας βούλεσθαι διάπειραν λαμβάνειν, εὖ ποτίσαι τὸν κακῶς ἔχοντα· καὶ γυναικὸς 10 δὲ τελευτησάσης ἐπιγράψαι ἐπὶ τὸ μνήμα τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῆς μητρὸς καὶ αὐτῆς <τῆς> γυναικὸς τούνομα καὶ ποδαπὴ ἔστι, καὶ προσεπιγράψαι ὅτι οὗτοι πάντες χρηστοὶ ἦσαν· καὶ ὁμνῶναι μέλλων εἰπεῖν πρὸς τοὺς περιεστηκότας ὅτι »καὶ πρότερον πολλὰκις ὁμώμοκα«.

The
grumbler

c. XVII, Μεμψιμοιρίας.

Ἔστιν ἡ μεμψιμοιρία ἐπιτίμησις παρὰ τὸ προσῆχον τῶν δεδομένων, ὃ δὲ μεμψίμοιρος τοιούδε τις οἷος, ἀποστείλαντος μερίδα τοῦ φίλου, εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸν φέροντα· »ἐφθόνήσέ μοι τοῦ ζωμοῦ καὶ τοῦ οἰναρίου, οὐκ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον καλέσας«· καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐταίρας καταφιλούμενος εἰπεῖν· »θαυμάζω εἰ σὺ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτω με φιλεῖς«· καὶ τῷ Διὶ ἀγανακτεῖν, οὐ διότι <οὐχ> ὕει, ἀλλὰ διότι 5 ὕστερον· καὶ εὐρὼν ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ βαλλάντιον εἰπεῖν· »ἀλλ' οὐ θησαυρὸν εὗρηκα οὐδέποτε«· καὶ πριάμενος ἀνδράποδον ἄξιον, καὶ πολλὰ δεηθεὶς τοῦ πωλοῦντος· »θαυμάζω« εἰπεῖν »ὅ τι ὑγιὲς οὕτω ἄξιον ἐώνημαι«· καὶ πρὸς τὸν εὐαγγελιζόμενον ὅτι· »νυῖός σοι γέγονεν« εἰπεῖν ὅτι· »ἂν προσθῇς· καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ ἥμισυ ἄπεστιν, ἀληθῆ ἔρεῖς«· καὶ δίκην νικήσας καὶ λαβὼν πάσας τὰς ψήφους 10 ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ γράψαντι τὸν λόγον, ὥς πολλὰ παραλελοιπότι τῶν δικαίων· καὶ ἐράνου εἰσενεχθέντος παρὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ φήσαντός τινος· »ἰλαρὸς ἴσθι«, »καὶ πῶς;« εἰπεῖν »ὅτε δεῖ τὰργύριον ἀποδοῦναι ἐκάστω καὶ χωρὶς τούτων χάριν ὀφείλειν ὥς εὐεργετημένον;»

2—DICAEARCHUS

688—Suidas s.v. Δικαίαρχος (fr. 1 Wehrli):

Life and
work

Δικαίαρχος: Φειδίου, Σικελιώτης, ἐκ πόλεως Μεσσήνης, Ἀριστοτέλους ἀκουστής, φιλόσοφος καὶ ῥήτωρ καὶ γεωμέτρης. Καταμετρήσεις τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ ὄρων, Ἑλλάδος βίον ἐν βιβλίοις γ'. οὗτος ἔγραψε τὴν πολιτείαν Σπαρτιατῶν, καὶ νόμος ἐτέθη ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι καθ' ἕκαστον ἔτος ἀναγινώσκεσθαι τὸν λόγον εἰς τὸ τῶν Ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον, τοὺς δὲ τὴν ἡβητικὴν ἔχοντας ἡλικίαν ἀκροᾶσθαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἐκράτει μέχρι πολλοῦ.

689—Cic., *De fin.* IV 28, 79 (fr. 3 W.):

A later
judgment

...Panaetius ... semperque habuit in ore Platonem, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, Theophrastum, Dicaearchum, ut ipsius scripta declarant. quos quidem tibi studiose et diligenter tractandos magno opere censeo.

690—Naturalistic doctrine on soul.

a. Cic., *Tusc.* I 10, 21 (fr. 7 W.):

Doctrine
on soul

Dicaearchus autem in eo sermone, quem Corinthi habitum tribus libris exponit, doctorum hominum disputantium primo libro multos loquentes facit; duobus Pherecraten quendam Phthiotam senem, quem ait a Deucalione ortum, disserentem inducit, nihil esse omnino animum et hoc esse nomen totum inane frustra animalia et animantes appellari, neque in homine inesse animum vel animam nec in bestia, vimque omnem eam, qua vel agamus quid vel sentiamus, in omnibus corporibus vivis aequabiliter esse fusam nec separabilem a corpore esse, quippe quae nulla sit, nec sit quicquam nisi corpus unum et simplex, ita figuratum, ut temperatione naturae vigeat et sentiat.

b. Cf. *Tusc.* I 22, 51 (fr. 8 e W.):

Dicaearchus quidem et Aristoxenus, quia difficilis erat animi quid aut qualis esset intellegentia, nullum omnino animum esse dixerunt.

c. Sextus, *Pyrrh.* II 31 (fr. 8 b W.):

Οἱ μὲν μὴ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφασκαν, ὥς οἱ περὶ τὸν Μεσσήνιον Δικαίαρχον.

691—Soul a harmony of the four elements.

Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* II, Patrol. Gr. XL, p. 537 (fr. 11 W.):

Δικαίαρχος δὲ ἁρμονίαν τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι) ἀντὶ τοῦ κρᾶσιν καὶ συμφωνίας τῶν στοιχείων. Οὐ γὰρ τὴν ἐκ τῶν φθόγγων συνισταμένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν καὶ

ξηρῶν ἐναρμόνιον κρᾶσιν καὶ συμφωνίαν βούλεται λέγειν. Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι λέγουσιν. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ 5 Δικαίαρχος ἀνούσιον.

The same doctrine is attested in a few words by Plut., *Plac.* IV 2, 5; Stob., *Ecl.* I 49, 1, and Theodoretus, *Gr. aff. cur.* V 18 (fr. 12 a-c W.).

Divination 692—In spite of this naturalistic doctrine of soul D. is said to have acknowledged divination in dreams.

a. Galenus, *Hist. phil.* 105 (fr. 13 a W.):

Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Δικαίαρχος τοὺς ὀνείρους εἰσάγουσιν, ἀθάνατον μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ νομίζοντες, θείου δὲ τινος μετέχειν.

b. Cic., *De div.* I 3, 5 (fr. 14 W.):

Dicaearchus Peripateticus cetera divinationis genera sustulit, somniorum et furoris reliquit.

Human possibilities

693—The following reflexion on the polarity of human possibilities¹ is cited by Cic. from D.' work Π. ἀνθρώπων φθορᾶς.

Cic. *De off.* II 5, 16 (fr. 24 W.):

Est Dicaearchi liber de interitu hominum, Peripatetici magni et copiosi, qui collectis ceteris causis eluvionis, pestilentiae, vastitatis, beluarum etiam repentinae multitudinis, quarum impetu docet quaedam hominum genera esse consumpta, deinde comparat, quanto plures deleti sint homines hominum impetu, id est bellis aut seditionibus quam omni 5 reliqua calamitate. cum igitur hic locus nihil habeat dubitationis, quin homines plurimum hominibus et prosint et obsint, proprium hoc statuo virtutis, conciliare animos hominum et ad usus suos adiungere.

Superiority of the βίος πρακτικός

694—Against Theophr., D. defended the superiority of the βίος πρακτικός to the βίος θεωρητικός.

a. Cic., *Ep. ad Att.* II 16, 3 (fr. 25 W.):

Nunc prorsus hoc statui, ut quoniam tanta controversia est Dicaearcho familiari tuo cum Theophrasto amico meo, ut ille tuus τὸν πρακτικὸν βίον longe omnibus anteponat, hic autem τὸν θεωρητικόν, utrique a me mos gestus esse videatur.

b. Codex Vaticanus 435 (fr. 31 W.):

(The ancient Romans did not strive after cleverness in words, not even

¹ The fragment is explained by Wehrli in this sense.

in such apophthegmata as those attributed to the seven sages.)

Δικαιάρχῳ δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα σοφῶν εἶναι ἀνδρῶν δοκεῖ, μὴ γὰρ δὴ γε τοὺς πάλαι λόγῳ φιλοσοφεῖν. ἀλλ' εἶναι τὴν σοφίαν τότε γοῦν ἐπιτηδευσιν ἔργων καλῶν, χρόνῳ δὲ λόγων ὀχλικῶν γενέσθαι τέχνην. καὶ νῦν μὲν τὸν πιθανῶς διαλεχθέντα μέγαν εἶναι δοκεῖν φιλόσοφον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πάλαι χρόνοις ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος ἦν 5 φιλόσοφος, εἰ καὶ μὴ περιβλέπτους καὶ ὀχλικοὺς ἀσκοῖτο λόγους. οὐ γὰρ ἐξήτουν ἐκεῖνοί γε εἰ πολιτευτέον οὐδὲ πῶς, ἀλλ' ἐπολιτεύοντο αὐτοὶ καλῶς, οὐδὲ εἰ χρὴ γαμεῖν, ἀλλὰ γήμαντες ὃν δεῖ τρόπον γαμεῖν ταῖς γυναιξὶ συνεβίου. ταῦτα ἦν, φησὶν, ἔργα ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα σοφῶν, αἱ δὲ ἀποφθέξεις αὐταὶ πρᾶγμα φορτικόν.

c. Cf. Plut., *An seni gerenda res publica*, c. 26, 796 c (fr. 29 W.).

(Philosophy does not only consist in speaking ex cathedra, like πολιτευέσθαι does not only consist in crying in the assembly. There is a συνεχῆς ἐν ἔργοις καὶ πράξεσιν ὁρωμένη καθ' ἡμέραν ὁμαλῶς πολιτεία καὶ φιλοσοφία, which escapes the notice of the people). Καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς στοαῖς ἀνακάμπτοντας περιπατεῖν φασιν, ὡς ἔλεγε Δικαιάρχος, οὐκέτι δὲ τοὺς εἰς ἀγρὸν ἢ πρὸς φίλον βαδίζοντας. ὅμοιον δ' ἐστὶ τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν τὸ πολιτευέσθαι. Σωκράτης γοῦν οὔτε βάθρα θείς οὔτε εἰς θρόνον καθίσας οὔθ' ὥραν διατριβῆς 5 ἢ περιπάτου τοῖς γνωρίμοις τεταγμένην φυλάττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ παίζων ὅτε τύχοι καὶ συμπίνων καὶ συστρατευόμενος ἐνίοις καὶ συναγοράζων, τέλος δὲ καὶ δεδεμένος καὶ πίνων τὸ φάρμακον ἐφιλοσόφει, πρῶτος ἀποδείξας τὸν βίον ἅπαντι χρόνῳ καὶ μέρει καὶ πάθεσι καὶ πράγμασιν ἀπλῶς ἅπασι φιλοσοφίαν δεχόμενον.

695—An important work of D. was his Βίος Ἑλλάδος, which is cited rather frequently by later writers (Wehrli, fr. 47-66).

The
development
of mankind

a. Varro, *Rerum rustic.* II 1, 3 (fr. 48 W., first part).

Igitur, inquam, et homines et pecudes cum semper fuisse sit necesse natura — sive enim aliquod fuit principium generandi animalium, ut putavit Thales Milesius et Zeno Citieus, sive contra principium horum exstitit nullum, ut credidit Pythagoras Samius et Aristoteles Stagiritēs — 5 necesse est humanae vitae a summa memoria gradatim descendisse ad hanc aetatem, ut scribit Dicaearchus, et summum gradum fuisse naturalem, cum viverent homines ex his rebus, quae inviolata ultro ferret terra; ex hac vita in secundam descendisse pastoriciam e feris atque agrestibus, ut arboribus ac virgultis [ac] decarpendo glandem, arbu[s]tum, mora, 10 poma colligerent ad usum, sic ex animalibus cum propter eandem utilitatem quae possent silvestria deprenderent ac concluderent et mansues-

cerent. In quis primum non sine causa putant oves assumptas et propter utilitatem et propter <p>laciditatem. maxime enim hae natura quietae et aptissimae ad vitam hominum. ad cibum enim lacte et caseum adhibitum, ad corpus vestitum et pelles attulerunt. tertio denique gradu a 15 vita pastoralis ad agri culturam descenderunt, in qua ex duobus gradibus superioribus retinuerunt multa, et quo descenderant, ibi processerunt longe, dum ad nos perveniret.

b. Porph., *De abstinentia* IV 2 (fr. 49 W., the beginning).

Τῶν τοίνυν συντόμως τε ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀκριβῶς τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ συναγαγόντων ἐστὶν καὶ ὁ περιπατητικὸς Δικαίαρχος, ὃς τὸν ἀρχαῖον βίον τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀφηγούμενος τοὺς παλαιούς καὶ ἐγγύς θεῶν φησὶ γεγονότας, βελτίστους τε ὄντας φύσει καὶ τὸν ἄριστον ἐξηκότας βίον, ὥς χρυσοῦν γένος νομίζεσθαι παραβαλλομένους πρὸς τοὺς νῦν, κιβδήλου καὶ φαυλοτάτης ὑπάρχοντας ὕλης, μηδὲν φονεύειν 5 ἐμψυχον. ὁ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς παριστάντας χρυσοῦν μὲν ἐπονομάζειν γένος

«ἐσθλὰ δὲ πάντα», λέγειν,

«τοῖσιν ἔην· καρπὸν δ' ἔφερον ζεῖδαρος ἄρουρα

αὐτομάτῃ πολλόν τε καὶ ἄφθονον. οἱ δ' ἐβλημιοῖ

ῥῖσχοι ἔργ' ἐνέμοντο σὺν ἐσθλοῖσιν πολέεσσιν»¹.

10

ἃ δὲ καὶ ἐξηγούμενος ὁ Δικαίαρχος τὸν ἐπὶ Κρόνου βίον τοιοῦτον εἶναι φησιν.

Political
writings

696—Cicero mentions D. with the greatest respect among writers on political subjects.

a. Cic., *De leg.* III 6, 14 (fr. 67 W.):

Nam veteres verbo tenus acute illi quidem, sed non ad hunc usum popularem atque civilem de re publica disserebant. ab hac familia magis ista manarunt Platone principe, post Aristoteles illustravit omnem hunc civilem in disputando locum; Heraclidesque Ponticus profectus ab eodem Platone; Theophrastus vero, institutus ab Aristotele, habitavit ut scitis 5 in eo genere rerum, ab eodemque Aristotele doctus Dicaearchus huic rationi studioque non defuit.

b. Cf. *Ep. ad Att.* II 2 (fr. 69 W.):

Πελληνάων² in manibus tenebam et hercule magnum acervum Dicaearchi mihi ante pedes exstruxeram. o magnum hominem, et unde multo plura didiceris quam de Procilio³. Κορινθίων et Ἀθηναίων puto me Romae habere. mihi credas, lege te hac doceo, mirabilis vir est.

¹ Hesiodus, *Erga* 116 ff.

² Whether this Πελληνάων πολιτεία was a work of D. or not, is uncertain. It may have belonged to Aristotle's collection of 158 πολιτεῖαι.

³ Procilius is unknown to us.

Ἡρώδης¹, si homo esset, eum potius legeret quam unam litteram scriberet.

697—D. seems to have considered a mixed constitution to be the best. **The best constitution**

Photius, *Bibl.* 37 (fr. 71 W.):

“Ὡν δ’ αὐτοὶ πολιτείαν εἰσάγουσιν (sc. post-Platonic writers among whom D. is mentioned) ἐκ τῶν τριῶν εἰδῶν τῆς πολιτείας δέον αὐτὴν συγκεῖσθαι φασι, βασιλικῷ καὶ ἀριστοκρατικῷ καὶ δημοκρατικῷ, τὸ εἰλικρινές αὐτῇ ἐκάστης πολιτείας συνεισαγούσης, ἀκείνην τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἀποτελούσης.

As it appears from a quotation in Athen. IV 141 a ff. (fr. 72 W.), the work in which D. expounded this theory was entitled Τριπολιτικός.

698—a. Like Aristotle and Eudoxus of Cnidus, D. taught the spherical form of the earth. **Form of the earth**

Martian. Capella VI 590 f. (fr. 108 W.):

Formam totius terrae non planam, ut aestimant positioni qui eam disci diffusioris assimilant, neque concavam, ut alii qui descendere imbrem dixere telluris in gremium, sed rotundam, globosam etiam [sicut Secundus] Dicaearchus asseverat. namque ortus obitusque siderum non 5 diversus pro terrae elevatione vel inclinationibus haberetur, si per plana diffusis mundanae constitutionis operibus uno eodemque tempore supra terras et aequora nituissent, aut item si emersi solis exortus concavis subductionis terrae latebris abderetur.

Cp. Ar., *De caelo* II 297 a⁸ ff., and Eudoxi *Ars astronomica* ed. Blass 1887, p. XI, XVIII-XX.

b. On D.’s calculation of the circumference of the earth, see Wehrli, *Dikaiarchos*, p. 77 ff.

3—ARISTOXENUS

699—Suidas s.v. Ἀριστόξενος (f. 1 W.): **Life**

Υἱὸς Μνησίου, τοῦ καὶ Σπινθάρου, μουσικοῦ, ἀπὸ Τάραντος τῆς Ἰταλίας. διατρίψας δὲ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ φιλόσοφος γέγονε καὶ μουσικῇ ἐπιθέμενος οὐκ ἥστόχησεν, ἀκουστῆς τοῦ τε πατρὸς καὶ Λάμπρου τοῦ Ἐρυθραίου, εἴτα Ξενοφίλου τοῦ Πυθαγορείου καὶ τέλος Ἀριστοτέλους. εἰς δὲ ἀποθανόντα 5 ὕβρισε, διότι κατέλιπε τῆς σχολῆς διάδοχον Θεόφραστον, αὐτοῦ δόξαν μεγάλην

¹ Atticus had an administrator of this name. Probably this person is meant here.

ἐν τοῖς ἀκροαταῖς τοῖς Ἀριστοτέλους ἔχοντος. γέγονε δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ τῶν μετέπειτα χρόνων, ὥς εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ριᾶ Ὀλυμπιάδος ¹, σύγχρονος Δικαιάρχῳ τῷ Μεσσηνίῳ. συνετάξατο δὲ μουσικά τε καὶ φιλόσοφα, καὶ ἱστορίας καὶ παντὸς εἵδους παιδείας. καὶ ἀριθμοῦνται αὐτοῦ τὰ βιβλία εἰς ὑγ'.

His life of
Pythag.

700—a. He wrote a *life of Pythagoras*, traces of which can be found in several later works (Wehrli, fr. 11-25).

In his work on *the Pythagorean bios* he explains the ancient taboos in a rationalistic sense. Cp. our nr. **24b, d.**

Life of Archytas and of Socrates

b. He also wrote a *life of Archytas* (Wehrli, fr. 47-50) and another of *Socrates* (W., fr. 51-60), in which he opposes the hot temper and profligacy of the latter to Archytas' self-command.

c. Cyrillus, *Contra Julianum* VI 185 (fr. 54 a, W.) quotes Aristoxenus' *Life of Socr.* as follows:

Λέγει δὲ ὁ Ἀριστόξενος, ἀφηγούμενος τὸν βίον τοῦ Σωκράτους, ἀκηκοέναι Σπινθάρου τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὃς ἦν εἰς τῶν τούτῳ ἐντυχόντων. τοῦτον λέγειν, ὅτι οὐ πολλοῖς αὐτός γε πιθανωτέροις ἐντετυχηκῶς εἶη, τοιαύτην εἶναι τὴν τε φωνὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα καὶ τὸ ἐπιφαινόμενον ἦθος, καὶ πρὸς πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν τοῦ εἵδους ἰδιότητα. γίνεσθαι δέ που τοῦτο, ὅτε μὴ ὀργίζεται, ὅτε δὲ φλεχθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους τούτου, δεινὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην. οὐδενὸς γὰρ οὔτε ὀνόματος ἀποσχέσθαι οὔτε πράγματος.

d. Ib., 186 (W., same fr.):

Γέγραφε γὰρ ὡδὶ πάλιν περὶ αὐτοῦ Πορφύριος: »ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τὸν βίον τὰ μὲν ἄλλα εὐκόλον, καὶ μικρᾶς δεόμενον παρασκευῆς εἰς τὰ καθ' ἡμέραν γεγενῆσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρῆσιν σφοδρότερον μὲν εἶναι, ἀδίκιαν δὲ μὴ προσεῖναι. ἥ γὰρ ταῖς γαμεταῖς ἢ ταῖς κοιναῖς χρῆσθαι μόναις. δύο δὲ σχεῖν γυναῖκας ἅμα, Ἐανθίππην μὲν πολῖτιν καὶ κοινοτέραν πῶς, Μυρτῶ δὲ Ἀριστείδου θυγατριδὴν τοῦ Λυσιμάχου. καὶ τὴν μὲν Ἐανθίππην περιπλακεῖσαν λαβεῖν, ἐξ ἧς ἑαυτῷ Λαμπροκλῆς ἐγένετο. τὴν δὲ Μυρτῶ γάμῳ, ἐξ ἧς Σωφρονίσκος καὶ Μενέξενος«.

The same is told by Theodoretus, *Gr. aff. cur.* XII 174, who used the same source.

Cp. Plut., *Aristides* c. 27: Δημήτριος δ' ὁ Φαληρεὺς καὶ Ἰερώνυμος ὁ Ῥόδιος καὶ Ἀριστόξενος ὁ μουσικὸς καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης . . . ἱστοροῦσι Μυρτῶ θυγατριδὴν Ἀριστείδου Σωκράτει τῷ σοφῷ συνοικῆσαι, γυναῖκα μὲν ἑτέραν ἔχοντι, ταύτην δ' ἀναλαβόντι χηρεοῦσαν διὰ πενίαν καὶ τῶν ἀναγκάλων δεομένην.

701—Plut., *De Herodoti malign.* 9, 856 c, qualifies this kind of gossip as a species of the genus κακοήθεια. Fr. 55 W.:

¹ 336-333 B.C.

Ἐγγὺς δὲ τούτων εἰσὶν οἱ τοῖς φόγοις ἐπαίνους τινὰς παρατιθέντες, ὥς ἐπὶ Σωκράτους Ἀριστόξενος, ἀπαίδευτον καὶ ἀμαθῆ καὶ ἀκόλαστον εἰπών, ἐπήνεγκεν ἡ ἀδικία δ' οὐ προσῆναι¹. "Ὡσπερ γὰρ οἱ σὺν τινι τέχνῃ καὶ δεινότητι κολακεύοντες ἔστιν ὅτε πολλοῖς καὶ μακροῖς ἐπαίνουσι φόγους παραμιγνύουσιν ἑλάφρους, οἷον ἡδυσμα τῇ κολακείᾳ τὴν παρρησίαν ἐμβάλλοντες, οὕτω τὸ κακὸν εἰς πίστιν ὧν ψέγει προαποτίθεται τὸν ἔπαινον.

702—The measure of reliability of Aristoxenus as a biographer may **Life of Plato** appear from what he tells about Plato (fragments of his *Life of Plato*, W. 61-68).

a. Diog. L. III 8 (fr. 61 W.):

Καὶ αὐτόν (sc. Πλάτωνα) φησιν Ἀριστόξενος τρεῖς ἐστρατεῦσθαι, ἅπαξ μὲν εἰς Τάναγραν, δεύτερον δὲ εἰς Κόρινθον, τρίτον ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ. ἔνθα καὶ ἀριστεύσαι.

b. Lucianus, *De parasito* 34 (861). Fr. 62 W.:

Παράσιτος: . . . ὁ δὲ Πλάτων . . . ὀλίγας παρασιτήσας ἡμέρας τῷ τυράννῳ (sc. Διονυσίῳ) τοῦ παρασιτεῖν ὑπὸ ἀφύιας ἐξέπεσε, καὶ πάλιν Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος καὶ φιλοπονήσας καὶ παρασκευάσας ἑαυτὸν αὖθις δευτέρῳ στόλῳ ἐπέπλευσε τῇ Σικελίᾳ καὶ δειπνήσας πάλιν ὀλίγας ἡμέρας ὑπὸ ἀμαθίας ἐξέπεσε. καὶ αὕτη ἡ συμφορὰ Πλάτωνι περὶ Σικελίαν ὁμοίᾳ δοκεῖ γενέσθαι τῇ Νικίου.

c. Aristocles ap. Euseb., *Praef. evang.* XV 2 (fr. 64 W.):

Τίς δ' ἂν πεισθεῖη τοῖς ὑπ' Ἀριστοξένου τοῦ μουσικοῦ λεγομένοις ἐν τῷ βίῳ τοῦ Πλάτωνος; ἐν γὰρ τῇ πλάνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀποδημίᾳ φησὶν ἐπανίστασθαι καὶ ἀντοικοδομεῖν αὐτῷ τινὰς Περίπατον ξένους ὄντας. οἴονται οὖν ἔνιοι ταῦτα περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους λέγειν αὐτόν, Ἀριστοξένου διὰ παντὸς εὐφημοῦντος Ἀριστοτέλην.

d. Diog. L. III 37 (fr. 67 W.):

Ἦν Πολιτεῖαν (sc. Πλάτωνος) Ἀριστόξενός φησιν πᾶσαν σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Πρωταγόρου γεγράφθαι Ἀντιλογικοῖς.

703—His doctrine of the soul is cited on a level with that of Dicaearchus **Soul** (our nr. 690b).

a. Cicero describes Aristoxenus' doctrine of the soul in *Tusc.* I 10, 19 (fr. 120 a W.):

Aristoxenus musicus idemque philosophus ipsius corporis intentionem quandam animam esse dixit, velut in cantu et fidibus quae harmonia dicitur, sic ex corporis totius natura et figura varios motus cieri tamquam in cantu sonos.

¹ Wehrli cites the text up till here.

b. Cp. Lactantius, *Inst.* VII 13 (fr. 120 c, W.):

Quid Aristoxenus, qui negavit omnino ullam esse animam, etiam cum vivit in corpore? sed sicut in fidibus ex intentione nervorum effici concordem sonum atque cantum, quem musici harmoniam vocant, ita in corporibus ex compage viscerum ac vigore membrorum vim sentiendi existere. Quo nihil dici delirius potest.

Musicology 704—In musicology, Aristox. was among the greatest authorities in Antiquity.

a. Cic., *De oratore* III 33, 132 (fr. 69a, W.):

An tu existimas, cum esset Hippocrates ille Cous, fuisse tum alios medicos qui morbis, alios qui vulneribus, alios qui oculis mederentur? num geometriam Euclide aut Archimede, num musicam Damone aut Aristoxeno, num ipsas litteras Aristophane aut Callimacho tractante tam discerptas fuisse, ut nemo genus universum complecteretur atque 5 ut alius aliam sibi partem, in qua elaboraret, seponeret?

b. Cic., *De fin.* V 18, 49 (fr. 69 b, W.):

Duci vero maiorum rerum contemplatione ad cupiditatem scientiae summorum virorum est putandum. quem enim ardorem studii censetis fuisse in Archimede etc. . . ., quantum Aristoxeni ingenium consumptum videmus in musicis?

c. Alex. Aphr., in *Ar. Top.* 105 a³⁴ (fr. 69 e, W.):

Θείη γάρ ἄν τις ὡς ἔνδοξον τὸ ὑπὸ Ἱπποκράτους λεγόμενον ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ Ἀρχιμήδους ἐν γεωμετρίας καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ Ἀριστοξένου ἐν μουσικῇ.

4—DEMETRIUS OF PHALERON

Life 705—a. Suidas Δ 429 (fr. 3 W.):

Δημήτριος Φανοστράτου Φαληρεύς (Φάληρον δὲ λιμὴν τῆς Ἀττικῆς), ὃς τὸ πρῶτον Φανὸς ἐκαλεῖτο. φιλόσοφος Περιπατητικός· γέγραφε φιλοσοφὰ τε καὶ ἱστορικὰ καὶ ῥητορικὰ καὶ πολιτικὰ καὶ περὶ ποιητῶν (fr. 75), ἠκροάσατο δὲ Θεοφράστου καὶ δημαγωγὸς Ἀθήνησι γέγονε. συνέγραψε δὲ συχνὰ βιβλία.

b. Diog. L. V 75:

Δημήτριος Φανοστράτου Φαληρεύς. οὗτος ἤκουσε μὲν Θεοφράστου· δημηγορῶν δὲ παρ' Ἀθηναίοις τῆς πόλεως ἐξηγήσατο ἔτη δέκα, καὶ εἰκόνων ἡξιώθη χαλκῶν ἐξήκοντα πρὸς ταῖς τριακοσίαις, ὧν αἱ πλείους ἐφ' ἵππων

ἦσαν καὶ ἄρμάτων καὶ συνωρίδων, συντελεσθεῖσαι ἐν οὐδὲ τριακοσίαις ἡμέραις·
 5 τοσοῦτον ἐσπουδάσθη. ἄρξασθαι δ' αὐτὸν τῆς πολιτείας φησὶ Δημήτριος ὁ
 Μάγνης ἐν τοῖς Ὀμωνύμοις, ὁπότε φυγὼν Ἀλέξανδρον εἰς Ἀθήνας ἦκεν
 Ἄρπαλος. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ κάλλιστα τῇ πατρίδι ἐπολιτεύσατο. καὶ γὰρ προσόδοις
 καὶ κατασκευαῖς ἠύξησε τὴν πόλιν, καίπερ οὐκ εὐγενὴς ὢν.

c. Diodorus XVIII 74, 2 (fr. 13 W., at the end):

Οὗτος δὲ παραλαβὼν τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τῆς πόλεως ἤρχεν εἰρηνικῶς καὶ πρὸς
 τοὺς πολίτας φιλανθρωπῶς.

706—D. was made absolute governor at Athens by Cassander in 318/7, and expelled ten years later by Demetrius Poliorcetes.

**Governor
of Athens**

a. Pausanias I 25, 6 (fr. 14 W.):

Κάσσανδρος δὲ βασιλεύσας . . . Πάνακτον τεῖχος ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ καὶ Σαλα-
 μῖνα εἶλε τύραννόν τε Ἀθηναίους ἔπραξε γενέσθαι Δημήτριον τὸν Φανοστράτου
 [τὰ πρὸς] δόξαν εἰληφότα ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ. τοῦτον μὲν δὴ τυραννίδος ἔπαυσε Δημήτριος
 ὁ Ἀντιγόνου.

b. Syncellus 274 d, p. 521, ¹³ Dind. (fr. 17 W.):

Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς ἐγνωρίζετο τρίτος νομοθέτης Ἀθήνησι, οὗτος Ἀθη-
 ναίοις ἀποδοὺς τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἦλθεν εἰς Αἴγυπτον.

Law-giver

c. Cic., *De leg.* II 25, 63 (fr. 135 W.) tells us something about D.' measures of legislation.

**Limitation
of funeral
pomp**

Posteaquam, ut scribit Phalereus, sumptuosa fieri funera et lamentabilia coepissent, Solonis lege sublata sunt. quam legem eisdem prope verbis nostri decemviri in decimam tabulam coniecerunt. —

Sed ait rursus idem Demetrius increbuisse eam funerum sepulcrorum-
 5 que magnificentiam, quae nunc fere Romae est; quam consuetudinem lege minuit ipse, fuit enim hic vir ut scitis non solum eruditissimus, sed etiam civis e re publica maxime tuendaeque civitatis peritissimus. is igitur sumptum minuit non solum poena sed etiam tempore, ante lucem enim iussit efferri. sepulcris autem novis finivit modum, nam super
 10 terrae tumulum noluit quod statui nisi columellam tribus cubitis ne altiore aut mensam aut labellum, et huic procurationi certum magistratum praefecerat.

Wilamowitz, *Ar. und Athen*, I p. 363, speaks of "die segensreiche Verwaltung des Demetrios" and states: "So über Athen zu herrschen hat D. bei Aristoteles gelernt: er ist der νομοθετικὸς ἀνὴρ, den die Politik erzogen hat. Gerade an Athen hat sie ihre praktische Probe bestanden".

Honoured by
the people

707—The people of Athens showed their gratitude by honouring D. exceedingly.

a. Nepos, *Milt.* 6 (fr. 21 W.):

Idem ille populus, posteaquam maius imperium est nactus et largitione magistratum corruptus est, trecentas statuas Demetrio Phalereo decrevit.

b. Cf. Plin., *N.H.* XXXIV 12, 27 (fr. 22 W.):

Nullique arbitror pluris statuas dicatas quam Phalereo Demetrio Athenis, siquidem CCCLX statuere, nondum anno hunc numerum dierum excedente, quas mox laceravere.

Cp. also Diog. Laert. V 75, sub **705b**, supra.

Later in
disgrace

708—His life was a good example of those sudden changes of Fate which happened not unfrequently in those days.

a. Plut., *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* c. 27, p. 820 e (fr. 54 W.):

Τῶν δὲ Δημητρίου τοῦ Φαληρέως τριακοσίων ἀνδριάντων οὐδεὶς ἔσχεν ἰδὼν οὐδὲ πίνον, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἔτι ζῶντος προανηρέθησαν.

His own
reaction

b. Diog. Laert. V 82 (fr. 122 W.):

Οὗτος ἀκούσας ὅτι τὰς εἰκόνας αὐτοῦ κατέστρεψαν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἔφη, δι' ἣν ἐκείνας ἀνέστησαν.

He meets
Krates in
Thebes

709—Plut., *De adulatore et amico* c. 28, p. 69 c (fr. 59 W.):

Λέγεται δὲ καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς ὅτε τῆς πατρίδος ἐξέπεσε καὶ περὶ Θήβας ἀδοξῶν καὶ ταπεινὰ πράττων διῆγεν, οὐχ ἡδέως ἰδεῖν προσιόντα Κράτητα, παρρησίαν κυνικὴν καὶ λόγους τραχεῖς προσδεχόμενος. ἐντυχόντος δὲ πρῶως αὐτῷ τοῦ Κράτητος καὶ διαλεχθέντος περὶ φυγῆς ὡς οὐδὲν ἔχοι κακὸν οὐδ' ἄξιον φέρειν βαρέως πραγμάτων σφαλερῶν καὶ ἀβεβαίων ἀπηλλαγμένον, ἅμα δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῇ διαθέσει παρακαλοῦντος, ἡδίῳ γενόμενος καὶ ἀναθαρρήσας πρὸς τοὺς φίλους εἶπε: φεῦ τῶν πράξεων ἐκείνων καὶ ἀσχολιῶν δι' ἃς ἄνδρα τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἔγνωμεν.

D. in
Alexandria

710—a. Cic., *De fin.* V 19, 53 (fr. 62 W.):

Itaque multi, cum in potestate essent hostium aut tyrannorum, multi in custodia, multi in exilio dolorem suum doctrinae studiis levaverunt. princeps huius civitatis Phalereus Demetrius, cum patria pulsus esset iniuria, ad Ptolemaeum se regem Alexandream contulit. qui cum in hac ipsa philosophia ad quam te hortamur excelleret Theophrastique esset

auditor, multa praeclara in illo calamitoso otio scripsit non ad usum aliquem suum, quo erat orbatus, sed animi cultus ille erat ei quasi quidam humanitatis cibus.

b. Aristeae ad Philocr. epist. 9 (fr. 66 W.):

Librarian of
Ptol. I

Κατασταθείς ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ βασιλέως βιβλιοθήκης Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς ἐ χρηματίσθη πολλὰ διάφορα πρὸς τὸ συναγαγεῖν, εἰ δυνατόν, ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην βιβλία, καὶ ποιούμενος ἀγορασμοὺς καὶ μεταγραφὰς ἐπὶ τέλος ἤγαγεν, ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ, τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως πρόθεσιν. παρόντων οὖν ἡμῶν ἐρωτηθείς, πόσαι τινὲς μυριάδες τυγχάνουσι βιβλίων, εἶπεν: ὑπὲρ τὰς εἴκοσι, βασιλεῦ· σπουδάσω δ' ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πρὸς τὸ πληρωθῆναι πεντήκοντα μυριάδας τὰ λοιπὰ. προσήγγεται δέ μοι καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἰουδαίων νόμιμα μεταγραφῆς ἄξια καὶ τῆς παρὰ σοὶ βιβλιοθήκης εἶναι. τί τὸ κωλύον οὖν, εἶπεν, ἐστὶ σε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι; πάντα γὰρ ὑποτέτακται σοὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν. ὁ δὲ Δημήτριος εἶπεν: ἐρμηνείας προσδεῖται, χαρακτῆρσι γὰρ ἰδίους κατὰ τὴν Ἰουδαίων χρῶνται . . . μεταλαβὼν δὲ ἕκαστα ὁ βασιλεὺς εἶπε γραφῆναι πρὸς τὸν ἀρχιερέα τῶν Ἰουδαίων, ὅπως τὰ προειρημένα τελείωσιν λάβῃ.

Josephus, *Adv. Apionem* II 45 tells that Ptol. Philadelphus sent Demetrius with two other persons to translate the Jewish Law. This story is probably invented by Jewish authors.

Further testimonies in Wendland's ed. of Aristeas' Epist., 1900, p. 90 ff.

711—a. Cicero mentions him as one of the very rare persons who excelled both in philosophy and in politics.

Cicero's
judgment
on D.

Cic., *De leg.* III 6, 14 (fr. 72 W.):

Post a Theophrasto (sc. doctus) Phalereus ille Demetrius, de quo feci supra mentionem, mirabiliter doctrinam ex umbraculis eruditorum[que] otioque non modo in solem atque in pulverem, sed in ipsum discrimen aciemque produxit: nam et mediocriter doctos magnos in re publica viros et doctissimos homines non nimis in re publica versatos multos commemorare possumus; qui vero utraque re excelleret, ut et doctrinae studiis et regenda civitate princeps esset, quis facile praeter hunc inveniri potest?

b. Again, he praises his double ability, both in forensic eloquence and in philosophical disputation.

Cic., *De off.* I 1, 3 (fr. 73 W.):

Et id quidem nemini video Graecorum adhuc contigisse, ut idem utroque in genere laboraret sequereturque et illud forense dicendi et hoc quietum disputandi genus, nisi forte Demetrius Phalereus in hoc numero

haberi potest, disputator subtilis, orator parum vehemens, dulcis tamen, ut Theophrasti discipulum possis agnoscere.

In his *Brutus* 9, 37, Cicero speaks of the rhetoric style of Demetrius. "Hic primus inflexit orationem et eam mollem teneramque reddidit, et suavis sicut fuit videri maluit quam gravis" (fr. 175 W.).

His works 712—Diog. Laert. V 80 (fr. 74 W., first part):

Πλήθει δὲ βιβλίων καὶ ἀριθμῷ στίχων σχεδὸν ἅπαντας παρελήλακε τοὺς κατ' αὐτὸν Περιπατητικούς, εὐπαίδευτος ὢν καὶ πολύπειρος παρ' ὄντινούν. ὢν ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἱστορικά τὰ δὲ πολιτικά τὰ δὲ περὶ ποιητῶν τὰ δὲ ῥητορικά, δημηγοριῶν τε καὶ πρεσβειῶν ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ λόγων Αἰσωπέων συναγωγαί καὶ ἄλλα πλείω.

A fragm. of the 713—The following passage from his *Περὶ τύχης* is cited by Plutarch in his *Consolatio ad Apoll.* c. 6, p. 104 a (fr. 79 W.):

"Οθεν ὀρθῶς ὁ Φαληρεὺς Δημήτριος εἰπόντος Εὐριπίδου

ὁ δ' ἄλβος οὐ βέβαιος ἀλλ' ἐφήμερος

καὶ ὅτι

μικρὰ τὰ σφάλλοντα, καὶ μί' ἡμέρα

τὰ μὲν καθεῖλεν ὑψόθεν τὰ δ' ἦρ' ἄνω

τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καλῶς ἔφη λέγειν αὐτόν, βέλτιον δ' ἂν ἔχειν εἰ μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν ἀλλὰ στιγμὴν εἶπε χρόνου.

5

5—STRATO OF LAMPSACUS

Successor of 714—Successor of Theophr. as the head of the Peripatetic School.
Theophr.

Diog. Laert. V 58 (fr 1 W.):

Διεδέξατο δ' αὐτοῦ (sc. Θεοφράστου) τὴν σχολὴν Στράτων Ἀρκεσιλάου Λαμψακηνός, οὗ καὶ ἐν ταῖς διαθήκαις ἐμνημόνευσεν· ἀνὴρ ἐλλογιμώτατος καὶ φυσικὸς ἐπικληθεὶς ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ τὴν θεωρίαν ταύτην παρ' ὄντινούν ἐπιμελέστατα διατετριφέναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ καθηγῆσατο Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Φιλαδέλφου καὶ ἔλαβε, φασί, παρ' αὐτοῦ τάλαντα ὀγδοήκοντα. σχολαρχεῖν δέ, καθά φησιν 5 Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν Χρονικοῖς, ἤρξατο τῇ τρίτῃ καὶ εἰκοστῇ καὶ ἑκατοστῇ Ὀλυμπιάδι¹, τῆς σχολῆς ἀφηγησάμενος ἔτη ὀκτωκαίδεκα.

715—His succession changed the character of the School.

a. Cic., *De fin.* V 5, 13 (fr. 12 W.):

Simus igitur contenti his (sc. Aristotele, Theophrasto), namque horum posterio meliores illi quidem mea sententia quam reliquarum philosophi

¹ 288-285 B.C.

disciplinarum, sed ita degenerant, ut ipsi ex se nati esse videantur. primum Theophrasti Strato physicum se voluit, in quo etsi est magnus, 5 tamen nova pleraque et perpauca de moribus; huius Lyco oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ieiunior.

In this book and in the *Ac. Post.* from which the next quotation is taken, Cicero follows Antiochus of Ascalon, who finds an essential agreement between the Stoa, the Academy and the early Peripatetic School, namely Aristotle and Theophr., excluding Strato and his successors.

b. Cic., *Acad. post.* I 9, 33 (fr. 13 W.):

Theophrastus autem . . . vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae, spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore inbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere. nam Strato, eius auditor, quamquam fuit acri ingenio, tamen ab ea 5 disciplina omnino semovendus est: qui cum maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et in moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis.

716—Diog. Laert. V 59-60 mentions several works of Str. on logic. Simplicius, in his Commentary on the *Categories*, mentions a monography Π. τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου (sub **a**), from which he cites an important fragment later in the same work (sub **b**).

**Works
on logic**

a. Simpl. in *Ar. Categ.*, p. 148, ²⁴ Kalbfleisch (fr. 29 W.):

Διὰ τοῦτο οὖν καὶ τοῦ προτέρου πολλαχῶς λεγομένου τὴν διαίρεσιν ποιεῖται (sc. Ἀριστοτέλης), οὐ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους παραδιδούς — καὶ ἄλλους γοῦν οὐκ ὀλίγους προστίθῃσιν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ ὁ Στράτων ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου μονοβιβλίῳ, — ἀρκοῦντας δὲ πρὸς εἰσαγωγὴν καὶ τοὺς ἐκτεθέντας οἰόμενος.

The same is told in the Scholia in *Ar.*, p. 87 a³⁷ Brandis (fr. 28 W.).

b. Simpl. in *Ar. Categ.*, p. 423, ¹ ff. Kalbfleisch (fr. 27 W.):

Καὶ Στράτων δὲ ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου μονοβιβλίῳ πολλοὺς ἀπηριθμήσατο τρόπους, οὓς νομίζω δυνατὸν εἶναι ὑπὸ τοὺς πέντε τοὺς ἐνταῦθα λεγομένους ἀναγαγεῖν οἷον μερισμὸν ἐκείνων ὄντας. ὑπὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τῷ χρόνῳ πρότερον ταχθήσεται τὸ ἀτελὲς τοῦ τελείου λεγόμενον, 5 διότι ἔσχατον ἐν πᾶσι τὸ τέλος · τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ὑπὸ τὴν τάξιν. ἔτι δὲ ὑπ' ἄμφω ταῦτα καὶ ὑπὸ <τὸ> τῇ ἀξίᾳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ φύσει πρότερόν ἐστιν, οὗ ἐπιστήμη πρότερον, οἷον μονάδος ἢ δυάδος καὶ πλήθους ἢ ἀρτίου καὶ περιττοῦ. ταῦτα γὰρ οὐδὲ ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτῶν. πρῶτον δὲ καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τῇ ἀξίᾳ, ὧν τὸ ἔργον πρότερον,

οἶον τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ κακοῦ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ σωτηρίας, τὸ δὲ φθορᾶς αἷτιον, πρῶτον 10
 δὲ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ φθείρεσθαι καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ ἀξίᾳ. πρῶτον δὲ τῇ φύσει ὡς μὴ
 ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολουθήσιν, ὅπερ δυνατόν εἶναι θατέρου μὴ
 ὄντος, ὡς τόπος σώματος καὶ σῶμα χρώματος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ θάτερον ἐν
 θατέρῳ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, οἶον ἡ οὐσία ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ. οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ κατὰ
 φύσιν πρότερον τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ ὁ νόμος τῆς παρανομίας καὶ ἡ ἕξις τῆς 15
 στερήσεως. ὑπὸ δὲ τὸ τῇ ἀξίᾳ πρότερον καὶ τὸ δυνάμει τάττοιτο ἂν τὰ τῷ
 τιμιωτέρῳ συγγενέστερα, ὡς τὸ ποσὸν τοῦ ποιοῦ προτάττοιτο ἂν, διότι τὸ μὲν
 ποσὸν μέρος τῆς οὐσίας, τὸ δὲ ποιοὺν οὐ. καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν μετέχει γενέσεως καὶ
 φθορᾶς, ὡς ὁ χρόνος, τὸ δὲ οὐ, ὡς ὁ τόπος, καὶ τὸ μὲν χωριστόν, τὸ δὲ οὐ·
 ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθήσεως εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀδύνατον, ἄνευ δὲ ἐπιθυμίας εἶναι 20
 δυνατόν. καὶ τὸ ἀμερὲς τοῦ μεριστοῦ· ἀρχῇ γὰρ ὁμοιότερον, ὥστε καὶ κύκλου
 τὸ κέντρον. καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον τοῦ προτέρου μετέχον, ὡς τὸ αἰδίον μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ,
 τὸ φθαρτὸν δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον δυάδος, τὸ δὲ περιττὸν τριάδος. καὶ εἰ
 τὸ μὲν μένει χρόνον τινά, τὸ δὲ οὐ μένει, οἶον σῶμα κινήσεως καὶ χρόνου. ὑπὸ
 δὲ τὸ τῇ τάξει πρότερον εἴη ἂν τὸ τοῦ μεταξὺ πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ τὸ τοῦ μεταξὺ 25
 ὕστερον. ὑπὸ δὲ <τὸ ἐν> τοῖς ἀντιστρέφουσιν ὡς αἰτιῶδες πρότερον ἂν εἴη τὸ
 στοιχεῖον· καὶ γὰρ αὐ καὶ τὸ μέρος τοῦ ὅλου, ὡς τὸ πεπερασμένον τοῦ ἀπείρου,
 καὶ εἰ θάτερον ἐκ θατέρου, οἶον ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος· ὕλικὸν γὰρ καὶ
 οὗτος αἷτιον. ὅτι δὲ καὶ <τὸ> αὐτὸ κατ' ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον
 εἶναι δυνατόν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Στράτων ἐνεδείξατο, τὸν χρόνον καὶ τὸν τόπον 30
 πρότερα καὶ ὕστερα ἀλλήλων δεικνύς.

**Explanation
 of the
 universe**

717—He explains the universe by purely natural causes.

a. Cic., *Ac. pr. (Lucullus)* 38, 121 (fr. 32 W.):

Negas sine deo posse quicquam: ecce tibi e transverso Lampsacenus
 Strato, qui det isti deo immunitatem magni quidem muneris. sed cum
 sacerdotes deorum vacationem habeant, quanto est aequius habere ipsos
 deos: negat opera deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum; quaecumque 5
 sint, docet omnia effecta esse natura, nec ut ille, qui asperis et levibus
 et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta haec esse dicat interiecto
 inani: somnia censet haec esse Democriti, non docentis, sed optantis,
 ipse autem singulas mundi partes persequens quicquid aut sit aut fiat
 naturalibus fieri aut factum esse docet ponderibus et motibus. ne ille et
 deum opere magno liberat et me timore.

10

b. Lactantius, *De ira Dei* X 1 (fr. 34 W.):

Qui nolunt divina providentia factum esse mundum, aut principiiis
 inter se temere coeuntibus dicunt esse concretum aut repente natura

exstitisse; naturam vero, ut ait Strato, habere in se vim gignendi et minuendi, sed eam nec sensum habere ullum nec figuram, ut intelligamus
5 omnia quasi sua sponte esse generata, nullo artifice nec auctore.

c. Cf. Plut. *Adv. Coloten* c. 14, p. 1115 b (fr. 35 W.):

Καὶ μὴν τῶν ἄλλων Περιπατητικῶν ὁ κορυφαϊότατος Στράτων οὗτ' Ἀριστο-
τέλει κατὰ πολλὰ συμφέρεται καὶ Πλάτωνι τὰς ἐναντίας ἔσχηκε δόξας περὶ
κινήσεως περὶ νοῦ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ περὶ γενέσεως· καὶ τελευτῶν τὸν κόσμον
αὐτὸν οὐ ζῶον εἶναι φησι, τὸ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἔπεσθαι τῷ κατὰ τύχην· ἀρχὴν
5 γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τὸ αὐτόματον, εἶθ' οὕτω περαίνεισθαι τῶν φυσικῶν παθῶν
ἕκαστον.

Strato abandons not only the Platonic and Stoic explanation of the universe, but also the Aristotelian principle of teleology.

718—a. By his theory of weight Str. comes near to Epicurus. Simpl. in *Ar. De caelo*, p. 267, ²⁹ Heiberg (fr. 52 W.):

Atomic
theory

Ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ τῇ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἐκθλίψει βιαζόμενα κινεῖται (sc. τὰ στοιχεῖα),
δείκνυσιν ἐφεξῆς (sc. Ἀριστοτέλης). ταύτης δὲ γεγόνاسι τῆς δόξης μετ'
αὐτὸν Στράτων τε καὶ Ἐπίκουρος πᾶν σῶμα βαρύτερα ἔχειν νομίζοντες καὶ
πρὸς τὸ μέσον φέρεσθαι, τῷ δὲ τὰ βαρύτερα ὑφίζανειν τὰ ἡττον βαρέα ὑπ'
5 ἐκείνων ἐκθλίβεσθαι βίᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, ὥστε, εἴ τις ὑφέιλε τὴν γῆν, ἐλθεῖν ἄν
τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸ κέντρον, καὶ εἴ τις τὸ ὕδωρ, τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ εἴ τὸν ἀέρα, τὸ πῦρ.

b. He differs from Epicurus in his theory of first principles.

Sextus, *Pyrrh.* III 33 (fr. 43 W.):

Στράτων δὲ ὁ φυσικὸς τὰς ποιότητας (sc. ἀρχὰς εἶναι εἶπεν).

Cf. Aëtius I 3, 24 (Dox., p. 288): Στράτων στοιχεῖα <θερμὸν> καὶ ψυχρόν.

719—His theory of the void.

The void

a. Theodoretus, *Graec. aff. cur.* IV 14 (fr. 54 W.):

Ὁ δὲ Στράτων ἔμπαλιν ἔξωθεν μὲν (sc. τοῦ παντός) μηδὲν εἶναι κενόν,
ἐνδοθεν δὲ δυνατόν εἶναι.

The meaning of the above statement may appear from the following passages of Simplicius.

b. Simpl., *Corollarium de loco*, in *Ar. Phys.* p. 618, ²⁰ Diels (fr. 60 W.):

Οἱ δὲ ἰσόμετρον αὐτὸ (sc. τὸ κενόν) τῷ κοσμικῷ σώματι ποιοῦσι, καὶ διὰ
τοῦτο τῇ μὲν ἑαυτοῦ φύσει κενὸν εἶναι λέγουσι, πεπληρῶσθαι δὲ αὐτὸ σωμάτων
αἰεὶ, καὶ μόνῃ γε τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ θεωρεῖσθαι ὥς καθ' αὐτὸ ὑφεστώς, οἷοι τινες οἱ
πολλοὶ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν φιλοσόφων γεγόνاسι, καὶ Στράτωνα δὲ οἶμαι τὸν
5 Λαμψακηνὸν ταύτης γενέσθαι τῆς δόξης.

c. Simpl., *Phys.* 693, ¹⁰ Diels (fr. 65 a, W.):

— 'Ο μέντοι Λαμψακηνός Στράτων δεικνύναι πειράται, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ κενὸν διαλαμβάνον τὸ πᾶν σῶμα, ὥστε μὴ εἶναι συνεχές, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἂν δι' ὕδατος ἢ ἀέρος ἢ ἄλλου σώματος ἐδύνατο διεκπίπτειν τὸ φῶς οὐδὲ ἡ θερμότης οὐδὲ ἄλλη δύναμις οὐδεμία σωματική. πῶς γὰρ ἂν αἱ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀκτῖνες διεξέπιπτον εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀγγείου ἕδαφος; εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὑγρὸν μὴ εἶχε πόρους, ἀλλὰ βίᾳ διέστελλον 5 αὐτὸ αἱ αὐγαί, συνέβαινεν ὑπερεκχεῖσθαι τὰ πλήρη τῶν ἀγγείων, καὶ οὐκ ἂν αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀκτίνων ἀνεκλῶντο πρὸς τὸν ἄνω τόπον, αἱ δὲ κάτω διεξέπιπτον.

The same argument for the existence of a void is used by Hero in his *Pneumatica* (fr. 65 b, W.).

d. Cp. the following passage in Hero:

Pneum. I p. 26, ¹³ Schmidt (fr. 66 W.):

Ἔτι δὲ καὶ ταύτη φανερὸν ὡς ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ὑπάρχει κενά, τῷ τὸν ἐμβαλλόμενον οἶνον εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ ὀρᾶσθαι κατὰ χύσιν εἰς πάντα τόπον τοῦ ὕδατος χωροῦντα. τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἂν ἐγίνετο μὴ ὄντων ἐν τῷ ὕδατι κενῶν. φέρεται δὲ καὶ τὸ φῶς τὸ ἕτερον διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου· ὅταν γὰρ τις πλείους ἄψῃ λύχνους ἅπαντα φωτίζεται μᾶλλον, τῶν αὐγῶν πάντῃ φερομένων δι' ἀλλήλων. [ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διὰ χαλκοῦ 5 καὶ σιδήρου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων διεκπίπτει σωμάτων, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς νάρκης τῆς θαλασσίας γινόμενον.]

Motion 720—Straton's definition of motion.

Simpl., *Phys.* 711, ⁹ Diels (fr. 70 W.):

Ἄνθρωπος δὲ Λαμψακηνός Στράτων οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγέθους μόνον συνεχῇ τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι φησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτήν, ὡς εἰ διακοπεῖται, στάσει διαλαμβανομένην, καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ δύο στάσεων κίνησιν οὔσαν ἀδιάκοπον. καὶ ποσὸν δέ τι, φησίν, ἡ κίνησις καὶ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά.

Time 721—**a.** Time differs from number.

Simpl., *Phys.* 788, ³⁶ Diels (fr. 75 W.):

Ἄνθρωπος δὲ μέντοι Λαμψακηνός Στράτων αἰτιασάμενος τὸν ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους τε καὶ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐταίρων ἀποδοθέντα τοῦ χρόνου ὀρισμὸν αὐτὸς καίτοι Θεοφράστου μαθητῆς ὢν τοῦ πάντα σχεδὸν ἀκολουθήσαντος τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει καινότεραν ἐβάδισεν ὁδόν. ἀριθμὸν μὲν γὰρ κινήσεως εἶναι τὸν χρόνον οὐκ ἀποδέχεται, διότι ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς διωρισμένον ποσόν, ἡ δὲ κίνησις καὶ ὁ χρόνος 5 συνεχῆς, τὸ δὲ συνεχές οὐκ ἀριθμητόν. εἰ δέ, ὅτι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο τὸ μέρος τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τούτων τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, κατὰ τοῦτο ἔστι τις τῆς κινήσεως ἀριθμός, οὕτω γε ἂν καὶ τὸ μῆκος ἀριθμητόν εἴη (καὶ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο ποσὸν ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ἐστί) καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ συνέχειαν γινόμενων

10 καὶ τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, ὥστε καὶ τοῦ χρόνου εἶη ἂν χρόνου χρόνος·
 ἔτι δὲ ἀριθμοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις καὶ φθορά, καὶ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ φθείρηται, ὁ
 δὲ χρόνος καὶ γίνεται καὶ φθίρεται συνεχῶς. καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἀριθμοῦ ἀναγκαῖον
 εἶναι πάντα τὰ μέρη (μὴ γὰρ οὐσῶν τῶν τριῶν μονάδων οὐδ' ἂν ἡ τριάς εἶη),
 τοῦ δὲ χρόνου ἀδύνατον. ἔσται γὰρ ὁ πρότερος χρόνος καὶ ὁ ὕστερος ἅμα.
 15 ἔτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται μονὰς καὶ νῦν, εἴπερ ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμός. ὁ μὲν γὰρ χρόνος ἐκ
 τῶν νῦν σύνθετος, ὁ δὲ ἀριθμὸς ἐκ μονάδων.

Cp. Ar.'s definition of time in *Phys.* IV, 219 b¹⁻² (our nr. 510a).

b. Again, he criticizes Ar.'s definition by remarking that time is no more the measure of motion than of rest.

Simpl., ib. 789, ¹⁵ D. (fr. 77 W.):

Καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἀπορεῖ (sc. Στράτων): τί μᾶλλον ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμὸς τοῦ
 ἐν κινήσει προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου ἢ τοῦ ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ; καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταύτῃ ὁμοίως ἔστι
 τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

A fact which, for the rest, did not remain unobserved by Ar. Cp. *Phys.* IV 221 b⁷, where he says: 'Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος μέτρον κινήσεως, ἔσται καὶ ἡρεμίας μέτρον κατὰ συμβεβηκός· πᾶσα γὰρ ἡρεμία ἐν χρόνῳ.

c. Time is the quantitative element in actions.

Simpl., ib. 789, ³³ D. (fr. 76 W.):

Καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πολλὰ ἀντειπὼν πρὸς τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους ἀπόδοσιν ὁ Στράτων
 αὐτὸς τὸν χρόνον τὸ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι ποσὸν εἶναι τίθεται: πολλὸν γὰρ, φησί,
 χρόνον φαμέν ἀποδημεῖν καὶ πλεῖν καὶ στρατεύεσθαι καὶ πολεμεῖν καὶ ὀλίγον
 χρόνον, ὁμοίως δὲ καθῆσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν καὶ μηδὲν πράττειν καὶ πολὺν χρόνον
 5 φαμέν καὶ ὀλίγον. ὧν μὲν ἔστι τὸ ποσὸν πολὺ, πολὺν χρόνον, ὧν δὲ ὀλίγον,
 ὀλίγον. χρόνος γὰρ τὸ ἐν ἐκάστοις τούτων ποσόν. διὸ καὶ φασιν οἱ μὲν βραδέως
 ἦκειν οἱ δὲ ταχέως τὸν αὐτόν, ὡς ἂν ἐκάστοις φαίνεται τὸ ἐν τούτοις ποσόν.
 ταχὺ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι φαμεν, ἐν ᾧ τὸ μὲν ποσὸν ἀφ' οὗ ἤρξατο καὶ εἰς ὃ ἐπαύσατο
 ὀλίγον, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς ἐν αὐτῷ πολὺ· τὸ βραδὺ δὲ τούναντίον, ὅταν ἦ τὸ μὲν
 10 ποσὸν ἐν αὐτῷ πολὺ, τὸ δὲ πεπραγμένον ὀλίγον. διό, φησὶν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ
 τὸ ταχὺ καὶ τὸ βραδὺ· πᾶσα γὰρ ἴση ἔστι τῷ ἑαυτῆς ποσῷ καὶ οὔτε ἐν ὀλίγῳ
 τῷ ποσῷ πολλὴ οὔτε ἐν πολλῷ βραχεῖα. διὰ τοῦτο δέ, φησί, καὶ πλείω μὲν
 εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω χρόνον λέγομεν, θάττω δὲ καὶ βραδύτερον χρόνον οὐ λέγομεν.
 πρᾶξις μὲν γὰρ καὶ κινήσις ἔστι θάττων καὶ βραδυτέρα, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν τὸ ἐν ᾧ
 15 ἡ πρᾶξις οὐκ ἔστι θάττων καὶ βραδυτέρον, ἀλλὰ πλέον καὶ ἐλαττον ὥσπερ
 καὶ χρόνος. ἡμέρα δὲ καὶ νύξ, φησί, καὶ μῆν καὶ ἐνιαυτὸς οὐκ ἔστι χρόνος οὐδὲ
 χρόνου μέρη, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὁ φωτισμὸς καὶ ἡ σκίασις, τὰ δὲ ἡ τῆς σελήνης καὶ
 τοῦ ἡλίου περιόδος, ἀλλὰ χρόνος ἔστι τὸ ποσὸν ἐν ᾧ ταῦτα.

Definition **d.** Sextus, *Math.* X (= *Adv. phys.* II) 177 (fr. 79a W.):

Διόπερ Στράτων ὁ φυσικὸς ἀποστάς τῆσδε τῆς ἐννοίας ἔλεγε χρόνον ὑπάρχειν μέτρον πάσης κινήσεως καὶ μονῆς.

Unity of the soul **722—a.** He rejects Ar.'s doctrine of the noûs.

Tertullianus, *De anima* 14 (fr. 108 W.):

Specta portentosissimam Archimedis munificentiam, organum hydraulicum dico, tot membra, tot partes, tot compagine, tot itinera vocum, tot compendia sonorum, tot commercia modorum, tot acies tibiarum, et una moles erunt omnia. sic et spiritus, qui illic de tormento aquae anhelat, non ideo separabitur in partes, quia per partes administratur, 5 substantia quidem solidus, opera vero divisus. non longe hoc exemplum est a Stratone et Aenesidemo et Heraclito, nam et ipsi unitatem animae tuentur, quae in totum corpus diffusa et ubique ipsa, velut flatus in calamo per cavernas ita per sensualia variis modis emicet, non tam concisa quam dispensata. 10

Mind identified with the senses

b. Cp. Sextus, *Math.* VII (= *Adv. log.* I) 350 (fr. 109 W.):

Καὶ οἱ μὲν διαφέρειν αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν διάνοιαν) τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὥς οἱ πλείους, οἱ δὲ αὐτὴν εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καθάπερ διὰ τινων ὁπῶν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων προκύπτουσιν, ἥς στάσεως ἤρξε Στράτων τε ὁ φυσικὸς καὶ Αἰνισίδημος.

Rejection of an a priori

723—He explains knowledge as a movement of the soul.

Simpl., *Phys.* 965, ⁷ Diels (fr. 74 W.):

Καὶ Στράτων δὲ ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς ὁ Θεοφράστου γεγονὼς ἀκουστὴς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀρίστοις Περιπατητικοῖς ἀριθμούμενος τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμολογεῖ κινεῖσθαι οὐ μόνον τὴν ἄλογον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν λογικὴν, κινήσεις λέγων εἶναι τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς. λέγει οὖν ἐν τῷ περὶ κινήσεως πρὸς ἄλλοις πολλοῖς καὶ τάδε· αἰεὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῶν κινεῖται ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ὁρῶν καὶ ἀκούων καὶ ὁσφραίνόμενος· 5 ἐνέργεια γὰρ ἡ νόησις τῆς διανοίας καθάπερ καὶ ἡ ὄρασις τῆς ὀψεως. καὶ πρὸ τούτου δὲ τοῦ ῥήτοῦ γέγραphen: ἐπεὶ οὖν εἰσιν αἱ πλεῖσται τῶν κινήσεων αἱ αὐταί, ἃς ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' αὐτὴν τε κινεῖται διανοουμένη καὶ ἃς ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐκινήθη πρότερον. δῆλον δὲ ἐστίν· ὅσα γὰρ μὴ πρότερον ἐώρακε, ταῦτα οὐ δύναται νοεῖν, οἷον τόπους ἢ λιμένας ἢ γραφὰς ἢ ἀνδριάντας ἢ ἀνθρώπους ἢ 10 τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν τοιούτων.

One central organ

724—His doctrine of one central organ.

a. Plut., *De libidine et aegritudine* c. 4, p. 697b (fr. 111 W.):

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἅπαντα συλλήβδην ταῦτα τῇ ψυχῇ φέροντες ἀνέθεσαν, ὥσπερ Στράτων ὁ φυσικὸς οὐ μόνον τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς λύπας, οὐδὲ τοὺς

φόβους καὶ τοὺς φθόνους καὶ τὰς ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόνους καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀλγηδόνας καὶ ὅλως πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ συνίστασθαι φάμενος καὶ 5 τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα εἶναι, μὴ τὸν πόδα πονούντων ἡμῶν ὅταν προσκρούσωμεν, μηδὲ τὴν κεφαλὴν ὅταν κατὰξωμεν, μὴ τὸν δάκτυλον ὅταν ἐκτέμωμεν. ἀναίσθητα γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ πλὴν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τῆς πληγῆς ὀξέως ἀναφερομένης τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀλγηδόνα καλοῦμεν. ὥς δὲ τὴν φωνὴν τοῖς ὦσιν αὐτοῖς ἐνηχοῦσαν ἔξω δοκοῦμεν εἶναι, τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν 10 διάστημα τῇ αἰσθήσει προσλογιζόμενοι, παραπλησίως τὸν ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος πόνον οὐχ' ὅπου τὴν αἴσθησιν εἴληφεν, ἀλλ' ὅθεν ἔσχε τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι δοκοῦμεν, ἔλκομένης ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφ' οὗ πέπονθε. διὸ καὶ προσκόφαντες αὐτίκα τὰς ὀφρῦς συνάγομεν, τῷ πληγέντι μορίῳ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τὴν αἴσθησιν ὀξέως ἀποδιδόντος, καὶ παρεγκόπτομεν ἔσθ' ὅτε τὸ πνεῦμα· καὶ τὰ μέρη δεσμοῖς 15 διαλαμβάνηται, <ταῖς> χερσὶ σφόδρα πιέζομεν, ἰστάμενοι πρὸς τὴν διάδοσιν τοῦ πάθους, καὶ τὴν πληγὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀναισθήτοις θλίβοντες, ἵνα μὴ συνάψῃ πρὸς τὸ φρονοῦν ἀλγηδὼν γένηται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὁ Στράτων ἐπὶ πολλοῖς ὥς εἰκὸς τοιοῦτοις.

b. Plut., *De sollertia anim.* 3, p. 961a (fr. 112 W.):

Καίτοι Στράτωνός γε τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγος ἐστὶν ἀποδεικνύων ὥς οὐδ' αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ παράπαν ἄνευ τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει· καὶ γὰρ γράμματα πολλάκις ἐπιπορευομένους τῇ ὄψει καὶ λόγοι προσπίπτοντες τῇ ἀκοῇ διαλανθάνουσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ διαφεύγουσι πρὸς ἑτέροις τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντας· εἴτ' αὖθις ἐπανῆλθεν 5 καὶ μεταθεῖ καὶ διώκει τῶν προιεμένων ἕκαστον ἀναλεγόμενος· ἥ καὶ λέλεκται·
νοὺς ὀρῇ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, τᾶλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά¹).

ὥς τοῦ περὶ τὰ ὅμματα καὶ ὦτα πάθους, ἂν μὴ παρῇ τὸ φρονοῦν, αἴσθησιν οὐ ποιοῦντος.

6—LYCO AND ARISTO OF CEOS

725—Strato was succeeded in the School by Lyco.

Strato
succeeded
by Lyco

a. Diog. Laërt. V 65:

Τοῦτον (sc. Στράτωνα) διεδέξατο Λύκων Ἀστυάνακτος Τρωαδεύς.

b. Ib. 68:

Ἀφηγήσατο δὲ τῆς σχολῆς ἔτη τέτταρα πρὸς τοῖς τετταράκοντα, Στράτωνος αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς διαθήκαις καταλιπόντος κατὰ τὴν ἐβδόμην καὶ εἰκοστὴν καὶ ἑκατοστὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα (270/268).

726—He is described by his contemporary Antigonos of Carystus as a man of the world, even of rather extravagant inclinations.

¹ Epicharmus, B 12 Diels VS.

His character

a. Athenaeus, *Deipn.* XII 69, 547d-548b (fr. 7 W.):

Καὶ Λύκων δὲ ὁ περιπατητικός, ὡς φησὶν Ἀντίγονος ὁ Καρύστιος¹, κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐπιδημήσας παιδείας ἕνεκα ταῖς Ἀθήναις περὶ συμβολικοῦ κώθωνος² καὶ πόσον ἐκάστη τῶν ἐταιρουσῶν ἐπράττετο μίσθωμα ἀκριβῶς ἡπίστατο. Ὑστερον δὲ καὶ τοῦ περιπάτου προστάς ἐδείπνιζε τοὺς φίλους ἀλαζονείᾳ καὶ πολυτελείᾳ πολλῇ χρώμενος. Χωρὶς γὰρ τῶν παραλαμβανομένων εἰς αὐτὰ 5 ἀκροαμάτων καὶ ἀργυρωμάτων καὶ στρωμνῆς ἢ λοιπῇ παρασκευῇ καὶ ἡ τῶν δείπνων περιεργία καὶ ὁ τῶν τραπεζοποιῶν καὶ μαγείρων ὄχλος τοσοῦτος ἦν ὥστε πολλοὺς ὀρρωδεῖν καὶ βουλομένους προσιέναι πρὸς τὴν διατριβὴν ἀνακόπτεσθαι. — Οὐ γὰρ ἵνα συρρέντες ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ἕως ὄρθρου γενομένης τραπέζης ἀπολαύσωσιν ἢ χάριν ἐξοινίας ἐποιήσαντο τὰς συνόδους ταύτας οἱ 10 περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Σπεύσιππον, ἀλλ' ἵνα φαίνωνται καὶ τὸ θεῖον τιμῶντες καὶ μουσικῶς ἀλλήλοις συμπεριφερόμενοι, καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον ἕνεκεν ἀνέσεως καὶ φιλολογίας. Ἄ δὴ πάντα γέγονεν δεύτερα παρὰ τοῖς ὕστερον τῶν τε χλανίδων καὶ τῆς πολυτελείας τῆς εἰρημένης· οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε τοὺς λοιποὺς ὑπεξαίρουμαι. Ὁ δὲ Λύκων ὑπ' ἀλαζονείας καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐπιφανεστάτῳ τῆς πόλεως τόπῳ ἐν 15 τῇ Κόνωνος οἰκίᾳ εἶχεν εἰκοσίκλινον οἶκον, ὃς ἦν ἐπιτήδειος αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰς ὑποδοχάς. Ἦν δὲ ὁ Λύκων καὶ σφαιριστὴς ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐπιδέξιος.

b. Cp. Diog. Laërt. V 67 (fr. 8 W.):

Ἦν δὲ καὶ καθαρώτατος τὴν στολήν, ὡς ἀνυπερβλήτῳ χρῆσθαι μαλακότητι ἱματίων, καθὰ φησὶν Ἑρμιππος. ἀλλὰ καὶ γυμναστικώτατος ἐγένετο καὶ εὐέκτης τὸ σῶμα τὴν τε πᾶσαν σχέσιν ἀθλητικὴν ἐπιφαίνων, ὠτοθλαδίας³ καὶ ἐμπινῆς ὦν, καθὰ φησὶν Ἀντίγονος ὁ Καρύστιος. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ παλαῖσαι λέγεται τὰ τ' ἐν τῇ πατρίδι Ἰλίσια καὶ σφαιρίσαι.

Political influence

727—a. He often gave political advice to the Athenians.

Diog. Laërt. V 66:

Πολλάκις τε πολλὰ συμβουλεύσας Ἀθηναίους τὰ μέγιστα αὐτοὺς ὠφέλησεν.

Liberality

b. And showed liberality towards the Athenian state as well as to the sanctuary of Delphi. The last point appears from a decree of the Delphic amphiktyones who honoured him with a laurel wreath etc. for the sake of his great εὐνοία and φιλοτιμία towards the God and the sanctuary at Delphi (Dittenberger, *Sylloge*³, nr. 461); the first from a list of

¹ Cp. Wilamowitz, *Antigonos von Karystos*, p. 78 sqq.

² Symposia on common account.

³ A boxer with cauliflower ears.

those who ἐπέδωκαν εἰς τὴν σωτηρίαν τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς χώρας κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦ δήμου (*ib.* nr. 491).

Wehrli sees in this liberality a feature of the μεγαλόψυχος of Aristotle, an ideal which was certainly before Lyco's eyes. I think it would require a great deal of benevolence to see in L. a true representative of the μεγαλόψυχος. Certainly L. displayed a kind of μεγαλοπρέπεια; yet, as it seems, not without avoiding the extreme of χανότης, as he was judged by his contemporaries. Whether his personality and behaviour offered a desirable antidote to the type of one-sided erudition represented by Strato, may seem to us rather problematical.

728—Lyco seems to have been more a rhetor than a philosopher. More a
rhetor than
a philosopher
a. Diog. Laert. praises him exclusively as a φραστικὸς ἀνὴρ and a philosopher for a certain paedagogical talent.

Diog. Laërt. V 65-66:

— Λύκων Ἀστυάνακτος Τρωαδεύς, φραστικὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ περὶ παίδων ἀγωγὴν ἄκρως συντεταγμένος. ἔφασκε γὰρ δεῖν παρεζεῦχθαι τοῖς παισὶ τὴν αἰδῶ καὶ φιλοτιμίαν ὡς τοῖς ἵπποις μύωπα καὶ χαλινόν. τὸ δ' ἐκφραστικὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ περιγεγώνος ἐν τῇ ἐρμηνείᾳ φαίνεται ἀνθένδε· φησὶ γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον
5 ἐπὶ παρθένου πενιχρᾶς· »Βαρὺ γὰρ φορτίον πατρὶ κόρη διὰ σπάνιν προικὸς ἐκτρέχουσα τὸν ἀκμαῖον τῆς ἡλικίας καιρόν.« διὸ δὴ καὶ φασιν Ἀντίγονον ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἦν ὥσπερ μήλου τὴν εὐωδίαν καὶ χάριν ἄλλοθί που μετενεγκεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δένδρου τῶν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἔδει θεωρεῖσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῷ λέγειν γλυκύτατος
10 ἦν· παρὸ καὶ τινες τὸ γάμμα αὐτοῦ τῷ ὀνόματι προσετίθεσαν.

We have a fragment of L. in the work of the rhetor Rutilius Lupus (II 7; Wehrli, fr. 26), which is indeed remarkable from a stylistic point of view.

b. Cf. Cic., *De fin.* V 13:

Lyco, oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ieiunior.

729—His view of the highest good appears from a passage in Clemens, *Strom.* II, c. 21, 129, 9 (Stählin II, p. 183), fr. 20 W.:

Λύκων ὁ Περιπατητικὸς τὴν ἀληθινὴν χαρὰν τῆς ψυχῆς τέλος ἔλεγεν εἶναι, ὡς Λεύκιμος τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς.

Wehrli rightly remarks that, for Lyco, the "true joy of the soul" is surely not the Aristotelian contemplation.

730—Probably Lyco was succeeded by Aristo of Ceos, the author of a great characterological fragment preserved in Philodemus' *Περὶ κακιῶν* X.

a. He is mentioned by Cicero in the above-cited passage, *De fin.* V 13 (after Lyco):

Aristo
of Ceos

Concinnus deinde et elegans huius (sc. successor), Aristo, sed ea quae desideratur a magno philosopho gravitas in eo non fuit. Scripta sane et multa et polita, sed nescio quo pacto auctoritatem oratio non habet.

b. Strabo X 6, 486, mentions him among those who came from Iulis in Ceos and calls him an emulator of Bion of Borysthenes:

Ἐκ δὲ τῆς Ἰουλίδος ὃ τε Σιμωνίδης ἦν ὁ μελοποιὸς καὶ Βακχυλίδης — καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου φιλοσόφων Ἀρίστων, ὁ τοῦ Βορυσθενίτου Βίωνος ζηλωτής.

731—After Lyco, whose chief interest seems to have been in rhetoric, A. develops another side of Aristotle's inheritance, namely, the description of types of character. The first part of the fragment in Philodemus' Π. κακιῶν X (col. X-XXIV; first part till XVI 27) deals amply with ὑπερηφανία.

This quality is not dealt with by Ar., either in the *Eth. Nic.* or in the *Eth. Eud. Theophr.*, *Char.* 24, defined it as καταφρόνησις τις πλὴν αὐτοῦ τῶν ἄλλων.

As to A., he considers ὑπερηφανία as a great fault, because it underestimates our dependence on τύχη and on our fellow-men. Thus, he protests against the Stoic idea of autarkeia of the individual.

The first part of our fragment seems to have been written in a protreptical style, as may appear from the following passages.

A fragment
from the
work "On
relieving
from
arrogance"

a. Philodemus, Π. κακιῶν X, col. X 30-XIII 8 (fr. 13 I-IV W.):

Ἐάν ποτε συναισθάνηται μετεωριζόμενος, μεταρίπτειν τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπὶ τὰς ἔμπροσθε ταπεινώσεις ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης, εἴποτε γεγόνασιν — — καὶ λαμβάνειν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τὸ τῆς τύχης ἑτεροκλινές¹ καὶ ὀξύστροφον· καὶ ἐπὶ πάγου πορευομένους τὸ Εὐριπίδου² λέγειν¹, ὃ καὶ Διονύσιος οὐ κακῶς ἐπιφανεῖν ἐκέλευεν τινα δις τῆς ἡμέρας·

Col.
XI

10

ὁρᾷς τυράννους διὰ μακρῶν ἡῤῃσμένους;
καὶ μνημονεύειν ἐναργῶς, ὃν τρόπον αὐτὸς διετέθη¹ πρὸς ὑπερηφανήσαντα, — — καθάπερ καὶ Δίων πρὸς Πτολόμενον τὸν Μεγαρέα, ὃς¹ πολὺν χρόνον 20 ἐπὶ τῆς θύρας περιμένων πρὸς τὸν ἀκόλουθον· »ἦ που καὶ ἡμεῖς«, εἶπεν, »ἐκεῖ πολλὰ τοιαῦτ' ἐποιοῦμεν.« Καὶ ὅταν ἐπὶ τὰς εὐκληρίας ἐφιστάνῃ, μὴ προσεπιρητορεύειν αὐταῖς πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον, ἀλλ' ἀποσπᾶν ὅτι δύναται, κουφίζειν³ τῆς ἰσχύοντος πεφυκυίας¹. . . ὥς καὶ Περικλῆς ταπεινοῦ- 30 μένους μὲν ἐξῆρεν Ἀθηναίους, μεγαλαυχουμένους δὲ συνέστειλε. — — καὶ παραμετρεῖν αὐτὸν μὴ πρὸς τοὺς πενεστέρους ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς καθ' ἕκαστον

Col.
XII

¹ Restitution of Wehrli.

² Fr. 420 Nauck².

³ To relieve from.

εἶδος ὑπερέχοντας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν ἐξαίρει, τὸ δὲ συστέλλει, τοῦτο μὲν ἐπ' ἀγρῶν
 10 κτήσεως, τοῦτο δ' ἐπ' ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας πόλεων καὶ ἐθνῶν· παρυπομιμνήσ-
 κεσθαι δὲ καὶ τοῦ συναντᾶν εἰωθότος φθόνου τοῖς ὑπερηφανοῦσιν, ὃς ὀφθαλμία
 τίς ἐστὶν ψυχῆς, ὥστε καθάπερ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς ἢ τῶν συναντῶντων γεγανω-
 20 μένη χλανὶς ἐνοχλεῖ, κωφότερον δ' ἤπερ ἐὰν παριῶν καὶ ἀναβαλλόμενος δια-
 τινάξῃ, παραπλησίως καὶ τὸν φθονερὸν λυπεῖ μὲν τάλλότρια τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οὐχ
 οὕτω δ' ὥσπερ ὅταν οἷον ἀναπτερυγίζοντά τινα καταμάθῃ δι' αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς
 ὕψος ἐξαιρόμενον· τότε δὲ προσφύς ἔδακεν. "Ὅσαι δ' ἀπώλειαι διὰ φθόνον
 30 γίνονται, βλέπεται τοῖς ἄπασιν. — Ἐννοεῖν δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν, ὅταν
 εἰς ἀτυχίαν μεταπέσῃ· λυπηρὰ γάρ, ἅτε συνεπιτιθεμένων εὐλόγως τῷ τῆς
 τύχης πταίσματι τῶν πολλῶν κατ' ἐχθρῶν ὁμολογουμένων — — ὅτι τῆς
 Col. XIII
 πρότερον ὑπερηφανίας ἀνεμίμνησκεν. διὸ καὶ φασιν ἀχθόμενον αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῷ
 σχεδὸν πάντας ἐπιχαίρειν πρὸς Ἀρχέλαον ἀπελθεῖν¹. —

b. "Greatness of soul"² is to be separated from arrogance.

Philodemus, *ib.*, col. XV, l. 22-33 (fr. 13 VI W.):

Καὶ διαίρειν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὑπερηφανίας, ἀλλὰ μὴ συμφύρειν ὥς ἐν καὶ
 ταῦτόν· διαφέρει γάρ ὅσον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος οἰδήσεως εὐεξία, καὶ ἐστὶν
 τοῦ μὲν μεγαλοψύχου τὸ καταφρονεῖν τῶν τυχηρῶν ὑπερέχοντα τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς
 30 ὄγκῳ, τοῦ δ' ὑπερηφάνου τὸ διὰ κουφότητα ταύτης ἐκπνευματούμενον ὑπὸ
 κτήσεως ὑπερορᾶν ἐτέρους.

c. Arrogance may turn to madness.

Philodemus, *ib.*, Col. XVI, l. 15-27 (fr. 13 VII W.):

Ἐννοεῖν δ' ὅτι καὶ εἰς μωρίαν ἐνίστε τὸ νόσημα περίσθησιν ἢ μάνιαν, εἰ μὴ
 20 τὰ Ξέρξου τῶν δυεῖν οὐκ ἔχεται ἢ θατέρου, τὸ ζευγνύειν τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον καὶ
 καθιέναι πέδας εἰς τὴν θάλατταν καὶ τᾶλλα ποιεῖν ἃ περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγουσιν·
 ἢ τὸ θεοὺς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἑαυτοὺς γεγονέναι δοκεῖν καὶ τᾶλλ' ὅσα γίνεται περὶ
 τοὺς ἀνέδην ὑπερηφανοῦντας.

The fragment of Aristo's *Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας*³, preserved by Philodemus, is, as Wehrli remarked, our oldest example of Hellenistic protreptic literature.

732—The rest of Philodemus' fragment shows a very different style and character. Wehrli considers it on good grounds as being taken from another work of A.

¹ It was Euripides who, by the φθόνος of his enemies which had passed over into ἐπιχαιρεκακία, was driven to Archelaus.

² Which is often translated by "pride".

³ The title is mentioned by Philodemus in col. X, l. 10-11.

The
αὐθάδης

a. Description of the αὐθάδης.

Philodemus, Π. κακιῶν X, col. XVI l. 29-col. XVII, l. 17 (fr. 14 I-II W.):

‘Ο δ’ αὐθάδης λεγόμενος ἔοικε μὲν εἶναι μεικτὸς ἐξ οἰήσεως ¹ καὶ ὑπερ-
ηφανίας καὶ ὑπεροψίας, μετέχων δὲ καὶ πολλῆς εἰκαιότητος ². Τοιοῦτος γάρ
ἐστίν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρίστων, οἷος ἐν τῇ μάκ<τ>ρα ³ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν αἰτεῖν μὴ
προανακρίνας τὸν συμβεβηκότ’, εἰ κάκεινῳ συναρέσκει, καὶ — — παῖδα πριά-
μενος μὴδὲ τοῦνομα προσερωτῆσαι μὴτ’ αὐτὸς θέσθαι, καλεῖν δὲ παῖδα καὶ
μηθὲν ἄλλο, καὶ τὸν συναλείψαντα μὴ ἀντισυναλείφειν· καὶ ξενισθεὶς μὴ
ἀντιξενίσαι· καὶ θύραν ἄλλοτρίαν κόπτων, ἐπερωτήσαντος τίς ἐστίν, μὴδὲν
ἀποκρίνεσθαι, μέχρι ἂν ἐξέλθῃ· καὶ ἄρρωστοῦντ’ αὐτὸν ἐπισκεπτομένου φίλου ¹⁰
μὴ λέγειν πῶς ἔχει, μὴδ’ αὐτὸς ἐπισκεπτόμενός τινα τοιοῦτό τι προσερωτῆσαι·
καὶ γράφων ἐπιστολὴν τὸ χαίρειν μὴ προσγράψαι μὴδ’ ἐρρῶσθαι τελευταῖον.

Col.
XVII

The
αὐθέκαστος

b. Description of the αὐθέκαστος. Ib., col. XVII 17-XVIII 11
(fr. 14 II-III W.):

‘Ο δ’ αὐθέκαστος οὐ πᾶν μὲν εἰκαῖός ἐστιν οὐδ’ ἄλογος ὥσπερ ὁ αὐθάδης,
δι’ οἷσιν δὲ τοῦ μόνος φρονεῖν ἰδιογνωμονῶν καὶ πειθόμενος ἐν ἅπασιν κατορθώ-
σειν, ἀμαρτήσεσθαι δ’, ἂν ἐτέρου κρίσει προσχρήσῃται, μετέχων δὲ καὶ ὑπερ-
ηφανίας· οἷος μὴδενὶ προσαναθέμενος ἀποδημεῖν, ἀγοράζειν, πωλεῖν, ἀρχὴν
μετιέναι, τᾶλλα συντελεῖν· κἂν προσερωτήσῃ τις, τί μέλλει ποιεῖν· »οἶδ’ ³⁰
ἐγώ« λέγειν· κἂν μέμφηται τις, ὑπομειδιῶν· »Ἐμὲ σύ;« καὶ παρακληθεὶς ἐπὶ
συνεδρεῖαν βουλευομένῳ μὴ βούλεσθαι τὸ δοκοῦν εἰπεῖν, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο μέλλει
πράττειν· καὶ πάντ’, ἐν ὅσοις ἀποτέτευχε, — — τελεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτεθυμηκέναι
γενέσθαι φάσκειν· καὶ μὴ δυσωπεῖσθαι τοῦνομα καλούμενος ὡς αὐθέκαστος, ἀλλὰ
καὶ ἔτι παιδάρια λέγειν εἶναι τοὺς ὡς παιδαγωγοῖς ἄλλοις προσανατιθεμένους·
καὶ μόνος ἔχειν πώγωνα καὶ πολιάς· καὶ ζῆν δυνήσεσθαι γενόμενος ἐν ἐρημίᾳ. ¹⁰

Col.
XVIII

The
παντειδήμων

c. Ib., col. XVIII 11-38 (fr. 14 III W.):

Τούτου δ’ ἔτι χείρων ἐστὶν ὁ παντειδήμων, ἀναπεπεικῶς ἑαυτὸν ὅτι πάντα
γινώσκει, τὰ μὲν μαθὼν παρὰ τῶν μάλιστ’ ἐπισταμένων, τὰ δ’ ἰδὼν ποιοῦντας
μόνον, τὰ δ’ αὐτὸς ἐπινοήσας ἀφ’ αὐτοῦ. κἄστι τοιοῦτος οὐ μόνον οἷον Ἰππίαν
τὸν Ἥλεϊον ἱστορεῖ Πλάτων, ὅσα περὶ τὸ σῶμ’ εἶχεν, αὐτῷ πεποιηκέναι ²⁰
λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατασκευάζειν οἰκίαν καὶ πλοῖον δι’ αὐτοῦ καὶ χωρὶς ἀρχιτέκ-
τονος· καὶ γράφειν συνθήκας ἑαυτῷ δεομένης ἐμπειρίας νομικῆς· καὶ δούλους
ιδίους ἰατρεῦειν, μὴ μόνον ἑαυτόν, ἐπιχειρεῖν δὲ καὶ ἄλλους· καὶ φυτεύειν καὶ ³⁰
φορτίζεσθαι τὰ μάλισθ’ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνικωτάτων κατορθούμενα· καὶ ναυαγῶν
ἐν ἅπασι μὴδ’ οὕτω παύεσθαι τῆς ἀποπληξίας· οἷος δὲ καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων
ἀντιποιοῦμενος πάντων ἀσχημονεῖν· καὶ τοὺς καταγελῶντας ἀπείρους λέγειν. —

¹ Presumption.

² Thoughtlessness.

³ Bathing-tub.

Wehrli remarks that the list of characters dealt with by A. was probably longer than our fragment in Philodemus, and that, in this case, the work of A. gave a complete description of human characters, which formed "ein bedeutendes Zeugnis peripatetischer Erfahrungswissenschaft auch auf ethischem Gebiete".

733—Plut., *De audiendis poetis* 14e, mentions, on a level with the *Abaris* of Heracl. Pont., the *Lycos* of A., as a writing in which τὰ περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν δόγματα were treated μεμειγμένα μυθολογία. Cp. our nr. **782**.

7—ARISTO OF COS

734—While we found in Lycos rhetoric accepted and cultivated as a part of philosophy, Aristo of Cos, a pupil of Aristo of Ceos and his successor, probably the author of the great fragments on rhetoric preserved by Philodemus, went back to Plato's view in the *Gorgias*.

a. Strabo, XIV, 19, 658:

Οὗτος (sc. Hippocrates) τε δὴ ἐστὶ τῶν ἐνδόξων Κῶος ἀνὴρ, — καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς Νικίας ὁ καὶ τυραννήσας Κῶων, καὶ Ἀρίστων ὁ ἀκροασάμενος τοῦ περιπατητικοῦ (i.e. Aristo of Ceos) καὶ κληρονομήσας ἐκεῖνον.

Aristo
of Cos

He is probably the same who is mentioned by Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* II 61, as a γνῶριμος Κριτολάου, and by Quintilianus II 15, 19 as *discipulus Critolai*.

b. Philodemus, *Volumina rhetorica* ed. Sudhaus I, p. 360, col. LXXI, l. 7-8:

τὸ βιβλίον τᾶρίστωνος.

735—a. The rhetor is not worthy to pretend to be a governor.

His rejection
of rhetoric

Philodemus, o.c. p. 361, col. LXXII l. 12-18:

Φησὶ δὴ πρῶτον ἀποτρέπων ὅτι κελευστοῦ καὶ οὐ κυβερνήτου δόξαν ἔχων ὁ ῥήτωρ οὐκ ἄξιός ἐστι προσποιεῖσθαι κυβερνήτης εἶναι.

b. Since rhetoric as a whole has to do with falsehood, the man who seeks truth has to avoid it.

Ib., col. LXXIII 1-4:

Φησὶν ὅλην τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν ἐκ τοῦ ψεύδους, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τῷ φιλαληθεῖ φευκτέαν.

c. In what sense rhetoric, in Aristo's opinion, does not achieve truth, may appear from the following lines, in which we are reminded of Plato's definition of rhetoric as a kind of κολακεία — ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος στο-

χάζεται ἀνευ τοῦ βελτίστου (Gorg. 464 e-465 a). Cp. 464c: οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη¹.

Philodemus, ib., p. 362, col. LXXIV, l. 5-15:

Εἰ δὲ τὸ κατεστοχασμένον εἰκότως ἢ τάληθεϊ συνεγγίζον πιθανὸν ἔλεγεν, ὥσπερ ἀδυνατοῦν ἀληθὲς εἶναι καὶ ἀποβαίνειν, δ [πι]θανῶς² λέγουσιν οἱ ῥήτορες, αἰσχύνομαι περὶ τοῦ μηδ' ὁποιοῦν ἀπόδειξιν εἰσενεγκεῖν.

d. A. denies the rhetor the right of uttering praise-or blame, since he is not able to judge.

Philod., ib., p. 367 f., col. LXXXIV, l. 5-10, 12-13:

Ἡ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν ἐροῦσιν (sc. τὸ ἐγκωμιάσαι καὶ ψέξει δυνατόν εἶναι³), ἢ τοῦτον ὁμολογοῦντες πῶς οὐ δεδείχασιν ἕτερον ὄντα τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων ἐμπειρίας; — "Ὡστ' οὐδ' ἐγκωμιάζειν καὶ ψέγειν — —

As Plato did in the above-cited passage of the *Gorgias*, he speaks of ἐμπειρία of the rhetores, as opposed to the knowledge of the πολιτικοί.

e. The Socratic-Platonic distinction between those who know their subject and the mass of ignorant people is seen in the following lines: the author speaks of ἀτεχνοὶ and ἐντεχνοὶ πίστεις, the first of which are the common property of everybody, while the latter are proper only to those who have some special knowledge.

Philod., o.c. p. 369 f., col. LXXXVII, l. 3-19:

Ἀξίον δ' ἐπιστάσεως⁴ τὰς μὲν ἀτέχνους (sc. πίστεις) κοινὰς ἀπάντων ὑπάρχειν, τῶν δ' ἐντέχνων⁵ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ σημεῖον καὶ τὸ τεκμήριον οὐθὲν αὐτοῖς προσήκειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν σημεῖον εἶναι τοῦ παρηκολουθηκότος⁶ ἴδιον, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἐν νόσοις ἰατρῶν, τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὸ πλεῖν χειμῶσιν κυβερνήτου, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· τὸ δ' εἶδος τοῦ παραθεωρήσαντος⁶ πῶς — —

f. The rhetor, by his lack of knowledge, might even be harmful to the state.

Philod., o.c. p. 375 f., col. XCVIII, l. 4-16:

— τῷ δὲ μήτε ποῦ μήτε πῶς μήτε πότε πλευστέον εἰδέναι προσβλαβὴς ἀν γένοιτο μᾶλλον οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ καὶ ὁ ῥήτωρ. Περὶ γὰρ ὠφελίμων τε καὶ βλαβερῶν

¹ Our nr. 198c.

² Text of Wehrli.

³ Col. LXXXIII, l. 8-10.

⁴ Attention.

⁵ Ar., *Rhet.* 1355 b³⁵ makes the distinction between ἐντεχνοὶ and ἀτεχνοὶ πίστεις (our nr. 657a), and deals with εἶδος, σημεῖον and τεκμήριον as means of proof.

⁶ The man who knows his subject is here indicated by the terms ὁ παρηκολουθηκώς and ὁ παραθεωρήσας.

ὥς τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο παρακολουθεῖν, εἰ καὶ τις αὐτὸν ἐνάγκησε ¹ νοεῖν παντάπασι διδακτὴν τὴν πάντων δύναμιν. —

g. The art of persuasion is perfectly useless if knowledge is lacking.

Philod., o.c., p. 379 f., col. CIV, l. 6-16:

Καὶ πρὸς τὸ τρίτον δὲ λεγέσθω τὸ κἂν πάνυ πειστικὸς ὁ λόγος ᾗ, ὁ μὴ τὸ πῶς καὶ τίνας δεῖ πείθειν καὶ πότε κατέχων πάντων ἂν ἀχρηστότατος εἴη καθάπερ καὶ πηδάλιον· ὃ συμβέβηκε καὶ τῷ τοῦ ῥήτορος, ὅτι λόγος μὲν, οὐ ῥήτορος δ' εἶναι λέγεται ἄν.

7A—NOTE ON THE MAGNA MORALIA

736—To the remains of the early Peripatetic School doubtless belong ^{The Magna} the *Magna moralia*, attributed to Ar. by tradition. See our nrs. 561, ^{Moralia} 565b, supra.

⁴ "hypnotized".

NINETEENTH CHAPTER THE EARLY ACADEMY

I—SPEUSIPPUS

**List of
members of
the Academy**

737—Diog. Laert. III 46 gives the following list of disciples of Plato.

Μαθηταὶ δ' αὐτοῦ Σπεύσιππος Ἀθηναῖος, Ξενοκράτης Χαλκηδόνιος, Ἀριστοτέλης Σταγειρίτης, Φίλιππος Ὀπούντιος, Ἐστιαῖος Περίνθιος, Δίων Συρακόσιος, Ἀμυκλος Ἡρακλεώτης, Ἐραστος καὶ Κορίσκος Σκῆψιοι, Τιμόλαος Κυζικηνός, Εὐαίων Λαμψακηνός, Πύθων καὶ Ἡρακλείδης Αἰνιοί, Ἴπποθάλης καὶ Κάλλιππος Ἀθηναῖοι, Δημήτριος Ἀμφιπολίτης, Ἡρακλείδης Ποντικός καὶ ἄλλοι πλείους, σὺν οἷς καὶ γυναῖκες δύο, Λασθένεια Μαντινικὴ καὶ Ἀξιόθεα Φλειασία, ἥ καὶ ἀνδρεῖα ἡμίσχετο, ὥς φησι Δικαίαρχος.

Cf. Index Herculensis col. VI, Mekler p. 33-37.

**Organisation
of the School**

738—The Academy seems to have been organized as a θίασος for the cult of the Muses.

Diog. L. III 25:

Ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων Φαβωρίνου φέρεται ὅτι Μιθραδάτης ὁ Πέρσης ἀνδριάντα Πλάτωνος ἀνέθετο εἰς τὴν Ἀκαδημειαν καὶ ἐπέγραψε· »Μιθραδάτης Ὀροντοβάτου Πέρσης Μούσαις εἰκόνα ἀνέθετο Πλάτωνος, ἣν Σιλανίων ἐποίησε.«

Cp. Wilamowitz, *Philol. Unters.* IV 263 ff., and our next nr.

Speusippus

739—a. Speusippus, successor of Plato. Diog. L. IV 1:

Διεδέξατο δ' αὐτὸν Σπεύσιππος Εὐρυμέδοντος Ἀθηναῖος, τῶν μὲν δῆμων Μυρρινούσιος, υἱὸς δὲ τῆς ἀδελφῆς αὐτοῦ Πωτώνης. Καὶ ἐσχολάρχησεν ἔτη ὀκτώ, ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς ὀγδόης καὶ ἑκατοστῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος¹. Χαρίτων τ' ἀγάλματ' ἀνέθηκεν ἐν τῷ μουσεῖῳ τῷ ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ ἰδρυθέντι. καὶ ἔμεινε μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν Πλάτωνι δογμάτων.

Zeller remarks rightly that the last sentence might prove something too much.

b. When struck by an incurable disease, he gave up the direction of the School voluntarily. Diog. L. IV 2:

¹ 348-345 B.C.

*Ἦδη δὲ ὑπὸ παραλύσεως καὶ τὸ σῶμα διέφθαρτο, καὶ πρὸς Ξενοκράτην διεπέμπετο παρακαλῶν αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν καὶ τὴν σχολὴν διαδέξασθαι.

c. His reply to Diogenes, who told him that life was not worth living in such a bad state of health.

Stob., *Ecl.* IV, c. 52*, 17:

Σπευσίππῳ παραλυθέντι τὰ σκέλη Διογένης ἐξαγαγεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦ βίου παρήγει, ὁ δὲ οὐ τοῖς σκέλεσιν, ἔφη, »ζῶμεν, ἀλλὰ τῷ νῷ«.

740—**a.** Speus. believed in the unity of science. Diog. L. IV 2: **The unity of science**

Οὗτος πρῶτος, καθά φησι Διδώρος ἐν ἀπομνημονευμάτων πρώτῳ, ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐθεάσατο τὸ κοινὸν καὶ συνφείωσε καθόσον ἦν δυνατόν ἀλλήλοις.

The method here referred to was applied by Speus. in his *Hómoia* and had the purpose of dividing things into genera and species.

b. Speus.' "Ὅμοια were, as it appears from fragments in Athenaeus, **The "Ὅμοια** a survey of the different kinds of plants and animals, in which similar phenomena were combined and dissimilar separated. Lang, fr. 5-26.

741—**a.** In the following passage of the *Anal. post.* Ar. is polemizing against Speus. **Definition and division impossible**

Ar., *Anal. post.* II 13, 97 a⁶⁻¹¹ (fr. 31a Lang):

Οὐδὲν δὲ δεῖ τὸν ὀριζόμενον καὶ διαιρούμενον ἅπαντα εἶδέναι τὰ ὄντα. καίτοι ἀδύνατόν φασι τινες εἶναι τὰς διαφορὰς εἶδέναι τὰς πρὸς ἕκαστον μὴ εἰδόμενα ἕκαστον. ἄνευ δὲ τῶν διαφορῶν οὐκ εἶναι ἕκαστον εἶδέναι· οὐ γὰρ μὴ διαφέρει, ταῦτόν εἶναι τούτῳ, οὗ δὲ διαφέρει, ἕτερον τούτου.

b. Cf. Philoponus in *Anal. post.*, p. 405, ²⁷, Wallies (fr. 31c Lang):

Τοῦτο λέγει ἀναιρῶν τοὺς λόγους δι' ὧν ἐπεχείρει ὁ Σπεύσιππος ἀναιρῆσαι καὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ τοὺς ὀρισμούς· ἐπεχείρει γὰρ οὗτος δεικνύειν, ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποδοῦναι ὀρισμὸν τινος, λέγων ὥς ὁ θέλων δι' ὀρισμοῦ παραστήσαι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ τοῦ ἵππου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς ὀφείλει γινώσκειν πάντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν καθ' ἃς διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων· οὕτως γὰρ παρίσταται ἡ φύσις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ τοῦ ἵππου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς ἐν τῷ χωρίζεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων πάντων· τὸ δὲ χωριζόμενον διὰ τινων διαφορῶν δεῖ χωρίζεσθαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀδύνατον πάντα τὰ ὄντα γινώσκειν ἢ τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν, λοιπὸν δι' ὀρισμοῦ παραστήσαι τι ἀδύνατον.

742—He attributed more to sense-perception than Plato did.

Theory of knowledge

Sextus, *Math.* VII (*Adv. Log.* I) 145 (Fr. 29 Lang):

ᾧδε μὲν καὶ Πλάτων· Σπεύσιππος δέ, ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν αἰσθητά,

τὰ δὲ νοητά, τῶν μὲν νοητῶν κριτήριον ἔλεξεν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον, τῶν δὲ αἰσθητῶν τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν αἴσθησιν. ἐπιστημονικὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν ὑπείληφε καθεστάναι τὴν μεταλαμβάνουσαν τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀληθείας. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τοῦ αὐλητοῦ ἢ τοῦ ψάλτου δάκτυλοι τεχνικὴν μὲν εἶχον ἐνέργειαν, 5 οὐκ ἐν αὐτοῖς δὲ προηγουμένως τελειουμένην ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τὸν λογισμὸν συνασκήσεως ἀπαρτιζομένην, καὶ ὡς ἡ τοῦ μουσικοῦ αἴσθησις ἐνέργειαν μὲν εἶχεν ἀντιληπτικὴν τοῦ τε ἡρμοσμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀναρμόστου, ταύτην δὲ οὐκ αὐτοφυῆ, ἀλλ' ἐκ λογισμοῦ περιγεγονυῖαν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις φυσικῶς παρὰ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ἐπιστημονικῆς μεταλαμβάνει τριβῆς πρὸς ἀπλανῆ τοῦ ὑποκειμένων διάγνωσιν.

Doctrine
of the first
principles

743—a. He separated the One from the Good and took the evolutionary point of view: the Good can, according to his teaching, not be at the beginning but only at the end of being, as its perfection, reached by a process of development.

Ar., *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072 b³⁰-1073 a³ (Fr. 34a, Lang):

“Οσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴονται. τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ ἐτέρων ἐστὶν προτέρων τελείων, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον· οἷον πρότερον ἄνθρωπον ἂν φαίη τις εἶναι τοῦ σπέρματος, οὐ τὸν ἐκ τούτου γενόμενον, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἐξ οὗ τὸ σπέρμα.

b. The One itself is not even being.

Ar. opposes again this view of Speus. in *Metaph.* N 5, 1092 a¹¹⁻¹⁵ (Fr. 34 e Lang):

Οὐκ ὀρθῶς δ' ὑπολαμβάνει οὐδ' εἴ τις παρεικάζει τὰς τοῦ ὅλου ἀρχὰς τῇ τῶν ζώων καὶ φυτῶν, ὅτι ἐξ ἀορίστων ἀτελῶν δὲ αἰεὶ τὰ τελειότερα, διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οὕτως ἔχειν φησίν, ὥστε μηδὲ ὄν τι εἶναι τὸ ἐν αὐτό.

c. A reason why he denied that the One is the Good, was that, in this case, multiplicity would be the bad.

Ar., *Metaph.* N 4, 1091 b^{30,35} (fr. 35 a Lang):

Ταῦτά τε δὴ συμβαίνει ἄτοπα, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον στοιχεῖον, εἴτε πλῆθος ὄν εἴτε τὸ ἄνισον καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρόν, τὸ κακὸν αὐτό. διόπερ ὁ μὲν ἔφευγε τὸ ἀγαθὸν προσάπτει τῷ ἐνὶ ὧς ἀναγκαῖον ὄν, ἐπειδὴ ἐξ ἐναντίων ἢ γένεσις, τὸ κακὸν τὴν τοῦ πλῆθους φύσιν εἶναι.

d. Meanwhile, he seems to have placed the One on the side of the good things in his scale of values.

Ar., *Eth. Nic.* I 4, 1096 b⁵⁻⁷ (fr. 37 a, Lang):

Πιθανώτερον δ' εοίκασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ) τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἕν· οἷς δὲ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθῆσαι δοκεῖ.

744—He seems to have identified Plato's principle of the infinite Dyad or the Great and Small with multiplicity.

Ar., *Metaph.* N 1, 1087 b⁴⁻⁹ (fr. 48 b Lang):

Οἱ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ὕλην ποιοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν τῷ ἐνὶ τῷ ἴσῳ τὸ ἀνίσον, ὥς τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ πλήθους οὖσαν φύσιν, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ πλήθους. γεννῶνται γὰρ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀνίσου δυνάμεως τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ, τῷ δ' ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους, ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἐνὸς δὲ οὐσίας ἀμφοῖν.

745—a. From the One and Multiplicity he derives mathematical **Mathematical numbers instead of Plato's Ideas** numbers, which in his system take the place of the Ideas in Plato.

Ar., *Metaph.* M 9, 1086 a²⁻⁵ (Fr. 42 e Lang):

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον ποιοῦντες παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, ὁρῶντες τὴν περὶ τὰ εἶδη δυσχέρειαν καὶ πλάσιν, ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδητικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ τὸν μαθηματικὸν ἐποίησαν.

b. Ar. criticized this explanation of the universe at the end of his book Λ of the *Metaph.*, 1075 b³⁷-1076 a⁴ (Fr. 33 e Lang):

Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικὸν καὶ οὕτως αἰεὶ ἄλλην ἔχουμένην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς ἐκάστης ἄλλας, ἐπεισοδιῶδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἢ ἐτέρα τῇ ἐτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὔσα ἢ μὴ οὔσα) καὶ ἀρχὰς πολλὰς· τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς. »οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω«.

c. In *Metaph.* M 6, 1080 b¹¹⁻¹⁸ Ar. states the difference between Speus. and Plato on the one hand, and between Speus. and Pythagoreanism on the other. From the latter Speus. differs in this way, that Pythagoreans did not separate their numbers from sensible things, while Speus. did (Fr. 42 c Lang).

Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέρους φασὶν εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς, τὸν μὲν ἔχοντα τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τὰς ιδέας, τὸν δὲ μαθηματικὸν παρὰ τὰς ιδέας καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά, καὶ χωριστοὺς ἀμφοτέρους τῶν αἰσθητῶν· οἱ δὲ τὸν μαθηματικὸν μόνον ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τὸν πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων κεχωρισμένον τῶν αἰσθητῶν. καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι δ' ἕνα, τὸν μαθηματικόν, πλὴν οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλ' ἐκ τούτου τὰς αἰσθητάς οὐσίας συνεστάναι φασίν.

Next geom.
magnitudes,
next soul

746—a. In his hierarchy of being, then, there followed after the One the numbers, then geometrical magnitudes, and next soul.

Ar., *Metaph.* Z 2, 1028 b¹⁸⁻²⁴ (Fr. 33 a Lang):

"Ἐτι παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ οἱ μὲν οὐκ οἴονται εἶναι οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον, οἱ δὲ πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον ὄντα αἰδία, ὥσπερ Πλάτων τὰ τ' εἶδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά δύο οὐσίας, τρίτην δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων οὐσίαν. Σπεύσιππος δὲ καὶ πλείους οὐσίας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀρξάμενος, καὶ ἀρχὰς ἐκάστης οὐσίας ἄλλην μὲν ἀριθμῶν, ἄλλην δὲ μεγεθῶν, ἔπειτα ψυχῆς· καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐπεκτείνει 5 τὰς οὐσίας.

b. Asclepius in *Metaph.* 377, ³⁵ and 379, ¹² Hayduck (Fr. 33 d Lang) adds to this:

Noūs καὶ πάλιν ἄλλην οὐσίαν νοῦ καὶ ἄλλην ψυχῆς.

Noūs
called God

747—a. Aëtius, *Plac.* ap. Stob. I 1, 29^b, p. 35, ³ W. (fr. 38 Lang):
Σπεύσιππος (θεὸν ἀπεφώνητο) τὸν νοῦν οὔτε τῷ ἐνὶ οὔτε τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸν αὐτόν, ἰδιοφυῇ δέ.

b. He seems to have localized this Mind or ruling power of the universe in the centre of the earth, as it appears from a rather obscure text of Theophr. ¹.

Theophr., *Metaph.* IX 32 ed. Ross-Fobes (fr. 41 Lang):

Τὸ δ' ὅλον σπάνιον τι καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις τὸ ἀγαθόν, πολὺ δὲ πλῆθος εἶναι τὸ κακόν, οὐκ ἐν ἀοριστίᾳ δὲ μόνον καὶ οἶον ὕλης εἶδει, καθάπερ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, ἀμαθεστάτου. Εἰκῇ γὰρ οἱ περὶ τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας λέγοντες ὥσπερ Σπεύσιππος σπάνιον τι τὸ τίμιον ποιεῖ τὸ περὶ τὴν τοῦ μέσου χώραν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα καὶ ἐκατέρωθεν. τὰ μὲν οὖν ὄντα καλῶς ἔτυχεν ὄντα. 5

c. In Cicero, and later by Minucius Felix, he is charged with atheism, in that he qualified this ruling Force of the universe as an animal power.

Cic., *N.D.* I 13, 32 (Fr. 39 a Lang):

Nec multo secus Speusippus Platonem avunculum subsequens et vim quandam dicens, qua omnia regantur, eamque animalem, evellere ex animis conatur cognitionem deorum.

Cf. Minuc. Felix 19, 7.

Immortality
of the soul

748—He considers the soul as immortal, even its irrational part. Olympiodorus in Plat. *Phaed.* p. 124, ¹³ Norvin (Fr. 55 Lang):

¹ I give the text as it is read by Ross-Fobes. Several corrections have been made in it.

“Οτι οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἄχρι τῆς ἐμψύχου ¹ ἔξωθεν ἀπαθανατίζουσιν, ὡς Νουμήνιος· οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς φύσεως, ὡς Πλωτῖνος † ἐνὶ ὅπου ²· οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας, ὡς τῶν μὲν παλαιῶν Ξενοκράτης καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων Ἰάμβλικος καὶ Πλούταρχος.

749—Speus. wrote several works on ethics. A few traces of them have remained in later writers. Ethics

a. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* II 22, 133; p. 186, ¹⁹ Stählin (Fr. 57 Lang): *eudaimonia*

Σπεύσιππός τε ὁ Πλάτωνος ἀδελφιδοῦς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν φησὶν ἔξιν εἶναι τελείαν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν ἢ ἔξιν ἀγαθῶν, ἧς δὴ καταστάσεως ἅπαντας μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὀρεξίν ἔχειν, στοχάζεσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῆς ἀοχλησίας. εἶεν δ' ἂν αἱ ἀρεταὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀπεργαστικάι.

b. Like Aristotle and other Academics, Speus. did not consider outward goods as indifferent things, though he held that virtue is in itself sufficient for happiness. its relation
to virtue

Cic., *Tusc.* V 10, 30 (fr. 58 a Lang):

Non igitur facile concedo neque Bruto meo neque communibus magistris nec veteribus illis, Aristoteli, Speusippo, Xenocrati, Polemoni, ut, cum ea quae supra enumeravi (paupertas, ignobilitas, humilitas, solitudo, amissio suorum, graves dolores corporis, perdita valetudo alia similia) in malis numerent, iidem dicant semper beatum esse sapientem.

c. Cp. Cic., *Tusc.* V 13, 39 (fr. 58 b Lang):

Hic (humanus animus) igitur si est excultus, etsi eius acies ita curata est, ut ne caecaretur erroribus, fit perfecta mens; id est absoluta ratio, quod est idem virtus. Et, si omne beatum est cui nihil deest et quod in suo genere expletum atque cumulatam est, idque virtutis est proprium, certe omnes virtutis compotes beati sunt. Et hoc quidem mihi cum Bruto convenit, id est cum Aristotele, Xenocrate, Speusippo, Polemone. Sed mihi videntur etiam beatissimi.

d. Seneca summarizes Speus.' doctrine shortly in the following sentence. *Epist.* 85, 18 (fr. 58 c, Lang):

Xenocrates et Speusippus putant beatum vel sola virtute fieri posse, non tamen unum bonum esse, quod honestum est.

Cp. also Plut., *De comm. not.* c. 13, p. 1065a (fr. 59 Lang).

¹ Lang reads ἐμψύχου (a conjecture of Bernays).

² The meaning of these words is uncertain.

pleasure
not a good

750—Speus. denied that, because pain is an evil, pleasure must be a good.

a. Ar., *Eth. Nic.* VII 14, 1153 b¹⁻⁷ (fr. 60 a Lang):

Ἄλλὰ μὴν οἷ τῇ λύπῃ κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κακόν, ἡ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική· τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ φευκτόν τι καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὥς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυσεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τῷ ἐλάττω καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν¹.

b. How Speus. meant his thesis, appears in the following passage of Gellius, *N.A.* IX 5, 4 (fr. 60 i Lang):

Speusippus vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter sese, bonum tamen esse, quod utriusque medium foret.

2—XENOCRATES

The man
and his
character

751—a. Diog. L. IV 6; 7-8:

Ξενοκράτης Ἀγαθήνορος Χαλκηδόνιος· οὗτος ἐκ νέου Πλάτωνος ἤκουσεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς Σικελίαν αὐτῷ συναπεδήμησεν. Ἦν δὲ τὴν φύσιν νωθρός, ὥστε λέγειν τὸν Πλάτωνα συγκρίνοντα αὐτὸν Ἀριστοτέλει, »τῷ μὲν μύωπος δεῖ, τῷ δὲ χαλινοῦ.« — »Σεμνός δὲ τὰ τ' ἄλλα Ξενοκράτης καὶ σκυθρωπὸς αἰεί, ὥστε αὐτῷ λέγειν συνεχῆς τὸν Πλάτωνα, »Ξενοκράτες, θῦε ταῖς Χάρισι.« — 5

Ἦν δὲ καὶ ἀξιόπιστος σφόδρα, ὥστε μὴ ἐξὸν ἀνώμοτον μαρτυρεῖν, τοῦτ' αὖ μόνῳ συνεχώρουν Ἀθηναῖοι. Καὶ δὴ καὶ αὐταρκέστατος ἦν. Ἀλεξάνδρου γοῦν ποτὲ συχρὸν ἀργύριον ἀποστείλαντος αὐτῷ, τρισχιλίας Ἀττικὰς ἀφελὼν τὸ λοιπὸν ἀπέπεμψεν, εἰπὼν ἐκείνῳ πλείονων δεῖν πλείονας τρέφοντι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὑπ' Ἀντιπάτρου πεμφθὲν μὴ προσέσθαι, ὥς φησι Μυρωνιανὸς ἐν Ὀμοίοις.

b. Cp. *Index Acad.* col. VI, Mekler p. 39:

Οἱ δ' ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ λέγονται προκρίναι τὸν Ξενοκράτην ἀγασθέντες αὐτοῦ τὴν σωφροσύνην.

His works

c. Diog. Laërt. IV 11:

Καὶ πλεῖστα ὅσα καταλέλοιπε συγγράμματα καὶ ἔπη καὶ παραινέσεις.

Follows a long list, in which are mentioned: a work *περὶ φύσεως*, several works on logic, theory of knowledge (such titles as *π. ἐπιστήμης*, *π. τοῦ ψεύδους*, *π. τὴν διάνοιαν*), metaphysics (*π. τοῦ ὄντος*, *π. εἰμαρμένης*, *π. ἰδεῶν*), on geometry, on numbers, on astronomy, and rather numerous works on ethical subjects.

Head of the
School during
25 years.

d. Ib., 14:

Διεδέξατο δὲ Σπεύσιππον καὶ ἀφηγήσατο τῆς σχολῆς πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἔτη.

¹ "that pleasure is essentially evil".

752—a. With Speusippus he shared a predilection for Pythagoreanism. Iambl., *Theol. arithm.* p. 61 g.E.:

Παρά Ξενοκράτους ἐξαιρέτως σπουδασθεισῶν αἰὲ Πυθαγορικῶν ἀκροάσεων, μάλιστα δὲ τῶν Φιλολάου συγγραμμάτων.

b. Diog. L. IV 10 (fr. 2 Heinze):

Πρὸς δὲ τὸν μήτε μουσικὴν μήτε γεωμετρίαν μήτε ἀστρονομίαν μεμαθηκότα, βουλόμενον δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν φοιτᾶν· πορεύου, ἔφη (ὁ Ξενοκράτης)· λαβὰς γὰρ οὐκ ἔχεις φιλοσοφίας. οἱ δὲ τοῦτο φασιν εἰπεῖν· παρ' ἐμοὶ γὰρ πόκος οὐ κνᾶπτεται.

Mathematical
studies a
necessary
propaedeusis

753—a. Tripartition of philosophy.

Sextus, *Math.* VII (= Adv. Log. I) 16; (fr. 1 H.):

Πλὴν οὗτοι μὲν (οἱ διμερῇ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὑποστησάμενοι) ἐλλειπῶς ἀνεστράφθαι δοκοῦσιν, ἐντελέστερον δὲ παρὰ τούτους οἱ εἰπόντες τῆς φιλοσοφίας τὸ μὲν τι εἶναι φυσικὸν τὸ δὲ ἡθικὸν τὸ δὲ λογικόν· ὧν δυνάμει μὲν Πλάτων ἐστὶν ἀρχηγός, περὶ πολλῶν μὲν φυσικῶν πολλῶν δὲ ἡθικῶν οὐκ ὀλίγων δὲ λογικῶν 5 διαλεχθεὶς· ῥητότατα δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ξενοκράτη καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔχονται τῆσδε τῆς διαίρέσεως.

Division
of phil.

b. Practical purpose of philosophy.

[Galenus], *Hist. phil.* 8, p. 605, ⁷ Diels; (fr. 4 H.):

Αἰτία δὲ φιλοσοφίας εὐρέσεώς ἐστι κατὰ Ξενοκράτη τὸ ταραχῶδες ἐν τῷ βίῳ καταπαῦσαι τῶν πραγμάτων.

Practical
purpose

754—Tripartition of knowledge.

Sextus, *Math.* VII 147 (fr. 5 H.):

Ξενοκράτης δὲ τρεῖς φησιν οὐσίας εἶναι, τὴν μὲν αἰσθητὴν τὴν δὲ νοητὴν τὴν δὲ σύνθετον καὶ δοξαστὴν, ὧν αἰσθητὴν μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, νοητὴν δὲ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς οὐρανοῦ, δοξαστὴν δὲ καὶ σύνθετον τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. ὁρατὴ μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῇ αἰσθήσει, νοητὴ δὲ δι' ἀστρολογίας. τούτων μέντοι 5 τοῦτον ἐχόντων τὸν τρόπον, τῆς μὲν ἐκτὸς οὐρανοῦ καὶ νοητῆς οὐσίας κριτήριον ἀπεφαίνετο τὴν ἐπιστήμην, τῆς δὲ ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ καὶ αἰσθητῆς τὴν αἰσθησιν, τῆς δὲ μικτῆς τὴν δόξαν· καὶ τούτων κοινῶς τὸ μὲν διὰ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ λόγου κριτήριον βεβαίον τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀληθές μὲν, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ λόγου, τὸ δὲ σύνθετον 10 κοινὸν ἀληθοῦς τε καὶ ψευδοῦς ὑπάρχειν. τῆς γὰρ δόξης τὴν μὲν τινα ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ. ὅθεν καὶ τρεῖς Μοίρας παραδεδόσθαι, "Ἀτροπον μὲν τὴν τῶν νοητῶν, ἀμετάθετον οὖσαν, Κλωθῶ δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, Λάχεσιν δὲ τὴν τῶν δοξαστῶν.

three kinds of
Knowledge

Cp. Ar., *Metaph.* E 1, our nr. 432b.

the categories

755—He reduced the categories to two, namely the καθ' αὐτό and the πρὸς τι.

Simpl., in *Ar. Categ.* γ 6 b; Schol. in *Ar.* 47 b²⁵ Brandis (fr. 12 H.):

Οἱ γὰρ περὶ Ξενοκράτην καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον πάντα τῷ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ τῷ πρὸς τι περιλαμβάνειν δοκοῦσιν, ὥστε περιττὸν εἶναι κατ' αὐτοὺς τοσοῦτον τῶν γενῶν πλῆθος.

the First Principles

756—His doctrine of First Principles.

a. Aetius, *Plac.* I 7, 30; *Dox.* p. 304 b¹ (fr. 15 H., first part):

Ξενοκράτης Ἀγαθήνορος Καλχηδόνιος τὴν μονάδα καὶ δυάδα θεούς, τὴν μὲν ὡς ἄρρενα πατὴρ ἐχούσαν τάξιν ἐν οὐρανῷ βασιλεύουσαν, ἥντινα προσ-αγορεύει καὶ Ζῆνα καὶ περιττὸν καὶ νοῦν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρῶτος θεός· τὴν δὲ ὡς θήλειαν, μητὴρ θεῶν δίκην, τῆς ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν λήξεως ἡγουμένην, ἥτις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός.

b. Aetius, *Plac.* I 3, 23; *Dox.* p. 288 b¹⁵ (fr. 28 H.):

Ξενοκράτης συνεστάναι τὸ πᾶν ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τοῦ ἀέναντος, ἀέναντος τὴν ὅλην αἰνιττόμενος διὰ τοῦ πλήθους.

The same doctrine of Xenocr. is mentioned by Theodoretus, *Graec. aff. cur.* IV 12, p. 158 Gaisford.

His hierarchy of being

757—From these two principles proceed first Numbers, not ideal but mathematical Numbers, identified by Xenocr. with the Ideas; next geometrical, finally physical bodies.

a. *Ar., Metaph.* Z 2, 1028 b²⁴ (fr. 34 H.):

Ἐνιοὶ δὲ τὰ μὲν εἶδη καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν φασὶ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐχόμενα, γραμμὰς καὶ ἐπίπεδα, μέχρι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά.

b. Asclepius, p. 379, ¹⁷ Hayduck, explains this passage in the following lines:

Ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τὸν Ξενοκράτην ἀποτείνεται, καὶ φησιν ὅτι τὰ εἶδη τῶν πραγμάτων τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς προσηγόρευεν, ἐπειδὴ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ περιοριστικοὶ εἰσιν ὧν εἰσιν ἀριθμοί, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ εἶδη περιοριστικὰ τῆς ὕλης ὑπάρχουσιν· εἶτα μετὰ τὰς ἰδέας δευτέρας οὐσίας ὑποτίθεται τὰς διανοητάς, τουτέστι τὰ μαθηήματα, γραμμὰς καὶ ἐπίπεδα· τελευταῖα δὲ τὰ φυσικά.

Between geometrical and physical bodies, doubtless the celestial bodies were interposed (τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐσίαν, *Ar.* l.c.; cp. our nr. 743, supra).

Xenocr.' identification of mathematical numbers and Ideas is referred to in several other places of *Ar.*'s *Metaphysics*, namely: Λ 1, 1069 a³³; Μ 1, 1076 a¹⁹;

M 6, 1080 b²¹; M 8, 1083 b²; M 9, 1086 a⁵; his doctrine of geometrical magnitudes in M 6, 1080 b²⁸ and N 3, 1090 b²¹.

On the place of Soul in this hierarchy, see nr. 748.

758—a. His doctrine of indivisible lines.

**Theory of
indivisible
lines**

Ar., *Metaph.* M 8, 1084 a³⁷-b² (fr. 41 H.):

Ἔτι τὰ μεγέθη καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα μέχρι πόσου (γεννώσι), ὅλον ἢ πρώτη γραμμὴ ἄτομος, εἴτα δύο, εἴτα καὶ ταῦτα μέχρι δεκάδος.

The meaning of this doctrine is, that all geometrical bodies should be finally reduced to very small and indivisible lines. Thus, Simplicius says, commenting on Ar.'s *Phys.* I 3, p. 142 Diels:

Ὡς οὖν ὁ Πλάτων ἐπίπεδα εἶπεν εἶναι τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἐλάχιστα σώματα, οὕτως ὁ Ξενοκράτης τὰς γραμμὰς, ἀδιαρέτους μὲν διὰ σμικρότητα, διαιρετὰς δὲ καὶ αὐτὰς οὕσας τῇ φύσει.

b. Ar. opposes this theory in several places, e.g. *De caelo* III 1, 299 a⁶ (fr. 41 H.):

Ἐπειτα δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου ἐστὶ στερεὰ μὲν ἐξ ἐπιπέδων συγκεῖσθαι, ἐπίπεδα δ' ἐκ γραμμῶν, ταύτας δ' ἐκ στιγμῶν· οὕτω δ' ἐχόντων οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ τῆς γραμμῆς μέρος γραμμὴν εἶναι· περὶ δὲ τούτων ἐπέσκεπται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως λόγοις, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδιαίρετα μήκη.

Cp. [Ar.], *De lin. insec.* 968 a¹-b²¹ (fr. 42 H.).

c. Philoponus in Ar. *Phys.* I 3, p. 84, ¹⁵ Vit., says that Xenocr. admitted his hypothesis of indivisible lines in order to avoid Zeno's consequences of indefinite division (Fr. 44 H.):

Ὅτι καὶ τῇ Ζήνωνος ἀπορίᾳ δι' ἧς κατεσκεύαζε καὶ ἐν εἶναι τὸ ὄν καὶ ἀκίνητον ἐκ τῆς ἐπ' ἄπειρον τομῆς τῶν μεγεθῶν, κακῶς ἐνέδοσαν ψευδῶς ὑποθέμενοι μὴ εἶναι ἐπ' ἄπειρον τὰ μεγέθη διαιρετὰ. ἐνδεδώκασιν γὰρ ὅτι εἰ ἐπ' ἄπειρον τὰ μεγέθη διαιρετὰ εἴη, μήτε κίνησιν εἶναι μήτε εἶναι τι κυρίως ἔν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μηδὲ πολλά, ἐπειδὴ τὸ πλῆθος ἐκ πολλῶν μονάδων. ἔνθεν ὁ Ξενοκράτης ἀνῆρει τὴν ἐπ' ἄπειρον τῶν μεγεθῶν τομῆν.

759—Soul is defined by Xenocr. as a self-moving number.

**Definition
of Soul**

a. Ar., *De an.* I 2, 404 b²⁷ (fr. 60 H.):

Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ κινητικὸν ἐδόκει ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι καὶ γνωριστικόν, οὕτως ἔνιοι συνέπλεξαν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἀποφηνάμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμὸν κινουῖνθ' ἑαυτὸν.

b. The commentators are unanimous in attributing this definition to Xenocr. E.g. Alex. Aphr. in Ar. *Top.* II 4, p. 162, ⁴ Wallies:

εἰ δὲ κατὰ Ξενοκράτην ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἀριθμὸς ἑαυτὸν κινῶν, —

c. Cp. Philoponus in Ar. *De an.* I 1 (402 a²²) A 15:

Οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ τὸ ποσόν (sc. ἀνάγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν)· ὧν ἔστι καὶ Ξενοκράτης· ἀριθμὸς γὰρ φησι κινῶν ἑαυτὸν ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ.

This
definition
explained

760—a. This definition is first explained as indicating that soul takes an intermediate place between the Ideas (Numbers) and sensible things.

Simpl., in Ar. *De an.* I 2 (404 b²⁷) p. 30, ⁴ Hayduck (fr. 64 H., the beginning):

Ξενοκράτους ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς οὗτος λόγος βουλομένου τὴν μεσότητα αὐτῆς τῶν τε εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδοποιουμένων ἅμα καὶ τὸ ἴδιον αὐτῆς ἐνδείξασθαι· ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς τὸ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ κινητὸν τοῖς εἰδοποιουμένοις προσήκει. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄκρων μόνον δηλοῖ ὅτι οὔτε ἀριθμὸς ἀπλῶς ἔσται οὔτε κινητὸν· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ὑφεῖται, ἥ τοῦ ἀμερίστου ἐκβέβληται, τοῦ δὲ ἔστι κρείττων, ἥ τοῦ 5 μεριστοῦ ὑπερέχει· τὸ συναμφοτέρον οὖν ἂν πως εἴη ὡς ἀμφοτέροις κοινωνοῦσα, ἀριθμὸς κινητός.

b. A similar explanation is given by Philoponus, in Ar. *De an.* I 4, (408 b³²) E 11 (fr. 65 H., l. 24-29):

Ἐλεγεν οὖν ἀριθμὸν μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τὸ πλήρωμα εἰδῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λόγου· ἐκ τῶν λόγων πάντων γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῇ τοὺς λόγους ἔχει ὡς εἵπομεν· ἀριθμοὺς δὲ τὰ εἶδη ἐκάλουν ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ αὐτὸς γοῦν ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς φησιν »καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν τόπον εἰδῶν«. ἀριθμὸν μὲν οὖν διὰ τοῦτο· κινουῦντα δὲ αὐτὸν διὰ τὸ αὐτοζῶν αὐτῆς· οὐ γὰρ ὑφ' ἑτέρου αὐτῇ τὸ ζῆν, 5 αὐτοζῶν γὰρ ἔστιν.

c. Plutarch (*De animi procr.* I, p. 1012 d) derives the two elements of soul in the definition of Xenocr. from the composing elements in Plato's *Tim.*, 35 a (Fr. 68 H., l. 11-16, 18-23).

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ (sc. those who follow Xenocr.) οὐδὲν ἢ γένεσιν ἀριθμοῦ δηλοῦσθαι νομίζουσι τῇ μίξει τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ μεριστῆς οὐσίας· ἀμέριστον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἔν, μεριστὸν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων γενέσθαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ ἐνὸς ὀρίζοντος τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ πέρας ἐντιθέντος, ἣν καὶ δυάδα καλοῦσιν ἀόριστον. — Τοῦτον δὲ μήπω ψυχὴν τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κινητικὸν 5 καὶ τὸ κινητὸν ἐνδεῖν αὐτῷ· τοῦ δὲ ταυτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου συμμιγέντων, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔστι κινήσεως ἀρχὴ καὶ μεταβολῆς, τὸ δὲ μονῆς, ψυχὴν γεγονέναι, μηδὲν ἥττον τοῦ ἰστάναι καὶ ἴστασθαι δύναμιν ἢ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ κινεῖν οὖσαν.

761—a. The soul's immateriality was proved by Xenocr. by the following argument.

Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* 30, p. 72 Matth. (fr. 66 H.):

"Ἐτι, ἡ ψυχὴ, εἰ μὲν τρέφεται, ὑπὸ ἄσωμάτου τρέφεται· τὰ γὰρ μαθήματα τρέφει αὐτήν· οὐδὲν δὲ σῶμα ὑπὸ ἄσωμάτου τρέφεται· οὐκ ἄρα σῶμα ἡ ψυχὴ· Ξενοκράτης οὕτω συνῆγεν.

We find the argument back in Tertull., *De anima* c. 6: "De insignioribus argumentationibus erit etiam illa, quod omne corpus corporalibus ali iudicant, animam vero ut incorporealem incorporealibus, sapientiae scilicet studiis."

b. Xenocr. held the immortality of the soul, not only of its logical part, but of the whole. Ar. opposes X. in the following lines of his *De anima* (Fr. 73 H.):

"Ἐτι δὲ πῶς οἷόν τε χωρίζεσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ ἀπολύεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων, εἰ γε μὴ διαιροῦνται αἱ γραμμαὶ εἰς στιγμάς;

Philoponus comments on these lines (E 14; Heinze ib.):

Ξενοκράτης ἅτε δὴ Πλάτωνος ὦν μαθητὴς χωριστὴν ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος.

Cp. our nr. 737 on Speus.

762—Xenocr. seems to have held that Soul penetrates the universe, descending from the higher regions of being to the inferior ones, so that not only the heavenly bodies are ensouled, and therefore divine beings, but also the elements of the sensible world. Moreover, he admitted the existence of half-divine beings (daemons) in the lower world, which take an intermediate place between the gods and men.

Gods and daemons

Aetius, *Plac.* I 7; *Dox.* 304 b (fr. 15 H., second half¹):

Θεὸν δ' εἶναι καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας πυρώδεις Ὀλυμπίους θεούς, καὶ ἑτέρους ὑποσελήνους δαίμονας ἀοράτους. ἀρέσκει δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ <θείας τινὰς δυνάμεις>² καὶ ἐνδιῆκειν τοῖς ὑλικοῖς στοιχείοις. τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν <διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος Ἄιδην ὥς> ἀειδῆ προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ διὰ τοῦ ὑγροῦ Ποσειδῶνα, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς γῆς φυτοσπύρον Δήμητρα. ταῦτα δὲ χορηγήσας τοῖς Στωικοῖς τὰ πρότερα παρὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος μεταπέφρακεν.

763—Molecular theory.

The elements composed of molecules

Aetius, *Plac.* I 17, 3; *Dox.* 315 b²³ (Fr. 50 H.):

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ξενοκράτης ἐκ μικροτέρων ὄγκων τὰ στοιχεῖα συγκρίνει, ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐλάχιστα καὶ οἶονεῖ στοιχεῖα στοιχείων.

764—**a.** Xenocr. held the eternity of the kosmos, and, accordingly, defends a non-literal interpretation of the *Timaetus*.

Eternity of the kosmos

¹ The first part of this fragment has been cited supra, under nr. 756a.

² Better: <θείας τινὰς εἶναι δυνάμεις>.

Ar. *De caelo* I 9, 279 b³² (fr. 54 H.):

“Ἦν δέ τινες βοήθειαν ἐπιχειροῦσι φέρειν ἑαυτοῖς τῶν λεγόντων ἄφθαρτον μὲν εἶναι γενόμενον δὲ (τὸν κόσμον), οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθής· ὁμοίως γάρ φασι τοῖς τὰ διαγράμματα γράφουσι καὶ σφᾶς εἰρηκέναι περὶ τῆς γενέσεως, οὐχ ὡς γενομένου ποτέ, ἀλλὰ διδασκαλίας χάριν ὡς μᾶλλον γνωρίζοντων, ὥσπερ τὸ διάγραμμα γιγνόμενον θεασαμένους· τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, οὐ τὸ 5 αὐτό ἔξ ἀτάκτων γάρ ποτε τεταγμένα γενέσθαι φασίν, ἅμα δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄτακτον εἶναι καὶ τεταγμένον ἀδύνατον.

The commentators explain the passage as referring to Xenocr.

b. One of the scholia mentions Xenocr. and Speus.:

Schol. cod. Reg. 1853, p. 489 a⁹ Brandis (Heinze, p. 180, l. 12-15):

‘Ὁ Ξενοκράτης καὶ ὁ Σπεύσιππος ἐπιχειροῦντες βοηθῆσαι τῷ Πλάτῳ ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐ γενητὸν τὸν κόσμον ὁ Πλάτων ἐδόξαζεν ἀλλὰ ἀγένητον, χάριν δὲ διδασκαλίας καὶ τοῦ γνωρίσαι καὶ παραστῆσαι αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον ἔλεγε τοῦτον γενητὸν.

Plut., *De an. procr.* 3, p. 1013 a mentions Xenocr. and Crantor.

Ethics

765—Xenocr. wrote a considerable number of works on ethics. Cp. our nr. 742b. He was known in Antiquity as a severe moralist, though he taught, with the whole Academy, that virtue is not the only good.

Virtue and the other goods

a. Cic., *De fin.* IV 18, 49 (fr. 90 H.):

Aristoteles, Xenocrates, tota illa familia non dabit (bonum omne esse laudabile), quippe qui valetudinem, vires, divitias, gloriam, multa alia bona esse dicant, laudabilia non dicant. et hi quidem ita non sola virtute finem bonorum contineri putant, ut rebus tamen omnibus virtutem anteponent.

b. Cp. Seneca, *Epist.* 85, 18 (fr. 91 H.):

Xenocrates et Speusippus putant beatum vel sola virtute fieri posse, non tamen unum bonum esse, quod honestum est.

c. Cic., *Tusc.* V 18, 51 (fr. 86 H.):

Quid ergo aut hunc (Critolaum) prohibet aut etiam Xenocratem illum gravissimum philosophorum, exaggerantem tantopere virtutem, extenuantem cetera et abicientem, in virtute non beatam modo vitam, sed etiam beatissimam ponere?

Plutarchus, *Comp. Cim. c. Luc.* 1, opposes Xenocr. together with the Stoa to Epicureanism.

766—In what Xenocr., and the Academy in general, differed from Stoicism, may appear from the following passages of Cicero.

a. Cic., *De leg.* I 21, 55 (fr. 89 H.):

Si ut Chius Aristo dixit solum bonum esse quod honestum esset, malumque quod turpe, ceteras res omnis plane paris ac ne minimum quidem utrum adessent an abessent interesse, valde a Xenocrate et Aristotele et ab illa Platonis familia discreparet (Antiochus), essetque
5 inter eos de re maxima et de omni vivendi ratione dissensio; nunc vero, cum decus, quod antiqui summum bonum esse dixerant, hic solum bonum dicat, itemque illi summum malum, hic solum, divitias, valetudinem, pulchritudinem commodas res appellet, non bonas, paupertatem, debilitatem, dolorem incommodas, non malas, sentit idem quod Xenocrates,
10 quod Aristoteles, loquitur alio modo.

b. Cic., *Ac. pr.* (*Lucullus*) 44, 136 (fr. 93 H.):

Atrocitas quidem ista tua (Antioche) quo modo in veterem Academiam intruperit nescio; illa vero (παράδοξα de sapiente) ferre non possum, non quo mihi displiceant — sunt enim Socratica pleraque — mirabilia Stoicorum, quae παράδοξα nominantur: sed ubi Xenocrates, ubi Aristoteles
5 ista tetigit? hos enim quasi eosdem esse vultis. Illi umquam dicerent sapientes solos reges, solos divites, solos formosos? omnia, quae ubique essent, sapientis esse? neminem consulem, praetorem, imperatorem, nescio an ne quinquvirum quidem quemquam nisi sapientem? postremo solum civem, solum liberum? insipientes omnes peregrinos, exules,
10 servos, furiosos? denique scripta Lycurgi, Solonis, duodecim tabulas nostras non esse leges? ne urbes quidem aut civitates, nisi quae essent sapientium?

767—He declared that the virtuous life is always happy, keeping to Plato's view in the *Gorgias*, the *Republic* and the *Laws* (cp. our nrs. **275a, b** and **374a**).

a. Ar., *Top.* VII 1, 152 a⁷⁻¹⁰ (fr. 82 H., l. 19-22):

Ξενοκράτης τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀποδείκνυσι τὸν αὐτόν, ἐπειδὴ πάντων τῶν βίων αἰρετώτατος ὁ σπουδαῖος καὶ ὁ εὐδαίμων· ἐν γὰρ τὸ αἰρετώτατον καὶ μέγιστον.

The virtuous
life is happy

b. Alex. Aphrod. in Ar. *Top.* II 6, 112 a³² (fr. 81 H., l. 11-13):

Εἰ δὴ δαίμων ἐκάστου ἡ ψυχὴ, καθ' ἃ Ξενοκράτει δοκεῖ, εἴη ἂν εὐδαίμων ὁ εὖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων· εὖ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος· ὁ σπουδαῖος ἄρα εὐδαίμων.

768—Virtue not only in actions, but in the intention of the heart.

Interior
character of
virtue

Ael., *Var. hist.* XIV 42 (fr. 95 H.):

Ξενοκράτης ὁ Πλάτωνος ἐταῖρος ἔλεγε μὴδὲν διαφέρειν, ἢ τοὺς πόδας ἢ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς εἰς ἄλλοτρίαν οἰκίαν τιθέναι. ἐν ταύτῳ γὰρ ἁμαρτάνειν τὸν τε ἐς αὐτὸ μὴ δεῖ χωρία βλέποντα, καὶ ἐς οὓς μὴ δεῖ τόπους παριόντα.

769—Xenocr. a friend of animals.

Stories
about X.

Ael., *Var. hist.* XIII 31 (fr. 101 H.):

Ξενοκράτης ὁ Καλχηδόνιος ὁ ἐταῖρος Πλάτωνος τὰ τε ἄλλα ἦν φιλοικτίρμων καὶ οὐ μόνον φιλόανθρωπος ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ἠλέει· καὶ οὐδὲν ποτε καθημένου ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ διωκόμενος βιαίως στρουθὸς ὑπὸ ἱέρακος ἐς τοὺς κόλπους αὐτοῦ κατέπτῃ· ὁ δὲ ἀσμένως ἐδέξατο τὸν ὄρνιν καὶ διεφύλαξεν ἀποκρύψας, ἔστε ὁ διώκων ἀπῆλθεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡλευθέρωσεν αὐτὸν τοῦ φόβου, ἀπλώσας τὸν κόλπον ἀφῆκε τὸν ὄρνιν ἐπειπὼν ὅτι μὴ ἐξέδωκε τὸν ἱκέτην.

770—Xenocr. as an ambassador.

Diog. L. IV 9 (fr. 109 H.):

Ἄλλὰ καὶ πρεσβεύων πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον περὶ αἰχμαλώτων Ἀθηναίων κατὰ τὸν Λαμιακὸν πόλεμον καὶ κληθεὶς ἐπὶ δεῖπνον πρὸς αὐτὸν προηγέχато ταυτί¹.

ὦ Κίρκη, τίς γάρ κεν ἀνὴρ ὃς ἐναΐσιμος εἴη

πρὶν τλαίῃ πάσσασθαι ἐδητύος ἢ δὲ ποτῆτος,

πρὶν λύσασθ' ἐτάρους καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδέσθαι;

καὶ τὸν ἀποδεξάμενον τὴν εὐστοχίαν εὐθὺς ἀφεῖναι.

5

3—HERACLIDES PONTICUS

A disciple
of Plato

771—a. He is mentioned among Plato's disciples in Diog. Laert. III 46 (our nr. 726), in the *Index Acad.* col. VI, p. 33 Mekler, and by Strabo XII 541.

b. He edited, as others did, Plato's lecture π. τάγαθοῦ.

Simpl., in *Ar. Phys.*, p. 453 D., l. 25-30 (fr. 42 W.):

Ἀρχὰς γὰρ καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὸ ἐν καὶ τὴν ἀόριστόν φασι δυάδα λέγειν τὸν Πλάτωνα, τὴν δὲ ἀόριστον δυάδα καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς τιθεὶς ἄπειρον εἶναι ἔλεγεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τάγαθοῦ λόγοις, οἷς Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ἡρακλείδης καὶ Ἐστιάϊος καὶ ἄλλοι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐταῖροι παραγενόμενοι ἀνεγράψαντο τὰ ρηθέντα αἰνιγματωδῶς, ὥς ἐρρήθη.

5

Head of the
Academy
in 361

c. Suidas says that Plato left him as head of the School during his third stay in Sicily (fr. 2 W.):

¹ *Od.* X 383-385.

Ἡρακλείδης, Εὐφρονος, φιλόσοφος, Ἡρακλείας τῆς Πόντου, — Πλάτωνος γνώριμος· ἐκδημήσαντος δὲ Πλάτωνος εἰς Σικελίαν, προσεσθάναι τῆς σχολῆς κατελείφθη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.

Speus. and Xenocr. accompanied the Master to Sicily (Plut., *Dio* 22; Diog. L. IV 11).

d. In this light we have to read the account of Diog. L., V 86 (fr. 3 W.):

Ἡρακλείδης Εὐθύφρονος Ἡρακλεώτης τοῦ Πόντου, ἀνὴρ πλούσιος. Ἀθήνησι δὲ παρέβαλε πρῶτον μὲν Σπευσίππῳ· ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων διήκουσε καὶ τὰ Πλάτωνος ἐξηλώκει· καὶ ὕστερον ἤκουσεν Ἀριστοτέλους, ὥς φησι Σωτίων ἐν διαδοχαῖς.

Supposed that the statement is true, the meeting with Speusippus here mentioned must have taken place during Plato's second stay in Sicily (367-364), while the τὰ Πλάτωνος ἐξηλώκει certainly implies that he knew Plato and heard him lecturing. That he heard Aristotle too, refers doubtless to Aristotle's lectures in the Academy. Cp. Strabo XIII 610, who says of Hermeias: γενόμενος δ' Ἀθήνησιν ἠκροάσατο καὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους.

772—a. When, after the death of Speusippus, Xenocrates was chosen as the head of the Academy (338), Heracl. returned to Pontus.

Index Acad., col. VI, p. 38-39 Mekler (fr. 9 W.):

Οἱ δὲ νεανίσκοι ψήφοφορήσαντες ὅστις αὐτῶν ἡγήσεται (sc. after the death of Speusippus) Ξενοκράτην εἶλοντο τὸν Καλχηδόνιον, Ἀριστοτέλους μὲν ἀποδεδημηκότος εἰς Μακεδονίαν, Μενεδήμου δὲ τοῦ Πυρραίου καὶ Ἡρακλείδου τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου παρ' ὀλίγας ψήφους ἡττηθέντων. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἡρακλείδης ἀπῆρεν εἰς τὸν Πόντον, ὁ δὲ Μενέδημος ἕτερον περίπατον καὶ διατριβὴν κατεσκευάσατο.

Probably, after his return to Pontus, Heracl. held a school there, as may appear from Diog. Laert. VII 166, where it is said of a certain Dionysius, called ὁ Μεταθέμενος:

ἤκουσε δὲ, καθὰ φησι Διοκλῆς, πρῶτον μὲν Ἡρακλείδου τοῦ πολίτου, ἔπειτ' Ἀλεξίνου καὶ Μενεδήμου, τελευταῖον δὲ Ζήνωνος (fr. 12 W.).

b. Later doxographi treat him sometimes as a Peripatetic, as by Diog. L. his bios is placed at the end of the 5th book, after that of Demetrius of Phaleron. Thus, among modern scholars, Wehrli treats him in Heft 7 of his *Schule des Aristoteles*, and Heath in ch. XVIII of his *Aristarchus of Samos*.

Proclus in *Tim.* 281 E (fr. 106 W.) does not deny that H. was in fact a disciple of Plato. What he denies is, that he was *legitimately* called a Platonist, since he held the rotation of the earth round its axis, while Plato made it unmoved (see our nr. 352 and note 2 to εἰλλομένην):

Ἡρακλείδης μὲν οὖν ὁ Ποντικός, οὐ Πλάτωνος ὢν ἀκουστής, ταύτην ἐχέτω τὴν δόξαν, κινῶν κύκλῳ τὴν γῆν· Πλάτων δὲ ἀκίνητον αὐτὴν ἵστησιν.

Instead of the οὐ in the first line of this text Fabricius conjectured ὁ, Taylor τοῦ. Schneider, in his edition of Proclus' Commentary of 1847, notes: "Fortasse Proclus non auditum esse Platonem, sed intellectum ab Heraclide negat".

Character 773—a. H.' character and writings. Diog. L. V 86 (fr. 3 W.):

Οὗτος ἐσθῆτί τε μαλακῇ ἐχρῆτο καὶ ὑπέρογκος ἦν τὸ σῶμα, ὥστ' αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀττικῶν μὴ Ποντικὸν ἀλλὰ Πομπικὸν καλεῖσθαι. πρῶτος τ' ἦν τὸ βλέμμα καὶ σεμνός. Φέρεται δ' αὐτοῦ συγγράμματα κάλλιστά τε καὶ ἄριστα.

Follows a long list of his works, among which many dialogues on ethical subjects are mentioned.

Ethical dialogues

b. Diog. describes these dialogues in the following lines.

Ib., 88-89 (fr. 22 W.):

Τούτων τὰ μὲν κωμικῶς πέπλακεν, ὡς τὸ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ περὶ σωφροσύνης· τὰ δὲ τραγικῶς, ὡς τὸ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἄδην καὶ τὸ περὶ εὐσεβείας καὶ τὸ περὶ ἐξουσίας. ἔστι δ' αὐτῷ καὶ μεσότης τις ὁμιλητικῇ φιλοσόφων τε καὶ στρατηγικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαλεγομένων. ἀλλὰ καὶ γεωμετρικά ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ διαλεκτικά. ἄλλως τ' ἐν ἅπασιν ποικίλος τε καὶ διηρημένος 5 τὴν λέξιν ἐστὶ καὶ ψυχαγωγεῖν ἱκανῶς δυνάμενος.

Other works

Soul 774—Soul is defined by Heracl. as an aetheric body, shining, something like light.

a. Stob., *Ecl.* I 49, 6 (Dox. 388) = fr. 99a W.:

Ἡρακλείδης φωτοειδῆ τὴν ψυχὴν ὥρίσατο.

We find this doctrine mentioned in Tertull., *De anima* 9, and in Macrobius, *Somn. Sc.* I 14.

b. Philoponus, *De an.* A 4 (Dox. 214) = fr. 100 W.:

Οἱ μὲν εἰρήκασιν αἰθέριον εἶναι σῶμα (ταῦτόν δὲ ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν οὐράνιον) ὥσπερ Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικός.

775—a. Before entering bodies, souls abide in the milky way.

Iambl. ap. Stob., *Ecl.* I 49, 39 (I, 378 Wachsmuth) = fr. 98 W.:

Καὶ τούτους (sc. the places whence the soul comes when it is incarnated in a στερεὸν σῶμα) Ἡρακλείδην μὲν τὸν Ποντικὸν ἀφορίζει περὶ τὸν γαλαξίαν, ἄλλους δὲ καθ' ὅλας τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰς σφαίρας, ἅψ' ὧν δὴ δεῦρο κατιέναι τὰς ψυχάς· τοὺς δὲ περὶ σελήνην ἢ ἐν τῷ ὑπὸ σελήνην ἀέρι λέγειν αὐτὰς κατοικεῖν καὶ ἅπ' αὐτῶν κάτω χωρεῖν εἰς τὴν περιγείον γένεσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἀπὸ σωμάτων αἰεὶ στερεῶν πίπτειν εἰς ἕτερα σώματα διυχυρίζεσθαι.

5

Cp. Pl., *Tim.* 41 d e (our nr. 354a).

b. He shares Plato's view that the universe, the planets, the earth and the heaven are gods.

Cic., *N.D.* I 13, 34 (fr. 112 W.):

Ex eadem Platonis schola Ponticus Heraclides puerilibus fabulis refersit libros, et tamen modo mundum tum mentem divinam esse putat, errantibus etiam stellis divinitatem tribuit sensuque deum privat et eius formam mutabilem esse vult, eodemque in libro rursus terram et caelum refert in deos.

776—a. The universe is infinite.

Cosmology

Stob., *Ecl.* I 21, 5 (Dox. 328, b 4) = fr. 113 W.:

Σέλευκος ὁ Ἐρυθραῖος ¹ καὶ Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς ἄπειρον τὸν κόσμον.

b. Each star is also a universe or world, suspended in the infinite aether and comprising an earth, an atmosphere and an aether.

Aët., *Plac.* II 13, 15 (Dox. 343, a⁷) = fr. 114a W.:

Ἡρακλείδης καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἕκαστον τῶν ἀστέρων κόσμον ὑπάρχειν γῆν περιέχοντα ἀέρα τε καὶ αἰθέρα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ αἰθέρι. Ταῦτα δὲ τὰ δόγματα ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς φέρεται· κοσμοποιοῦσι γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀστέρων.

c. The moon is earth surrounded with mist.

Stob., *Ecl.* I 26 (Dox. 356, b²⁵) = fr. 115a W.:

Ἡρακλείδης [καὶ Ὀκελλος] γῆν ὁμίχλη περιεχομένην.

777—Heracl. held the rotation of the earth round its own axis.

Rotation
of the earth

a. Aët. III 13, 3 (Dox. 378 a¹⁰) = fr. 105 W.:

Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς καὶ Ἐκφαντος ὁ Πυθαγόρειος κινοῦσι μὲν τὴν γῆν, οὐ μὴν γε μεταβατικῶς, ἀλλὰ τρεπτικῶς, τροχοῦ δίκην ἐνηξονισμένην, ἀπὸ δυσμῶν ἐπ' ἀνατολὰς περὶ τὸ ἴδιον αὐτῆς κέντρον.

The text has been reproduced under **44b**, and is cited here again for the sake of its utmost interest.

Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos* p. 252, suggests that the views attributed by the Doxographi to Ecphantus the Pythagorean (who is, for the rest, unknown to us) were expressed in a dialogue of Heracl. and put into the mouth of Ecph., represented as a Pythagorean.

b. Cp. Simpl. in Ar. *De caelo*, p. 444 l. 31-445, 2 Heiberg (fr. 109 W.):

Ar. admitted the possibility that both the heaven of the fixed stars and the fixed stars themselves are at rest διὰ τὸ γεγονέναι τινάς, ὧν Ἡρακλείδης τε ὁ Ποντικὸς ἦν καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος, νομίζοντας σώζεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα τοῦ μὲν

¹ The astronomer Seleucus of Babylon.

οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄστρον ἡρεμούντων, τῆς δὲ γῆς περὶ τοὺς τοῦ ἰσημερινοῦ πόλους ἀπὸ δυσμῶν κινουμένης ἐκάστης ἡμέρας μίαν ἔγγιστα περιστροφὴν.

Also ib. p. 519, ⁹⁻¹¹; 541, ²⁸⁻²⁹; schol. in Ar. p. 505 b⁴⁶⁻⁴⁷ Brandis. Cp. Simpl. in *Phys.*, p. 292, ²⁰, infra, sub 768.

Copernicus refers to Heracl. in his dedicatory epistle to Paul III and in I 5 of his work *De revolutionibus orbium caelestium*.

Rotation of
Mercury and
Venus

778—Heracl. seems to have held also the theory that Mercury and Venus rotate round the sun, a theory which occurs later combined with that of the epicyclia, as it may be seen in Theon of Smyrna, p. 186, 17-187, 13 Hiller.

The passage is explained by Heath, *Aristarchus* p. 257 f. The same theory is mentioned by Chalcidius, *Tim.* c. 110, pp. 176-7 Wrobel. It occurs again in Macrobius, *Somn. Sc.* I 19; Vitruvius, *Architect.* IX 1 (4), 6; Martianus Capella VIII 854, 880, 882.

779—That he held the Copernican system, was defended by Schiaparelli¹, and again by Staigmüller, on the ground of Simpl., *De caelo* 444 and 452 Heiberg, and chiefly of *Phys.* 292 Diels. It is not accepted by Heath, who follows Tannery in rejecting the name 'Ηρακλ. ὁ Ποντικός in l. 21 of the last mentioned passage of Simplicius, as a gloss².

The text of Simpl., *Phys.* 292, ¹⁵⁻²³ (fr. 111 W.), runs:

Διὰ τί ἀνωμάλως ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη καὶ οἱ πλάνητες φαίνονται κινούμενοι; 15
"Ὅτι, εἰ ὑποθῶμεθα ἐκκέντρους αὐτῶν τοὺς κύκλους ἢ κατ' ἐπίκυκλον πολοῦ-
μενα τὰ ἄστρα, σωθήσεται ἡ φαινομένη ἀνωμαλία αὐτῶν, δεήσει τε ἐπεξελεῖν,
καθ' ὅσους δυνατὸν τρόπους ταῦτα ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα, ὥστε εἰκέναι
τῇ κατὰ τὸν ἐνδεχόμενον τρόπον αἰτιολογίᾳ τὴν περὶ τῶν πλανωμένων ἄστρον 20
πραγματεῖαν. Διὸ καὶ παρελθὼν τίς φησιν 'Ηρακλείδης Ποντικός, ὅτι καὶ
κινουμένης πῶς τῆς γῆς, τοῦ δὲ ἡλίου μένοντός πῶς δύναται ἡ περὶ τὸν ἥλιον
φαινομένη ἀνωμαλία σφῆζεσθαι.

By the τις in l. 21, according to Tannery and Heath, Aristarchus of Samos is meant.

Atomic
theory

780—His atomic theory differed from that of Democritus in that Heracl. makes his ὄγκοι παθητοί, i.e. capable of being worked on by each other.

a. Dionys. ap. Euseb., *Praep. ev.* XIV 23, 3 (Dox. 252) = fr. 119 W.:

Ταύτης δὲ τῆς δόξης (sc. atomism) 'Επίκουρος γεγόνασι καὶ Δημόκριτος. Τοσοῦτον δὲ διεφώνησαν ὅσον ὁ μὲν ἐλαχίστας πάσας καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνεπαισθη-

¹ *I precursori di Copernico nell' Antiquità*, Milano 1873.

² Heath, *Aristarchus*, pp. 276-283.

τους, ὁ δὲ καὶ μεγίστας εἶναι τινας ἀτόμους ὁ Δημόκριτος ὑπέλαβεν. Ἀτόμους δὲ εἶναι φασιν ἀμφοτέροι καὶ λέγεσθαι, διὰ τὴν ἄλυτον στερρότητα. Οἱ δὲ τὰς
 5 ἀτόμους μετονομάσαντες ἀμερῇ φασιν εἶναι σώματα τοῦ παντὸς μέρη, ἐξ ὧν
 ἀδαιρέτων ὄντων συντίθεται τὰ πάντα καὶ εἰς ἃ διαλύεται. καὶ τούτων φασὶ
 τῶν ἀμερῶν ὀνοματοποιῶν Διόδωρον γεγονέναι. Ὅνομα δέ, φασίν, αὐτοῖς
 ἄλλο Ἑρακλείδης θέμενος ἐκάλεσεν ὄγκους.

On Diodorus, cf. our nr. 232 (Diodorus Cronus).

b. Sextus, *Math.* X (= *Adv. Phys.* II) 318 = fr. 121 W.:

Ἐξ ἀπείρων δ' ἐδόξασαν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων γένεσιν οἱ περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν
 τὸν Κλαζομένιον καὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ Ἐπίκουρον καὶ ἄλλοι παμπληθεῖς, ἀλλ'
 ὁ μὲν Ἀναξαγόρας ἐξ ὁμοίων τοῖς γεννωμένοις, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δημόκριτον καὶ
 Ἐπίκουρον ἐξ ἀνομοίων τε καὶ ἀπαθῶν, τουτέστι τῶν ἀτόμων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν
 5 Ποντικὸν Ἑρακλείδην καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδην ἐξ ἀνομοίων μὲν, παθητῶν δέ,
 καθάπερ τῶν ἀνάρμων ὄγκων.

Asclepiades of Prusa was a medical man, who lived at Rome in the first century B.C. He was influenced by Epicurus and Heracl. Pont., and is mentioned by later authors as an adherent of the atomic theory.

c. Heracl. held that the atoms are joined together to a universe by divine Reason. See our nr. 775b (Cic., *N.D.* I 13, 34).

781—One of the chief works of Heracl. was his books Π. μουσικῆς. **Musicology**
 An important fragment of these is preserved in Plut., *De mus.* § 25-103. Another passage is cited in Athenaeus XIV 624 C-626 A. For the rest, Philodemus, *De mus.* col. XXIII 30-XXIV 4 may give us some idea of the contents of Heracl.' work (fr. 163 W.). The text runs:

Ἄ μέντοι Διογένης φησίν, κατανοήσαντας ἡμᾶς <τ>ἀναγεγραμμένα παρ'
 Ἑρακλείδῃ περὶ πρέποντος μέλους καὶ ἀπρεποῦς καὶ ἀρρένων καὶ μαλακῶν
 ἡθῶν καὶ πράξεων ἀρμοττουσῶν καὶ ἀναρμόστων τοῖς ὑποκείμενοις προσώποις,
 οὐ μακρὰν ἀπηρτημένην τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἡγήσεσθαι τῷ πρὸς πλεῖστα ἐπὶ
 5 τοῦ βίου χρησιμεύειν τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτὴν φιλοτεχνίαν οἰκείως
 διατιθέναι πρὸς πλείους ἀρετάς, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πάσας, ἐκθέντες ἡμεῖς ἐν τῷ
 τρίτῳ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων, καὶ τὰ παρ' ἄλλοις δὲ συγγενῶς εἰρημένα παρ-
 εδείξαμεν ὅσης ἐστὶν γέμοντα ληρείας.

H., like Plato and Aristotle before him, held apparently that music should have a moral value and influence on men, a thesis which was violently opposed by the Epicurean Philodemus.

782—Heracl.' *Abaris* was a kind of life of a saint, which became the **The Abaris**
 prototype of later lives of Pythagoras. It was adorned with spiritistic stories, which made it very popular in Antiquity.

Plut., *De audiendis poetis* 1, p. 14 E (fr. 74 W.):

“Ὅτι δὲ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λεγομένων οἱ σφόδρα νέοι τοῖς μὴ δοκοῦσι φιλοσόφως, μηδὲ ἀπὸ σπουδῆς λέγεσθαι χαίρουσι μᾶλλον καὶ παρέχουσιν ὑπηκόους ἑαυτοὺς καὶ χειροῦθεις, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἡμῖν. Οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ Αἰσώπεια μυθάρια καὶ τὰς ποιητικὰς ὑποθέσεις, καὶ τὸν Ἀβάριν τὸν Ἡρακλείδου, καὶ τὸν Λύκωνα τὸν Ἀρίστωνος διερχόμενοι, [ἀλλὰ καὶ] τὰ περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν δόγματα μεμιγμένα 5 μυθολογία μεθ’ ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιῶσι.

H.’ name
in Antiquity

783—On the whole, Heracl. was a celebrated and much read author in later Antiquity, up to the Christian era. Varro was greatly influenced by his dialogues; Cicero and Atticus admired him.

a. Cic., *Tusc.* V 3, 8 praises his erudition (fr. 89 W.):
auditor Platonis Ponticus Heraclides, vir doctus in primis.

Cp. also *Div.* I 23, 46.

b. Timaeus rebuked him for his mysticism. Diog. L. VIII 72 (fr. 85 W.):

Timaeus opposes the stories of the miraculous disappearance of Empedocles.
Τοιαῦτά τινα εἰπὼν ὁ Τίμαιος ἐπιφέρει· »Ἀλλὰ διὰ παντός ἐστιν Ἡρακλείδης τοιοῦτος παραδοξολόγος, καὶ ἐκ τῆς σελήνης πεπτωκέναι ἄνθρωπον λέγων«.

Cp. Plut., *Cam.* 22; *De aud. poet.* 1.

c. Epicurus and his disciples covered him with invectives.

Plut., *Contra Epicuri beatitudinem* 2, p. 1086 E (fr. 20 W.):

Compared with Epicurus and Metrodorus, Colotes was very moderate in his language. Τὰ γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποις αἰσχίστα ῥήματα βωμολοχίας, ληκυθισμούς, ἀλαζονείας, ἐταιρήσεις, ἀνδροφονίας, βαρυστόνους, πολυφθόρους, βαρυεγκεφάλους συναγαγόντες Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πρωταγόρου καὶ Θεοφράστου καὶ Ἡρακλείδου καὶ Ἰππάρχου καὶ τίνος γὰρ οὐχὶ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν κατεσκέδασαν.

4—EUDOXUS, PHILIPPUS OF OPOUS AND THE EPINOMIS

784—Another famous disciple of Plato and teacher in the Academy was Eudoxus of Cnidus, philosopher, mathematician, astronomer, medical man and lawgiver.

Eudoxus
of Cnidus

a. Diog. L. VIII 86-88:

Εὐδοξος Αἰσχίνου Κνίδιος, ἀστρολόγος, γεωμέτρης, ἱατρός, νομοθέτης. οὗτος τὰ μὲν γεωμετρικὰ Ἀρχύτα διήκουσε, τὰ δ’ ἱατρικὰ Φιλιστίνωνος τοῦ Σικελιώτου, καθὰ Καλλίμαχος ἐν τοῖς πίναξί φησι. Σωτίων δ’ ἐν ταῖς διαδοχαῖς

λέγει καὶ Πλάτωνος αὐτὸν ἀκοῦσαι. γενόμενον γὰρ ἐτῶν τριῶν που καὶ εἴκοσι
 5 καὶ στενῶς διακείμενον κατὰ κλέος τῶν Σωκρατικῶν εἰς Ἀθήνας ἀπᾶραι
 σὺν Θεομέδοντι τῷ ἱατρῷ, τρεφόμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ· οἱ δέ, καὶ παιδικὰ ὄντα·
 καταχθέντα δ' εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ ὁσημέραι ἀνιέναι Ἀθήναζε καὶ ἀκούσαντα τῶν
 σοφιστῶν αὐτόθι ὑποστρέφειν. δύο δὴ μῆνας διατρίψαντα οἴκαδ' ἐπανελθεῖν
 καὶ πρὸς τῶν φίλων ἐρανισθέντα εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἀπᾶραι μετὰ Χρυσίππου τοῦ
 10 ἱατροῦ, συστατικᾶς φέροντα παρ' Ἀγησιλάου πρὸς Νεκτάναβιν· τὸν δὲ τοῖς
 ἱερεῦσιν αὐτὸν συστήσαι. — Ἐντεῦθεν τε γενέσθαι ἐν Κυζίκῳ καὶ τῇ Προπον-
 τίδι σοφιστεύοντα· ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ Μαυσωλὸν ἀφικέσθαι. ἔπειθ' οὕτως ἐπανελ-
 θεῖν Ἀθήναζε, πάνυ πολλοὺς περὶ ἑαυτὸν ἔχοντα μαθητάς. — Ἀπεδέχθη δὴ
 15 ἔν τῇ πατρίδι μεγαλοτίμως, ὥς τό γε περὶ αὐτοῦ ψήφισμα γενόμενον δηλοῖ.
 ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ἐπιφανέστατος ἐγένετο, γράψας τοῖς ἰδίοις
 πολίταις νόμους, ὥς φησιν Ἑρμιππος ἐν τετάρτῃ περὶ τῶν ἐπτὰ σοφῶν, καὶ
 ἀστρολογούμενα καὶ γεωμετρούμενα καὶ ἕτερ' ἅττα ἀξιόλογα.

b. He died at the age of 53, before Plato. Diog. L., ib., 90:
 Ἐτελεύτησε δὲ τρίτον ἄγων καὶ πεντηκοστὸν ἔτος.

c. His celebrity. Diog., ib. 91:
 Τοῦτον ἀντὶ Εὐδόξου Ἐνδοξον ἐκάλουν διὰ τὴν λαμπρότητα τῆς φήμης.

785—He rejected the theory of the Ideas in its Platonic form.

Interpreta-
 tion of the
 theory of
 the Ideas

a. Ar., *Metaph.* A 9, 991 a⁸⁻¹⁸ (our nr. 529a).

b. Alex. explains the passage as follows:

Εὐδόξος τῶν Πλάτωνος γνωρίμων μίξει τῶν ἰδεῶν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς αὐτάς τὸ
 εἶναι ἔχουσιν ἡγεῖτο ἕκαστον εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλοι δέ τινες, ὥς ἔλεγε . . . μίξει τῶν
 ἰδεῶν τὰ ἄλλα.

786—In ethics, too, he held a view very different from Plato's, namely
 that pleasure is the supreme good. We found it in Aristotle's *Ethics*
 (our nrs. 594-596) and shall find it again in Epicurus.

Pleasure
 the supreme
 good

a. Ar., *Eth. Nic.* X 2, 1172 b⁹⁻¹⁸ 1:

Εὐδόξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τάγαθὸν ᾧ τ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάνθ' ὁρᾶν ἐφιέμενα
 10 αὐτῆς, καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα, ἐν πᾶσι δ' εἶναι τὸ αἰρετὸν ἐπιεικές, καὶ τὸ
 μάλιστα κράτιστον· τὸ δὲ πάντ' ἐπὶ ταῦτ' ὀφείσθαι μὴ γινώσκειν ὥς πᾶσι τοῦτο
 ἄριστον (ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὐρίσκειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τροφήν), τὸ
 15 δὴ πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, τάγαθόν εἶναι· ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι

¹ The passage referred to sub 596c.

διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὐτούς. Διαφερόντως γὰρ ἐδόκει σώφρων εἶναι· οὐ δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν.

b. Plato himself was brought by this theory to write his *Philebus* and to revise his own view of the best life (our nr. 348).

**Theory of
the celestial
spheres**

787—As to astronomy, Eudoxus' theory of concentric celestial spheres preceded that of Callippus and Aristotle's theory of a plurality of unmoved Movers, expounded in *Metaph.* A 8.

Our nr. 517.

See on Eudoxus' hypothesis: Heath, *Aristarchus*, p. 193-211.

**Geometry
1. His theory
of proportion**

788—a. An important part of Euclides' *Elementa* has been taken from Eudoxus. It was Eud. who invented and elaborated the theory of proportion expounded in *Elem.* V. The essence of this theory is its applicability to incommensurable as well as commensurable quantities.

Eud.' conception of equal ratios is embodied in Eucl. V, def. 5:

Ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ μεγέθη λέγεται εἶναι πρῶτον πρὸς δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον πρὸς τέταρτον, ὅταν τὰ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τρίτου ἰσάκεις πολλαπλάσια τῶν τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ τετάρτου ἰσάκεις πολλαπλασίων καθ' ὅποιον οὖν πολλαπλασιασμὸν ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου ἢ ἅμα ὑπερέχῃ ἢ ἅμα ἴσα ᾗ ἢ ἅμα ἐλλείπῃ ληφθέντα κατάλληλα.

On the importance of this definition see Heath, *Aristarchus* p. 191.

**2. His
method of
exhaustion**

b. Secondly, he discovered the method of exhaustion, which is at the root of all Archimedes' further developments in the mensuration of plain and solid figures. The fundamental thesis has come down to us by Eucl., *Elem.* X 1.

The method is explained in Cantor's *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Mathematik* I² 229, 254, 257 f.; Heath, *Works of Archimedes* p. XLVIII ff.; Zeuthen, *Hist. des math.*, 136 ff.

**3. His curve
for doubling
a cube**

c. He solved, by means of a complicated curve, the problem of doubling the cube.

Eutocius in Archim. *Sphaer. et cyl.* 66, 12 Heiberg:

(Εὐδόξος) φησὶν ἐν προοιμίῳ διὰ καμπύλων γραμμῶν αὐτὴν (τὴν εὕρεσιν) ἡύρηκέναι.

Cf. Proclus' account of the problem, in *Eucl. Elem.* I 213, 3-7. A reconstruction of Eud.' method has been ventured by Tannery, *Mém. de la Société des Sciences de Bordeaux*, 2e série, II (1878), 282 f., and by Künssberg, *Eud. von Knidos* II, 55 f.

Heath treats the question shortly in his *Aristarchus*, p. 190 f., and again, in his *Apollonius of Perga*, p. XXII f.

789—A less dissentient Platonist and member of the Academy was **Philippus of Opous**

a. He is mentioned among Plato's disciples in the list of Diog. L. III 46 (our nr. **726**).

b. He is said to have transcribed the *Laws* and to be the author of the *Epinomis*. **Author of the *Epinomis*?**

Diog. L. III 37:

"Ἐνιοὶ τέ φασι ὅτι Φίλιππος ὁ Ὀπούντιος τοὺς νόμους αὐτοῦ μετέγραψεν ὄντας ἐν κηρῷ. Τούτου δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἐπινομίδα φασὶν εἶναι.

Cp. *Index Acad.* 13, where he is called ὁ ἀστρολόγος and ἀναγραφεὺς τοῦ Πλάτωνος καὶ ἀκουστής.

Suidas says: ὅς τοὺς Πλάτωνος Νόμους διεῖλεν εἰς βιβλία ιβ'· τὸ γὰρ ιγ' αὐτὸς προσθεῖναι λέγεται.

The authenticity of the *Epinomis* has been lately defended by J. Harward (*The Epinomis of Plato*, Oxford 1928), by

A. E. Taylor (*Proceedings of the Brit. Acad.* XV, 235), by

H. Raeder (*Kgl. Danske Vidensk. Selskab, Hist. filol. Medd.* XXVI 1, Copenhagen 1938), and by

E. des Places (*Revue des Et. grecques* XLIV, 153 ff.), while many others reject it.

I personally think the authorship of Philippus probable, though there is no decisive evidence for it.

c. The list of his works presented by Suidas contains chiefly mathematical and astronomical treatises, but also ethical writings. **Works**

790—Doubtless, certain features in the *Epinomis* may be mentioned as being characteristic of the first generation of the Academy, during Plato's old age and after his death. **Wisdom in the *Epinomis***

First, Wisdom is in the *Epinomis* essentially conditioned by the knowledge of number.

Epin. 976 c-977 d:

976 Ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ φανῆναι γέ τινα ἐπιστήμην ἣν ἔχων σοφὸς γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὁ σοφὸς ὄντως ὦν καὶ μὴ μόνον δοξαζόμενος. ἴδωμεν δὴ. χαλεπῷ μὲν γὰρ λόγῳ παντὰ d πασιν ἐπιχειροῦμεν, ἑτέραν πάρεξ τῶν εἰρημένων εὐρεῖν, ἣ σοφία μὲν λέγοιτ' ἂν ὄντως τε καὶ εἰκότως, ὁ δὲ λαβὼν οὔτε βάναισος οὔτ' ἡλίθιος ἔσται, σοφὸς δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸς δι' αὐτὴν πόλιτῆς τε καὶ ἀρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος ἐνδίκως ἔσται 5 πόλεως ἅμα καὶ ἐμμελής. κατιδωμεν δὴ ταύτην πρώτην, τίς ποτ' ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἐπιστήμη μία διεξεληθοῦσα ἢ μὴ παραγενομένη τῶν νῦν παρουσῶν ἀνοητότατον ἂν καὶ ἀφρονέστατον παράσχοιτο ζῶον τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. οὐ δὲ τοῦτο γε πάνυ χαλεπὸν τὸ κατιδεῖν. μία γὰρ ὥς εἰπεῖν πρὸς μίαν ἢ τὸν ἀριθμὸν δοῦσα παντὶ τῷ θνητῷ γένει τοῦτ' ἂν δράσειεν· θεὸν δ' αὐτὸν μᾶλλον ἢ τινα τύχην ἡγοῦμαι δόντα ἡμῖν σφάζειν ἡμᾶς. ὃν δὲ θεὸν ἡγοῦμαι,

φράζειν χρή, καίπερ ἄτοπον ὄντα, καί πως οὐκ ἄτοπον αὖ· πῶς γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθῶν αἷτιον ἡμῖν συμπάντων οὐ καὶ τοῦ πολὺ μεγίστου, τῆς φρονήσεως, αἷτιον 977 ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ γεγονέναι; τίνα δὴ καὶ σεμνύνων ποτὲ λέγω θεόν, ὦ Μέγιστέ τε καὶ Κλεινία; σχεδὸν Οὐρανόν, ὃν καὶ δικαιοτάτον, ὡς σύμπαντες ἄλλοι δαίμονες ἅμα καὶ θεοί, τιμᾶν τε καὶ εὐχεσθαι διαφερόντως αὐτῷ. τὸ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 5 αἷτιον ἀγαθῶν πάντων ἡμῖν αὐτὸν γεγονέναι πάντες ἂν ὁμολογοῖμεν· δοῦναι δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἀριθμὸν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως αὐτόν φαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ δώσειν, ἐάν τις θέλῃ συνακολουθεῖν. ἐάν γὰρ ἴη τις ἐπὶ θεωρίαν ὀρθὴν τὴν τοῦδε, εἴτε κόσμον b εἴτε Ὀλυμπον εἴτε οὐρανὸν ἐν ἡδονῇ τῷ λέγειν, λεγέτω μὲν, ἀκολουθεῖτω δὲ ὅπῃ ποικίλλων αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ στρέφων ἄστρα πάσας διεξόδους ὥρας τε καὶ τροφὴν πᾶσιν παρέχεται. καὶ τὴν ἄλλην δὲ οὐν φρόνησιν, ὡς φαῖμεν ἂν, 5 σὺν ἀριθμῷ παντί, καὶ τᾶλλ' ἀγαθὰ· τοῦτο δὲ μέγιστον, ἐάν τις τὴν ἀριθμῶν αὐτοῦ δόσιν δεξάμενος ἐπεξέλθῃ πᾶσαν τὴν περίοδον.

Ἔτι δὲ σμικρὸν ἐπανελθόντες πως τοῖς λόγοις ἀναμνησθῶμεν ὅτι καὶ μάλ' ὀρθῶς ἐνόησαμεν ὡς, εἴπερ ἀριθμὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἐξέλοιμεν, c οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ τι φρόνιμοι γενοίμεθα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι ποτὲ ψυχὴ τούτου τοῦ ζῴου πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν λάβοι σχεδόν, ὅτου λόγος ἀπείη· ζῶον δὲ ὅτι μὴ γιγνώσκει δύο καὶ τρία μηδὲ περιττὸν μηδὲ ἄρτιον, ἀγνοοῖ δὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀριθμὸν, οὐκ ἂν 5 ποτε διδόναι λόγον ἔχοι περὶ ὧν αἰσθήσεις καὶ μνήμας [ἔχοι] μόνον εἴη κεκτημένον, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἀρετὴν, ἀνδρείαν καὶ σωφροσύνην, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει. d στερόμενος δὲ ἀληθοῦς λόγου σοφὸς οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο, ὅτῳ δὲ σοφία μὴ προσείη, πάσης ἀρετῆς τὸ μέγιστον μέρος, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τελέως ἀγαθὸς γενόμενος εὐδαίμων ποτὲ γένοιτο.

Moral
purpose of
astronomical
studies

791—Second, the greatest virtue is, according to our author, piety,—and it is learned by learning astronomy. To this purpose mathematical studies are necessary.

a. *Epin.* 989 b¹-990 b²; 990 c⁵-991 a¹:

Μεῖζον μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς μηδεὶς ἡμᾶς ποτε πείσῃ τῆς εὐσεβείας εἶναι τῷ 989 θνητῷ γένει· τοῦτο δ' ὅτι δι' ἀμαθίαν τὴν μεγίστην ἐν ταῖς ἀρίσταις φύσεσιν οὐ γέγονεν, λεκτέον. ἀρίσται δ' εἰσὶν αἱ χαλεπώτατα μὲν ἂν γενόμεναι, μέγιστον δὲ ὄφελος, ἂν γίγνωνται· τά τε γὰρ τῆς βραδείας τε καὶ τῆς ἐναντίας φύσεως 5 μετρίως ἀποδεχομένη ψυχὴ καὶ πρᾶως, εὐκολος ἂν εἴη, τὴν τε ἀνδρείαν ἀγαμένη, καὶ πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν εὐπειθής, καὶ τό γε μέγιστον, ἐν ταύταις ταῖς φύσεσιν δυναμένη μακθάνειν καὶ μνήμων οὖσα, εὖ μάλα χαίρειν τούτοις αὐτοῖς δύναιτ' c ἂν φιλομαθῆς ὥστ' εἶναι. ταῦτα γὰρ οὔτε ῥάδια φύεσθαι, γενόμενά τε, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας τυχόντα ἥς δεῖ, τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν καὶ χεῖρους κατέχειν ὀρθότατα δύναιτ' ἂν τῷ φρονεῖν καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν περὶ θεοῦ ἕκαστα ὡς 5 δεῖ τε καὶ ὅτε δεῖ, περὶ θυσίας τε καὶ καθαρμῶν τῶν περὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώ-

πους, οὐ σχήμασι τεχνάζοντας, ἀλλὰ ἀληθείᾳ τιμῶντας ἀρετὴν, ὃ δὴ καὶ μέ-
 d γιστόν ἐστι συμπάντων πάσῃ τῇ πόλει. τοῦτο δὴ οὖν τὸ μέρος εἶναι φαμεν
 φύσει κυριώτατον καὶ δυνατὸν ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα μαθεῖν, εἰ
 διδάσκοι τις. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἂν διδάξειεν, εἰ μὴ θεὸς ὑφηγοῖτο· εἰ τ' οὖν διδάσκει,
 5 κατὰ τρόπον δὲ μὴ δρῶ τὸ τοιοῦτον, κρεῖττον μὴ μαθηθάνειν. ὅμως δ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν
 λεγομένων ἀνάγκη μαθεῖν ταῦτα καὶ ἐμὲ λέγειν τὴν τοιαύτην τε καὶ ἀρίστην
 e φύσιν. πειρώμεθα δὴ τῷ τε λόγῳ διεξιελθεῖν ἅ τ' ἐστὶν καὶ οἷα καὶ ὡς δεῖ μαθηθάν-
 νειν, κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν τ' ἐμὴν τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τὴν τῶν δυναμένων εἰσακοῦσαι,
 990 θεοσεβείας ᾧτινι τρόπῳ τις τίνα μαθήσεται. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἄτοπον
 ἀκούσαντι, τὸ δ' ὄνομα αὐτοῦ λέγομεν ἡμεῖς γε, ὃ τις οὐκ ἂν ποτε δόξειεν δι'
 ἀπειρίαν τοῦ πράγματος — ἀστρονομίαν — ἀγνοεῖ τε ὅτι σφώτατον ἀνάγκη
 5 τὸν ἀληθῶς ἀστρονόμον εἶναι, μὴ τὸν καθ' Ἡσίοδον ἀστρονομοῦντα καὶ πάντας
 τοὺς τοιούτους, οἷον δυσμάς τε καὶ ἀνατολὰς ἐπεσκεμμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν
 ὁκτῶ περιόδων τὰς ἐπτὰ περιόδους, διεξιούσης τὸν αὐτῶν κύκλον ἐκάστης
 b οὕτως ὡς οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως ποτὲ πᾶσα φύσις ἱκανὴ γένοιτο θεωρῆσαι, μὴ θαυ-
 c 5 μαστῆς μετέχουσα φύσεως. — Διὸ μαθημάτων δέον ἂν εἴη· τὸ δὲ μέγιστόν
 τε καὶ πρῶτον καὶ ἀριθμῶν αὐτῶν ἀλλ' οὐ σώματα ἔχόντων, ἀλλὰ ὅλης τῆς τοῦ
 περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἀρτίου γενέσεώς τε καὶ δυνάμεως, ὅσην παρέχεται πρὸς τὴν
 d τῶν ὄντων φύσιν. ταῦτα δὲ μαθόντι τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἐστὶν ὃ καλοῦσι μὲν σφῶδρα
 γελοῖον ὄνομα γεωμετρίαν, τῶν οὐκ ὄντων δὲ ὁμοίων ἀλλήλοις φύσει ἀριθμῶν
 ὁμοιώσεις πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐπιπέδων μοῖραν γεγонуῖά ἐστιν διαφανής· ὃ δὴ θαῦμα
 5 οὐκ ἀνθρώπινον ἀλλὰ γεγονὸς θεῖον φανερόν ἂν γίγναιτο τῷ δυναμένῳ συννοεῖν.
 μετὰ δὲ ταύτην τοὺς τρεῖς ἡυξημένους καὶ τῇ στερεᾷ φύσει ὁμοίους· τοὺς δὲ
 ἀνομοίους αὖ γεγονότας ἑτέρα τέχνη ὁμοιοῖ, ταύτη ἣν δὴ στερεομετρίαν ἐκά-
 e λεσαν οἱ προστυχεῖς αὐτῇ γεγονότες· ὃ δὲ θεῖόν τ' ἐστὶν καὶ θαυμαστὸν τοῖς
 ἐγκαθορῶσί τε καὶ διανοομένοις ὡς περὶ τὸ διπλάσιον αἰετρεφομένης τῆς
 δυνάμεως καὶ τῆς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτης καθ' ἐκάστην ἀναλογίαν εἶδος καὶ γένος
 991 ἀποτυποῦται πᾶσα ἡ φύσις.

b. Knowledge of the heavenly bodies is at the top, for its object is divine. *Ib.*, 991 b⁵-c¹:

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ ταύτη γιγνέσθω τε καὶ ἐχέτω σύμπαντα· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις
 τέλος, εἰς θείαν γένεσιν ἅμα καὶ τὴν τῶν ὁρατῶν καλλίστην τε καὶ θειοτάτην
 φύσιν ἱτέον, ὅσην ἀνθρώποις θεὸς ἔδωκεν κατιδεῖν, ἣν οὐποτε ἄνευ τῶν νῦν
 διειρημένων μὴ κατιδὼν ἐπεύξηται τις ῥασιώνῃ παραλαβεῖν.

792—These things are certainly not against the spirit of Plato's philosophy, at least in his later years. Cp. the following passages:

a. *Epin.* 98I e³⁻⁶:

Νομίσαι δὲ δὴ δεῖ πάλιν τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν ζώων γένη, ὃ δὴ πᾶν χρὴ φάναι

The souls of
the celestial
bodies

θεῖον γένος ἄστρον γεγονέναι, σώματος μὲν τυχὸν καλλίστου, ψυχῆς δ' εὐδαιμονεστάτης τε καὶ ἀρίστης.

Cp. Plato, *Nom.* 898 d-899 c (our nr. 391).

Evil
overcome by
good

b. *Epin.* 988 d⁴-e⁴:

Διὸ καὶ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀξιούντων, ψυχῆς οὐσης αἰτίας τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ πάντων μὲν d 5 τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὄντων τοιούτων, τῶν δὲ αὖ φλαύρων τοιούτων ἄλλων, τῆς μὲν φορᾶς πάσης καὶ κινήσεως ψυχὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι θαῦμα οὐδέν, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τάγαθόν e φορὰν καὶ κίνησιν τῆς ἀρίστης ψυχῆς εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τούναντίον ἐναντίαν, νενικηκέναι δεῖ καὶ νικᾶν τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα.

Cp. Plato, *Nom.* 904 a b (our nr. 392a).

Gods and
daemons

c. *Epin.* 984 d³-e³:

Θεοὺς μὲν δὴ, Δία τε καὶ Ἥραν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας, ὅπη τις ἐθέλει, d ταύτῃ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τιθέσθω νόμον καὶ πάγιον ἐχέτω τοῦτον τὸν λόγον· θεοὺς δὲ δὴ τοὺς ὁρατοὺς, μεγίστους καὶ τιμιωτάτους καὶ ὀξύτατον ὁρῶντας 5 πάντῃ, τοὺς πρῶτους τὴν τῶν ἄστρον φύσιν λεκτέον καὶ ὅσα μετὰ τούτων αἰσθανόμεθα γεγονότα, μετὰ δὲ τούτους καὶ ὑπὸ τούτοις ἐξῆς δαίμονας, ἀέριον e δὲ γένος, ἔχον ἔδραν τρίτην καὶ μέσσην, τῆς ἐρμηνείας αἷτιον, εὐχαῖς τιμᾶν μάλα χρεῶν χάριν τῆς εὐφήμου διαπορείας.

This, too, can be placed quite well in the Platonic view of the universe. And yet, there is a nescioquid in these things which does give us the impression that they are rather the work of the next generation than that of the Master himself. Indeed, they fit in excellently with what we know of the character of Philippus of Opous. Cp. Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* II 1⁵, 1044 f.

5—POLEMO, CRATES AND CRANTOR

Polemo 793—The next generation of the School turned from mathematics to ethics.

Conversion
to philosophy

a. Polemo and his conversion to philosophy by Xenocrates.

Diog. L. IV 16:

Πολέμων Φιλοστράτου μὲν ἦν υἱός, Ἀθηναῖος, τῶν δῆμων Οἷθηεν. νέος δ' ὦν ἀκόλαστός τε καὶ διακεχυμένος ἦν οὕτως, ὥστε καὶ περιφέρειν ἀργύριον πρὸς τὰς ἐτοίμους λύσεις τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς στενωποῖς διέκρυπτεν. καὶ ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ πρὸς κιονί τινι τριώβολον εὗρέθη προσπεπλασμένον αὐτοῦ διὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν τῇ προειρημένῃ πρόφασιν. καὶ ποτε συνθέμενος τοῖς νέοις 5 μεθύων καὶ ἐστεφανωμένος εἰς τὴν Ξενοκράτους ἦξε σχολήν· ὁ δὲ οὐδὲν διατραπείς εἶρε τὸν λόγον ὁμοίως· ἦν δὲ περὶ σωφροσύνης. ἀκοῦον δὴ τὸ μειράκιον κατ' ὀλίγον ἐθηράθη καὶ οὕτως ἐγένετο φιλόπονος, ὥς ὑπερβάλλεσθαι τοὺς

ἄλλους καὶ αὐτὸς διαδέξασθαι τὴν σχολήν, ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκτης καὶ δεκάτης
10 καὶ ἑκατοστῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος¹.

b. His further life and behaviour. Diog., ib. 17-18:

His ἀπάθεια

Τοσοῦτον δὲ ἐπιτείνει τὸ ἦθος ἀρξάμενον φιλοσοφεῖν, ὥστ' ἐπὶ ταύτῳ
σχήματος τῆς μορφῆς πάντοτε μένειν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν φωνὴν ἀναλλοίωτος ἦν·
διὸ καὶ θηραθῆναι Κράντορα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. κυνὸς γοῦν λυττῶντος καὶ τὴν ἰγνύαν²
διασπάσαντος μόνον μὴ ὠχριάσαι· καὶ ταραχῆς γενομένης ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως
5 πυθομένων τὸ γεγονὸς ἄτρεπτον μεῖναι. ἔν τε τοῖς θεάτροις ἀσυμπαθέστατος
ἦν. Νικοστράτου γοῦν ποτε τοῦ ἐπικαλουμένου Κλυταιμνήστρα ἀναγινώσκοντός
τι τοῦ ποιητοῦ αὐτῷ τε καὶ Κράτητι, τὸν μὲν συνδιατίθεσθαι³, τὸν δ' ἴσα καὶ
μὴ ἀκοῦσαι. καὶ ὅλως ἦν τοιοῦτος οἶόν φησι Μελάνθιος ὁ ζωγράφος ἐν τοῖς
περὶ ζωγραφικῆς· φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν αὐθάδειάν τινα καὶ σκληρότητα τοῖς ἔργοις
10 ἐπιτρέχειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἡθεσιν.

c. His main interest was more turned to practical life than to theory.

Diog. L. IV 18:

Ἐφασκε δὲ ὁ Πολέμων δεῖν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς
διαλεκτικοῖς θεώρημασι.

794—His ruling principle in ethics was: living according to nature.

a. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* VII 6, 32, 9 (Stählin III p. 25, l. 2):

Πολέμων ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν βίου συντάγμασι.

Living
according to
nature

b. Cic., *Acad.* II 42, 131:

Honestum autem vivere fruentem rebus iis quas primas homini natura
conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit (sc. finem bonorum), ut indicant
scripta Polemonis.

c. Plut., *Comm. not.* c. 23, p. 1069:

Τίνας δὲ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Πολέμων λαμβάνουσιν ἀρχάς; Οὐχὶ καὶ Ζήνων
τούτοις ἠκολούθησεν, ὑποτιθέμενος στοιχεῖα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν φύσιν καὶ
τὸ κατὰ φύσιν;

795—The doctrine of the *πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν* is expounded more fully
by Cicero in *De finibus* II 11, 33 f., with reference to Polemo:

Omne enim animal, simul et ortum est, et se ipsum et omnes partes
suas diligit duasque, quae maximae sunt, in primis amplectitur, animum et

The theory
of the
πρῶτα κατὰ
φύσιν

¹ 316-313 B.C.

² The hollow of the knee.

³ Came under the impression.

corpus, deinde utriusque partes. Nam sunt et in animo praecipua quaedam et in corpore, quae cum leviter agnovit, tunc discernere incipit, ut ea, quae prima data sint natura, appetat asperneturque contraria. In his primis 5 naturalibus voluptas insit necne, magna quaestio est. Nihil vero putare esse praeter voluptatem, non membra, non sensus, non ingenii motum, non integritatem corporis, non valetudinem, summae mihi videtur inscitiae. Atque ab isto capite fluere necesse est omnem rationem bonorum et malorum. Polemoni et iam ante Aristoteli ea prima visa sunt quae 10 paulo ante dixi. Ergo nata est sententia veterum Academicorum et Peripateticorum, ut finem bonorum dicerent secundum naturam vivere, id est virtute adhibita frui primis a natura datis.

Cp. also *De fin.* IV 6, 14 f.

Virtue the first condition to happiness

796—Virtue was, according to Polemo, the first and absolute condition to happiness, while exterior goods were considered by him as being not absolute conditions.

Clem., *Strom.* II 22, 133, 7 (St. II, p. 186, ²⁸-187, ²:

‘Ο γὰρ Ξενοκράτους γνῶριμος Πολέμων φαίνεται τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτάρκειαν εἶναι βουλόμενος ἀγαθῶν πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων. Δογματίζει γοῦν, χωρὶς μὲν ἀρετῆς μηδέποτε ἂν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπάρχειν, δίχα δὲ καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτάρκη πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι.

Crates

797—Of Crates, Polemo's successor in the School, we know very little for certain. Diog. speaks about his intimate friendship with Polemo and his relations with Crantor.

Diog. L. IV 21-22:

Κράτης πατὴρ μὲν ἦν Ἀντιγένους <Ἀθηναῖος>, Θριάσιος δὲ τῶν δῆμων, ἀκροατὴς ἄμα καὶ ἐρώμενος Πολέμωνος· ἀλλὰ καὶ διεδέξατο τὴν σχολὴν αὐτοῦ. Καὶ οὕτως ἀλλήλῳ ἐφιλείτην ὥστε καὶ ζῶντε οὐ μόνον τῶν αὐτῶν ἡσθητικῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέχρι σχεδὸν ἀναπνοῆς ἐξωμωίσθησαν ἀλλήλοις καὶ θανόντε τῆς αὐτῆς ταφῆς ἐκοινωνεῖτην. ὅθεν Ἀνταγόρας εἰς ἅμφω τοῦτον ἐποίησε 5 τὸν τρόπον·

Μνήματι τῷδε Κράτητα θεοῦδέα καὶ Πολέμονα
 ἔννεπε κρύπτεσθαι, ξεῖνε, παρερχόμενος,
 ἄνδρας ὁμοφροσύνη μεγάλητορας, ὧν ἅπο μῦθος
 ἱερὸς ἦϊσεν δαιμονίου στόματος,
 καὶ βίσιος καθαρὸς σοφίας ἐπὶ θεῶν ἐκόσμη
 αἰῶν' ἀστρέπτοις δόγμασι πειθόμενος.

ἔνθεν καὶ Ἀρκεσίλαον μετελθόντα παρὰ Θεοφράστου πρὸς αὐτοὺς λέγειν ὡς εἶεν θεοὶ τινες ἢ λείψανα τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους. — Συσσίτιον δέ φησιν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἀντίγονος εἶναι παρὰ Κράντορι, ὁμονόως συμβιούντων τούτων τε καὶ Ἀρκεσιλάου. τὴν δὲ οἴκησιν Ἀρκεσίλαον μὲν ἔχειν μετὰ Κράντορος, Πολέμωνα δὲ σὺν Κράτητι μετὰ Λυσικλέους τινὸς τῶν πολιτῶν.

798—Something more is known to us about Crantor.

Crantor

a. Diog. L. IV 24:

Κράντωρ Σολεὺς θαυμαζόμενος ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδι ἀπῆρεν εἰς Ἀθήνας καὶ Ξενοκράτους διηκούσε Πολέμωνι συσκολάζων. Καὶ κατέλειπεν ὑπομνήματα εἰς μυριάδας στίχων τρεῖς, ὧν τινὰ τινες Ἀρκεσιλάῳ προσάπτουσι.

b. As we saw before, he lived together with Arcesilas. He died before Polemo and Crates.

Diog. IV 27:

Καὶ κατέστρεψε πρὸ Πολέμωνος καὶ Κράτητος.

799—a. Proclus in *Tim.* 24 A mentions him as the first to write commentaries on Plato, at least on the *Timaeus*:

His commentary on the *Timaeus*

(Κρ.) ὁ πρῶτος τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐξηγητής.

b. Plutarch cites this commentary in his *De an. procr.* 2, p. 1012 f.:

The creation of the soul

Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Κράντορα μάλιστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἔργον εἶναι τὸ κρίνειν τὰ τε νοητὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά, τὰς τε τούτων ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα γινομένας διαφορὰς καὶ ὁμοιότητας, ἐκ πάντων φασίν, ἵνα πάντα γινώσκη, συγκεκράσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν· ταῦτα δ' εἶναι τέτταρα, τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν αἰεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσιν, καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰ σώματα παθητικὴν καὶ μεταβλητὴν· ἔτι δὲ τὴν ταύτου καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου, διὰ τὸ ἀκρίβειαν ἑκατέραν μετέχειν ἑτερότητας καὶ ταυτότητας.

800—He cites it again in the same work, a few lines further, on the eternity of the world and the non-literal interpretation of the *Timaeus*.

The eternity of the world

Plut., *De an. procr.* 3, p. 1013 A:

Τὰ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ περὶ τοῦ κόσμου διανοούμενον, ἐπίστασθαι μὲν αἰδίων ὄντα καὶ ἀγέννητον· τὸ δὲ ᾧ τρόπῳ συντέτακται καὶ διοικεῖται καταμαθεῖν οὐ ῥάδιον ὁρῶντα τοῖς μήτε γένεσιν αὐτοῦ μήτε τῶν γενητικῶν σύνοδον ἐξ ἀρχῆς προϋποθεμένοις, ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν τραπέσθαι.

801—A fragment of his ethics is preserved in Sextus, *Math.* XI (= *Adv. Eth.*) 51-58:

Ethics

The highest
good

Some authors have been cited who call health the highest good. S. continues:

Ἄγαθόν δ' εἶπαν αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν, οὐ μὴν καὶ πρῶτον, οἷ τε ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκα- 51
δημείας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Περιπάτου. δεῖν γὰρ ὑπέλαβον ἐκάστῳ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὴν
οἰκείαν τάξιν τε καὶ ἀξίαν ἀπονέμειν. ἐνθεν καὶ ὁ Κράντωρ εἰς ἔμφασιν τοῦ
λεγομένου βουλόμενος ἡμᾶς ἄγειν πάνυ χαρίεντι συνεκρήσατο παραδείγματι.
εἰ γὰρ νοήσαιομεν, φησί, κοινόν τι τῶν Πανελλήνων θέατρον, εἰς τοῦτό τε ἔκα- 52
στον τῶν ἀγαθῶν παρὶόν καὶ τῶν πρωτείων ἀντιποιοῦμενον ἦκειν, εὐθύς καὶ
εἰς ἔννοιαν ἀναχθῆσόμεθα τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διαφορᾶς. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὁ 53
πλοῦτος παραπηδήσας ἐρεῖ· »ἐγώ, ἄνδρες Πανέλληνες, κόσμον παρέχων
πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰς ἐσθῆτας καὶ τὰς ὑποδέσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀπόλαυσιν
χρειώδης εἰμὶ νοσοῦσι καὶ ὑγιαίνουσι, καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ παρέχω τὰ τερπνὰ,
ἐν δὲ πολέμοις νεῦρα τῶν πράξεων γίνομαι«. τούτων γὰρ δὴ τῶν λόγων ἀκού- 54
σαντες οἱ Πανέλληνες ὁμοθυμαδὸν κελεύουσιν ἀποδοῦναι τὰ πρωτεῖα τῷ
πλούτῳ. ἀλλ' ἐὰν τούτου ἤδη ἀνακηρυττομένου ἐπιστᾶσα ἡ ἡδονή,

τῇ ἐνὶ μὲν φιλότῃ, ἐνὶ δ' ἡμέρῳ, ἐν δ' ὀριστῷ,
πάρφασις, ἢ τ' ἐκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονεόντων¹,

λέγῃ δὲ εἰς μέσον καταστᾶσα, ὅτι αὐτὴν δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀναγορεύειν

55

(ὁ δ' ὄλβος οὐ βέβαιος, ἀλλ' ἐφήμερος
ἐξέπτат' οἷκων, μικρὸν ἀνθήσας χρόνον²,

διώκεται τε πρὸς τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐ δι' ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ περιγινο-
μένην ἀπόλαυσιν καὶ ἡδονήν), πάντως οἱ Πανέλληνες, οὐκ ἄλλως ἔχειν τὸ
πρᾶγμα ἢ οὕτως ὑπολαβόντες, κεκράζονται δεῖν τὴν ἡδονὴν στεφανοῦν. ἀλλὰ
καὶ ταύτης τὸ βραβεῖον φέρεσθαι μελλούσης, ἐπὶν εἰσβάλλῃ ἡ ὑγεία μετὰ τῶν 56
συνέδρων αὐτῇ θεῶν, καὶ διδάσκη, ὥς οὔτε ἡδονῆς οὔτε πλούτου ὄφελός τι
ἐστὶν ἀπούσης αὐτῆς

(τί γάρ με πλοῦτος, < . . . > ὠφελεῖ νόσον;
μικρ' ἂν θέλοιμι καὶ καθ' ἡμέραν ἔχων
ἄλυτον οἰκεῖν βίοντον ἢ πλουτῶν νοσεῖν)³,

ἀκούσαντες πάλιν οἱ Πανέλληνες καὶ μεταμαθόντες, ὥς οὐκ ἔνεστι κλινοπετῇ 57
καὶ νοσοῦσαν ὑποστῆναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, φήσουσι νικᾶν τὴν ὑγείαν. ἀλλὰ καὶ
τῆς ὑγείας ἤδη νικώσης, ἐπὶν εἰσέλθῃ ἡ ἀνδρεία πολὺ στίφος ἀριστέων καὶ
ἡρώων ἔχουσα περὶ ἑαυτήν, καταστᾶσά τε λέγῃ· »ἐμοῦ μὴ παρούσης, ἄνδρες 58

¹ *Iliad* XIV 216.

² Eur., *Phoen.* 558 and *Electra* 944.

³ Eur., fr. 714 Nauck.

"Ἕλληνες, ἀλλοτρία γίνεται ἢ κτῆσις τῶν παρ' ὑμῖν ἀγαθῶν, εὖξαιντό τ' ἂν οἱ πολέμιοι περιουσιάζειν ὑμᾶς πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὥς μελλήσοντες ὑμῶν κρατεῖν, καὶ τούτων οὖν ἀκούσαντες οἱ "Ἕλληνες τὰ μὲν πρωτεῖα τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀποδώσουσι, τὰ δὲ δευτερεῖα τῇ ὑγείᾳ, τὰ δὲ τρίτα τῇ ἡδονῇ, τελευταῖον δὲ τάξουσι τὸν πλοῦτον.

802—a. Cr. was the author of a *Περὶ πένθους*, which became the pattern of many later *Consolationes*. Plutarchus quotes it in the following passage of his *Consol. ad Apollonium*, 3, p. 102: The π. πένθους

Οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε συμφέρομαι τοῖς τὴν ἄγριον ὕμνοῦσι καὶ σκληρὰν ἀπάθειαν, ἔξω καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος οὔσαν· ἀφαιρήσεται γὰρ ἡμῶν αὕτη τὴν ἐκ τοῦ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν εὖνοιαν, ἣν παντὸς μᾶλλον διασώζειν ἀναγκαῖον. Τὸ δὲ πέρα τοῦ μέτρου παρεκφέρεσθαι καὶ συναύξειν τὰ πένθη παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι φημι, καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν φαύλης γίνεσθαι δόξης. Διὸ καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἑατέον ὥς βλαβερὸν καὶ φαῦλον, καὶ σπουδαίοις ἀνδράσιν ἥκιστα πρέπον· τὴν δὲ μετριοπάθειαν οὐκ ἀποδοκιμαστέον. Μὴ γὰρ νοσοῦμεν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀκαδημαῖκος Κράντωρ, νοσήσασι δὲ παρείη τις αἰσθησις, εἴτ' οὖν τέμνοιτό τι τῶν ἡμετέρων, εἴτ' ἀποσπῶτο· τὸ γὰρ ἀνώδυνον τοῦτο οὐκ ἄνευ μεγάλων ἐγγίνεται μισθῶν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· τεθηριῶσθαι γὰρ εἰκὸς, ἐκεῖ μὲν σῶμα τοιοῦτον, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ψυχὴν.

How far the quotation goes, may be seen in Cicero, *Tusc.* III 6, 12:

Nec absurde Crantor ille, qui in nostra Academia vel in primis fuit nobilis, 'minime', inquit, 'adsentior iis, qui istam nescio quam indolentiam magno opere laudant, quae nec potest ulla esse nec debet. ne aegrotus sim; si' inquit 'fuero, sensus adsit, sive secetur quid sive avellatur a corpore. nam istuc nihil dolere non sine magna mercede contingit inmanitatis in animo, stuporis in corpore'.

b. Again, Cicero quotes the same work of Crantor in the following passage.

Acad. pr. (= Lucullus) 44, 135-136:

Sed quaero quando ista fuerint Academia vetere decreta, ut animam sapientis commoveri et conturbari negarent: mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotione naturalem volebant esse quendam modum. legimus omnes Crantoris veteris Academici de luctu; est enim non magnus verum aureolus et ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit ad verbum ediscendus libellus, atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura dicebant permotiones istas animis nostris datas, metum cavendi causa, misericordiam aegritudinemque clementiae; ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi cotem esse dicebant — recte secusne alias viderimus; atrocitas quidem ista tua quomodo in veterem Academiam intruperit nescio.

Cr.'s name
as a moralist

803—Horatius, *Epist.* I 2, 4 mentions him as a moralist on a level with Chrysippus:

qui quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non,
planus ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit.

His view
of life

804—Crantor's view of life, as it appears in Plutarch's *Consol. ad Apoll.* 27:

Πολλοῖς γὰρ καὶ σοφοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ὥς φησι Κράντωρ, οὐ νῦν, ἀλλὰ πάλαι
κέκλαυσται τὰνθρώπινα, τιμωρίαν ἡγουμένους εἶναι τὸν βίον, καὶ ἀρχὴν τὸ
γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπον συμφορὰν τὴν μεγίστην.

Plut. quotes it together with the young Aristotle's tale of Midas and Silenus in the dialogue *Eudemus* (see our nr. 417a).

A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY

I—ARISTOTLE

A—GENERAL EDITIONS

- Aristotelis opera* edidit Academia regia Borussica, vol. I-II (Greek text) recogn. I. Bekker (Berlin 1831). Vol. III contains the Latin translation, vol. IV the scholia, vol. V the fragments ed. by V. Rose and the index of H. Bonitz.
Aristotelis opera omnia Graece et Latine ed. Firmin-Didot, 5 vol., Paris 1848-1874.

B—SPECIAL EDITIONS AND COMMENTARIES

- Aristotelis Categoriae et liber De interpretatione* recogn. L. Minio-Paluello, Oxford *The Organon* 1949 (Bibl. Ox.).
Aristotle, *The Organon I, The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics*. Text and translation by H. Cooke and H. Tredennick (Loeb Class. Libr.), 1938.
Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics, text with introduction and commentary by W. D. Ross, Oxford 1949.
Aristotelis Topica recogn. I. Strache, M. Wallies. Teubner 1923.
Aristotle's Metaphysics, text with introduction and commentary by W. D. Ross, *Metaphysics* 2 vol., Oxford 1924.
Aristotle, *The Metaphysics*, text and translation by H. Tredennick, 2 vol., Loeb Class. Libr., ³1947.
Aristotle's Physics, text with introduction and commentary by W. D. Ross, *Physics* Oxford 1936.
Aristote, *Physique*, texte établi et traduit par H. Carteron, 2 vol. (Coll. Budé) Paris, 1926-'31.
Aristotle, *Physics*. Text and transl. by Ph. H. Wickstead and F. M. Cornford. 2 vol., Loeb Class. Libr., 1929-1934.
Aristotelis Physica ed. D. Ross, Oxford 1950 (Bibl. Ox.).
Aristotle *On Coming-to-be and Passing-away* (De generatione et corruptione). Text with introd. and commentary by H. H. Joachim, Oxford 1922.
Aristotelis De caelo ll. IV rec. D. J. Allan, Oxford 1936 (Bibl. Oxon.).
Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, text and transl. by W. K. C. Guthrie, Loeb Class. Libr., ²1945.
Aristotelis Meteorologicorum ll. IV rec. F. H. Fobes, Cambridge (Mass.) 1918.
— *Parva naturalia* recogn. G. Biehl, Teubner 1898.
— *De animalium historia* recogn. L. Dittmeyer, Teubner 1907.
Aristotle, *Parts of Animals, Movement of animals, Progression of animals*. Text and transl. by A. L. Peck and E. S. Forster, Loeb Class. Libr., ²1945.
Aristotle, *Generation of Animals*, Text and transl. by A. L. Peck (Loeb. Class. Libr.) 1943.
Aristotle, *De anima*, with transl., introd. and notes by R. D. Hicks, Cambridge 1907. *De anima*
Aristotelis De Anima ll. III recogn. A. Förster, Budapest 1912.
Aristotelis De anima (with Latin transl. and notes) ed. P. Siwek, Rome 1933.
Aristote, *Traité de l'âme*. Texte, trad. et commentaire par G. Rodier, 2 vol., Paris 1900 (important commentary).

- Eth. Nic.* Aristotelis *Ethica Nicomachea* recogn. F. Susemihl, Teubner 1880.
 — recogn. I. Bywater, Oxford 1890 (Bibl. Oxon.).
 — recogn. O. Apelt, Teubner 1902.
 — Text and commentary by Alex. Grant, 2 vol., London, 41885.
 — Commentary by J. A. Stewart, 2 vol., Oxford 1892.
 — Text and Commentary by J. Burnet, London 1900.
 — Book V, text, transl. and commentary by H. Jackson, Cambridge 1879.
 — Book VI, text, transl. and commentary by Greenwood, Cambridge 1909.
 — Livre X. Texte et commentaire par G. Rodier, Paris 1897.
 — Livres I et II. Traduction et Commentaire par J. Souilhé et G. Cruchon (*Archives de phil.* vol. VII) 1929.
 Aristote, *Le plaisir*. (*Eth. Nic.* VII 11-14, X 1-5). Introd., traduction et notes par A. J. Festugière. Paris 1936.
 — Text and transl. by H. Rackham (Loeb Class. Libr.) 21947.
 H. H. Joachim, *The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle*. Oxford 1951.
- Politica* Aristotelis *Politica* recogn. O. Immisch, Teubner 1929.
 — Text and transl. by H. Rackham (Loeb Class. Libr.) 1932.
The Politics of Ar. with Introd., two Prefatory Essays and Notes by W. L. Newman, 4 vol., Oxford 1887-1902.
 — translated by E. Barker. With introduction (important) and notes. Oxford 1941.
- Rhetorica* Aristotelis *Ars rhetorica* ed. A. Roemer, Teubner 1899.
 Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Text, introd. and commentary by E. M. Cope, edited by J. E. Sandys, 3 vol., London 1877 (Exhaustive commentary).
 Aristote, *Rhétorique*, Texte établi et traduit par M. Dufour, 2 vol. (Coll. Budé) 1932, 1938.
 Aristotle, *The "Art" of Rhetoric*. Text and transl. by J. H. Freese, Loeb Class. Libr., 21947.
- Poetica* Aristotelis *Poetica* recogn. I. Bywater, Oxford 1911 (Bibl. Ox.).
 Aristotle, Π. ποιητικῆς. Text with introd., transl. and commentary by I. Bywater, Oxford 1909.
 — *The Poetics*. Text and transl. by W. Hamilton Fyfe (together with Longinus, *On the sublime*, and Demetrius *On Style*). Loeb Class. Libr., 1927.
 J. Tkatsch, *Die Arabische Übersetzung der Poetik des Aristoteles und die Grundlage der Kritik des griechischen Textes*, 2 vol., Wien-Leipzig, 1928, 1932.
 Aristote, *Poétique*, texte établi et traduit par J. Hardy (Coll. Budé) 1932.
 Aristoteles, Π. ποιητικῆς. Einleitung, Text u. Kommentar von A. Gudeman. Berlin 1934.
 Aristotle, *The Art of Poetry*. A Greek view of Poetry and Drama. Transl., introd. and explanations by W. Hamilton Fyfe. Oxford 1940.
 Aristotele, *Poetica*. Introd., testo e commento di A. Rostagni, Torino 1945.
 Aristoteles, *Poetica*, texto original y version Española, introducion y notas por el Dr. J. D. Garcia Bacca. Universidad National Autónoma de México, 1946.
 — S. H. Butcher, *Aristotle's theory of poetry and fine art*. With a critical text and transl. of the *Poetics*. Pref. essay on *Aristotelian literary criticism* by I. Gassner. London, 41907. Reprinted 1951.
- Fragments* Aristotelis fragmenta ed. V. Rose. Teubner 1886.
 Aristotelis Dialogorum fragmenta selegit R. Walzer, Firenze 1934.

C—TRANSLATIONS

The works of Aristotle translated into English, under the editorship of W. D. Ross, 12 vol., 1908 ff. = 1928 ff., Oxford Clarendon Press.

- Aristoteles, *Philosophische Werke*, hrg. von E. Rolfes, Leipzig 1921/22.
 Aristote, *La Métaphysique*, trad. et notes par J. Tricot. Paris 1948.
 ——— *Organon*, vol. I-VI, trad. et notes par J. Tricot. Paris 1939-46, 21947-1950.
 ——— *De l'âme*, trad. et notes par J. Tricot. Paris 1947.
 Of the same author: *De la Génération et de la Corruption*, 21951.
 ——— *Les Météorologiques*, 1941.
 ——— *Traité du Ciel* suivi du *Traité pseudo-aristotélécien Du Monde*, 1949.
 ——— *Parva naturalia* suivi du *Traité ps.-ar. De Spiritu*, 1951.
 J. Tricot, Aristote, *La Métaphysique*. Nouvelle édition entièrement refondue, avec commentaire, 2 vol. Paris 1953.
 Die Lehrschriften des Aristoteles, hrg., übertragen u. in ihrer Entstehung erläutert von P. Gohlke. Paderborn 1949 ff.
 Aristoteles, *Sämtliche Werke* übersetzt von O. Gigon, Artemisverlag Zürich, 5 vol. (vol. 1-2 just out, 1951).

D—GENERAL WORKS ON ARISTOTLE

- W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung. Berlin 1923.
 English transl. by R. Robinson, Oxford 21948.
 ——— Trad. ital. da G. Calogero, Firenze 1935.
 W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*. London 1923 (21944).
 O. Hamelin, *Le système d'Aristote*, Paris 1921 (21931).
 L. Robin, *Aristote*. Paris 1944.

E—WORKS ON SPECIAL SUBJECTS

- E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, 2 vol., *Lost works* Firenze 1935.
 J. Bidez, *Un singulier naufrage littéraire dans l'Antiquité: à la recherche des épaves de l'Aristote perdu*. Bruxelles 1938.
 P. Wilpert, *Zwei aristotelische Frühschriften über die Ideenlehre*, Regensburg 1949.
 On the Περὶ φιλοσοφίας see our nr. 431e.
 P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote*, Louvain 1951. Important review of G. Verbeke in *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 1952, p. 90-102.
 H. Maier, *Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles*. 3 vol., Tübingen 1896-1900. *Logic*
 F. Solmsen, *Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik*, 1929.
 A. Becker, *Die aristotelische Theorie der Möglichkeitsschlüsse*, Berlin 1922.
 P. Gohlke, *Die Entstehung der aristotelischen Logik*, Berlin 1936.
 E. Kapp, *Greek Foundations of traditional Logic*. New York 1942.
 S. Mansion, *Le jugement d'existence chez Aristote*. Paris-Louvain 1946.
 J. Lukasiewics, *Aristotle's Syllogistic from the standpoint of modern formal logic*. Oxford 1951.
 L. M. de Rijk, *The place of the Categories of being in Aristotle's philosophy*. Assen 1952 (diss. Utrecht).
 A. Mansion, *Introduction à la physique aristotélécienne*. Paris-Louvain 21946. *Phil. of Nature*
 J. M. le Blond, *Logique et méthode chez Aristote*. Etude sur la recherche des principes dans la physique aristotélécienne. Paris 1939.
 F. Ravaisson, *Essai sur la métaphysique d'Aristote*. 2 vol., Paris 1913. *Metaphysics*
 Jos. Owens CRR, *The doctrine of being in Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Toronto 1951.
 On the theory of the Unmoved Mover(s) see our nr. 410.
 L. Ollé-Laprune, *Essai sur la morale d'Aristote*, Paris, 1881. *Ethics*
 M. Wittmann, *Die Ethik des Aristoteles*, Regensburg 1920.
 A. Goedeckemeyer, *Aristoteles' praktische Philosophie*, Leipzig 1922.

- J. de Munter, *Studie over de zedelijke schoonheid en goedheid bij Aristoteles*, Brussel 1932.
 H. Schilling, *Das Ethos der Mesotes*, Tübingen 1930.
 A. Mansion, *Aristoteles en het vrijheidsprobleem*, in *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie* I (1939), pp. 483-510.
 J. Léonard S.J., *Le bonheur chez Aristote* (Académie Royale de Belgique, Classe des Lettres et des Sciences morales et politiques, Mémoires, Tome XLIV, fasc. 1) Bruxelles 1948.
 Psychology H. Poppelreuter, *Zur Psychologie des Aristoteles, Theophrast u. Strato*, Diss. Erlangen 1892.
 L. Keller, *Aristoteles und die moderne Psychologie*, Diss. Fribourg 1927.
 H. Cassirer, *Aristoteles' Schrift "Von der Seele" und ihre Stellung innerhalb der aristotelischen Philosophie*, Tübingen 1932.
 M. de Corte, *La doctrine de l'intelligence chez Aristote*, Paris 1934.
 M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliche Deutung u. Umbildung der aristotelischen Lehre vom νοῦς ποιητικός*, München 1936.
 P. van Schilfgaarde, *De zielkunde van Aristoteles*, Diss. Amsterdam 1938.
 F. Nuyens, *Ontwikkelingsmomenten in de zielkunde van Aristoteles*, Diss. Amsterdam 1939.
 French translation: *L'Evolution de la psychologie d'Aristote*, Paris-Louvain 1948.
 Rhetoric E. M. Cope, *Introduction to the Rhetoric of Aristotle*, London 1867.
 Poetics F. W. Trench, *Mimesis in Aristotle's Poetics*, in *Hermathena* vol. XXIII (1933), pp. 1-24.
 ——— *The place of Katharsis in Aristotle's Aesthetics*, in *Hermathena* vol. LI (1938), pp. 110-134.
 See further sub nr. 664a.

II—THE PERIPATETIC SCHOOL

A—TEXTS, TRANSLATIONS AND COMMENTARIES

- Theophrasti Eresii opera omnia ed. Fr. Wimmer, Paris 1866, ²1931.
 Theophrastus, *Metaphysics*, with transl., commentary and introd. by W. D. Ross and F. H. Fobes, Oxford 1929.
 Théophraste, *La Métaphysique*. Traduction et notes par J. Tricot, Paris 1948.
 Théophraste, *Caractères*, texte établi et traduit par O. Navarre. Paris 1920.
 F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, Texte und Kommentar,
 Heft I, *Dikaiarchos*, Basel 1944.
 Heft II, *Aristoxenos*, Basel 1945.
 Heft III, *Klearchos*, Basel 1948.
 Heft IV, *Demetrios von Phaleron*, Basel 1949.
 Heft V, *Straton von Lampsakos*, Basel 1950.
 Heft VI, *Lykon und Ariston von Keos*, Basel 1952.
 Aristo of Ceos in Philodemus, *Περὶ κακίων* X, ed. Chr. Jensen, Teubner 1911.
 Aristo of Cos in Philodemi *Volumina rhetorica* ed. S. Sudhaus, Teubner 1885/6.

B—WORKS ON THE PERIPATETIC SCHOOL

- O. Regenbogen, *Theophrastos von Eresos*, Stuttgart 1940.
 I. M. Bochenski, *La logique de Théophraste*, Fribourg 1947.
 G. Rodier, *La physique de Straton de Lampsaque*, Paris 1891.
 M. J. Lagrange, *Les péripatéticiens jusqu'à l'ère chrétienne* in *Revue Thomiste* XXXII (1927), pp. 196-213.
 A general work of Wehrli on the Perip. School is to be expected.

III. THE EARLY ACADEMY

A—TEXTS AND STUDIES

- De Speusippi Academici scriptis*. Accedunt fragmenta. Scr. P. Lang, Bonn 1911.
 R. Heinze, *Xenokrates*. Darstellung der Lehre und Sammlung der Fragmente, Leipzig 1892.
 O. Voss, *De Heraclidis Pontici vita et scriptis*. Diss. Rostock 1896.
 To be published in 1953: F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, Heft VII, *Herakleides von Pontos*.

B—GENERAL WORKS

- H. Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1945.
 A general work on the Early Academy is shortly to be expected of Ph. Merlan (1953).

ADDITIONS TO THE BIBLIOGRAPHY

I—ARISTOTLE

A—EDITIONS, TRANSLATIONS AND COMMENTARIES

- Aristotelis *Fragmenta selecta* recogn. W. D. Ross, Oxford 1955 (Bibl. Ox.).
 ——— *De anima* recogn. W. D. Ross, Oxford 1956 (Bibl. Ox.).
 ——— *Metaphysica* recogn. W. Jaeger, Oxford 1957 (Bibl. Ox.).
 Aristoteles, *Nikomachische Ethik* übersetzt von Fr. Dirlmeier, Berlin 1956. With a commentary.
 ——— *Eudemische Ethik* übers. von F. Dirlmeier, Berlin 1957.
 ——— *Magna Moralia* übers. von F. Dirlmeier, Berlin 1958.
 Aristote, *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*, traduction nouvelle par J. Tricot, Paris 1959.

B—GENERAL WORKS AND SPECIAL STUDIES

- D. J. Allan, *The philosophy of Aristotle*, Oxford 1952.
 S. G. Nogales, S.I., *Horizonte de la metafísica Aristotelica*, Madrid 1955. Contains a copious general bibliography (p. 247-398).
 A. Mansion, *Travaux d'ensemble sur Aristote, son oeuvre et sa philosophie*, in *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 1959, p. 44-70.
 J. H. Randall, *Aristotle*, 1960.
 I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Protrepticus*, in: *Autour d'Aristote* („Mélanges Mansion") Louvain 1955, p. 81-97.
 P. Wilpert, *Die aristotelische Schrift „Über die Philosophie"*, in: *Autour d'Aristote*, Louvain 1955, p. 99-116.
 W. G. Rabinowitz, *Aristotle's Protrepticus and the sources of its reconstruction*, Berkeley, & Los Angeles 1957. See on this work S. Mansion in *Rev. phil. de Louvain* 1958, p. 316 ff.
 P. Moraux, *A la recherche de l'Aristote perdu. Le dialogue „Sur la Justice"*. Louvain-Paris 1957.
 O. Hamelin, *La théorie de l'intellect d'après Aristote et ses commentateurs*. Ouvrage publié avec une introduction par E. Barbotin, Paris 1953.
 E. Barbotin, *La théorie de l'intellect d'après Aristote et ses commentateurs*. Paris 1953.
 ——— *La théorie aristotélécienne de l'intellect d'après Théophraste*, in: *Proceedings of the XIth international Congress of Phil.*, Brussels 1953, vol. XIV, p. 276-281.

- A. Mansion, *L'immortalité de l'âme et de l'intellect d'après Aristote*, in: *Rev. phil. de Louvain* 1953, p. 444-472.
- E. von Ivanka, *Zur Problematik der aristotelischen Seelenlehre*, in: *Autour d'Aristote*, Louvain 1955, p. 245-253.
- P. Moraux, *A propos du νοῦς θύραθεν chez Aristote*, in: *Autour d'Aristote*, Louvain 1955, p. 255-295.
- H. von Arnim, *Die Entstehung der Gotteslehre des Aristoteles*. Sitzungsber. Wien, 212, Abh. 5, 1931.
- W. K. C. Guthrie, *The development of Aristotle's theology*, in: *Class. Quart.* 27 (1933), p. 162-171; 28 (1934), p. 90-98.
- A. J. Festugière, *Les premiers moteurs d'Aristote*, in: *Revue philosophique*, Paris 1949, p. 66-71.
- J. Owens, *The reality of the Aristotelian separate Movers*, in: *Review of Metaphysics* 3 (1950), p. 319-337.
- H. A. Wolfson, *The plurality of immovable Movers in Aristotle*, in: *Harvard Studies in Class. Philol.* 63, 1958, p. 233-253.
- A. Mansion, *L'objet de la science philosophique suprême d'après Aristote*, *Métaph. E 1*, in: *Mélanges Diès*, Paris 1957, p. 151-168.
- *Philosophie première, philosophie seconde et métaphysique chez Aristote*, in: *Rev. phil. de Louvain* 1958, p. 165-221.
- S. Mansion, *Les apories de la Métaphysique aristotélicienne*, in: *Autour d'Aristote*, Louvain 1955, p. 141-179.
- C. J. de Vogel, *Quelques remarques à propos du premier chapitre de l'Ethique à Nicomaque*, in: *Autour d'Aristote*, Louvain 1955, p. 307-323.
- D. J. Allan, *The practical syllogism*, in: *Autour d'Aristote*, Louvain 1955, p. 325-340.
- R. A. Gauthier, O.P., *La morale d'Aristote*, Paris 1958. On this work see A. Wyllie in *Rev. phil. de Louvain* 1958, p. 512 ff.
- G. Lieberg, *Die Lehre von der Lust in den Ethiken des Aristoteles*, München 1958 (Zetemata, Heft 19).
- C. W. Boekel, *Katharsis. Een filosofische verklaring van Aristoteles' psychologie van het gevoelsleven*. Diss. Nijmegen 1957.
- Aristotle and Plato in the mid-fourth century*. Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum held at Oxford, August 1957, edited by I. Düring and G.E.L. Owen, Göteborg 1960.

II—THE PERIPATETIC SCHOOL

- E. Barbotin, *La théorie aristotélicienne de l'intellect d'après Théophraste*, Louvain-Paris 1954.
- Fr. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles*,
Heft VIII, *Eudemos von Rhodos*, Basel 1955.
Heft IX, *Phainias von Eresos, Chamaileon, Praxiphanes*, Basel 1957.
Heft X, *Hieronymos von Rhodos, Kritolaos u. seine Schüler. Rückblick: Der Peripatos in vorchristlicher Zeit*. Basel 1959.

III—THE EARLY ACADEMY

- Fr. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, Heft VII, *Herakleides Pontikos*, Basel 1953.
Ph. Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism*, Den Haag 1953.

NEW ADDITIONS TO THE BIBLIOGRAPHY

I—ARISTOTLE

A—EDITIONS, TRANSLATIONS AND COMMENTARIES

- Aristote, *Du Ciel*, texte ét. et trad. p. P. Moraux, Paris 1965.
 — *L'éthique à Nicomaque*, p. R. A. Gauthier et J. Y. Jolif, t. I *Introduction et traduction*, Louvain 1958, t. II *Commentaire*, Louvain 1959.
 Aristoteles, *Problemata physica*, übers. (& komm.) von H. Flashar, Darmstadt 1962.
 — *Opuscula I (Über die Tugend)*, übers. (& komm.) von E. A. Schmidt, Darmstadt 1965.
 — *Über die Seele*, übers. (& komm.) von W. Theiler, Darmstadt 1966.
 — *Physikvorlesung*, übers. (& komm.) von H. Wagner, Darmstadt 1967.
 L. Elders, *Aristotle's Cosmology, A Commentary on the De caelo*, Assen 1966.

B—GENERAL WORKS AND SPECIAL STUDIES

- B. L. Cencillo, *HYLE*, Madrid 1958.
 G. Patzig, *Die aristotelische Syllogistik*, Göttingen 1959, ² 1963.
 Fr. Solmsen, *Aristotle's System of the Physical World*, Ithaca N.Y. 1960.
Aristote et les problèmes de Méthode, (Symposium Aristotelicum 1960), Louvain-Paris 1961.
 G. Reale, *Il concetto di filosofia prima e l'unità della metafisica di Aristotele*, Milano 1961, ² 1965.
 E. Berti, *La filosofia del primo Aristotele*, Padova 1962.
 W. Wieland, *Die aristotelische Physik*, Göttingen 1962.
 P. Aubenque, *Le problème de l'être chez Aristote*, Paris 1962.
 — *La prudence chez Aristote*, Paris 1963.
 W. J. Oates, *Aristotle and the Problem of Value*, Princeton N.J. 1963.
 R. Ritter, *Die aristotelische Freundschaftsphilosophie nach der Nikomachischen Ethik*, Diss. München 1963.
 J. Moreau, *L'Espace et le Temps selon Aristote*, Padova 1965.
 I. Düring, *Aristoteles, Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens*, Heidelberg 1966.

II—THE PERIPATETIC SCHOOL

- Theophrastus, *De Sensibus* (G. M. Stratton), 1917, Amsterdam ² 1964.
 P. Steinmetz, *Die Physik des Theophrast*, Bad Homburg-Berlin-Zürich 1964.
 G. Reale, *Teofrasto e la sua aporetica metafisica*, Brescia 1964.

III—THE EARLY ACADEMY

- H. Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1945, ² 1962.
 Speusippus, *Fragm.* ed. Lang, repr. Frankfurt/M. 1964.
 Xenocrates, *Fragm.* ed. Heinze, repr. Hildesheim 1965.
 H. J. Krämer, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik*, Amsterdam 1964.

INDICES

I—NAMES

- Aelianus 769**
Aenesidemus 722 b
Aeschylus 662 b
Aëtius sub 718 b; 747 a; 756; 763
Albertus Magnus 431 d
Alcmaeon 431 d
Alexander of Aphrodisias 421 b; 519,
 p. 105 n. 3; 527, n. 5; 674; 675 b;
 704 c; 759 b; 785 b
Alexander (the Great) 398, p. 4 n. 1;
 405
Anacharsis 605 b
Anaxagoras 420; 473; 529 a; 591 b;
 651 a, b; 780 b
Anaximenes 474; 519, p. 105, n. 3
Andronicus 401 b; 402, p. 9
Antigonus of Carystus 726
Antiochus of Ascalon sub 715 a; 766
 a, b
Antiphon 483 a
Antisthenes 433 a
Apellicon 401 a, b
Apuleius 431 a
Arcesilaus 797; 798 a, b
Archelaus 731 a
Archimedes 704 a, c; 722 a; 788 b
Archytas 632 e; 700 b; 784 a
Aristarchus of Samos 777 b; 779
Aristeas 710 b
Aristo of Ceos 730-733
Aristo of Chios 766 a
Aristo of Cos 734-735
Aristocles 702 c
Aristophanes 704 a
Aristotle
 source problems **395-397**
 life **398**
 poems **399**
 lectures **400**
 library **401**
 works **402**
 chronology **403-414**
 exoteric writings **415-431**
 logic **432-468**
 philosophy of nature **469-518**
 metaphysics **519-560**
 ethics **561-607**
 politics **608-632**
 psychology (*De anima*) **633-653**
 rhetoric **654-659**
 poetics **660-666**
 mentioned by Cic. **696 a**
 criticized by Theophr. **676; 677;**
 681; 682
 and by Strato **717 c; 721 b; 722**
 cited sub **698 a; 715 a; 757 b;**
 758; 764 a; 766; 771 d; 786; 787
Aristoxenus 699-704
Arnim, H. von, 565 b
Asclepiades of Prusa, 780 b
Asclepius 746 b; 757 b
Athenaeus 399 c; 401 a, p. 7 n. i;
 566, p. 138 n. 2; 726 a; 740 b; 781
Atticus, friend of Cic., 783
Atticus, a Platonist of the 2nd century,
 561
Averroës sub 524
Avicenna sub 524
Bergson, H., 501
Bernays, J., 396, n. 1 and 2
Bias 585; 659 b
Bidez, J., 410; 424 a
Bignone, E., 410; 431 e
Bion of Borysthenes 730 b
Bochensky, I. M., 672 b; 673 a; 674 b;
 675 b
Boehme, Jacob, 431 d
Boëthius 673 b
Bonaventura 431 d
Bonitz, H., 559, sub a
Bousset, M., 410
Brandis 435 b
 Schol. in Ar., **716 a; 764 b; 777 b**

- Bréhier, E., **410**
 Brentano, F., **516 a**, n. 5
 Brink, K. O., **402**, p. 10 n. 1; **565 b**
 Burnet, J., **566**, p. 138 f. n. 4; p. 143 n. 2
- Callimachus **704 a**
 Callippus **408**; **517 c**, n. 3; **787**
 Callisthenes **398**, p. 4 n. 1
 Cantor **788 b**
 Cassander **667 d**; **706**
 Chalcidius **778**
 Chilo **659 a**
 Chrysippus **803**
 Cicero **401 a**, p. 7 n. 4; **415 a**; **427**; **430 n. 1**; **563 a**; **566**, p. 138 n. 2; **689**; **690 a, b**; **692 b**; **693**; **694 a**; **696**; **703 a**; **704**; **706 c**; **710 a**; **711**; **715 a**; **730 a**; **747 c**; **783**; **795**; **802 b**
 Clemens Alexandrinus **729**; **749 a**
 Cleophon (a poet), **661 b**
 Colotes **783 c**
 Copernicus **777 b**
 Coriscus **398**, p. 3 n. 3; **737**
 Corte, M. de, **412**
 Crantor, Academicus, **764 b**; **793 b**; **798-804**
 Crates, Cynicus, **709**
 Crates, Polemo's successor in the Academy, **797**
 Critolaus sub **734 a**; **765 c**
 Cyrillus Alexandrinus **700 c, d**
- Damon **704 a**
 Demetrius of Phaleron **398**, p. 4 n. 1; **705-713**
 Demetrius Poliorcetes **706**
 Democritus **471 a**; **474**; **717 a**; **780**
 Dicaearchus **688-698**
 Diels, H., **483 a**, n. 3
 Diodorus, the historian, **705 c**; **740 a**
 Diodorus Cronus **780 a**
 Diogenes Cynicus **739 c**
 Diogenes Laertius **399 b, c**; **401 a**, p. 7 n. 4; in ch. XVIII and XIX frequently cited
 Dionysius Halicarnassensis **398**
 Dionysius, ὁ μεταθέμενος (an apostate of Stoicism) **772 a**
 Dionysius, a painter, **661 b**
- Dittenberger, **398**, p. 4 n. 1; **727 b**
 Döring, I., **414**
 Drossaart Lulofs, H. J., **414**
 Dufour, M., **654 n. 1**
 Duns Scotus **431 d**; **524**
- Ecphantus **777 a**
 Empedocles **473**; **498 a**; **499 a**; **649 a**; **661 a**; **763**; **783 b**
 Epicharmus **724 b**, n. 1
 Epicurus **410**; **718**; **780 a, b**; **783 c**; **786**
 Erastus, **398**, n. 3; **737**
 Euclides (the mathematician) **704 a**; **788 a, b**
 Eudemus of Cyprus **415**
 Eudemus of Rhodos, **402**, p. 10 n. 1; **407**; **563 b**; **565 a**; **672 a, b**; **673b**; **674 a, b**; **675 a, b**
 Eudoxus **408**; **517 c**, n. 3; **529 a**; **596 c**; **698 a**; **784-788**
 Euripides **632 a** (1339 a 19); **731 a**, n. 1; **801**
 Eusebius **561**
 Eutocius **788 c**
- Festugière, A. J., **430**, n. 1; **431 e**
- Galenus **692 a**
 Gaye **483 a**, n. 2
 Gellius **400**; **750 b**
 Gohlke, P., **435 b**
 Gorgias **399 c**; **611** (1260 a 28)
 Guthrie, W. K. C., **424 b**, n. 2
- Hackforth, R., **596 a**, n. 2
 Hardie **483 a**, n. 2
 Harward, J., **789 b**
 Heath, Sir Thomas, **517 c**, n. 3; **772 b**; **777 a**; **778**; **779**; **787**; **788 a, b, c**
 Hegel **412**
 Hegemon, a poet, **661 b**
 Helena **574 c**
 Heliodorus **566**, p. 139 n. 6
 Heraclides Ponticus **696 a**; **733**; **737**, **771-783**
 Heraclitus
 cited in *De part. an.* I 5, **406**; **474**
 in Theophr. *Metaph.*, **677 a**
 Hermias **398**, p. 3 n. 3, p. 4 n. 1; **399 b, c**; **771 d**

- Hermippus **401 a**, p. 7 n. 4; **784 a** (the end)
 Hero **719 c, d**
 Herodotus **666**
 Hesiodus **566**, p. 136; **608 a**; **695 b**; **791 a**
 Hesychius **562 b**
 Hieronymus **686 b**
 Hippocrates **704 a, c**; **734 a**
 Hoffmann, E., **410**
 Homerus **574 c** (Helena); **591 a**; **649 a**; **661 a, b, c**; **665 b**; **770**; **801**
 Homolle, **398**, p. 4 n. 1
 Horatius **803**
 Iamblichus **418 b**, **419**; **420-423**; **748**; **775 a**
 Immisch, O., **624**, p. 194 n. 1
 Isocrates **419**
 Ivanka, von, **411 b**; **412**
 Jackson **527 n. 8**
 Jaeger, W., **395**; **396**; **398 n. 3**; **399 c**; **402** (third group, sub VI); **403-414**; **416**; **420**; **424 b**; **425 c**; **426**; **427**; **431 a**; **516 a**, n. 4; **518**; **564**; **565 a, b**
 Julianus **680 b**
 Kant **465**, p. 64
 Kapp, E., **434**; **435 b, c**; **448**; **565 a**
 Kommerell, M., **664 a**
 Künssberg **788 c**
 Lactantius **703 b**; **717 b**
 Lagrange, M. J., **410**
 Lucianus **702 b**
 Luyken, Jan, **431 d**
 Lyco, Strato's successor in the Lyceum **725-729**
 Lycurgus **766 b**
 Macrobius **778**
 Mansion, A., **397**; **402**, p. 8 n. 2; **411**; **412**; **427**, p. 32 n. 2; **469**; **482 a**; **485**; **496 b**; **498 b, d**; **501**; **502**; **518**; **565 a, b**
 Mansion, S., **402**, p. 8 n. 1; **438 a**
 Martianus Capella **698 a**; **778**
 Meeuwesse, A. C. M., **431 d**, n. 1
 Mekler, *Index Acad.*, **737**; **751 b**
 Melanthius **793 b**
 Melissus **471 a**; **472 a, b**
 Menedemus **772 a**
 Meno **407**
 Merlan, Ph., **410**, p. 16 n. 1; **518**
 Metrodorus **783 c**
 Midas **417 a**
 Minucius Felix **679 a**; **747 c**
 Mithradates **738**
 Moreau, J., **430**, n. 1; **431 e**
 Mugnier, R., **410**
 Mühlh, P. von der, **565 a**
 Mulvany, C. M., **566**, p. 138 f. n. 4
 Mure, G. R. G., **465**, p. 63 n. 4 and 5, p. 64 n. 1
 Musaeus **632 c**
 Myrto **700 d**
 Neleus **401 a**
 Nemesius **691**; **761 a**
 Nicomachus **563 b**
 Numenius **748**
 Nuyens, F., **412 n. 5, 6**; **413-414**; **418 a**, p. 23 n. 1; **425 c**; **427**
 Olympiodorus **399 a**; **748**
 Olympus (the musician) **632 d**
 Onomacritus **424 b**
 Orphici **424 b**; **776 b**
 Parmenides **471-472**; **474**
 Pausanias **706 a**
 Pauson (a painter) **661 b**
 Philippus of Opous **737**; **789**; sub **792 c**
 Philistion **784 a**
 Philo **431 a**
 Philodemus **731**; **732**; **734**; **735**; **781**
 Philolaus **752 a**
 Philoponus **416**; **424 b**; **434**; **675**; **758 c**; **759 c**; **760 b**
 Pittacus **659 a**
 Photius **697**
 Places, E. des, **789 b**
 Plato **395**; **398**, n. 3; **399 a**; **402** (first group); **403**; **404**; **424 a**; **425**; **427**; **430**, n. 1; **434**; **440**; **463 a**, p. 60 n. 1; **480**; **485**; **498 a**; **501**; **525-532**; **566**, p. 135 n. 2, p. 136 n. 1, p. 137; p. 139-140; **581**; **584**; **611**; **613**
 Life of — by Aristoxenus, **702**
 — opposed by Strato, **717 c**;
 —'s view of rhetoric, **734**; **735**;
 List of disciples, **737**;

- doctrine of Numbers **746 a**;
 tripartition of phil., **753 a**;
 doctrine of indivisible planes, **758 a**;
 Gods and daemons, **762**;
 interpretation of the *Tim.*, **764 b**;
 the virtuous life is happy, **767**;
 Heracl. Pont. heard him, **771 d**;
772 b;
 cited sub **775 a, b**;
 — and Eudoxus, **786**;
 — and the *Epinomis*, **789 b**; **792**
 Plotinus **416 a**; **748**
 Plutarchus **401 b**; **417 a**; **425 b**; **694 c**;
700 d; **701**; **709**; **713**; **717 c**; **724**;
733; **748**; **760 c**; **764 b**; **765 c**;
781; **782**; **783 b, c**; **802 a**; **804**
 Polemo **793-796**
 Polygnotus **661 b**
 Porphyrius **695 b**; **700 d**
 Posidonius **402**, p. 8
 Proclus **425 b**; **772 b**; **788 c**
 Protagoras **702 d**
 Ptolemaeus (Philadelphus) **401 a**, p. 7
 n. 1; **667 d**; **710 a, b**
 Pythagoras **680 b**; **695 a**; **700 a**
 Pythagoreans **463 a**, p. 60 n. 1; **566**,
 p. 140 (1096 b 5 f.); **743 a, d**; **745 c**;
752 a; **776 b**
 Quintilianus **734 a**
 Rackham **566**, p. 141 n. 3; p. 143 n. 2;
594 b, n. 1; **596**, p. 172 n. 1;
597 a, n. 3; **602**, n. 2
 Raeder, H., **789 b**
 Ramsauer, G., **566**, p. 138, n. 4; **597 a**,
 n. 3
 Robin, L., **463 b**
 Rose, V., **396 n. 1**
 Ross, Sir David, **397**; **402**; **410**; **424 b**,
 n. 3; **433 a**; **435 c**, n. 1; **455 b**,
 n. 5; **460 b**, n. 2; **461**; **478 a**; **527**,
 n. 8; **565 a**; **566**, p. 135 n. 1; p.
 137 n. 3; p. 141 n. 2; p. 142 n. 2;
581; **582**; **583**; **597 a**, n. 3; **624**,
 p. 194 n. 1 and 2;
 Ross-Fobes, **747 b**, n. 1
 Rutilius Lupus **728 a**
 Rijk, L. M. de, **402**, p. 8 n. 1; **438 a**;
559 a, n. 1
 Sardanapallos **566**, p. 138 (1095 b 22),
 with n. 2
 Schächer, E. J., **402**, p. 10 n. 1; **565 a, b**
 Schaerer, R., **434**
 Schilfgaard, P. van, **412**
 Schleiermacher **565 b**
 Seleucus of Babylon (Ἐρυθραῖος), **776 a**
 Seneca **428 a**; **749 d**; **765 b**
 Sextus Empiricus **426 a, b**; **690 c**;
753 a; **754**; **780 b**; **801**
 Silenus **417 a**
 Simonides **519**, p. 105 (b 30)
 Simplicius **418 a**; **716**; **719**; **720**; **721**
a, b, c; **723**; **755**; **760 a**; **771 b**;
777 b; **779**
 Socrates **431 d**; **611** (1260 a 22); **700**
b, c, d; **701**
 οἱ Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι, **661 a**
 Solmsen, Fr., **435 b**
 Solon **579 a**, n. 1; **612 a** (1256 b 32 f.);
766 b
 Sophocles **658 a** (1375 a 33 ff.); **662 b**
 Sotion **771 d**; **784 a**
 Souilhé, J., **566**, p. 143 n. 2
 Speusippus **404**; **532 b**, n. 1; **566**, p.
 140 (1096 b 7); **594 a**; **596 a**; **737-**
750; **764 b**; **771 c, d**
 Staigmüller **779**
 Stebbing, S., **443 c**, n. 1
 Stoics **433**; **434**; **686 a**, n. 1; **762**
 Strabo **401 a**; **730 b**; **734 a**; sub **771 d**
 Strato of Lampsacus, **714-724**
 Strycker, E. de, **424 a**
 Suidas **789 c**
 Sulla **401 a, b**
 Syrianus **425 a**
 Tannery **779**; **788 c**
 Taylor, A. E., **789 b**
 Tertullianus **722 a**; **761 a**
 Thales **420**; **519**, p. 105, n. 3; **591 b**;
695 a
 Theiler, W., **565 b**
 Themiso **419**
 Theodoretus **700 d**, **719 a**; **756 b**
 Theognis **585**; **604**
 Theon of Smyrna **778**
 Theophrastus **398 n. 4**; **401 a, b**; **565 b**;
667-687; **696 a**; **710 a**; **715**; **747 b**
 Thompson, **398**, n. 4
 Thomas Aquinas **431 d**; **465**, p. 64,
 sub II; sub **516 a**, n. 5; **641**; **651 a**,
 n. 1
 Timaeus of Tauromenium **783 b**

Tredennick, H., **455 b**, n. 5
 Trench, F. W., **664 a**; see also bibliogr.
 p. 304
 Trendelenburg **395**
 Tumarkin, A., **664 a**
 Tyrannion **401 a, b**

 Überweg **410**

 Varro **695; 783**
 Verbeke, G., **414**
 Vermehren **602**, n. 2
 Vitruvius **778**
 Vollgraff, W., **399 c**, n. 1

 Watt, J., **566**, p. 138 n. 4

Wehrli, Fr., **693**, n. 1; **698 b; 701**, n. 1;
 727 b; 729; 731; 732; 735 c; 772 b
 Wendland, P., **710 b**
 Wilamowitz, **399 a, c**; sub **706 c; 726 a**
 n. 1; **738**

 Xanthippe **700 d**
 Xenocrates **398**, n. 3; **404**, n. 2; **409**;
 737; 739 b; 748; 749 d; 751-770;
 771 c

 Zarathustra **424 a**
 Zeller, E., **396**, p. 3 n. 2; **401 a**, p. 7 n. 4;
 483 a, n. 3; **739 a; 792 c**
 Zeno of Citium, **695 a**; sub **772 a**
 Zeno of Elea **758 c**
 Zeuthen **788 b**

II—SUBJECTS

Abaris
 the — of Heracl. Pont., **782**
 abortion **627 b**
 abstraction
 See ἀφαίρεσις
 Academy **398** n. 3, 4; **403; 404; 405**
 n. 2; **413; 415; 419; 424 a; 430**;
 434; 532; 594; 737-804. Index
 Acad. cited sub **737**
 Organization, **738**;
 agreement with Stoicism and the
 Peripatetic School, **715**;
 difference from Stoicism, **766**
 accent
 (a kind of sophism) **468 b**
 accidens
 (a kind of sophism) **468 c**
 See further συμβεβηκός
 act (actuality)
 and potency, **479 c; 548-556**
 action
 only complete when the end is pre-
 sent in it, **552**;
 always aims at some good, **566**, p. 135;
 See further πράξις and ἐνέργεια (ac-
 tivity)
 activity **552; 566**, the beginning
 actuality, see act
 aether **430; 431**
 aetheric body **774**
 amphiboly **468 b**
 analogia
 attributionis and proportionalitatis,

566, p. 140 f., n. 6
Analytics
 See Ἀναλυτικά
 angels **431 a**
 See also δαίμων
 anima sub **648 a; 690 a; 722 a**
 (unitatem —)
 See further: soul and ψυχή; also νοῦς
 Aristotle's *De anima*, **633-653**
 animus **651 a**, n. 1; **690 a**
 See further: soul, ψυχή, and νοῦς
 apodeictic **443 b; 445 a, b**
 a priori
 in Ar.'s theory of knowledge **465**
 p. 64;
 rejected by Strato, **723**
 art
 opposed to nature, **481**;
 — imitates nature, **490 a**
 artefacta
 Ideas of —, **527** n. 5
 assertoric **443 b; 448**
 Assos **398**, n. 4; **402** (first group), **403**;
 404; 413; 416 a, n. 1; **427**
 astronomy
 position of —, **488**;
 — of Aristotle, **517**
 — a necessary propaedeusis for
 philosophy, **752 b**
 — of Heracl. Pont., **776-779**;
 — of Eudoxus, **787**
 moral purpose of — in the *Epinomis*,
 791 a

atheism

- Ar. on —, **428 b**;
- Theophrastus, **679 b**

autarkia

- See *αὐτάρχεια*

Barbara **449 b**

beatus

- a vita, **686 a**
- See further *εὐδαίμων* and *εὐδαιμονία*

becoming

- Ar.'s theory of —, **476-480**

being

- See *ὄν*, and *εἶναι*
- Eternal b., see *ἀίδια*;
- well-being, see *εὐδαιμονία*

biological research

- with Aristotle, **398**, n. 4; **405**; **413**

biological works **469**; **500-501**

body

- relation with the soul in the *ExotERICA*, **413**; **417 c**; **422 b**; **423**;
- in the *De anima*, **633 d-637**; **651 a**;
- cp. **653**;
- with Xenocr., **761 a**;
- with Heracl. Pont., **774 b**; **775 c**

bonum

- , finis —orum, see *ἀγαθόν*

botany **405**; **668**

- See also *φυτόν*

Camestres **450 a**

Categories

- authenticity of the —, **402** (third group I 1) n. 1; **416 a**; **438 a**;
- date **413**;
- doctrine of the —, **416 sub c**; **435 c**; **436-439**;
- The ten categories, **437 b**;
- With Xenocr., **755**

causa

- non c. pro c., **468 c**

cause

- See *αἰτία* and *διότι*
- the four causes, **492-495**

Celarent **449 b**

celestial bodies

- having a soul, **430**; **431**
- See further *ἀστέρες* and *ἄστροα*
- celestial spheres **408**; **430**; **517-518**
- Chalcis **398**

character

- forming of the — by actions, **567-570**;

- by the influence of music, **632 d**;
- cp. **781**;

- the — of man of different ages, **659**;
- description of types of —, **687** (Theophrastus); **731-732** (Aristo of Ceos)

- See also *ἦθος*

choice **576-578**

circumstances

- value of outward —, **686 a**; **749 b**;
- 765-767**; **796**;

- See also **802 b**

comedy **663 a**

compositum

- (form and matter) **484**; cf. **406**,
- the end;

- See further *σύνθετον*, *σύνθεσις* and *σύνολον*

conclusion

- See *συμπέρασμα*

composition **468 b**

consequens

- (a kind of sophism) **468 c**

contemplatio **680 b**contemplation **464**

- See further *βίος θεωρητικός* s.v. *βίος*

contingent

- τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον* **443 b**;
- no knowledge of the c., **457**;
- in nature, sub **505 b**;
- things, **559 a**, with n. 2

- contracts, Ar., *Rhet.* I 15, **658 b**

contradiction

- See *principium contradictionis*

contradictories **443 c**

- See also *principium contradictionis*

contraries **443 c**

conversion

- of terms, **448**;
- of propositions, **672**

Copernican system **777**, **779**Corpus Aristotelicum **402**

courage

- See *ἀνδρεία*

creation { sub **516 a**

- Creator {
- See also: the interpretation of Plato's *Timaeus*, s.v. *Timaeus*

curve

Eudoxus' — for doubling the cube, **788 c**

Daemonology, daemons **431 a**; **762**; **790**; **792 c**

See also δαίμων

Darapti **451 a**

Darii **449 c**

death **417 a, c**; **422 b**

definition **464**; **541**; **542**

Impossibility of —, **741 b**

See also ὁρισμός and ὅρος

Delphi **398**, p. 4 n. 1 (decree of the Delphians); **727 b**

deus

Strato deo immunitatem magni muneris dat, **717 a**

See further θεός

development

of mankind, **695**;

the Good results from a process of —, **743 a**

dialectical

(proposition or syllogism) **445 a, b**

dictum

a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, **468 c**

divination

See μαντική

division

(a kind of sophism) **468 b**

— of philosophy, see philosophy

dreams **405**, n. 4; **415**

Demiurge **427**

Earth

spherical form of the —, **698 a**;

its circumference, **698 b**;

rotation, **772 b**; **777**;

the — a god, **775 b**

surrounded with mist, **776 c**

eclipse **463 b**; **464**

education **568-569** (exercise of moral virtue);

settled by law, **628**;

in general, **629**;

value of music for —, **630**; **632**;

value of gymnastics and athletics, **631**

Eleatics **472**; **479**

empirical method

with Aristotle, **405**; **406**; **413**;

with Theophr. **669**; **670-671**

epic poetry **663 b**

Epinomis

[Plato's], **431 b, c**; **789 b**; **790-792**

equity **589**; **658 a**;

See also ἐπιείκεια and ἐπιεικής

equivocation **468 b**; **566**, p. 140, n. 6

essence **437 b-439**;

= Form, **497**;

See also οὐσία and τί ἦν εἶναι

Ethica

See ethics

ethics

three works in the Corpus Arist. on

—, **402**, p. 9, sub VI;

date, **403**; **404**; **409**; **413**; **414**;

object, **432 a**;

testimonia, **561-563**;

difference in character, **564**;

modern judgment, **565**

Ethica Eudemia

character and authenticity, **464**;

465 a

Ethica Nicomachea

compared with the *Ethic. Eud.*,

464; **465 a**;

Books I-III 5, **566-580**;

Books III 5-X, **581-607**

Magna Moralia

date and authenticity, **565 b**

On the starting point of Ar.'s ethics,

see **566**, p. 135 n. 1;

on the application of his formal view, sub **581 b**

Speusippus' works on —, **749**;

Xenocrates, **765-768**;

Heracl. Pont., **773 b**;

Eudoxus, **786**;

Polemo, **794-796**;

Crantor **801-804**

See also **731-732** (Aristo of Ceos)

Eudemus

Aristotle's *Eudemus* **415-418**

evil

no — among the ἀθδία, **556 c**;

— overcome by the good, **792 b**

evolution **743**

exclusum tertium

See *principium exclusi tertii*

exhaustion

method of —, **788 b**

experimental method

See empirical method.

exposure of infants, **627 b**

Facts

See τὸ ὄν

fallacies **467-468**

family

the germ-cell of the state, **608 a, b**

Fate

= Nature (Theophr.), **680 a**

See εἰμαρμένη. Also τύχη

Ferio **449 c**

figura dictionis

(a kind of sophism) **468 b**

figure

—s of the syllogism, see *syllogism*

finality in nature

See teleology

form

See εἶδος and μορφή

friendship **600-604**

funera

— um sepulcrorumque magnificen-
tia, **706 c**

Genera

See γένος

Dividing into — and species, **740 a, b**

quintum genus (aether), **431 d**

geometry **488**

a necessary propaedeusis for philo-
sophy, **752 b**

Eudoxus' inventions in —, **788**

the name, **791 a**

God(s)

proofs of the existence of —, **426-430;**

God and nature, **502**

See also Prime Mover and θεός

Good, the,

See Ἄγαθόν

gradus

argumentum ex gradibus, **429 a**

greatness of soul

See μεγαλοψυχία

Happiness

See εὐδαιμονία

hierarchy of being

with Speusippus, **746**

— Xenocrates, **757**

As to Aristotle, see **432 b-d** and **524**

history,

research on the field of —, **398**, p. 4
n. 1; **405;**

h. of the sciences, **407;**

h. of phil. **407;** **668;**

repetition in h., **424 b;**

— inferior to poetry, **666**

homonymity

three kinds of —, **566**, p. 140 f.,
with n. 6

Ideas

theory of — criticized, **404;** **413;**
425 b; **525-532;**

accepted by Ar., **417 b;** **421 a, b;**
425;

abandoned, **427;**

Pl.'s ideal numbers and Ar.'s un-
moved Movers, **518;**

rejected by Speusippus, **745;**

identified with mathematical num-
bers by Xenocr., **757;**

considered as immanent in things
by Eudoxus, **785;**

See also εἶδος and ἰδέα.

ignoratio elenchi **468 c**

Iliad **665 b**

imitation **660-664**

inconstantia

Theophrasti —, **679 a**

induction **455;** **463**

infants

exposure of —, **627 b**

education of —, **628**

[intentionalism]

in ethics, **768**

intellectus agens (= νοῦς) **412;** **413;**
418 a-d; (mens) **430;** of the same

substance as the celestial bodies,
431 d;

function of the —, **465;**

in *De An.* III, **652-653**

See further νοῦς

interpretatio

de —ne, see π. ἐρμηνείας, s.v. ἐρμηνεία

interrogatio

facere ex pluribus interrogationibus
unam, **468 c**

Justice

See δικαιοσύνη

Knowledge

pre-existing —, **456;**

- conditions of k., **457**;
 — and sense-perception, **463**; **465**
 With Theophr. **669-671**;
 — Strato **723**, **724**
 See further *ἐπιστήμη*
 kosmos
 See *κόσμος*
- Laws**
 Plato's L., **403**; **431 b, c**; **485**;
498 a; **566**, p. 136 n. 1; **789 b**;
 law of contradiction etc., see *principium contradictionis* and *exclusionis tertii*
 See further *legislation*, and νόμος
 lawgiver **784**
 See also **706** (νομοθέτης)
 lectures,
 Aristotle's —, **400**
 legislation
 presupposes responsibility, **579 b**;
 of Demetrius of Phaleron, **706 c**;
 of Eudoxus, **784 a**
 Lesbos **398** n. 4; **405** n. 2; **413**
 library,
 Aristotle's —, **401**
 life
 and death, **417 a, c**; **422 b**;
 three main types of —, see βίος;
 a phenomenology of human —, **659**
 logic
 place of — in Ar.'s system, **432-434**
 See further: *logical treatises*;
 — of Theophrastus, **672-675**;
 — of Strato, **716**
 logical treatises
 titles, **402** (third group I);
 date, **403**, **413**;
 interrelation, **435**;
 the *Categories*, **436-439**;
De interpr., **440-442**;
Analyt. pr. and *post.*, **443-465**;
Topica, see s.v. *Topica*;
P. Soph. El., **467-468**
 also under the Greek titles
 Lyceum **400**; **405**; **409**; **437 b**, with
 n. 1
 Lyco
 the "L." of Aristo of Ceos, **733**
Magna Moralia **561**; **565 b**; **736**
 See also *Ethics*
- major
 See μέζων
 man
 See ἄνθρωπος
 the young —, **659 a**;
 elderly men, **659 b**;
 men in their prime, **659 c**
 marriage **627 a**, **686 b**
 Mars
 rotation of —, **778**
materia prima **496**
 mathematics
 history of —, **407**;
 object of —, **432 a, b**; **487 b, c**;
 applied m., **488**;
 See also geometry and γεωμετρία
 matter
 See ὕλη and ὑποκείμενον
 mean
 See μέσον and μεσότης
 means
 τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη **577 b**
 medicine
 history of —, **407**;
 studies of — in the Lyceum, **407**
 Mercury
 rotation of —, **778**
 metaphysics
 the name, **402**, p. 9, sub V;
 the work, *ib.*; **403**; **404**;
 — as opposed to empirical research
406; **409** sub 3;
 chronology of the M., **409**; **411**;
413; **414**;
 object of m. **432 a-d**; **519-524**
 opposed to physics, **491**; cp. **523 a**;
524
Metaphysics,
 Aristotle's M., **519-560**;
 — of Theophrastus, **676-680**
Meteorology
 See Μετεωρολογικά
 middle term
 (in a syllogism)
 See μέσον.
 mind
 See διάνοια and νοῦς
 minor
 See ἐλάττων
 modality
 of propositions, **443 b**
 logic of — in Theophrastus, **672 b**; **674**

molecular theory **763**

monotheism **518**

monstrosities **496 b**

mood

—s of the syllogism, see *syllogism*

motion, movement

eternal m. **430**;

nature a principle of —, **469**; **481**;

— of the heavenly bodies, **517**;

defined by Ar., **506**;

correction of Theophr., **681**;

defined by Strato, **720**

See also *κίνησις*

Mover

See Prime —

and Unmoved —s

music,

in education, **630**; **632**

musica **704 a, b**

musicology **704**; **781**

See also *μουσική*

mysticism

of Heraclides Ponticus, **783 b**

Nature

Ar.'s phil. of nature, **469-513**;

— a principle of motion, **469**; **481**;

two aspects, **483-484**; **489-490**

as an intelligent artist, **406**; **427**;

498-502;

Theophrastus' view of —, **678**;

679; **680 a**

Nile

rising of the —, **405**

nomen

See *ὄνομα*

noûs

See *intellectus agens* and *νοῦς*

Numbers

doctrine of ideal N. criticized:

425 a; **518**;

See further *ἀριθμός*

nuptiae

Theophr.' book *de nuptiis*, **686 b**

Odyssey **665 b**

organisms

forming of —, **498**

Organum

See logical treatises

organum hydraulicum **722 a**

Orphic poems **424 b**

outward goods

value of —, see circumstances

Particular

See *μέρος*; *ἐν μέρει*

knowledge of —s impossible, **463 a**

perfect

(of a syllogism) see *τέλειος*

Peripatetic School

as opposed to the Academy, **406**;

the *Magna Moralia* a work of the —

565 b; its members, **667-735**

petitio principii **452 d**; **454**; **468 c**

phantasma

See *φάντασμα*

Philebus

Plato's —, **594 a**; **786 b**

philological studies

foundation of —, **398**, p. 4 n. 1

philosophy

history of —, **407**; **668**;

speculative ph. opposed to empirical

science, **406**; **413**;

cultivated for its own sake, **419 b**;

defined as *κτῆσις τε καὶ χρῆσις σοφίας*,

420 b;

— of religion, **426**;

first ph. **432 a-d**;

division of ph. **432-433**;

concerned with the first causes, **519**,

p. 104 ff.;

has no practical use, **519**, p. 105 f.;

the most divine science, **519**, p. 105 f.;

the science of being as such, **521**;

concerned with substances, **522**;

with axioms and first principles, **523**;

with the *οὐσία ἀκίνητος*, **524**

Division of — with Xenocr., **753 a**;

practical purpose of —, **753 b**

See also *φιλοσοφία* and *σοφία*

physical bodies

See *φυσικά*, s.v. *φυσικός*

physics

object of physics **432 a, b**; **487 b**;

border-line between — and meta-

physics, **491**;

ph. not the highest wisdom **523 a**

See also **524**

with Theophr., **681-682**;

with Strato, **717-721**;

with Xenocr., **763**;

— Heracl. Pont., **780**

Physics

- date, **403; 404; 413;**
- introduction, **469;**
- Phys. I*, **470-480;**
- *II*, **481-505;**
- *III-IV*, **506-512;**
- *VIII*, **408, 513**

phrase

- See λόγος

planets

- eternal motion of the —, **517 a;**
- the — gods, **775 b**

plants

- See φυτόν
- classification of —, **671 a, b; 740 b**

pleasure

- See ἡδονή

poetics, poetry **660-666**

- general definition, **660;**
- means and objects, **661;**
- origin, **662;**
- comedy and epic poetry, **663;**
- tragedy **664-665;**
- more philosophical than history, **666**

political reforms **398, n.3**

politics

- the object of —, **566, p. 135 f.;**
- method, see *practical sciences* s.v. *science*
- See further *state*
- Dicaearchus a great writer on —, **696;**
- Demetrius of Phaleron combined phil. with —, **711**

Politics **402** (third group VII 1);

- date, **403, 404; 409; 413;**
- Pol. I*, **608-612;**
- *II*, **613;**
- *III*, **614-620;**
- *IV*, **621-625;**
- *VII-VIII*, **626-632**

polytheism **518**

- See also **792 c**

potency

- and actuality, **479 c**
- See further δύναμις

practical sciences

- See *science*

premiss

- See πρότασις
- knowledge of the first —es, **455 b;**
- cp. **465**

Prime Mover **408; 410; 411; 427; 430;** in *Phys. VIII*, **513;** in *Metaph. A* 7-10, **514-518;**

the — is first actuality, **555 b**

Theophr. opposes Ar.'s theory of the —, **676 b**

principium contradictionis **443 c; 444 a, b; 461; 523 b**

principium exclusi tertii **444 c; 461**

Problemata **402** (Third group IV)

problematic **443 b**

procreation **627 a**

proof **445; 449 a**

proportion

geometrical, **587;**

arithmetical, **588;**

Eudoxus' theory of —, **788 a**

analogia proportionalitatis, **566, p. 140 n. 6**

proposition

See λόγος (ἀποφαντικός) and ἀπόφανσις

Division of —s, **443 a, b;**

relation between —s, **443 c**

conversion of —s, **672 a, b**

protreptic literature

See Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, and

Aristo of Ceos: **731, the end**

[providence] sub **427, 2; 502;** sub **516 a,** with n. 5

providentia

denied by Strato, **717 b**

psychology

Aristotle's —, **413**

In the *Eudemus*, **416-418;**

— — *Protr.*, **418 b; 422 b, c; 423b;**

— *Metaph. A*, **418 c;**

— *Ethica Nic. X*, **418 d;**

— the *De Anima*, **633-653;**

practical — in the *Rhetoric*, **659**

Pythionikai

list of the —, **398, p. 4, n. 1**

Quality

of propositions, **443 a**

the category of —, see ποιόν

[quantity]

quantitative division of propositions, **443 a**

the category of —, see ποσόν

Reincarnation **775 c**

religion

philosophy of —, **426-430**

- repetition
 (in history) **424 b**
 replicatio
 replicatione quadam **430**, with n. 1
 responsibility
 conditions, **575-579**
 objections, **580**
 rhetoric
 Ar.'s *Art of Rh.*, **654-659**;
 cultivated by Lyco, **728**;
 rejected by Aristo of Cos, **734-735**
 Rome **401 a, b**
 rotation
 of the earth, **772 b**; **777**
 of Mercury and Mars, **778**

 Scep̄sis **401 a**
 science
 sc. and empirical research, **406**; **413**;
 history of sc., **407**;
 hierarchy of —s, **432 c**; **462**;
 tripartition of —, **487 b**; **524**;
 knowledge of the causes, **519**;
 practical —s less exact, **566**, p. 136
 See further ἐπιστήμη
 self-love
 basis for friendship, **602**; **603**
 senses,
 sense-perception, see αἰσθησις
sensus interior **648**
 sentence
 See λόγος
 slaves
 definition, **610 a**;
 whether by nature, **610 b, c**;
 can — have virtue? **611**
 sophismata **467**; **468**
 soul
 in Aristotle:
 relation with the body, **413**; **417 c**;
 422 b; **423**;
 no harmony, **416**;
 immortality of the —, **417**;
 relation to the nous, **418**;
 in the *De anima*, **633-653**;
 aporiai, **633**;
 subject of affections? **634**;
 unity of the —, **635**;
 definition, **636**;
 its implications, **637**;
 principle of life, **638**;
 various powers, **639**;

 the nutritive —, **640**;
 sense-perception, **641-647**;
 thinking, **648-653**
 With Dicaearchus, **690**; **691**; **692 a**;
 with Strato, **722**;
 thinking a movement of the —, **723**;
 the subject of perception, **724**;
 with Speusippus, **746-748**;
 with Xenocr., **759-761**;
 — penetrates the universe, **756 a**,
 762;
 with Heracl. Pont. **774-775**
 —s of the celestial bodies in the
 Epinomis, **792 a**;
 Creation of the — with Crantor,
 799 b
 space
 defined by Ar., **480**; **507**;
 this definition opposed by Theophr.,
 682
 spheres
 number of the celestial —, **517 c**;
 518
 stars
 the ἀστέριος οὐσία of the —, **517 a**;
 eternal motion of the —, **517 a, b**
 star gods **430**; **431**; cf. **517 a**
 state
 structure and aim, **608-612**
statua
 trecentas —s Demetrio Phalereo,
 707
 Stoa, stoicism
 agreement between the —, the
 Acad. and the Perip. School, sub
 715 a;
 difference, **765 c**; **766**
 Stoics **433**; **434**; **686 a**, n. 1; **762**
 subaltern **443 c**
 subcontraries **443 c**
 substance
 idea of — in Aristotle, **402**, p. 8, n. 1;
 in the *Categories*, **437 b-439**;
 in the *Metaph.*, **533-547**;
 soul a s. **416 a**;
 See further τί ἐστι, τί ἦν εἶναι, οὐσία,
 and τὸδε τι
 syllogism **435**, **443-465**
 apodeictical and dialectical, **445**;
 definition, **447 a**;
 perfect and imperfect, **447 b**;
 figures and moods of the s., **449-451**;

- rules, **452; 453**
 induction treated as a s., **455 b**
 scientific s., **458**;
 new moods added to the first figure
 by Theophr., **673**;
 modality in —s, **674**;
 hypothetical and disjunctive —s, **675**
- [*Tabula rasa*] (γραμματεῖον) **651 c**
 teleology
 principle of —, **423 a; 498-502**;
 accepted by Theophrastus, **678**;
 difficulties about —, **677**
- temperance
 See σωφροσύνη
- tessera logica **443 c**
- theology
 the term, **402**, (third group, sub V);
 history of th., **407**;
 object of th., **432 a, b; 524**;
 inconsistency in Ar.'s theology
 according to Cic., **430**;
 the same is said about Theophrastus,
 679 a;
 Theophr.' theology, **679 b; 680**;
 See also *Prime Mover* and *religion*
- theoretical thinking **432 a-c; 519**, p. 104 ff.;
- thinking
 See νοεῖν, **651**, and νοῦς
 In Theophrastus κρίσεις κ. θεωρίαι,
 684
- Timaeus*
 spirit of Plato's —, **428; 430; 431**
 a, d; **480; 485; 501; 529 b**, n. 6
 Xenocr.' interpretation of the —,
 764
 Crantor's commentary, **799, 800**
- time
 defined by Aristotle, **508-512**;
 by Strato, **721**
- Topica*
 Early date of the —, **413; 414**;
 435 a, b; 445 a, b; 464 c
- tragedy **664-665**
- truth
 defined, **557**;
 excluded from metaphysics, **558 a**;
 depends on combination, **558 b**;
 559 a (in composites);
 — in incomposites, **559 b, c**;
 both in composites and incompo-
 sites, **559 d**
- Unitas*
 animae, **722 a**
 universal see καθόλου
- universe
 eternity of the —, see κόσμος
 a teleological explanation of the —,
 see teleology
 a purely physical explanation of the
 —, **717**
- Unmoved Movers, **408; 410; 411; 430**;
517-518
- Veins
 — and arteries, **402**, p. 9, n. 2
- verbum
 See ῥῆμα
- vice
 See κακία and κακός, μοχθηρία and
 αἰσχροός
- virtue
 See ἀρετή
- virtus*
 See ἀρετή
- void
 the —, **719**
- voluntary
 and involuntary acts, **575 a-e**
- Wisdom
 = first phil., **519**;
 in the *Epinomis*, **790**
- witnesses
 Ar., *Rhet.* I 15, **658 b**

III—GREEK WORDS

- ἄγαθόν
 —ά as opposed to ἀναγκαῖα, **419 b**;
 good is what the φρόνιμος chooses
 for himself, **420 a**
- τὸ τέλος καὶ τᾶγαθόν, **498b; 519**,
 p. 105;
 in the *Eth. Eud.* **564**;
 in the *Eth. Nic.*, **566**, p. 135-143;

- Plato's — criticized, p. 139 ff.;
 ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι, p. 139 (1096 a 23 f.);
 distinction between primary and secondary goods, p. 140 f.;
 τὸ — not to be connected with τὸ ἓν (Speus.), **743 c**
finis bonorum ap. Cic. (= τὸ τέλος καὶ τἀγαθόν) **765 a**
 Also *summum bonum*, e.g., **766 a**
 Plato's lecture περὶ τἀγαθοῦ, **771 b**
 νικᾶν τὰ — ἅ τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα **792b**
- ἀγαθός
 in the *Epinomis*, **790**, the end
- ἄγαν
 πάντα — πράττουσιν οἱ νέοι, **659 a** (1389 b 4)
- ἀγένητον
 τὸν κοσμόν, **428b**; **764**; **800**
- ἄγνοεῖν, ἄγνοια
 παρὰ τὴν — ν ἐλέγχου (a kind of sophism) **468 c**
 the alternative to truth concerning ἀσύνθετα, **559b, d**
- ἄγραφος
 οἱ — οἱ νόμοι, **658 a** (1375 b 7)
- ἄδης
 περὶ τῶν καθ' — ἡν, a dialogue of Heracl. Pont., **773 b**
- ἄδικος
 three meanings of the term, **584**;
 παράνομος, **585**
- ἀδιόριστος **443 a**; **448**
- ἀδολεσχία **687 a**
- ἀέναιος **756b**
- ἀθανατίζειν **606b** (1177 b 33)
- ἄθεος **679b**
- ἀθεότης **428b**
- ἀθλητική
 — ἔξις, **631 a**
- ἄττιος **421 a**; **422 a**;
 — κίνησις } **517 a**;
 — φορά }
 — οὐσία **517 a**;
 ἄττια always actual, **555 c**;
 no evil among the ἄττια, **556 c**;
 περὶ τῶν —ων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται **577 a**;
 τὸ — ν ἄνω σῶμα (the fifth element), **642b**;
 — τὸν κόσμον, **800**
- αἰδῶς **572** (1108 a 32)
- αἰθέριος
 — ν σῶμα, **774b**
- αἰθήρ (*aether*) **430**; **431 a-d**; **776 b**
- αἰσθησις
 π. — εως κ. αἰσθητῶν, **402** (third group III 2);
 τὰ ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἰσθ., **458b**, sub 3;
 ἐπιστήμη and —, **463**;
 first stage of cognition, **465**; **519**;
 τὸ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν — ν γνωριμώτερον, **470**;
 in *De anima*, **638**; **639**; **641-647**; **648**
 differs from thinking, **649**
 ἡ — δίδωσιν ἀρχάς, **669 c**; cp. **670-671**;
 with Strato, **722 b**; **723**; **724**;
 with Speusippus, **742**;
 with Xenocr., **754**;
 νοσήσασι παρεῖη τις —, **802 a**
 αἰσθητήριον **645**; **648**; **722b**
- αἰσθητικόν,
 τὸ —, **639 a, b**
- αἰσθητός
 ὕλη — ἡ and νοητή, **541d**;
 οὐσία — ἡ (with Xenocr.), **754**
- αἰσυνμήτης **625** (1295 a 14)
- αἰσχρορός
 πράττειν τὰ — ἅ, **579 a**
- αἰτία, αἷτιον **457 a**, **458**;
 See also διότι
 τὸ αἷτιον **463b**;
 μὴ αἷτιον ὡς αἷτιον τιθέναι **468 c**;
 πρῶται — αι τῆς φύσεως, **469**; **470**;
 four kinds of αἷτιον, **493-495**;
 knowledge of the —, **519**, p. 103 ff.;
521; **522**;
 Plato's Ideas an —? **529 a**; **530**;
531; **532**
- ἀκίνητος, ἀκίνητα
 ἀκίνητα **432b, d**; **487b**
 ἀκίνητον (τὸ πρῶτον κινῶν) **517 a**;
 οὐσία ἀκίνητος, **524**
- ἀκμάζοντες
 οἱ —, **659 c**
- ἀκμή **659 c** (1390 b 10 ff.)
- ἀκρασία **594**
- ἀκριβές,
 τὸ —, different degree of — in different sciences, **566**, p. 136
- ἀκριβέσταται
 τῶν ἐπιστημῶν **462**; **488b**; **519**,
 p. 104; cp. **566**, p. 136

- ἀκριβέστεροι
οἱ — τῶν λόγων, **527**
- ἀκροατικά, **400**
- ἄκρος, τὰ — α (in a syllogism) **449b**;
450a; **451a**;
αἱ ἄκραι (διαθέσεις), in ethics, **573a**.
See also ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις. Also
τὰ ἄκρα, **574a**
- ἀλαζονεία **572** (1108 a 21)
- ἀλήθεια
object of contemplation, **419 b**, the
end
= τὸ ἀληθές (relation with being)
557-559;
as a virtue, **572** (1108 a 20)
- ἀληθής
— λόγος **440**;
— πρότασις **445b**;
ἐξ — ὧν **449a**; **458**;
ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς ἀεὶ —, **465**; cp.
559b, c
τὸ ἀληθές (relation with being),
557-559;
object of a virtue, **572** (1108 a 19)
- ἀμαρτάνειν **768**
- ἀμαρτήματα **422b**
τὸ γελοῖόν ἐστιν ἀμάρτημά τι, **663a**
- ἄμβλωσις **627b**
- ἀμέριστος
τὸ — ν, **760a**;
— οὐσία, **760c**
- ἄμεσα **458a**; **459**; **465**
- ἄμυγξ
νοῦς in the active sense is —, **652**
- ἀμφιβολία **468b**
- ἀναγκαῖον, ἀνάγκη
— α opposed to ἀγαθά, **419b**;
of a proposition, **443 b**;
of a syllogism, **447 b**;
ἐξ ἀνάγκης, **448**;
ἐπιστήμη καθόλου καὶ δι' — ὦν, **457b**;
τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης (in nature), **505**;
(τέχναι) πρὸς τὰναγκαῖα, **519**, p. 104
and 105;
ἄνευ τῶν — ὦν ἀδύνατον καὶ ζῆν καὶ εὖ
ζῆν, **610a**
- ἀναισθησία, ἀναισθητοί
572 (1107 b 8); **582b**
- ἀναλογία **566**, p. 140 (1096 b 28), with
n. 6
- ³Αναλυτικά **402** (third group I 3, 4);
435a; **443-465**;
- τὰ ἀναλυτικά (= logic) **433 a**
ἀνάπαισις
γίνεται ἔνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας, **605b**;
παιδιὰ χάριν — εως, **632c**
- ἀναπνεῖν
τὸ —, **643b**; **645**
- ἀναπνοή,
Π. —ς, **402** (third group III 2)
ἡ —, **643b**
- ⁴Ανατομαί **407**
- ἀνδρεία **572** (the beginning); **581**
- ἀνείλιξις, ap. Pl., *Polit.* 270 d, **430**, n. 1
- ἀνθρώπινος
the possession of wisdom (= phil.)
οὐκ — η, **519**, p. 105 (982 b 28 ff.);
cp. **606b** (1177 b 26 ff.).
- ἄνθρωπος
ὁ τρίτος —, **527**;
πολιτικός, **604** (1169 b 18);
πολιτικὸν ζῶον, **609b**;
λόγον μόνον ἔχει, **609b**;
man alone knows moral principles,
ib.;
π. — ὦν φθορᾶς, **693**
- ἀντιστρέφειν **448**
- ἀντιστροφή **453a**
- ἀντίφασις **445a, b**
- ἀνωμαλία
ἡ περὶ τὸν ἥλιον etc., **779**
- ἀόριστα **421b**;
ἐξ — ὦν ἀτελῶν ἀεὶ τὰ τελειότερα, **743b**
- ἄξιώματα **460b**; **461**; **523a**
- ἀπάθεια **802a**; cp. **802b**
- ἀπαθής
the νοῦς is —, **634 b**;
not in every sense, **651 b, c**;
the active νοῦς is —, **652**
- ἀπάτη, ἀπατηθῆναι
— οὐκ ἔστι περὶ τὰς μὴ συνθετάς οὐ-
σίας, **559b, d**; **641**;
τὸ ἡπατῆσθαι, **649a**
- ἀπειράκις **424b**
- ἄπειρον **472a**
— α, **421b**
- ἀπλῶς
— ἡ μὴ — (a kind of sophism) **468c**;
becoming — and becoming τότε τι,
476a;
οὐδὲν — ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, **479b**
- ἀποδεικτικός
— ἡ πρότασις } **445**; **448**
— συλλογισμός }

ἀπόδειξις

449 a; 452 a; 453 b;
ἐκ πιστοτέρων καὶ προτέρων, **454;**
conditions, **458; 463; 464;**
ἀρχὴ — εὖς οὐκ ἄ., **465;**
no — about particulars, **545 a**

ἀπόθεσις

τῶν γιγνομένων, **627 b**

ἀποκρότημα **566**, p. 138, n. 2

ἀπολαυστικὸς,

βίος —, **566**, p. 138 (1095 b 16-22)

Ἀπορήματα Ὀμηρικά, **398** p. 4, n. 1

ἀπορίαι

in metaphysics, **520**

ἀπόφανσις **440; 442 a-c**

ἀπόφασις **440; 442 a-c; 445 b**

ἀποφατικὸς **448**

ἀραχναί **499 d**

ἀρετή,

hymn to 'A., **399 c;**

Π. ἀρετῶν κ. κακιῶν, **402** (third group, sub VI);

ἀρετὴ in the πολιτικὸς βίος, **566**, p. 138 (1095 b 26 ff.);

διανοητικὴ and ἡθικὴ —, **567 a, b;**
origin of ἡθικὴ —, **568;**

how it can be tested, **569;**

difficulties in this theory, **570;**

virtue defined, **571;**

table of moral virtues, **572;**

practical rules, **574;**

responsibility, **575-579;**

choice, **576-578;**

objections to this theory, **580;**

special virtues, **581-604;**

the intellectual virtues, **590-593;**

αἱ κατ' — ν πράξεις τῶν δι' αὐτὰ αἰρε-
τῶν, **605 a;**

εὐδαίμων βίος κατ' — ν, **605 c;**

moral virtue ranged as second, **606 c;**

relation of — to εὐδαιμονία, **749 b-d;**
765-767; 796; 801;

interior character of —, **768;**

διατιθέναι πρὸς πλείους — ἄς, **781;**
in the *Epinomis*, **790; 791 a**

ἀριθμητικὴ **519**, p. 104

ἀριθμὸς **425 a; 510 a, b; 511 c; 512;**

the Ideas — οἱ? **531;**

— belongs to the sensibilia com-
munia, **641;**

— εἰδητικὸς and μαθηματικὸς, **745 a,**
b, c; 746 a; 756; 760;

ψυχὴ — ἑαυτὸν κινῶν, **759; 760;**

in the *Epinomis*, **790**

ἀριστοκρατία **617; 623 a, b**

ἄριστον

τὸ — ἐν τῇ φύσει πάση, **519**, p. 105

See also ἀγαθόν

τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ — μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι
743 a

ἄρρην

the supreme Principle called — by
Xenocr., **756 a**

ἀρχαῖοι

οἱ —, **479 a**

ἀρχή **429 b;**

τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτεῖται, **452 d; 454;**

definition of ἄ. in logic, **460 a;**

special — αἱ, **460 b;**

apprehension of — αἱ, **465;**

παρὰ τὸ ἐν — ἢ λαμβάνειν (a kind
of sophism) **468 c;**

αἱ πρῶται — αἱ, **470;**

one — or many? **471-472;**

how many? **473-475;**

the three — αἱ, **476-478;**

this theory compared with preceding
theories, **479-480**

Of the Prime Mover, **515 b; 517 a;**

phil. the science of — αἱ and αἰτίαι,

519, p. 104 (982 a 1); **521; 522;**

523 b (βεβαιωτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν);

λόγοι ἀπὸ τῶν — ὦν and ἐπὶ τὰς — ἄς,
566, p. 137, with n. 3;

μία — (with Theophr.) **676 a;**

Strato's doctrine of — αἱ, **718;**

Speusippus, **743-747;**

Xenocrates, **756-757**

ἀρχή (office), **585** (1130 a 1 f.)

ἀρχων **616 b, c**

ἀστρονομία

See astronomy

the term in the *Epinomis*, **791 a**

ἀστέρες

(θεοί), **762;** cp. **775 b**

ἐκάστων τῶν — ὦν κόσμον ὑπάρχων,
776 b

ἄστρα

θεῖον γένος, **792 a, c**

ἀσώματος

τὸ — ν, **761 a**

ἀτελής

(of syllogisms) **453 a**

ἄτομοι **780 a, b**

ἄτοπα

object of philosophical amazement,
519, p. 105 (982 b 13 f.)

αὐθάδης **732a**

αὐθέκαστος **732b**

αὐτά

αὐτά τὰ πρῶτα }
αὐτά τὰ ἀκριβῆ } (the Ideas) **421 a**

αὐτά

See δι' αὐτά and δι' αὐτήν

αὐτάρκεια

of εὐδαιμονία, **566**, p. 142 (1097 b 6-21);

of theoretical life, **606 b** (1177 a 27 ff.); **607 a**;

— τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον, **609 a**

Ar. protests against the idea of —
of the individual, **731** (introd.
remark)

αὐταρκές

τὸ —, defined in **566**, p. 142 (1097 b 15)

αὐτοέκαστον **566**, p. 140 (1096 a 35);

αὐτόματον **499 a**; **503-504**; **717 c**

αὐτοζών

τὸ — τῆς ψυχῆς, **760 b**

ἀφαίρεσις

τὰ ἔξ —εως, **463 a**, with n. 1, p. 60;
465, p. 64 sub III;

cf. **487**, sub b; **488 a**

ἀφή **582 a**; **639 a, b**; **641**; **646**

ἀφθαρσία

τοῦ κόσμου, **428 b**

ἀφθαρτος

ὁ κόσμος, **428 b**; **764**

Βάναυσος

a — βίος not suitable for citizens,
626 b (1328 b 39);

τὸ —ν οὐ μετέχει τῆς πόλεως, **626 b**
(1329 a 20);

—ν ἔργον defined, **629 b**

βαρύτης

of the atoms, **718 a**

βασίλεια **617**; **620**

βήξ **643 b**

βία, βίαιος, **575 a, b**

βίος

three βίοι, **566**, p. 137 f. (*Eth. Nic.*
1095 b 15 - 1096 a 10);

βίος θεωρητικός, **419**; **566**, p. 138
(1096 a 4-5);

εὐδαίμων β., **605 c**;

superiority of the β. θεωρητικός,
606-607;

ὁ — πράξις, οὐ ποίησις, **610 a** (1254
a 7);

βάνυσος κ. ἀγοραῖος —, **626 b** (1328
a 39);

The — θεωρητικός with Theophras-
tus, **680 b**;

Opposed by Dicaearchus, **694**;

— Ἑλλάδος, **695**;

— πυθαγορικός, **700 a**

τὸν —ν τιμωρίαν εἶναι, **804**; cp.
417 a and **422 b**

βουλή, βουλευέσθαι **577**

βούλησις

αἱ —εις ἄδελφοι, **607 a**;

a psychic power, **639 a**

βροντή

definition of — **464 b**

βωμός φιλίας, **399 a**

Γαλαξίας **775 a**

γαμικὴ ὁμιλία **627 a**

γελοῖος

τὸ —ν τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστὶ μῦριον, **663 a**

γένεσις

II. —σεως κ. φθορᾶς, **402** (third
group, II 3);

Ar.'s theory of becoming, **476-480**;

II. ζῶων γ. see ζῶα;

γ. and φθορά, **498e**; **545 a**;

τοῦ τέλους ἔνεκα ἢ —, **554 d**

γένος

in logic, **438 a**; **464 c**; **535 a**

χρυσοῦν —, **695 b**

γεῦσις **582 a**; **643 b**

γεωμετρία

a necessary propaedeutis for philo-
sophy, **752 b**;

σφόδρα γελοῖον ὄνομα, **791 a** (*Epin.*
990 d 2)

γεωργοί **626 b** (1329 a 35 ff.)

γῆ see earth

γίγνεσθαι **476**

γνώριμος

γνωριμώτερα **458**; **470**; **519**; **566**

γνώσις **456 a**; **465**

γραμματεῖον

the nou̓s a tabula rasa **651 c**

γραμμὴ

instance of special ἀρχαί, **460 b**;

- αι καὶ ἐπίπεδα, **757 a, b** ;
 — ἄτομος, **758** ;
 διὰ καμπύλων — ὦν (Eudoxus' curve),
788 c
 γραφική **664 b**
- Δαίμων
 —ες, **762** ;
 — ἐκάστου ἡ ψυχῇ, **767 b**
 —ες καὶ θεοί, in the *Epinomis*, **790** ;
792 c
 See also **431 a** (angels)
- δημοκρατία
 in a classification of πολιτεῖαι, **617-618** ;
 justice in a —, **619 a** ;
 true democracy, **621 a** ;
 its perversion, **621 b** ;
 — restored by Demetrius of Phaleron, **706 b**
- διαγωγή
 ἡ ἐν τῷ τεθνάναι —, **417 a**
- διαίρεσις **468 b** ; **741 b** ; cp. **740** ; **741 a**
 (διαίρεισθαι)
- διαλεκτικός
 — ἡ πραγματεία, **434** ;
 — ἡ πρότασις } **445** ; **449 a** ;
 — συλλογισμός }
 ἡ — ἡ counterpart of rhetoric,
654 a ; both are ἀντιλογικαί, **655 b**
- διανοητικόν
 τὸ —, a power of the soul, **639 a**
- διάνοια
 general term for intellectual activity,
432 a ;
 a function of the soul, **639 b** ;
 in tragedy, **664 b** ;
 with Strato, **722 b** ;
 cp. ἐνέργειαι τῆς ψυχῆς, **723** ;
 Περὶ τ. —ν, a work of Xenocr., sub
751 c
- δι' αὐτά
 τιμὴν κ. ἡδονὴν κ. νοῦν κ. πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν
 αἰρούμεθα —, **566**, p. 142 (1097 b) ;
 cp. **570 a**, p. 146 (1105 a 32), προ-
 αἰρούμενος δι' αὐτά
 — αἰρετά (τὰ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα) **605 a**
- δι' αὐτήν
 τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀεὶ αἰρούμεθα —,
566, p. 142 (1097 b) ;
 — ἀγαπᾶσθαι (δοκεῖ ἡ θεωρητικὴ δια-
 γωγή), **606 b** (1177 b 1) ;
- also in **419 b** (the *Protr.*), l. 5 (δι' αὐτά) and l. 19, δι' αὐτήν ;
 cp. **519**, p. 105 (982 b 28), phil.
 alone is αὐτῆς ἔνεκεν
 Also καθ' αὐτήν, **605 a**
- διαφανές
 φῶς ἐστὶ τι —, **642 b**
- διαφορά
 part of the definition **464 c** ;
 ἡ τελευταία δ. ἡ οὐσία τοῦ πράγματος,
542 ;
 knowledge of the —αὶ presupposed
 in διαίρεσις, **741 a** ;
 in defining, **741 b**
- διδασκαλία
 πᾶσα δ. ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γνώσεως,
456 a
- διδάσκειν
 σημεῖον τοῦ εἰδότος τὸ δύνασθαι δ.,
519, p. 103
- δίκαιον
 τό τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικόν,
619 a, b
 See further δικαιοσύνη
- δικαιοσύνη **584—589**
 See also δίκαιον
- διότι
 τὸ —, **457 a** ; **462** ; **519**, p. 103 ; **566**,
 p. 137 (1095 b 7)
- δόξα
 opposed to ἐπιστήμη, **457 b** ;
 with Xenocr., **754**, l. 7
- δουλεία see δοῦλος
- δοῦλος
 κτῆμά τι ἐμψυχον, **610 a** ;
 πότερον φύσει τοιοῦτος, **610 b, c** ;
 πότερον ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τις —ου, **611**
- δυάς
 (ἄδριςτος) = τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρόν, **744** ;
 Xenocr. called the — god, **756 a** ;
 — ἄδριςτος, in Plato's lecture II.
 τάχαθού, **771 b**
- δυναμῖς
 and ἐνέργεια, **479 c** ;
 δ. defined and explained, **548-550** ;
 δυνάμει, **484** ; **548 c** ; **553** ;
 most οὐσίαι are δυνάμεις, **546 a** ;
 δ. subsequent to "energy", **554** ;
 good and bad δ., **556** ;
 ἡ ὕλη —, **636**
- δυναστεία
 a perverted kind of oligarchy, **622**
 (1292 b 10)

δύνατον

(of a proposition) **443 b; 451 a**

Ἐγκράτεια **594**

ἔθος

ἡ ἥθικη (ἀρετή) ἐξ —ους περιγίγνεται,
567 a

εἶδος

soul an —, **416 c;**

τῶν εἰδῶν δεκτική, **418 a;**

in Ar.'s theory of becoming, **476;**
477; 483 b, c; 489; 491;

formal cause, **493-495;**

= the essence, **497; cf. 406,** the end
(ὅλη οὐσία);

εἶδη (Platonic Ideas) **526-532;**

not substances **544;**

ἡ ψυχὴ τόπος —ῶν, **651 a;**

οὐκ ἐντελεχεῖα ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ —η, *ib.*;
τὰ —η καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί, **757; 760**

εἰ ἔστι **457 a; 464**

εἰκῶν

enjoyment of man in seeing —ας,
even of unpleasant things, **662 a**

εἰμαρμένη **680 a**

Περὶ —s, a work of Xenocr., sub
751 c

εἶναι

βέλτιον τοῦ μὴ —, **498 c, d;**

= συγκεῖσθαι καὶ ἐν εἶναι, **559 a;**

— in asyntheta, **559 b, c;**

both in syntheta and asyntheta,
559 d

See also ὄν

εἰρωνεία **572** (1108 a 22)

ἕκαστος

τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα opposite to τὰ καθόλου,
458 b sub 3; **470;**

τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα οὔτε ὀρισμὸς οὔτε
ἀπόδειξις, **545 a**

ἐκθλιψις

(of the atoms) **718 a**

ἐκούσιον

and ἀκούσιον, **575 a-e**

ἐλαττον, ἐλάττων

τὸ ἔ. ἄκρον } **449 b; 450 a; 451 a;**
πρότασις ἔ. }

ἐπιστήμη ἐξ ἐλαττόνων, **462; 488 b;**
519, p. 104

ἐλεγχος,

π. σοφ. ἐλ., **402** (Third group, I 6);
435 a; 467-468

Definition of ἐ., **467 b;**

two groups, **468**

ἔλεος

in the definition of tragedy, **664 a**

ἐλευθεριότης **572** (1107 b 9-10)

ἐλεύθερος

Tyranny not acceptable for the —,
625 (the end);

—α ἔργα, **629 b**

ἐλπὶς

in the life of young men, **659 a**
(1389 a 21 ff.)

ἐμπειρία

third stage of cognition, **465; 519**

ἐμψυχον **695 b,** l. 6; **748** (τῆς ἐμψύχου
ἕξεως);

δοῦλος κτῆμά τι —, **610 a;**

— characterized by life, **638 a**

ἐν,

τὸ — πολλαχῶς λέγεται, **472 a;**

τὸ — καὶ τὸ ὄν, **520,** p. 107 (996a 5);

τὸ — ἐπὶ πολλῶν (argument for
Plato's Ideas) **527;**

τὸ — not a substance, **546 b;**

τὸ εἶναι = συγκεῖσθαι καὶ ἐν εἶναι,
559 a; cp. 559 d;

the Pythagoreans placed it in their
series of good things, **566,** p. 140
(1096 b 5 f.);

τὸ ἀφ' ἐνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἐν, **566,** p. 140,
n. 6;

not to be identified with τὸ ἀγαθόν
(Speus.), **743 c;**

yet on the side of good things, **743 d.**

See also **746 a**

τὸ πᾶν ἐκ τοῦ —ός, **756 b;**

τὸ — in Plato's lecture Π. τάγαθοῦ,
771 b

ἐναντία, ἐναντιότης, ἐναντίωσις **474; 475**

ἐναντίον **439 a, c;**

τάναντία δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν, **655 b**

ἐνδεχόμενον

(of a proposition) **443 b; 448;**

τὰ —α, **559 a**

ἐνδοξος

συλλογίζεσθαι ἐξ ἐνδόξων —, **445 a;**
449 a

ἐνεκά του

τὸ πάνθ' —, **677 b**

See also μάτην: μηδὲν —

ἐνέργεια

and δυνάμεις, **479 c; 500 d; 515;**
 ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐ. ζωή, **516 a;**
 ἐ. defined, **551 a;**
 explained, **551 b;**
 difference from motion, **552;**
 prior to potency, **554;**
 either in the object or in the agent
555; good and bad —, **556;**
 activity, **567 b; 568 b;**
 εὐδαιμονία — τις, **605 a;**
 κατ' ἀρετὴν —, **606 a;**
 ἡ νοῦ —, *ib.*;
 κινήσεις defined by Theophr. as — τις
 ἀτελής τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος, **681;**
 τὰς —ς τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις εἶναι
 (Strato), **723**

ἐνθυμήματα **456 a; 654 b**

ἐντελέχεια **484; 515; 541 c;**
 in the definition of soul, **636**

ἐντευξίς **565 a**

ἐνύπνια

π. —ων, **402** (third group, III 2)
 See further: dreams

ἐξις, γνωρίζουσα, **465**

ἐξις

virtue a —, **571 a, b; 572** (1108 a
 26); **580 a;**

τῶν —εων συναιτίοι πως αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν,
580 b, c;

εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἔστιν —, **605 a**

ἐξ οὗ

τὸ — γίνεται τι, **493**

ἐξωτερικά,

the term, **400, 401 a;**
 writings of Ar., **415-431**

ἐπαγωγή **455; 463**

ἐπεισοδιώδης

—η τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσι, **745 b**

ἐπεικεία, ἐπεικέας **589;**

τὰ ἐπεικῆ ὡς δικαιοτέρα, **658 a** (1375
 a 29)

ἐπιθυμία

in Ar.'s *De anima*, **639 a;**
 with Theophr., **684**

ἐπίπεδον

γραμμαὶ καὶ —α, **757 a, b; 758 a, b**

ἐπιστήμη

δι' αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ, **419 b;**
 conditions of —, **457; 458;**

πᾶσα ἐ. ἀποδεικτική, **459;**

ἀρχαί of the sciences, **459-461;**

a hierarchy of sciences, **462;**

— and αἰσθήσεις, **463; 465; 519,**
 p. 102-104;

purely theoretical, **519,** p. 105 f.;
 ἐκ τῶν —ων ("the argument from the
 sciences") **527;**

different degrees of precision in dif-
 ferent sciences, **566,** p. 136;

κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν μία τις —, **566,**
 p. 139 f. (1096 a 30 f.);

Π. —ς, a work of Xenocr., sub
751 c;

— only of the νοητὴ οὐσία, **754,** l. 5 f.

ἐπιστημονικός

συλλογισμὸς —, **458;**

αἰσθήσεις —ή, **742**

ἐπόμενον

παρὰ τὸ — (a kind of sophism) **468 c**

ἐποποιία, **663 b**

ἐρμηνεία,

Π. —ς, **402** (third group, I 2), **435 c;**
440-442; 443;

ἡ — ἐνεκα τοῦ εὖ, **643 b**

ἐρώτημα

τὰ πλείω ἐρωτήματα ἐν ποιεῖν, **468 c**

ἐρώτησις **445 a, b**

ἔσχατον, τὸ — (in a syllogism) **449 b**
 εὐγένεια **624**

εὐδαιμονεῖν, τὸ — (consists of virtue and
 pleasure) **632 c** (1339 b 19)

εὐδαιμονία

πρᾶξις τις, **504 a;**

the supreme end, **566** (*Eth. Nic.* I
 1-7); definition, p. 143;

dealt with in *Eth. Nic.* X, **605-607;**
 in a πόλις, **626 a, b;**

ἡ — ἐν πράξει ἐστί, **664 b;**

with Theophr., **685; 686 a;**

with Speusippus, **749 a-d;**

στοιχεῖα τῆς —ς, **794 c;**

relation with virtue **749 b-d; 765-**
767; 796; 801

εὐδαίμων, **399 a;**

εἰ δεῖσεται φίλων (ὁ —), **604;**

ὁ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν, **607 d;**

— βίος, **605 c;**

— πόλις, **626 a, b** (1329 a 23);

ὁ σπουδαῖος —, **767;**

in the *Epinomis*, **790,** the end

εὐσέβεια

Περὶ —ς, a dialogue of Heracl. Pont.,
773 b;

in the *Epinomis*, **791 a**
 εὐτραπέλεια **572** (1108 a 24);
 πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις, **659 a** (1389 b 11)
 ἐφ' ἡμῖν
 τὰ —, **576 c** (1111 b 30), **576 d**,
 (1111 b 32/33); **577 a** (1112 a 30);
578; **579 a, b**; **580 a** (1114 a 29);
580 c (1115 a 2)
 ἔχειν **437 b**

Ζεὺς
 the supreme Principle called — by
 Xenocr. **756 a**
 ζῆν and εὖ ζῆν,
 τοῦ ζῆν ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ ζῆν εὖ γλίχεσθαι,
420 b;
 ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ κολάσει, **422 b**;
 τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν in *Eth.*
Nic. I 4, **566**, p. 137 (1095 a 19);
 in the *Politics*, **608 b**; **610 a**;
 τέλος πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζῆν, **619 b**;
 τὸ ζῆν the characteristic of animals,
638 a, b; **640**;
 — πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, **638 a**;
 ἡ ἐρμηνεία ἔνεκεν τοῦ εὖ (ζῆν), **643 b**
 ζῶα

402 (third group, IV 1-5);
 — have αἰσθησις, some of them also
 μνήμη, **519**, p. 102;
 characterized by αἰσθησις, **638 b**
 See also αἰσθητικόν and αἰσθησις
 ζωή
 Π. —ς κ. θανάτου, **402** (third group,
 III 2);
 — αἰδῖος, **430**; **516 a**;
 — defined in *De Anima* II 1, **636**
 (412 a 14)

Ἠγεμονικόν,
 τὸ —, **724 a**, l. 13
 ἡδονή
 — αὐ καὶ λύπαι as object of virtue and
 vice, **572** (1107 b 5, 1108 b 1 ff.);
 the test of virtue, **569 a, b**;
 μαῖλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς —άς, **573 b**
 (1109 a 15); **574 b, c**;
 ἡ σαφροσύνη περὶ —άς ἐστιν, **582 a, b**;
 dealt with in *Eth. Nic.* VII 11-15,
594-596; and in X 1-5, **597-599**;
 defined, **597 b**;
 intellectual —, **606 b**;
 — of music, **632 d**;

characteristic of animals, **639 a**;
 According to Speus. — not an ἀγαθόν,
750;
 Eudoxus' theory, **786**;
 Περὶ —ης, a dialogue of Heracl. Pont.
773 b;
 in a fragment of Crantor's ethics, **801**
 ἡδὺ,
 τὸ — καὶ λυπηρόν **572**; **639 a**
 Ἠθικά see Ethics
 ἥθος
 the influence of music on the —,
632 d; **781**;
 certain πίστεις are ἐν τῷ —ει τοῦ
 λέγοντος, **657 a**;
 ἡ περὶ τὰ —η πραγματεία, **657 b**;
 τὰ —η at different ages, **659**;
 in tragedy not of primary impor-
 tance, **664 b**
 ἡρεμία **511 c**; **721 b**

Θαυμάζειν
 τὸ — the beginning of philosophy,
519, p. 105 f. (982 b 11 ff.)
 θεάματα, ἐκεῖ θ. (= the Ideas) **417 b**
 θεῖος
 — α τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, **519**, p. 106
 (983 a 5 ff.);
 the νοῦς is θεῖόν τι, **418 b**; **606 a, b**
 (1177 b 30); **653**;
 θεῖα γένεσις and θεοστάτη φύσις, **791 b**;
 — ν γένος ἀστρων, **792 a**

θεολογία,
402 (third group, sub V)

θεολογική
 ἡ —, **432 b**; **524**

θεός **408**;
 ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ὁ —, **418 b**; **426 a, b**;
 ὁρατός —, **428 b**;
 ὁ — καὶ ἡ φύσις, **502**; cp. ad **427**.
 Life and character, **516 a, b**;
 cp. **519**, p. 105 f. (ἐπιστήμη ἣν μάλιστα
 ἂν ἔχοι θεός), and **607 b**;
 τ. ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἔχομεν π. τῶν θεῶν,
632 b (1339 b 7 ff.);
 ὁμοιοῦσθαι —ῳ, **680 b**;
 Speusippus called the νοῦς —, **747**;
 Xenocr. **756 a**;
 τὸν οὐρανὸν κ. τοὺς ἀστέρας, **762**;
 in the *Epinomis*, **790**; **791 a**; **792 c**;
 See also *deus*, *providentia* and [*pro-*
vidence]

θεοφιλέστατος

ὁ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν, **607 d**

θέσεις **461**

θεωρητικός,

— ἡ ἐπιστήμη, **519**, p. 104, 105 f;

524 (τρεῖς φιλοσοφίαι θ.);

— ἡ ἐνέργεια, **606 a**;

— βίος, see βίος

θεωρία

an intellectual function **684**

θῆλυς

the second Principle (δυάς)

called — by Xenocr., **756 a**

θηριῶδες

οὐ τὸ — δεῖ πρωταγωνιστεῖν, **631 b**

θίασος, **738**

θρεπτικόν, **639 a, b**; cp. **640**: ἡ — ἡ ψυχὴ

θυμός **639 a**

θύραθεν

τὸν νοῦν μόνον — ἐπεισιέναι, **653**

Ἰαμβεῖον **662 b**

ιδέαι **421 b**; **425 a, b**; **526-532**; **545 b**;

745 c;

Περὶ —ων, a work of Xenocr., sub

751 c;

= ἀριθμοί, **757 b**;

with Eudoxus, **785**

ἴδια

opposed to κοινά, **460 b**;

τὸ ἴδιον ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως, **641**;

τὸ — τῆς ψυχῆς, **633 c**; **760 a**

ἱερεὺς **626 b** (1329 a 27 ff.)

ἱστορία

inferior to poetry, **666**

ἰχθύς

οἱ —ες ἄφωνοι, **643 b**

Κάθαρσις

in the definition of tragedy, **664 a**

καθ' αὐτά

and καθ' αὐτήν, used by Ar. like

δι' αὐτά and δι' αὐτήν

— one of the two categories admitted

by Xenocr., **755**

καθόλου

398 n. 3; **438 c, d**; **443 a**; **448**; **450**;

451; **452 d**; **455 a**; **456 a**; **457 b**;

458 b sub 3; **463**; **465**; **470**; **519**;

535 a;

the — not a substance **543**;

τὸ — ἀγαθόν, **566**, p. 139 (1096 a 11 ff.)

κακία

573; **580 a, b**; cp. κακὰ or αἰσχροὰ πράττειν, **579 a**, and μοχθηρία, *ib.*

Περὶ —ων, see Philodemus

κακοήθεια **659 b** (1389 b 20); **701**

κακόν

no — among eternal things, **556 b, c**;

see also φλαῦρον

κακός

— εἶναι, **579 a**

καλός

τὸ πράττειν —ν, **579 a**;

τὸ —ν δεῖ πρωταγωνιστεῖν (opposed to τὸ θηριῶδες), **631 b**;

οἱ νέοι μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται πράττειν τὰ

—ὰ τῶν συμφερόντων, **659 a** (1389 a 34).

καπηλικόν

τὸ —, **612**

κατάφασις **440**; **442 a-c**; **445 b**

καταφατικός, **448**; **450 b**; **451 b**

κατηγορεῖν,

κατηγορεῖσθαι { **446**; **447 c**; **449 b**;

κατηγορούμενον { **450 a**; **451 a**; **452 c**

κατηγορία **402** (third group, I 1), **435 c**,

436-439;

τὸ ἀγαθὸν λέγεται ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κ.,

566, p. 139 (1096 a 28 ff.)

κατηγοριικός

— ἡ (πρότασις) **448**; **452 d**

κείμενον,

τὸ — (the assumption) **452 d**

κεῖσθαι **437 b**

κεκλᾶσθαι (of a line) **460 b**

κενολογεῖν **529 b**

κενόν,

τὸ —, denied by Strato, **719**

κίνησις **469**; **506**; **517 a**;

See also φύσις and χρόνος

κ. distinguished from actuality, **552**;

the πάθη of the soul are —εις, **634 a**;

— belongs to the sensibilia communia, **641**;

defined in Theophr.' *Phys.*, **681**;

ὁρέξεις and ἐπιθυμίαι explained as

—εις of the body, κρίσεις and θεω-

ρίαι as —εις of the soul, **684**;

Strato's definition, **720**;

τάς ἐνεργείας τῆς ψυχῆς —εις εἶναι, **723**

κινητικόν

— κατὰ τόπον, **639 a, b**

- κινουῖν **494 a**;
 πρῶτον —, **513-518**; **555 b**;
 τὸ — in Theophr.' *Metaph.*, **676 b**
 κλαυθμός
 of young children, **628**
 κοινά
 (basic truths in the sciences) **460 b**;
 (sensibilia communia), **641**;
 ἐθεάσατο τὸ —όν, **740 a**
 κοίρανος **515 c**; **745 b**;
 See also **429 b**
 κόλασις
 ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ —ει μεγάλων ἀμαρτημά-
 των, **422 b**
 κοσμοποιεῖν **776 b**
 κόσμος
 Περὶ κόσμου, **402** (third group, sub II);
 eternity of the —, **428**;
 with Theophrastus, **683**;
 τὸν —ν οὐ ζῶον εἶναι, **717 c**;
 eternity of the — taught in the
 Academy, **764**;
 ἀπειρος ὁ —, **776 a**;
 ἕκαστον τῶν ἀστέρων —ν ὑπάρχειν, **776 b**
 κρεῖττων
 ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον, the βίος θεωρητικός,
606 b (1177 b 26);
 cf. **519** (*Metaph.* A 982 b 28 ff.)
 κρίσις
 judgment, as an intellectual func-
 tion, **684**
 κτήμα
 ὄργανον πρὸς ζωὴν, **610 a**;
 ὁ δοῦλος — τι ἔμψυχον, *ib.*
 κτήσις
 μέρος τῆς οἰκίας, **610 a**;
 πληθὸς ὀργάνων, *ib.*;
 on — in general, **612**;
 in the ideal state, **626 a** (1328 a 33
 ff.); **626 b** (1329 a 18 ff.)
 κτηνική
 μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας, **610 a**; **612**
 κύστις **500 c**
 κόμη **608 b**
 κωμῳδία
 forbidden for children, **628**;
 definition, **663 a**
 Λέξις
 παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, **468 a, b**, with n. 2
 ἔξω τῆς —εως, **468 a, c**;
 ἡ — (in tragedy), **664 b**
 λογικός
 —ῆ πραγματεία, **434**
 λογισμός, a function of the soul, **639 b**
 λόγος **440**; **442 a-b**;
 in the sense of φάντασμα, **465**, with
 remark II, p. 64;
 ὁ — ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι, **493**; **494 b**;
497 a, b; cp. **536 b-c**; **539**; **540**;
541 b; **545 a**;
 —ν μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει, **609 b**;
 the — (theory) must be based on
 facts, **669**. See also αἰσθησις
 λύπη see ἡδονή
 μετὰ —ς ἡ μάθησις, **632 b** (1339 a 28 ff.)
 Μάγοι **424 a**
 μαθήματα
 ἐν τοῖς —σι, **523 a**;
 τὰ — τοῖς νῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία, **532 b**;
 τὰ —, γραμμᾶς καὶ ἐπίπεδα, **757 b**
 μαθηματικός
 ὁ — (opposed to ὁ φυσικός), **486-487**;
 ἡ μαθηματική, **487-488**; **524**;
 see also τὰ μαθήματα
 τὰ μαθηματικά, **487 a**
 with Speusippus, **745**
 μάθησις
 πᾶσα μ. ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γνώσεως,
456 a;
 μετὰ λύπης, **632 b** (1339 a 28/29)
 μακρόβιος **455 b**
 μακροβιότης
 Π. —τητος κ. βραχυβιότητος, **402**
 (third group III 6)
 μαλακόσαρκος
 οἱ —οι εὐφρεῖς, **644**
 μάλλον καὶ ἥττον
439 b; **571 b** (1106 b 20)
 See also ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις
 μαρθάνειν
 — οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον,
662 a
 μανότης **475 a**
 μαντική
 Π. τῆς καθ' ὕπνον —ς, **402** (third
 group, III 2); **405**, n. 4; **692**
 μάρτυρες, μαρτυρίαι **658 b**
 μάτην
 ὁ θεὸς κ. ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν — ποιοῦσι, **502**;
 cp. ad **427**
 Also in the *Politica*, **609 b**

- In Theophr.' *Metaph.*, 677 b; cp. 678 a, b
 μέγα καὶ μικρόν
 τὸ —, 744
 μεγαλοπρέπεια
 572 (1107 b 17); sub 727 b
 μεγαλοψυχία
 572 (1107 b 22); 583
 To be distinguished from ὑπερφηφάνια,
 731 b
 μεγαλόψυχος
 —οι οἱ νέοι, 659 a
 of Lyco, sub 727 b
 μέγεθος
 ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ — εἰ ἡ κίνησις, 509 b, c;
 one of the sensibilia communia, 641
 Place of τὰ —η in Speusippus' hier-
 archy of being, 746 a;
 with Xenocr., 758 a-c; cp. 757
 μεῖζον, μεῖζων
 τὸ — ἄκρον { 449 b; 450 a; 451 a
 πρότασις — }
 μελοποιία
 in tragedy, 664 b
 μεμψιμοιρία, 687 c
 μεριστός
 τὸ —ν, 760 a;
 — οὐσία, 760 c
 μέρος
 ἐν μέρει, κατὰ μέρος (particular)
 443 a; 448; 450;
 τὸ — καὶ τὸ ὅλον, 472 b; 539; 540
 μέσον
 in a syllogism, 449 b; 450 a; 451 a;
 452 c; in induction, 455 b;
 μέσον, μεσότης
 in ethics, 571 b (1106a 29 ff., 615 ff.);
 572-574
 the intermediate place of soul in the
 hierarchy of being, 760
 μεσότης τις ὁμιλητική, 773 b
 μετέχειν
 τὰλλὰ τῶν εἰδῶν, 529 b; 532 a
 Μετεωρολογικά
 402 (third group, II 4);
 date 405;
 (introduction to the —) 469
 μετρεῖν, μετρεῖσθαι
 — τῷ χρόνῳ, 511 a, b
 μέτρον
 χρόνος — κινήσεως 511 c
 μέτρον
 in poetics, 661 a; 662 b; 663 b;
 664 a; 666
 Time defined as — πάσης κινήσεως
 κ. μονῆς, 721 d
 μὴ ὄν
 οὐδὲν γίγνεται ἀπλῶς ἐκ μὴ ὄντος,
 479 b
 μήτηρ, — θεῶν, 756 a
 μικροψυχία 572 (1107 b 23)
 μικρόψυχος
 elderly men are —οι, 659 b (1389 b
 24 f.)
 μιμήματα 421 a
 μίμησις, μιμεῖσθαι
 the essence of poetry, 660;
 various means and objects, 661;
 σύμφυτον τ. ἀνθρώποις, 662 a;
 comedy a — φαυλοτέρων, 663 a;
 tragedy — πράξεως σπουδαίας κ. τε-
 λείας, 664 a, b
 μνήμη
 II. —ς κ. ἀναμνήσεως, 402 (third
 group, III 2);
 second stage of cognition, 465; 519;
 in the life of elderly men, 659 b
 (1390 a 6)
 μονάδες
 instance of special ἀρχαί, 460 b;
 μονὰς οὐσία ἄθετος, 462;
 Xenocr. called the μονὰς God, 756 a
 μοναρχία
 II. —ς, 398 p. 4, n. 1
 μονή (= ἐρημία), 721 d
 μορφή 476 b; 477; 483 b; 497 b
 Cp. 406, the end
 Μοῦσαι 738
 μουσεῖον 739 a
 μουσική
 as a part of education, 630; 632
 Aristoxenus a great authority in
 —ῃ, 704;
 a necessary propaedeusis for philo-
 sophy, 752 b;
 Περὶ —ς, a work of Heracl. Pont.,
 781
 μοχθηρία 579 a, b
 μυθολογία, 782
 μῦθος 519, p. 105 (982 b 19);
 ὁ —τῆς τραγωδίας, 664 b, 665 b
 μύρμηκες 499 d

Νέμεσις **572** (1108 a 35, b 1)

νέος

τῶν —ων τὰ ἥθη, **659 a**

νεύειν (of a line) **460 b**

νοεῖν

τὸ — τι φθαρέντος ((argument for Plato's Ideas) **527**;

τὸ — δοκεῖ ὥστερ αἰσθάνεσθαι τι εἶναι, **649 a, b**;

πῶς γίνεται τὸ —, **651**

νόησις

463 b; — νοήσεως, **516 b**

νοητός

ὕλη —ή, **541 d**;

δυνάμει πῶς ἐστὶ τὰ —ά ὁ νοῦς, **651 c**;

with Xenocr. **754**

νόμιμος

ὁ δίκαιος —, **585**;

ἐπιείκεια ἐπανόρθωμα —ου δικαίου, **589**
(1137 b 12-13)

νόμισμα **612** (1257 b 5 f.)

νομοθέτης **706 b**

νομοθετικὸς ἀνὴρ **706 c**; cp. **784**

νόμος

the task of law in general, **585**;

law is necessarily general, therefore defective in special cases, **589**
(1137 b 12 f.)

ὁ γεγραμμένος — opposed to the κοινὸς —, **658 a**

νοῦς

τῆς ψυχῆς κρείττων, **418 a**;

θεῖον, **418 b**; cp. **c, d**;

τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν **465**;

ἡ νοῦ ἐνέργεια (of the Prime Mover) **516 a**;

ἡ νοῦ ἐνέργεια εὐδαιμονία, **606 a, b**

ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, **606 b** (1178 a 7);

ὁ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν θεοφιλέστατος, **607 d**;

an οὐσία and ἀπαθές, **634 b**; **638 c**;

639 a-b; **651**; **652-653**

noûs in the passive sense a tabula rasa, **651 c**;

the active noûs, **652, 653**

A part of soul? **651 a** (the end), **652, 653**

With Theophr., **684**

Aristotle's doctrine of the — rejected by Strato, **722 a**

— ὁρῇ καὶ — ἀκούει (Epicharmus), **724 b**

οὐ τοῖς σκέλεσι ζῶμεν, ἀλλὰ τῷ νῷ, **739 c**

With Speusippus, **746 b**; **747 a-c**;

Xenocr. called the supreme principle —, **756 a**

See also *intellectus agens*

Ὀγκος **763**; **780 a, b**

ὄθεν

— ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς, **493**;

— ἡ κίνησις, **494 b**; **495**

οἰκία

πρώτη κοινωνία, **608 a, b**;

moral principles needed for founding an —, **609 b**, the end;

κτῆσις μέρος τῆς —ς, **610 a**

Οἰκονομικά **402** (third group, VII 2)

οἰκονομικός

ὁ —, **610 a**;

ἡ —ή, **612**

οἰκονόμος

— ἀγαθὸς (ἡ φύσις) **500 a**

ὀλιγαρχία **617**; **618**;

justice in an —, **619 a**;

— described, **622**

ὄλος

ἡ —η οὐσία, **406**, the end

τὸ ἐν ὄλῳ εἶναι, **447 c**; **449 b**;

τὸ — **470**; **472 b**; **539**; **540**

ὁμιλία (sexual) **627 a, c**

ὁμίλην **776 c**

ὁμοιομερῆ **496 a**

ὅμοιος

τὸ —ν τῷ ὁμοίῳ γνωρίζειν, **649 a**

Speusippus' "Ὅμοια, **740**

ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ **680 b**

ὁμώνυμος **436 a**

three kinds of ὁμώνυμα, **566'** p. 140 f., with n. 6

ὁμωνυμία **468 b**

ὄν

τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν θεωρεῖν, **419 b**, the end; τὸ ὄν ἢ ὄν object of metaphysics, **432 d**; **521**;

— πολλαχῶς λέγεται, **472 a**; **533 a**;

ἐξ —τος τὸ — γίγνεται, **479 b**

τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ —, **520**, p. 107 (996 a 5);

τὸ — no substance, **546 b**

Various meanings of ὄν and μὴ ὄν, **557**;

the supreme — (in the *Eth. Eud.*) **564**;

- Περὶ τοῦ —τος, a work of Xenocr., sub
751 c
 δεινός **692 a**. See also *μαντική*
ὄνομα **440, 441 a**
ὀνόματα **470**
ὀπή (hole or crack), **722 b**
ὀπτική **488**
ὄργανον, logic an *ὄ.*, **434**
ὄργή **572** (1108 a 4)
ὀρεκτικόν
 a power of the soul, **639 a**
ὀρεξις
 in Ar.'s *De anima*, **639 a**;
 with Theophr., **684**
ὀρισμός
 461; 464; 536 b-c; 537; 539;
 541 c; 542; 545 a;
 impossibility of —, **741 b**
ὅρος
 term of a syllogism, **446; 447; 452;**
 definition, **464 b**;
 difficulty of — in the classification
 of plants, **671 a**
ὁσμή **645**
ὁσφρησις **645**
ὅτι
 τὸ *ὅτι*, **457 a; 462; 519; 566,**
 p. 137 (1095 b 6)
οὐ *ἐνεκα*
 τὸ —, **490 b; 493-495**
 ἢ φύσις τέλος καὶ — **497 b**;
 τὸ — βέλτιστον, **498 b; 609 b**
 See also *τίνας ἐνεκεν*
οὐράνιος
 (= *αιθέριος*) **774 b**
οὐρανός
 Π. — οὐ, **402** (third group, II 2);
 τὴν τοῦ — οὐσίαν (with Xenocr.),
 757 a, b;
 θεὸν εἶναι τὸν —ν, **762**; cp. **775 b**
 Also in the *Epinomis*, **790**
οὐσία **437 b; 438; 439**;
 — *ἄθετος* **462**;
 — *θετός* **462**;
 πότερον — τὰ πάντα **472; 475 a, b**;
 ἢ *ὅλη* —, **406**, the end;
 — *ἀκίνητος*, **524**;
 Ideas only of —αι, **528**;
 Substance in *Metaph. Z*, **533-547**;
 τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ —, **566**, p. 139
 (1096 a 2 f.);
 τὰ σώματα —αι, **636**
- Speusippus admitted a multitude
 of —αι, **746 a, b**;
 Xenocr. three, **754; 757**
ὄψις **641; 642**;
 in tragedy, **664 b**
- Πάθη
 (attributes) **460 b**;
 (ἐν ψυχῇ) **571 a** (the beginning);
 571 b (1106 b 16);
μεσότητες ἐν τοῖς π., **572** (1108 a 31);
 575 a;
 — τῆς ψυχῆς, **633 c, d; 634**;
 words may lead to a certain —ος,
 657 a
- πάθημα
κάθαρσις τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων,
664 a
- παθητικός
 the νοῦς —, **652** (the end)
- παιδιά **572** (1108 a 23); **605 b, c**
 in the education of young children
 628 (1336 a 33);
μη — *ἐνεκα δεῖ παιδεύειν τοὺς νέους*,
632 b;
 whether music is π., **632 c**
- παντειδήμων **732 c**
πάν, *πάντα*
 ἡ θεωρία τοῦ παντός, **419 b, l. 24**;
 ἐν τὰ —τα, **472**;
 ψυχὴ τοῦ —τος, **756 a**;
 τὸ — ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς συνεστάναι, **756 b**
παράδειγμα, *παραδείγματα* **456 a**
 τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ —, **493; 497 a**;
 Plato's Ideas as —τα, **529 b**
παράδοξα de sapiente **766 b**; cp. **802**
παραδοξολόγος **783 b**
παραλογισμοί **467 a; 468 c**
παράνομος
 ὁ — *ἄδικος* **584; 585**
παρώνυμος **436 c**
πάσχειν **437 b**
πατήρ
 the supreme Principle called — by
 Xenocr. **756 a**
- πένθος
 Cranor's *Περὶ* —ους, **802; 804**
πεπερασμένον **472 b; 473**
περιεργία, **687 b**
περίπατος
 τοῖς ἐκ τῶν —ων, **401 a**

περιττόν

the supreme Principle called — by Xenocr., **756 a**

πιθανός

the function of rhetoric is to see τὰ ὑπάρχοντα — **α**, **655 d**;

cp. the definition of rhetoric, **656**

πίστις

αἱ πίστεις, the technical part of rhetoric, **654 b**;

three kinds of —εις, **657 a, b**;

the ἄτεχνοι —εις, **658 a**;

with Aristo of Cos **735 e**

πλεῦμων **500 c**; **643 b**

πλήθος **743 c**; **744**

πλήρωμα εἰδῶν, **760 b**

πλουτος **612 a, b**; **801**

πνεῦμα

Π. —τος, **402** (third group, III 2)

τὸ —, see ἀναπνοή and ἀναπνεῖν

πόθος, **399 c**

ποιεῖν

one of the ten categories, **437 b**

ποίησις

differs from πράξις, **610 a**;

— φιλοσοφώτερον κ. σπουδαιότερον ἱστορίας **666**

ποιητική

Π. —ς, **402** (third group, VIII 2); **660-666**;

(διάνοια), **432a**; cp. **566**, p. 135 n. 1

— ἐπιστήμη, **519**, p. 104 f.; **524**;

[ποιητικὸς] νοῦς, a later term, **653**

ποιόν

437 b; **472 a**; **476 a**; **533 a, b**; **536 d**; **566**, p. 139 (1096 a 20)

ποιότης

(in tragedy) τὸ τέλος πράξις τις ἐστίν, οὐ —, **664 b**;

the —τες as elements **718 b**

πόλις

404, n. 4; its genesis **608 b**; its nature **609 a**; moral principles needed for founding a —, **609 b**, the end;

the identity of the —, **615 a, b**;

τέλος πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζῆν, **619 b**

the best — according to Ar., **626-628**;

education in the ideal —, **629-632**

π. defined in **626** (1328 a 35-37)

πολιτεία

—αι, **402** (third group, sub VII); the Aθ. πολ., *ib.*;

ἀρίστη —, **404**;

classification of —αι, **617, 618**;

description of various forms, **619**;

a form of constitutional government, **624**;

ἡ ἀρίστη —, **626-628**;

defined in **626 b** (1328 b 35)

The best — according to Dicaearchus, **697**;

Plato's —, **702 d**

πολίτης

404, n. 4;

definition, **614 a, b**;

the good — a good man? **616 a, b, c**;

a βάνανσος ἢ ἀγοραῖος βίος not suitable for the π., **626 b** (1328 b 39);

the π. must possess land, *ib.* (1329 a 18 ff.); and be priests, *ib.* (1329 a 27 ff.)

Πολιτικά

402 (third group, VII 1); **403**; **404**

πολιτικός

— βίος, **566**, p. 138 (1095 b 22 ff.);

— ὁ ἀνθρωπος, **604** (1169 b 18);

— ν ζῶν ὁ ἀνθρωπος, **609 b**;

ἡ —ή, κυριωτάτη καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, **566**, p. 135 (1194 a 26 ff.);

its method, **566**, p. 136 (1094 b 11 ff.);

relation with rhetoric, **657 b**

πολυκοιρανίη **429 b**; **515 c**

ποσόν **437 b**; **472 a**; **476 a**; **533 a, b**;

536 d; **566**, p. 139 (1096 a 25)

time defined as τὸ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι ποσόν, **721 c**

ποτέ **437 b**; **476 a**

πού **437 b**; **476 a**; **533 b**

πρακτικός

οἱ —οί, **566**, p. 138 (1095 b 22 f.);

διάνοια —ή, **432 a**;

cp. **566**, p. 135 n. 1;

the βίος — superior to the βίος θεωρητικός, **694**

πρᾶξις

522; **566**, the beginning;

ἡ ἥθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἐστὶ περὶ πάθη καὶ —εις, **571 b** (1106 b 17); **575 a**;

τῶν —εων κύριοι ἐσμέν, **580 c**;

- αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν —εις τῶν δι' αὐτὰ αἶρε-
τῶν, **605 a**;
— differs from ποιήσις, **610 a** (cp.
432 a);
ἡ τραγωδία μίμησις —εως, **664 b**;
time defined as τὸ ἐν ταῖς —εσι ποσόν,
721 c
πραότης **572** (1108 a 6)
πρεσβύτεροι
τῶν —ων τὰ ἡθη, **659 b**
προαίρεσις **576-578**
Προβλήματα see *Problemata*
πρόβλημα (in logic) **445 a**
πρόσθεσις
ἐκ —εως, **462; 488 b; 519**, p. 104; **537**
πρός τι
437 b; 476 a;
matter belongs to the —, **490 c**;
Ideas of τὰ —, **527**;
τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ —, **566**, p. 139
(1096 a 20 ff.)
One of the two categories admitted
by Xenocr., **755**
προσφθία **468 b**
πρότασις **443; 445; 452 b**
πρότερος
—α κ. γνωριμώτερα, **458 a, b**;
πρ. φύσει and πρ. πρὸς ἡμᾶς, **458 b**,
sub 3;
τὸ —ν καὶ ὕστερον, **509 c, d; 510 a**;
512; 566, p. 139 (1096 a 17 ff.),
with n. 4;
Strato's work Περὶ τοῦ —ου καὶ
ὕστερου, **716**
τὸν μὲν (ἀριθμὸν) ἔχοντα τὸ —ν καὶ
ὕστερον, **745 c**
Προτρεπτικός
402 (first group); **403; 413; 419-423**
προϋπάρχειν
προϋπάρχουσα γνῶσις, **456 a; 465**
πρῶτος
αὐτὰ τὰ πρῶτα ((the Ideas), **421 a**;
ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ —ων, **449 a; 458**;
Can first principles (τὰ πρ.) be known?
459
σχῆμα πρ., **449 d; 453 a**;
ἡ πρώτη (φιλοσοφία), **402** (third
group, sub V), **487 b**
—ν κινεῖν, see *Prime Mover*
— θεός (with Xenocr.), **756 a**
ἡ —η ψυχὴ, **640 b**
πυκνότης **475 a**
'Ρῆμα **440; 441 b**
ῥητορικὴ
The 'P., **402** (third group, VIII);
403; 654-659;
ῥ. the counterpart of dialectic,
654 a;
how to treat of it, **654 b**;
its use, **655**;
definition, **656**;
it is οἷον παραφύες τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς,
657 b;
a demonstration of rhetoric as
ἀντιλογικὴ τέχνη, **658**
Σάρξ
ἡ — οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον,
648
σαφέστερα **470**
σημεῖα
instance of special ἀρχαί, **460 b**
σιμός **487 c, d**
σιμότης **489; 537; 540 a**
σκληρόσαρκος
οἱ —οι ἀφύεις τὴν διάνοιαν, **644**
σκληρόφθαλμος
τὰ —α, **645**
σκότος
defined as the δύναμις of the διαφανές,
or στέρησις of light, **642 b**
σοφός }
σοφία }
420. σοφία in the sense of πρ. φιλ. **519**;
as a διανοητικὴ ἀρετή, **590-592; 593 b**
in the *Epinomis*, **790**
σπέρμα
τὸ κινεῖν, **494 a**
τὸ πρῶτον οὐ —, **743 a**
σπουδαῖος
βελτίω τὰ —α τῶν γελοίων, **605 c**;
τὰ καλὰ καὶ —α, **605 a**;
epos and tragedy a μίμησις —ων,
663 b (1449 b 10); **664 a**
ὁ —, **767 a, b; 802 a**
σπουδῇ
εὐδαίμων βίος μετὰ —ῆς, **605 c**
στερεομετρία
791 a (*Epin.* 990 d 8)
στέρησις **476; 478 a; 479; 480**
στερητικός
(negative) **448; 450 b; 451 b**
στιγμὴ **462; 758 b; 761 b**
στοιχεῖα **470; 496 a; 718; 763**

σύζευξις **627 a**

συλλογισμός see *sylogism*

συμβεβηκός (accidens)

παρά τὸ σ. (a kind of sophism) **468 c**;
in Ar.'s theory of becoming, **478-480**;

the πρὸς τι ἔοικε συμβεβηκότητι τοῦ ὄν-
τος, **566**, p. 139 (1096 a 21 f.)

συνπέρασμα (conclusion) **449 b**

σύμπτωμα **499 a**

συνφέρον

μὴ πρὸς τὸ — κρίνειν μηδέν, **659 a**
(1389 b 1);

πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ζῶσιν, **659 b** (1389
b 36)

συναίτια (ἀναγκαῖα) **419 b**

συνεχές **472 b**

σύνθεσις, the composition of a natural
object, **406**, the end;
a kind of sophism, **468 b**

σύνθετον

the compositum of form and matter,
484;

the term σ. in **418 d**;

cf. σύνθεσις in **406**, the end;

cp. also σύνολον in **541 a, c**;

545 a;

σύνθετος οὐσία, with Xenocr. **754**

συνθήκη

περὶ — ὦν, **658 b** (1376 a 33 ff.)

σύνολον **541 a, c**; **545 a**

συνώνυμος **436 b**

σφαῖραι **517 c**

σφαιριστής **726 a**, l. 17

σχῆμα

figure of the syllogism, see *sylogism*

— λέξεως **468 b**;

one of the sensibilia communia, **641**

σχολάζειν

μᾶλλον αἰρετὸν τὸ — τῆς ἀσχολίας, **630**

σχολή

δοκεῖ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ — ἥ εἶναι,
606 b (1177 b 4);

cp. **519**, p. 104 (981 b 20-25)

σῶμα

relation with the soul, **413**, **417 c**;
422 b; **423**; **633 d**; **634**; **635**;

636; **637**;

οὐκ εὐλογον τὸν νοῦν μεμῖχθαι τῷ — τι,
651 a; cp. **653**. See also **690 a**
(*corpus*);

οὐ — ἡ ψυχῇ, **761 a**;

αἰθέριον —, **774 b**;

ἀπὸ — των εἰς ἕτερα — τα πίπτειν, **775 c**

σφάζειν

τὰ φαινόμενα, **777 b**; cp. **779**

σωφροσύνη

572 (1107 b 5-6); **582**;

of Xenocrates, **751 b**;

Περὶ —ς, a dialogue of Heracl. Pont.,
773 b

Ταραχώδες

τὸ — ἐν τῷ βίῳ καταπαῦσαι, **753 b**

τεκνοποιία **627 a, b, c**

τελειοῦσθαι **453 a**

τέλειος of a syllogism, **447 b**; **449 d**;
450 a;

πρῶτον εἶναι τὸ —ν, **743 a**

τέλος **490 b**; **493**; **494**;

ἡ φύσις — καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα, **498 a**;

τὸ — καὶ τὰγαθόν, **498 b**; **566**
(*Eth. Nic.* I, 1-7);

βουλευόμεθα οὐ περὶ τῶν —ων, **577 b**;

ἡ φύσις — ἐστίν, **609 a**;

in tragedy, τὸ — πρᾶξις τις ἐστίν,
οὐ ποιότης, **664 b**

τέρας **496 b**

τέχνη, **465**; **519**;

compared with φύσις, **481**; **483 c**;
490 b; **499 c**;

ἡ — μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν **490 a**

τεχνῖται **626 b** (1329 a 35 ff.)

τί ἐστι **437 b**; **438 a**; **457 a**; **464**;
533 a, b; **536 d**; **547 b**;

τό τι, **566**, p. 139 (1096 a 20)

τί ἦν εἶναι **437 b**; **438 b**

ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ —, **493**; **494 a**; **497 a**;
535 a; **536**; **538**; **547 a**

τιμή

the "end" of practical or political
life, **566**, p. 138 (1095 b 22);

in the table of virtues, **572** (1107
b 26 ff.);

μέγιστον τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν, **583**
(1123 b 20)

τιμωρία

life a —, **422 b**; **802**; cp. **417 a**

τίνος ἔνεκεν **519**, p. 105

τόδε τι **533 a**; **534**; **536 d**

Τοπικά

402 (Third group, I 5), **435 a, b**; **466**;
cited in *Rhet.* I 1, **655 a**

- τόπος defined by Ar., **507**;
criticized by Theophr., **682 a, b**;
— εἰδῶν, **651 a**, with n. 2; **760 b**
- τραγωδία **664-665**
- Τριπολιτικός **697**
- τροφή
the βίοι of animals distinguished by
their τροφή, **612 a** (1256 a 22);
παίδων, **627 b, 628**;
a function of the soul, **636**; **638-640**
- τυραννίς **617**; **625**
- τύχη **499 a**; **503**
- Περὶ — of Demetrius of Phaleron,
713;
τὸ κατὰ —, **717 c**
- Our dependence on — underesti-
mated by the ὑπερφανῶν, **731**
(introd. remark); **731 a**
- Ἰβρις
in the young man's character, **659 a**
- ὕγεια **801**
- ὅλη
406, the end; **476 c, d**; **480**; **483 a, c**;
484; **487 d**; **489**; **490 b, c**;
491; **494-495**;
relative character of —, **496**;
resistence of — against form, **496 b**;
Is — a substance? **535 c**;
Does — belong to the definition?
540; **541**; individuating principle,
541 a;
— αἰσθητή and νοητή, **541 d**;
ἡ — δύναμις, **636**; **ἀέναιος**, **756 b**
- ὑπάρχειν
τοῦ — or ἐν τῷ — (assertoric) **443 b**;
448; **449 b, d**; **451 a**;
τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, **460 b**;
τὸ ὑπάρχον, a species of ἀναγκαῖον,
672 b, with n. 1
- ὑπερβολή
καὶ ἔλλειψις, **571 b** (1106 a 29 ff.,
b 25 ff.) **572**; **573**
- ὑπερφανία **731**
- ὕπνος
Περὶ —ου, **402** (third group, III 2)
ὑπόθεσις, **445 b**; **461**
ἐξ —εως περαίνεσθαι, **675 b**
- ὑποθετικός
— συλλογισμός, **675 a**
cf. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως περαίνεσθαι, **675 b**
- ὑποκείμενον
462; **472 a**; **475 a**; **476**; **477**; **478**;
535
- ὑποκριτής
τὸ τῶν —ῶν πλῆθος **661 b**
- Φαινόμενα
πάντα τὰ — ἀληθῆ εἶναι **649 a**
σφίζειν τὰ φαινόμενα (concerning the
heavenly bodies), **777 b**; **779**
- φαντασία
in animals, together with μνήμη,
519;
τῆς — οὐ κύριοι, **580 b**;
a psychic function, **639 a, b**; **649 b**;
650; defined in **650 b**
- [φάντασμα] **465**, p. 64, sub II
- φάρυγξ
ὄργανον τῇ ἀναπνοῇ, **643 b**
- φθορά **498 e**; **545 a**
- φιλία, **572** (1108 a 28); **600-604**
- φιλόμυθος
ὁ — φιλόσοφος πῶς ἐστίν, **519**, p. 105
(b 18)
- φιλοσοφία
Π. —, **402** (first group) **403**; **404**;
405; **413**; **414**; **424-431**;
πρώτη —, **402** (third group, sub V);
432 a-d;
τρεις —αι θεωρητικαί, **524**;
the object of first phil., *ib.*;
ἡ — δοκεῖ θαυμαστάς ἡδονάς ἔχειν,
606 b (1177 a 25)
See also σοφία
- φιλότιμος **572** (1107 b 30)
- φλαῦρα **792 b**
- φόβος
περὶ — ους κ. θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης,
572; **581 a**;
in the definition of tragedy, **664 a**
- φονεύειν
μηδὲν — ξιψυχον **695 b**
- φορά
πρώτη τῶν μεταβολῶν, **515 a** (1072
b 8, 9);
ἡ τοῦ παντός —, **517 a**; cf. **430 n. 1**
- φραστικός
— ἀνήρ, **728 a**
- φρονεῖν
τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ —, **649 a**; **651**
φρόνησις **420**; **464**; **590**;
relation to σοφία **592**; **593 b**;

- to moral virtue, **593 a**
in the *Epinomis*, **790**
- φρόνιμος
the φρ. has the arbitrium of what is
good: **420 a**; **571 b** (1107 a 1)
- Φυσικά
τὰ —, **402** (third group, II 1) **470**;
See further *Physics* and φυσικός
Theophrastus' — **681-682**
- φυσικοί,
οἱ — **471 a**
- φυσικός,
ὁ —, opposed to the μαθηματικός
486-487; opposed to the meta-
physician, **491**
- φυσικά (σώματα), **406**; **486-487**;
490 b; **757 b**;
- ἡ φυσική, **432 b**; **487 b**; **490 a**; **495**;
523 a; **524**
- Theophr. Φυσικῶν δόξαι, **668**
Strato surnamed φ., **714**
- φυσιολόγος
(Empedocles) **661 a**
- φύσις
definition **481**; cp. **554 a** (1049 b
10);
ἀεὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, **482 a**;
two aspects of —, **483-484**; **489-490**;
ἡ — τέλος καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα **490 b**; **498 a**;
609 a;
— works ἔνεκά του **499**; instances
500; explanation **501**
ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἡ — **502**; cp. **609 b** (οὐθὲν
μάτην ποιεῖ);
the same words in Theophr., **677 b**,
678 a;
φύσει and κατὰ φύσιν **481**; **482 b**;
τέχνη compared with — see τέχνη;
τὸ κατὰ —ν ἔπεσθαι τῷ κατὰ τύχην,
717 c
τὸ κατὰ —ν **794 a, c**;
τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ —ν, **795**
- φυτόν
a σῶμα φυσικὸν ὀργανικόν, **636**;
cp. **638 a**; τὰ φυόμενα πάντα δοκεῖ ζῆν;
on the "soul" of plants, **639** and
640
Theophrastus' works II. φυτῶν, **668**
φωνή **440**; **609 b**;
ζῶου ψόφος } **643 b**
ψόφος σημαντικός }
- φῶς
a necessary condition for the seeing
of colours, **642 a**;
defined as the "energeia" of the
διαφανές, **642 b**
- φωτοειδής
(ἡ ψυχὴ), **774 a**
- Χαρά
ἀληθινή — τῆς ψυχῆς, **729**
χαρίεντες,
οἱ —, **566**, p. 137, 138
- χαυνότης
the excess (ὑπερβολή) near to μεγα-
λοψυχία, **572** (1107 b 23); sub
727 b
- χρηματιστής, **566**, p. 138 (1096 a 5 ff.)
with n. 4
- χρηματιστική, **612**
- χρῆσις
knowledge is striven after οὐ —εἰς
τινος ἔνεκεν, **519**, p. 105 (982 b 21)
cp. the *Protr.*, **419 b**
- χρησιμὸς
whether philosophy should be use-
ful, **419 a-b**; **519**, p. 105 f.
- χρόνος
defined by Aristotle, **508-512**;
defined by Strato, **721**
- χρυσοῦν γένος **695 b**
- χρῶμα **641**, **642**
- χώρα **480**
- χωρίς **530**
- χωριστός, χωριστά
—ά, **432 b**; **487 b**; **491**;
the active nous is —ός, **652**;
whether soul is —ῇ τοῦ σώματος,
761 b
- Ψευδής
—λόγος, **440**;
δόξα and λογισμός, **465**
- ψεῦδος
opposed to truth, **557-559**
ἐν ταῖς φαντασίαις, **650 a, b**
in rhetoric, **735 b, c**
Περὶ τοῦ — οὐς, a work of Xenocr.,
751 c
- ψόφος **641**; **643**
ψυχαγωγεῖν **773 b**
ψυχή,
in Aristotle: II. —ς (= *Eudemus*),
402 (first group), **415-418**;

Π. —ς (= *De anima*) **402** (third group, III 1); **633-653**;

— defined, **636**;

its various powers, **639**

See further *psychology* and *soul*

relation with time **512**;

relation with *noûs*, **418**; **634 b**;

638 c;

— τόπος εἰδῶν, **651 a** (cp. **418**);

νοῦς a part of —? **651-653**;

with the Peripatetics and Academics, see *soul*.

— εὐδαιμονεστιάτη καὶ ἀρίστη, **792 a, b**

— αἰτία τοῦ ὄλου, **792 b**

᾽Ορισμένα **421 b**

ὠτοθλαδίας **726 b**

ὠφέλιμος, see *χρήσιμος*

C. J. DE VOGEL

GREEK PHILOSOPHY

III

THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN PERIOD

GREEK PHILOSOPHY III

GREEK PHILOSOPHY

A COLLECTION OF TEXTS

WITH NOTES AND EXPLANATIONS

BY

C. J. DE VOGEL

PH.D., PROFESSOR OF ANCIENT AND MEDIAEVAL
PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF UTRECHT

VOLUME III

THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN PERIOD

SECOND EDITION



LEIDEN
E. J. BRILL
1964

*The publication of this volume is facilitated by a subvention granted by
"The Netherlands Organization for Pure Research" (Z.W.O.)*

Copyright 1964 by E. J. Brill, Leiden, Netherlands.

*All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or
translated in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm or any other
means without written permission from the publisher.*

Printed in the Netherlands

GUIELMO VOLLGRAFF

MAGISTRO - COLLEGAE - AMICO

CONTENTS

GENERAL INTRODUCTION	I-3
BOOK V—POST-ARISTOTELIAN DOGMATISM AND THE SCEPTICAL REACTION	
CHAPTER XX—EPICURUS AND HIS SCHOOL	
1—The man and his works	4-10
2—Basic principles: the Canonice	10-14
3—The atomic theory	14-23
4—The Gods	23-32
5—Ethics	32-43
CHAPTER XXI—THE STOA	
1—General aspect, chief personalities	44-51
2—Physics: (1) general principles	51-64
3—Physics: (2) God, providence, mantic	64-85
4—Physics: (3) Soul and its various functions; immortality	85-100
5—Logic: (1) Grammatical science	100-107
6—Logic: (2) Formal logic	107-115
7—Logic: (3) Theory of knowledge.	115-127
8—Ethics: (1) The starting-point and the end	127-139
9—Ethics: (2) Bonum, bona, and relatively val- uable things	139-146
10—Ethics: (3) Virtue, virtues, absolute and re- lative morality	146-158
11—Ethics: (4) Wise men and fools.	158-168
12—Ethics: (5) The $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$ and how to treat them	168-176
13—Ethics: (6) Law, state and humanity	176-183
CHAPTER XXII—SCEPTICISM	
1—Introductory remarks	184-187
2—The older Sceptics: Pyrrho and Timon	187-194
3—The Second or Middle Academy: Arcesilaus	195-200

4—The Third or New Academy: Carneades . .	200-218
5—Dialectical scepticism: Aenesidemus and Agrippa	218-226
6—Later Sceptics: Menodotus and Sextus . .	226-230
CHAPTER XXIII—THE STOA AND THE ACADEMY AFTER CARNEADES' CRITICISM; LATER STOICS AND LATER CYNICISM	
1—The Stoa in discussion with Carneades . .	231-234
2—The so-called Middle Stoa: (1) Panaetius . .	234-246
3—The so-called Middle Stoa: (2) Posidonius . .	247-274
4—The fourth Academy: Philo and Antiochus	274-284
5—Seneca	284-298
6—Musonius Rufus and Epictetus	299-317
7—Later Cynics	317-328
8—Marcus Aurelius	328-339
BOOK VI—THE THEOLOGICAL OR THEOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS	
CHAPTER XXIV—PRAE-NEOPLATONISM	
1—The revival of Pythagoreanism in the second-first century B.C. till the second century of our era	340-353
2—Philo of Alexandria	353-376
3—Plutarchus	376-396
4—Middle Platonism: Albinus, Apuleius, Maximus of Tyrus	397-407
5—Gnosis and Hermetics	407-420
6—Numenius	421-433
CHAPTER XXV—PLOTINUS, THE FOUNDER OF NEOPLATONISM	
1—Life and works	434-438
2—The theory of the three hypostases	438-445
3—Soul: its μέση τάξις	445-459
4—Noûs or the intelligible world	459-469
5—The One or the Good	469-480
6—The sensible world	481-498
7—Man and his life on earth	498-516
8—Fate and providence, Logos and the "boundless powers", time and eternity	516-539

CHAPTER XXVI—LATER NEOPLATONISM

1—Porphyrius	539-552
2—Iamblichus and his School	552-562
3—Proclus	562-587
4—Damascius and the end of the School of Athens	587-592
Bibliography	593-609
Index I—of names	611-622
II—of concepts	622-648
III—of Greek words	648-672
Addenda	673

PREFACE

With the present volume this history of Greek philosophy, as much as possible composed by the texts, is completed. I might simply repeat the sober words written in the preface of the second volume: "the purpose of the book will be easily understood by those who take the trouble of reading it." Meanwhile, since it happens that even reviewers do not, or hardly, take this trouble, or, if they do, may fail to understand essential things, it might be better to add a few words.

The leading principles of this work have been: first, that the study of Greek philosophy can be practised only on the texts; second, though the study of special parts and, say, of details is always, and should be, the basis, the philosopher's interest is to have a view of the whole. 'Ο γὰρ συνοπτικός διαλεκτικός. And lastly, the right understanding of the part is promoted and deepened by as wide as possible a knowledge of the whole. The present work has been undertaken to serve this purpose. As some of the reviewers rightly observed, it is by no means sufficiently characterized by saying that it is "ein Buch für den Unterricht",—a formula which, as it seems, may be easily understood in such a sense that the work denoted by it would be of a more or less elementary character, and as such of no interest to the scholar. With regard to the present work this might prove to be, indeed, rather a strange and regrettable misunderstanding, and it would be better, therefore, not to apply the said formula to it. The work is evidently not what is called in the Anglo-American world a "text-book". It is a source-book in the largest sense, giving ample documentation on the whole of Greek philosophy. After all, the comparison with Ritter and Preller could better be dropped, since the present work was conceived in an entirely independent way.

A word must be said on the character of personal interpretation which is—and should be—found in a work like this. It has been there from the beginning, though always with a certain discretion and often compressed into a very short form. So it is in the present volume. Evidently such paragraphs as those on Posidonius, Antiochus of Ascalon, questions such as the Logos theory of Philo, Albinus' Platonism, the three Gods of Numenius and many points of detail required a considerable amount of personal interpretation. But *where* in Greek philosophy—or in whatever

piece of human thought in past or present days—is this not the case if anybody is to write its history, be it a history composed of the texts, with marginal notes, introductions and explanations? I am well aware that the present volume, too, contains a good deal of personal interpretation. I can only say: I did it as carefully and well as possible, though always limiting my remarks to a very moderate space; i.e. keeping them as short as possible. The essential thing is always to have the texts, and to have them well ordered, so that the whole forms a readable history, with due information as to literature, with some explanation as far as necessary, and—last not least—with copious indexes for the use of everybody who might consult the work with profit: the historian and the philosopher, the medievalist, the ethicist, the theologian, and the historian of various sciences, including law, logic and philology.

A volume like this, which contains a history of eight centuries of very varied thought—from the atomism of Epicurus, the great system of the Stoa with its many aspects, and the subtle criticism of the sceptic thinkers to the wide-spread complex of what we call prae-neoplatonism, the mature and profound philosophy of Plotinus, and to that of his followers—such a volume must be equipped with good indexes, where the history of all kinds of concepts, theories and terms can be easily found. Now and then such an index has to do more than just sum up the passages where a certain word occurs,—though this too may evidently be quite revealing. There may be more in it. For it happens not unfrequently that the equivalent of a modern concept—or what is approximately so—is expressed in Greek by different terms or circumscriptiions. Sometimes historians have been inclined to conclude from this that “the Greeks did not know this or that concept” because, as it seemed to them, “they did not have a word for it”. Such was, e.g., the case of the concept of *person* and *personality*. It has been said by some illustrious historians of philosophy that the Greeks did not know this concept, and that it was formally discovered by Christian thinkers, since it was first defined by Boëthius.

Now this is—it must be said—rather strange, and even alarming, information to those who know something of Greek literature and of the life in the Greek philosophers’ Schools, where obviously a true cult of the personality was practised. Briefly speaking, the above-quoted statement was erroneous; moreover, it was an error springing from lack of knowledge both of Greek philosophy and of the terms used by its representatives. The notion of “person” and “personality” existed. The “concept” was,

formally speaking, "discovered" by Panaetius,—only, under a name so common, that it appears to have escaped the notice even of such scholars as E. Gilson and R. Klibanski.—But, once we are paying attention to such a notion, we shall find that it occurs again very clearly in the writings of certain other authors, be it once more under names so common, that they *might* pass unobserved. For not only is Panaetius' expression *propria natura* (indicating the natural aptitude or disposition of the individual man, as opposed to the "nature of man"-as-a-species) found literally in Plotinus' οἰκεία φύσις, but we shall find this author seeking for an exact definition of "what are *we*": not *we* in the vegetative or animal sense, but "we" as morally responsible and spiritual beings; "we" as—*persons* or, say, *personalities*.

But once we have arrived at this point we shall have to observe that the "concept of personality" found in such late Greek authors as Plotinus and Porphyry, was already explicitly present in Aristotle, who obviously took it from Plato (whether we think the *Alcibiades maior* authentic or not),—and that Gilson was very wrong indeed when writing that the metaphysical basis of personality was not discovered by the Greeks.

I hope to expound this question more explicitly. It is one point out of many. May the sample indicate somehow both the need for and the use of a work like this, which in its three volumes taken together offers to the scholar the opportunity of a σύνοψις of Greek philosophical thought; the opportunity of finding quickly and safely where, and how, many a concept and many a philosophical term was used first, how it spread and how it developed. For this purpose the author made the indexes of "concepts" and of "Greek words". If anything is lacking in them, the benevolent reader will realize that an enormous work has been done, and that it was done by one person.

To me it has been and always is a thing of great delight to live in the world of Greek philosophical thought and its vehicle, the Greek language, and to penetrate more and more deeply into it. Especially the reading and re-reading of Plotinus has been and always is to me a great delight. The fact that I shared it since several years with a circle of young friends interested in these matters, certainly increased the joy of this spiritual intercourse.

As has been said above, many questions of detail had to be considered and now and then compressed into a very short formula. To expound certain points more explicitly will be a task for coming years, which I hope to carry out myself.

In achieving this laborious task of many years, I think it both an honour and a joy to dedicate this third volume of my *Greek Philosophy* to the man who, in past years, was my venerated master in Greek philology, and always stayed a good and faithful friend, full of interest in my work, not the least in this part of it which is now reaching its term.

In preparing this volume for the press I have been kindly assisted by Dr. W. Wiersma who, though finding himself at the beginning of a new task of university teaching, took the trouble of reading a complete series of proofs with me. I thank him sincerely for his kind help.

It was Mr. B. L. Hijmans, at present lecturer in the university of Capetown who, before leaving Europe, did the preparatory work for composing the index of names. I wish to express my gratitude to him in this place. I also thank Mr. M. T. P. van Buijtenen, Mr. T. H. Janssen and Mr. Th. G. Sinnige, who each took their share in the laborious task of reading the proofs.

C. J. d. V.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

In the second edition a few small corrections have been made. The Bibliography was completed.

Utrecht, nov. 1963.

C. J. d. V.

EDITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

As in my previous volumes, I have used the best modern editions. Since the authors cited are numerous and the texts are all mentioned in the bibliography, it is hardly necessary to give a complete list of them. The following indications may be sufficient.

For Epicurus I used Bailey ¹⁾, for the ancient Stoa Von Arnim SVF, for Sextus Emp. Mutschmann and Mau; for Cicero, Seneca, Musonius, Epictetus, M. Aurelius, Plutarchus, Maximus Tyrius, Apuleius, Porphyrius and Iamblichus the Teubner editions mentioned in the bibliography; for Philo Cohn-Wendland, for Albinus P. Louis, for the *Hermetica* Nock-Festugière, for Irenaeus (Valentinus) Stieren, for Numenius Leemans, for Plotinus *Enn.* I-III Henri-Schwyzler, for *Enn.* IV-VI Bréhier; for Proclus' *Elementa* Dodds, for the Timaeus commentary Diehl, and for the other commentaries the editions mentioned in the bibliography. For Damascius Ruelle.

Where I chose a reading different from those editions, I usually said so in a note.

I did not abuse of abbreviations. Those which are used require hardly any explanation. In the indexes of concepts and Greek words such formulas as "according to" and "small print" are written: *acc. to* and *sm. pr.*

¹⁾ A copy of *The extant remains*, which was out of print for several years, was procured for me by the great kindness of Dr. Bailey himself, when I had the pleasure of meeting him in Oxford, May 1951.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

805—The profound political change in the Greek world after Alexander had its reflexion in philosophical thought. The disappearance of the polis, the loss of freedom, the utter uncertainty of all outward circumstances of life, lead on the one hand to a narrowing of the interests (individualism and culture of the personality as an aim in itself), on the other hand to an extension of the ken (universalism). On the whole, they lead to a striving for inner peace, which consists of being freed from passions and desires (ἀπάθεια and ἀταραξία).

(1) a. The note of individualism appears strongly in Epicureanism, **Individualism** which might even be defined as "living to oneself". See our XXth chapter, especially nrs. **860a, 861a, 878, 879**.

b. It appears also in the Stoa, which is, after all, a philosophy aiming at a certain moral or spiritual training of the individual man, hardening him against the vicissitudes of life. Ch. XXI, nrs. **942, 1006-1011, 1044**.

c. It may be seen, also in Pyrrho's utter indifferentism to anything happening round about him. Ch. XXII, nr. **1082b**.

(2) The note of universalism appears most strikingly in the greatest **Universalism** dogmatical system of the period: the Stoa, which may be rightly called *a cosmic religion*.

Festugière, *Le dieu cosmique*, especially chapters IX-XIV.

Our ch. XXI, nrs. **919-934**.

I do not think Festugière is right in denying any oriental influence on the Stoic cosmic religion. It is quite true that Plato taught a cosmic religion in his later dialogues (*Tim.* and *Nom.*), and that, with an important modification, Aristotle taught it in his *Π. φιλ.* Yet, why should not persons like Zeno of Citium, Chrysippus of Soli, Diogenes called the Babylonian, Antipater of Tarsus and Posidonius of Apamea in their general attitude of mind have been more or less influenced by that spiritual climate from which they came by birth? The room dedicated to Cyprian art in the Louvre-Museum, adjacent to the compartment of Syria and Anatolia, speaks an eloquent language as to the character of this civilization.

(3) Our third note, which means that during this period happiness is defined in a negative way, may be first observed in Epicureanism: **A negative definition of happiness** ch. XX, nrs. **860a, 864a**; next in the Stoic striving after ἀπάθεια (ch. XXI, nrs. **1059-1062; XXIII, nrs. (1166), 1211**, and finally in the

ἀταραξία of Pyrrho and Arcesilaus and of the later Sceptics (XXII, nr. 1087a).

**School-
philosophy**

806—During the Hellenistic-Roman period philosophy remains a school-discipline, and as such preserves a technical character. E.g. the letters of Epicurus, especially those to Herodotus and to Pythocles, and the discussions between Stoics and Sceptics. Even a man like Epictetus shows himself to be interested in purely theoretical questions (*Diss.* III 9, 21). Therefore, one would be mistaken in thinking that after Aristotle Greek philosophy was made popular and preached for everyman. It was, but during the last three centuries B.C. only occasionally, by some few individuals, (Bion of Borysthene etc., ch. XXIII, nrs. 1249 ff.); more generally during the Roman Empire, but even then not so as to take the place of the school-philosophy, in its more technical sense.

**and world-
philosophy**

Thus, next to the school-philosophy, the Hellenistic-Roman age knew a more popular form of philosophy addressed to every man of good intention. The Cynical device ὅτι πᾶσι φιλοσοφητέον, later found in Musonius Rufus (nr. 1227bc) and Epictetus, expresses another kind of *universalism*.

**Number of
students**

807—We know something about the number of students of philosophy during the generation directly after Aristotle¹.

Diog. Laert. V 37 (about Theophrastus): Ἀπηντων δ' εἰς τὴν διατριβὴν αὐτοῦ μαθηταὶ πρὸς δισχιλίους.

Now Theophr. directed the school for 34 years, so there was an average of 60 students a year. Consequently we have to imagine that in the Lyceum lectures were held for hundreds of people. To this one must take into account that at the same time three other flourishing schools of philosophy existed at Athens (the Academy, that of Epicurus and of the Stoa), and besides that outside of Athens Stilpo of Megara attracted many people, while others went to Eretria and heard Menedemus.

**Synopsis of
Epicurus
and the Stoa**

808—Both Epicurus and Zeno try to give an answer to the same question, namely: *How to live? How to be happy in a so uncertain world?* Their replies are opposed the one to the other on the following points:

(1) In defining the *telos* or *summum bonum*: according to Epicurus it is pleasure, according to Zeno virtue.

¹ The remark was made by G. Verbeke, *Kleanthes* p. 12, who gives a good introduction into the Hellenistic period in his first chapter.

(2) In physics: both systems are a kind of materialism, but Epicurus teaches a mere mechanicism (nothing exists but the atoms moved by a merely mechanical force), Zeno vitalism (matter is animated); Epicurus holds that organisms are fortuitous combinations, Zeno is a finalist; Epicurus teaches the contingency of all things, Zeno defends fatalism (the rule of a fixed and inexorable law of the universe which is the Divine Logos); Epicurus admits innumerable worlds, once to be dissolved into their elements, the Stoa one kosmos, either eternal (Panaetius) or periodically perishing and rebuilt (the general Stoic doctrine).

(3) In theology: Epicurus teaches that the gods live in the intermundia and are not concerned with the world; the Stoa holds that the Divine penetrates the world and leads it by *pronoia*.

(4) In theory of knowledge: Epicurus teaches consequent sensualism (every sense-impression is true); according to Zeno the intellect has to judge about the value of sense-impressions.

(5) The soul: for Epicurus it is merely material and therefore perishing with the body; the Stoa, in spite of its materialistic starting point, tends to spiritualism. Later Stoics believe in the soul's immortality.

(6) Political life: According to Epicurus it is normally to be avoided; according to Stoics only exceptionally (in perfectly desperate cases).

809—Pyrrho and the later Sceptics give a third reply to the questions **A third reply** of "how to live" and "how to be happy": by suspending one's judgment (*ἐποχή*). In practical life they either showed a complete indifferentism (Pyrrho), or were led by practical evidence (Arcesilaus and Carneades). Later Sceptics elaborated a systematical empiricism.

Chronologically Pyrrho precedes Epicurus, but I hardly think he influenced him. Epicurus, on the other hand, preceded Zeno, and I do think the founder of the Stoa was influenced by Epicurus' doctrine.

Preferring to follow the lines of the different schools to a disposition of the stuff according to succession in time, I treat first Epicurus and his school, next the Stoa and thirdly scepticism.

BOOK V

POST-ARISTOTELIAN DOGMATISM AND THE SCEPTICAL REACTION

TWENTIETH CHAPTER EPICURUS AND HIS SCHOOL

I—THE MAN AND HIS WORKS

Life **810—a.** Diog. Laert. X, 1-2:

Ἐπίκουρος Νεοκλέους καὶ Χαιρεστράτης Ἀθηναῖος, τῶν δῆμων Γαργήτιος, γένους τοῦ τῶν Φιλαῖδων, ὥς φησι Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῷ περὶ εὐγενείας. τοῦτόν φασιν ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἡρακλείδης ἐν τῇ Σωτίωνος ἐπιτομῇ, κληρουχισάντων Ἀθηναίων τὴν Σάμον, ἐκεῖ τραφῆναι, ὀκτωκαιδεκέτη δ' ἐλθεῖν εἰς Ἀθήνας, Ξενοκράτους μὲν ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ, Ἀριστοτέλους δ' ἐν Χαλκίδι διατρίβοντος ¹. τελευτήσαντος δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Μακεδόνος καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐκπεσόντων ² ὑπὸ Περδίκκου, μετελθεῖν εἰς Κολοφῶνα πρὸς τὸν πατέρα. (2) χρόνον δέ τινα διατρίψαντα αὐτόθι καὶ μαθητὰς ἀθροίσαντα ³ πάλιν ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς Ἀθήνας ἐπὶ Ἀναξικράτους ⁴, καὶ μέχρι μὲν τινος κατ' ἐπιμιξίαν τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσοφεῖν, ἔπειτα ἰδίᾳ ἀποφαινέσθαι τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ κληθεῖσαν ἀίρεσιν συστήσαντα. ἐφάψασθαι τε φιλοσοφίας αὐτός φησιν ἔτη γεγωνὶς τέτταρα καὶ δέκα· Ἀπολλόδωρος δ' ὁ Ἐπικούρειος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου βίου φησὶν ἐλθεῖν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν καταγνόντα τῶν γραμματιστῶν, ἐπειδὴ μὴ ἐδυνήθησαν ἐρμηνεῦσαι αὐτῷ τὰ περὶ τοῦ παρ' Ἡσιόδῳ χάους.

**How he came
to philosophy**

b. Sextus, *Math.* X (*Against the Physicists* II) 18-19:

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἰπὼν

ἦτοι μὲν πρῶτιστα χάος γένετ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα

γαῖ' εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος,

ἐξ αὐτοῦ περιτρέπεται ⁵. ἐρομένου γὰρ τινος αὐτὸν ἐκ τίνος γέγονε τὸ χάος,

¹ In the year 322.

² Sc. ἐκ τῆς Σάμου.

³ Vid. sub c.

⁴ In the year 307/6.

⁵ „is refuted by himself”.

οὐχ ἔξει λέγειν. καὶ τοῦτό φασι νῦν αἴτιον γεγονέναι Ἐπικούρῳ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ὁρμῆς. κομιδῇ γὰρ μεираκίσκος ὢν ἤρετο τὸν ἐπαναγινώσκοντα αὐτῷ γραμματιστὴν “ἦτοι μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γένετ’”, ἐκ τίνος χάος ἐγένετο, εἴπερ πρῶτον ἐγένετο. τούτου δὲ εἰπόντος μὴ αὐτοῦ ἔργον εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα διδάσκειν ἀλλὰ τῶν καλουμένων φιλοσόφων, τοίνυν, ἔφησεν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, ἐπ’ ἐκείνους μοι βαδιστέον ἐστίν, εἴπερ αὐτοὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀλήθειαν ἴσασιν.

c. Diog. Laert. X 15:

First school

‘Υπάρχοντα δ’ αὐτὸν ἐτῶν δύο καὶ τριάκοντα πρῶτον ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ καὶ Λαμψάκῳ συστήσασθαι σχολὴν ἐπὶ ἔτη πέντε· ἔπειθ’ οὕτως εἰς Ἀθήνας μετελθεῖν..

811—He shows a marked hostility towards learning and disparages all other philosophers in a rather disagreeable way. He is said to have heard the lectures of the Democritean *Nausiphanes* at Teos, but has no good word for him either.

a. Sextus, *Math.* I 1-4, says that both Epicurus and the School of Pyrrho were hostile towards the μαθηματικοί (“professors of Arts and Sciences”), and this for different reasons:

Hostility
towards
learning

Οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ὡς τῶν μαθημάτων μηδὲν συνεργούντων πρὸς σοφίας τελείωσιν, ἣ ὡς τινες εἰκάζουσι, τοῦτο προκάλυμμα τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀπαιδευσίας εἶναι νομίζοντες (ἐν πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀμαθῆς Ἐπίκουρος ἐλέγχεται, οὐδὲ ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ὁμιλίαις καθαρεύων), τάχα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους δυσμένειαν πολυμαθεῖς γεγονότας. οὐκ ἀπέοικε δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς Νausιφάνην τὸν Πύρρωνος ἀκουστὴν ἔχθραν· πολλοὺς γὰρ τῶν νέων συνεῖχε καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων σπουδαίως ἐπεμελεῖτο, μάλιστα δὲ ῥητορικῆς. γενόμενος οὖν τούτου μαθητῆς ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ὑπὲρ τοῦ δοκεῖν αὐτοδίδακτος εἶναι καὶ αὐτοφυῆς φιλόσοφος ἠρνεῖτο ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου, τὴν τε περὶ αὐτοῦ φήμην ἐξαλείφειν ἔσπευδε, πολὺς τε ἐγένετο τῶν μαθημάτων κατήγορος, ἐν οἷς ἐκεῖνος ἐσεμνύνετο. φησὶ γοῦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους ἐπιστολῇ “οἶμαι δὲ ἔγωγε τοὺς βαρυστόνους καὶ μαθητὴν με δόξειν τοῦ πλεύμονος εἶναι, μετὰ μεираκίων τινῶν κραιπαλώντων ἀκούσαντα,” νῦν πλεύμονα καλῶν τὸν Νausιφάνην ὡς ἀναίσθητον. καὶ πάλιν προβάς πολλά τε κατειπῶν ἀνδρὸς ὑπεμφαίνει τὴν ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν αὐτοῦ προκοπὴν λέγων “καὶ γὰρ πονηρὸς ἄνθρωπος ἦν καὶ ἐπιτετηδευκῶς τοιαῦτα ἐξ ὧν οὐ δυνατόν εἰς σοφίαν ἔλθεῖν,” αἰνισσόμενος τὰ μαθήματα.

b. Cicero, who is not a friend of Epicurus, says in *N.D.* I, 26, 73:
In Nausiphane Democriteo tenetur: quem cum a se non neget auditum, vexat tamen omnibus contumeliis.

pupil of
Nausiphanes

We have to admit either that Epic. studied philosophy between the age of 20 and 30, till he started to teach himself at the age of 32 (Bailey), and that he heard Nausiphanes after his 20th year¹, roaming, either alone or with his parents, through the towns of Mikrasia,—or to imagine, as Festugière² does, that the young Epicurus at the age of 14 was sent to Teos by his father and stayed there till 17, following the lectures of Nausiphanes among the “jeunesse dorée” that surrounded this teacher. In favour of this view F. adduces the following text:

**The school of
Nausiphanes**

c. Vol. Herc. 2 I, 132 ff. (probably from Epicurus' Letter *To the friends at Mytilene*):

“<Αὐτοῦ> ταῖς ἡμεροκωμίαις ἐν Τέῳ συσχόμενος πρὸς τοῦ σοφιστεῦσαι, τοῦ τ' Ἀναξαγόρου ἀναγινώσκοντος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τερθρευομένου κατατεταμένῳ” ἢ πάλιν “ὁ τοὺς Ἐρμοκοπίδας ἐν Τέῳ συκσπτήσας κατὰ Δ' ἡμόκριτον καὶ <Λεύκιπ>πον πραγματευομένου ἀκουσομένους”.

The word ἡμεροκωμία suggests revels at an unusually early hour. Nausiphanes seems to have arranged such parties “before lecturing”, and is said to have gathered “the lawless young people” (τοὺς Ἐρμοκοπίδας) in Teos, who were going to hear his lectures in which he followed Democritus and Leucippus.

I think Bailey's opinion as to the youth of Epicurus is much more probable. He may, of course, have got some books of Democritus at an early age. This is less romantical than Festugière's picture, but probably more true.

Epicurus' personality

812—Diogenes, after having mentioned a whole series of unelegant predicates, lavished by Epicurus on his colleagues-philosophers—e.g. he called Nausiphanes “the jelly-fish”, an illiterate, a fraud and a trollop; Plato he called ironically “the golden”, Aristotle a profligate, who after devouring his patrimony took to soldiering and selling drugs, Heraclitus a muddler (κυκητής), Democritus Lerocritus etc.—mentions some interesting features of the character of Epicurus and of the life in his school.

his philanthropia

a. Diog. X, 9-10:

Τῷ γὰρ ἀνδρὶ μάρτυρες ἱκανοὶ τῆς ἀνυπερβλήτου πρὸς πάντας εὐγνώμοσύνης ἢ τε πατρίς χαλκαῖς εἰκόσι τιμήσασα οἷ τε φίλοι τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος ὥς μὴδ' ἂν πόλεσιν ὅλαις μετρεῖσθαι δύνασθαι· οἷ τε γινώριμοι πάντες ταῖς δογματικαῖς αὐτοῦ σειρῇσι προσκατασχεθέντες, πλὴν Μητροδώρου τοῦ Στρατονικέως πρὸς Καρνεάδην ἀποχωρήσαντος, τάχα βαρυνθέντος ταῖς ἀνυπερβλήτοις αὐτοῦ χρηστότησιν· ἢ τε διαδοχὴ πασῶν σχεδὸν ἐκλιπουσῶν τῶν ἄλλων³ ἐς αἰ

¹ He is called a Democritean in several other places: Cic., *N.D.* I 26, 73; Suidas, *Life of Epic.*; Vol. Herc. 2 IV f. 206 (cited by Usener, p. 414).

² *Epicure et ses dieux*, p. 25.

³ This statement is exaggerated: probably in the Sceptic School there has been an interruption, in other schools certainly not.

διαμένουσα καὶ νηρίθμους ἀρχὰς ἀπολύουσα ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης τῶν γνωρίμων· ἥ τε πρὸς τοὺς γονέας εὐχαριστία καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ἀδελφούς εὐποιία πρὸς τε τοὺς οἰκέτας ἡμερότης, ὡς δῆλον καὶ τῶν διαθηκῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅτι αὐτοὶ συνεφιλοσόφουν αὐτῷ, ὣν ἦν ἐνδοξότατος ὁ προειρημένος Μῦς· καθόλου τε ἡ πρὸς πάντας αὐτοῦ φιλανθρωπία. Τῆς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς θεοὺς ὁσιότητος καὶ πρὸς πατρίδα φιλίας ἄλεκτος ἡ διάθεσις· ὑπερβολῇ γὰρ ἐπιεικείας οὐδε πολιτείας ἤψατο.

b. He spent nearly his whole life at Athens. Only once or twice he went to Ionia to see his friends there. **The community of the friends**

Diog. ib., 10-11:

Οἱ καὶ πανταχόθεν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀφικνοῦντο καὶ συνεβίουν αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ κήπῳ, καθά φησι καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος, [ὃν καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα μνῶν πρίασθαι. Διοκλῆς δὲ ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ τῆς ἐπιδρομῆς φησιν] εὐτελέστατα καὶ λιτότατα διαιτῶμενοι. “Κοτύλη γοῦν, φησίν, οἰνιδίου ἤρκοοντο, τὸ δὲ πᾶν ὕδωρ ἦν αὐτοῖς ποτόν.” τόν τε Ἐπίκουρον μὴ ἀξιοῦν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν κατατίθεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας, καθάπερ τὸν Πυθαγόραν κοινὰ τὰ φίλων λέγοντα· ἀπιστούντων γὰρ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ δ’ ἀπίστων, οὐδὲ φίλων. αὐτὸς τέ φησιν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς ὕδατι μόνον ἀρκεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρτῳ λιτῷ. καί, “Πέμψον μοι τυροῦ, φησί, κυθριδίου, ἵν’ ὅταν βούλωμαι πολυτελεύσασθαι δύνωμαι.” τοιοῦτος ἦν ὁ τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶναι τέλος δογματίζων.

813—a. *To Leontion*, ap. Diog. X 5 (fr. 143 Us.):

his cordiality

Παιὰν ἄναξ, φίλον Λεοντάριον, οἷου κροτοθορύβου ἡμᾶς ἐνέπλησας ἀναγνόντας σου τὸ ἐπιστόλιον.

Plut., *De recta ratione audiendi* 15, p. 45 f., is displeased with this κροτοθόρυβος of Epic. and calls him ἀηδής.

b. *To Themista*. Ap. Diog., ib. (fr. 125 Us.):

Οἷός τέ εἰμι, ἐὰν μὴ ὑμεῖς πρὸς με ἀφίκησθε, αὐτὸς τρικύλιστος, ὅπου ἂν ὑμεῖς καὶ Θεμίστα παρακαλῇτε, ὠθεῖσθαι.

c. *To a child*: Vol. Herc. 176, col. 18 (fr. 176 Us.):

Ἀφείγμεθα εἰς Λάμψακον ὑγιαίνοντες ἐγὼ καὶ Πυθοκλῆς καὶ Ἐρμαρχος καὶ Κ<τῆ>σιππος, καὶ ἐκεῖ κατειλήφαμεν ὑ<γ>ιαιόντας Θεμίσταν καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς <φί>λο<υ>ς. εὐ δὲ ποιε<ι>ς καὶ σὺ ε<ι> ὑ<γ>ιαινεις καὶ ἡ μ<α>μμη <σ>ου, καὶ πάπαι καὶ Μάτρων<ι> πάντα πε<ί>θη<ι>, <ῶ>σ<π>ερ καὶ ἔ<μ>προσθεν. εὐ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἡ αἰτία, ὅτι καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ <ι> λοιποὶ πάντες σε μέγα φιλοῦμεν, ὅτι τούτοις πείθη πάντα * *.

814—As we saw in **812b**, soberness was one of the essential features **Soberness**

of the Epicurean style of life. The principle is put forth in the following lines.

a. *Letter to Idomeneus*. Stob. *Flor.* XVII 24 (fr. 135 Us.):

Εἰ βούλει πλοῦσιον Πυθοκλέα ποιῆσαι, μὴ χρημάτων προστίθει, τῆς δὲ ἐπιθυμίας ἀφαίρει.

b. Aelianus, *Var. Hist.* IV 13 (fr. 602 Us.):

Ὁ αὐτὸς ἔλεγεν ἐτοίμως ἔχειν καὶ τῷ Διὶ ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας διαγωνίζεσθαι μᾶζαν ἔχων καὶ ὕδωρ.

c. The reason why Epic. thought it good to strive after αὐτάρκεια, is expressed in the following lines.

To Idomeneus. Stob., *Flor.* XVII 14 (Bailey V 28):

Ἐζηλώσαμεν τὴν αὐτάρκειαν οὐχ ὅπως τοῖς εὐτελέσι καὶ λιτοῖς πάντως χρώμεθα, ἀλλ' ὅπως θαρρῶμεν πρὸς αὐτά.

Cheerfulness

815—a. Epicurus prescribed that at regular times there should be feasts. To this purpose he made some arrangements in his testament.

Diog. X 18:

Ἐκ δὲ τῶν γινομένων προσόδων τῶν δεδομένων ἀφ' ἡμῶν Ἀμυνομάχῳ καὶ Τιμοκράτῃ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν μερίζεσθωσαν μεθ' Ἑρμάρχου σκοπούμενοι εἰς τε τὰ ἐναγίσματα τῷ τε πατρὶ καὶ τῇ μητρὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν εἰθισμένην ἄγεσθαι γενέθλιον ἡμέραν ἐκάστου ἔτους τῇ προτέρᾳ δεκάτῃ τοῦ Γαμηλιῶνος, ὥσπερ καὶ εἰς τὴν γινομένην σύνοδον ἐκάστου μηνὸς ταῖς εἰκάσι τῶν συμφιλοσοφούντων ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν ἡμῶν τε καὶ Μητροδώρου μνήμην κατατεταγμένην.

b. We learn something about the spirit and the organization of these feasts in a text of Philodemus.

Vogliano, *Epicuri et Epicureorum scripta*, p. 70, fr. 8, col. I:

.... μῆ[τε τοῖς δι]ὰ ταράχους μ[ο]χθοῦσι, τὰς τ' ἱ[δέας τ]ῶν ἀρίστων καὶ μακ[α]ρισ[τοτάτ]ων φύσεων ἐν μ[νήμῃ] ἔχοντας κ[α]λεῖν εὐωχ[εῖσθαι]¹ αὐτοὺς καὶ γελαῖν ὡς καὶ τ[οὺς] ἄλλους, τοὺς γε [κ]ατὰ τὴν οἰκ[ίαν] ἀπαντας καὶ [τ]ῶ[ν] ἔξωθεν [μνηδέν] ὄλ[ω]ς παραλείποντας, ὅσοι τ[ὰ]ς [εὐ]νοίας [καὶ] τὰς ἑαυτοῦ κ[α]τὰ τ[ὰς τ]ῶν ἑαυτοῦ φίλων ἔχουσιν· οὐ γὰρ δημαγωγῆσειν, τοῦτο πράττοντας, τὴν κενὴν καὶ ἀφυσιο[λ]όγητον δ[η]μαγ[ωγ]ίαν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεω[ς] οἰκ[εί]οις ἐνεργούντας μνη[σθ]ήσεσθαι πάντων τῶν τὰς εὐ[νοίας] ἡμῖν ἐχόντων

¹ Non-members of the School to be invited: 1. (text unreadable). 2. no grumblers. 3. "such persons as have a remembrance of the best and most blessed beings", i.e. the gods.

ὅπως συ[γκαθ]αγίζωσιν τὰ τοῖς ἐπὶ τῇ ἐαυτ[ῶν μα]καρίαι συ[μφι]λοσ[ο]φο[ῦσι] καθ[ή]κοντα.

The sense of these ritual meals is not, as Cic. thinks (*De fin.* II 31, 101), that Epic., in spite of his theory, attributed some form of survival to the dead, but that he wished the sphere of cheerfulness and friendship in his school to be continued after his death.

c. Epic., *Sent. Vat.* XLI (Bailey VA, XLI):

Γελᾶν ἄμα δεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν *.

816—Epicurus intends to give a philosophy of life for the simple ones. Dislike
of learning His first principle is that for being happy very few things are required. Hence he shows a certain dislike of learning and scholarly pretentions.

a. *To Pythocles.* Ap. Diog. X 6 (Bailey V B, 33):

Παιδεῖαν δὲ πᾶσαν, μακάριε, φεῦγε τὰκᾶτιον ἀράμενος.

b. It is from this attitude of mind that we can understand the less agreeable predicates attributed by Epic. to former and contemporary philosophers (**811a**, **812**). On the other hand we find him writing and reproaching Timocrates, who left his school and wrote against it, for despising the philosophers who certainly do not deserve such contempt.

Philodemus, π. κακιῶν I, col. IV, l. 25-29¹:

Καὶ [τ]ῶν φι[λ]οσόφων δὴ καθυπε[ρ]ηφανεῖ, περὶ ὧν ἀποπληξία λέ[γε]ιν ὥς εἰσιν ἐπιτήδειοι καταφρονεῖσθαι.

817—The same letter gives, in opposition to Timocrates' ὑπερηφανία, Simplicity a short summary of Epicurus' attitude in life.

Philodemus, *ib.*, col. IX, l. 1-28 (Jensen, o.c., p. 31):

. [μηδὲ τῶν ἄλλ]ων ἀνθρ[ώ]πων ἐξ[ευτε]λιστὴν μηδ' ἐαυτοῦ θαυμαστήν, καὶ μάλιστα ἐ[πι] τοῖς ἐκ τύχης· μ[η]δ' ἐξηλ[λα]γμένον ἐν μηδενὶ φαίνεσθαι· μηδὲ δ[υσ]πρόσδεκτον εἰς ο[ί]κ[ι]αν καὶ ὁμιλίαν καὶ τῶν λοιπ[ω]ν μετὰδοσιν· μ[η]δ' ἀναξίους ἀποφαίν[ειν] ἐαυτοῦ πάντας· καὶ τατ[τόν]τ[ω]ν ὑπ[α]κού[ει]ν δ[υνά]μεων [καὶ] θε[ῶ]ν· ὥφ[ελία]ς [τε λέγ]ε[ιν] ὑπ' ἐνίων εὐ[εργετῶ]ν γεγ[ο]νέν[α] καὶ εὐ[χαριστ]εῖν ἐπ' αὐταῖς, ἀλλ[ὰ] μὴ κατα[ξ]ιοῦν ἐκ[εῖ]νους μέγα νομίζειν, ὅτι προσδέδεκται τι παρ' αὐτῶν· κἂν χρεῖαν τινὸς [π]οιῇται μείζονος, αὐτὸν θεραπεύειν, ὅπότ[αν] ἀνδάνη, μὴ θεραπεύεσθαι ζητεῖν· πρόνοιαν δ' ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν [καὶ] τῶν ὑπηρετούντων ἐ[λε]υθέρων ἢ συνόντων ἄλλων·

* γελᾶν om. Usener.

¹ Jensen, *Ein neuer Brief Epikurs*, p. 21.

Veneration of friends

818—*To Colotes*. Plut., *Adv. Coloten* 17, p. 1117 b (fr. 141 Us.):

Colotes, on hearing Epicurus' teaching, suddenly knelt before him and venerated him as a god. Epicurus answers him with a glimpse of irony.

ὥς σεβομένῳ γάρ σοι τὰ τότε ὑφ' ἡμῶν λεγόμενα προσέπεσεν ἐπιθύμημα ἀφυσιολόγητον τοῦ περιπλακῆναι ἡμῖν γονάτων ἐφαπτόμενον καὶ πάσης τῆς εἰθισμένης ἐπιλήψεως γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὰς σεβάσεις τινῶν καὶ λιτάς· ἐποίεις οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀνθιεροῦν σὲ αὐτὸν καὶ ἀντισέβεσθαι. ἄφθαρτός μοι περιπᾶται καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀφθάρτους διανοοῦ.

Last letter to Idomeneus

819—On the day of his death Epicurus writes to Idomeneus the following letter. Diog. X 22 (fr. 138 Us.):

Τὴν μακαρίαν ἄγοντες καὶ ἅμα τελευτῶντες ἡμέραν τοῦ βίου ἐγράφομεν ὑμῖν ταυτί· στραγγουρικὰ τε παρηκολούθει καὶ δυσεντερικὰ πάθη ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολείποντα τοῦ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους· ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ. σὺ δὲ ἀξίως τῆς ἐκ μειρακίου παραστάσεως πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιμελοῦ τῶν παίδων Μητροδώρου.

Works

820—Of the works of Epic. we possess in the tenth book of Diog. Laert. the three great epistles (that to *Herodotus*, which is a treatise on physics, that to *Pythocles*, on the celestial phenomena, and the letter to *Menoceus* on ethics), the *Kyriai doxai* and a considerable number of fragments. Of the great work π. φύσεως important fragments have been found on papyri, published by Vogliano. The *Letter to Idomeneus*, cited sub **816, 817**, on Timocrates' *ὑπερφηφάνια* was admirably reconstructed and explained by Chr. Jensen.

2—BASIC PRINCIPLES: THE CANONICE

The Canon

821—Diog. X 30:

Διαιρεῖται τοίνυν (sc. philosophy, according to Epic.) εἰς τρία, τό τε κανονικὸν καὶ φυσικὸν καὶ ἠθικόν. τὸ μὲν οὖν κανονικὸν ἐφόδους ἐπὶ τὴν πραγματείαν ἔχει καὶ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Κανών.

Ἡ κανονική: the doctrine of the leading principles. It was concerned with the criterium (or criteria) of truth. The title seems to have been inspired by a work of Democr.: Π. λογικῶν κανόν.

All sensibles are true and existent

822—The summary of Epicurus' theory of knowledge, which forms the basis of his doctrine, is expressed by Sextus, *Adv. Math.* VIII (*Against the Logicians* II) 9:

Ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ πάντα ἔλεγεν ἀληθῆ καὶ ὄντα. οὐ διήνεγκε γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τι λέγειν ἢ ὑπάρχον· ἔνθεν καὶ ὑπογράφων τὰληθὲς καὶ

ψεῦδος “ἔστι” φησὶν “ἀληθὲς τὸ οὕτως ἔχον ὡς λέγεται ἔχειν,” καὶ “ψεῦδός ἐστι” φησὶ “τὸ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον ὡς λέγεται ἔχειν.”

Which means: there is one means of knowledge, and one only, namely sense-perception, which is in itself our last and only guarantee of truth.—This solution of the problem of knowledge is, after Plato's *Theaet.* and Aristotle's *Post. Anal.*, incredibly simplistic. We can agree with Bailey that Epicurus' atomic theory shows a certain genius; yet, it must be granted that his philosophical basis was extremely weak.

823—a. In Diog. X 31 three or even four criteria are mentioned:

αἰσθήσεις,
προλήψεις,
πάθη

Ἐν τοίνυν τῷ Κανόνι λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ προλήψεις καὶ τὰ πάθη, οἱ δ' Ἐπικούρειοι καὶ τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας.

It is hardly possible that Epic. should have intended to introduce other standards of truth besides the senses.

b. Cf. *Kyriai doxai* XXIII (Diog. X 146):

Εἰ μάχῃ πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, οὐχ ἔξεις οὐδ' ἂν φῆς αὐτῶν διεψεῦσθαι πρὸς τί ποιούμενος τὴν ἀναγωγὴν κρίνης.

c. Also *K.D.* XXIV (Diog. ib. 147):

Εἴ τιν' ἐκβαλεῖς ἀπλῶς αἰσθῆσιν, . . . συνταράξεις καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις, . . . ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν ἐκβαλεῖς.

d. *Lucr.* IV, 469-70, 472-79:

Denique nil sciri siquis putat, id quoque nescit
470 an sciri possit, quoniam nil scire fatetur.
Et tamen hoc quoque uti concedam scire, at id ipsum
quaeram, cum in rebus veri nil viderit ante,
475 unde sciat quid sit scire et nescire vicissim,
notitiam veri quae res falsique crearit
et dubium certo quae res differre probarit.
Invenies primis ab sensibus esse creatam
notitiem veri neque sensus posse refelli.

e. *To Herod.*, ap. Diog. X 38:

Ἐτι τε κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντα τηρεῖν.

We can hardly admit that the following words of this passage should retract anything of the first principle. The text runs:

Καὶ ἀπλῶς <κατὰ> τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς εἴτε διανοίας εἴθ' ὅτου δήποτε τῶν κριτηρίων. ὁμοίως δὲ κατὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη, ὅπως ἂν καὶ τὸ προσ-
μέμον καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἔχωμεν οἷς σημειωσόμεθα.

What is meant by ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας and by other criteria will be explained in the following numbers.

What are
προλήψεις?

824—What then are προλήψεις and in what sense can they be called criteria?

a. Diog. X 33:

Τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἶονεῖ κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν ἢ ἔννοιαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόησιν ἐναποκειμένην, τουτέστι μνήμην τοῦ πολλάκις ἔξωθεν φανέντος, οἷον τὸ Τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ῥηθῆναι ἄνθρωπος εὐθὺς κατὰ πρόληψιν καὶ ὁ τύπος αὐτοῦ νοεῖται προηγουμένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων.

Thus, the general notion called πρόληψις is a sediment of various sensations. Having such a notion in our mind, we are able to identify new individual perceptions.

b. Same passage, continued:

Παντὶ οὖν ὀνόματι τὸ πρῶτως ὑποτεταγμένον ἐναργές ἐστι· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐζητήσαμεν τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ μὴ πρότερον ἐγνώκειμεν αὐτό, οἷον Τὸ πόρρω ἐστὼς ἵππος ἐστὶν ἢ βοῦς· δεῖ γὰρ κατὰ πρόληψιν ἐγνωσθῆναι ποτὲ ἵππου καὶ βοὸς μορφήν· οὐδ' ἂν ὠνομάσαμεν τι μὴ πρότερον αὐτοῦ κατὰ πρόληψιν τὸν τύπον μαθόντες. ἐναργεῖς οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ προλήψεις καὶ τὸ δοξαστὸν ἀπὸ προτέρου τινὸς ἐναργοῦς ἡρτῆται, ἐφ' ὃ ἀναφέροντες λέγομεν, οἷον Πόθεν ἴσμεν εἰ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος;

The explanation is, of course, a *circulus*: perception is explained by perception.

c. Cf. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* II 4, 16, 3 (Stählin II, p. 121, 10-13):

Πρόληψιν δὲ ἀποδίδωσιν ἐπιβολὴν ἐπὶ τι ἐναργές καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐναργῆ τοῦ πράγματος ἐπίνοιαν.

Epic. in the passage cited sub **823e** speaks of ἐπιβολὰς εἴτε διανοίας εἰθ' ὅτου δὴποτε τῶν κριτηρίων: directing one's attention (either of the mind or of whatever other means of knowledge) to a thing.

Notitia
or *notities*
in Lucr.

825—In Lucr. the πρόληψις appears as a *notitia veri falsique*, by which alone we are able to distinguish between what is doubtful and what is certain.

a. Lucr. IV 474 ff., cited sub **823d**.

b. How would the gods have brought forth a world, if they had not had a *notities* of it?

Lucr. V 181 f.:

Exemplum porro gignundis rebus et ipsa
notities divis hominum unde est insita primum?

The passage will be quoted at length sub 854 b.

c. And how could man have invented language, if he had not a notion of it by a language already existing round about him?

Lucr. V 1046-49:

Praeterea si non alii quoque vocibus usi
inter se fuerant, unde insita notities est
utilitatis et unde data est huic prima potestas,
quid vellet facere ut sciret animoque videret?

826—The πάθη, finally, are a criterium in ethics, and they too can be reduced to the senses, for “good” is what is agreeable to them, and “bad” what is not. The
πάθη as
a criterium

a. Diog. X 34:

Πάθη δὲ λέγουσιν εἶναι δύο, ἡδονὴν καὶ ἀλγηδónα, ἰστάμενα περὶ πάντων ζῶον· καὶ τὴν μὲν οἰκεῖον, τὴν δὲ ἀλλότριον· δι’ ὧν κρίνεσθαι τὰς αἰρέσεις καὶ φυγὰς.

b. *To Menoeceus*, ap. Diog. X 129:

Ταύτην γὰρ (sc. τὴν ἡδονὴν) ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἐγνώμεν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πάντων ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες.

827—In Diog. X 31 there is spoken of ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας as a fourth criterium, introduced not by Epic. himself but in his School (nr. 823a; cf. 824c, with note 1). We find the term used by Epic: ἐπιβολὴ
τῆς διανοίας

a. in the letter to Herod., Diog. X 38, cited above, sub 823e; cp. 824c.

b. in K.D. XXIV (Diog. X 147):

Εἴ τιν’ ἐκβαλεῖς ἀπλῶς αἰσθῆσιν καὶ μὴ διαιρήσεις τὸ δοξαζόμενον κατὰ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ τὴν αἰσθῆσιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας, συνταράξεις καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίᾳ δόξῃ.

τὸ προσμένον: that which awaits to be confirmed by experience.

τὸ παρὸν: “that which is already present, whether in sensation or in feelings or in any presentative perception of the mind” (Hicks).

Epic. means that certain beings, e.g. the gods, send out *eidola* so fine, that they can only be perceived by the finer atoms of the mind, provided it directs its attention to them. Thus, here again we have a kind of aisthesis, be it of a subtler form.

828—Epic. supports his criteriology by two arguments:

Epicurus’
arguments

for his
sensualism

- (1) sensation is irrational and therefore immediate,
(2) we do not possess any other criterium by which we could refute it.

Diog. X 31-32:

Πᾶσα γάρ, φησίν, αἰσθησις ἄλογός ἐστι καὶ μνήμης οὐδεμιᾶς δεκτική· οὔτε γὰρ ὑφ' αὐτῆς οὔτε ὑφ' ἐτέρου κινήσεισα δύναται τι προσθεῖναι ἢ ἀφελεῖν οὐδὲ ἐστὶ τὸ δυνάμενον αὐτὰς διελέγξαι. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ὁμοιογενὴς αἰσθησις τὴν ὁμογενῇ διὰ τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν, οὔθ' ἡ ἀνομογένεια τὴν ἀνομογένειαν· οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσι κριτικαί· οὔτε μὴν λόγος, πᾶς γὰρ λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἥρτηται· οὔθ' ἡ ἑτέρα τὴν ἑτέραν· πάσαις γὰρ προσέχομεν.

A criticism of this theory may be found in Plato's *Theaet.* "Αἰσθησις αἰ τοῦ ὄντος ἐστίν" is said in that dialogue. So far Epic. is right. The senses do not lie. But how then to explain ψευδὴς δόξα?

3—THE ATOMIC THEORY

829—In principle Epic. adopted the atomic theory of Democr., though it might seem not to be compatible with his standard of knowledge. In fact Epic. holds that the senses first give us positive σημεία for the atomic theory, and secondly procure us a method of negative control: κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντα τηρεῖν (*To Herod.* 38), which means, our theories are never allowed to be against sense data.

The
ἀδῆλα
Nothing is
created out
of nothing,
nothing
destroyed
into nothing

a. *To Herod.*, ap. Diog. X 38-41:

Ταῦτα δεῖ διαλαβόντας συνορᾶν ἤδη περὶ τῶν ἀδῆλων, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐδὲν γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· πᾶν γὰρ ἐκ παντὸς ἐγίνετ' ἂν, σπερμάτων γε οὐθὲν προσδεόμενον. καὶ εἰ ἐφθείρετο δὲ τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, πάντα ἂν ἀπωλώλει τὰ πράγματα, οὐκ ὄντων τῶν εἰς αὐτὸ διελύετο. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν αἰ τοιοῦτον ἦν οἶον νῦν ἐστὶ καὶ αἰ τοιοῦτον ἔσται. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν εἰς δ μεταβάλλει. παρὰ γὰρ τὸ πᾶν οὐθὲν ἐστὶν δ ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς αὐτὸ τὴν μεταβολὴν ποιῆσαιτο. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐστὶ <σώματα καὶ τόπος>*· τὰ μὲν γὰρ σώματα ὥς ἐστὶν αὐτὴ ἡ αἰσθησις ἐπὶ πάντων μαρτυρεῖ καθ' ἣν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἀδῆλον τῷ λογισμῷ τεκμαίρεσθαι (ὥσπερ προεῖπον τὸ πρόσθεν). εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦν δ κε- νὸν καὶ χῶραν καὶ ἀναφῇ φύσιν ὀνομάζομεν, οὐκ ἂν εἶχε τὰ σώματα ὅπου ἦν οὐδε δι' οὗ ἐκινεῖτο, καθάπερ φαίνεται κινούμενα. παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐθὲν ἐπινοηθῆναι δύναται οὔτε περιληπτῶς** οὔτε ἀναλόγως τοῖς περιληπτοῖς, ὥς τὰ καθ' ὅλας φύσεις λαμβανόμενα καὶ μὴ ὥς τὰ τούτων συμπτώματα ἢ συμβεβηκότα¹

¹ By συμπτώματα Epic. means *accidents*, by συμβεβηκότα however he designs *permanent properties*, not separable from the thing.

* <σώματα καὶ τόπος> Usener, followed by Bailey.

** περιληπτικῶς corr. Bailey.

λεγόμενα. — καὶ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ συγκρίσεις, τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποίηνται. ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἄτομα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα, εἴπερ μὴ μέλλει πάντα εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν φθαρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ἰσχύοντα* ὑπομένειν ἐν ταῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων, πλήρη τὴν φύσιν ὄντα καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντα ὅπη ἢ ὅπως διαλυθήσεται. ὥστε τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀτόμους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σωμάτων φύσεις.

Bodies and space

b. Ib., 41:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἄπειρόν ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ πεπερασμένον ἄκρον ἔχει· τὸ δὲ ἄκρον παρ' ἑτερόν τι θεωρεῖται. ὥστε οὐκ ἔχον ἄκρον πέρας οὐκ ἔχει, πέρας δὲ οὐκ ἔχον ἄπειρον ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐ πεπερασμένον. καὶ μὴν καὶ τῷ πλήθει τῶν σωμάτων ἄπειρόν ἐστι τὸ πᾶν καὶ τῷ μεγέθει τοῦ κενοῦ.

Infinity of the universe

830—a. Ib., 42:

Πρὸς τε τούτοις τὰ ἄτομα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ μεστά, ἐξ ὧν καὶ αἱ συγκρίσεις γίνονται καὶ εἰς ἃ διαλύονται, ἀπερίληπτά ἐστι ταῖς διαφοραῖς τῶν σχημάτων· οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν γενέσθαι τὰς τοσαύτας διαφορὰς ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν σχημάτων περιελημμένων. καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ σχημάτισιν ἀπλῶς ἄπειροὶ εἰσιν αἱ ὁμοίαι, ταῖς δὲ διαφοραῖς οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἄπειροι, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀπερίληπτοι.

Differences of shape in the atoms

The question will be explained sub 832 b.

b. Ib., 43:

Κινουῦνται τε συνεχῶς αἱ ἄτομοι τὸν αἰῶνα.

Motion of the atoms

831—a. Besides shape and size the atoms must possess weight. Diog. X 54:

Shape, weight and size

Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους νομιστέον μηδεμίαν ποιότητα τῶν φαινομένων προσφέρεσθαι πλὴν σχήματος καὶ βάρους καὶ μεγέθους καὶ ὅσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης σχήματι συμφυῇ ἐστι· ποιότης γὰρ πᾶσα μεταβάλλει, αἱ δὲ ἄτομοι οὐδὲν μεταβάλλουσιν, ἐπειδὴ περ δεῖ τι ὑπομένειν ἐν ταῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων στερεὸν καὶ ἀδιάλυτον, ὃ τὰς μεταβολὰς οὐκ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν ποιήσεται οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μεταθέσεις <τινῶν>, τινῶν δὲ καὶ προσόδους καὶ ἀφόδους. ὅθεν ἀναγκαῖον τὰ μὴ μετατιθέμενα ἀφθαρτα εἶναι καὶ τὴν τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος φύσιν οὐκ ἔχοντα.

Cf. our nr. 141: Democr. admitted only shape and size in his atoms.

b. [Plut.], Plac. I 3, 26 (285, 15 Dox.):

Ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος τούτοις καὶ τρίτον βάρος προσέθηκεν· ἀνάγκη γάρ, φησί, κινεῖσθαι τὰ σώματα τῇ τοῦ βάρους πληγῇ.

Difference from Democr.

Bailey, *The Gr. atomists* p. 289, thinks that this third property of the atoms was introduced not by Epic., but before him, perhaps by Nausiphanes, because

* ἰσχύόν τι corr. Bailey.

Lucr. ii 225-242 explains the atomic movement not by weight but by the lack of resistance in the void. In fact, the passage of Lucr. does not tend to deny that the downward motion of the atoms is caused by their weight. What he says is that the *meeting* of the atoms in their downward fall cannot be accounted for by their weight, because in the void, which offers no resistance, all bodies, whatever be their weight, move with equal speed.

Other points of difference **832**—Epicurus' theory is original on two other points. The second is his doctrine of the *minimae partes*, by which he can explain the difference in shape of the atoms. Epic. rejects the theory of infinite divisibility of the atoms, because it is against experience.

a. To Herod., ap. Diog. 56-59:

**Theory of
minimae
partes**

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν ἐν τῷ ὀρισμένῳ σώματι ἀπείρους ὄγκους εἶναι οὐδ' ὀπηλικουσούν· ὥστε οὐ μόνον τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον τομὴν ἐπὶ τοῦλαττον ἀναιρετέον, ἵνα μὴ πάντα ἀσθενῇ ποιῶμεν καὶ ὡς ἐν ταῖς περιλήψεσι τῶν ἀθρόων εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀναγκαζώμεθα τὰ ὄντα θλίβοντες καταναλίσκειν· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν μετὰβασιν μὴ νομιστέον γίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς ὀρισμένοις εἰς ἄπειρον μὴδ' <ἐπὶ> τοῦλαττον. οὐτὲ γὰρ ὅπως, ἐπειδὴν ἅπαξ τις εἴπη ὅτι ἄπειροι ὄγκοι ἐν τινι ὑπάρχουσιν ἢ ὀπηλικοιοῦν, ἔστι νοῆσαι πῶς τ' ἂν ἔτι τοῦτο πεπερασμένον εἴη τὸ μέγεθος·—

Τὸ τε ἐλάχιστον τὸ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει δεῖ κατανοεῖν ὅτι οὔτε τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἶον τὸ τὰς μεταβάσεις ἔχον οὔτε πάντως ἀνόμοιον, ἀλλ' ἔχον μὲν τινα κοινότητα τῶν μεταβατῶν*, διάληψιν δὲ μερῶν οὐκ ἔχον·—

Ταύτῃ τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ νομιστέον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀτόμῳ ἐλάχιστον κεχρῆσθαι· μικρότητι γὰρ ἐκεῖνο δῆλον ὡς διαφέρει τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν θεωρουμένου, ἀναλογία δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ κέχρηται.

cf. Lucr. I 599-634. Bailey, *The Gr. Atomists*, p. 285-287.

b. As we saw sub **830a**, Epic. admitted a large number of shapes of the atoms. The theory of *minimae partes* enables us to explain this point further. I cite Bailey, *The Gr. Atomists*, p. 287 f.:

"An ingenious critic ¹ has worked out some of these differences. If, for instance, we suppose the *minimae partes* to be cubes of exactly the same size, then, if an atom contains two only, it can have but one shape ; if it contains three, two

shapes  and ; if four, five shapes on one plane,     

and two more in two planes, according as one of the parts in the last figure be placed on top either of one of its neighbours, or of that at the opposite corner: with five or six parts the possibilities are very largely increased".

* Corr. Schneider; μεταβάτων codd.

¹ Brieger, *Jahrb. Fleck.*, 1875, p. 630.

833—The third point on which Epic. differs from Democr. is his **the clinamen** theory of the *παρέγκλισις*: a “tiny swerve” of the atoms, which is to account for their meeting and collisions, i.e. for the forming and for the dissipation of bodies. Bailey, *Gr. At.* p. 316 says: “It is curious that there is no mention of the “swerve” of the atoms in the Letter to Herodotus: it must have been there either at the beginning of par. 43, where some words have been lost, or in another section which has perished. But we have evidence enough for it elsewhere.”

a. *Diogenes of Oenoanda*, fr. 33, col. II l. 14-col. III, 19:

[Οὐκουν] οἶδας, ὅστις ποτὲ εἶ, καὶ ἐλευθέραν τινὰ ἐν ταῖς ἀτόμοις κείνησιν εἶναι, ἣν Δημόκριτος μὲν οὐχ εὔρεν, Ἐπίκουρος δὲ εἰς φῶς ἤγαγεν, παρεγκλιτικὴν ὑπάρχουσαν, ὥς ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων δείκνυσιν;

b. *Aetius I* 12, 5 (p. 311a 10 Dox.):

Κινεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ἄτομα τότε μὲν κατὰ στάθμην τότε δὲ κατὰ παρέγκλινιν.

c. *Ib.* I 23, 4 (p. 319 Dox.):

Ἐπίκουρος δύο εἶδη τῆς κινήσεως, τὸ κατὰ στάθμην καὶ τὸ κατὰ παρέγκλινιν.

834—The connexion with ethics is clearly brought out by Diog. **Connexion with ethics** *Oenoand.* fr. 33, col. III, l. 9-14 (directly after the above cited lines):

Τὸ δὲ μέγιστον πιστευθείσης γὰρ εἰμαρμένης αἵρεται πᾶσα νουθεσία καὶ ἐπιτείμησις καὶ οὐδὲ τοὺς πονηροὺς [ἐξέσται κολάζειν]¹.

b. *Lucr.* II, 289-293:

Sed ne mens ipsa necessum
intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis
et devicta quasi cogatur ferre patique,
id facit exiguum clinamen principiorum
nec regione loci certa nec tempore certo.

c. *Plut., De sollertia an.* 7, 964c:

Ἄτομον παρεγκλῖναι μίαν ἐπὶ τοῦλάχιστον, ὅπως ἄστρα καὶ ζῷα καὶ τύχη παρεισέλθῃ καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μὴ ἀπόλῃται.

835—This theory has been criticized very severely, both in ancient **Objections** and in modern times.

¹ The last words have been supplied by Usener.

a. Cic., *De fato* X 22 (281 Us.):

Epicurus declinatione atomi vitari necessitatem fati putat. Itaque tertius quidam motus oritur extra pondus et plagam, cum declinat atomus intervallo minimo—id appellat ἐλάχιστον—; quam declinationem sine causa fieri si minus verbis, re cogitur confiteri. Non enim atomus ab atomo pulsa declinat. Nam qui potest pelli alia ab alia, si gravitate feruntur ad perpendicularum corpora individua rectis lineis, ut Epicuro placet? Sequitur enim ut, si alia ab alia numquam depellatur, ne contingat quidem alia aliam. Ex quo efficitur, etiamsi sit atomus eaque declinet, declinare sine causa. Hanc Epicurus rationem induxit ob eam rem, quod veritus est ne, si semper atomus gravitate ferretur naturali ac necessaria, nihil liberum nobis esset, cum ita moveretur animus, ut atomorum motu cogeretur. Id Democritus, auctor atomorum, accipere maluit, necessitate omnia fieri, quam a corporibus individuis naturalis motus avellere.

b. Ib. XX, 46 (Us., ib.):

Declinat, inquit, atomus. Primum cur? Aliam enim quandam vim motus habebant a Democrito impulsionis, quam plagam ille appellat, a te, Epicure, gravitatis et ponderis. Quae ergo nova causa in natura est, qua declinet atomus? Aut num sortiuntur inter se, quae declinet, quae non? Aut cur minimo declinent intervallo, maiore non? Aut cur declinent uno minimo, non declinent duobus aut tribus? Optare hoc quidem est, non disputare.

c. In *De finibus* I 6, 19 he calls it a *res ficta pueriliter* and in *De N.D.* I 25, 70 he even says:

hoc dicere turpius est quam illud quod vult non posse defendere.

On the value of the theory and modern analogies see Bailey, *Gr. At.* p. 320-327.

Atomic speed 836—a. All atoms move at equal rate, because the void offers no resistance.

To Herod. ap. Diog. X 61:

Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἰσοταχεῖς ἀναγκαῖον τὰς ἀτόμους εἶναι, ὅταν διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ εἰσφέρωνται μηδενὸς ἀντικόπτοντος· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ βαρέα θάττον οἰσθήσεται τῶν μικρῶν καὶ κούφων, ὅταν γε δὴ μηδὲν ἀπαντᾷ αὐτοῖς· οὔτε τὰ μικρὰ τῶν μεγάλων, πάντα πόρον σύμμετρον ἔχοντα, ὅταν μηθὲν μηδὲ ἐκείνοις ἀντικόπτῃ· οὔθ' ἢ ἄνω οὔθ' ἢ εἰς τὸ πλάγιον διὰ τῶν κρούσεων φορὰ οὔθ' ἢ κάτω διὰ τῶν ἰδίῳ βαρῶν· ἐφ' ὅπόσον γὰρ ἂν κατίσχη ἑκατέρᾳ αὐτῶν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον

ἅμα νοήματι τὴν φορὰν σχήσει, ἕως <ἂν τι> ἀντικόψη ἢ ἔξωθεν ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου βάρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πλήξαντος δύναμιν.

This theory of Epic. has been confirmed by modern physics.

b. Lucr., II 238-239:

Omnia quapropter debent per inane quietum
aeque ponderibus non aequis concita ferri.

c. *To Herod.*, ap. Diog. X 46b (placed by Bailey after c. 61):

Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡ διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ φορὰ κατὰ μηδεμίαν ἀπάντησιν τῶν ἀντικοψόντων * γινομένη πᾶν μῆκος περιληπτὸν ἐν ἀπερινοήτῳ χρόνῳ συντελεῖ· βράδους γὰρ καὶ τάχους ἀντικοπὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀντικοπὴ ὁμοίωμα λαμβάνει.

837—What becomes of the motions of atoms imprisoned in compounds? —“It is one of the most striking of Epicurus’ acts of “mental apprehension”,” Bailey says (*Gr. At.* p. 331), “that he saw that the motion of the atom through the void at ‘atomic’ speed is not in any way diminished or altered by its entry into a compound body”.

**Motion in
compound
bodies**

To Herod., ap. Diog. X 43:

Κινοῦνται τε συνεχῶς αἱ ἄτομοι τὸν αἰῶνα, καὶ αἱ μὲν . . . ** εἰς μακρὰν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων διιστάμεναι, αἱ δ’ αὐτὸν τὸν παλμὸν ἰσχουσιν, ὅταν τύχῃσιν τῇ περιπλοκῇ κεκλιμέναι ἢ στεγαζόμεναι παρὰ τῶν πλεκτικῶν.

Bailey, l.l., explains: “The only result of the density of formation (sc. of a compound body) is that the atom, as it moves at absolute speed, more immediately comes into conflict with other atoms and is again changed in direction: its “trajectories”—if this term may be applied to its infinitely minute journeyings to and fro—are made shorter and its collisions more frequent.” This perpetual interior vibration of a compound body is called by Epic. *παλμός*. Lucr. described it in II 308-332.

838—The compound body (*ἄθροισμα*, *concilium*) is not a mere aggregate, but a new unity endowed with properties which do not belong to the atoms themselves, e.g. colour. Lucr. II 766-775 argues that, if the atoms had colour, changes of colour could not possibly be accounted for. We cite II. 772-775:

**Properties
of compound
bodies**

Quod si caeruleis constarent aequora ponti
seminibus, nullo possent albescere pacto.
Nam quocumque modo perturbes caerulea quae sint,
numquam in marmoreum possunt migrare colorem.

* ἀντικοψόντων Usener, Bailey; ἀντικοψάντων codd.

** Bailey, following Bignone, indicates a lacuna here. It might be supplied by the words <κατὰ στάθμην, αἱ δὲ κατὰ παρέγκλισιν, αἱ δὲ κατὰ παλμόν. τούτων δὲ αἱ μὲν φέρονται>, as has been suggested by Bignone.

Bailey, *Gr. At.* p. 354 ff., rightly points to the difference between Democr. and Epic. in the appreciation of the so-called secondary qualities: for Democr. only primary qualities were essential and the object of true knowledge; for Epic. however sense-perception is true, and therefore, also secondary qualities are real.

**Definition
of time**

839—We saw (sub **829a**) that Epic. uses the term σύμπτωμα in the sense of *accident*. He defines *time* as “an accident of accidents”.

Sextus, *Adv. Math.* X (Against the Physicists II) 219 (294 Us.):

Ἐπίκουρος δὲ . . . τὸν χρόνον σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων εἶναι λέγει, παρεπόμενον ἡμέραις τε καὶ νυξὶ καὶ ὥραις καὶ πάθεσι καὶ ἀπαθείαις καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ μοναῖς.

Which means: time is not *essentially* connected with things, as is, for instance, weight; and as, for instance, colour is a συμβεβηκός of *visible* things.

**Infinite
number of
worlds**

840—Since there is a countless number of atoms, there is an infinite number of worlds.

a. *To Herod.* ap. Diog. X 45:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ κόσμοι ἄπειροί εἰσιν, οἱ θ' ὅμοιοι τούτῳ καὶ οἱ ἀνόμοιοι· αἱ τε γὰρ ἄτομοι ἄπειροι οὔσαι, ὥς ἄρτι ἀπεδείχθη, φέρονται καὶ πορρωτάτω· οὐ γὰρ κατανήλωνται αἱ τοιαῦται ἄτομοι, ἐξ ὧν ἂν γένοιτο κόσμος ἢ ὑφ' ὧν ἂν ποιηθεῖν, οὔτ' εἰς ἓνα οὔτ' εἰς πεπερασμένους, οὔθ' ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι, οὔθ' ὅσοι διάφοροι τούτοις· ὥστ' οὐδὲν τὸ ἐμποδοστατῆσόν ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν κόσμων.

b. *Ib.* 73:

Ἐπὶ τε τοῖς προειρημένοις τοὺς κόσμους δεῖ καὶ πᾶσαν σύγκρισιν πεπερασμένην, τὸ ὁμοειδὲς τοῖς θεωρουμένοις πυκνῶς ἔχουσιν νομίζειν γεγονέναι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου, πάντων τούτων ἐκ συστροφῶν ἰδίων ἀποκεκριμένων καὶ μειζόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων· καὶ πάλιν διαλύεσθαι πάντα, τὰ μὲν θάττον, τὰ δὲ βραδυτέρον· καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ τοιῶνδε, τὰ δ' ὑπὸ τοιῶνδε τοῦτο πάσχοντα.

**formed by
agglomera-
tions of mat-
ter and dis-
solved again**

metakosmia

c. The space between the different worlds is called by Epicurus μετακόσμια, by Lucr. *intermundia*. It is firstly the place where new worlds may come into being, secondly the dwelling place of the gods.

To Pythocles, ap. Diog. X 89:

Ὅτι δὲ καὶ τοιοῦτοι κόσμοι εἰσὶν ἄπειροι τὸ πλῆθος, ἔστι καταλαβεῖν, καὶ ὅτι ὁ τοιοῦτος δύναται κόσμος γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ καὶ μετακοσμῳ, ὃ λέγομεν μεταξὺ κόσμων διάστημα, ἐν πολυκένῳ τόπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐν μεγάλῳ εἰλικρινεῖ καὶ κενῷ, καθάπερ τινές φασιν.

The coming into being of a world is picturesquely described by Lucr. V 416-508. Cp. also Vergil's *Ecl.* VI. Bailey explains the theory in his *Gr. At.*, p. 364 ff.

841—Lucr. speaks at great length on the ultimate destruction of worlds: V 64-109, 235-415. He thinks that our world is already on the path of decay.

Lucr. V 104-109:

Dictis dabit ipsa fidem res
fortisan et graviter terrarum motibus ortis
omnia conquassari in parvo tempore cernes.
Quod procul a nobis flectat fortuna gubernans,
et ratio potius quam res persuadeat ipsa
succidere horrisono posse omnia victa fragore.

**Our aging
world**

842—Lucr. describes the early development of the animal kingdom in the same way as Empedocles did (our nr. 111): arbitrary combinations arise, of which the fittest survive. **Formation of organisms**

a. Lucr. V 837-850:

Multaque tum tellus etiam portenta creare
conatast mira facie membrisque coorta,
androgynum, interutrasque nec utrum, utrimque remotum,
840 orba pedum partim, manuum viduata vicissim,
muta sine ore etiam, sine vultu caeca reperta,
vinctaque membrorum per totum corpus adhaesu,
nec facere ut possent quicquam nec cedere quoquam
nec vitare malum nec sumere quod foret usus.
845 Cetera de genere hoc monstra ac portenta creabat,
nequiquam, quoniam natura absterruit auctum
nec potuere cupitum aetatis tangere florem
nec reperire cibum nec iungi per Veneris res.
Multa videmus enim rebus concurrere debere,
850 ut propagando possint procudere saecula.

b. Lucr. denies the possibility of the existence of such mythical beings as centaurs, scyllas and chimaeras, and does this by applying the criterium of experience. The passage shows a remarkably keen observation.

Lucr. V 878-894:

Sed neque Centauri fuerunt, nec tempore in ullo
esse queunt duplici natura et corpore bino
880 ex alienigenis membris compacta, potestas

**no centaurs
and
chimaeras**

- hinc illinc par, vis ut sat par * esse potissit.
 Id licet hinc quamvis hebeti cognoscere corde.
 Principio circum tribus actis impiger annis
 floret equus, puer haudquaquam; nam saepe etiam nunc
 885 ubera mammarum in somnis lactantia quaeret.
 Post ubi equum validae vires aetate senecta
 membraque deficiunt fugienti languida vita,
 tum demum puerili aevo florente iuventus
 occipit et molli vestit lanugine malas.
 890 Ne forte ex homine et veterino semine equorum
 confieri credas Centauros posse neque esse,
 aut rabidis canibus succinctas semimarinis
 corporibus Scyllas et cetera de genere horum,
 inter se quorum discordia membra videmus.

843—Since there is no other kind of being than the atoms and the void, the soul must be a body consisting of fine atoms.

The soul a
body
consisting of
fine atoms

a. *To Herod.*, ap. Diog. X 63:

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δεῖ συνορᾶν ἀναφέροντα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ πάθη· οὕτω γὰρ ἡ βεβαιότης πίσις ἔσται, ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμά ἐστι λεπτομερές, παρ' ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα παρεσπαρμένον, προσεμφερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κρᾶσιν ἔχοντι καὶ πῇ μὲν τούτῳ προσεμφερές, πῇ δὲ τούτῳ. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μέρος πολλὴν παραλλαγὴν εἰληφὸς τῇ λεπτομερείᾳ καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων, συμπαθεῖς δὲ τούτῳ μᾶλλον καὶ τῷ λοιπῷ ἀθροίσματι. τοῦτο δὲ πᾶν αἰ δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς δηλοῦσι καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ αἰ εὐκίνησιν καὶ αἰ διανοήσεις καὶ ὧν στερόμενοι θνήσκομεν.

b. The soul has sensation, yet not in itself but by its being enclosed in a body.

Interdepen-
dence of soul
and body

To Herod., ib. 63-65:

Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν δεῖ κατέχειν. οὐ μὴν εἰλήφει ἂν ταύτην, εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ λοιποῦ ἀθροίσματος ἐστεγάζεται πῶς· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἄθροισμα παρασκευάσαν τὴν αἰτίαν ταύτην μετέιληφε καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτου συμπτώματος παρ' ἐκείνης, οὐ μέντοι πάντων ὧν ἐκείνη κέκτηται. διὸ ἀπαλλαγείσης τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔχει τὴν αἰσθησιν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταύτην ἐκέκτητο τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἐτέρῳ ἅμα συγγεγεννημένῳ αὐτῷ παρεσκευάζεν.—65. διὸ δὴ καὶ ἐνυπάρχουσα ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδέποτε, ἄλλου τινὸς μέρους ἀπηλλαγμένου, ἀναισθητεῖ, ἀλλ' ἃ ἂν καὶ ταύτης** ξυναπόληται, τοῦ στε-

* par, vis ut sat par *Giussani*; partis *Lachmann, Bailey*.

** ταύτης *Usener*; ταύτη *codd*.

γάζοντος λυθέντος εἴθ' ὅλου εἴτε καὶ μέρους τινός, ἐάν περ διαμένη, ἔξει τὴν αἴσθησιν· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἄθροισμα διαμένον καὶ ὅλον καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὐκ ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἐκείνου ἀπηλλαγμένου ὅσον ποτέ ἐστι τὸ συντεῖνον τῶν ἀτόμων πλῆθος εἰς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν. καὶ μὴν καὶ διαλυομένου τοῦ ὅλου ἀθροίσματος ἡ ψυχὴ διασπείρεται καὶ οὐκέτι ἔχει τὰς αὐτὰς δυνάμεις οὐδὲ κινεῖται, ὥστε οὐδ' αἴσθησιν κέκτηται.

c. Why the soul cannot be incorporeal:

the soul
cannot be
incorporeal

Id. 67:

Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε δεῖ προσκατανοεῖν, ὅτι τὸ ἀσώματον λέγεται * κατὰ τὴν πλείστην ὁμιλίαν τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπὶ τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸ νοηθέντος ἄν· καθ' ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι τὸ ἀσώματον πλὴν τοῦ κενοῦ. τὸ δὲ κενὸν οὔτε ποιῆσαι οὔτε παθεῖν δύναται, ἀλλὰ κίνησιν μόνον δι' ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς σώμασι παρέχεται. ὥσθ' οἱ λέγοντες ἀσώματον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ματαίῳουσιν.

844—The above point is of great importance for man, since its direct consequence is that death is nothing to us.

Death is
nothing to us

a. *Kyr. dox.* II, ap. *Diog.* X 139:

Ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δ' ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

b. *To Menoeceus*, ap. *Diog.* X 125:

Τὸ φρικωδέστατον οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὁ θάνατος οὐθὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδὴ περ ὅταν μὲν ἡμεῖς ὦμεν, ὁ θάνατος οὐ πάρεστιν· ὅταν δὲ ὁ θάνατος παρῇ, τότε ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμέν.

Together with the message that the gods are not concerned with human affairs this is the gospel of Epicurus to humanity. *Lucr.* explains the physical theory at length in his third book (416-829) and then concludes with a great paean on the mortality of the soul, opening with the following verses:

c. *Lucr.* III 830 f.:

Nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinet hilum,
quandoquidem natura animi mortalis habetur.

4—THE GODS

845—Epicurus was an atheist not in the sense of denying the existence of God(s), but in the sense of denying providence.

Francis Bacon, in his *Essay XVI (Of Atheism)*¹, speaks very precisely of Epicurus, saying:

¹ The *Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon* edited by J. M. Robertson, p. 754 f.

* λέγεται Bignone; λέγει γὰρ codd.

"Epicurus is charged that he did but dissemble for his credit's sake, when he affirmed there were blessed natures, but such as enjoyed themselves without having respect to the government of the world. Wherein they say he did temporize; though in secret he thought there was no God. But certainly he is traduced; for his words are noble and divine: Non Deos vulgi negare profanum; sed vulgi opinio-nes Diis applicare profanum. Plato could have said no more. And although he had the confidence to deny the administration, he had not the power to deny the nature."

The gods
exist, but
are not such
as is mostly
supposed

To Menoecus, ap. Diog. X 123-124:

"Α δέ σοι συνεχῶς παρήγγελον, ταῦτα καὶ πρᾶττε καὶ μελέτα, στοιχεῖα τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν ταῦτ' εἶναι διαλαμβάνων. Πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῶον ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων, ὡς ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόησις ὑπεγράφη, μὴθὲν μήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον μήτε τῆς μακαριότητος ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ πρόσαπτε¹. πᾶν δὲ τὸ φυλάττειν αὐτοῦ δυνάμενον τὴν μετὰ ἀφθαρσίας μακαριότητα περὶ αὐτοῦ δόξαζε. θεοὶ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν. ἐναργῆς δὲ ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἡ γνῶσις· οἷους δ' αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ φυλάττουσιν αὐτοὺς οἷους νομίζουσιν. ἀσεβῆς δὲ οὐχ ὁ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν θεοὺς ἀναιρῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας θεοῖς προσάπτων. (124) οὐ γὰρ προλήψεις εἰσὶν, ἀλλ' ὑπολήψεις ψευδεῖς² αἱ τῶν πολλῶν ὑπὲρ θεῶν ἀποφάσεις, ἔνθεν αἱ μέγιστα βλάβαι [αἵτιαι] τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγονται καὶ ὠφέλεια <τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς>. ταῖς γὰρ ἰδίαις οἰκειοῦμενοι διὰ παντὸς ἀρεταῖς τοὺς ὁμοίους ἀποδέχονται, πᾶν τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον ὡς ἀλλότριον νομίζοντες.

846—Cic., De N.D. I 43-44, gives an Epicurean "proof of the existence of God(s)".

Having spoken of the "error of the poets", to which he adds Chaldaean and Egyptian superstition, and also "popular opinions" which are "more inconsistent and ignorant", Velleius continues:

"Ea qui consideret quam inconsulte ac temere dicantur, venerari Epicurum et in eorum ipsorum numero, de quibus haec quaestio est, habere debeat. Solus enim vidit³ primum esse deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura. Quae est enim gens aut quod genus hominum quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam deorum? quam appellat πρόληψιν Epicurus, id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intelligi quidquam

¹ Cf. *Kyr. dox.* I, sub nr. 865a.

² "Not conceptions derived from sensation" (προλήψεις), "but false suppositions" (Bailey). See sub 848a, b.

³ On this point we have to correct Velleius: Epicurus was certainly not *the* only one to have seen this, for the Stoics too used this proof and counted the notion of God among their κοινὰ ἔννοια. But he may have been the first.

nec quaeri nec disputari potest.—Cum enim non instituto aliquo aut more aut lege sit opinio constituta maneatque ad unum omnium firma consensio, intelligi necesse est esse deos, quoniam insitas eorum vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus. De quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est. Esse igitur deos confitendum est.”

Now a πρόληψις according to Epicurus is founded in sense experience. How then is it possible for man to have a πρόληψις of the gods?

847—The following texts explain how Epic. thinks that man comes to have a πρόληψις of the gods.

Human
experience
of the gods

a. Sextus, *Adv. Math.* IX (*Against the Phys.* I) 25:

Ἐπίκουρος δὲ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους φαντασιῶν οἴεται τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἔννοιαν ἐσπακέναι θεοῦ· μεγάλων γὰρ εἰδώλων, φησί, καὶ ἀνθρωπομόρφων κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους προσπιπτόντων ὑπέλαβον καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ὑπάρχειν τινὰς τοιοῦτους θεοὺς ἀνθρωπομόρφους.

b. Cf. *Aetius* I 7, 34 (Dox. 306):

Ἐπίκουρος ἀνθρωποειδεῖς μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς, λόγῳ δὲ πάντας θεωρητοὺς διὰ τῇν λεπτομέρειαν τῆς τῶν εἰδώλων φύσεως.

c. Cf. Cic., *N.D.* I 19, 49:

Epicurus..... docet eam esse vim et naturam deorum ut..... non sensu sed mente cernatur.

The passage will be treated at length sub nr. **849**. Cp. also Lucr. V 148 f.:

Tenuis enim natura deum longeque remota
sensibus et nostris animi vix mente videtur.

848—a. How to explain these images? May we assume that they come from real beings?—To this Epic. replies: the fact that these appearances occur very frequently and generally is a guarantee that they come indeed from real beings. Hence Epic. says that the belief in gods is founded on an ἐναργής γνώσις (see the passage quoted sub **845**): the repeatedly occurring images cause in the mind of man a durable general notion (πρόληψις) of divine beings.

Ἐναργής
γνώσις

b. In contemplating the order of celestial phaenomena men are inclined to think that sun, moon and stars are divine beings.¹ These

¹ A widely spread belief in Hellenistic times. It can be traced back directly to Plato's later dialogues (*Tim.* and *Nom.*) and to Aristotle's II. φιλ.; further back to Alcmaeon of Croton and probably to Socrates. Festugière treats the subject amply in *Le dieu cosmique*.

προλήψεις however, are not notions founded on sense experience (προλήψεις),
and
ὑπολήψεις Epic. says, but false suppositions (ὑπολήψεις ψευδεῖς); and philosophy
has the task of rooting them out.

Lucr. V 114-116:

Religione refrenatus ne forte rearis
terrās et solem et caelum, mare sidera lunam
corpore divino debere aeterna manere.

c. Also Lucr. V 1183-1197:

Praeterea caeli rationes ordine certo
et varia annorum cernebant tempora verti
1185 nec poterant quibus id fieret cognoscere causas.
Ergo perfugium sibi habebant omnia divis
tradere et illorum nutu facere omnia flecti.
In caeloque deum sedis et templa locarunt,
per caelum volvi quia nox et luna videtur,
1190 luna dies et nox et noctis signa severa
noctivagaeque faces caeli flammaeque volantes,
nubila sol imbres nix venti fulmina grando
et rapidi fremitus et murmura magna minarum.
O genus infelix humanum, talia divis
1195 cum tribuit facta atque iras adiunxit acerbas!
Quantos tum gemitus ipsi sibi, quantaque nobis
vulnera, quas lacrimas peperere minoribu' nostris!

The nature of the gods 849—How does Epic. imagine those material beings from which
spring the eidola grasped by the human mind during sleep?

Cic., *N.D.* I 19, 49:

Epicurus autem, qui res occultas et penitus abditas non modo viderat
animo, sed etiam sic tractat, ut manu ¹, docet eam esse vim et naturam
deorum, ut primum non sensu, sed mente cernatur *, nec soliditate quadam
nec ad numerum ², ut ea, quae ille propter firmitatem στερέμνια appellat,

¹ Cic. speaks with a slight irony, though this does not suit the person of Velleius.

² The gods are "neither solid nor a unity by numerical identity". "Non solid" means: mere outlines (liniamenta, Cic. *N.D.* I 44, 123, i.e. void forms. *Soliditate quadam* is an abl. qual. with *vim et naturam deorum*.

The expression κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἐν (*ad numerum*), is opposed by Ar. (*Metaph.* Δ 6, 1016 b 32) to κατ' εἶδος ἐν. The first is a material unity, the latter a notional one.—Epic. applies the distinction in this way: there are things in which matter is permanent (solid bodies, called στερέμνια, e.g. a stone), and others in which form only

sed imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptis¹: quum infinita simillimarum imaginum species ** ex innumerabilibus individuis existat² et ad deos *** adfluat³, tum maximis voluptatibus in eas imagines mentem intentam infixamque nostram intelligentiam capere, quae sit et beata natura et aeterna.

The passage is treated at length by Bailey, *Gr. At.*, pp. 443-467.

850—Next to the proof *ex consensu gentium* Epic. introduced another proof of the existence of gods, namely, there must be an equilibrium in the universe: therefore, the existence of destructive forces in our world implies the existence of conserving forces elsewhere.

**Second
proof of the
existence
of gods**

a. Cic., *N.D.* I 19, 50:

Summa vero vis infinitatis et magna ac diligenti contemplatione

is permanent (e.g. a flame, a river, a waterfall). Of the last kind are the gods.

This is Epicurus' solution of the problem how material beings can be imperishable: in the *intermundia* there is an unlimited quantity of atoms, everlastingly streaming through the "forms" of the gods, like water through a waterfall (Bailey, p. 452).

¹ *Sed imaginibus perceptis* belongs to the preceding *cernatur*. I propose to translate: "It is rather perceived by images apprehended by their being equal and by a direct passing over from the *intermundia* to our mind".

The images are perceived or apprehended by their similarity (*similitudine*), i.e. single "idols" are too thin to be perceived, but by a succession of similar idols the image can be apprehended by the mind.

My translation of *transitione* is based on a text in Philodemus' treatise π. θεῶν, the fragments of which have been edited by Diels in *Abhandl. d. Kön. Preuss. Akad.* 1916, vol. 4 and 6. In col. IX l. 20 (Diels vol. 6, p. 28) the term ὑπερβάσις is used to indicate a direct passing over from the *intermundia* to the human mind, without passing through the atomic world where they might be crushed and distorted. Bailey, *Gr. At.* p. 449, hesitates to adopt this interpretation and prefers to explain *similitudine et transitione* as a hendiadys: "by a succession of similar idols", taking *transitione* as a translation of the Greek μετάβασις which should mean succession. Cp. Cic. *N.D.* I 39, 109: fluentium frequenter transitio fit visionum, ut e multis una videatur. To this my first objection is that μετάβασις does not mean *succession*, nor does *transitio*.

² Cum existat: "For an infinite number of very similar images spring from innumerable atoms" (individua). Series, as Brieger proposed, is easier to understand than *species*.

³ "And stream to the gods". This is perfectly unintelligible. Bailey, o.c., p. 459, says: "Cicero may fairly be convicted of an inaccuracy due to brevity of expression. He ought rather to have said: 'an infinite succession of similar images is formed out of innumerable atoms, which flow together to make in successive instants the forms of the gods'."

* Perhaps *cernantur*.

** Brieger: *series*.

*** Some mss have *eos*. Lambinus reads: *nos*.

dignissima est, in qua intelligi necesse est eam esse naturam, ut omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant. Hanc *ισονομίαν* appellat Epicurus, id est, aequabilem tributionem. Ex hac igitur illud efficitur, si mortalium tanta multitudo sit, esse immortalium non minorem et, si quae interimant innumerabilia sint, etiam ea quae conservent infinita esse debere.

the principle
of isonomy

b. Lucr. speaks frequently on this principle of isonomy. He even thinks that every species must be represented by an equal number of copies.

Lucr. II 532-540:

Nam quod rara vides magis esse animalia quaedam
fecundamque minus naturam cernis in illis,
at regione locoque alio terrisque remotis
535 multa licet genere esse in eo numerumque repleti;
sicut quadrupedum cum primis esse videmus
in genere anguimanus elephantos, India quorum
milibus e multis vallo munitur eburno,
ut penitus nequeat penetrari: tanta ferarum
540 vis est, quarum nos perpauca exempla videmus.

c. Lucr. II 569-576:

Nec superare queunt motus itaque exitiales
570 perpetuo neque in aeternum sepelire salutem,
nec porro rerum genitales auctificique
motus perpetuo possunt servare creata.
Sic aequo geritur certamine principiorum
ex infinito contractum tempore bellum.
575 Nunc hic nunc illic superant vitalia rerum
et superantur item.

the equi-
brium of
destructive
and con-
serving
forces

Objections
against this
theory

851—Cotta is not convinced, either by Epicurus' arguments for the eternity of the gods or by his second argument for their existence.

Cic., N.D. I 39, 109:

Fluentium frequenter transitio fit visionum, ut e multis una videatur. Puderet me dicere non intelligere, si vos ipsi intelligeretis, qui ista defenditis. Quo modo enim probas continenter imagines ferri? aut, si continenter, quo modo aeternae? Innumerabilitas, inquis, suppeditat atomorum. Num eadem ergo ista faciet ut sint omnia sempiterna? Confugis ad aequilibratam—sic enim *ισονομίαν*, si placet, appellemus—

et ais, quoniam sit natura mortalis, immortalem etiam esse oportere. Isto modo, quoniam homines mortales sunt, sint aliqui immortales, et quoniam nascuntur in terra, nascantur in aqua. "Et quia sunt quae interimant, sint quae conservent". Sint sane, sed ea conservent, quae sunt. Deos istos esse non sentio.

852—With Epic. the standing predicates of the gods are: μακάριον καὶ ἀφθαρτον (K. Δ. I; Ep. III 123). Hence follows directly that the gods are not concerned with governing the universe and with human affairs; for happiness, according to Epic., is ἀπονία and ἀταραξία. Properties of the gods

Kyr. Dox. I, ap. Diog. X 139:

Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἀφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλω παρέχει, ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται· ἐν ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον.

By this Epic. denied firstly that the kosmos is created (i.e. arranged) by a *Demiurge*, such as Plato introduced in his *Tim.*; secondly, the existence of a *pronoia*, as was taught by the Stoics.

853—There are too many bad things in the world that it could be the work of almighty gods. Pessimistic view of the world

a. *Lucr.* V 196-199:

Hoc tamen ex ipsis caeli rationibus ausim
confirmare aliisque ex rebus reddere multis,
nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratum
naturam rerum: tanta stat praedita culpa.

b. *Lactantius, Div. inst.* III 17, 16 cites Epic. in this way: "Nulla", inquit, "dispositio est. Multa enim facta sunt aliter quam fieri debuerunt".

854—a. Firstly the gods had no reason to create a world and human beings. No reason for creation

Lucr. V 165-174:

Quid enim immortalibus atque beatis
gratia nostra queat largiri emolumentum,
ut nostra quicquam causa gerere aggrediantur?
Quidve novi potuit tanto post ante quietos
illicere ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?
170 Nam gaudere novis rebus debere videtur
cui veteres obsunt; sed cui nil accidit aegri

tempore in anteacto, cum pulchre degeret aevum,
quid potuit novitatis amorem accendere tali?
Quidve mali fuerat nobis non esse creatis?

b. Finally, they *could* not create a world unless they had a *notities* of what they were going to make, and this they could not have unless a world existed already.

Impossibility of creation

Ib., 181-186:

Exemplum porro gignundis rebus et ipsa
notities divis hominum unde est insita primum,
quid vellent facere ut scirent animoque viderent,
quove modost umquam vis cognita principiorum
185 quidque inter sese permutato ordine possent,
si non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi?

The idea of teleology criticized

855—The teleological view of nature is very sharply criticized by Lucr., IV 822-842:

Illud in his rebus vitium vementer avessis
effugere, errorem vitareque praemetuenter,
825 lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata,
prospicere ut possimus, et ut proferre queamus
proceros passus, ideo fastigia posse
surarum ac feminum pedibus fundata plicari,
830 bracchia tum porro validis ex apta lacertis
esse manusque datas utraque (ex) parte ministras,
ut facere ad vitam possemus quae foret usus.
Cetera de genere hoc inter quaecumque pretantur
omnia perversa praepostera sunt ratione,
nil ideo quoniam natumst in corpore ut uti
835 possemus, sed quod natumst id procreat usum.
Nec fuit ante videre oculorum lumina nata
nec dictis orare prius quam lingua creatast,
sed potius longe linguae praecessit origo
sermonem multoque creatae sunt prius aures
840 quam sonus est auditus, et omnia denique membra
ante fuere, ut opinor, eorum quam foret usus.
Haud igitur potuere utendi crescere causa.

The gods an example of happiness

856—For Epic. the religious sense of the existence of the gods is, that for man they are an example of happiness.

a. Philodemus, Π. εὐσεβείας 28 (Gomperz, *Herc. Stud.* p. 148):

Οἱ δὲ πεισθέντες οἷς ἐχρησμιωθήσασμεν περὶ θεῶν πρῶτον μὲν ὥς θνητοὶ
μειμῆσθαι τὴν ἐκείνων εὐδαιμονίαν θελήσουσιν,—

b. In this sense Epicureans can say that a blessing comes from the gods to man.

Atticus ap. Euseb., *Praep. Ev.* XV 5:

Ἡδὴ δὲ ταύτῃ γε καὶ κατ' Ἐπίκουρον ὄνησις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπὸ θεῶν
γίνεται.

Atticus, quite consistently, explains the coming of this blessing in a merely physical way (ib.):

Τὰς γοῦν βελτίονας ἀπορροίας αὐτῶν φασι τοῖς μετασχοῦσι μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν
παραίτιας γίνεσθαι.

857—Epicurus knew in his way a kind of ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὸ Epicurean
mysticism
δύνατον (cp. our nr. 318).

Philodemus, *De deorum victu*, Vol. Herc. VI, col. I:

... Καὶ θαυμάζει τῇ[ν] φύσιν [αὐτῶν κ(αί)] τὴν διάθεσιν καὶ πειρᾶται
συνεγγί[ζειν] αὐτῇ καὶ καθαπερεὶ γλίσχεται θιγεῖ[ιν καὶ συ]νεῖναι, καλεῖ τ[ε]
καὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς τῶν [θεῶν] φίλους καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τῶν σοφῶν.

Cp. also our nr. 815b: among those who are to be invited for dinner belongs the group of "such persons as have a remembrance of the best and most blessed beings".

858—In the first column of Philodemus' Περὶ κακίων we find Epicurus Epicurus
favoured by
the gods
talking with the god Asklepios.

Philodemus, Π. κακίων I, col. I, l. 11-26 (Jensen, *Ein neuer Brief Epikurs*, p. 15):

... Τὸν θεὸν δ' εἰπὼν ἐθ[έ]λειν ἀν[ε]υ λ[ύ]πῃ[ς] μένε[ιν οὐ πρ]οσ[δεχόμενον]
τοῦ[ς π]ό[ρους] ε[ὐ]δαίμων[ος] ἔφην εἶν[αι]. "Τί γ[ὰρ]", [ἀντ]εῖπε[ν] "περ[ι]εσ[τά]ι
μοι; [δεδίδ]αχ[α]ς τοὺς θεοὺς τῇ[ν] [ἀταρ]αξίαν [ἐθ]έλοντάς τ[ι] πάσ[χ]ε[ιν] διὰ
τῇ[ν] κ[αταφ]ρόνησιν· κα[ὶ] τῆς τ[ινω]ν ἐνίο[τ'] εὐμ[ενεία]ς μετ[ασχ]ών ἀνέχ[ου]
ζῶντα[ς αὐ]το[ὺς με]τ' ἀ[ταραξί]ας ὅλως [πα]ρ' ἧ[ν] τηροῦσι δίκην, ἐ[πειδ]ὴ
δι' ἀ[δικί]αν [Τυ]φώνι[ον πο]νεῖν τ[ι] τὸν Π[ρο]μη[θε]α φής· ἧ οὐ [φῆ]σε[ι]ς
προ[ο]ρᾶ[ν] ἐμ[ὲ] τοῦ τοιοῦτο[υ] πό[νου] δι' ἀ[σ]ωτηρίας·—

Jensen asks: How can it be that Asklepios speaks of the benevolence of certain gods towards Epicurus, and that he even assures him of his salutary cares?—As a parallel he cites the wellknown words of the *Letter to Menoeceus*, Diog. X 124: ταῖς γὰρ ἰδίαις οἰκειούμενοι διὰ παντὸς ἀρεταῖς τοὺς ὁμοίους ἀποδέχονται, πᾶν τὸ μὴ

τοιούτων ὡς ἀλλότριον νομίζοντες (cited above, sub 845), which he translates: "For the gods are always only familiar with their own virtues and therefore accept only those men who are similar to them, while they consider all that is different as alien."

Thus he makes *the gods* subject of ἀποδέχονται, while usually the text is understood as saying that *men* are always accustomed to their own virtues and therefore welcome only those like themselves (see Bailey in *Epicurus, The extant Remains*). The latter translation must be the right one, since in the preceding lines it is rejected as a false supposition that great misfortunes befall the wicked and great blessings the good by the gift of the gods. The meaning of the following lines is: "for men make to themselves the gods according to their own image."

So I do not think the Letter to Menoeceus offers a good parallel to the passage restituted by Jensen. But we can grant him that, supposing the restitution is right, Epic. admitted that certain persons are more or less favoured by the gods.

5—ETHICS

859—Epicurus, together with the other post-aristotelian Schools, uses Aristotle's terminology in speaking of "the end" to which all conduct should be subordinated. Generally speaking, the end is: the happy life, and of this the first principle is, according to Epic., pleasure.

The telos

To *Menoec.*, Diog. X 128:

Τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν.

860—The above statement in the *Letter to Menoeceus* is not the beginning but the end of an argument. The passage begins by a division of desires (our nr. 866): of desires some are natural, others vain; of the natural some are necessary, others just natural. Now of the necessary some are so for happiness, others for the repose of the body, still others for very life. The author continues:

Diog. X 128:

Τούτων γὰρ ἀπλάνης θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπανάγειν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος υγίειαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστὶ τέλος. τούτου γὰρ χάριν ἅπαντα πράττομεν, ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν. ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται, λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμῶν, οὐκ ἔχοντος τοῦ ζῶου βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς ἐνδέον τι καὶ ζητεῖν ἕτερον ὅ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὸν συμπληρωθήσεται. τότε γὰρ ἡδονῆς χρεῖαν ἔχομεν, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλγῶμεν. ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἀλγῶμεν, οὐκέτι τῆς ἡδονῆς δεόμεθα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν.

861—According to Diog. Epicurus based this principle on the same argument as was used by Eudoxus (see our nr. 786).

Diog. X 137:

Ἀποδείξει δὲ χρῆται τοῦ τέλους εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τῷ τὰ ζῶα ἅμα τῷ γεννηθῆναι τῇ μὲν εὐαρεστεῖσθαι, τῷ δὲ πόνῳ προσκρούειν φυσικῶς καὶ χωρὶς λόγου.

862—a. The *Letter to Menoec.* continues (Diog. X 129):

Pleasure
the standard
of good

Ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες.

b. Ib. (same passage, continued):

But not every
pleasure is
to be chosen

Καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν αἰρούμεθα, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβαίνομεν, ὅταν πλεῖον ἡμῖν τὸ δυσχερὲς ἐκ τούτων ἔπτηται· καὶ πολλὰς ἀλγηδόνας ἡδονῶν κρείττους νομίζομεν, ἐπειδὴ μείζων ἡμῖν ἡδονὴ παρακολουθῇ, πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομείνασι τὰς ἀλγηδόνας. πᾶσα οὖν ἡδονή, διὰ τὸ φύσιν ἔχειν οἰκείαν, ἀγαθόν, οὐ πᾶσα μέντοι αἰρετή· καθάπερ καὶ ἀλγηδὼν πᾶσα κακόν, οὐ πᾶσα δὲ αἰεὶ φευκτὴ πεφυκυῖα. τῇ μέντοι συμμετρήσει καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ ἀσυμφόρων βλέπει ταῦτα πάντα κρίνειν καθήκει.

c. Since all pleasure as such is good, the standard of selection is one of quantity.

Aristocles ap. Euseb., *Praep. Ev.* XIV 21, 3:

Standard of
selection

Μετρεῖσθαι γὰρ αὐτὰ τῷ ποσῷ καὶ οὐ τῷ ποιῷ.

863—According to this standard the pleasure of the body is the greatest.

a. Epic. ap. Athenaeum VII, p. 280a:

The pleasure
of the body
is the
greatest

Κὰν τῷ Περὶ τέλους δὲ φησιν οὕτω πως· οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τί νοήσω ἀγαθόν, ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονὰς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς δι' ἀφροδισίων, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς δι' ἀκροαμάτων, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς κατ' ὅψιν ἡδείας κινήσεις.

The passage is translated by Cicero, *Tusc.* III 18, 41.

b. The pleasure of the stomach according to Epicurus' standard takes the first place.

Athenaeus XII, p. 546 f.:

Ἀρχὴ καὶ ῥίζα παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἡ τῆς γαστροῦς ἡδονή· καὶ τὰ σοφὰ καὶ τὰ περιττὰ ἐπὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν ἀναφοράν.¹

¹ "Even wisdom and culture must be referred to this" (Bailey).

c. Cf. Plut., *Contra Epicuri beatitudinem* 17, p. 1098d:

Οἱ ἄνθρωποι ("those people" sc. Epicureans) τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸ μέγεθος καθάπερ κέντρῳ καὶ διαστήματι τῇ γαστρὶ περιγράφουσι.¹

864—It is Epicurus' originality to have taught that bodily pleasure is limited, and even very restrained: it is satisfying the most elementary, strictly bodily needs. The aponia and analgia resulting from this satisfaction are already pleasure, and therefore perfect happiness.

Pleasure
defined by
absence of
pain

a. *Kyr. dox.* III, ap. Diog. 139:

"Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. ὅπου δ' ἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθ' ὃν ἂν χρόνον ᾗ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ τὸ λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ συναμφοτέρον.

Cp. also our nr. 860a, supra.

Therefore
limited

b. Plut., *Contra Epic. beat.* 3, p. 1088c:

Καὶ πέρας (ταῖς ἡδοναῖς) κοινὸν Ἐπίκουρος τὴν παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσιν ἐπιτέθεικεν, ὡς τῆς φύσεως ἄχρι τοῦ λῦσαι τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐξοῦσης τὸ ἡδύ, περαιτέρω δὲ προελθεῖν οὐκ ἐώσης κατὰ μέγεθος.

Reason sets
bounds to
the pleasure
of the body

c. The judgment of reason about pleasure.

Kyr. dox. XX (Diog. X 145):

Ἡ μὲν σὰρξ ἀπέλαβε τὰ πέρατα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἄπειρα, καὶ ἄπειρος αὐτὴν χρόνος παρεσκεύασεν. Ἡ δὲ διάνοια τοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς τέλους καὶ πέρατος λαβοῦσα τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τοῦ αἰῶνος φόβους ἐκλύσασα τὸν παντελῆ βίον παρεσκεύασεν καὶ οὐθὲν ἔτι τοῦ ἀπείρου χρόνου προσεδέηθημεν· ἀλλ' οὔτε ἔφυγε τὴν ἡδονήν, οὐθ' ἡνίκα τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν τὰ πράγματα παρεσκεύαζεν ὡς ἐλλείπουσά τι τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου κατέστρεφεν.

See our nr. 869.

Two
preliminary
points

865—Epicurus is well aware that man, in any case civilized man, has very different aspirations from satisfying his most elementary bodily needs, and other concerns than merely for physical pain. Therefore, his doctrine of pleasure is preceded by two preliminary points.

1. The gods
are not con-
cerned with
human
affairs

a. The gods are not concerned with the world and with human affairs. *To Menoec.*, ap. Diog. X 123, see above, nr. 845. The meaning of the words "μηθὲν μήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον μήτε τῆς μακαριό-

¹ "measure the amount of pleasure as with compasses from the stomach as centre" (Bailey).

τητος ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ πρόσαπτε” is clearly explained in *Kyr. dox.* I (Diog. X 139):

Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλω παρέχει, ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται· ἐν ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον.

b. There is nothing terrible in death.

To Menoec., Diog. X 124:

Συνέθιζε δὲ ἐν τῷ νομίζειν μηθὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι τὸν θάνατον, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ἐν αἰσθήσει, στερήσεις δὲ ἐστὶν αἰσθήσεως ὁ θάνατος. ὅθεν γνῶσις ὀρθὴ τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸν θάνατον ἀπολαυστὸν ποιεῖ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς θνητόν, οὐκ ἄπειρον προστιθεῖσα χρόνον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῆς ἀθανασίας ἀφελομένη πόθον. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν δεινὸν τῷ κατειληφότι γνησίως τὸ μηθὲν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ μὴ ζῆν δεινόν. ὥστε μάταιος ὁ λέγων δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον, οὐχ ὅτι λυτῇσει παρών, ἀλλ’ ὅτι λυπεῖ μέλλων. ὁ γὰρ παρὸν οὐκ ἐνοχλεῖ, προσδοκώμενον κενῶς λυπεῖ.

Follows the text cited above, sub **844b**.

Cp. also *Kyr. dox.* II, sub **844a**.

866—a. Having established these two points, Epic. begins the exposition of his theory of pleasure by an analysis of desires.

2. Death
is nothing
to us

Analysis
of desires

To Menoec., ap. Diog. X 127:

Ἀναλογιστέον δὲ ὡς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ κεναί. καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον· τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν.

b. The division is explained in a scholion in Arist., *E.N.* III 13, 1118b⁸ (456 Us.):

Ἐπίκουρος καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ οὕτω διαιροῦσι· τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν τινες ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μὲν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, αἱ δὲ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι οὔτε φυσικαὶ ἀλλὰ κατὰ κενὴν γινόμεναι δόξαν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῆς τροφῆς ἐπιθυμία καὶ τῆς ἐσθῆτος ἀναγκαία· ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀφροδισίων φυσικὴ μὲν οὐκ ἀναγκαία δέ· ἡ δὲ τῶν τοιῶνδε σιτιῶν ἢ τοιῶνδε ἐσθῆτος ἢ τοιῶνδε ἀφροδισίων οὔτε φυσικὴ οὔτε ἀναγκαία.

Cp. *Kyr. dox.* XXIX (Diog. X 149).

c. Cic., *Tusc.* V 33, 93:

Vides, credo, ut Epicurus cupiditatum genera diviserit, non nimis fortasse subtiliter, utiliter tamen: partim esse naturalis et necessarias, partim naturalis et non necessarias, partim neutrum. Necessarias satiari posse paene nihilo, divitias enim naturae esse parabilis; secundum autem

genus cupiditatum nec ad potiendum difficile esse censet nec vero ad carendum; tertias, quod essent plane inanes neque necessitatem modo, sed ne naturam quidem attingerent, funditus eiciendas putavit.

**The pleasures
of love**

d. As to the pleasures of love, though they belong to the middle category, it should be noticed that Epic. rather declined them.

Epic., *Sent. Vat.* LI:

Πυνθάνομαί σου τὴν κατὰ σάρκα κίνησιν ἀφθονώτερον διακεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἔντευξιν. σὺ δὲ ὅταν μῆτε τοὺς νόμους καταλύῃς μῆτε τὰ καλῶς ἔθη κείμενα κινήῃς μῆτε τῶν πλησίον τινὰ λυπῇς μῆτε τὴν σάρκα καταξάινῃς μῆτε τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καταναλίσκῃς, χρῶ ὡς βούλει τῇ σεαυτοῦ προαιρέσει. ἀμήχανον μέντοι γε τὸ μὴ οὐχ ἐνί γέ τινι τούτων συνέχεσθαι· ἀφροδίσια γὰρ οὐδέποτε ὤνησεν· ἀγαπητὸν δὲ εἰ μὴ ἐβλάψεν.

**Epicurean
ascetism**

867—Thus, Epicurus' attitude of life is, in fact, ascetical: a voluntary limitation of desires to that which is strictly necessary.

a. *Kyr. dox.* XV (Diog. X 144):

Ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ὥριστα καὶ εὐπόριστός ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἀπειρον ἐκπίπτει.

b. *Sent. Vat.* XXXIII:

Σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν. Ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἔξειν καὶ <Δι> ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχεσάιτο.

**Judgment
of Clemens
Alex.**

868—a. The Epicurean asceticism was violently opposed by Clem. Alex., *Strom.* II 21 (602 Us.):

Ἐπίκουρος δὲ ἐν τῷ μὴ πεινῆν μηδὲ διψῆν μηδὲ ῥιγοῦν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τιθέμενος τὴν ἰσότητον ἐπεφώνησε φωνήν, ἀσεβῶς εἰπὼν ἐν τούτοις καὶ Διὶ πατρὶ μάχεσθαι, ὥσπερ ὧν σκατοφάγων καὶ οὐχὶ τῶν λογικῶν καὶ φιλοσόφων τὴν μακαρίαν νικᾶν δογματίζων.

b. Seneca, *Ep.* 25, 4, speaks with more comprehension about it:

Ad legem naturae revertamur: divitiae paratae sunt. Aut gratuitum est quo egemus aut vile: panem et aquam natura desiderat. Nemo ad haec pauper est. Intra quae quisquis desiderium suum clusit, cum ipso Iove de felicitate contendat, ut ait Epicurus.

869—In fact, Epicurus' reduction of desires to that which is most elementary is the triumph of reason over the flesh.

Kyr. dox. XVIII (Diog. X 144):

Οὐκ ἐπαύξεται ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἡ ἡδονή, ἐπειδὴν ἅπαξ τὸ κατ' ἐνδειαν ἀλγοῦν ἐξαιρεθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ποικίλλεται· τῆς δὲ διανοίας τὸ πέρας τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀπεγένησεν ἢ τε τούτων αὐτῶν ἐκλόγησις καὶ τῶν ὁμογενῶν τούτοις¹, ὅσα τοὺς μεγίστους φόβους παρεσκευάζει τῇ διανοίᾳ.

The triumph
of reason
over the
flesh

870—A direct consequence of the principle enunciated in the first line of the above text is, that infinite time does not increase pleasure.

Infinite
time does
not increase
pleasure

Kyr. dox. XIX (Diog. X 145):

Ὁ ἀπειρος χρόνος ἴσην ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ὁ πεπερασμένος, ἐάν τις αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ τῷ λογισμῷ.

871—The elementary needs being satisfied, the “fullness of life” is reached.

Epicurean
wisdom

Kyr. dox. XXI (Diog. X 146):

Ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου κατειδώς οἶδεν ὡς εὐπόριστόν ἐστι τὸ <τὸ> ἀλγοῦν κατ' ἐνδειαν ἐξαιροῦν καὶ τὸ τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελεῖ καθιστάν· ὥστ' οὐδὲν προσδεῖται πραγμάτων ἀγῶνας κεκτημένων.

872—a. Epic. speaks on autarkeia (independence of desire) in much the same way as the Stoics.

To Menoec., ap. Diog. X 130 f.:

αὐτάρκεια

Καὶ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δὲ ἀγαθὸν μέγα νομίζομεν, οὐχ ἵνα πάντως τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα, ἀλλ' ὅπως, ἐάν μὴ ἔχωμεν τὰ πολλά, τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα, πεπεισμένοι γνησίως ὅτι ἥδιστα πολυτελείας ἀπολαύουσιν οἱ ἥκιστα ταύτης δεόμενοι, καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν φυσικὸν πᾶν εὐπόριστόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ κενὸν δυσπόριστον. οἷ τε λιτοὶ χυλοὶ ἴσην πολυτελεῖ διαίτη τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐπιφέρουσιν, ὅταν ἅπαν τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ' ἐνδειαν ἐξαιρεθῇ· καὶ μᾶζα καὶ ὕδωρ τὴν ἀκροτάτην ἀποδίδωσιν ἡδονήν, ἐπειδὴν ἐνδέων τις αὐτὰ προσενέγκηται.

b. He proclaims φρόνησις to be the greatest good and the root of all other virtues. I cite the whole passage. Epic. here clearly opposes the popular misinterpretation of his doctrine.

φρόνησις

Diog. X 131 f.:

Ὅταν οὖν λέγωμεν ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν, οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας λέγομεν, ὡς τινες ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦντες ἢ κακῶς ἐκδεχόμενοι νομίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα μήτε ταράτ-

¹ “And of the emotions akin to them” (Bailey).

τεσθαι κατὰ ψυχὴν. οὐ γὰρ πότοι καὶ κῶμοι συνείροντες οὐδ' ἀπολαύσεις παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν οὐδ' ἰχθύων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα φέρει πολυτελὴς τράπεζα, τὸν ἡδὺν γεννᾷ βίον, ἀλλὰ νήφων λογισμὸς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἐξερευνῶν πάσης αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ τὰς δόξας ἐξελαύνων ἀφ' ὧν πλεῖστος τὰς ψυχὰς καταλαμβάνει θόρυβος. τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν φρόνησις· διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφίας τιμιώτερον ὑπάρχει φρόνησις, ἐξ ἧς αἱ λοιπαὶ πᾶσαι πεφύκασιν ἀρεταί, διδάσκουσαι ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, <οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως> ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως· συμπεφύκασι γὰρ αἱ ἀρεταὶ τῷ ζῆν ἡδέως, καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἡδέως τούτων ἔστιν ἀχώριστον.

873—It may be seen from the above passage, as it might be concluded from *Ad Menoec.* 129 (our nr. **861a**) that, for Epicurus, the passing over from the doctrine of pleasure to that of moral good is hardly a *metabasis*, in any case no passing over to another *genos*.

Virtue sub-
ordinated
to pleasure

a. Alex. Aphr., *De anima* II 22, p. 156, 9 (515 Us.):
(Ἡ ἀρετὴ) περὶ τὴν ἐκλογὴν ἔστι τῶν ἡδέων κατ' Ἐπίκουρον.

b. Virtue, consequently, is nothing in itself.

Cic., *Tusc.* V 26, 73 (511 Us.):

Epicuro qui ... haec nostra honesta turpia irrideat dicatque nos in vocibus occupatos inanis sonos fundere.

Cf. Laelius 23, 86: A multis virtus ipsa contemnitur et venditatio quaedam atque ostentatio esse dicitur.

c. Athenaeus XII, p. 547a cites Epicurus in this way:

Προσπύω τῷ καλῷ καὶ τοῖς κενῷς αὐτὸ θαυμάζουσιν, ὅταν μηδεμίαν ἡδονὴν ποιῇ.

τὸ καλόν means here *honestum*, i.e. virtue.

Correlation
between
pleasure
and virtue

874—Epic. teaches that, in fact, there is a correlation between pleasure and virtue.

Kyr. dox. V (Diog. X 140):

Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως <οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως> ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως. ὅτῳ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐ ζῇ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, <καὶ ὅτῳ ἐκεῖνο μὴ> ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτον ἡδέως ζῆν.

The four
virtues

875—That, of the four classical virtues, wisdom, selfrestraint, and bravery contribute something to the right selection of pleasure, might be fairly clear; but concerning justice the theory reveals its weakness.

a. *Kyr. dox.* XXXI (Diog. X 150):

Τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιόν ἐστι σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἄλλήλους μὴδὲ βλάπτεσθαι. **Justice**

b. *Ib.* XXXIII:

Οὐκ ἦν τι καθ' ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς μετ' ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς καθ' ὁπληκίους δὴ ποτε αἰεὶ τόπους συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι.

c. *Ib.* XXXIV:

Ἡ ἀδικία οὐ καθ' ἑαυτὴν κακόν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν φόβῳ, εἰ μὴ λήσει τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων ἐφεστηκότας κολαστάς. **Injustice**

Lucr. III 1011-23 describes this fear of punishment, of which Epic. says in *Kyr. dox.* XXXV that it never leaves anyone who has committed injustice.

The theory recalls that of Callicles and Thrasymachus, who taught that nothing is better for man than doing as much injustice as possible, provided that he remains unpunished.

d. Epic. only hesitates with his reply when asking himself "whether the wise man will do things forbidden by law, if he is sure that he will escape punishment".

**Epic.
shrinks
from the
conse-
quences**

Plut., *Adv. Col.* 34, p. 1127d:

Ἀποκρίνεται, "οὐκ εὖοδον τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ κατηγόρημα." τοῦτ' ἔστι, πράξω μὲν, οὐ βούλομαι δὲ ὁμολογεῖν.

In fact, Epic. shrinks from drawing the consequences of his own theory.

876—Cicero criticized Epicurus' theory of virtues judiciously.

**The theory
criticized
by Cic.**

De off. III 33, 117:

Si illum (Epicurum) audiam de continentia et temperantia, dicit ille quidem multa multis locis, sed aqua haeret, ut aiunt. Nam qui potest temperantiam laudare is, qui ponat summum bonum in voluptate? Atque in his tamen tribus generibus, quoquo modo possunt, non incallide tergiversantur. Prudentiam introducunt scientiam suppeditantem voluptates, depellentem dolores. Fortitudinem quoque aliquo modo expediunt, cum tradunt rationem neglegendae mortis, perpetiendi doloris. Etiam temperantiam inducunt, non facillime illi quidem, sed tamen quoquo modo possunt: dicunt enim voluptatis magnitudinem doloris detractatione finiri. Iustitia vacillat vel iacet potius omnesque eae virtutes quae in communitate cernuntur et in societate generis humani. Neque enim bonitas nec liberalitas nec comitas esse potest, non plus quam amicitia, si haec non per se expetantur, sed ad voluptatem utilitatemve referantur.

Friendship 877—Friendship however, though it can be reduced, indeed, to reasons of material interest and, thus, to primitive *ἡδονή*, takes a very important place in Epicurean life and is taxed high in the ranks of value.

a. *Kyr. dox.* XXVII (Diog. X 148):

Ὡν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα, πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις.

Cp. our first paragraph, nrs. 812-819.

b. *Sent. Vat.* XXIII:

Πᾶσα φιλία δι' ἑαυτὴν αἰρετή· ἀρχὴν δ' εἴληφεν ἀπὸ τῆς ὠφελείας.

878—Clem. Alex., *Strom.* II 23, 138 (St. II, p. 189, 15-18):

Marriage Δημόκριτος δὲ γάμον καὶ παιδοποιαν παραιτεῖται διὰ τὰς πολλὰς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀηδίας τε καὶ ἀφορκᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαιοτέρων. συγκατατάττεται δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ ὅσοι ἐν ἡδονῇ καὶ ἀοχλησίᾳ, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀλυπία τάγαθὸν τίθενται.

The principle of avoiding public life 879—Since the wise man will try to avoid βλάβας ἐξ ἀνθρώπων (Diog. X 117), he will keep aloof from public life. The *Λάθε βιώσας* is a well known Epicurean principle. It is mentioned or referred to by many later writers.

a. Plutarch wrote a few pages (1128-1130) on the subject:

Εἰ καλῶς εἴρηται τὸ Λάθε βιώσας.

Cp. Julianus ad Themistium, p. 471 Pet.; Themistius, *Or.* 26, p. 390, 21 Dind.; Philostr., *Vit. Apoll.* VIII 28, p. 368; Hor., *Ep.* I 17, 10; I 18, 102-103.

b. Lucretius expresses it in these lines (V 1127 f.):

ut satius multo iam sit parere quietum
quam regere imperio res velle et regna tenere.

c. The principle is connected with Epicurus' view that man is naturally not a social being.

Themistius, *Or.* XXVI, p. 390 Dind.:

Ἐπίκουρος λάθρα βιώσας ἐπηγεῖτο καὶ ἔθετο δόγμα μὴ φύσει εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπον κοινωνικόν τε καὶ ἡμερον.

By this principle Epic. continues the line of certain Sophists, such as Critias (our nr. 195b) and stands against the view of Plato (*Rep.* II, 369b, our nr. 277) and of Aristotle.

d. The principle itself of avoiding public life is found in Epicurus' *Sent. Vat.*, fr. LVIII Bailey:

Ἐκλυτέον ἑαυτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια καὶ πολιτικὰ δεσμωτηρίου.

880—From Aristippus and his School Epicurus differs on three main points:

Differences from the Cyrenaics

1) Against Aristippus, who considered the pleasure of the moment as being the end (our nr. **255**), Epic. holds that the end is happiness, which is a permanent condition of equilibrium (ἀταραξία), as well of the mind as of the body.

1. Happiness a permanent condition

Olympiodorus in Plat. *Philebum*, p. 274 Stallb.:

Καὶ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος λέγει τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἡδονὴν, καταστηματικὴν αὐτὴν λέγων.

2) In defining pleasure as absence of pain, Epicurus views it essentially as implying a state of rest, and in this he is opposed to Aristippus, who defined pleasure as a λεία κίνησις (our nr. **256c-e**). Diog., however says that Epic. admitted both.

2. As such opposed to Aristippus' λεία κίνησις

Diog. X 136:

Διαφέρεται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναίους περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν καταστηματικὴν οὐκ ἐγκρίνουσι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἐν κινήσει· ὁ δ' ἀμφοτέραν, ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὡς φησιν ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ τέλους καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ βίων καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους ἐπιστολῇ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ ἐπτακαίδεκάτῃ τῶν Ἐπιλέκτων καὶ Μητροδώρος ἐν τῷ Τιμοκράτει λέγουσιν οὕτω· “Νοομένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς.” ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἰρέσεων οὕτω λέγει· “Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαὶ εἰσιν ἡδοναί, ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργεία βλέπονται.”

3) Next, the mind is not limited to the sensation of the present moment, as Aristippus argued it is (our nr. **256b**): it can look “before and after”. Therefore,

3. The mind not limited to the present

a. the memory of past pleasures may overwhelm, at least diminish, present distress.

Plut., *Contra Epic. beat.* 18, p. 1099d:

“Ὡςπερ λέγουσι τὸ μεμνησθαι τῶν προτέρων ἀγαθῶν μέγιστόν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν.

Value of pleasures

Cf. Hieronymus, in *Esaïam* b. XI c. 38 (t. IV, p. 473e Vall.): Unde stulta Epicuri sententia est, qui asserit recordatione praeteritorum bonorum mala praesentia mitigari.

Epic.’ last letter to Idomeneus (our nr. **819**) illustrates the doctrine referred to in these texts.

b. The hope of pleasure to come is a source of happiness next to “the stable condition of rest in the flesh”.

of future pleasures

Epic. fr. 11 Bailey, ap. Plut., *Contra Epic. beat.* 4, 1089d:

Τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις.

Pains of the
mind worse
than bodily
pains

c. Accordingly pains of the mind, embracing past, present and future, are worse than those of the body.

Diog. X 137:

"Ἐτι πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναϊκοὺς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ χείρους τὰς σωματικὰς ἀλγηδόνας τῶν ψυχικῶν· κολάζεσθαι γοῦν τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας σώματι¹· ὁ δὲ τὰς ψυχικὰς τὴν γοῦν σάρκα τὸ παρὸν μόνον χειμάζειν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ παρελθὸν καὶ τὸ παρὸν καὶ τὸ μέλλον.

Pleasures
of the mind
greater

d. Thus, the pleasures of the mind are greater than those of the body.

Ib. (same passage continued):

Οὕτως οὖν καὶ μεῖζονας ἡδονὰς εἶναι τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς.

881—We conclude from the preceding points that, in spite of his starting point (vid. 863), happiness for Epicurus essentially transcends the body.

For Epic.
happiness
transcends
the body

Plut., *Contra Epic. beat.* 5, p. 1089d:

"Ὅρα δὴ πρῶτον μὲν οἷα ποιοῦσιν τὴν εἴτε ἡδονὴν ταύτην εἴτε ἀπονίαν ἢ εὐστάθειαν ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταίροντες ἐκ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν, εἴτα πάλιν ἐκ ταύτης εἰς ἑκείνο, τῷ μὴ στέγειν ἀπορρέουσιν καὶ περιολισθάνουσιν ἀναγκαζόμενοι τῇ ἀρχῇ συνάπτειν καὶ τὸ μὲν ἡδόμενον, ὥς φησι, τῆς σαρκὸς τῷ χαίροντι τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπερείδοντες, αὖθις δ' ἐκ τοῦ χαίροντος εἰς τὸ ἡδόμενον τῇ ἐλπίδι τελευτῶντες.

General
character-
istic of Epic.
ethics

882—Bailey, *Gr. At.* p. 525 f., rightly qualifies Epicurus' ethics as a system of uncompromising egoistic hedonism. Most modern hedonistic systems, he remarks, have preferred to abandon egoism in favour of a social utilitarianism aiming at the "greatest happiness of the greatest number". Epicurus however is prepared to stand by his principles and take their consequences.

Epicurea-
nism as a
gospel

883—a. How his doctrine was accepted by his followers as a real gospel may appear first in the exordium of Lucretius' third book (1-30)²:

E tenebris tantis tam clarum extollere lumen
qui primus potuisti inlustrans commoda vitae,
te sequor, o Graiae gentis decus, inque tuis nunc
ficta pedum pono pressis vestigia signis,
5 non ita certandi cupidus quam propter amorem
quod te imitari aveo; quid enim contendat hirundo

¹ Our nr. 256g.

² A highly poetical translation of this wonderful passage was given by the Dutch poet J. H. Leopold.

- cycnis, aut quidnam tremulis facere artubus haedi
 consimile in cursu possint et fortis equi vis?
 tu, pater, es rerum inventor, tu patria nobis,
 10 suppeditas praecepta, tuisque ex, inclute, chartis,
 floriferis ut apes in saltibus omnia libant,
 omnia nos itidem depascimur aurea dicta,
 aurea, perpetua semper dignissima vita.
 nam simul ac ratio tua coepit vociferari
 15 naturam rerum, divina mente coorta,
 diffugiunt animi terrores, moenia mundi
 discedunt, totum video per inane geri res.
 apparet divum numen sedesque quietae
 quas neque concutiunt venti nec nubila nimbis
 20 aspergunt neque nix acri concreta pruina
 cana cadens violat semperque innubilis aether
 integit, et large diffuso lumine ridet.
 omnia suppeditat porro natura neque ulla
 res animi pacem delibat tempore in ullo.
 25 at contra nusquam apparent Acherusia templa
 nec tellus obstat quin omnia dispiciantur,
 sub pedibus quaecumque infra per inane geruntur.
 his ibi me rebus quaedam divina voluptas
 percipit atque horror, quod sic natura tua vi
 30 tam manifesta patens ex omni parte relecta est.

b. Five centuries after Epicurus the great inscription, which Diogenes of Oenoanda in Lycia ordered to be placed in the wall of a stoa "to help the strangers passing by", shows the same appreciation: men are considered as suffering from a general and widely spread disease, and Epicurus' doctrine is "the medicine of salvation".

Diog. Oenoand., fr. II, col. IV, 1. 3-col. VI l. 2:

Ἐπεὶ δέ, ὡς προεῖπα, οἱ πλεῖστοι καθάπερ ἐν λοιμῷ τῇ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων
 ψευδοδοξία νοσοῦσι κοινῶς, γείνονται δὲ καὶ πλείονες — διὰ γὰρ τὸν ἀλλήλων
 ζῆλον ἄλλος ἐξ ἄλλου λαμβάνει τὴν νόσον, ὡς τὰ πρόβατα —, δίκαιο[ν δ' ἐστὶ
 καὶ] τοῖς μεθ' ἡμᾶς ἐσομένοις βοηθῆσαι — κάκεῖνοι γὰρ εἰσιν ἡμέτεροι καὶ εἰ
 [μὴ] γεγónασί πω —, πρὸς δὲ δὴ φιλόανθρωπον καὶ τοῖς παραγεινομένοις ἐπικου-
 ρεῖν ξένους, — ἐπεὶ δὲ οὖν εἰς πλείονας διαβέβηκε τὰ βοηθήματα τοῦ συγγράμ-
 ματος, ἡθέλησα τῇ στοᾷ ταύτῃ καταχρησάμενος ἐν κοινῷ τὰ τῆς σωτηρίας
 προθε[ῖναι φάρμακ]α.

TWENTY-FIRST CHAPTER

THE STOA

I—GENERAL ASPECT, CHIEF PERSONALITIES

Zeno of
Citium

884—a. Diog. VII, 1:

Ζήνων Μνασέου ἢ Δημέου Κιτιεύς ἀπὸ Κύπρου, πολίσματος Ἑλληνικοῦ, Φοίνικας ἐποίκους ἐσχηκότος. — Ἀπολλώνιος δέ φησιν ὁ Τύριος ὅτι ἰσχνὸς ἦν, ὑπομήκης, μελάγχρους — ὅθεν τις αὐτὸν εἶπεν Αἰγυπτίαν κληματίδα.

Probably Pohlenz is right in thinking that Zeno was a Phoenician. In fact all our testimonies agree on the point (see Diog. VII, 3, 15, 25 and 30; also Cic., *De Fin.* IV, 56). Festugière, *Le Dieu cosm.* 266 n. 1 argues that the point is uncertain and that nothing can be concluded from Crates' words "Τί φεύγεις, Φοινικίδιον;" (Diog. VII, 3).

Date

b. Zeno came to Athens in the year 311/0 at the age of 22, as appears from the testimony of his disciple Persaeus, the year of his death being known from the honorary decree to be cited sub **887b**.

Diog. VII 28:

Περσαῖος δέ φησιν ἐν ταῖς ἡθικαῖς σχολαῖς δύο καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν τελευτῆσαι αὐτόν, ἐλθεῖν δ' Ἀθήνας δύο καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν.

885—Since he studied philosophy under the direction of Crates and others during a period of some ten years, he started to teach not earlier than in the year 301/0.

Disciple of
Crates and
of Polemo

a. Diog. VII 2:

Δήκουσε δέ, καθὰ προεῖρηται, Κράτητος· εἶτα καὶ Στίλπωνος ἀκοῦσαι φασιν αὐτὸν καὶ Ξενοκράτους ἔτη δέκα, ὡς Τιμοκράτης ἐν τῷ Δίῳ· ἀλλὰ καὶ Πολέμωνος.

The Crates here mentioned was the well known disciple of Diogenes the Cynic (Diog. Laert. VI 85-93). His *floruit* was, according to Diog. VI 87, about 328-324. Probably he was the man who was Zeno's teacher during ten years¹. That Zeno heard Xenocrates, is impossible, for the latter died 314. Polemo was head of the Academy 314-270.

¹ Three philosophers of the name Crates are known to us. The first, Crates the Cynic, was a Theban (Diog. VI 85). He cannot be identified with Crates the inti-

b. Ib. 2-3:

How he came
to Crates

Τῷ οὖν Κράτητι παρέβαλε τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. πορφύραν ἐμπεπορευμένος ἀπὸ τῆς Φοινίκης πρὸς τῷ Πειραιεῖ ἐναυάγησεν. ἀνελθὼν δ' εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἤδη τριακοντούτης ἐκάθισε παρὰ τινὰ βιβλιοπώλην· ἀναγινώσκοντος δ' ἐκείνου τὸ δεύτερον τῶν Ξενοφῶντος Ἀπομνημονευμάτων, ἡσθεῖς ἐπύθετο ποῦ διατρίβοιεν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες. εὐκαίρως δὲ παρίοντος Κράτητος, ὁ βιβλιοπώλης δεῖξας αὐτόν φησι, "τούτῳ παρακολούθησον." ἐντεῦθεν ἤκουσε τοῦ Κράτητος, ἄλλως μὲν εὐτονος πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, αἰδήμων δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὴν Κυνικὴν ἀναισχυντίαν.

c. The rest of the story is a clear indication that the Crates who was Zeno's teacher was no other than the Cynic Crates.

Ib. 3:

Crates the
Cynic

"Ὅθεν ὁ Κράτης βουλόμενος αὐτὸν καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεῦσαι δίδωσι χύτραν φακῆς διὰ τοῦ Κεραμεικοῦ φέρειν. ἐπεὶ δ' εἶδεν αὐτὸν αἰδούμενον καὶ παρακαλύπτοντα, παίσας τῇ βακτηρίᾳ κατάγνυσι τὴν χύτραν· φεύγοντος δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς φακῆς κατὰ τῶν σκελῶν ῥεούσης, φησὶν ὁ Κράτης, "τί φεύγεις, Φοινικίδιον; οὐδὲν δεινὸν πέπονθας".

d. He seems to have still frequented Polemo's lectures when already teaching himself.

Diog. VII 25:

He attends
Polemo's
lectures

"Ἦδη δὲ προκόπτων εἰσῆει καὶ πρὸς Πολέμωνα ὑπ' αὐτοφίας, ὥστε φασὶ λέγειν ἐκείνον, "οὐ λανθάνεις, ὦ Ζήνων, ταῖς κηπαίαις παρεισρέων θύραις καὶ τὰ δόγματα κλέπτων Φοινικικῶς μεταμφιεννύς."

886—He starts teaching in the Stoa Poikile.

His own
School

Diog. VII 5:

Ἀνακάμπτων δὴ ἐν τῇ ποικίλῃ στοᾷ τῇ καὶ Πεισιανακτεῖω καλουμένῃ, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς γραφῆς τῆς Πολυγνώτου ποικίλῃ, διετίθετο τοὺς λόγους. —

The name
Στωϊκοί

Προσῆσαν δὴ λοιπὸν ἀκούοντες αὐτοῦ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Στωϊκοὶ ἐκλήθησαν καὶ οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ὁμοίως, πρότερον Ζηνώνειοι καλούμενοι, καθὰ φησι καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ἐπιστολαῖς.

Since Zeno started to teach in the Stoa some six years after Epicurus opened his School at Athens, we may be sure that he was influenced by Epicurus' teaching:

Reaction
against
Epicurus

mate friend of Polemo and his successor in the Academy (Diog. IV 21 f.; *Index Acad.* ed. Mekler, p. 56, 58 f., 62. See our nr. 797). This second Crates was an Athenian and apparently much younger than Polemo. Zeno must have known him as a συσχολαστής. The *Index Acad.* (p. 87 M.) mentions a third Crates, of Tarsus, who lived more than a century later and was the head of the School between Carneades and Clitomachus.

doubtless in Zeno's doctrine we have to see a reaction against Epicurus' teaching that pleasure is the end and that the universe is a product of chance. Both theses must have offended Zeno's belief in a rational Power (logos) ruling the universe and dwelling also in man.

Honoured
by the
Athenians

887—a. Diog. VII 6:

Ἐτίμων δὴ οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι σφόδρα τὸν Ζήνωνα, οὕτως ὥς καὶ τῶν τειχῶν αὐτῷ τὰς κλεῖς παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ τιμῆσαι καὶ χαλκῇ εἰκόνη.

b. Decree of the Athenians after Zeno's death.

Diog. VII 10-11:

Ἐπειδὴ Ζήνων Μνασέου Κιτιεύς ἔτη πολλὰ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐν τῇ πόλει γενόμενος ἐν τε τοῖς λοιποῖς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ὧν διετέλεσε καὶ τοὺς εἰς σύστασιν αὐτῷ τῶν νέων πορεύομένους παρακαλῶν ἐπ' ἀρετὴν καὶ σωφροσύνην παρῶρμα πρὸς τὰ βέλτιστα παράδειγμα τὸν ἴδιον βίον ἐκθεῖς ἅπασιν, ἀκόλουθον ὄντα τοῖς λόγοις οἷς διελέγετο, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ δεδόχθαι τῷ δήμῳ, ἐπαινέσαι μὲν Ζήνωνα Μνασέου Κιτιέα καὶ στεφανῶσαι χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἀρετῆς ἔνεκεν καὶ σωφροσύνης, οἰκοδομῆσαι δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τάφον ἐπὶ τοῦ Κεραμεικοῦ δημοσίᾳ. τῆς δὲ ποιήσεως τοῦ στεφάνου καὶ τῆς οἰκοδομῆς τοῦ τάφου χειροτονῆσαι τὸν δῆμον ἤδη τοὺς ἐπιμελησομένους πέντε ἀνδρας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων· ἀναγράψαι δὲ <τόδε> τὸ ψήφισμα τὸν γραμματέα τοῦ δήμου ἐν στήλαις <λιθίναις> δύο καὶ ἐξεῖναι αὐτῷ θεῖναι τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ, τὴν δὲ ἐν Λυκείῳ. τὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμα τὸ εἰς τὰς στήλας γινόμενον μερίσαι τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει, ὅπως ἅπαντες εἰδῶσιν ὅτι ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ζῶντας τιμᾷ καὶ τελευτήσαντας.

Favoured
by king
Antigonus

888—a. Antigonus Gonatas also favoured him. Diog. VII 6:

Ἀπεδέχετο δ' αὐτὸν καὶ Ἀντίγονος καὶ εἴ ποτ' Ἀθήναζε ἦκοι, ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ πολλὰ τε παρεκάλει ἀφικέσθαι ὥς αὐτόν. ὁ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν παρητήσατο, Περσαῖον δὲ ἓνα τῶν γνωρίμων ἀπέστειλεν.¹

A. praises
Zeno's
character

b. Antigonus' words after Zeno's death. Diog. VII 15:

Λέγεται δὲ καὶ μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦ Ζήνωνος εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀντίγονον οἶον εἶη θέατρον ἀπολωλεκώς. —

Ἐρωτηθεὶς δὲ διὰ τί θαυμάζει αὐτόν, “ὅτι, ἔφη, πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων αὐτῷ διδομένων ὑπ' ἐμοῦ οὐδέποτ' ἐχαυνώθη οὐδὲ ταπεινὸς ὤφθη.

Comic poets
on Zeno

c. His soberness. Diog. VII 27:

Οἱ γε μὴν κωμικοὶ ἐλάνθανον ἐπαινοῦντες αὐτόν διὰ τῶν σκαμμάτων. ἵνα καὶ Φιλήμων φησὶν οὕτως ἐν δράματι Φιλοσόφοις:

¹ On this Persaeus see below, nrs. 890, 924.

εἷς ἄρτος, ὃψον ἰσχάς, ἐπιπιεῖν ὕδωρ.
φιλοσοφίαν καινὴν γὰρ οὗτος φιλοσοφεῖ,
πεινῇ διδάσκει καὶ μαθητὰς λαμβάνει·

— ἤδη δὲ καὶ εἰς παροιμίαν σχεδὸν ἐχώρησεν. ἐλέγετο γοῦν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ·
Τοῦ φιλοσόφου Ζήνωνος ἐγκρατέστερος.

889—Zeno was succeeded by his faithful disciple Cleanthes of Assos. **Cleanthes**
Diog. VII 168, 170:

Κλεάνθης Φανίου Ἀσσιος. οὗτος πρῶτον ἦν πύκτης, ὥς φησιν Ἀντισθένης
ἐν Διαδοχαῖς· ἀφικόμενος δ' εἰς Ἀθήνας τέσσαρας ἔχων δραχμάς, καθά
φασί τινες, καὶ Ζήνωνι παραβαλὼν ἐφιλοσόφησε γενναιότατα καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν ἔμεινε δογμάτων. διεβόηθη δ' ἐπὶ φιλοπονίᾳ, ὅς γε πένης ὦν ἄγαν
ὥρμησε μισθοφορεῖν· καὶ νύκτωρ μὲν ἐν τοῖς κήποις ἤντλει, μεθ' ἡμέραν δ'
ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγυμνάζεται· ὅθεν καὶ Φρεάντλης ἐκλήθη. —

Ἦν δὲ πονικὸς μὲν, ἀφύσικος δὲ καὶ βραδὺς ὑπερβαλλόντως. —

Καὶ σκωπτόμενος δ' ὑπὸ τῶν συμμαθητῶν ἡνείχετο· καὶ ὅνος ἀκούων
προσεδέχετο, λέγων αὐτὸς μόνος δύνασθαι βαστάζειν τὸ Ζήνωνος φορτίον.

Of Cleanthes' works, as of Zeno's, only fragments have survived. His *Hymn to Zeus*, preserved by Stobaeus (our nr. **943**) is the longest authentic text we possess of the Ancient Stoa.

890—Herillus and Aristo of Chios were more or less heretical Stoics. We shall speak of them in dealing with the doctrine of adiaphora (nr. **1021**) and with the definition of virtue (nrs. **1028c**, **1030a**, **b**).

**Herillus,
Aristo of
Chios,
Persaeus**

Persaeus, too, is frequently considered as a heretic (e.g. by Goedeckemeyer¹) or as a practically unworthy Stoic (Verbeke²). It may be questioned, however, whether this view is justified (below, under **924c**).

891—Cleanthes was succeeded by Chrysippus, a famous dialectician who truly rebuilt the Stoic philosophy as a solid and well ordered system.

a. Diog. VII 179, 180:

Chrysippus

Χρύσιππος Ἀπολλωνίου Σολεὺς ἢ Ταρσεύς, ὥς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν Διαδοχαῖς, μαθητὴς Κλεάνθους. οὗτος πρότερον μὲν δόλιχον ἤσκει, ἔπειτ' ἀκούσας Ζήνωνος ἢ Κλεάνθους, ὥς Διοκλῆς καὶ οἱ πλείους, ἔτι τε ζῶντος ἀπέστη αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐχ ὁ τυχὼν ἐγένετο κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν· ἀνὴρ εὐφυῆς καὶ δξύτατος ἐν παντὶ μέρει οὕτως ὥστε καὶ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις διηνέχθη πρὸς Ζήωνα,

¹ Barth-Goedeckemeyer, *Die Stoa*⁵ 1941, p. 37, 41.

² *Kleanthes*, p. 32 f. On p. 16 the author even cites Persaeus' writing Π. θεῶν under the title *On impiety* ("Over de goddeloosheid").

ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς Κλεάνθην, ᾧ καὶ πολλάκις ἔλεγε μόνῃς τῆς τῶν δογμάτων διδασκαλίας χρῆζειν, τὰς δὲ ἀποδείξεις αὐτὸς εὐρήσειν. — οὕτω δ' ἐπίδοξος ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ἐγένετο, ὥστε δοκεῖν τοὺς πλείους ὅτι εἰ παρὰ θεοῖς ἦν διαλεκτική, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλη ἦν ἢ ἡ Χρυσίππειος.

His writings **b. Ib. 180:**

Πλεονάσας δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν λέξιν οὐ κατάρθωσε. πονικώτατός τε παρ' ὄντινόν γε γέγονεν, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων αὐτοῦ· τὸν ἀριθμὸν γὰρ ὑπὲρ πέντε καὶ ἑπτακόσια ἐστίν. ἐπλήθυνε δ' αὐτὰ πολλάκις ὑπὲρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δόγματος ἐπιχειρῶν καὶ πᾶν τὸ ὑποπεσὸν γράφων καὶ διορθούμενος πλεονάκις πλείστη τε τῶν μαρτυριῶν παραθέσει χρώμενος· ὥστε καὶ ἐπειδὴ ποτ' ἐν τινι τῶν συγγραμμάτων παρ' ὀλίγον τὴν Εὐριπίδου Μήδειαν ὅλην παρετίθετο καὶ τις μετὰ χειρὸς εἶχε τὸ βιβλίον, πρὸς τὸν πυθόμενον τί ἄρα ἔχοι, ἔφη, "Χρυσίππου Μήδειαν".

Style

c. Dionys. Halic., *De comp. verb.* p. 30 Re. (SVF II, 28):

Καὶ τί δεῖ τούτους θαυμάζειν, ὅπουγε καὶ οἱ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπαγγελ-
λόμενοι καὶ τὰς διαλεκτικὰς ἐκφέροντες τέχνας οὕτως εἰσὶν ἄθλιοι περὶ τὴν
σύνθεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὥστ' αἰδεῖσθαι καὶ λέγειν; ἀπόχρη δὲ τεκμηρίω
χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ Χρυσίππου τοῦ Στωϊκοῦ· περαιτέρω γὰρ οὐκ ἂν προβαίην.
τούτου γὰρ οὐτ' ἄμεινον οὐδεὶς τὰς διαλεκτικὰς τέχνας ἡκρίβωσεν, οὔτε χείρονι
ἁρμονίᾳ συνταχθέντας ἐξήνεγκε λόγους τῶν ὀνόματος καὶ δόξης ἀξιωθέντων.

**Merits for
Stoic
philosophy**

892—*a.* His merits for Stoic philosophy are expressed in the popular verse (Diog. VII 183):

Εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρυσίππος, οὐκ ἂν ἦν Στωά.

In fact, Stoic doctrine is known to us almost entirely in the form Chrysippus gave it, and it is often difficult to decide what exactly was the founder's opinion. On some important points however (e.g. in the theory of knowledge) we can see that Chrys. altered Zeno's doctrine considerably.

b. Cf. Origenes, *Contra Cels.* II 12 (SVF II 21):

Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Χρυσίππος πολλαχοῦ τῶν συγγραμμάτων αὐτοῦ φαίνεται
καθαπτόμενος Κλεάνθους, καινοτομῶν παρὰ τὰ ἐκείνῳ δεδογμένα, γενομένων
αὐτοῦ διδασκάλῳ ἔτι νέου καὶ ἀρχὰς ἔχοντος φιλοσοφίας.

Vid. sub 896.

**Diogenes of
Seleucia and
Antipater
of Tarsus**

893—Of Chrysippus' disciples the best known were *Diogenes the Babylonian*, together with Carneades ambassador to Rome in the year 156/5, and *Antipater of Tarsus*, who succeeded Diogenes as the head of the school ± 150.

Both are considered by von Arnim as belonging to the Ancient Stoa and accordingly treated in *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta III*.

894—A new period starts with *Panaetius*, who lived a part of his life in Rome, where he belonged to the circle of Scipio and Laelius. His disciple *Posidonius* had his school on Rhodes, where he was heard by Cicero in the year 78 and visited by Pompeius coming from his victory over Mithradates.

**Middle
period of
the Stoa**

Both Panaetius and Posidonius were important thinkers and scholars. We shall come back to them after having expounded the Stoic doctrine as a whole.

895—A third period in the history of the Stoa is that of the Roman Empire. Its chief representatives are:

**The Roman
Stoa**

- a. Seneca
- b. Musonius Rufus
- c. Epictetus
- d. the emperor Marcus Aurelius.

We shall deal with them and with later Cynicism in a special chapter (XXIII).

896—As opposed to Epicurus' School the Stoa contained, from the very beginning, a variety of opinions.

**Unity and
diversity
in Stoic
doctrine**

Numenius ap. Eusebium, *Praep. ev.* XIV, p. 728a:

Τὰ δὲ τῶν Στωϊκῶν ἐστασίασται, ἀρξάμενα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ μηδέπω τελευτῶντα καὶ νῦν. ἐλέγχουσι δ' ἀγαπώντας ὑπὸ δυσμενοῦς ἐλεγκοῦ, οἱ μὲν τινες αὐτῶν ἐμμεμενηκότες ἔτι, οἱ δ' ἤδη μεταθέμενοι. εἴξασιν οὖν οἱ πρῶτοι ὀλιγαρχικώτεροι, οἱ δὲ διαστάντες ὑπῆρξαν εἰς τοὺς μετέπειτα πολλῆς μὲν τοῖς προτέροις, πολλῆς δὲ τῆς ἀλλήλοις ἐπιτιμῆσεως αἵτιοι, εἰσέτι ἐτέρων ἕτεροι Στωϊκώτεροι.

In fact, the term *ἐστασίασται* is too strong: there is one Stoic doctrine we find from Zeno and the Ancient Stoics down to the Roman period. Aristo of Chios and Herillus differed too much from Zeno to be considered as Stoics at all. However, there have been alterations of Zeno's doctrine, first by Chrysippus (under the influence of Arcesilaus' criticism), next by Panaetius, who was influenced by Carneades. Posidonius restored the ancient doctrine on several points but had his own strong individuality. Ancient Stoic doctrine is found again in Seneca, Musonius and Epictetus; it is found essentially also in Marcus Aurelius, though with an individual accent. Therefore, we shall treat Stoic doctrine as such, illustrating it by texts of ancient and later Stoics, and marking the chief points of its development.

Division of philosophy

897—The well known tripartition of philosophy is generally ascribed to the Stoa.

a. Diog. VII 39:

Τριμερῇ φασιν εἶναι τὸν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγον· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν τι φυσικόν, τὸ δὲ ἠθικόν, τὸ δὲ λογικόν. οὕτω δὲ πρῶτος διεῖλε Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς . . . καὶ Χρύσιππος . . . καὶ Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος καὶ Ποσειδώνιος.

b. The same sequence of the three parts appears in Aëtius, *Plac.* I, Prooem. 2 (273, 11 Dox.):

Οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωϊκοὶ ἔφασαν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν εἶναι θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμην, τὴν δὲ φιλοσοφίαν ἄσκησιν ἐπιτηδείου τέχνης· ἐπιτήδειον δὲ εἶναι μίαν καὶ ἀνωτάτω τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἀρετὰς δὲ τὰς γενικωτάτας τρεῖς, φυσικὴν ἠθικὴν λογικὴν. δι' ἣν αἰτίαν καὶ τριμερὴς ἐστὶν ἡ φιλοσοφία, ἥς τὸ μὲν φυσικὸν τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν τὸ δὲ λογικόν· καὶ φυσικὸν μὲν ὅταν περὶ κόσμου ζητῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ, ἠθικὸν δὲ τὸ κατησχολημένον περὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον, λογικὸν δὲ τὸ περὶ τὸν λόγον, ὃ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλοῦσιν.

c. Varro, ap. Cic., *Acad. post.* 5, 19, about to expound what he calls the *veterum philosophia* (i.e. that of the early Academy and the first Peripatetics), introduces the same tripartition, saying:

“Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio triplex: una de vita et moribus, altera de natura et rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum sit, quid falsum, quid rectum in oratione pravumve, quid consentiens, quid repugnans iudicando”.

Sextus, *Adv. math.* VII (= *Ag. the logicians I*) 16 says more accurately that Plato is “virtually” the pioneer (δυνάμει μὲν Πλάτων ἐστὶν ἀρχηγός), but it was Xenocrates who introduced it explicitly (ῥητότατα). Cp. Xenocr., fr. 1. H. (our nr. 753a) ¹.

Likenesses

898—The following likenesses were used.

Diog. VII 40:

Εἰκάζουσι δὲ ζῶν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ὅστοις μὲν καὶ νεύροις τὸ λογικόν προσομοιοῦντες, τοῖς δὲ σαρκοδεστέροις τὸ ἠθικόν, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ τὸ φυσικόν. ἡ πάλιν ὥσ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τὸ λογικόν, τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸ ἠθικόν, τὰ δ' ἐσωτάτω τὸ φυσικόν. ἡ ἀγρῶ παμφόρῳ· οὗ τὸν μὲν περιβεβλημένον φραγμὸν τὸν λογικόν, τὸν δὲ καρπὸν τὸ ἠθικόν, τὴν δὲ γῆν ἣ τὰ δένδρα τὸ φυσικόν. ἡ πόλει καλῶς τετειχισμένη καὶ κατὰ λόγον διοικουμένη.

¹ The same definition of wisdom appears in Seneca, *Ep.* 89. Also ap. Sext., *Adv. math.* IX (= *Ag. the phys. I*) 13.

If we might perhaps wonder why in a living being *the body* is compared with ethics, while *physics* is said to be like the soul, and again, why in the egg the yolk is compared with physics, while ethics is said to resemble the white, we shall find that in the above cited passage of Sextus *physics* is compared with the white of the egg and with the body of a living being, while *ethics* is said to resemble the yolk of the egg and the soul of a living being, the latter comparison being attributed to Posidonius.

b. Sextus, *Adv. Math.* VII (= *Against the Logicians* I) 19:

Ὁ δὲ Ποσειδώνιος, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν μέρη τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀχώριστά ἐστιν ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ φυτὰ τῶν καρπῶν ἕτερα θεωρεῖται καὶ τὰ τεῖχη τῶν φυτῶν κεχώρισται, ζῶν μᾶλλον εἰκάζειν ἡξίου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, αἵματι μὲν καὶ σαρκὶ τὸ φυσικόν, ὁστέοις δὲ καὶ νεύροις τὸ λογικόν, ψυχῇ δὲ τὸ ἡθικόν.

c. It seems that the sequence and appreciation of the three parts is subject to variation. Cp. Diog. VII 40 (the passage cited sub a. continued): Variation
in sequence

Καὶ οὐθὲν μέρος τοῦ ἐτέρου ἀποκεκρίσθαι, καθά τινες αὐτῶν φασιν, ἀλλὰ μεμίχθαι αὐτά. καὶ τὴν παράδοσιν μικτὴν ἐποιοῦν. ἄλλοι δὲ πρῶτον μὲν τὸ λογικόν τάττουσι, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ φυσικόν, καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἡθικόν. ὧν ἐστὶ Ζήνων ἐν τῷ Περὶ λόγου καὶ Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀρχέδημος καὶ Εὐδρόμος.

The sequence *logic, ethics, physics* is found in Sext., *Math.* VII 22. Also in the fr. of Chrys. ap. Plut., *Stoic. repugn.* 9, p. 1035a (SVF II 42)

Since Chrysippus himself seems to have varied the order of the three parts of philosophy, I think it better not to follow the direction of the last cited passage, but to choose the order which seems most rational to me, namely 1. physics, 2. logic, 3. ethics. After all the orchard is there before the enclosure, and usually the enclosure is made before the fruits are there. Order to be
followed

2—PHYSICS: (1) GENERAL PRINCIPLES

899—a. Diog. VII 134:

Δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὄλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἀποιον οὐσίαν, τὴν ὕλην· τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον, τὸν θεόν. τοῦτον γὰρ αἰδίδιον ὄντα διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς δημιουργεῖν ἕκαστα. τίθησι δὲ τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο Ζήνων μὲν ὁ Κιτιεύς ἐν τῷ Περὶ οὐσίας, Κλεάνθης δὲ ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῶν ἀτόμων, Χρύσιππος δὲ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν Φυσικῶν.

b. Aëtius, I 3, 25 (Dox. 289):

Ζήνων Μνασέου Κιτιεύς ἀρχὰς μὲν τὸν θεόν καὶ τὴν ὕλην, ὧν ὁ μὲν ἐστὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν αἴτιος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ πάσχειν, στοιχεῖα δὲ τέσσαρα.

**First
principles**

Diog., l.c., adds a note on the difference between ἀρχαί and στοιχεῖα:

Τὰς μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἀγενήτους καὶ ἀφθάρτους, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα κατὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν φθείρεσθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσωμάτους εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ ἀμόρφους, τὰ δὲ μεμορφῶσθαι.

c. Seneca, *Ep.* 65, 2:

Dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri duo esse in rerum natura, ex quibus omnia fiant, causam et materiam. Materia iacet iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura si nemo moveat. Causa autem, id est ratio, materiam format et quocumque vult versat, ex illa varia opera producit. Esse ergo debet, unde aliquid fiat, deinde a quo fiat. Hoc causa est, illud materia.

The difference from Aristotle's doctrine of εἶδος and ὕλη may be easily seen from the Stoic principle mentioned sub 901.

Πρώτη ὕλη
and
λόγος

900—a. Zeno speaks on πρώτη ὕλη as follows.

Stob., *Ecl.* I 11, 5a, p. 132, 26W. (SVF I 87):

Ζήνωνος· οὐσίαν δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ὕλην, ταύτην δὲ πᾶσαν αἰδῖον καὶ οὔτε πλείω γιγνομένην οὔτε ἐλάττω· τὰ δὲ μέρη ταύτης οὐκ αἰεὶ ταῦτά διαμένειν ἀλλὰ διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ συγχεῖσθαι. διὰ ταύτης δὲ διαθεῖν τὸν τοῦ παντός λόγον, ὃν ἐνιοὶ εἰμαρμένην καλοῦσιν, οἴόνπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα.

God
inseparable
from matter

b. Cp. Chalcid. in *Tim.* c. 294 (SVF ib.):

Stoici deum scilicet hoc esse quod silva sit vel etiam qualitatem inseparabilem deum silvae, eundemque per silvam meare, velut semen per membra genitalia.

c. Epiphani., *Adv. Haer.* I 5 (Dox. 588), SVF, ib.:

Φάσκει οὖν καὶ οὗτος (Ζήνων) τὴν ὕλην σύγχρονον καλῶν τῷ θεῷ ἴσα ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰρέσεσιν. εἰμαρμένην τε εἶναι καὶ γένεσιν ἐξ ἧς τὰ πάντα διοικεῖται καὶ πάσχει.

Stoics never speak of God and matter as being two substances. They always consider them as two aspects of the same nature which is one. Thus, for the Stoa in a sense God "is" matter, or at least inseparably connected with matter.

Everything
which
operates
is a body

901—God and soul must be matter according to the Stoic principle that everything which operates is a body.

a. Diog. VII 56:

Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν σῶμά ἐστι.

b. Cic., *Acad. Post.* I 11, 39:

Discrepabat etiam ab his (sc. Zeno ab Academicis et Peripateticis) quod nullo modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea quae expers esset corporis, cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse dixerant, nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus.

c. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* V 14, p. 384 St. (SVF II 1035):

Φασί γάρ σῶμα εἶναι τὸν θεὸν οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ πνεῦμα κατ' οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν.

Cp. Theodoretus, *Graec. aff. cur.* p. 37, 33, who speaks of τῶν Στωϊκῶν τὴν ἀπρεπῆ περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξαν: σωματοειδῆ γὰρ οὗτοι τὸν θεὸν ἔφασαν εἶναι. (SVF II 1028).

902—In fact, the Stoic monism tends to wipe out the opposition of “matter” to “spirit” or “mind”: God is defined as πῦρ τεχνικόν, but this creative fire is a kind of metaphysical fire,—corporeal, yet spiritual.

a. Aëtius, *Plac.* I, 7, 33 (SVF II 1027):

God defined
as

Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ νοερὸν θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται, πῦρ τεχνικόν, ὃδῳ βαδίζον ἐπὶ πῦρ τεχνικόν γένεσιν κόσμου, ἐμπεριειληφὸς πάντας τοὺς σπερματικούς λόγους, καθ' οὓς ἕκαστα καθ' εἰμαρμένην γίνεται· καὶ πνεῦμα μὲν διῆκον δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, τὰς δὲ προσηγορίας μεταλαμβάνον κατὰ τὰς τῆς ὕλης, δι' ἧς κεχώρηκε, παραλλάξεις. θεοὺς δὲ καὶ τὸν κόσμον καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὴν γῆν, τὸν δ' ἀνωτάτω πάντων νοῦν ἐν αἰθέρι.

The definition Πῦρ τεχνικόν, etc. is also found in Diog. VII 156. On the notion of σπερματικοὶ λόγοι vid. infra, sub nrs. **904a**, **919**. That the Spirit alters its names according to the different forms of the matter which it pervades, is a typically pantheistic view. We shall find it again in Seneca, *De benef.* IV 7-8 (our nr. **924a**).

b. Cicero, *N.D.* II 22, 57 (SVF I 171):

Zeno igitur naturam ita definit, ut eam dicat ignem esse artificiosum ad gignendum progredientem via. Censet enim artis maxime proprium esse creare et gignere, quodque in operibus nostrarum artium manus efficiat, id multo artificiosius naturam efficere, id est, ut dixi, ignem artificiosum, magistrum artium reliquarum.

c. Stob., *Ecl.* I p. 213, l. 17 ff. W.:

Two kinds
of fire

Ζήνωνος. — Δύο γὰρ γένη πυρός, τὸ μὲν ἄτεχον καὶ μεταβάλλον εἰς ἑαυτὸ τὴν τροφήν, τὸ δὲ τεχνικόν, αὐξητικόν τε καὶ τηρητικόν, ὅλον ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἐστί καὶ ζῳοῖς, ὃ δὲ φύσις ἐστὶ καὶ ψυχή.

Cf. Cic., *N.D.* II 15, 41.

903—Contrary to Aristotle's doctrine in Π. φιλ. that *noûs* consists of the same element as the celestial bodies, namely aether (our nr. **431d**), Zeno held that the soul is fire or pneuma.

Soul is
not aether
but fire

a. Cic., *Ac. Post.* I 11, 39:

De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum, ut in quattuor initiis rerum illis quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur, non adhiberet. Statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quae quidque gigneret, etiam mentem atque sensus.

Idem, *de Fin.* IV 12:

Cum autem quaereretur res admodum difficilis, num quinta quaedam natura videretur esse, ex qua ratio et intelligentia oriretur, in quo etiam de animis cuius generis essent quaereretur, Zeno id dixit esse ignem.

or
πνεῦμα
ἐνθερμον

b. Diog. VII 157:

Ζήνων δ' ὁ Κιτιεὺς καὶ Ἀντίπατρος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ Ποσειδώνιος πνεῦμα ἐνθερμον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν· τούτῳ γὰρ ἡμᾶς εἶναι ἐμπνούς καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου κινεῖσθαι.

Consitus
Spiritus

c. We find the doctrine of Zeno again in Tertull., *De anima* 5 (SVF I 137):

Denique Zeno "consitum spiritum" definiens animam hoc modo instruit, "quo" inquit "digresso animal emoritur, corpus est: consito autem spiritu digresso animal emoritur: ergo consitus spiritus corpus est: consitus autem spiritus anima est: ergo corpus est anima".

On the consequences of the Stoic doctrine of materiality of the soul, see our nrs. **914-915**.

904—In what sense God or the Logos is called Demiurge or Builder of the world.

How the
world comes
into being

a. Diog. VII 135 f.:

Ἐν τ' εἶναι θεὸν καὶ νοῦν καὶ εἰμαρμένην καὶ Δία· πολλὰς τ' ἐτέρας ὀνομασίας προσονομάζεσθαι. κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν καθ' αὐτὸν ὄντα τρέπειν τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν δι' ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ· καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα περιέχεται, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου τοιόνδ' ὑπολείπεσθαι ἐν τῷ ὕγρῳ, εὐεργὸν αὐτῷ ποιοῦντα τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐξῆς γένεσιν, εἴτ' ἀπογεννᾶν πρῶτον τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, πῦρ, ὕδωρ, ἀέρα, γῆν. λέγει δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν Ζήνων τ' ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ Χρυσίππος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν Φυσικῶν.

How it is meant that the world comes into being when "God" transforms "the whole of substance" through air into water, may become somewhat clearer

from the passage cited sub *b*. We have to remember Heraclitus' downward and upward way (our nr. 55). Zeno who adopts the theory of the four elements, introduces air into Heraclitus' scheme. That God who is called by Zeno "the seminal Reason of the Universe", remains behind in cosmic moisture as an agent "adapting matter to himself with a view to the next stage of creation", reminds us of a passage in Seneca, *Nat. quaest.*, to be cited sub 905c.

b. Diog., ib. 142:

ὁδὸς κάτω,
ὁδὸς ἄνω

Γίνεσθαι δὲ τὸν κόσμον, ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς ἡ οὐσία τραπῇ δι' ἀέρος εἰς ὑγρότητα, εἶτα τὸ παχυμερές αὐτοῦ συστάν ἀποτελεσθῇ γῆ, τὸ δὲ λεπτομερές ἐξαερωθῇ, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πλέον λεπτυνθὲν πῦρ ἀπογεννήσῃ· εἶτα κατὰ μίξιν ἐκ τούτων φυτὰ τε καὶ ζῶα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γένη.

That this generation of the universe, and its destruction, is meant as a *periodical process*, appears both from the praesens γίνεσθαι and from the ὅταν. It is expressed explicitly in Stob., *Ecl.* I 17, 3, p. 152, 19 (see Pearson, *The fragments of Zeno*, nr. 52). See also the next nr.

905—a. Aristocles ap. Euseb., *Praep. Evang.* XV, p. 816d, (SVF I 98), having summarized Zeno's doctrine of the active and the passive principle, continues:

"Ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ κατὰ τινας εἰμαρμένους χρόνους ἐκπυροῦσθαι τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον, εἴτ' αὖθις πάλιν διακοσμεῖσθαι. τὸ μέντοι πρῶτον πῦρ εἶναι καθαπερεῖ τι σπέρμα, τῶν ἀπάντων ἔχον τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας τῶν γεγονότων καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων καὶ τῶν ἐσομένων·

Periodical
conflagration

b. Heracles who, tired by his works, gave himself death by fire appears as a symbol of the "creative fire" from which everything springs and to which everything returns periodically.

Seneca, *De benef.* IV 8:

Herculem quia vis eius invicta sit, quandoque lassata fuerit operibus editis in ignem recessura.

c. Seneca describes the process of conflagration and regeneration of the world in such a way that, when fire is extinguished humour remains, in which a germ for a new world is present.

Sen., *Nat. quaest.* III 13:

Nihil relinqui aliud in rerum natura igne restincto quam umorem, in hoc futuri mundi spem latere. Ita ignis exitus mundi est, umor primordium.

and
regeneration

Cp. Cleanthes' description of the regeneration of the kosmos, to be cited sub 908.

906—Hence the curious doctrine of the periodical repetition of history (cp. our nr. 23c), called by later writers ἀποκατάστασις.

Reiteration
of history

Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* 38, p. 277 (SVF II 625):

Οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ φασιν ἀποκαθισταμένους τοὺς πλάνητας εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τε μῆκος καὶ πλάτος, ἔνθα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἕκαστος ἦν, ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ὁ κόσμος συνέστη, ἐν ῥηταῖς χρόνων περιόδοις ἐκπύρωσιν καὶ φθορὰν τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργάζεσθαι· καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ τὸν κόσμον ἀποκαθίστασθαι· τῶν ἀστέρων ὁμοίως πάλιν φερομένων ἕκαστον ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ περιόδῳ γινόμενον ἀπαρallάκτως ἀποτελεῖσθαι. ἔσεσθαι γὰρ πάλιν Σωκράτη καὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων σὺν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ φίλοις καὶ πολίταις· καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πείσεσθαι καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μεταχειριεῖσθαι, καὶ πᾶσαν πόλιν καὶ κώμην καὶ ἀγρὸν ὁμοίως ἀποκαθίστασθαι· γίνεσθαι δὲ τὴν ἀποκατάστασιν τοῦ παντός οὐχ ἅπαξ, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις· μᾶλλον δ' εἰς ἄπειρον καὶ ἀτελεύτητον τὰ αὐτὰ ἀποκαθίστασθαι. τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς τοὺς μὴ ὑποκειμένους τῇ φθορᾷ, ταύτῃ παρακολουθήσαντας μιᾷ περιόδῳ, γινώσκειν ἐκ ταύτης πάντα τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ἐξῆς περιόδοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ ξένον ἔσεσθαι παρὰ τὰ γενόμενα πρότερον, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὡσάντως ἀπαρallάκτως ἄχρι καὶ τῶν ἐλαχίστων.

Later development of the doctrine

907—Panaetius, influenced by Carneades' criticism, abandoned the theory of πῦρ τεχνικόν and periodical conflagration. He adopts the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world and the aether hypothesis. Posidonius restores the Ancient Stoic theory. It is found again with later Stoics, though in a more ethical version: both Seneca and Marcus Aurelius view the conflagration as a renewal of the world ordered by Providence ¹.

a. Seneca, *Nat. quaest.* III 28, 7 and 30, 8.

Speaking on great floods inundating the world without rules or measure (*solutus legibus sine modo fertur*) Seneca says:

Qua ratione? inquis. Eadem qua conflagratio futura est. Utrumque fit, cum deo visum ordiri meliora, vetera finiri.

And again, in 30, 8:

Omne ex integro animal generabitur dabiturque terris homo inscius scelerum et melioribus auspiciis natus. Sed illis quoque innocentia non durabit, nisi dum novi sunt; cito nequitia subrepat.

b. Cf. Marcus Aurelius XII 23, 3:

Τὸν δὲ καιρὸν καὶ τὸν ὅρον δίδωσιν ἡ φύσις, ποτὲ μὲν καὶ ἡ ἰδία, ὅταν ἐν

¹ The same view was, however, already taken by Chrysippus, as appears from a passage in Origenes, *Contra Celsum*. See sub. **938**.

γῆρα, πάντως δὲ ἡ τῶν ὅλων, ἥς τῶν μερῶν μεταβαλλόντων νεαρὸς αἰὲ καὶ ἀκμαῖος ὁ σύμπας κόσμος διαμένει.

Cp. also VII 25, and Seneca, *Ep.* 90, 44.

908—a. Cleanthes describes the periodical renewal of the kosmos in the following passage.

Stob. *Ecl.* I 17, 3, p. 153, 7W. (SVF I 497):

The
periodical
renewal of
the kosmos

Κλεάνθης δὲ οὕτω πῶς φησιν· ἐκφλογισθέντος τοῦ παντός συνίζειν τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ πρῶτον, εἴτα τὰ ἐχόμενα ἀποσβέννυσθαι δι' ὅλου. τοῦ δὲ παντός ἐξυγρανθέντος, τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ πυρός, ἀντιτυπήσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ μέσου, τρέπεσθαι πάλιν εἰς τοῦναντίον, εἴθ' οὕτω τρεπόμενον ἄνωθέν φησιν αὔξεσθαι καὶ ἄρχεσθαι διακοσμεῖν τὸ ὅλον· καὶ τοιαύτην περίοδον αἰεὶ καὶ διακόσμησιν ποιούμενον¹ τὸν ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅλων οὐσίᾳ τόνον μὴ παύεσθαι. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐνός τινος τὰ μέρη πάντα φύεται ἐκ σπερμάτων ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μέρη, ὧν καὶ τὰ ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει, ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις φύεται. καὶ ὥσπερ τινὲς λόγοι τῶν μερῶν εἰς σπέρμα συνιόντες μίγνυνται καὶ αὖθις διακρίνονται γινομένων τῶν μερῶν, οὕτως ἐξ ἐνός τε πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἐν συγκρίνεσθαι, ὁδῷ καὶ συμφώνως διεξιούσης τῆς περιόδου.

After the conflagration, the whole mass of fire is gradually extinguished, the process spreading from the centre to the periphery. A last sparklet of fire remains at the outskirts of the kosmos.² Thus, all things are reduced to the sperma whence they came, and it is from this cosmic sperma that a new process of generation comes forth: the resistance of the moist mass is overcome and again matter is transformed into the diversity of a kosmos.

Τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ πυρός — τρέπεσθαι πάλιν εἰς τοῦναντίον: if the text is sound, τρέπεσθαι is a medial form, as Verbeke, *Kleanthes* p. 126, rightly explains it. Therefore in the next line τρεπόμενον gives a better sense than τρεπομένον.

b. The notion of a *τόνος* in the universe which entertains the cosmic process is found again in Cornutus, c. 31 (SVF I 514):

¹ A necessary correction, made by Meerwaldt (*Mnem.* 1951, p. 53). The codd. have ποιούμενου.

² This is, at least what our text, as it has come to us, says. J. D. Meerwaldt (in *Mnem.* 1951, p. 46 ff.) thinks the text must be emended by cancelling the words τοῦ πυρός, because all texts agree on the point that *the whole mass of fire* is extinguished, turning through air into water, and no part of it remains. Cp. however Diog. VII, 136 (sub **904a**), where it is said that "he", i.e. God or the creative fire, "who is the σπερματικὸς λόγος of the universe", *remains behind as such in the moisture* (τοιόνδ' ὑπολείπεσθαι ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ), which seems to mean: as creative fire, which is cosmic sperma. Cp. also SVF II 717 (τοὺς σπερματικούς λόγους . . . ἀφθάρτους ἐποίησαν), and Epict. III 13, 4-7 (Zeus is alone at the conflagration), to be cited sub **924b**.

Ἡρακλῆς δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις τόνος, καθ' ὃν ἡ φύσις ἰσχυρὰ καὶ κραταῖα ἐστίν, ἀνίκητος καὶ ἀπεριγένητος οὔσα, μεταδοτικὸς ἰσχύος καὶ τοῖς κατὰ μέρος καὶ ἀλκῆς ὑπάρχων.

Seneca, *Nat. quaest.* II 8, speaks of *intentio spiritus*.

909—The doctrine of periodical destruction and renewal of the world is connected with the view of the kosmos as a living being, springing up, growing, perishing, and arising again from the original sperma whence it came.

The kosmos
endowed
with soul
and reason

Diog. L. VII 138-139:

Τὸν δὴ κόσμον διοικεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος τ' ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ Περὶ προνοίας καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ Περὶ θεῶν, εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος διήκοντος τοῦ νοῦ, καθάπερ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀλλ' ἤδη δι' ὧν μὲν μᾶλλον, δι' ὧν δὲ ἥττον. δι' ὧν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἕξις κεχώρηκεν, ὡς διὰ τῶν ὁσίων καὶ τῶν νεύρων· δι' ὧν δὲ ὡς νοῦς, ὡς διὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ζῶον ὄντα καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ λογικόν, ἔχειν ἡγεμονικὸν μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, καθά φησιν Ἀντίπατρος ὁ Τύριος ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ Περὶ κόσμου. Χρύσιππος δ' ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ προνοίας καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανόν φησι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου, Κλεάνθης δὲ τὸν ἥλιον.

On Cleanthes' doctrine see Verbeke, *Kleanthes*, p. 135 f. V. is quite right in rejecting the necessity of oriental influence on this point. Cp. Plato, *Symp.* 220d: Socrates, after that famous night in the camp near Potidaea, adores the sun (our nr. 208c, the end).

910—Zeno seems to have "proved" the intelligent character of the kosmos by three arguments.

First
argument

a. Sext., *Adv. math.* IX (= *Against the Physicists* I) 104:

Καὶ πάλιν ὁ Ζήνων φησίν, "τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ μὴ λογικοῦ κρεῖττόν ἐστιν· οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου κρεῖττόν ἐστιν· λογικὸν ἄρα ὁ κόσμος. καὶ ὡσαύτως ἐπὶ τοῦ νοεροῦ καὶ ἐμψυχίας μετέχοντος. τὸ γὰρ νοερὸν τοῦ μὴ νοεροῦ καὶ τὸ ἐμψυχον τοῦ μὴ ἐμψύχου κρεῖττόν ἐστιν· οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου κρεῖττον· νοερὸς ἄρα καὶ ἐμψυχός ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος."

Cf. Cic., *N.D.* II, 8. 21: Quod ratione utitur, id melius est quam id quod ratione non utitur. Nihil autem mundo melius: ratione igitur mundus utitur.

The argument is severely criticized by Carneades (our nr. 1117a).

Second
argument

b. Sextus, *ib.* 101:

Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἀπὸ Ξενοφώντος τὴν ἀφορμὴν λαβὼν οὕτως συνερωτᾷ. τὸ προϊέμενον σπέρμα λογικοῦ καὶ αὐτὸ λογικόν ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ κόσμος προτετα σπέρμα λογικοῦ· λογικὸν ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ κόσμος.

Cf. Cic., *N.D.* II 22: nihil quod animi, quodque rationis est expers, id generare ex se potest animantem compotemque rationis. Mundus autem generat animantes compotesque rationis. Animans est igitur mundus composque rationis.

c. Sextus, *ib.* 85:

Ἄλλα καὶ ἡ τὰς λογικὰς περιέχουσα φύσει πάντως ἐστὶ λογική· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους χειρὸν εἶναι.

Cf. Cic., *N.D.* II 22: Idemque (Zeno) hoc modo: nullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest esse sentiens. Mundi autem partes sentientes sunt. Non igitur caret sensu mundus.

Third
argument

911—In this sense then Zeno could call the logos δημιουργός τοῦ ὅλου or τοῦ παντός, as was implied in the passage of Diog. Laërt. cited sub 899a.

In what
sense the
Logos is
δημιουργός

a. Lactantius, *De vera sap.* c. 9:

Zeno rerum naturae dispositorem atque artificem universitatis λόγον praedicat, quem et fatum et necessitatem rerum et deum et animum Iovis nuncupat.

b. Cf. Philodemus, Π. εὐσ. c. 11 (Dox. 545 b 12):

Ἄλλα μὴν καὶ Χρύσιππος . . . ἐν μὲν τῷ πρώτῳ (Περὶ θεῶν) Δία φη(σὶν εἶναι τὸν) ἅπαντ(α διοικοῦν)τα λόγον κ(αὶ τὴν) τοῦ ὅλου ψυχὴ(ν καὶ) τῇ τούτου μ(ετοχ)ῇ πάντα (ζῆν).

912—To the question of “How it is possible that God being a body penetrates the universe which is a body too” the Stoa replies by its theory of the interpenetration of bodies.

a. Simplicius, *Phys.* p. 530, 9 Diels (SVF II 467):

Τὸ δὲ σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοι ὡς ἐναργὲς ἄτοπον ἐλάμβανον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὕστερον προσήκαντο ὡς ἀκολουθοῦν ταῖς σφῶν αὐτῶν ὑποθέσεσιν, ἃς ἐνόμιζον παντὶ τρόπῳ δεῖν κυροῦν· σώματα γὰρ πάντα λέγειν δοκοῦντες, καὶ τὰς ποιότητας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ διὰ παντός ὄρῶντες τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν χωροῦσαν καὶ τὰς ποιότητας, ἐν ταῖς κράσεσι συνεχώρουσιν σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν.

Theory of
the inter-
penetration
of bodies

b. The theory of mixture according to Chrysippus is expounded in Stob., *Ecl.* I 17, 4 (p. 153-155 W.), SVF II 471. Four kinds of “mixture” are distinguished, namely παράθεσις, μῖξις, κρᾶσις and σύγχυσις. Only in the last kind the two substances and their qualities disappear, being transformed into a new substance¹. The connexion of soul and

¹ It is to be noticed that the Stoic texts do not use the term “substance” but only speak of “qualities” which are or are not transformed into a new “quality”.

body proves to be a form of *μίξις*, which is an interpenetration of bodies preserving their own qualities, like iron in fire.

Παράθεσιν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι σωμάτων συναφὴν κατὰ τὰς ἐπιφανείας, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν σωρῶν ὁρῶμεν . . .

Μίξιν δ' εἶναι δύο ἢ καὶ πλείονων σωμάτων ἀντιπαρέκτασιν δι' ὧλων, ὑπομενουσῶν τῶν συμφυῶν περὶ αὐτὰ ποιότητων, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἔχει καὶ τοῦ πεπυρακτωμένου σιδήρου, ἐπὶ τούτων γὰρ <δι' > ὧλων γίγνεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων τὴν ἀντιπαρέκτασιν. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ψυχῶν ἔχει· δι' ὧλων γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων ἡμῶν ἀντιπαρεκτείνουσιν, ἀρέσκει γὰρ αὐτοῖς σῶμα διὰ σώματος ἀντιπαρήκειν. Κράσιν δὲ εἶναι λέγουσι δύο ἢ καὶ πλείονων σωμάτων ὑγρῶν δι' ὧλων ἀντιπαρέκτασιν τῶν περὶ αὐτὰ ποιότητων ὑπομενουσῶν· [τὴν μὲν μίξιν καὶ ἐπὶ ξηρῶν γίγνεσθαι σωμάτων, οἶον πυρὸς καὶ σιδήρου, ψυχῆς τε καὶ τοῦ περιέχοντος αὐτὴν σώματος· τὴν δὲ κράσιν ἐπὶ μόνων φασὶ γίνεσθαι τῶν ὑγρῶν] συνεκφαίνεσθαι γὰρ ἐκ τῆς κράσεως τὴν ἐκάστου τῶν συγκραθέντων ὑγρῶν ποιότητα, οἶον οἴνου, μέλιτος, ὕδατος, ὀξους, τῶν παραπλησίων. Ὅτι δ' ἐπὶ τοιούτων κράσεων διαμένουσιν αἱ ποιότητες τῶν συγκραθέντων, πρόδηλον ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἐξ ἐπιμηχανήσεως ἀποχωρίζεσθαι ταῦτα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. Ἐὰν γοῦν σπόγγον ἡλαιωμένον καθῆτις εἰς οἶνον ὕδατι κεκραμένον, ἀποχωρίσει τὸ ὕδωρ τοῦ οἴνου, ἀναδραμόντος τοῦ ὕδατος εἰς τὸν σπόγγον. Τὴν δὲ σύγχυσιν δύο ἢ καὶ πλείονων ποιότητων περὶ τὰ σώματα μεταβολὴν εἰς ἑτέρας διαφερούσης τούτων ποιότητος γένεσιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς συνθέσεως ἔχει τῶν μύρων καὶ τῶν ἱατρικῶν φαρμάκων.

Again, the theory is expounded in Alex. Aphrod., *De mixtione* p. 216, 14 Bruns (SVF II 473). It is combated by Plutarchus, *De comm. not.* 37, p. 1077e (SVF II, 465) and discussed by Plotinus, *Enn.* II, 7, 1.

c. Alex. Aphr., *De mixt.* p. 226 (SVF II 475) rightly points to the importance of the doctrine with regard to the theory of εἰμαρμένη and of cosmic sympathy.

He speaks of the "absurdity of the doctrine".

(Τῆς ἀτοπίας τῶν ὑφ' αὐτῶν λεγομένων), οἷς καὶ τὰ κυριώτατα καὶ μέγιστα τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν δογμάτων ἡρτῆται καὶ τὴν κατασκευὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ θαυμαστοῦ δόγματος ἔχει τοῦ σώματος χωρεῖν διὰ σώματος. Ὁ τε γὰρ περὶ κράσεως αὐτοῖς λόγος οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινί. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς ὑπ' αὐτῶν λεγόμενα ἐντεῦθεν ἡρτῆται. ἢ τε πολυθρόλυτος αὐτοῖς εἰμαρμένη καὶ ἡ τῶν πάντων πρόνοια δὲ <ἐντεῦθεν> τὴν πίστιν λαμβάνουσιν. ἔτι τε ὁ περὶ ἀρχῶν τε καὶ θεοῦ <λόγος> καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ἑνωσίς τε καὶ συμπάθεια πρὸς αὐτό. πάντα γὰρ αὐτοῖς ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁ διὰ τῆς ὕλης διήκων θεός.

913—The notion of a κραῖσις δι' ὅλου or δι' ὅλων, famous by Chrysippus' instance of the drop of wine, appears already with Zeno.

a. Galenus, in *Hippocr. de humoribus* I (XVI 32 K.), SVF I 92:

Ζήνων τε ὁ Κιτιεύς ὡς τὰς ποιότητας οὕτω καὶ τὰς οὐσίας δι' ὅλου κεράννυσθαι ἐνόμιζεν.

Cf. Themistius, *De anima* f. 68 II, p. 30, 17 Spengel (SVF I 145).

b. Diog. VII 151 (SVF II 479):

Καὶ τὰς κράσεις δὲ διόλου γίνεσθαι, καθά φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ τῶν Φυσικῶν, καὶ μὴ κατὰ περιγραφὴν καὶ παράθεσιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰς πέλαιος ὀλίγος οἶνος βληθεὶς ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἀντιπαρεκταθήσεται, εἴτα συμφθαρήσεται.

c. Plut., *Comm. not.* 37, p. 1078e (SVF II 480):

Καὶ ταῦτα προσδέχεται Χρύσιππος εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν ζητημάτων "οὐδὲν ἀπέχειν φάμενος, οἶνου σταλαγμὸν ἓνα κεράσαι τὴν θάλατταν," καὶ ἵνα δὴ μὴ τοῦτο θαυμάζωμεν, "εἰς ὅλον, φησί, τὸν κόσμον διατενεῖν τῇ κράσει τὸν σταλαγμόν."

The image, and the text itself, became famous in Dutch literature by the poem of J. H. Leopold, *Verzen*, (2) 1920, p. 137-141, a late expression of the Stoic doctrine of cosmic sympathy.

914—Consequences of Stoic materialism.

To the principle mentioned sub **901** and the definition of soul sub **903** must be referred the Stoic doctrine that virtues and all mental activities are bodies.

Virtues
and mental
activities
are bodies

a. Alex. Aphr., *De anima libri mant.* p. 115 Bruns (SVF II 797):

Καὶ γὰρ καί, ἐπεὶ αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς ποιότητες σώματα κατ' αὐτοὺς (sc. τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς) καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώματος, πολλὰ σώματά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ διάφορα δι' ἀλλήλων διήκοντα καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ.

II6, 13: ἔτι εἰ καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ σώματα καὶ αἱ τέχναι, πῶς οὐ προσγενόμενα ταῦτά τινι στενοχωρήσει τὸ σῶμα ἢ αὐξήσει;

b. Plut., *De comm. not.* c. 45, p. 1084a (SVF II 848):

and even
animals

"Ἀποπον' γὰρ εὖ μάλα τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας, πρὸς δὲ ταύταις τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς μνήμας πάσας, ἔτι δὲ φαντασίας καὶ πάθη καὶ ὀρμάς καὶ συγκαταθέσεις σώματα ποιουμένους, ἐν μηδενὶ φάναι κεῖσθαι μὴδ' ὑπάρχειν τόπον τούτοις, ἓνα <δὲ> τὸν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ πόρον στιγμαῖον ἀπολιπεῖν, ὅπου τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν συστέλλουσι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὑπὸ τοσοῦτων σωμάτων κατεχόμενον, ὅσων τοὺς πάνυ δοκοῦντας ἀφορίζειν καὶ ἀποκρίνειν ἕτερον ἐτέρου πολὺ πλῆθος

διαπέφευγε. τὸ δὲ μὴ μόνον σώματα ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῶα λογικὰ — ὑπερβολή τις ἐστίν — παρανομίας εἰς τὴν — συνήθειαν. 1084c. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας σώματα καὶ ζῶα ποιοῦσι.

c. Seneca, *Ep.* 113, 1 discusses the question
quid sentiam de hac questione iactata apud nostros: an iustitia
fortitudo prudentia ceteraeque virtutes animalia sint.

SVF III 307. Seneca rejects Chrysippus' consequence that mental qualities and activities are ζῶα, but he does not doubt of their corporeality. Cp. *Ep.* 106, 5: *Non puto te dubitaturum an adfectus corpora sint . . . an vultum nobis mutant, an frontem adstringant* etc.

Pohlenz, *Stoa* I p. 66, explains the doctrine as a Semitic view of things. Cp. certain expressions in the A.T., such as "bad face" for sadness, and "sniffing" for wrath. In any case it is connected with Chrysippus' doctrine of the ἡγεμονικόν πῶς ἔχον, the πῶς ἔχον being one of his four categories of being.

four kinds
of being

915—Chrysippus admits four categories of being.

a. Simpl., in *Ar. Categ.* f. 16 Δ ed. Bas. (SVF II 369):

Οἱ δὲ γε Στωϊκοὶ εἰς ἐλάττονα συστέλλειν ἀξιοῦσι τὸν τῶν πρώτων γενῶν ἀριθμὸν. — ποιοῦνται γὰρ τὴν τομὴν εἰς τέσσαρα· εἰς ὑποκείμενα καὶ ποιὰ καὶ πῶς ἔχοντα καὶ πρὸς τί πῶς ἔχοντα.

The four γένη are discussed by Plotinus in *Enn.* VI, 1, 25.

τὸ
ἡγεμονικόν
πῶς ἔχον

b. The πῶς ἔχον means: a certain state or condition. Therefore Chrysippus, tracing all πάθη and ὁρμαὶ and mental activities back to the hegemonikon, could call ἐπιστήμη or ὁργή or ἐπιθυμία: τὸ ἡγεμονικόν πῶς ἔχον. Alex. Aphrod., *De anima libri mant.* p. 118, 6 Bruns (SVF II 823):

"Ὅτι μὴ "μία ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις, ὥς τὴν αὐτὴν πῶς ἔχουσιν ποτὲ μὲν διανοεῖσθαι, ποτὲ δὲ ὁργίζεσθαι, ποτὲ δ' ἐπιθυμεῖν παρὰ μέρος" δεικτέον.

c. Cf. Sextus, *Pyrrh.* II 81:

Ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη πῶς ἔχον ἡγεμονικόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ πῶς ἔχουσα χεὶρ πυγμῇ, τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικόν σῶμα: ἔστι γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς πνεῦμα.

Chrysippus' doctrine of the ἡγεμονικόν πῶς ἔχον is expounded by Pohlenz in *Zenon und Chrysipp*, p. 181 ff.

Stoic
materialism
criticized
by Plotinus

916—Plotinus in combating the Stoic materialism, argues that before the bodies there must exist some other kind of being: according to the Stoics themselves soul is not merely pneuma (for there are many πνεύματα ἄψυχα), but pneuma πῶς ἔχον, which either is nothing or introduces some other kind of being.

a. *Enn.* IV 7, 4:Soul as
πνεῦμά
πως ἔχον

Μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀγόμενοι, ὥς δεῖ τι πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι κρεῖττον αὐτῶν ψυχῆς εἶδος, ἔννουν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ πῦρ νοερὸν τιθέμενοι, ὥσπερ ἄνευ πυρὸς καὶ πνεύματος οὐ δυναμένης τῆς κρεῖττονος μοίρας ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν εἶναι, τόπον δὲ ζητούσης εἰς τὸ ἰδρυθῆναι, δέον ζητεῖν, ὅπου τὰ σώματα ἰδρύσουσιν, ὥς ἄρα δεῖ ταῦτα ἐν ψυχῆς δυνάμεσιν ἰδρυθῆναι. Εἰ δὲ μηδὲν παρὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὴν ζωὴν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τίθενται, τί τὸ πολυθρόλητον αὐτοῖς πως ἔχον, εἰς ὃ καταφεύγουσιν ἀναγκαζόμενοι τίθεσθαι ἄλλην παρὰ τὰ σώματα φύσιν δραστήριον; Εἰ οὖν οὐ πᾶν μὲν πνεῦμα ψυχὴ, ὅτι μυρία πνεύματα ἄψυχα, τὸ δὲ πως ἔχον πνεῦμα φήσουσι, τό πως ἔχον τοῦτο καὶ ταύτην τὴν σχέσιν ἢ τῶν ὄντων τι φήσουσιν, ἢ μηδέν. Ἄλλ' εἰ μὲν μηδέν, πνεῦμα ἂν εἴη μόνον, τὸ δὲ πως ἔχον ὄνομα. Καὶ οὕτως συμβήσεται αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν εἶναι λέγειν ἢ τὴν ὕλην, καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ θεὸν ὀνόματα πάντα, ἐκεῖνο δὲ μόνον <ὄν>. Εἰ δὲ τῶν ὄντων ἡ σχέσις καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ τὴν ὕλην, ἐν ὕλῃ μὲν, ἄϋλον δὲ αὐτὸ τῷ μὴ πάλιν αὖ συγκεῖσθαι ἐξ ὕλης, λόγος ἂν εἴη τις καὶ οὐ σῶμα καὶ φύσις ἑτέρα.

We need not infer from this passage that soul was explicitly defined by the Stoics as πνεῦμά πως ἔχον: Plotinus, adopting their terminology, rather seems to urge on them the necessity of this consequence.

The same definition of soul is attributed to the Stoics by Porphyrius ap. Euseb., *Praep. ev.* XV, p. 813c:

Πῶς δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνῃς γέμων ὁ πνεῦμά πως ἔχον αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν) ἀποδιδούς, ἢ πῦρ νοερὸν, τῇ περιψύξει καὶ οἷον βαφῇ τοῦ ἀέρος ἀναφθὲν ἡ στομωθέν;

Indeed, the Stoics imagined that the πῦρ νοερὸν or πνεῦμα ἑνθερμον at the birth of a child was cooled by the air and "stimulated" and thus became a living being: hence the name of ψυχὴ, παρὰ τὴν ψύξιν¹.—This is the account of the soul's origin we find in Plut., *Stoic. repugn.* 41 (SVF II 806):

Τὸ βρέφος ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ φύσει τρέφεσθαι νομίζει καθάπερ φυτὸν· ὅταν δὲ τεχθῇ, ψυχόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ στομούμενον τὸ πνεῦμα μεταβάλλειν καὶ γίνεσθαι ζῶον· ὅθεν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου τὴν ψυχὴν ὀνομάσθαι παρὰ τὴν ψύξιν.

It is clear, then, that soul was not the πῦρ νοερὸν or cosmic pneuma, which Zeno called also νοῦς, as such; it was πνεῦμά πως ἔχον, to say it in Chrysippus' terminology.

b. Again, in another passage of the *Enneads* Plotinus says that the Stoics went so far as to define God as "prime matter πως ἔχουσαν".

Enn. II, 4, 1:God as
(πρώτη)
ὕλη πως
ἔχουσα

Καὶ οἱ μὲν σώματα μόνον τὰ ὄντα εἶναι θέμενοι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐν τούτοις, μίαν τε τὴν ὕλην λέγουσι καὶ τοῖς στοιχείοις ὑποβεβλῆσθαι, καὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι

¹ We find this Stoic doctrine later in Origenes, who frequently declares that "soul" is "cooled νοῦς".

τὴν οὐσίαν· τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα οἷον πάθη ταύτης, καὶ πως ἔχουσαν αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα εἶναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ τολμῶσι καὶ μέχρι θεῶν αὐτὴν ἄγειν· καὶ τέλος δὴ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θεὸν ὕλην ταύτην πως ἔχουσαν εἶναι.

That Chrysippus or other Stoics really defined God as (πρώτη) ὕλη πως ἔχουσα seems hardly credible. Pohlenz, *Stoa* II p. 41 qualifies it as a "natürlich unzulässige Folgerung" and remarks that in fact, Stoics must consider *qualified things* as ὕλη πως ἔχουσα. However, it should be noticed that *in a sense* (as we remarked sub 900c) for Stoics God is matter. And this is what Plotinus, using Stoic terminology, expresses in the terms: God is to them ὕλη πως ἔχουσα, just as he could say that soul is to them πνεῦμά πως ἔχον.

The definition of God as prime matter occurs again in the beginning of the 13th century with David of Dinant (but without the addition of a πως ἔχουσα!): *Deus et materia prima sunt omnino simplicia. Ergo nullo modo differunt*. The argument is mentioned by Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.* I qu. 3, art. 8, ad 3, who rejects it mainly because God does not mix with anything ("Non est possibile Deum aliquo modo in compositionem alicuius venire,—nec sicut principium formale nec sicut principium materiale".)

3—PHYSICS: (2) GOD, PROVIDENCE, MANTIC

God

917—Various aspects of the Deity.

1. τὸ ποιοῦν,
Λόγος,
πῦρ τεχνικόν

1. The active principle in Nature, called Logos and defined as πῦρ τεχνικόν:

Nrs. 899-902.

2. Εἰμαρμένη

918—Since the Logos rules all that is and happens, it is identified with the Εἰμαρμένη of popular faith: the inexorable Law of the Universe.

a. Schol. in Hom. *Il.* VIII 69 (SVF II 931):

Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δέ φασιν ὡς ταῦτ' οὖν εἰμαρμένη καὶ Ζεὺς.

b. Stob., *Ecl.* I 79, 1 W. (SVF II 913):

Χρύσιππος δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς εἰμαρμένης, τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικὴν. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ κόσμου. Ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ ὅρων καὶ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τῆς εἰμαρμένης καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις σποράδην πολυτρόπως ἀποφαίνεται λέγων· "Εἰμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος" ἢ "λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοία διοικουμένων" ἢ "λόγος καθ' ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γινόμενα γίνεται, τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται."

c. Plut., *Stoic. refugn.* c. 34 p. 1049f (SVF II 937):

"Οτι δ' ἡ κοινὴ φύσις καὶ ὁ κοινὸς τῆς φύσεως λόγος εἰμαρμένη καὶ πρόνοια καὶ Ζεὺς ἐστίν, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀντίποδας λέληθε· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ταῦτα θρυλεῖται ὑπ' αὐτῶν· καὶ τὸ

(A5) Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή,

τὸν "Ὁμηρον εἰρηκέναι φησὶν ὀρθῶς, ἐπὶ τὴν εἰμαρμένην ἀναφέροντα καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄλων φύσιν, καθ' ἣν πάντα διοικεῖται.

d. The same view of the universe is expressed in Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus* (our nr. 943), but in such a way that Zeus is addressed as the *Ruler* of the κοινὸς λόγος which pervades the Universe (vs. 12). This λόγος then, or νόμος, is identic with the *Will* of Zeus, and thus may be said to be identic with Zeus. Seneca's *semper paret, semel iussit* is a less philosophical expression of the same view. For the rest the passage has a somewhat different accent.

Seneca, *De Prov.* 5, 8:

Grande solacium est cum universo rapi; quicquid est quod nos sic vivere, sic mori iussit, eadem necessitate et deos alligat. Irrevocabilis humana pariter ac divina cursus vehit: ille ipse omnium conditor et rector scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur, semper paret, semel iussit.

On the problem of *Fate and Liberty* (of man) see below nr. 944.

919—The Logos is also called Λόγος σπερματικός and is said to contain all λόγοι σπερματικοί: our nr. 902a (the creative fire contains all the "seminal reasons") and 904a (God or the fire as the "seminal reason" which, when "the whole of substance" is transformed through air into water, remains behind "as such"—i.e. as fire, which is cosmic sperma—in the moisture).

3. λόγος
σπερματικός
and
λόγοι
σπερματικοί

a. In the text cited sub 902a the λόγοι σπερματικοί are described as a kind of *exemplary forms* of things coming into being:

exemplary
forms

Τοὺς σπερματικούς λόγους καθ' οὓς ἕκαστα καθ' εἰμαρμένην γίνεται.

The expression is also used by *Athenagoras, Presb.* c. 6 (to be cited sub 924b). It reminds us of the Platonic Idea, the difference being evidently that Plato's ideal world is transcendent, while the stoic seminal reasons are immanent.

b. They are imperishable. Proclus in *Plat. Parm.* V, p. 135 Cousin imperishable (SVF II 717):

In order to warrant the permanent character of participation, a cause is required which should be beyond motion and instability.

Ταύτης γὰρ ἐφειμένοι πάντες τῆς αἰτίας, οἱ μὲν τοὺς σπερματικούς λόγους εἶναι τούτους οἰηθέντες, ἀφθάρτους αὐτοὺς ἐποίησαν, ὥς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς.

c. They are immanent in matter.

immanent

Origenes, *Contra Celsum* IV 48 (SVF II 1074):

Λέγει γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ συγγράμμασιν ὁ σεμνὸς φιλόσοφος (sc. Chrysip-

pus), ὅτι τοὺς σπερματικούς λόγους τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ ὕλη παραδεξαμένη ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῇ εἰς κατακόσμησιν τῶν ὄλων.

One and
many

d. Like Plato's Ideas formed one kosmos noètós, which is (according to *Soph.* 249a ¹) an intelligent and living being, thus the Stoic seminal reasons, which are many, form the seminal Reason which is one. E.g. Marcus Aurelius, who declares that soul originates from "the seminal Reason" as a part of it and will return to it after death (IV, 14), elsewhere says that soul goes back to the σπερματικοὶ λόγοι.

Soul
originates
from the
logos sperm.

Marc. Aur. IV, 14:

Ἐνυπέστης ὡς μέρος. Ἐναφανισθήσῃ τῷ γεννήσαντι· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναληφθῇ εἰς τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ τὸν σπερματικὸν κατὰ μεταβολήν.

or logoi
sperm.

Cf. VI 24, where the plural is used in exactly the same sense: ἀνελήφθησαν εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοῦ κόσμου σπερματικούς λόγους.

920—The Logos is also, but less frequently, called Νοῦς. Thus in:

a. Diog. VII 135, cited sub 904a:

Ἐν τ' εἶναι θεὸν καὶ νοῦν καὶ εἰμαρμένην etc.

b. Epiphanius, *Adv. haer.* III 2, 9 (SVF I 146):

Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ὁ Στωϊκὸς ἔφη μὴ δεῖν θεοῖς οἰκοδομεῖν ἱερά, ἀλλ' ἔχειν τὸ θεῖον ἐν μόνῳ τῷ νῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ θεὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν νοῦν. ἔστι γὰρ ἀθάνατος.

In spite of these words, Zeno, as we shall see, did not oppose popular belief, but tried to assimilate it. Pohlenz supposes that the above text, belonging to his Ideal State, was still near to Antisthenes' influence.

c. Cp. Diog. VII 138:

Τὸν δὴ κόσμον διοικεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν, καθά φησι Χρῦσιππός τ' ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ Περὶ προνοίας καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ Περὶ θεῶν, εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος διήκοντος τοῦ νοῦ, καθάπερ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀλλ' ἡδὴ δι' ὧν μὲν μᾶλλον, δι' ὧν δὲ ἥττον.

Thus, Alex. Aphrod. could say that τὸν νοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις εἶναι, θεῖον ὄντα, was Stoic doctrine (SVF II 1038).

In using the terms νοῦς and πρόνοια the Stoics follow Plato's terminology in *Tim.* and *Nom.*, while usually they follow Heraclitus in speaking of the Logos.

921—Since God the Logos pervades the kosmos, he may be called 5. φύσις φύσις, giving vital force and various abilities to various beings.

¹ Nr. 315c.

Seneca, *De benef.* IV 7:

Having mentioned various arts and talents, such as music, song and poetry, the natural development of the body and its various functions, the author continues:

"Natura", inquit, "haec mihi praestat". Non intellegis te, cum hoc dicis, mutare nomen Deo? Quid enim aliud est natura quam Deus et divina ratio, toti mundo partibusque eius inserta?

922—a. From the unity of the Logos follows firstly the unity of the kosmos. Unity of the kosmos

Diog. VII 140:

"Ἐνα τὸν κόσμον εἶναι καὶ τοῦτον πεπερασμένον, σχῆμ' ἔχοντα σφαιροειδές. — Ἐν δὲ τῷ κόσμῳ μηδὲν εἶναι κενόν, ἀλλ' ἡνῶσθαι αὐτόν.

Also in Cornutus, *Compendium* c. 27; Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* c. 9.

b. Next, the unity of God might be concluded from it. And in fact, Unity of God we find the doctrine ascribed to Zeno and to Stoics in general.

Philodemus, Π εὔσεβ. p. 84 G.:

Πάντες οὖν οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος, εἰ καὶ ἀπέλειπον τὸ δαιμόνιον . . . , ἓνα θεὸν λέγουσιν εἶναι.

Cp. also Lactantius, *De ira Dei* c. 11: Antisthenes . . . unum esse naturalem Deum dixit, quamvis gentes et urbes suos habeant populares. Eadem fere Zeno cum Stoicis suis.

923—On the other hand, the existence of *gods* is defended, both by Zeno and Cleanthes.

Combined
with
polytheism

a. Sextus, *Adv. Math.* IX (Ag. the Phys. I) 133:

Ζήνων δὲ καὶ τοιοῦτον ἡρώτα λόγον· "τοὺς θεοὺς εὐλόγως ἂν τις τιμῶῃ. τοὺς δὲ μὴ ὄντας οὐκ ἂν τις εὐλόγως τιμῶῃ· εἰσὶν ἄρα θεοί."

b. Cleanthes wrote a book Π. θεῶν (Diog. VII 174).

Ap. Cicero, *N.D.* I 14, 37, Velleius says that he, in his books against pleasure, "tum fingit formam quandam et speciem deorum, tum divinitatem omnem tribuit astris, tum nihil ratione censet divinius."

924—Popular polytheism is not as such rejected by the Stoa, but explained in a syncretistic spirit. This is what we find in the above cited passage of Seneca, *De Benef.* IV (sub 921), where God is identified with nature. Syncretistic explanation of popular religion

a. Seneca, *De benef.* IV, 7-8. Deus — natura — divina ratio.

The passage cited sub 921 continues as follows:

Quotiens voles, tibi licet aliter hunc auctorem rerum nostrarum compellare. Et Iovem illum optimum ac maximum rite dices, et Tonantem et Statorem: qui non, ut historici tradiderunt, ex eo quod post votum susceptum acies Romanorum fugientium stetit, sed quod stant beneficio eius omnia, stator stabilitorque est: hunc eundem et Fatum si dixeris, non mentieris. Nam cum fatum nihil aliud sit quam series implexa causarum, ille est prima omnium causa, ex qua ceterae pendent. Quaecumque voles illi nomina proprie aptabis, vim aliquam effectumque coelestium rerum continentia. Tot appellationes eius possunt esse quot munera.

Hunc et Liberum patrem et Herculem ac Mercurium nostri putant. Liberum patrem quia omnium parens sit, quod *ab eo* primum inventa seminum vis est, consultura per voluptatem. Herculem, quia vis eius invicta sit, quandoque lassata fuerit operibus editis, in ignem recessura. Mercurium, quia ratio penes illum est, numerusque et ordo et scientia. Quocumque te flexeris, ibi illum videbis occurrentem tibi. Nihil ab illo vacat: opus suum ipse implet. Ergo nihil agis, ingratis mortalium, qui te negas Deo debere, sed naturae: quia nec natura sine Deo est, nec Deus sine natura; sed idem est utrumque, nec distat officio. Si quid a Seneca accepisses, Annaeo te diceres debere, vel Lucio: non creditorem mutares, sed nomen. Quoniam sive praenomen eius, sive nomen dixisses, sive cognomen, idem tamen ille esset. Sic hunc naturam voca, fatum, fortunam: omnia eiusdem dei nomina sunt, varie utentis sua potestate.

The doctrine is summarized by Servius ad Verg. *Aen.* IV 638: Et sciendum Stoicos dicere unum esse deum, cui nomina variantur pro actibus et officiis.

b. The Christian writer Athenagoras speaks on Stoic "monotheism" in the following passage.

Presbeia c. 6, p. 7 B:

Οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς καὶ ταῖς προσηγορίαις κατὰ τὰς παραλλάξεις τῆς ὕλης, δι' ἧς φασὶ τὸ πνεῦμα χωρεῖν τοῦ θεοῦ, πληθύνωσι τὸ θεῖον τοῖς ὀνόμασι, τῷ γοῦν ἔργῳ ἓνα νομίζουσι τὸν θεόν· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν θεὸς πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῶ βάδιζον ἐπὶ γενέσεις κόσμου ἐμπεριειληφὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς σπερματικὸς λόγους καθ' οὓς ἕκαστα καθ' εἰμαρμένην γίνεται, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ διήκει δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, ὁ θεὸς εἷς κατ' αὐτοὺς Ζεὺς μὲν κατὰ τὸ ζέον τῆς ὕλης ὀνομαζόμενος, Ἥρα δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ καθ' ἕκαστον τῆς ὕλης μέρος δι' ἧς κεχώρηκεν καλούμενος.

c. Minucius Felix, *Octav.* 19, 10:The method
of
allegorizing

Idem (sc. Zeno) interpretando Iunonem aera, Iovem caelum, Neptunum mare, ignem esse Vulcanum et ceteros similiter vulgi deos elementa esse monstrando publicum arguit graviter et revincit errorem.

The method of allegorizing, inaugurated by Antisthenes and generally practiced by the Stoics, may be called a kind of rationalisation of popular religion. Yet, it is done in a spirit different from Prodicus' rationalism mentioned sub 192. The latter's argument tends to "humanize" the gods by proving that they are not φύσει but by human institution, useful things being *considered* by man as gods. The Stoics, however, intend to say that Nature and her various forces *are indeed* divine and thus rightly venerated¹.

925—God the Logos or Physis is called Zeus by Zeno (904a) and Cleanthes (*Hymn to Zeus*, to be cited as a compendium of Stoic theology at the end of this paragraph).

6. Zeus

a. *Epictetus* usually speaks of ὁ θεός, e.g. in *Diatr.* I 16, the end. Having spoken of the gifts of God to man he concludes:

or
ὁ θεός

Τί οὖν; ἐπεὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποτετύφλωσθε, οὐκ ἔδει τινὰ εἶναι τὸν ταύτην ἐκπληροῦντα τὴν χώραν καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντων ἄδοντα τὸν ὕμνον τὸν εἰς τὸν θεόν; τί γὰρ ἄλλο δύναμαι γέρον χωλὸς εἰ μὴ ὕμνεῖν τὸν θεόν; εἰ γοῦν ἀηδὼν ἤμην, ἐποίουν τὰ τῆς ἀηδόνος, εἰ κύκνος, τὰ τοῦ κύκνου. νῦν δὲ λογικός εἰμι· ὕμνεῖν με δεῖ τὸν θεόν. τοῦτό μου τὸ ἔργον ἐστίν, ποιῶ αὐτὸ οὐδ' ἐγκαταλείψω τὴν τάξιν ταύτην, ἐφ' ὅσον ἂν διδῶται, καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ᾠδὴν παρακαλῶ.

b. But e.g. in the following passage he speaks of Zeus and his government of the universe.

Epict., *Diatr.* III 13, 4-7.

Loneliness (ἐρημία) is, the author says, a feeling of helplessness: not just being alone, but feeling bereft and threatened.

Ἐπεὶ εἰ τὸ μόνον εἶναι ἄρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἐρημον εἶναι, λέγε ὅτι καὶ ὁ Ζεὺς ἐν τῇ ἐκπυρώσει ἐρημὸς ἐστὶ καὶ κατακλαίει αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ· "τάλας ἐγώ, οὔτε τὴν Ἥραν ἔχω οὔτε τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν οὔτε τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα οὔτε ὅλως ἢ ἀδελφὸν ἢ υἱὸν ἢ ἐγγονον ἢ συγγενῇ". ταῦτα καὶ λέγουσιν οἱ τινες ὅτι ποιεῖ μόνος ἐν τῇ ἐκπυρώσει. οὐ γὰρ ἐπινοοῦσι διεξαγωγὴν μόνου καὶ ἀπὸ τινος φυσικοῦ ὁρμώμενοι, ἀπὸ τοῦ φύσει κοινωνικοῦ εἶναι καὶ φιλαλλήλου καὶ ἡδέως συναναστρέ-

¹ For this reason I do not think it quite convincing to put Persaeus, Zeno's disciple, on a level with Prodicus, as is done by Philodemus, II. εὐσεβ. 9 (our nr. 192a).

φεσθαι ἀνθρώποις. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἤττον δεῖ τινα καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο παρασκευὴν ἔχειν τὸ δύνασθαι αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀρκεῖν, δύνασθαι αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ συνεῖναι· ὡς ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ σύνεστι καὶ ἡσυχάζει ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐννοεῖ τὴν διοίκησιν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οἷα ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν ἐπινοίαις γίνεται πρεπούσαις ἑαυτῷ, οὕτως καὶ ἡμᾶς δύνασθαι αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοῖς λαλεῖν, μὴ προσδεῖσθαι ἄλλων¹.

The passage is instructive. Zeus is alone at the conflagration; as soon as there is a world, there are many gods. Epict. does not reject them, he believes in all good gods and all good daemons: Πάντα θεῶν μεστὰ καὶ δαιμόνων, he says (III, 13, 15). He rejects only the bad ones (I, 22, 16). The same may be seen in Marc. Aurel.: he speaks of Asklepios (VI 43) and Demeter, of "Helios and the other Gods" (VIII 19) as really existing beings. But he does not believe in bad spirits and in exorcisms (I 6).

**Good
spirits or
daemons**

926—Do Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius imagine good spirits as existing exterior to man? The point is not quite clear.

a. Epict. I 14, 12-14. In a paragraph entitled ὅτι πάντας ἐφορᾷ τὸ θεῖον Epict. says (to a man who complains that, by the limitation of his abilities, he is not able to understand Providence):

Τοῦτο δέ σοι καὶ λέγει τις, ὅτι ἴσῃν ἔχεις δύναμιν τῷ Διί; ἀλλ' οὖν οὐδὲν ἤττον καὶ ἐπίτροπον ἐκάστῳ παρέστησεν τὸν ἐκάστου δαίμονα καὶ παρέδωκεν φυλάσσειν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦτον ἀκοίμητον καὶ ἀπαραλόγιστον. ἴνι γὰρ ἄλλῳ κρεῖττονι καὶ ἐπιμελεστέρω φύλακι παρέδωκεν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον; ὥσθ', ὅταν κλείσητε τὰς θύρας καὶ σκότος ἔνδον ποιήσητε, μέμνησθε μὴδέποτε λέγειν ὅτι μόνοι ἐστέ· οὐ γὰρ ἐστέ, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς ἔνδον ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ὑμέτερος δαίμων ἐστίν.

b. *Marc. Aur.* identifies the daemon with the hegemonikon. V 27: "Συζῆν θεοῖς". συζῆ δὲ θεοῖς ὁ συνεχῶς δεικνὺς αὐτοῖς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν ἀρεσκομένην μὲν τοῖς ἀπονεμομένοις, ποιοῦσαν δὲ ὅσα βούλεται ὁ δαίμων, ὃν ἐκάστῳ προστάτην καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν, ἀπόσπασμα ἑαυτοῦ. οὗτος δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐκάστου νοῦς καὶ λόγος.

c. Cp. also Seneca, *ad Lucil.* 41, 1:

Non sunt ad caelum elevandae manus nec exorandus aedituus, ut nos ad aurem simulacri, quasi magis exaudiri possimus, admittat: prope est a te deus, tecum est, intus est. ita dico, Lucili: sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos.

¹ The passage may be quoted, I think, in order to illustrate such passages as Diog. VII 136 (sub **904a**) and Cleanthes' description of the renewal of the kosmos ap. Stob., *Ecl.* I 17, 3 (sub **908a**): at the conflagration of the kosmos, *Zeus alone* remains, i.e. "God" who is the creative fire.

927—Zeus, the creative fire, Logos, Heimarmene, Nature, is also *Providence*.

7. πρόνοια

Later Stoics speak very frequently on it, but the doctrine is certainly ancient Stoic.

a. *Theodoretus, Graec. aff. cur.* VI 14, p. 153 Raeder (SVF I 176):

Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιτιεὺς δύναιμιν κέκληκε τὴν εἰμαρμένην κινητικὴν τῆς ὕλης· τὴν δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ πρόνοιαν καὶ φύσιν ὠνόμασεν.

The same is said by Aëtius I 27, 5 (SVF I ib.).

b. Cleanthes confines the field of Providence: everything happens by Fate, not everything by Providence.

Chalcidius in *Tim.* c. 144 (SVF I 551):

Ex quo fieri ut, quae secundum fatum sunt, etiam ex providentia sint, eodemque modo quae secundum providentiam, ex fato, ut Chrysippus putat. alii vero quae quidem ex providentiae auctoritate, fataliter quoque provenire, nec tamen quae fataliter, ex providentia, ut Cleanthes.

According to this passage, Chrysippus returned to Zeno's doctrine of the identity of Fate and Providence. But cp. Plut., *Stoic. repugn.* (SVF II 1178), to be cited sub **939a**.

928—In the later Stoa Providence takes a very important place. Besides in *De Prov.*, Seneca speaks amply of it in the introduction to his *Nat. quaest.*

Seneca, *Nat. quaest.*, praef. 13-15:

Quid est deus? Mens universi. Quid est deus? Quod vides totum et quod non vides totum. Sic demum magnitudo illi sua redditur, qua nihil maius cogitari potest, si solus est omnia, si opus suum et intra et extra tenet. Quid ergo interest inter naturam dei et nostram? Nostri melior pars animus est; in illo nulla pars extra animum est. Totus est ratio, cum interim tantus error mortalia tenet, ut hoc, quo neque formosius est quicquam nec dispositius nec in proposito constantius, existiment homines fortuitum et casu volubile ideoque tumultuosum inter fulmina nubes tempestates et cetera quibus terrae ac terris vicina pulsantur. Nec haec intra vulgum dementia est, sed sapientiam quoque professos contigit. Sunt qui putent ipsis animum esse, et quidem providum, dispensantem singula et sua et aliena, hoc autem universum, in quo nos quoque sumus, expers consilii ferri aut temeritate quadam aut natura nesciente quid faciat.

929—Epictetus' *Diatribae* are full of it. He writes at least four special treatises on Providence.

a. Epict., *Diatr.* I 16, 15-18:

Τίς ἐξαρκεῖ λόγος ὁμοίως αὐτὰ (sc. τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἔργα τῆς προνοίας) ἐπαινέσαι ἢ παραστῆσαι; εἰ γὰρ νοῦν εἴχομεν, ἄλλο τι ἔδει ἡμᾶς ποιεῖν καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἢ ὑμνεῖν τὸ θεῖον καὶ εὐφημεῖν καὶ ἐπεξέρχεσθαι τὰς χάριτας; οὐκ ἔδει καὶ σκάπτοντας καὶ ἀροῦντας καὶ ἐσθλόντας ἄδειν τὸν ὕμνον τὸν εἰς τὸν θεόν; “μέγας ὁ θεός, ὅτι ἡμῖν παρέσχεν ὄργανα ταῦτα δι' ὧν τὴν γῆν ἐργασόμεθα· μέγας ὁ θεός, ὅτι χεῖρας δέδωκεν, ὅτι κατὰποσιν, ὅτι κοιλιάν, ὅτι αὖξέσθαι λεληθότως, ὅτι καθεύδοντας ἀναπνεῖν.” ταῦτα ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἐφυμνεῖν ἔδει καὶ τὸν μέγιστον καὶ θεϊότατον ὕμνον ἐφυμνεῖν, ὅτι τὴν δύναμιν ἔδωκεν τὴν παρακολουθητικὴν τούτοις καὶ ὁδῶ χρηστικῇν.

Divine
providence
extended to
all human
conduct

b. I 14, 1-10:

Πυθομένου δέ τινος, πῶς ἂν τις πεισθεῖη, ὅτι ἕκαστον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πραττομένων ἐφορᾶται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, Οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡνώσθαι τὰ πάντα; — Δοκεῖ, ἔφη. — Τί δέ; συμπαθεῖν τὰ ἐπιγεία τοῖς οὐρανίοις οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; — Δοκεῖ, ἔφη. — Πόθεν γὰρ οὕτω τεταγμένως καθάπερ ἐκ προστάγματος τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν ἐκεῖνος εἴπῃ τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀνθεῖν, ἀνθεῖ, ὅταν εἴπῃ βλαστάνειν, βλαστάνει, ὅταν ἐκφέρειν τὸν καρπὸν, ἐκφέρει, ὅταν πεπαίνειν, πεπαίνει, ὅταν πάλιν ἀποβάλλειν καὶ φυλλοκρῶρεῖν καὶ αὐτὰ εἰς αὐτὰ συνειλούμενα ἐφ' ἡσυχίας μένειν καὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι, μένει καὶ ἀναπαύεται; πόθεν δὲ πρὸς τὴν αὖξιν καὶ μείωσιν τῆς σελήνης καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου πρόσσodon καὶ ἄφοdon τοσαύτη παραλλαγή καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβολὴ τῶν ἐπιγείων θεωρεῖται; ἀλλὰ τὰ φυτὰ μὲν καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα σώματα οὕτως ἐνδέδεται τοῖς ὅλοις καὶ συμπέπονθεν, αἱ ψυχαὶ δ' αἱ ἡμέτεραι οὐ πολὺ πλέον; ἀλλ' αἱ ψυχαὶ μὲν οὕτως εἰσὶν ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια οὔσαι καὶ ἀποσπάσματα, οὐ παντὸς δ' αὐτῶν κινήματος ἅτε οἰκείου καὶ συμφυοῦς ὁ θεὸς αἰσθάνεται; ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν περὶ τῆς θείας διοικήσεως καὶ περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν θείων, ὁμοῦ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δύνασαι καὶ ἅμα μὲν αἰσθητικῶς ἀπὸ μυρίων πραγμάτων κινεῖσθαι, ἅμα δὲ διανοητικῶς, ἅμα δὲ συγκαταθετικῶς, τοῖς δ' ἀνανευστικῶς ἢ ἐφεκτικῶς, τύπους δὲ τοσοῦτους ἅφ' οὕτω πολλῶν καὶ ποικίλων πραγμάτων ἐν τῇ σαυτοῦ ψυχῇ φυλάττεεις καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν κινούμενος εἰς ἐπινοίας ὁμοειδεῖς ἐμπίπτεις τοῖς πρώτως τετυπωκόσι τέχναις τ' ἄλλην ἐπ' ἄλλη καὶ μνήμας ἀπὸ μυρίων πραγμάτων διασφῆζεις· ὁ δὲ θεὸς οὐχ οἷός τ' ἐστὶ πάντα ἐφορᾶν καὶ πᾶσιν συμπαρεῖναι καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων τινὰ ἴσχειν διάδοσιν; ἀλλὰ φωτίζειν οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἥλιος τηλικαῦτον μέρος τοῦ παντός, ὀλίγον δὲ τὸ ἀφώτιστον ἀπολιπεῖν ὅσον οἷόν τ' ἐπέχεσθαι ὑπὸ

σκιᾶς, ἣν ἡ γῆ ποιεῖ· ὁ δὲ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον αὐτὸν πεποιηκῶς καὶ περιάγων μέρος ὄντ' αὐτοῦ μικρὸν ὥς πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, οὗτος δ' οὐ δύναται πάντων αἰσθάνεσθαι;

930—a. Marcus Aurelius II 11 (speaking on the possibility of passing away):

Τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀπελθεῖν, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ εἰσὶν, οὐδὲν δεινόν· κακῶ γάρ σε οὐκ ἂν περιβάλοιεν· εἰ δὲ ἦτοι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἢ οὐ μέλει αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, τί μοι ζῆν ἐν κόσμῳ κενῷ θεῶν ἢ προνοίας κενῷ; ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰσὶ καὶ μέλει αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπείων.

b. Ib. IV 10:

“Οτι πᾶν τὸ συμβαῖνον δικαίως συμβαίνει· ὁ ἂν ἀκριβῶς παραφυλάσσης, εὐρήσεις· οὐ λέγω μόνον κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς, ἀλλ’ ἔτι κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ὥς ἂν ὑπὸ τινος ἀπονέμοντος τὸ κατ’ ἄξιαν.

931—Marc. Aur. speaks repeatedly of the hierarchic order in nature. **The principle of teleology**
V 16:

Ἡ οὐκ ἦν ἐναργὲς ὅτι τὰ χεῖρω τῶν κρείττωνων ἔνεκεν, τὰ δὲ κρείττω ἀλλήλων; κρείττω δὲ τῶν μὲν ἀψύχων τὰ ἐμψυχα, τῶν δὲ ἐμψύχων τὰ λογικά.

Cp. also VII 55.

932—a. How the principle of teleology was applied by Chrysippus, **Its application**
may appear from a few instances cited by Plutarch, *Stoic. repugn.* 21, p. 1044d:

Οἱ κόρεις εὐχρηστώς ἐξυπνίζουσιν ἡμᾶς, καὶ οἱ μύες ἐπιστρέφουσιν ἡμᾶς μὴ ἀμελῶς ἔκαστα τιθέναι.

This anthropocentric interpretation reminds us of the rather narrow views of Chr. Wolff and his school. With regard to such interpretations Heine wrote, referring to the suitable organization of the body of man:

Hätte er der Mäuler zwei,
lüge er sogar beim Fressen.

In Greek philosophy the teleological explanation of nature was introduced by Diogenes of Apollonia (our nr. 163a). Cf. Xen. *Mem.* I 4. Chrysippus' teleological explanations were criticized by Carneades. We find his arguments in the following passage of Porphyrius.

b. Porphyrius, *De abstinentia* III 20:

Ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο, νῆΔία, τοῦ Χρυσίππου πιθανὸν ἦν, ὥς ἡμᾶς αὐτῶν καὶ ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοὶ χάριν ἐποίησαντο, ἡμῶν δὲ τὰ ζῶα, συμπολεμεῖν μὲν ἵππους καὶ συνηρεῖν κύνας, ἀνδρείας δὲ γυμνάσια παρδάλεις καὶ ἄρκτους καὶ λέοντας.

ἡ δὲ ὕς, ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν χαρίτων τὸ ἥδιστον, οὐ δι' ἄλλο τι πλὴν θύεσθαι ἐγεγόνει, καὶ τῇ σαρκὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁ θεὸς οἶον ἄλας ἐνέμιξεν, εὐοψίαν ἡμῶν μηχανώμενος. ὅπως δὲ ζωμοῦ καὶ παραδειπνίων ἀφθονίαν ἔχωμεν, ὅστρον τε παντοδαπὰ καὶ πορφύρας καὶ ἀκαλήφας καὶ γένη πτηνῶν ποικίλα παρεσκεύασεν.

In spite of the reminiscence of Diog. of Apoll., Pohlenz (*Stoa* I p. 100) thinks that Chrysippus' anthropocentrism is a new element in Greek thought and hence must be of Semitic origin.

c. According to Chrysippus, however, not everything is made for the sake of its utility: nature makes many things for beauty's sake and rejoicing in variation.

Plut., *Stoic. repugn.* 21, 1044c:

Γράψας τοίνυν ἐν τοῖς περὶ Φύσεως, ὅτι "πολλὰ τῶν ζῴων ἕνεκα κάλλους ἡ φύσις ἐνήνοχε, φιλοκαλοῦσα καὶ χαίρουσα τῇ ποικιλίᾳ", καὶ λόγον ἐπειπὼν παραλογώτατον, ὡς "ὁ ταῶς ἕνεκα τῆς οὐραῆς γέγονε, διὰ τὸ κάλλος αὐτῆς."

And in a literal quotation, directly after the words cited sub a:

Γένοιτο δ' ἂν μάλιστα τούτου ἔμφασιν ἐπὶ τῆς κέρκου τοῦ ταῶ.

d. Marc. Aurel. considers everything firstly as a part of a whole.

II 3:

Πάντι δὲ φύσεως μέρος ἀγαθόν, ὃ φέρει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις καὶ ὃ ἐκείνης ἐστὶ σωστικόν.

This is also the point of view of Leibniz' teleology.

Mantic and providence

933—The belief in Providence is connected with the belief in *omina*. Cp. Socrates' belief in signs and mantic (nr. 217).

a. Cic., *de Div.* II 63, 130:

Definition of mantic

Chrysippus quidem divinationem definit his verbis: vim cognoscentem et videntem et explicantem signa quae a dis hominibus portendantur.

b. We find the Greek text of this definition in Sextus, *Adv. Math.* IX (*Ag. the Phys.* I) 132:

Ἐπιστήμη θεωρητικὴ καὶ ἐξηγητικὴ τῶν ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀνθρώποις διδομένων σημείων.

A similar definition is given in Stob., *Ecl.* II 67, 13 W.

its possibility

c. Cicero founds the possibility of mantic firstly on the existence of gods and providence. *Div.* I 38, 82:

Quam quidem esse re vera hac Stoicorum ratione concluditur: "si sunt di neque ante declarant hominibus quae futura sint, aut non diligunt homines, aut quid eventurum sit ignorant, aut existumant nihil interesse hominum scire quid sit futurum, aut non censent esse suae maiestatis praesignificare hominibus quae sint futura, aut ea ne ipsi quidem di significare possunt. at neque non diligunt nos: sunt enim benefici generique hominum amici; neque ignorant ea quae ab ipsis constituta et designata sunt; neque nostra nihil interest scire ea quae eventura sint: erimus enim cautiores si sciemus; neque hoc alienum ducunt maiestate sua: nihil est enim beneficentia praestantius; neque non possunt futura praenoscere.

934—Stoics distinguished between *natural and artificial mantic*. The first, being by dreams and by words spoken in *trance* or by chance ($\phi\eta\mu\alpha\iota$), is dealt with by Cic. in *Div.* I. He follows Posidonius in his work on dreams. Natural and artificial mantic

a. Cic., *Div.* I 33, 72; 49, 109-110:

Quae vero aut coniectura explicantur aut eventis animadversa ac notata sunt, ea genera divinandi, ut supra dixi, non naturalia sed artificiosa dicuntur; in quo haruspices augures coniectoresque numerantur. haec improbantur a Peripateticis, a Stoicis defenduntur.

49, 109-110: Quid, si etiam ratio exstat artificiosae praesensionis facilis, divinae autem paulo obscurior? quae enim extis, quae fulgoribus, quae portentis, quae astris praesentiuntur, haec notata sunt observatione diuturna. adfert autem vetustas omnibus in rebus longinqua observatione incredibilem scientiam; quae potest esse etiam sine motu atque impulsu deorum, cum quid ex quoque eveniat et quid quamque rem significet crebra animadversione perspectum est.

Altera divinatio est naturalis, ut ante dixi, quae physica disputandi subtilitate referenda est ad naturam deorum, a qua, ut doctissimis sapientissimisque placuit, haustos animos et libatos habemus; cumque omnia completa et referta sint aeterno sensu et mente divina, necesse est contagione divinorum animorum animos humanos commoveri.

b. How to understand artificial mantic. Cic., *Div.* I 118:

Nam non placet Stoicis singulis iecorum fissis aut avium cantibus interesse deum: neque enim decorum est nec dis dignum nec fieri ullo pacto potest; sed ita a principio inchoatum esse mundum, ut certis rebus certa signa praecurrerent, alia in extis, alia in avibus, alia in fulgoribus,

alia in ostentis, alia in stellis, alia in somniantium visis, alia in furentium vocibus. ea quibus bene percepta sunt, ii non saepe falluntur; male coniecta maleque interpretata falsa sunt non rerum vitio sed interpretum inscientia.

Artificial
mantic based
on cosmic
συμπάθεια

935—As appears from the “sed ita a principio inchoatum esse mundum” in the above quotation, artificial mantic is founded on the theory of cosmic συμπάθεια. The sceptic criticism (doubtless of Carneades) attacks this point.

Cic., *Div.* II 14, 33:

Cum rerum autem natura quam cognationem habent (sc. exta e quibus haruspices futura praedicunt)? quae ut uno consensu iuncta sit et continens, quod video placuisse physicis eisque maxime qui omne quod esset unum esse dixerunt, quid habere mundus potest cum thesauri inventionem coniunctum? si enim extis pecuniae mihi amplificatio ostenditur idque fit natura, primum exta sunt coniuncta mundo, deinde meum lucrum natura rerum continetur. Nonne pudet physicos haec dicere?

34. Sescenta licet eiusdem modi proferri, ut distantium rerum cognatio naturalis appareat—demus hoc; nihil enim huic disputationi adversatur; num etiam, si fissum cuiusdam modi fuerit in iecore, lucrum ostenditur? qua ex coniunctione naturae et quasi concentu et consensu, quam συμπάθειαν Graeci appellant, convenire potest aut fissum iecoris cum lucello meo aut meus quaesticulus cum caelo terra rerumque natura? ¹

936—Panaetius, under the impression of Carneades' arguments, rejects mantic. His influence may be seen in the behaviour of C. Blossius of Cumae ap. Plut., *Tiberius Gracchus* 17.

Though several bad signs have happened on the morning of that day, Tiberius sets out, on learning that the people were assembled on the Capitol.

¹ A curious instance of modern belief in “signs” by fortuitous events based on cosmic “sympathy” may be found in R. H. Benson's novel *Initiation*, 1914, p. 229 f.: „I suppose you notice how things happen,” he said, „like birds flying, or a shadow over the sun, and think they're signs?” — „How do you know?” she asked, amazed. — „Because I used to do it myself,” he said, „until I learned how useless it was.” — „You think it all nonsense, then? Just as I do? — at least, just as I know it is, really?” „Not all nonsense,” he said imperturbably. „I am entirely convinced, from simple observation, that there is some connection between — well, between different things that seem to have no connection. That there are laws that are true and active in all realms at once; and that sensitive or intuitive people can sometimes perceive them.”

Μικρὸν δ' αὐτοῦ προσελθόντος ὥφθησαν ὑπὲρ κεράμου μαχόμενοι κόρακες ἐν ἀριστερᾷ· καὶ πολλῶν ὡς εἰκὸς ἀνθρώπων παρερχομένων, κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν Τιβέριον λίθος ἀπωσθεὶς ὑπὸ θατέρου τῶν κοράκων ἔπεσε παρὰ τὸν πόδα. τοῦτο καὶ τοὺς θρασυτάτους τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἐπέστησεν· ἀλλὰ Βλόσσιος ὁ Κυμαῖος παρὼν αἰσχύνην ἔφη καὶ κατήφειαν ἂν εἶναι πολλήν, εἰ Τιβέριος, Γράκχου μὲν υἱὸς Ἀφρικανοῦ δὲ Σκηπίωνος θυγατριδοῦς, προστάτης δὲ τοῦ Ῥωμαίων δήμου, κόρακα δέισας οὐχ ὑπακούσειε τοῖς πολίταις καλοῦσι.

937—Posidonius restores the belief in mantic. We find it again in the later Stoa. Seneca believes in "signs".

a. Seneca, *Nat. quaest.* II 32, 2:

Hoc inter nos et Tuscus, quibus summa est fulgurum persequendorum scientia, interest: nos putamus, quia nubes collisae sunt, fulmina emitti; ipsi existimant nubes collidi ut fulmina emittantur; nam, cum omnia ad deum referant, in ea opinione sunt tamquam non, quia facta sunt, significant, sed quia significatura sunt, fiant. Eadem tamen ratione fiunt, sive illis significare propositum, sive consequens est.

b. *Ib.* 6-7:

Quinque stellarum potestates Chaldaeorum observatio exceperit; quid? tu tot illa milia siderum iudicas otiosa lucere? Quid est porro aliud quod errorem maximum incutiat peritis natalium quam quod paucis nos sideribus assignant, cum omnia quae supra nos sunt partem nostri sibi vindicent? Summissiora forsitan propius in nos vim suam dirigunt et ea quae frequentius mota aliter nos aliterque prospiciunt; ceterum et illa quae aut immota sunt aut propter velocitatem universo parem immotis similia non extra ius dominiumque nostri sunt.

**Astrology
accepted on
the same
grounds**

The belief in the connexion between human life and the heavenly bodies, which might seem to be an arbitrary assumption to the modern mind, was for the Stoic rationally founded on cosmic "sympathy."

938—If the identity of God and Providence with Nature be admitted, the problem of the origin of evil presents certain obvious difficulties. The Stoic philosophers do not confine themselves to the teaching that all outward events are adiaphora, but propose three arguments in order to meet the said difficulties.

**The problem
of evil**

I. "Evil" is an instrument in the hands of God for the education of man.

**First
solution**

Thus, Chrysippus says, ap. Plut., *Stoic. repugn.* 15, p. 1040c, citing the verses of Hesiod, *Erga* 242:

Τοῖσιν δ' οὐρανόθεν μέγ' ἐπήλασε πῆμα Κρονίων,
 λιμὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ λοιμόν· ἀποφθινύθουσι δὲ λαοί·

ταῦτά φησι τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν, ὅπως κολαζομένων τῶν πονηρῶν οἱ λοιποὶ παραδείγμασι τούτοις χρώμενοι ἤττον ἐπιχειρῶσι τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν.

Cp. the view that God "purifies" the world by floods and conflagration, ὅταν πολλή ἡ κακία γένηται ἐν αὐτῷ (Origenes, *Contra Celsum* IV 64, SVF II 1174).

Difficulties 939—Here, of course, the question arises as to why so many innocent people are struck by evil.

a. Both Cleanthes (Vid. 926b) and Chrysippus admit a certain limitation of Providence. Plut., *Stoic. refugn.* 37, p. 1051b:

Ἔτι περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν ἐγκλητὸν εἶναι μηδὲ μεμπτὸν κόσμῳ κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν ἀπάντων παραγομένων πολλάκις γεγραφώς (sc. Chrys.), ἔστιν ὅπου πάλιν ἐγκλητὰς τινὰς ἀμελείας οὐ περὶ μικρὰ καὶ φαῦλα ἀπολείπει. Ἐν γοῦν τῷ τρίτῳ Περὶ οὐσίας, μνησθεὶς ὅτι συμβαίνει τινὰ τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς τοιαῦτα "Πότερον, φησὶν, ἀμελουμένων τινῶν, καθάπερ ἐν οἰκίαις μελίζοσι παραπίπτει τινὰ πίτυρα καὶ ποσοὶ πυροὶ τινες, τῶν ὅλων εὖ οἰκονομουμένων· ἢ διὰ τὸ καθίστασθαι ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων δαιμόνια φαῦλα, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι γίνονται καὶ ἐγκλητέαι ἀμέλειαι;" φησὶ δὲ πολὺ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης μεμῖχθαι.

Hence the Epicurean Philodemus reproaches the Stoics that they, first, hold the almightiness of God, and afterwards confine it by saying that God is not the cause of accidental things.

b. The doctrine that matter has its own causality, was accepted in the School. We find it in Seneca, *Nat. Quaest.* VI 3, who, speaking of men perishing in catastrophes of nature, says:

Illud quoque proderit praesumere animo nihil horum deos facere nec ira numinum aut caelum converti aut terram; suas ista causas habent.

Cf. *De Prov.* 5, 9: Quare tamen deus tam iniquus in distributione fati fuit, ut bonis viris paupertatem et vulnera et acerba funera ascriberet? non potest artifex mutare materiam: hoc passa est.

c. Marcus Aurelius VI 36:

Πάντα ἐκεῖθεν ἔρχεται, ἀπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ κοινοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ὁρμήσαντα ἢ κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν¹. καὶ τὸ χάσμα οὖν τοῦ λέοντος καὶ τὸ δηλητήριο καὶ πᾶσα κακουργία ὡς ἄκανθα, ὡς βόρβορος, ἐκείνων ἐπιγεννήματα τῶν σεμνῶν καὶ καλῶν. μὴ οὖν αὐτὰ ἀλλότρια τούτου οὐ σέβεις φαντάζου, ἀλλὰ τὴν πάντων πηγὴν ἐπιλογίζου.

¹ ὁρμήσαντα ἢ κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν—be it directly or by accident.

d. Thus, according to Chrysippus diseases are *κατὰ παρακολούθησιν*. Gellius, *N.A.* VII 1, 7:

Chrysippus in eodem libro (i.e. quarto *Περὶ προνοίας*) tractat consideratque dignumque esse id quaeri putat, εἰ αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων νόσοι κατὰ φύσιν γίνονται, id est, si natura ipsa rerum vel providentia, quae compagem hanc mundi et genus hominum fecit, morbos quoque et debilitates et aegritudines corporum, quas patiuntur homines, fecerit. Existimat autem non fuisse hoc principale naturae consilium, ut faceret homines morbis obnoxios, nunquam enim hoc convenisse naturae auctori parentique omnium rerum bonarum. "Sed cum multa", inquit, "atque magna gigneret pareretque aptissima et utilissima, alia quoque simul adgnata sunt incommoda his ipsis quae faciebat cohaerentia", eaque neque per naturam, sed per sequellas quasdam necessarias facta dicit, quod ipse appellat "*κατὰ παρακολούθησιν*". "Sicut", inquit, "cum corpora hominum natura fingeret, ratio subtilior et utilitas ipsa operis postulavit, ut tenuissimis minutisque ossiculis caput compingeret. Sed hanc utilitatem rei maiorem alia quaedam incommoditas extrinsecus consecuta est, ut fieret caput tenuiter munitum et ictibus offensionibusque parvis fragile. Proinde morbi quoque et aegritudines partae sunt, dum salus paritur.

By the above cited passage of Marcus Aurelius P. Barth, *Die Stoa* p. 66, feels reminded of J. Stuart Mill who, in his *Three Essays on Religion*, wrote that "on the ground of natural theology" almightiness cannot be attributed to God.—Which, after all, does not mean anything else than that divine Providence is incomprehensible for man. Cp., for the rest, the "gnostical" solution of the problem, followed e.g. by the Dutch poet Frederic van Eeden (before he became a Catholic): that the world cannot be the work of "the highest God" but must have been made by some minor Spirits.

940—2. The cosmological point of view: the universe is an organical whole; therefore, what happens to the individual man should not be considered as an isolated phenomenon. It may serve for preserving the whole.

Second
solution

a. Chrysippus ap. Plut., *Stoic. repugn.* 35, p. 1050 e:

Ποτὲ μὲν τὰ δύσχρηστα συμβαίνειν φησὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οὐχ ὥσπερ τοῖς φαύλοις κολάσεως χάριν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλην οἰκονομίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι.

What he means by this, appears from c. 32, p. 1049a:

Ὡς δὲ αἱ πόλεις πλεονάσαι εἰς ἀποικίας ἀπαίρουσι τὰ πλήθη καὶ πολέμους ἐνίστανται πρὸς τινάς, οὕτως ὁ θεὸς φθορᾶς ἀρχὰς δίδωσι. καὶ τὸν Εὐριπίδην μάρτυρα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους προσάγει τοὺς λέγοντας ὡς ὁ Τρωϊκὸς πόλεμος ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἀπαντλήσεως χάριν τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένοιτο.

b. Seneca, *Ep.* 74, 20:

Nihil indignetur sibi accidere sciatque illa ipsa, quibus laedi videtur, ad conservationem universi pertinere et ex iis esse quae cursum mundi officiumque consummant.

c. Marc. Aur. IX 39:

Ἦτοι ἀπὸ μιᾶς πηγῆς νοεράς πάντα ὥς ἐνὶ σώματι ἐπισυμβαίνει καὶ οὐ δεῖ τὸ μέρος τοῖς ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὅλου γινομένοις μέμφεσθαι· ἢ ἄτομοι καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ κυκεὼν καὶ σκεδασμός.

He means that, evidently, in this alternative only the first is possible.

Third
solution

941—3. The bad is correlate of the good, just as left is the correlate of right.

This view of the problem is certainly connected with Heraclitus' doctrine of the harmony of opposites (our nrs. 53 and 54).

a. Gellius, *N.A.* VII 1 (SVF II 116g):

Quibus non videtur mundus dei et hominum causa institutus neque res humanas providentia gubernari, gravi se argumento uti putant, cum ita dicunt: "si esset providentia, nulla essent mala". Nihil enim minus aiunt providentiae congruere, quam in eo mundo, quem propter homines fecisse dicatur, tantam vim esse aerumnarum et malorum. Adversus ea Chrysippus cum in libro *Περὶ προνοίας* quarto dissereret "nihil est prorsus istis", inquit, "insubidius, qui opinantur bona esse potuisse, si non essent ibidem mala. Nam cum bona malis contraria sint, utraque necessum est opposita inter sese et quasi mutuo adversoque fulta nisu consistere; nullum adeo contrarium est sine contrario altero. Quo enim pacto iustitiae sensus esse posset, nisi essent iniuriae? aut quid aliud iustitia est quam iniustitiae privatio? quid item fortitudo intellegi posset, nisi ex ignaviae adpositione? quid continentia, nisi ex intemperantiae? quo item modo prudentia esset, nisi foret contra imprudentia? Proinde", inquit, "homines stulti cur non hoc etiam desiderant, ut veritas sit et non sit mendacium? Namque itidem sunt bona et mala, felicitas et importunitas, dolor et voluptas. Alterum enim ex altero, sicuti Plato ait¹, verticibus inter se contrariis deligatum est; si tuleris unum, abstuleris utrumque."

In this passage we have primarily to do with a logical thesis: *nullum contrarium est sine contrario altero*. Now this thesis is wrong, as may be seen from Aristotle, *Categ.* 10. Various kinds of opposites are distinguished in this chapter. The first,

¹ *Phaedo* 60c.

called ἀντικείμενα πρὸς τι, are correlates: they depend on each other and do not have a μέσον. The second group however, consisting of things which do not depend on each other (ὧν μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν), do possess a middle term: οὐ γὰρ πᾶν ἥτοι λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἐστίν. Of this kind are φαῦλον καὶ σπουδαῖον (good and bad): where the one is, the other must not necessarily be too. There is a μέσον.

b. It appears as a metaphysical principle in Plut., *St. repugn.* 35, p. 105of, where Chrys. is cited in this way:

Ἡ δὲ κακία πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ συμπτώματα ἰδιὸν τινα ἔχει λόγον· γίνεται μὲν γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ πῶς κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον, καὶ, ἔν' οὕτως εἴπω, οὐκ ἀχρήστως γίνεται πρὸς τὰ ὅλα· οὐδὲ γὰρ τάγαθὰ ᾗν.

This explanation tends to legitimate evil, by making it metaphysically necessary, and thus creates a contradiction in the notion of God. A systematical exposition of the objections against Providence and their refutation by the Stoics is given by Philo, *Provid.* II.

942—In Seneca's *De prov.* Providence is defended according to the first view, which might be called the paedagogical principle.

Seneca's
defense of
Providence

Hence he says (II 2) that the good man *omnia adversa exercitationes putat*. From this point of view it may be understood that on the very best the hardest training is imposed, so that it is an honour and an election to be on hard trial. *De Prov.* IV 8:

Quare deus optimum quemque aut mala valitudine aut luctu aut aliis incommodis afficit? quia in castris quoque periculosa fortissimis impetrantur: dux lectissimos mittit, qui nocturnis hostes aggrediantur insidiis aut explorent iter aut praesidium loco deiciant. Nemo eorum qui exeunt dicit: "male de me imperator meruit", sed "bene iudicavit". item dicant quicumque iubentur pati timidis ignavisque flebilis: "digni visi sumus deo in quibus experiretur quantum humana natura posset pati".

Two remarks must be made here.

1—The difference between the Stoic and the Christian attitude towards suffering appears clearly from such a passage as *De prov.* II, 1: *Quare multa bonis viris adversa eveniunt? nihil accidere bono viro mali potest: non miscentur contraria. quemadmodum tot amnes, tantum superne deiectionum imbrium, tanta medicamentorum vis fontium non mutant saporem maris, ne remittunt quidem, ita adversarum impetus rerum viri fortis non vertit animum: manet in statu et quicquid evenit in suum colorem trahit; est enim omnibus externis potentior. nec hoc dico: non sentit illa.*

The Christian accepts suffering as such and wishes to pass through it, the Stoic denies its existence and thus tries to make himself immune to it. Cp. our nrs. 1013, 1017a, 1018.

2—Seneca's God looks at human suffering with the delight of the spectator in an arena. *De prov.* II 9: *Ecce spectaculum dignum ad quod respiciat intentus operi suo deus, ecce par deo dignum, vir fortis cum fortuna mala compositus, utique si et provocavit. non video, inquam, quid habeat in terris Iuppiter pulchrius, si eo conver-*

tere animum velit, quam ut spectet Catonem iam partibus non semel fractis stantem nihilominus inter ruinas publicas rectum.

Very different is the attitude of "God and the holy Angels" at the sight of the Christian's trial, as for instance Newman represents it (*Parochial and Plain Sermons*, vol. VII, p. 54 ed. Longmans): "They rejoice over one sinner that repenteth; how must they mourn over those who fall away! What interest, surely, is excited among them by the sight of the Christian's trial, when faith and the desire of the world's esteem are struggling in his heart for victory! what rejoicing if, through the grace of God, he overcomes! what sorrow and pity if he is overcome by the world!"

A compen-
dium of
Stoic
theology

943—Cleanthes, *Hymn to Zeus*, ap. Stob., *Ecl.* I 1, 12, p. 25 W. (SVF I 537).

- Κύδισθ' ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε, παγκρατὲς αἰεὶ,
 Ζεῦ, φύσεως ἀρχηγέ, νόμου μέτα πάντα κυβερνῶν,
 χαῖρε· σὲ γὰρ πάντεσσι θέμις θνητοῖσι προσαυδᾶν.
 ἔκ σου γὰρ γένος εἶσ' ἥχου μίμημα λαχόντες ¹
 5 μούνοι, ὅσα ζῶει τε καὶ ἔρπει θνήτ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν·
 τῷ σε καθυμνήσω καὶ σὸν κράτος αἰὲν αἰέσω.
 σοὶ δὴ πᾶς ὁδε κόσμος, ἐλισσόμενος περὶ γαῖαν ²,
 πείθεται, ἥ κεν ἄγης, καὶ ἐκὼν ὑπὸ σεῖο κρατεῖται·
 τοῖον ἔχεις ὑποεργὸν ἀνικῆτοις ὑπὸ χερσὶν
 10 ἀμφήκη, πυρόεντα, αἰεζῶντα κεραυνόν·
 τοῦ γὰρ ὑπὸ πληγῆς φύσεως πάντ' ἔργα <τελεῖται>·
 ᾧ σὺ κατευθύνεις κοινὸν λόγον, δς διὰ πάντων
 φοιτᾷ, μιγνύμενος μεγάλοις μικροῖς τε φάεσι·
 ᾧ σὺ τόσος γεγαῶς ὕπατος βασιλεὺς διὰ παντός.
 15 οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σου δίχα, δαῖμον,
 οὔτε κατ' αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον οὔτ' ἐνὶ πόντῳ,
 πλὴν ὅποσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέραισιν ἀνόλαις·
 ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θεῖναι,
 καὶ κοσμεῖν τᾶκοσμα καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν.
 20 ὦδε γὰρ εἰς ἕν πάντα συνήρμοκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν,
 ὥσθ' ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντα,
 ὃν φεύγοντες ἐῷσιν ὅσοι θνητῶν κακοὶ εἰσι,

¹ ἥχου μίμημα λαχόντες "for they have got an image of Thee within themselves, namely language". Human logos is an image of Divine Logos. Because he has an image of divine Logos in himself, man is "of God's race" (Verbeke). Others explain ἥχου μίμημα as "language which imitates things".

² Cleanthes was a declared enemy of Aristarchus, and this on religious grounds: the heliocentric hypothesis seemed to him in contradiction with the divine order of things.

- δύσμοροι, οἳ τ' ἀγαθῶν μὲν αἰὲν κτῆσιν ποθέοντες
οὔτ' ἐσορῶσι θεοῦ κοινὸν νόμον, οὔτε κλύουσιν,
25 ὃ κεν πειθόμενοι σὺν νῶ βίον ἐσθλὸν ἔχοιεν.
αὐτοὶ δ' αὖθ' ὀρμῶσιν ἄνοι κακὸν ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλο,
οἱ μὲν ὑπὲρ δόξης σπουδῇν δυσέριστον ἔχοντες,
οἱ δ' ἐπὶ κερδοσύνας τετραμμένοι οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ,
ἄλλοι δ' εἰς ἄνεσιν καὶ σώματος ἡδέα ἔργα.
30 <ἀλλὰ κακοῖς ἐπέκυσαν>*, ἐπ' ἄλλοτε δ' ἄλλα φέρονται
σπεύδοντες μάλα πάμπαν ἐναντία τῶνδε γενέσθαι.
ἀλλὰ Ζεῦ πάνδωρε, κελαίνεφές, ἀργικέραυνε,
ἀνθρώπους <μὲν> ** ῥύου ἀπειροσύνης ἀπὸ λυγρῆς,
ἦν σύ, πάτερ, σκέδασον ψυχῆς ἄπο, δὸς δὲ κυρῆσαι
35 γνῶμης, ἥ πρίσυνος σὺ δίκης μέτα πάντα κυβερνᾷς,
ὅφρ' ἂν τιμηθέντες ἀμειβώμεσθά σε τιμῇ,
ὑμνοῦντες τὰ σὰ ἔργα διηνεκές, ὥς ἐπέοικε
θνητὸν ἔόντ', ἐπεὶ οὔτε βροτοῖς γέρας ἄλλο τι μεῖζον,
οὔτε θεοῖς, ἧ κοινὸν αἰὲν νόμον ἐν δίκῃ ὑμνεῖν.

The prayer in vs. 28 ff. aims at realizing the Stoic ideal of virtue: to live in inner harmony with the divine Law. For this purpose the poet asks the help of God, and he feels that, without this help, we, on our side, are not able to honour God truly (ὅφρ' ἂν τιμηθέντες ἀμειβώμεσθά σε τιμῇ)¹.

The hymn has been recently explained by G. Verbeke, *Kleanthes*, p. 235-251, by A. J. Festugière in *Le Dieu Cosmique*, p. 310-332, and finally by J. D. Meerwaldt in *Mnemosyne* 1951, p. 58-69; 1952 p. 1-12.

Festugière rightly qualifies Cleanthes' religious attitude as a *mystique du consentement*. It is the same philosophy of life which is expressed more than four centuries later by Marcus Aurelius in these words: ὅτι μόνῳ τῷ λογικῷ ζῶντι δέδοται τὸ ἐκουσίως ἔπεσθαι τοῖς γινομένοις, τὸ δὲ ἔπεσθαι ψιλὸν πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον (X 28).

944—a. The discussion on the problem "Fate and Liberty" to which the Stoic doctrine gave rise, is summarized in the following passage of Gellius, *N.A.* VII 2:

**Fate and
Liberty**

Fatum quod εἰμαρμένην Graeci vocant, ad hanc ferme sententiam Chrysippus, Stoicae princeps philosophiae, definit (fr. 33 G.): "Fatum

¹ Festugière, *Le Dieu cosmique* p. 324 f., commented excellently on these lines. Note the expression τιμᾶσθαι: *recevoir une faveur divine*.

* I give the text according to Von Arnim's reconstruction *exempli causa* (SVF I 537). Meerwaldt (in *Mnem.* 1952 p. 7) proposed: πᾶσιν δ' ἄλγε' ἐτοῖμα or πάντες δ' ἄλγε' ἐφεῦρον.

** μὲν was added by Scaliger, followed by Pearson and Von Arnim. Meerwaldt (o.c., p. 8) proposed: σοῦς.

est", inquit "sempiterna quaedam et indeclinabilis series rerum et catena volvens semetipsa sese et implicans per aeternos consequentiae ordines, ex quibus apta nexaque est." Ipsa autem verba Chrysippi, quantum valui memoria, ascripsi, ut, si cui meum istud interpretamentum videbitur esse obscurius, ad ipsius verba animadvertat. In libro enim *Περὶ προνοίας* quarto (fr. 33 G.) εἰμαρμένην esse dicit φυσικὴν τινὰ σύνταξιν τῶν ὄλων ἐξ αἰδίου τῶν ἐτέρων τοῖς ἐτέροις ἐπακολουθοῦντων καὶ μεταπολουμένων ἀπαραβάτου οὔσης τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιπλοκῆς.

Aliarum autem opinionum disciplinarumque auctores huic definitioni ita obstrepunt: "Si Chrysippus" inquiunt "fato putat omnia moveri et regi nec declinari transcendique posse agmina fati et volumina, peccata quoque hominum et delicta non suscensenda neque inducenda sunt ipsis voluntatibusque eorum, sed necessitati cuidam et instantiae, quae oritur ex fato, omnium quae sit rerum domina et arbitra, per quam necesse sit fieri, quicquid futurum est; et propterea nocentium poenas legibus inique constitutas, si homines ad maléficia non sponte veniunt, sed fato trahuntur".

Contra ea Chrysippus tenuiter multa et argute disserit; sed omnium fere, quae super ea re scripsit, huiuscemodi sententia est (fr. 30 G.): "Quamquam ita sit", inquit "ut ratione quadam necessaria et principali coacta atque conexa sint fato omnia, ingenia tamen ipsa mentium nostrarum proinde sunt fato obnoxia, ut proprietas eorum est ipsa et qualitas. Nam si sunt per naturam primitus salubriter utiliterque ficta, omnem illam vim, quae de fato extrinsecus ingruit, inoffensius tractabiliusque transmittunt. Sin vero sunt aspera et inscita et rudia nullisque artium bonarum adminiculis fulta, etiam si parvo sive nullo fatalis incommodi conflictu urgeantur, sua tamen scaevitate et voluntario impetu in assidua delicta et in errores se ruunt. Idque ipsum ut ea ratione fiat, naturalis illa et necessaria rerum consequentia efficit, quae fatum vocatur. Est enim genere ipso quasi fatale et consequens, ut mala ingenia peccatis et erroribus non vacent."

Huius deinde rei exemplo non hercle nimis alieno neque inlepidio utitur (fr. 31 G.). "Sicut" inquit "lapidem cylindrum si per spatia terrae prona atque derupta iacias, causam quidem ei et initium praecipitantiae feceris, mox tamen ille praeceps volvitur, non quia tu id iam facis, sed quoniam ita sese modus eius et formae volubilitas habet: sic ordo et ratio et necessitas fati genera ipsa et principia causarum movet, impetus vero consiliorum mentiumque nostrarum actionesque ipsas voluntas cuiusque propria et animorum ingenia moderantur". Infert

deinde verba haec his, quae dixi, congruentia (fr. 32 G.): Διὸ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Πυθαγορείων (χρῦς. ἔπ. 54) εἴρηται·

γνώσει δ' ἀνθρώπους αὐθαίρετα πῆματ' ἔχοντας,

ὥς τῶν βλαβῶν ἐκάστοις παρ' αὐτοῖς γινομένων καὶ καθ' ὁρμὴν αὐτῶν ἁμαρτανόντων τε καὶ βλαπτομένων καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν καὶ θέσιν.

Propterea negat oportere ferri audirique homines aut nequam aut ignavos et nocentes et audaces, qui, cum in culpa et in maleficio revicti sunt, perfugiant ad fati necessitatem tamquam in aliquod fani asylum et, quae pessime fecerunt, ea non suae temeritati, sed fato esse attribuenda dicunt.

Primus autem hoc sapientissimus ille et antiquissimus poetarum dixit hisce versibus (Hom. Od. I 32):

ὦ πόποι, οἷον δὴ νυ θεοὺς βροτοὶ αἰτιύωνται.
ἐξ ἡμέων γάρ φασι κάκ' ἔμμεναι· οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ
σφῆσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόνον ἄλγε' ἔχουσιν.

b. Chrysippus holds that Fate does not exclude liberty. His view is illustrated by the following example.

Hippolyt., *Philos.* 21 (SVF II 975):

Καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ (sc. Zeno and Chrys.) τὸ καθ' εἰμαρμένην εἶναι πάντα διεβηβαιώσαντο παραδείγματι χρησάμενοι τοιούτῳ, ὅτι ὥσπερ ὀχήματος ἐὰν ᾗ ἐξηρητημένος κύων, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται ἔπεσθαι, καὶ ἔλκεται καὶ ἔπεται, ποιῶν καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον μετὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης [οἷον τῆς εἰμαρμένης]· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ βούληται ἔπεσθαι, πάντως ἀναγκασθήσεται· τὸ αὐτὸ δῆπου καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀναγκασθήσονται πάντως εἰς τὸ πεπρωμένον εἰσελθεῖν.

the
draughtdog

c. Cp. Cleanthes' prayer, cited by Epict., *Ench.* 53:

Ἄγου δέ μ', ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ' ἡ Πεπρωμένη,
ὅποι ποθ' ὤμῃν εἰμι διατεταγμένος·
ὥς ἔψομαί γ' ἄοκνος· ἦν δέ γε μὴ θέλω,
κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἤττον ἔψομαι.

Pohlenz argues for the oriental character of this "feeling" of fate, as displayed in the Stoic doctrine of heimarmene: *Stoa* I p. 107 f.; *Stoa und Semitismus*, 263 ff.

4—PHYSICS: (3) SOUL AND ITS VARIOUS FUNCTIONS; IMMORTALITY

945—Contrary to Epicurus the Stoa teaches that the animal's first impulse is not towards pleasure but towards selfpreservation.

οἰκειώσεις

a. Diog. VII 85:

Τὴν δὲ πρῶτην ὁρμὴν φασὶ τὸ ζῶον ἴσχειν ἐπὶ τὸ τηρεῖν ἑαυτὸ, οἰκειούσης αὐτῷ τῆς φύσεως ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, καθά φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ τελῶν, πρῶτον οἰκεῖον εἶναι λέγων παντὶ ζῷῳ τὴν αὐτοῦ σύστασιν καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνείδησιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀλλοτριῶσαι εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτὸ τὸ ζῶον, οὔτε ποιήσασαν αὐτὸ μήτ' ἀλλοτριῶσαι μήτ' οἰκειῶσαι. ἀπολείπεται τοίνυν λέγειν συστησαμένην αὐτὸ οἰκειῶσαι πρὸς ἑαυτὸ· οὕτω γὰρ τὰ τε βλάπτοντα διωθεῖται καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα προσίεται. δὲ δὲ λέγουσί τινες, πρὸς ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι τὴν πρῶτην ὁρμὴν τοῖς ζῷοις, ψεῦδος ἀποφαίνουσιν.

The oikeiosis is common to man and irrational animals.

b. Cic., *De Fin.* III 16:

Placet his quorum ratio mihi probatur, simulatque natum sit animal, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ¹ ad se conservandum et ad suum statum ² eaque quae conservantia sint eius status diligenda, alienari ³ autem ab interitu iisque rebus quae interitum videantur afferre.

c. Hierocles I 38:

Διὸ φαίνεται τὸ ζῶον ἅμα τῇ γενέσει αἰσθάνεσθαι τε αὐτοῦ καὶ οἰκειοῦσθαι ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ συστάσει.

That the doctrine reaches back to Zeno, is argued by Pohlenz (*Zeno u. Chrysipp*, p. 199 ff.) against Dirlmeier. The doctrine is found in Arius Didymus' account of peripatetic ethics, which according to H. von Arnim ⁴ goes back directly to Theophrastus. Against this Dirlmeier ⁵ argued that, because (on p. 126, 12 ff. of the treatise) Critolaus is referred to, it must go back to a later peripatetic. He agrees however with von Arnim in ascribing the oikeiosis-doctrine to Theophrastus: from him it was borrowed by the peripatetic who was Arius Didymus' source. Pohlenz, *Grundfragen*, p. 8 ff., argues on good grounds that Didymus' source was "contaminated" with Stoic doctrine and terminology, Didymus being also influenced by the Stoa on other points. For these reasons Pohlenz maintains the Stoic origin of the doctrine of oikeiosis. See further below, under 999c.

Instinct
and reason

946—The Stoa makes a sharp distinction between non rational animals and man.

¹ *sibi conciliari et commendari* is Cicero's translation of οἰκειοῦσθαι.

² σύστασιν.

³ ἀλλοτριοῦσθαι.

⁴ H. von Arnim, *Arius Didymus' Abriss der peripatetischen Ethik*, Sitzungsberichte Wien, Philol.-hist. Kl. 204 (1926), 3.

⁵ O. Dirlmeier, *Die Oikeiosislehre Theophrasts*, in *Philologus*, Suppl. XXX (1937), nr. I.

a. Origenes, *Contra Celsum* IV 87 (SVF II 725):

Ἔστω δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ὑπὸ τῶν ζώων γινώσκεισθαι ἀλεξιφάρμακα, τί οὖν τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ μὴ φύσιν ἀλλὰ λόγον εἶναι τὸν εὐρίσκοντα ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς ζώοις; εἰ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἦν ὁ εὐρίσκων, οὐκ ἂν ἀποτεταγμένως τόδε τι μόνον εὐρίσκετο ἐν ὄφειν, ἔστω καὶ δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον, καὶ ἄλλο τι ἐν ἀετῶ καὶ οὕτως ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ζώοις· ἀλλὰ τοσαῦτα ἂν ὅσα καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις· νυνὶ δὲ φανερόν ἐκ τοῦ ἀποτεταγμένως πρὸς τινα ἐκάστου φύσιν ζώου νενευκέναι βοηθήματα, ὅτι οὐ σοφία οὐδὲ λόγος ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τις φυσικὴ πρὸς τὰ τοιάδε σωτηρίας ἕνεκεν τῶν ζώων κατασκευή, ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου γεγενημένη.

b. Philo, *De animalibus adv. Alex.*, p. 147 Aucher (SVF II 726):

Canis cum persequeretur feram, perveniens ad fossam profundam, iuxta quam duae erant semitae, una ad dextram, altera in sinistram, paululum se sistens, quo ire oporteat, meditabatur. Currens autem ad dexteram et nullum inveniens vestigium, reversus per alteram ibat. Quando vero neque in ista aperte appareret aliquod signum, transiliens fossam curiose indagat, praeter odoratum cursum accelerans; satis declarans non obiter haec facere, sed potius vera inquisitione consilii. Consilium autem talis cogitationis dialectici appellant demonstrativum evidens quinti modi: "Quoniam vel ad dextram fera fugit vel ad sinistram aut demum transsiliit, <atqui neque ad dextram fugit neque ad sinistram; ergo transsiliit>."

Idem p. 166 Aucher. Proscribenda et opinio eorum, qui canem venaticum bestias persequentem autumarunt quinto argumenti modo uti. Idem dicendum de collectoribus conchyliorum deque quaerentibus quidquam; indicia enim rerum sequuntur, apparenter sub specie dialectica, verum tamen nec per somnium quidem philosophentur; alioquin dicendum esset de omnibus aliquid quaerentibus, quod quintum illum modum usurpent. —

Nos enim dicimus, quod ex decentibus bonisque sibi convenientibus multisque rebus iuvantibus ad sanitatem perseverationemque valetudinis habent appetitionem et universali comprehensione universorum carentes eam possident certitudinem, quae in propria specie cernitur. Verum tamen rationalis habitus necesse est illa nullam habere participationem. Rationalis autem habitus est syllogismus ex apprehensione entium, quae minime adsunt; ut intellectus de deo, de mundo, de lege, de patrio more, de civitate, de politica — quorum nihil percipiunt bestiae.

c. Cp. Plut., *De E apud Delphos*, p. 386 f.:

Τῆς μὲν ὑπάρξεως τῶν πραγμάτων ἔχει καὶ τὰ θῆρια γνῶσιν, ἀκολούθου δὲ . . . κρίσιν ἀνθρώπῳ μόνῳ παραδέδωκεν ἡ φύσις.

The soul
of man

947—a. Zeno distinguishes eight “parts” or faculties of the soul of man.

Nemesius, *De natura hominis* p. 96 (SVF I 143):

Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Στωϊκὸς ὀκταμερῇ φησιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, διαιρῶν αὐτὴν εἰς τε τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ εἰς τὰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις καὶ εἰς τὸ φωνητικὸν καὶ τὸ σπερματικόν.

Its eight
parts or
faculties

b. Aëtius explains the division as it was made by Chrysippus. Aëtius, *Plac.* IV 21 (SVF II 836):

Πόθεν αἰσθητικὴ γίνεται ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τί αὐτῆς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ φασιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνώτατον μέρος τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, τὸ ποιοῦν τὰς φαντασίας καὶ συγκαταθέσεις καὶ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ὁρμάς· καὶ τοῦτο λογισμὸν καλοῦσιν. — Ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἑπτὰ μέρη ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκπεφυκότα καὶ ἐκτεινόμενα εἰς τὸ σῶμα καθάπερ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ πολύποδος πλεκτάναι· τῶν δὲ ἑπτὰ μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς πέντε μὲν εἰσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια, ὄρασις ὁσφρησις ἀκοὴ γεῦσις καὶ ἀφή. — Ὡν ἡ μὲν ὄρασις ἐστὶ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρις ὀφθαλμῶν, ἀκοὴ δὲ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρις ὠτῶν, ὁσφρησις δὲ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι μυκτήρων [λεπτύνων], γεῦσις δὲ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι γλώττης, ἀφή δὲ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι ἐπιφανείας εἰς θίξιν εὐαίσθητον τῶν προσπιπτόντων. — Τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν τὸ μὲν λέγεται σπέρμα, ὅπερ καὶ αὐτὸ πνεῦμά ἐστι διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι τῶν παραστατῶν· τὸ δὲ “φωνᾶν” ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος εἰρημένον, ὃ καὶ φωνὴν καλοῦσιν, ἐστὶ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι φάρυγγος καὶ γλώττης καὶ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων. αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ὥσπερ ἐν κόσμῳ <ἥλιος> κατοικεῖ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ σφαιροειδεῖ κεφαλῇ.

c. Cp. the quotation of Chrysippus in *Chalcidius*, in *Tim.* c. 220 (SVF II 879):

Porro animae partes velut ex capite fontis cordis sede manantes per universum corpus porriguntur omniaque membra usque quaque vitali spiritu complent reguntque et moderantur innumerabilibus diversisque virtutibus nutriendo, adolendo, movendo, motibus localibus instruendo, sensibus compellendo ad operandum, totaque anima sensus, qui sunt eius officia, velut ramos ex principali parte illa tamquam trabe pandit,

futuros eorum quae sentiunt nuntios, ipsa de iis quae nuntiaverint iudicat ut rex.

The same image is used by St. Augustine.

948—Zeno, and after him Chrysippus, placed the hegemonikon in **The seat of the hegemonikon** the heart.

a. *Chalc.*, in *Tim.* c. 220 (SVF II 879 the beginning):

Stoici vero cor quidem sedem esse principalis animae partis consentiunt, nec tamen sanguinem, qui cum corpore nascitur.

b. Chalcidius (in the same chapter) cites Chrysippus in this way:

Sicut aranea in medietate cassis omnia filorum tenet pedibus exordia, ut, cum quid ex bestiolis plagas incurrerit ex quacunque parte, de proximo sentiat, sic animae principale, positum in media sede cordis, sensuum exordia retinere, ut cum quid nuntiabunt de proximo recognoscat.

c. Not long before Chrysippus Herophilus of Alexandria discovered the nervous system and the function of the brain. The following passage of Chrysippus refers to the discussions about the seat of the hegemonikon going on in those days.

Galenus, *De Hippocr. et Platonis Plac.* III 1 (112), p. 251 Müller (SVF II 885):

Ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχὲς παντὶ τῷ σώματι διήκον, ἔστ' ἂν ἡ τῆς ζωῆς εὐπνοία παρῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι. ταύτης οὖν τῶν μερῶν ἐκάστω διατεταγμένων μορίῳ, τὸ διήκον αὐτῆς εἰς τὴν τραχεῖαν ἀρτηρίαν φωνὴν <φαμεν> εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὀφθαλμούς ὄψιν, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὠτα ἀκοήν, τὸ δὲ εἰς ῥῖνας ὀσφρησιν, τὸ δ' εἰς γλῶτταν γεῦσιν, τὸ δ' εἰς ὅλην τὴν σάρκα ἀφήν, καὶ τὸ εἰς ὄρχεις ἑτερόν τιν' ἔχον τοιοῦτον λόγον σπερματικόν, εἰς δὲ συμβαίνει πάντα ταῦτα, ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ εἶναι, μέρος δὲ αὐτῆς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. οὕτω δὲ ἐχόντων αὐτῶν, τὰ μὲν λοιπὰ συμφωνεῖται, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς διαφωνοῦσιν, ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις λέγοντες αὐτὸ εἶναι τόποις. οἱ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν θώρακά φασιν εἶναι αὐτό, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν.

949—Chrysippus supports Zeno's thesis by the following arguments. **Chrysippus' arguments**

a. Thinking must be situated in the place whence the word comes.

Galenus, o.c. II 5 (98), p. 203 M. (SVF II 894):

Εὐλογον δέ, εἰς δὲ γίνονται αἱ ἐν τούτῳ¹ σημασίαι, καὶ ἐξ οὗ <ὁ> λόγος,

¹ Müller seems to have found difficulties in the ἐν τούτῳ and brackets it. In

ἐκεῖνο εἶναι τὸ κυριεῦον τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη μὲν [ῆ] πηγὴ λόγου ἐστίν, ἄλλη δὲ διανοίας, οὐδὲ ἄλλη μὲν φωνῆς πηγὴ, ἄλλη δὲ λόγου, οὐδὲ τὸ ὅλον ἀπλῶς ἄλλη φωνῆς πηγὴ ἐστίν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κυριεῦον τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος. — τοιοῦτοις δὲ καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν συμφώνως ἀφοριζόμενοι λέγουσιν αὐτὴν πηγὴν εἶναι λόγου. — Τὸ γὰρ ὅλον ὅθεν ὁ λόγος ἐκπέμπεται, ἐκεῖσε δεῖ καὶ τὸν διαλογισμὸν γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς διανοήσεις καὶ τὰς μελέτας τῶν ῥήσεων, καθάπερ ἔφην. ταῦτα δὲ ἐκφανῶς περὶ τὴν καρδίαν γίγνεται, ἐκ τῆς καρδίας διὰ φάρυγγος καὶ τῆς φωνῆς καὶ τοῦ λόγου ἐκπεμπομένων. πιθανὸν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, εἰς ὃ ἐνσημαίνεται τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ σημαίνεσθαι ἐκεῖθεν, καὶ τὰς φωνὰς ἀπ' ἐκείνου γίγνεσθαι κατὰ τὸν προειρημένον τρόπον.

b. In saying "I am it", we usually point to the breast.

Galenus, o.c. II 2, p. 172 M. (SVF II 895):

Οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν κατὰ τοῦτο, δεικνύντες αὐτοὺς ἐν τῷ <λέγειν· "ἐμοὶ τοῦτο προσήκει, τοῦτο ἐγὼ σοι λέγω" εἰς τὸ> ἀποφαίνεσθαι <ἐκεῖ> τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι¹, τῆς δείξεως φυσικῶς καὶ οἰκειῶς ἐνταῦθα φερομένης.

c. Chrysippus adduced even a selfmade etymology in support of his thesis.

Galenus, o.c. III 5 (124), p. 295 M. (SVF II 896):

Τούτοις πᾶσι συμφώνως καὶ τοῦνομα τοῦτ' ἔσχηκεν ἡ καρδία κατὰ τινα κράτησιν καὶ κυρείαν, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι τὸ κυριεῦον καὶ κρατοῦν τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ὡς ἂν κρατία λεγομένη.

d. Besides these arguments Chrys. could cite a good number of verses of Homer and of other poets in support of his thesis, and Galenus shows us that he did (SVF II 890, 904-906). We mention only *Od.* XX 17 f.:

Στῆθος δὲ πλῆξας καρδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·

Τέτλαθι δὴ καρδίη, καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης.

Chrysippus
tries to
refute
Herophilus

950—Chrysippus tries to refute Herophilus, who holds that the brain is the seat of the hegemonikon.

a. Galenus, o.c. II 5 (102), p. 215 M. (SVF II 898):

Παραγράψω δὲ καὶ τὴν ῥῆσιν αὐτὴν, ἐν ᾗ δείκνυσιν ὁ Χρύσιππος,

my opinion it is an instance of the well known paratactical construction, the meaning of the sentence being: εἰς ὃ καὶ ἐν ᾧ γίνονται αἱ σημασίαι (to put it in bad Greek).

¹ Müller restituted the text by adding λέγειν — εἰς τὸ between ἐν τῷ and ἀποφαίνεσθαι. It seems necessary to me to add ἐκεῖ after ἀποφαίνεσθαι.

ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ προγεγραμμένος λόγος ἀποδεικτικός. ἔστι δὲ τοιάδε·

“Ἐχει δ’ ὥς ἔφην πλείονα αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ πᾶσι, μήποτε’ εἰ καὶ τοῦτο δοθείη, καθάπερ ἐπιπορεύονται, ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ τὰ εἰρημένα μέρη, ἐπιζητήσομεν. σχεδὸν γάρ, οἷα ἂν τινα λέγοιεν περὶ τοῦ τὴν φωνὴν ἐκ τοῦ στήθους φέρεσθαι διὰ τῆς φάρυγγος, ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς ποιᾶς τινος καταρχῆς γιγνομένης, τοιαῦτ’ ἔξεστι λέγειν, ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ μὲν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ὄντος, τῆς δὲ τῶν κινήσεων ἀρχῆς ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς οὔσης.”

b. Galenus in introducing this passage remarks that, being in fact forced to grant his opponent’s argument, Chrysippus prefers to destroy his own with it. Ib., the beginning:

Κατὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλην τινὰ (sc. ῥῆσιν) μετ’ οὐ πάνυ πολὺ ταύτης γεγραμμένην ἠναγκάσθη τὸ ἀληθὲς ὁμολογῆσαι. ἀναγκασθῆναι δὲ εἶπον αὐτόν, ὅτι λόγον ἕτερον ἀνατρέψαι βουλόμενος ὥς οὐκ ἀληθὴ, κἀπειτα τὸ τῆς ἀντιλογίας εἶδος αἰσθόμενος οὐδὲν ἤττον ἐπιστρέψον καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτοῦ, συνανατρέψαι καὶ τὸν ἴδιον οὐκ ὤκνησε τῷ τῶν ἑτεροδόξων.

c. Galenus concludes, after having cited the passage and explained it (ib., p. 224 M.):

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς εἴρηται τῷ Χρυσίππῳ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἂν τις αὐτῷ καὶ μᾶλλον μέμψαιτο, διότι κατιδὼν τὸ ἀληθὲς ὅμως οὐ χρήται· τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς θέσεως ἐπικειρημένα, καὶ τούτων μᾶλλον ὅσα ποιηταὶ μαρτυροῦσιν ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἐτυμολογία τις ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, οὐκ ὀρθῶς.

951—Everything which happens in the soul—φαντασίαι, ὁρμαί, πάθη—is explained by Chrysippus as a ἑτεροίωσις τῆς ψυχῆς. Zeno speaks of a τύπωσις. Ὁρμή is explained in this way.

a. Philo, *Quod deus sit immut.* 41 (SVF II 458):

Τὸ δὲ φανὲν καὶ τυπῶσαν τότε μὲν οἰκείως, τότε δὲ ὥς ἐτέρως διέθηκε τὴν ψυχὴν. Τοῦτο δ’ αὐτῆς τὸ πάθος ὁρμὴ καλεῖται, ἣν ὀριζόμενοι πρῶτην ἔφασαν εἶναι ψυχῆς κίνησιν.

b. Stob., *Ecl.* II 86, 17 W. (SVF III 169):

Τὴν δὲ ὁρμὴν εἶναι φ ο ρ ἂ ν ψ υ χ ῆ ς ἐ π ῖ τ ι κατὰ τὸ γένος. ταύτης δ’ ἐν εἶδει θεωρεῖσθαι τὴν τε ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς γιγνομένην ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴους· οὐ κατωνομασμένοι δ’ εἰσὶν· ἢ γὰρ ὀρεξις οὐκ ἔστι λογικὴ ὁρμὴ, ἀλλὰ λογικῆς ὁρμῆς εἶδος.

Τὴν δὲ λογικὴν ὁρμὴν δεόντως ἂν τις ἀφορίζοιτο, λέγων εἶναι φορὰν διανοίας ἐπὶ τι τῶν ἐν τῷ πράττειν· ταύτη δ’ ἀντιτίθεσθαι ἀφορμὴν, φορὰν τινα <διανοίας ἀπὸ τινος τῶν ἐν τῷ πράττειν>.

c. Cf. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* II 13, p. 145 St. (SVF III 377):

‘Ὁρμή μὲν οὖν φορὰ διανοίας ἐπὶ τι ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ.

πάθος

952—a. In the same passage πάθος is defined:

Clem. Alex., *ib.*:

Πάθος δὲ πλεονάζουσα ὁρμή ἢ ὑπερτείνουσα τὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον μέτρα· ἢ ὁρμή ἑκφερομένη καὶ ἀπειθής λόγῳ. Παρὰ φύσιν οὖν κινήσεις ψυχῆς κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀπειθείαν τὰ πάθη.

b. Cf. Diog. VII 110 (SVF I 205):

Ἔστι δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζήνωνα ἢ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις, ἢ ὁρμή πλεονάζουσα.

c. Again, in Stob., *Ecl.* II 7, 10, p. 88, 8 W.:

Πάθος δ’ εἶναι φασιν ὁρμὴν πλεονάζουσαν καὶ ἀπειθῇ τῷ αἰροῦντι λόγῳ ἢ κίνησιν ψυχῆς <ἄλογον> παρὰ φύσιν.

On the ground of this text Zeller defended the irrationality of the πάθη according to Zeno. After him R. Philippson supported the same thesis (in *Rhein. Mus.* 86, 1937, p. 140-179), but his argument is not conclusive. See under **953d**.

d. Stob., *Ib.* 7, 1, p. 39, 5 W.:

πτοία

Ἐρίσατο δὲ κάκεινως· “πάθος ἐστὶ πτοία ψυχῆς”, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν πτηνῶν φορᾶς τὸ εὐκίνητον τοῦ παθητικοῦ παρεικάσας.

Chrysippus’
theory

953—Chrysippus’ doctrine that all psychical functions, actions and qualities—not only φαντασία, ὁρμή and πάθος, but also knowledge, virtue and vice, and even walking—are a certain state or condition of the hegemonikon, appears in the following passages.

a. Plut., *De virtute morali* c. 3, p. 441c (SVF III 459):

Κοινῶς δὲ ἅπαντες οὗτοι (sc. Zeno, Aristo, Menedemus and Chrysippus ¹) τὴν ἀρετὴν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς διαθέσιν τινα καὶ δύναμιν, γεγεννημένην ὑπὸ λόγου, μᾶλλον δὲ λόγον οὖσαν αὐτὴν ὁμολογούμενον καὶ βέβαιον καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον, ὑποτίθενται· καὶ νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορᾶ τινι καὶ φύσει ψυχῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονικόν, διόλου τρεπόμενον καὶ

¹ Plutarchus gives it certainly as an ancient Stoic theory. This means: he explains Zeno’s ἄλογος κίνησις in such a way, that soul would not contain any irrational part. Doubtless, this was Chrysippus’ view. Whether it was Zeno’s too, is a more complicated question.

μεταβάλλον ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς κατὰ ἔξιν ἢ διάθεσιν μεταβολαῖς, κακίαν τε γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετὴν, καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον ἐν ἑαυτῷ· λέγεσθαι δὲ ἄλογον, ὅταν τῷ πλεονάζοντι τῆς ὁρμῆς, ἰσχυρῷ γενομένῳ καὶ κρατήσαντι, πρὸς τι τῶν ἀτόπων παρὰ τὸν αἰροῦντα λόγον ἐκφέρηται· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάθος εἶναι λόγον πονηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ἐκ φαύλης καὶ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμην προσλαβούσης.

b. Thus Clem. Alex., *Strom.* II 16, p. 151 St., calls such feelings as χαρά and ἔλεος, τροπὰς ψυχῆς (SVF III 433):

Τὴν μὲν γὰρ χαρὰν εὐλογον ἔπαρσιν ἀποδιδόασιν· καὶ τὸ ἀγάλλεσθαι χαίρειν ἐπὶ καλοῖς· τὸ δὲ ἔλεος λύπην ἐπὶ ἀναξίως κακοπαθοῦντι· τροπὰς δὲ εἶναι ψυχῆς καὶ πάθη τὰ τοιαῦτα.

c. Alex. Aphrod., *De anima libri mant.*, p. 118, 6 Bruns (SVF II 823):

“Ὅτι μὴ ‘μία ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις, ὥς τὴν αὐτὴν πῶς ἔχουσιν ποτὲ μὲν διανοεῖσθαι, ποτὲ δὲ ὀργίζεσθαι, ποτὲ δ’ ἐπιθυμεῖν παρὰ μέρος’”, δεικτέον.

ψυχὴ πῶς
ἔχουσα

d. Cp. Stob., *Ecl.* I 49, 33, p. 368, 17 W.:

“Ὡσπερ γὰρ τὸ μῆλον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι τὴν γλυκύτητα ἔχει καὶ τὴν εὐωδίαν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἐν ταύτῳ φαντασίαν, συγκατάθεσιν, ὁρμὴν, λόγον συνεῖληφε.

According to this theory all ὁμαί are essentially rational, and there is no irrational part in the soul.—If this was also Zeno’s view, his definition of πάθος as κίνησις ψυχῆς ἄλογος must be explained in this sense that the πάθη are essentially rational but accidentally revolting against reason¹.

954—a. The “rational” interpretation of Zeno’s definition of πάθος might seem to be supported by the following text.

Did Zeno
hold that
πάθη
are
κρίσεις?

Themistius, *De anima* 90b, Spengel II 197, 24 (SVF I 208):

Καὶ οὐ κακῶς οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος τὰ πάθη τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς τοῦ λόγου διαστροφὰς εἶναι τιθέμενοι καὶ λόγου κρίσεις ἡμαρτημένας.

b. But in fact, Posidonius’ controversy against Chrysippus’ intellectualism, preserved in Galenus’ *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, gives us reason to doubt of the correctness of this interpretation.

Galenus, o.c. V 1, p. 405 Müller:

Χρυσίππος μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ παθῶν ἀποδεικνύει πειρᾶται κρίσεις

¹ Thus, M. van Straaten, *Panaetius*, p. 108 ff. The author refers to Pohlenz’ earlier study *Antikes Führertum* (1934) and to R. Philippson’s article in the *Rhein. Mus.* 1937, but apparently he does not know Pohlenz’ later study *Zenon u. Chrysipp.* See our following numbers.

τινάς εἶναι τὰ πάθη, Ζήνων δὲ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπιγινόμενας αὐταῖς συστολάς καὶ διαχύσεις ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ πτώσεις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη.

From this and similar texts Pohlenz infers that, while for Zeno the πάθη were irrational, Chrysippus rationalized them, in behalf of his theory of the unity of the hegemonikon (Pohlenz, *Zeno u. Chrys.* p. 188 f.).

λύπη
defined as
δόξα
πρόσφατος

955—Again, Zeno's definition of λύπη might be cited in favour of his intellectualism.

a. Galenus, *De Plac. Hipp. et Plat.* IV 7, p. 391 M. (SVF I 212):
Δόξαν γὰρ εἶναι πρόσφατον τοῦ κακὸν αὐτῷ παρεῖναι φησι τὴν λύπην.

Pohlenz explains this formula as a brachylogy: Zeno had so often and so clearly defined πάθος in a non rationalistic way, that he needed not always add "the feelings accompanying" δόξα.

Opinion the
cause of
πάθη

b. The "opinion" which produces the affect is not truth, but error: it is a perversion of reason (τοῦ λόγου διαστροφάι and κρίσεις ἡμαρτημέναι). Thus Cicero could say in *Tusc.* IV 37, 80:

Ut constantia scientiae, sic perturbatio erroris est.

c. Cf. *Tusc.* III 11, 24, where he says that the cause of *aegritudo* and of all perturbations is in "opinion":

Nam cum omnis perturbatio sit animi motus vel rationis expers vel rationem aspernans vel rationi non oboediens, isque motus aut boni aut mali opinione citetur, bifariam quattuor perturbationes aequaliter distributae sunt.

And having described these four as *praeter modum elata laetitia* and *libido* on the one hand, *metus* and *aegritudo* on the other¹, he goes on:

(Ib. 25) His autem perturbationibus, quas in vitam hominum stultitia quasi quasdam furias immittit atque incitat, omnibus viribus atque opibus repugnandum est, si volumus hoc quod datum est vitae tranquille placideque traducere.

Treatment

This statement, then, gives an indication for the treatment of the perturbations: it is *persuasion*. E.g. in the case of *libido*. *Tusc.* IV 35, 74:

Sic igitur affecto haec adhibenda curatio est, ut et illud quod cupiat ostendatur quam leve, quam contemnendum, quam nihil sit omnino, quam facile vel aliunde vel alio modo perfici, vel omnino neglegi possit. Abducendus est etiam nonnumquam ad alia studia, sollicitudines, curas,

¹ The four πάθη were, according to Zeno's doctrine: λύπη, φόβος, ἐπιθυμία, ἡδονή (Diog. VII 110; Stob., *Ecl.* II 7, 10).

negotia. Loci denique mutatione, tamquam aegroti non convalescentes, saepe curandus est.

956—a. That Chrysippus really changed the meaning of Zeno's formulas, as is argued by Posidonius, appears also in Sextus' treatment of the Stoic doctrine of φαντασία, ὁρμή etc. He remarks that, while Zeno explains presentation as an *impression* in the soul (τύπωσις), Chrysippus speaks of an *alteration* of the ruling part (ἑτεροίωσις ἐν ἡγεμονικῷ): *Ag. the Logicians* I 233 (see below our nr. **986b**).

Chrysippus altered the sense of Zeno's formulas

Sextus, *Adv. Math.* VII (*Ag. the Log.* I) 237:

Καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὁρμή καὶ ἡ συγκατάθεσις καὶ ἡ κατάληψις ἑτεροιώσεις μὲν εἰσι τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ.

b. Cp. also the discussion between Cleanthes and Chrysippus on the nature of "walking".

Seneca, *Ep.* 113, 18 (SVF I 525):

Inter Cleanthem et discipulum eius Chrysippum non convenit quid sit ambulatio: Cleanthes ait spiritum esse a principali usque in pedes permissum; Chrysippus ipsum principale.

Which means that Chrysippus—not yet Cleanthes—explained "walking" too as "the ἡγεμονικὸν πᾶς ἔχον".

c. That Cleanthes did not conceive the πάθη as a part of reason, was deduced by Posidonius from the following verses of Cleanthes (SVF I 570), where a dialogue is held between λογισμός and θυμός:

ΛΟΓ. Τί ποτ' ἔσθ' ὃ βούλει, θυμέ; τοῦτό μοι φράσον.

ΘΥΜ. <Σ>έ γ', ὦ λογισμέ, πᾶν ὃ βούλομαι ποιεῖν.

ΛΟΓ. Βασιλικὸν <εἰ>πε<ς>· πλὴν ὅμως εἰπὸν πάλιν.

ΘΥΜ. Ὡν ἂν ἐπιθυμῶ, ταῦθ' ὅπως γενήσεται.

Zeller thinks the argument not conclusive, but Pohlenz (*Stoa* I p. 91) rightly remarks that the obvious sense of Cleanthes' words is as Posidonius understands them.

957—When reading in Epiphanius, as cited under **920b**, that Zeno said noûs is immortal, we certainly do not have to imagine that he meant, *a part of soul*, say the hegemonikon, is immortal. When speaking of noûs in the above cited passage Zeno means the *cosmic pneuma* or πῦρ νοερόν which he calls God. Now surely this pneuma is in man (and even in every being), but as we saw above (**916a**), "cooled". What Zeno thought about the durability of this cooled pneuma which is soul, is this:

The soul not immortal

though it
does not
perish with
the body

a. Epiphanius, *Adv. Haer.* III 2, 26 (SVF I 146):

Ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ μετὰ χωρισμὸν τοῦ σώματος <χρόνον τινὰ διαμένειν>¹ καὶ ἐκάλει τὴν ψυχὴν πολυχρόνιον πνεῦμα, οὐ μὴν δὲ ἄφθαρτον δι' ὅλου ἔλεγεν αὐτὴν εἶναι. ἐκδαπανᾶται γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου εἰς τὸ ἀφανές, ὥς φησι.

b. Cf. Arius Didymus, *Epit. phys.* fr. 39 Diels (SVF II 809):

Τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν γενητὴν τε καὶ φθαρτὴν λέγουσιν. οὐκ εὐθὺς δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσθαι φθείρεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπιμένειν τινὰς χρόνους καθ' ἑαυτήν· τὴν μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων μέχρι τῆς εἰς πῦρ ἀναλύσεως τῶν πάντων, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων πρὸς ποσοῦς τινας χρόνους. — Τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων καὶ ἀλόγων ζώων ψυχὰς συναπόλλυσθαι τοῖς σώμασι.

c. Diog. VII 157:

Κλεάνθης μὲν οὖν πάσας ἐπιδιαμένειν μέχρι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως, Χρύσιππος δὲ τὰς τῶν σοφῶν μόνον.

Panaetius
holds the
soul's
mortality

958—Panaetius, influenced by the sceptic criticism of Carneades, draws a stricter consequence from the Stoic materialism.

a. Cic., *Tusc. Disp.* I 32, 79:

Vult enim, quod nemo negat, quidquid natum sit, interire: nasci autem animos, quod declaret eorum similitudo, qui procreentur: quae etiam in ingeniis, non solum in corporibus, appareat.

b. Ib.:

Alteram autem affert rationem: nihil esse, quod doleat, quin id aegrum esse quoque possit: quod autem in morbum cadat, id etiam interitum; dolere autem animos; ergo etiam interire.

In this Cic. follows Posidonius, who accepted Plato's tripartition of soul and considered the hegemonikon as immortal.

Posidonius
believes in
„celestial
immortality”

959—Contrary to Panaetius, Posidonius held that soul does not come into being with the body, but enters into it θύραθεν (like Aristotle said in *De gen. anim.* II 3), while after death it ascends into aether and feeds on the same substance as the stars².

a. Cic., *Tusc.* I 18, 42-19, 43:

The soul, by its fiery nature, must seek higher regions.

Calidior est enim vel potius ardentior animus quam est hic aër, quem modo dixi crassum atque concretum, quod ex eo sciri potest, quia cor-

¹ Something like this must have been dropped (restitution of Diels).

² Cp. our nr. 431 d.

pora nostra terreno principiorum genere confecta ardore animi concalescunt. Accedit ut eo facilius animus evadat ex hoc aëre, quem saepe iam appello, eumque perrumpat, quod nihil est animo velocius, nulla est celeritas quae possit cum animi celeritate contendere. Qui si permanet incorruptus suique similis, necesse est ita feratur, ut penetret et dividat omne caelum hoc, in quo nubes imbres ventique coguntur, quod et humidum et caliginosum est propter exhalationes terrae.

Quam regionem cum superavit animus naturamque sui similem contigit et adgnovit, iunctis ex anima tenui et ex ardore solis temperato ignibus insistit et finem altius se ecferendi facit. Cum enim sui similem et levitatem et calorem adeptus est, tamquam paribus examinatus ponderibus nullam in partem movetur, eaque ei demum naturalis est sedes, cum ad sui simile penetravit; in quo nulla re egens aletur et sustentabitur isdem rebus, quibus astra sustentantur et aluntur.

Most probably this is Posidonius' doctrine, which is founded on Plato's in the *Tim.*¹ and Aristotle's in *II. φηλ.*²

b. The same doctrine is found in the *Somnium Scipionis* (Cic., *De re publ.* VI 26-28), where the spirit of Scipio Africanus, *de excelso et pleno stellarum, illustri et claro quodam loco*, speaks to the younger Scipio as follows:

"Tu vero enitere et sic habeto, non esse te mortalem sed corpus hoc; nec enim tu is es quem forma ista declarat, sed mens cuiusque is est quisque³, non ea figura quae digito demonstrari potest. deum te igitur scito esse, siquidem est deus qui viget qui sentit qui meminit qui providet, qui tam regit et moderatur et movet id corpus cui praepositus est, quam hunc mundum ille princeps deus; et ut mundum ex quadam parte mortalem ipse deus aeternus, sic fragile corpus animus sempiternus movet. nam quod semper movetur, aeternum est; quod autem motum adfert alicui quodque ipsum agitur aliunde, quando finem habet motus, vivendi finem habeat necesse est. solum igitur quod se ipsum movet, quia numquam deseritur a se, numquam ne moveri quidem desinit; quin etiam ceteris quae moventur hic fons, hoc principium est movendi. principii autem nulla est origo; nam ex principio oriuntur omnia, ipsum autem nulla ex re alia nasci potest; nec enim esset id principium quod gigneretur aliunde; quodsi numquam oritur, nec occidit quidem umquam. nam principium extinctum nec ipsum ab alio renascetur,

¹ 42b (our nr. 354b).

² Cp. our nr. 431d.

³ Cp. Ar., EN X 7, 1178a 2: Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον (above, under 418d).

nec ex se aliud creabit, siquidem necesse est a principio oriri omnia. Ita fit ut motus principium ex eo sit quod ipsum a se movetur; id autem nec nasci potest nec mori; vel concidat omne caelum omnisque natura et consistat necesse est nec vim ullam nanciscatur qua a primo impulsa moveatur. cum pateat igitur aeternum id esse quod se ipsum moveat, quis est qui hanc naturam animis esse tributam neget? inanimus est enim omne quod pulsu agitur externo; quod autem est animal, id motu cietur interiore et suo; nam haec est propria natura animi atque vis; quae si est una ex omnibus quae se ipsa moveat, neque nata certe est et aeterna est.

Discussion To this passage the following remarks must be made.

I—The immortality advocated in the *Somn. Sc.* has been rightly called "celestial immortality": the soul of Africanus is situated on the Milky Way cp. Heraclides Ponticus, our nr. 775a) and shows to the younger Scipio the order of the universe (c. 16 ff.).

II—This kind of immortality is first promised to those who have served their country well: *omnibus qui patriam conservaverint, adiuverint, auxerint, certum esse in caelo ac definitum locum, ubi beati aevo sempiterno fruuntur* (c. 13). But in the above cited passage the soul as such is said to be immortal, because it is a self-moving principle.

III—The author knows a supreme God who rules the world, and he regards the soul as god, but of a lower degree. Hence it does not follow that the supreme God should be considered as transcendent. The background of the *Somn. Sc.* is doubtless the Stoic doctrine of God—the fiery *pneuma* pervading the universe and being present in the *hegemonikon* of man in a higher degree than in non-rational beings, even in anorganic nature (cf. Diog. VII 138-139, our nr. 909; cf. 920c).

IV—The *Somn. Sc.* (c. 15) contains a condemnation of suicide borrowed from Plato's *Phaedo*.

V—The doctrine of the *Somn. Sc.* was generally attributed by modern scholars to Posidonius, until Edelstein¹ denied it him, because the fragments bearing the name of Posidonius explicitly, should not give any indication in this direction.

That this argument is not conclusive, will appear below (nrs. 1192-1195). Moreover, the following points make it probable that, for a part at least, Posidonius is behind the doctrine of immortality set forth in the *Somn. Sc.*

(1) Similar thoughts are found with the Stoic Cato of Utica (Plut., *Cato minor* 68 f.); (2) in Diog. VII 138-139, where Posidonius is mentioned, the view that the *hegemonikon*, being *noûs*, is immortal, is in any case *very near*; (3) We know from Galenus that Posid. in his anthropology was to a great extent inspired by Plato; (4) the *neque nata et certe aeterna* of our text contains clearly a polemic against Panaetius.

VI—Litterature on the *Somn. Sc.*:

F. Cumont, *After life in Roman paganism*, New Haven 1922, pp. 91 ff. (Celestial immortality).

R. M. Jones, *Posidonius and the flight of the mind*, in *Class. Philol.* XXI (1926), p. 97-113.

P. Boyancé, *Etudes sur le Songe de Scipion*, Paris 1936.

¹ In the *Amer. Journal of Philol.*, 1936.

Tends to eliminate the influence of Posid. by maintaining that Cicero himself is a disciple of Plato and quite able to be the author of the theory.

A. J. Festugière, *Le dieu cosmique*, Paris 1949, pp. 441-459.

A. A. C. Sier, Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis*, Diss. Utrecht 1945, gives a survey of the problem and a bibliography.

See also the important "Rapport" of P. Boyancé at the Budé-congress of 1953: *Le Platonisme à Rome. Platon et Cicéron*, in: *Congrès de Tours et Poitiers*, 3-9 Sept. 1953, Actes du Congrès, Paris 1954, p. 195-222.

960—With Seneca, immortality takes an important place. He speaks frequently about it, and in terms which remind us of Plato (especially of the *Phaedo*).

The same
belief in
Seneca

a. Sen., *Ep.* 65, 16:

Nam corpus hoc animi pondus ac poena est: premente illo urgetur, in vinculis est, nisi accessit philosophia, et illum respirare rerum naturae spectaculo iussit, et a terrenis dimisit ad divina. Haec libertas eius est, haec evagatio: subducit interim se custodiae in qua tenetur, et caelo reficitur.

b. Sen., *Ep.* 102, 22:

Cum venerit dies ille, qui mixtum hoc divini humanique secernat, corpus hic, ubi inveni, relinquam: ipse me dis reddam. nec nunc sine illis sum, sed gravi terrenoque detineor.

c. Id., *Nat. quaest.*, Praef. 11-12:

Sursum ingentia spatia sunt, in quorum possessionem animus admittitur, et ita si secum minimum ex corpore tulit, si sordidum omne detersit et expeditus levisque ac contentus modico emicuit. Cum illa tetigit, alitur, crescit ac velut vinculis liberatus in originem redit et hoc habet argumentum divinitatis suae, quod illum divina delectant, nec ut alienis, sed ut suis interest. Secure spectat occasus siderum atque ortus et tam diversas concordantium vias; observat ubi quaeque stella primum terris lumen ostendat, ubi columen eius summum cursus sit, quousque descendat; curiosus spectator excutit singula et quaerit. Quidni quaerat? Scit illa ad se pertinere.

d. Id., *Ad Marciam de consolatione* 25:

Proinde non est quod ad sepulcrum fili tui curras: pessima eius et ipsi molestissima istic iacent, ossa cineresque, non magis illius partes quam vestes aliaque tegimenta corporum. integer ille nihilque in terris relinquens sui fugit et totus excessit; paulumque supra nos commoratus, dum expurgatur et inhaerentia vitia situmque omnem mortalis aevi

excudit, deinde ad excelsa sublatus inter felices currit animas. exceptit illum coetus sacer, Scipiones Catonesque, interque contemptores vitae et beneficio . . . liberos parens tuus, Marcia. ille nepotem suum — quamquam illic omnibus omne cognatum est — adplicat sibi nova luce gaudentem et vicinorum siderum meatus docet, nec ex coniectura sed omnium ex vero peritus in arcana naturae libens ducit; utque ignotarum urbium monstrator hospiti gratus est, ita sciscitanti caelestium causas domesticus interpres.

Also the Christian Origenes imagines that in "paradise" the souls will be initiated into the secrets of the kosmos¹; and, as we remarked already in treating Aristotle's Π. φιλ.², the conviction that the heavenly bodies are a kind of reality superior to our world, remained until the days of Kepler and Galilei: they still regarded the celestial bodies with the eye of Plato in the *Tim.* and of the ancient Stoics, such as Seneca.

The difference between Stoics and Christians longing for "heaven" lies chiefly in these two points: 1) For the Christian, God is *above* creation, and even a perfect knowledge of the heavenly bodies can never be more than an initiation preparing for a higher vision, as it was for Plato, too. For the Stoics, however, the clear vision of the heavenly bodies was in the fullest sense the vision of God. 2) Stoics, such as Seneca, expect this vision as a *right* which will be given to them in consequence of their virtue. Seneca (*Ep.* 95, 10) writes: "*Merui quidem admitti et iam inter illos (sc. deos) fui animumque illo meum misi et ad me illi suum miserant.*" — This view is strange to the Christian who prays:

"*Nobis quoque peccatoribus, famulis tuis, de multitudine miserationum tuarum sperantibus, partem aliquam et societatem donare digneris, cum tuis sanctis apostolis et martyribus, et omnibus sanctis tuis, intra quorum nos consortium, non aestimator meriti, sed veniae quaesumus largitor admitte, per Christum dominum nostrum*" (h. mass).

Moreover, it should be noticed that the above mentioned belief is not the only aspect of the problem of immortality with Seneca. See below, our nr. 1223b-c.

5—LOGIC: (1) GRAMMATICAL SCIENCE

The
foundation
of
grammatical
science

961—From Zeno onwards, Stoics have been always well aware that, since λόγος means both *word* and *thought*, philosophy and language can be hardly separated. By their reflexions on the elementary facts of language, by their definitions and divisions, they laid the foundation of grammatical science. The Grammar of Dionysius Thrax is founded for the greater part on Diogenes the Babylonian's Τέχνη περὶ φωνῆς, and Roman grammarians borrowed still more from him.

¹ *Contra Celsum* II 62. It should be noticed that this initiation, which is equal to that of the Stoic "celestial immortality", according to Origenes takes place *not in heaven* but ἐν μεθορίῳ τινί.

² Our nr. 431d.

See: K. Barwick, *Remmius Palaemon u. die römische ars grammatica*, Leipzig 1922 (*Philologus*, Suppl. Bd. XV), pp. 90-101.

Also: M. Pohlenz, *Die Begründung der abendländischen Sprachlehre durch die Stoa*. Nachr. d. Göttinger Gesellschaft d. Wissensch., phil.-hist. Kl., Fachgruppe I, N.F. III 6 (1939).

—, *Die Stoa I*, p. 37-47.

Diog. Laert. VII 55-59 gives a survey of Diogenes' Τέχνη. That Zeno himself was already occupied with these problems, may appear from our next nrs., and from the fact that he considered dialectic as being only a more concentrated form of rhetoric (964a), while Cleanthes made rhetoric a part of philosophy next to dialectic (964c).

962—a. Eustath. in *Iliad*. Σ 506, p. 1158, 37 (SVF I 74):

Ἡεροφώνους κήρυκας "Ομηρος κἀνταῦθα εἰπὼν τὸν κατὰ Ζήνωνα τῆς φωνῆς ὅρον προϋπέβαλεν εἰπόντα· "φωνὴ ἐστὶν ἄῤῥ πεπληγμένος."

**Zeno's
definition of
φωνή**

b. Diog. Laërt. VII 55 (SVF III, Diog. Bab. 17):

"Ἔστι δὲ φωνὴ ἄῤῥ πεπληγμένος ἢ τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν¹ ἀκοῆς, ὡς φησι Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς φωνῆς τέχνῃ. <καὶ> ζῆλου μὲν ἐστὶ φωνὴ ἄῤῥ ὑπὸ ὀρμῆς πεπληγμένος, ἀνθρώπου δὲ ἐστὶν ἔναρθρος καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη, ὡς ὁ Διογένης φησὶν, ἥτις ἀπὸ δεκατεσσάρων ἐτῶν τελειοῦται.

**repeated
by Diog.**

c. From this definition follows directly that voice is something corporeal.

**voice is
corporeal**

Diog. Laërt., ib. (SVF III, Diog. Bab. 18):

Καὶ σῶμα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ φωνὴ κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς, ὡς φησιν Ἀρχέδημος τ' ἐν τῇ Περὶ φωνῆς καὶ Διογένης καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ τῶν Φυσικῶν. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν σῶμά ἐστι, ποιεῖ δὲ ἡ φωνὴ προσιοῦσα τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν φωνούντων.

963—From the fact that voice proceeds from the throat Zeno, followed by Diogenes the Babylonian, concluded that thought does not originate from the brain, but from the heart.

**Both thought
and voice
spring from
the heart**

Galenus, *De plac. Hippocr. et Plat.* II 5, p. 201 Müller (SVF III, Diog. Bab. 29):

Καὶ μὴν ὁ θαυμαζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν Στωϊκῶν λόγος ὁ Ζήνωνος, ὃν καὶ πρῶτον ἀπάντων ἔγραψεν ἐν τῇ Περὶ τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικοῦ Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος, — εἴση δ' ἐναργέστερον, εἰ παραγράψαιμεν αὐτόν, ἔχει γὰρ ὧδε. "Φωνὴ διὰ φάρυγγος χωρεῖ. εἰ δὲ ἦν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου χωροῦσα, οὐκ ἂν διὰ φάρυγγος ἐχώρει. ὅθεν δὲ λόγος, καὶ φωνὴ ἐκεῖθεν χωρεῖ. λόγος δὲ ἀπὸ διανοίας χωρεῖ,

¹ τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν—"the proper object of the sense of hearing". Cp. nr. 641.

ὥστ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ ἐστὶν ἡ διάνοια." τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον λόγον Διογένης οὐ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐρωτᾷ λέξιν, ἀλλ' ὧδε: „Οθεν ἐκπέμπεται ἡ φωνή, καὶ ἡ ἔναρθρος, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σημαίνουσα ἔναρθρος φωνὴ ἐκεῖθεν. τοῦτο δὲ ὁ λόγος. καὶ λόγος ἄρα ἐκεῖθεν ἐκπέμπεται, ὅθεν καὶ ἡ φωνή. ἡ δὲ φωνὴ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὴν κεφαλὴν τόπων ἐκπέμπεται, ἀλλὰ φανερώς ἐκ τῶν κάτωθεν μᾶλλον. — καὶ ὁ λόγος ἄρα οὐκ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐκπέμπεται, ἀλλὰ κάτωθεν μᾶλλον. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀκχεῖνο ἀληθές τὸ τὸν λόγον ἐκ τῆς διανοίας ἐκπέμπεσθαι. — καὶ ἡ διανοία ἄρα οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς κατωτέρω τόποις, μάλιστα πῶς περὶ τὴν καρδίαν."

**Dialectic is
linked with
rhetoric**

964—Since, then, language and thought are so closely related, dialectic is, according to Zeno, essentially linked with rhetoric.

a. Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* II 7 (SVF I 75):

“Ἐνθεν γοῦν καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἐρωτηθεὶς ὅτῃ διαφέρει διαλεκτικὴ ῥητορικῆς, συστρέψας τὴν χεῖρα καὶ πάλιν ἐξαπλώσας ἔφη “τούτῃ”, κατὰ μὲν τὴν συστροφὴν τὸ στρογγύλον καὶ βραχὺ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς τάττων ἰδίωμα, διὰ δὲ τῆς ἐξαπλώσεως καὶ ἐκτάσεως τῶν δακτύλων τὸ πλατὺ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δυνάμειος αἰνιττόμενος.

b. Cp. Cicero, *De fin.* II 17 (SVF I ib.):

Zenonis est, inquam, hoc Stoici. Omnem vim loquendi, ut iam ante Aristoteles, in duas tributam esse partes, rhetoricam palmae, dialecticam pugni similem esse dicebat, quod latius loquerentur rhetores, dialectici autem compressius.

c. Diog. Laërt., after having mentioned the well-known tripartition of philosophy with Zeno and his followers (see above, nr. 897a), adds that “some Stoics” used to divide logic into rhetoric and dialectic, as we know Cleanthes did, who introduced rhetoric as a part of philosophy next to dialectic.

Diog. Laërt. VII 41:

‘Ο δὲ Κλεάνθης ἐξ μέρη φησί, διαλεκτικόν, ῥητορικόν, ἠθικόν, πολιτικόν, φυσικόν, θεολογικόν. —

Τὸ δὲ λογικόν μέρος φασὶν ἔνιοι εἰς δύο διαιρεῖσθαι ἐπιστήμας, εἰς ῥητορικὴν καὶ διαλεκτικὴν.

λόγος
ἐνδιάθετος
and
προφορικὸς
as voice.

965—Later, the terms ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικὸς are generally used to indicate the different functions of the *logos* as thought and the *logos*

a. Galenus in *Hippocr. de med. officina*, vol. XVIII B, p. 649 K. (SVF II 135):

Τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀπάσαις τὴν γνῶμην ἐφεξῆς ἔταξεν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἣν τε καὶ νοῦν καὶ φρένα καὶ λόγον κοῖνῳς οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν κατὰ φωνὴν ἐστὶ τις λόγος, ἀφορίζοντες οὖν τοῦτον τὸν προειρημένον λόγον οἱ φιλόσοφοι καλοῦσιν ἐνδιάθετον, ὃ λόγῳ τὰ τε ἀκόλουθα καὶ τὰ μαχόμενα γινώσκομεν.

b. Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VIII (*Against the logicians* II) 275:

... φασὶν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος οὐχὶ τῷ προφορικῷ λόγῳ διαφέρει τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων (καὶ γὰρ κόρακες καὶ ψιττακοὶ καὶ κίτται ἐνάθρους προφέρονται φωνάς) ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνδιαθέτῳ, οὐδὲ τῇ ἀπλῇ μόνον φαντασίᾳ — ἀλλὰ τῇ μεταβατικῇ καὶ συνθετικῇ.

It should be noted that in these passages no indication occurs that these terms have been used already in the Ancient Stoa. Probably they date from the days of Carneades and his discussions with Stoics on the question as to whether animals possess speech and thought, too. See Pohlenz, *Begründung* p. 191 ff.

966—Having defined voice, Diogenes the Babylonian went on by defining the elements of language.

The
elements
of language

Diog. Laërt. VII 56-57 (SVF III, Diog. Bab. 20):

Λέξις δὲ ἐστὶ κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς, ὥς φησιν ὁ Διογένης, φωνὴ ἐγγράμματος, οἷον “ἡμέρα”.

Λόγος δὲ ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντικὴ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη, <οἷον “ἡμέρα ἐστὶ”>.

Διάλεκτος δὲ ἐστὶ λέξις κεχαραγμένη ἐθνικῶς τε καὶ Ἑλληνικῶς· ἢ λέξις ποταπὴ, τουτέστι ποιά κατὰ διάλεκτον, οἷον κατὰ μὲν τὴν Ἀτθίδα “θάλαττα”, κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἰάδα “ἡμέρη”.

Τῆς δὲ λέξεως στοιχεῖά ἐστὶ τὰ εἰκοσιτέσσαρα γράμματα. —

Φωνήεντα δὲ ἐστὶ τῶν στοιχείων ἑπτὰ· α, ε, η, ι, ο, υ, ω.

Ἀφωνα δὲ εἰς· β, γ, δ, π, κ, τ.

Διαφέρει δὲ φωνὴ καὶ λέξις, ὅτι φωνὴ μὲν καὶ ὁ ἥχος ἐστὶ, λέξις δὲ τὸ ἐναρθρον μόνον.

Λέξις δὲ λόγος διαφέρει, ὅτι λόγος αἰὲ σημαντικός ἐστι, λέξις δὲ καὶ ἀσημαντος, ὥς ἡ “βλίτυρι”, λόγος δὲ οὐδαμῶς.

967—Diog. now proceeds to define the five parts of speech.

The five
parts of
speech

Diog. Laërt. VII 57-58 (SVF III, Diog. Bab. 21, 22):

Τοῦ δὲ λόγου ἐστὶ μέρη πέντε, ὥς φησι Διογένης τε ἐν τῷ Περὶ φωνῆς καὶ Χρύσιππος· ὄνομα, προσηγορία, ῥῆμα, σύνδεσμος, ἄρθρον. —

"Ἔστι δὲ προσηγορία μὲν, κατὰ τὸν Διογένην, μέρος λόγου σημαῖνον κοινήν ποιότητα, οἷον "ἄνθρωπος" "ἵππος".

"Ὄνομα δὲ ἔστι μέρος λόγου δηλοῦν ἰδίαν ποιότητα, οἷον Διογένης, Σωκράτης.

"Ῥῆμα δὲ ἔστι μέρος λόγου σημαῖνον ἀσύνθετον κατηγορήμα, ὡς ὁ Διογένης, ἢ ὡς τινες, στοιχεῖον λόγου ἄπτωτον¹ σημαῖνόν τι συντακτὸν περὶ τινος ἢ τινῶν, οἷον "γράφω" "λέγω".

Σύνδεσμος δὲ ἔστι μέρος λόγου ἄπτωτον, συνδοῦν τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου.

"Ἄρθρον δὲ ἔστι στοιχεῖον λόγου πτωτικόν, διορίζον τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς· οἷον "ὁ, ἡ, τό, οἱ, αἱ, τά".

According to Dion. Halic., *De verb. comp.* 2, the Stoics started by admitting four parts of speech: ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, σύνδεσμος, ἄρθρον, the same that were also mentioned by Aristotle in *Poet.* 20. Aristotle, however, did not separate them from other elements of language, saying:

Τῆς δὲ λέξεως ἀπάσης τὰδ' ἔστι μέρη· στοιχεῖον, συλλαβή, σύνδεσμος, ἄρθρον, ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, πτώσις, λόγος.

Therefore, Pohlenz (*Stoa* I, p. 44) seems to be right in stating that it was Zeno who first distinguished "the four parts of speech" as such, and separated them from other elements. Later, Chrysippus divided ὄνομα into ὄνομα and προσηγορία.

**The
excellences
and vices
of speech**

968—Next, Diog. deals with the excellences and vices of speech.

Diog. Laërt. VII 59 (SVF III, Diog. Bab. 24):

'Ἀρεταὶ δὲ λόγου εἰσὶ πέντε· ἑλληνισμός, σαφήνεια, συντομία, πρέπον, κατασκευή.

'Ἑλληνισμὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι φράσις ἀδιάπτωτος ἐν τῇ τεχνικῇ καὶ μὴ εἰκαία συνηθεία.

Σαφήνεια δὲ ἔστι λέξις γνωρίμως παριστάσα τὸ νοούμενον.

Συντομία δὲ ἔστι λέξις αὐτὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα περιέχουσα πρὸς δῆλωσιν τοῦ πράγματος.

Πρέπον δὲ ἔστι λέξις οἰκεία τῷ πράγματι.

Κατασκευὴ δὲ ἔστι λέξις ἐκτεφευγυῖα τὸν ἰδιωτισμόν.

'Ὁ δὲ βαρβαρισμός, ἐκ τῶν κακιῶν, λέξις ἐστὶ παρὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων Ἑλλήνων.

Σολοικισμός δὲ ἔστι λόγος ἀκαταλλήλως συντεταγμένος.

The ἀρεταὶ and κακίαι of speech were not adopted by Dion. Thr., but they were by Latin grammarians.

**The doctrine
of declension**

969—Zeno seems to have been the author of the doctrine of declension, the term πτώσις having been used by Aristotle in a more general sense (for every form deduced by alteration from another, for verbal

¹ ἄπτωτον-indeclinable.

forms, comparatives and adverbs as well as for the cases of a noun). Pohlenz, *Stoa* I 44, admits that Zeno limited the term to the sense it has until the present day¹. Chrysippus wrote a book Π. τῶν πέντε πτώσεων.

a. The *casus obliqui* are mentioned in Diog. Laërt. VII 65:

Πλάγιοι δὲ πτώσεις εἰσὶ γενική καὶ δοτική καὶ αἰτιατική.

It must be noticed that in the preceding chapter the term πῶσις is used for verbal forms.

b. There seems to have been a controversy between Stoics and Peripatetics on the question as to whether the nominative can be called a "case" at all.

Ammonius in Ar. *De interpret.* p. 42, 30 Busse (SVF II, 164):


Περὶ τῆς κατ' εὐθείαν γινομένης τῶν ὀνομάτων προφορᾶς εἴωθε παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ζητεῖσθαι, πότερον πῶσιν αὐτὴν προσήκει καλεῖν ἢ οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ ταύτην μὲν ὄνομα, ὡς κατ' αὐτὴν ἐκάστου τῶν πραγμάτων ὀνομαζομένου, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πτώσεις ὀνόματος ἀπὸ τοῦ μετασχηματισμοῦ τῆς εὐθείας γινόμενας. τῆς μὲν οὖν δευτέρας προτίσταται δόξης ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης — τῆς δὲ προτέρας οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς καὶ ὡς τούτοις ἀκολουθοῦντες οἱ τὴν γραμματικὴν μετιόντες τέχνην. λεγόντων δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τῶν Περιπατητικῶν — "τὴν εὐθείαν κατὰ τίνα λόγον πῶσιν ὀνομάζειν δίκαιον, ὡς ἀπὸ τίνος πεσοῦσαν;" — ἀποκρίνονται οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ νόηματος τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ αὕτη πέπτωκεν· ὁ γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχομεν τοῦ Σωκράτους νόημα δηλῶσαι βουλόμενοι τὸ "Σωκράτης" ὄνομα προφερόμεθα· καθάπερ οὖν τὸ ἄνωθεν ἀφεθὲν γραφεῖον καὶ ὀρθὸν παγὲν πεπτωκέναι τε λέγεται καὶ τὴν πῶσιν ὀρθὴν ἐσχηκέναι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τὴν εὐθείαν πεπτωκέναι μὲν ἀξιούμεν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννοίας, ὀρθὴν δὲ εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἐκφώνησιν προφορᾶς.

Doubtless Pohlenz (*Stoa* II p. 26) is right in noticing that the *casus rectus* probably has got its name from being the *normal* form of the word, in which the noun "remains erect".

970—As to the conjugation of verbs, Stoics had their chief merits in composing a new system of the *tempora*. System of the tempora

a. As we are informed by later grammarians (*Stephanus* in the scholia on Dionys. Thr., p. 250, 26 and *Priscianus* VIII 51 ff.), they made their main distinction between *definite* and *indefinite tenses*, and thus came to the following scheme:

¹ See also Pohlenz, *Begründung*, p. 167 ff.



To this, Pohlenz (*Stoa* II, p. 27) remarks that probably the system reaches back to Zeno, since it presupposes the sharp distinction between *perfectum* and *aoristus*, a distinction which began to disappear as early as the middle of the third century.

Meaning
of the
durativum

b. The meaning of the *durativum* (or *imperfectum*) is explained by Priscianus, VIII, p. 414, 24:

... praesens tempus hoc solemus dicere, quod contineat et coniungat quasi puncto aliquo iuncturam praeteriti temporis et futuri nulla intermissione interveniente, unde Stoici iure hoc tempus *praesens imperfectum* vocabant.

c. Cp. Scholia in Dionys. Thr., Bekker, *Anecd. Gr.* II, p. 891 (SVF II, 165):

Τὸν ἐνεστῶτα οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἐνεστῶτα παρατατικὸν ὀρίζονται, ὅτι παρατείνεται καὶ εἰς μέλλοντα· ὁ γὰρ λέγων “ποιῶ” καὶ ὅτι ἐποίησέ τι ἐμφαίνει καὶ ὅτι ποιήσῃ.

Words are
φύσει

971—As to their general idea of language, Stoics held that words are φύσει, while Aristotle taught they are θέσει.

a. Origenes, *Contra Celsum* I 24 (SVF II 146):

Ἐμπίπτει εἰς τὸ προκειμένον λόγος βαθὺς καὶ ἀπόρρητος, ὁ περὶ φύσεως ὀνομάτων, πότερον, ὥς οἶται Ἀριστοτέλης, θέσει ἐστὶ τὰ ὀνόματα ἢ, ὥς νομίζουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, φύσει, μιμουμένων τῶν πρώτων φωνῶν τὰ πράγματα, καθ’ ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα, καθὸ καὶ στοιχεῖά τινα τῆς ἐτυμολογίας εἰσάγουσιν.

Cp. the expression *ἤχου μίμημα* in Cleanthes’ *Hymn to Zeus*, which might be explained in this way (above, nr. 943, n. 1).

Etymology

b. Hence their interest in etymology. Some instances may be found in SVF II 156-163.

972—From the thesis that words are φύσει one might deduce that there is an exact congruity between words and thought. Now this is what is called *analogy* and was defended by Aristarchus of Alexandria. Chrysippus however opposed him, holding that there is *anomaly*.

**Analogy
and anomaly**

a. Varro, *De lingua Latina* IX 1 (SVF II 151):

«Insignis eorum est error qui malunt quae» nesciunt docere quam discere quae ignorant: in quo fuit Crates, nobilis grammaticus, qui fretus Chrysippo, homine acutissimo qui reliquit Περὶ ἀνωμαλίας III libros, contra analogian atque Aristarchum est nixus, sed ita, ut scripta indicant eius, ut neutrius videatur pervidisse voluntatem, quod et Chrysippus de inaequabilitate cum scribit sermonis, propositum habet ostendere similes res dissimilibus verbis et dissimiles similibus esse vocabulis notatas, id quod est verum, et quod Aristarchus, de aequabilitate cum scribit ei<us>de<m> verborum similitudinem quandam <in> inclinatione sequi iubet, quoad patiatur consuetudo.

Varro argues that both anomaly and regularity must be admitted, both having sprung from a certain usage in speech ¹.

b. By what kind of reasons Chrysippus was brought to this thesis, may be seen from the following passage of Simplicius, which deals with negation.

Simpl. in Ar. *Categ.* f. 100 Z ed. Bas. (SVF II 177, towards the end):

Καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἰστέον ὅτι ἐνίοτε μὲν οὐ στερητικὰ ὀνόματα στέρησιν δηλοῦ, ὥς ἡ πενία τὴν στέρησιν τῶν χρημάτων καὶ ὁ τυφλὸς στέρησιν ὀψεως. ἐνίοτε δὲ στερητικὰ ὀνόματα οὐ στέρησιν δηλοῖ· τὸ γὰρ ἀθάνατον, στερητικὸν ἔχον τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως, οὐ σημαίνει στέρησιν.

Doubtless, the fact that there is often not a complete congruity between the form of a word and its meaning, as is suggested by the above cited passage of Varro, was explained by the Stoics by historical development (*consuetudo*): originally there was analogy, but the later usage of speech changed many things. Thus fem. words having a masc. ending, such as *mater*, *soror*; plural forms indicating singular notions, such as *nuptiae*, etc.

6—LOGIC (2): FORMAL LOGIC

973—Stoics took great care of accurate expression. They distinguished between the modalities of single sentences, between the various kinds of composed sentences and between the different forms of negation.

¹ See further on the conflict between Analogy and Anomaly: H. Steinthal, *Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft b. d. Griechen und Römern*, Vol. I (2), Berlin 1890, p. 357.

**Judgement
or
proposition**

a. Definition of judgement. Diog. Laërt. VII 65:

Ἀξίωμα δέ ἐστιν ὃ ἐστιν ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος ἢ πρᾶγμα αὐτοτελές ἀποφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος φησιν ἐν τοῖς Διαλεκτικοῖς ὅροις· „ἀξιώμα ἐστὶ τὸ ἀποφαντὸν ἢ καταφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ, οἷον Ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, Δίῳν περιπατεῖ.” ὠνόμασται δὲ τὸ ἀξίωμα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀξιόϋσθαι ἢ ἀθετεῖσθαι· ὁ γὰρ λέγων Ἡμέρα ἐστίν, ἀξιοῦν δοκεῖ τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι. οὔσης μὲν οὖν ἡμέρας, ἀληθές γίνεται τὸ προκείμενον ἀξίωμα· μὴ οὔσης δέ, ψεῦδος.

**Modalities
of the
sentence**

b. Diog. Laërt. VII 66-68 (SVF II 186):

Διαφέρει δὲ ἀξίωμα καὶ ἐρώτημα καὶ πύσμα <καὶ> προστακτικὸν καὶ ὀρκικὸν καὶ ἀρατικὸν καὶ ὑποθετικὸν καὶ προσαγορευτικὸν καὶ πρᾶγμα ὅμοιον ἀξιώματι. ἀξίωμα μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ὃ λέγοντες ἀποφαινόμεθα, ὅπερ ἡ ἀληθές ἐστὶν ἢ ψεῦδος. ἐρώτημα δέ ἐστι πρᾶγμα αὐτοτελές μὲν, ὡς καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα, αἰτητικὸν δὲ ἀποκρίσεως, οἷον “ἄρά γ' ἡμέρα ἐστὶ;” τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε ἀληθές ἐστὶν οὔτε ψεῦδος· ὥστε τὸ μὲν “ἡμέρα ἐστίν” ἀξιώμα ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ “ἄρά γ' ἡμέρα ἐστίν;” ἐρώτημα. πύσμα δέ ἐστι πρᾶγμα πρὸς ὃ συμβολικῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐρωτήματος, “ναί”, ἀλλὰ <δεῖ> εἰπεῖν “οἰκεῖ ἐν τῷδε τῷ τόπῳ”. προστακτικὸν δέ ἐστι πρᾶγμα, ὃ λέγοντες προστάσσομεν, οἷον·

“σὺ μὲν βιάδιζε τὰς ἐπ' Ἰνάχου ῥάας”¹.

ὀρκικὸν****² <προσαγορευτικὸν> δέ ἐστι πρᾶγμα, ὃ εἰ λέγοι τις, προσαγορεύοι ἄν, οἷον

“Ἀτρείδῃ κύδιστε, ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων”³.

ὅμοιον δέ ἐστιν ἀξιώματι, ὃ τὴν ἐκφορὰν ἔχον ἀξιώματικὴν παρὰ τινος μορίου πλεονασμὸν ἢ πάθος ἔξω πίπτει τοῦ γένους τῶν ἀξιωμάτων, οἷον·

“καλός γ' ὁ παρθενών”.

“ὡς Πριαμίδῃσιν ἐμφερὴς ὁ βουκόλος”⁴ ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἐπαπορητικὸν τι πρᾶγμα διεννηνοχὸς ἀξιώματος, ὃ εἰ λέγοι τις, ἀποροίη ἄν·

“ἄρ' ἐστὶ συγγενές τι λύπη καὶ βίος;”⁵

οὔτε δὲ ἀληθὴ ἐστὶν οὔτε ψευδῆ τὰ ἐρωτήματα καὶ τὰ πύσματα καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια, τῶν ἀξιωμάτων ἢ ἀληθῶν ἢ ψευδῶν ὄντων.

c. More precisely, Ammonius says that, to the five traditional modalities, Stoics added five others.

Ammonius in Ar. *De interpr.*, p. 2, 26 Busse (SVF II 188):

Καλοῦσι δὲ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὸν μὲν ἀποφαντικὸν λόγον ἀξίωμα, τὸν δὲ εὐκτικὸν

¹ Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Fragm.*, Adesp. 177.

² The lacuna must have covered the definitions of the ὀρκικόν, ἀρατικόν and ὑποθετικόν.

³ *Iliad* IX 96.

⁴ Nauck, T.G.F., Adesp. 286.

⁵ Menander, fr. 281, 9 Kock.

ἀρατικόν, τὸν δὲ κλητικὸν προσαγορευτικόν, προστιθέντες τούτοις¹ ἕτερα πέντε λόγων εἶδη σαφῶς ὑπὸ τινὰ τῶν ἀπηριθμημένων ἀναφερόμενα· λέγουσι γὰρ τὸ μὲν τι εἶναι ὁμοτικόν, οἷον·

“ἴστω νῦν τόδε γαῖα,”

τὸ δὲ ἐκθετικόν, οἷον “ἔστω εὐθεῖα γραμμὴ ἡδε”, τὸ δὲ ὑποθετικόν, οἷον “ὑποκείσθω τὴν γῆν κέντρον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ἡλίου σφαίρας” τὸ δὲ ὁμοιον ἀξιωματικόν, οἷον

“ὥς ὠρατίζεται ἡ τύχη εἰς τὰς βίους”².

ἄπερ ἅπαντα δεκτικὰ ὄντα ψεύδους τε καὶ ἀληθείας ὑπάγοντο ἂν τῷ ἀποφαντικῷ. — πέμπτον δὲ τι τούτοις εἶναί φασι τὸ ἐπαπορητικόν. —

974—To the fundamental thesis that every proposition must be either true or false, the Sceptics opposed the famous “Liar”³.

The Stoic basis of dialectic opposed by Sceptics

Thus, Cic. in *Acad. pr.* (*Lucullus*) 29, 95:

Nempe fundamentum dialecticae est, quidquid enuntietur (id autem appellant ἀξιωμα; quod est quasi effatum) aut verum esse aut falsum. Quid igitur? Haec vera an falsa sunt? “Si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris” et “si te mentiri dicis idque mentiris, verum dicis”? Haec scilicet inexplicabilia esse dicitis. Quod est odiosius quam illa, quae nos incomprehensa et non percepta dicimus. Sed haec omitto. Illud quaero, si ista explicari non possunt nec eorum ullum iudicium invenitur, ut respondere possitis verane an falsa sint: ubi est illa definitio “effatum esse id, quod aut verum aut falsum sit”?

975—a. Diog. Laërt. VII 75-76 (SVF II 201):

Various kinds of propositions

Πιθανὸν δὲ ἐστὶν ἀξιωμα τὸ ἄγον εἰς συγκατάθεσιν, οἷον “εἴ τίς τι ἔτεκεν, ἐκεῖνη ἐκείνου μήτηρ ἐστί.” ψεῦδος δὲ τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὄρνις ῥοῦ ἐστὶ μήτηρ. ἔτι τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ δυνατά, τὰ δὲ ἀδύνατα, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα, τὰ δ’ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα. δυνατόν μὲν τὸ ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ἀληθές εἶναι, τῶν ἐκτὸς μὴ ἐναντιουμένων πρὸς τὸ ἀληθές εἶναι, οἷον “ζῆ Διοκλῆς”. ἀδύνατον δὲ ὁ μὴ ἐστὶν ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ἀληθές εἶναι, οἷον “ἡ γῆ ἵπταται”. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ἐστὶν, ὅπερ ἀληθές ὄν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ψεῦδος εἶναι, ἢ ἐπιδεκτικὸν μὲν ἐστὶ, τὰ δ’ ἐκτὸς αὐτῷ ἐναντιοῦται πρὸς τὸ ψεῦδος εἶναι, οἷον “ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ”. οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ καὶ ἀληθές ἐστὶ καὶ ψεῦδος οἷον τε εἶναι, τῶν ἐκτὸς μηδὲν ἐναντιουμέ-

¹ Of the five modalities admitted by Peripatetics he mentions here only three, omitting the ἐρώτημα or αἰτητικόν, and the προστακτικόν. Cp. Ammonius in *Anal. pr.*, p. 2, 3 Wallies: ἤτοι τῶν πέντε κατὰ τοὺς Περιπατητικούς ἢ τῶν δέκα κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς πλὴν τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ—which is correct, since they introduced the πύσμα as a special kind next to the ἐρώτημα.

² Menander, fr. 855.

³ Our nr. 231b.

νων, οἷον τὸ “περιπατεῖ Δίῳ”. εὐλογον δέ ἐστιν ἀξίωμα τὸ πλείονας ἀφορμὰς ἔχον εἰς τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, οἷον “βιώσομαι αὖριον”. καὶ ἄλλαι δέ εἰσι διαφοραὶ ἀξιωματῶν καὶ μεταπτώσεις αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀληθῶν εἰς ψεῦδη καὶ ἀντιστροφαί, περὶ ὧν ἐν τῷ πλάτει λέγομεν.

**Stoic doctrine
of modalities
criticized by
Boëthius**

b. The Stoic doctrine about “possible” and “necessary” is opposed by Boëthius, ad Ar. *De interpr.*, p. 429 (SVF II ib.):

Illud autem ignorandum non est, quod Stoicis universalius videatur esse possibile a necessario; dividunt enim enuntiationes hoc modo: “enuntiationum, inquit, aliae sunt possibiles, aliae impossibiles; possibilitium aliae sunt necessariae, aliae non necessariae; rursus non necessariarum aliae possibiles, etc.” stulte atque improvide idem possibile et genus non necessari et speciem constituentes.

**Different
kinds of
negation**

976—Diog. Laërt. VII 69-70 (SVF II 204):

... ἀποφατικὸν μὲν οἷον “οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἐστίν”. εἶδος δὲ τούτου τὸ ὑπεραποφατικόν. ὑπεραποφατικὸν δέ ἐστιν ἀποφατικὸν ἀποφατικοῦ, οἷον “οὐχὶ ἡμέρα <οὐκ> ἐστίν. τίθησι δὲ τὸ “ἡμέρα ἐστίν”. ἀρνητικὸν δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐξ ἀρνητικοῦ μορίου καὶ κατηγορήματος, οἷον “οὐδεὶς περιπατεῖ”, στερητικὸν δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐκ στερητικοῦ μορίου καὶ ἀξιώματος κατὰ δύναμιν, οἷον “ἀφιλάνθρωπός ἐστιν οὗτος”.

**Division
of compound
sentences**

977—Simple propositions may be linked to one another by different conjunctions. Thus, six kinds are distinguished:

1. *συνημμένον* - hypothetical
2. *παρασυνημμένον* - inferential
3. *συμπεπλεγμένον* - coupled (also called *conjunctive* ¹)
4. *διεzeugμένον* - disjunctive
5. *αἰτιῶδες* - causal
6. *διασαφοῦν τὸ μᾶλλον* } comparative (also called { a. preferential ².
— *τὸ ἥττον* } b. quantitative ²).

Diog. Laërt. VII 71-73 (SVF II 207):

Τῶν δ' οὐχ ἀπλῶν ἀξιωματῶν *συνημμένον* μὲν ἐστίν, ὥς ὁ Χρῦσιππος ἐν ταῖς Διαλεκτικαῖς φησι καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ Διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ, τὸ συνεστὸς διὰ τοῦ “εἰ” συναπτικοῦ συνδέσμου. ἐπαγγέλλεται δ' ὁ σύνδεσμος οὗτος ἀκολουθεῖν

¹ Mme A. Virieux-Reymond, *La logique et l'épistémologie des Stoïciens*, p. 138, speaks of “le type conjonctif”.

² Mme Virieux-Reymond calls them “le type préférentiel” and “le type quantitatif”.

τὸ δεύτερον τῷ πρώτῳ, οἷον “εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστι.” παρασυνημμένον δέ ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ Κρῖνις φησιν ἐν τῇ Διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ, ἀξίωμα ὁ ὑπὸ τοῦ “ἐπεὶ” συνδέσμου παρασυνήπται ἀρχόμενον ἀπ’ ἀξιώματος καὶ λήγον εἰς ἀξίωμα, οἷον “ἐπεὶ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστιν”. ἐπαγγέλλεται δ’ ὁ σύνδεσμος ἀκολουθεῖν τε τὸ δεύτερον τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὑφεστάναι. συμπεπλεγμένον δέ ἐστιν ἀξίωμα ὁ ὑπὸ τινων συμπλεκτικῶν συνδέσμων συμπεπλέκεται, οἷον “καὶ ἡμέρα ἐστί, καὶ φῶς ἐστιν.” διεzeugμένον δέ ἐστιν ὁ ὑπὸ τοῦ “ἥτοι” διαzeug-
 τικοῦ συνδέσμου διέzeugεται, οἷον “ἥτοι ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἢ νύξ ἐστιν. ἐπαγγέλλεται δ’ ὁ σύνδεσμος οὗτος τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἀξιωμάτων ψευδὸς εἶναι. αἰτιῶδες δέ ἐστιν ἀξίωμα τὸ συντασσόμενον διὰ τοῦ “διότι”, οἷον “διότι ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστιν”. οἶονε γὰρ αἰτιόν ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ δευτέρου. διασαφούν δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀξίωμα ἐστὶ τὸ συνταττόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ διασαφούντος τὸ μᾶλλον συν-
 δέσμου καὶ τοῦ <,,ἢ”> μέσου τῶν ἀξιωμάτων τασσομένου, οἷον “μᾶλλον ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἢ νύξ ἐστι. διασαφούν δὲ τὸ ἥττον ἀξίωμα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ προκειμένῳ, οἷον “ἥττον νύξ ἐστὶν ἢ ἡμέρα ἐστίν.”

978—Disjunctive and hypothetical propositions became the basis of Stoic syllogistic and of their doctrine of proof. The function of hypothetical propositions with a view to acquiring knowledge may be understood from the following passage of Sextus.

The impor-
 tance of
 hypothetical
 propositions

Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VIII (*Against the logicians* II) 108-III (SVF II 216):

Καὶ δὴ οὐχ ἀπλᾶ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀξιώματα τὰ ἀνώτερον προσειρημένα, ἅπερ ἐξ ἀξιώματος διαφορουμένου¹ ἢ ἀξιωμάτων διαφερόντων συνέστηκε καὶ ἐν οἷς σύνδεσμος ἢ σύνδεσμοι ἐπικρατοῦσιν. λαμβανέσθω δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος τὸ καλούμενον συνημμένον. τοῦτο τοίνυν συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀξιώματος διαφορουμένου ἢ ἐξ ἀξιωμάτων διαφερόντων διὰ τοῦ “εἰ” ἢ “εἴπερ” συνδέσμου, οἷον ἐκ διαφορουμένου μὲν ἀξιώματος καὶ τοῦ “εἰ” συνδέσμου συνέστηκε τὸ τοιοῦτον συνημμένον “εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστιν, ἡμέρα ἐστίν”, ἐκ διαφερόντων δὲ ἀξιωμάτων καὶ διὰ τοῦ “εἴπερ” συνδέσμου τὸ οὕτως ἔχον “εἴπερ ἡμέρα ἐστι, φῶς ἐστιν”. τῶν δὲ ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ ἀξιωμάτων τὸ μετὰ τὸν „εἰ” ἢ τὸν „εἴπερ” σύνδεσμον τεταγμένον ἡγούμενόν τε καὶ πρῶτον καλεῖται, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν λήγόν τε καὶ δεύτερον, καὶ ἐὰν ἀναστρόφως ἐκφέρηται τὸ ὅλον συνημμένον, οἷον οὕτως “φῶς ἐστιν, εἴπερ ἡμέρα ἐστίν”. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ λήγον μὲν καλεῖται τὸ “φῶς ἐστιν” καίπερ πρῶτον ἐξενεχθέν, ἡγούμενον δὲ τὸ “ἡμέρα ἐστίν” καίπερ δεύτερον λεγόμενον, διὰ τὸ μετὰ τὸν „εἴπερ” σύνδεσμον

¹ ἀξιώματος διαφορουμένου - a duplicated proposition, as in the example given *infra*. The true name of tautological syllogisms, such as are meant here, is διαφοροῦμενοι. Later they were called erroneously διαφορούμενοι.

τετάχθαι. ἡ μὲν οὖν σύστασις τοῦ συνημμένου, ὡς ἐν συντόμῳ εἰπεῖν, ἐστὶ τοιαύτη, ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι δὲ δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀξίωμα ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ πρώτῳ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ δεύτερον καὶ ὄντος τοῦ ἡγουμένου ἔσεσθαι τὸ λήγον. ὅθεν σφῆζομένης μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπαγγελίας καὶ ἀκολουθοῦντος τῷ ἡγουμένῳ τοῦ λήγοντος ἀληθὲς γίνεται καὶ τὸ συνημμένον, μὴ σφῆζομένης δὲ ψευδός.

Proof

979—Proof, then, is defined as follows.

Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VIII (*Against the logicians* II) 310-314:

Τούτων δὴ οὕτως ἔχόντων ἡ ἀπόδειξις πρὸ πάντος ὀφείλει λόγος εἶναι, δεύτερον συνακτικὸς¹, τρίτον καὶ ἀληθής, τέταρτον καὶ ἄδηλον ἔχων συμπέρασμα, πέμπτον καὶ ἐκκαλυπτόμενον τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς δυνάμεως τῶν λημμάτων². ὁ γοῦν τοιοῦτος λόγος ἡμέρας οὔσης “εἰ νῦν ἔστι, σκότος ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν νῦν ἔστι· σκότος ἄρα ἔστιν” συνακτικὸς μὲν καθειστῆται (δοθέντων γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῶν λημμάτων ὑπάρχειν συνάγεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά³), οὐκ ἀληθὲς δὲ γε ἦν (εἶχε γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ λήμμα ψευδός τὸ “νῦν ἔστιν”)· διόπερ οὐδὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔστιν. πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος “εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἡμέρα δ’ ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν” πρὸς τῷ συνακτικῷ ἔτι καὶ ἀληθὲς ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ περ δοθέντων αὐτοῦ τῶν λημμάτων διδοται καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά, καὶ δι’ ἀληθῶν ἀληθὲς τι δείκνυσιν. τοιοῦτος δὲ ὢν πάλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις τῷ πρόδηλον ἔχειν τὸ συμπέρασμα τὸ “φῶς ἔστιν”, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄδηλον. κατὰ ταῦτά δὲ καὶ ὁ οὕτως ἔχων “εἰ τίς σοι θεῶν εἶπεν ὅτι πλουτήσῃ οὗτος, πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· οὗτος δὲ ὁ θεὸς εἶπέ σοι ὅτι πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· πλουτήσῃ ἄρα οὗτος” ἄδηλον μὲν ἔχει συμπέρασμα τὸ πλουτήσῃ τοῦτον, οὐκ ἔστι δ’ ἀποδεικτικὸς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐκ τῆς τῶν λημμάτων δυνάμεως ἐκκαλύπτεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ πίστεως παραδοχῆς τυγχάνειν. συνδραμόντων οὖν πάντων τούτων, τοῦ τε συνακτικὸν εἶναι τὸν λόγον καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ἄδηλου παραστατικόν, ὑφίσταται ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἐνθεν καὶ οὕτως αὐτὴν ὑπογράφουσιν “ἀπόδειξις ἔστι λόγος δι’ ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων κατὰ συναγωγὴν¹ ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων ἄδηλον”, οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος “εἰ ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔστι κίνησις· ἔστιν ἄρα κενόν”. τὸ γὰρ εἶναι κενὸν ἄδηλόν τ’ ἐστὶ, καὶ δι’ ἀληθῶν δοκεῖ, τοῦ τε “εἰ ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν” καὶ τοῦ “ἔστι δὲ κίνησις”, κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐκκαλύπτεσθαι.

λόγοι
ἀπέραντοι

980—When it happens that an argument is not conclusive (ἀπέραντος).
Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VIII (*Ag. the log.* II) 429-434 (SVF II 240):

¹ The term συνακτικὸς is used by Stoic logicians for “conclusive”, συναγωγὴ for deduction or inference.

² λήμματα is used by Stoics for the premisses. Aristotle mostly called them προτάσεις, but sometimes he also spoke of λήμματα.

³ ἐπιφορά is the Stoic term for “what follows from premisses”, ergo the conclusion.

Τοῖνυν φασὶ τετραχῶς γίνεσθαι τὸν ἀπέραντον λόγον, ἥτοι κατὰ διάρτησιν ¹ ἢ κατὰ παρολκὴν ² ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἠρωτῆσθαι σχήματι ἢ κατὰ ἔλλειψιν. ἀλλὰ κατὰ διάρτησιν μὲν, ὅταν μηδεμίαν ἔχῃ κοινωνίαν καὶ συνάρτησιν τὰ λήμματα πρὸς ἀλλήλα τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιφοράν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοιούτου λόγου “εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν πυροὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πωλοῦνται· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν.” ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τούτου οὔτε τὸ “εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν” ἔχει τινὰ σύμπνοιαν καὶ συμπλοκὴν πρὸς τὸ “πυροὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πωλοῦνται”, οὔτε ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸ “φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν”, ἀλλ’ ἕκαστον ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων διήρηται. κατὰ δὲ παρολκὴν ἀπέραντος γίνεται ὁ λόγος, ὅταν ἔξωθέν τι καὶ περισσῶς παραλαμβάνηται τοῖς λήμμασι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὕτως ἔχοντος “εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν”. τὸ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὠφελεῖν περισσῶς συμπαρελήπται τοῖς ἄλλοις λήμμασιν, εἰ γε δυνατόν ἔστιν ἐξαιρεθέντος αὐτοῦ διὰ τῶν περιλειπομένων, τοῦ τε “εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν” καὶ τοῦ “ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν”, συνάγεσθαι τὴν ἐπιφοράν τὸ “φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν”. διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἠρωτῆσθαι σχήματι ἀπέραντος γίνεται <ὁ> λόγος, ὅταν ἐν τινι τῶν παρὰ τὰ ὑγιῆ σχήματα θεωρουμένων ἐρωτηθῇ σχήματι· οἷον ὄντος ὑγιῶς σχήματος τοῦ τοιούτου “εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον, τὸ δὲ γε πρῶτον, τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον”, ὄντος δὲ καὶ τοῦ “εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον, οὐχὶ δὲ γε τὸ δεύτερον, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον”, φαμέν τὸν ἐν τοιούτῳ σχήματι ἐρωτηθέντα “εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον, οὐχὶ δὲ γε τὸ πρῶτον, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον” ἀπέραντον εἶναι, οὐχ ὅτι ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σχήματι λόγον συνερωτᾶσθαι δι’ ἀληθῶν ἀληθῆς συνάγοντα (δύναται γάρ, οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος “εἰ τὰ τρία τέσσαρά ἐστιν, τὰ ἕξ ὀκτώ ἐστιν· οὐχὶ δὲ γε τὰ τρία τέσσαρά ἐστιν, οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ἕξ ὀκτώ ἐστιν”), τῷ δὲ δύνασθαι τινας λόγους ἐν αὐτῷ τάττεσθαι μοχθηρούς, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον “εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμέρα· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι φῶς”. κατ’ ἔλλειψιν δὲ ἀπέραντος γίνεται ὁ λόγος, ὅταν ἐλλείπη τι τῶν συνακτικῶν λημμάτων. οἷον “ἥτοι κακόν ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος ἢ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος· οὐχὶ δὲ γε κακόν ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος· ἀγαθόν ἄρα ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος.” ἐλλείπει γὰρ ἐν τῷ διεzeugμένῳ τὸ ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸν πλοῦτον, ὥστε τὴν ὑγιῆ συνερῶτησιν τοιαύτην μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν “ἥτοι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος ἢ κακόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀδιάφορον· οὔτε δὲ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος οὔτε κακόν· ἀδιάφορον ἄρα ἐστίν.”

981—For Chrysippus, the chief task of dialectic is: determining the τρόποι in which a correct conclusion is possible. He finds five forms which are evident without any proof. The five anapodeiktōi

¹ By διάρτησις he means *incoherence*, as will appear in the following explanation.

² παρολκή means that “strange” elements are introduced into the argument, as will be explained below.

Diog. Laërt. VII 79-81 (SVF II 241):

Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἀναπόδεικτοὶ τινες, τῷ μὴ χρῆζειν ἀποδείξεως, ἄλλοι μὲν παρ' ἄλλοις, παρὰ δὲ τῷ Χρυσίπῳ πέντε, δι' ὧν πᾶς λόγος πλέκεται. — πρῶτος δέ ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος, ἐν ᾧ πᾶς λόγος συντάσσεται ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἡγουμένου, ἅφ' οὗ ἄρχεται τὸ συνημμένον, καὶ τὸ λήγον ἐπιφέρει, οἷον "εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον". δεύτερος δ' ἐστὶν ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ διὰ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἡγουμένου ἔχων συμπέρασμα, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μὴν νύξ ἐστίν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἐστίν". ἡ γὰρ πρόσληψις γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τῷ λήγοντι καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορὰ ἐκ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τῷ ἡγουμένῳ. τρίτος δέ ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ δι' ἀποφατικῆς συμπλοκῆς καὶ ἐνὸς τῶν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ ἐπιφέρων τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ, οἷον "οὐχὶ τέθνηκε Πλάτων καὶ ζῇ Πλάτων· ἀλλὰ μὴν τέθνηκε Πλάτων· οὐκ ἄρα ζῇ Πλάτων". τέταρτος δέ ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ διὰ διεzeugμένου καὶ ἐνὸς τῶν ἐν τῷ διεzeugμένῳ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ ἔχων συμπέρασμα, οἷον "ἦτοι τὸ πρῶτον ἢ τὸ δεύτερον· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον". πέμπτος δέ ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος, ἐν ᾧ πᾶς λόγος συντάσσεται ἐκ διεzeugμένου καὶ ἐνὸς τῶν ἐν τῷ διεzeugμένῳ ἀντικειμένου καὶ ἐπιφέρει τὸ λοιπόν, οἷον "ἦτοι ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἢ νύξ ἐστίν· οὐχὶ δὲ νύξ ἐστίν· ἡμέρα ἄρα ἐστίν."

Mme Virieux-Reymond gives the list in the above cited work, p. 141 f. Cp. also Sextus, *Ag. the Log.* II 223-230 (SVF II 242).

**Originality
of Chrysip-
pus' logic**

982—That, after Aristotle, and even for the greater part after Theophrastus and Eudemus, Chrysippus went a new way, is confirmed by the following passage of Boëthius.

Boëthius, *De syllogismo hypoth.* I, Prooem. (Patrol. Lat. LXIV 831):

De hypotheticis syllogismis . . . ab Aristotele nihil est conscriptum, Theophrastus vero . . . rerum tantum summas exsequitur; Eudemus latiore docendi graditur viam, sed ita ut veluti quaedam seminaria sparsisse, nullum tamen frugis videatur extulisse proventum. Nos igitur . . . quae ab illis vel dicta breviter vel funditus omissa sunt, elucidanda diligenter suscepimus.

About Theophr. and Eudemus, cp. our nr. **675**.

**Modern
estimation
of it**

983—In the nineteenth century, Stoic logic has been seriously underestimated by German scholars, first of all by Prantl in his *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, Vol. I, Leipzig 1885. Prantl was followed only too much by Zeller and by Überweg.

V. Brochard was the first to appreciate Stoic logic in a more intelligent way, in his article *La logique des Stoïciens*, first published in the *Archiv für Geschichte der Phil.*, 1892; reprinted in *Etudes de phil. ancienne et de phil. moderne*, Paris 1912, pp. 220 ff.

He was followed by E. Bréhier, *Chrysippe*, Paris 1910;

A. Reymond, *La logique stoïcienne* in the Swiss *Revue de théol. et de phil.* 1929, pp. 161-171;

J. Lukasiewicz, *Zur Geschichte der Aussagenlogik*, in *Annalen der Phil.*, Bd. XIII, Heft 1 (Congress of Prague, 1935);

M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa I*, Göttingen 1948, pp. 47-51;

Mme A. Virieux-Reymond, *La logique et l'épistémologie des Stoïciens*, Lausanne, sans date (1949).

Finally, there is a recent American publication on Stoic logic: B. Mates, *Stoic Logic* (Univ. of California publications in phil.), Berkeley 1953.

Mme Virieux summarizes her judgement on Stoic logic in the following lines (o.c., p. 153):

"Elle (i.e. la logique stoïcienne) s'apparente à celle de Stuart Mill: données concrètes et individuelles du jugement; définitions purement nominales (énumération des propriétés d'un sujet); inférences et propositions conditionnelles, etc. La logique du Portique tendait ainsi à être inductive. —

Il y a un certain flottement dans la logique stoïcienne entre une tendance à l'empirisme et une autre vers la formalisation logique: c'est à propos de cette dernière — sur le terrain de la logique pure — que MM. Lukasiewicz et Reymond ont découvert simultanément la similitude indéniable qui existe entre la logique et la dialectique stoïcienne."

The value of
Stoic Logic
according to
A. Virieux-
Reymond

7—LOGIC (3): THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

984—Stoic theory of knowledge is usually qualified as "sensualism", a qualification which, as we shall see, is not correct, i.e. if by "sensualism" a doctrine is meant which makes the senses the criterium of knowledge. What is true is, first, that in their theory of knowledge the Stoics *started from* the senses; secondly that Zeno defined his φαντασία quite materially as an impression in "the soul"; thirdly, that the decisive act, called κατάληψις, was itself named αἴσθησις; fourthly that Chrysippus, altering Zeno's account of the process of knowledge, did not call κατάληψις but φαντασία καταληπτική the standard of knowledge, conceiving it in a different way which, in any case, came nearer to sensualism.

a. Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VII (Ag. the logicians I) 236 (SVF I 58):

"Ὅταν λέγῃ ὁ Ζήνων φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, —

φαντασία
defined by
Zeno

φαντασία
καταληπτική

b. Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VII (*Ag. the log.* I) 248 (SVF I 59):

Φαντασία καταληπτική ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, ὅποια οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος.

That, according to Zeno's conception, φαντασία καταληπτική should not be translated by "fetching" or "arresting presentation", but "liable to κατάληψις", i.e. comprehension, may be understood from the following nr.

The meaning of 985—a. Cic., *Acad. post.* (I) 11, 40-42:

κατάληψις

... primum de sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova; quos iunctos¹ esse censuit e quadam quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus: quam ille φαντασίαν, nos visum appellemus licet;—sed ad haec, quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus, adsensionem adiungit animorum²: quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam. Visis³ non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum, quae viderentur: id autem visum, cum ipsum per se cerne-retur, comprehensibile. Feretis haec? Nos vero, inquit. Quonam enim modo καταληπτὸν diceretis?—Sed, cum acceptum iam et approbatum esset, comprehensionem⁴ appellabat, similem iis rebus, quae manu prenderentur: ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo verbo ante nemo tali in re usus esset: plurimisque idem novis verbis (nova enim dicebat) usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum⁵ appellabat, et si ita erat comprehensum, ut convelli ratione non posset, scientiam: sin aliter, inscientiam nominabat⁶: ex qua existeret etiam opinio, quae esset imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis. Sed inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illam, quam dixi, collocabat.

b. How the relation between φαντασία, συγκατάθεσις, κατάληψις and ἐπιστήμη was illustrated by Zeno by a gesture.

¹ iunctos esse - The senses are "affected by" some impulsion from outside, which makes them "joint" and, in a sense, united: *perception* (αἰσθησις), which is one, comes from the, thus affected, αἰσθήσεις.

² adsensio animorum - the συγκατάθεσις, which is free and in our power.

³ φαντασίαις.

⁴ κατάληψις. Zeno speaks of "comprehension"—we should rather say *apprehension*—only when the "presentation" of the senses has been accepted by Reason.

⁵ In this sense, αἰσθησις contains the rational element of the συγκατάθεσις.

⁶ The Stoic conception of knowledge as τὴν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ βεβαίαν καὶ ἀμετάθετον ὑπὸ λόγου κατάληψιν and of "opinion" as τὴν ἀσθενῆ καὶ ψευδῇ συγκατάθεσιν, while the κατάληψις stands between them, may be clearly seen in Sextus, *Ag. the Log.* I 151, who (at the end of 152) confirms explicitly that κατάληψις was made the standard of truth (καὶ ταύτην κριτήριον ἀληθείας καθεστάναι).

Cic., *Acad. pr. (Lucullus)* 47, 145:

Et hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. Nam cum extensis digitis adversam manum ostenderat, "*visum*, inquiebat, huiusmodi est". Deinde, cum paulum digitos constrinxerat, "*assensus* huiusmodi". Tum, cum plane compresserat pugnumque fecerat, *comprehensionem* illam esse dicebat: quae ex similitudine etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, κατάληψιν imposuit. Cum autem laevam manum admoverat et illum pugnum arte vehementerque compresserat, *scientiam* talem esse dicebat; cuius compotem, nisi sapientem, esse neminem.

On the division of mankind into σοφοί and φαῦλοι, see *Ethics*.

c. That φαντασία καταληπτική, as it is usually called, is the same as what Cicero, in the passage cited sub a, called καταληπτός and consequently had a passive sense, at least originally, may be clearly seen from the following passage of Sextus. The double aspect of apprehension, according to Zeno's conception, is keenly noticed in this passage.

Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VIII (*Ag. the log.* II) 397 (SVF II 91):

**Double
aspect of
apprehension**

"Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ κατάληψις, ὡς ἔστι παρ' αὐτῶν ἀκούειν, καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις, ἥτις διπλοῦν ἔοικεν εἶναι πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὸ μὲν τι ἔχειν ἀκούσιον, τὸ δὲ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ κρίσει κείμενον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φαντασιωθῆναι ἀβούλητον ἦν· καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ πάσχοντι ἔκειτο ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ φαντασιῶντι τὸ οὕτως διατεθῆναι, οἷον λευκαντικῶς λευκοῦ ὑποπεσόντος χρώματος ἢ γλυκαντικῶς γλυκεῶς τῇ γεύσει προσαχθέντος· τὸ δὲ συγκαταθέσθαι τοῦτο τῷ κινήματι ἔκειτο ἐπὶ τῷ παραδεχομένῳ τὴν φαντασίαν.

986—Since, according to the Stoics, κατάληψις was the standard of truth, and κατάληψις presupposing the φαντασία καταληπτική, it was against this notion that Arcesilaus, head of the Academy after Polemo and Crates, directed his criticism. He simply states that such a presentation, the definition of which has been given sub 984b, does not exist, since there is not true presentation which could not be confounded with an untrue one ¹. In general, the Sceptics attacked the Stoic definition of φαντασία as an impression, because, if it were so, the idea of μνήμη as a θησαυρισμός φαντασιῶν, as Zeno called it ², would become impossible ³. Chrysippus,

**The
φαντασία
καταληπτική
criticized by
Arcesilaus**

¹ The argument of Arcesilaus, found in Sextus, *Math.* VII (*Ag. the Log.* I) 247-252, will be given in our next chapter, nr. 1104.

² The expression has become famous by the well known passage of St. Augustine, *Conf.* X 8, 12: "et venio in campos et lata praetoria memoriae, ubi sunt thesauri innumerabiles imaginum de cuiuscumque rebus sensus invectarum."

³ The Sceptic argument ap. Sextus, *Math.* VII (*Ag. the Log.* I) 372. Below, nr. 1134.

therefore, first altered Zeno's idea of "presentation", next his conception of the presentation called *kataleptic*.

a. Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VII (*Ag. the log.* I) 228-231 (SVF II 56):

The
φαντασία
explained as
ἐτεροίωσις
ψυχῆς

Φαντασία οὖν ἐστὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς (sc. τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς) τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ. περὶ τῆς εὐθὺς καὶ διέστησαν. Κλεάνθης μὲν γὰρ ἤκουσε τὴν τύπωσιν κατὰ εἰσοχὴν τε καὶ ἐξοχὴν¹, ὥσπερ καὶ <τὴν> διὰ τῶν δακτυλίων γινομένην τοῦ κηροῦ τύπωσιν. Χρύσιππος δὲ ἄτοπον ἡγεῖτο τὸ τοιοῦτον. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, φησί, τῆς διανοίας δεήσει ὑφ' ἐν ποτε τρίγωνόν τι καὶ τετράγωνον φαντασιουμένης τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον διαφέροντα ἔχειν περὶ αὐτῷ σχήματα ἅμα τε τρίγωνον καὶ τετράγωνον γίνεσθαι ἢ καὶ περιφερές, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον· εἴτα, πολλῶν ἅμα φαντασιῶν ὑφισταμένων ἐν ἡμῖν παμπληθεῖς καὶ τοὺς σχηματισμοὺς ἔξειν τὴν ψυχὴν, ὃ τοῦ προτέρου χειρόν ἐστιν. αὐτὸς οὖν τὴν τύπωσιν εἰρησθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὑπενόει ἀντὶ τῆς ἐτεροιώσεως, ὥστ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον τὸν λόγον "φαντασία ἐστὶν ἐτεροίωσις ψυχῆς", μηκέτι ἀτόπου ὄντος <τοῦ> τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα, ὑφ' ἐν [κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον]* πολλῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς συνισταμένων φαντασιῶν, παμπληθεῖς ἀναδέχεσθαι ἐτεροιώσεις· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἄῃρ, ὅταν ἅμα πολλοὶ φωνῶσιν, ἀμυθήτους ὑπὸ ἐν καὶ διαφερούσας ἀναδεχόμενος πληγὰς εὐθὺς πολλὰς ἴσχει καὶ τὰς ἐτεροιώσεις, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ποικίλως φαντασιούμενον ἀνάλογόν τι τοῦτῃ πείσεται.

or
ἐτεροίωσις
ἐν
ἡγεμονικῷ

b. The definition is formulated more explicitly in Sextus, *Adv. math.* VII (*Ag. the Log.* I) 233:

... ὅταν λέγωμεν τὴν φαντασίαν τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, συνεμφαίνομεν καὶ τὸ περὶ ποῖον μέρος γίνεσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν τύπωσιν, τουτέστι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, ὥστε ἐξαπλούμενον γίνεσθαι τὸν ὅρον τοιοῦτον "φαντασία ἐστὶν ἐτεροίωσις ἐν ἡγεμονικῷ".

Cp. our nr. 956a, b, where it was argued that Chrysippus explained all mental activities, such as ὁρμή, συγκατάθεσις, κατάληψις, and even movements of the body, such as walking, as ἐτεροιώσεις τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ, technically called also: the ἡγεμονικὸν πῶς ἔχον.

c. We find the formula later in Seneca's definition of virtue. Seneca, *Ep.* 113, 2:

Virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodammodo se habens.

d. Cp. Plut., *De virt. mor.* 3:

Κοινῶς δὲ ἅπαντες οὗτοι (sc. οἱ Στωϊκοί) τὴν ἀρετὴν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς διάθεσιν τινα καὶ δύνανμιν γεγεννημένην ὑπὸ λόγου, μᾶλλον δὲ λόγον

¹ "by way of intaglios and of embossed figures". Cp. *Pyrrh. Hyp.* II 70.

* del. Mutschmann.

οὔσαν αὐτὴν ὁμολογούμενον καὶ βέβαιον καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον, ὑποτίθενται· καὶ νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορᾶ τινι καὶ φύσει ψυχῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσι διανοίαν καὶ ἡγεμονικόν, διόλου τρεπόμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς κατὰ ἕξιν ἢ διάθεσιν μεταβολαῖς, κακίαν τε γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετὴν, καὶ μὴδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον ἐν ἑαυτῷ. —

And again in c. 7:

“Ἐνιοὶ δέ φασι οὐχ ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ λόγου τὸ πάθος, οὐδὲ δυοῖν διαφορὰν καὶ στάσιν, ἀλλὰ ἐνὸς λόγου τροπὴν ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέρα.

From these passages may be inferred that, indeed, Chrysippus held a kind of psychological monism, in which the different psychical functions—φαντασία, συγκατάθεσις, ὁρμή and πάθος—and also moral dispositions such as virtue and vice, are considered each as a ἡγεμονικόν πῶς ἔχον.

As we shall see later, Posidonius opposed this doctrine of the πάθη and, according to Pohlenz, came back to Zeno’s conception.

987—a. The following description of φαντασία καταληπτική, ascribed by Sextus to νεώτεροι, is by some scholars attributed to Chrysippus¹.

The character of the φαντασία καταληπτική is changed

Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VII (*Ag. the log.* I) 257:

Αὕτη γὰρ ἐναργὴς οὔσα καὶ πληκτικὴ μόνον οὐχὶ τῶν τριχῶν, φασί, λαμβάνεται, κατασπῶσα ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθεσιν, καὶ ἄλλου μὴδενὸς δεομένη εἰς τὸ τοιαύτη προσπίπτειν ἢ εἰς τὸ τὴν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας διαφορὰν ὑποβάλλειν.

Pohlenz, *Zeno und Chrysipp*, p. 181, notices that, while in Zeno’s conception the συγκατάθεσις is a free and active decision of the intellect, to be clearly distinguished from the φαντασία, in which the soul is entirely passive, Chrysippus explains the process of knowledge in such a way that the presentation, if it is “kataleptic”, is in itself decisive and *compels* the intellect to assent. This, then, is indeed what we call *sensualism*.

It should be noticed, however, that these very νεώτεροι, to whom the above description is attributed, added the condition “μὴδὲν ἔχουσιν ἐνσθημα” to Zeno’s definition². Which means that a man may receive a kataleptic presentation—but reject it because he thinks it improbable διὰ τὴν ἔξωθεν περίστασιν³. Thus, the assent, which is normally given, in special cases may be held back. And in this our decision is free.

Whether, then, Chrys. was or was not the author of the above expressed view, this much is sure, that he differed from Zeno as to the theory of knowledge not so much in that he should have abolished the freedom of the intellect with regard to presentation, while Zeno upheld it, but rather in that Chrys. was more strictly

¹ Thus by Pohlenz in *Zeno und Chrysipp*. Later, in *Die Stoa* I p. 62, he says that “later, in the days after Chrysippus”, the kataleptic presentation was explained as being a “fetching” or “arresting” presentation, which “lays hold of us, almost by the very hair, and drags us off to assent” (Bury).

² Sextus, o.c., 253.

³ E.g. Admetus when Alcestis is brought back to him from the grave, or Menelaus when he sees Helen at Proteus’ house in Pharos.

a psychological monist, and therefore regarded presentation and assent both as rational, both being functions of the hegemonikon. We can understand, that, by this doctrine, Chrys. was led to making the kataleptic presentation itself the criterium of truth, as is mentioned repeatedly by Sextus and by Diog. Laërt.

φαντασία
καταληπτική
the criterium
of knowledge

b. While according to Zeno the κατάληψις is the criterium of truth, and only indirectly the kataleptic presentation which underlies it, in Chrysippus' conception it is the kataleptic presentation itself that becomes the criterium.

Diog. Laërt. VII 54:

Κριτήριον δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας φασὶ τυγχάνειν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, τουτέστι τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ δυοδεκάτῃ τῶν Φυσικῶν καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος.

988—Later Stoics, such as Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, lay great stress on the freedom of personality, also with regard to presentations.

Active rôle
of the
intellect
stressed by
later Stoics

a. Epict., *Diss.* III 12, 15:

Ὡς γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν ἀνεξέταστον βίον μὴ ζῆν, οὕτως ἀνεξέταστον φαντασίαν μὴ παραδέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ λέγειν "ἐκδεξαι, ἄφες ἴδω, τίς εἴ και πόθεν ἔρχη", ὡς οἱ νυκτοφύλακες "δεῖξόν μοι τὰ συνθήματα". "ἔχεις τὸ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως σύμβολον, ὃ δεῖ τὴν παραδεχθισομένην ἔχειν φαντασίαν;"

b. Again he stresses the rôle of the active intellect in the process of knowledge in a passage like the following, where he is speaking on the organization of the human mind as a proof of Providence.

Epict., *Diss.* I 6, 10:

Ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη τῆς διανοίας κατασκευή, καθ' ἣν οὐχ ἀπλῶς ὑποπίπτοντες τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τυπούμεθα ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκλαμβάνομεν τι καὶ ἀφαιροῦμεν καὶ προστίθεμεν καὶ συντίθεμεν τάδε τινὰ δι' αὐτῶν καὶ νῆ Δία μεταβαίνομεν ἀπ' ἄλλων ἐπ' ἄλλα τινὰ οὕτω πως παρακείμενα, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἱκανὰ κινῆσαι τινὰς καὶ διατρέψαι πρὸς τὸ ἀπολιπεῖν¹ τὸν τεχνίτην;

c. Marc. Aur., VII 54, mentions three things which are the task of a piously living man. The third is: "carefully working at your presentations, lest anything not liable to reasonable confirmation should intrude."

Πανταχοῦ καὶ διηνεκῶς ἐπὶ σοὶ ἐστὶ καὶ τῇ παρούσῃ συμβάσει θεοσεβῶς εὐαρεστεῖν καὶ τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀνθρώποις κατὰ δικαιοσύνην προσφέρεισθαι καὶ τῇ παρούσῃ φαντασίᾳ ἐμφιλοτεχνεῖν, ἵνα μὴ τι ἀκατάληπτον παρεισρυῇ.

¹ ἀπολιπεῖν is used a.o. by Chrysippus for "leaving undisputed", hence for "admitting".

989—Since Schmekel, the spiritualistic tendency of the later Stoa is usually explained by saying that, after Carneades' criticism, the materialism and sensualism of the older Stoa was overcome by Posidonius, who, returning to Plato and Aristotle, introduced the notion of ὁρθὸς λόγος into Stoic theology and theory of knowledge.

Posidonius
the author
of later spi-
ritualism?

Schmekel¹ argues that, by ὁρθὸς λόγος, Posid. meant: Reason not dependent on the body; consequently God, or the κοινὸς λόγος pervading the Universe. This Logos being evidently faultless, our presentations must be checked by comparing them with it. This is what Posid. says in criticizing Chrysippus' doctrine of the πάθη.

a. Galenus, *De plac. Hippocr. et Plat.* ed. Müller p. 448, 15:

Τὸ δὴ τῶν παθῶν αἴτιον, τουτέστι τῆς τε ἀνομολογίας καὶ τοῦ κακοδαίμονος βίου, τὸ μὴ κατὰ πᾶν ἐπεσθαι τῷ ἐν αὐτοῖς δαίμονι συγγενεῖ τε ὄντι καὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχοντι τῷ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διοικοῦντι, τῷ δὲ χεῖρονι καὶ ζφώδει ποτὲ συνεκκλίνοντας φέρεσθαι.

To this text three points should be noticed.

1. The view that human intellect is connected with, and even part of, the κοινὸς λόγος in the Universe, is ancient Stoic doctrine. Cp. Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus* (above, nr. 943).

2. The identification of the hegemonikon with an inward "daemon", connected with the Spirit of the Universe, is a more personal and religious interpretation of the ancient Stoic doctrine of the fiery pneuma. Marcus Aurelius speaks in the same way. It must be asked, however, whether it is not exactly the same view, and even the same terminology, which in the next cited passage of Diog. Laërtius seems to belong to Chrysippus himself.

3. In his doctrine that the intellect judging must be ranked essentially higher than the senses furnishing presentations Posid. agrees with Zeno's doctrine of συγκατάθεσις.

To these three notes, tending to show that Posid. in his opposition to Chrysippus, and what may be surely called a spiritualizing tendency, was not utterly strange to ancient Stoic doctrine, a fourth note must be added, namely, that Posid. was probably not the first to introduce the Platonic-Aristotelian notion of ὁρθὸς λόγος into Stoic doctrine.

b. The following passage on the *telos* may show that, most probably, Chrys. himself spoke of ὁρθὸς λόγος and expressed himself in almost the same terms as Posid. did in the above cited lines.

The term
ὁρθὸς λόγος
probably
used by
Chrysippus

Diog. Laërt. VII 87-88:

Πάλιν δ' ἴσον ἐστὶ τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν τῷ κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων ζῆν, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ τελῶν· μέρη γάρ εἰσιν αἱ ἡμέτεραι φύσεις τῆς τοῦ ὅλου. διόπερ τέλος γίνεται τὸ ἀκολουθῶν τῇ φύσει

¹ *Die mittlere Stoa*, p. 266 ff.

ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατὰ τε τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων, οὐδὲν ἐνεργοῦντας ὧν ἀπαγορεύειν εἴωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὧν τῷ Δίῃ, καθηγεμόνι τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως ὄντι· εἶναι δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὐροίαν βίου, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ' ἐκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τῶν ὅλων διοικητοῦ βούλησιν.

Cp. also the papyrusfragment of Chrys. cited in SVF II 131, p. 41, l. 27 f., where philosophy is called ἐπιτήδευσις λόγου ὀρθότητος.

Again, we shall find the term ὀρθὸς λόγος attributed to "some of the older Stoics" in Diog. Laërt. VII 54 (to be cited sub 990).

c. It must be stressed that Zeno's doctrine of the criterium was *not a sensualistic theory of knowledge*. By his doctrine of assent Zeno wanted to oppose Epicurus' sensualism, and he did so consciously and explicitly.

Chrysippus indeed, by his doctrine of kataleptic presentation came very near to sensualism. Hence, after Carneades' criticism, a certain spiritualistic reaction appears among later Stoics. Posidonius, who, as we shall see in dealing with Ethics, opposed Chrysippus' monism as to the doctrine of the πάθη, may as well have opposed him concerning the relation of the senses and the intellect in the theory of knowledge, and by doing so, may have determined the character of later Stoic doctrine.

Other
„criteria“
are
mentioned

990—Diog. Laërt. VII 54, having declared that, according to Chrysippus and his disciples, the kataleptic presentation was the criterium of truth, continues as follows:

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Βόηθος¹ κριτήρια πλείονα ἀπολείπει, νοῦν καὶ αἴσθησιν καὶ ὄρεξιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην· ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος διαφερόμενος πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ λόγου κριτήριά φησιν εἶναι αἴσθησιν καὶ πρόληψιν· ἔστι δ' ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου. ἄλλοι δὲ τινες τῶν ἀρχαιότερων Στωϊκῶν τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κριτήριον ἀπολείπουσιν, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ κριτηρίου φησί.

To this passage it should be noticed that κριτήριον does not only mean "standard" or "test" of truth, but also the *means* of acquiring knowledge. Cp. Sextus, *Adv. Math.* VII 35 ff. on the different meanings of the term. Cp. also Epict., *Diss.* I 11, 9 ff., where first is asked for a "criterium" for distinguishing black and white, etc. For these things and for other αἰσθητά the criteria prove to be the senses. For the distinction of moral principles, however, another criterium is required.

¹ Boëthus of Sidon, a disciple of Diogenes the Babylonian.

It is determined in I 18, 6, where the γνώμη διακριτική τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν is opposed to the ὅψις διακριτική τῶν λευκῶν καὶ μελάνων.

Instead of γνώμη he also speaks of διάνοια or λόγος. Here then we have fundamentally the same criteria as those attributed to Chrysippus in the above cited passage of Diog. Laërt.¹

Our next task is to see what is exactly the meaning of ἔννοια and πρόληψις.

991—The katalepsis is only the beginning of the work of the mind at the presentations of the senses. Do they stay, they become ἔννοιαι or ἐννοήματα, *notions or concepts of the mind*. Our clearest account of this process is in Aëtius, *Plac.* IV 11 (SVF II 83):

ἐννοιαὶ
or
ἐννοήματα

Πῶς γίνεται ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ ἔννοια καὶ ὁ κατὰ ἐνδιάθεσιν λόγος. Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ φασιν· ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ χάρτην εὐεργον εἰς ἀπογραφὴν· εἰς τοῦτο μίαν ἐκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐναπογράφεται. — Πρῶτος δὲ [ὁ] τῆς ἀναγραφῆς τρόπος ὁ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων. αἰσθανόμενοι γάρ τινος οἶον λευκοῦ, ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ μνήμην ἔχουσιν· ὅταν δὲ ὁμοειδεῖς πολλὰ μνημαὶ γένωνται, τότε φαιμέν ἔχειν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐμπειρία γάρ ἐστι τὸ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν φαντασιῶν πλήθος. — Τῶν δὲ ἐννοιῶν αἱ μὲν φυσικῶς γίνονται κατὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους καὶ ἀνεπιτεχνήτως, αἱ δὲ ἤδη δι' ἡμετέρας διδασκαλίας καὶ ἐπιμελείας· αὗται μὲν οὖν ἐννοιαὶ καλοῦνται μόνον, ἐκεῖναι δὲ καὶ προλήψεις. — Ὁ δὲ λόγος, καθ' ὃν προσαγορευόμεθα λογικοί, ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων συμπληροῦσθαι λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐβδομάδα. ἔστι δ' ἐννόημα φάντασμα διανοίας λογικοῦ ζώου· τὸ γὰρ φάντασμα ἐπειδὴν λογικῇ προσπίπτῃ ψυχῇ, τότε ἐννόημα καλεῖται, εἰληφὸς τοῦνομα παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ. — Διόπερ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις ὅσα προσπίπτει, φαντάσματα μόνον ἐστίν· ὅσα δὲ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, ταῦτα καὶ φαντάσματα κατὰ γένος καὶ ἐννοήματα κατ' εἶδος· ὥσπερ τὰ δηνάρια καὶ οἱ στατῆρες αὐτὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ ὑπάρχει δηνάρια <καὶ> στατῆρες· ἐὰν δὲ εἰς πλοίων δοθῇ μίσθωσιν, τηνικαῦτα πρὸς τῷ δηνάρια εἶναι καὶ ναῦλα λέγεται.

In this account we have first the *tabula rasa* image, later adopted by Locke.

The account of ἐμπειρία as preceding concepts reminds us of Aristotle, *Anal. Post.* II 19 and *Metaph.* A 1 (our nr. 465 and 519).

The relation between ἔννοια and προλήψεις can be hardly other than this: that ἔννοιαι are the more general notion, while only a part of them—namely, those occurring “naturally” and without instruction, in early youth—are called προλήψεις.

As to ἐννοήματα, one might hesitate as to whether they are simply synonymous with ἔννοιαι, or these become ἐννοήματα only at a later state of reflexion, say after the age of 14, when a man is in the full possession of his reason. Pohlenz, *Stoa* I p. 56, seems to be of the latter opinion². Yet, the way in which we find both terms

¹ The question of the criteria is discussed at length by Bonhöffer, *Epiktet u. die Stoa*, p. 223 ff.

² „Der Begriff, die Ennoia, und die Allgemeinvorstellung wird zum Ennoëma, dem geistig geschauten Bilde” . . .

used rather gives the impression that they are synonyms, both indicating "general idea" or "concept".

The
ennoëma a
mere
abstraction

992—The Stoic *ennoëma* is merely a *concept of the mind*. It is not supposed to have any "physical" or metaphysical existence.

a. Stobaeus, *Ecl.* I, p. 136, 21 W. (SVF I 65):

Ζήνωνος <καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ>. τὰ ἐννοήματά φασι μήτε τινα εἶναι μήτε ποιά, ὥσανει δέ τινα καὶ ὥσανει ποιά φαντάσματα ψυχῆς· ταῦτα δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων ιδέας προσαγορεύεσθαι. τῶν γὰρ κατὰ τὰ ἐννοήματα ὑποπιπτόντων εἶναι τὰς ιδέας, οἷον ἀνθρώπων, ἵππων, κοινότερον εἰπεῖν πάντων τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁπόσων λέγουσιν ιδέας εἶναι. ταύτας δὲ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ φιλόσοφοι φασιν ἀνυπάρκτους εἶναι.

b. Cp. Diog. Laërt. VII 61:

Ἐννόημα δὲ ἐστὶ φάντασμα διανοίας, οὔτε τι ὄν οὔτε ποιόν, ὥσανει δέ τι ὄν καὶ ὥσανει ποιόν, οἷον γίνεται ἀνατύπωμα ἵππου καὶ μὴ παρόντος.

In the same sense Descartes speaks of *perceptio generalis*, and many after him of *idea generalis*. Berkeley rejects it, saying that such schematical general notions (e.g. a triangle being neither rectangular nor equilateral) are not really representable. A real representation is always concrete (Stoics would have said *τι ἢ ποιόν*).

The doctrine
of
κοινὰ
ἐννοιαὶ

993—A special class of these general notions are the *κοινὰ ἐννοιαὶ*. Since they are said to be "natural" or "given to us by nature", and criteria of truth, it is likely that they are identic with the *προλήψεις*, of which was said that they *φυσικῶς γίνονται καὶ ἀνεπιτεχνήτως* (991) and that Chrys. admitted them as a criterium next to sense perception (990).

They are
„natural”
and criteria
of truth

a. Alex. Aphrod., *De mixtione*, p. 217, l. 2-4 Bruns (SVF II 473). Having expounded Chrysippus' theory on the different kinds of mixture, he continues:

Τὸ δὲ ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς εἶναι τῆς μίξεως, πειρᾶται πιστοῦσθαι διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν, μάλιστα δὲ κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας φησὶν ἡμᾶς παρὰ τῆς φύσεως λαβεῖν ταύτας.

b. Cp. Plut., apud Olympiodorum in Plat. *Phaed.* p. 156, 8 ed. Norvin (SVF II 104) who is speaking on the aporia broached in Plato's *Meno* (80e) εἰ οἷόν τε ζητεῖν καὶ εὐρίσκειν, solved by Plato by his anamnesis theory.

Οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς τὰς φυσικὰς ἐννοίας αἰτιῶνται.

994—They comprise first a certain knowledge of moral principles in general, next of the existence and the nature of God(s).

Their
subject:
first moral
principles

a. Origenes, *Contra Celsum* VIII 52 (SVF III 218):

Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας περὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχυρῶν καὶ δικαίων <καὶ ἀδίκων> εὗροι τις ἂν πάντως ἀπολωλεκότας.

b. Plut., *De Stoic. refugn.* c. 17, p. 1041e (SVF III 69):

Τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον ὃν αὐτὸς (sc. Chrysippus) εἰσάγει καὶ δοκιμάζει “συμφωνότατον εἶναι φησι τῷ βίῳ καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐμφύτων ἄπτεσθαι προλήψεων.”

When the προλήψεις are called here ἐμφυτοί, this should not be understood in the sense of *ideae innatae* of Descartes and Leibniz or of Spinoza's *notiones communes*, which were meant as being inborn as to their contents. Now this would have been impossible to Stoics, who held that man's soul at birth is like a *tabula rasa*. What they meant is apparently that the human mind is naturally *predisposed* to having these notions. In my opinion, therefore, P. Barth was right in speaking here of a *formal a priori* (as opposed to a “material” one).

995—a. Doubtless, the ἐννοια θεῶν, elsewhere called a πρόληψις, belonged to the κοινὰ ἐννοιαί, too.

Also the
notion of
God(s)

Aëtius I 6 (SVF II 1009):

Ἐσχον δὲ ἐννοίαν τούτου (sc. of God as πνεῦμα νοερόν) πρῶτον μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ἐμφαινόμενων προσλαμβάνοντες. οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν καλῶν εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε γίνεται, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τινος τέχνης δημιουργούσης.

b. Cp. Plut., *De comm. not.* 32, p. 1075:

Καὶ μὴν αὐτοὶ γε πρὸς τὸν Ἐπίκουρον οὐδὲν ἀπολείπουν τῶν πραγμάτων, ἰού, ἰού, φεῦ, φεῦ βοῶντες, ὡς συγγέοντα τὴν τῶν θεῶν πρόληψιν, ἀναιρουμένης τῆς προνοίας· “οὐ γὰρ ἀθάνατον καὶ μακάριον μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλόανθρωπον καὶ κηδεμονικὸν καὶ ὠφέλιμον προλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ νοεῖσθαι τὸν θεόν.”

Which means: “This prolepsis, namely, does not only include the immortality and beatitude of the gods, but also that they love man and care for him and look after their interests”.

996—a. According to Cicero, also the opinion that death is an evil and that there is some form of a life hereafter—though not its mode—belong to them.

and of a life
hereafter

Cic., *Tusc. disp.* I 13, 30 - 14, 31:

Ut porro firmissimum hoc adferri videtur, cur deos esse credamus, quod nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit inmanis, cuius mentem non imbuerit deorum opinio:—multi de dis prava sentiunt (id enim

vitioso more effici solet), omnes tamen esse vim et naturam divinam arbitrantur, nec vero id conlocutio hominum aut consessus efficit, non institutis opinio est confirmata, non legibus; omni autem in re consensus omnium gentium lex naturae putanda est:—quis est igitur qui suorum mortem primum non eo lugeat, quod eos orbatos vitae commodis arbitretur? Tolle hanc opinionem, luctum sustuleris. Nemo enim maeret suo incommodo: dolent fortasse et anguntur; sed illa lugubris lamentatio fletusque maerens ex eo est, quod eum, quem dileximus, vitae commodis privatum arbitramur idque sentire. Atque haec ita sentimus natura duce, nulla ratione nullaue doctrina.

Maximum vero argumentum est naturam ipsam de immortalitate animorum tacitum iudicare, quod omnibus curae sunt et maxumae quidem, quae post mortem futura sint.

And in 16, 36:

Sed ut deos esse natura opinamur, qualesque sint ratione cognoscimus, sic permanere animos arbitramur consensu nationum omnium, qua in sede maneant qualesque sint ratione discendum est.

From the consensus gentium concerning the matter of the *notiones communes*, their truth is concluded. Cp. ND I 44: *de quo omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est.*

b. Cp. Seneca, *Ep.* 117, 6:

Multum dare solemus praesumptioni omnium hominum, et apud nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri. tamquam deos esse inter alia hoc colligimus, quod omnibus insita de dis opinio est nec ulla gens usquam est adeo extra leges moresque proiecta, ut non aliquos deos credat. cum de animarum aeternitate disserimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet consensus hominum aut timentium inferos aut colentium.

We shall find the Sceptics opposing this argument. In the 16th and 17th century it became very popular: the so called *natural religion* was built on it.

The
categories

997—Evidently, the *notiones communes* differ from the categories. As to the latter, Stoics reduced the number of Aristotle's categories¹ to four.

Simpl. in Ar. *Categ.* p. 66, 32K (SVF II 369):

Οἱ δὲ γε Στωϊκοὶ εἰς ἐλάττωνα συστέλλειν ἀξιοῦσι τὸν τῶν πρώτων γενῶν ἀριθμόν. καὶ τινα ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττωσιν ὑπερλαγμένα παραλαμβάνουσι. ποιοῦνται γὰρ τὴν τομὴν εἰς τέσσαρα· εἰς ὑποκείμενα καὶ ποιά καὶ πῶς ἔχοντα καὶ πρὸς τί πῶς ἔχοντα.

¹ Cp. nr. 437b.

Aristotle's first category, the οὐσία, is understood here as ὑποκείμενον. The πῶς ἔχον (Aristotle's ἔχειν) includes all possible attributes: κεῖσθαι, εἶναι, ποιεῖν, πάσχειν, and even quantity (ποσόν). Place and time belong to the category of relation: the πρὸς τί πῶς ἔχοντα.

Since Chrysippus, this was generally accepted Stoic doctrine. It is criticized by Plotinus in *Enn.* VI 1, 25-34 (after his criticism of Aristotle's doctrine of the categories, *ib.* 1-24).—Modern logicians feel nearer to the Stoic theory than to Aristotle's.

998—Francis Bacon, *Novum organum* I, art. 95, apparently inspired by a passage in Seneca's *Epist.* 84, 3, writes the following lines on the method of philosophy.

Qui tractaverunt scientias, aut empirici aut dogmatici fuerunt. *Empirici* formicae more congerunt tantum et utuntur; *rationales* (we should say "idealists") araneorum more telas ex se conficiunt. Apis vero ratio media est, quae materiam ex floribus horti et agri elicit, sed tamen eam propria facultate vertit et digerit. Neque absimile philosophiae verum opificium est, quod nec mentis viribus tantum aut praecipue nititur, neque ex historia naturali et mechanicis experimentis praeditam materiam, in memoria integram, sed in intellectu mutatam et subactam reponit.

A modern judgement on Stoic theory of knowledge

P. Barth, *Die Stoa*, ⁴ 1922, p. 85, declares that, in Ancient philosophy, it was Stoic theory of knowledge that came nearest to the demands pitched by Bacon.—In fact, this judgement is founded on a highly insufficient knowledge and understanding of Plato and Aristotle. The author assumes that, in Aristotle's theory, knowledge does not really start from the senses—which, in fact, it does, and even to a certain extent in Plato's theory, where seeing certain objects "reminds" one of the Idea. Finally, we should ask ourselves whether the active part of the intellect in the process of knowledge is sufficiently understood and analyzed by Stoics.

8—ETHICS (1): THE STARTING-POINT AND THE END

999—Like Epicurus, Zeno starts from the question of "what is the primary impulse of man". Believing, however, that man's *proprium* lies in Reason and its full development, he opposes Epicurus by holding that man's primary impulse is not for pleasure (which, being an animal instinct, cannot be of primary value for man), but for selfpreservation. Cp. above, our nr. 945.

a. Diog. Laërt., VII 85 (SVF III 178):

Τὴν δὲ πρώτην ὁρμὴν φασὶ τὸ ζῶον ἴσχειν ἐπὶ τὸ τηρεῖν ἑαυτό, οἰκειούσης αὐτῷ τῆς φύσεως ἀπ' ἀρχῆς· καθά φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ τελῶν, πρῶτον οἰκεῖον λέγων εἶναι παντὶ ζῳῷ τὴν αὐτοῦ σύστασιν καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνειδησιν. οὔτε γὰρ ἀλλοτριῶσαι εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτῷ τὸ ζῶον, οὔτε ποιήσασαν αὐτὸ μήτε ἀλλοτριῶσαι μήτε [οὐκ] οἰκειῶσαι. ἀπολείπεται τοίνυν λέγειν συστημαμένην αὐτὸ οἰκειῶσαι πρὸς ἑαυτό. οὕτω γὰρ τὰ τε βλάπτοντα διωθεῖται καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα προσίεται. ὁ δὲ λέγουσί τινες, πρὸς ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι τὴν πρώτην ὁρμὴν τοῖς ζῳοῖς, ψεῦδος ἀποφαίνουσιν. ἐπιγέννημα γὰρ φασιν, εἰ ἄρα ἐστίν, ἡδονὴν εἶναι ὅταν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν ἡ φύσις ἐπιζητήσασα τὰ ἐναρ-

The oikeiosis doctrine

μόζοντα τῇ συστάσει ἀπολάβῃ· ὃν τρόπον ἀφιλαρύνεται τὰ ζῶα καὶ θάλλει τὰ φυτά.

This passage, which will be continued under nr. **1003**, is not a direct quotation of Zeno, but, as has been recognized by W. Wiersma, Π. τέλους p. 27 ff., from Chrysippus' work Π. τέλους.

b. Cp. Plut., *Stoic. refugn.* 12, p. 1038b (SVF III 179):

Πῶς οὖν ἀποκναίει πάλιν (sc. Chrysippus) ἐν παντὶ βιβλίῳ φυσικῷ, νῆ Δία, καὶ ἡθικῷ γράφων ὥς "οἰκειούμεθα πρὸς αὐτοὺς εὐθὺς γενόμενοι καὶ τὰ μέρη καὶ τὰ ἔκγονα τὰ ἑαυτῶν";

c. In Cicero's *De finibus* III, 5, 16, Cato begins his survey of Stoic doctrine by speaking of *oikeiosis* (*sibi conciliari*). (SVF III 182).

Placet his, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simulatque natum sit animal (hinc enim est ordiendum) ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque quae conservantia sunt eius status diligenda: alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur afferre. Id ita esse sic probant, quod, ante quam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria: quod non fieret nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. Fieri autem non posset, ut appeterent aliquid, nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. Ex quo intellegi debet, principium ductum esse a se diligendo.

The words *ipsum sibi conciliari* - *ad suum statum* correspond exactly to the Greek οἰκειοῦσθαι ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ συστάσει, as is found e.g. with Hierocles I 38.

The term οἰκειοῦσθαι, *to be familiarized to*, is used in the perfect (ῥκειῶσθαι) simply in the sense of *feeling an affection for*, while the substantive, οἰκείωσις, means *attachment* or *affection*. The opposite is ἀλλοτρίωσις. Thus, Posidonius opposes Chrysippus' doctrine that, by nature, man has no *oikeiosis* for pleasure, but only for the moral good (Galenus, *De Hippocr. et Plat. plac.*, 437 M.): μηδεμίαν οἰκείωσιν εἶναι πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἢ ἀλλοτρίωσιν πρὸς πόνον—

And in 439 M.: ἡμᾶς ῥκειῶσθαι πρὸς μόνον τὸ κάλον.

Does this
doctrine
originate
from Zeno
or from
Theophr.?

In the last decads, there has been some discussion about the origin of the *oikeiosis* doctrine, as was mentioned above (sub **945c**). Against H. von Arnim (*Arius Didymus' Abriss der peripatetischen Ethik*, SB. Wien, Ph.-Hist. Kl. 204, 1926, 3) and F. Dirlmeier (*Die Oikeiosislehre Theophrasts*, in *Philol.*, Suppl. XXX, 1937, 1) Pohlenz holds (*Grundfragen*, p. 1-47; *Die Stoa* II p. 66) that the doctrine originates from Zeno, not from Theophrastus. It is true that Arius Didymus' account of peripatetic ethics (preserved by Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II, 116 sqq.) shows some traces of Stoic doctrine and terminology, not only on the topic of *oikeiosis*. But, first, Arius' account of *oikeiosis* is not exact and clear, and, secondly, his speaking of ἐκλογὴ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν and ἀπεκλογὴ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν betrays some later Stoic influence, the doctrine of ἐκλογὴ having been developed not before Diogenes the Babylonian and Antipater in their controversy with Carneades. Pohlenz thinks, Antiochus of Ascalon is the source of the kind of doctrine of *oikeiosis* we find with Arius (cp. Cic., *De fin.* V 65 ff.).

In the seventeenth century, the doctrine of oikeiosis was adopted by Herbert of Cherbury (s. Pohlenz, *Stoa* II p. 469 f.). We even find traces of it in modern psychology ¹).

1000—In man, oikeiosis is not limited to our own offspring, but applies to all human beings.

**Oikeiosis
extends to
all human
beings**

a. Cic., *De fin.* III 19, 62-63:

Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri, ut liberi a parentibus amentur; a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. Quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. Neque vero haec inter se congruere possent ut natura et procreari vellet et diligere procreatos non curaret. Atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspicui potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. Quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore abhorrere, sic apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos quos genuerimus amemus, impelli. Ex hoc nascitur, ut etiam communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum quod homo sit, non alienum videri.

It must be remarked that this aspect of oikeiosis is already present in Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* VIII 10, 1161 b 1-8.

b. The practical consequences of this principle are drawn in *De officiis* III, ch. V-VI, espec. V 25 and VI 27-28:

Ex quo efficitur hominem naturae oboedientem homini nocere non posse. —

(27) Atque etiam, si hoc natura praescribit, ut homo homini, quicumque sit, ob eam ipsam causam, quod is homo sit, consultum velit, necesse est secundum eandem naturam omnium utilitatem esse communem. Quod si ita est, una continemur omnes et eadem lege naturae, idque ipsum si ita est, certe violare alterum naturae lege prohibemur. Verum autem primum; verum igitur extremum. —

(28) Qui autem civium rationem dicunt habendam, externorum negant, ii dirimunt communem humani generis societatem, qua sublata beneficentia, liberalitas, bonitas, iustitia funditus tollitur. Quae qui tollunt, etiam adversus deos immortales impii iudicandi sunt; ab iis enim

¹ Pohlenz cites Aug. Bier, *Die Seele*, 1939, p. 78: "Der Grundtrieb des Menschen ist der Begehrungstrieb, d.h. der Wille etwas zu besitzen und zu erreichen, was angenehm oder nützlich ist. Am stärksten äussert sich dieser Wille im Trieb zur Erhaltung der eigenen Person und der eigenen Art."

constitutam inter homines societatem evertunt. Cuius societatis artissimum vinculum est magis arbitrari esse contra naturam hominem homini detrahere sui commodi causa quam omnia incommoda subire vel externa vel corporis.

See further the idea of *humanity* with *Panaetius*, infra, nr. 1159b, and of natural law, nrs. 1066, 1069f.

but not to
animals

1001—Though man shares with the lower animals the instinct of selfpreservation, there cannot exist any moral community between man and animals, the latter being devoid of reason. In other words, by lack of natural affinity the *oikeiosis* in man does not extend to animals. Hence follow three consequences:

a. Man has no duties towards animals. Cic., *De fin.* III 20, 67:

Et quomodo hominum inter homines iuris esse vincula putant, sic homini nihil iuris esse cum bestiis. Praeclare enim Chrysippus, cetera nata esse hominum causa et deorum; eos autem communitatis et societatis suae: ut bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem suam possent sine iniuria.

In the same way Plutarch, *De esu carni* 2, 6 (p. 999) makes the Stoics reply to the reproach of "the barbarity of extravagance and of cruelty" in their habits of eating meat:

"Ναί, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα δίκαιόν ἐστι."

Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 168, says he extended *oikeiosis* to animals. Also Porphyry, *De abst.* III 19.

b. Animals do not possess any moral principles.

Philo, *De opif. mundi* 73 (SVF III 372):

Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν οὔτε ἀρετῆς οὔτε κακίας μετέχει, ὥσπερ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα ἄλογα, τὰ μὲν ὅτι ἄψυχά τε ἐστὶ καὶ ἀφαντάστῳ φύσει διοικεῖται, τὰ δὲ ὅτι νοῦν καὶ λόγον ἐκτέμνεται. Κακίας δὲ καὶ ἀρετῆς ὥς ἂν οἶκος νοῦς καὶ λόγος, ᾧ πεφύκασιν ἐνδiciaitᾶσθαι. Τὰ δὲ αὖ μόνης κεκοινωνήκεν ἀρετῆς, ἀμέτοχα πάσης ὄντα κακίας, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀστέρες. Οὗτοι γὰρ ζῷά τε εἶναι λέγονται καὶ ζῷα νοερά Τὰ δὲ τῆς μικτῆς ἐστὶ φύσεως, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος, ὃς ἐπιδέχεται . . . ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν.

A certain analogy with the communal sense of rational beings may be noticed in such cases as the symbiosis of the *pinoteres*, and in the behaviour of bees and ants (mentioned by Cic., *De fin.* III 19, 63); yet, these things are no more than a μίμησις πρὸς τὰ λογικά, as it is called by Origenes (*Celsum* IV 81).

c. There is a *civitas communis deorum atque hominum*. Lower animals do not belong to it.

Cic., *De leg.* I 7, 22:

Animal hoc providum, sagax, multiplex, acutum, memor, plenum rationis et consilii, quem vocamus hominem, praeclara quadam conditione generatum esse a supremo deo. Solum est enim ex tot animantium generibus atque naturis particeps rationis et cogitationis, cum cetera sint omnia expertia. Quid est autem, non dicam in homine, sed in omni caelo atque terra ratione divinius? quae cum adulevit atque perfecta est, nominatur rite sapientia. Est igitur, quoniam nihil est ratione melius, eaque <est> et in homine et in deo, prima homini cum deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio communis est. Quae cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum diis putandi sumus. Inter quos porro est communio legis, inter eos communio iuris est. Quibus autem haec sunt [inter eos] communia, ei civitatis eiusdem habendi sunt. Si vero iisdem imperiis et potestatibus parent, multo iam magis. Parent autem huic caelesti descriptioni mentique divinae et praepotenti deo: ut iam universus hic mundus una civitas communis deorum atque hominum existimanda <sit>.

I do not think—as Wiersma did in his above cited work (II. τέλους)—that Stoicism became a social philosophy only off Chrysippus, and especially *after* him. The principle of oikeiosis, which certainly comes from Zeno, makes it very probable that the founder of the Stoa himself, opposing Epicurus' asocial doctrine, very consciously laid the foundation of a philosophy of humanity on the basis of Reason. Wiersma considers Zeno too exclusively as starting from Cynicism, and almost suggests that the controversy with Epicureanism began only with Cleanthes.

On the main difference between man and non rational animals, see also Cic., *De off.* I 4, 11. On law and state, below, nrs. 1066-1074.

1002—Reason, then, being the proprium of man, man feels attachment for himself as a rational being.

Reason the
proprium
of man

Seneca, *Ep.* 121, 14:

Dicitis, inquit, omne animal primum constitutioni suae conciliari, hominis autem constitutionem rationalem esse et ideo conciliari hominem sibi non tamquam animali, sed tamquam rationali. ea enim parte sibi carus est homo qua homo est.

1003—Since, on the basis of lower nature, reason has been given to man as his proper characteristic, *living according to nature*, for man, means *living according to Reason*. Hence, virtue being regarded, since Plato and Aristotle¹, as a perfection of nature, "living according to

¹ Plato, *Laches* 190b, describes virtue as a thing by the presence of which a man becomes better as to his soul. *Republ.* 353b he states that everything, which has

nature" means: *virtuous life*,—though in itself the first impulse of man is not for virtue, and the so called "primary objects of nature" (τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν) are not yet of the level of morality.

a. How Stoics pass on from the first impulse to virtuous life.

Diog. Laert. VII 86-87 (the passage cited sub 999a continued):

Οὐδέν τε, φασί, διήλλαξεν ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων, ὅτι χωρὶς ὀρμῆς καὶ αἰσθήσεως κἀκεῖνα οἰκονομεῖ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τινα φυτοειδῶς γίνεται. ἐκ περιττοῦ δὲ τῆς ὀρμῆς τοῖς ζώοις ἐπιγενομένης, ἥ συγχρώμενα πορεύεται πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα, τοῦτοις μὲν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ¹ κατὰ τὴν ὀρμὴν διοικεῖσθαι. τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῖς λογικοῖς κατὰ τελειοτέραν προστασίαν δεδομένου, τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν ὀρθῶς γίνεσθαι <τού>τοις κατὰ φύσιν· τεχνίτης γὰρ οὗτος ἐπιγίνεται τῆς ὀρμῆς. διόπερ πρῶτος ὁ Ζήνων ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως τέλος εἶπε τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν· ἄγει γὰρ πρὸς ταύτην ἡμᾶς ἡ φύσις.

„Living according to nature" a moral principle

Probably Zeno did not use the formula ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, but simply ὁμολογουμένως. See the text of Stobaeus, below (1004a). Diog., in the above cited text, follows Chrysippus, who only said that Zeno's formula had to be explained in this sense.

b. Cicero, who, in his IIIrd book *De finibus*, doubtless follows ancient Stoic sources, clearly marks the difference of level between the "primary objects of nature" and the *honestum*, which arises only on a later stage of development.

Man's first impulse not yet on the level of morality

Cic., *De finibus* III 6, 20-21:

a special function has its proper virtue, namely that property by which they fulfill that function well, e.g. the eyes the function of seeing, the ears that of hearing. Now, according to Plato, what he calls "justice" is the special virtue of the soul, which enables it to fulfill its function (i.e. *living*) well.—Thus, for Plato virtue is undoubtedly a perfection of nature. By Aristotle, *Phys.* VII 3, 246a, 13-17, virtue and vice are explicitly defined in this way:

Ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ τελείωσις τις—ὅταν γὰρ λάβῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρετὴν, τότε λέγεται τέλειον ἕκαστον· τότε γὰρ μάλιστα ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, ὥσπερ κύκλος τέλειος ὅταν μάλιστα γένηται κύκλος καὶ ὅταν βέλτιστος—, ἡ δὲ κακία φθορὰ τούτου καὶ ἑκστασις.

Thus, man possesses his proper virtue, when he fully realizes his essence.

Cp. Thomas Aquinas who, in his *S. Th.* II¹, qu. 71, refers to the above cited passage of Aristotle, and concludes, quoting Dionysius Areop. (*De div. nom.* 22, 4): *Bonum autem hominis est secundum rationem esse, et malum hominis est praeter rationem esse.*

See also St. Augustine, *De lib. arb.* III 13, 38: "Omne vitium, eo ipso quo vitium est, contra naturam est. Si enim naturae non nocet, nec vitium est; si autem quia nocet ideo vitium est, ideo vitium est quia contra naturam est."—Hence, in 14, 41: "Quod ergo perfectioni naturae deesse perspexeris, id vocas vitium".—*Virtus*, then, in a general sense, must be defined as *perfectio naturae*.

¹ τῷ corr. Von Arnim; codd. τὸ.

Initiis igitur ita constitutis, ut ea quae secundum naturam sunt ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, primum est officium (id enim appello καθήκον), ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat quae secundum naturam sint, pellatque contraria; qua inventa selectione et item rejectione sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaue naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi quid sit quod vere bonum possit dici. Prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea quae sunt secundum naturam; simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant ἐννοίαν illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit quam omnia illa quae prima dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum. Quod cum positum sit in eo quod ὁμολογίαν Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet, cum igitur eo sit id bonum quo omnia referenda sint, honeste facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est; eorum autem quae sunt prima naturae propter se nihil est expetendum.

By the ὁμολογία mentioned in this text is meant: the ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν, i.e. "living in inner harmony", or "living consistently". See under our next nr.

1004—The following text of Stobaeus gives us some more precise information about the telos formula.

Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II 75, 11 W.:

The telos
formula

Τὸ δὲ τέλος ὁ μὲν Ζήνων οὕτως ἀπέδωκε· "τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν". τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἓνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν, ὡς τῶν μαχομένως ζώντων κακοδαίμονων. Οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον προσδιαρθροῦντες οὕτως ἐξέφερον "ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν" ὑπολαβόντες ἔλαττον εἶναι κατηγορήμα τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ῥηθέν¹. Κλεάνθης γὰρ πρῶτος διαδεξάμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν αἵρεσιν προσέθηκε "τῇ φύσει" καὶ οὕτως ἀπέδωκε· "τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν". "Ὅπερ ὁ Χρύσιππος σαφέστερον βουλόμενος ποιῆσαι, ἐξήνεγκε τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· "ζῆν κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων".

The passage continues by reporting the definitions of telos by Diogenes of Seleucia, Archedemus and Antipater, who are all occupied with "choosing what is according to nature" (the so-called πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν) and rejecting what is against it (ἐκλογὴ and ἀπεκλογὴ). Wiersma, II. τέλους, remarked rightly that in these formula's a more active attitude of life is expressed than in the classical formula of ὁμολογου-

¹ "since they thought the formula, as it was said by Zeno, incomplete".

μένως τῇ φύσει (at least as Cleanthes took it). But at the same time, there is a certain inconsistency about a so great interest in adiaphora! We shall come back to these questions in dealing with καθήκοντα and with Carneades' criticism.

**Zeno's
formula
explained**

1005—a. The explanation given in the above cited text of Zeno's telos formula is supported by the Stoic definition of virtue as it is found, for instance, in Diog. Laërt. VII 89:

Τὴν τε ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι ὁμολογουμένην·

b. Or in Clem. Alex., *Paed.* I 13 (p. 150 St.):

Ἡ ἀρετὴ . . . διάθεσις ἐστὶ ψυχῆς σύμφωνος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον.

c. If anything must be supplied to the ὁμολογουμένη or σύμφωνος—and, in fact, we do supply something mentally—it can be nothing but a εαυτῇ, as we read in Stob. II p. 60, 7-8 W.:

Τὴν ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι φασὶ ψυχῆς σύμφωνον αὐτῇ περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον.

d. Cleanthes, in adding τῇ φύσει to Zeno's formula, does not seem to have thought primarily of the individual "nature" of the subject, but of universal Nature, the κοινὸς νόμος (Hymn to Zeus, l. 20 f.) with which the individual must agree, if it will live a good and happy life. Now, evidently, since the individual is rooted essentially in universal Nature and is congenial with this, there is no essential difference between the one and the other. Therefore, Cleanthes could without any difficulty interpret Zeno's formula as he did. As is told us explicitly in the following passage of Diogenes, Chrysippus thought equally of the individual and of universal nature.

Diog. Laert. VII 89:

Φύσιν δὲ Χρύσιππος μὲν ἐξακούει, ἣ ἀκολουθῶς δεῖ ζῆν, τὴν τε κοινὴν καὶ ἰδίως τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην· ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης τὴν κοινὴν μόνην ἐκδέχεται φύσιν, ἣ ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ μέρους.

The distinction between the individual and the "common" nature was made, in any case, explicitly by Panaetius. We find it in Cic., *De off.* I 30, 107, where great stress is laid on the principle of following one's individual character and endowments. See below, nr. 1163.

**Constantia
with Cic.**

1006—The formal principle of selfconsistency plays a great rôle with Cic. and later Stoics. The first, in his *De legibus* I 17, 45, defines *virtus* as *constans et perpetua ratio vitae*, while *vitium* is equalized to *inconstantia*.

and Seneca

With Seneca, *constantia* is the first thing required for a philosophical state of mind.

a. Sen., *Ep.* 35, 4:

Proface et ante omnia hoc cura, ut constes tibi. quotiens experiri voles an aliquid actum sit, observa an eadem hodie velis quae heri: mutatio voluntatis indicat animum natere, aliubi atque aliubi apparere, prout tulit ventus. non vagatur quod fixum atque fundatum est. istud sapienti perfecto contingit, aliquatenus et proficienti provectoque. quid ergo interest? hic commovetur quidem, non tamen transit, sed suo loco nutat; ille ne commovetur quidem.

b. Sen., *Ep.* 120, 22:

Sic maxime coarguitur animus imprudens: alius prodit atque alius et, quo turpius nihil iudico, impar sibi est. magnam rem puta unum hominem agere. praeter sapientem autem nemo unum agit, ceteri multiformes sumus. modo frugi tibi videbimur et graves, modo prodigi et vani. mutamus subinde personam et contrariam ei sumimus, quam exuimus. hoc ergo a te exige, ut, qualem institueris praestare te, talem usque ad exitum serves. effice ut possis laudari, si minus, ut adgnosci.

c. Sen., *De vita beata* 8, 3 (of the man of a philosophical state of mind):

Maneant illi semel placita nec ulla in decretis eius litura sit.

1007—The ideal of selfconsistency with Epictetus.

Selfconsistency with Epictetus

a. For Epict., the first principle of philosophy is: to distinguish between the things that are in our power ($\tau\alpha\ \epsilon\phi'\ \eta\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$) and those which are not ($\tau\alpha\ \omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \epsilon\phi'\ \eta\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$). Now this is a fundamental dilemma: you choose either $\tau\alpha\ \epsilon\kappa\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$, or you choose $\tau\alpha\ \sigma\acute{\alpha}$. In the first case you have to do it always and radically. It is a choice for slavery.

Epict., *Diss.* II 2, 12-13:

“Όταν γάρ ὑποθῆς τὰ σὰ τοῖς ἐκτός, δούλευε τὸ λοιπὸν καὶ μὴ ἀντισπῶ καὶ ποτὲ μὲν θέλε δουλεῦειν, ποτὲ δὲ μὴ θέλε, ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἐξ ὅλης τῆς διανοίας ἢ ταῦτα ἢ ἐκεῖνα.

b. To what results this principle might lead, and, in fact, did lead sometimes, may be seen from the 15th ch. of the same book of Epict., where he says: there are some people who fancy they must, in any case, stick to their decisions. But first the decision must be sound!

Epict., *Diss.* II 15, 4-7, 8:

Όλος καὶ ἐμός τις ἐταῖρος ἐξ οὐδεμιᾶς αἰτίας ἔκρινεν ἀποκαρτερεῖν. ἔγνω ἐγὼ ἤδη τρίτην ἡμέραν ἔχοντος αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀποχῆς καὶ ἐλθὼν ἐπυνθανόμην

τί ἐγένετο. — Κέκρικα, φησίν. — 'Αλλ' ὅμως, τί σε ἦν τὸ ἀναπεῖσαν; εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἔκρινας, ἰδοὺ παρακαθήμεθά σοι καὶ συνεργοῦμεν, ἔν' ἐξέλθῃς· εἰ δ' ἀλόγως ἔκρινας, μετάρθου. — Τοῖς κριθεῖσιν ἐμμένειν δεῖ. — Τί ποιεῖς, ἄνθρωπε; οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὀρθῶς. —

Οὐ θέλεις τὴν ἀρχὴν στῆσαι καὶ τὸν θεμέλιον, τὸ κρῖμα σκέψασθαι πότερον ὑγιὲς ἢ οὐχ ὑγιὲς, καὶ οὕτως λοιπὸν ἐποικοδομεῖν αὐτῷ τὴν εὐτονίαν, τὴν ἀσφάλειαν;

"Now this man let himself be persuaded. But of the present generation there are some people whose mind you cannot change"

with
Marc Aurel

1008—a. Marc. Aur. X 11 says of the wise man:

. . . καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο βούλεται ἢ εὐθεῖαν περαίνειν διὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ εὐθεῖαν περαίνοντι ἔπεσθαι τῷ θεῷ.

b. Cp. Marc. Aur. XI 21:

"Ὡ μὴ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν αἶψα τοῦ βίου σκοπός, οὗτος εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτός δι' ὅλου τοῦ βίου εἶναι οὐ δύναται." οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τὸ εἰρημένον, ἔαν μὴ ἀκχεῖνο προσθῇς, ὅποῖον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτον τὸν σκοπόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐχ ἡ πάντων τῶν ὁπωσοῦν τοῖς πλείοσι δοκούντων ἀγαθῶν ὑπόληψις ὁμοία ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν τοιῶνδ' ἐτινων, τουτέστι τῶν κοινῶν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν σκοπὸν δεῖ τὸν κοινωνικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ὑποστήσασθαι. ὁ γὰρ εἰς τοῦτον πάσας τὰς ἰδίας ὁρμάς ἀπευθύων πάσας τὰς πράξεις ὁμοίας ἀποδώσει καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο αἶψα ὁ αὐτός ἐσται.

The in-
consistency
of sin

1009—As we found with Cicero that vitium was equalized to *inconstantia*, thus, Epictetus writes in his diatribe „What is the true nature of sin” (Diss. II 26, 1-3, 7):

Πᾶν ἀμάρτημα μάχην περιέχει¹. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀμαρτάνων οὐ θέλει ἀμαρτάνειν, ἀλλὰ κατορθῶσαι, δηλονότι ὅτι ὁ μὲν θέλει οὐ ποιεῖ. τί γὰρ ὁ κλέπτῃς θέλει πρᾶξαι; τὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρον. οὐκ οὖν, εἰ ἀσύμφορόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ τὸ κλέπτειν, ὁ μὲν θέλει ποιεῖ. πᾶσα δὲ ψυχὴ λογικὴ φύσει διαβέβληται πρὸς μάχην· καὶ μέχρι μὲν ἂν μὴ παρακολουθῇ τούτῳ, ὅτι ἐν μάχῃ ἐστίν, οὐδὲν κωλύεται τὰ μαχόμενα ποιεῖν· παρακολουθῆσαντα δὲ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἀποστήναι τῆς μάχης καὶ φυγεῖν οὕτως ὥς καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ψεύδους ἀνανεῦσαι πικρὰ ἀνάγκη τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ, ὅτι ψεῦδός ἐστιν· μέχρι δὲ τοῦτο μὴ φαντάζεται, ὥς ἀληθεῖ ἐπινεύει αὐτῷ. —

(7) Λογικῷ ἡγεμονικῷ δεῖξον μάχην καὶ ἀποστήσεται· ἂν δὲ μὴ δεικνύῃς, αὐτὸς σαυτῷ μᾶλλον ἐγκάλει ἢ τῷ μὴ πειθομένῳ.

¹ "Contains an inconsistency".

1010—Selfconsistency, then, being the true nature of virtue, we can understand that, according to Stoics, the wise man never repents.

a. Cic., *Tusc.* V 81:

The wise man
never repents

Sapientis enim est proprium nihil quod paenitere possit facere, nihil invitum, splendide, constanter, graviter, honeste omnia.

b. Seneca, *Ep.* 115, 18:

Hoc tibi philosophia praestabit, quo equidem nihil maius existimo: numquam te paenitebit tui.

c. Sen., *De benef.* IV 34, 4:

Non mutat sapiens consilium omnibus his manentibus, quae erant cum sumeret. ideo numquam illum poenitentia subit, quia nihil melius illo tempore fieri potuit quam quod factum est, nihil melius constitui quam quod constitutum est. ceterum ad omnia cum exceptione venit: si nihil inciderit quod impediatur.

d. Marc. Aur. VIII 53:

Repentance
not a virtue

Ἐπαινέσθαι θέλεις ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπου τρίς τῆς ὥρας ἑαυτῷ καταρωμένου; ἀρέσκειν θέλεις ἀνθρώπῳ ὃς οὐκ ἀρέσκει ἑαυτῷ; ἀρέσκει ἑαυτῷ ὁ μετανοῶν ἐφ' ἅπασι σχεδὸν οἷς πράσσει;

Cp. also the portrait of the wise man in Cicero's *Pro Murena* 60 ff., our nr. **1050b**.—Similar thoughts may be found later with Spinoza.

1011—As we found in the passage of Stobaeus quoted sub **1004**, those who live inconsistently live unhappily (ὡς τῶν μαχομένως ζώντων κακοδαίμονούντων). To put it in positive terms: the harmonious life is the happy life. The
harmonious
life is happy

a. Thus, Diog. Laërt. says, in his description of the telos according to Chrysippus (VII 88):

Διόπερ τέλος γίνεται τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατὰ τε τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων, οὐδὲν ἐνεργοῦντας ὧν ἀπαγορεύειν εἶωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὧν τῷ Διὶ καθηγμένονι τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὅλων διοικήσεως ὄντι· εἶναι δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὐροίαν βίου, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ' ἐκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τῶν ὅλων διοικήτου βούλησιν.

In this fr. of Chrysippus we find many things which play an important rôle with later Stoics.

(1) "Nature" is taken as well in the sense of individual nature as in that of universal.

(2) The νόμος κοινός is called ὁρθὸς λόγος, a term much used e.g. by Epict.

(3) Every man is said to have a daimon who, in the wise man, is in harmony with the will of the Governor of the universe. —

The idea of a good or evil spirit following every individual man throughout his life is ancient¹. The formula ὁ παρ' ἐκάστῳ δαίμων *can*, doubtless, mean: the spirit *dwelling in* the individual man. This is what we find with Posidonius (*infra* nr. 1055). Marc. Aur. identifies the daimon within us with the hegemonikon (our nr. 1266a).

Wiersma, Π. τέλους p. 30 f., thinks that Chrysippus' conception of the daimon differs from Posidonius', in that Chrys. thought the daimon could be against the will of the Governor of the universe, while according to Posidonius such a disagreement is essentially excluded. It seems, however, that W. reads here more in Chrysippus' text, than is in it.

Happiness a
concomitant
state

b. It must be noticed that, unlike Aristotle, Stoics emphatically did not regard *eudaimonia* as the telos, but simply as a concomitant state.

Seneca, *De vita beata* 8, opposes Stoic doctrine to Epicurus in this way:

Quid, quod tam bonis quam malis voluptas inest nec minus turpes dedecus suum quam honestos egregia delectant? ideoque praeceperunt veteres optimam sequi vitam, non iucundissimam, ut rectae ac bonae voluntatis non dux sed comes sit voluptas. natura enim duce utendum est; hanc ratio observat, hanc consulit. idem est ergo beate vivere et secundum naturam.

And again, at the end of ch. 13:

Agedum, virtus antecedit, tutum erit omne vestigium. et voluptas nocet nimia: in virtute non est verendum, ne quid nimium sit, quia in ipsa est modus; non est bonum, quod magnitudine laborat sua. rationalem porro sortitis naturam quae melius res quam ratio proponitur? et si placet ista iunctura, si hoc placet ad beatam vitam ire comitatu, virtus antecedit, comitetur voluptas et circa corpus ut umbra versetur: virtutem quidem, excelsissimam dominam, voluptati tradere ancillam nihil magnum animo capientis est.

The last sentence refers to the picture Cleanthes used to draw, representing

¹ It occurs frequently in Plato, e.g.

Phaed. 107d: ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμων ὄνπερ ζῶντα εἴληχεν.

Phaed. 108b: ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἴχεται ἀγομένη (ἡ ψυχὴ).

Phaed. 113d: οἱ δὲ δαίμων ἕκαστον κομίζει.

Resp. X 617e: Οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἰρήσεσθε.

Polit. 274b: τοῦ κεκτημένου καὶ νέμοντος ἡμᾶς δαίμονος.

In *Tim.* 90a he says that God gave "the most sovereign form of soul in us" (τὸ κυριώτατον ἐν ἡμῖν ψυχῆς εἶδος) as a daimon to each of us.

Pleasure, dressed as a queen and seated on a throne, surrounded by the Virtues, ministering to her as humble servants.

c. Cp. Cic., *De fin.* II 21, 69:

Pudebit te, inquam, illius tabulae, quam Cleanthes sane commode verbis depingere solebat. Iubebat eos, qui audiebant, secum ipsos cogitare pictam in tabula Voluptatem pulcherrimo vestitu et ornatu regali in solio sedentem, praesto esse Virtutes ut ancillulas, quae nihil aliud agerent, nullum suum officium ducerent, nisi ut Voluptati ministrarent et eam tantum ad aurem admonerent, si modo id pictura intellegi posset, ut caveret, ne quid faceret imprudens, quod offenderet animos hominum, aut quicquam, e quo oriretur aliquis dolor. "Nos quidem Virtutes sic natae sumus, ut tibi serviremus, aliud negoti nihil habemus."

The Stoic
view opposed
to Epicurea-
nism by
Cleanthes

Wiersma, Π. τέλους, p. 19 ff., considers Zeno as a pure eudaemonist: eudaimonia, according to him, should have been the true "end" of life. I think this view is not justified by the texts.

9—ETHICS (2): BONUM, BONA, AND RELATIVELY VALUABLE THINGS

1012—a. Diog. Laërt. VI 1, 14 cites the following lines of the epigrammatist Athenaeus:

Virtue the
only good

ὦ Στωϊκῶν μύθων εἰδήμονες, ὦ πανάριστα,
δόγματα ταῖς ἱεραῖς ἐνθέμενοι σελίσιν,
τὴν ἀρετὴν ψυχᾶς ἀγαθὸν μόνον· ἄδε γὰρ ἀνδρῶν
μούνα καὶ βιοτὴν ῥύσατο καὶ πόλιος.

In fact, the doctrine that "the virtue of the soul is the only good" has been from the beginning a main dogma of the Stoa, or even, next to the formal principle of ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν, the fundamental principle. Zeno expressed it as follows.

b. Stob., *Ecl.* II p. 57, 18 W. (SVF I 190):

Τῶν δ' ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ κακὰ, τὰ δὲ ἀδιάφορα. ἀγαθὰ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα· φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, δικαιοσύνην, ἀνδρείαν καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ ἢ μετέχον ἀρετῆς· κακὰ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἀφροσύνην, ἀκολασίαν, ἀδικίαν, δειλίαν, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἐστὶ κακία ἢ μετέχον κακίας· ἀδιάφορα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ζωὴν θάνατον, δόξαν ἀδοξίαν, πόνον ἡδονήν, πλοῦτον πενίαν, νόσον ὑγίειαν, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια.

A similar division was made by Xenocr., who said, according to Sextus, *Adv. math.* XI (= *Ag. the Ethicists*) 4:

Πᾶν τὸ ὄν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἐστὶν ἢ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν οὔτε κακὸν ἐστὶν.

In the preceding chapter Sextus says that the Stoic division was common to the Ancient Academy, Peripatetics and Stoics. However, the term ἀδιάφορα for the third group is specifically Stoic, and it is most characteristic.

c. Thus, Tacitus, when speaking about Helvidius Priscus and Paetus Thrasea, qualifies Stoics by these terms (*Hist.* IV 5):

Doctores sapientiae secutus est (Priscus), qui bona quae honesta, mala tantum quae turpia, potentiam nobilitatem ceteraque extra animum neque bonis neque malis adnumerant.

d. Seneca, *Ep.* 71, 4:

Summum bonum est quod honestum est. Et quod magis admireris: *unum* bonum est quod honestum est. Ceteri falsa et adulterina bona sunt.

1013—To this only good belongs that which is essentially linked up with it.

Reason its
ground

a. *Reason* is its ground. Therefore, Seneca could say in *Ep.* 76, 9:

In homine optimum quid est? — Ratio. Hoc antecedit animalia, deos sequitur.

Freedom
its outward
aspect

b. *Freedom* may be called its visible or outward aspect: for wisdom, which implies all virtues, liberates man from outward things. Epictetus, therefore, calls the non-philosophical man δοῦλος, and says that Antisthenes "liberated" him, viz. by teaching him not to desire outward things, which are not in our power.

Epict., *Diatr.* III 24, 67 ff.:

Διὰ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν ὅτι "ἐξ οὗ μ' Ἀντισθένης ἡλευθέρωσεν, οὐκέτι ἐδούλευσα". πῶς ἡλευθέρωσεν; ἄκουε, τί λέγει. "ἐδίδασκέν με τὰ ἐμὰ καὶ τὰ οὐκ ἐμὰ."

Cp. supra, 1007a.

Happiness
its inner
aspect

c. *Happiness* might be called its inner aspect or psychological reverse. It depends wholly and exclusively on virtue.

Cic., *Acad. post.* I 35:

Zeno . . . qui omnia quae ad beatam vitam pertinerent, in una virtute poneret.

See also *Tusc. disp.* V 48.

The
autarkeia
of virtue

1014—Virtue, therefore, is considered as self-sufficient by Stoics.

a. Diog. Laert. VII 127:

Αὐτάρκη τε εἶναι αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν ἀρετὴν) πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, καθά φησι Ζήνων.

b. Cp. Cic., *De fin.* V 79:

A Zenone hoc magnifice tamquam ex oraculo editur: "Virtus ad beate vivendum se ipsa contenta est".

1015—The absolute character of virtue implies that there are no degrees of it, just as there are no degrees of sin. No degrees
of bonum

a. Seneca, *Ep.* 66, 12:

Mortalia minuuntur, cadunt, deteruntur, crescunt, exhauriuntur, implentur. itaque illis in tam incerta sorte inaequalitas est: divinum una natura est. ratio autem nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa. si ratio divina est, nullum autem bonum sine ratione est, bonum omne divinum est. nullum porro inter divina discrimen est: ergo nec inter bona. paria itaque sunt et gaudium et fortis atque obstinata tormentorum perpessio. in utroque enim eadem est animi magnitudo, in altero remissa et laeta, in altera pugnax et intenta.

Thus, Diog. Laert. summarizes Stoic doctrine in these words (VII 101):

Δοκεῖ δὲ πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἴσα εἶναι καὶ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἐπ' ἄκρον εἶναι αἰρετὸν καὶ μήτ' ἄνεσιν μήτ' ἐπίτασιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι.

b. The reverse of this thesis is that sins are equal, as we find it in Cicero's *Pro Munera* 61: *omnia peccata esse paria*. Peccata paria

Diog. Laert. VII 120:

Ἀρέσκει τ' αὐτοῖς ἴσα ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ ἀμαρτήματα, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος . . . καὶ Ζήνων. —

Καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἑκατὸν σταδίου ἀπέχων Κανώβου καὶ ὁ ἕνα ἐπίσης οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν Κανώβῳ· οὕτω καὶ ὁ πλεόν καὶ ὁ ἔλαττον ἀμαρτάνων ἐπίσης οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν τῷ κατορθοῦν.

The doctrine is also mentioned in Sextus, *Adv. math.* VII 422. It is explained by Cicero, *De fin.* III 14, 45-48, as we shall see in dealing with the κατόρθωμα (below, nr. 1036).

1016—For the Stoics, virtue has a strictly interior character: it is a question of intention, not of any practical result. A good
action has
its value
in itself

a. Cic., *De fin.* III, 6, 22:

Ut enim si cui propositum sit conliniare hastam aliquo aut sagittam,

sic nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, [sic illi facere omnia, quae possit, ut conliniet]. Huic in eius modi similitudine omnia sint facienda, ut conliniet, et tamen, ut omnia faciat, quo propositum assequatur, sit hoc quasi ultimum quale nos summum in vita bonum dicimus: illud autem ut feriat quasi seligendum, non expetendum.

Plut., *De comm. not.* 26, mentions this point among the "strange and puzzling things" in Stoic doctrine. In fact, it is inherent in the view that a good action has its value in itself, as is also explained in the following passage.

b. Cic., *De fin.* III 7, 24:

Ut enim histrioni actio, saltatori motus non quivis, sed certus quidam est datus, sic vita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus conveniens consentaneumque dicimus. Nec enim gubernationi aut medicinae similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius quam modo dixi et saltationi, ut in ipsa insit, non foris petatur extremum, id est artis effectio. — Sola enim sapientia in se tota conversa est, quod idem in ceteris artibus non fit.

We shall come back to this passage again in dealing with *kathorthomata* (nrs. 1033-1036).

Bonum
defined as
ὠφέλεια

1017—a. Ἀγαθόν, in general, is defined by Stoics as ὄφελος or ὠφέλεια, e.g. in Diog. Laert. VII 94 (SVF III 76); cp. Sextus, *adv. Math.* XI 22 (SVF III 75); by which they mean, of course, not outward things—for there is no help in these—, but virtue and what belongs to it. See our nr. 1013; also 1018a.

or as a
natural
perfection

b. Or again, the good is defined by them as *the natural perfection of a rational being*:

Τὸ τέλειον κατὰ φύσιν λογικοῦ ὡς λογικοῦ (Diog. Laërt. VII 94).

in which they follow the line of Plato (*Laches* 190b, *Resp.* 353b sqq.) and of Aristotle (*Phys.* VII 3), as indicated *supra* (n. 1 to nr. 1003).

„that which
is absolute
by nature”

c. The clearest expression of the Stoic view is given in Diogenes' definition mentioned by Cicero, *De fin.* III 10, 33:

Ego assentior Diogeni qui bonum definierit *id quod esset natura absolutum*.

By this definition is clearly indicated that the good is of a level different from relatively valuable things, as is explained in the following passage.

As such, it
is superior
to relatively
valuable
things

d. Cic., *De fin.* III 10, 34:

Hoc autem ipsum bonum non accessione neque crescendo aut cum ceteris comparando, sed propria vi sua et sentimus et appellamus bonum.

ut enim mel, etsi dulcissimum est, suo tamen proprio genere saporis, non comparatione cum aliis dulce esse sentitur, sic bonum hoc, de quo agimus, est illud quidem plurimi aestimandum, sed ea aestimatio genere valet, non magnitudine. Nam cum aestimatio, quae ἀξία dicitur, neque in bonis numerata sit nec rursus in malis, quantumcumque eo addideris, in suo genere manebit. Alia est igitur propria aestimatio virtutis, quae genere, non crescendo valet.

To this absolute character of the good we shall come back, again, in dealing with *katorthomata*.

1018—Zeno's division of all things into three classes—good, bad and morally indifferent—, as mentioned under **1012b**, is maintained by Chrysippus and other Stoics. The third class is not deprived of any value (ἀξία); only, this value is not of the moral level. Two arguments are given to support this view: (1) these things are not profitable to man; (2) both good and bad use can be made of them.

The doctrine
of adiaphora

Diog. Laërt. VII 101 (the end)-103:

Τῶν δ' ὄντων φασὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κακὰ, τὰ δ' οὐδέτερα. Ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὖν τὰς τ' ἀρετάς, . . . κακὰ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία . . . Οὐδέτερα δὲ ὅσα μήτε ὠφελεῖ μήτε βλάπτει· οἷον ζωὴ, υἱεία, ἡδονή, κάλλος, ἰσχύς, πλοῦτος, εὐδοξία, εὐγένεια· καὶ τὰ τοῦτοις ἐναντία, θάνατος, νόσος, πόνος, αἰσχος, ἀσθένεια, πενία, ἀδοξία, δυσγένεια καὶ τὰ τοῦτοις παραπλήσια· καθά φησιν Ἐκάτων ἐν ἐβδόμῳ Περὶ τέλους καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Ἠθικῇ καὶ Χρύσιππος. μὴ γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ, ἀλλ' ἀδιάφορα, κατ' εἶδος προηγμένα· ὥς γὰρ ἴδιον θερμοῦ τὸ θερμαίνειν, οὐ τὸ ψύχειν, οὕτω καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ὠφελεῖν, οὐ τὸ βλάπτειν. οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ ὠφελεῖ ἢ βλάπτει ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ υἱεία· οὐκ ἄρα ἀγαθὸν οὔτε πλοῦτος οὔτε υἱεία. ἔτι τέ φασιν· ὅ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν· πλούτῳ δὲ καὶ υἱείᾳ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι· οὐκ ἄρα ἀγαθὸν πλοῦτος καὶ υἱεία.

1019—This, then, being presupposed, ἀδιάφορα are again divided.

προηγμένα
and
ἀποπροηγ-
μένα

a. Diog. Laërt. VII 105:

Τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τὰ μὲν λέγουσι προηγμένα, τὰ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα· προηγμένα μὲν τὰ ἔχοντα ἀξίαν, ἀποπροηγμένα δὲ τὰ ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα.

b. What is meant by ἀξία. Diog. L., ib.:

What is
ἀξία

Ἀξίαν δὲ τὴν μὲν τίνα λέγουσι σύμβλησιν πρὸς τὸν ὁμολογούμενον βίον, ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ πᾶν ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ εἶναι μέσσην τίνα δύναμιν ἢ χρεῖαν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον, ὅμοιον εἰπεῖν ἢν τίνα προσφέρεται πρὸς τὸν

κατὰ φύσιν βίον πλοῦτος ἢ ὑγίεια· τὴν δ' εἶναι ἀξίαν ἀμοιβὴν δοκιμαστοῦ, ἣν ἂν ὁ ἔμπειρος τῶν πραγμάτων τάξῃ, ὅμοιον εἶπεῖν ἀμείβεσθαι πυρούς πρὸς τὰς σὺν ἡμιόνῳ κριθάς.

The text will be further explained sub 1020b.

Instances

c. Instances of προηγμένα and of ἀποπροηγμένα.

Diog. Laërt. VII 106:

Προηγμένα μὲν οὖν εἶναι ἃ καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ψυχικῶν εὐφυῖαν, τέχνην, προκοπὴν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν ζωὴν, ὑγίειαν, ῥώμην, εὐεξίαν, ἀρτιότητα, κάλλος· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐκτὸς πλοῦτον, δόξαν, εὐγένειαν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. ἀποπροηγμένα δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ψυχικῶν ἀφυῖαν, ἀτεχνίαν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν θάνατον, νόσον, ἀσθένειαν, καχεξίαν, πῆρωσιν, αἰσχος καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐκτὸς πενίαν, ἀδοξίαν, δυσγένειαν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια. οὔτε δὲ προήχθη οὔτε ἀποπροήχθη τὰ οὐδετέρως ἔχοντα.

The last group is specified as μήτε ὁρμῆς μήτε ἀφορμῆς κινητικά (Diog. VII 104) and instanced as follows:

Τὸ ἀρτίας ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς τρίχας ἢ περιττάς, ἢ ἐκτεῖναι τὸν δάκτυλον συστεῖλαι.

The first two groups (proegmena and apoproegmena) are ὁρμῆς καὶ ἀφορμῆς κινητικά.

The
proegmenon
not of the
level of
morality

1020—a. That the *proegmenon* is not of the level of the agathon, is illustrated by the simile of the king and his courtiers.

Stob., *Ecl.* II p. 84, 21 (SVF I 192):

Προηγμένον δ' εἶναι λέγουσιν, ὃ ἀδιάφορον <ὄν> ἐκλεγόμεθα κατὰ προηγούμενον λόγον. τὸν δὲ ὅμοιον λόγον ἐπὶ τῷ ἀποπροηγμένῳ εἶναι. . . . οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι προηγμένον διὰ τὸ τὴν μεγίστην ἀξίαν αὐτὰ ἔχειν. τὸ δὲ προηγμένον, τὴν δευτέραν χώραν καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχον, συνεγγίζειν πως τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσει· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν προηγμένων εἶναι τὸν βασιλέα, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μετ' αὐτὸν τεταγμένους.

Cic. mentions the simile in *De fin.* III 16, 52.

b. The same text continued:

Προηγμένα δὲ λέγεσθαι οὐ τῷ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν τινὰ συμβάλλεσθαι συνεργεῖν τε πρὸς αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τούτων τὴν ἐκλογὴν ποιεῖσθαι παρὰ τὰ ἀποπροηγμένα.

The proegmena, then, come under the second kind of ἀξία mentioned sub 1018b. The first class, evidently, is of the agatha, which by definition contribute something to the ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν. That the second kind is said to contribute to "the life according to nature", be it in an indirect way (μέσσην τινὰ δύναμιν ἢ χρεῖαν), does not imply that, in fact, they should be good, too. It should be remembered

that those things which by Stoics were called τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, (see 1003b) are not yet of the moral level. Now, it is exactly to these *prima naturae* that the proegmena must be referred.

c. Thus, we can understand the following passage, on the reasons why things are preferred. Diog. Laërt. VII 107: Why certain things are preferred

Ἔτι τῶν προηγμένων τὰ μὲν δι' αὐτὰ προῆκται, τὰ δὲ δι' ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτὰ καὶ δι' ἕτερα. καὶ δι' αὐτὰ μὲν εὐφυῖα, προκοπὴ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· δι' ἕτερα δὲ πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· δι' αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ δι' ἕτερα ἰσχύς, εὐαισθησία, ἀρτιότης. δι' αὐτὰ μὲν, ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν ἐστί· δι' ἕτερα δέ, ὅτι περιποιεῖ χρείας οὐκ ὀλίγας. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἀποπροηγμένον κατὰ τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον.

1021—Aristo of Chios differed from Zeno in rejecting any distinction between the adiaphora. Cicero mentions him repeatedly together with Pyrrho (cp. infra, nr. 1088b, c) and Herillus. The heresy of Aristo of Chios

a. Cic., *De fin.* II 13, 43 (SVF I 364):

Quae (sc. prima naturae) quod Aristoni et Pyrrhoni omnino visa sunt pro nihilo, ut inter optime valere et gravissime aegrotare nihil prorsus dicerent interesse, recte iam pridem contra eos desitum est disputari. Dum enim in una virtute sic omnia esse voluerunt, ut eam rerum selectione exspoliarent nec ei quicquam aut unde oriretur darent, aut ubi niteretur, virtutem ipsam, quam amplexabantur, sustulerunt.

b. Cic., *De off.* I 2, 6:

Quoniam Aristonis, Pyrrhonis, Erilli iam pridem explosa sententia est; qui tamen haberent ius suum disputandi de officio, si rerum aliquem dilectum reliquissent, ut ad officii inventionem aditus esset.

c. Chrysippus opposed this doctrine energetically. Cic., *De fin.* IV 25, 68:

Cum enim, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse confirmatur, tollitur cura valetudinis, diligentia rei familiaris, administratio rei publicae, ordo gerendorum negotiorum, officia vitae, ipsum denique illud honestum, in quo uno vultis esse omnia, deserendum est. Quae diligentissime contra Aristonem dicuntur a Chrysippo.

1022—The Stoic thesis that outward things do not contribute anything to happiness, was opposed by Peripatetics; later by Carneades. Cicero speaks of it in *De fin.* III 12, 41: The great controversy between Stoics and Peripatetics

Tum ille (sc. Cato); "His igitur ita positis", inquit, "sequitur magna contentio, quam tractatam a Peripateticis mollius (est enim eorum consuetudo dicendi non satis acuta propter ignorationem dialecticae) Carneades tuus egregia quadam exercitatione in dialecticis summaque eloquentia rem in summum discrimen adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit in omni hac quaestione, quae de bonis et malis appelletur, non esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis controversiam, sed nominum. Mihi autem nihil tam perspicuum videtur, quam has sententias eorum philosophorum re inter se magis quam verbis dissidere; maiorem multo inter Stoicos et Peripateticos rerum esse aio discrepantiam quam verborum, quippe cum Peripatetici omnia quae ipsi bona appellant pertinere dicant ad beate vivendum, nostri non ex omni quod aestimatione aliqua dignum sit compleri vitam beatam putent."

Carneades' essential argument was that Zeno, in distinguishing proegmena and apoproegmena, in fact reintroduced the notion of relatively good things, rejected by him in principle. It is clear that Stoics never could grant this.

10—ETHICS (3): VIRTUE, VIRTUES, ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE MORALITY

Virtue a
perfection
of nature

1023—Virtue, then, is defined by the Stoics, as by Aristotle, as a perfection of each individual's nature. Cp. our nr. **1003** n. 1.

a. In general: Diog. Laërt. VII 90 (SVF III 197):

Ἀρετὴ δὲ τοι ἡ μὲν τις κοινῶς παντὶ τελείωσις, ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντος· καὶ ἡ ἀθεώρητος, ὥσπερ ὑγίεια· καὶ ἡ θεωρηματικὴ, ὥς φρόνησις.

Cp. the definition of ἀγαθόν given sub **1017b** (Diog. VII 94).

b. In man: Galenus defends against Chrysippus the unity of virtue, because it is a perfection, "as he (Chrys.) himself grants".

De plac. Hippocr. et Plat. V 5, p. 446 M. (SVF III 257):

Μία γὰρ ἐκάστου τῶν ὄντων ἡ τελειότης, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ τελειότης ἐστὶ τῆς ἐκάστου φύσεως, ὥς αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖ.

Not a
ἕξις
but a
διάθεσις

1024—Stoics do not follow Aristotle in considering virtue as a ἕξις. They call it a διάθεσις.

a. Plut., *De virt. mor.* 3 (SVF I 202):

Κοινῶς δὲ ἅπαντες οὗτοι (sc. Menedemus, Aristo, Zeno, Chrys.) τὴν ἀρετὴν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς διάθεσιν τινα καὶ δύνανται γεγεννημένην ὑπὸ λόγου.

Cp. also Diog. Laërt. VII 89: τὴν τε ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι ὁμολογουμένην.

b. The reason of this preference for the term *διάθεσις* may be seen from the following text.

Simpl., in *Ar. Categ.* f. 61b ed. Bas. (SVF II 393):

Τὰς μὲν ἕξεις ἐπιτείνεσθαι φασι δύνασθαι καὶ ἀνίσθαι· τὰς δὲ διαθέσεις ἀνεπιτάτους εἶναι καὶ ἀνανέτους.

1025—According to Stoics, man has by nature an aptitude for virtue.

Natural
aptitude
for virtue

a. Cleanthes, SVF I fr. 566 (Stob., *Ecl.* II, p. 65, 8 W.):

Πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετὴν.

b. Cp. *Anecd. graeca Paris.* ed. Cramer, Vol. I p. 171, l. 28 (SVF III 214):

Φύσει δὲ πάντες πρὸς ἀρετὴν γεννώμεθα, καθ' ὅσον ἀφορμὰς ἔχομεν.

1026—This view of the origin of virtue is rather well in agreement with Aristotle's, expounded in EN II 1, where virtue is said not to come to us φύσει, but may be said to be κατὰ φύσιν, because human nature is made so, that virtue may arise in it by practice. As might be expected, we find it in Stoic as well as in Peripatetic, may be more or less mixed, sources.

a. Cic., *Tusc. disp.* III 1, 2:

Sunt enim ingenii nostris semina innata virtutum, quae si adolescere liceret, ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret. Nunc autem, simul atque editi in lucem et suscepti sumus, in omni continuo pravitate et in summa opinionum perversitate versamur, ut paene cum lacte nutricis errorem suxisse videamur. Cum vero parentibus redditi, dein magistris traditi sumus, tum ita variis inbuimur erroribus, ut vanitati veritas et opinioni confirmatae natura ipsa cedat.

Semina
innata
virtutum

Cp. Diog. Laërt. VII 89 (SVF III 228):

Διαστρέφεσθαι δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ζῶον ποτὲ μὲν διὰ τὰς τῶν ἔξωθεν πραγμάτων πιθανότητας, ποτὲ δὲ διὰ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν τῶν συνόντων· ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις ἀφορμὰς δίδωσιν ἀδιαστρόφους.

See our next nr.

b. Cic., *De fin.* V 18, 43:

Est enim natura sic generata vis hominis, ut ad omnem virtutem percipiendam facta videatur, ob eamque causam parvi virtutum simulacris, quarum in se habent semina, sine doctrina moventur; sunt enim prima

elementa naturae, quibus auctis virtutis quasi germen efficitur. nam cum ita nati factique simus, ut et agendi aliquid et diligendi aliquos et liberalitatis et referendae gratiae principia in nobis contineremus atque ad scientiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem aptos animos haberemus a contrariisque rebus alienos, non sine causa eas, quas dixi, in pueris virtutum quasi scintillas videmus, e quibus accendi philosophi ratio debet, ut eam quasi deum ducem subsequens ad naturae perveniat extremum. nam, ut saepe iam dixi, in infirma aetate inbecillaque mente vis naturae quasi per caliginem cernitur; cum autem progrediens confirmatur animus, agnoscit ille quidem naturae vim, sed ita, ut progredi possit longius, per se sit tantum inchoata.

In this book the ethics of Antiochus of Ascalon is expounded. A certain contamination of Stoic and Aristotelian doctrine in this passage must be noticed.

c. Cp. Arius Didymus in Stob., *Ecl.* II, p. 116, 21 W.:

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἦθος τοῦνομα λαβεῖν φησιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους· ὧν γὰρ ἐκ φύσεως ἀρχὰς ἔχομεν καὶ σπέρματα, τούτων τὰς τελειότητας περιποιεῖσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ ταῖς ὀρθαῖς ἀγωγαῖς· δι' ὃ καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἐθικὴν εἶναι καὶ περὶ μόνᾳ τὰ ζῶα γίνεσθαι καὶ μάλιστα περὶ ἀνθρώπων.

On the sources of Arius Didymus' survey of peripatetic ethics, see under nr. 999 (on the origin of the oikeiosis theory).

d. Seneca, *Ep.* 108, 8:

Facile est auditorem concitare ad cupidinem recti: omnibus enim natura fundamenta dedit semenque virtutum.

Sin a
perversio
naturae
(διαστροφή)

1027—The reverse of this thesis is, evidently, that sin comes from without and is a perversion of nature.

a. Galenus, Π. τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡθῶν ed. Bas. I 351 (SVF III 235):

Οὐ γὰρ, ὡς οἱ Στωϊκοὶ φασιν, ἐξωθεν ἐπέρχεται ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν τὸ σύμπαν τῆς κακίας.

b. As we saw in Diog. Laërt. VII 89, cited under **1026a**, Stoics spoke of a διαστροφή of the reasonable being, caused by two reasons. The same is found in Galenus, *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* V 5, p. 437 M.:

Διττὴν γὰρ εἶναι τῆς διαστροφῆς τὴν αἰτίαν, ἑτέραν μὲν ἐκ κατηχέσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐγγιγνομένην, ἑτέραν δ' ἐξ αὐτῆς τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς φύσεως.

c. Chalcidius in *Timaeum* c. 165 ff. (SVF III 229) gives a long description of this double perversion.

Dicunt porro non spontanea esse delicta, ideo quod omnis anima particeps divinitatis naturali adpetitu bonum quidem semper expetit, errat tamen aliquando in iudicio bonorum et malorum. namque alii nostrum summum bonum voluptatem putant, divitias alii, plerique gloriam et omnia magis quam ipsum verum bonum. Est erroris causa multiplex. Prima quam Stoici duplicem perversionem vocant. haec autem nascitur tam ex rebus ipsis quam ex divulgatione famae. Quippe mox natis exque materno viscere decidentibus provenit ortus cum aliquo dolore, propterea quod ex calida atque umida sede ad frigus et siccitatem aëris circumfusi migrent. Adversum quem dolorem frigusque puerorum opposita est, medicinae loco, artificiosa obstetricum provisio, ut aqua calida confoveantur recens nati adhibeanturque vices et similitudo materni gremii ex calefactione atque fotu, quo laxatum corpus tenerum delectatur et quiescit. Ergo ex utroque sensu, tam doloris quam delectationis, opinio quaedam naturalis exoritur, omne suave ac delectabile bonum, contraque quod dolorem adferat malum esse atque vitandum. Par atque eadem habetur sententia de indigentia quoque et exsaturazione, blanditiis obiurgationibusque, cum aetatis fuerint auctioris. proptereaque confirmata eadem aetate in anticipata sententia permanent: omne blandum bonum, etiamsi sit inutile, omne etiam laboriosum, etiamsi conmoditatem adferat, malum existimantes. Consequenter divitias, quod praestantissimum sit in his instrumentum voluptatis, eximie diligunt, gloriamque pro honore amplexantur. Natura quippe omnis homo laudis atque honoris est adpetens. est enim honor virtutis testimonium. Sed prudentes quidem versatique in sciscitatione sapientiae viri sciunt, quam et cuiusmodi debeant excolere virtutem. Vulgus vero imperitum propter ignorationem rerum pro honore gloriam popularemque estimationem colunt. pro virtute vero vitam consecrantur voluptatibus delibutam, potestatem faciendi quae velint regiam quandam esse eminentiam existimantes; —

simul quia beatum necesse est libenter vivere, putant etiam eos, qui cum voluptate vivant, beatos fore. Talis error est, opinor, qui ex rebus ortus hominum animos possidet. ex divulgatione autem succedit errori supra dicto ex matrum et nutricum votis de divitiis gloriaque et ceteris falso putatis bonis insusurratio, in terriculis etiam, quibus tenera aetas vehementius commovetur, nec non in solaciis et omnibus huiusmodi perturbatio. Quin etiam corroboratarum mentium delinitrix poëtica et cetera scriptorum et auctorum opera magnifica quantam animis rudibus invehunt, iuxta voluptatem laboremque, inclinationem favoris?

Quid? pictores quoque et fictores, nonne rapiunt animos ad suavitatem ab industria?

Similar things are said by Cicero in *De legibus* I 11, 31 and 17, 47. Cp. also Seneca, *Ep.* 94, 53 and *Ep.* 115, 11-12.

The unity
of virtue
maintained
by Zeno

1028—a. How Zeno maintained the unity of virtue, may be seen from the following passage of Cicero, *Ac. post.* I 10, 38:

Cumque superiores non omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut more perfectas, hic (scil. Zeno) omnes in ratione ponebat; cumque illi ea genera virtutum, quae supra dixi, seiungi posse arbitrarentur, hic nec id ullo modo fieri posse disserebat, nec virtutis usum modo, ut superiores, sed ipsum habitum per se esse praeclarum, nec tamen virtutem cuiquam adesse, quin ea semper uteretur.

By *superiores* Aristotle and his school are meant, and the distinction between *διανοητικαὶ* and *ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ* (EN I 13, 1103 a 5).

Also the last sentence refers to Aristotle who, having defined the *ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν* as "an activity of the soul according to virtue" (EN I 7, 1098 a 17), posits that displaying virtue is much more than possessing it (EN I 8, 1098 a 32-b 7).

The four
main virtues

b. Zeno admitted the four main virtues as distinct one from the other, but inseparable. Plut., *Stoic. repugn.* 7, p. 1034c:

Ἀρετὰς ὁ Ζήνων ἀπολείπει πλείονας κατὰ διαφοράς, ὥσπερ ὁ Πλάτων, οἷον φρόνησιν ἀνδρείαν σωφροσύνην δικαιοσύνην, ὡς ἀχωρίστους μὲν οὖσας, ἑτέρας δὲ καὶ διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων.

φρόνησις
used in the
general sense

c. He seems to have used the term *φρόνησις* also in the general sense of "practical reason", which is the basis of all virtue, as Socrates does in Xen.'s *Mem.* III 9.

Plut., *De virt. mor.* 2, p. 441a:

Ἦτοικε δὲ καὶ Ζήνων εἰς τοῦτό πως ὑποφέρεισθαι ὁ Κιτιεύς, ὀριζόμενος τὴν φρόνησιν ἐν μὲν ἀπονειμητέοις δικαιοσύνην, ἐν δ' αἰρετέοις σωφροσύνην, ἐν δ' ὑπομενετέοις ἀνδρείαν. ἀπολογούμενοι δ' ἄξιουσιν ἐν τούτοις τὴν ἐπιστήμην φρόνησιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὀνομάσθαι.

Aristo of Chios found an inconsistency in accepting a plurality of virtues. He rejected any distinction between them and, defining them as *ἐπιστήμη*, maintained their strict unity (see **1030a**).

Cleanthes'
view of
virtue

1029—Cleanthes described virtue as a force and a tension of the soul.

a. Plut., *Stoic. repugn.* 7, p. 1034d (SVF I 563):

Ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης ἐν ὑπομνήμασι φυσικοῖς εἰπὼν ὅτι "πληγὴ πυρὸς ὁ τόνος

ἐστὶ, καὶ ἰκανὸς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένηται πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα, ἰσχύς καλεῖται καὶ κράτος", ἐπιφέρει κατὰ λέξιν "ἡ δ' ἰσχύς αὕτη καὶ τὸ κράτος, ὅταν μὲν ἐν τοῖς φανεῖσιν ἐμμενετέοις ἐγγένηται, ἐγκράτειά ἐστιν· ὅταν δ' ἐν τοῖς ὑπομενετέοις, ἀνδρεία· περὶ τὰς ἀξίας δὲ δικαιοσύνη· περὶ τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ ἐκκλίσεις σωφροσύνη."

b. Stob., *Ecl.* II 7, 5, p. 62, 24 W. (SVF I ib.):

Καὶ ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἰσχύς τοῦ σώματος τόνος ἐστὶν ἰκανὸς ἐν νεύροις, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰσχύς τόνος ἐστὶν ἰκανὸς ἐν τῷ κρίνειν καὶ πράττειν ἢ μή.

1030—Of Chrysippus, we have some more intellectual definitions of virtue and virtues.

a. In spite of his fundamentally monistic view of the soul, whence follows that every virtue is nothing but the hegemonikon in a certain state or condition—the ἡγεμονικόν πῶς ἔχον—(supra, nrs. 953 and 986c) Chrys. opposed Aristo's view of virtue as an undifferentiated unity, though holding essentially the same definition.

Galenus, *De plac. Hippocr. et Plat.* VII 2, 591 M. (SVF III 256): Virtue is knowledge

Νομίσας γοῦν ὁ Ἀρίστων μίαν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμιν, ἣ λογιζόμεθα, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔθετο μίαν, ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν αἰρεῖσθαι τε δέη τάγαθὰ καὶ φεύγειν τὰ κακά, τὴν ἐπιστήμην τήνδε καλεῖ σωφροσύνην· ὅταν δὲ πράττειν μὲν τάγαθὰ, μὴ πράττειν δὲ τὰ κακά, φρόνησιν· ἀνδρεία δ' ὅταν τὰ μὲν θαρρῇ, τὰ δὲ φεύγῃ· ὅταν δὲ τὸ κατὰ ἀξίαν ἐκάστω νέμῃ, δικαιοσύνην· ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ γινώσκουσα μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ χωρὶς τοῦ πράττειν τάγαθὰ τε καὶ κακά σοφία τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐπιστήμη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις ἀφικνουμένη τὰς κατὰ τὸν βίον, ὀνόματα πλείω λαμβάνει τὰ προειρημένα, φρόνησίς τε καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καλουμένη. τοιαύτη μὲν τις ἡ Ἀρίστωνος δόξα περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετῶν.

"Ὁ γε μὴν Χρύσιππος οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ἀντιλέγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ τάνδρῃ τὴν κοινήν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑπόθεσιν ἀκριβῶς διαφυλάττοντι. καλῶς γὰρ ἅπαντα γινωσκόντων τε καὶ πραττόντων ἡμῶν ἂν ὁ βίος διοικοῖτο κατὰ ἐπιστήμην, κακῶς δὲ καὶ ψευδῶς γινωσκόντων τε καὶ πραττόντων κατὰ ἄγνοιαν. ὥς αὐτὸς ὁ Χρύσιππος βούλεται, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μία μὲν ἀρετὴ γίνοιτο ἂν, ἡ ἐπιστήμη, μία δὲ ὡσαύτως ἡ κακία, προσαγορευομένη καὶ ἥδε ποτὲ μὲν ἄγνοια, ποτὲ δὲ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη.

b. How this general definition was meant, is explained by Galenus in the next passage (ib., 592 M.):

Ἐὰν οὖν τις τὸν θάνατον ἢ τὴν πενίαν ἢ τὴν νόσον ὡς κακά δεδιώς ᾖ, δέον θαρρεῖν, ὥς ἐπὶ ἀδιαφόροις, ἐνδεία μὲν ἐπιστήμης αὐτὸν τίθενται ἀγνοεῖν

τἀληθές, ὡς ἂν Ἀρίστων τε καὶ Χρύσιππος εἴποι, κακίαν δὲ ἔχειν ψυχῆς, ἣν ὀνομάζουσι δειλίαν, ἥ ἐναντίαν ἀρετὴν αὐτοὶ φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν ὧν χρὴ θαρρεῖν ἢ μὴ θαρρεῖν, τουτέστιν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν τῶν ὄντως δηλονότι τοιούτων, οὐ κατὰ ψευδῆ δόξαν ὑπειλημμένων, οἷάπερ ἐστὶν ὑγίεια καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ νόσος καὶ πένια. τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι φασιν, ἀλλὰ ἀδιάφορα πάντα. καὶ τοίνυν, εἰ τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ νομίσας τις ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀνιαρὸν κακὸν ἀκολουθῶν τῇ δόξῃ τῇδε τοῦ μὲν τὴν αἵρεσιν ποιοῖτο, τοῦ δὲ τὴν φυγὴν, ἀμαθὴς ἐστὶν οὐσίας ἀγαθοῦ καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀκόλαστος. ἐν ἀπάσαις γὰρ πράξεσιν αἰρουμένων ἡμῶν τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, φευγόντων δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον κακόν, ἐχόντων δὲ φύσει τὰς ὁρμὰς ταύτας ἐφ' ἑκάτερον ἢ φιλοσοφία διδάσκουσα τὸ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακὸν ἀναμαρτήτους ἐργάζεται.

Definitions
of the four
cardinal
virtues

c. The following definitions of the four cardinal virtues are due to Chrysippus¹.

Stob., *Ecl.* II, p. 59, 4 W. (SVF III 262):

Φρόνησιν δ' εἶναι ἐπιστήμην ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων, ἣ ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων φύσει πολιτικοῦ ζῴου (καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δὲ ἀρετῶν οὕτως ἀκούειν παραγγέλλουσι). σωφροσύνην δ' εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αἰρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων· δικαιοσύνην δ' ἐπιστήμην ἀπονεμητικὴν τῆς ἀξίας ἐκάστω· ἀνδρείαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων.

Inseparability
of virtue

1031—a. From the fundamental unity of virtue follows that he who possesses one virtue possesses all of them.

Stob., *ib.*, p. 63, 6 W.:

Πάσας δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ὅσαι ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι καὶ τέχναι κοινὰ τε θεωρήματα ἔχειν καὶ τέλος, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ αὐτό· διὸ καὶ ἀχωρίστους εἶναι· τὸν γὰρ μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν, καὶ τὸν κατὰ μίαν πράττοντα κατὰ πάσας πράττειν.

b. The same doctrine is found in Seneca, *Ep.* 67, 10:

Cum aliquis tormenta fortiter patitur, omnibus virtutibus utitur. Fortasse una in promptu sit et maxime appareat, patientia: ceterum illic est fortitudo, cuius patientia et perpessio et tolerantia rami sunt; illic est prudentia, sine qua nullum initur consilium, quae suadet quod effugere non possis quam fortissime ferre; illic est constantia, quae deici loco non potest et propositum nulla vi extorquente dimittit;

¹ See Dyroff, *Die Ethik der alten Stoa*, p. 82 ff., also Wachsmuth in his apparatus.

illic est individuus ille comitatus virtutum. Quicquid honeste fit, una virtus facit.

c. The reverse of this thesis is, evidently, that he who lacks one virtue lacks all; whence the division of mankind into wise men and fools (our next paragraph).

1032—The absolute character of virtue implies also that he who possesses it cannot lose it. This was, in general, the Stoic thesis. A point of discussion among Stoics was the question whether or not virtue can be lost by intoxication or melancholy. Cleanthes held it could not, Chrysippus thought it could ¹.

Virtue
cannot be
lost

a. Simplicius in *Ar. Categ.* f. 102 A ed. Bas. (SVF III 238):

(Ἐκ μὲν φαύλου σπουδαῖος γίνεται) τὸ δ' ἀνάπαλιν οἱ Στωϊκοὶ οὐ διδόασιν. οὐκ εἶναι γάρ φασιν ἀποβλητὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν.

b. *Ib.* B:

(Aristotle and Theophr. thought it above the human condition that virtue could not be lost.)

Ἦτι δὲ καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἐν μελαγχολίαις καὶ κάροις καὶ ληθάργοις καὶ ἐν φαρμάκων λήψεσι συγχωροῦσιν ἀποβολὴν γίνεσθαι μεθ' ὅλης τῆς λογικῆς ἕξεως καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀρετῆς, κακίας μὲν οὐκ ἀντισταγομένης, τῆς δὲ βεβαιότητος χαλωμένης καὶ εἰς ἣν λέγουσιν ἕξιν μέσσην οἱ παλαιοὶ μεταπιπτούσης.

c. *Cp.* Diog. Laërt. VII 127 (SVF III 237):

Καὶ μὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρύσιππος μὲν ἀποβλητὴν, Κλεάνθης δὲ ἀναπόβλητον· ὁ μὲν ἀποβλητὴν διὰ μέσσην καὶ μελαγχολίαν, ὁ δὲ ἀναπόβλητον διὰ βεβαίους καταλήψεις.

1033—Virtuous acts are called by Stoics *κατορθώματα*. Now, since virtue is a certain state of mind (*διάθεσις*), the first thing to be stressed is that *katorthomata* are not defined by what is done, but by the state of mind which is behind the action. As such, they are distinct from *καθήκοντα*, which are, in general, “befitting acts”, for which a reasonable defence can be adduced. The *katorthoma*, however, can be (and in fact, was) regarded as the perfect *kathekon*.

Virtuous
acts: kat-
orthomata

¹ Later, we shall find the problem in Plotinus, *Enn.* I 4, 9-10 and IV 4, 43-44; *infra*, our nrs. **1422c** and **1432c**.

καθήκοντα:
τέλεια
and μέσα κ.

a. Stob., *Ecl.* II 85, 13 W. (SVF III 494):

Ἀκόλουθος δ' ἐστὶ τῷ λόγῳ τῷ περὶ τῶν προηγμένων ὁ περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος τόπος. Ὅρίζεται δὲ τὸ καθήκον. "τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζῳῇ, ὃ πραχθὲν εὖλογον ἀπολογίαν ἔχει." παρὰ τὸ καθήκον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίως. Τοῦτο διατείνει καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων, ἐνεργεῖ γάρ τι ἀκρίτως ἀκολούθως τῇ ἐαυτῶν φύσει· ἐπὶ <δὲ> τῶν λογικῶν ζώων οὕτως ἀποδίδεται· "τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ". Τῶν δὲ καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναι φασὶ τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι. Κατορθώματα δ' εἶναι τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργήματα, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν, τὸ δικαιοπραγεῖν. οὐκ εἶναι δὲ κατορθώματα τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἃ δὴ οὐδὲ τέλεια καθήκοντα προσαγορεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ μέσα, οἷον τὸ γαμεῖν, τὸ πρεσβεῦειν, τὸ διαλέγεσθαι, τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια.

b. Stob., *ib.*, p. 93, 14 W. (SVF III 500):

Κατόρθωμα δ' εἶναι λέγουσι καθήκον πάντας ἐπέχον τοὺς ἀριθμούς, ἧ . . . τέλειον καθήκον.

Cp. Cic., *De fin.* III 7, 24, where wisdom is compared with other arts: it differs from the arts of acting and of dancing, the author says, in this, that a movement perfectly executed does not include all the parts which together constitute the subject matter of the art, whereas the *katorthoma*, indeed, contains the whole of virtue.

... "est etiam alia cum his ipsis artibus sapientiae dissimilitudo, propterea quod in illis, quae recte facta sunt, non continent tamen omnis partis, e quibus constant: quae autem nos aut recta facta dicamus, si placet, illi autem appellant *κατορθώματα*, *omnis numeros virtutis continent*".

The
kathekon
and the
κατὰ φύσιν

1034—The καθήκον is connected with the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, and as such, not yet of the moral level (cp. *supra*, nrs. 1017-1020).

a. Diog. Laërt. VII 108-109:

Ἐνέργημα δ' αὐτὸ εἶναι ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν κατασκευαῖς οἰκεῖον. τῶν γὰρ καθ' ὁρμὴν ἐνεργουμένων τὰ μὲν καθήκοντα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τὸ καθήκον, τὰ δ' οὐτε καθήκοντα οὐτε παρὰ τὸ καθήκον. καθήκοντα μὲν οὖν εἶναι ὅσα λόγος αἰρεῖ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔχει τὸ γονεῖς τιμᾶν, ἀδελφούς, πατρίδα, συμπεριφέρεσθαι φίλοις· παρὰ τὸ καθήκον δέ, ὅσα μὴ αἰρεῖ λόγος, ὡς ἔχει τὰ τοιαῦτα, γονέων ἀμελεῖν, ἀδελφῶν ἀφροντιστεῖν, φίλοις μὴ συνδιατίθεσθαι, πατρίδα ὑπερορᾶν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια· οὐτε δὲ καθήκοντα οὐτε παρὰ τὸ καθήκον, ὅσα οὐθ' αἰρεῖ λόγος πράττειν οὐτ' ἀπαγορεύει, οἷον κάρφος ἀνελεῖσθαι, γραφεῖον κρατεῖν ἢ στλεγγίδα καὶ τὰ ὅμοια τούτοις.

not yet of the
moral level

b. Cic., *De fin.* III 6, 22:

Cum vero illa, quae officia esse dixi, proficiscantur ab initiis naturae, necesse est ea ad haec referri, ut recte dici possit omnia officia eo referri,

ut adipiscamur principia naturae, nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturae conciliationibus honesta actio; consequens enim est et post oritur, ut dixi. Est tamen ea secundum naturam multoque nos ad se expetendam magis hortatur quam superiora omnia.

In fact, the doctrine of the καθήκον, which is, in principle, the question of choosing what is to be "preferred" among the ἀδιάφορα, took a great place in Stoic philosophy since Chrysippus. Wiersma, II. τέλους, p. 65 ff., expounds how Diogenes of Seleucia, by wording the telos as εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ—a formula in which the προηγμένα are shortly called τὰ κατὰ φύσιν—, gave a remarkable development to Chrysippus' doctrine of the καθήκοντα. Chrysippus' immediate successors—Diogenes, Archedemus and Antipater—appear to have considered the choice of the right kind of adiaphora as the essential thing in life, and therefore could define the telos by the ἐκλογὴ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν and ἀπεκλογὴ of what was opposed to these. Thus Stoicism became a philosophy of the προκόπτοντες, though never forgetting that the προκόπτων is essentially not of the level of the wise man, as the προηγμένον is not of the level of the ἀγαθόν.

**Importance
of the
καθήκοντα
stressed by
Chrysippus'
successors**

c. Cic., ib. 17, 58:

Sed cum quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse dicamus, consentaneum tamen est fungi officio, cum id officium nec in bonis ponamus nec in malis. Est enim aliquid in rebus probabile, et quidem ita, ut eius ratio reddi possit, ergo ut etiam probabiliter acti ratio reddi possit. Est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit. Ex quo intelligitur officium medium quiddam esse, quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis.

In this text the term *probabile* is used as a translation of the Greek εὐλογον which, with Stoic writers, has not a sceptical sense, but means simply "reasonable" or "justifiable by reason".

d. We possess a text of Chrysippus himself on the (relative) value of καθήκοντα.

Stob., *Florileg.* 103, 22 (SVF III 510):

Χρυσίππου. 'Ο δ' ἐπ' ἄκρον, φησί, προκόπτων ἅπαντα πάντως ἀποδίδωσι τὰ καθήκοντα καὶ οὐδὲν παραλείπει.

Τὸν δὲ τούτου βίον οὐκ εἶναι πῶ φησιν εὐδαίμονα, ἀλλ' ἐπιγίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὅταν αἱ μέσαι πράξεις αὐταὶ προσλάβωσι τὸ βέβαιον καὶ ἐκτικὸν καὶ ἰδίαν πῆξιν τινὰ λάβωσι.

The text reminds us of Aristotle's teaching in the *Eth. Nic.* II, that virtue arises from habit (our nr. 567a), but only then, ἐάν ὁ πράττων πως ἔχων πράττη, and ἐάν καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττη (EN II 4; our nr. 570a).

Chrysippus was not so far from Aristotle as he might seem to have been!

Wiersma cites the above text of Chrysippus and comments on it, II. τέλους p. 61 f.

See also, on the relation between καθῆκον and κατόρθωμα, the article of G. Nebel, *Hermes* 70, 1935, p. 439-460.

Morality
depends on
the inner
man

1035—The katorthoma proceeds from the inner man.

a. Seneca, *Ep.* 95, 57:

Actio recta non erit, nisi recta fuerit voluntas: ab hac enim est actio. Rursus voluntas non erit recta, nisi habitus animi rectus fuerit: ab hoc enim est voluntas. Habitus porro animi non erit in optimo, nisi totius vitae leges perceperit et quid de quoque iudicandum sit exegerit.

Cp. Stob., *Ecl.* II 7, 1, p. 38, 15 W. (SVF I 203):

Οἱ δὲ κατὰ Ζήνωνα τὸν Στωϊκὸν τροπικῶς ἡθὺς ἐστὶ πηγὴ βίου, ἀφ' ἧς αἱ κατὰ μέρος πράξεις ῥέουσι.

No outward
conditions

b. No outward conditions are required for it.

Seneca, *De benef.* III 18:

Refert enim cuius animi sit qui praestat, non cuius status: nulli praeclusa virtus est, omnibus patet, omnes admittit, omnes invitat, ingenuos, libertinos, servos, reges, exules. non eligit domum nec censum, nudo homine contenta est.

In this Stoic ethics stands opposite to Aristotle, who, in his EN I 8 (1099 a 31-b 2; cp. 1098 b 32 - 1099 a 7) taught that outward means are necessary for the exercise of virtue, the χρῆσις of which seemed to him far superior to its κτήσις.

Hence, for Aristotle, it is a question whether or not slaves, women and children can have virtue. He replied that, indeed, none of them can in full sense, and that the virtue of a woman is different from that of a man, and the virtue of slaves different from that of freeborn people (our nr. 611).

To this view, Stoics opposed energetically ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, etc., or, as it was said by Musonius Rufus¹ and later, e.g., by Clement of Alexandria: ὅτι πᾶσι φιλοσοφητέον². In this, the Stoics were preceded by Antisthenes and his school.

Not increased
by duration

1036—The value of morality being something absolute, right conduct, which depends on a certain inner disposition, is not capable of increase, and therefore independent of duration.

Cic., *De fin.* III 14, 45-47:

Ut enim obscuratur et offunditur luce solis lumen lucernae et ut interit in magnitudine maris Aegaei stilla mellis et ut in divitiis Croesi teruncii accessio et gradus unus in ea via, quae est hinc in Indiam, sic,

¹ Musonius c. 3, "Ὅτι καὶ γυναῖξί φιλοσοφητέον.

² Clem. Alex., *Strom.* IV 8, p. 590 and 592 (SVF III 254). Cp. Lactantius, *Inst.*, III 25.

cum sit is bonorum finis, quem Stoici dicunt, omnis ista rerum corporearum aestimatio splendore virtutis et magnitudine obscoretur et obruatur atque intereat necesse est; et quem ad modum opportunitas—sic enim appellemus εὐκαιρίαν—non fit maior productione temporis—habent enim suum modum quae opportuna dicuntur—, sic recta effectio—κατόρθωσιν enim ita appello, quoniam rectum factum κατόρθωμα—, recta igitur effectio, item convenientia, denique ipsum bonum, quod in eo positum est ut naturae consentiat, crescendi accessionem nullam habet. ut enim opportunitas illa, sic haec, de quibus dixi, non fiunt temporis productione maiora, ob eamque causam Stoicis non videtur optabilior nec magis expetenda beata vita, si sit longa, quam si brevis, utunturque simili: ut, si cothurni laus illa esset, ad pedem apte convenire, neque multi cothurni paucis anteponerentur nec maiores minoribus, sic, quorum omne bonum convenientia atque opportunitate finitur, nec plura paucioribus nec longinquiora brevioribus anteponent. nec vero satis acute dicunt: “si bona valetudo pluris aestimanda sit longa quam brevis, sapientiae quoque usus longissimus quisque sit plurimi.” non intellegunt valetudinis aestimationem spatio iudicari, virtutis opportunitate, ut videantur qui illud dicunt idem hoc esse dicturi, bonam mortem et bonum partum meliorem longum esse quam brevem. Non vident alia brevitate pluris aestimari, alia diurnitate.

1037—As to the outward appearance, the man who does not possess virtue may do the same things as he who possesses it. The difference is in the inner man.

A non-moral action may be seemingly the same as a katorthoma

a. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* VII 10, p. 43 St. (SVF III 511):

Καίτοι πράσσεται τινα καὶ πρὸς τῶν μὴ γνωστικῶν ὀρθῶς, ἀλλ’ οὐ κατὰ λόγον· οἷον ἐπὶ ἀνδρείας· ἐνιοὶ γὰρ ἐκ φύσεως θυμοειδεῖς γενόμενοι, εἴτα ἄνευ τοῦ λόγου τοῦτο θρέψαντες, ἀλόγως ἐπὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὁρμῶσι καὶ ὅμοια τοῖς ἀνδρείοις δρῶσιν, ὥστε ἐνίοτε τὰ αὐτὰ κατορθοῦν οἷον βασάνους ὑπομένειν εὐκόλως· ἀλλ’ οὔτε ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς αἰτίας τῷ γνωστικῷ οὔτε καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ προθέμενοι, οὐδ’ ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἅπαν ἐπιδιδῶσιν. — Πᾶσα οὖν ἡ διὰ τοῦ ἐπιστήμονος πρᾶξις εὐπραγία, ἡ δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἀνεπιστήμονος κακοπραγία, καὶ ἐνστάσιν σφίζῃ. ἐπεὶ μὴ ἐκ λογισμοῦ ἀνδρίζεται μηδὲ ἐπὶ τι χρήσιμον τῶν ἐπὶ ἀρετῇ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀρετῆς καταστρεφόντων τὴν πρᾶξιν κατευθύνει. Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν.

What Clement calls the γνωστικός is the spiritually fullgrown, or deeply initiated, Christian, as opposed to the “simple believer” (ἀπλῶς πιστός) who is at a lower stage of spiritual development. The actions of the first, whom he calls also the

ἐπιστήμων, are always right—Clement calls them εὐπραγία, or also κατορθώματα (see sub *b*)—, those of the latter, who does not possess “knowledge”, never.

In this and the following passage we find Stoic views and terminology adopted by a Christian.

b. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* VI 14, p. 487 St. (SVF III 515):

Οὕτως καὶ πᾶσα πράξις γνωστικοῦ μὲν κατόρθωμα, τοῦ δὲ ἀπλῶς πιστοῦ μέση πράξις λέγοιτ' ἂν, μηδέπω κατὰ λόγον ἐπιτελουμένη μηδὲ μὴν κατ' ἐπίστασιν κατορθουμένη.

c. That there is a true analogy between the Stoic and the Christian view of moral perfection, may be seen from the following well-known text.

Paulus, *ad Rom.* 14, 23:

Πᾶν δὲ ὁ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως ἀμαρτία ἐστίν.

Which means: those actions which do not spring from the right state of the inner man, cannot be called good actions.

11—ETHICS (4): WISE MEN AND FOOLS

No medium
between
virtue and
vice

1038—Stoics did not admit of any medium between virtue and vice.

a. Diog. Laërt. VII 127 (SVF III 536):

Ἀρέσκει δὲ αὐτοῖς μηδὲν μέσον εἶναι ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, τῶν Περιπατητικῶν μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας εἶναι λεγόντων τὴν προκοπὴν· ὥς γὰρ δεῖν φασιν ἢ ὀρθὸν εἶναι ξύλον ἢ στρεβλόν, οὕτως ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἀδικον, οὔτε δὲ δικαιότερον οὔτε ἀδικώτερον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως.

b. Cp. Cleanthes, fr. 566 SVF I (ap. Stob., *Ecl.* II 65, 7 W.):

Ἀρετῆς δὲ καὶ κακίας οὐδὲν εἶναι μεταξύ. πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετὴν, καὶ οἶονεὶ τὸν τῶν ἡμιαμβείων λόγον ἔχειν, κατὰ Κλεάνθην· ὅθεν ἀτελεῖς μὲν ὄντας εἶναι φαύλους, τελειωθέντας δὲ σπουδαίους.

The
προκόπ-
τοντες
classed as
ἀνόητοι

1039—The προκόπτοντες are classed as ἀνόητοι.

a. Plut., *De comm. not.* 10, p. 1063a (SVF III 539):

Ναί, φασίν, ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ὁ πῆχυν ἀπέχων ἐν θαλάττῃ τῆς ἐπιφανείας, οὐδὲν ἥττον πνίγεται τοῦ καταδεδυκότος ὀργυιάς πεντακοσίας, οὕτως οὐδὲ οἱ πελάζοντες ἀρετῇ τῶν μακρὰν ὄντων ἥττόν εἰσιν ἐν κακίᾳ· καὶ καθάπερ οἱ τυφλοὶ τυφλοὶ εἰσι, καὶ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀναβλέπειν μέλλωσιν, οὕτως οἱ προκόπτοντες, ἄχρις οὗ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναλάβωσιν, ἀνόητοι καὶ μοχθηροὶ διαμένουσιν.

b. Likewise, Cicero in *De finibus* III 14, 48, when expounding that wisdom does not admit of degrees, says:

Ut enim qui demersi sunt in aqua nihilo magis respirare possunt, si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam tum essent in profundo, nec catulus ille, qui iam adpropinquat ut videat, plus cernit quam is, qui modo est natus, item qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis habitum nihilo minus in miseria est quam ille, qui nihil processit.

c. Plut. finds some difficulties in the abrupt transition from φαυλότης to wisdom. *Quomodo quis in virtute sentiat profectum*, c. 1, p. 75c (SVF III ib.):

Οὕτως ἐν τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν οὔτε προκοπὴν οὔτε τινὰ προκοπῆς αἴσθησιν ὑποληπτέον, εἰ μὴδὲν ἡ ψυχὴ μεθίσῃ μὴδ' ἀποκαθαίρεται τῆς ἀβελτερίας, ἄχρι δὲ τοῦ λαβεῖν ἄκρατον τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τέλειον ἀκράτῳ τῷ κακῷ χρῆται. Καὶ γὰρ ἀκαρεῖ χρόνου καὶ ὥρας ἐκ τῆς ὥς ἐνὶ μάλιστα φαυλότητος εἰς οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς διαθέσειν μεταβαλὼν ὁ σοφός, ἥς οὐδ' ἐν χρόνῳ πόλλω μέρος ἀφεῖλε κακίας ἅμα πᾶσαν ἐξαίφνης ἐκπέφευγε. καίτοι ἤδη τοὺς ταῦτά γε λέγοντας οἶσθα δήπου πάλιν πολλὰ παρέχοντας αὐτοῖς πράγματα καὶ μεγάλας ἀπορίας περὶ τοῦ διαλεληθότος, ὃς αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν οὐδέπω κατείληφε γεγωνὸς σοφός. — Εἰ δέ γε ἦν τάχος τοσοῦτον τῆς μεταβολῆς καὶ μέγεθος, ὥστε τὸν πρῶτ' ἀκρίστον ἐσπέρας γεγενῆσθαι κράτιστον, ἢ ἂν οὕτω τινὶ συντύχη τὰ τῆς μεταβολῆς, καταδαρθόντα φαῦλον ἀνεγρέσθαι σοφὸν καὶ προσειπεῖν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς μεθεικότα τὰς χθιζὰς ἀβελτερίας καὶ ἀπάτας

“ψευδεῖς ὄνειροι, χαίρετ’· οὐδὲν ἦτ’ ἄρα”,

τίς ἂν ἀγνοήσειεν αὐτοῦ διαφορὰν ἐν αὐτῷ τοσαύτην γενομένην καὶ φρόνησιν ἀθρόον ἐκλάμψασαν;

1040—Stoics themselves made a certain difference between the **Fundamental** ἀμαρτήματα though they are fundamentally equal. **equality of** ἀμαρτήματα

a. Stob., *Ecl.* II 7, p. 106, 21 W. (SVF III 528):

Ἰσά τε πάντα λέγουσιν εἶναι τὰ ἀμαρτήματα, οὐκ ἐτι δ' ὅμοια. Καθάπερ γὰρ ἀπὸ μιᾶς τινος πηγῆς τῆς κακίας φέρεσθαι πέφυκε, τῆς κρίσεως οὐσης ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἀμαρτήμασι τῆς αὐτῆς· παρὰ δὲ τὴν ἔξωθεν αἰτίαν τῶν ἐφ' οἷς αἱ κρίσεις ἀποτελοῦνται μέσων διαλλαττόντων, διάφορα κατὰ ποιότητα γίνεσθαι τὰ ἀμαρτήματα. Λάβοις δ' ἂν εἰκόνα σαφῆ τοῦ δηλουμένου τῷδ' ἐπιστήσας· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐπ' ἴσης ψεῦδος συμβέβηκεν, οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον διεψευσμένον· τὸ [τε] γὰρ νύκτ' <αἰ> εἶναι ψεῦδος ἐστι, καθάπερ

τὸ ἱπποκένταυρον ζῆν· καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον εἶπεῖν ἔστι ψεῦδος εἶναι θάτερον θατέρου· ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐπίσης ψεῦδός ἐστιν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ διεψευσμένοι ἐπίσης εἰσὶ διεψευσμένοι. Καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οὐκ ἔστιν, πᾶσαν γὰρ ἁμαρτίαν κατὰ διάψευσιν πράττεσθαι. "Ἐτι, οὐχὶ κατόρθωμα μὲν μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον οὐ γίγνεσθαι, ἁμαρτήματα δὲ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον γίγνεσθαι· πάντα γὰρ ἔστι τέλεια, διόπερ οὐτ' ἐλλείπειν οὐτ' ὑπερέχειν δύναιτ' ἂν ἀλλήλων.

Fools are
equally
fools

b. Stob., *ib.*, 113, 18 W. (SVF III 529):

Πάντων τε τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἴσων ὄντων καὶ τῶν κατορθωμάτων, καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας ἐπίσης πάντας ἄφρονας εἶναι, τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ ἴσῃν ἔχοντας διάθεσιν. ἴσων δὲ ὄντων τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων εἶναι τινας ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφοράς, καθ' ὅσον τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπὸ σκληραῖς καὶ δυσιάτου διαθέσεως γίνεται, τὰ δ' οὐ.

Moral
progress
admitted
by Zeno

1041—a. That Zeno admitted a προκοπή, may be seen from the following passage.

Plut., *De prof. in virt.* 12, p. 82 f. (SVF I 234):

"Ὅρα δὴ καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὁποῖόν ἐστιν. ἥξιον γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνείρων ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ συναισθάνεσθαι προκόπτοντος, εἰ μὴτ' ἡδόμενον αἰσχυρῶ τινα ἑαυτὸν μῆτε τι προσιέμενον ἢ πράττοντα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ ἀτόπων ὁρᾷ κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους, ἀλλ' οἷον ἐν βυθῷ γαλήνης ἀκλύστου καταφανεῖ διαλάμπει τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ φανταστικὸν καὶ παθητικὸν διακεχυμένον ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου.

The same
doctrine in
Seneca

b. Seneca treats at some length of moral progress. *Ep.* 75, 8:

Quid ergo? infra illum nulli gradus sunt? statim a sapientia praeceps est? Non, ut existimo: nam qui proficit, in numero quidem stultorum est, magno tamen intervallo ab illis diducitur. Inter ipsos quoque proficientes sunt magna discrimina.

He then proceeds to divide the *proficientes* into three classes, of which we shall speak again in dealing with the πάθη and their treatment.

Wise men
and fools

1042—Mankind, then, is divided by Stoics into two classes: wise men and fools.

a. Stob., *Ecl.* II 7, 11g; p. 99, 3 W. (SVF I 216):

Ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ Στωϊκοῖς φιλοσόφοις δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων· καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων διὰ πάντος τοῦ βίου χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων ταῖς κακίαις· ὅθεν τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ κατορθοῦν ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς προστίθεται, τὸ δὲ ἁμαρτάνειν. καὶ τὸν μὲν σπουδαῖον ταῖς περὶ τὸν βίον ἐμπειρίαις χρώμενον ἐν τοῖς πραττομένοις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πάντ' εὖ ποιεῖν, καθάπερ φρονίμως καὶ σωφρόνως

καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς· τὸν δὲ φαῦλον κατὰ τοῦναντίον κακῶς. καὶ τὸν μὲν σπουδαῖον μέγαν καὶ ἄδρὸν καὶ ὑψηλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρόν. μέγαν μὲν ὅτι δύναται ἐφικνεῖσθαι τῶν κατὰ προαίρεσιν ὄντων αὐτῷ καὶ προκειμένων· ἄδρὸν δέ, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡὔξημένος πάντοθεν· ὑψηλὸν δ', ὅτι μετείληφε τοῦ ἐπιβάλλοντος ὕψους ἀνδρὶ γενναίῳ καὶ σοφῷ. καὶ ἰσχυρόν δ', ὅτι τὴν ἐπιβάλλουσαν ἰσχὺν περιπεποίηται, ἀήττητος ὢν καὶ ἀκαταγώνιστος. παρ' ὃ καὶ οὔτε ἀναγκάζεται ὑπό τινος οὔτε ἀναγκάζει τινα, οὔτε κωλύεται οὔτε κωλύει, οὔτε βιάζεται ὑπό τινος οὔτ' αὐτὸς βιάζει τινα, οὔτε δεσπόζει οὔτε δεσπάζεται, οὔτε κακοποιεῖ τινα οὔτ' αὐτὸς κακοποιεῖται, οὔτε κακοῖς περιπίπτει <οὔτ' ἄλλον ποιεῖ κακοῖς περιπίπτειν>, οὔτε ἐξαπατᾶται οὔτε ἐξαπατᾷ ἄλλον, οὔτε διαψεύδεται οὔτε ἀγνοεῖ οὔτε λανθάνει ἑαυτόν, οὔτε καθόλου ψεῦδος ὑπολαμβάνει· εὐδαίμων δὲ ἐστὶν μάλιστα καὶ εὐτυχὴς καὶ μακάριος καὶ ὄλβιος καὶ εὐσεβὴς καὶ θεοφιλὴς καὶ ἀξιοματικὸς, βασιλικὸς τε καὶ στρατηγικὸς καὶ πολιτικὸς καὶ οἰκονομικὸς καὶ χρηματιστικὸς. τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ἅπαντα τούτοις ἐναντία ἔχειν.

b. Athenaeus IV 158b (SVF I 217):

Στωϊκὸν δὲ δόγμα ἐστίν· ὅτι πάντα τε εὖ ποιήσει ὁ σοφὸς καὶ φακῆν φρονίμως ἀρτύσει· διὸ καὶ Τίμων ὁ Φλιάσιος ἔφη (fr. 72 Wachsm.) [καὶ]

The wise
man does
every thing
well

“Ζηνώνειόν γε φακῆν ἔψειν ὃς μὴ φρονίμως μεμάθηκεν”

ὥς οὐκ ἄλλως δυναμένης ἐψηθῆναι φακῆς εἰ μὴ κατὰ τὴν Ζηνώνειον ὑφήγησιν, ὃς ἔφη

“εἷς δὲ φακῆν ἔμβαλλε δυωδέκατον κοριάννου”.

1043—The wise man never fails, neither in judgment nor in action; consequently, he never repents and never changes his opinion.

a. Stob., *Ecl.* II, p. 111, 18 W. (SVF III 548):

He is never
in error

Ψεῦδος δ' ὑπολαμβάνειν οὐδέποτε φασὶ τὸν σοφόν, οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀκατάληπτον τινὶ συγκατατίθεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴδὲ δοξάζειν αὐτόν μὴδ' ἀγνοεῖν μὴδὲν. τὴν γὰρ ἀγνοίαν μεταπτωτικὴν εἶναι συγκατάθεσιν καὶ ἀσθενῆ. Μηδὲν δ' ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀσθενῶς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀσφαλῶς καὶ βεβαίως, διὸ καὶ μὴδὲ δοξάζειν τὸν σοφόν. Διττὰς γὰρ εἶναι δόξας, τὴν μὲν ἀκαταλήπτῳ συγκατάθεσιν, τὴν δὲ ὑπόληψιν ἀσθενῆ· ταύτας <δ'> ἄλλοτρίους εἶναι τῆς τοῦ σοφοῦ διαθέσεως· δι' ὃ καὶ τὸ προπίπτειν πρὸ καταλήψεως <καὶ> συγκατατίθεσθαι κατὰ τὸν προπετῇ φαῦλον εἶναι καὶ μὴ πίπτειν εἰς τὸν εὐφυῆ καὶ τέλειον ἄνδρα καὶ σπουδαῖον. Οὐδὲ λανθάνειν δὲ αὐτόν τι, τὴν γὰρ λῆσιν εἶναι ψεύδους ὑπόληψιν ἀποφαντικὴν πράγματος. Τούτοις δ' ἀκολουθῶς οὐκ ἀπιστεῖν, τὴν γὰρ ἀπιστίαν εἶναι ψεύδους ὑπόληψιν· τὴν δὲ πίστιν ἀστεῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἶναι γὰρ κατὰληψιν ἰσχυράν, βεβαιουσαν τὸ ὑπολαμβανόμενον. Ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου· διὰ ταῦτά φασὶ μήτε ἐπίστασθαι τι τὸν

φαῦλον μήτε πιστεύειν. Ἐχομένως δὲ τούτων οὔτε πλεονεκτεῖσθαι τὸν σοφὸν οὔτε βουκολεῖσθαι οὔτε διαιτᾶσθαι οὔτε παραριθμεῖν οὔτε ὑφ' ἑτέρου παραριθμεῖσθαι. ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα τὴν ἀπάτην περιέχειν καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὸν τόπον ψεύδεσι πρόσθεσιν. Οὐδένα δὲ τῶν ἀστείων οὐθ' ὁδοῦ διαμαρτάνειν οὔτ' οἰκίας οὔτε σκοποῦ· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ παρορᾶν [ἀλλ'] οὐδὲ παρακούειν νομίζουσι τὸν σοφόν, οὐδὲ τὸ σύνολον παραπαίνειν κατὰ τι τῶν αἰσθητηρίων· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστον ἔχεσθαι νομίζουσι τῶν[δε] ψευδῶν συγκαταθέσεων. οὐδ' ὑπονοεῖν δέ φασι τὸν σοφόν· καὶ γὰρ τὴν ὑπόνοιαν ἀκαταλήπτω εἶναι τῷ γένει συγκατάθεσιν· οὐδὲ μετανοεῖν δ' ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα· καὶ γὰρ τὴν μετάνοιαν ἔχεσθαι ψευδοῦς συγκαταθέσεως, <ὡς> ἂν προδιαπεπτωκότος. οὐδὲ μεταβάλλεσθαι δὲ κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον οὐδὲ μετατίθεσθαι οὐδὲ σφάλλεσθαι· ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι πάντα τῶν τοῖς δόγμασι μεταπιπτόντων, ὅπερ ἀλλότριον εἶναι τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος· οὐδὲ δοκεῖν αὐτῷ τί φασι παραπλησίως τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

and
possesses
all virtues

b. Stob., ib. 65, 12 W. (SVF III 557):

Φασὶ δὲ καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν τὸν σοφὸν <κατὰ> πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς. πᾶσαν γὰρ πρᾶξιν τελείαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, διὸ καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπολελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς.

Relation
with
Cynicism

1044—In his ideal of the wise man, Zeno was doubtless inspired by Cynicism, as appears clearly from the following passage.

a. Diog. Laërt. VII 121-122:

Πολιτεύεσθαι φασὶ τὸν σοφὸν ἂν μὴ τι καλύῃ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ Περὶ βίων· καὶ γὰρ κακίαν ἐφέξειν καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετὴν παρορμήσειν. καὶ γαμήσειν, ὥς ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν ἐν Πολιτείᾳ, καὶ παιδοποιήσεσθαι. ἔτι τε μὴ δοξάσειν τὸν σοφόν, τουτέστι ψεύδει μὴ συγκαταθήσεσθαι μηδενί. κυνιεῖν τ' αὐτόν· εἶναι γὰρ τὸν κυνισμόν σύντομον ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ὁδόν, ὥς Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Ἡθικῇ. γεύσεσθαι τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων σαρκῶν κατὰ περίστασιν. μόνον τ' ἐλεύθερον, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους δούλους. εἶναι γὰρ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐξουσίαν αὐτοπραγίας, τὴν δὲ δουλείαν στέρησιν αὐτοπραγίας. —

(122) Οὐ μόνον δ' ἐλευθέρους εἶναι τοὺς σοφοὺς, ἀλλὰ καὶ βασιλέας, τῆς βασιλείας οὐσης ἀρχῆς ἀνυπευθύνου, ἥτις περὶ μόνους ἂν τοὺς σοφοὺς συσταίη, καθὰ φησι Χρύσιππος, ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ κυρίως κεχρῆσθαι Ζήνωνα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν· ἐγνώκεναι γὰρ φησι δεῖν τὸν ἄρχοντα περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, μηδένα δὲ τῶν φαύλων ἐπίστασθαι ταῦτα.

Ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ἀρχικοὺς δικαστικούς τε καὶ ῥητορικοὺς μόνους εἶναι, τῶν δὲ φαύλων οὐδένα. ἔτι καὶ ἀναμαρτήτους, τῷ ἀπεριπτώτους εἶναι ἀμαρτήματι.

In this portrait of the sage, the notes of *freedom* and of *kingship* are of Cynic origin ¹, as is copiously shown by R. Höistad, *Cynic hero and Cynic King*, Uppsala

¹ See *Gr. Ph.* I, nrs. **244b** (the example of Heracles), and **248a**.

1948. We shall find them again in Dio Chrysostomus. See also our nr. **1013b**, where Epictetus says that he is no more a slave since Antisthenes liberated him by teaching him what is, and what is not, in our power.

The Cynic tradition knows also the ideal of the philosopher as a ruler and an educator. Cp. the story of Diogenes as the educator of the sons of Xenocrates (Diog. Laërt. VI 30). On this theme: Höistad, o.c., p. 118-126; on *paideia* in Dio Chrys., ib. p. 156-179. The ancient Cynic ideal of education, however, has an ethical-individual character; with the Stoics, it becomes more social and political. See our next nr.

b. The following chapter of Diog. Laërt. (VII 123) shows us the hardness of the Stoic sage. The wise man does not feel compassion

Ἐλεήμονάς τε μὴ εἶναι συγγνώμην τ' ἔχειν μηδενί· μὴ γὰρ παριέναι τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ἐπιβαλλούσας κολάσεις, ἐπεὶ τό γ' εἴκειν καὶ ὁ ἔλεος αὐτῇ θ' ἡ ἐπιείκεια οὐδένειά ἐστι ψυχῆς πρὸς κολάσεις προσποιουμένης χρηστότητα· μηδ' οἴεσθαι σκληροτέρας αὐτὰς εἶναι.

We shall find this feature again in Cicero's description of the sapiens in *Pro Murena* 61 ff. (infra, **1050b**).

On ἐπιείκεια, nrs. **589** and **658a**.

1045—a. With the Stoics, παιδεία shows more a political character than it had in ancient Cynicism.

Political character of *paideia* with the Stoics

Stob., *Ecl.* II, p. 94, 7 W. (SVF III 611):

Τό τε δίκαιόν φασι φύσει εἶναι καὶ μὴ θέσει. Ἐπόμενον δὲ τούτοις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ταῖς ἐμφαινούσαις τινὰ προκοπὴν πρὸς τὰς τελείας πολιτείας· καὶ τὸ νομοθετεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους.

b. In Stoicism, again, the ideal of the *basileus* acquires a cosmic and religious character, which was alien to the ancient Cynic conception. This specifically Stoic character of the *basileus* may be seen in Dio Chrys. *Or.* 3, 51-85, where the earthly being is a copy of Zeus-basileus, ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ἄριστος θεός (50).

Cosmic and religious character of the Stoic *basileus*

We cite the beginning of Dio's exposition, c. 51 ff.:

Πρῶτον μὲν ἐστὶ θεοφιλὴς, ἅτε τῆς μεγίστης τυγχάνων παρὰ θεῶν τιμῆς καὶ πίστεως. καὶ πρῶτόν γε καὶ μάλιστα θεραπεύσει τὸ θεῖον, οὐκ ὁμολογῶν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πεπεισμένος εἶναι θεούς, ἵνα δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχῃ τοὺς κατ' ἀξίαν ἄρχοντας. ἡγεῖται δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις συμφέρειν τὴν αὐτοῦ πρόνοιαν οὕτως ὥς αὐτῷ τὴν ἐκείνων ἀρχήν. —

(53) Ἥγεῖται δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν ὁσιότητα, τὴν δὲ κακίαν πᾶσαν ἀσέβειαν. εἶναι γὰρ ἐναγεῖς καὶ ἀλιτηρίους οὐ μόνον τοὺς τὰ ἱερὰ συλῶντας ἢ λέγοντάς

τι βλάσφημον περὶ τῶν θεῶν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τοὺς τε δειλοὺς καὶ ἀδίκους καὶ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ ἀνοήτους καὶ καθόλου τοὺς ἐναντίον τι πράττοντας τῇ τε δυνάμει καὶ βουλήσει τῶν θεῶν.

See on this passage: Høistad o.c., p. 190 f.

The wise
man is rich

1046—a. Stob., *Ecl.* II, p. 101, 14 W. (SVF III 593):

Τὸν δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πλοῦτον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι λέγουσι καὶ τὴν κατ' ἀλήθειαν πενίαν κακόν. καὶ τὴν μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἐλευθερίαν ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν δουλείαν κακόν· δι' ὃ δὴ καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον εἶναι μόνον πλούσιον καὶ ἐλεύθερον, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον τοῦναντίον πένητα, τῶν εἰς τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀφορμῶν ἐστερημένον, καὶ δοῦλον διὰ τὴν ὑποπτωτικὴν ἐν αὐτῷ διάθεσιν.

He alone is
beautiful

b. Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* XI (= *Ag. the ethicists*) 170:

Cp. Cic., *De fin.* III, 22, 75: recte etiam pulcher appellabitur; animi enim linimenta sunt pulchriora quam corporis.

Καὶ ὁ ἀξιέραστός ἐστι καλός, μόνος δὲ ὁ σοφὸς ἀξιέραστος· μόνος ἄρα ὁ σοφός ἐστι καλός.

and happy

c. Gregorius Nazianzenus, *Ep.* 32 (SVF III 586):

Ἐπαινώ δὲ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς τὸ νεανικόν τε καὶ μεγαλόνουν, οἳ μὴδὲν κωλύειν φασὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν τὰ ἐξωθεν, ἀλλ' εἶναι τὸν σπουδαῖον μακάριον, καὶ ὁ Φαλάριδος ταῦρος ἔχῃ καίόμενον.

εὐλόγος
ἐξαγωγή

1047—He has the right to dispose of his own life.

a. Diog. Laërt. VII 130 (SVF III 757):

Εὐλόγως τέ φασι ἐξάξειν ἑαυτὸν τοῦ βίου τὸν σοφόν, καὶ ὑπὲρ πατρίδος καὶ ὑπὲρ φίλων, καὶ ἐν σκληροτέρῃ γένηται ἀλγηδόνι ἢ πηρώσειν ἢ νόσοις ἀνιάτοις.

b. Stob., *Ecl.* II, p. 110, 9 W. (SVF III 758):

Φασὶ δὲ ποτε καὶ τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ βίου τοῖς σπουδαίοις καθηκόντως <γίγνεσθαι> κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους, τοῖς <δὲ> φαύλοις μονὴν <τὴν> ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ εἰ μὴ μέλλοιεν ἔσεσθαι σοφοί· οὔτε γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν κατέχειν ἐν τῷ ζῆν οὔτε τὴν κακίαν ἐκβάλλειν· τοῖς δὲ καθήκουσι καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τὸ καθήκον <παρα>μετρεῖσθαι τὴν τε ζωὴν καὶ τὸν θάνατον.

c. Cf. Plut., *De Stoic. repugn.* 18, p. 1042d:

Ἄλλ' οὐδ' ὅλως, φασίν, οἴεται δεῖν Χρύσιππος οὔτε μονὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, οὔτ' ἐξαγωγὴν τοῖς κακοῖς παραμετρεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μέσοις κατὰ φύσιν·

διὸ καὶ τοῖς εὐδαιμονοῦσι γίνεται ποτε καθῆκον ἐξάγειν ἑαυτούς, καὶ μένειν αὖθις ἐν τῷ ζῆν τοῖς κακοδαιμονοῦσιν.

d. The doctrine is explained at some length by Cato in Cicero's *De fin.* III 18, 60:

Sed cum ab his (i.e. a principiis naturalibus sive *primis naturae*) omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur ad ea referri omnis nostras cogitationes, in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem: in quo enim plura sunt quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, huius officium est e vita excedere; e quo adparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser. nam bonum illud et malum, quod saepe iam dictum est, postea consequitur; prima autem illa naturae, sive secunda, sive contraria, sub iudicium sapientis et dilectum cadunt, estque illa subiecta quasi materia sapientiae. itaque et manendi in vita et migrandi ratio omnis iis rebus, quas supra dixi, metienda. nam neque virtutem qui habet virtute retinetur in vita, nec iis, qui sine virtute sunt, mors est oppetenda; et saepe officium est sapientis desciscere a vita, cum sit beatissimus, si id opportune facere possit. sic enim censent, opportunitatis esse beate vivere, quod est convenienter naturae vivere; itaque a sapientia praecipitur, se ipsam, si usus sit, sapiens ut relinquat. quam ob rem cum vitiorum ista vis non sit, ut causam adferant mortis voluntariae, perspicuum est etiam stultorum, qui idem miseri sint, officium esse manere in vita, si sint in maiore parte rerum earum, quas secundum naturam esse dicimus; et quoniam excedens e vita et manens aequae miser est, nec diuturnitas magis ei vitam fugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur iis, qui pluribus naturalibus frui possint, esse in vita manendum.

1048—The wise man is the absolute example. Practically speaking, he is as rare as the phoenix.

The wise man
a very rare
phaenomenon

a. Plut., *De Stoic. repugn.* 31 (SVF III 662):

Καὶ μὴν οὐθ' αὐτὸν ὁ Χρῦσιππος ἀποφαίνει σπουδαῖον οὔτε τινὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ γνωρίμων ἢ καθηγεμόνων.

b. Cp. Seneca, *De tranqu.* 7, 4, who says, speaking of the importance of selecting friends carefully:

Nec hoc praeceperim tibi, ut neminem nisi sapientem sequaris aut adtrahas; ubi enim istum invenies, quem tot saeculis quaerimus?

c. Seneca, *Ep.* 42, 1:

Iam tibi iste persuasit virum se bonum esse? atqui vir bonus tam cito nec fieri potest nec intellegi. Scis quem nunc virum bonum dicam? huius secundae notae. Nam ille alter fortasse tamquam phoenix semel anno quingentesimo nascitur. Nec est mirum ex intervallo magna generari: mediocria et in turbam nascentia saepe fortuna producit, eximia vero ipsa raritate commendat.

Value of
the absolute
example

1049—In general, a very great value was attributed by ancient philosophers to the moral example. This attitude, which appears in the Stoic ideal of the wise man, may be seen e.g. in the following texts.

a. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* II 20, 125; p. 178 St. (SVF I 241):

Καλῶς ὁ Ζήνων ἐπὶ τῶν Ἰνδῶν ἔλεγεν ἓνα Ἰνδὸν παροπτώμενον ἐθέλειν <ἀν> ἰδεῖν ἢ πάσας τὰς περὶ πόνου ἀποδείξεις μαθεῖν.

b. Seneca, *Ep.* VI 5-6:

Plus tamen tibi et viva vox et convictus quam oratio proderit: in rem praesentem venias oportet, primum quia homines amplius oculis quam auribus credunt, deinde quia longum iter est per praecepta, breve et efficax per exempla. Zenonem Cleanthes non expressisset, si tantummodo audisset; vitae eius interfuit, secreta perspexit et observavit illum, an ex formula sua viveret. Platon et Aristoteles et omnis in diversum itura sapientium turba plus ex moribus quam ex verbis Socratis traxit: Metrodorum et Hermarchum et Polyaeum magnos viros non schola Epicuri sed contubernium fecit. Nec in hoc te accerso tantum, ut proficias, sed ut prosis: plurimum enim alter alteri conferemus.

Philosophy has always been for the Ancients first of all a certain style of life. Only by this attitude we can explain the rôle of a man like Pyrrho in ancient philosophy. See our nr. **1082** ff.

Ancient criticism of
the wise man

1050—a. Evidently, the Stoic sage was a grateful object of mockery and satire. This is what we find in Lucianus, *Bion phrasis* 20:

ΖΕΥΣ. Ἄλλον κάλει, τὸν ἐν χρῶ κουρίαν ἐκεῖνον, τὸν σκυθρωπὸν, τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς.

ΕΡΜ. Εὖ λέγεις· εἰκόμασι γοῦν πολὺ τι πλῆθος αὐτὸν περιμένειν τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν ἀπηντηχότων. αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν πωλῶ, τῶν βίων τὸν τελειότατον. τίς πάντα μόνος εἰδέναι ἐθέλει;

ΩΝΗΤΗΣ. Πῶς τοῦτο φής;

ΕΡΜ. "Οτι μόνος οὗτος σοφός, μόνος καλός, μόνος δίκαιος ἀνδρεῖος βασιλεὺς ῥήτωρ πλούσιος νομοθέτης καὶ τᾶλλα ὅποσα ἐστίν.

ΩΝ. Οὐκοῦν, ὠγαθέ, καὶ μάγειρος μόνος, καὶ νῆ Δία γε σκυτοδέψης καὶ τέκτων καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

ΕΡΜ. "Εοικεν.

ΩΝ. 'Ελθέ, ὠγαθέ, καὶ λέγε πρὸς τὸν ὦνητὴν ἐμὲ ποιός τις εἶ, καὶ πρῶτον εἰ οὐκ ἄχθῃ πιπρασκόμενος καὶ δοῦλος ὢν.

ΧΡΥΣΙΠΠΟΣ. Οὐδαμῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ταῦτά ἐστιν. ὅσα δὲ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἀδιάφορα εἶναι συμβέβηκεν.

ΩΝ. Οὐ μανθάνω ἤ καὶ λέγεις.

ΧΡΥΣ. Τί φής; οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ προηγμένα, τὰ δ' ἐμπαλιν ἀποπροηγμένα;

ΩΝ. Οὐδὲ νῦν μανθάνω.

ΧΡΥΣ. Εἰκότως· οὐ γὰρ εἰ συνήθης τοῖς ἡμετέροις ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲ τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἔχεις, ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος ὁ τὴν λογικὴν θεωρίαν ἐκμαθὼν οὐ μόνον ταῦτ' οἶδεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ σύμβαμα καὶ παρασύμβαμα ὅποια καὶ ὅποσον ἀλλήλων διαφέρει.

ΩΝ. Πρὸς τῆς σοφίας, μὴ φθονήσης καὶν τοῦτο εἰπεῖν τί τὸ σύμβαμα καὶ τί τὸ παρασύμβαμα· καὶ γὰρ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἐπλήγην ὑπὸ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ τῶν ὀνομάτων.

ΧΡΥΣ. 'Αλλ' οὐδεις φθόνος· ἦν γὰρ τις χωλὸς ὢν αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ τῷ χωλῷ ποδὶ προσπταίσας λίθῳ τραῦμα ἐξ ἀφανοῦς λάβῃ, ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶχε μὲν δῆπου σύμβαμα τὴν χωλείαν, τὸ τραῦμα δὲ παρασύμβαμα προσέλαβεν.

ΩΝ. "Ω τῆς ἀγχινοίας. —

b. A serious criticism of the Stoic conception of the wise man is found in Cicero, *Pro Murena* 29, 60 - 31, 64, where he addresses Cato in this way:

Ego tuum consilium, Cato, propter singulare animi mei de tua virtute iudicium vituperare non possum: nonnulla forsitan conformare et leviter emendare possim. "non multa peccas", inquit ille fortissimo viro senior magister, "sed peccas: te regere possum". at ego non te: verissime dixerim peccare te nihil neque ulla in re te esse huius modi, ut corrigendus potius quam leviter inflectendus esse videare; finxit enim te ipsa natura ad honestatem, gravitatem, temperantiam, magnitudinem animi, iustitiam, ad omnis denique virtutes magnum hominem et excelsum. accessit doctrina non moderata nec mitis, sed, ut mihi videtur, paulo asperior et durior quam aut veritas aut natura patitur. et quoniam non est nobis haec oratio habenda aut in imperita multitudine aut in aliquo conventu

agrestium, audacius paulo de studiis humanitatis, quae et mihi et vobis nota et iucunda sunt, disputabo. In M. Catone, iudices, haec bona quae videmus divina et egregia, ipsius scitote esse propria: quae nonnumquam requirimus, ea sunt omnia non a natura, verum a magistro. fuit enim quidam summo ingenio vir, Zeno, cuius inventorum aemuli Stoici nominantur. huius sententiae sunt et praecepta huius modi: sapientem gratia numquam moveri, numquam cuiusquam delicto ignoscere; neminem misericordem esse nisi stultum et levem; viri non esse neque exorari neque placari; solos sapientes esse, si distortissimi sint, formosos; si mendicissimi, divites; si servitutem serviant, reges; nos autem, qui sapientes non sumus, fugitivos, exules, hostis, insanos denique esse dicunt; omnia peccata esse paria; omne delictum scelus esse nefarium, nec minus delinquere eum, qui gallum gallinaceum, cum opus non fuerit, quam eum qui patrem suffocaverit; sapientem nihil opinari, nullius rei paenitere, nulla in re falli, sententiam mutare numquam. —

(30, 63) Nostri autem illi, — fatebor enim, Cato, me quoque in adulescentia diffisum ingenio meo quaesisse adiumenta doctrinae — nostri, inquam, illi a Platone et Aristotele, moderati homines et temperati, aiunt apud sapientem valere aliquando gratiam; viri boni esse misereri; distincta genera esse delictorum et disparis poenas; esse apud hominem constantem ignoscendi locum; ipsum sapientem saepe aliquid opinari quod nesciat; irasci nonnumquam; exorari eundem et placari; quod dixerit, interdum, si ita rectius sit, mutare; de sententia decedere aliquando; omnis virtutes mediocritate quadam esse moderatas. hos ad magistros si qua te fortuna, Cato, cum ista natura detulisset, non tu quidem vir melior esses nec fortior nec temperantior nec iustior — neque enim esse potes, — sed paulo ad lenitatem propensior.

12—ETHICS (5): THE ΠΑΘΗ AND HOW TO TREAT THEM

1051—Before Zeno, the notion of πάθος ἐν ψυχῇ was used, but not precisely defined, by Aristotle. The πάθη had a certain function in his ethics (see our nrs. 571a and 572) and their nature was inquired into in his psychology (633c, d; 634). But Zeno was the first to develop a full doctrine of the πάθη, to define the notion precisely and give it a very important place as well in theoretical as in applied ethics.

πάθος
defined

a. Zeno's definition of πάθος. Diog. Laërt. VII 110 (SVF I 205):

Ἔστι δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζήνωνα ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις, ἣ ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα.

b. Cp. Stob., *Ecl.* II 7, 10, p. 88, 8 W. (SVF I ib.):

Πάθος δ' εἶναι φασιν ὁρμὴν πλεονάζουσαν καὶ ἀπειθῇ τῷ αἰροῦντι λόγῳ, ἣ κίνησιν ψυχῆς <ἄλογον> παρὰ φύσιν.

Cicero mentions these definitions of *perturbatio* in *Tusc. disp.* IV 11 and IV 47: (*perturbatio est*) *aversa a recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio*, vel *brevius appetitus vehementior*.

And again in *De off.* I 136: *perturbationes, id est motus animi nimios rationi non obtemperantes*.

1052—Zeno gave also the following definition of πάθος, found in Stob., *Ecl.* II 7, 1, p. 39, 7 W. (SVF I 206):

Other
definition

᾽Ωρίσατο δὲ κάκεινως· “πάθος ἐστὶ πτοία ψυχῆς”, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν πτηνῶν φορᾶς τὸ εὐκίνητον τοῦ παθητικοῦ παρεικάσας.

1053—Chrysippus, in defining the πάθη as judgments, seems to have differed from Zeno, on this point as well as in his theory of knowledge.

a. Galenus, *De plac. Hippocr. et Plat.* V 1, p. 405 M. (SVF III 461):

Chrysippus
defined the
πάθη as
κρίσεις

Χρύσιππος μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ παθῶν ἀποδεικνύει πειρᾶται, κρίσεις τινὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τὰ πάθη, Ζήνων δ' οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπιγιγνομένας αὐταῖς συστολὰς χύσεις, ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ πτώσεις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη.

b. Plutarchus, though speaking (in his already cited chapter 3 of the *De virtute morali*¹) of Stoics in general, expounds in fact Chrysippus' doctrine of the ἡγεμονικόν πως ἔχον, when he says, after having qualified virtue as a διάθεσις τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ or rather “Reason itself, harmonious and steady and inalterable” (SVF III 459):

Καὶ νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορᾶ τινι καὶ φύσει ψυχῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονικόν, διόλου τρεπόμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς κατὰ ἔξιν ἢ διάθεσιν μεταβολαῖς, κακίαν τε γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετήν, καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον ἐν ἑαυτῷ· λέγεσθαι δὲ ἄλογον, ὅταν τῷ πλεονάζοντι τῆς ὁρμῆς, ἰσχυρῷ γενομένῳ καὶ κρατήσαντι, πρὸς τι τῶν ἀτόπων παρὰ τὸν αἰροῦντα λόγον ἐκφέρηται· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάθος εἶναι λόγον πονηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ἐκ φαύλης καὶ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμην προσλαβοῦσης.

The difference between Zeno and Chrysippus as to the conception of the πάθη, which is chiefly known to us by Posidonius' polemic against Chrysippus, recorded

¹ See above, nr. 953a, 1024a.

by Galenus in his above cited work, is very clearly expounded by Pohlenz, *Zenon u. Chrysipp*, p. 182 ff., 187 ff., summarized in *Die Stoa* I, p. 143. Cp. our nrs. **953-955**.

1054—Posidonius, opposing Chrysippus' doctrine of the *πάθη* as *κρίσεις*, cites the following dialogue of λογισμός and θυμός, to show that its author, Cleanthes, was on his side.

Cleanthes,
unlike
Chrys.,
admitted
a dualism
in man

Galenus, *De plac. Hippocr. et Plat.*, p. 456 M. (SVF I 570):

Τὴν μὲν οὖν τοῦ Κλεάνθους γνώμην ὑπὲρ τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκ τῶνδε φαίνεσθαι φησι τῶν ἐπῶν.

ΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ. τί ποτ' ἔσθ' ὃ βούλει, θυμέ; τοῦτό μοι φράσον.

ΘΥΜΟΣ. <σ>έ γ', ὦ λογισμέ, πᾶν ὃ βούλομαι ποιεῖν.

Λ. βασιλικὸν <εἰ>πε<ς>· πλὴν ὅμως εἰπὸν πάλιν.

Θ. ὦν ἂν ἐπιθυμῶ, ταῦθ' ὅπως γενήσεται.

ταυτὶ τὰ ἁμοιβαῖα Κλεάνθους φησὶν εἶναι Ποσειδώνιος ἐναργῶς ἐνδεικνύμενα τὴν περὶ τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς γνώμην αὐτοῦ, εἴ γε δὴ πεποίηκε τὸν Λογισμὸν τῷ Θυμῷ διαλεγόμενον ὡς ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ.

1055—The reason why Posidonius opposes Chrysippus' monism so vigorously, going back essentially to Zeno's view, may be seen from the following passage.

Posidonius
opposes
Chrys.'
doctrine
of the
πάθη

Galenus, o.c., p. 448 M.:

Τὸ δὴ τῶν παθῶν αἷτιον, τουτέστι τῆς τε ἀνομολογίας καὶ τοῦ κακοδαίμονος βίου, τὸ μὴ κατὰ πᾶν ἐπεσθαι τῷ ἐν αὐτοῖς δαίμονι συγγενεῖ τε ὄντι καὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχοντι τῷ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διοικοῦντι, τῷ δὲ χείρονι καὶ ζφώδει ποτὲ συνεκκλίνοντας φέρεσθαι. οἱ δὲ τοῦτο παριδόντες οὔτε ἐν τούτοις βελτιοῦσι τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν παθῶν, οὔτ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ὁμολογίας ὀρθοδοξοῦσι. οὐ γὰρ βλέπουσιν, ὅτι πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ κατὰ μηδὲν ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου τε καὶ κακοδαίμονος καὶ ἀθέου τῆς ψυχῆς.

Posid., then, holds that there is, indeed, an irrational part in the soul. He blames Chrys. for having overlooked, or at least undervalued this, and hence for not having understood the real character of the moral struggle in man. *Infra*, nrs. **1181-1188**.

Seneca
holds it

1056—a. In Seneca we find again Chrysippus' doctrine of the ἡγεμονικόν πως ἔχον. *De ira* I 8, 2-3:

In primis, inquam, finibus hostis arcendus est; nam cum intravit et portis se intulit, modum a captivis non accipit. neque enim sepositus est animus et extrinsecus speculatur adfectus, ut illos non patiatur ultra quam oportet procedere, sed in adfectum ipse mutatur ideoque non potest utilem illam vim et salutarem proditam iam infirmatamque revocare.

non enim, ut dixi, separatas ista sedes suas diductasque habent, sed affectus et ratio in melius peiusque mutatio animi est.

From this passage it may be easily understood that Chrysippus, in his way, gave a very strong expression to the Stoic view that, indeed, πάθη cannot be moderated, but can be only extirpated: as soon as πάθος is introduced, Reason has lost its power. Indeed, Zeno taught that πάθη are παρὰ φύσιν, and are ἄλογα in the sense of ἀπειθῇ τῷ λόγῳ.

b. Cp. Stob., *Ecl.* II 89, 4 W. (SVF III 389), where the violent character of the πάθη is brought out.

Violent
character
of the
πάθη

Τὸ δὲ “ἄλογον” καὶ τὸ “παρὰ φύσιν” (sc. in πάθους definitione) οὐ κοινῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν “ἄλογον” ἴσον τῷ “ἀπειθῆς τῷ λόγῳ”. πᾶν γὰρ πάθος βιαστικόν ἐστι, ὡς πολλάκις ὁρῶντας τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντας ὅτι οὐ συμφέρει τόδε ποιεῖν, ὑπὸ τῆς σφοδρότητος ἐκφερομένους, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τινος ἀπειθοῦς ἔππου, ἀνάγεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτό, παρ’ ὃ καὶ πολλάκις τινὰς ἐξομολογεῖσθαι λέγοντας τὸ θρυλούμενον τοῦτο·

γνώμην δ’ ἔχοντα μ’ ἢ φύσις βιάζεται.¹

γνώμην γὰρ λέγει νῦν τὴν εἰδησιν καὶ γνώσιν τῶν ὀρθῶν πραγμάτων. καὶ τὸ “παρὰ φύσιν” δ’ εἴληπται ἐν τῇ τοῦ πάθους ὑπογραφῇ, ὡς συμβαίνοντος παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν λόγον. πάντες δ’ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες ἀποστρέφονται τὸν λόγον, οὐ παραπλησίως δὲ τοῖς ἐξηπατημένοις ἐν ὁρωῦν, ἀλλ’ ἰδιαζόντως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἡπατημένοι λόγου χάριν περὶ <τοῦ> τὰς ἀτόμους ἀρχὰς εἶναι, διδασκόμενοι ὅτι οὐκ εἰσιν, ἀφίστανται τῆς κρίσεως· οἱ δ’ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες, καὶ μάθωσι, καὶ μεταδιδασκώσιν ὅτι οὐ δεῖ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἢ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅμως οὐκ ἀφίστανται τούτων, ἀλλ’ ἄγονται ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν εἰς τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τούτων κρατεῖσθαι τυραννίδος.

1057—Plotinus, *Enn.* III 6, 3, opposes Chrysippus’ doctrine more fundamentally than Posidonius did, saying that it is not the soul itself that changes, but that the πάθη proceed from it, while the soul, being a substance, stays what it is.

Plotinus’
criticism
of the
doctrine

Τὰς δ’ οἰκειώσεις καὶ ἀλλοτριώσεις² πῶς; Καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ὀργαὶ καὶ ἡδοναὶ ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ φόβοι πῶς οὐ τροπαὶ καὶ πάθη ἐνόντα καὶ κινούμενα; Δεῖ δὲ καὶ περὶ τούτων ὧδε διαλαβεῖν. “Ὅτι γὰρ ἐγγίγνονται ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ σφοδραὶ τούτων αἰσθήσεις μὴ οὐ λέγειν ἐναντία λέγοντός ἐστι τοῖς ἐναργέσιν. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ συγχωροῦντας ζητεῖν ὃ τι ἐστὶ τὸ τρεπόμενον. Κινδυνεύομεν γὰρ περὶ ψυχὴν ταῦτα λέγοντες ὁμοίον τι ὑπολαμβάνειν, ὡς εἰ τὴν ψυχὴν λέγομεν ἐρυθρίαν

¹ Eur. fr. 837 Nauck.

² Affections and aversions.

ἢ αὖ ἐν ὠχριάσει γίνεσθαι, μὴ λογιζόμενοι, ὥς διὰ ψυχὴν μὲν ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, περὶ δὲ τὴν ἄλλην σύστασιν ἔστι γιγνόμενα.

The four
main
πάθη

1058—The four main πάθη.

a. Diog. Laërt. VII 110 (SVF I 211):

Τῶν παθῶν τὰ ἀνωτάτω (καθὰ φησιν . . . Ζήνων ἐν τῷ Περὶ παθῶν) εἶναι γένη τέτταρα, λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, ἡδονήν.

Their
causes

b. Aspasius in Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* p. 45, 16 Heylb. (SVF III 386):

Γενικὰ δὲ πάθη οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Στοᾶς ἔφασαν εἶναι ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, φόβον <καὶ> ἐπιθυμίαν· γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ τὰ πάθη ἔφασαν δι' ὑπόληψιν ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν ὥς ἐπὶ παροῦσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς κινῆται ἡ ψυχὴ, ἡδονὴν εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ὥς ἐπὶ παροῦσι τοῖς κακοῖς, λύπην· πάλιν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς προσδοκωμένοις ἀγαθοῖς ἐπιθυμία συμβαίνει, ὅρεξις οὕσα ὥς φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, κακῶν δὲ προσδοκωμένων τὸ συμβαῖνον πάθος φόβον ἔλεγον εἶναι.

c. Andronicus, Π. παθῶν 1 (SVF III 391) defines them as follows:

Definitions

Λύπη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἄλογος συστολή· ἡ δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίας, ἐφ' ᾧ οἴονται δεῖν συστέλλεσθαι.

Φόβος δὲ ἄλογος ἐκκλισις· ἡ φυγὴ ἀπὸ προσδοκωμένου δεινοῦ.

Ἐπιθυμία δὲ ἄλογος ὅρεξις· ἡ διωξις προσδοκωμένου ἀγαθοῦ.

Ἡδονὴ δὲ ἄλογος ἔπαρσις· ἡ δόξα πρόσφατος ἀγαθοῦ παρουσίας, ἐφ' ᾧ οἴονται δεῖν ἐπαίρεσθαι.

1059—Since the πάθη destroy the harmony of the soul and obstruct the right function of Reason, they are essentially unnatural and must be extirpated. On this point, too, Stoic doctrine is opposite to Aristotelian.

The
πάθη
must be
extirpated

a. Seneca, *Ep.* 116, 1:

Utrum satius sit modicos habere adfectus an nullos, saepe quaesitum est: nostri illos expellunt, Peripatetici temperant.

b. Lactantius, *Div. inst.* VI 14:

Nam Stoici affectus omnes, quorum impulsu animus commovetur, ex homine tollunt, cupiditatem, laetitiam, metum, moestitiam: quorum duo priora ex bonis sunt aut futuris aut praesentibus; posteriora ex malis. Eodem modo haec quattuor morbos (ut dixi) vocant, non tam natura insitos, quam prava opinione susceptos: et idcirco eos censent extirpari posse radicitus, si bonorum malorumque opinio falsa tollatur.

c. Cp. Lactantius, *De ira* c. 17:

Sed Stoici non viderunt esse discrimen recti et pravi; esse iram iustam, esse et iniustam; et quia medelam rei non inveniebant, voluerunt eam penitus excidere.

1060—Since there is an exact parallel between body and soul, philosophy is the healing art of the soul like medicine is of the body. As such, it has essentially to treat the πάθη.

a. Galenus, *De plac. Hippocr. et Plat.* V 2, p. 413 M. (SVF III 471) cites Chrysippus in his ethical treatise Π. παθῶν:

Philosophy
the healing
art of the
soul

Οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τὸ νοσοῦν σῶμά ἐστί τις τέχνη, ἣν προσαγορεύομεν ἰατρικὴν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν νοσοῦσαν ψυχὴν ἐστί τις τέχνη, οὔτ' ἐν τῇ κατὰ μέρος θεωρίᾳ τε καὶ θεραπείᾳ δεῖ λείπεσθαι ταύτην ἐκείνης. διὸ καί, καθάπερ τῷ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἱατρῷ καθήκει τῶν τε συμβαινόντων αὐτοῖς παθῶν ἐντὸς εἶναι, ὥς εἰώθασι τοῦτο λέγειν, καὶ τῆς ἐκάστῃ οἰκείας θεραπείας, οὕτω καὶ τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἱατρῷ ἐπιβάλλει, ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐντὸς εἶναι, ὥς ἐν ἄριστᾳ. καὶ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, μάθοι ἂν τις τῆς πρὸς ταῦτα ἀναλογίας παρατεθείσης ἀπ' ἀρχῆς. ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντιπαρατείνουσα οἰκειότης παραστήσει, ὥς οἶομαι, καὶ τὴν τῶν θεραπειῶν ὁμοιότητα, καὶ ἔτι τὴν ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἱατρειῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἀναλογίαν.

b. Cp. Cic., *Tusc. disp.* II 4, 11:

Nam efficit hoc philosophia: medetur animis, inanes sollicitudines detrahit, cupiditatibus liberat, pellit timores.

As may be clear from the preceding chapters, this conception of philosophy, though Cicero had it doubtless from his Stoic preceptors, is not exclusively Stoic. It was also Epicurean, Platonic and Aristotelian and, as will appear from our next chapter, even Sceptic.

1061—The general treatment of the πάθη is: to set before the patient's mind the irrational character of the πάθος.

a. Galenus, *De plac. Hippocr. et Plat.* IV 7, p. 397 M. (SVF III 467), where Chrysippus, Π. τῶν παθῶν, is cited as follows:

General
treatment
of the
πάθη

“Περὶ δὲ τῆς λύπης [καὶ] ὥς ἂν ἐμπλησθέντες τινὲς ὁμοίως φαίνονται ἀφίστασθαι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ Ἀχιλλέως ταῦτα λέγει ὁ ποιητῆς πενθοῦντος τὸν Πάτροκλον· (δ 541. Ω 514)

Ἄλλ' ὅτε δὴ κλαίων τε κυλινδόμενός τ' ἐκορέσθη,
Καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ πραπίδων ἤλθ' ἕμρος ἡδ' ἀπὸ γυίων,

ἐπὶ τὸ παρακαλεῖν ὥρμησε τὸν Πρίαμον, τὴν τῆς λύπης ἀλογίαν αὐτῷ παριστάς.”

εἴτ' ἐφεξῆς ἐπιφέρει καὶ ταῦτα·

“Καθ' ὃν λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἀπελπίσαι τις οὕτως τῶν πραγμάτων ἐγχρονιζομένων, καὶ τῆς παθητικῆς φλεγμονῆς ἀνιεμένης, τὸν λόγον παρεισδυόμενον καὶ οἶονεὶ χώραν λαμβάνοντα παριστάναι τὴν τοῦ πάθους ἀλογίαν.”

Galenus rightly observed that Chrys.—and doubtless Zeno before him, as may be seen in his definition of λύπη as δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίας¹—paid due attention to the fact that affects lose their force by time and then, growing weaker, may be overcome by reason.

**Prevention
of violent
impressions**

b. Therefore, to prevent violent impressions, it is useful to familiarize oneself with things beforehand (προενδημεῖν τοῖς πράγμασι).

Galenus, o.c., IV 7, p. 392 M. (SVF III 482):

Καὶ φησι διότι πᾶν τὸ ἀμελέτητον καὶ ξένον ἀθρόως προσπίπτον ἐκπίπτει τε καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν ἐξίστησι κρίσεων, ἀσκηθὲν δὲ καὶ συνεισθὲν καὶ χρονίσαν ἢ οὐδ' ὅλως ἐξίστησιν, ὡς κατὰ πάθος κινεῖν, ἢ ἐπὶ μικρὸν κομιδῇ· διὸ καὶ προενδημεῖν δεῖν φησι τοῖς πράγμασι μήπω τε παροῦσιν οἶον παροῦσι χρῆσθαι. βούλεται δὲ τὸ προενδημεῖν ῥῆμα τῷ Ποσειδωνίῳ τὸ οἶον προαναπλάττειν τε καὶ προτυποῦν τὸ πρᾶγμα παρ' ἑαυτῷ τὸ μέλλον γενήσεσθαι καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἤδη γενόμενον ἐθισμόν τινα ποιεῖσθαι κατὰ βραχύ. διὸ καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου παρελήφεν ἐνταῦθα, ὡς ἄρα τινὸς ἀναγγειλαντος αὐτῷ τεθνάναι τὸν υἱὸν εὖ μάλα καθεστηκότως εἶπεν “ἦδειν θνητὸν γεννήσας”.

c. Evidently, the true medicine against sorrow according to the Stoic view is always: convincing people that there is no evil except what is morally bad. Thus, Cicero says in *Tusc. disp.* III 76:

**Nihil esse
malum quod
turpe non sit**

Sunt qui unum officium consolantis putant “malum illud omnino non esse”, ut Cleanthi placet.

Cp. also our nr. 955b, c.

**The wise
man is
ἀπαθής**

1062—The wise man is passionless, but not insensible to impressions.

a. Diog. Laert. VII 117:

Φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τὸν σοφόν, διὰ τὸ ἀνέμπωτον εἶναι. εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ἀπαθῆ, τὸν φαῦλον, ἐν ἴσῳ λεγόμενον τῷ σκληρῷ καὶ ἀτέγκτῳ.

b. Cp. Stob., *Flor.* 7, 21 (SVF III 574):

Χρυσίππου. ἔλεγεν δὲ ὁ Χρυσίππος ἀλγεῖν μὲν τὸν σοφόν, μὴ βασανίζεσθαι δέ· μὴ γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τῇ ψυχῇ. Καὶ δεῖσθαι μὲν, μὴ προσδέχεσθαι δέ.

¹ In its fuller form the definition is cited in our nr. 955a.

c. In a passage cited in our first volume (nr. 239) Seneca opposes the Stoic wise man to that of Stilpo and certain others "quibus summum bonum visum est animus impatiens", saying (*Ep.* I 9, 3):

Hoc inter nos et illos interest: noster sapiens vincit quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit, illorum ne sentit quidem.

The representatives of ἀταραξία, meant by *illi*, were doubtless, besides Stilpo, Cynics who professed a complete indifference to outward things (cp. our nr. 248), and, perhaps even stronger, a man like Pyrrho who, without making a "doctrine" of it, displayed a radical indifference in daily life. Below, nr. 1082b.

The Stoic attitude towards *externa* may be also illustrated by Seneca, *De prov.* 2, 1, where he says: *nec hoc dico: "non sentit illa"*, sed vincit, e.q.s.—See also, on Stoic ἀπάθεια, Wiersma, II. τέλους p. 15.

1063—The Stoics do acknowledge right feelings.

a. Diog. Laërt. VII 116 (SVF III 431):

The three
εὐπάθειαι

Εἶναι δὲ καὶ εὐπαθείας φασὶ τρεῖς, χαρὰν, εὐλάβειαν, βούλησιν. καὶ τὴν μὲν χαρὰν ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τῇ ἡδονῇ, οὖσαν εὐλογον ἔπαρσιν, τὴν δὲ εὐλάβειαν τῷ φόβῳ, οὖσαν εὐλογον ἔκκλισιν· φοβηθῆσεσθαι μὲν γὰρ τὸν σοφὸν οὐδαμῶς, εὐλαβηθῆσεσθαι δέ. τῇ δὲ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τὴν βούλησιν, οὖσαν εὐλογον ὀρεξίν. καθάπερ οὖν ὑπὸ τὰ πρῶτα πάθη πίπτει τινά, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὑπὸ τὰς πρῶτας εὐπαθείας· καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν βούλησιν εὐνοίαν, εὐμένειαν, ἀσπασμόν, ἀγάπησιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν εὐλάβειαν αἰδῶ, ἀγνείαν, ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν χαρὰν τέρψιν, εὐφροσύνην, εὐθυμίαν.

b. Cp. the definitions in Andronicus, II. παθῶν, c. 6 (SVF III 432): **Definitions**

Εὐπαθείας εἶδη γ'.

Βούλησις μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν εὐλογος ὀρεξίς.

Χαρὰ δὲ εὐλογος ἔπαρσις.

Εὐλάβεια δὲ εὐλογος ἔκκλισις.

Βουλῆσεως εἶδη δ'.

Εὐνοία μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ βούλησις ἀγαθῶν <ἐτέρῳ> αὐτοῦ ἕνεκεν ἐκείνου.

Εὐμένεια δὲ εὐνοία ἐπίμονος.

Ἀσπασμός δὲ ἀδιάστατος <εὐνοία>.

Ἀγάπησις — —

Χαρᾶς εἶδη γ'.

Τέρψις μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ χαρὰ πρέπουσα ταῖς περὶ αὐτὸν ὠφελείαις.

Εὐφροσύνη δὲ χαρὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς τοῦ σώφρονος ἔργοις.

Εὐθυμία δὲ χαρὰ ἐπὶ διαγωγῇ ἢ ἀνεπιζητησίᾳ παντός.

Εὐλαβείας εἶδη β'.

Αἰδώς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν εὐλάβεια ὀρθοῦ φόγου.

Ἀγνεία δὲ εὐλάβεια τῶν περὶ θεοῦς ἀμαρτημάτων.

1064—As we noticed before, the Stoics neither classed compassion nor repentance as right feelings.

Rejection of
compassion

a. On compassion, cp. Cicero, *Tusc. disp.* IV 26, 56:

An sine misericordia liberales esse non possumus? Non enim suscipere ipsi aegritudines propter alios debemus, sed alios, si possumus, levare aegritudine.

See also our nr. **1044b**: The wise man does not feel compassion.

and of
repentance

b. On repentance, see Stob., *Ecl.*, II 102, 25 W. (SVF III 563):

Εἶναι δὲ τὴν μεταμέλειαν λύπην ἐπὶ πεπραγμένοις ὥς παρ' αὐτοῦ ἡμαρτημένοις, κακοδαιμονικόν τι πάθος ψυχῆς καὶ στασιῶδες· ἐφ' ὅσον γὰρ ἄχθεται τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν ὁ ἐν ταῖς μεταμελείαις ὢν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀγανακτεῖ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὥς αἴτιον γεγονότα τούτων.

Cp. also our nr. **1010a-d**: The wise man never repents, etc.

13—ETHICS (6): LAW, STATE AND HUMANITY

Nature the
basis of
morality
and law

1065—Morality is founded on "nature", as it is conceived by Stoic philosophers.

a. Diog. Laërt. VII 128:

Φύσει τε τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ μὴ θέσει, ὥς καὶ τὸν νόμον καὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ.

b. In Cicero's *De fin.* III 21, 71, Cato expounds Stoic doctrine on law and justice as follows:

Ius autem, quod ita dici appellarique possit, id esse natura, alienumque esse a sapiente non modo iniuriam cui facere, verum etiam nocere. Nec vero rectum est cum amicis aut bene meritis consociare aut coniungere iniuriam. Gravissimeque . . . defenditur numquam aequitatem ab utilitate posse seiungi, et, quicquid aequum iustumque esset, id etiam honestum, vicissimque quicquid esset honestum, iustum etiam atque aequum fore.

c. In general, what is morally good is natural.

Cic., *De leg.* I 16, 44:

Nec solum ius et iniuria natura diiudicantur, sed omnino omnia honesta ac turpia. Nam et communis intelligentia notas nobis res efficit easque in animis nostris inchoavit, ut honesta in virtute ponantur, in vitiis turpia. Haec autem in opinione existimare, non in natura posita, dementis

est. Nam nec arboris nec equi virtus, quae dicitur (in quo abutimur nomine) in opinione sita est, sed in natura. Quodsi ita est, honesta quoque et turpia natura diiudicanda sunt. Nam si opinione universa virtus, eadem etiam eius partes probarentur. Quis igitur prudentem, et, ut ita dicam, catum non ex ipsius habitu, sed ex aliqua re externa iudicet? Est enim virtus perfecta ratio; quod certe in natura est. Igitur omnis honestas eodem modo.

1066—a. Cic., *De leg.* I 6, 18, gives the following definition of law: **Lex defined as ratio summa**

Lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae iubet ea quae facienda sunt prohibetque contraria.

b. Human law is derived from divine Reason.

Cic., *De leg.* II 4, 8:

Hanc igitur video sapientissimorum fuisse sententiam, legem neque hominum ingeniis excogitatam nec scitum aliquod esse populorum, sed aeternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret imperandi prohibendique sapientia. Ita principem legem illam et ultimam mentem esse dicebant omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis dei; ex quo illa lex, quam di humano generi dederunt, recte est laudata; est enim ratio mensque sapientis ad iubendum et ad deterrendum idonea. —

Sed vero intellegi sic oportet, . . . iussa ac vetita populorum vim habere ad recte facta vocandi et a peccatis avocandi, quae vis non modo senior est quam aetas populorum et civitatum, sed aequalis illius caelum atque terras tuentis et regentis dei. — Neque enim esse mens divina sine ratione potest, nec ratio divina non hanc vim in rectis pravisque sanciendo habet. — Quam ob rem lex vera atque princeps apta ad iubendum et ad vetandum ratio est recta summi Iovis.

c. Cic., *De re publ.* III 33:

True law is eternal

Est quidem vera lex recta ratio, naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna; quae vocet ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat, quae tamen neque probos frustra iubet aut vetat, nec improbos iubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec obrogari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest: nec vero aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus: neque est quaerendus explanator aut interpret eius alius: nec erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immutabilis continebit; unusque erit communis

quasi magister et imperator omnium deus, ille legis huius inventor, disceptator, lator; cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet ac naturam hominis aspernatus, hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiam si cetera supplicia, quae putantur, effugerit.

The passage is cited by Lactantius, *Div. inst.* VI 8. For the notion of eternal law in the Stoa, cp. Cleanthes' κοινὸς νόμος in the Hymn to Zeus (our nr. 943). The notion goes back to Heraclitus' conception of Law (fr. 114 Diels; our nr. 62d). Cp. also Plato, *Laws* IV 713e-714a, where he says that God and Reason which follows Him must rule our public and our private life:

Καὶ ὅσον ἐν ἡμῖν ἀθανασίας ἔνεστι, τοῦτω πειθομένους δημοσίᾳ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τὰς τ' οἰκήσεις καὶ τὰς πόλεις διοικεῖν, τὴν τοῦ Νοῦ διανομήν ἐπονομάζοντας νόμον.

Only, when Plato says that God, and not man, must be the measure of all things (*Laws* IV 716c), he certainly thought of a *transcendent* Reason, which can be only "imitated" by man, i.e. which is not directly and as such in man, but only by participation. Thus, between Plato and the Stoics, though the words are similar, there is a considerable distance.

Pindarus' wellknown words Νόμος πάντων βασιλεὺς were cited by Chrysippus in the beginning of his book II. νόμου (quoted by Marcianus, I. I *Instit.*, SVF III 314).

As to the notion of eternal law in Aristotle, see our nrs. 589 and 658a.

d. Plut., *St. repugn.* 9 (SVF III 326), cites the following lines of Chrysippus, where we find the basis of Cicero's doctrine.

"Ακουε δὲ ἃ λέγει περὶ τούτων ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ Περὶ θεῶν. "οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εὐρεῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἄλλην ἀρχήν, οὐδ' ἄλλην γένεσιν, ἢ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως. ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ δεῖ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν, εἰ μέλλομέν τι ἐρεῖν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν".

Empirical
law

1067. Empirical law as such has no authority. It derives its force exclusively from eternal law, and must be judged after the latter.

a. Cic., *De leg.* I 15, 42:

Iam vero illud stultissimum, existimare omnia iusta esse, quae sancita sint in populorum institutis aut legibus. Etiamne si quae leges sint tyrannorum? — Est enim unum ius, quo devincta est hominum societas et quod lex constituit una; quae lex est recta ratio imperandi atque prohibendi: quam qui ignorat, is est iniustus, sive est illa scripta uspiam, sive nusquam.

b. Ib., I 16, 43:

Quodsi populorum iussis, si principum decretis, si sententiis iudicum iura constituerentur: ius esset latrocinari, ius adulterare, ius testamenta falsa supponere, si haec suffragiis aut scitis multitudinis probarentur.

Quod si tanta potestas est stultorum sententiis atque iussis, ut eorum suffragiis rerum natura vertatur: cur non sanciant, ut quae mala perniciosaeque sunt habeantur pro bonis ac salutaribus? aut cur ius ex iniuria lex facere possit, bonum eadem facere non possit ex malo? Atqui nos legem bonam a mala nulla alia nisi naturae norma dividere possumus.

Cp. *Tusc. Disp.* I 45, 108, where Cicero says that Chrysippus collected a great number of instances of immoral laws, in order to show that empirical law as such has no authority.

Permulta alia colligit Chrysippus, ut est in omni historia curiosus: sed ita tetra sunt quaedam, ut ea fugiat et reformidet oratio.

1068—The *katorthoma*, however, is a commandment of Nomos. Hence, by Nomos nothing is commanded to the φαῦλοι, though many things are prohibited to them. Cp. our nrs. **1033 ff.**

a. Plut., *Stoic. refugn.* II, p. 1037c (SVF III 520):

Τὸ κατόρθωμά φασι νόμου πρόσταγμα εἶναι· τὸ δ' ἀμάρτημα νόμου ἀπαγό-
ρευμα, διὸ τὸν νόμον πολλὰ τοῖς φαύλοις ἀπαγορεύειν, προστάττειν δὲ μηδέν.
οὐ γὰρ δύνανται κατορθοῦν.

The
katorthoma
a command-
ment of Law

b. The following text of Origenes shows how much this Christian author was penetrated by Stoic views and terminology.

Orig., *Comment. in Matth.*, vol. III p. 494 Delarue (SVF III 523):

Καὶ πρέπον γέ ἐστι θεοῦ νόμῳ ἀπαγορεύειν τὰ ἀπὸ κακίας καὶ προστάσσειν
τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν, τὰ δὲ τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ ἀδιάφορα ταῦτα ἔαν ἐπὶ χώρας, δυνάμενα
διὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν λόγον ἀμαρτανόμενα μὲν κακῶς πράττεσθαι,
κατορθούμενα δὲ γίνεσθαι καλῶς.

The same
terminology
is used by
Origenes

1069—a. Stoics taught with a certain emphasis the natural equality of men, as well as their social character. The doctrine is found in Cicero, *De leg.* I 10, 28-30:

Nihil est profecto praestabilius, quam plane intellegi, nos ad iustitiam esse natos, neque opinione, sed natura constitutum esse ius. Id iam patebit, si hominum inter ipsos societatem coniunctionemque perspexeris. Nihil est enim unum uni tam simile, tam par, quam omnes inter nosmet ipsos sumus: quod si depravatio consuetudinum, si opinionum vanitas non imbecillitatem animorum torqueret et flecteret, quocunque coepisset, sui nemo ipse tam similis esset quam omnes sunt omnium. Itaque quaecunque est hominis definitio, una in omnes valet. Quod argumenti satis est, nullam dissimilitudinem esse in genere: quae si esset, non una

Men are
equal by
nature

omnes definitio contineret. Etenim ratio, qua una praestamus beluis, per quam coniectura valemus, argumentamur, refellimus, disserimus, conficimus aliquid, concludimus, certe est communis, doctrina differens, discendi quidem facultate par. Nam et sensibus eadem omnia comprehenduntur: et ea quae movent sensus, itidem movent omnium: quaeque in animis imprimuntur, de quibus ante dixi, inchoatae intelligentiae, similiter in omnibus imprimuntur: interpresque mentis oratio verbis discrepat, sententiis congruens. Nec est quisquam gentis ullius, qui ducem <naturam> nactus ad virtutem pervenire non possit.

Natural
community
of mankind

b. That humanity is the first and most fundamental community founded on nature, is a principle more than once repeated by Cicero. Violating it is considered by him as a transgression of the divine Order.

Cic., *De fin.* III 19, 62-63; *De off.* III 5, 25-6, 27 and 28, all cited under nr. 1000.

1070—Cicero founds a certain international law on the principle of the natural community of men.

International
law based on
this principle

a. Justice prevails, not only among citizens of the same state, but also in intercourse with foreigners.

Cic., in the last cited passage, *De off.* III 6, 28:

Qui autem civium rationem dicunt habendam, externorum negant, ii dirimunt communem humani generis societatem; e.q.s.

Vid. sub nr. 1000b.

b. It counts, too, in the case of a state in its external relations.

Cic., *De off.* I 11, 34-35:

Atque in re publica maxime conservanda sunt iura belli: nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim, cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum, confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore. qua re suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob eam causam, ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur, parta autem victoria conservandi ii, qui non crudeles in bello, non inmanes fuerunt, ut maiores nostri Tusculanos, Aequos, Volscos, Sabinos, Hernicos in civitatem etiam acceperunt, at Karthaginem et Numantiam funditus sustulerunt.

c. We are bound by certain moral obligations, also towards enemies.

Cicero fills five chapters of his third book *De officiis* (27-31) with the famous case of Regulus, who kept his oath towards a bitter and treacherous enemy, at the sacrifice of what seemed to be expedient for himself.

1071—Since men are equal by nature, Chrysippus, and Stoics in general, do not make any distinction between what is called a noble or ignoble birth, between free men and slaves.

Class
distinction
rejected

a. Seneca, *De benef.* III 28:

Eadem omnibus principia eademque origo, nemo altero nobilior, nisi cui rectius ingenium et artibus bonis aptius.

Cp. Plut., *Pers. de nobil.*, c. 12, where Chrysippus is cited (SVF III 350).

b. Seneca, *De benef.* III 22:

Nobody is a
slave by
nature

Servus, ut placet Chrysippo, perpetuus mercennarius est.

c. Cp. Philo, *De septen. et fest. dieb.*, p. 283 vol. II Mang.:

*Ἀνθρώπος γὰρ ἐκ φύσεως δοῦλος οὐδεὶς.

This Stoic doctrine is also found with Eratosthenes, ap. Strabo I, 66.

1072—As we noticed earlier, Stoics admitted a *civitas* of all reasonable beings, including men as well as gods, animals being excluded. Our nr. 1001.

Civitas
communis
deorum
atque
hominum

1073—In their principle of the natural equality of men and their notion of humanity founded on this principle, Stoics were anticipated by the older Cynics. In fact, Zeno's *Politeia*, and even that of Chrysippus, showed (not only on this point) some rather marked Cynic features. A certain congeniality with Cynicism may be found in the following texts, the first of which displays Zeno's ideal of a practical community of mankind, the other his spiritualized conception of God and worship.

Congeniality
with Cynics
on this and
other points

a. Plut., *De Alex. virt.* I 6, p. 329a (SVF I 262):

Καὶ μὴν ἡ πολὺ θαυμάζομένη πολιτεία τοῦ τὴν Στωϊκῶν αἵρεσιν καταβαλομένου Ζήνωνος εἰς ἐν τοῦτο συντείνει κεφάλαιον, ἵνα μὴ κατὰ πόλεις μηδὲ κατὰ δήμους οἰκῶμεν, ἰδίους ἕκαστοι διωρισμένοι δικαίοις, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγώμεθα δημότας καὶ πολίτας, εἰς δὲ βίος ἥ καὶ κόσμος, ὥσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμου νόμῳ κοινῶ συντρεφομένης. τοῦτο Ζήνων μὲν ἔγραψεν ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἢ εἰδωλὸν εὐνομίας φιλοσόφου καὶ πολιτείας ἀνατυπωσάμενος. —

b. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* V 12, 76, p. 377 St. (SVF I 264):

Λέγει δὲ καὶ Ζήνων, ὁ τῆς Στωϊκῆς κτίστης αἰρέσεως, ἐν τῷ τῆς Πολιτείας βιβλίῳ μῆτε ναοὺς δεῖν ποιεῖν μῆτε ἀγάλματα· μηδὲν γὰρ εἶναι τῶν θεῶν ἄξιον κατασκευάσμα, καὶ γράφειν οὐ δέδιεν αὐταῖς λέξεσι τάδε· ἱερά τε οἰκο-

δομεῖν οὐδὲν δεήσει· ἱερὸν γὰρ μὴ πολλοῦ ἄξιον καὶ ἄγιον οὐδὲν χρή νομίζειν· οὐδὲν δὲ πολλοῦ ἄξιον καὶ ἄγιον οἰκοδόμων ἔργον καὶ βαναύσων.

1074—In spite of their tendency towards cosmopolitanism, Stoics had a high appreciation of existing laws and states.

Appreciation
of existing
laws and
states

a. Stob., *Ecl.* II 7, p. 103, 9 W. (SVF III 328):

Λέγουσι δὲ καὶ φυγάδα πάντα φαῦλον εἶναι καθ' ὅσον στέρεται νόμου καὶ πολιτείας κατὰ φύσιν ἐπιβαλλούσης. Τὸν γὰρ νόμον εἶναι, καθάπερ εἵπομεν, σπουδαῖον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν πόλιν.

Definition
of „state”

b. “State” is defined by Stoics as πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ νόμου διοικούμενον. The definition is found in Clem. Alex., *Strom.* IV 26, p. 324 St., and in Dio Chrysost., *Or.* 36, 20 (SVF III, 327, 329).

Aristotle too, in *Pol.* I 1, set a high value on the polis (1253 a 2-5). He described it as γινομένη μὲν τοῦ ζῆν ἐνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν, but did not define it by law.

1075—In principle, neither Zeno nor Chrysippus was against taking part in political life, though neither of them did.

Zeno and
Chrys. not
against
taking part
in politics

a. Seneca, *De otio* 3, 2 Gertz:

Zenon ait: accedet ad rem publicam (sapiens), nisi si quid impedierit.

b. Diog. Laërt. VII 121:

Πολιτεύσεσθαι φασὶ τὸν σοφὸν ἂν μὴ τι κωλύῃ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ *Περὶ βίων*· καὶ γὰρ κακίαν ἐφέξειν καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετὴν παρορμήσειν.

Panaetius'
attitude

c. Panaetius laid great stress on the duty of public service for a special class of people, but did not set more value on these duties than on those of pure theory.

Cic., *De off.* I 21, 71-72:

The author thinks some persons excused by special reasons for having retired from the service of the state. He continues (72):

Sed iis qui habent a natura adiumenta rerum gerendarum, abiecta omni cunctatione adipiscendi magistratus et gerenda res publica est; nec enim aliter aut regi civitas aut declarari animi magnitudo potest.

Probably the whole passage has been more or less worked over by Cicero, who may well be the author of the last cited words.

In any case, as we know from ch. 6 of the same work, Panaetius placed the first of the four cardinal virtues, “qui in veri cognitione consistit”, at the top, as “touching human nature most closely” (*maxime naturam attingit humanam*).

d. Cicero went a step further, in grading social duties as such higher than theoretical.

De off. I 6, 19:

After having praised certain persons for their knowledge of astronomy, geometry, dialectics and law, he says:

Cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra officium est.

In practice, from Panaetius onwards Stoicism has been for a large part the philosophy of the leading statesmen of Rome. By its very attitude towards political life, and by its moral severity in general, it was much more adapted to the Roman mind than Epicureanism was.

1076—The notion of natural law, as established by the Stoics, who continued on this point the line of Plato's and Aristotle's thought, was adopted by the classical jurists of the Roman Empire.

**Later
influence**

a. Though *Ulpianus* (Dig. I 1, 1, 3; Inst. I 2) extends natural law to all living beings, with the clear purpose of distinguishing *ius naturale* from *ius gentium*, on the whole, he stands on Stoic ground, e.g. in his definitions of *iustitia* and *iuris prudentia*.

**In the
Digestae**

Dig. I 1, 10:

Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi. Iuris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere. Iuris prudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti scientia.

b. *Florentinus* (*Dig.* I 1, 3) deduces natural law from the *πρώτη ὁρμή* of self-preservation and from mutual relationship of men.

In *Inst.* I 2, 2 we find the Stoic principle that, according to natural law, every man is born free; and *Marcianus* began his *Institutiones* by quoting Chrysippus as the highest authority of Stoic wisdom (*Dig.* I 3, 2).

c. In the 13th Century, the principle of natural law is adopted by Thomas Aquinas. It is kept up till our days in scholastical philosophy.

**In Thomas
Aquinas**

See, for instance, Thomas Aq., *Summa theol.* II, 1, qu. 93, art. 3, Resp.:

*Cum ergo lex aeterna sit ratio gubernationis in supremo gubernante, necesse est quod omnes rationes gubernationis, quae sunt in inferioribus gubernantibus, a lege aeterna deriventur. Huiusmodi autem rationes inferiorum gubernantium sunt quaecumque aliae leges praeter aeternam; unde omnes leges, inquantum participant de ratione recta, intantum derivantur a lege aeterna. Et propter hoc Augustinus dicit in l. *De Lib. Arb.* (cap. 6), quod in temporali lege nihil est iustum ac legitimum, quod non ex lege aeterna homines sibi derivaverunt.*

Cp. also *S. Th.* II, 1, qu. 91, art. 2, Resp.:

*... Cum omnia, quae divinae providentiae subduntur, a lege aeterna reguntur et mensurentur, ut ex dictis patet (art. praec.), manifestum est, quod omnia participant aliquo modo legem aeternam, inquantum scilicet ex impressione eius habent inclinationes in proprios actus et fines. Inter cetera autem rationalis creatura excellentiori quodam modo divinae providentiae subjacet, inquantum et ipsa fit providentiae particeps, sibi ipsi et aliis providens. Unde et in ipsa participatur ratio aeterna, per quam habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem: et talis participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura *lex naturalis* dicitur.*

**Natural law
as a participation
of
eternal law**

That S. Thomas speaks here of *participation*, shows us the difference between his and the Stoic view of eternal law: for Stoics, eternal Law is directly immanent in nature; for S. Thomas, it is essentially transcendent, and only indirectly immanent, as a regulative principle.

TWENTY-SECOND CHAPTER SCEPTICISM

I—INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

**What is
meant by
Sceptics**

1077—By Sceptics we mean those philosophers who deny the possibility of any knowledge and think that wisdom consists in withholding assent (ἐποχή). Since Pyrrho of Elis was the first to take this attitude, he is considered as the founder of the Sceptical School, and Sceptics were also called Πυρρώνειοι.

In the following passage of Sextus "Sceptics" are distinguished from those philosophers who, being members of the Academy, took the sceptical attitude.¹ Certain points of difference between the two Schools are noticed by Sextus in the same book, 229-231. Arcesilaus, however, is said to have been on the side of the Sceptical School (232). Later both groups are practically identified in being σκεπτικοί or ἐφεκτικοί. St. Augustine, in combating scepticism, wrote *Contra Academicos*.

**Academics
and Sceptics
opposed to
dogmatists**

a. Sextus, *P. I* 1, 1-4:

Τοῖς ζητοῦσι τι πρᾶγμα ἢ εὔρεσιν ἐπακολουθεῖν εἰκὸς ἢ ἄρνησιν εὐρέσεως καὶ ἀκαταληψίας¹ ὁμολογίαν ἢ ἐπιμονὴν ζητήσεως. διόπερ ἴσως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ζητουμένων οἱ μὲν εὐρηκέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔφασαν, οἱ δ' ἀπεφήναντο μὴ δυνατόν εἶναι τοῦτο καταληφθῆναι, οἱ δὲ ἔτι ζητοῦσιν. καὶ εὐρηκέναι μὲν δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἰδίως καλούμενοι δογματικοί, οἷον οἱ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ Ἐπίκουρον καὶ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, ὥς δὲ περὶ ἀκαταλήπτων ἀπεφήναντο οἱ περὶ Κλειτόμαχον καὶ Καρνεάδην καὶ ἄλλοι Ἀκαδημαῖκοι, ζητοῦσι δὲ οἱ σκεπτικοί. ὅθεν εὐλόγως δοκοῦσιν αἱ ἀνωτάτω φιλοσοφίαι τρεῖς εἶναι, δογματικὴ Ἀκαδημαϊκὴ σκεπτικὴ.

**Various
names of
scepticism**

b. Besides the above-mentioned names, scepticism is also qualified as ζητητικὴ or ἀπορητικὴ.

Sextus, *P. I* 3, 7:

Ἡ σκεπτικὴ τοίνυν ἀγωγὴ καλεῖται μὲν καὶ ζητητικὴ ἀπὸ ἐνεργείας τῆς κατὰ τὸ ζητεῖν καὶ σκέπτεσθαι, καὶ ἐφεκτικὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ μετὰ τὴν ζήτησιν περὶ τὸν σκεπτόμενον γινομένου πάθους, καὶ ἀπορητικὴ ἦτοι ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ παντὸς ἀπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν, ὥς ἐνίοι φασιν, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀμηχανεῖν πρὸς συγκατάθεσιν ἢ

¹ The impossibility of κατάληψις, as it is taught by Stoics (above, nrs. 984-985).

ἄρνησιν, καὶ Πυρρώνειος ἀπὸ τοῦ φαίνεσθαι ἡμῖν τὸν Πύρωνα σωματικώτερον καὶ ἐπιφανέστερον τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ προσεληλυθέναι τῇ σκέψει.

1078—There seems to have been an interruption in the Sceptical School: Menodotus, a later Sceptic of the empirical school, says that Pyrrho's successor Timon had no successor himself. Probable interruption of the School after Timon

a. Diog. Laërt. IX 115:

Τούτου (sc. Τίμωνος) διάδοχος, ὡς μὲν Μηνόδοτός φησι, γέγονεν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλὰ διέλιπεν ἡ ἀγωγή ἕως αὐτὴν Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Κυρηναῖος ἀνεκτήσατο.

Ptolemaeus of Cyrene lived towards the end of the second century or in the beginning of the first.

b. Others filled the gap between Timon and Ptolemaeus.

Diog. Laërt., ib.:

‘Ὡς δ’ Ἰππόβοτός φησι καὶ Σωτίων, διήκουσαν αὐτοῦ Διοσκουρίδης Κύπριος καὶ Νικόλοχος Ῥόδιος καὶ Εὐφράνωρ Σελευκεὺς Πραῦλος τ’ ἀπὸ Τρωάδος, δς οὕτω καρτερικὸς ἐγένετο, καθά φησι Φύλαρχος ἱστορῶν, ὥστ’ ἀδίκως ὑπομεῖναι ὡς ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ κολασθῆναι, μηδὲ λόγου τοὺς πολίτας καταξιώσας. Εὐφράνωρος δὲ διήκουσεν Εὐβουλος Ἀλεξανδρεὺς, οὗ Πτολεμαῖος, οὗ Σαρπηδῶν καὶ Ἡρακλείδης, Ἡρακλείδου δ’ Αἰνεσίδημος Κνώσιος, δς καὶ Πυρρωνεῖων λόγων ὀκτὼ συνέγραψε βιβλία· οὗ Ζεύξιππος ὁ πολίτης, οὗ Ζεῦξις ὁ Γωνιόπους, οὗ Ἀντίοχος Λαοδικεὺς ἀπὸ Λύκου· τοῦτου δὲ Μηνόδοτος ὁ Νικομηδεύς, ἱατρὸς ἐμπειρικός, καὶ Θειωδᾶς Λαοδικεὺς· Μηνόδοτου δὲ Ἡρόδοτος Ἀριεὺς Ταρσεύς· Ἡρόδοτου δὲ διήκουσε Σέξτος ὁ Ἐμπειρικός, οὗ καὶ τὰ δέκα τῶν Σκεπτικῶν καὶ ἄλλα κάλλιστα· Σέξτου δὲ διήκουσε Σατορνῆνος ὁ Κυθηναῖς, ἐμπειρικός καὶ αὐτός.

Probably this list was fabricated later, as is admitted by Brochard, *Les sceptiques grecs*, Paris 1887, 1932, p. 229. See also L. Robin, *Pyrrhon*, Paris 1944, p. 137-139; Zeller III 2, p. 2. C. W. Vollgraff, in his interesting study on the life of Sextus Empiricus (*Revue de Philologie* 1902, p. 195-210) defends the authenticity of this list. In fact, the space of time between Timon and Ptolemaeus is exactly filled if a period of 30 years is attributed to every schoolhead. Now, this is certainly not impossible, yet rather suspect.

c. That an interruption has happened in at least one philosophers school, is confirmed by the following passage from the life of Epicurus. Diog. Laërt. X 9:

As a witness in favour of Epicurus' character he mentions i.a.:

‘Ἡ τε διαδοχὴ πασῶν σχεδὸν ἐκλιπουσῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἐσαεὶ διαμένουσα καὶ νηρίθμους ἀρχὰς ἀπολύνουσα ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης τῶν γνωρίμων.

Moreover, we know that neither in the Stoa, nor in the Academy or Peripatos was the succession ever interrupted.

When did
Sextus
Empiricus
live?

1079—Usually the life of Sextus Empiricus is dated c. 180-210. Vollgraff, in his above cited article, identified this Sextus with Sextus of Chaeronea, nephew of Plutarchus and teacher of Marcus Aurelius. If this identification is right—and, indeed, it does not depend on the list of Hippobotus and Sotion—, we possess a description of Sextus' character by the emperor's hand.

a. Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* I 9:

Παρά Σέξτου τὸ εὐμενές· καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦ οἴκου τοῦ πατρονομουμένου· καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν· καὶ τὸ σεμνὸν ἀπλάστως· καὶ τὸ στοχαστικὸν τῶν φίλων κηδεμονικῶς· καὶ τὸ ἀνεκτικὸν τῶν ιδιωτῶν καὶ <διὰ> τὸ ἀθεώρητον οἰομένων· καὶ τὸ πρὸς πάντας εὐάρμοστον, ὥστε κολακείας μὲν πάσης προσηνεστέραν εἶναι τὴν ὀμιλίαν αὐτοῦ, αἰδεσιμώτατον δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐκεῖνοις παρ' αὐτὸν ἐκείνον τὸν καιρὸν εἶναι· καὶ τὸ καταληπτικῶς καὶ ὁδῶ ἐξευρετικόν τε καὶ τακτικὸν τῶν εἰς βίον ἀναγκαίων δογμάτων· καὶ τὸ μὴδὲ ἔμφασιν ποτε ὀργῆς ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς πάθους παρασχεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἅμα μὲν ἀπαθέστατον εἶναι, ἅμα δὲ φιλοστοργότατον· καὶ τὸ εὐφημον καὶ τοῦτο ἀσφορητί· καὶ τὸ πολυμαθὲς ἀνεπιφάντως.

Doubtless, the feature of ἀπάθεια in this portrait does not prove at all that the philosopher was a Stoic. As to the words καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν, as a general rule of life this formula was evidently Stoic. In a sense, however, the sceptic Sextus did speak of the "guidance of Nature", too (*Pyrrh. Hyp.* I 23-24, see under nr. **1140b**), and it is quite possible that Marcus Aurelius, on hearing the well-known formula used by Sextus in a more limited sense, took it, as Stoics did, δογματικῶς.

Thus, I do not think there is anything against the identification in this passage.

b. The identification is confirmed by Suidas:

Σέξτος Χαιρωνεύς ἀδελφιδοῦς Πλουτάρχου γεγονὼς κατὰ Μάρκον Ἀντωνῖνον τὸν Καίσαρα φιλόσοφος μαθητὴς Ἡροδότου τοῦ Φιλαδελφαίου. Ἦν δὲ τῆς Πυρρωνείου ἀγωγῆς. Καὶ τοσοῦτον πρὸς τιμῆς τῷ βασιλεῖ ἦν ὥστε καὶ συνδικάζειν αὐτῷ. Ἐγραψεν Ἡθικά καὶ ¹ Σκεπτικά βιβλία δέκα.

Division of
the Sceptical
School

1080—The Sceptical School may be divided into three periods:

- I. *The older Sceptics*, Pyrrho and Timon: *an anti-dialectical philosophy of life*;
- II. *The dialectical scepticism* of Aenesidemus and Agrippa;

¹ The traditional reading is: ἐπὶ.

III. The *empirical phenomenism* of the later Sceptical School, to which belongs Sextus Empiricus.

This later Scepticism is prepared and certainly influenced by the philosophers of the so-called *Middle and Third Academy*, Arcesilaus and Carneades. We shall deal with them between (I) and (II).

1081—The question may be asked whether or not Pyrrho's scepticism was a new philosophy. I think, it was, for Is scepticism a new philosophy?

(1) Presocratic philosophers, on the whole, did not so much confide in the senses, but they had great confidence in reason (Heraclitus, our nr. 66; Parmenides, nrs. 80, l. 33-37, 81-83; Anaxagoras, nr. 133a, b; Democritus, 142a d).

(2) The Sophists displayed a beginning of scepticism: Protagoras' principle of *ἀντιλογική* (nr. 172), and Gorgias' three nihilistic theses (182-184). All sophists, however, differ from Pyrrho in that their scepticism had no bearing on their conduct, and from the scepticism of the Academy and later members of the Sceptical School by its not being intellectually full-grown.

(3) The Socratic dialogues, certainly, were *ἀπορητικοί*. Yet, neither Socrates nor Plato were sceptics. They both believed firmly in many things, such as the superiority of soul to body, the not only objective but even absolute value of moral principles, the existence of good and righteous Gods and their providence; and all this, they believed on rational grounds (215, 217, 223; cp. 198-199, 388 and 394).

Therefore, the Sceptics and those philosophers of the Academy who are on their side can appeal to Socrates and Plato only *per accidens*. The mental attitude both of Socrates and of Plato differs very much from Pyrrho's and his followers' attitude in life. The latter were interested in dialectic, much more and deeper than the Sophists were. Yet, it may be said that the Sceptics developed certain principles laid down somewhat provisionally by the older Sophists, especially Protagoras.

2—THE OLDER SCEPTICS: PYRRHO AND TIMON

1082—Antigonos of Karystos, a contemporary of Timon, a physician who wrote biographies of philosophers, was inter alia the author of a life of Pyrrho and of Timon. These biographies were used by Diogenes Laërtius.

a. Diog. Laërt. IX 61:

Life of
Pyrrho

Πύρρων Ἡλεῖος Πλειστάρχου μὲν ἦν υἱός, καθὰ καὶ Διοκλῆς ἱστορεῖ· ὥς φησι δ' Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν Χρονικοῖς, πρότερον ἦν ζωγράφος, καὶ ἤκουσε Βρύσωνος τοῦ Στίλπωνος, ὥς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν Διαδοχαῖς, εἶτ' Ἀναξάρχου¹ ξυνακολουθῶν πανταχοῦ, ὥς καὶ τοῖς Γυμνοσοφισταῖς ἐν Ἰνδίᾳ συμμῖξαι²

¹ Anaxarchus of Abdera, who accompanied Alexander on his expedition to the Orient, is described as a man of a very strong and independent character, who impressed Alexander. Diog. L. IX 58-60.

² On the Gymnosophists, see Plutarch, *Life of Alexander*, cc. 64-65 and 69, 3-4.

καὶ τοῖς Μάγοις. ὅθεν γενναιότατα δοκεῖ φιλοσοφῆσαι, τὸ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας¹ καὶ ἐποχῆς εἶδος² εἰσαγαγών, ὥς Ἀσκάνιος ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης φησίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔφασκεν οὔτε καλὸν οὔτ' αἰσχρὸν οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτ' ἄδικον· καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, νόμῳ δὲ καὶ ἔθει πάντα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πράττειν· οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον τότε ἢ τότε εἶναι ἕκαστον.

His indif-
ferentism

b. Diog. L., ib., c. 62:

Ἀκόλουθος δ' ἦν καὶ τῷ βίῳ, μηδὲν ἐκτρεπόμενος μηδὲ φυλαττόμενος, ἅπαντα ὑφιστάμενος, ἀμάξας, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ κρημνοὺς καὶ κύνας καὶ ὅλως μηδὲν ταῖς αἰσθησέσιν ἐπιτρέπων. σφίζεσθαι μέντοι, καθά φασιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρύστιον Ἀντίγονον, ὑπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων παρακολουθούντων. Αἰνεσίδημος δὲ φησι φιλοσοφεῖν μὲν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἐποχῆς λόγον, μὴ μέντοι γ' ἀπροοράτως ἕκαστα πράττειν. Ὁ δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἐνενήκοντα ἔτη κατεβίω.

1083—Antigonos gave some more explicit information about Pyrrho's life and conduct.

a. Diog. L., ib., c. 62 (continued):

Ἀντίγονος δὲ φησιν ὁ Καρύστιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ Πύρρωνος τάδε περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἄδοξός τ' ἦν καὶ πένης καὶ ζωγράφος. σφίζεσθαι τ' αὐτοῦ ἐν Ἡλίδι ἐν τῷ γυμνασίῳ λαμπαδιστὰς μετρίως ἔχοντας. ἐκπατεῖν τ' αὐτὸν καὶ ἐρημάζειν, σπανίως ποτ' ἐπιφαινόμενον τοῖς οἴκοι. τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἀκούσαντα Ἰνδοῦ τινος ὀνειδίζοντος Ἀναξάρχῳ ὥς οὐκ ἂν ἑτερόν τινα διδάξει οὗτος ἀγαθόν, αὐτὸς αὐτὰς βασιλικὰς θεραπεύων. αἰεὶ τ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καταστήματι, ὥστ' εἰ καὶ τις αὐτὸν καταλίποι μεταξὺ λέγοντα, αὐτῷ διαπεραίνειν τὸν λόγον, καίτοι κεκινημένον τε <τῷ τοῦ ὄχλου κρότῳ καὶ φιλόδοξον>³ ὄντα ἐν νεότητι. πολλάκις, φησί, καὶ ἀπεδήμει, μηδενὶ προειπών, καὶ συνερρέμβετο οἷσιτις ἤθελεν, καὶ ποτ' Ἀναξάρχου εἰς τέλμα ἐμπεσόντος, παρῆλθεν οὐ βοηθήσας· τινῶν δ' αἰτιωμένων, αὐτὸς Ἀναξάρχος ἐπῆναι τὸ ἀδιάφορον καὶ ἄστοργον αὐτοῦ.

b. Ib., c. 64:

Καταληφθεὶς δὲ ποθ' ἑαυτῷ λαλῶν καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς τὴν αἰτίαν ἔφη μελετᾶν

where it is told how the gymnosophist Calanos burned himself on a pyre. Pyrrho seems to have been greatly impressed by these Indian sages.

¹ See **1077a** n. 1.

² The term ἐποχή, which is much used by later Sceptics, seems not to have been used by Pyrrho. It does not occur, at least, in the fragment of Aristocles, which goes back to Timon (our nr. **1087a**).

³ The lacuna was filled in this way by Diels.

χρηστός εἶναι. ἔν τε ταῖς ζητήσεσιν ὑπ' οὐδενὸς κατεφρονεῖτο διὰ τὸ διεξοδικῶς λέγειν καὶ πρὸς ἐρώτησιν· ὅθεν καὶ Ναυσιφάνην ἥδη νεανίσκον ὄντα θηραθῆναι¹. ἔφασκε γοῦν γίνεσθαι δεῖν τῆς μὲν διαθέσεως τῆς Πυρρωνείου, τῶν δὲ λόγων τῶν ἑαυτοῦ. ἔλεγέ τε πολλάκις καὶ Ἐπίκουρον θαυμάζοντα τὴν Πύρρωνος ἀναστροφὴν συνεχὲς αὐτοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ. οὕτω δ' αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῆς πατρίδος τιμηθῆναι ὥστε καὶ ἀρχιερέα καταστῆσαι αὐτὸν καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον πᾶσι τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἀτέλειαν ψηφίσασθαι.

1084—Other witnesses.

A sceptical
saint

a. Diog. L. IX 66:

Εὐσεβῶς δὲ καὶ τῇ ἀδελφῇ συνεβίω μαίᾳ οὔσῃ, καθά φησιν Ἐρατοσθένης ἐν τῷ Περὶ πλούτου καὶ πενίας, ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς φέρων εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐπίπρασκεν ὀρνίθια, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ χοιρίδια, καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας ἐκάθαιρεν ἀδιαφόρως. λέγεται δὲ καὶ δέλφακα λούειν αὐτὸς ὑπ' ἀδιαφορίας. καὶ χολήσας τι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀδελφῆς, Φιλίστα δ' ἐκαλεῖτο, πρὸς τὸν ἐπιλαβόμενον εἰπεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἐν γυναικί ἢ ἐπιδειξίς τῆς ἀδιαφορίας. καὶ κυνὸς ποτ' ἐπενεχθέντος διασοβηθέντα εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸν αἰτιασάμενον, ὡς χαλεπὸν εἶη ὀλοσχερῶς ἐκδύναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

b. Ib., c. 68:

Ποσειδώνιος δὲ καὶ τοιοῦτόν τι διέξεισι περὶ αὐτοῦ. τῶν γὰρ συμπλεόντων αὐτῷ ἐσκυθρωπακότων ὑπὸ χειμῶνος, αὐτὸς γαληνὸς ὢν ἀνέρρωσε τὴν ψυχὴν, δείξας ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ χοιρίδιον ἐσθίον καὶ εἰπὼν ὡς χρὴ τὸν σοφὸν ἐν τοιαύτῃ καθεστάναι ἀταραξίᾳ.

1085—Timon expressed his admiration for Pyrrho in the following lines.

Praise of
Pyrrho
by Timon

a. In the *Silloi*, fr. 48 Diels (ap. Diog. L. IX 65):

ᾧ γέρον, ὦ Πύρρων, πῶς ἡ πόθεν ἔκδυσιν εὖρες
λατρείης δοξῶν τε κενοφροσύνης τε σοφιστῶν,
καὶ πάσης ἀπάτης πειθοῦς τ' ἀπελύσαο δεσμά;
οὐδ' ἔμελέν σοι ταῦτα μετ' ἄλλοισιν, τίνες αὔραι
Ἑλλάδ' ἔχουσι, πόθεν τε καὶ εἰς ὅ, τι κυρεῖ ἕκαστα.

b. In the *Indalmoi*, fr. 67 Diels (partly ap. Diog. L., ib., more completely ap. Sext. Emp., *Adv. math.* I 305):

¹ Nausiphanes, Epicurus' teacher, is mentioned among Pyrrho's pupils ap. Diog. L. IX 69 (our nr. 1099).

Τοῦτό μοι, ὦ Πύρρων, ἰμείρεται ἥτορ ἀκοῦσαι,
 πῶς ποτ' ἀνὴρ ὅτ' ἄγεις¹ ῥᾶστα μετ' ἡσυχίης
 μούνης ἐν ἀνθρώποισι Θεοῦ τρόπον ἡγεμονεύων,
 ὃς περὶ πᾶσαν ἐλὼν γαῖαν ἀναστρέφεται,
 δεικνύς εὐτόρνου σφαίρας πυρिकाύτορα κύκλον.

1086—Brochard thinks (as Diels seems to do) that the next fragment may have been written by Timon as Pyrrho's reply to the question asked in the last lines.

Pyrrho's
reply?

Timon, fr. 68 Diels (ap. Sext., *Adv. math.* XI 20):

Ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω ὥς μοι καταφαίνεται εἶναι,
 μῦθον ἀληθείης ὁρθὸν ἔχων κανόνα,
 ὥς ἡ τοῦ θείου τε φύσις καὶ τάγαθοῦ αἰεί,
 ἐξ ὧν ἰσότητος γίνεται ἀνδρὶ βίος.

Now, this might seem to us a curious sceptic who, when about to reveal "how the nature of God and of goodness is", pretends to have an exact standard of truth in his speech!—Most of this form of expression must be put down, doubtless, to Timon's account. Later Sceptics make use of the fragment without any reserve, e.g. Sextus Empiricus l.l., who precedently remarks that, the word "is" having two meanings, namely first "really exists", and secondly "appears", sentences like ours are, of course, used in the sense of appearance.

Cp. Timon's fr. 69D (ap. Diog. L. IX 105):

ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον πάντῃ σθένει, οὐπερ ἂν ἔλθῃ.

Pyrrho's
doctrine

1087—a. Of fundamental importance is the following fragment, which, according to the text, goes back to Timon.

Aristocles ap. Euseb., *Praep. ev.* XIV 18, 2:

Ὁ δέ γε μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ (sc. Πύρρωνος) Τίμων φησὶ δεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαιμονήσῃν εἰς τρία ταῦτα βλέπειν· πρῶτον μὲν, ὅποια πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα· δεύτερον δέ, τίνα χρὴ τρόπον ἡμᾶς πρὸς αὐτὰ διακεῖσθαι· τελευταῖον δέ, τί περιέσται τοῖς οὕτως ἔχουσι. Τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματά φησιν αὐτὸν ἀποφαίνειν ἐπίσης ἀδιάφορα καὶ ἀστάθμητα καὶ ἀνεπίκριτα, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο μήτε τὰς δόξας ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι. Διὰ τοῦτο οὖν μηδὲ πιστεύειν αὐταῖς δεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀδόξατους καὶ ἀκλινεῖς καὶ ἀκραδάντους εἶναι, περὶ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου λέγοντας ὅτι οὐ μᾶλλον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ καὶ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι, ἢ οὐτ' ἔστι οὐτ' οὐκ ἔστιν. Τοῖς μὲντοι διακειμένοις οὕτω περιέσεσθαι Τίμων φησὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀφασίαν, ἔπειτα δ' ἀταραξίαν.

¹ Most mss. read ἀνὴρ ὅτ' ἄγεις. Now, this would mean, as Diels remarks: *etiam virili aetate incuriosus tamquam infans*. This is, however, against the view the Ancients took of infancy; and further, in this case ἀνὴρ is rather opposed to θεός. Hence there is no parallel with the lines "δολίῃ δ' ὄδῳ ἑξαπατήθη / πρεσβυγενὴς ἔτ' ἐών", (fr. 59 D., ap. Sext., P. I 224), as there might seem to be!

From this passage we may conclude:

Conclusions

(1) Pyrrho replied in his way to the question of "how to live happily". In this sense, he may be considered as a moralist,—and a very severe one—, as he was e.g. by Cicero.

(2) He replies: We must be aware that we do not know things as they are. Neither by the senses nor by thinking do we touch reality. Therefore, we must live without any opinions or preference for anything. The result will be: first, *aphasia*; next, *ataraxia*.

(3) Thus, *ἐποχή*, which is a theoretical attitude, was not aimed at by Pyrrho, but *ataraxia*, which is a practical attitude in life and means *indifferentism*, as complete as possible. Hence Cicero's view of Pyrrho (next nr.).

The theoretical consequences of what may be called Pyrrho's doctrine will be developed later by Carneades (probabilism) and Menodotus (empirical phenomenism). Cp. the so-called sensualism (better: *phenomenism*) of Aristippus of Cyrene, who taught that our knowledge is strictly confined to our own *πάθη* (Vol. I, nr. 260).

b. Cp. Aenesidemus ap. Diog. Laërt. IX 106:

Καὶ Αἰνεσίδημος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Πυρρωνείων λόγων οὐδὲν φησι ὀρίζειν τὸν Πύρρωνα δογματικῶς διὰ τὴν ἀντιλογίαν, τοῖς δὲ φαινομένοις ἀκολουθεῖν.

c. Cp. also the following description of the sceptical attitude.

Diog. L. IX 74:

Διετέλουν δὴ οἱ Σκεπτικοὶ τὰ τῶν αἱρέσεων δόγματα πάντ' ἀνατρέποντες, αὐτοὶ δ' οὐδὲν ἀπεφαίνοντο δογματικῶς, ἕως δὲ τοῦ προφέρεισθαι τὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ διηγέσθαι μηδὲν ὀρίζοντες, μηδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο. ὥστε καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀρίζειν ἀνῆρουν, λέγοντες οἷον „Οὐδὲν ὀρίζομεν", ἐπεὶ ὥριζον ἄν. προφερόμεθα δέ, φασί, τὰς ἀποφάσεις εἰς μήνυσιν τῆς ἀπροπτωσίας, ὥς εἰ καὶ νεύσαντας τοῦτο ἐνεδέχeto δηλῶσαι· διὰ τῆς οὖν „Οὐδὲν ὀρίζομεν" φωνῆς τὸ τῆς ἀρρεψίας πάθος δηλοῦται· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διὰ τῆς „Οὐδὲν μᾶλλον" καὶ τῆς „Παντὶ λόγῳ λόγος ἀντίκειται" καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων.

1088—a. In morals, certainly, Pyrrho did not teach any theoretically more positive doctrine, as may appear clearly from the above cited passage of Diog. (1082a), IX 61:

Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔφασκεν οὔτε καλὸν οὔτ' αἰσχρὸν οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτ' ἄδικον· e.q.s.

b. Cicero repeatedly mentions him on a level with a most rigorous moralist such as Aristo of Chios, who refused to admit of any distinction between *adiaphora*. Thus, he says in *De finibus* II 13, 43:

Cicero's
judgment
on Pyrrho

Quae (sc. external goods) quod Aristoni et Pyrrhoni omnino visa sunt pro nihilo, ut inter optime valere et gravissime aegrotare nihil prorsus dicerent interesse, recte iam pridem contra eos desitum est disputari. Dum enim in una virtute sic omnia esse voluerunt, ut eam rerum selec-

tione exspoliarent nec ei quicquam aut unde oriretur darent, aut ubi niteretur, virtutem ipsam, quam amplexabantur, sustulerunt.

Cp. also *De fin.* III 3, 11 and III 4, the beginning.

c. Again, *De finibus* IV 16, the beginning:

Itaque mihi videntur omnes quidem illi errasse qui finem bonorum esse dixerunt honeste vivere, sed alius alio magis, Pyrrho scilicet maxime, qui virtute constituta nihil omnino quod appetendum sit relinquat, deinde Aristo, e.q.s.

Now it is clear how Pyrrho, being a practical indifferentist of great rigorism, could be placed on a level with Aristo. If the question is asked how then, after all, "virtue was constituted" by the sceptical philosopher who denied that anything was honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust, one answer only can be given, namely: that, for Pyrrho, "virtue" was this very attitude of utter indifference towards everything.

Cicero, evidently, "translated" Pyrrhonism into the terminology of dogmatists.

A modern
judgment
on Pyrrho

1089—V. Brochard, at the end of his excellent chapter on Pyrrho, gives the following characteristic of his personality¹.

"On a vu bien des hommes, dans l'histoire de la philosophie et des religions, pratiquer le détachement des biens du monde et le renoncement absolu; mais les uns étaient soutenus par l'espoir d'une récompense future; ils attendaient le prix de leur vertu, et les joies qu'ils entrevoyaient reconfortaient leur courage et les assuraient contre eux-mêmes. Les autres, à défaut d'une telle espérance, avaient au moins un dogme, un idéal, auquel ils faisaient le sacrifice de leurs désirs et de leur personne; le sentiment de leur perfection était au moins une compensation à tant de sacrifices. Tous avaient pour point d'appui une foi solide. Seul, Pyrrhon n'attend rien, n'espère rien, ne croit à rien; pourtant il vit comme ceux qui croient et espèrent². Il n'est soutenu par rien et il se tient debout.—

Quelques réserves qu'on puisse faire, il y a peu d'hommes qui donnent une plus haute idée de l'humanité. En un sens, Pyrrhon dépasse Marc-Aurèle et Spinoza. Et il n'y a plus qu'un pas à faire pour dire, comme quelques-uns de ses disciples l'ont dit, que la douceur est le dernier mot du scepticisme."

The reference at the end is to Diog. L. IX 108:

Gentleness
the end of
scepticism

Τινὲς καὶ τὴν ἀπάθειαν, ἄλλοι δὲ τὴν πραότητα τέλος εἰπεῖν φασὶ τοὺς σκεπτικούς.

1090—Diog. L. IX 69:

Pyrrho's
pupils

Πρὸς τοῦτοις διήκουε τοῦ Πύρρωνος Ἑκαταῖός θ' ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης³ καὶ

¹ *Les sceptiques grecs*¹, p. 73.

² This, certainly, is not quite true: compared with those who believe and hope, Pyrrho's greatness is a tragic one. It lacks all joy.

³ Hecataeus of Abdera wrote a history of Egypt under Ptolemaeus I (= 300), later followed by Manetho. Jacoby, *Fr. Gr. Hist.* III A, p. 12.

Τίμων ὁ Φιλιάσιος ὁ τοὺς Σίλλους πεποιηκώς, περὶ οὗ λέξομεν, ἔτι τε Ναυσιφάνης <ὁ> Τήιος, οὗ φασὶ τινες ἀκοῦσαι Ἐπίκουρον.

1091—Diog. L. IX 109-III; 112:

Timon

Ἀπολλωνίδης ὁ Νικαεὺς ὁ παρ' ἡμῶν¹ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Εἰς τοὺς Σίλλους ὑπομνημάτων, ἃ προσφωνεῖ Τιβερίῳ Καίσαρι, φησὶ τὸν Τίμωνα εἶναι πατὴρ μὲν Τιμάρχου, Φιλιάσιον δὲ τὸ γένος· νέον δὲ καταλειφθέντα χορεύειν, ἔπειτα καταγόντα ἀποδημῆσαι εἰς Μέγαρα πρὸς Στίλπωνα· ἀκκείνῳ συνδιατρίψαντα αὐθις ἐπανελθεῖν οἶκαδε καὶ γῆμαι. εἴτα πρὸς Πύρρωνα εἰς Ἥλιν ἀποδημῆσαι μετὰ τῆς γυναικὸς ἀκκεί διατρίβειν ἕως αὐτῷ παῖδες ἐγένοντο, ὧν τὸν μὲν πρεσβύτερον Εἰάνθον ἐκάλεσε καὶ ἱατρικὴν ἐδίδαξε καὶ διάδοχον τοῦ βίου κατέλιπε. ὁ δ' ἐλλόγιμος ἦν, ὥς καὶ Σωτίων ἐν τῷ ἐνδεκάτῳ φησίν. ἀπορῶν μέντοι τροφῶν ἀπῆρεν εἰς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον καὶ τὴν Προποντίδα· ἐν Χαλκηδόνι τε σοφιστεύων ἐπὶ πλεόν ἀποδοχῆς ἡξιώθη· ἐντεῦθεν τε πορισάμενος ἀπῆρεν εἰς Ἀθήνας, ἀκκεί διέτριβε μέχρι καὶ τελευτῆς, ὀλίγον χρόνον εἰς Θήβας διαδραμών. ἐγνώσθη δὲ καὶ Ἀντιγόνῳ τῷ βασιλεῖ καὶ Πτολεμαίῳ τῷ Φιλιδέλφῳ, ὥς αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς ἰάμβοις αὐτῷ μαρτυρεῖ. Ἦν δέ, φησιν ὁ Ἀντίγονος, καὶ φιλοπότης καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων εἰ σχολάζοι ποιήματα συνέγραφε καὶ ἔπη καὶ τραγωδίας καὶ σατύρους καὶ δράματα κωμικὰ τριάκοντα, τραγικά δὲ ἐξήκοντα, σίλλους τε καὶ κιναίδους. — Τῶν δὲ σίλλων τρία ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ὡς ἂν σκεπτικὸς ὢν πάντας λοιδορεῖ καὶ σιλλαίνει τοὺς δογματικούς ἐν παρῳδίᾳ εἶδει. — 112. Ἐτελεύτησε δ' ἐγγὺς ἐτῶν ἐνενήκοντα.

His works

Timon died in the year 235 (later than Arcesilaus, see under 1093). Of his principal work, the *Silloi*, Wachsmuth published the remains and tried to reconstruct the whole (*De Timone Phlasiio*, Leipzig 1859). Later, these fragments were inserted in Diels' *Poetarum philosophorum fragmenta*, Berlin 1901.

1092—The first book of the *Silloi* seems to have been a *Nekyia*: the philosophers were distinguished in the crowd of souls and characterized by Timon in a hardly flattering way.

the *Silloi*

Zeno, the founder of the Stoa, is introduced as a sneaky and greedy Phoenician old woman, sitting in a dark place full of (dogmatical) smoke and bearing a very small fishbasket (an allusion to the dialectical subtleties of the Stoa), too tiny to contain all the fishes and hence swept away by the river. She was not quite as intelligent as a guitar...

¹ This Apollonides is unknown to us. The words ὁ παρ' ἡμῶν either mean that Diogenes himself was a sceptic, or that he used a sceptic's work without indicating that it was a citation.

a. Fr. 38 D. (ap. Diog. L. VII 15):

Καὶ Φοίνισσαν ἴδον λιχνόγραυν σκιερῶ ἐνὶ τύφῳ
πάντων ἱμεύουσιν· ὁ δ' ἔρρει γυργαθὸς αὐτῆς
σμικρὸς ἑὼν, νοῦν δ' εἶχεν ἐλάσσονα κινδαψοῖο.

b. Xenophanes, writer of *Silloi*, finds most favour in Timon's eyes. He is introduced in this way.

Fr. 60 D. (ap. Sext., *P.* I 224):

Ξεινοφάνης ὑπάτυφος, ὁμηραπάτης ἐπισκώπτης,
ἐκτὸς * ἅπ' ἀνθρώπων θεὸν ἐπλάσας ἴσον ἅπάντῃ,
<ἀτρεμῇ> ἀσκηθῇ, νοερώτερον ἢ νόημα.

Relation to
Arcesilaus

1093—Arcesilaus, though not far from him in philosophy, was handled not much better in the *Silloi*, but glorified after his death.

Diog. L. IX 115:

Ἐρωτηθεὶς δέ ποθ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀρκεσιλάου διὰ τί παρείη ἐκ Θηβῶν, ἔφη,
"ὣν ὑμᾶς ἀναπεπταμένους ὀρῶν γελῶ". ὅμως δὲ καταπτόμενος Ἀρκεσιλάου
ἐν τοῖς σίλλοις ἐπήνεκεν αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Ἀρκεσιλάου περιδείπνῳ.

The
Indalmoi

1094—By Ἰνδαλμοί the writer probably meant the deceptive images or appearances of wisdom, brought forward by philosophers.

Sextus, *Adv. math.* XI (= *Ag. the eth.*) I, fr. 67 D., cited under 1085b, l. 4:

Μὴ προσέχων δίνους ** ἡδυλόγου σοφίης.

He sneers
at Stoic
κατάληψις

1095—The following passage of Diogenes shows us his way of attacking the Stoic theory of κατάληψις.

Diog. L. IX 114:

Συνεχές τ' ἐπιλέγειν εἰώθει πρὸς τοὺς τὰς αἰσθήσεις μετ' ἐπιμαρτυροῦντος
τοῦ νοῦ ἐγκρίνοντας,

Συνῆλθεν Ἀτταγᾶς τε καὶ Νουμήνιος.

εἰώθει δὲ καὶ παίζειν τοιαῦτα.

According to Diogenianus Attagas and Numenius were two notorious thieves. R. D. Hicks translates elegantly:

Conclusion

"Birds of a feather flock together".

Timon appears to have been more a fighting spirit and a scoffer than Pyrrho was, but not yet a dialectician.

* ἐκτὸς Bekker; εἰ τὸν Diels; ἕα τὸν codd.

** δίνους corr. Nauck, followed by Diels; δειλοῖς codd. R. G. Bury proposes αἶνοις: "sweet-voiced Science's tales".

3—THE SECOND OR MIDDLE ACADEMY: ARCESILAUS

1096—Arcesilaus is said to have first taught to suspend judgment by developing opposite arguments, and to have first restored in the Academy the Socratic-Platonic method of question and reply.

**Arcesilaus
introduced
scepticism
in the
Academy**

a. Diog. L. IV 28:

Ἀρκεσίλαος Σεύθου, ὡς Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τρίτῳ Χρονικῶν, Πιτάνης τῆς Αἰολίδος. Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τῆς μέσης Ἀκαδημίας κατάρξας, πρῶτος ἐπισχὼν τὰς ἀποφάσεις διὰ τὰς ἐναντιότητας τῶν λόγων. πρῶτος δὲ καὶ εἰς ἑκάτερον ἐπεχείρησε, καὶ πρῶτος τὸν λόγον ἐκίνησε τὸν ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος παραδεδομένον καὶ ἐποίησε δι' ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως ἐριστικώτερον.

b. At Athens, he heard first Theophrastus, later Crantor in the Academy (see our nrs. **798** ff.) and succeeded to Crates. We may admit that by Crantor he was introduced into Plato's works, and, as to his sceptical attitude, that he was greatly influenced by Pyrrho.

Diog. L. IV 32-33:

**Crates'
successor**

Κράτητος δὲ ἐκλιπόντος κατέσχε τὴν σχολήν, ἐκχωρήσαντος αὐτῷ Σωκρατίδου τινός. Διὰ δὲ τὸ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχειν οὐδὲ βιβλίον, φασὶ τινες, συνέγραψεν. — Ἐφίκει δὴ θαυμάζειν καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ τὰ βιβλία ἐκέκτητο αὐτοῦ. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Πύρρωνα κατὰ τινας ἐζηλώκει. Καὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶχετο καὶ τῶν Ἑρετρικῶν ἤπτετο λόγων· ὅθεν καὶ ἐλέγετο ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ὑπ' Ἀρίστωνος·

Πρόσθε Πλάτων, ἔπιθεν Πύρρων, μέσσος Διόδωρος.¹

1097—In the Academy, Arcesilaus' method meant a radical change, as may appear from the following passages of Cicero.

**A revolution
in the
Academy**

a. Cicero, *Ac. post.* I 17:

Utrique (sc. both Academics and Peripatetics), Platonis ubertate completi, certam quandam disciplinae formulam² composuerunt, et eam quidem plenam ac refertam: illam autem Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus rebus et nulla affirmatione adhibita consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt. Ita facta est [disserendi] (quod minime Socrates probabat) ars quaedam philosophiae, et rerum ordo, et descriptio disciplinae³.

¹ The famous dialectician Diodorus Cronus of the Megarian School. See vol. I, **232** ff.

² A definite dogmatical form.

³ A technical philosophy, systematically divided and with a positive doctrinary contents.

b. Cic., *De Oratore* III 67:

(Arcesilaum) quem ferunt eximio quodam usum lepore dicendi . . . primum instituisse (quamquam id fuit Socraticum maxime) non quid ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id quod quisque se sentire dixisset disputare.

I.e.: he expounded different views, the one opposite to the other, without coming to any positive result;—exactly what was done by Carneades at Rome in the year 155 (below, nr. 1111).

and in the
history of
scepticism

1098—In the history of scepticism, too, Arcesilaus marks an epoch. From the early sceptics he differs by being a dialectician, and this for the sake of pure theory: for him, suspense of judgment was the end, *ataraxia* a concomitant symptom.

Sext. Emp., P. I 232:

Ὁ μέντοι Ἀρκεσίλαος, ὃν τῆς μέσης Ἀκαδημίας ἐλέγομεν εἶναι προστάτην καὶ ἀρχηγόν, πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῖς Πυρρωνεῖοις κοινωνεῖν λόγοις, ὥς μίαν εἶναι σχεδὸν τὴν κατ' αὐτὸν ἀγωγὴν καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν. οὔτε γὰρ περὶ ὑπάρξεως ἢ ἀνυπαρξίας τινὸς ἀποφαινόμενος εὐρίσκεται, οὔτε κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν προκρίνει τι ἕτερον ἐτέρου, ἀλλὰ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχει. καὶ τέλος μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐποχὴν, ἣ συνεισέρχεσθαι τὴν ἀταραξίαν ἡμεῖς ἐφάσκομεν.

For Pyrrho, as we saw, *ataraxia* was the end, non-judging the means to reach it.

Arcesilaus'
character

1099—Arcesilaus was a wealthy man and certainly not an ascetic. Diog. L. IV 40 says, he was πολυτελής ἄγαν, fond of dining well and of certain other pleasures. For the rest, he and others tell many good things about A.: he was very generous, an excellent friend and discrete in his liberality. Cleanthes defends him when he is censured.

a. Diog. L. VII 171:

Εἰπόντος δέ τινος Ἀρκεσίλαον μὴ ποιεῖν τὰ δέοντα, “Παῦσαι,” ἔφη, “καὶ μὴ ψέγε· εἰ γὰρ καὶ λόγῳ τὸ καθῆκον ἀναιρεῖ, τοῖς γοῦν ἔργοις αὐτὸ τιθεῖ.

b. A., on his side, showed great regards for Cleanthes.

Plut., *De discernendo adulate ab amico* c. 11, p. 55c:

Καὶ Βάττω τὴν σχολὴν ἀπέιπεν Ἀρκεσίλαος, ὅτε πρὸς Κλεάνθην στίχον ἐποίησεν ἐν κωμῳδίᾳ, πείσαντος δὲ τὸν Κλεάνθην καὶ μεταμελομένου διηλλάγη.

¹ In this passage, Sextus opposes Arcesilaus, as being a pure sceptic, to Carneades and Critolaus who, in his opinion, were no pure ἐφεκτικοί (cp. our nr. 1077; infra, 1116).

1100—a. Plut., in the same work, c. 22, p. 63 D, tells the following story.

How he
behaved
towards a
friend

Τοιοῦτος Ἀρκεσίλαος περί τε τᾶλλα καὶ νοσοῦντος Ἀπελλοῦ τοῦ Χίου τὴν πενίαν καταμαθὼν ἐπανῆλθεν αὐθις ἔχων εἴκοσι δραχμάς, καὶ καθίσας πλησίον “ἐνταῦθα μὲν,” εἶπεν, “οὐδὲν ἢ τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους στοιχεῖα ταυτί·

πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα καὶ αἰθέρος ἥπιον ὕψος.

ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ κατάκεισαι σὺ δεξιῶς,” ἅμα δὲ διακινῶν τὸ προσκεφάλαιον αὐτοῦ, λαθὼν ὑπέβαλε τὸ κερμάτιον. ὥς οὖν ἡ διακονοῦσα πρεσβῦτις εὔρε καὶ θαυμάσασα τῷ Ἀπελλῇ προσήγγειλε, γελάσας ἐκεῖνος “Ἀρκεσιλάου,” εἶπε, “τοῦτο τὸ κλέμμα”.

b. It seems that he was well-known for such-like benefits.

Diog. L. IV 37 says:

Ἐν τε τῷ βίῳ κοινωνικώτατος ἐγένετο καὶ εὐεργετῆσαι πρόχειρος ἦν καὶ λαθεῖν τὴν χάριν ἀτυφώτατος. —

Follows a similar story as sub a. And again, in c. 38:

Καὶ ποτέ τινος ἀργυρώματα λαβόντος εἰς ὑποδοχὴν φίλων καὶ ἀποστεροῦντος οὐκ ἀπήτησεν οὐδὲ προσεποιήθη¹.

c. Cp. also Diog. L. IV 32:

Διήκουσε δὲ καὶ Ἰππονίκου τοῦ γεωμέτρου· ὃν καὶ ἔσκωψε τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κωθρὸν ὄντα καὶ χασμῶδη, ἐν δὲ τῇ τέχνῃ τεθεωρημένον, εἰπὼν τὴν γεωμετρίαν τοῦ χάσκοντος εἰς τὸ στόμα ἐμπτῆναι. τοῦτον καὶ παρακόψαντα ἀναλαβὼν οἴκοι ἐς τοσοῦτον ἐθεράπευσεν, ἐς ὅσον ἀποκαταστῆσαι.

1101—He was very able in discussion, and very good for his pupils.

How towards
his pupils

Diog. L. IV 37:

Ἦν δὲ καὶ εὐρεσιλογώτατος ἀπαντῆσαι εὐστόχως καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ προκείμενον ἀνενεγκεῖν τὴν περίοδον τῶν λόγων καὶ ἀπαντι συναρμόσασθαι καιρῷ. πειστικός τε ὑπὲρ πάνθ’ ὄντινον· παρὸ καὶ πλείους πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπῆνταν εἰς τὴν σχολήν, καίπερ ὑπ’ ὀξύτητος αὐτοῦ ἐπιπληττόμενοι. ἀλλ’ ἔφερον ἡδέως· καὶ γὰρ ἦν ἀγαθὸς σφόδρα καὶ ἐλπίδων ὑποπιμπλὰς τοὺς ἀκούοντας.

1102—Two arguments against the Stoic doctrine of assent (see above, nr. 985a, b).

First
argument
against the
doctrine of
assent

(1) Since it is by assent only that we come to κατάληψις, this assent itself is a judgment which precedes knowledge.

¹ “and pretended it had not been borrowed”.

a. The argument is given very shortly by Cicero, *Acad. pr.* (*Lucullus*) 18, 59:

Si enim percipi nihil potest—as is held by sceptics, such as Arcesilaus—tollendus assensus est; quid enim est tam futile quam quicquam approbare non cognitum?

b. More explicitly in *Acad. post.* (I) 12, 45:

— Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam, quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia latere censebat in occulto. Neque esse quicquam quod cerni aut intellegi posset: quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri, necque affirmare quemquam, neque assensione approbare. cohibereque semper, et ab omni lapsu continere temeritatem, quae tum esset insignis, cum aut falsa, aut incognita res approbaretur, neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et perceptioni assensionem approbationemque praecurrere.

**Second
argument**

1103—(2) The doctrine of assent is in conflict with the Stoic doctrine of the wise man.

a. Cic., *Acad. pr.* (*Lucullus*) 66-67:

Quid igitur loquar de firmitate sapientis? quem quidem nihil opinari tu quoque, Luculle, concedis. Quod quoniam a te probatur,— haec primum conclusio, quam habeat vim, considera. 67. Si ulli rei sapiens assentietur unquam, aliquando etiam opinabitur. Nunquam autem opinabitur, nulli igitur rei assentietur. Hanc conclusionem Arcesilas probabat.

b. Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VII (*Ag. the log.* I) 156:

Πάντων ὄντων ἀκαταλήπτων διὰ τὴν ἀνυπαρξίαν τοῦ Στωϊκοῦ κριτηρίου, εἰ συγκαταθήσεται ὁ σοφός, δοξάσει ὁ σοφός· μηδενὸς γὰρ ὄντος καταληπτοῦ εἰ συγκατατίθεται τινι, τῷ ἀκαταλήπτῳ συγκαταθήσεται, ἢ δὲ τῷ ἀκαταλήπτῳ συγκατάθεσις δόξα ἐστίν.

**Against
kataleptic
presentation**

1104—The concept of kataleptic presentation as it was defined by Zeno (see above, 984b) is criticized by saying shortly that such a presentation does not exist; for there is no true presentation which could not be confounded with an untrue one.

Sextus, *Adv. math.* VII, 249; 252:

— Πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος γίνεσθαι· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν φαντασιῶν προσπίπτουσιν ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μεμνημένων, αἵτινες οὐκ ἂν εἶεν καταληπτικά. δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος εἶναι καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ

τὸ ὑπάρχον· ἔναι γὰρ πάλιν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν εἰσιν, οὐκ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἰνδάλλονται, ὥς ἐπὶ τοῦ μεμνηνός 'Ορέστου μικρῷ πρότερον ἐδείκνυμεν. εἶλκε μὲν γὰρ φαντασίαν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος τῆς 'Ηλέκτρας, οὐ κατ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον· μίαν γὰρ τῶν 'Ερινύων ὑπελάμβανεν αὐτὴν εἶναι, καθὼ καὶ προσιοῦσαν καὶ τημελεῖν αὐτὸν σπουδάζουσιν ἀπαθεῖται λέγων

μέθεες μί' οὔσα τῶν ἐμῶν 'Ερινύων.¹

καὶ ὁ 'Ηρακλῆς² ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν ἐκινεῖτο τῶν Θηβῶν, οὐ κατ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον· καὶ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν.

— 252. Τὸ δὲ “οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος” προσέθεσαν, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἀδύνατον ὑπειλήφασιν κατὰ πάντα ἀπαράλλακτον τινα εὑρεθήσεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς 'Ακαδημίας. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ φασιν ὅτι ὁ ἔχων τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν τεχνικῶς προσβάλλει τῇ ὑπόψει τῶν πραγμάτων διαφορᾶ, ἐπεὶ περ καὶ εἶχε τι τοιοῦτον ἰδίωμα ἢ τοιαύτη φαντασία παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας φαντασίας καθάπερ οἱ κεράσται παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ὄφεις· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς 'Ακαδημίας τοῦναντίον φασὶ δύνασθαι τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ ἀπαράλλακτον εὑρεθήσεσθαι ψεῦδος.

1105—To the question of “How to regulate practical life” A. replies that conduct will be directed rightly by the rule of the εὐλογον.

The
εὐλογον
a rule for
practical life

Sextus, *Adv. math.* VII 158:

‘Ἄλλ’ ἐπεὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔδει καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγῆς ζητεῖν, ἥτις οὐ χωρὶς κριτηρίου πέφυκεν ἀποδίδοσθαι, ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τουτέστι τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος, ἡρτημένην ἔχει τὴν πίστιν, φησὶν ὁ 'Αρκεσίλαος ὅτι ὁ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχων κανονιεῖ τὰς αἰρέσεις καὶ φυγὰς καὶ κοινῶς τὰς πράξεις τῷ εὐλόγῳ, κατὰ τοῦτό τε προερχόμενος τὸ κριτήριον κατορθώσει· τὴν μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν περιγίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς φρονήσεως, τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν κεῖσθαι ἐν τοῖς κατορθώμασιν, τὸ δὲ κατόρθωμα εἶναι ὅπερ πραχθὲν εὐλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπολογίαν. ὁ προσέχων οὖν τῷ εὐλόγῳ κατορθώσει καὶ εὐδαιμονήσει.

The wording of this passage is Stoic, e.g. “eudaimonia, i.e. the end of life”. Surely, this is not what was taught by Arcesilaus; but we may infer from the passage that A. replied to Stoic opponents saying that sceptics do have a rule for practical life in the εὐλογον, and that happiness, *which according to Stoics is the end of life*, depends on it, since it is attained by φρόνησις.—It should be noticed, further, that A., replying to Stoics, called “right action” (the κατόρθωμα) ὅπερ πραχθὲν εὐλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπολογίαν. Now this is the formula used by Stoics not to qualify the κατόρθωμα but the καθήκον. Arcesilaus, then, appears to have opposed Stoic doctrine by saying that, indeed, actions which can be reasonably justified are *moral* actions in the full sense (κατορθώματα), not only *befitting* (καθήκοντα).

¹ Eur. *Orest.* 264.

² The author seems to confound the mad Heracles with the mad Pentheus who, according to Eur., *Bacch.* 918, saw the image of a “doubled Thebes and a doubled sun”.

Difference
between
πιθανόν
and
εὔλογον

1106—a. Later, Carneades will speak of πιθανόν to indicate probability. This principle differs from Arcesilaus' εὔλογον by being an *experimental* principle, while the εὔλογον depends entirely on reason. Below, nr. 1116. Cp. Brochard, *Les sceptiques grecs*, p. 110 f.

b. Numenius ap. Euseb., *Praep. ev.* XIV 6, p. 731 b4, says about A.:

— ἀναιροῦντα καὶ αὐτὸν τὸ ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος, καὶ τὸ πιθανόν.

Evidently, Arc. rejected the πιθανόν in the sense the Stoics gave to it, viz. of ἀξίωμα τὸ ἄγον εἰς συγκατάθεσιν.

What about
Arc.'s
„esoterical
dogmatism”

1107—a. Cic., *Acad. pr.* (*Lucullus*) 18, 60, alludes to a kind of esoterical dogmatism of Arc. The method of arguing pro and contra would have been used by him and Carneades as a heuristic method and for the larger circle of their students.

— dicunt veri inveniendi causa contra omnia dici oportere, et pro omnibus. Volo igitur videre quid invenerint. Non solemus, inquit, ostendere. Quae sunt tandem ista mysteria? aut cur celatis, quasi turpe aliquid, sententiam vestram?

b. Cp. Sextus Emp., *P.* I 234:

Εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις πιστεύειν, φασὶν ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρόχειρον Πυρρώνειος ἐφαίνετο εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν δογματικὸς ἦν· καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν ἐταίρων ἀπόπειραν ἐλάμβανε διὰ τῆς ἀπορητικῆς, εἰ εὐφυῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς τὴν ἀνάληψιν τῶν Πλατωνικῶν δογμάτων, δόξαι αὐτὸν ἀπορητικὸν εἶναι, τοῖς μέντοι γε εὐφρεσί τῶν ἐταίρων τὰ Πλάτωνος παρεγχερεῖν.

c. A far echo of this pretended dogmatism of Arc. is heard in Augustinus, *Contra Acad.* I 17, 38, and in one of his letters, viz. *Ad Diosc.* 118, 16. This is, however, not an independent witness: it depends on Cicero.

d. As to the truth of the story, certainly there has not been anything like a *disciplina arcani* with Arcesilaus. The Academy did not know any secrete doctrine, and Arc. least of all. What is true, is that Arc. intended to restore *Platonism* in the School;—surely not dogmatic Platonism, but there may have been some misunderstanding about the point. This is the explanation offered by Robin, *Pyrrhon*, p. 69, which is in fact most satisfactory. Brochard, p. 117 f., thinks of probabilism, but here we are with Carneades, not with Arc.

4—THE THIRD OR NEW ACADEMY: CARNEADES

His life and
character

1108—Diog. L. IV 62, 63, 65:

Καρνεάδης Ἐπικώμου ἢ Φιλοκώμου ὡς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν Διαδοχαῖς, Κυρηναῖος. οὗτος τὰ τῶν Στωϊκῶν βιβλία ἀναγνούς ἐπιμελῶς καὶ μάλιστα τὰ τοῦ

Χρυσίππου, ἐπεικῶς αὐτοῖς ἀντέλεγε καὶ εὐημέρει τοσοῦτον, ὥστε ἐκεῖνο ἐπιλέγειν·

Εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρυσίππος, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἐγώ.

Φιλόπωνος δ' ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν εἰ καὶ τις ἄλλος, ἐν μὲν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἤττον φερόμενος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἠθικοῖς μᾶλλον. ὅθεν καὶ ἐκόμα καὶ ἔτρεφεν ὄνυχας ἀσχολίᾳ τῇ περὶ τοὺς λόγους. τοσοῦτον δ' ἴσχυσεν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας ἀπολύσαντας ἐκ τῶν σχολῶν παρ' αὐτὸν ἰέναι καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀκούειν. — Δεινῶς τ' ἦν ἐπιπληκτικὸς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσι δύσμαχος· τὰ τε δεῖπνα λοιπὸν παρηγεῖτο διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας. —

Φησὶ δὲ Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν Χρονικοῖς ἀπελθεῖν αὐτὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἔτει τετάρτῳ τῆς δευτέρας καὶ ἐξηκοστῆς καὶ ἑκατοστῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος (a. 129-128), βιώσαντα ἔτη πέντε πρὸς τοῖς ὀγδοήκοντα. Φέρονται δ' αὐτοῦ ἐπιστολαὶ πρὸς Ἀριαράθην τὸν Καππαδοκίας βασιλέα. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ αὐτοῦ οἱ μαθηταὶ συνέγραψαν· αὐτὸς δὲ κατέλιπεν οὐδέν.

We know his arguments mainly from Cicero and from Sextus Empiricus, who both go back to Clitomachus, a direct pupil of Carneades, acute and precise. Clitomachus succeeded to Carneades as head of the School and wrote many books. Cp. Diog. L. IV 67.

1109—In the year 155 Carneades and two other philosophers came to Rome as ambassadors from Athens.

**Carneades
at Rome**

Plut., *Cato maior* c. 22, p. 349:

Ἦδη δὲ αὐτοῦ (sc. Cato maior) γέροντος γεγονότος πρέσβεις Ἀθήνηθεν ἦλθον εἰς Ῥώμην οἱ περὶ Καρνεάδην τὸν Ἀκαδημαϊκὸν καὶ Διογένη τὸν Στωϊκὸν φιλόσοφον, καταδίκην τινὰ παραιτησόμενοι τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ἀθηναίων. — εὐθύς οὖν οἱ φιλολογώτατοι τῶν νεανίσκων ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἔεντο, καὶ συνῆσαν ἀκροώμενοι καὶ θαυμάζοντες αὐτούς, μάλιστα δ' ἡ Καρνεάδου χάρις, ἥς δυνάμεις τε πλείστη καὶ δόξα τῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ ἀποδέουσα, μεγάλων ἐπιλαβομένη καὶ φιλανθρώπων ἀκροατηρίων ὡς πνεῦμα τὴν πόλιν ἤχῃς ἐνέπλησε. καὶ λόγος κατείχεν, ὡς ἀνὴρ Ἕλληνα εἰς ἑκπληξιν ὑπερφυῆς πάντα κηλῶν καὶ χειρούμενος ἔρωτα δεινὸν ἐμβέβληκε τοῖς νέοις, ὅφ' οὗ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν καὶ διατριβῶν ἐκπεσόντες ἐνθουσιῶσι περὶ φιλοσοφίαν. ταῦτα τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἤρεσκε Ῥωμαίοις γινόμενα, καὶ τὰ μεираκία παιδείας Ἑλληνικῆς μεταλαμβάνοντα καὶ συνόντα θαυμαζομένοις ἀνδράσιν ἡδέως ἐώρων. ὁ δὲ Κάτων ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε τοῦ ζήλου τῶν λόγων παραρρέοντος εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἤχθετο φοβούμενος, μὴ τὸ φιλότιμον ἐνταῦθα τρέψαντες οἱ νέοι τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ λέγειν δόξαν ἀγαπήσωσι μᾶλλον τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν στρατειῶν, ἐπεὶ δὲ προὔβαινε ἡ δόξα τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους λόγους αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν σύγκλητον ἀνὴρ ἐπιφανής

σπουδάσας αὐτὸς καὶ δεηθεὶς ἡρμήνευσε, Γάϊος Ἀκίλιος, ἔγνω μετ' εὐπρεπείας ἀποδιαπομπήσασθαι τοὺς φιλοσόφους ἅπαντας ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. καὶ παρελθὼν εἰς τὴν σύγκλητον ἐμέμψατο τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, ὅτι πρεσβεία κάθηται πολλὸν χρόνον ἄπρακτος ἀνδρῶν, οἱ περὶ παντὸς οὗ βούλονται ῥαδίως πείθειν δύνανται· δεῖν οὖν τὴν ταχίστην γυνῶναι τι καὶ ψηφίσασθαι περὶ τῆς πρεσβείας. ὅπως οὗτοι μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς σχολὰς τραπόμενοι διαλέγωνται παισὶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαίων νέοι τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων ὡς πρότερον ἀκούωσι.

His fame as
a dialectician

1110—a. Lactantius, *Inst.* V 14:

Carneades Academicæ sectæ philosophus, cuius in disserendo quæ vis fuerit, quæ eloquentia, quod acumen, qui nescit ipsum, ex prædicatione Ciceronis intellegat aut Lucilli, apud quem disserens Neptunus de re difficillima ostendit non posse id explicari,

non Carneaden si ipsum Orcus remittat, —

b. Cp. Cic., *De oratore* II 38, 161:

Carneadis vero vis incredibilis illa dicendi, et varietas, perquam esset optanda nobis: qui nullam unquam in illis suis disputationibus rem defendit quam non probarit; nullam oppugnavit quam non everterit.

c. Numenius ap. Euseb., *Praep. Ev.* XIV 8, p. 738 b4:

Καὶ μέντοι λέγων ὁ Καρνεάδης ἐψυγαγῶγει καὶ ἡνδραποδίζετο.

His method

1111—What was his method, can be inferred fairly well from what Lactantius says about Carneades' expositions on justice, held at Rome,—the report of Furius Philus in Cicero's *Republic* III is lost—, if it is combined with a passage in Cicero's *De finibus*.

a. Lactantius, *Inst.* V 14:

(The beginning of the sentence was cited under **1110a**).

— Is cum legatus ab Atheniensibus Romam missus esset, disputavit de iustitia copiose audiente Galba et Catone Censorio maximis tunc oratoribus. sed idem disputationem suam postridie contraria disputatione subvertit et iustitiam quam pridie laudaverat sustulit, non quidem philosophi gravitate, cuius firma et stabilis debet esse sententia, sed quasi oratorio exercitii genere in utramque partem disserendi. quod ille facere solebat, ut alios quidlibet adserentes posset refutare. eam disputationem, qua iustitia evertitur, apud Ciceronem Lucius Furius recordatur, credo quoniam de re publica disserebat, ut defensionem laudatio-

nemque eius induceret, sine qua putabat regi non posse rem publicam. Carneades autem ut Aristotelem refelleret ac Platonem iustitiae patronos, prima illa disputatione collegit ea omnia quae pro iustitia dicebantur, ut posset illam, sicut fecit, evertere.

Carn., then, appears to have expounded on the first day of his disputation all the arguments in favour of justice, following the line of the three great dogmatic Schools, viz. those of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoa. On the second day he developed all the arguments against it. That such was his usual way of proceeding, may be inferred from what Cicero says on the *Carneadea divisio*.

b. Cic., *De fin.* V 6, 16, says, speaking of the means of finding a rule of happiness:

Quod quoniam in quo sit magna dissensio est, Carneadea nobis adhibenda divisio est, qua noster Antiochus libenter uti solet. Ille igitur vidit, non modo quot fuissent adhuc philosophorum de summo bono, sed quot omnino esse possent sententiae.

1112—Against the kataleptic presentation Carneades repeats Arcesilaus' argument that an untrue presentation can present itself to us with as much evidence as a true one¹. It is expounded by Cicero in *Acad. pr.* (*Lucullus*) 26, 84-28, 90, and by Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VII (= *Ag. the log.* I) 401-411. Here are the main points of the argument.

Arguments
against the
Stoic
criterium
of truth

a. Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VII 403-405, 410-411:

Καὶ τεκμήριον τῆς ἀπαρραλλεξίας τὸ ἐπ' ἴσης ταύτας ἐναργεῖς καὶ πληκτικὰς εὐρίσκεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ ἐπ' ἴσης πληκτικὰς καὶ ἐναργεῖς εἶναι τὸ τὰς ἀκολουθούς πράξεις ἐπιζεύγνυσθαι. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπαρ ὁ μὲν διψῶν ἀρυόμενος ποτὸν ἡδεταί, ὁ δὲ θηρίον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν δειμαλέων φεύγων βοᾷ καὶ κέκραγεν, οὕτω καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους ἡ μὲν διάχυσίς ἐστι τοῖς διψῶσι καὶ ἀπὸ κρήνης πίνειν δοκοῦσιν, ἀνάλογον δὲ φόβος τοῖς δειματουμένοις·

ταφῶν γὰρ ἀνόρουσεν Ἀχιλλεύς
χερσὶ τε συμπλατάγησεν, ἔπος τ' ὀλοφυνδὸν ἔειπεν·²

καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἐν καταστάσει τοῖς τρανότατα φαινομένοις πιστεύομεν καὶ συγκατατιθέμεθα, οἷον Δίῳ μὲν ὡς Δίῳ, Θέῳ δὲ ὡς Θέῳ προσφερόμενοι, οὕτω καὶ ἐν μανίᾳ τὸ παραπλήσιον πάσχουσι τινες. ὁ γοῦν Ἡρακλῆς μανεῖς, καὶ λαβὼν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων παίδων ὡς Εὐρυσθέως, τὴν ἀκόλουθον πράξιν ταύτῃ τῇ φαντασίᾳ συνῆψεν. ἀκόλουθον δ' ἦν τὸ τοὺς τοῦ ἐχθροῦ παῖδας ἀνελεῖν, ὅπερ καὶ ἐποίησεν. εἰ οὖν καταληπτικαὶ τινές εἰσι φαντασίαι παρόσον ἐπάγονται ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθεσιν καὶ εἰς τὸ τὴν ἀκόλουθον αὐταῖς πράξιν

¹ Above, nr. 1104.

² *Iliad* 23, 101.

συνάπτειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ψευδεῖς τοιαῦται πεφήνασι, λεκτέον ἀπαρἀλλάκτους εἶναι ταῖς καταληπτικαῖς φαντασίαις τὰς ἀκαταλήπτους. —

‘Ο δ’ αὐτός λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπὶ διδύμων· λήψεται γὰρ ψευδῇ φαντασίαν ὁ σπουδαῖος καὶ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένην καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένην ἔχων τὴν φαντασίαν, ἐὰν ἀπὸ Κάστορος ὡς ἀπὸ Πολυδεύκους φαντασιωθῇ. ἐντεῦθεν γοῦν καὶ ὁ ἐγκεκαλυμμένος συνέστη λόγος· ἐὰν γὰρ προκύψαντος δράκοντος θέλωμεν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἐπιστῆναι, εἰς πολλὴν ἀπορίαν ἐμπεσοῦμεθα, καὶ οὐχ ἔξομεν λέγειν πότερον ὁ αὐτός ἐστι δράκων τῷ πρότερον προκύψαντι ἢ ἕτερος, πολλῶν ἐνεσπειραμένων τῷ αὐτῷ φωλεῷ δρακόντων. οὐ τοίνυν ἔχει τι ἰδίωμα ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία ὧ διαφέρει τῶν ψευδῶν τε καὶ ἀκαταλήπτων φαντασιῶν.

b. To these arguments, the first of which were, in any case, already brought forward by Arcesilaus, Carneades added two others: first that of colour there is no kataleptic presentation, since colour changes with time and circumstances; but not of other sensible qualities either.

Sextus, *ib.* 411-414:

Πρὸς τούτοις, εἴ τι ἄλλο καταληπτικόν τινός ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ὄρασις. οὐχὶ δέ γ’ αὕτη καταληπτικὴ τινός ἐστιν, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τι καταληπτικόν τινος. ἡ γὰρ ὄρασις λαμβάνειν μὲν δοκεῖ χρώματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ σχήματα καὶ κινήσεις, τούτων δὲ οὐδὲν λαμβάνει, καθάπερ εὐθύς ἀπὸ τῶν χρωμάτων ἀρξαμένοις ἡμῖν φανεῖται. εἴπερ οὖν ἡ ὄρασις καταλαμβάνεται τι χρῶμα, φασὶν οἱ ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας, καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καταλήψεται· οὐ καταλαμβάνεται δὲ τοῦτο· οὐδ’ ἄλλο τοίνυν καταλήψεται χρῶμα. καὶ ὅτι οὐ καταλαμβάνεται, πρόδηλον· μεταβάλλει γὰρ κατὰ ὥρας ἐνεργείας φύσεις ἡλικίας περιστάσεις νόσους ὑγείαν ὕπνον ἐγρήγορσιν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν οὕτως αὐτὸ ποικίλλεσθαι γινώσκειν ἡμᾶς, τὸ δὲ τί ἐστὶ τὸ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἀγνοεῖν. ταύτῃ τε εἰ τοῦτο μὴ ἐστὶ καταληπτόν, οὐδ’ ἄλλο τι γενήσεται γνώριμον. καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐπὶ σχήματος τὸ αὐτὸ γένος τῆς ἀπορίας εὐρήσομεν· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λεῖον καὶ τραχὺ ὑποπίπτει ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν γραφῶν, στρογγύλον τε καὶ τετράγωνον ὡς ἐπὶ πύργων, εὐθύ τε καὶ κεκλασμένον ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἐξάλου τε καὶ ἐνάλου κώπης, καὶ ἐπὶ κινήσεως κινούμενον καὶ ἡρεμοῦν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν νηὶ καθεζομένων ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν αἰγιαλοῖς ἐστῶτων.

Cp. Berkeley’s doctrine of the subjectivity of the sensible qualities.

c. Chrysippus said, one should not lightly give one’s assent to a presentation: in doubtful cases one must let the hegemonikon take some rest (ἡσυχάζειν). Now, Carn. asks: How is it possible to find a transition from the last kataleptic presentation to the first non-kataleptic one?

Cic., *Acad. pr.* (Luc.) 29, 93-94:

Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur verbi causa tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat quiescere. (Id est quod ab his dicitur ἡσυχάζειν). Per me vel stertas licet, inquit Carneades, non modo quiescas. Sed quid proficit? sequitur enim qui te ex somno excitet et eodem modo interroget: quo in numero conticuisti, si ad eum numerum unum addidero, multane erunt? progrediare rursus, quoad videbitur. quid plura? hoc enim fateris, neque ultimum te paucorum neque primum multorum respondere posse. cuius generis error ita manat, ut non videam quo non possit accedere. Nihil me laedit, inquit; ego enim ut agitator callidus priusquam ad finem veniam equos sustinebo, eoque magis si locus is quo ferentur equi praeceps erit. sic me, inquit, ante sustineo nec diutius captiose interroganti respondeo. Si habes quod liqueat neque respondes, superbe; si non habes, ne tu quidem percipis¹.

1113—Next, Carn. attacks the fundamental thesis of Stoic logic: that a proposition must be necessarily true or untrue.

Against the
basis of
logic, the
law of con-
tradiction

a. Cic., *Acad. pr.* (Luc.) 29, 95:

Nempe fundamentum dialecticae est, quidquid enuntietur (id autem appellant ἀξιωμα, quod est quasi effatum) aut verum esse aut falsum. Quid igitur? haec vera an falsa sunt: "si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris" et „*si te mentiri dicis idque mentiris*, verum dicis?" haec scilicet inexplicabilia esse dicitis; quod est odiosius quam illa quae nos non comprehensa et non percepta dicimus.—Sed hoc omitto, illud quaero: si ista explicari non possunt nec eorum ullum iudicium invenitur, ut respondere possitis verane an falsa sint, ubi est illa definitio, effatum esse id quod aut verum aut falsum sit?

b. Now this argument overthrows the whole logic.

Cic., *ib.* 30, 97-98:

"Aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet." — Si talis disiunctio falsa potest esse, nulla vera est. mecum vero quid habent litium, qui ipsorum disciplinam sequor? cum aliquid huius modi inciderat, sic ludere Carneades solebat: "si recte conclusi, teneo; sin vitiose, minam Diogenes mihi reddet". ab eo enim Stoico dialecticam didicerat; haec autem merces erat dialecticorum.

¹ I.e.; you have no more a kataleptic presentation than I have.

Against
proof

1114—In Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VIII (= *Ag. the log.* II) 337 ff. we find some arguments against proof which, probably, go back to Carneades.

It has been argued in the preceding passage (322-325) that proof is a non-evident thing, if concerned with non-evident objects. Therefore, the author goes on in the following chapters, proof is not acceptable without a proof,—either a generic or a particular one. But both are impossible, for the generic proof depends on the particular, and the particular proof presupposes the generic.

Sextus, *Adv. math.* VIII 340-343:

Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἀδελόν ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ὡς ἐπελογισάμεθα, ὀφείλει ἀποδεδεῖχθαι· πᾶν γὰρ ἀδελόν ἀναποδείκτως λαμβανόμενόν ἐστιν ἄπιστον. ἦτοι οὖν ὑπὸ γενικῆς ἀποδείξεως καταστήσεται τὸ εἶναι τι ἀπόδειξιν ἢ ὑπὸ εἰδικῆς. ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μὲν εἰδικῆς οὐδαμῶς· οὐπω γὰρ οὐδεμία καθίσταται εἰδικὴ ἀπόδειξις διὰ τὸ μήπω ὠμολογῆσθαι τὴν γενικὴν. ὡς γὰρ μηδέπω σαφοῦς ὄντος τοῦ ὅτι ἐστὶ ζῶον, οὐδὲ ὅτι ἵππος ἐστὶ γνώριμον καθέστηκεν, οὕτω μηδέπω συνομολογηθέντος τοῦ ὅτι ἐστὶ γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τις τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀποδείξεων πιστή, μετὰ τοῦ καὶ εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων τρόπον ἡμᾶς ἐμπίπτειν· ἵνα μὲν γὰρ ἡ γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις βεβαιωθῇ, τὴν εἰδικὴν ἡμᾶς ἔχειν δεῖ πιστὴν, ἵνα δὲ ἡ εἰδικὴ ὁμολογηθῇ, τὴν γενικὴν ἔχειν βέβαιον, ὥστε μήτε ἐκείνην πρὸ ταύτης ἔχειν δύνασθαι μήτε ταύτην πρὸ ἐκείνης. οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ μὲν εἰδικῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀμήχανον τὴν γενικὴν ἀποδειχθῆναι. καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπὸ γενικῆς· αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ζητούμενη, ἀδελος δὲ οὔσα καὶ ζητούμενη οὐκ ἂν εἴη κατασκευαστικὴ ἐαυτῆς, ἥ γε καὶ τῶν ἐκκαλυπτόντων αὐτὴν ἔχρηζεν.

The argument is directed not against Aristotle's conception of proof—for Aristotle taught that proof must depend on *ἄμεσα*¹—, but against Chrysippus, who held that proof must be founded on proof.

Akatalepsia

1115—Conclusion: strictly speaking, it is impossible to know anything. Since there is no kataleptic presentation, there are only ἀκατάληπτα.

This means: we are strictly confined to our individual πάθη and can never be sure whether or not there is any exterior object behind them.

a. Cic., *Acad. pr.* (*Luc.*) 15, 48:

— Cum mens moveatur ipsa per sese, ut et ea declarant quae cogitatione depingimus et ea quae vel dormientibus vel furiosis videntur, non, inquiunt, veri simile sit sic etiam mentem moveri, ut non modo non internoscat vera illa visa sint anne falsa, sed ut in is nihil intersit omnino, ut si qui tremere et exalbescerent vel ipsi per se motu mentis aliquo vel objecta terribili re extrinsecus, nihil ut esset qui distingueretur

¹ Vol. II, nr. 458a, b.

tremor ille et pallor, neque ut quicquam interesset <inter> intestinum et oblatum.

b. Another curious argument of sceptics, may be of Carneades, is mentioned in the previous lines (15, 47):

Nam cum dicatis, inquiunt, visa quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea quae in somnis videantur quaeque oraculis auspiciis extis declarentur (haec enim aiunt probari a Stoicis, quos contra disputant) — quaerunt quonam modo falsa visa quae sint, ea deus efficere possit probabilia, quae autem plane proxume ad verum accedant efficere non possit, aut si ea quoque possit, cur illa non possit quae perdifficiliter internoscantur tamen, et si haec, cur non inter quae nihil sit omnino?

The argument reminds us of Descartes, who based human knowledge on the confidence that it is impossible that God should be willing to deceive man. See on this principle: B. J. H. Ovink, *Philosophie und Sophistik*, Den Haag 1940, p. 234 f.

1116—a. According to Sextus Emp., *P. I* 227, Carneades differed from the Sceptics by admitting that some impressions are probable, others **Probability** improbable.

Τὰς τε φαντασίας ἡμεῖς μὲν ἴσας λέγομεν εἶναι κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τὰς μὲν πιθανὰς εἶναι φασι, τὰς δὲ ἀπιθάνους.

We may infer from this text that probability, as it was conceived by Carn., was not only an ethical-practical principle, but had a theoretical value, too.

b. Carn. distinguished three degrees of probability; the third and highest may be called practical certitude. **Three degrees of probability**

Sextus, *P. I* 227-229:

Καὶ τῶν πιθανῶν δὲ λέγουσι διαφοράς· τὰς μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ μόνον πιθανὰς ὑπάρχειν ἡγοῦνται, τὰς δὲ πιθανὰς καὶ διεξωδευμένας, τὰς δὲ πιθανὰς καὶ περιωδευμένας καὶ ἀπερισπάστους. οἷον ἐν οἴκῳ σκοτεινῷ ποσῶς κειμένου σχοινίου ἐσπειραμένου πιθανὴ ἀπλῶς φαντασία γίνεται ἀπὸ τούτου ὡς ἀπὸ ὕφους τῷ ἀθρόως ἐπεισελθόντι· τῷ μέντοι περισκοπήσαντι ἀκριβῶς καὶ διεξοδεύσαντι τὰ περὶ αὐτό, οἷον ὅτι οὐ κινεῖται, ὅτι τὸ χρῶμα τοῖόν ἐστι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, φαίνεται σχοινίον κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν τὴν πιθανὴν καὶ περιωδευμένην. ἡ δὲ καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος φαντασία τοιάδε ἐστίν. λέγεται ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀποθανοῦσαν τὴν Ἀλκυστιν αὖθις ἐξ Αἰδοῦ ἀναγαγεῖν καὶ δεῖξαι τῷ Ἀδμήτῳ, ὃς πιθανὴν ἐλάμβανεν φαντασίαν τῆς Ἀλκῆστιδος καὶ περιωδευμένην· ἐπεὶ μέντοι ἥδει ὅτι τέθνηκεν, περισπᾶτο αὐτοῦ ἡ διάνοια ἀπὸ τῆς συγκαταθέσεως καὶ πρὸς ἀπιστίαν ἐκλινεν. προκρίνουσιν οὖν οἱ ἐκ τῆς νέας Ἀκαδημίας

τῆς μὲν πιθανῆς ἀπλῶς τὴν πιθανὴν καὶ περιωδευμένην φαντασίαν, ἀμφοτέρων δὲ τούτων τὴν πιθανὴν καὶ περιωδευμένην καὶ ἀπερίσπαστον.

It has been rightly observed, both by Brochard and Robin, that what is described in this passage is a kind of experimental method, the value of which is not confined to the field of ethics.

The
existence
of Gods

1117—The Stoic arguments for the existence of God(s) are criticized by Carneades as follows.

a. First, he opposes Zeno's argument that the cosmos must be an intelligent being. Cic., *De n.d.* III 9, 22-23:

The cosmos
an intelligent
being?

Zeno enim ita concludit: quod ratione utitur, id melius est quam id quod ratione non utitur; nihil autem mundo melius; ratione igitur mundus utitur. Hoc si placet, iam efficies ut mundus optime librum legere videatur; Zenonis enim vestigiis hoc modo rationem poteris concludere: quod litteratum est, id est melius quam quod non est litteratum; nihil autem mundo melius; litteratus igitur est mundus. Isto modo etiam disertus et quidem mathematicus musicus, omni denique doctrina eruditus, postremo philosophus.

b. In fact, neither the cosmos nor the celestial bodies are divine. *Ib.*, 23-24:

Neither the
universe nor
the stars
are gods

Non est igitur mundus deus; et tamen nihil est eo melius: nihil est enim eo pulchrius, nihil salutarius nobis, nihil ornatius aspectu motuque constantius. Quod si mundus universus non est deus, ne stellae quidem, quas tu innumerabiles in deorum numero reponebas. quarum te cursus aequabiles aeternique delectabant, nec mehercule iniuria, sunt enim admirabili incredibilique constantia. sed non omnia, Balbe, quae cursus certos et constantis habent, ea deo potius tribuenda sunt quam naturae. — Vide, quaeso, si omnis motus omniaquae quae certis temporibus ordinem suum conservant divina dicimus, ne tertianas quoque febres et quartanas divinas esse dicendum sit, quarum reversione et motu quid potest esse constantius?

1118—Next, Chrysippus' argument that the world and what is in it must be made by God.

Why should
not the
universe
have been
made by
nature?

a. Cic., *De n.d.* III 10, 25-26:

Et Chrysippus tibi acute dicere videbatur, homo sine dubio versutus et callidus —; is igitur: „Si aliquid est”, inquit, „quod homo efficere non possit, qui id efficit melior est homine; homo autem haec quae in mundo

sunt efficere non potest; qui potuit igitur, is praestat homini; homini autem praestare quis possit nisi deus? est igitur deus." Haec omnia in eodem quo illa Zenonis errore versantur. quid enim sit melius, quid praestabilius, quid inter naturam et rationem intersit, non distinguitur. Idemque, si dei non sint, negat esse in omni natura quicquam homine melius; id autem putare quemquam hominem, nihil homine esse melius, summae adrogantiae censet esse.

b. Ib., 26:

Et "Si domus pulchra sit, intellegamus eam dominis" inquit "aedificatam esse, non muribus; sic igitur mundum deorum domum existimare debemus". Ita prorsus existimarem, si illum aedificatum, non quem ad modum docebo a natura conformatum putarem.

c. Cp. Cic., *Acad. pr.* (*Lucullus*) 38, 121:

Negas sine deo posse quicquam: ecce tibi e transverso Lampsacenus Strato, qui det isti deo immunitatem—magni quidem muneris; sed cum sacerdotes deorum vacationem habeant, quanto est aequius habere ipsos deos! negat opera deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum, quaecumque sint docet omnia effecta esse natura, nec ut ille qui asperis et levibus et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta haec esse dicat interiecto inani: somnia censet haec esse Democriti non docentis, sed optantis. ipse autem singulas mundi partes persequens, quidquid aut sit aut fiat naturalibus fieri aut factum esse docet ponderibus et motibus. ne ille et deum opere magno liberat et me timore. quis enim potest, cum existimet curari se a deo, non et dies et noctes divinum numen horrere et si quid adversi acciderit, quod cui non accidit, extimescere ne id iure evenerit? nec Stratonem tamen adsentior nec vero tibi; modo hoc modo illud probabilius videtur.

1119—The fact that man is a rational being does not prove divine Providence and its benevolence towards man.

**Are the Gods
benevolent
towards
man?**

a. Cic., *De n.d.* III 31, 78:

Si homines rationem bono consilio a dis immortalibus datam in fraudem malitiamque convertunt, non dari illam quam dari humano generi melius fuit. Ut si medicus sciat eum aegrotum, qui iussus sit vinum sumere, meracius sumpturum statimque periturum, magna sit in culpa, sic vestra ista Providentia reprehendenda, quae rationem dederit iis quos scierit ea perverse et improbe usuros. Nisi forte dicitis eam

nescisse. Utinam quidem! sed non audebitis. non enim ignoro quanti eius nomen putetis.

b. If the gods are benevolent towards man, why then so many harmful beings on earth and in the sea?

Cic., *Acad. pr.* (*Luc.*) 38, 120:

Quaero enim cur deus, omnia nostra causa cum faceret (sic enim vultis), tantam vim natricum viperarumque fecerit, cur mortifera tam multa ac perniciosa terra marique disperserit.

Inconsistencies in the Stoic notion of God

1120—a. If the gods are material, they cannot be eternal.

Cic., *De n.d.* III 12, 29:

Illa autem quae Carneades adferebat, quem ad modum dissolvitis? si nullum corpus immortale sit, nullum esse corpus sempiternum: corpus autem immortale nullum esse, ne individuum quidem nec quod dirimi distrahivē non possit; cumque omne animal patibilem naturam habeat, nullum est eorum quod effugiat accipiendi aliquid extrinsecus, id est, quasi ferendi et patiendi necessitatem, et si omne animal tale est, immortale nullum est. Ergo itidem, si omne animal secari ac dividi potest, nullum est eorum individuum, nullum aeternum; atqui omne animal ad accipiendam vim externam et ferendam paratum est; mortale igitur omne animal et dissolubile et dividuum sit necesse est.

b. If the gods are living beings, they must have perception and, consequently, be liable to pain. But then, they must be corruptible. *Ib.* 13, 32:

Et, ut haec omittamus, tamen animal nullum inveniri potest quod neque natum umquam sit et semper sit futurum. omne enim animal sensus habet; sentit igitur et calida et frigida et dulcia et amara, nec potest ullo sensu iucunda accipere, non accipere contraria; si igitur voluptatis sensum capit, doloris etiam capit; quod autem dolorem accipit, id accipiat etiam interitum necesse est; omne igitur animal confitendum est esse mortale.

c. If the gods are happy, they must possess virtue. But how could they be self-controlled or brave?

Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* IX (= *Ag. the phys.* I) 152, 157-160:

Εἴγε μὴν ἔστι τὸ θεῖον, πάντως καὶ ζῶόν ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ ζῶόν ἐστιν, πάντως καὶ πανάρετόν ἐστι καὶ εὐδαίμων· εὐδαιμονία δὲ χωρὶς ἀρετῆς οὐ δύναται.

ὑποστῆναι· εἰ δὲ πανάρετός ἐστι, καὶ πάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀρετάς. ἀλλ' οὐ πάσας μὲν ἔχει τὰς ἀρετάς, οὐχὶ δέ γε καὶ ἐγκράτειαν ἔχει καὶ καρτερίαν. οὐχὶ δέ γε ταύτας μὲν ἔχει τὰς ἀρετάς, οὐχὶ δέ γε ἔστι τινὰ δυσαπόσχετα καὶ δυσεγκαρτέρητα τῷ θεῷ. —

Εἰ δὲ ἔστι τινὰ δυσαπόσχετα καὶ δυσυπομένητα τῷ θεῷ, ἔστι τινὰ καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον αὐτοῦ μεταβλητικὰ καὶ ὀχλήσεως ποιητικά. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, δεκτικός ἐστιν ὀχλήσεως ὁ θεὸς καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς, διὸ καὶ φθορᾶς. ὥστε εἴπερ ἔστιν ὁ θεός, φθαρτός ἐστιν· οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον. "Ἐτι δὲ σὺν τοῖς προκειμένοις, εἰ πανάρετόν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον, καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἔχει· εἰ δὲ ἀνδρείαν ἔχει, ἐπιστήμην ἔχει δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν καὶ τῶν μεταξὺ, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, ἔστι τι θεῷ δεινόν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε ὁ ἀνδρεῖος διὰ ταῦτά ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖος ὅτι ἐπιστήμην ἔχει τοῦ ποῖά ἐστι τὰ δεινὰ τῷ γείτονι, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτῷ. ἅπερ οὐκ ἀπαράλλακτά ἐστι τοῖς τοῦ πλησίον δεινοῖς. ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἀνδρεῖός ἐστιν ὁ θεός, ἔστι τι αὐτῷ δεινόν. εἰ ἔστι τι θεῷ δεινόν, ἔστι τι τῷ θεῷ ὀχλήσεως ποιητικόν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐπιδεκτικός ἐστιν ὀχλήσεως, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ φθορᾶς. ὅθεν εἰ ἔστι τὸ θεῖον, φθαρτόν ἐστιν. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν.

1121—As to the gods of popular religion, adopted by the Stoics, Carneades proceeds by *soritai*¹.

The gods of
popular
religion
ridiculed
by soritai

a. Cic., *De n.d.* III 17, 43-44:

Si enim vos sequar, dic quid ei respondeam qui me sic roget: "Si di sunt, suntne etiam Nymphae deae? si Nymphae, Panisci etiam et Satyri; hi autem non sunt; ne Nymphae quidem igitur. at earum templa sunt publice vota et dedicata. ne ceteri quidem ergo di, quorum templa sunt dedicata. Age porro: Iovem et Neptunum deum numeras; ergo etiam Orcus frater eorum deus, et illi qui fluere apud inferos dicuntur, Acheron Cocytus Pyriphlegethon, tum Charon tum Cerberus di putandi. At id quidem repudiandum; ne Orcus quidem igitur; quid dicitis ergo de fratribus?" Haec Carneades aiebat, non ut deos tolleret (quid enim philosopho minus conveniens?), sed ut Stoicos nihil de dis explicare convinceret. itaque insequabatur: "Quid enim?", aiebat, "si hi fratres sunt in numero deorum, num de patre eorum Saturno negari potest, quem volgo maxime colunt ad occidentem? qui si est deus, patrem quoque eius Caelum esse deum confitendum est. quod si ita est, Caeli quoque parentes dii habendi sunt Aether et Dies eorumque fratres et sorores, qui a genealogis antiquis sic nominantur, Amor Dolus

¹ See for this kind of arguments Zeno of Elea, nr. 88 f., and Eubulides of the Megarian School (nr. 231e).

Metus Labor Invidentia Fatum Senectus Mors Tenebrae Miseria Querella Gratia Fraus Pertinacia Parcae Hesperides Somnia; quos omnis Erebo et Nocte natos ferunt. aut igitur haec monstra probanda sunt aut prima illa tollenda.

b. Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* IX (= *Ag. the phys.* I) 186-188:

Εἴγε μὴν Ἀφροδίτην θεὰν λέγομεν εἶναι, ἔσται καὶ ὁ Ἑρως υἱὸς ὧν Ἀφροδίτης θεός. ἀλλ' εἰ ὁ Ἑρως θεός ἐστί, καὶ ὁ Ἑλεος ἔσται θεός· ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ ἐστί ψυχικὰ πάθη, καὶ ὁμοίως ἀφωσίωται τῷ Ἑρωτι καὶ ὁ Ἑλεος· παρὰ Ἀθηναίοις γοῦν Ἑλέου βωμοὶ τινές εἰσιν. εἰ δὲ ὁ Ἑλεος θεός ἐστί, καὶ ὁ Φόβος· —

Εἰ δὲ ὁ φόβος, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη. οὐχὶ δέ γε ταῦτα· οὐδὲ ἡ Ἀφροδίτη ἄρα θεός ἐστί.

c. Cic., *De n.d.* III 20, 51:

Illa autem, Balbe, quae tu a caelo astrisque ducebas, quam longe serpant non vides: solem deum esse lunamque, quorum alterum Apollinem, Graeci alteram Dianam putant. quod si Luna dea est, ergo etiam Lucifer ceteraeque errantes numerum deorum obtinebunt; igitur etiam inerrantes. cur autem arqui species non in deorum numero reponatur? est enim pulcher, et ob eam speciem, quia causam habeat admirabilem, Thaumante dicitur esse nata. cuius si divina natura est, quid facies nubibus? arcus enim ipse e nubibus efficitur quodam modo coloratis; quarum una etiam Centauros peperisse dicitur. quod si nubes rettuleris in deos, referendae certe erunt tempestates, quae populi Romani ritibus consecratae sunt. ergo imbres nimbi procellae turbines dei putandi. —

Ergo hoc aut immensum serpet, aut nihil horum recipiemus; nec illa infinita ratio superstitionis probabitur; nihil ergo horum probandum est.

Mantic
criticized

1122—Carneades' arguments against the Stoic doctrine of mantic, expounded by Cic. in *De div.* II (the first book *De div.* contains Chrysippus' doctrine), may be summarized as follows.

1. There is no special object of mantic, though it is said not to be universal.

2. If it is said to be concerned with *fortuita*, either these are incalculable and therefore unpredicable, or they do not exist, since (according to the Stoics) everything is determined by fate.

3. If the possibility of mantic be founded on cosmic sympathy, Carn. replied that a certain coherence of natural phenomena does exist,

but not such a coherence as is admitted by the Stoics (e.g. between the form of a liver of a victim and a certain advantage of mine).

a. When, now, the Stoics conclude that mantic must be possible because there are gods, Carn. turns the argument.

**It is based
on insuffi-
cient grounds**

Cic., *De div.* II 17, 41:

Ita enim, cum magis properant, concludere solent "si di sunt, est divinatio; sunt autem di; est ergo divinatio." Multo est probabilius "non est autem divinatio; non sunt ergo di".

b. Neither can mantic be founded on the *consensus omnium*.

Ib. 39, 81:

At omnes reges populi nationes utuntur auspiciis. quasi vero quicquam sit tam valde quam nihil sapere vulgare, aut quasi tibi ipsi in iudicando placeat multitudo. quotus quisque est qui voluptatem neget esse bonum? plerique etiam summum bonum dicunt. num igitur eorum frequentia Stoici de sententia deterrentur? aut num plerisque in rebus sequitur eorum auctoritatem multitudo? quid mirum igitur, si in auspiciis et in omni divinatione inbecilli animi superstitiosa ista concipiant, verum dispicere non possint?

c. Finally, why should the gods give us signs, and why so obscurely?

Ib. 25, 54-55:

Quae est enim ista a deis profecta significatio et quasi denuntiatio calamitatum? quid autem volunt ea di immortales primum significantes quae sine interpretibus non possimus intellegere, deinde ea quae cavere nequeamus? at hoc ne homines quidem probi faciunt, ut amicis inpendentis calamitates praedicant quas illi effugere nullo modo possint, ut medici quamquam intellegunt saepe tamen numquam aegris dicunt illo morbo eos esse morituros; omnis enim praedictio mali tum probatur, cum ad praedictionem cautio adiungitur. quid igitur aut ostenta aut eorum interpretes vel Lacedaemonios olim vel nuper nostros adiuverunt? quae si signa deorum putanda sunt, cur tam obscura fuerunt? si enim, ut intellegeremus quid esset eventurum, aperte declarari oportebat, aut ne occulte quidem, si ea sciri nolebant.

1123—Prodigia, oracles and dreams can be explained by natural causes.

**How to
explain
prodigia**

a. Cic., *De div.* II 27, 58; 28, 60:

Sanguine[m] pluisset senatui nuntiatum est, Atratum etiam fluvium

fluxisse sanguine[m] deorum sudasse simulacra. num censes his nuntiis Thalen aut Anaxagoran aut quemquam physicum crediturum fuisse? nec enim sanguis nec sudor nisi e corpore. —

An vero illa nos terrent, si quando aliqua portentosa aut ex pecude aut ex homine nata dicuntur? quorum omnium, ne sim longior, una ratio est. Quicquid enim oritur quaecumque est, causam habeat a natura necesse est, ut etiamsi praeter consuetudinem extiterit, praeter naturam tamen non possit existere. causam igitur investigato in re nova atque admirabili si poteris; si nullam reperies, illud tamen exploratum habeto, nihil fieri potuisse sine causa, eumque terrorem quem tibi rei novitas attulerit naturae ratione depellito.

b. Cic., ib. 56, 115-116; 57, 117.

Oracles

Some oracles happen to be true (by chance); others are so ambiguous that they are never false.

Nam cum sors illa edita est opulentissimo regi Asiae

“Croesus Halyn penetrans magnam pervertet opum vim”,

hostium vim se perversurum putavit; pervertit autem suam: utrum igitur eorum accidisset, verum oraculum fuisset. cur autem hoc credam umquam editum Croeso, aut Herodotum cur veraciorem ducam Ennio? num minus ille potuit de Croeso quam de Pyrrho fingere Ennius? quis enim est qui credat Apollinis ex oraclo Pyrrho esse responsum

“aio te, Aeacida, Romanos vincere posse.”

primum latine Apollo numquam locutus est; deinde ista sors inaudita Graecis est; praeterea Pyrrhi temporibus iam Apollo versus facere desierat. —

117. Sed quod caput est, cur isto modo iam oracula Delphis non eduntur, non modo nostra aetate, sed iam diu *tantum modo iam* ut nihil possit esse contemptius? hoc loco cum urgentur, evanuisse aiunt vetustate vim loci eius unde anhelitus ille terrae fieret quo Pythia mente incitata oracula ederet. —

Quando ista vis autem evanuit? an postquam homines minus creduli esse coeperunt?

Dreams

c. Cic., ib. 62, 127-128:

Iam vero quis dicere audeat vera omnia esse somnia? Aliquot somnia vera, inquit Ennius, sed omnia non necesse est. Quae est tandem ista distinctio? quae vera, quae falsa habet? et si vera a deo mittuntur,

falsa unde nascuntur? nam si ea quoque divina, quid inconstantius deo? quid inscitius autem est quam mentes mortalium falsis et mendacibus visis concitare? sin vera visa divina sunt, falsa autem et inania humana, quae est ista designandi licentia, ut hoc deus hoc natura fecerit potius quam aut omnia deus, quod negatis, aut omnia natura? quod quoniam illud negatis, hoc necessario confitendum est. naturam autem eam dico, qua numquam animus insistens agitatione et motu esse vacuus potest. Is cum languore corporis nec membris uti nec sensibus potest, incidit in visa varia et incerta ex reliquis ut ait Aristoteles inhaerentibus earum rerum quas vigilans gesserit aut cogitaverit; quarum turbatione mirabiles interdum existunt species somniorum.

Cicero concludes (72, 148) that, by these arguments, not religion but superstition is extirpated, and this is certainly a gain.

1124—According to Chrysippus, everything is determined by preceding causes. The problem is: how to find room for free will under this system of natural fatality. Carneades solved the problem by introducing free will as an independent cause ¹.

**Fate and
free will**

Cic., *De fato* 14, 31 - 15, 35:

Carneades genus hoc totum non probabat et nimis inconsiderate concludi hanc rationem putabat; itaque premebat alio modo nec ullam adhibebat calumniam. cuius erat haec conclusio "si omnia antecedentibus causis fiunt, omnia naturali conligatione conserte contextequae fiunt; quod si ita est, omnia necessitas efficit; id si verum est, nihil est in nostra potestate; est autem aliquid in nostra potestate; at, si omnia fato fiunt, omnia causis antecedentibus fiunt; non igitur fato fiunt, quaecumque fiunt. — itaque dicebat Carneades ne Apollinem quidem futura posse dicere nisi ea quorum causas natura ita contineret, ut ea fieri necesse esset. — Causis enim efficientibus quamque rem cognitis posse denique sciri, quid futurum esset. ergo nec de Oedipode potuisse Apollinem praedicere nullis in rerum natura causis praepositis, cur ab eo patrem interfici necesse esset, nec quicquam eius modi. —

15, 34. Causa autem ea est, quae id efficit cuius est causa, ut vulnus mortis, cruditas morbi, ignis ardoris. itaque non sic causa intellegi debet, ut quod cuique antecedit, id ei causa sit, sed quod cuique efficienter antecedit, nec quod in campum descenderim, id fuisse causae cur pila

¹ Cp. Aristotle, EN III, 3, 1112a 31-34 (above, nr. 577e, the end); later Plotinus, *Enn.* III 1, cc. 8-9, below, nr. 1418; also 1425c, d and 1430c, d.

luderem, nec Hecubam causam interitus fuisse Troianis quod Alexandrum genuerit, nec Tyndareum Agamemnoni quod Clytemestram. hoc enim modo viator quoque bene vestitus causa grassatori fuisse dicitur, cur ab eo spoliaretur. ex hoc genere illud est Enni

“utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus
caesae accidissent abiegnae ad terram trabes”

— licuit vel altius “utinam ne in Pelio nata ulla umquam esset arbor”, etiam supra “utinam ne esset mons ullus Pelius” similiterque superiora repetentem regredi infinite licet.

1125—In ethics, Carn. denies that moral principles could be founded on nature, as is done by Stoics and, in a sense, by Plato and Aristotle, who used to consider ἀρετή in general as a perfection of being (cp. above, nr. 1003, n. 1). Hence, Carn. rejects the notion of *natural law* as rooted in the objective order of things. To this he opposes the following arguments.

**Law not
rooted in
nature**

a. If law were rooted in the natural order of things, everybody could find it there and conceptions of law would never be in disagreement. But laws are different in different countries, and man is not just by nature.

Cic., *De republ.* III 8, 13; 11, 18:

Ius enim de quo quaerimus, civile est aliquod, naturale nullum; nam si esset, ut calida et frigida, et amara et dulcia, sic essent iusta et iniusta eadem omnibus. —

(Deus si) sanxisset iura nobis, et omnes isdem et idem non alias aliis uterentur. Quaero autem, si iusti hominis et si boni est viri parere legibus, quibus? an quaecumque erunt? At nec inconstantiam virtus recipit, nec varietatem natura patitur, legesque poena, non iustitia nostra comprobantur; nihil habet igitur naturale ius; ex quo illud efficitur, ne iustos quidem esse natura.

**Man is not
just by
nature**

b. That men are not just by nature, can be inferred from their attitude towards animals.

Cic., *ib.* 11, 18-19:

An vero in legibus varietatem esse dicunt, natura autem viros bonos eam iustitiam sequi, quae sit, non eam, quae putetur? esse enim hoc boni viri et iusti, tribuere id cuique, quod sit quoque dignum. Ecquid ergo primum mutis tribuimus beluis?

1126—Doubtless, Carn. opposed to this the *social contract* theory, held previously by some of the older sophists (cp. our nr. **195b**) and by Epicurus.

a. Lactantius, *Inst.* V 16, 3 summarizes Carn.'s doctrine as follows: **The social contract theory**

Iura sibi homines pro utilitate sanxisse, scilicet varia pro moribus, et aput eosdem pro temporibus saepe mutata, ius autem naturale esse nullum; omnes et homines et alias animantes ad utilitates suas natura ducente ferri; proinde aut nullam esse iustitiam aut, si sit aliqua, summam esse stultitiam, quoniam sibi noceret alienis commodis consulens.

b. Lact., *ib.* 16, 4:

Arguments from history

Et inferebat haec argumenta: omnibus populis qui florerent imperio et Romanis quoque ipsis, qui totius orbis potirentur, si iusti velint esse, hoc est si aliena restituant, ad casas esse redeundum et in egestate ac miseriis iacendum.

1127—Thus there is no link either between justice and wisdom, or between wisdom and happiness, as the dogmatists admitted there is. **Conflict between wisdom and justice**

Cic., *De republ.* III 15, 24:

Sapientia iubet augere opes, amplificare divitias, proferre fines — unde enim esset illa laus in summorum imperatorum incisa monumentis “finis imperii propagavit”, nisi aliquid de alieno accessisset? — imperare quam plurimis, frui voluptatibus, pollere regnare dominari; iustitia autem praecipit parcere omnibus, consulere generi hominum, suum cuique reddere, sacra publica aliena non tangere. quid igitur efficitur si sapientiae pareas?

1128—Carn. illustrated the conflict of justice and “wisdom” by some famous examples, cited by Lactantius.

a. Lact., *Inst.* V 16, 5-6:

Carneades' casus conscientiae

Bonus vir, inquit, si habeat servum fugitivum, vel domum insalubrem ac pestilentem, quae vitia solus sciat, et ideo proscribat ut vendat, utrumne profitebitur fugitivum se servum vel pestilentem domum vendere an celabit emptorem? si profitebitur, bonus quidem, quia non fallit, sed tamen stultus iudicabitur, quia vel parvo vendet vel omnino non vendet; si celabit, erit quidem sapiens, quia rei consulet, sed idem malus, quia fallit.

b. Ib. 16, 10:

Quid ergo iustus faciet, si forte naufragium fecerit et aliquis imbecillior viribus tabulam ceperit? nonne illum tabula deturbabit, ut ipse conscendat eaque nixus evadat, maxime cum sit nullus medio mari testis? si sapiens est, faciet: ipsi enim pereundum est, nisi fecerit; si autem mori maluerit quam manus inferre alteri, iam iustus ille, sed <idem> stultus est, qui vitae suae non parcat, dum parcit alienae.

c. Ib., 16, 11:

Item si acie suorum fusa hostes insequi coeperint, et iustus ille nactus fuerit aliquem saucium equum insidentem, eine parcat, ut ipse occidatur, an deiciet ex equo, ut ipse hostem possit effugere? quod si fecerit, sapiens, sed idem malus, si non fecerit, iustus, sed idem stultus sit necesse est.

The *casus* of Carneades are treated in a very interesting article by J. Croissant, *La morale de Carnéade*, in *Revue internat. de phil.*, 1939, p. 545-570.

Casuistic
in the Stoa

As appears from Cicero's *De officiis* III, cc. 12 ff., these and many similar "cases" were discussed by Diogenes the Babylonian and Antipater¹. Panaetius' pupil Hecaton of Rhodes in his 6th book *De officiis* mentioned a great number of such-like questions (Cic., *De off.* III 23).

Cicero's
attitude

Cicero, who in *theoreticis* was an admirer of Carneades, took the part of the Stoics as to ethics and the foundation of law: he defended natural law by the principle of *oikeiosis* (above, nrs. 1065b-c, 1066-1067, 1070), denied any conflict between the *honestum* and the *utile* (*De off.* III 3), and in cases of a *seeming* conflict, such as the instances introduced by Carn., Cicero even preferred the severe solution of Antipater to the laxer one of Diogenes (ib., cc. 12-23).

Carneades
a dogmatist
in ethics?

As to Carneades' position in ethics, if it is true that he admitted the social contract theory instead of that of "nature" being the basis of moral principles and law, it is clear that he was not a sceptic, but a dogmatist, too.

Remark on
„classical
naturalism”

With regard to those modern philosophers who are inclined to adopt Carneades' arguments against "classical naturalism", saying that "nature" is something neutral and therefore can never furnish us with any moral principles, it should be remarked that, for the ancient philosophers opposed by Carn. (as for those among modern philosophers who follow them), "nature" meant more than "just what happens". Cp. the passages of St. Thomas Aquinas cited under 1076.

5—DIALECTICAL SCEPTICISM: AENESIDEMUS AND AGRIPPA

Aenedise-
mus of
Cnossus

1129—a. In the list of Hippobotus and Sotion (ap. Diog. L. IX 115 f., cited under nr. 1078b) Aenesidemus of Cnossus is mentioned third after Ptolemaeus of Cyrene and is said to be the author of 8 books of *Pyrrhoneioi logoi*.

b. Aristocles ap. Euseb., *Praep. ev.* XIV 18, 763d, mentions him as the first important man of the Sceptical School after Pyrrho and Timon:

¹ Cp. below, nr. 1143, sub (5).

Μηδενὸς δ' ἐπιστραφέντος αὐτῶν, ὥς εἰ μὴδὲ ἐγένοντο τὸ παράπαν, ἐχθρὸς καὶ πρῶν ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ τῇ κατ' Αἰγυπτον Αἰνεσίδημός τις ἀναζωπυρεῖν ἤρξατο τὸν ὕβλον τοῦτον.

He lived at
Alexandria

c. The patriarch Photius, *Myriobiblon* p. 212, 169 b 17 sqq., 171 a 4 Bekker, in his short analysis of the *Pyrrh. log.* says that Aenesidemus dedicated this work to the Roman L. Aelius Tubero. The identity of this personage with the friend of Cicero is rejected by Zeller, but defended by Robin. It is mostly admitted that Aen. lived c. 80-60 B.C. His arguments are fairly well known to us by Sextus Emp. and by Diog. Laert., who seems to have possessed the text.

Date

1130—Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VIII (= *Ag. the log.* II) 40-47:

i. Against
truth

Εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι ἀληθές, ἥτοι αἰσθητόν ἐστιν ἢ νοητόν ἐστιν, ἢ καὶ νοητόν ἐστι καὶ αἰσθητόν ἐστιν. [ῥ] οὔτε δὲ αἰσθητόν ἐστιν οὔτε νοητόν ἐστι, οὔτε τὸ συναμφοτέρον, ὥς παρασταθῆσεται· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι ἀληθές. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθητόν, οὕτως ἐπιλογιούμεθα. τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστι γένη τὰ δὲ εἶδη, καὶ γένη μὲν αἰ ἐνδιήκουσαι ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος κοινότητες, ὥς ἄνθρωπος ὁ διὰ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων πεφοιτηκώς καὶ ἵππος ὁ διὰ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἵππων, εἶδη δὲ καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ιδιότητες, ὥς Δίωνος, Θέωνος, τῶν ἄλλων. εἴπερ οὖν αἰσθητόν ἐστι τὸ ἀληθές, καὶ τοῦτο πάντως κοινὸν πλείονων <ἢ ἐν> ιδιότητι κείμενον ἔσται αἰσθητόν [τὸ ἀληθές]· οὔτε δὲ κοινὸν ἐστιν οὔτε ἐν ιδιότητι κείμενον· οὐκ ἄρα αἰσθητόν ἐστι τὸ ἀληθές. ἔτι δὲ τρόπον τὸ μὲν ὁρατὸν ὁράσει ληπτὸν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀκουστὸν ἀκοῇ γνωρίμῳ ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ὁσφρητὸν ὁσφρήσει, οὕτω καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν κοινῶς αἰσθήσει γνωρίζεται. οὐ γνωρίζεται δὲ κοινῶς αἰσθήσει <τὸ ἀληθές>· ἢ γὰρ αἰσθησις ἀλογός ἐστιν, καὶ τὸ ἀληθές οὐκ ἀλόγως γνωρίζεται. οὐκ ἄρα αἰσθητόν τὸ ἀληθές. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ νοητόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἔσται τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀληθές· ὁ πάλιν ἄτοπον. —

Ἄλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ αἰσθητόν ἅμα καὶ νοητόν. ἥτοι γὰρ πᾶν αἰσθητόν καὶ πᾶν νοητόν ἀληθές ἐστιν ἢ τὶ αἰσθητόν καὶ τὶ νοητόν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν φάσκειν πᾶν αἰσθητόν καὶ πᾶν νοητόν ἀληθές εἶναι τῶν ἀμηχάνων. μάχεται γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ τὰ νοητὰ τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ ἐναλλάξ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ δεήσει πάντων ἀληθῶν ὄντων τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἀληθές τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ ψεῦδος. τί δὲ αἰσθητόν ἀληθές καὶ τὶ νοητόν ἀληθές ἀξιοῦν πάλιν τῶν ἀπόρων· ζητεῖται γὰρ τοῦτο. καὶ ἄλλως ἀκόλουθόν ἐστιν ἢ πάντα λέγειν ἀληθῆ ἢ πάντα λέγειν ψευδῆ τὰ αἰσθητὰ· ἐπ' ἴσης γὰρ ἐστιν αἰσθητὰ, καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον τὸ δὲ ἥττον, καὶ τὰ νοητὰ πάλιν ἐπ' ἴσης ἐστὶ νοητὰ, καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον. οὐ πάντα δὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ λέγεται ἀληθῆ, οὐδὲ πάντα ψευδῆ· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι ἀληθές.

As to the value of Aenesidemus' arguments against truth and the notion of cause, see under 1134. Also 1135 (the ten "tropes").

2. Against
causality

1131—Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* IX (= *Ag. the phys.* I) 219-226:

Τὸ γὰρ σῶμα τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἂν εἴη αἷτιον, ἐπεὶπερ ἡ ἀγέννητόν ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον σῶμα καθάπερ ἡ κατ' Ἐπικούρου ἄτομος, ἡ γεννητὸν ὡς ἔθος, καὶ ἡ φανερόν ὡς σίδηρος καὶ πῦρ, ἡ ἀφανὲς ὡς ἄτομος. ὅ τι δ' ἂν ᾖ τούτων, οὐδὲν δύναται ποιεῖν. ἦτοι γὰρ καθ' ἑαυτὸ μένον ἕτερόν τι ποιεῖ ἢ ἐτέρῳ συνελθόν. ἀλλὰ μένον μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὸ πλεῖον αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο τι ποιεῖν. συνελθόν δὲ ἐτέρῳ τρίτον οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο ἀποτελεῖν, ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἐν τῷ εἶναι ὑπῆρχεν. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἐν γενέσθαι δύο δυνατόν ἐστιν, οὔτε τὰ δύο τρίτον ἀποτελεῖ. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐν δύο γενέσθαι δυνατόν ᾖ, καὶ ἑκάτερον τῶν γενομένων ἐν ὃν δύο ἀποτελέσει, καὶ τῶν τεσσάρων ἕκαστον ἐν ὃν δύο ποιήσει, καὶ ὁμοίως τῶν ὀκτὼ ἕκαστον, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. παντελῶς δὲ γε ἄτοπόν ἐστι τὸ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἄπειρα λέγειν γίνεσθαι. ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς λέγειν τι πλεῖον γενεᾶσθαι. τὰ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ ἀξιῶ τις ἐκ τῶν ἡσόνων κατὰ σύνοδον πλείονα ἀποτελεῖσθαι. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ συνελθόν τρίτον ποιεῖ, καὶ τὸ τρίτον προσγενόμενον τοῖς δυσὶ τέταρτον ἀποτελέσει, καὶ τὸ τέταρτον προσγενόμενον τοῖς τρισὶ πέμπτον ἀποτελέσει, καὶ οὕτω πάλιν εἰς ἄπειρον. οὐκοῦν σῶμα μὲν σώματος οὐκ ἔστιν αἷτιον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀσώματον ἀσωμάτου διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας. οὔτε γὰρ ἐξ ἑνὸς οὔτε ἐκ πλειόνων ἢ ἐνὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τι πλεῖον. καὶ ἄλλως. ἀναφῆς φύσις καθεστὼς τὸ ἀσώματον οὔτε ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν δύναται. ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀσώματον ἀσωμάτου ποιητικόν ἐστιν. οὕτως δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐναλλάξ, τουτέστι σῶμα ἀσωμάτου ἢ ἀσώματον σώματος. τό τε γὰρ σῶμα οὐκ ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ ἀσωμάτου φύσιν, τό τε ἀσώματον οὐκ ἐμπεριεῖχε τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν. διόπερ οὐδέτερον ἐξ οὐδετέρου συστήναι δυνατόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκ πλατάνου οὐ γίνεται ἵππος διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν τῇ πλατάνῳ τὴν τοῦ ἵππου φύσιν, οὐδὲ ἐξ ἵππου συνίσταται ἄνθρωπος διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἵππῳ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσιν, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἐκ σώματος ἔσται ποτ' ἂν τὸ ἀσώματον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν τῷ σώματι τὴν τοῦ ἀσωμάτου φύσιν, οὐδὲ ἀνάπαλιν ἐκ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου τὸ σῶμα. — οὐδὲ σῶμα οὖν ἀσωμάτου ἢ ἀσώματον σώματος ἐστιν αἷτιον. ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι αἷτιον.

σημεῖα
do not lead
to any
certitude
either

1132—Epicurus and the Stoics thought it possible to find the causes indirectly by the effects. Hence their doctrine of σημεῖα. To this, Aen. opposes the following argument.

a. Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VIII (= *Ag. the log.* II) 215:

Εἰ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται καὶ τὰ σημεῖα ἐστὶ φαινόμενα, τὰ σημεῖα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παρα-

πλησίως φαίνεται. οὐχὶ δέ γε τὰ σημεῖα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται· τὰ δὲ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται· οὐκ ἄρα φαινόμενά ἐστι τὰ σημεῖα.

b. The proposition that "signs do not appear alike to all those in a similar condition" is illustrated by a medical instance: the symptoms of fever are explained differently by different physicians according to their different theories.

Sextus, *ib.* 219-220:

Τὸ γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν πυρεσσόντων ἔρευθος καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀγγείων προπάλεια καὶ ὁ ἔνικμος χρώς καὶ ἡ πλείων θερμασία καὶ ἡ σφοδρότης τῶν σφυγμῶν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ σημεῖα τοῖς ὁμοίως κατὰ τε τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σύγκρισιν διακειμένοις τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσπίπτει σημεῖα, οὐδ' ὡσαύτως πᾶσι φαίνεται, ἀλλ' Ἡροφίλῳ μὲν λόγου χάριν ὡς ἀντικρυς χρηστοῦ αἵματος σημεῖα, Ἐρασιστράτῳ δὲ ὡς μεταπτώσεως τῆς ἐκ φλεβῶν εἰς ἀρτηρίας, Ἀσκληπιάδῃ δὲ ὡς ἐνστάσεως νοητῶν ὄγκων ἐν νοητοῖς ἀραιώμασιν.

Photius says, *Aen.* taught that signs are no visible things revealing the invisible (φανερὰ τῶν ἀφανῶν).

1133—The books of Sextus contain quite a number of passages containing arguments against proof. In these passages the name of Aenesidemus is not mentioned; but it is highly probable that he had his part in developing the arguments.

3. Against
proof

a. Proof, too, is a "sign", and as such to be rejected.

Sextus Emp., *P.* II 134:

Φανερόν μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐδὲ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ὁμολογούμενόν τι πρᾶγμα ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ σημείου ἐπέχομεν, καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις δὲ σημεῖόν τί ἐστι, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη. καὶ γὰρ εὐρήσομεν τοὺς περὶ τοῦ σημείου λόγους ἠρωτημένους ἐφαρμόζεσθαι δυναμένους καὶ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ πρὸς τι εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ ἐκκαλυπτική τοῦ συμπεράσματος, οἷς ἡκολούθει τὰ πρὸς τὸ σημεῖον ἡμῶν εἰρημένα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα.

Other passages containing the same argument are: *P.* II 122; *M.* VIII 277, 279 sq.

b. Proof as a conclusion from premisses depends on conditions which must be also proved.

Sextus Emp., *P.* II 113-116:

Καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ὑγῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὅταν ἀκολουθῇ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτῆς συμπλοκῇ τὸ συμπέρασμα αὐτῆς ὡς λῆγον ἡγουμένῳ, οἷον οὕτως

“εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν. εἴπερ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· καὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ φῶς ἔστιν.” ζητουμένου δὲ περὶ τοῦ πῶς κρινοῦμεν τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τοῦ λήγοντος πρὸς τὸ ἡγούμενον ¹, ὁ διάλληλος εὐρίσκεται τρόπος ². ἵνα μὲν γὰρ ἡ κρίσις τοῦ συνημμένου ³ ἀποδειχθῇ, τὸ συμπέρασμα τοῖς λήμμασι ⁴ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀκολουθεῖ, ὡς προειρήκαμεν· ἵνα δὲ πάλιν τοῦτο πιστευθῇ, δεῖ τὸ συνημμένον καὶ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν ἐπιχειρήσθαι. ὅπερ ἄτοπον. ἀκατάληπτον ἄρα τὸ ὑγιὲς συνημμένον.

Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ προκαθηγούμενον ⁵ ἀπορόν ἐστιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ προκαθηγούμενον, ὡς φασιν, ἐστὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον ἐν τοιοῦτῳ συνημμένῳ, ὃ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστὶ τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ σημεῖον, ἦτοι πρόδηλόν ἐστὶ τὸ λῆγον ἢ ἄδηλον. εἰ μὲν οὖν πρόδηλον, οὐδὲ τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος δεῖσεται, ἀλλὰ συγκαταληφθήσεται αὐτῷ, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ σημειωτόν, διόπερ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο τούτου σημεῖον. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδῆλων διαπεφώνηται ἀνεπικρίτως, ποῖα μὲν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἀληθῆ ποῖα δὲ ψευδῆ, καὶ ὅλας εἰ ἔστι τι αὐτῶν ἀληθές, ἄδηλον ἔσται εἰ εἰς ἀληθές λήγει τὸ συνημμένον. ὃ συνεισέρχεται καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι εἰ προκαθηγεῖται τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγούμενον.

The argument is directed not against Aristotle's categorical syllogism, but against hypothetical syllogism, much used in the Stoa. Cp. above nr. 979.

c. Another argument is given in the following passage.

Sextus Emp., *P.* II 177-179:

“Ἐτι ἐκ τούτων τὸ ἀνυπόστατον τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἔνεστιν ὑπομιμνήσκειν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἦτοι φαινομένη φαινομένου ἐστὶν ἐκκαλυπτικὴ ἢ ἄδηλος ἀδήλου ἢ ἄδηλος φαινομένου ἢ φαινομένη ἀδήλου· οὐδενὸς δὲ τούτων ἐκκαλυπτικὴ δύναται ἐπινοεῖσθαι· ἀνεπινόητος ἄρα ἐστίν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ φαινομένη φαινομένου ἐκκαλυπτικὴ ἐστίν, ἔσται τὸ ἐκκαλυπτόμενον ἅμα φαινόμενόν τε καὶ ἄδηλον, φαινόμενον μὲν, ἐπεὶ τοιοῦτον εἶναι ὑπετέθη, ἄδηλον δέ, ἐπεὶ δεῖται τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ὑποπίπτει ἡμῖν σαφῶς. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλος ἀδήλου, αὕτη δεῖσεται τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος αὐτὴν καὶ οὐκ ἔσται ἐκκαλυπτικὴ ἐτέρων, ὅπερ ἀφέστηκε τῆς ἐννοίας τῆς ἀποδείξεως. διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἄδηλος προδήλου δύναται εἶναι ἀπόδειξις. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ πρόδηλος ἀδήλου· ἐπεὶ γὰρ πρὸς τί ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι ἀλλήλοις συγκαταλαμβάνονται, συγκαταλαμβάνόμενον τῇ προδήλῳ ἀποδείξει τὸ ἀποδείκνυσθαι λεγόμενον πρόδηλον ἔσται, ὡς περιτρέπεσθαι τὸν λόγον καὶ μὴ εὐρίσκεσθαι πρόδηλον αὐτὴν ἀδήλου ἀποδεικτικὴν. εἰ οὖν μήτε

¹ “the logical sequence of the consequent in its relation to the antecedent.”

² The argument of the circle.

³ By συνημμένος (συλλογισμός) the hypothetical syllogism is meant.

⁴ λήμματα, as was explained under 979, is the term for premisses.

⁵ “antecedent”.

φαινομένη φαινομένου ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις μήτε ἄδηλος ἀδήλου μήτε ἄδηλος προδήλου μήτε πρόδηλος ἀδήλου, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν εἶναι λέγουσιν, λεκτέον μηδὲν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.

Cp. also *M.* VIII 381-395.

1134—Now, Aristotle was well aware that proof must start from certain ἀρχαὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι (see vol. II, nr. 458), and Chrysippus admits of certain indemonstrable statements (λόγοι ἀναπόδεικτοι), employed in the construction of every argument (above, 981). This position of the dogmatists is attacked in the following passage.

Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VIII (= *Ag. the log.* II) 367 f.:

The classical
argument of
the Sceptics

Ἄλλ' οὐ δεῖ, φασί, πάντων ἀπόδειξιν αἰτεῖν, τινὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνειν, ἐπεὶ οὐ δυνήσεται προβαίνειν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δοθῇ τι πιστὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τυγχάνειν. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐροῦμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον τὰς ἐκείνων δογματολογίας προβαίνειν, πλασματώδεις ὑπαρχούσας. εἴτα καὶ ποῖ προβήσονται; τῶν γὰρ φαινομένων αὐτὸ μόνον παριστάντων ὅτι φαίνεται, τὸ δ' ὅτι καὶ ὑπόκειται μηκέτι προσισχυόντων διδάσκειν, τιθέσθω καὶ τὰ λήμματα τῆς ἀποδείξεως ὅτι φαίνεται, καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορὰ ὁμοίως. ὧδε δὲ οὐ συναχθήσεται τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ οὐ παραχθήσεται ἡ ἀλήθεια, μενόντων ἡμῶν ἐπὶ ψιλῆς φάσεως καὶ τοῦ οἰκείου πάθους. τὸ δ' ὅτι οὐ μόνον φαίνεται ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπόκειται θέλει παριστᾶν ἀνδρῶν ἐστί μὴ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν ἀρκουμένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δυνατόν συναρπάζειν ἐσπουδαχότων.

This is the classical argument of sceptics and "phenomenists", from Pyrrho to Kant and logical positivism of our days: human experience never transcends phenomena; hence we can never say what "is behind" them or reach a truth *in se*. Surely this is what Aenes. intended to say by his arguments against truth and against the notion of a cause. In form they may be rather sophistical,—as to their tendency they were renewed by Berkeley, Hume and Kant.

1135—The so-called ten "tropes" of Aenedisemus, i.e. ten modes by which suspension of judgment was supposed to be brought about, were all concerned with the difficulties of perception. Diog. L. IX 79-88 describes them shortly (a); Sextus, *Pyrrh. hyp.* I 36-163, after a short survey (b) deals with them at great length.

a. Diog. L. IX 79-88:

The ten
tropoi

[Εἷς] πρῶτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ζώων πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ἀλγηδὸνα καὶ βλάβην καὶ ὠφέλειαν. συνάγεται δὲ δι' αὐτοῦ τὸ μὴ τὰς αὐτὰς ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν προσπίπτειν φαντασίας καὶ τὸ διότι τῇ τοιαύτῃ μάχῃ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ ἐπέχειν. —

(80) Δεύτερος ὁ παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσεις καὶ τὰς ἰδιοσυγκρισίας· Δημοφῶν γοῦν ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου τραπεζοκόμος ἐν σκιᾷ ἐθάλπετο, ἐν ἡλίῳ δ' ἐρρίγυε. Ἄνδρων δ' ὁ Ἀργεῖος, ὡς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης, διὰ τῆς ἀνύδρου Λιβύης ὥδευεν ἄποτος. — Καὶ ταῦτά οὐς μὲν βλάπτει, οὐς δὲ ὠφελεῖ· ὅθεν ἐφεκτέον.

(81) Τρίτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων διαφοράς. τὸ γοῦν μᾶλλον ὁράσει μὲν ὥχρον, γεύσει δὲ γλυκύ, ὁσφρήσει δ' εὐῶδες ὑποπίπτει. καὶ ἡ αὐτῇ δὲ μορφή παρὰ τὰς διαφοράς τῶν κατόπτρων ἄλλοιᾳ θεωρεῖται. ἀκολουθεῖ οὖν μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι τοῖον τὸ φαινόμενον ἢ ἄλλοιον.

(82) Τέταρτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς διαθέσεις καὶ κοινῶς παραλλαγάς, οἷον ὑγίειαν, νόσον, ὕπνον, ἐργήγορσιν, χαράν, λύπην, νεότητα, γῆρας, θάρσος, φόβον, . . . Ἄλλοιᾳ οὖν φαίνεται τὰ προσπίπτοντα παρὰ τὰς ποιὰς διαθέσεις. —

(83) Πέμπτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς μυθικὰς πίστεις καὶ τὰς ἐθνικὰς συνθήκας καὶ δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις. ἐν τούτῳ περιέχεται τὰ περὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχυρῶν, περὶ ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν, περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ θεῶν καὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῶν φαινομένων πάντων. τὸ γοῦν αὐτὸ παρ' οἷς μὲν δίκαιον, παρ' οἷς δὲ ἄδικον· καὶ ἄλλοις μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἄλλοις δὲ κακόν. —

(84) Ἐκτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς μίξεις καὶ κοινωνίας, καθ' ὃν εἰλικρινῶς οὐδὲν καθ' αὐτὸ φαίνεται, ἀλλὰ σὺν ἀέρι, σὺν φωτί, σὺν ὑγρῷ, σὺν στερεῷ θερμότητι, ψυχρότητι, κινήσει, ἀναθυμιάσεσιν, ἄλλαις δυνάμεσιν. — (85) Ἀγνοοῦμεν οὖν τὸ κατ' ἰδίαν, ὡς ἔλαιον ἐν μύρῳ.

Ἐβδομος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἀποστάσεις καὶ ποιὰς θέσεις καὶ τοὺς τόπους καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς τόποις. κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τὰ δοκοῦντ' εἶναι μεγάλα μικρὰ φαίνεται, τὰ τετράγωνα στρογγύλα, τὰ ὁμαλὰ ἐξωχὰς ἔχοντα, τὰ ὀρθὰ κεκλασμένα, τὰ ὠχρὰ ἐτερόχροα. — (86) Ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐκ ἐνὶ ἕξῳ τόπων καὶ θέσεων ταῦτα κατανοῆσαι, ἀγνοεῖται ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν.

Ὀγδοος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας καὶ ποιότητας αὐτῶν ἢ θερμότητος ἢ ψυχρότητος ἢ ταχύτητος ἢ βραδύτητος ἢ ὠχρότητος ἢ ἐτεροχρωιότητος. ὁ γοῦν οἶνος μέτριος μὲν ληφθεὶς ῥώννυσιν, πλείων δὲ παρίησιν· ὁμοίως καὶ ἡ τροφή καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. — (87) Ἐνατος ὁ παρὰ τὸ ἐνδελεχὲς ἢ ξένον ἢ σπάνιον. οἱ γοῦν σεισμοὶ παρ' οἷς συνεχῶς ἀποτελοῦνται οὐ θαυμάζονται, οὐδ' ὁ ἥλιος, ὅτι καθ' ἡμέραν ὁράται. — (88) Δέκατος ὁ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἄλλα σύμβλησιν, καθάπερ τὸ κοῦφον παρὰ τὸ βαρὺ, τὸ ἰσχυρὸν παρὰ τὸ ἀσθενές, τὸ μεῖζον παρὰ τὸ ἔλαττον, τὸ ἄνω παρὰ τὸ κάτω. τὸ γοῦν δεξιὸν φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστι δεξιόν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὥς πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον σχέσιν νοεῖται· μετατεθέντος γοῦν ἐκείνου, οὐκέτ' ἐστὶ δεξιόν. ὁμοίως καὶ πατὴρ καὶ ἀδελφός ὡς πρὸς τι καὶ ἡμέρα ὡς πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον καὶ πάντα ὡς πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν. ἄγνωστα οὖν τὰ πρὸς τι [ὡς] καθ' ἑαυτά. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν οἱ δέκα τρόποι.

b. Sextus Emp., *P. I* 36-38, summarizes them very shortly.

Παραδίδονται τοίνυν συνήθως παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαιοτέροις Σκεπτικοῖς τρόποι, δι' ὧν ἡ ἐποχὴ συνάγεσθαι δοκεῖ, δέκα τὸν ἀριθμόν, οὓς καὶ λόγους καὶ τόπους συνωνύμως καλοῦσιν. εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι, πρῶτος ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζῶων ἐξαλλαγήν, δεύτερος ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφοράν, τρίτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους τῶν αἰσθητηρίων κατασκευάς, τέταρτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις, πέμπτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους, ἕκτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας, ἑβδομος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας καὶ σκευασίας τῶν ὑποκειμένων, ὄγδοος ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι, ἔννατος ὁ παρὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους ἐγκυρήσεις, δέκατος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς μυθικὰς πίστεις καὶ τὰς δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις. χρώμεθα δὲ τῇ τάξει ταύτῃ θετικῶς.

c. Next, Sextus reduces them to three main groups:

(1) those based on the differences in the subject that judges (the first four);

(2) those based on variances in the object (nr. 7 and 10);

(3) those based on both subject and object (nrs. 5, 6, 8 and 9).

Finally, all could be reduced, he says, to one category, viz. that of relation (the πρὸς τι). *Ib.*, 38-39.

Τούτων δὲ ἐπαναβεβηκότες εἰσὶ τρόποι τρεῖς, ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρίνοντος, ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρινομένου, ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρίνοντος ὑποτάσσονται οἱ πρῶτοι τέσσαρες (τὸ γὰρ κρίνον ἢ ζῷον ἐστὶν ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἢ αἰσθησις καὶ ἐν τινι περιστάσει), εἰς δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ κρινομένου ἀνάγονται ὁ ἑβδομος καὶ ὁ δέκατος, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν σύνθετον ὁ πέμπτος καὶ ὁ ἕκτος καὶ ὁ ὄγδοος καὶ ὁ ἔννατος. πάλιν δὲ οἱ τρεῖς οὗτοι ἀνάγονται εἰς τὸν πρὸς τι, ὥς εἶναι γενικώτατον μὲν τὸν πρὸς τι, εἰδικούς δὲ τοὺς τρεῖς, ὑποβεβηκότας δὲ τοὺς δέκα.

1136—About Agrippa we do not know anything but the fact that, after Aenesidemus, he introduced 5 modes, which by certain modern critics have been judged to be the sharpest and most radical expression of scepticism¹. Agrippa's name is mentioned by Diog. Laërt., who adds a short description of the arguments. Sextus, who says that "later Sceptics" (νεώτεροι Σκεπτικοί) handed down these arguments, explains them more clearly.

a. Diog. Laërt. IX 88:

Οἱ δὲ περὶ Ἀγρίππαν τούτοις ἄλλους πέντε προσεισάγουσι, τὸν τ' ἀπὸ

The five
tropes of
Agrippa

¹ Brochard, *Les sceptiques grecs*, p. 306

τῆς διαφωνίας καὶ τὸν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλοντα καὶ τὸν πρὸς τι καὶ τὸν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καὶ τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων.

Description

b. Sextus Emp., *P.* I 165-169:

Καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας ἐστὶ καθ' ὃν περὶ τοῦ προτεθέντος πράγματος ἀνεπίκριτον στάσιν παρά τε τῷ βίῳ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις εὐρίσκομεν γεγενημένην, δι' ἣν οὐ δυνάμενοι αἰρεῖσθαι τι ἢ ἀποδοκιμάζειν καταλήγομεν εἰς ἐποχὴν. ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπτώσεως ἐστὶν ἐν ᾧ τὸ φερόμενον εἰς πίστιν τοῦ προτεθέντος πράγματος πίστεως ἐτέρας χρήζειν λέγομεν, ἀκακῆν ἄλλης, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου, ὡς μὴ ἔχοντων ἡμῶν πόθεν ἀρξόμεθα τῆς κατασκευῆς τὴν ἐποχὴν ἀκολουθεῖν. ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι, καθὼς προειρήκαμεν, ἐν ᾧ πρὸς μὲν τὸ κρῖνον καὶ τὰ συνθεωρούμενα τοῖον ἢ τοῖον φαίνεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὁποῖον δὲ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἐπέχομεν. ὁ δὲ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐστὶν ὅταν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβαλλόμενοι οἱ δογματικοὶ ἀπὸ τίνος ἀρξῶνται ὃ οὐ κατασκευάζουσιν ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀναποδείκτως κατὰ συγχώρησιν λαμβάνειν ἀξιούσιν. ὁ δὲ διάλληλος τρόπος συνίσταται ὅταν τὸ ὀφείλον τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος εἶναι βεβαιωτικὸν χρεῖαν ἔχῃ τῆς ἐκ τοῦ ζητουμένου πίστεως· ἐνθα μὴδὲτερον δυνάμενοι λαβεῖν πρὸς κατασκευὴν θατέρου, περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἐπέχομεν.

6—LATER SCEPTICS: MENODOTUS AND SEXTUS

1137—Later Sceptics, such as Menodotus and Sextus Empiricus, were empirical physicians, and this with an elaborate method and a theory on it. They opposed dogmatism, as in our days neopositivists oppose metaphysics: to dogmatical philosophy they opposed experience and observation (τήρησις) as nowadays positive science is often opposed to metaphysics.

Menodotus was not the first to invent empirical method: it went back to Philinos of Cos (middle of the third century), and was represented after him by Serapion of Alexandria (c. 200) and Heraclides of Tarentum (first half of the first century).

The empirical school

a. [Galenus], *Εἰσαγωγή ἢ ἱατρὸς* XIV 683, 11 (Deichgr. 6):

Τῆς δὲ ἐμπειρικῆς (sc. αἰρέσεως) προέστηκε Φιλῖνος Κῶος ὁ πρῶτος αὐτὴν ἀποτεμόμενος ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς αἰρέσεως τὰς ἀφορμὰς λαβὼν παρὰ Ἡροφίλου οὗ καὶ ἀκουστῆς ἐγένετο. — μετὰ δὲ Φιλῖνον ἐγένετο Σεραπίων Ἀλεξανδρεὺς, εἷτα Ἀπολλώνιοι δύο πατὴρ τε καὶ υἱὸς Ἀντιοχεῖς, μεθ' οὓς Μηνόδοτος καὶ Σέξτος, οἱ καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐκράτουν αὐτήν.

b. [Galenus] "Οροι Ιατρικοί XIX 353, 9 (Deichgr. 11):

Its method

Πόσαι (sc. εἰσὶν) κατὰ ἰατρικὴν αἱρέσεις; ἰατρικῆς αἱρέσεις αἱ πρῶται δύο, ἐμπειρικὴ τε καὶ λογικὴ . . . τί ἐστὶν ἐμπειρικὴ; ἔστιν ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρικὴ αἱρέσεις τήρησις τῶν πλειστάκις κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ὡσαύτως ἐωραμένων.

1138—Sextus gives a general description of the empirical method in medicine in the following passages.

**General
description
by Sextus**

a. *Adv. math.* VIII 288:

Κἂν δῶμεν δὲ διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τὸν ἄνθρωπον λόγῳ τε καὶ μεταβατικῇ φαντασίᾳ καὶ ἐννοίᾳ ἀκολουθίας, ἀλλ' οὐ τοί γε καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀδῆλοις καὶ ἀνεπικρίτως διαπεφωνημένοις συγχωρήσομεν αὐτὸν εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φαινομένοις τηρητικὴν τινα ἔχειν ἀκολουθίαν, καθ' ἣν μνημονεύων τίνα μετὰ τίνων τεθεώρηται καὶ τίνα πρὸ τίνων καὶ τίνα μετὰ τίνα, ἐκ τῆς τῶν προτέρων ὑποπτώσεως ἀνανεοῦται τὰ λοιπά.

b. *Ib.*, 291:

Τῆς μὲν τῶν ἄλλων θεωρητικῆς τέχνης οὐδὲν ἐστὶ θεώρημα, καθάπερ ὕστερον διδάξομεν, τῆς δὲ ἐν τοῖς φαινομένοις στρεφομένης ἔστιν ἰδίον τι θεώρημα. διὰ γὰρ τῶν πολλάκις τετηρημένων ἢ ἱστορημένων ποιεῖται τὰς τῶν θεωρημάτων συστάσεις· τὰ δὲ πολλάκις τηρηθέντα καὶ ἱστορηθέντα ἴδια καθείστηται τῶν πλειστάκις τηρησάντων, ἀλλ' οὐ κοινὰ πάντων.

1139—In *Adv. math.* V the empirical method is applied to astrology. The author concludes as follows.

**The
empirical
method
applied to
astrology**

Adv. math. V 104 f.:

Καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἐν τῇ ἰατρικῇ ἐτηρήσαμεν ὅτι ἡ τῆς καρδίας τρῶσις αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ θανάτου, οὐ τὴν Δίωνος μόνον τελευτὴν αὐτῇ συμπαρατηρήσαντες ἀλλὰ καὶ Θέωνος καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν μαθηματικῇ εἰ πιστόν ἐστιν ὅτι ὁδε ὁ συσχηματισμὸς τῶν ἀστέρων τοιοῦτου βίου μηνυτικὸς καθεστήκειν, πάντως οὐχ ἅπαξ ἐφ' ἐνὸς ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἐπὶ πολλῶν παρατηρήθη. ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ αὐτὸς τῶν ἀστέρων συσχηματισμὸς διὰ μακρῶν, ὥς φασι, χρόνων θεωρεῖται, ἀποκαταστάσεως γινομένης τοῦ μεγάλου ἐνιαυτοῦ δι' ἐννεακισχιλίων ἐνακοσίων καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ ἑπτὰ ἐτῶν, οὐ φθάσει ἀνθρωπίνῃ τήρησις τοῖς τοσούτοις αἰῶσι συνδραμεῖν ἐπὶ μιᾷ γενέσεως, καὶ ταῦτα οὐχ ἅπαξ ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἦτοι <τῆς> τοῦ κόσμου φθορᾶς, εἰρήκασιν ὥς τινες, μεσολαβούσης αὐτήν, ἣ πάντως γε τῆς κατὰ μέρος μεταβολῆς ἐξαφανιζούσης τὸ συνεχές τῆς ἱστορικῆς παραδόσεως.

1140—Scepticism as a philosophical method.

The
criterium

a. Sextus, *P. I* 22:

Κριτήριον τοίνυν φαμέν εἶναι τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς τὸ φαινόμενον, δυνάμει τὴν φαντασίαν αὐτοῦ οὕτω καλοῦντες· ἐν πείσει γὰρ καὶ ἀβουλήτῳ πάθει κειμένη ἀζήτητός ἐστιν. διὸ περὶ μὲν τοῦ φαίνεσθαι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐδεὶς ἴσως ἀμφισβητεῖ, περὶ δὲ τοῦ εἰ τοιοῦτον ἔστιν ὅποιον φαίνεται ζητεῖται.

applied to
practical
life

b. *Ib.*, 23-24:

Τοὺς φαινομένοις οὖν προσέχοντες κατὰ τὴν βιωτικὴν τήρησιν ἀδοξάστως βιοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα ἀνενέργητοι παντάπασιν εἶναι. ἔοικε δὲ αὕτη ἡ βιωτικὴ τήρησις τετραμερὴς εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὲν τι ἔχειν ἐν ὑψηλῇ φύσεως¹, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἀνάγκῃ παθῶν, τὸ δὲ ἐν παραδόσει νόμων τε καὶ ἔθων, τὸ δὲ ἐν διδασκαλίᾳ τεχνῶν, ὑψηλῇ μὲν φυσικῇ καθ' ἣν φυσικῶς αἰσθητικοὶ καὶ νοητικοὶ ἐσμεν, παθῶν δὲ ἀνάγκῃ καθ' ἣν λιμὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τροφῇ ἡμᾶς ὀδηγεῖ δίψος δ' ἐπὶ πόμα, ἔθων δὲ καὶ νόμων παραδόσει καθ' ἣν τὸ μὲν εὐσεβεῖν παραλαμβάνομεν βιωτικῶς ὡς ἀγαθὸν τὸ δὲ ἀσεβεῖν ὡς φαῦλον, τεχνῶν δὲ διδασκαλίᾳ καθ' ἣν οὐκ ἀνενέργητοὶ ἐσμεν ἐν αἷς παραλαμβάνομεν τέχναις. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα φαμέν ἀδοξάστως.

1141—Later Sceptics have a dislike of dialectic, whether true or false (i.e., producing fallacies or opposing them): they thought it useless to argue against such arguments as “that you have horns”², or “that motion is impossible”³, “becoming is impossible”⁴, or “that snow is black”⁵, because experience is against it.

Against
dialectic

a. Sextus, *P. II* 244-245:

Καὶ τοιοῦτους τινὰς ἀθροίσας ὕθλους συνάγει τὰς ὁφρῦς, καὶ προχειρίζεται τὴν διαλεκτικὴν, καὶ πάνυ σεμνῶς ἐπιχειρεῖ κατασκευάζειν ἡμῖν δι' ἀποδείξεων συλλογιστικῶν ὅτι γίνεται τι καὶ ὅτι κινεῖται τι καὶ ὅτι ἡ χιών ἐστὶ λευκὴ

¹ The passage shows that Sextus, too, spoke of a “guidance of Nature”, be it in a far more limited sense than the Stoics did. Cp. above, our note to 1079a.

² Argument of Eubulides: our nr. 231d.

³ Sextus, *P. II* 242, refers to the argument of Diodorus Cronus, our nr. 232.

⁴ The argument referred to by Sextus l.1. goes back to Parmenides, fr. 8 D., l. 7-8, where a lacuna should be marked after the words πῇ πόθεν αὐξήθην; Diels filled it up as follows:

οὐτ' ἔκ τευ ἐόντος ἔγεντ' ἄν·

ἄλλο γὰρ ἂν πρὶν ἔην· οὐτ' ἔκ μὴ ἐόντος κτλ.

⁵ This assertion, according to Sextus, *P. I* 33, based by Anaxagoras on the fact that snow is frozen water, and water is black, was with its author not so much a result of dialectic as of a general theory of Nature. Cp. our nrs. 124b, c and 133a.

καὶ ὅτι κέρατα οὐκ ἔχομεν, καίτοι γε ἀρκοῦντος ἴσως τοῦ τὴν ἐνάργειαν αὐτοῖς ἀντιτιθέναι πρὸς τὸ θραύεσθαι τὴν διαβεβαιωτικὴν θέσιν αὐτῶν διὰ τῆς ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἰσοσθενοῦς αὐτῶν ἀντιμαρτυρήσεως. ταῦτά τοι καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς φιλόσοφος <τις>¹ τὸν κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως λόγον σιωπῶν περιεπάτησεν, καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὸν βίον ἄνθρωποι πεζάς τε καὶ διαποντίους στέλλονται πορείας κατασκευάζουσί τε ναῦς καὶ οἰκίας καὶ παιδοποιοῦνται τῶν κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ γενέσεως ἀμελοῦντες λόγων. φέρεται δὲ καὶ Ἡροφίλου τοῦ ἱατροῦ χάριεν <τι> ἀπομνημόνευμα· συνεχρόνισε γὰρ οὗτος Διοδώρῳ, ὃς ἐναπειροκαλῶν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ λόγους διεξέηκε σοφιστικούς κατὰ τε ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ τῆς κινήσεως. ὥς οὖν ἐκβαλὼν ποτε ὤμον ὁ Διόδωρος ἦκε θεραπευθισόμενος ὥς τὸν Ἡρόφιλον, ἐχαριεντίσατο ἐκεῖνος πρὸς αὐτὸν λέγων “ἦτοι ἐν ᾧ ἦν τόπῳ ὁ ὤμος ὦν ἐκπέπτωκεν, ἦ ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἦν· οὔτε δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἦν οὔτε ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἦν². οὐκ ἄρα ἐκπέπτωκεν,” ὥς τὸν σοφιστὴν λιπαρεῖν ἔαν μὲν τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους, τὴν δὲ ἐξ ἱατρικῆς ἀρμόζουσαν αὐτῷ προσάγειν θεραπείαν.

b. Sextus concludes the above passage by saying that it is possible to live in accordance with “what is generally observed and believed”, without affirming anything dogmatically. **Scepticism in accordance with common sense**

Ib. 246:

Ἄρκει γάρ, οἶμαι, τὸ ἐμπείρως τε καὶ ἀδοξάστως κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς τηρήσεις τε καὶ προλήψεις βιοῦν, περὶ τῶν ἐκ δογματικῆς περιεργίας καὶ μάλιστα ἐξω τῆς βιωτικῆς χρείας λεγομένων ἐπέχοντας.

1142—The sceptical rejection of the σημεῖον is not against common sense either.

Sextus, *Adv. math.* VIII 156-157:

Ἄλλα γὰρ δυοῖν ὄντων σημείων, τοῦ τε ὑπομνηστικοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρὸς καιρὸν ἀδήλων τὰ πολλὰ χρησιμεύειν δοκοῦντος, καὶ τοῦ ἐνδεικτικοῦ, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει ἀδήλων ἐγκρίνεται, μελλήσομεν πᾶσαν ποιεῖσθαι ζήτησιν καὶ ἀπορίαν οὐ περὶ τοῦ ὑπομνηστικοῦ (τοῦτο γὰρ παρὰ πᾶσι κοινῶς τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ βίου πεπίστευται χρησιμεύειν), ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐνδεικτικοῦ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἱατρῶν, ὥς δυνάμενον τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην αὐτοῖς παρέχειν χρεῖαν, πέπλασται. ὅθεν οὐδὲ μαχόμεθα ταῖς κοιναῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων προλήψεσιν, οὐδὲ συγχέομεν τὸν βίον, λέγοντες μηθὲν εἶναι σημεῖον, καθάπερ τινὲς ἡμᾶς συκοφαντοῦσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ πᾶν ἀνηροῦμεν σημεῖον, τάχ' ἴσως ἂν καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐμαχόμεθα· νυνὶ δὲ οὕτω καὶ

¹ According to Diog. L. VI 39 this philosopher was Diogenes the Cynic.

² See the argument of Diodorus under nr. 232.

αὐτοὶ ἔγνωμεν, ἐκ μὲν καπνοῦ πῦρ, ἐκ δὲ οὐλῆς προηγησάμενον ἔλκος, ἐκ δὲ προηγουμένης καρδίας τρώσεως θάνατον, ἐκ δὲ προκειμένης ταινίας ἄλειμμα λαμβάνοντας.

Thus with regard to practical life, Sextus comes near to Pyrrho—namely in just doing what everybody does, without any dogmatical assumptions. Though he dislikes the method of dialectics, he stands with Aenesidemus in rejecting truth, causality and indicative signs. With Carneades, finally, he shares the idea of practical certitude on a merely empirical basis.

TWENTY-THIRD CHAPTER

THE STOA AND THE ACADEMY AFTER CARNEADES' CRITICISM; LATER STOICS AND LATER CYNICISM.

I—THE STOA IN DISCUSSION WITH CARNEADES

1143—Stoic philosophy was defended against Carneades by Diogenes the Babylonian and Antipater of Tarsus. Certain points were altered under the influence of Carneades' criticism.

a. The doctrine of *ekpyrosis* was abandoned by Diogenes in his later years. **Ekpyrosis abandoned**

Philo, *De incorrupt. mundi* 15; SVF III, fr. 27 Diog.:

Λέγεται δὲ καὶ Διογένης ἡνίκα νέος ἦν συνεπιγραψάμενος τῷ δόγματι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως ὅψὲ τῆς ἡλικίας ἐνδοιάσας ἐπισχεῖν.

b. Boëthus of Sidon denied that the cosmos is a living being, but held that the sphere of the fixed stars (aether) is God. **The cosmos divine?**

Diog. L. VII 143, 148:

Βόηθος δέ φησιν οὐκ εἶναι ζῶον τὸν κόσμον. —

Βόηθος δὲ ἐν τῇ Περὶ φύσεως οὐσίαν θεοῦ τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν.

c. Mantic, however, was defended both by Diogenes and by Antipater, as appears in Cic., *Div.* I 39, 84; 54, 123. **Mantic defended**

1144—The wording of the telos formula by Diogenes, Archdemus and Antipater is influenced by Carneades. **The telos formula**

Stob., *Ecl.* II, p. 76, 8 W:

Διογένης δέ· εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ καὶ ἀπεκλογῇ.

Ἀρχέδημος δέ· πάντα τὰ καθήκοντα ἐπιτελοῦντας ζῆν.

Ἀντίπατρος δέ· ζῆν ἐκλεγομένους μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλεγομένους δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν διηνεκῶς. Πολλάκις δὲ καὶ οὕτως ἀπεδίδου· πᾶν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν ποιεῖν διηνεκῶς καὶ ἀπαραβάτως πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν προηγουμένων κατὰ φύσιν.

Doubtless, the increased interest in practical life displayed in these formulae was a result of Carneades' criticism. They tried to find an answer to the question of "How to submit practical life to reason, if the object of our striving does not contribute anything to the end".

Antipater's last cited formula leads to the difficulty that, in this conception, either the striving itself must be said to be the end, or a duplicity of ends is introduced, namely first the right choice of the object, secondly attaining it¹. The difficulty is touched upon by Cicero, *De fin.* III 6, 22-7, 24, cited above (nr. 1016a, b; cp. nrs. 1033-1036).

The formula of Archedemus means a transition to Panaetius' doctrine of *καθ' ὅντα*, which was, for this philosopher, the essential part of moral philosophy.

**Casuistic
in the Stoa**

1145—As was remarked under nr. 1128c, Diogenes and Antipater discussed a number of *casus conscientiae* such as those introduced by Carneades. Diogenes, laying stress on the instinct of selfpreservation implied in the principle of *oikeiosis*, held that, in case of a conflict of interests, one is allowed to follow one's own advantage. Antipater, emphasizing the obligations towards our fellow-men, implied in the same principle, defended the opposite rule, coming near in this to what Cicero, following the lead of Panaetius, called *humanitas*.

a. Cicero, *De off.* III 12, 51:

In huius modi causis² aliud Diogeni Babylonio videri solet, magno et gravi Stoico, aliud Antipatro, discipulo eius, homini acutissimo. Antipatro omnia patefacienda, ut ne quid omnino, quod venditor norit, emptor ignoret, Diogeni venditorem, quatenus iure civili constitutum sit, dicere vitia oportere, cetera sine insidiis agere et, quoniam vendat velle quam optime vendere.

b. In chapter 23 of the same book Cicero mentions quite a number of "cases", found in Hecaton's 6th book "On moral duties".

De off. III 23, 91:

Quaerit etiam, si sapiens adulterinos nummos acceperit imprudens pro bonis, cum id rescierit, soluturusne sit eos, si cui debeat, pro bonis. Diogenes ait, Antipater negat, cui potius adsentior. Qui vinum fugiens vendat sciens, debeatne dicere. Non necesse putat Diogenes, Antipater viri boni existimat.

¹ A distinction is made here between *τέλος* and *σκοπός*. See the instance of the archer, mentioned by Plut., *Comm. not.* 26, cited under 1016a.

² Such as Carneades' first instance: how to act in selling a bad house.

1146—Also on other points Antipater laid more emphasis on the social aspect of Stoicism, e.g. in appreciating good fame (εὐδοξία), as is told by Cicero, *De fin.* III 17, 57:

The appreciation of
εὐδοξία

De bona autem fama (quam enim appellant εὐδοξίαν, aptius est bonam famam hoc loco appellare quam gloriam) Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes detracta utilitate ne digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse dicebant; quibus ego vehementer assentior. Qui autem post eos fuerunt, cum Carneadem sustinere non possent, hanc, quam dixi, bonam famam ipsam propter se praepositam et sumendam esse dixerunt, esseque hominis ingenui et liberaliter educati velle bene audire a parentibus, a propinquis, a bonis etiam viris, idque propter rem ipsam, non propter usum.

In this, too, Antipater came near to Panaetius and his *humanitas*, as may be seen in Cic., *De off.* I 28, 99:

Adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia adversus homines et optimi cuiusque et reliquorum. Nam neglegere, quid de se quisque sentiat, non solum arrogantis est, sed etiam omnino dissoluti.

1147—In his work Π. γάμου, Antipater praised married life as the only *complete* life, which is superior to the so-called ἡθεος βίος, and a duty both towards one's native country and towards the Gods (fr. 63).

Praise of
marriage

a. This is what he says about the way of seeking a companion.

Stob. Flor. LXX 13; SVF III, fr. 62 Antip.:

Πρῶτον μὲν χρή τὴν μνηστείαν μὴ εἰκῇ ποιήσασθαι ἀλλὰ πάνυ πεφροντισμένως, μὴδ' εἰς πλοῦτον μὴδ' εἰς ὀγκοῦσαν εὐγένειαν μὴδὲ εἰς ἄλλην χάσμην μηδεμίαν ἀποβλέπειν, μὴδὲ μὰ Δία εἰς κάλλος· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ὡς ἐπὶ πᾶν ὄγκον καὶ δεσποτικὸν ἦθος περιποιεῖ· ἀλλὰ πρῶτα μὲν τὸ τοῦ γονέως ἐξετάζειν ἦθος καὶ τρόπον, εἰ πολιτικὸς καὶ ἀφορτος <καὶ> εὐγνώμων, ἔτι δὲ σώφρων καὶ δίκαιος, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἀκονόσπουδος καὶ <κατ'> ἔχνος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα <ἀ> περὶ τοῦ ποίους τινὰς φίλους κτᾶσθαι δεῖ παραγγέλλεται. ἔπειτα καὶ τὴν μητέρα, ἥ <ῆ> γαμεῖσθαι μέλλουσα συντρέφεται καὶ τὸν ταύτης τρόπον κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀποπλάττεται. μετὰ ταῦτα εἰ ἀκολούθως τῷ ἑαυτῶν τρόπῳ ἤχασι τὴν θυγατέρα καὶ μὴ ἡττημένοι εἰσὶν καὶ ἀποκεκλικότες ἀπὸ τοῦ συμφέροντος διὰ τὴν ἄγαν φιλοστοργίαν· καὶ τοῦτο ποικίλως ἐζητακέναι καὶ διὰ δούλων καὶ <δι> ἑλευθέρων τῶν τε ἔνδοθεν καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν καὶ διὰ γειτόνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰσιόντων εἴσω διὰ φίλων ἐπιπλοκάς ἐστιατικὰς ἢ ἄλλως, μαγειρῶν ἢ δημιουργῶν ἢ ἀκαστριῶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν καὶ τεχνιτίδων. καὶ λίαν γὰρ προχειρότερον τοὺς τοιοῦτους εἰσάγουσιν καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν ἀξίαν μεγάλα πράγματα καὶ πίστιν ἐγχειρίζουσιν.

b. To the traditional view that having a wife is a handicap he opposes the following argument. Fr. 63, SVF III p. 256, 17:

‘Ομοιότατον γάρ ἐστιν ὡς εἴ τις μίαν ἔχων χεῖρα ἑτέραν ποθὲν προσλάβοι ἢ ἓνα πόδα ἔχων ἕτερον ἀλλαχόθεν κτήσαιοτο. ὡς γὰρ οὗτος πολὺ ἂν ῥᾶον καὶ βαδίσαι οὐ θέλει κάπελάσαι καὶ προσαγάγοιτο, οὕτως ὁ γυναῖκα εἰσαγαγόμενος ῥᾶον ἀπολήψεται τὰς κατὰ τὸν βίον σωτηρίους καὶ συμφερούσας χρείας. ἀντὶ γοῦν δύο ὀφθαλμῶν χρῶνται τέσσαρσι καὶ ἀντὶ δύο χειρῶν ἑτέrais τοσαύταις, αἷς καὶ ἀθρόως πράττει ἂν <καὶ> ῥᾶον τὸ τῶν χειρῶν ἔργον. διὸ καὶ εἰ αἱ ἕτεραι κάμνοιεν, ταῖς ἑτέrais αὖ θεραπεύοιτο καὶ τὸ σύνολον δύο γεγονώς ἀνθ’ ἑνὸς μᾶλλον ἂν ἐν τῷ βίῳ κατορθοίη. διόπερ τὸν νομίζοντα τὴν εἰσοδὸν τῆς γυναικὸς καταβαρύνειν τὸν βίον καὶ δυσκίνητον ποιεῖν ὅμοιον <οἶμαι> πᾶσχειν, ὡς εἴ τις πλείονας πόδας κωλύει προσλαβεῖν, ἢ ἐὰν πολὺ δέη βαδίξειν μὴ ἐφελκώμεθα πολλούς, ἢ τῷ πλείονας χεῖρας κτωμένῳ μέμφοιτο. ὅταν γάρ τι δέη πράττειν ἐμποδίσεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους αὐτῶν.

2—THE SO-CALLED MIDDLE STOA: (1) PANAETIUS

Panaetius 1148—a. Suidas (Fr. 2 V. Str.):

Παναίτιος· ὁ νεώτερος, Νικαγόρου, Ῥόδιος, φιλόσοφος Στωϊκός, Διογένης γνῶριμος, ὃς καθηγήσατο καὶ Σικηπείωνος τοῦ ἐπικληθέντος Ἀφρικανοῦ μετὰ Πολύβιον Μεγαλοπολίτην. ἐτελεύτησε δ’ ἐν Ἀθήναις.

His ancestors b. Strabo XIV 2, 13 (Fr. 3 V. Str.):

Ἄνδρες δ’ ἐγένοντο (sc. ἐν Ῥόδῳ) μνήμης ἄξιοι πολλοὶ στρατηλάται τε καὶ ἀθληταί, ὧν εἰσι καὶ οἱ Παναιτίου τοῦ φιλοσόφου πρόγονοι.

His intimacy with Scipio and Laelius c. Cic., *De fin.* IV 9, 23 (Fr. 10 V. Str.):

Homo in primis ingenuus et gravis, dignus illa familiaritate Scipionis et Laelii, Panaetius. —

His works 1149—P. was a learned man, interested in history, mathematics and natural science, but he chiefly concentrated on metaphysical questions (he wrote a famous work Π. προνοίας, cited by Cic., *Ep. ad Att.* XIII 8) and was especially concerned with a “philosophy of life” for those who, by birth and talents, were called to take a leading position in the state.

a. We are informed of the contents of Panaetius’ work Π. τοῦ καθήκοντος by Cicero, *De off.* III 2, 7:

Panaetius igitur, qui sine controversia de officiis accuratissime disputavit, quemque nos correctione quadam adhibita potissimum secuti

sumus, tribus generibus propositis, in quibus deliberare homines et consultare de officio solerent, uno, cum dubitarent, honestumne id esset, de quo ageretur, an turpe, altero, utilene esset an inutile, tertio, si id, quod speciem haberet honesti, pugnaret cum eo, quod utile videretur, quo modo ea discerni oporteret, de duobus generibus primis tribus libris explicavit, de tertio autem genere deinceps se scripsit dicturum nec exsolvit id, quod promiserat.

b. That it was a very famous work in Antiquity may be inferred from the following passage, *ib.* § 10:

Accedit eodem testis locuples Posidonius, qui etiam scribit in quadam epistula P. Rutilium Rufum dicere solere, qui Panaetium audierat, ut nemo pictor esset inventus, qui in Coa Venere eam partem, quam Apelles inchoatam reliquisset, absolveret (oris enim pulchritudo reliqui corporis imitandi spem auferebat), sic ea, quae Panaetius praetermisisset et non perfecisset, propter eorum, quae perfecisset, praestantiam neminem persecutum.

c. His work Π. αἰρέσεων, cited by Diog. Laërt. II 87, was a history Π. αἰρέσεων of philosophy. In this work he seems to have emphasized the Socratical character of Stoicism by tracing it back to Socrates as the father of ethical philosophy.

Hence, the philosopher Iccius, when about to join a military expedition to Arabia Felix, is addressed by Horatius, *Carm.* I 29, in these words:

—Quis neget arduis
 pronos relabi posse rivos
 montibus et Tiberim reverti,
 cum tu coemptos undique nobilis
 libros Panaeti Socraticam et domum
 mutare loricis Hiberis,
 pollicitus meliora, tendis?

Cp. Diog. Laërt. I 18, where "the ten ethical Schools" are, as such, traced back to Socrates. Pohlenz, *Stoa* II p. 98, assumes that the passage is borrowed from Panaetius, Π. αἰρέσεων.

1150—On the whole, it can be said that P. *humanized* Stoicism by omitting many of its former characteristics: he was not interested in logical subtleties, nor in casuistic, rejected mantic and astrology, ἀπάθεια and the rationalistic view of man; he even abandoned the autarky of virtue, and was as much interested in Plato and Aristotle and their Schools as in Stoic philosophers.

**General
 character
 of his
 philosophy**

a. Cic., *De fin.* IV 28, 79:

Quam illorum (sc. Stoicorum) tristitiam atque asperitatem fugiens

Panaetius nec acerbiter sententiarum nec disserendi spinas probavit fuitque in altero genere mitior, in altero illustrior semperque habuit in ore Platonem, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, Theophrastum, Dicaearchum, ut ipsius scripta declarant.

b. Cp. *Stoic. Index Herc.* col. 61 (Fr. 57 V. Str.):

Ἦν γὰρ ἰσχυρῶς φιλοπλάτων καὶ φιλοαριστοτέλης, ἀ[λλὰ] (κ)αὶ παρε[ν-
έδ]ω[κ]ε τ(ῶ)ν Ζηνων[εῖω]ν [τι διὰ τῇ]ν Ἀκαδημίαν [καὶ τὸν Περτ](π)ατον.

Phil. of
nature

1151—Like Posidonius after him, P. started from the philosophy of nature.

a. Diog. Laërt. VII 41:

Παναίτιος δὲ καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἀπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν ἄρχονται.

Eternity of
the cosmos

b. He rejected *ekpyrosis* and held the eternity of the cosmos. Philo, *De aetern. mundi* 76 (Fr. 65 V. Str.):

Βοηθὸς γοῦν ὁ Σιδώνιος καὶ Παναίτιος, ἄνδρες ἐν τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς δόγμασιν ἰσχυρότερες, ἅτε θεόληπτοι, τὰς ἐκπυρώσεις καὶ παλιγγενεσίας καταλιπόντες πρὸς ὁσιώτερον δόγμα τὸ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς ἡτομόλησαν.

c. In Cic., *De n.d.* II 38, 98, -40, 103 we find a passage where the beauty and harmony of nature (not only of the heavens) are adduced as an argument for Providence. Pohlenz, *St.* I 195, II 99, attributes the passage to P., as was done by Heinemann, *Posid.* II 183 ff. This is, however, purely conjectural. Cp. Festugière, *Le dieu cosmique*, p. 416 ff. K. Reinhardt attributed the same passage with the following chapters to Posidonius.

Rejection
of mantic

1152—P. rejected mantic and popular religion.

a. Epiphanius, *De fide* 9, 45 (Fr. 68 V. Str.):

Παναίτιος ὁ Ῥόδιος τὸν κόσμον ἔλεγεν ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀγήρω, καὶ τῆς μαντείας κατ' οὐδὲν ἐπεστρέφετο, καὶ τὰ περὶ θεῶν λεγόμενα ἀνήρει. ἔλεγε γὰρ φλήναφον εἶναι τὸν περὶ θεοῦ λόγον.

b. Diog. Laërt. VII 149 (Fr. 73 V. Str.):

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Παναίτιος ἀνυπόστατον αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν μαντικὴν) φησιν.

Arguments
against
astrology

1153—According to Cicero, *De div.* II ch. 42 ff., P. rejected the predictions of astrology. Even Diogenes, he says, made certain restrictions here.

a. *De div.* II 43, 90:

Etenim geminorum formas esse similis, vitam atque fortunam ple-

rumque disparem. Procles et Eurysthenes Lacedaemoniorum reges gemini fratres fuerunt. at ii nec totidem annos vixerunt, anno enim Procli vita brevior fuit, multumque is fratri rerum gestarum gloria praestitit.

b. P.'s strongest argument is that climatic influences must be more important than sidereal ones.

Ib., 44, 93 - 45, 94; 46, 96 f.:

(—necesse est ortus occasusque siderum non fieri eodem tempore apud omnes.)

Quodsi eorum vi caelum modo hoc modo illo modo temperatur, qui potest eadem vis esse nascentium, cum caeli tanta sit dissimilitudo? in his locis quae nos incolimus post solstitium Canicula exoritur et quidem aliquot diebus, at apud Troglodytas, ut scribitur, ante solstitium, ut, si iam concedamus aliquid vim caelestem ad eos qui in terra gignuntur pertinere, confitendum sit illis eos, qui nascuntur eodem tempore, posse in dissimilis incidere naturas propter caeli dissimilitudinem; quod minime illis placet; volunt enim illi omnis eodem tempore ortos qui ubique sint nati eadem condicione nasci. Sed quae tanta dementia est, ut in maxumis motibus mutationibusque caeli nihil intersit qui ventus, qui imber, quae tempestas ubique sit? quarum rerum in proxumis locis tantae dissimilitudines saepe sint, ut alia Tusculi alia Romae eveniat saepe tempestas; quod qui navigant maxume animadvertunt, cum in flectendis promunturiis ventorum mutationes maxumas saepe sentiant — haec igitur cum sit tum serenitas tum perturbatio caeli, estne sanorum hominum hoc ad nascentium ortus pertinere non dicere, quod non certe pertinet, illud nescio quid tenue, quod sentiri nullo modo, intellegi autem vix potest, quae a luna ceterisque sideribus caeli temperatio fiat, dicere ad puerorum ortus pertinere? —

Quid? Dissimilitudo locorum nonne dissimilis hominum procreationes habet? quas quidem percurrere oratione facile est, quid inter Indos et Persas, Aethiopas <et> Syros differat corporibus animis, ut incredibilis varietas dissimilitudoque sit. ex quo intellegitur plus terrarum situs quam lunae tactus ad nascendum valere.

1154—P. also denied the immortality of the soul, and this for two reasons.

**Arguments
against im-
mortality**

Cic., *Tusc. disp.* I 32, 79, cited above, nr. 958.

1155—P. opposes Chrysippus' psychological monism.

He admits
an irratio-
nal part in
the soul

a. Cic., *De off.* I 28, 101:

Duplex est enim vis animorum atque naturae; una pars in adpetitu posita est, quae est ὁρμή Graece, quae hominem huc et illuc rapit, altera in ratione, quae docet et explanat, quid faciendum fugiendumve sit.

b. Ib., I 36, 132:

Motus autem animorum duplices sunt, alteri cogitationis, alteri adpetitus; cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur, appetitus impellit ad agendum. Curandum est igitur, ut cogitatione ad res quam optimas utamur, adpetitum rationi oboedientem praebeamus.

New inter-
pretation
of the telos
formula

1156—He took Zeno's telos formula in such a sense, that *natural aspirations* (ἀφορμαί) acquire a very positive sense.

Clem. Alex., *Strom.* II 21 (Fr. 96 V. Str.):

Πρὸς τοῦτοις ἐτι Παναίτιος τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὰς δεδομένας ἡμῖν ἐκ φύσεως ἀφορμὰς τέλος ἀπεφύνατο.

Thus the classical Stoic rule of life was interpreted in a decidedly individual sense. Cp. what was noticed under 1005d. See further 1163.

Virtues
founded on
natural
strivings

1157—P. finds four natural aspirations or "strivings" in man, on which he founds the four cardinal virtues.

Cic., *De off.* I 4, 12-14:

Having spoken of the instinct of selfpreservation which, in its lower form, is common to all living beings, the author continues as follows.

Eademque natura vi rationis hominem conciliat homini et ad orationis et ad vitae societatem ingeneratque in primis praecipuum quendam amorem in eos, qui procreati sunt, impellitque, ut hominum coetus et celebrationes et esse et a se obiri velit ob easque causas studeat parare ea, quae suppedient ad cultum et ad victum, nec sibi soli, sed coniugi, liberis ceterisque, quos caros habeat tuerique debeat; quae cura exsuscitat etiam animos et maiores ad rem gerendam facit. In primisque hominis est propria veri inquisitio atque investigatio. Itaque cum sumus necessariis negotiis curisque vacui, tum avemus aliquid videre, audire, addiscere cognitionemque rerum aut occultarum aut admirabilium ad beate vivendum necessariam ducimus. Ex quo intellegitur, quod verum, simplex sincerumque sit, id esse naturae hominis aptissimum. Huic veri videndi cupiditati adiuncta est adpetitio quaedam principatus, ut nemini parere animus bene informatus a natura velit nisi praecipienti

aut docenti aut utilitatis causa iuste et legitime imperanti; ex quo magnitudo animi existit humanarumque rerum contemptio. Nec vero illa parva vis naturae est rationisque, quod unum hoc animal sentit, quid sit ordo, quid sit quod deceat, in factis dictisque qui modus. Itaque eorum ipsorum, quae aspectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit; quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis factisque conservandam putat cavetque, ne quid indecore effeminateve faciat, tum in omnibus et opinionibus et factis ne quid libidinose aut faciat aut cogitet. Quibus ex rebus conflatur et efficitur id, quod quaerimus, honestum, quod, etiamsi nobilitatum non sit, tamen honestum est, quodque vere dicimus, etiamsi a nullo laudetur, natura esse laudabile.

1158—Thus, the *honestum* is displayed in four different fields, the first of which consists in the knowledge of truth.

The
intellectual
virtue

Cic., *De off.* I 6, 18-19:

Ex quattuor autem locis, in quos honesti naturam vimque divisimus, primus ille, qui in veri cognitione consistit, maxime naturam attingit humanam. Omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et scientiae cupiditatem, in qua excellere pulchrum putamus, labi autem, errare, nescire, decipi et malum et turpe ducimus. In hoc genere et naturali et honesto duo vitia vitanda sunt, unum, ne incognita pro cognitis habeamus iisque temere adsentiamur; quod vitium effugere qui volet (omnes autem velle debent), adhibebit ad considerandas res et tempus et diligentiam. Alterum est vitium, quod quidam nimis magnum studium multamque operam in res obscuras atque difficiles conferunt easdemque non necessarias.

1159—Next comes social virtue.

Social virtue:
justice and
generosity

a. *Ib.*, I 7, 20:

De tribus autem reliquis latissime patet ea ratio, qua societas hominum inter ipsos et vitae quasi communitas continetur. Cuius partes sunt duae, iustitia, in qua virtutis splendor est maximus, ex qua viri boni nominantur, et huic coniuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet. Sed iustitiae primum munus est, ut ne cui quis noceat nisi lacessitus iniuria, deinde ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatis ut suis.

As may be seen in this definition and in several other passages of the same work, P. accepted the legitimacy of private property as a basic principle of human society (*De off.* I 7, 21). Violating it is a sin against humanity (III 5, 21; III 6, 30). Cp. 1162b and 1168.

b. In fact, P.'s social virtue did not stop at the "ne cui quis noceat, nisi lacessitus iniuria". First, he exhorts to moderation towards those who have wronged us (*De off.* I 11, 33) and extends moral obligations to our enemies (cp. our nrs. 1069b and 1070, on the natural community of mankind, and on international law founded on this principle; also 1000b, on the practical consequences of *oikeiosis*). Secondly his social virtue is not only negative in character, but means an active kindness towards man in general and towards special groups of persons in particular. This is the doctrine of *beneficentia* and *liberalitas*, expounded in *De off.* I, ch. 14-18.

Cicero, following P., uses also the term *humanitas*, which includes both the Greek *παιδεία* and *φιλανθρωπία* (kindness towards man). A word will be said on it under 1162.

Fortitudo

1160—The virtue corresponding to the classical *ἀνδρεία* is developed by P. in the direction of Aristotle's *μεγαλοψυχία*. It is not called first, but *splendidissimum*, and is worked by, or even consists in, an *animus magnus elatusque humanasque res despiciens*.

a. Cic., *De off.* I 20, 66-67:

Omnino fortis animus et magnus duabus rebus maxime cernitur, quarum una in rerum externarum despicientia ponitur, cum persuasum sit nihil hominem, nisi quod honestum decorumque sit, aut admirari aut optare aut expetere oportere nullique neque homini neque perturbationi animi nec fortunae succumbere. Altera est res, ut, cum ita sis adfectus animo, ut supra dixi, res geras magnas illas quidem et maxime utiles, sed et vehementer arduas plenasque laborum et periculorum cum vitae, tum multarum rerum, quae ad vitam pertinent. Harum rerum duarum splendor omnis, amplitudo, addo etiam utilitatem, in posteriore est, causa autem et ratio efficiens magnos viros in priore.

b. Under this heading P. probably gave some directions for state-government. He warned against partisanship (citing Plato) and against ambition, and exhorted to gentleness towards political enemies and to humility in favourable conditions of life.

Cic., *De off.* I 26, 90:

Atque etiam in rebus prosperis et ad voluntatem nostram fluentibus superbiam magnopere, fastidium arrogantiamque fugiamus. Nam ut adversas res, sic secundas immoderate ferre levitatis est, praeclaraque est aequabilitas in omni vita et idem semper vultus eademque frons, ut de Socrate idemque de C. Laelio accepimus. —

**Warning
against
arrogance**

Panaetius quidem Africanum, auditorem et familiarem suum, solitum ait dicere: "ut equos propter crebras contentiones proeliorum ferocitate exultantes domitoribus tradere soleant, ut iis facilioribus possint uti, sic homines secundis rebus effrenatos sibi praevidentes tamquam in gyrum rationis et doctrinae duci oportere, ut perspicerent rerum humanarum inbecillitatem varietatemque fortunae.

1161—In the fourth kind, which is concerned with moderation and self-control, is included what is called by Cicero the *decorum* (Gr. τὸ πρέπον). **Temperantia et modestia**

a. Cic., *De off.* I 27, 93-94; 96:

Sequitur, ut de una reliqua parte honestatis dicendum sit, in qua verecundia et quasi quidam ornatus vitae, temperantia et modestia omnisque sedatio perturbationum animi et rerum modus cernitur. Hoc loco continetur id, quod dici Latine decorum potest; Graece enim πρέπον dicitur. Huius vis ea est, ut ab honesto non queat separari; nam et quod decet, honestum est, et quod honestum est, decet. Qualis autem differentia sit honesti et decori, facilius intellegi quam explanari potest. Quidquid est enim quod deceat, id tum apparet, cum antegressa est honestas. Itaque non solum in hac parte honestatis, de qua hoc loco disserendum est, sed etiam in tribus superioribus quid deceat apparet.—

Est autem eius descriptio duplex; nam et generale quoddam decorum intellegimus, quod in omni honestate versatur, et aliud huic subiectum, quod pertinet ad singulas partes honestatis. Atque illud superius sic fere definiri solet: decorum id esse, quod consentaneum sit hominis excellentiae in eo, in quo natura eius a reliquis animantibus differat. Quae autem pars subiecta generi est, eam sic definiunt, ut id decorum velint esse, quod ita naturae consentaneum sit, ut in eo moderatio et temperantia appareat cum specie quadam liberali.

b. It completes justice as a social virtue. Ib. 28, 99:

Adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia adversus homines et optimi cuiusque et reliquorum.¹ —

**Reverence
towards
men**

¹ Here follows the sentence on the value of good fame, cited above, nr. 1146.

Est autem quod differat in hominum ratione habenda inter iustitiam et verecundiam. Iustitiae partes sunt non violare homines, verecundiae non offendere; in quo maxime vis perspicitur decori.

Humanity
and
humanitas

1162—Of P. is certainly the doctrine of degrees of social relationship, and of the natural bond that binds together man and man.

a. Cic., *De off.* I 16, 50-51; 17, 53:

Est enim primum (principium communitatis), quod cernitur in universi generis humani societate. Eius autem vinculum est ratio et oratio, quae docendo, discendo, communicando, disceptando, iudicando conciliat inter se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate. Neque ulla re longius absumus a natura ferarum, in quibus inesse fortitudinem saepe dicimus, ut in equis, in leonibus, iustitiam, aequitatem, bonitatem non dicimus; sunt enim rationis et orationis expertes. Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter omnes, societas haec est. In qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum usum natura genuit, est servanda communitas. —

Gradus autem plures sunt societatis hominum. Ut enim ab illa infinita discedatur, propior est eiusdem gentis, nationis, linguae, qua maxime homines coniunguntur. Interius etiam est eiusdem esse civitatis; multa enim sunt civibus inter se communia, forum, fana, porticus, viae, leges, iura, iudicia, suffragia, consuetudines praeterea et familiaritates multisque cum multis res rationesque contractae. Artior vero colligatio est societatis propinquorum; ab illa enim immensa societate humani generis in exiguum angustumque concluditur.

The idea of *humanity* as a whole is found repeatedly in *De off.* Some passages have been cited under **1000b** and **1096b**. Since certain moral obligations are deduced from it, we find ourselves here in the sphere of that *humanitas* which, through the medium of Cicero, became so famous in later history.

b. What is "human" and what is "inhuman".

What is
„human“

Cic., *De off.* III 6, 30; 10, 41; 11, 47; 23, 89:

Si quid ab homine ad nullam partem utili utilitatis tuae causa detraheris, inhumane feceris contraque naturae legem. —

(41) Omisit hic (sc. Romulus patricida) et pietatem et humanitatem. —

(47) Usu vero urbis prohibere peregrinos sane inhumanum est.

(89) (Hecaton in sexto libro de officiis) ad extremum utilitate, ut putat, officium dirigit magis quam humanitate.

1163—P. distinguished the generic nature of man from the individual nature. By the latter notion he formally discovered the concept of personality. It took an important place in his philosophy. The concept
of
personality

Cic., *De off.* I 30, 107; 31, 110-112, 114:

Intellegendum etiam est duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus rationis praestantiaeque eius, qua antecellimus bestiis, a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur, et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii exquiritur, altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa. Ut enim in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt (alios videmus velocitate ad cursum, alios viribus ad luctandum valere, itemque in formis aliis dignitatem inesse, aliis venustatem), sic in animis existunt maiores etiam varietates. — (110) Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius decorum illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur. Sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut, etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam sequi, quod adsequi non queas. Ex quo magis emergit, quale sit decorum illud, ideo quia nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante et repugnante natura. Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas universae vitae, tum singularium actionum, quam conservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam. — (112) Atque haec differentia naturarum tantam habet vim, ut non numquam mortem sibi ipse consciscere alius debeat, alius in eadem causa non debeat. Num enim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri, qui se in Africa Caesari tradiderunt? Atqui ceteris forsitan vitio datum esset, si se interemissent, propterea quod lenior eorum vita et mores fuerant faciliores, Catoni cum incredibilem tribuisset natura gravitatem eamque ipse perpetua constantia roboravisset semperque in proposito susceptoque consilio permansisset, moriendum potius quam tyranni vultus aspiciendus fuit. — (114) Suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur habere prudentiae.

1164—In his *De off.* III, Cicero followed P. in holding, first, that the *utile* should not be compared with the *honestum*. Honestum
and utile

a. *De off.* III 4, 18:

Qui autem omnia metiuntur emolumentis et commodis neque ea volunt praeponderari honestate, ii solent in deliberando honestum cum eo, quod utile putant, comparare, boni viri non solent. Itaque existimo Panaetium, cum dixerit homines solere in hac comparatione dubitare, hoc ipsum sensisse quod dixerit, "solere" modo, non etiam "oportere". Etenim non modo pluris putare quod utile videatur quam quod honestum sit, sed etiam haec inter se comparare et in his addubitare turpissimum est.

b. Secondly, that there is not any real conflict between the two.

De off. III 7, 34-8, 35:

Ac primum in hoc Panaetius defendendus est, quod non utilia cum honestis pugnare aliquando posse dixerit (neque enim ei fas erat), sed ea, quae viderentur utilia. Nihil vero utile, quod non idem honestum, nihil honestum, quod non idem utile sit, saepe testatur negatque ullam pestem maiorem in vitam hominum invasisse quam eorum opinionem, qui ista distraxerint. Itaque, non ut aliquando anteponeremus utilia honestis, sed ut ea sine errore diiudicaremus, si quando incidissent, induxit eam, quae videretur esse, non quae esset, repugnantiam.

The autarchy
of virtue
abandoned

1165—The *πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν* taxed as real values.

a. Diog. Laërt. VII 128 (Fr. 110 V. Str.):

Ὁ μέντοι Παναίτιος καὶ Ποσειδώνιος οὐκ αὐτάρκη λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ χρεῖαν εἶναι φασὶ καὶ ὑγιείας καὶ χορηγίας καὶ ἰσχύος.

Not an
ascetic
style of life

b. In fact, P. was not an ascetic, nor did he teach his aristocratic pupils an ascetic style of life. E.g., in *De off.* I 39, 138 f., it is said that a man of rank and station should have a spacious and imposing house, according to his dignity.

Rejection of
ἀπάθεια

1166—Rejection of *ἀπάθεια* and *ἀναλγησία*.

a. Gellius, *N.A.* XII 5 (Fr. 111 V. Str.):

„*Ἀναλγησία* enim atque *ἀπάθεια* non meo tantum," inquit, „sed quorundam etiam ex eadem porticu prudentiorum hominum, sicuti iudicio Panaetii, gravis atque docti viri, improbata abiectaue est."

Cp. Cic., *De off.* I 29, 103: Ex quibus intellegitur, . . . *appetitus omnes contrahendos sedandosque esse.*

Now this was exactly what the Academics and Peripatetics held, as opposed to the Stoic tenets. Our nr. 1059a, b. Cp. Posidonius, *infra*, nr. 1187.

b. Sextus, *Adv. math.* XI (= *Ag. the Eth.*) 73 (Fr. 112 V. Str.): **Pleasure**

Παναίτιος δὲ (φησὶν ἡδονὴν) τινὰ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν, τινὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν.

Cp. Cic., *De off.* I 30, 105-106, where it is said—and certainly P. is the author—that sensual pleasure is unworthy of the dignity of man, and that a sober life is in accordance with the superiority and dignity of our nature.

c. He never said that pain is not an evil, but, for the rest, took a **Pain** “Stoic” attitude towards it as much as possible.

Cic., *De fin.* IV 9, 23:

Homo in primis ingenuus et gravis, dignus illa familiaritate Scipionis et Laelii, Panaetius, cum ad Q. Tuberone de dolore patiendo scriberet, quod esse caput debebat, si probari posset, nusquam posuit non esse malum dolorem, sed quid esset et quale, quantumque in eo inesset alieni, deinde quae ratio esset perferendi.

1167—Seneca, *Ep.* XIX 7, 5 (Fr. 114 V. Str.):

Love

Eleganter mihi videtur Panaetius respondisse adulescentulo cuidam quaerenti, an sapiens amaturus esset. de sapiente, inquit, videbimus: mihi et tibi, qui adhuc a sapiente longe absumus, non est committendum, ut incidamus in rem commotam, inpotentem, alteri emancipatam, vilem sibi. sive enim non respuit, humanitate eius irritamur, sive contempsit, superbia accendimur. aequae facilitas amoris quam difficultas nocet: facilitate capimur, cum difficultate certamus. itaque conscii nobis imbecillitatis nostrae quiescamus. nec vino infirmum animum committamus nec formae nec adulationi nec ullis rebus blande trahentibus.

1168—On the whole, P.’s moral philosophy displays an essentially aristocratic character. This appears first in his attitude towards private property and what he declares to be the first duty of the statesman and the essential function of the state. **Aristocratic character of P.’s moral philosophy**

a. Cic., *De off.* III 5, 21:

Private property

Detrahare igitur alteri aliquid et hominem hominis incommodo suum commodum augere magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam dolor, quam cetera, quae possunt aut corpori accidere aut rebus externis. Nam principio tollit convictum humanum et societatem.

Since Cicero wrote the third book *De off.* “suo marte”, these words cannot be regarded as a literal quotation of P.; they were, however, certainly an expression of his conviction.

**The
statesman's
first care**

b. Cic., *De off.* II 21, 73:

In primis autem videndum erit ei, qui rem publicam administrabit, ut suum quisque teneat neque de bonis privatorum publice deminutio fiat. — Hanc enim ob causam maxime, ut sua tenerentur, res publicae civitatesque constitutae sunt.

**Roman
imperialism
justified**

1169—P. did not think that his principles of humanity came into conflict with Roman imperialism. On the contrary, he thinks imperialism can and must be justified by the humanity of the rulers. Hence his directions about "humanity" in war, and mildness towards the vanquished.

a. Cic., *De off.* I 11, 34-35:

Atque in re publica maxime conservanda sunt iura belli. Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceputationem, alterum per vim, cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum, confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore. Quare suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob eam causam, ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur, parta autem victoria conservandi ii, qui non crudeles in bello, non inmanes fuerunt. — Et cum iis, quos vi deviceris, consulendum est, tum ii, qui armis posititis ad imperatorum fidem confugient, quamvis murum aries percusserit, recipiendi.

Cp. also III, 11, 46 f.

Thus P. defended Roman justice against Carneades' famous attack. And this was, certainly, one of the reasons of his great influence in Rome.

b. An ironical application of P.'s principles—ironical, not to the Roman author, evidently, but to modern appreciation—may be seen in Cicero's praise of Aemilius Paullus who, by bringing all the wealth of Macedonia into the treasury of Rome, provided an ideal solution of all tax problems.

De off. II 22, 76:

Laudat Africanum Panaetius, quod fuerit abstinens. Quidni laudet? Sed in illo alia maiora; laus abstinentiae non hominis est solum, sed etiam temporum illorum. Omni Macedonum gaza, quae fuit maxima, potitus Paulus tantum in aerarium pecuniae invexit, ut unius imperatoris praeda finem attulerit tributorum. At hic nihil domum suam intulit praeter memoriam nominis sempiternam.

3—THE SO-CALLED MIDDLE STOA: (2) POSIDONIUS

1170—a. Suidas:

Life

Ποσειδώνιος· Ἀπαμεύς ἐκ Συρίας ἢ Ῥόδιος.¹ φιλόσοφος Στωϊκός, ὃς ἐπεκλήθη Ἀθλητής. σχόλην δ' ἔσχεν ἐν Ῥόδῳ, διάδοχος γεγωνῶς καὶ μαθητῆς Παναιτίου. ἤλθε δὲ καὶ εἰς Ῥώμην ἐπὶ Μάρκου Μαρκέλλου.² ἔγραψε πόλλα.

b. Strabo, XIV 2, 13:

Ποσειδώνιος δ' ἐπολιτεύσατο μὲν ἐν Ῥόδῳ καὶ ἐσοφίστευσεν, ἦν δ' Ἀπαμεύς ἐκ τῆς Συρίας.

c. Strabo XVI 2, 10:

The fame of
his learning

Ἐντεῦθεν (sc. ἐξ Ἀπαμείας) δ' ἐστὶ Ποσειδώνιος ὁ Στωϊκός, ἀνὴρ τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς φιλοσόφων πολυμαθέστατος.

Cicero mentions him with pride as his master and friend: *De n.d.* I 3, 6.

1171—a. In 86 he was an ambassador to Rome and met with Marius, then an old and sick man.

Ambassador
to Rome

Plut., *Marius* 45:

Having described Marius's state of mind as that of an overtired man, full of fears and anguish, he concludes:

Τέλος δὲ . . . εἰς νόσον κατηνέχθη πλευρῖτιν, ὥς ἱστορεῖ Ποσειδώνιος ὁ φιλόσοφος, αὐτὸς ἐσελθεῖν καὶ διαλεχθῆναι περὶ ὧν ἐπρέσβευεν ἤδη νοσοῦντι φάσκων αὐτῷ.

b. Pompeius visited him on Rhodes in going to and coming from the war with Mithradates.

Visit of
Pompeius

Cic., *Tusc. disp.* II 25, 61:

Solebat narrare Pompeius, se, cum Rhodum venisset decedens ex Syria, audire voluisse Posidonium; sed cum audisset eum graviter esse aegrum, quod vehementer eius artus laborarent, voluisse tamen nobilissimum philosophum visere: quem ut vidisset et salutavisset honorificisque verbis prosecutus esset molesteque se dixisset ferre, quod eum non posset audire, at ille: "tu vero", inquit, "potes, nec committam, ut dolor corporis efficiat, ut frustra tantus vir ad me venerit." Itaque narrabat eum graviter et copiose de hoc ipso, nihil esse bonum nisi quod esset

¹ More accurately: he was born at Apameia in Syria and had his school on Rhodes. Cp. 1170b and 1171b.

² Probably in 51 B.C., when the pact between Rome and Rhodes was renewed.

honestum, cubantem disputavisse, cumque quasi faces ei doloris admo-verentur, saepe dixisse: "nihil agis, dolor! quamvis sis molestus, num-quam te esse confitebor malum."

Cp. Strabo XI 1, 6 and Plut., *Pomp.* 42 (F.Gr.Hist. II, T 8).

**The histori-
an and the
geographer**

1172—He wrote historical and geographical-ethnological works, fre-quently cited by Strabo, Diodorus and Athenaeus.

a. [Lucian.], *Macrob.* 20 (F. Gr. Hist. II, T 4):

Ποσειδώνιος ὁ Ἀπαμεύς τῆς Συρίας, νόμῳ δὲ Ῥόδιος, φιλόσοφος τε ἄμα καὶ ἱστορίας συγγραφεύς —

b. Athen. IV 36, p. 151 E (F. Gr. Hist. II, T 12a):

Ποσειδώνιος δ' ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις, αἷς συνέθηκεν οὐκ ἄλλοτρῶς ἥς προήρητο φιλοσοφίας, πολλὰ παρὰ πολλοῖς ἔθιμα καὶ νόμιμα ἀναγράφων —

c. Physical geography took an important place in his works. Strabo VIII 1, 1 (F. Gr. Hist. II, T 14):

Οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ κοινῇ τῆς ἱστορίας γραφῇ χωρὶς ἀποδείξαντες τὴν τῶν ἡπείρων τοπογραφίαν, καθάπερ Ἐφορός τε ἐποίησε καὶ Πολύβιος, ἄλλοι δ' εἰς τὸν φυσικὸν τόπον καὶ τὸν μαθηματικὸν προσέλαβόν τινα καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καθάπερ Ποσειδωνίος τε καὶ Ἰππαρχος.

d. Cp. Strabo II 3, 8 (F. Gr. Hist. II, T 15b):

Πολὺ γάρ ἐστι τὸ αἰτιολογικὸν παρὰ αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ ἀριστοτελιζόν.

Fragments in *F.Gr.Hist.* II A, pp. 225-317. Pohlenz calls him the greatest scientific explorer of the Ancient world.

1173—In his work Π. Ὁκεανοῦ, frequently cited by Strabo, he develops his theory of the form of the earth, the five zones and the climates.

**The form of
the earth**

a. Strabo II 2, 1-3 (F. Gr. Hist. II, F 28):

Ἔστιν οὖν τι τῶν πρὸς γεωγραφίαν οἰκείων τὸ τὴν γῆν ὅλην ὑποθέσθαι σφαιροειδῇ, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν κόσμον, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα παραδέξασθαι τὰ ἀκόλουθα τῇ ὑποθέσει ταύτῃ. τούτων δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ πεντάζωνον αὐτὴν εἶναι. — (3) αὐτὸς δὲ διαιρῶν εἰς τὰς ζώνας πέντε μὲν φησιν εἶναι χρησίμους πρὸς τὰ οὐράνια. τούτων δὲ περισκίους δύο τὰς ὑπὸ τοῖς πόλοις μέχρι τῶν ἐχόντων τοὺς τροπικοὺς ἄρκτικούς· ἑτεροσκίους δὲ τὰς ἐφεξῆς ταύταις δύο μέχρι τῶν ὑπὸ τροπικοῖς οἰκούντων, ἀμφίσκιον δὲ τὴν μεταξὺ τῶν τροπικῶν.

**The five
zones**

b. The terms are explained in II 5, 43 (F. Gr. Hist. II, F 76):

Ἀμφίσκιοι μὲν, ὅσοι κατὰ μέσον ἡμέρας τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ τάδε πιπτούσας ἔχουσι τὰς σκιάς, ὅταν ὁ ἥλιος ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας τῷ γνώμονι προσπίπτῃ τῷ ὀρθῷ πρὸς τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐπίπεδον, τοτὲ δ' εἰς τοῦναντίον, ὅταν ὁ ἥλιος εἰς τοῦναντίον περιστῇ. τοῦτο δὲ συμβέβηκε μόνους τοῖς μεταξὺ τῶν τροπικῶν οἰκοῦσιν. ἑτερόσκιοι δ' ὅσοις ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν ἄρκτον αἰεὶ πίπτουσιν, ὥσπερ ἡμῖν, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰ νότια, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἐτέρᾳ εὐκράτῳ ζώνῃ οἰκοῦσι· τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει πᾶσι τοῖς ἐλάττονα ἔχουσι τοῦ τροπικοῦ τὸν ἀρκτικόν. ὅταν δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ἢ μεῖζονα, ἀρχὴ τῶν περισκιῶν ἐστὶ μέχρι τῶν οἰκούντων ὑπὸ τῷ πόλῳ.

c. He holds that the zone, called "torrid" by his predecessors, is not only inhabited, but even "well-mixed".

The "torrid" zone inhabited

Cleomedes, *De motu circ. corp. cael.* I 6, 31 f., p. 56 Ziegler (F. Gr. Hist. II, F 78):

Καὶ πέντε ζώνας εἶναι τῆς γῆς τῶν εὐδοκίμων φυσικῶν ἀποφνημαμένων, αὐτὸς τὴν ὑπ' ἐκείνων διακεκαῦσθαι λεγομένην οἰκουμένην καὶ εὐκρατον εἶναι ἀπεφῆνατο. "ὅπου γάρ", φησιν, "ἐπὶ πλεόν τοῦ ἡλίου περὶ τοὺς τροπικοὺς διατρίβοντος, οὐκ ἔστιν αὐόκητα τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ τὰ ἔτι τούτων ἐνδοτέρῳ, πῶς οὐκ ἂν πολὺ πλεόν τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ ἰσημερινῷ εὐκρατα εἴη, ταχέως τῷ κύκλῳ τούτῳ καὶ προσίοντος τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ πάλιν ἴσῳ τάχει ἀφισταμένου αὐτοῦ καὶ μὴ ἐγχνονίζοντος περὶ τὸ κλίμα, καὶ μὴν διὰ παντός", φησιν, "ἴσης τῆς νυκτὸς τῇ ἡμέρᾳ οὔσης ἐνταῦθα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο σύμμετρον ἐχούσης πρὸς ἀνάψυξιν τὸ διάστημα; καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος τούτου ἐν τῷ μεσαιτάτῳ καὶ βαθυτάτῳ τῆς σκιάς ὄντος, καὶ ὄμβροι γενήσονται καὶ πνεύματα δυνάμενα ἀναψύχειν τὸν ἀέρα· ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τὴν Αἰθιοπίαν ὄμβροι συνεχεῖς καταφέρεσθαι ἱστοροῦνται περὶ τὸ θέρος καὶ μάλιστα τὴν ἀκμὴν αὐτοῦ, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ὁ Νεῖλος πληθύνει τοῦ θέρους ὑπονοεῖται.

1174—a. The inhabited world is surrounded by the ocean.

The inhabited world

Strabo II 3, 5 (F. Gr. Hist. II, 28):

Ἐκ πάντων δὴ τούτων φησὶ (sc. ὁ Ποσειδώνιος) δεῖκνυσθαι, διότι ἡ οἰκουμένη κύκλῳ περιρρεῖται τῷ ὠκεανῷ·

"οὐ γάρ μιν δεσμός περιβάλλεται ἡπείριοι, ἀλλ' ἐς ἀπειρεσίην κέχυται· τό μιν οὔτι μιάζειν."¹

b. The length of the inhabited world is judged by him to be about 70,000 stadia.

Its length

Strabo ib., 6 (F. Gr. Hist., ib.):

Ὑπονοεῖ δὲ τὸ τῆς οἰκουμένης μῆκος ἐπτὰ πού μυριάδων σταδίων ὑπάρχον

¹ The author of these verses is unknown.

ἥμισυ εἶναι τοῦ ὅλου κύκλου, καθ' ὃν εἴληπται, "ὥστε", φησίν, "ἀπὸ τῆς δύσεως εὐρὺ πλέων ἐν τοσαύταις μυριάσιν ἔλθοι ἂν εἰς Ἰνδοῦς."

The circum-
ference of
the earth

1175—His method of measuring the circumference of the earth. Cleomedes, *De motu circ.* I 10, 49-52; Ziegler p. 90 ff. (F. Gr. Hist. II, F 97):

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς γῆς πλείους μὲν γεγόνασι δόξαι παρὰ τοῖς φυσικοῖς, βελτίους δὲ τῶν ἄλλων εἰσὶν ἢ τε Ποσειδωνίου καὶ ἡ Ἐρατοσθένους· αὕτη μὲν διὰ γεωμετρικῆς ἐφόδου δεικνύουσα τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῆς, ἡ δὲ Ποσειδωνίου ἐστὶν ἀπλουστέρα. ἑκάτερος δὲ αὐτῶν ὑποθέσεις τινὰς λαμβάνων διὰ τῶν ἀκολούθων ταῖς ὑποθέσεσι ἐπὶ τὰς ἀποδείξεις παραγίνεται. ἐροῦμεν δὲ περὶ προτέρας τῆς Ποσειδωνίου.

Φησὶν οὖν ὑπὸ τῷ αὐτῷ μεσημβρινῷ¹ κεῖσθαι Ῥόδον καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρειαν. . . . καὶ τὸ διάστημα τὸ μεταξὺ τῶν πόλεων πεντακισχιλίων σταδίων εἶναι δοκεῖ· καὶ ὑποκείσθω οὕτως ἔχειν . . . ἐξῆς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἴσον ὄντα τὸν ζῳδιακὸν τοῖς μεσημβρινοῖς . . . εἰς ὀκτῶ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα καὶ ὀκτῶ μέρη διαιρεῖ, ἕκαστον τῶν δωδεκατημορίων αὐτοῦ εἰς τέσσαρα τέμνων. ἂν τοίνυν καὶ ὁ διὰ Ῥόδου καὶ Ἀλεξανδρείας μεσημβρινὸς εἰς τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ ζῳδιακῷ τεσσαράκοντα καὶ ὀκτῶ μέρη διαιρεθῇ, ἴσα γίνεται αὐτοῦ τὰ τμήματα τοῖς προειρημένοις τοῦ ζῳδιακοῦ τμήμασιν . . . τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἐξῆς φησιν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος, ὅτι ὁ Κάνωβος καλούμενος ἀστήρ λαμπρότατός ἐστι πρὸς μεσημβρίαν ὥς ἐπὶ τῷ πηδαλίῳ τῆς Ἀργεῦς. οὗτος ἐν Ἑλλάδι οὐδ' ὅλως ὀρᾷται, ὅθεν οὐδ' ὁ Ἄρατος ἐν τοῖς Φαινομένοις μιμνήσκειται αὐτοῦ. ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἀρκτικῶν ὥς πρὸς μεσημβρίαν ἰοῦσιν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ὀρᾶσθαι ἐν Ῥόδῳ λαμβάνει καὶ ὁφθεῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀρίζοντος εὐθέως κατὰ τὴν στροφὴν τοῦ κόσμου καταδύεται. ὁπότεν δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ Ῥόδου πεντακισχιλίους σταδίους διαπλεύσαντες ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ γενώμεθα, εὐρίσκεται ὁ ἀστήρ οὗτος ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ ὕψος ἀπέχων τοῦ ὀρίζοντος, ἐπειδὴν ἀκριβῶς μεσουρανήσῃ, τέταρτον ζῳδίου, ὃ ἐστὶ τεσσαρακοστὸν ὄγδοον τοῦ ζῳδιακοῦ· ἀνάγκη τοίνυν καὶ τὸ ὑπερκείμενον τοῦ αὐτοῦ μεσημβρινοῦ τμήμα τοῦ διαστήματος τοῦ μεταξὺ Ῥόδου καὶ Ἀλεξανδρείας τεσσαρακοστὸν ὄγδοον μέρος αὐτοῦ εἶναι διὰ τὸ καὶ τὸν ὀρίζοντα τῶν Ῥοδίων τοῦ ὀρίζοντος τῶν Ἀλεξανδρέων ἀφίστασθαι τεσσαρακοστὸν ὄγδοον τοῦ ζῳδιακοῦ κύκλου. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ τούτῳ τῷ τμήματι ὑποκείμενον μέρος τῆς γῆς πεντακισχιλίων σταδίων εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις τμήμασι ὑποκείμενα πεντακισχιλίων σταδίων ἐστί. καὶ οὕτως ὁ μέγιστος τῆς γῆς κύκλος εὐρίσκεται μυριάδων τεσσάρων καὶ εἴκοσιν, ἐὰν ἐῷσιν οἱ ἀπὸ Ῥόδου εἰς Ἀλεξάνδρειαν πεντακισχιλίοι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, πρὸς λόγον τοῦ διαστήματος. καὶ ἡ μὲν τοῦ Ποσειδωνίου ἔφοδος περὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν γῆν μεγέθους τοιαύτη.

¹ Meridian.

1176—As a philosopher of nature—his Φυσικός λόγος is repeatedly cited by Diog. Laërt.—Posid. appears to have been a vitalist: distinguishing, as Zeno and Chrysippus did, an active and a passive element in nature, Pos. seems to have spoken of a *vital force* (*vis vitalis*, ζωτική δύναμις), which he found everywhere in the cosmos. We find traces of the theory in several writers who, on other points too, were influenced by Posidonius¹.

Cic., *De n.d.* II 33, 83:

Vitalism

Quod si ea quae a terra stirpibus continentur arte naturae vivunt et vigent, profecto ipsa terra eadem vi continetur arte naturae, quippe quae gravidata seminibus omnia pariat et fundat ex sese, stirpes amplexa alat et augeat ipsaque alatur vicissim a superis externisque naturis; eiusdemque expirationibus et aer alitur et aether et omnia supera. Ita si terra natura tenetur et vigeat, eadem ratio in reliquo mundo est; stirpes enim terrae inhaerent, animantes autem adspiratione aeris sustententur; ipseque aer nobiscum videt nobiscum audit nobiscum sonat, nihil enim eorum sine eo fieri potest; quin etiam movetur nobiscum, quacumque enim imus, qua movemur, videtur quasi locum dare et cedere.

The term *vis vitalis* occurs in the same book, ch. 9, § 24, where he is speaking of heat as the source of life: *ex quo intellegi debet eam caloris naturam vim habere in se vitalem per omnem mundum pertinentem*. Cleanthes, who is cited, did speak of heat as a source of life, but the term *vis vitalis* does not occur in the Ancient Stoa.²

b. Seneca, *Nat. quaest.* V 5-6 (speaking of the cause of the winds):

An hoc existimas nobis quidem datas vires quibus nos moveremus, aera autem relictum inertem et inagitabilem esse, cum aqua motum suum habeat etiam ventis quiescentibus? Nec enim aliter animalia ederet; muscum quoque innasci aquis et herbosa quaedam videmus summo innatantia; est ergo aliquid in aqua vitale.

De aqua dico? ignis, qui omnia consumit, quaedam creat et, quod videri non potest simile veri, tamen verum est animalia igne generari. Habet ergo aliquam vim talem aer et ideo modo spissat se, modo expandit et purgat et alias contrahit diducit ac differt. Hoc ergo interest inter aera et ventum quod inter lacum et flumen.

¹ In the following passages the name of Posidonius is not mentioned; but there is some converging evidence for attributing the *vis vitalis* theory to him. G. Luck, *Der Akademiker Antiochos* (Noctes Romanae 7), Bern 1953, ascribes the theory to Antiochus of Ascalon, including Cic., *De n.d.* 2, 33.

² That it was used in medical literature, is shown by Crönert in *Gnomon* 1930, p. 155 ff.

c. Diodorus Siculus, who used Posid.'s historical and geographical works a great deal, speaks of the ζωτικὴ δύναμις of the sun.

Diod. II 51, 3:

Δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ συνεγγίζουσα χώρα τῇ μεσημβρίᾳ τὴν ἀφ' ἡλίου δύναμιν ζωτικωτάτην οὔσαν πολλὴν ἐμπνεῖσθαι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλῶν καὶ ποικίλων, ἔτι δὲ καλῶν ζώων φύσεις γεννᾶν.

d. Plutarchus, in the final chapter of the *De facie in orbe lunae* (945c) attributes the origin of new souls to the vital force of the moon:

Χρόνῳ δὲ κάκεινας¹ κατεδέξατο εἰς αὐτὴν ἡ σελήνη καὶ κατεκόσμησεν, εἶτα τὸν νοῦν αἰθῆς ἐπισπεύραντος τοῦ ἡλίου, τῷ ζωτικῷ δεχομένη, νέας ποιεῖ ψυχάς· ἡ δὲ γῆ τρίτον σῶμα παρέσχεν.

Cp. *Aquane an ignis sit utilior*, c. 13 (p. 958e): Τοῦ δὲ πυρὸς ἅπαντα μὲν αἰσθησις, οἶον τὸ ζωτικὸν ἐνεργαζομένου, μετέιληφεν.

Also *Quaest. conv.* VII 4, 3 (p. 703A) where he says: Nothing more resembles a living being than does fire, which moves and feeds by itself and, by its shining, makes everything clear. Μάλιστα δὲ ταῖς σβέσεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ φθοραῖς ἐμφαίνεται δύναμις οὐκ ἀμοιροῦσα ζωτικῆς ἀρχῆς.

Reinhardt, *Pos.* p. 242 f.; *Kosmos u. Symp.* p. 320, 329; Pohlenz, *Stoa* II p. 107. On Posid.' vitalism as opposed to atomism, our nr. 1181.

1177—The cosmos is a body forming an organical unity, of which all the parts are naturally connected (συμφυῆ) and therefore interacting (συμπαθεῖα) (συμπαθῆ).

a. Cleomedes, *De motu circ.* I 1, 4, p. 8 Ziegler:

There is no void within the universe.

Δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ δι' ὅλου συμφυῆς ὑπῆρχεν ἡ τῶν ὄλων οὐσία, οὔτ' ἂν ὑπὸ φύσεως οἶόν τ' ἦν συνέχεσθαι καὶ διοικεῖσθαι τὸν κόσμον, οὔτε τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ συμπάθειά τις ἂν ἦν πρὸς ἄλληλα, οὔτε, μὴ ὑφ' ἐνὸς τόπου συνεχομένου αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος μὴ δι' ὅλου ὄντος συμφυοῦς, οἶόν τ' ἂν ἦν ἡμῖν ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν. Μεταξὺ γὰρ ὄντων κενωμάτων ἐνεποδίζοντο ἂν ὑπ' αὐτῶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις.

Cp. Cic., *De n.d.* II 83, cited above (1176a). The term *συμφυῖα* is used by Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VII 129.

See further Reinhardt, *Kosmos u. Symp.*, p. 92 ff.; W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, pp. 72 ff., 112 ff.

b Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* IX (= *Ag. the phys.* I) 78-80:

Τῶν τε σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἡνωμένα, τὰ δὲ ἐξ συναπτομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐκ

¹ I.e.: souls like those of Tityos and Typhon, foolish and arrogant and full of confusing passions.

διεστῶτων. ἡνωμένα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὰ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἕξεως κρατούμενα καθάπερ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα, ἐκ συναπτομένων δὲ τὰ ἐκ τε παρακειμένων καὶ πρὸς ἓν τι κεφάλαιον νευόντων συνεστῶτα ὡς ἀλύσεις καὶ πυργίσκοι καὶ νῆες, ἐκ διεστῶτων δὲ τὰ ἐκ διεζευγμένων καὶ [ἐκ] κεχωρισμένων καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ ὑποκειμένων συγκείμενα ὡς στρατιαὶ καὶ ποιμναὶ καὶ χοροί. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ ὁ κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν, ἦτοι ἡνωμένον ἐστὶ σῶμα ἢ ἐκ συναπτομένων ἢ ἐκ διεστῶτων. οὔτε δὲ ἐκ συναπτομένων οὔτε ἐκ διεστῶτων, ὡς δείκνυμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν συμπαθειῶν. κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τῆς σελήνης ἀυξήσεις καὶ φθίσεις πολλὰ τῶν τε ἐπιγείων ζῶων καὶ θαλασσίων φθίνει τε καὶ αὖξεται, ἀμπώτεις τε καὶ πλημμυρίδες περὶ τινὰ μέρη τῆς θαλάσσης γίνονται. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τινὰς τῶν ἀστέρων ἐπιτολὰς καὶ δύσεις μεταβολαὶ τοῦ περιέχοντος καὶ παμποίκιοι περὶ τὸν ἀέρα τροπαὶ συμβαίνουσιν, ὅτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον, ὅτε δὲ λοιμικῶς. ἐξ ὧν συμφανὲς ὅτι ἡνωμένον τι σῶμα καθέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐκ συναπτομένων ἢ διεστῶτων οὐ συμπάσχει τὰ μέρη ἀλλήλοις, εἴγε ἓν στρατιᾷ πάντων, εἰ τύχοι, διαφθαρέντων τῶν στρατιωτῶν οὐδὲν κατὰ διάδοσιν πάσχειν φαίνεται ὁ περισῶθεϊς· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἡνωμένων συμπάθειά τις ἔστιν, εἴγε δακτύλου τεμνομένου τὸ ὅλον συνδιατίθεται σῶμα. ἡνωμένον τοίνυν ἐστὶ σῶμα καὶ ὁ κόσμος.

The same doctrine is found in Cic., *De n.d.* II 7, 19. The author speaks of *tanta rerum consentiens conspirans continuata cognatio*.

Cp. also *De div.* II 14, 33, and Plinius, *N.H.* II 109, 112 ff. Certainly the notion of cosmic sympathy did not originate with Posid. We dealt with it earlier as a Chrysippean doctrine (our nr. 913). But Reinhardt seems to be right in holding that, in Posid.' system, the doctrine took a very important place, and, moreover, a special character.¹

1178—After Panaetius, who maintained that the world is indestructible, Posid. returned to the ekpyrosis theory.

The generation and the destruction of the world

a. Diog. L. VII 142:

Περὶ δὲ οὖν τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς τοῦ κόσμου φησὶ Ζήνων μὲν ἐν τῷ Περὶ ὄλου, Χρύσιππος δ' ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν πρώτῳ Περὶ κόσμου.

¹ *Kosmos u. Symp.*, p. 52 ff.: "Als kosmischer, erklärender Begriff erscheint die Sympathie zuerst bei Cicero, bei Strabo und bei Philo; bei den ersten beiden ausschliesslich an Stellen wo sie nachweislich aus Poseidonios schöpfen. Daraus folgt: erst Poseidonios hat die "Sympathie" aus der Beschränktheit astrologischer Gleichungen einerseits, aus medizinischen, prognostischen und mirabilienartigen einzelnen Beobachtungen andererseits zu einem physikalischen, das ganze Weltbild ganz und gar durchdringenden . . . Begriff erhoben; . . . er erst hat den Weltzusammenhang als Sympathie geschaut."

Edelstein, however, holds that the doctrine of sympathy did not take a particularly important place in Posid.' philosophy (*Am. Journal of Philol.* 1936, p. 324).

b. Cp. Arius Did. ap. Stob., *Ecl.* I, p. 177 f.:

Ποσειδώνιος δὲ φορὰς καὶ γενέσεις τέτταρας εἶναι φησιν ἐκ τῶν ὄντων εἰς τὰ ὄντα γινομένας. Τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων καὶ τὴν εἰς οὐκ ὄντα, καθάπερ εἶπομεν πρόσθεν, ἀπέγνωσαν ἀνύπαρκτον οὖσαν. Τῶν δ' εἰς ὄντα γινομένων μεταβάλλον τὴν μὲν εἶναι κατὰ διαίρεσιν, τὴν δὲ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ κατὰ σύγχυσιν, τὴν δ' ἐξ ὄλων, λεγομένην δὲ κατ' ἀνάλυσιν. Τούτων δὲ τὴν κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν γίνεσθαι, τὰς δ' ἄλλας τρεῖς περὶ τοὺς ποιοὺς λεγομένους τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας γινομένους. Ἀκολούθως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις συμβαίνειν. Τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν οὐτ' αὖξεσθαι οὔτε μειοῦσθαι κατὰ πρόσθεσιν ἢ ἀφαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, καθάπερ ἐπ' ἀριθμῶν καὶ μέτρων συμβαίνειν. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν, οἶον Δίωνος καὶ Θέωνος, καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ μειώσεις γίνεσθαι. Διὸ καὶ παραμένειν τὴν ἐκάστου ποιότητα ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως μέχρι τῆς ἀναιρέσεως, ὥς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀναιρέσιν ἐπιδεχομένων ζῶων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ τῶν τούτοις παραπλησίων.

The passage is discussed by Edelstein in the above-mentioned article, p. 293 ff. Cp. also Philo, *De aetern. mundi* II, 497 M., cited there (n. 37).

The sun

1179—a. Of his theory of the sun, the following account is given by Diog. L. VII 144:

Εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον εἰλικρινὲς πῦρ, καθά φησι Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ ἐβδόμῳ Περὶ μετεώρων· καὶ μείζονα τῆς γῆς, ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ ἕκτῳ τοῦ Φυσικοῦ λόγου· ἀλλὰ καὶ σφαιροειδῆ, ὡς οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν τοῦτόν φασι, ἀναλόγως τῷ κόσμῳ. πῦρ μὲν οὖν εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ πυρὸς πάντα ποιεῖ. μείζω δὲ τῆς γῆς τῷ πᾶσαν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ φωτίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν. καὶ τὸ τὴν γῆν δὲ κωνοειδῆ σκιάν ἀποτελεῖν τὸ μείζονα εἶναι σημαίνει. πάντοθεν δὲ βλέπεσθαι διὰ τὸ μέγεθος.

By Cleomedes, *De motu circ.* I 11, 65 (p. 118 Ziegler) we know that P. wrote a special treatise on the size of the sun. Hultsch, in the *Abh. d. Gött. Ges.* 1897, nr. 5, tried to reconstruct his methods.

b. Cleomedes, *De motu circ.* II 1, 84-85 (p. 152-154 Ziegler) is generally attributed to Posid.

After having dealt with the size of the sun and its distance from the earth, the author continues as follows.

Description
of its force

Ἄλλ' εἰ καὶ μὴ τούτοις ἐπιστῆσαι οἶός τ' ἐγένετο μὴδ' ἀνευρεῖν ταῦτα, ὧν μείζων ἢ ζήτησις ἦν ἀνθρώπου ἡδονὴν τετιμηκότος, αὐτῇ γε τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ ἡλίου ἐπιστῆσαι αὐτὸν ἐχρῆν καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐνθυμηθῆναι, διότι πάντα τὸν κόσμον φωτίζει σχεδὸν ἀπειρομεγέθη ὄντα, ἔπειτα, ὅτι οὕτω διακαίει τὴν γῆν, ὡς ἓνα μέρος αὐτῆς ὑπὸ φλογμοῦ ἀοίκητα εἶναι, καὶ ὑπὸ πολλῆς τῆς

δυνάμεως αὐτὸς ἔμπνουν παρέχεται τὴν γῆν, ὥς καὶ καρποφορεῖν αὐτὴν καὶ ζωογονεῖν· καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἐστὶν αἷτιος τοῦ καὶ τὰ ζῶα ὑφεστάναι καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὖξεσθαι καὶ τελεσφορεῖσθαι· καὶ διότι μὴ μόνον τὰς ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας, ἀλλὰ καὶ θέρος καὶ χειμῶνα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὥρας αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ μὴν καὶ τοῦ μέλανας εἶναι καὶ λευκοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ξανθοὺς καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἰδέας διαφέροντας αὐτὸς αἷτιος γίνεται παρὰ τὸ πῶς ἀποπέμπειν τὰς ἀκτῖνας ἐπὶ τὰ κλίματα τῆς γῆς· καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλη τις εἰ μὴ ἢ τοῦ ἡλίου δυνάμεις τοὺς μὲν καθύγρους καὶ πληθύνοντας ποταμοῖς παρέχεται τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς τόπων, τοὺς δὲ ξηροὺς καὶ ἀνύδρους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀκάρπους, τοὺς δὲ καρποφορεῖν ἱκανοὺς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν δριμεῖς καὶ δυσώδεις, ὥς τοὺς τῶν Ἰχθυοφάγων, τοὺς δὲ εὐώδεις καὶ ἄρωματοφόρους, ὥς τοὺς περὶ τὴν Ἀραβίαν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν τοιοῦσδε καρποὺς, τοὺς δὲ τοιοῦσδε ἐκφέρειν δυνάμενους.

See on this passage: Reinhardt, *Posid.* p. 205 ff.; Pohlenz, *Stoa* I p. 223.

1180—The moon is mixed with air and, for this very reason, has great influence on the earth. The moon

a. Diog. L. VII 145:

Τὴν δὲ σελήνην ἐκ ποτίμων ὑδάτων, ἀερομιγῇ τυγχάνουσιν καὶ πρόσγειον οὔσαν, ὥς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ ἕκτῳ τοῦ Φυσικοῦ λόγου.

That Chrysippus held the same theory, appears in Arius Didymus's *Epit.* ap. Stob., *Ecl.* I 185, l. 19 W.

b. Cp. Cleomedes, *De motu circ.* II 4, 99 (p. 180 Ziegler):

Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον αὐτῆς σῶμα ἀερομιγὲς καὶ ζοφωδέστερόν ἐστι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν τῷ εἰλικρινεῖ τοῦ αἰθέρος, καθάπερ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἄστρον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν συναφὴν τῶν δύο στοιχείων, ὥς εἴρηται. —

Καὶ τὴν συμπάθειαν τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἐπίγεια αὕτη παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν ἄστρον ἐξαίρετον ἔχει δι' αὐτὸ τὸ προσγειότερα εἶναι.

Cp. also Plut., *De facie in orbe lunae* c. 5, p. 921 f.; c. 29, the beginning. Reinhardt, *Posid.*, p. 201 f.; Pohlenz, *Stoa* I, p. 223.

1181—a. In Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* IX (= *Ag. the phys.* I) 81-85, the divinity of the cosmos is proved by the following argument.

Four kinds
of natural
bodies

Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ τῶν ἡνωμένων σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ ψιλῆς ἕξεως συνέχεται, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ φύσεως, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς, καὶ ἕξεως μὲν ὥς λίθοι καὶ ξύλα, φύσεως δὲ καθάπερ τὰ φυτά, ψυχῆς δὲ τὰ ζῶα, πάντως δὴ καὶ ὁ κόσμος ὑπὸ τίνος τούτων διακρατεῖται. καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν ψιλῆς ἕξεως οὐκ ἂν συνέχοιτο. τὰ γὰρ ὑπὸ ἕξεως κρατούμενα οὐδεμίαν ἀξιόλογον μεταβολὴν τε καὶ τροπὴν ἀναδέχεται, καθάπερ

ξύλα καὶ λίθοι, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐξ αὐτῶν πάσχει τὴν κατὰ ἄνεσιν καὶ τὴν κατὰ συμ-
πιεσμὸν διάθεσιν. ὁ δὲ κόσμος ἀξιολόγους ἀναδέχεται μεταβολάς, ὅτε μὲν
κρυμαλέου τοῦ περιέχοντος γινομένου, ὅτε δὲ ἄλεινοῦ, καὶ ὅτε μὲν αὐχμῶδους,
ὅτε δὲ νοτεροῦ, ὅτε δὲ ἄλλως πως κατὰ τὰς τῶν οὐρανίων κινήσεις ἐτεροιομένου.
οὐ τοίνυν ὑπὸ ψιλλῆς ἕξεως ὁ κόσμος συνέχεται. εἰ δὲ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης, πάντως
ὑπὸ φύσεως· καὶ γὰρ τὰ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς διακρατούμενα πολὺ πρότερον ὑπὸ φύσεως
συνείχετο. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρίστης αὐτὸν φύσεως συνέχεσθαι, ἐπεὶ καὶ
περιέχει τὰς πάντων φύσεις. ἡ δὲ γε τὰς πάντων περιέχουσα φύσις καὶ τὰς
λογικὰς περιέσχηκεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ τὰς λογικὰς περιέχουσα φύσις πάντως ἔστι
λογικὴ· οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους χειρὸν εἶναι. ἀλλ' εἰ ἀρίστη ἔστι
φύσις ἡ τὸν κόσμον διοικοῦσα, νοερά τε ἔσται καὶ σπουδαία καὶ ἀθάνατος.
τοιαύτη δὲ τυγχάνουσα θεὸς ἔστιν.

The passage is cited and analysed by Reinhardt, *Kosmos u. Symp.*, p. 47 ff. In order to distinguish what does and what does not belong to Posid. in particular, the following remarks must be made.

1. The *hierarchy of three or four uniting forces*, forming the unity of natural bodies,—ἐξίς, φύσις, ψυχὴ and ψυχὴ λογικὴ or νοῦς—, was certainly known to Chrysippus. The doctrine is found e.g. in Philo, *Leg. alleg.* II 22, cited by V. Arnim, SVF II 458, as illustrating Chrys.'s doctrine, and again in *Quod Deus sit immut.* 35 (SVF II ib.):

Τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐνεδήσατο ἕξει, τὰ δὲ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ψυχῇ, τὰ δὲ καὶ λογικῇ ψυχῇ. Λίθων μὲν οὖν καὶ ξύλων, ἃ δὴ τῆς συμφοῦτας ἀπέσπασται, δεσμὸν κραταιότατον ἔξιν εἰργάζεται. — Τὴν δὲ φύσιν ἀπένειμε τοῖς φυτοῖς. — (41) Ψυχὴν δὲ φύσεως τρισὶ διαλλάττουσαν ὁ ποῖων ἐποίει αἰσθήσει, φαντασίᾳ, ὄρμῃ. — Τοσούτοις μὲν δὴ ζῶα προὔχει φυτῶν. Ἰδωμεν δὲ τίνι τῶν ἄλλων ζῶων ὑπερβέβληκεν ἄνθρωπος. Ἐξαίρετον οὗτος τοίνυν γέρας ἔλαχε διάνοιαν, ἥ τὰς ἀπάντων φύσεις, σωμάτων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ πραγμάτων εἴωθε καταλαμβάνειν.

Now this is the function of νοῦς, which is "the sight of soul", and as such τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ κρατιστεῦον.

Cp. Plut., *Stoic. refugn.* 43, p. 1053 F (SVF II 449), where Chrysippus is cited (on ἐξίς).

The distinction between ἐξίς, φύσις, ψυχὴ is also found in Clem. Alex., *Strom.* II p. 173 St., and in Galenus (SVF II 714-716).

2. In this, the theory of the *vital force of the elements*, as was illustrated under **1176**, seems to have been peculiar to Posid.

In Sen., *Nat. quaest.* II 2, a survey is given of various kinds of bodies. In this passage, *composite* bodies are opposed to *united* ones, i.e. such as are one by their own (organical) force. II 2, 4:

Quare istud? Si quando dixero unum, memineris me non ad numerum referre, sed ad naturam corporis nulla ope externa sed unitate sua cohaerentis: ex hac nota corporum aer est.

A description of this organical force of air is given in II 6, again in V 5, cited under **1176b**, and in VI 16.

Cp. also the passage of Sextus, cited under **1177b**.

Reinhardt, who deals with the question in *Kosmos und Symp.*, p. 34-54, concludes (p. 43) that the notion of unity, expounded in the above-cited passage of Seneca,

is based on the organical character of the element, and that this conception of the element, which stands opposite to that of atomism, was peculiar to Posid.

It is, as is evident, closely connected with the idea of cosmic sympathy, which might be called its dynamical expression.

b. The following passage of Nemesisius of Emesa, in which man is described as communicating with the three kinds of being, and thus as being placed ἐν μεθορίοις between God and the world (qualified as νοητή and αἰσθητή οὐσία), may contain some traces of Posidonian doctrine.

**A trace of
this doctrine
in Nemesisius**

Nemesisius, *De natura hominis* I, P. Gr. t. 40, col. 505B-507A:

Γινώριμον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις κοινωνεῖ, καὶ τῆς τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων μετέχει ζωῆς, καὶ τῆς τῶν λογικῶν μετέληφε νοήσεως. Κοινωνεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν ἀψύχοις κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων κρᾶσιν· τοῖς δὲ φυτοῖς κατὰ τε ταῦτα καὶ τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ σπερματικὴν δύναμιν· τοῖς δὲ ἀλόγοις καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν, ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου δὲ κατὰ τε τὴν καθ' ὁρμὴν κίνησιν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὀρεξιν καὶ τὸν θυμὸν καὶ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν καὶ ἀναπνευστικὴν δύναμιν. — Συνάπτεται δὲ διὰ τοῦ λογικοῦ ταῖς ἀσωμάτοις καὶ νοεραῖς φύσεσι, λογιζόμενος καὶ νοῶν καὶ κρίνων ἕκαστα, καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς μεταδιώκων, καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν τὸν κολοφῶνα τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἀσπαζόμενος. Δι' ὃ καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν μεθορίοις ἐστὶ νοητῆς καὶ αἰσθητῆς οὐσίας, συναπτόμενος κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰς σωματικὰς δυνάμεις τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις, κατὰ δὲ τὸ λογικὸν τοῖς ἀσωμάτοις οὐσίαις, ὡς εἴρηται πρότερον. Ὁ γὰρ Δημιουργὸς ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ὀλίγον ἔοικεν ἐπισυνάπτειν ἀλλήλαις τὰς διαφόρους φύσεις, ὥστε μίαν εἶναι καὶ συγγενῇ τὴν πάσαν κτίσιν.

See on this passage W. Jaeger, *Nemesisios vom Emesa*, p. 98 ff.

1182—A trace of Posidonius' vitalism and his doctrine of the unity of the cosmos may be found in the following passage of Nemesisius, where first the magnet, next certain intermediate forms between plants and animals (so-called ζώοφυτα) are mentioned as connecting links between the above mentioned groups.

**Connecting
links
between the
four groups**

a. Between anorganic and organic nature. Nemesisius, *De nat. hom.* I, P. Gr. t. 40, col. 508C-509A:

The magnet

Διαλλάττει μὲν γὰρ καὶ λίθος, λίθου δυνάμει τινί, ἀλλ' ἡ μαγνητὶς λίθος ἐξεληλυθέναι δοκεῖ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων λίθων φύσιν τε καὶ δύναμιν. ἐν τῷ προφανῶς ἔλκειν πρὸς ἑαυτὴν καὶ κατέχει τὸν σίδηρον, ὥσπερ τροφὴν αὐτὸν ποιήσασθαι βουλομένη, καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐφ' ἐνὸς σιδήρου τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλον δι' ἄλλου κατέχειν τῷ μεταδιδόναι τοῖς ἐχομένοις πᾶσι τῆς δυνάμεως ἑαυτῆς.

In the same sense the magnet is mentioned by H. Lotze, *Mikrokosmos*, Leipzig 1896, I⁵ p. 64.

Zoophyta**b.** Between plants and animals. Ib., col. 509A-B:

Τὰς γὰρ πίννας καὶ τὰς ἀκαλύφας ὥσπερ αἰσθητικὰ δένδρα κατεσκεύασεν. ἐρρίζωσε μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰς ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ δίκην φυτῶν, καὶ ὥσπερ ξύλα τὰ ὄστρακα περιέθηκε καὶ ἔστησεν ὥσπερ φυτά. αἰσθησιν δ' αὐταῖς ἐνέθηκε τὴν ἀπτικήν, τὴν κοινὴν πάντων ζῶων αἰσθησιν, ὡς κοινωνεῖν τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς κατὰ τὸ ἐρριζῶσθαι καὶ ἐστάναι, τοῖς δὲ ζῷοις κατὰ τὴν ἀφήν [καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι]. Τὸν γοῦν σπόγγον, καίτοι προσπεφυκότα ταῖς πέτραις καὶ συστέλλεσθαι καὶ ἀνοίγεσθαι ἢ μᾶλλον ἐκτείνεσθαι [καὶ ἀμύνεσθαι], ὅταν προσιόντος αἰσθηταί τινος, Ἀριστοτέλης ἰστόρησε. Διὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ζωόφυτα καλεῖν ἔθος ἔχουσιν οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν σοφῶν.

Cp. Aristot., *Hist. an.* 588 b 20, 487 b 9 (on the sponges); 588 b 15, 548 a 5 (on the πίνναι and ἀκαλῆφαι).

„Intelligent animals”**c.** Between non-rational animals and man: ib., col. 509C-512A:

Πάλιν δὲ μεταβαίνων ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλόγων ἐπὶ τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον, τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀθρόως κατεσκεύασεν, ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοις φυσικὰς τινὰς συνέσεις καὶ μηχανὰς καὶ πανουργίας πρὸς σωτηρίαν ἐνέθηκεν, ὡς ἐγγὺς λογικῶν αὐτὰ φαίνεσθαι, καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀληθῶς λογικὸν ζῷον τὸν ἄνθρωπον προεβάλετο.

Conclusion**d.** Thus, the whole creation was unified to an harmonious organism.

Ib., col. 512B:

Καὶ οὕτω πᾶσι πάντα μουσικῶς συνήρμοσε καὶ συνέδησε καὶ εἰς ἓν συνήγαγε τὰ τε νοητὰ καὶ τὰ ὁρατὰ διὰ μέσου τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων γενέσεως.

Concerning the doctrine of intermediate forms, cp. Strabo VII 5, 8 (Posid. F 93 *F.Gr.Hist.*), where is spoken of an asphalt mine which, when trenched, fills itself up (τμηθὲν ἐκπληροῦται πάλιν τῷ χρόνῳ). The same is reported by Strabo V 2, 6 about the iron mines of Elba, about the ledges of rocks in Rhodos, the marble-rock in Paros and the salt-rock in India.

Cp. Theiler, *Vorb. d. Neupl.* p. 74.

Animal instinct distinguished from human reason

1183—The following passage in which a remarkable analysis is given of the difference between animal instinct and human reason, probably goes back to Posidonius.

Seneca, *Epist.* 121, 19-23:

Quid est, quare pavonem, quare anserem gallina non fugiat, at tanto minorem et ne notum quidem sibi accipitrem? quare pulli faelem timeant, canem non timeant? apparet illis inesse nocituri scientiam non experimento collectam: nam antequam possint experisci, cavent. deinde ne hoc casu existimes fieri, nec metuunt alia quam debent nec umquam

obliviscuntur huius tutelae et diligentiae: aequalis est illis a pernicioso fuga. praeterea non fiunt timidiora vivendo. ex quo quidem apparet non usu illa in hoc pervenire, sed naturali amore salutis suae. et tardum est et varium, quod usus docet; quicquid natura tradit, et aequale omnibus est et statim. —

(21) Naturales ad utilia impetus, naturales a contrariis aspernationes sunt: sine ulla cogitatione, quae hoc dictet, sine consilio fit, quidquid natura praecepit. non vides, quanta sit subtilitas apibus ad fingenda domicilia, quanta dividui laboris obeundi undique concordia? non vides, quam nulli mortalium imitabilis illa aranei textura, quanto operis sit fila disponere, alia in rectum inmissa firmamenti loco, alia in orbem currentia ex denso rara, quae minora animalia, in quorum perniciem illa tenduntur, velut retibus implicata teneantur? nascitur ars ista, non discitur. itaque nullum est animal altero doctius: videbis araneorum pares telas, par in favis angulorum omnium foramen. incertum est et inaequabile, quidquid ars tradit; ex aequo venit, quod natura distribuit.

On the attribution to Posid., see Reinhardt, *Posid.* p. 356-365; Pohlenz, *Grundfragen* p. 5 ff.; *Stoa* I p. 227.

1184—Two important conclusions from the psychophysical unity which is man.

a. Man's moral character is in accordance with his physical constitution, and the latter is greatly influenced by the climate.

Galenus, *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* p. 442 M.; F. Gr. Hist. II, F 102:

Συνάπτει δὲ εἰκότως τοῖς λόγοις τούτοις ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὰ κατὰ τὴν φυσιογνωμονίαν φαινόμενα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅσα μὲν εὐρύστερνα τε καὶ θερμότερα, θυμικώτερα πάνθ' ὑπάρχειν φύσει, ὅσα δὲ πλατυσχιά τε καὶ ψυχρότερα, δειλότερα. καὶ κατὰ τὰς χώρας δὲ οὐ μικρῶ τι διενηνοχένοι τοῖς ἡθεσι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰς δειλίαν καὶ τόλμαν ἤτοι φιλήδονον τε καὶ φιλόπονον, ὥς τῶν παθητικῶν κινήσεων τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπομένων ἀεὶ τῇ διαθέσει τοῦ σώματος, ἣν ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὸ περιέχον κράσεως οὐ κατὰ ὀλίγον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι.

**Climatic
influence
on man**

b. The soul itself is not merely rational (as was held by Chrysippus), but contains an irrational part—or rather, has irrational functions.

**Man's soul
partly
irrational**

Galenus, o.c., p. 460 f. M., accepts Plato's tripartition of psychical "forces", with Posid. and against Chrysippus:

Οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τρία μόρια ἢ τρεῖς εἶναι δυνάμεις δείκνυσιν ὁ λόγος· ὅτι μέντοι γε τρία τὰ σύμπαντά ἐστιν εἴτε μόρια ψυχῆς εἴτε δυνάμεις, ὅφ'

ὧν ὁ βίος ἡμῶν διοικεῖται, βιαστικῶς τε καὶ ἀναντιρρήτως ἀποδείκνυται. ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεχθησομένων ἢ μὲν τοῦ Χρυσίππου διαβληθήσεται δόξα, κατασκευασθήσεται δὲ τὸ κοινὸν Ἀριστοτέλει καὶ Πλάτῳ καὶ Ποσειδωνίῳ δόγμα, τὸ καθ' ἑτέραν μὲν ἡμᾶς δύναμιν λογίζεσθαι, καθ' ἑτέραν δὲ θυμοῦσθαι, κατὰ ἄλλην δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν.

Cp. also p. 501:

Ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης τε καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος εἶδη μὲν ἡ μέρη ψυχῆς οὐκ ὀνομάζουσιν, δυνάμεις δὲ εἶναι φασι μιᾶς οὐσίας ἐκ τῆς καρδίας ὀρμωμένης· ὁ δὲ Χρυσίππος ὥσπερ εἰς μίαν οὐσίαν, οὕτω καὶ εἰς δύναμιν μίαν ἄγει καὶ τὸν θυμὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.

1185—Against Chrysippus's rational monism¹ Posid. defends

(1) that the πάθη are non-rational;

(2) that they are as such not unnatural.

The
πάθη
are
irrational

a. First argument: if the too violent ὁρμή is a too violent συγκατά-θεσις and if the assent is caused by the greatness of its object, how is it that the wise man is not led into πάθη by such objects as are greatly approved by him?

Chrysippus said: — ἀρρωστήματα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀπλῶς τῷ ψευδῶς ὑπειληφέναι περὶ τινων ὡς ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ μέγιστα νομίζειν αὐτά (Galenus, o.c., p. 369, 10 M.).

Posid. replies (Galenus o.c., p. 370, 2 M.):

Τοιούτων δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Χρυσίππου λεγομένων διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις πρῶτον μὲν, πῶς οἱ σόφοι μέγιστα καὶ ἀνυπέρβλητα νομίζοντες εἶναι ἀγαθὰ τὰ καλὰ πάντα οὐκ ἐμπαθῶς κινουῦνται ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντές τε ὧν ὀρέγονται καὶ περιχαρεῖς γινόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅταν τύχῳσιν αὐτῶν.

b. Secondly: fall into passions not only those who are involved in advanced moral badness, but all those who are "fools" (in the Stoic sense); and this not only in proportion to the object. And often men of the same weakness react differently in receiving a similar presentation, and even the same man may show different reactions at different moments.

Not in pro-
portion to the
object

Galenus, o.c., p. 371, 9 - 372, 9 M.:

Εἶτα ἐφεξῆς καὶ τάδε γράφει (sc. ὁ Ποσειδώνιος)· οὐ μόνον δὲ οἱ ἐπὶ πλεόν ἔρρυκηῦαν ἔχοντες τὴν κακίαν καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐεμπτωσίαις ὄντες ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς τὰ πάθη, ἀλλὰ πάντες οἱ ἄφρονες, ἕως ἂν ἔχωσιν τὴν κακίαν, καὶ εἰς μεγάλα πάθη καὶ εἰς μίκρα ἐμπίπτουσι. καὶ τούτων ἐξῆς τάδε· τὸ δὲ ὑπολαμβάνειν

¹ Zeno's definition of πάθος and Chrysippus's interpretation of it are cited under the nrs. 1051 ff.; Cleanthes, 1054.

κατὰ ἄξιαν εἶναι τῶν συμβεβηκότων οὕτως κεκινῆσθαι, ὥστε ἀποστρέφεσθαι τὸν λόγον, μέγα δὲ πάθος ἐμφαίνειν, οὐ καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνειν ἐστί. γίνεται δὲ καὶ διὰ σύμμετρον καὶ μικρόν. ἐχόμενα δὲ τούτων ὁ Ποσειδώνιος καὶ τάδε γράφει· δυοῖν τε τὴν αὐτὴν ἀσθένειαν ἐχόντων καὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν λαμβανόντων φαντασίαν ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ ὁ μὲν ἐν πάθει γίνεται, ὁ δὲ οὐ, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἤττον, ὁ δὲ μᾶλλον, καὶ ἐνίοτε ὁ ἀσθενέστερος μεῖζον ὑπολαμβάνων τὸ προσπεπτωκὸς οὐ κινεῖται καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὅτε μὲν ἐν πάθει γίνεται, ἔστιν ὅτε δὲ οὐ, καὶ ὅτε μὲν μᾶλλον, ὅτε δὲ ἤττον.

c. Thirdly: that passions are not judgments appears from the fact Changed by time
that they are changed by time.

Now, Zeno was aware of this fact, as appears in his definition of λύπη. And Chrysippus, too, was aware of it.

Galenus, o.c., p. 391, 5-11 ; p. 397, 12-398, 4 M.:

‘Ὁ γοῦν ὄρος οὗτος, φησὶν (sc. ὁ Ποσειδώνιος), ὁ τῆς λύπης, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν παθῶν ὑπὸ τε Ζήνωνος εἰρημένον καὶ πρὸς τοῦ Χρυσίππου γεγραμμένοι, σαφῶς ἐξελέγχουσι τὴν γνώμην αὐτοῦ. δόξαν γὰρ εἶναι πρόσφατον τοῦ κακὸν αὐτῷ παρεῖναι φησι τὴν λύπην. ἐν ᾧ καὶ συντομώτερον ἐνίοτε λέγοντες ὧδέ πως προφέρονται· λύπη ἐστὶ δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίας. —

Προσchrῆται δὲ εἰς τοῦτο μάρτυρι καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ Χρυσίππῳ κατὰ τὸ δευτέρον Περὶ παθῶν ὧδέ πως γράφοντι· περὶ δὲ τῆς λύπης, [καὶ] ὥς ἂν ἐμπλησθέντες τινὲς ὁμοίως φαίνονται ἀφίστασθαι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ Ἀχιλλέως ταῦτα λέγει ὁ ποιητὴς πενθοῦντος τὸν Πάτροκλον·

“ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ κλαίων τε κυλινδόμενός τ’ ἐκορέσθη
καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ πρᾶπίδων ἦλθ’ ἡμερος ἢ δ’ ἀπὸ γυίων”,

ἐπὶ τὸ παρακαλεῖν ὥρμησε τὸν Πρίαμον τὴν τῆς λύπης ἀλογίαν αὐτῷ παριστάς.

d. Chrysippus compares the man who is liable to passions with persons of weak health, Posid. considers him as a normal man.

The
πάθη
are not
unnatural

Galenus, o.c., p. 408, 4-15 M.:

‘Ὅποια δὲ τίς ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν φαύλων ψυχὴ κατὰ τε τὰ πάθη καὶ πρὸ τῶν παθῶν, οὐκέθ’ ὁμοίως ἐξηγοῦνται. Χρυσίππος μὲν γὰρ ἀνάλογον ἔχειν αὐτὴν φησι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύουσιν σώμασιν εἰς πυρετοὺς ἐμπίπτειν ἢ διαρροίας ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον ἐπὶ σμικρᾷ καὶ τυχούσῃ προφάσει. καὶ μέμφεται γὰρ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος αὐτοῦ τὴν εἰκόνα· χρῆναι γὰρ φησὶν οὐ τούτοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀπλῶς ὑγιαίνουσιν σώμασιν εἰκασαί τὴν τῶν φαύλων ψυχὴν· εἴτε γὰρ ἐπὶ μεγάλοις αἰτίαις εἴτε ἐπὶ σμικροῖς πυρεττοῖεν, οὐδὲν διαφέρειν ὥς πρὸς τὸ πάσχειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ εἰς πάθος ἐσαγεσθαι καθ’ ὅτιον, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὰ μὲν εὐέμπυτα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ δύσπυτα διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων.

1186—A consequence of this psychological view of man is that, according to Posid., wickedness does not come from without (as was held by Chrys.), but has its roots in the soul itself.

Wickedness
has its
roots within
the soul

Galenus, *Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur*, Scr. min. II, p. 78, 8 sqq. Müller:

Οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ Ποσειδωνίῳ δοκεῖ τὴν κακίαν ἐξωθεν ἐπεισέναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐδεμίαν ἔχουσαν ἰδίαν ρίζαν <ἐν> ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν, ὅθεν ὀρμωμένη βλαστάνει τε καὶ αὐξάνεται, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦναντίον· καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ τῆς κακίας ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς σπέρμα· καὶ δεόμεθα πάντες οὐχ οὕτω τοῦ φεύγειν τοὺς πονηροὺς ὥς τοῦ διώκειν τοὺς καθαρίσοντάς τε καὶ κωλύσοντάς ἡμῶν τὴν αὕξησιν τῆς κακίας.

1187—The paedagogical consequences.

a. Galenus, *De plac. Hippocr. et Plat.*, p. 445, 8-15 M.:

Posid. praises Plato for his prescriptions about giving motion to infants.

Γέγραφεν οἷον ἐπιτομήν τινα κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ Περὶ παθῶν σύγγραμμα τῶν ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος εἰρημένων, ὥς χρὴ τρέφεσθαι καὶ παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς παῖδας ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς σύμμετρον ἀποφαίνεσθαι ταῖς κινήσεσι καὶ τοῖς τοῦ λόγου προστάγμασιν εὐπειθές. Αὕτη γὰρ ἀρίστη παίδων παιδεία, παρασκευὴ τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὥς ἂν ἐπιτηδειοτάτη ᾖ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ λογιστικοῦ.

b. Ib., p. 452, 10 - 453, 2 M.:

Καὶ τοὺς τρόπους δέ, φησί, τῆς ἀσκήσεως ἡ τῶν παθῶν αἰτία γνωρισθεῖσα διωρίσατο. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοιοῖσδε ῥυθμοῖς ἅμα καὶ ἁρμονίαις καὶ ἐπιτηδεύμασι, τοὺς δὲ ἐν τοιοῖσδε διαιτᾶσθαι κελεύσομεν, ὥσπερ ὁ Πλάτων ἡμᾶς ἐδίδαξε, τοὺς μὲν ἀμβλεῖς καὶ νωθροὺς καὶ ἀθύμους ἐν τε τοῖς ὀρθοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ ταῖς κινούσαις ἰσχυρῶς τὴν ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐπιτηδεύμασι τρέφοντες, τοὺς δὲ θυμικωτέρους καὶ μανικώτερον ἄττοντας ἐν ταῖς ἐναντίαις.

c. The πάθη then, being as such not unnatural, should be "formed" and educated, not extirpated. The same view, founded on the same anthropological principles (ἐξίς, φύσις, ψυχὴ ἄλογος and λογική, all being present in man), is found in Plutarch, *De virtute morali* 12. The author concludes (451c):

Μέτεστιν οὖν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου, καὶ σύμφυτον ἔχει τὴν τοῦ πάθους ἀρχήν, οὐκ ἐπεισόδιον, ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαίαν οὔσαν, οὐδὲ ἀναιρετέαν παντάπασιν, ἀλλὰ θεραπείας καὶ παιδαγωγίας δεομένην.

1188—a. The true cause of passions then is *that men do not follow the daimon in themselves*, which is of the same nature as the Ruler of the Universe. Text ap. Gal., p. 448 M., cited above, nr. **1055**.

The true cause of passions and the end of life

b. The author concludes that Posid., then, differed from Chrysippus in his explanation of the "end".

Galenus, p. 449, 8 - 450, 2 M.:

Ἐν τούτοις φανερώς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐδίδαξε, πηλίκον ἀμαρτάνουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν παθῶν λογισμοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς περὶ τοῦ τέλους. οὐ γάρ, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ ὡς ὁ Πλάτων ἐδίδαξε, τὸ τῇ φύσει ζῆν ὁμολογουμένως ἐστίν. ὄντος γάρ ἐν ἡμῖν τοῦ μὲν βελτίονος τῆς ψυχῆς μέρους, τοῦ δὲ χείρονος ὁ μὲν τῷ βελτίονι συνεπόμενος ὁμολογουμένως ἂν λέγοιτο τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὁ δὲ τῷ χείρονι μᾶλλον ἐπόμενος ἀνομολογουμένως· ἐστὶ δὲ οὗτος μὲν ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ὁ κατὰ λόγον.

c. He criticized the telos formulae of Diogenes, Antipater and Archedemus (our nr. **1144**).

Chrysippus' successors criticized by Posid.

Galenus, ib., p. 450, 5-12 M. (citing Posid.):

"Α (sc. Chrysippus' theory) δὴ παρέντες ἔνιοι τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν συστέλλουσιν εἰς τὸ πᾶν τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ποιεῖν ἕνεκα τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν ὅμοιον αὐτὸ ποιῶντες τῷ σκοπὸν ἐκτίθεσθαι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν ἀσχηλίσαν ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον. ἐστὶ δὲ μάχην ἐμφαίνειν κατὰ αὐτὴν τὴν ἐκφοράν, καλὸν δὲ καὶ εὐδαιμονικὸν οὐδέν, παρέπεται γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τῷ τέλει, τέλος δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν.

d. He concludes that, when the end is rightly understood, all difficulties can be solved, and there is no need of Chrysippus's "liberal" explanation (see our nr. **1004**, the end), which in fact is a simple tau-tology.

Galenus, ib., p. 450, 12 - 451, 2 (Posid. is still cited):

Ἄλλὰ καὶ τούτου (sc. τοῦ τέλους) διαληφθέντος ὀρθῶς ἔξεστι μὲν αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸ διακόπτειν τὰς ἀπορίας, ἃς οἱ σοφισταὶ προτείνουσι, μὴ μέντοι γε τῷ κατὰ ἐμπειρίαν τῶν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν συμβαινόντων ζῆν, ὅπερ ἰσοδυναμεῖ τῷ ὁμολογουμένως εἰπεῖν ζῆν, ἥνίκα μὴ τοῦτο μικροπρεπῶς συντείνει εἰς τὸ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τυγχάνειν.

Chrysippus' formula rebuked

1189—Solution of preceding difficulties.

a. Now it is evident why wise men—also *relatively* wise men¹—do

¹ That the προκόπτοντες were recognized as such by Posid., may be inferred from Diog. L. VII 91.

Difficulties explained

not fall into passion by attaining the object striven after or by expecting bad things.

Galenus, *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.*, p. 454, 12-15 M.:

Καὶ μὴν οἱ προκόπτοντες μεγάλα κακὰ δοκοῦντες ἑαυτοῖς παρεῖναι ἢ ἐπιφέρεισθαι οὐ λυποῦνται· φέρονται γὰρ οὐ κατὰ τὸ ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ λογικόν.

b. How it is that passions are soothed by time.

Galenus, *ib.*, p. 454, 15 - 455, 16 M.:

Εἴτα ἐφεξῆς οὗτος, δια τί τὰ χρονίζοντα τῶν παθῶν ἡσυχέστερά τε καὶ ἀσθενέστερα γίνεται, τὴν αἰτίαν ἀποδίδωσιν, ὑπὲρ ἧς ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ παθῶν ἀπορεῖν ὡμολόγησεν. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τῇ τελευτῇ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ νῦν δὲ εἰρήσεται διὰ βραχέων οἷον ἐπιτομῇ τις τῆς Ποσειδωνίου ῥήσεως μακρᾶς ὑπαρχούσης. τὸ τοίνυν παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τοῦτο μὲν ἐμπίπλῃται τῶν οἰκείων ἐπιθυμιῶν, τοῦτο δὲ κάμνει ταῖς πολυχρονίους κινήσεσιν, ὥστε διὰ ἄμφω καθησυχάσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ μέτρια κινουμένου κρατεῖν ὁ λογισμὸς ἤδη δύναται, ὥσπερ καὶ εἰ ἵππου τινὸς ἐκφόρου τὸν ἐπιβάτην ἐξενεγκόντος βιαίως, εἴτα κάμνοντός τε ἅμα τῷ δρόμῳ καὶ προσέτι καὶ ἐμπλησθέντος ὧν ἐπεθύμησεν αὐθις ὁ ἡνίοχος ἐγκρατὴς κατασταίῃ. φαίνεται γὰρ τοῦτο πολλάκις γινόμενον καὶ οἷ γε παιδεύοντες τὰ νέα τῶν ζώων ἐπιτρέψαντες αὐτοῖς κάμνειν τε ἅμα καὶ ἐμπλησθῆναι κατὰ τὰς ἐκφόρους κινήσεις ὕστερον ἐπιτίθενται.

Virtues

1190—Since there are rational and irrational forces in man, there is a real moral struggle in us, there is a virtue of ἐγκράτεια and σωφροσύνη¹.

a. Galenus, *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* p. 467, 3 - 468, 5 M.:

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἄλογος ἐν ἡμῖν δύναμις ἐφ' ἑκάστον τῶν ἐπιθυμουμένων ἔλκει τὸν δεόμενον, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς ἀντισπᾷ καὶ κατέχει τὴν οὐκ ἐν καιρῷ φοράν. καὶ μάχῃ γε πολλάκις ἐκατέρων ἰσχυρὰ γίνεται πρὸς ἄλληλα φανερώς ἐπιδεικνυμένη διττὴν εἶναι φύσιν ἐν ἡμῖν τῶν στασιαζουσῶν ἀλλήλαις δυνάμεων. εἴπερ γὰρ ἦν μία μόνη, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς παισίν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκώλυεν ἀκαίρως ἡμᾶς ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἐπιθυμουμένων, ὥσπερ γε καὶ εἰ μόνος ὁ λογισμὸς ἦν πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀνθέλκειν τε καὶ στασιάζειν εἰθισμένος, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν πρᾶγμα διψῶντα μὴ πίνειν ἢ πεινῶντα μὴ ἐσθίειν οὐδὲ ἐγκρατὴς οὐδὲ σώφρων ἂν ὁ μὴ πίνων ὠνομάζετο, καθάπερ οὐδὲ ὁ μὴ βαδίζων, εἰ μὴ βούλοιο. νυνὶ δέ, ἐπεὶ διτταὶ τινές εἰσιν αἱ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐπισπώμεναι δυνάμεις, ἔστι δὲ ἄλογος ἡ τοῦ πόματος

¹ The following passage of Gal. is not a quotation from Posid., but it expresses his thought fairly well.

ἐπιθυμοῦσα, ἥ δὲ κατέχουσα ταύτην λογική, σωφροσύνης ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ ἐγκρατείας ἥ γένεσις. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὐ σμικρὸν ἐν παρέργῳ δειχθὲν εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν λόγον μνημονεύεσθω, μήτε ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι τι μήτε σωφροσύνην ἀναιρεθείσης τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ἐπιθυμητικῆς δυνάμεως.

b. Not every virtue should be defined as ἐπιστήμη, as was done by Chrysippus.

Galenus, *ib.*, p. 446, 13 M.:

Ἐπεταὶ δὲ εὐθὺς τοῖσδε καὶ ὁ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν λόγος αὐτοῦ ἐλέγχων τὸ σφάλμα διττόν, εἴτε ἐπιστήμας τις ἀπάσας αὐτὰς εἴτε δυνάμεις ὑπολάβοι. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγων τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν ἀλόγους ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι, τοῦ λογιστικοῦ δὲ μόνου λογικὴν. ὥστε εὐλόγως ἐκείνων μὲν αἱ ἀρεταὶ δυνάμεις εἰσίν, ἐπιστήμη δὲ μόνου τοῦ λογιστικοῦ.

c. Like Panaetius, Posid. considered virtue not as self-sufficient. Our nr. 1165a.

1191—a. Posid. seems to have divided ethics into three main parts: Division of ethics
(1) a prescriptive part, including suasion, consolation and exhortation;
(2) an aetiological part; (3) a phenomenology of virtues, called *ethology*.

Seneca, *Ep.* 95, 65:

Posidonius non tantum praeceptionem, nihil enim nos hoc verbo uti prohibet, sed etiam suasionem et consolationem et exhortationem necessariam iudicat. His adicit causarum inquisitionem, aetiologian quam quare nos dicere non audeamus, cum grammatici, custodes Latini sermonis, suo iure ita appellant, non video. ait utilem futuram et descriptionem cuiusque virtutis: hanc Posidonius ethologian vocat, quidam characterismon appellant, signa cuiusque virtutis ac vitii et notas reddentem, quibus inter se similia discriminantur.

b. Doubtless the aetiological part was concerned with the πάθη.

Galenus, *De plac.* 448, 9-11 M:

Νομίζω γὰρ καὶ τὴν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ τὴν περὶ τελῶν καὶ τὴν περὶ ἀρετῶν ἐκ τῆς περὶ παθῶν ὁρθῶς διασκέψεως ἡρτῆσθαι.

c. Diog. Laërt. VII 91, 129 mentions a *Protrepticus* of Posid. According to the same author, VII 124, 129, he wrote also a Π. καθήκοντος or Π. καθηκόντων. Ethical treatises

Cic., *ad Att.* XVI 11, 4 says that Posidonius discussed the conflict of the *honestum* and the *utile*; but, according to *De off.* III 2, 7-8, he touched the subject only briefly.

**The soul
and its im-
mortality**

1192—a. Posid. opposed Epicurus's doctrine of mortality of the soul. Achilles Tat., *Isag. in Arat. Phaen.* c. 13, p. 41 M.:

Ποσειδώνιος δὲ ἀγνοεῖν τοὺς Ἐπικουρείους ἔφη ὡς οὐ τὰ σώματα τὰς ψυχὰς συνέχει, ἀλλ' αἱ ψυχαὶ τὰ σώματα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ κόλλα καὶ ἑαυτὴν καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς κρατεῖ.

**Other
evidence**

The same argument is found in Sextus, *Adv. math.* IX (= *Ag. the phys.* I) 72. It is preceded by a remark on the fiery nature of soul, and followed by the statement that souls "having quitted the sphere of the sun, inhabit the region below the moon". Cp. Diodorus II 51, 3 (cited above, nr. **1176c**) on the ζωτική δύναμις of the sun, and Diog. L. VII 157, where Posid. is mentioned with other Stoics who taught that soul is πνεῦμα ἑνθερμον. Cic., *Tusc.* I 18, 42, concludes (against Panaetius) that, if this be so, the soul must necessarily seek higher regions. With Plutarch, lastly, in the final chapters of the *De facie in orbe lunae* (28-30), we find the doctrine that *noûs* originates from the sun and finally returns to it, while *psyche*, sprung from the moon which is of a mixed nature, is dissolved into the substance of the moon, like bodies into earth. Since, in these chapters, we find certain hardly dubitable Posidonian features (in c. 30 the ζωτική δύναμις of the moon is mentioned ¹, in 29 its mixed character ²), while in general the tenor is similar to that of the above mentioned passages of Sextus and of Cic., *Tusc.* I 19, 43, it is certainly not arbitrary to say that, for an essential part, Posid. is behind them. (For the moment I wish to make abstraction of the distinction between ψυχή and νοῦς made by Plutarch).

Sextus concludes (§ 74) that, since souls are permanent, they are *daemons*, and this he uses as a proof of the existence of gods.

Now we know by an important text of Galenus, cited under nr. **1055**, that Posid. spoke of the "daemon within us" which is of the same nature as the Ruler of the universe. —

After this short account we may proceed to cite our texts.

Sextus

b. Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* IX (= *Ag. the phys.* I) 71-74:

Καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὰς ψυχὰς ἔνεστιν ὑπονοῆσαι κάτω φερομένας· λεπτομερεῖς γὰρ οὔσαι καὶ οὐχ ἤττον πυρώδεις ἢ πνευματώδεις εἰς τοὺς ἄνω μᾶλλον τόπους κουφοφοροῦσιν. καὶ καθ' αὐτάς δὲ διαμένουσι καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, ἀπολυθεῖσαι τῶν σωμάτων καπνοῦ δίκην σκιδνάνται. οὐδὲ γὰρ πρότερον τὸ σῶμα διακρατητικὸν ἦν αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' αὐταὶ τῷ σώματι συμμονῆς ἦσαν αἵτιαι, πολὺ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ἑαυταῖς. ἐκσκηνοὶ γοῦν ἡλίου γενόμεναι τὸν ὑπὸ σελήνην οἰκοῦσι τόπον, ἐνθάδε τε διὰ τὴν εἰλικρίνειαν τοῦ ἀέρος πλείονα πρὸς διαμονὴν λαμβάνουσι χρόνον, τροφῇ τε χρῶνται οἰκείᾳ τῇ ἀπὸ γῆς ἀναθυμιάσει ὡς καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα, τὸ διαλυθόν τε αὐτάς ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἔχουσιν. εἰ οὖν διαμένουσιν αἱ ψυχαί, δαίμοσιν αἱ αὐταὶ γίνονται· εἰ δὲ δαίμονές εἰσι, ῥητέον καὶ θεοὺς ὑπάρχειν.

Jones, *Posid. and solar eschatology*, in *Class. Philol.* 1936, p. 115, argues that, since the argument of soul holding the body together occurs in Aristotle's *De*

¹ See above, nr. **1176d**.

² See above, nr. **1180**.

Anima 411 b 6, there is no sufficient ground to see Posid. behind this passage of Sextus. The essential point is, however, that the *setting* of the argument in Sextus is similar to that of Ach. Tatius (both opposing it to Epicureanism, and both speaking of κρατεῖν-διακρατητικόν), while both the preceding and the following paragraphs point to that kind of spiritualizing Stoicism which may be expected of Posid. Cp. S. Blankert, *Seneca, Ep. 90*, p. 202.

c. Cp. Cic., *Tusc.* I 18, 42 - 19, 43:

Cicero

Is autem animus, qui si est horum quattuor generum, ex quibus omnia constare dicuntur, ex inflammata anima ¹ constat, ut potissimum videri video Panaetio, superiora capessat necesse est. Nihil enim habent haec duo genera ² proni et supra semper petunt. Ita, sive dissipantur, procul a terris id evenit, sive permanent et conservant habitum suum, hoc etiam magis necesse est ferantur ad caelum et ab is perrumpatur et dividatur crassus hoc et concretus aër, qui est terrae proximus. Calidior est enim vel potius ardentior animus quam est hic aër, quem modo dixi crassum et concretum; quod ex eo sciri potest, quia corpora nostra terreno principiorum genere confecta ardore animi concalescunt. Accedit ut eo facilius animus evadat ex hoc aëre, quem saepe iam appello, eumque perrumpat, quod nihil est animo velocius, nulla est celeritas quae possit cum animi celeritate contendere. Qui si permanet incorruptus suique similis, necesse est ita feratur, ut penetret et dividat omne caelum hoc, in quo nubes imbres ventique coguntur, quod et umidum et caliginosum est propter exhalationes terrae. Quam regionem cum superavit animus naturamque sui similem contigit et adgnovit, iunctis ex anima tenui ³ et ex ardore solis temperato ignibus insistit et finem altius se ecferendi facit. Cum enim sui similem et levitatem et calorem adeptus <est>, tamquam paribus exanimatus ponderibus nullam in partem movetur, eaque ei demum naturalis est sedes, cum ad sui simile penetravit; in quo nulla re egens aletur et sustentabitur isdem rebus, quibus astra sustentantur et aluntur ⁴.

In this passage Posid.'s doctrine of the soul as πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον is explained in this sense that, first, soul proves to be of the same (viz. intermediate) nature as the moon, and secondly, that being purified it may ascend to higher regions. Elsewhere, Cic. speaks of *mens* (νοῦς) which, according to Aristotle in II. φιλοσοφίας, consisted of aether.

¹ πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον; cp. Diog. L. VII 157.

² Sc. ignis et aër, which are implied in *inflammata anima*. Cp. the mixed character of the moon: our nr. 1180.

³ i.e. *aether*.

⁴ On the doctrine that νοῦς (*mens*) is of the substance of the stars: our nr. 431d (vol. II). Cp. also *Tusc.* I 10, 22.

Jones, *Posid. and Cicero's Tusc. Disp.* I 17-81, in *Class. Philol.* 1923, p. 202-228, tried to prove that the greater part of *Tusc.* I either *cannot* belong to Posid., or does not contain sufficient indications to attribute it to him. Generally, in this as well as in his two other articles on Posid. in which he criticizes i.a. Reinhardt's views, he does not take sufficiently into account that Posid. was greatly influenced by Plato, and that, therefore, we cannot conclude from the fact that a thought is platonic (e.g. the superiority of νοῦς to ψυχή, as will be found with Plutarch), that *ergo* it is not Posidonian. Again, the *setting* of this Platonism should be carefully observed.

Moreover, Jones is certainly wrong when saying (p. 227) that in *Tusc.* I 43 there is not any further ascent of the soul than to the sublunary sphere¹, and opposing it on this very point to the *Somnium Scipionis*, where the soul is said to ascend to the Milky Way. Essentially the same doctrine is found here. It will be illustrated further by Plutarch's last chapters of the *De facie*.

Plutarch

d. In the following passage of Plutarch a distinction is made between ψυχή and νοῦς. The passage contains a similar view, but is more explicit than Cicero's in the above-cited text.

Plutarchus, *De facie in orbe lunae*, cc. 28-30:

(28) Νοῦς γὰρ ψυχῆς ὅσῳ ψυχὴ σώματος ἄμεινόν ἐστι καὶ θεϊότερον. —

Τριῶν δὲ τούτων συμπαγέντων τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἢ γῆ, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἢ σελήνη, τὸν δὲ νοῦν ὁ ἥλιος παρέσχεεν εἰς τὴν γένεσιν², . . ὥσπερ αὖ τῇ σελήνῃ τὸ φέγγος³. —

Συντυγχάνει δὲ οὕτως κατὰ φύσιν ἑκάτερον. Πᾶσαν ψυχὴν, ἄνουν τε καὶ σὺν νῷ, σώματος ἐκπεσοῦσαν, εἰμαρμένον ἐστὶ τῷ μεταξὺ γῆς καὶ σελήνης χωρίῳ πλανηθῆναι χρόνον οὐκ ἶσον.

Follows a description of the different destinies of the souls, according to their merit. Next, at the beginning of c. 29, he speaks of the "mixed" substance of the moon. Now, in the moon there are βάθῃ καὶ κοιλώματα (what is called *its face*), the largest of which is called Ἐκάτης μυχός. It is here that the souls do penance or receive satisfaction for what they suffered or did, *after having become daemons*.

(944c) Καλοῦσι δ' αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν μέγιστον Ἐκάτης μυχόν, ὅπου καὶ δίκας διδόασιν αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ λαμβάνουσιν, ὧν ἂν ἤδη γεγενήμεναι δαίμονες⁴ ἢ πάθωσιν ἢ δράσωσιν.

Next (30), Plutarch speaks of the duties of the daemons in the world and towards man. Some of them migrate to better regions.

(944e) Τυχάνουσι δὲ οἱ μὲν πρότερον, οἱ δὲ ὕστερον, ὅταν ὁ νοῦς ἀποκριθῇ τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀποκρίνεται δ' ἔρωτι τῆς περὶ τὸν ἥλιον εἰκόνας, δι' ἧς ἐπιλάμπει

¹ *quam regionem cum superavit animus* —

² Cp. the expression ἐκσκηνοὶ γοῦν ἡλίου γενόμεναι ap. Sext. 73 (under 1192b).

³ Νοῦς is given to man by the sun as light is given to the moon. Cp. the function of νοῦς in the text of Philo, cited under 1181, sub. 1.

⁴ Cp. Sextus, § 74 (under b), and Galenus, *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.*, p. 448 M, cited under nr. 1055.

τὸ ἐφετὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ θεῖον καὶ μακάριον, οὗ πᾶσα φύσις, ἄλλη δ' ἄλλως, ὀρέγεται. Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τὴν σελήνην ἔρωτι τοῦ ἡλίου περιπολεῖν ἀεί, καὶ συγγίνεσθαι ὀρεγομένην, ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ γονιμώτατον ** (5) Λείπεται δὲ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς φύσις ἐπὶ τὴν σελήνην, οἷον ἔχνη τινὰ βίου καὶ ὀνείρατα διαφυλάττουσα· καὶ περὶ ταύτης ὀρθῶς ἡγοῦ λελέχθαι τὸ,

“Ψυχὴ δ' ἡύτ' ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότῃται.”¹

οὐδὲ γὰρ εὐθύς οὐδὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσα, τοῦτο πέπονθεν, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον, ὅταν ἔρημος καὶ μόνη τοῦ νοῦ ἀπαλλαττομένη γένηται. (6) Καὶ “Ὀμηρος ὦν εἶπε πάντων μάλιστα δὴ κατὰ θεὸν εἰπεῖν ἔοικε περὶ τῶν καθ' Αἰδοῦ

“Τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα βίην Ἑρακληΐην,
εἶδωλον· αὐτὸς δὲ μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν.”²

αὐτός τε γὰρ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν οὐ θυμὸς ἐστίν, οὐδὲ φόβος, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ οὐδὲ σάρκες οὐδὲ ὑγρότητες, ἀλλ' ὧ διανοούμεθα καὶ φρονοῦμεν, * ἡ τε ψυχὴ τυπουμένη μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ, τυπούσα δὲ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περιπτύσσουσα πανταχόθεν ἐκμάττεται τὸ εἶδος· ὥστε καὶ πολὺν χρόνον χωρὶς ἑκατέρου γένηται, διατηρούσα τὴν ὁμοιότητα καὶ τὸν τύπον, εἶδωλον ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζεται. (7) Τούτων δὲ ἡ σελήνη, καθάπερ εἴρηται, στοιχεῖόν ἐστιν· ἀναλύονται γὰρ εἰς ταύτην, ὥσπερ εἰς τὴν γῆν τὰ σώματα τῶν νεκρῶν.

Noûs then, being born from the sun, returns to the sun; soul, being of a mixed nature, to the moon, and body, consisting of the grossest matter, to earth.

The passage is striking by its marked spiritualism. The question must be asked whether or not this sharp distinction between noûs and psychè goes back to Posid. Verbeke, *La doctrine du pneuma*, p. 129 f., observes that Plutarch's psychology does not correspond exactly with that of Posid. So did Pohlenz, *Gott. Gel. Anz.* 1926, p. 305.

Reinhardt, *Kosmos u. Symp.* p. 320-323, 348-353, defends the Posidonian origin of the whole theory, pointing out its closed and systematical character. “Von der Sonne geht das Werden aus (τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐνδίδωσι τῆς γενέσεως); die Sonne ist zugleich das “Herz der Welt”, zugleich der “Nus der Welt”.—Der Nus kann nur vom Nus ausgehen, der Nus des Menschen nur vom “Nus des Kosmos””³.

On *Tusc.* I, compared with this eschatology, Reinhardt, o.c., p. 363. Jones opposes Reinhardt in *Class. Philol.* 1936, p. 113-135, but his criticism is liable to the above-made objections.

Pohlenz, *Stoa* I, p. 229 f., appears to be convinced by Reinhardt's arguments. See also Blankert, *Seneca Ep.* 90, p. 229. Parallel passages concerning noûs: our nr. 1195.

1193—a. That Posid. adopted the view of the Ancient Academy as ^{Intermediate} to the intermediate position of the soul (cp. Xenocrates, our nr. 759, ^{place of the} vol. II), appears from the following passage. ^{soul}

¹ *Odysea* λ 222.

² *Od.* λ 601 f.

³ p. 351, 352.

Plutarchus, *De procr. animae in Tim.* 22, p. 1023b:

“Ὅμοια δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ἀντειπεῖν καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ποσειδώνιον· οὐ γὰρ μακρὰν τῆς ὕλης ἀπέστησαν· ἀλλὰ δεξάμενοι τὴν τῶν περάτων οὐσίαν περὶ τὰ σώματα λέγεσθαι μεριστὴν καὶ ταῦτα τῷ νοητῷ μίξαντες ἀπεφάνησαν τὴν ψυχὴν ἰδέαν εἶναι τοῦ πάντῃ διαστατοῦ κατ’ ἀριθμὸν συνεστῶσαν ἁρμονίαν περιέχοντα· τὰ τε γὰρ μαθηματικὰ τῶν πρώτων νοητῶν μεταξὺ καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τετάχθαι, τῆς τε ψυχῆς, τῶν νοητῶν τὸ αἶδιον καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὸ παθητικὸν ἐχούσης, προσῆκον ἐν μέσῳ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπάρχειν.

On this passage: R. M. Jones, *The Platonism of Plutarch*, Chicago 1916, pp. 73 ff.;

A. E. Taylor, *A commentary on Plato's Tim.* 1928, p. 118 f.

Ph. Merlan, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des antiken Platonismus. Poseidonios über die Weltseele in Platons Timaios*, *Philologus* 89 (NF 43), 1934, p. 198 ff.

P. Thévenaz, *L'âme du monde, le devenir et la matière chez Plutarque*, Paris 1938, p. 65-67.

G. Verbeke, *La doctrine du pneuma*, pp. 117-120.

Ph. Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism*, The Hague 1953, p. 31 ff.

C. J. de Vogel, *A la recherche des étapes précises entre le Platonisme et le Néoplat.*, *Mnemosyne* 1954, p. 111-122.

The essential point is that, according to this view, soul, being an intermediate body, is, though not identified, yet essentially connected with a mathematical principle (τὸ πάντῃ διαστατόν means: space).

spiritualism **b.** The following words of Posid. are the expression of a strongly “dualistic” or spiritualistic conception of man.

Seneca, *Ep.* 92, 10:

Prima ars hominis est ipsa virtus: huic committitur inutilis caro et fluida, receptandis tantum cibis habilis, ut ait Posidonius.

Immortality presupposed in Posid.'s theory of mantic **1194—a.** Posidonius's explanation of what is called *natural mantic* is based on this view of soul and its immortality.

Cic., *De div.* I 30, 63-64:

Cum ergo est somno sevocatus animus a societate et a contagione corporis, tum meminit praeteritorum, praesentia cernit, futura providet; iacet enim corpus dormientis ut mortui, viget autem et vivit animus. quod multo magis faciet post mortem, cum omnino corpore excesserit. itaque adpropinquante morte multo est divinior. nam et id ipsum vident qui sunt morbo gravi et mortifero adfecti, instare mortem; itaque si occurrunt plerumque imagines mortuorum tumque vel maxime laudi student eosque qui secus quam decuit vixerunt peccatorum suorum tum maxime paenitet. divinare autem morientes illo etiam exemplo confirmat Posidonius quod adfert, Rhodium quendam morientem sex

aequales nominasse et dixisse qui primus eorum, qui secundus, qui deinde deinceps moriturus esset. Sed tribus modis censet deorum adpulsu homines somnare, uno quod provideat animus ipse per sese, quippe qui deorum cognatione teneatur, altero quod plenus aër sit immortalium animorum, in quibus tamquam insignitae notae veritatis appareant, tertio quod ipsi di cum dormientibus conloquantur.

First, the *quod plenus aër sit immortalium animorum* comes from the same theory as that which we found in Plutarch's *De facie* 28-30. It is the ψυχή, ἔνους τε καὶ σὺν νῷ, σώματος ἐκπεσοῦσα, which "roams" between the earth and the moon. And, first of all, there are the pre-existing souls coming from the sun and passing through the sublunary sphere before being bound in a body.

Secondly, these souls prove to possess certain innate notions of truth—, which certainly means, that its νοῦς comes from a higher region ¹.

Cp. also Seneca, *Ep.* 90, 28, 105 and Aug., *Civ. Dei* VII 6 C. The passages are discussed by Blankert, o.c., p. 204 ff.

b. Having reported Posidonius's defense of "technical mantic", which is essentially based on *sympatheia*, i.e. the connexion of everything with everything in nature, the author concludes: Also in that
of technical
mantic

Cic., *De div.* I 57, 131:

Quid est igitur cur, cum domus sit omnium una eaque communis cumque animi hominum semper fuerint futurique sint, cur ii quid ex quoque eveniat et quid quamque rem significet perspicere non possint?

The passage must be interpreted in this sense that, by its *pre-existence and post-existence* (*cum animi hominum semper fuerint futurique sint*), the soul has certain "innate notions of truth", which enable man to understand *quid ex quoque eveniat*, etc.

It might seem perhaps to us that, to this purpose, the possession of innate notions of truth is not necessary or even helpful. Yet, it is clear that the argument *cumque animi* does not refer to the explanation of natural but to that of technical mantic.

1195—There is some converging evidence for the thesis that Posid. called the higher intellectual functions of man *noûs*, and that he derived it from regions superior to those of what he called *psychè*. Doubtless, the above cited passages from *De div.* I must be reckoned to this evidence. Moreover Pohlenz (*St. II*, p. 116) points to the following texts.

¹ Verbeke, *La doctrine du pneuma*, p. 125, explains the passage in this sense that, according to the Ancient Stoic theory, the *πνώσεις* in the psychical pneuma could be *seen* in these souls delivered from the body.

This explanation, evidently, is possible in the case of those souls which, having left the body, are on the way to higher spheres. It does not apply, however, to those who, coming from the sun, are on the way to the earth.

The doctrine
of νοῦς
with Posid.

a. Strabo X 3, 9 (speaking of ekstasis being effected by music):
Καὶ τοῦθ' ἡ φύσις οὕτως ὑπαγορεύει. ἥ τε γὰρ ἄνεσις τὸν νοῦν ἀπάγει ἀπὸ
τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν ἀσχολημάτων, * τὸν δὲ ὄντως νοῦν τρέπει πρὸς τὸ θεῖον·
ὃ τε ἐνθουσιασμός ἐπίπνευσίν τινα θεῖαν ἔχειν δοκεῖ καὶ τῷ μαντικῷ γένει
πλησιάζειν.

It is at least probable that Strabo, who used Posid.' works continually, took these ideas from him.

b. Cp. Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VII (= *Ag. the log.* I) 129, explaining Heraclitus' words that not the senses, but *logos*, or τὸ κοινόν is the criterium of truth:

Τοῦτον δὴ τὸν θεῖον λόγον καθ' Ἡράκλειτον δι' ἀναπνοῆς σπάσαντες νοεροὶ
γινόμεθα, καὶ ἐν μὲν ὕπνοις ληθαῖοι, κατὰ δὲ ἐγερσιν πάλιν ἐμφρονες. ἐν
γὰρ τοῖς ὕπνοις μυσάντων τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων χωρίζεται τῆς πρὸς τὸ
περιέχον συμφύτας ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς, μόνης τῆς κατὰ ἀναπνοὴν προσφύσεως
σφζομένης οἰονεῖ τινος ῥίξης, χωρισθεὶς τε ἀποβάλλει ἣν πρότερον εἶχε μνη-
μονικὴν δύναμιν· ἐν δὲ ἐγρηγορόσι πάλιν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων ὥσπερ
διὰ τινων θυρίδων προκύψας καὶ τῷ περιέχοντι συμβαλὼν λογικὴν ἐνδύεται
δύναμιν.

It is on the ground of these texts that by modern writers Posid. is usually represented as a mystic. The point is denied by Edelstein who, in his important article of 1936¹, tried to make a reconstruction of Posid. exclusively on the ground of texts in which his name is mentioned. E. even denies that Posid. held the immortality of the soul. It may be clear by the preceding pages that E.'s method is defective.

Posid.'s
conception
of God

1196—a. At first sight, Posid.'s conception of God might seem to be hardly separable from that of other Stoics.

Diog. L. VII 138-139; 148:

Τὸν δὴ κόσμον διοικεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος
τ' ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ Περὶ προνοίας καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ Περὶ θεῶν, εἰς
ἅπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος διήκοντος τοῦ νοῦ, καθάπερ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀλλ' ἡδη
δι' ὧν μὲν μᾶλλον, δι' ὧν δὲ ἥττον. δι' ὧν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἕξις κεχώρηκεν, ὡς
διὰ τῶν ὁστῶν καὶ τῶν νεύρων· δι' ὧν δὲ ὡς νοῦς, ὡς διὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ.
οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ζῶον ὄντα καὶ ἐμψυχον καὶ λογικόν, ἔχειν ἡγεμο-
νικὸν μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, καθά φησιν Ἀντίπατρος ὁ Τύριος ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ Περὶ
κόσμου. Χρύσιππος δ' ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ προνοίας καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ
Περὶ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανόν φησι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου, Κλεάνθης δὲ τὸν ἥλιον. —

¹ L. Edelstein, *The philosophical System of Posidonius*, in *American Journ. of Philol.* 57 (1936), p. 286-325.

Οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ Ζήνων μὲν φησι τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Χρῦσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ θεῶν καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν πρώτῳ Περὶ θεῶν.

b. The following definition of God, explicitly attributed to Posid., does not bring us much further with regard to the question whether Posid. was a mere pantheist, or, if not, in what respects he differed from other Stoics, e.g. Chrysippus.

Commenta Lucani ad v. 578, ed. H. Usener, p. 305:

Θεός ἐστι πνεῦμα νοερὸν διήκον δι' ἀπάσης οὐσίας.

c. We find another apparently pantheistic definition of God in Strabo's description of Moses's teaching, which certainly goes back to Posid.

Strabo XVI 2, 35:

Ἐφη γὰρ ἐκεῖνος (sc. ὁ Μωυσῆς) καὶ ἐδίδασκεν, ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς φρονοῖεν οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι θηρίοις εἰκάζοντες καὶ βοσκήμασι τὸ θεῖον [οὐδ' οἱ Λίβυες], οὐκ εὖ δ' οὐδ' οἱ Ἕλληνες ἀνθρωπομόρφους τυποῦντες· εἴη γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ μόνον θεὸς τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς ἀπαντας καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν, ὃ καλοῦμεν οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν. τούτου δὴ τίς ἂν εἰκόνα πλάττειν θαρρήσειεν νοῦν ἔχων ὁμοίαν τινὶ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν; ἀλλ' ἂν δεῖν πᾶσαν ξοανοποιῖαν, τέμενος δ' ἀφορίσαντας καὶ σηκὸν ἀξιόλογον τιμᾶν ἔδους χωρίς.

Blankert, *Seneca Ep.* 90, p. 228 ff., compares Sextus, *M.* IX 102 f., where it is argued that, lastly, every power which is in a part springs from the hegemonikón; much more than the whole, which contains all rational animals, must be rational itself. Blankert concludes that, since in this passage—be it or be it not "Posidonian"—the argument tends more to the ἡγεμονικόν than to the All, Strabo's definition, too, admits of a not merely pantheistic interpretation.

d. The following definition explicitly attributed to Posid., enables us to distinguish between the Ancient Stoic conception (cp. our nr. 918) and Posid.'s conception of God.

Doxogr. Gr., p. 324 a 4:

Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν Δία, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν φύσιν, τρίτην δὲ τὴν εἰμαρμένην.

We may conclude that the identification, as it is expressed in Diog. L. VII 135 (the end): "Ἐν τ' εἶναι θεὸν καὶ νοῦν καὶ εἰμαρμένην καὶ Δία—appears not to be Posidonean.

Posid., as might be expected from the evidence adduced in the preceding numbers, appears to have held a hierarchical view of the universe and of the (immanent) spiritual forces by which it is governed and "held together": first is the *Noûs* or ἡγεμονικόν, which is in the proper sense *God*; divine, but in a lower degree, is *φύσις*;

**Hierarchical
view of the
spiritual
forces in the
universe**

and last comes εἰμαρμένη, which may have been conceived like Plato's ἀνάγκη in the *Timaeus*.

Cp. Blankert, o.c., p. 206 ff., on Philo, *Spec. leg.* I 66.

See also Verbeke, *La doctrine du pneuma*, p. 120.

On εἰμαρμένη, Edelstein, o.c., p. 301.

From all this it may be clear that to consider Posid. as a forerunner of Neoplatonism is not an unfounded opinion.

On his influence on Plotinus and later Neoplatonists, as well as on later Stoics, see W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, Berlin 1930, p. 61-109. Also R. E. Witt, *Plotinus and Posidonius*, in *Class. Quart.* 1930, p. 198-207.

4—THE FOURTH ACADEMY: PHILO AND ANTIOCHUS

Philo of
Larisa

1197—a. Philo was the successor of Clitomachus, Carneades's successor in the Academy.

Euseb., *Praep. ev.* XIV 8, 15:

Διάδοχος δ' αὐτοῦ (sc. Καρνεάδου) τῆς διατριβῆς καθίσταται Κλειτόμαχος, μεθ' ὃν Φίλων.

Admired by
Cicero

b. A. 88 he came to Rome, where Cicero heard him with great enthusiasm.

Cicero, *Brutus* 89, 306 (Cicero is speaking to Brutus):

Eodemque tempore, cum princeps Academiae Philo cum Atheniensium optumatis Mithridatico bello domo profugisset Romamque venisset, totum ei me tradidi admirabili quodam ad philosophiam studio concitatus; in quo hoc etiam commorabar attentius — etsi rerum ipsarum varietas et magnitudo summa me delectatione retinebat.

Cp. also *Tusc.* II 3, 9.

He did not
return to
dogmatism

c. Cic., *Ac. pr.* (*Lucullus*) 4, 11 speaks of "two books of Philo", in which (according to *Ac. post.* 4, 13) he "denied that there are two Academies"; i.e. he considered the New Academy as being a legitimate continuation of the Old, while his pupil Antiochus denied this and desired to return to dogmatism.

Cic., *Ac. post.* 4, 13 (Cic. speaks to Varro):

Quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, magnus vir ut tu existimas ipse, negaret in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebam, duas Academias esse, erroremque eorum qui ita putarent coarguit.

"Est", inquit (sc. Varro) "ut dicis; sed ignorare te non arbitror quae contra Philonis Antiochus scripserit."

d. Cp. Cic., *Ac. pr.* (*Lucullus*) 6, 18:

(Lucullus, a pupil and friend of Antiochus, speaks.)

Philo autem dum nova quaedam commovet . . . in id ipsum se induit quod timebat. cum enim ita negaret quicquam esse quod comprehendi posset (id enim volumus esse ἀκατάληπτον), si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret, tale visum (iam enim hoc pro φαντασία verbum satis hesterno sermone trivimus) — visum igitur impressum effectumque ex eo unde esset quale esse non posset ex eo unde non esset¹ (id nos a Zenone definitum rectissime dicimus; qui enim potest quicquam comprehendi, ut plane confidas perceptum id cognitumque esse, quod est tale quale vel falsum esse possit?) — hoc cum infirmat tollitque Philo, iudicium tollit incogniti et cogniti; ex quo efficitur nihil posse comprehendi. ita inprudens eo quo minime volt revolvitur. Quare omnis oratio contra Academiam suscipitur a nobis, ut retineamus eam definitionem quam Philo voluit evertere; quam nisi optinemus, percipi nihil posse concedimus.

Philo, then, rejected the cataleptic presentation as a criterion of truth and therefore, in fact, fell into scepticism, though he did not intend this. Denying that there was any real difference between the Old and the New Academy, Philo probably maintained that Carneades's "empirical certitude" (see above, nr. 1116b) did not differ essentially from Plato's or the Early Academic view of truth. In this, he was contradicted by Antiochus, who maintained the validity of sense-perception, and thus, went back essentially to Stoicism, not to classical Platonism. See Lucullus in the next par. of the *Ac. pr.* (19):

Meo autem iudicio ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et sani sunt ac valentes et omnia remonentur quae obstant et impediunt.

Cp. also Sextus, *P. I* 235.

1198—Antiochus, then, who was Philo's disciple for quite a long time (see Cicero's *Lucullus* 22, 69), abandoned scepticism and went back to the Old Academy, or at least pretended to do so.

**Antiochus
of Ascalon**

He seems to have left Athens with Philo in 88 B.C., and is found with Lucullus at Alexandria in 87/86, where the conflict with Philo arose when he received the above-mentioned two books, in which was written "that there are not two Academies".

a. Cic., *Ac. pr.* (*Lucullus*) 4, 11-12:

At ille (sc. Lucullus) "Cum Alexandriae pro quaestore" inquit "essem, fuit Antiochus mecum, et erat iam antea Alexandriae familiaris Antiochi

¹ *Visum igitur — ex eo unde non esset*: a translation of Zeno's definition of φαντασία καταληπτική cited under nr. 984b.

Heraclitus Tyrius, qui et Clitomachum multos annos et Philonem audierat, homo sane in ista philosophia, quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur, probatus et nobilis; cum quo et Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam — sed utrumque leniter; et quidem isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo est, tum erant allati Alexandriam tumque primum in Antiochi manus venerant; et homo natura lenissimus (nihil enim poterat fieri illo mitius) stomachari tamen coepit. —

Nec se tenuit quin contra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet, qui Sosus inscribitur.

b. He seems to have known Lucullus in Rome and to have lived in his house.

Plutarchus, *Luc.* 42:

Καὶ ὅλως ἐστία καὶ πρυτανεῖον Ἑλληνικὸν ὁ οἶκος ἦν αὐτοῦ τοῖς ἀφικνουμένοις εἰς Ῥώμην. φιλοσοφίαν δὲ πᾶσαν μὲν ἡσπάζετο καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν εὐμενὴς ἦν καὶ οἰκεῖος, ἴδιον δὲ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον ἔσχευ, οὐ τῆς νέας λεγομένης, καίπερ ἀνθούσης τότε τοῖς Καρνεάδου λόγοις διὰ Φίλωνος, ἀλλὰ τῆς παλαιᾶς, πιθανὸν ἄνδρα καὶ δεινὸν εἰπεῖν τότε προστάτην ἐχούσης τὸν Ἀσκαλωνίτην Ἀντίοχον, ὃν πάσῃ σπουδῇ ποιησάμενος φίλον ὁ Λούκουλλος καὶ συμβιωτὴν ἀντέταττε τοῖς Φίλωνος ἀκροαταῖς, ὧν καὶ Κικέρων ἦν.

c. In 79, Cicero heard him during 6 months at Athens.

Cicero, *Brutus* 91, 315:

Cum venissem Athenas, sex menses cum Antiocho veteris Academiae nobilissimo et prudentissimo philosopho fui studiumque philosophiae nunquam intermissum a primaque adulescentia cultum et semper auctum hoc rursus summo auctore et doctore renovavi.

Cp. Plut., *Cic.* 4, where it is said that Cicero was charmed by the fluency and grace of Antiochus' diction, but disapproved of his innovations in doctrine.

Varro, too, belonged to the pupils and admirers of Antiochus.

Cicero makes him expound Antiochus' doctrine in the *Acad. post.* §§ 15-42, as he had it done by Lucullus in the *Prior Acad.*, 11-60, and by M. Pupius Piso Calpurnianus in *De finibus* V 9-74.

These are our direct sources concerning Antiochus' doctrine. Parts of *De finibus* IV also must be traced back to him (probably to another work than that which is followed in *De fin.* V).

De fin. II 33 ff. contain a summary of his views. So do the first chapters of S. Augustine's *De civ. Dei*, in which Varro is followed.

See the work of A. Lueder, *Die philosophische Persönlichkeit des Antiochos von Askalon*, Göttingen, 1940; also G. Luck, *Der Akademiker Antiochos* (Noctes Romanae 7), Bern 1953 (a collection of the fragments, preceded by some introductory chapters).

1199—Together with Posidonius, who was a platonizing and aristotelizing Stoic, Antiochus must be considered as the founder of that philosophy of synthesis, which prevailed during the first centuries A.D. **The founder of a philosophy of synthesis**

Antiochus did not see any essential difference between Plato and Aristotle, between the Academics (Speusippus, Xenocrates, etc. *until* Arcesilas) and Peripatetics (eliminating Strato as *totum dissidentem a suis*). Moreover, Stoicism was judged by him not to be a new doctrine, but a correction of the Academy of Polemo and Crates, to which he adhered essentially.

a. Cic., *Acad. post.* I 4, 17-18:

Platonis autem auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est Academicorum et Peripateticorum, qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. —

Nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem Academiam differebat. abundantia quadam ingenii praestabat, ut mihi quidem videtur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat utrisque et eadem rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque partitio.

b. *Ib.*, 9, 34-35:

Speusippus autem et Xenocrates, qui primi Platonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant, et post eos Polemo et Crates unaque Crantor in Academia congregati diligenter ea quae a superioribus acceperantuebantur. Iam Polemonem audiverant assidue Zeno et Arcesilas, sed Zeno, cum Arcesilam anteiret aetate valdeque subtiliter disserteret et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam.

1200—Did Antiochus, who wished to restore the authority of the Old Academy, or did he not, reintroduce the Platonic Ideas in their transcendent sense?

Did he reintroduce the Platonic ideas?

Theiler, *Vorbereitung des Neupl.* pp. 40 ff., thinks he did, and therefore should be called "the ἀρχηγέτης of the Academic schooltradition which ends in Neoplatonism". Witt¹, who is followed in this by A. Lueder, opposes him, arguing that, as appears in Cic., *Ac. pr.* 10, 30, Antiochus was essentially a Stoic in his theory of knowledge and not a transcendentalist. Albinus, on the contrary, went back to the Early Academy, for this very reason, that Antiochus' philosophy was essentially alien to Platonic metaphysics. Luck, *Antiochos*, p. 28 ff., adheres to Theiler's view.

¹ R. E. Witt, *Albinus and the history of middle Platonism*, Cambridge 1937, p. 27, 57/8, 68.

a. The "third part of philosophy" (i.e. the theory of knowledge) is expounded by Varro, who follows Antiochus, as follows.

Cic., *Acad. post.* 8, 30-33:

Tertia deinde philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in disserendo, sic tractabatur ab utrisque ¹. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus, tamen non esse iudicium veritatis in sensibus ². mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem, solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset (hanc illi ἰδέαν appellabant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus dicere). sensus autem omnis hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur nec percipere ullo modo res eas quae subjectae sensibus viderentur, quod essent aut ita parvae ut sub sensum cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et concitatae ut nihil umquam unum esset <et> constans, ne idem quidem, quia continenter laberentur et fluerent omnia. itaque hanc omnem partem rerum opinabilem appellabant; scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in animi notionibus ³ atque rationibus ⁴. qua de causa definitiones rerum probabant et has ad omnia de quibus disceptabatur adhibebant; verborum etiam explicatio ⁵ probabatur, id est qua de causa quaeque essent ita nominata, quam ἐτυμολογίαν appellabant; post argumentis quibusdam et quasi rerum notis ducibus utebantur ad probandum et ad concludendum id quod explanari volebant. in qua tradebatur omnis dialecticae disciplina, id est, orationis ratione conclusae ⁶; huic quasi ex altera parte oratoria vis dicendi adhibebatur, explicatrix orationis perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae. Haec forma erat illis prima, a Platone tradita.

The whole of this description bears a synthetic character, with a strong element of Stoicism in it. The formula *id quod semper esset simplex et eius modi et tale quale esset* may sound rather Platonic. Yet, the passage of the *Acad. pr.*, to be cited sub c, will not allow us to attribute a transcendental conception of the ideas to Antiochus.

b. *Acad. post.* 9, 33:

Aristoteles igitur primus species quas paulo ante dixi labefactavit, quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, ut in iis quiddam divinum esse

¹ Sc. Academics and Peripatetics.

² Cp. our nr. 985.

³ ἐννοιαίς.

⁴ Intelligible forms or definitions (λόγοις).

⁵ He means: the derivation of words. This too is a Stoic feature in the description.

⁶ "In a logical form".

diceret. Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione suavis et ita moratus ut prae se probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat, vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae; spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere.

The question is, whether we may infer from this passage that by Antiochus, who wished to restore the authority of the Old Academy, Aristotle's criticism of Plato's Ideas, too, was considered as a destruction of the *vetus disciplina*. This is what Theiler thinks, who (in *Gnomon* 1939, p. 105) uses the passage as an argument against Witt. Much depends, evidently, on the sense of the word *mirifice*, which by Theiler is apparently interpreted as "in a wonderful way". I think it rather means "very strongly" (θαυμαστώως ὥς); and the author thought that Aristotle was right in criticizing Plato's transcendentalism.

On the contrary, he rebuked Theophr. for having deprived virtue of its self-sufficiency. On both points Antiochus rather takes the Stoic point of view.

c. Cic., *Acad. pr.* (*Lucullus*) 10, 30:

Sequitur disputatio copiosa illa quidem, sed paulo abstrusior — habet enim aliquantum a physicis, ut verear ne maiorem largiar ei qui contra dicturus est libertatem et licentiam; nam quid eum facturum putem de abditis rebus et obscuris, qui lucem eripere conetur? — sed disputari poterat subtiliter quanto quasi artificio natura fabricata esset primum animal omne, deinde hominem maxime, quae vis esset in sensibus, quem ad modum prima visa nos pellerent, deinde adpetitio ab his pulsa sequeretur, tum ut sensus ad res percipiendas intenderemus. Mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est¹, naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea quibus movetur. itaque alia visa sic arripit, ut iis statim utatur, alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur; cetera autem similitudinibus construit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum ἐννοίας, tum προλήψεις vocant; eo cum accessit ratio argumentique conclusio rerumque innumerabilium multitudo, tum et perceptio eorum omnium apparet et eadem ratio perfecta his gradibus ad sapientiam pervenit.

The theory here expounded is purely Stoic, and certainly, even though we may hesitate to qualify it as mere sensualism, does not tend to a renewal of classical Platonism.

Cp. what is said of Antiochus in *Acad. pr.* 43, 132: *Erat quidem si perpauca mutavisset germanissimus Stoicus.*

¹ Hence, Witt (o.c., p. 68) says: "We must not forget, that for Antiochus *mens* and *sensus* mean the same thing".

Cp. however *De fin.* V, 13, 36, where, next to the *sensus*, *mens* is mentioned as *princeps pars animi*, which is said to possess two kinds of virtues, (1) innate intellectual gifts, (2) moral virtues depending on volition. On this passage: A. Lueder, o.c., p. 42 ff.

Ethics

1201—a. In explaining the telos formula (*vivere secundum naturam*) Antiochus, starting from *οἰκείωσις*, first stresses the *progress* from the *πρώτη ὁρμή* to selfconsciousness, next the *difference between the species* of living beings.

The telos
formula
explained

Cic., *De fin.* V 9, 24-26:

Omne animal se ipsum diligit ac, simul ut ortum est, id agit, ut se conservet, quod hic ei primus ad omnem vitam tuendam appetitus a natura datur, se ut conservet atque ita sit affectum, ut optime secundum naturam affectum esse possit. Hanc initio institutionem confusam habet et incertam, ut tantum modo se tueatur, quaecumque sit, sed nec quid sit nec quid possit, nec quid ipsius natura sit, intellegit. Cum autem processit paulum et, quatenus quidque se attingat ad seque pertineat, perspicere coepit, tum sensim incipit progredi seseque agnoscere et intellegere. quam ob causam habeat eum quem diximus animi appetitum coepstatque et ea quae naturae sentit apta appetere et propulsare contraria. Ergo omni animali illud quod appetit positum est in eo quod naturae est accommodatum. Ita finis bonorum existit secundum naturam vivere sic affectum, ut optime affici possit ad naturamque accommodatissime.

Quoniam autem sua cuiusque animantis natura est, necesse est finem quoque omnium hunc esse, ut natura expleatur (nihil enim prohibet quaedam esse et inter se animalibus reliquis et cum bestiis homini communia, quoniam omnium est natura communis), sed extrema illa et summa quae quaerimus inter animalium genera distincta et dispertita sint et sua cuique propria et ad id apta quod cuiusque natura desideret. —

Ex quo intellegi debet homini id esse in bonis ultimum, secundum naturam vivere, quod ita interpretemur: vivere ex hominis natura undique perfecta et nihil requirente.

b. In c. 12, the author proceeds to describe the nature of man: man consists of body and soul, both of which must be brought to perfection. He concludes:

Cic., *De fin.* V 13, 37-38:

Ea enim vita expetitur, quae sit animi corporisque expleta virtutibus, in eoque summum bonum poni necesse est, quandoquidem id tale esse debet, ut rerum expetendarum sit extremum. —

(38) Quibus expositis facilis est coniectura ea maxime esse expetenda ex nostris, quae plurimum habent dignitatis, ut optimae cuiusque partis,

quae per se expetatur, virtus sit expetenda maxime. Ita fiet ut animi virtus corporis virtuti anteponatur animique virtutes non voluntarias vincant virtutes voluntariae, quae quidem proprie virtutes appellantur multumque excellunt, propterea quod ex ratione gignuntur, qua nihil est in homine divinius.

c. Thus, for man there is a gradual ascent, from the πρώτη ὁρμή to the full development both of the body and of the mind.

Man's end
the perfec-
tion of his
whole being

Cic., *De fin.* V 14, 40:

Sic exitit extremum omnium appetendorum atque ductum a prima commendatione naturae multis gradibus adscendit, ut ad summum perveniret, quod cumulatur ex integritate corporis et ex mentis ratione perfecta.

This is what Antiochus called *tota natura* (ib. 15, 41), a conception which agrees essentially with the Aristotelian view of man. He appears to have opposed this to Chrysippus' one-sided conception of man.

1202—Self-knowledge means: to know the whole of our nature.

Self-
knowledge

Cic., *De fin.* V 16, 44:

Intrandum est igitur in rerum naturam et penitus quid ea postulet pervidendum; aliter enim nosmet ipsos nosse non possumus. Quod praeceptum quia maius erat quam ut ab homine videretur, idcirco adsignatum est deo. Iubet igitur nos Pythius Apollo noscere nosmet ipsos. Cognitio autem haec est una nostri, ut vim corporis animique norimus sequamurque eam vitam quae rebus iis perfruatur.

1203—a. Since the perfection of the whole is desirable to us, the perfection of each part of our nature is also desirable to us for its own sake.

The perfec-
tion of the
parts also
desirable
for their
own sake

Cic., *De fin.* V 17, 46:

Nunc autem aliud iam argumentandi sequamur genus, ut non solum quia nos diligamus, sed quia cuiusque partis naturae et in corpore et in animo sua quaeque vis sit, idcirco in his rebus summe nostra sponte moveamur. Atque ut a corpore ordiar, videsne, ut, si quae in membris prava aut delibitata aut inminuta sint, occultent homines? ut etiam contendat et elaborent, si efficere possint, ut aut non appareat corporis vitium aut quam minimum appareat? multosque etiam dolores curationis causa perferant, ut, si ipse usus membrorum non modo non maior, verum etiam minor futurus sit, eorum tamen species ad naturam rever-

tatur? Etenim, cum omnes natura totos se expetendos putent, nec id ob aliam rem, sed propter ipsos, necesse est eius etiam partis propter se expeti, quod universum propter se expetatur.

Health,
strength and
beauty desi-
rable for
their own
sake

b. Therefore, health, strength and beauty are desirable for their own sake.

Ib., 47:

Quid? in motu et in statu corporis nihil inest, quod animadvertendum esse ipsa natura iudicet? quem ad modum quis ambulet, sedeat, qui ductus oris, qui vultus in quoque sit? nihilne est in his rebus quod dignum libero aut indignum esse ducamus? Nonne odio dignos multos putamus, qui quodam motu aut statu videntur naturae legem et modum contempsisse? Et quoniam haec deducuntur de corpore, quid est cur non recte pulchritudo etiam ipsa propter se expetenda ducatur? Nam si pravitatem imminutionemque corporis propter se fugiendam putamus, cur non etiam, ac fortasse magis, propter se formae dignitatem sequamur? Et si turpitudinem fugimus in statu et motu corporis, quid est cur pulchritudinem non sequamur? Atque etiam valetudinem, vires, vacuitatem doloris non propter utilitatem solum, sed etiam ipsas propter se expetemus. Quoniam enim natura suis omnibus expleri partibus vult, hunc statum corporis per se ipsum expetit qui est maxime e natura, quae tota perturbatur, si aut aegrum corpus est aut dolet aut caret viribus.

Man's task
of realizing
his
endowments

1204—*a.* Both the striving for knowledge and social activities are natural to man. So is the germ of virtue, which must be developed by our personal energy.

Cic., *De fin.* V 21, 59-60:

Natura igitur corpus quidem hominis sic et genuit et formavit, ut alia in primo ortu perficeret, alia progrediente aetate fingeret neque sane multum adiumentis externis et adventiciis uteretur; animum autem reliquis rebus ita perfecit, ut corpus; sensibus enim ornavit ad res percipiendas idoneis, ut nihil aut non multum adiumento ullo ad suam confirmationem indigeret; quod autem in homine praestantissimum atque optimum est, id deseruit. Etsi dedit talem mentem, quae omnem virtutem accipere posset, ingenuitque sine doctrina notitias parvas rerum maximarum et quasi instituit docere et induxit in ea quae inerant tamquam elementa virtutis. Sed virtutem ipsam inchoavit, nihil amplius. Itaque nostrum est (quod nostrum dico, artis est) ad ea principia quae accepimus con-

sequentia exquirere, quoad sit id quod volumus effectum; quod quidem pluris est haud paulo magisque ipsum propter se expetendum quam aut sensus aut corporis ea quae diximus, quibus tantum praestat mentis excellens perfectio, ut vix cogitari possit quid intersit. Itaque omnis honos, omnis admiratio, omne studium ad virtutem et ad eas actiones quae virtuti sunt consentaneae refertur, eaque omnia quae aut ita in animis sunt, aut ita geruntur uno nomine honesta dicuntur.

b. In this, man is helped first of all by the *ars vivendi*:

Ars vivendi

Cic., *De fin.* IV 7, 16:

Omnis natura vult esse conservatrix sui, ut et salva sit, et in genere conservetur suo. Ad hanc rem aiunt artis quoque requisitas, quae naturam adiuvarent; in quibus ea numeretur in primis, quae est vivendi ars, ut tueatur quod a natura datum sit, quod desit acquirat. Idemque diviserrunt naturam hominis in animum et corpus. Cumque eorum utrumque per se expetendum esse dixissent, virtutes quoque utriusque eorum per se expetendas esse dicebant, et, cum animum infinita quadam laude anteponerent corpori, virtutes quoque animi bonis corporis anteponebant.

In § 76 of the same book he calls this art *prudentia*, saying: Omnibus enim artibus volumus attributam esse eam quae communis appellatur prudentia, quam omnes qui cuique artificio praesunt debent habere.

1205—The leading virtue is justice, which is rooted in the natural affection of man towards man (*caritas generis humani*).

**Caritas
generis
humani**

Cic., *De fin.* V 23, 65:

In omni autem honesto, de quo loquimur, nihil est tam illustre nec quod latius pateat quam coniunctio inter homines hominum et quasi quaedam societas et communicatio utilitatum et ipsa caritas generis humani, quae nata a primo satu, quod a procreatoribus nati diliguntur et tota domus coniugio et stirpe coniungitur, serpit sensim foras, cognitionibus primum, tum affinitatibus, deinde amicitiiis, post vicinitatibus, tum civibus et iis qui publice socii atque amici sunt, deinde totius complexu gentis humanae; quae animi affectio, suum cuique tribuens atque hanc quam dico societatem coniunctionis humanae munifice et aequae tuens, iustitia dicitur, cui sunt adiunctae pietas, bonitas, liberalitas, benignitas, comitas, quaeque sunt generis eiusdem. Atque haec ita iustitiae propria sunt, ut sint virtutum reliquarum communia.

The terms *carus* and *caritas* are also repeatedly used in § 37 of the same book:

Nam cui proposita sit conservatio sui, necesse est huic partes quoque sui caras esse carioresque quo perfectiores sint. —

Quo cognito, dubitari non potest quin, cum ipsi homines sibi sint per se et sua sponte cari, partes quoque et corporis et animi . . . sua caritate colantur et per se ipsae appetantur.

The *societas generis humani* and its *conciliatio* is repeatedly spoken of by Cicero in *De officiis*, especially in the last chapters of the first book (§§ 149, the end; 153; 157-160). See also III 5, 21 and 6, 26-32. In this, both Cicero and Antiochus were doubtless influenced by Panaetius. See above, our nrs. 1159 and 1162, and the passages cited under 1159b. Cp. also H. F. Reynders, *Societas generis humani bij Cicero*, diss. Utrecht 1954, p. 62-65.

A precise description of Antiochus's place in the history of philosophy is given by A. Lueder, o.c., p. 59-75; a new collection of the fragments by G. Luck, Bern 1953, (*Noctes Romanae* 7); See also Pohlenz, *Stoa* I, pp. 248-256, and *Grundfr.*, pp. 47-81.

5—SENECA

1206—With the later Stoics, moral philosophy becomes not only the essential part, but almost the whole of philosophy. Logic and "physics"—Seneca speaks of *naturales quaestiones*—have their function, but a subordinate one. As to the so-called *artes liberales*, admitted by Posidonius as a part of philosophy, Seneca does not even acknowledge the name and excludes them from philosophy, for this very reason that they are auxiliary sciences.

Auxiliary
sciences not
a part of
philosophy

a. Seneca, *Ep.* 88, 23-25:

Solae autem liberales sunt, immo, ut dicam verius, liberae, quibus curae virtus est. "quemadmodum" inquit "est aliqua pars philosophiae naturalis, est aliqua moralis, est aliqua rationalis, sic et haec quoque liberalium artium turba locum sibi in philosophia vindicat. cum ventum est ad naturales quaestiones, geometriae testimonio statur: ergo eius quam adiuvat pars est." multa adiuvant nos nec ideo partes nostri sunt. immo si partes essent, non adiuvarent: cibus adiutorium corporis, nec tamen pars est. aliquid nobis praestat geometriae ministerium: sic philosophiae necessaria est, quomodo ipsi faber. sed nec hic geometriae pars est nec illa philosophiae.

The science
of good and
bad is the
object of
philosophy
only

b. *Ib.*, 28:

Una re consummatur animus, scientia bonorum ac malorum inmutabili, <quae soli philosophiae competit> nihil autem ulla ars alia de bonis ac malis quaerit.

c. Liberal studies do not even make any real contribution to moral development.

Ib., 31-32:

"Cum dicatis" inquit "sine liberalibus studiis ad virtutem non perveniri, quemadmodum negatis illa nihil conferre virtuti?" quia nec sine cibo ad virtutem pervenitur, cibus tamen ad virtutem non pertinet. ligna navi nihil conferunt, quamvis non fiat navis nisi ex lignis: non est, inquam, cur aliquid putes eius adiutorio fieri, sine quo non potest fieri. potest quidem etiam illud dici, sine liberalibus studiis veniri ad sapientiam posse. quamvis enim virtus discenda sit, tamen non per haec discitur. quid est autem, quare existimem non futurum sapientem eum, qui litteras nescit, cum sapientia non sit in litteris?

1207—The true aim of philosophy is: to form man's character and enable him to stand firm against all blows of Fortune.

The aim
of philosophy
and how to
reach it

Sen., *Ep.* 104, 21-24:

Si velis vitiis exui, longe a vitiorum exemplis recedendum est. avarus, corruptor, saevos, fraudulentus, multum nocituri, si prope a te fuissent, intra te sunt. ad meliores transi: cum Catonibus vive, cum Laelio, cum Tuberone. quod si convivere etiam Graecis iuvat, cum Socrate, cum Zenone versare: alter te docebit mori, si necesse erit, alter antequam necesse erit. vive cum Chrysippo, cum Posidonio. hi tibi tradent humanorum divinorumque notitiam, hi iubebunt in opere esse nec tantum scite loqui et in oblectationem audientium verba iactare, sed animum indurare et adversus minas erigere. unus est enim huius vitae fluctuantis et turbidae portus eventura contemnere, stare fidenter ac paratum tela fortunae adverso pectore excipere, non latitantem nec tergiversantem. magnanimos nos natura produxit et ut quibusdam animalibus ferum dedit, quibusdam subdolum, quibusdam pavidum, ita nobis gloriosum et excelsum spiritum, quaerentem ubi honestissime, non ubi tutissime vivat, simillimum mundo, quem quantum mortalium passibus licet, sequitur aemulaturque: profert se, laudari et aspici credit. <dominus> omnium est, supra omnia est: itaque nulli se rei summittat, nihil illi videatur grave, nihil quod virum incurvet. "terribiles visu formae letumque labosque"¹: minime quidem si quis rectis oculis intueri illa possit et tenebras perrumpere. multa per noctem habita terrori dies vertit ad risum. "terribiles visu formae letumque labosque": egregie Vergilius noster non re dixit terribiles esse, sed visu, id est videri, non esse.

1208—Asked by Lucilius whether the paraenetic part of philosophy

¹ Verg., *Aen.* VI 277.

is sufficient to attain perfect wisdom, Seneca, however, replies that there is a theoretical and a practical part of philosophy.

Theoretical
and practical
philosophy

Sen., *Ep.* 95, 10-14:

Philosophia autem et contemplativa est et activa: spectat simul agitque. erras enim, si tibi illam putas tantum terrestres operas promittere: altius spirat. totum, inquit, mundum scrutor nec me intra contubernium mortale contineo suadere vobis ac dissuadere contenta. magna me vocant supraque vos posita. —

Sequitur ergo ut, cum contemplativa sit, habeat decreta sua. quid? quod facienda quoque nemo rite obibit nisi is, cui ratio erit tradita, qua in quaque re omne officiorum numeros exequi possit, quos non servabit, qui in rem praesentem praecepta acceperit, non in omnem. inbecilla sunt per se et, ut ita dicam, sine radice, quae partibus dantur. decreta sunt, quae muniant, quae securitatem nostram tranquillitatemque tueantur, quae totam vitam totamque rerum naturam simul contineant. hoc interest inter decreta philosophiae et praecepta, quod inter elementa et membra: haec ex illis dependent, illa et horum causae sunt et omnium. “antiqua” inquit “sapientia nihil aliud quam facienda ac vitanda praecepit, et tunc longe meliores erant viri: postquam docti prodierunt, boni desunt. simplex enim illa et aperta virtus in obscuram et sollertem scientiam versa est docemurque disputare, non vivere”. fuit sine dubio ut dicitis, vetus illa sapientia cum maxime nascens rudis non minus quam ceterae artes, quarum in processu subtilitas crevit. sed ne opus quidem adhuc erat remediis diligentibus. nondum in tantum nequitia surrexerat nec tam late se sparserat. poterant vitiis simplicibus obstare remedia simplicia. nunc necesse est tanto operosiora esse munimenta, quanto vehementiora sunt, quibus petimur.

1209—Pointing to the example of Socrates, he admonishes people to despise the *ineptiae poetarum* concerning the Gods, and rather to honour virtue and those who profess it than to listen to those who perform some vulgar rites of the so-called *mysteria*.

The cult of
virtue is the
true religion

Sen., *De vita beata* 26, 7 - 27, 1:

Sed quamquam ista me nihil laedant, vestra tamen vos moneo causa: suspicite virtutem, credite iis, qui illam diu secuti magnum quiddam ipsos et quod in dies maius appareat sequi clamant, et ipsam ut deos ac professores eius ut antistites colite et, quotiens mentio sacrarum litterarum intervenerit, favete linguis. hoc verbum non, ut plerique existimant,

a favore trahitur, sed imperat silentium, ut rite peragi possit sacrum nulla voce mala opstrepente: quod multo magis necessarium est imperari vobis, ut, quotiens aliquid ex illo proferetur oraculo, intenti et compressa voce audiatis. cum sistrum aliquis concutiens ex imperio mentitur, cum aliquis secandi lacertos suos artifex brachia atque umeros suspensa manu cruentat, cum aliqua genibus per viam repens ululat laurumque linteatus senex et medio lucernam die praeferens conclamat iratum aliquem deorum, concurritis et auditis ac divinum esse eum, invicem mutum alentes stuporem, adfirmatis.

Ecce Socrates ex illo carcere, quem intrando purgavit omnique honestiorem curia reddidit, proclamat: "qui iste furor, quae ista inimica dis hominibusque natura est infamare virtutes et malignis sermonibus sancta violare? si potestis, bonos laudate, si minus, transite; quod si vobis exercere taetram istam licentiam placet, alter in alterum incursitate: nam cum in caelum insanitis, non dico sacrilegium facitis, sed operam perditis."

Cp. *Ep.* 95, 47-50, on the true manner of venerating the gods. Also *Superst.*, fr. 30-44.

1210—The greatest thing in life is: to stand firm against the blows of Fortune and to dominate our passions. **The greatest thing in life**

Sen., *Nat. quaest.* III, Praef. 10-14:

Quid praecipuum in rebus humanis est? Non classibus maria complexse nec in Rubri maris litore signa fixisse nec, deficiente ad iniurias terra, errasse in oceano ignota quaerentem, sed animo omne vidisse et, qua maior nulla victoria est, vitia domuisse. Innumerabiles sunt qui populos, qui urbes habuerunt in potestate; paucissimi qui se.

Quid est praecipuum? Erigere animum supra minas et promissa fortunae; nihil dignum putare quod speres. Quid enim habet quod concupiscas? qui a divinorum conversatione quotiens ad humana recideris, non aliter caligabis quam quorum oculi in densam umbram ex claro sole redierunt.

Quid est praecipuum? Posse laeto animo adversa tolerare; quicquid acciderit, sic ferre, quasi tibi volueris accidere. Debuisses enim velle, si scisses omnia ex decreto dei fieri: flere, queri et gemere desciscere est.

Quid est praecipuum? Animus contra calamitates fortis et contumax, luxuriae non aversus tantum sed infestus, nec avidus periculi nec fugax, qui sciat fortunam non expectare sed facere et adversus utramque intrepidus inconfususque prodire, nec illius tumultu nec huius fulgore percussus.

Quid est praecipuum? Non admittere in animo mala consilia, puras ad caelum manus tollere, nullum bonum petere quod, ut ad te transeat, aliquis dare debet aliquis amittere, optare, quod sine adversario optatur, bonam mentem; cetera magno aestimata mortalibus, etiamsi quis domum casus attulerit, sic intueri quasi exitura qua venerint.

Happiness **1211**—It is in this state of mind that happiness consists.

Sen., *Ep.* 92, 2-3:

(The first point is, that Reason must prevail.)

Si de hoc inter nos convenit, sequitur ut de illo quoque conveniat, in hoc uno positam esse beatam vitam, ut in nobis ratio perfecta sit. haec enim sola non submittit animum, stat contra fortunam: in quolibet rerum habitu securos servat. id autem unum bonum est, quod numquam defringitur. is est, inquam, beatus quem nulla res minorem facit. tenet summa, et ne ulli quidem nisi sibi innixus. nam qui aliquo auxilio sustinetur, potest cadere. si aliter est, incipient multum in nobis valere non nostra. quis autem vult constare fortunam aut quis se prudens ob aliena miratur? quid est beata vita? securitas et perpetua tranquillitas. hanc dabit animi magnitudo, dabit constantia bene iudicati tenax. ad haec quomodo pervenitur? si veritas tota perspecta est. si servatus est in rebus agendis ordo, modus, decor, innoxia voluntas ac benigna, intenta rationi nec umquam ab illa recedens, amabilis simul mirabilisque.

1212—Hence, no addition can be made to virtue: it is perfect in itself.

**Virtue
cannot
increase**

a. Sen., *Ep.* 66, 9:

Omnis in modo est virtus. modo certa mensura est: constantia non habet, quo procedat, non magis quam fiducia aut veritas aut fides. quid accedere perfecto potest? nihil, aut perfectum non erat, cui accessit: ergo ne virtuti quidem, cui si quid adici potest, defuit. honestum quoque nullam accessionem recipit. honestum est enim propter ista, quae rettuli. quid porro? decorum et iustum et legitimum non eiusdem esse formae putas, certis terminis comprehensum? crescere posse imperfectae rei signum est.

**Against
Antipater**

b. Sen., *Ep.* 92, 5:

Antipater quoque inter magnos sectae huius auctores aliquid se tribuere dicit externis, sed exiguum admodum. vides autem quale sit die non esse contentum, nisi aliquis igniculus adluxerit. quod potest in hac claritate solis habere scintilla momentum?

1213—In spite of his admiration for Posidonius, which is expressed for instance in *Ep.* 90, 20, concerning the doctrine of the πάθη Seneca follows essentially Chrysippus. Vid. *De ira* I 8, 2-3, cited above (nr. **1056a**) in illustration of Chrysippus's doctrine of the ἡγεμονικὸν πῶς ἔχον:

Affectus et ratio in melius peiusque mutatio animi est.

On the psychology of the emotions: *De ira* II 1-4. On προπάθειαι further literature is mentioned in Pohlenz, *St.* II, p. 154.

1214—It is only consistent, then, that Seneca opposes Aristotle's doctrine that Reason must be helped by feelings.¹

a. Sen., *De ira* I 9, 2-10, 2; II, 1:

Seneca
opposes
Aristotle

Ira, inquit Aristoteles, necessaria est, nec quicquam sine illa expugnari potest, nisi illa implet animum et spiritum accendit; utendum autem illa est non ut duce sed ut milite. quod est falsum: nam si exaudit rationem sequiturque qua ducitur, iam non est ira, cuius proprium est contumacia; si vero repugnat et non ubi iussa est quiescit, sed libidine ferociaque provehitur, tam inutilis animi minister est quam miles, qui signum receptui neglegit. itaque si modum adhiberi sibi patitur, alio nomine appellanda est, desit ira esse, quam effrenatam indomitamque intellego; si non patitur, pernicioza est nec inter auxilia numeranda: ita aut ira non est aut inutilis est. nam si quis poenam exigit non ipsius poenae avidus sed quia oportet, non est adnumerandus iratis. hic erit utilis miles qui scit parere consilio; adfectus quidem tam mali ministri quam duces sunt.

(10, 1) Ideo numquam adsumet ratio in adiutorium inprovidos et violentos impetus, aput quos nihil ipsa auctoritatis habeat, quos numquam comprimere possit, nisi pares illis similisque opposuerit [ut irae metum, inertiae iram, timori cupiditatem]. apsit hoc a virtute malum, ut umquam ratio ad vitia confugiat!

(11, 1) Sed adversus hostes, inquit, necessaria est ira. nusquam minus: ubi non effusos esse oportet impetus sed temperatos et oboedientes.

b. Ib. 17, 1-2:

Aristoteles ait affectus quosdam, si quis illis bene utatur, pro armis esse. quod verum foret, si velut bellica instrumenta sumi deponique

¹ On ὁργή with Aristotle, see our nr. **572** (*EN* 1108 a 3-9).—In general, concerning the relation between φρόνησις and ὁρεξεις in Aristotle's Ethics, see the excellent article of D. J. Allan in *Proceedings of the XIth Internat. Congress of Phil.*, Brussels 1953, p. 123 f.

possent induentis arbitrio. haec arma, quae Aristoteles virtuti dat, ipsa per se pugnant, non expectant manum, et habent, non habentur. nil aliis instrumentis opus est, satis nos instruxit ratione natura. hoc dedit telum firmum, perpetuum, obsequens, nec anceps, nec quod in dominum remitti posset. non ad providendum tantum, sed ad res gerendas satis est per se ipsa ratio; etenim quid est stultius quam hanc ab iracundia petere praesidium, rem stabilem ab incerta, fidelem ab infida, sanam ab aegra?

Sapientia **1215**—*Sapientia*, then, is *mens perfecta*. It is *constantia*, called *ὁμολογία* by Zeno.

a. Seneca stresses the element of the will in it.

Sen., *Ep.* 20, 5:

Quid est sapientia? Semper idem velle atque idem nolle. —

Non potest enim cuiquam idem semper placere nisi rectum.

On the part of the will in Seneca's moral philosophy, see our next number.

b. The wise man is not liable to any offence.

Sen., *De constantia sap.* 3, 5:

Hoc igitur dico, sapientem nulli esse iniuriae obnoxium; itaque non refert, quam multa in illum coiciantur tela, cum sit nulli penetrabilis. quomodo quorundam lapidum inexpugnabilis ferro duritia est nec secari adamas aut caedi vel deteri potest sed incurrentia ultro retundit, quemadmodum quaedam non possunt igne consumi sed flamma circumfusa rigorem suum habitumque conservant, quemadmodum proiecti quidam in altum scopuli mare frangunt nec ipsi ulla saevitiae vestigia tot verberati saeculis ostentant: ita sapientis animus solidus est et id roboris collegit, ut tam tutus sit ab iniuria quam illa quae rettuli.

c. He is equal to the gods.

Sen., *Ep.* 31, 8:

His state of mind and life is described as *aequalitas ac tenor vitae per omnia consonans sibi*. The author continues:

Quod non potest esse, nisi rerum scientia contingit et ars, per quam humana ac divina noscantur. hoc est summum bonum. quod si occupas, incipis deorum socius esse, non supplex.

The part of
the will in
moral
progress

1216—More than has been done by any Greek philosopher, the part of the will in moral progress was emphasized by Seneca.

a. Sen., *Ep.* 71, 36 f.:

Plus quam profligavimus restat, sed magna pars est profectus velle proficere. huius rei conscius mihi sum: volo, et mente tota volo. te quoque instinctum esse et magno ad pulcherrima properare impetu video. properemus: ita demum vita beneficium erit. alioqui mora est, et quidem turpis inter foeda versantibus. id agamus, ut nostrum omne tempus sit. non erit autem, nisi prius nos nostri esse coeperimus. quando continget contemnere utramque fortunam, quando continget omnibus oppressis adfectibus et sub arbitrium suum adductis hanc vocem emittere, "vici"? quem vicerim, quaeris? non Persas nec extrema Medorum nec si quid ultra Dahas bellicosum iacet, sed avaritiam, sed ambitionem, sed metum mortis, qui victores gentium vicit.

b. Cp. *Ep.* 80, 4:

Quid tibi opus est ut sis bonus? — Velle.

To will
cannot be
learned

c. Now willing does not depend on the intellect in such a sense that it could be learned by teaching.

Sen., *Ep.* 81, 13:

Velle non discitur.

On this important point s. Pohlenz, *Nachr. d. Gött. Ges. d. Wiss.*, phil.-hist. Kl. 1941, p. 241 ff.; *Hell. Mensch*, p. 210, 304; *Stoa I*, p. 319 f.

1217—Seneca lays great emphasis on the inner character of moral action. Cp. our nr. **1035a** (on the notion of *κατόρθωμα*).

Inner
character of
moral action

a. Sen., *De benef.* I 6, 1:

Quid est ergo beneficium? Benevola actio tribuens gaudium capiensque tribuendo in id, quod facit, prona et sponte sua parata. Itaque non, quid fiat aut quid detur, refert, sed qua mente, quia beneficium non in eo, quod fit aut datur, consistit, sed in ipso dantis aut facientis animo.

b. The principle is extended to all moral action.

De benef. IV 14, 1:

Non dicam pudicam, quae amatorem ut incenderet reppulit, quae aut legem aut virum timuit; ut ait Ovidius:

Quae, quia non licuit, non dedit, illa dedit.

Non immerito in numerum peccantium refertur, quae pudicitiam timori praestitit, non sibi. Eodem modo, qui beneficium ut reciperet dedit, non dedit.

c. As to *beneficium*, Seneca is quite categorical on the point that it is not concerned with gain.

Ib. 14, 2-4:

Ergo et nos beneficium damus animalibus, quae aut usui aut alimento futura nutrimus? beneficium damus arbustis, quae colimus, ne siccitate aut inmoti et neglecti soli duritia laborent? Nemo ad agrum colendum ex aequo et bono venit nec ad ullam rem, cuius extra ipsam fructus est; ad beneficium dandum non adducit cogitatio avara nec sordida, sed humana, liberalis, cupiens dare, etiam cum dederit, et augere novis ac recentibus vetera, unum habens propositum, quanto ei cui praestat bono futura sit; alioqui humile est, sine laude, sine gloria, prodesse, quia expedit. Quid magnifici est se amare, sibi parcere, sibi adquirere? ab omnibus istis vera beneficii dandi cupido avocat, ad detrimentum iniecta manu trahit et utilitates relinquit ipso bene faciendi opere laetissima.

Shorter at the end of chapter 13: *Non est beneficium quod in quaestum mittitur. "Hoc dabo et hoc recipiam" auctio est.*

Conscience 1218—Our good or bad conscience is, in the last instance, the reward or punishment of virtue and of vice.

a. The bad conscience.

Sen., *De clem.* I 13, 3:

(The cruel man must persevere in cruelty).

O miserabilem illum, sibi certe! nam ceteris misereri eius nefas sit, qui caedibus ac rapinis potentiam exercuit, qui suspecta sibi cuncta reddidit tam externa quam domestica, cum arma metuat ad arma confugiens, non amicorum fidei credens, non pietati liberorum; qui, ubi circumspexit, quaeque fecit quaeque facturus est, et conscientiam suam plenam sceleribus ac tormentis adaperuit, saepe mortem timet, saepius optat, inuisior sibi quam servientibus.

b. The good conscience.

Sen., *De benef.* II 33, 3:

Sic beneficii fructus primus ille est conscientiae: hunc percipit qui, quo voluit, munus suum pertulit; secundus est et tertius et famae et eorum, quae praestari in vicem possunt.

c. Cp. *De benef.* IV 12, 4:

Quom interrogaveris quid reddat, respondebo: bonam conscientiam.

Quid reddat beneficium? dic tu mihi quid reddat iustitia, quid innocentia, quid magnitudo animi, quid pudicitia, quid temperantia; si quicquam praeter ipsas, ipsas non petis.

Cp. also *Ep.* 23, 7, and *De Clem.* I 1, 1.

d. In contrast to Epicurus, Seneca infers from the fact of conscience that man is naturally inclined to virtue.

Sen., *Ep.* 97, 15:

Illic dissentiamus cum Epicuro, ubi dicit nihil iustum esse natura et crimina vitanda esse, quia vitari metus non posse: hic consentiamus mala facinora conscientia flagellari et plurimum illi tormentorum esse eo, quod perpetua illam sollicitudo urget ac verberat, quod sponsoribus securitatis suae non potest credere. hoc enim ipsum argumentum est, Epicure, natura nos a scelere abhorreere, quod nulli non etiam inter tuta timor est. multos fortuna liberat poena, metu neminem. quare nisi quia infixi nobis eius rei aversatio est, quam natura damnavit?

On the importance of the notion of conscience in Seneca's moral philosophy, see Pohlenz, *Stoa* I, p. 317.

1219—Seneca speaks of the habit of daily examining one's conscience.

**Daily ex-
amination of
the
conscience**

Sen., *De ira* III 36:

Omnes sensus perducendi sunt ad firmitatem; natura patientes sunt, si animus illos desit corrumpere, qui cotidie ad rationem reddendam vocandus est. faciebat hoc Sextius, ut consummato die, cum se ad nocturnam quietem recepisset, interrogaret animum suum: "quod hodie malum tuum sanasti? cui vitio obstitisti? qua parte melior es?" desinet ira et moderatior erit, quae sciet sibi cotidie ad iudicem esse veniendum. quicquam ergo pulchrius hac consuetudine excutiendi totum diem? qualis ille somnus post recognitionem sui sequitur quam tranquillus, quam altus ac liber, cum aut laudatus est animus aut admonitus et speculator sui censorque secretus cognovit de moribus suis! utor hac potestate et cotidie aput me causam dico. cum sublatum e conspectu lumen est et conticuit uxor moris iam mei conscia, totum diem meum scrutor factaque ac dicta mea remetior; nihil mihi ipse abscondo, nihil transeo. quare enim quicquam ex erroribus meis timeam, cum possim dicere: "vide ne istud amplius facias, nunc tibi ignosco. in illa disputatione pugnacius locutus es: noli postea congredi cum imperitis; nolunt discere, qui numquam didicerunt. illum liberius admonuisti quam debebas, itaque non emendasti sed offendisti: de cetero vide, non tantum an verum

sit quod dicis, sed an ille cui dicitur veri patiens sit; admoneri bonus gaudet, pessimus quisque rectorem asperrime patitur.

Cp. *Carmen aureum* 40, cited sub 26g, and the preceding remark. Sextius, of whom a word will be said in Ch. XXIV, § 5, on this point at least followed a Pythagorean tradition.

Seneca as a
"directeur
de
conscience"

1220—In his *Letters to Lucilius* we see Seneca at work on the task of giving directions for personal life.

a. On using one's time well.

Sen., *Ep.* I 1, 1-2:

Ita fac, mi Lucili, vindica te tibi, et tempus, quod adhuc aut auferebatur aut subripiiebatur aut excidebat, collige et serva. persuade tibi hoc sic esse, ut scribo: quaedam tempora eripiuntur nobis, quaedam subducuntur, quaedam effluunt. turpissima tamen est iactura, quae per negligentiam fit. et si volueris attendere, maxima pars vitae elabatur male agentibus, magna nihil agentibus, tota vita aliud agentibus. quem mihi dabis, qui aliquod pretium tempori ponat, qui diem aestimet, qui intellegat se cotidie mori? in hoc enim fallimur, quod mortem prospicimus: magna pars eius iam praeterit. quicquid aetatis retro est, mors tenet. fac ergo, mi Lucili, quod facere te scribis, omnes horas complectere.

b. On avoiding eccentricity.

Sen., *Ep.* 5, 1-2:

Quod pertinaciter studes et omnibus omissis hoc unum agis, ut te meliorem cotidie facias, et probo et gaudeo, nec tantum hortor ut perseveres, sed etiam rogo. illud autem te admoneo, ne eorum more, qui non proficere sed conspici cupiunt, facias aliqua, quae in habitu tuo aut genere vitae notabilia sint. asperum cultum et intonsum caput et negligentiores barbam et indictum argento odium et cubile humi positum, et quicquid aliud ambitio nempe perversa via sequitur, evita. satis ipsum nomen philosophiae, etiam si modeste tractetur, invidiosum est: quid si nos hominum consuetudini coeperimus excerpere? intus omnia dissimilia sint, frons populo nostra conveniat.

c. The danger of consorting with the crowd.

Sen., *Ep.* 7, 1-2:

Quid tibi vitandum praecipue existimem, quaeris? turbam. nondum illi tuto committeris. ego certe confitebor inbecillitatem meam: numquam mores, quos extuli, refero. aliquid ex eo quod composui turbatur; aliquid

ex iis quae fugavi redit. quod aegris evenit, quos longa inbecillitas usque eo adfecit, ut nusquam sine offensa proferantur, hoc accidit nobis, quorum animi ex longo morbo reficiuntur. inimica est multorum conversatio: nemo non aliquod nobis vitium aut commendat aut imprimit aut nescientibus adlinit. utique quo maior est populus, cui miscemur, hoc periculi plus est. nihil vero tam damnosum bonis moribus quam in aliquo spectaculo desiderare. tunc enim per voluptatem facilius vitia subrepunt.

See also *Ep.* 71, 36 f., cited sub nr. 1216a.

1221—Seneca made a sharp distinction between God, as the cause of the universe, and the universe, which is His work.

**God, the
cause of the
universe**

a. Sen., *Ep.* 65, 12-14:

(Aristotle and Plato introduced different causes.)

Sed nos nunc primam et generalem quaerimus causam. haec simplex esse debet. nam et materia simplex est. quaerimus, quid sit causa? ratio scilicet faciens, id est deus. ista enim, quaecumque rettulistis, non sunt multae et singulae causae, sed ex una pendent, ex ea, quae faciet. formam dicis causam esse? hanc imponit artifex operi: pars causae est, non causa. exemplar quoque non est causa, sed instrumentum causae necessarium. sic necessarium est exemplar artificis, quomodo scalprum, quomodo lima: sine his procedere ars non potest. non tamen hae partes artis aut causae sunt. "propositum" inquit "artificis, propter quod ad faciendum aliquid accedit, causa est." ut sit causa, non est efficiens causa, sed superveniens. hae autem innumerabiles sunt: nos de causa generali quaerimus. illud vero non pro solita ipsis subtilitate dixerunt, totum mundum et consummatum opus causam esse. multum enim interest inter opus et causam operis.

b. Cp. *Nat. quaest.* VII 30, 3-4:

In Seneca's opinion, comets should be explained not as *fortuiti ignes*, but as *intexti mundo*, quos (deus) non frequenter educit sed in occulto movet. He continues:

Quam multa praeter hos per secretum eunt numquam humanis oculis orientia! Neque enim omnia deus homini <pate>fecit. Quota pars operis tanti nobis committitur? Ipse qui ista tractat, qui condidit, qui totum hoc fundavit deditque circa se, maiorque est pars sui operis ac melior, effugit oculos; cogitatione visendus est.

c. Cp. also *Nat. quaest.* I, Praef. 13:

Quid est deus? Mens universi. Quid est deus? Quod vides totum et

quod non vides totum. Sic demum magnitudo illi sua redditur, qua nihil maius cogitari potest, si solus est omnia, si opus suum et intra et extra tenet.

Was Seneca
a religious
man?

1222—Seneca often speaks of God. Yet, if it is true that the feeling of utter dependence is essential in religion, he was not a religious man: in his opinion, the wise man—not even in the absolute sense, but what the Stoics called the “advanced” man—is equal to God and has nothing to ask from Him.

a. Sen., *Ep.* 41, 1 and 4:

Facis rem optimam et tibi salutarem, si, ut scribis, perseveras ire ad bonam mentem, quam stultum est optare, cum possis a te impetrare. non sunt ad caelum elevandae manus nec exorandus aedituus, ut nos ad aurem simulacri, quasi magis exaudiri possimus, admittat: prope est a te deus, tecum est, intus est. —

Si hominem videris interritum periculis, intactum cupiditatibus, inter adversa felicem, in mediis tempestatibus placidum, ex superiore loco homines videntem, ex aequo deos: non subibit te veneratio eius? non dices: “iste res maior est altiorque quam ut credi similis huic, in quo est, corpusculo possit”? vis isto divina descendit.

b. Cp. also *Ep.* 31, 8, cited under **1215c**, and *Ep.* 73, 12-13:

Plura Iuppiter habet, quae praestet hominibus, sed inter duos bonos non est melior qui locupletior, non magis quam inter duos, quibus par scientia regendi gubernaculum est, meliorem dixeris cui maius speciosiusque navigium est. Iuppiter quo antecedit virum bonum? diutius bonus est: sapiens nihilo se minoris existimat, quod virtutes eius spatio breviori cluduntur.

c. In the following passage may be seen that, finally, Seneca’s “advanced man” is alone with himself.

Sen., *De benef.* VII 1, 7:

Si animus fortuita contempsit, si se supra metus sustulit nec avida spe infinita complectitur, sed didicit a se petere divitias; si deorum hominumque formidinem eiecit et scit non multum esse ab homine timendum, a deo nihil; si contemptor omnium, quibus torquetur vita, dum ornatur, eo perductus est, ut illi liqueat mortem nullius mali materiam esse, multorum finem; si animum virtuti consecravit et, quacumque vocat illa, planum putat; si sociale animal et in commune genitus

mundum ut unam omnium domum spectat et conscientiam suam disaperuit semperque tamquam in publico vivit se magis veritus quam alios: subductus ille tempestatibus in solido ac sereno stetit consummatumque scientiam utilem ac necessariam.

1223—a. In several passages Seneca spoke of after-life in the same sense as Cicero did in the *Somnium Scipionis*. Some of these were cited in our nr. 960. The author seems to have been rather strongly impressed by Posidonius and his spiritualistic tendency. Did Seneca believe in immortality?

b. On the other hand, it should be noticed that, repeatedly, in the same works in which the above-mentioned passages occur, he also admits the possibility that death is the end of everything.

Thus, *Ad Marciam* 19, 4-6:

Cogita nullis defunctum malis addici, illa, quae nobis inferos faciunt terribiles, fabulas esse, nullas imminere mortuis tenebras nec carcerem nec flumina igne flagrantia nec Oblivionem amnem nec tribunalia et reos et in illa libertate tam laxa ullos iterum tyrannos: luserunt ista poetae et vanis nos agitavere terroribus. mors dolorum omnium exolutio est et finis, ultra quem mala nostra non exeunt, quae nos in illam tranquillitatem, in qua antequam nasceremur iacuimus, reponit. si mortuorum aliquis miseretur, et non natorum misereatur. mors nec bonum nec malum est. id enim potest aut bonum aut malum esse, quod aliquid est; quod vero ipsum nihil est et omnia in nihilum redigit, nulli nos fortunae tradit; mala enim bonaque circa aliquam versantur materiam. non potest id fortuna tenere, quod natura dimisit, nec potest miser esse qui nullus est.

The *magna et aeterna pax* which waits for us after this life according to the present passage, turns out to be of a rather negative character.

c. Both the positive and the negative views occur in

Ad Polyb. 9, 2.

The author advises Polybius to argue with himself on his brother's death in this way:

"Si illius nomine doleo, necesse est alterutrum ex his duobus esse iudicem: nam si nullus defunctis sensus superest, evasit omnia frater meus vitae incommoda et in eum restitutus est locum, in quo fuerat antequam nasceretur, et expers omnis mali nihil timet, nihil cupit, nihil patitur: quis iste furor est pro eo me numquam dolere desinere, qui numquam doliturus est? si est aliquis defunctis sensus, nunc animus fratris mei velut ex diutino carcere emissus, tandem sui iuris et arbitrii, gestit

et rerum naturae spectaculo fruitur et humana omnia ex loco superiore despicit, divina vero, quorum rationem tam diu frustra quaesierat, propius intuetur. quid itaque eius desiderio maceror, qui aut beatus aut nullus est? beatum deflere invidia est, nullum dementia."

Also in *Ep.* 65, 24 and in *De prov.* 6, 6 both possibilities are admitted: *Mors quid est? — Aut finis aut transitus.*

Cp. also *Ep.* 57,8 f. (more positive); *Ep.* 71, 16; *Ep.* 36, 10-11.

On ending
one's life
artificially

1224—Seneca speaks repeatedly of the εὐλογος ἐξαγωγή. E.g.:

a. *Sen.*, *Ep.* 58, 32-36:

Potest frugalitas producere senectutem, quam ut non puto concupiscendam, ita ne recusandam quidem. iucundum est secum esse quam diutissime, cum quis se dignum quo frueretur effecit. itaque de isto feremus sententiam, an oporteat fastidire senectutis extrema et finem non opperiri, sed manu facere. prope est a timente, qui fatum segnis expectat, sicut ille ultra modum deditus vino est, qui amphoram exiccat et faecem quoque exorbet. de hoc tamen quaeremus, pars summa vitae utrum [ea] faex sit an liquidissimum ac purissimum quiddam, si modo mens sine iniuria est et integri sensus animum iuvant nec defectum et praemortuum corpus est. plurimum enim refert, vitam aliquis extendat an mortem. at si inutile ministeriis corpus est, quidni oporteat educere animum laborantem? et fortasse paulo ante quam debet, faciendum est, ne cum fieri debebit, facere non possis. —

Non relinquam senectutem, si me totum mihi reservabit, totum autem ab illa parte meliore; at si coeperit concutere mentem, si partes eius convellere, si mihi non vitam reliquerit, sed animam, prosiliam ex aedificio putri ac ruenti. morbum morte non fugiam, dumtaxat sanabilem nec officientem animo. non adferam mihi manus propter dolorem: sic mori vinci est. hunc tamen si sciero perpetuo mihi esse patiendum, exhibo, non propter ipsum, sed quia impedimento mihi futurus est ad omne, propter quod vivitur. inbecillus est et ignavus, qui propter dolorem moritur, stultus, qui doloris causa vivit.

b. *Ep.* 24, 24-25:

Etiam cum ratio suadet finire se, non temere nec cum procursu capiendus est impetus. vir fortis ac sapiens non fugere debet e vita, sed exire. et ante omnia ille quoque vitetur affectus, qui multos occupavit, libido moriendi.

Seneca's
death

1225—Seneca's death is reported by Tacitus, *Ann.* XV 62-64.

6—MUSONIUS RUFUS AND EPICTETUS

1226—Musonius, Epictetus' master, lived at Rome under Nero. In 65 A.D. he was banished to Gyarus. **Musonius Rufus**

a. Tacitus, *Ann.* XV 71:

Verginium <Flavum et Musonium> Rufum claritudo nominis expulit; nam Verginius studia iuvenum eloquentia, Musonius praeceptis sapientiae fovebat.

b. C. Plinius speaks of him and his son-in-law Artemidorus in a tone of high admiration.

Plinius, *Epist.* III (ad Julium Genitorem), 11, 5 Müller:

Nam et C. Musonium, socerum eius, quantum licitum est per aetatem, cum admiratione dilexi et Artemidorum ipsum iam tum, cum in Syria tribunus militarem, arta familiaritate complexus sum idque primum nonnullius indolis dedi specimen, quod virum aut sapientem, aut proximum simillimumque sapienti intelligere sum visus. Nam ex omnibus, qui nunc se philosophos vocant, vix unum aut alterum invenies tanta sinceritate, tanta veritate. Mitto qua patientia corporis hiemes iuxta et aestates ferat, ut nullis laboribus cedat, ut nihil in cibo aut potu voluptatibus tribuat, ut oculos animumque contineat. Sunt haec magna, sed in alio; in hoc vero minima, si ceteris virtutibus comparentur, quibus meruit ut a C. Musonio ex omnibus omnium ordinum assectatoribus gener assumeretur.

More than Seneca, Musonius seems to have been a man of character.

c. The following passage shows us Musonius as a missionary in the army.

Tac., *Hist.* III 81:

Miscuerat se legatis Musonius Rufus, equestris ordinis, studium philosophiae et placita Stoicorum aemulatus, coeptabatque permixtus manipulis bona pacis ac belli discrimina disserens armatos monere. Id plerisque ludibrio, pluribus taedio; nec deerant, qui propellerent proculcarentque, ni admonitu modestissimi cuiusque et aliis minitantibus omisisset intempestivam sapientiam.

1227—After Panaetius and Posidonius, who were learned men and did not address themselves to the masses, Musonius was the first among Stoics to take up the rôle of a popular preacher and of a spiritual adviser, **Musonius and his affinity with older Cynicism**

joining with the older Cynics in their view of the moral task of man, his training and the essential equality of the sexes. From this he drew not only the conclusion for education, but he maintained also that in the field of sex ethics men and women are equal.

a. Man and his moral task.

Musonius II, p. 6, 5-12 Hense:

Πάντες, ἔφη, φύσει πεφύκαμεν οὕτως, ὥστε ζῆν ἀναμαρτήτως καὶ καλῶς, οὐχ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ὁ δ' οὐ· καὶ τούτου μέγα τεκμήριον ὅτι πᾶσιν ὁμοίως οἱ νομοθέται καὶ προστάττουσιν ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἀπαγορεύουσιν ἃ μὴ χρὴ, οὐχ ὑπεξαίρου-
μενοι οὐδένα τῶν ἀπειθουσιν ἢ τῶν ἀμαρτανόντων ὥστε ἀτιμώρητον εἶναι, οὐ νέον, οὐ πρεσβύτερον, οὐκ ἰσχυρόν, οὐκ ἀσθενῆ οὐχ ὄντινα οὖν.

b. Therefore, men and women equally must practice philosophy.

III, p. 8, 15-9, 16 H.:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπύθετό τις αὐτοῦ, εἰ καὶ γυναίξει φιλοσοφητέον, οὕτω πως ἤρξατο διδάσκειν ὡς φιλοσοφητέον αὐταῖς. Λόγον μὲν, ἔφη, τὸν αὐτὸν εἰλήφασιν παρὰ θεῶν αἱ γυναῖκες τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ᾧ τε χρώμεθα πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ καθ' ὃν διανοούμεθα περὶ ἐκάστου πράγματος, <εἰ> ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἐστίν, καὶ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἰσθήσεις τὰς αὐτάς ἔχει τὸ θῆλυ τῷ ἄρρενι, ὁρᾶν, ἀκοῦειν, ὁσφραίνεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μέρη σώματος τὰ αὐτὰ ὑπάρχει ἐκατέρῳ, καὶ οὐδὲν θατέρῳ πλέον. ἔτι δ' ὄρεξις καὶ οἰκείωσις φύσει πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐ μόνον γίνεται τοῖς ἀνδράσι, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναίξιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἥττον αὐταῖ γε τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῖς μὲν καλοῖς καὶ δικαίοις ἔργοις ἀρέσκεσθαι πεφύκασι, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων προβάλλεσθαι. τούτων δὲ ταύτῃ ἐχόντων, διὰ τί ποτ' οὖν τοῖς μὲν ἀνδράσι προσήκοι ἂν ζητεῖν καὶ σκοπεῖν ὅπως βιώσονται καλῶς, ὅπερ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐστίν, γυναίξει δὲ οὐ; πότερον ὅτι ἀνδρας μὲν προσήκει ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, γυναῖκας δὲ οὐ;

c. In what sense philosophy is required for everybody.

IV, p. 19, 8-14 H.:

Καὶ οὐ τοῦτο βούλομαι λέγειν, ὅτι τρανότητα περὶ λόγους καὶ δεινότητά τινα περιττὴν χρὴ προσεῖναι ταῖς γυναίξιν, εἴπερ φιλοσοφῆσουσιν ὡς γυναῖκες· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπ' ἀνδρῶν ἐγὼ πάνυ τι τοῦτο ἐπαινῶ· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡθους χρηστότητα καὶ καλοκάγαθίαν τρόπου κτητέον ταῖς γυναίξιν· ἐπειδὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία καλοκάγα-
θίας ἐστὶν ἐπιτήδευσις καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον.

1228—Since man consists of body and soul, a double training is needed, as was taught by the older Cynics (cp. our nr. 244).

Musonius VI, p. 24, 8-25, 6 H.:

Πῶς οὖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον τούτοις ἀσκητέον; ἐπεὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὔτε ψυχὴν μόνον εἶναι συμβέβηκεν οὔτε σῶμα μόνον, ἀλλὰ τι σύνθετον ἐκ τοῖν δυοῖν τούτων, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀσχοῦντα ἀμφοῖν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τοῦ μὲν κρείττονος μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ ἄξιον, τουτέστι τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ θατέρου δέ, εἴ γε μέλλει μηδὲν ἐνδεῶς ἔχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μέρος. δεῖ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα παρεσκευασθαι καλῶς πρὸς τὰ σώματος ἔργα τὸ τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος, ὅτι πολλάκις αἱ ἀρεταὶ καταχρῶνται τούτῳ ὄντι ὀργάνῳ ἀναγκαίῳ πρὸς τὰς τοῦ βίου πράξεις. τῆς οὖν ἀσκήσεως ἡ μὲν τις ἰδία τῆς ψυχῆς μόνης γίνετ' ἂν ὀρθῶς, ἡ δέ τις κοινὴ ταύτης τε καὶ τοῦ σώματος.

1229—a. Musonius summarizes his sex ethics in the following lines. **Sex ethics**
Musonius XII, p. 63, 17-64, 9 H.:

Χρὴ δὲ τοὺς μὴ τρυφῶντας ἢ μὴ κακοὺς μόνῃ μὲν ἀφροδίσει νομίζειν δίκαια τὰ ἐν γάμῳ καὶ ἐπὶ γενέσει παίδων συντελούμενα, ὅτι καὶ νόμιμά ἐστιν· τὰ δέ γε ἡδονὴν θηρώμενα ψιλὴν ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα, κἂν ἐν γάμῳ ἢ συμπλοκαὶ δὲ ἄλλαι αἱ μὲν κατὰ μοιχείαν παρανομώταται, καὶ μετριώτεροι τούτων οὐδὲν αἱ πρὸς ἄρρενας τοῖς ἄρρεσιν, ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν τὸ τόλμημα· ὅσαι δὲ μοιχείας ἐκτὸς συνουσίαι πρὸς θηλείας εἰσὶν ἐστερημέναι τοῦ γίνεσθαι κατὰ νόμον, καὶ αὗται πᾶσαι αἰσχραί, αἱ γε πράττονται δι' ἀκολασίας.

b. Some people think that sexual intercourse with his bondswoman is allowed to a master on the ground of his proprietary right. To this Musonius opposes the following reply.

Musonius XII, p. 66, 6-67, 2 H.:

Πρὸς τοῦτο δὲ ἀπλοῦς μοι ὁ λόγος· εἰ γὰρ τῷ δοκεῖ μὴ αἰσχρὸν μὴδ' ἄτοπον εἶναι δούλῃ δεσπότην πλησιάζειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα εἰ τύχοι οὔσα χήρα, λογισάσθω ποῖόν τι καταφαίνεται αὐτῷ, εἰ δέσποινα δούλῃ πλησιάζοι. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι ἀνεκτόν, οὐ μόνον εἰ κεκτημένη ἄνδρα νόμιμον ἢ γυνὴ προσοῖτο δοῦλον, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἀνάνδρος οὔσα τοῦτο πράττοι; καίτοι τοὺς ἄνδρας οὐ δήπου τῶν γυναικῶν ἀξιῶσι τις εἶναι χείρονας, οὐδ' ἤττον δύνασθαι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας παιδαγωγεῖν τὰς ἑαυτῶν, τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους τὴν γνώμην τῶν ἀσθενεστέρων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων. πολὺ γὰρ κρείττονας εἶναι προσήκει τοὺς ἄνδρας, εἴπερ καὶ προσεσθάναι ἀξιοῦνται τῶν γυναικῶν. ἂν μέντοι ἀκρατέστεροι φαίνωνται ὄντες, . . * καὶ κακίονες. ὅτι δ' ἀκрасίας ἔργον καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου ἐστὶ τὸ δεσπότην δούλῃ πλησιάζειν, τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν; γνώριμον γάρ.

In his work on Musonius ¹, p. 81-89, Dr. A. C. van Geytenbeek, dealing with

* ἔσονται suppl. Hense.

¹ *Musonius Rufus en de Griekse diatribe*. Diss. Utrecht 1948.

these remarkable passages, rightly points out the fact that in his moral approach to these things Musonius differs profoundly from the older Cynics, who stressed the facility of satisfying one's sexual needs, without adding any moral condition. Cp. Xenophon, *Symp.* 4, 38, where Antisthenes says, explaining to Socrates how he feels so rich, having so little money:

“Ὡν δέ ποτε καὶ ἀφροδισιάσαι τὸ σῶμά μου δεηθῆ, οὕτω μοι τὸ παρὸν ἀρκεῖ, ὥστε αἷς ἂν προσέλθω ἀσπάζονται με διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἄλλον αὐταῖς ἐθέλιν προσιέναι.

Likewise, Diogenes says in Dio Chrysostomus' 6th discourse, 16-17, that what men go to the most trouble to obtain and what they spend the most money on, is found by him the easiest and most inexpensive of all things to procure: “ἀπανταχοῦ (γάρ) παρεῖναι αὐτῷ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην προῖκα.” — Cp. also the third century Cynic Cercidas, *Meliamb.* III 23-33 Knox, who speaks of “Aphrodite of the market”, whom you can have for an obol.

Marriage

1230—a. The main purpose of marriage.

Musonius XIII A, p. 67-68 H.:

Βίου καὶ γενέσεως παίδων κοινωνίαν κεφάλαιον εἶναι γάμου. Τὸν γὰρ γαμοῦντα, ἔφη, καὶ τὴν γαμουμένην ἐπὶ τούτῳ συνιέναι χρὴ ἐκάτερον θατέρῳ, ὥσθ' ἅμα μὲν ἀλλήλοις βιοῦν, ἅμα δὲ <παιδο>ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ κοινὰ δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ μηδὲν ἴδιον, μηδ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα. μεγάλη μὲν γὰρ γένεσις ἀνθρώπου, ἣν ἀποτελεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ζεῦγος. ἀλλ' οὐπω τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τῷ γαμοῦντι, ὃ δὴ καὶ δίχα γάμου γένοιτ' ἂν συμπλεκόμενων ἄλλως, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ζῶα συμπλέκεται αὐτοῖς. δεῖ δὲ ἐν γάμῳ πάντως συμβίωσιν τε εἶναι καὶ κηδεμονίαν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς περὶ ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐρρωμένους καὶ νοσοῦντας καὶ ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ, ἧς ἐφιεμένος ἐκάτερος ὥσπερ καὶ παιδοποιίας εἴσιν ἐπὶ γάμον. ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἡ κηδεμονία αὕτη τέλειός ἐστι, καὶ τελέως αὐτὴν οἱ συνόντες ἀλλήλοις παρέχονται, ἀμιλλώμενοι νικᾶν ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον, οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ γάμος ἢ προσήκει ἔχει καὶ ἀξιοζήλωτός ἐστι· καλὴ γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη κοινωνία· ὅπου δὲ ἐκάτερος σκοπεῖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον ἀμελῶν θατέρου, ἢ καὶ νῆ Δί' ὁ ἕτερος οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οἰκίαν μὲν οἰκεῖ τὴν αὐτὴν, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ βλέπει ἔξω, μὴ βουλόμενος τῷ ὁμόζυγι συντείνειν τε καὶ συμπνεῖν, ἐνταῦθ' ἀνάγκη φθεῖρεσθαι μὲν τὴν κοινωνίαν, φαύλως δὲ ἔχειν τὰ πράγματα τοῖς συνοικοῦσιν, καὶ ἡ διαλύονται τέλεον ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἢ τὴν συμμο- νὴν χεῖρως ἐρημίας ἔχουσιν.

Dudley, *History of Cynicism*, p. 196 n. 1, remarks that Musonius in his whole attitude to women appears to be largely influenced by the old Roman tradition.

Children

b. The beauty of having a large family.

XV A, p. 79, 1-2:

Ἀξίον δὲ νοῆσαι ποῖόν τι καὶ θεαμὰ ἐστὶν ἀνὴρ πολὺπαις ἢ γυνὴ σὺν ἀθρόοις ὀρώμενοι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν παισίν· οὔτε γὰρ πομπὴν πεμπομένην θεοῖς οὕτω καλὴν θεάσαιτ' ἂν τις οὔτε χορείαν ἐπὶ ἱεροῖς κόσμῳ χορευόντων οὕτως ἀξιοθέατον, ὥς χορὸν παίδων πολλῶν προηγουμένων ἐν πόλει πατρός τοῦ ἑαυτῶν ἢ μητρός,

<καί> χειραγωγούντων τοὺς γονεῖς ἢ τρόπον ἕτερον περιεπόντων κηδεμονικῶς. τί μὲν τούτου κάλλιον τοῦ θεάματος; τί δὲ τῶν γονέων τούτων ζηλωτότερον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς ὧσι; τίσι δ' ἂν ἄλλοις οὕτω προθύμως ἢ συνεύξαιτό τις ἀγαθὰ παρὰ θεῶν, ἢ συμπράξειεν αὐτοῖς εἰς ὃ τι δέοιντο;

1231—Musonius' pupil Epictetus was a Phrygian slave, living at Rome under Nero. As a freedman, he settled in Nicopolis (Actium) under Domitianus and had his school there. His works were edited by his pupil Arrianus.

Epictetus

a. Suidas:

Epaphroditus' slave

Ἐπίκτητος· Ἱεραπόλεως τῆς Φρυγίας, φιλόσοφος, δοῦλος Ἐπαφροδίτου, τῶν σωματοφυλάκων τοῦ βασιλέως Νέρωνος. πηρωθεὶς δὲ τὸ σκέλος ὑπὸ βρύματος ἐν Νικοπόλει τῆς νέας Ἡπείρου ὤκησε, καὶ διατείνας μέχρι Μάρκου Ἀντωνίνου. ἔγραψε πολλά.

That he lived till the reign of Marcus Aurelius is hardly possible.

b. His lameness was frequently said to have been caused by the brutality of a master. E.g. Celsus ap. Orig., *C. Celsum* VII 53:

Οὐκοῦν (sc. εἴχετε) Ἐπίκτητον, ὃς τοῦ δεσπότης στρεβλοῦντος αὐτοῦ τὸ σκέλος, ὑπομειδιῶν ἀνεκπλήκτως ἔλεγε “κατάσσεις” καὶ κατὰξαντος “οὐκ ἔλεγον”, εἶπεν, “ὅτι κατάσσεις;”

c. That he heard Musonius while yet in Epaphroditus' service, appears from the following passage.

Epict., *Diss.* I 9, 27-31:

Ἐμέ τις ἡξίωκεν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ γράψαι εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ὡς ἐδόκει τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡτυχηκῶς καὶ πρότερον μὲν ἐπιφανὴς ὦν καὶ πλούσιος, ὕστερον δ' ἐκπεπτωκῶς ἀπάντων καὶ διάγων ἐνταῦθα. καὶ γὰρ ἔγραψα ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ταπεινῶς. ὁ δ' ἀναγνούς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀπέδωκέν μοι αὐτὴν καὶ ἔφη ὅτι “Ἐγὼ βοηθηθῆναι τι ὑπὸ σοῦ ἤθελον, οὐχὶ ἐλεηθῆναι· κακὸν δέ μοι οὐθέν ἐστιν”. οὕτως καὶ Ῥοῦφος πειράζων μ' εἰώθει λέγειν “Συμβήσεται σοι τοῦτο καὶ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότης”. κάμοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποκριναμένου ὅτι “Ἀνθρώπινα” “Τί οὖν ἔτι ἐκεῖνον παρακαλῶ παρὰ σοῦ αὐτὰ λαβεῖν δυνάμενος”; τῷ γὰρ ὄντι, ὃ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τις ἔχει, περισσὸς καὶ μάταιος παρ' ἄλλου λαμβάνων.

We shall find the note of interior freedom to be the dominating motive of Epictetus' philosophy.

d. The fame of his wisdom and character resounds in an undated but fairly early inscription from Pisidia, edited by J. R. S. Sterrett,

Papers of the American School of Class. Stud. at Athens, 1884-5, 3, 315 f., and discussed by Kaibel in *Hermes* XXIII (1888), p. 542 ff.

Schenkl, *Epict. ed. maior*, test. XIX:

ὦ ξ[ένε, 'Επ]ικτατος δούλας ἀπὸ ματρὸς ἐτέχθη,
αἰε[τὸς] ἀνθρώπων, σοφία ἐπὶ κυδα[λί]μα φρήν.
ὄν [τί] χρή με λέγειν; θ[ε]ῖος γένετ'. αἶθε δὲ καὶ νῦν
τοιούτος τις ἀνὴρ ὄφελος μέγα καὶ μέγα χάρμα
πάντων εὐξαμένων δούλας ἀπὸ ματρὸς ἐτέχθη.

τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν
καὶ τὰ οὐκ
ἐφ' ἡμῖν

1232—First principles of his philosophy: the distinction between what is and what is not in our power.

a. *Encheiridion* I 1-3:

Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. ἐφ' ἡμῖν μὲν ὑπόληψις, ὁρμή, ὄρεξις, ἐκκλισίς καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ ὅσα ἡμέτερα ἔργα· οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ τὸ σῶμα, ἡ κτῆσις, δόξαι, ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ ὅσα οὐχ ἡμέτερα ἔργα. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ φύσει ἐλεύθερα, ἀκώλυτα, ἀπαράποδιστα, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἀσθενῆ, δοῦλα, κωλυτά, ἀλλότρια. μέμνησο οὖν, ὅτι, ἐὰν τὰ φύσει δοῦλα ἐλεύθερα οἰηθῇς καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἴδια, ἐμποδισθήσῃ, πενθήσῃς, ταραχθήσῃ, μέμψῃ καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ σὸν μόνον οἰηθῇς σὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀλλότριον, ὥσπερ ἐστίν, ἀλλότριον, οὐδεὶς σε ἀναγκάσει οὐδέποτε, οὐδεὶς σε κωλύσει, οὐ μέμψῃ οὐδένα, οὐκ ἐγκαλέσεις τινί, ἄκων πράξεις οὐδὲ ἓν, οὐδεὶς σε βλάψει, ἐχθρὸν οὐχ ἔξεις, οὐδὲ γὰρ βλαβερόν τι πείσει.

b. *Diss.* II 6, 24:

τὰ σὰ καὶ
τὰ οὐ σὰ

Μόνον ἐκείνης τῆς διαιρέσεως μέμνησο, καθ' ἣν διορίζεται τὰ σὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ σά. μή ποτ' ἀντιποίησιν τινὸς τῶν ἀλλοτρίων.

Only the
first are
of real value

1233—Only things that are "ours" are of real value. Therefore, watch over your sense-impressions. It is your freedom that depends on it.

a. *Diss.* IV 3, 1-8:

Ἐκεῖνο πρόχειρον ἔχε, ὅταν τινὸς ἀπολείπη τῶν ἐκτός, τί ἀντ' αὐτοῦ περιποιῇ· κἂν ᾗ πλείονος ἄξιον, μηδέποτ' εἴπῃς ὅτι "ἐζημίωμαι". οὐδ' <ἀν> ἀντὶ ὄνου ἵππον, οὐδ' ἀντὶ προβάτου βοῦν, οὐδ' ἀντὶ κέρματος πρᾶξιν καλὴν, οὐδ' ἀντὶ ψυχρολογίας ἡσυχίαν οἶαν δεῖ, οὐδ' ἀντὶ αἰσχρολογίας αἰδῶ. τούτων μεμνημένος πανταχοῦ διασώσεις τὸ σαυτοῦ πρόσωπον οἷον ἔχειν σε δεῖ. εἰ δὲ μή, σκόπει, ὅτι ἀπόλλυνται οἱ χρόνοι εἰκῇ καὶ ὅσα νῦν προσέχεις σεαυτῷ, μέλλεις ἐκχεῖν ἅπαντα ταῦτα καὶ ἀνατρέπειν. ὀλίγου δὲ χρεία ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπώλειαν τὴν πάντων καὶ ἀνατροπὴν, μικρᾶς ἀποστροφῆς τοῦ λόγου. ἵνα ὁ

κυβερνήτης ἀνατρέψῃ τὸ πλοῖον, οὐ χρεῖαν ἔχει τῆς αὐτῆς παρασκευῆς, ὅσης εἰς τὸ σῶσαι· ἀλλὰ μικρὸν πρὸς τὸν ἀνεμον ἂν ἐπιστρέψῃ, ἀπώλετο· καὶ μὴ αὐτὸς ἐκὼν, ὑποπαρενθυμηθῇ δ', ἀπώλετο. τοιοῦτόν ἐστὶ τι καὶ ἐνθάδε· μικρὸν ἂν ἀπονυστάξῃς, ἀπῆλθεν πάντα τὰ μέχρι νῦν συνειλεγμένα. πρόσεχε οὖν ταῖς φαντασίαις, ἐπαγρύπνει. οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν τὸ τηρούμενον, ἀλλ' αἰδῶς καὶ πίστις καὶ εὐστάθεια, ἀπάθεια, ἀλυπία, ἀφοβία, ἀταραξία, ἀπλῶς ἐλευθερία.

b. Ench. I, 5:

Εὐθὺς οὖν πάσῃ φαντασίᾳ τραχεῖα μελέτα ἐπιλέγειν ὅτι “φαντασία εἶ καὶ οὐ πάντως τὸ φαινόμενον”. ἔπειτα ἐξέταζε αὐτὴν καὶ δοκίμαζε τοῖς κανόσι τούτοις οἷς ἔχεις, πρῶτῳ δὲ τούτῳ καὶ μάλιστα, πότερον περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ τὰ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· καὶ περὶ τι τῶν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦ, πρόχειρον ἔστω τὸ διότι “οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐμέ”.

1234—The free man does not revolt against the order of things given to him, but obeys God of his own free will.

**Inner
freedom**

a. Diss. IV 3, 8-12:

Τῶν μέλλεις ταῦτα¹ πωλεῖν; βλέπε, πόσου ἀξίων. — Ἄλλ' οὐ τεύξομαι τοιούτου τινὸς ἀντ' αὐτοῦ. — Βλέπε καὶ τυγχάνων πάλιν ἐκείνου, τί ἀντ' αὐτοῦ λαμβάνεις. “ἐγὼ εὐκοσμίαν, ἐκεῖνος δημαρχίαν· ἐκεῖνος στρατηγίαν, ἐγὼ αἰδῶ. ἀλλ' οὐ κραυγάζω, ὅπου ἀπρεπές· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀναστήσομαι, ὅπου μὴ δεῖ. ἐλεύθερος γὰρ εἰμι καὶ φίλος τοῦ θεοῦ, ἔν' ἐκὼν πείθωμαι αὐτῷ. τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐδενὸς ἀντιποιεῖσθαι με δεῖ, οὐ σώματος, οὐ κτήσεως, οὐκ ἀρχῆς, οὐ φήμης, ἀπλῶς οὐδενός· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος βούλεται μ' ἀντιποιεῖσθαι αὐτῶν. εἰ γὰρ ᾔθελεν, ἀγαθὰ πεποιήκει αὐτὰ ἂν ἐμοί. νῦν δ' οὐ πεποίηκεν· διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν δύναμαι παραβῆναι τῶν ἐντολῶν.” τήρει τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ σαυτοῦ ἐν παντί, τῶν δ' ἄλλων κατὰ τὸ διδόμενον μέχρι τοῦ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν αὐτοῖς, τούτῳ μόνῳ ἀρκούμενος. εἰ δὲ μή, δυστυχῆσεις, ἀτυχῆσεις, κωλυθήσῃ, ἐμποδισθήσῃ, οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖθεν ἀπεσταλμένοι νόμοι, ταῦτα τὰ διατάγματα· τούτων ἐξηγητὴν δεῖ γενέσθαι, τούτοις ὑποτεταγμένον, οὐ τοῖς Μασουρίου καὶ Κασσίου².

b. Cp. Ench. 8:

Μὴ ζητεῖ τὰ γινόμενα γίνεσθαι ὡς θέλεις, ἀλλὰ θέλε τὰ γινόμενα ὡς γίνεται καὶ εὐροῇσεις.

The term εὐροία βίου was used by Zeno, who defined εὐδαιμονία by it.

¹ The things mentioned in the preceding sentence: αἰδῶς καὶ πίστις κτλ., ἀπλῶς ἐλευθερία.

² Two well-known jurists of the first century.

The applica-
tion of these
principles

1235—In the *diatribes*, we see Epictetus continuously at work on the application of these principles.

a. *Diss. I 29, 5-8*:

Λοιπὸν ὅταν ἀπειλῇ ὁ τύραννος καὶ μὴ καλῇ¹, λέγω “τίني ἀπειλεῖ,” ἂν λέγει “δήσω σε”, φημί ὅτι “ταῖς χερσίν ἀπειλεῖ καὶ τοῖς ποσίν.” ἂν λέγῃ “τραχηλοκοπήσω σε”, λέγω “τῷ τραχήλῳ ἀπειλεῖ”. ἂν λέγῃ “εἰς φυλακὴν σε βαλῶ”, “ὄλῳ τῷ σαρκιδίῳ”· καὶ ἐξορισμὸν ἀπειλῇ, τὸ αὐτό. — σοὶ οὖν οὐδὲν ἀπειλεῖ; — εἰ πέπονθα ὅτι ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πρὸς ἐμέ, οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ φοβοῦμαι τι τούτων, ἐμοὶ ἀπειλεῖ. τίνα λοιπὸν δέδοικα; τὸν τίνων ὄντα κύριον; τῶν ἐπ’ ἐμοί; οὐδὲ εἷς ἐστίν. τῶν οὐκ ἐπ’ ἐμοί; καὶ τί μοι αὐτῶν μέλει;

b. *Diss. II 6, 20-27*:

“Τῇ κεφαλῇ κινδυνεύω ἐπὶ Καίσαρος”. ἐγὼ δ’ οὐ κινδυνεύω, ὅς οἱ κῶ ἐν Νικοπόλει, ὅπου σεισμοὶ τοσοῦτοι; σὺ δ’ αὐτὸς ὅταν διαπλέῃς τὸν Ἀδρίαν, τί κινδυνεύεις; οὐ τῇ κεφαλῇ; “ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ ὑπολήψει κινδυνεύω.” τῇ σῇ; πῶς; τίς γάρ σε ἀναγκάσαι δύναται ὑπολαβεῖν τι ὃν οὐ θέλεις; ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ; καὶ ποῖός ἐστι κίνδυνος σὸς ἄλλους τὰ ψεύδη ὑπολαβεῖν; “ἀλλ’ ἐξορισθῆναι κινδυνεύω.” τί ἐστὶν ἐξορισθῆναι; ἀλλαχοῦ εἶναι ἢ ἐν Ῥώμῃ; “ναί. τί οὖν; ἂν εἰς Γύαρά πεμφθῶ;” ἂν σοι ποιῇ, ἀπελεύσῃ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἔχεις ποῦ ἀντὶ Γυάρων ἀπέλθῃς, ὅπου κάκεῖνος ἐλεύσεται, ἂν τε θέλῃ ἂν τε μή, ὁ πέμπων σε εἰς Γύαρά. τί λοιπὸν ὥς ἐπὶ μεγάλα ἀνέρχῃ; μικρότερα ἐστὶ τῆς παρασκευῆς, ἵν’ εἴπῃ νέος εὐφυῆς ὅτι “οὐκ ἦν τοσοῦτου τοσοῦτων μὲν ἀκηχοέναι, τοσαῦτα δὲ γεγραφέναι, τοσοῦτῳ δὲ χρόνῳ παρακεκαθικέναι γεροντίῳ οὐ πολλοῦ ἀξίῳ.” μόνον ἐκείνης τῆς διαιρέσεως μέμνησο, καθ’ ἣν διορίζεται τὰ σὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ σά. μή ποτ’ ἀντιποιήσῃ τινὸς τῶν ἀλλοτρίων. βῆμα καὶ φυλακὴ τόπος ἐστὶν ἐκάτερον, ὁ μὲν ὑψηλός, ὁ δὲ ταπεινός· ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ ἴση, ἂν ἴσῃ αὐτὴν ἐν ἐκατέρῳ φυλάξαι θέλῃς, δύναται φυλαχθῆναι. καὶ τότε ἐσόμεθα ζηλωταὶ Σωκράτους, ὅταν ἐν φυλακῇ δυνώμεθα παιᾶνας γράφειν. μέχρι δὲ νῦν ὥς ἔχομεν, ὅρα εἰ ἡγεσόμεθ’ ἂν ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ ἄλλου τινὸς ἡμῶν λέγοντος “θέλεις ἀναγνῶ σοι παιᾶνας;” “τί μοι πράγματα παρέχεις; οὐκ οἶδας τὰ ἔχοντά με κακά; ἐν τούτοις γάρ μοι ἔστιν —” ἐν τίσιν οὖν; “ἀποθνήσκειν μέλλω”. ἄνθρωποι δ’ ἄλλοι ἀθάνατοι ἔσονται;

προαίρεσις

1236—A certain moral purpose, then, a deliberate choice, is the specific quality of man. On this his liberty depends.

a. *Diss. I 29, 1-4* (lines preceding the quotation of **1235a**):

Οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ προαίρεσις ποιὰ, τοῦ κακοῦ προαίρεσις ποιὰ. τί οὖν τὰ

¹ μὴ codd., με Wolf.

ἐκτός; ὕλαι τῇ προαιρέσει, περὶ ἧς ἀναστροφομένη τεύξεται τοῦ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ. πῶς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τεύξεται; ἂν τὰς ὕλας μὴ θαυμάσῃ. τὰ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ὕλων δόγματα ὀρθὰ μὲν ὄντα ἀγαθὴν ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν, στρεβλά δὲ καὶ διεστραμμένα κακὴν. τοῦτον τὸν νόμον ὁ θεὸς τέθεικεν καὶ φησὶν “εἴ τι ἀγαθὸν θέλεις, παρὰ σεαυτοῦ λάβε”. σὺ λέγεις “οὐ· ἀλλὰ παρ’ ἄλλου”. μὴ, ἀλλὰ παρὰ σεαυτοῦ.

b. By prohairesis man maintains his inner liberty against all violence.

Ib., 9-12:

‘Υμεῖς οὖν οἱ φιλόσοφοι διδάσκετε καταφρονεῖν τῶν βασιλέων; — Μὴ γένοιτο. τίς ἡμῶν διδάσκει ἀντιποιεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτούς, ὧν ἐκεῖνοι ἔχουσιν ἐξουσίαν; τὸ σωμάτιον λάβε, τὴν κτῆσιν λάβε, τὴν φήμην λάβε, τοὺς περὶ ἐμὲ λάβε. ἂν τις τούτων ἀναπείθῃ ἀντιποιεῖσθαι, τῷ ὄντι ἐγκαλεῖται μοι. “ναί· ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν δογμάτων ἄρχειν θέλω.” καὶ τίς σοι ταύτην τὴν ἐξουσίαν δέδωκεν; ποῦ δύνασαι νικῆσαι δόγμα ἑλλότριον; “προσάγων”, φησὶν, “αὐτῷ φόβον νικήσω.” ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι αὐτὸ αὐτὸ ἐνίκησεν, οὐχ ὑπ’ ἄλλου ἐνικήθη· προαίρεσιν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο νικῆσαι δύναται, πλὴν αὐτῇ ἑαυτήν.

c. The divine law that the better must always prevail over the worse.

Ib. 13-18:

Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ νόμος κράτιστός ἐστι καὶ δικαιοτάτος· τὸ κρεῖσσον αἰεὶ περιγινέσθω τοῦ χείρονος. “κρείττονές εἰσιν οἱ δέκα τοῦ ενός.” πρὸς τί; πρὸς τὸ δῆσαι, πρὸς τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι, πρὸς τὸ ἀπαγαγεῖν ὅπου θέλουσιν, πρὸς τὸ ἀφελέσθαι τὰ ὄντα. νικῶσιν τοίνυν οἱ δέκα τὸν ἕνα ἐν τούτῳ, ἐν ᾧ κρεῖσσονές εἰσιν. ἐν τίνι οὖν χείρονές εἰσιν; ἂν ὁ μὲν ἔχῃ δόγματα ὀρθά, οἱ δὲ μή. τί οὖν; ἐν τούτῳ δύνανται νικῆσαι; πόθεν; εἰ δὲ ἰστάμεθα ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ, οὐκ ἔδει τὸν βαρύτερον καθελκύσαι;

Σωκράτης οὖν ἵνα πάθῃ ταῦτα ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων; — Ἀνδράποδον, τί λέγεις τὸ Σωκράτης; ὡς ἔχει τὸ πρᾶγμα λέγε· ἵν’ οὖν τὸ Σωκράτους σωμάτιον ἀπαχθῇ καὶ συρῇ ὑπὸ τῶν ἰσχυροτέρων εἰς δεσμοτήριον καὶ κώνειόν τις δῶ τῷ σωματίῳ τῷ Σωκράτους κάκεινο ἀποψυγῇ; ταῦτά σοι φαίνεται θαυμαστά, ταῦτα ἄδικοι, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐγκαλεῖς τῷ θεῷ; οὐδὲν οὖν εἶχε Σωκράτης ἀντὶ τούτων; ποῦ ἦν ἡ οὐσία αὐτῷ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; τί τι προσσχῶμεν; σοὶ ἢ αὐτῷ; καὶ τί λέγει ἐκεῖνος; “ἐμὲ δ’ Ἄνυτος καὶ Μέλητος ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν δύνανται, βλάψαι δ’ οὐ”. καὶ πάλιν “εἰ ταύτῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, ταύτῃ γινέσθω”.

d. Cp. also *Diss.* II 10, 1:

Σκέψαι τίς εἶ. τὸ πρῶτον ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτο δ’ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἔχων κυριώτερον

προαιρέσεως, ἀλλὰ ταύτη τὰ ἄλλα ὑποτεταγμένα, αὐτὴν δ' ἀδούλευτον καὶ ἀνυπότακτον.

The greater part of this diatribe will be cited later (s. nr. 1242).

Thus, the notion of *prohairesis* becomes a basic principle of Epictetus' philosophy. The term, frequently used by Aristotle, does not occur in the early Stoa, where the "knowledge of good and bad" is said to be decisive. Pohlenz, *St.* I 332 f., discusses the subject and remarks that, by this notion, Epict. comes nearer to voluntarism than Chrysippus did, yet, in principle, keeps Chrysippus' intellectualism, by defining "choice" as a judgment.

**Intellectual
character of
Epictetus'
ethics**

1237—Epictetus' ethics have a rather strong intellectual character: our judgment is decisive.

a. *Diss.* III 9, 1-2:

Εἰσελθόντος δέ τινος πρὸς αὐτόν, ὃς εἰς Ῥώμην ἀνῆκει δίκην ἔχων περὶ τιμῆς τῆς αὐτοῦ, πυθόμενος τὴν αἰτίαν, δι' ἣν ἄνεισιν, ἐπερωτήσαντος ἐκείνου, τίνα γνώμην ἔχει περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, Εἰ μου πυνθάνη, τί πράξεις ἐν Ῥώμῃ, φησίν, πότερον κατορθώσεις ἢ ἀποτεύξῃ, θεώρημα πρὸς τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχω· εἰ δὲ πυνθάνη, πῶς πράξεις, τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ὀρθὰ δόγματα ἔχεις, καλῶς, εἰ δὲ φαῦλα, κακῶς. παντὶ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ πράσσειν τι δόγμα.

b. *Cp. Ench.* 5:

Ταράσσει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων δόγματα· οἷον ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν δεινόν (ἐπεὶ καὶ Σωκράτει ἂν ἐφαίνετο), ἀλλὰ τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ τοῦ θανάτου, διότι δεινόν, ἐκεῖνο τὸ δεινόν ἐστίν. ὅταν οὖν ἐμποδιζώμεθα ἢ ταρασώμεθα ἢ λυπώμεθα, μηδέποτε ἄλλον αἰτιώμεθα, ἀλλ' ἑαυτούς, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν δόγματα.

**Prohairesis
a dogma**

c. Prohairesis itself is a judgment. *Diss.* I 17, 26:

Πάλιν οὖν τὸ σὸν δόγμα σε ἠνάγκασεν, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ προαίρεσιν προαίρεσις.

1238—Epictetus accepts the consequence that Medea killed her own children by an erroneous judgment.

Medea

a. *Diss.* I 28, 6-8:

“Οὐ δύναται οὖν τις δοκεῖν μέν, ὅτι συμφέρει αὐτῷ, μὴ αἰρεῖσθαι δ' αὐτό;” οὐ δύναται. πῶς ἢ λέγουσα

καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά,
θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων;¹

ὅτι αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τῷ θυμῷ χαρίσασθαι καὶ τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν ἄνδρα, συμφορώτερον ἡγγεῖται τοῦ σῶσαι τὰ τέκνα. “ναί· ἀλλ' ἐξηπάτηται.” δεῖξον αὐτῇ ἑναργῶς

¹ Eur., *Med.* 1078 f.

ὅτι ἐξηπάτηται καὶ οὐ ποιήσῃ· μέχρι δ' ἂν οὐ μὴ δεικνύῃς, τίνοι ἔχει ἀκολουθεῖν ἢ τῷ φαινομένῳ; — οὐδενί.

I.e. in the question of the πάθη, Epictetus follows Chrysippus, not Posidonius.

b. Medea, therefore, ought rather to be pitied than condemned.

Ib. 9:

Τί οὖν χαλεπαίνεις αὐτῇ, ὅτι πεπλάνηται <ῆ> ταλαίπωρος περὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ ἔχῃς ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου γέγονεν; οὐχὶ δ', εἴπερ ἄρα, μᾶλλον ἔλεεῖς, ὥς τοὺς τυφλοὺς ἐλεοῦμεν, ὥς τοὺς χωλοὺς, οὕτως τοὺς τὰ κυριώτατα τετυφλωμένους καὶ ἀποκεχωλωμένους;

c. In general, this point of view should bring us to lenience towards those who go astray on the most important matters.

Ib. 10:

Ὅστις οὖν τούτου μέμνηται καθαρῶς ὅτι ἀνθρώπῳ μέτρον πάσης πράξεως τὸ φαινόμενον (λοιπὸν ἢ καλῶς φαίνεται ἢ κακῶς· εἰ καλῶς, ἀνέγκλητός ἐστιν· εἰ κακῶς, αὐτὸς ἐζημιάται· οὐ δύναται γὰρ ἄλλος μὲν εἶναι ὁ πεπλανημένος, ἄλλος δὲ ὁ βλαπτόμενος), οὐδενὶ ὀργισθήσεται, οὐδενὶ χαλεπανεῖ, οὐδένα λοιδορήσει, οὐδένα μέμψεται, οὐ μισήσει, οὐ προσκόψει οὐδενί.

Also II 22, 36.

1239—To be a man of character, you must either labour to improve your own governing principle—i.e. opt for the inner man—, or be interested in externals. You cannot do both.

**The
dilemma**

a. *Diss.* III 15, 13:

Ἐνα σε δεῖ ἀνθρώπον εἶναι ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν· ἢ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν σε δεῖ ἐξεργάζεσθαι τὸ σαυτοῦ ἢ τὰ ἐκτός· ἢ περὶ τὰ ἔσω φιλοπονεῖν ἢ περὶ τὰ ἔξω· τοῦτ' ἔστι φιλοσόφου στάσιν ἔχειν ἢ ἰδιώτου.

b. *Ench.* 13:

Εἰ προκόψαι θέλεις, ὑπόμεινον ἕνεκα τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀνότητος δόξας καὶ ἡλίθιος, μηδὲν βούλου δοκεῖν ἐπίστασθαι· καὶ δόξης τις εἶναι τισιν, ἀπίσται σεαυτῷ. ἴσθι γὰρ ὅτι ῥᾶδιον τὴν προαίρεσιν τὴν σεαυτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν φυλάττειν καὶ τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου ἐπιμελούμενον τοῦ ἐτέρου ἀμελεῖναι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη.

1240—The cardinal virtues in Epictetus' ethical system are: *aídoos* and *pistis*.

Aídoos

a. Epict., fr. 14 (Stob. III 6, 57). Against Epicurus.

Τί ποτ' οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθοῖς μικροτέροις οὔσι χαίρει καὶ γαληνῶ, ὥς φησιν Ἐπίκουρος, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς αὐτῆς ἀγαθοῖς μεγίστοις

οὖσιν οὐχ ἡδεται; καίτοι καὶ δέδωκέ μοι ἡ φύσις αἰδῶ καὶ πολλὰ ὑπερυβριῶ, ὅταν τι ὑπολάβω αἰσχρὸν λέγειν. τοῦτό με τὸ κίνημα οὐκ ἔξ τὴν ἡδονὴν θέσθαι ἀγαθὸν καὶ τέλος τοῦ βίου.

b. Cp. *Diss.* III 7, 27: Aidoos is peculiar to mankind.

Πεφύκαμεν δὲ πῶς; ὡς ἐλεύθεροι, ὡς γενναῖοι, ὡς αἰδήμονες. ποῖον γὰρ ἄλλο ζῶον ἐρυθριᾷ; ποῖον αἰσχροῦ φαντασίαν λαμβάνει;

Pistis

1241—Pistis the basis of human society.

a. *Diss.* II 4, 1:

Λέγοντος αὐτοῦ ὅτι "Ὁ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς πίστιν γέγονεν καὶ τοῦτο ὁ ἀνατρέπων ἀνατρέπει τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου" ἐπεισῆλθέν τις τῶν δοκούντων φιλολόγων, ὃς κατείληπτό ποτε μοιχὸς ἐν τῇ πόλει. ὁ δ' „Ἀλλ' ἄν", φησίν, „ἀφέντες τοῦτο τὸ πιστόν, πρὸς ὃ πεφύκαμεν, ἐπιβουλευόμεν τῇ γυναικὶ τοῦ γείτονος, τί ποιοῦμεν; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ ἀπόλλυμεν καὶ ἀναιροῦμεν;" τίνα; „τὸν πιστόν, τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν ὅσιον." ταῦτα μόνα; γειννᾶσιν δ' οὐκ ἀναιροῦμεν, φιλίαν δ' οὐ, πόλιν δ' οὐ; εἰς τίνα δὲ χώραν αὐτοὺς κατατάσσομεν; ὡς τίνι σοι χρῶμαι, ἄνθρωπε; ὡς γείτονι, ὡς φίλῳ; ποίῳ τινί; ὡς πολίτῃ; τί σοι πιστεύσω;

b. He who loses his natural sense of fidelity, suffers a loss in his moral personality.

Diss. II 10, 21 f.:

(The man who lost his nose has suffered an injury.)

Ψυχῆς οὖν δύναμις οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία, ἣν ὁ μὲν κτησάμενος ὠφελεῖται, ὁ δ' ἀποβαλὼν ζημιοῦται; — Ποίαν καὶ λέγεις; — Οὐδὲν ἔχομεν αἰδήμον φύσει; — Ἔχομεν. — Ὁ τοῦτο ἀπολλύων οὐ ζημιοῦται, οὐδενὸς στερίσκεται, οὐδὲν ἀποβάλλει τῶν πρὸς αὐτόν; οὐκ ἔχομεν φύσει τι πιστόν, φύσει στερκτικόν, φύσει ὠφελητικόν, ἀλλήλων φύσει ἀνεκτικόν; ὅστις οὖν εἰς ταῦτα περιορᾷ ζημιούμενον ἑαυτόν, οὗτος ἢ ἀβλαβὴς καὶ ἀζήμιος;

Cp. also *Ench.* 24, 4-5.

The example of Socrates

c. Socrates, for instance, did not fear death. What he wished to preserve was: his moral personality.

Diss. IV 1, 160-161:

Ἐπὶ Λέοντα δ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυράννων πεμφθείς¹, ὅτι αἰσχρὸν ἡγεῖτο, οὐδ' ἐπεβουλευσάτο εἰδῶς ὅτι ἀποθανεῖν δεήσει, ἂν οὕτως τύχη. καὶ τί αὐτῷ διέφερον; ἄλλο γάρ τι σῶζειν ἤθελεν· οὐ τὸ σαρκίδιον, ἀλλὰ τὸν πιστόν, τὸν αἰδήμονα. ταῦτα ἀπαρεγγεῖρητα, ἀνυπότακτα.

¹ Plato, *Apol.* 32c.

1242—On the whole, Epictetus' view of man is displayed fairly completely in the following passage. **Man in his different aspects**

In this, *prohairesis* is mentioned as the first characteristic of man; next, man is considered successively as a part of the cosmos—and a leading part, able to understand the Divine administration of the world—; as a citizen—i.e., not a detached unit, but organically connected with the whole—; as a son—obedient to his Father, honouring Him and cooperating with Him as much as he can—; and finally as a brother.

Diss. II 10, 1-14:

Σκέψαι τίς εἷ. τὸ πρῶτον ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἔχων κυριώτερον προαιρέσεως, ἀλλὰ ταύτη τὰ ἄλλα ὑποτεταγμένα, αὐτὴν δ' ἀδούλευτον καὶ ἀνυπότακτον¹. σκόπει οὖν, τίνων κεχώρισαι κατὰ λόγον. κεχώρισαι θηρίων, κεχώρισαι προβάτων. ἐπὶ τούτοις πολίτης εἷ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ μέρος αὐτοῦ, οὐχ ἔν τῶν ὑπηρετικῶν, ἀλλὰ τῶν προηγουμένων· παρακολουθητικός γάρ εἷ τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει καὶ τοῦ ἐξῆς ἐπιλογιστικός. τίς οὖν ἐπαγγελία πολίτου; μηδὲν ἔχειν ἰδίᾳ συμφέρον, περὶ μηδενὸς βουλευέσθαι ὡς ἀπόλυτον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄν, εἰ ἡ χεὶρ ἢ ὁ πούς λογισμὸν εἶχον καὶ παρηκολούθουν τῇ φυσικῇ κατασκευῇ, οὐδέποτε' ἂν ἄλλως ὥρμησαν ἢ ὠρέχθησαν ἢ ἐπανενεγκόντες ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον. διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι ὅτι, εἰ προῆδει ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὰ ἐσόμενα, συνήργει ἂν καὶ τῷ νοσεῖν καὶ τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν καὶ τῷ πηροῦσθαι, αἰσθανόμενός γε, ὅτι ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὅλων διατάξεως τοῦτο ἀπονέμεται, κυριώτερον δὲ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους καὶ ἡ πόλις τοῦ πολίτου. νῦν δ' ὅτι οὐ προγιγνώσκομεν, καθήκει τῶν πρὸς ἐκλογὴν εὐφυστέρων ἔχεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο γεγόναμεν.

Μετὰ τοῦτο μέμνησο, ὅτι υἱὸς εἷ. τίς τούτου τοῦ προσώπου ἐπαγγελία; πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἡγεῖσθαι τοῦ πατρός, πάντα ὑπακούειν, μηδέποτε ψέξαι πρὸς τινὰ μήδε βλαβερόν τι αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν ἢ πρᾶξαι, ἐξίστασθαι ἐν πᾶσιν καὶ παραχωρεῖν συνεργοῦντα κατὰ δύναμιν. μετὰ τοῦτο ἴσθι ὅτι καὶ ἀδελφός εἷ. καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο δὲ τὸ πρόσωπον ὀφείλεται παραχώρησις, εὐπειθία, εὐφημία, μηδέποτε' ἀντιποιήσασθαι τινος πρὸς [ἐ]αὐτὸν τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων, ἀλλ' ἡδέως ἐκεῖνα προέσθαι, ἵν' ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς πλεόν ἔχῃς. ὅρα γὰρ οἷόν ἐστιν ἀντὶ θίδρακος, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ καθέδρας αὐτὸν εὐγνωμοσύνην κτήσασθαι, ὅση ἢ πλεονεξία. μετὰ ταῦτα εἰ βουλευτὴς πόλεώς τινος, ὅτι βουλευτὴς· εἰ νέος, ὅτι νέος· εἰ πρεσβύτερος, ὅτι πρεσβύτερος· εἰ πατήρ, ὅτι πατήρ. αἰ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ὀνομάτων εἰς ἐπιλογισμὸν ἐρχόμενον ὑπογράφει τὰ οἰκεῖα ἔργα. ἐὰν δ' ἀπελθὼν ψέγῃς σου τὸν ἀδελφόν, λέγω σοι "ἐπελάθου τίς εἰ καὶ τί σοι ὄνομα". εἴτα εἰ μὲν χαλκεὺς ὢν ἐχρῶ τῇ σφύρᾳ ἄλλως, ἐπιλεησμένος ἂν ᾗς τοῦ χαλκείως· εἰ δὲ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ἐπελάθου καὶ ἀντὶ ἀδελφοῦ ἐχθρὸς ἐγένου, οὐδὲν

¹ This sentence has been already cited under 1236d.

ἀντ' οὐδενός ἡλλάχθαι φανεῖ σεαυτῷ; εἰ δ' ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου, ἡμέρου ζῶου καὶ κοινωνικοῦ, θηρίον γέγονας βλαβερόν, ἐπίβουλον, δηκτικόν, οὐδὲν ἀπολώλεκας; ἀλλὰ δεῖ σε κέρμα ἀπολέσαι, ἵνα ζημιωθῇς, ἄλλου δ' οὐδενός ἀπώλεια ζημιῶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον;

Natural love
of one's
neighbour

1243—Indeed, Epictetus calls man a ἡμερον ζῶον καὶ φιλάλληλον (*Diss.* IV 1, 126; 5, 10, 17), i.e.: he knows a natural love of one's neighbour. Cp. the *caritas* in Cicero's *De off.* and in Antiochus of Ascalon¹. Epictetus repeatedly used the term ἀδελφός.

ἀδελφός

a. *Diss.* I 13, 3-5:

Somebody asks how it is possible to bear with persons refusing us some small service or with servants not heeding our wishes. Epict. replies:

Ἀνδράποδον, οὐκ ἀνέξῃ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ σαυτοῦ, ὃς ἔχει τὸν Δία πρόγονον, ὥσπερ υἱὸς ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν σπερμάτων γέγονεν καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἄνωθεν καταβολῆς, ἀλλ' εἰ ἔν τινι τοιαύτῃ χώρᾳ κατετάγης ὑπερεχούση, εὐθὺς τύραννον καταστήσεις σεαυτόν; οὐ μεμνήσῃ τί εἶ καὶ τίνων ἄρχεις; ὅτι συγγενῶν, ὅτι ἀδελφῶν φύσει, ὅτι τοῦ Διὸς ἀπογόνων;—Ἀλλ' ὦνῃν αὐτῶν ἔχω, ἐκεῖνοι δ' ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἔχουσιν. — Ὅρῳ ποῦ βλέπεις; ὅτι εἰς τὴν γῆν, ὅτι εἰς τὸ βάραθρον, ὅτι εἰς τοὺς ταλαιπώρους τούτους νόμους τοὺς τῶν νεκρῶν, εἰς δὲ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν οὐ βλέπεις;

b. To the tyrant who is going to chain his leg, the philosopher says:

Diss. I 19, 9:

“Πόθεν σύ; ἐμὲ ὁ Ζεὺς ἐλεύθερον ἀφῆκεν. ἡ δοκεῖς ὅτι ἔμελλεν τὸν ἴδιον υἱὸν ἔαν καταδουλοῦσθαι; τοῦ νεκροῦ δέ μου κύριος εἶ, λάβε αὐτόν.”

Also in *Diss.* III 22, 41 Epictetus calls the body τὸ φύσει νεκρόν, ἡ γῆ, ὁ πηλός.

Man is a
part of God

1244—Man—i.e., the inner man—is a fragment of God and should be aware of that in all his actions.

a. *Diss.* II 8, 11-12; 18-19:

Other things are ἔργα θεῶν, but not of primary importance, nor are they portions of Divinity,—

Σὺ δὲ προηγούμενον εἶ, σὺ ἀπόσπασμα εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ· ἔχεις τι ἐν σεαυτῷ μέρος ἐκείνου. τί οὖν ἀγνοεῖς σου τὴν συγγένειαν; τί οὐκ οἶδας πόθεν ἐλήλυθας; οὐ θέλεις μεμνησθαι, ὅταν ἐσθίῃς, τίς ὦν ἐσθίεις καὶ τίνα τρέφεις; ὅταν συνουσία χρῇ, τίς ὦν χρῇ; ὅταν ὁμιλία; ὅταν γυμνάζῃ, ὅταν διαλέγῃ, οὐκ οἶδας

¹ Above nr. 1205.

ὅτι θεὸν τρέφεις, θεὸν γυμνάζεις; θεὸν περιφέρεις, τάλας, καὶ ἀγνοεῖς.—'Αλλ' εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀγαλλμα ἥς τὸ Φειδίου, ἢ Ἀθηνᾶ ἢ ὁ Ζεὺς, ἐμέμνησο ἂν καὶ σαυτοῦ καὶ τοῦ τεχνίτου καὶ εἴ τινα αἰσθησιν εἶχες, ἐπειρῶ ἂν μηδὲν [ἂν] ἀνάξιον ποιεῖν τοῦ κατασκευάσαντος μηδὲ σεαυτοῦ μηδ' ἐν ἀπρεπεῖ σχήματι φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ὁρῶσι· νῦν δέ σε ὅτι ὁ Ζεὺς πεποίηκεν, διὰ τοῦτο ἀμελεῖς οἷόν τινα δείξεις σεαυτόν;

b. The fact that a part of God is in us, is a pledge of liberty.

Diss. I 17, 27:

Εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἴδιον μέρος, ὃ ἡμῖν ἔδωκεν ἀποσπάσας ὁ θεός, ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου τινὸς κωλυτὸν ἢ ἀναγκαστὸν κατεσκευάκει, οὐκέτι ἂν ἦν θεὸς οὐδ' ἐπεμελεῖτο ἡμῶν ὃν δεῖ τρόπον.

Also I 14, 6.

1245—He who wishes to live as a free and happy man, must surrender himself entirely to God.

**Complete
acceptance
of the will
of God**

a. *Diss.* IV I, 91-94; 97-104; 131:

Οὕτως ποιοῦσι καὶ τῶν ὁδοιπόρων οἱ ἀσφαλέστεροι. ἀκήκοεν ὅτι ληστεύεται ἡ ὁδός· μόνος οὐ τολμᾷ καθεῖναι, ἀλλὰ περιέμεινεν συνοδίαν ἢ πρεσβευτοῦ ἢ ταμίου ἢ ἀνθυπάτου καὶ προσκατατάξας ἑαυτὸν παρέρχεται ἀσφαλῶς. οὕτως καὶ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ποιεῖ ὁ φρόνιμος. "πολλὰ ληστήρια, τύραννοι, χειμῶνες, ἀπορίαι, ἀποβολαὶ τῶν φιλτάτων. ποῦ τις καταφύγη; πῶς ἀλήστευτος παρέλθῃ; ποῖαν συνοδίαν περιμένειν ἀσφαλῶς διέλθῃ; τίς προσκατατάξας ἑαυτόν; τῷ δεῖνι, τῷ πλουσίῳ, τῷ ὑπατικῷ. καὶ τί μοι ὄφελος; αὐτὸς ἐκδύεται, οἰμῶζει, πενθεῖ. τί δ' ἂν ὁ συνοδοιπόρος αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἐμὲ στραφεὶς ληστής μου γένηται; τί ποιήσω;—

Οὐκ ἔστιν εὐρεῖν ἀσφαλῆ σύνδοτον, πιστόν, ἰσχυρόν, ἀνεπιβούλευτον;" οὕτως ἐφίστησιν καὶ ἐννοεῖ, ὅτι, ἐὰν τῷ θεῷ προσκατατάξῃ ἑαυτόν, διελεύσεται ἀσφαλῶς. Πῶς λέγεις προσκατατάξαι;—"Ἰν", ὃ ἂν ἐκεῖνος θέλῃ, καὶ αὐτὸς θέλῃ καί, ὃ ἂν ἐκεῖνος μὴ θέλῃ, τοῦτο μηδ' αὐτὸς θέλῃ.—Πῶς οὖν τοῦτο γένηται;—Πῶς γὰρ ἄλλως ἢ ἐπισκεψαμένῳ τὰς ὁρμὰς τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὴν διοίκησιν; τί μοι δέδωκεν ἐμὸν καὶ αὐτεξούσιον, τί αὐτῷ κατέλιπεν; τὰ προαιρετικά μοι δέδωκεν, ἐπ' ἐμοὶ πεποίηκεν, ἀνεμπόδιστα, ἀκώλυτα. τὸ σῶμα τὸ πῆλινον πῶς ἐδύνατο ἀκώλυτον ποιῆσαι; ὑπέταξεν οὖν τῇ τῶν ὄλων περιόδῳ, τὴν κτῆσιν, τὰ σκεύη, τὴν οἰκίαν, τὰ τέκνα, τὴν γυναῖκα. τί οὖν θεομαχῶ; τί θέλω τὰ μὴ θελητά; τὰ μὴ δοθέντα μοι ἐξ ἁπαντος ἔχειν; ἀλλὰ πῶς; ὥς δέδοται καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον δύναται. ἀλλ' ὁ δοὺς ἀφαιρεῖται. τί οὖν ἀντιτείνω; οὐ λέγω ὅτι ἡλίθιος ἔσομαι τὸν ἰσχυρότερον βιαζόμενος, ἀλλ' ἔτι πρότερον ἄδικος.

πόθεν γὰρ ἔχων αὐτὰ ἦλθον; ὁ πατήρ μου αὐτὰ ἔδωκεν. ἐκείνῳ δὲ τίς; τὸν ἥλιον δὲ τίς πεποίηκε, τοὺς καρπούς δὲ τίς, τὰς δ' ὥρας τίς, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους συμπλοκὴν καὶ κοινωνίαν τίς;

Εἶτα σύμπαντα εἰληφώς παρ' ἄλλου καὶ αὐτὸν σεαυτόν, ἀγανακτεῖς καὶ μέμφῃ τὸν δόντα, ἂν σοὺ τι ἀφέληται; τίς ὦν καὶ ἐπὶ τί ἐληλυθώς; οὐχὶ ἐκεῖνός σε εἰσήγαγεν; οὐχὶ τὸ φῶς ἐκεῖνός σοι ἔδειξεν; οὐ συνεργούς δέδωκεν; οὐ καὶ αἰσθήσεις; οὐ λόγον; ὡς τίνα δ' εἰσήγαγεν; οὐχ ὡς θνητόν; οὐχ ὡς μετὰ ὀλίγου σαρκιδίου ζήσοντα ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ θεασόμενον τὴν διοίκησιν αὐτοῦ καὶ συμπομπεύσοντα αὐτῷ καὶ συνεορτάσοντα πρὸς ὀλίγον;

(I3I)—Αὕτη ἡ ὁδὸς ἐπ' ἐλευθερίαν ἄγει, αὕτη μόνη ἀπαλλαγὴ δουλείας, [μόνῃ] τὸ δυνηθῆναι ποτ' εἰπεῖν ἐξ ὅλης ψυχῆς τὸ

ἄγου δέ μ', ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ' ἡ Πεπρωμένη,
ὅποι ποθ' ὑμῖν εἴμι διατεταγμένος.¹

b. Speaking for himself Epictetus says: I have been set free by God; I shall attach myself to Him; my will is one with His will.

Diss. IV 7, 17; 19-20:

Ἦλευθερώμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἔγνωκα αὐτοῦ τὰς ἐντολάς, οὐκέτι οὐδεὶς δουλαγωγῆσαι με δύναται. —

Τίνα οὖν ἔτι φοβηθῆναι δύναμαι; τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦ κοιτῶνος; μὴ τί ποιήσωσιν; ἀποκλείσωσί με; ἂν με εὕρωσι θέλοντα εἰσελθεῖν, ἀποκλεισάτωσαν. — Τί οὖν ἔρχῃ ἐπὶ θύρας; — "Οτι καθήκειν ἑμαυτῷ δοκῶ μενούσης τῆς παιδιᾶς συμπαίζειν. — Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἀποκλείῃ; — "Οτι ἂν μή τίς με δέχεται, οὐ θέλω εἰσελθεῖν, ἀλλ' αἰετὶ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνο θέλω τὸ γινόμενον. κρεῖττον γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι ὁ θεὸς θέλει ἢ ὁ ἐγώ. προσκείσομαι διάκονος καὶ ἀκόλουθος ἐκείνῳ, συνορμῶ, συνορέγομαι, ἀπλῶς συνθέλω. ἀποκλεισμός ἐμοὶ οὐ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τοῖς βιαζομένοις.

c. The punishment of not accepting things as they are. You must generously yield all things received and give them gladly back to the Giver.

Diss. I 12, 21-25:

Τίς οὖν ἡ κόλασις τοῖς οὐ προσδεχομένοις; τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἔχουσιν. δυσαρεστεῖ τις τῷ μόνος εἶναι; ἔστω ἐν ἐρημίᾳ. δυσαρεστεῖ τις τοῖς γονεῦσιν; ἔστω κακὸς υἱὸς καὶ πενθεῖτω. δυσαρεστεῖ τοῖς τέκνοις; ἔστω κακὸς πατήρ. "βάλε αὐτὸν εἰς φυλακὴν." ποῖαν φυλακὴν; ὅπου νῦν ἐστίν· ἄκων γάρ ἐστιν· ὅπου δὲ τις ἄκων ἐστίν, ἐκεῖνο φυλακὴ αὐτῷ ἐστίν, καθὼς καὶ Σωκράτης οὐκ

¹ These lines are of Kleantes (SVF I 527). Above, nr. 943c.

ἦν ἐν φυλακῇ, ἐκὼν γὰρ ἦν. “σκέλος οὖν μοι γενέσθαι πεπηρωμένον.” ἀνδράποδον, εἴτα δι’ ἐν σκελύδριον τῷ κόσμῳ ἐγκαλεῖς; οὐκ ἐπιδώσεις αὐτὸ τοῖς ὄλοις; οὐκ ἀποστήσῃ; οὐ χαίρων παραχωρήσεις τῷ δεδωκότι; ἀγανακτήσεις δὲ καὶ δυσαρεστήσεις τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ Διὸς διατεταγμένοις, ἃ ἐκεῖνος μετὰ τῶν Μοιρῶν παρουσῶν καὶ ἐπικλωθουσῶν σου τὴν γένεσιν ὥρισεν καὶ διέταξεν;

d. Do, as they say, some foolish thing for your freedom: give yourself up completely to the Divine Will.

Diss. II 16, 41-43:

“Ἀνθρωπε, τὸ λεγόμενον τοῦτο ἀπονοήθητι ἤδη ὑπὲρ εὐροίας, ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας, ὑπὲρ μεγαλοψυχίας. ἀνάτεινόν ποτε τὸν τράχηλον ὡς ἀπηλλαγμένος δουλείας, τόλμησον ἀναβλέψας πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι “χρῶ μοι λοιπὸν εἰς ὃ ἂν θέλῃς· ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι, [ἐ]σός εἰμι· οὐδὲν παραιτοῦμαι τῶν σοὶ δοκούντων· ὅπου θέλεις, ἄγε· ἦν θέλεις ἐσθῆτα περίθεος. ἄρχειν με θέλεις, ἰδιωτεύειν, μένειν, φεύγειν, πένεσθαι, πλουτεῖν; ἐγὼ σοι ὑπὲρ πάντων τούτων πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπολογήσομαι· δείξω τὴν ἐκάστου φύσιν οἷα ἐστίν.”

1246—Epictetus, who sees the ideal of inner freedom realized by the Cynic, is convinced that man cannot reach this, and ought not to try without the help of God. This is his first word to the man who asked him what kind of person the Cynic ought to be. The calling of the Cynic

a. *Diss.* III 22, 1-9:

Πυθομένου δὲ τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς αὐτοῦ, ὃς ἐφαίνετο ἐπιρρεπῶς ἔχων πρὸς τὸ κυνίσαι, Ποῦόν τινα εἶναι δεῖ τὸν κυνίζοντα καὶ τίς ἡ πρόληψις ἡ τοῦ πράγματος, Σκεψόμεθα κατὰ σχολήν. τοσοῦτον δ’ ἔχω σοι εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ὁ δῖχος θεοῦ τηλικούτῳ πράγματι ἐπιβαλλόμενος θεοχόλωτός ἐστι καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δημοσία θέλει ἀσχημονεῖν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν οἰκίᾳ καλῶς οἰκουμένην παρελθὼν τις αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ λέγει “ἐμὲ δεῖ οἰκονόμον εἶναι”· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπιστραφεὶς ὁ κύριος καὶ ἰδὼν αὐτὸν σοβαρῶς διατασσόμενον, ἐλκύσας ἔτεμεν. οὕτως γίνεται καὶ ἐν τῇ μεγάλῃ ταύτῃ πόλει. ἔστι γὰρ τις καὶ ἐνθάδ’ οἰκοδεσπότης ἕκαστα ὁ διατάσσων. “σὺ ἥλιος εἶ· δύνاسαι περιερχόμενος ἐνιαυτὸν ποιεῖν καὶ ὥρας καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς αὔξειν καὶ τρέφειν καὶ ἀνέμους κινεῖν καὶ ἀνιέναι καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων θερμαίνειν συμμέτρως· ὕπαγε, περιέρχου καὶ οὕτως διακίνει ἀπὸ τῶν μεγίστων ἐπὶ τὰ μικρότατα. σὺ μοσχάριον εἶ· ὅταν ἐπιφανῇ λέων, τὰ σαυτοῦ πρᾶσσε· εἰ δὲ μή, οἰμῶξεις. σὺ ταῦρος εἶ· προσελθὼν μάχου· σοὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐπιβάλλει καὶ πρέπει καὶ δύνاسαι αὐτὸ ποιεῖν. σὺ δύνاسαι ἡγεῖσθαι τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐπὶ Ἴλιον· ἴσθι Ἀγαμέμνων. σὺ δύνاسαι τῷ Ἑκτορι μονομαχεῖσθαι· ἴσθι Ἀχιλλεύς.” εἰ δὲ Θεοσίτης παρελθὼν ἀντεποιεῖτο τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἣ οὐκ ἂν

ἔτυχεν ἢ τυχὼν ἂν ἡσχημόνησεν ἐν πλείοσι μάρτυσι. Καὶ σὺ[μ] βούλευσαι περὶ πράγματος ἐπιμελῶς· οὐκ ἔστιν οἶον δοκεῖ σοι.

b. The Cynic is sent by God to the world and he has to serve Him without reserve.

Ib. 56-57:

Κυνικῷ δὲ Καῖσαρ τί ἐστὶν ἢ ἀνθύπατος ἢ ἄλλος ἢ ὁ καταπεπομφῶς αὐτὸν καὶ ᾧ λατρεῖται, ὁ Ζεὺς; ἄλλον τινὰ ἐπικαλεῖται ἢ ἐκεῖνον; οὐ πέπεισται δ', ὅτι ἂν πάσῃ τούτων, ὅτι ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸν γυμνάζει; ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Ἡρακλῆς ὑπὸ Εὐρυσθέως γυμναζόμενος οὐκ ἐνόμιζεν ἄθλιος εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀόκνως ἐπετέλει πάντα τὰ προσταττόμενα· οὗτος δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἀθλούμενος καὶ γυμναζόμενος μέλλει κεκραγῆναι καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν, ἄξιος φορεῖν τὸ σκῆπτρον τὸ Διογένους;

Life is a campaign

1247—Life is a campaign: you have to perform the duties assigned to you by the commanding officer.

a. *Diss.* III 24, 31-32:

(To a man who sits down, complaining of events and circumstances).

Ταῦτα ἤκουες παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ταῦτ' ἐμάνθανες; οὐκ οἶσθ', ὅτι στρατεία τὸ χρῆμά ἐστιν; τὸν μὲν δεῖ φυλάττειν, τὸν δὲ κατασκοπῆσοντα ἐξιέναι, τὸν δὲ καὶ πολεμήσοντα· οὐχ οἶόν τ' εἶναι πάντας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὐδ' ἄμεινον. σὺ δ' ἀφεις ἐκτελεῖν τὰ προσταγμάτων τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅταν τί σοι προσταχθῇ τραχύτερον, καὶ οὐ παρακολουθεῖς, οἶον ἀποφαίνεις, ὅσον ἐπὶ σοί, τὸ στράτευμα, ὅτι ἂν σε πάντες μιμήσωνται, οὐ τάφρον σκάψει τις, οὐ χάρακα περιβαλεῖ, οὐκ ἀγρυπνήσει, οὐ κινδυνεύσει, ἀλλὰ ἄχρηστος δόξει στρατεύεσθαι.

The metaphor of the drama of life

b. *Cp. Ench.* 17:

Μέμνησο, ὅτι ὑποκριτῆς εἶ δράματος, οἶον ἂν θέλῃ ὁ διδάσκαλος· ἂν βραχύ, βραχέος· ἂν μακρόν, μακροῦ· ἂν πτωχὸν ὑποκρίνασθαι σε θέλῃ, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτον εὐφυῶς ὑποκρίνῃ· ἂν χωλόν, ἂν ἄρχοντα, ἂν ἰδιώτην. σὸν γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔστι, τὸ δοθὲν ὑποκρίνασθαι πρόσωπον καλῶς· ἐκλέξασθαι δ' αὐτὸ ἄλλου.

The same metaphor is found with the second century Cynic Favorinus. See Dudley, *History of Cynicism*, p. 200.

Death

1248—Death is a natural redivision of the elements by Him who governs the universe, who has given life to us and may take it from us.

a. *Diss.* IV 10, 16:

Ὁ με σὺ ἐγέννησας, <χάριν ἔχω> χάριν ἔχω, ὧν ἔδωκας· ἐφ' ὅσον ἐχρησάμην τοῖς σοῖς, ἀρκεῖ μοι. πάλιν αὐτὰ ἀπόλαβε καὶ κατὰταξον εἰς ἣν θέλεις χώραν. σὰ γὰρ ἦν πάντα, σὺ μοι αὐτὰ δέδωκας.

b. God supplies us with everything we need for living. As soon as He does not, this is a sign for retiring: He does not need us any longer.

Diss. III 13, 14-15:

“Όταν δὲ μὴ παρέχῃ τὰναγκαῖα, τὸ ἀνακλητικὸν σημαίνει, τὴν θύραν ἡνοῖξεν καὶ λέγει σοι “ἔρχου”. ποῦ; εἰς οὐδὲν δεινόν, ἀλλ’ ὅθεν ἐγένου, εἰς τὰ φίλα καὶ συγγενῇ, εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα. ὅσον ἦν ἐν σοὶ πυρ<ός>, εἰς πῦρ ἅπεισιν, ὅσον ἦν γῆδιον, εἰς γῆδιον, ὅσον πνευματίου, εἰς πνευμάτιον, ὅσον ὕδατιον, εἰς ὕδατιον. οὐδεὶς “Αἰδῆς οὐδ’ Ἀχέρων οὐδὲ Κωκυτὸς οὐδὲ Πυριφλεγέθων, ἀλλὰ πάντα θεῶν μεστὰ καὶ δαιμόνων¹.”

c. Cp. also III 24, 95-101:

Διὰ τοῦτο ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς μεμνημένος τίς τ’ ἐστὶ καὶ πόθεν ἐλήλυθεν καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος γέγονεν, πρὸς μόνῳ τούτῳ ἐστίν, πῶς τὴν αὐτοῦ χώραν ἐκπληρώσῃ εὐτάκτως καὶ εὐπειθῶς τῷ θεῷ. “ἔτι μ’ εἶναι θέλεις; ὡς ἐλεύθερος, ὡς γενναῖος, ὡς σύ ἡθέλησας· σὺ γάρ με ἀκώλυτον ἐποίησας ἐν τοῖς ἐμοῖς. ἀλλ’ οὐκέτι μου χρειάν ἔχεις; καλῶς σοι γένοιτο· καὶ μέχρι νῦν διὰ σέ ἔμενον, δι’ ἄλλον οὐδένα, καὶ νῦν σοι πειθόμενος ἀπέρχομαι.” “πῶς ἀπέρχῃ;” “πάλιν ὡς σὺ ἡθέλησας ὡς ἐλεύθερος, ὡς ὑπηρέτης σός, ὡς ἡσθημένος σου τῶν προσταγμάτων καὶ ἀπαγορευμάτων. μέχρι δ’ ἂν οὗ διατρίβω ἐν τοῖς σοῖς, τίνα με θέλεις εἶναι; ἄρχοντα ἢ ιδιώτην, βουλευτὴν ἢ δημότην, στρατιώτην ἢ στρατηγόν, παιδευτὴν ἢ οἰκοδεσπότην; ἦν ἂν χώραν καὶ τάξιν ἐγχειρίσης, ὡς λέγει ὁ Σωκράτης, μυριάκις ἀποθανοῦμαι πρότερον ἢ ταύτην ἐγκαταλείψω. ποῦ δέ μ’ εἶναι θέλεις; ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἢ ἐν Ἀθήναις ἢ ἐν Θήβαις ἢ ἐν Γυάραις; μόνον ἐκεῖ μου μέμνησο. ἂν μ’ ἐκεῖ πέμπῃς, ὅπου κατὰ φύσιν διεξαγωγή οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπων, οὐ σοὶ ἀπειθῶν ἔξειμι, ἀλλ’ ὡς σοῦ μοι σημαίνοντος τὸ ἀνακλητικόν· οὐκ ἀπολείπω σε· μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλ’ αἰσθάνομαι, ὅτι μου χρειάν οὐκ ἔχεις.”

Parallel passages: III 26, 29; I 29, 28 f. See also above, our nrs. 1234, 1242, 1245.

On the whole, there is a real grandeur in the fierce spiritualism of this little man with his lame leg and his entire surrender to the divine Will.

7—LATER CYNICS

1249—The kind of popular sermons, called *diatribes*, found in The diatribe Epictetus, originated with Bion of Borysthenes, a Cynic of the first half of the 3rd century. Of Bion's diatribes fragments are preserved in the remains of Teles' works, handed down to us by Stobaeus.

¹ A quotation of Thales; see our nr. 9c.

Definition

a. The genre is defined by the rhetor Hermogenes, *Rhet. Graec.* III, p. 406 W.:

Διατριβή ἐστι βραχέος διανοήματος ἡθικὴ ἐκθεσις.

Bion.
Happiness
depends on
ourselves

b. Circumstances being immutable, happiness or unhappiness depends on our approach to them.

Bion in Teles, p. 4-5 Hense:

Εἰ λάβοι, φησὶ ὁ Βίων, φωνὴν τὰ πράγματα, ὃν τρόπον καὶ ἡμεῖς, καὶ δύναιτο δικαιολογεῖσθαι, οὖν ἂν εἴποι, φησὶν, ἡ Πενία . . . πρὸς τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα "τί μοι μάχη; μὴ καλοῦ τινος δι' ἐμὲ στερίσκη; μὴ σωφροσύνης; μὴ δικαιοσύνης; μὴ ἀνδρείας; ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδεῆς εἶ; ἢ οὐ μεστὰι μὲν αἱ ὁδοὶ λαχάνων, πλήρεις δὲ αἱ κρῆναι ὕδατος; οὐκ εὐνάς σοι τοσαύτας παρέχω ὁπόση γῆ; καὶ στρωμνὰς φύλλα; ἢ εὐφραίνεισθαι μετ' ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν; ἢ οὐχ ὀρεῖς γράδια φυστὴν φαγόντα τερετίζοντα; ἢ οὐκ ὕψον ἀδάπανον καὶ ἀτρύφερον παρασκευάζω σοι τὴν πεῖναν; —

Εἰ ταῦτα λέγοι ἡ Πενία, τί ἂν ἔχοις ἀντειπεῖν; ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ ἂν δοκῶ ἄφωνος γενέσθαι. ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτιώμεθα ἢ τὴν ἑαυτῶν δυστροπίαν καὶ κακοδαιμονίαν, τὸ γῆρας, τὴν πενίαν, τὸν ἀπαντήσαντα, τὴν ἡμέραν, τὴν ὥραν, τὸν τόπον. διὸ φησιν ὁ Διογένης φωνῆς ἀκηκοέναι κακίας ἑαυτὴν αἰτιωμένης,

οὔτις ἐμοὶ τῶνδ' ἄλλος ἐπαίτιος, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ αὐτή.¹

Cp. Epictetus, nr. 1245.

c. Bion, ib., p. 6-7 H.:

Ὁ δὲ Βίων, ὥσπερ τῶν θηρίων, φησί, παρὰ τὴν λῆψιν ἡ δῆξις γίνεται, καὶ μέσου τοῦ ὄφεως ἐπιλαμβάνη, δηχθήσῃ, ἐὰν τοῦ τραχήλου, οὐδὲν πείσῃ· οὕτω καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, φησί, παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἡ ὁδὴ γίνεται, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν οὕτως ὑπολάβῃς περὶ αὐτῶν, ὥς ἂν κρατῆς, οὐκ ὁδυνήσῃ, ἐὰν δὲ ὥς ἐτέρως, ἀνιάσῃ, οὐχ ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδίων τρόπων καὶ τῆς ψευδοῦς δόξης. διὸ δεῖ μὴ τὰ πράγματα πειρᾶσθαι μετατιθέναι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν παρασκευάσαι πρὸς ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ ναυτικοί· οὐ γὰρ τοὺς ἀνέμους καὶ τὴν θάλατταν πειρῶνται μετατιθέναι, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζουσιν αὐτοὺς δυναμένους πρὸς ἐκεῖνα στρέφεσθαι. εὐδία, γαλήνη· ταῖς κώπαις πλέουσι· κατὰ ναῦν ἄνεμος· ἐπῆραν τὰ ἄρμενα. ἀντιπέπνευκεν· ἐστείλαντο, μεθείλαντο. καὶ σὺ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα χρῶ. γέρων γέγονας· μὴ ζῆτει τὰ τοῦ νέου. ἀσθενὴς πάλιν· μὴ ζῆτει τὰ τοῦ ἰσχυροῦ. — "Απορος πάλιν γέγονας· μὴ ζῆτει τὴν τοῦ εὐπόρου δίαιταν.

¹ The verse is probably not a literal quotation, but a free Homeric reminiscence of such a line as *Iliad* A 335: οὔτι μοι ὕμμες ἐπαίτιοι, ἀλλ' Ἀγαμέμνων.

d. As to Teles, he was a Megarian schoolmaster in the second half of the 3rd cent. B.C. His own work was less interesting than what he quoted. Dudley, *History of Cynicism*, p. 84-87.

Teles

1250—a. After a period of silence, there is a revival of Cynicism in the first cent. B.C. *Meleager of Gadara*, author of satires and of a collection of epigrams, lived in the first half of the first Century, for the greater part at Tyrus, later on Cos. Dudley, p. 121 f.

Cynicism
in the first
cent. B.C.

b. From the same period dates the so-called *Wiener Diogenes Papyrus*, which contains a number of anecdotes. It was first published by Wessely in *Festschrift Th. Gomperz*, Wien 1902, p. 68-72 (*Neues über Diogenes den Kyniker*); next by W. Crönert, *Kolotes u. Menedemos*, Leipzig 1906, (*Studien zur Palaeographie u. Papyruskunde*, herausgeg. von C. Wessely, Bd. VI), p. 49-52. K. von Fritz, *Quellenuntersuchungen zu Leben u. Philosophie des Diogenes von Sinope*. Philologus, Suppl. Bd. 18, 2, Leipzig 1926, p. 60-63; R. Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King*, Uppsala 1948, p. 147.

c. The so-called *Letters of the Cynics* (sc. of Antisthenes, Diogenes and Crates) date from the Augustan age and later. See von Fritz, o.c. p. 63-71; Dudley, p. 123 f.

1251—The first Cynic who is somewhat better known to us in the first cent. A.D. is Demetrius, a well-known figure in Rome under Caligula and Nero, banished by Vespasianus in 71. Seneca admired him as a rare example of wisdom.

Demetrius

a. Seneca, *De benef.* VII 8, 2 - 9, 1; 10, 6:

Haec universa habere de quibus loqueris, abominabitur (sapiens). Non referam tibi Socratem, Chrysippum, Zenonem et ceteros magnos quidem viros, maiores quidem quia in laudem vetustorum invidia non obstat. Paulo ante Demetrium rettuli, quem mihi videtur rerum natura nostris tulisse temporibus, ut ostenderet nec illum a nobis corrumpi nec nos ab illo corripui posse, virum exactae, licet neget ipse, sapientiae firmaeque in iis, quae proposuit, constantiae, eloquentiae vero eius quae res fortissimas deceat, non concinnatae nec in verba sollicitae, sed ingenti animo, prout inpetus tulit, res suas prosequentis. Huic non dubito quin providentia et talem vitam et talem dicendi facultatem dederit, ne aut exemplum saeculo nostro aut convicium deesset. Demetrio si res nostras aliquis deorum possidendas velit tradere sub lege certa, ne liceat donare, adfirmaverim repudiaturum dicturumque: "Ego vero me ad istud inextricabile pondus non adligo nec in altam faecem rerum hunc expeditum hominem demitto. Quid ad me defers populorum omnium mala? quae ne daturus quidem acciperem, quoniam multa video, quae me donare non deceat." —

(10, 6) "Dimitte me et illis divitiis meis redde; ego regnum sapientiae novi, magnum, securum; ego sic omnia habeo, ut omnium sint."

b. Seneca, *Ep.* 62, 3:

Demetrium, virorum optimum, mecum circumfero et relictis conchyliatis cum illo seminudo loquor, illum admiror. quidni admirer? vidi nihil ei deesse. contemnere aliquis omnia potest, omnia habere nemo potest. brevissima ad divitias per contemptum divitiarum via est. Demetrius autem noster sic vivit, non tamquam contempserit omnia, sed tamquam aliis habenda permiserit.

Epictetus seems to have disliked him: he mentions him only once. On the association of Demetrius with Paetus Thrasea and his circle, see Dudley, o.c. p. 128 ff.

Epictetus'
ideal of the
Cynic

1252—Both Musonius and Epictetus had, as we pointed out, a strong affinity with older Cynics. Epictetus, however, in his diatribe "On the calling of the Cynic" warns against the vulgar kind of Cynicism: the essential thing is not wearing a rough cloak, having a hard bed and taking a wallet and a staff, but purity of the hegemonikón (III 22, 9: Πρωτον οὖν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν σε δεῖ τὸ σαυτοῦ καθαρὸν ποιῆσαι) and a detachment from outward matters. Next, he must know that he has a divine mission.

The Cynic
has been
sent by God
to men

a. Epict., *Diss.* III 22, 23-27; 30:

Εἰδέναι δεῖ, ὅτι ἄγγελος ἀπὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἀπέσταλται καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ὑποδείξων αὐτοῖς, ὅτι πεπλάνηται καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ ζητοῦσι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, ὅπου οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅπου δ' ἔστιν οὐκ ἐνθυμοῦνται, καὶ ὡς ὁ Διογένης ἀπαχθεὶς πρὸς Φίλιππον μετὰ τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχην κατάσκοπος εἶναι¹. τῷ γὰρ ὄντι κατάσκοπός ἐστιν ὁ Κύνικος τοῦ τίνα ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις φίλα καὶ τίνα πολέμια. καὶ δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀκριβῶς κατασκευάμενον ἐλθόντ' ἀπαγγεῖλαι τάληθ' ἢ μὴ ὑπὸ φόβου ἐκπλαγέντα, ὥστε τοὺς μὴ ὄντας πολεμίους δεῖξαι, μήτε τινὰ ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν παραταραχθέντα ἢ συγχυθέντα.

Δεῖ οὖν αὐτὸν δύνασθαι ἀνατεινόμενον, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ ἐπὶ σκηνὴν τραγικὴν ἀνερχόμενον λέγειν τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους "ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ποῖ φέρεσθε; τί ποιεῖτε, ὦ ταλαίπωροι; ὡς τυφλοὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω κυλίεσθε· ἄλλην ὁδὸν ἀπέρχεσθε τὴν οὖσαν ἀπολελοιπότες, ἀλλαχοῦ ζητεῖτε τὸ εὖρον καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονικόν, ὅπου οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἄλλου δεικνύοντος πιστεύετε. τί αὐτὸ ἐξω ζητεῖτε; ἐν σώματι οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ ἀπιστεῖτε, ἴδετε Μύρωνα, ἴδετε Ὀφέλλιον. ἐν κτήσει οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ δ' ἀπιστεῖτε, ἴδετε Κροῖσον, ἴδετε τοὺς νῦν πλουσίους, ὅσῃς οἰμωγῇς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν μεστός ἐστιν. ἐν ἀρχῇ οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ μή γε, ἔδει τοὺς δις καὶ τρίς ὑπάτους εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· οὐκ εἰσὶ δέ.

(30) — ἐν βασιλείᾳ οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ μή, Νέρων ἂν εὐδαίμων ἐγένετο καὶ Σαρδανάπαλλος. ἀλλ' οὐδ' Ἀγαμέμνων εὐδαίμων ἦν καίτοι κομφότερος ὢν Σαρδανάπαλλος καὶ Νέρωνος.

¹ Cp. Diog. Laërt. VI 43.

b. He has been sent to show in practice that it is possible to be free and happy without any externals.

Ib., 45-48:

Καὶ πῶς ἐνδέχεται μὴδὲν ἔχοντα, γυμνόν, ἄοικον, ἀνέστιον, αὐχμῶντα, ἄδουλον, ἄπολιν διεξάγειν εὐρώας; ἰδοῦ ἀπέσταλκεν ὑμῖν ὁ θεὸς τὸν δείζοντα ἔργῳ, ὅτι ἐνδέχεται. “Ἰδετέ με, ἄοικός εἰμι, ἄπολις, ἀκτῆμων, ἄδουλος· χαμαὶ κοιμῶμαι. οὐ γυνή, οὐ παιδία, οὐ πραιτωρίδιον, ἀλλὰ γῇ μόνον καὶ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἐν τριβωνάριον, καὶ τί μοι λείπει[ν]; οὐκ εἰμι ἄλυπος, οὐκ εἰμι ἄφοβος, οὐκ εἰμι ἐλεύθερος;

1253—Dio Chrysostomus or Dio of Prusa.

Dio of Prusa

Dio of Prusa, a famous sophist and Hellenist in his native city, came to Rome under Domitianus with the most brilliant prospects. But, by the downfall of his friend Flavius Sabinus, he was driven into exile and lost all his property. In his *Or.* 13, 1 ff., he relates how he was brought to philosophy by these events.

His *Orations* 6, 8, 9 and 10 are the exposition of a radical Cynicism; with a strong emphasis on ἀναιδεία, αὐτάρχεια and ἄσκησις.

Recalled by Nerva, he returned to Prusa, to be loaded with honours by his own and neighbouring states. He was in high favour with Trajanus. The orations I-IV, *Περὶ βασιλείας*, were delivered before this emperor in Rome, at the beginning of his reign.

Under this number, we quote some passages in which Dio expounds the old Cynic ideal of παιδεία, the example of which was found in Heracles.

a. Dio, *Or.* 32, 3 (To the people of Alexandria):

The Cynic
ideal of
Paideia

Νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἀμαρτάνετε τὸ Ἀθηναίων ποτὲ ἀμάρτημα. τοῦ γὰρ Ἀπόλλωνος εἰπόντος, εἰ θέλουσιν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει γενέσθαι, τὸ κάλλιστον ἐμβάλλειν τοῖς ὡσὶ τῶν παιδων, οἱ δὲ τρήσαντες τὸ ἕτερον χρυσίον ἐνέβαλον, οὐ συνέντες τοῦ θεοῦ. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ κόραις μᾶλλον ἔπρεπε καὶ παῖσι Λυδῶν ἢ Φρυγῶν· Ἑλλήνων δὲ παισὶ, καὶ ταῦτα θεοῦ προστάξαντος, οὐκ ἄλλο ἤρμοζεν ἡ παιδεία καὶ λόγος, ὧν οἱ τυχόντες εἰκότως [ἄν] ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται καὶ σωτῆρες τῶν πόλεων.

b. Cp. Dio, *Or.* 1, 61. Heracles, the “educated” king.

Ἦν δὲ καὶ πεπαιδευμένος ἀπλῶς, οὐ πολυτρόπως οὐδὲ περιττῶς σοφίσμασι καὶ πανουργήμασιν ἀνθρώπων κακοδαιμόνων.

c. Dio, *Or.* 32, 15-16. Paideia is a gift of the Gods, a help against human folly.

Διὰ γὰρ ἀνθρώπων ἄνοιαν καὶ τρυφήν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν δυσχερὴς ὁ βίος καὶ μέστος ἀπάτης, πονηρίας, λύπης, μυρίων ἄλλων κακῶν. τούτων δὲ ἐν ἱαμα

καὶ φάρμακον ἐποίησαν οἱ θεοὶ παιδεῖαν καὶ λόγον, ᾧ διὰ βίου μέν τις χρώμενος καὶ συνεχῶς ἡλθέ ποτε πρὸς τέλος ὑγιὲς καὶ εὐδαιμον· — οἱ δὲ διὰ παντὸς ἄπειροι τοῦ φαρμάκου τούτου καὶ μηδέποτε σωφρονοῦντι λόγῳ τὰς ἀκοὰς ὑπέχοντες ὁλοκλήρως ἄθλιοι μηδεμίαν σκέπην μηδὲ προβολὴν ἔχοντες ἀπὸ τῶν παθῶν.

Höistad, o.c., p. 164, concludes that Dio's Or. 32 expounds a genuine Cynic paideia, with its roots in classical Cynicism.

On Dio as a source of our knowledge of older Cynicism see also K. von Fritz, *Diogenes von Sinope*, p. 71-90.

The Cynic
King

1254—The following passage shows us the classical Cynic ideal of the king.

a. Dio, *Or.* I, 14:

Οὐδεὶς ποτε πονηρὸς καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ φιλοχρήματος οὔτε αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι δυνατὸς ἄρχων οὐδ' ἐγκρατὴς οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενός, οὐδ' ἔσται ποτὲ ἐκεῖνος βασιλεὺς, οὐδ' ἂν πάντες φῶσιν Ἑλληνες καὶ βάρβαροι καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες, καὶ μὴ μόνον ἄνθρωποι θαυμάζωσιν αὐτὸν καὶ ὑπακούωσιν, ἀλλ' οἷ τε ὄρνιθες πετόμενοι καὶ τὰ θηρία ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι μηδὲν ἤττον τῶν ἀνθρώπων συγχωρῇ τε καὶ ποιῇ τὸ προσταττόμενον.

b. In the second part of the 3rd discourse, however, Dio's description of the basileus is strongly influenced by the Stoic conception of Zeus-basileus, who is the Governor of the universe. Virtue and vice are considered from the religious point of view. And also the belief in daemons comes in as an essential point.

Dio, *Or.* 3, 51-54:

Τοιοῦτος δ' ὢν πρῶτον μὲν ἐστὶ θεοφιλὴς, ἅτε τῆς μεγίστης τυγχάνων παρὰ θεῶν τιμῆς καὶ πίστεως. καὶ πρῶτόν γε καὶ μάλιστα θεραπεύσει τὸ θεῖον, οὐχ ὁμολογῶν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πεπεισμένος εἶναι θεούς, ἵνα δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχη τοὺς κατ' ἄξιαν ἄρχοντας. ἡγεῖται δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις συμφέρειν τὴν αὐτοῦ πρόνοιαν οὕτως ὡς αὐτῷ τὴν ἐκείνων ἀρχήν. καὶ μὴν ἐκεῖνο ἑαυτῷ συνειδὼς ὡς οὐποτε δῶρον δέξεται παρὰ κακῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐδὲ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀναθήμασιν οὐδὲ θυσίαις οἶεται χαίρειν τῶν ἀδίκων [ἀνδρῶν], παρὰ μόνων δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν προσίσεσθαι τὰ δεδομένα. τοιγαροῦν θεραπεύειν ἀφθόνως αὐτοὺς σπουδάζει καὶ τούτοις· ἐκείνοις γε μὴν οὐδέποτε παύσεται τιμῶν, τοῖς καλοῖς ἔργοις καὶ ταῖς δικαίαις πράξεσιν. ἕκαστόν γε μὴν τῶν θεῶν ἰλάσκειται κατὰ [τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ] δύναμιν. ἡγεῖται δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν ὁσιότητα, τὴν δὲ κακίαν πᾶσαν ἀσέβειαν. εἶναι γὰρ ἐναγεῖς καὶ ἀλιτηρίους οὐ μόνον τοὺς τὰ ἱερὰ συλῶντας ἢ λέγοντάς τι βλάσφημον περὶ τῶν θεῶν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τοὺς τε δειλοὺς καὶ ἀδίκους καὶ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ ἀνοήτους καὶ καθόλου τοὺς ἐναντίον τι πράττοντας

τῇ τε δυνάμει καὶ βουλήσει τῶν θεῶν. οὐ μόνον δὲ ἡγεῖται θεούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ δαίμονας καὶ ἥρωας ἀγαθοὺς τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ψυχὰς μεταβαλούσας ἐκ τῆς θνητῆς φύσεως· τοῦτο δὲ βεβαίω· τὸ δόγμα οὐχ ἥκιστα χαριζόμενος αὐτῷ.

On this passage: Höistad o.c., p. 190 ff.

c. More than once the basileus is represented as a solitary, poor and suffering figure, as Heracles often was in ancient Cynic literature.

Dio, *Or.* 9, 8-9 (On Diogenes attending the Isthmian games):

Τινὲς μὲν οὖν αὐτὸν ἐθαύμαζον ὡς σοφώτατον πάντων, τισὶ δὲ μαίνεσθαι ἐδόκει, πολλοὶ δὲ κατεφρόνουν ὡς πτωχοῦ τε καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίου, τινὲς δ' ἐλοι-δόρουν, οἱ δὲ προπηλακίζειν ἐπεχείρουν, ὅστ' ῥίπτοῦντες πρὸ τῶν ποδῶν, ὥσπερ τοῖς κυσίν, οἱ δὲ καὶ τοῦ τρίβωνος ἤπτοντο προσιόντες, πολλοὶ δὲ οὐκ εἴων, ἀλλ' ἡγανάκτουν, καθάπερ "Ομηρὸς φησι τὸν Ὀδυσσεά προσπαίζειν τοὺς μνηστῆρας, ἀκχεῖνον πρὸς ὀλίγας ἡμέρας ἐνεγκεῖν τὴν ἀκολασίαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ὕβριν· ὁ δὲ ὅμοιος ἦν ἐν ἀπαντι· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ ἐφίκει βασιλεῖ καὶ δεσπότῃ, πτωχοῦ στολὴν ἔχοντι, κάπνεια ἐν ἀνδραπόδοις τε καὶ δούλοις αὐτοῦ στρεφομένῳ τρυφῶσι καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ὅστις ἐστί, καὶ ῥαδίως φέροντι μεθύοντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ μαινομένους ὑπὸ ἀγνοίας καὶ ἀμαθίας.

Cp. also Dio, *Or.* I, 61-62; *Or.* 47, 4; and Epictetus, *Diss.* III, 26, 32: Heracles, the ruler of all the land and sea, who introduced justice and righteousness everywhere, ταῦτα ἐποίει καὶ γυμνὸς καὶ μόνος. Cp. Höistad, *Eine Hellenistische Parallele zu 2 Cor.* 6, 3 ff., Uppsala 1944.

1255—In his Seventh or Euboean discourse, Dio is to us a most precious witness about the life of the working classes in this period.

On the life
of the
working
classes

He says that, on the whole, the poor are not at a disadvantage in comparison with the rich on account of their poverty, so far as living a seemly and natural life is concerned. On the contrary, as to hospitality, the poor are usually much more liberal than the rich.

a. Dio, *Or.* 7, 82:

Καὶ δῆτα καὶ τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ¹ σκοπῶν, εἰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀπόρως αὐτοῖς ἔχει τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ξένους, ὡς μήτε ὑποδέξασθαι ποτε δύνασθαι μήτε ἔπαρκεσαι δεομένῳ τινί, οὐδαμῇ πω τοιοῦτον εὕρισκω τὸ τῆς ξενίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ πῦρ ἐναύον-τας προθυμότερον τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ὁδῶν ἀπροφασίστους ἡγεμόνας· ἐπεὶ τοι τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ αἰσχύνοιντο ἄν· πολλάκις δὲ καὶ μεταδιδόντας ὧν ἔχουσιν ἐτοιμότερον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ναυαγῷ τις δώσει ἐκείνων οὔτε τὸ τῆς γυναικὸς ἀλουργές

¹ The reference is to *Electra* 424 f., where the farmer says:

Ἔστιν δὲ δὴ τοσαῦτά γ' ἐν δόμοις ἔτι,
ὥσθ' ἐν γ' ἐπ' ἡμᾶρ τοῦσδε πληρῶσαι βορᾶς.

ἢ τὸ τῆς θυγατρὸς οὔτε πολὺ ἤττον τούτου φόρημα, τῶν χλαινῶν τινα ἢ χιτῶνων, μυρία ἔχοντες, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν οἰκετῶν οὐδενὸς ἱμάτιον.

b. For the poor in cities, however, it may be difficult to find a living.

Ib., 105-106:

Μήποτε σπάνια ἢ τὰ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔργα τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἀφορμῆς τε ἐξωθεν προσδεόμενα, ὅταν οἰκεῖν τε μισθοῦ δέῃ¹ καὶ τᾶλλ' ἔχειν ὠνούμενους, οὐ μόνον ἱμάτια καὶ σκευή καὶ σῖτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύλα, τῆς γε καθ' ἡμέραν χρείας ἕνεκα τοῦ πυρός, καὶ φρυγάνων δέῃ ποτε ἢ φύλλων ἢ ἄλλου ὅτουοῦν τῶν πάνυ φαύλων, δίχα δὲ ὕδατος τὰ ἄλλα σύμπαντα ἀναγκάζονται λαμβάνειν τιμὴν κατατιθέντες, ἅτε πάντων κατακλειομένων καὶ μηδενὸς ἐν μέσφ φαινομένου, πλήν γε οἶμαι τῶν ἐπὶ πράσει, πολλῶν καὶ τιμίων. τάχα γὰρ φανεῖται χαλεπὸν τοιούτῳ βίῳ διαρκεῖν μηδὲν ἄλλο κτῆμα ἔξω τοῦ σώματος κεκτημένου, ἄλλως τε ὅταν μὴ τὸ τυχὸν ἔργον μηδὲ πάνθ' ὁμοίως συμβουλευόμεν αὐτοῖς, ὅθεν ἔστι κερδαίνειν.

c. Dio urges people to undertake any honest occupation without hesitation, and pay no heed to the sneers of idle objectors.

Ib. 114-115:

... θαρροῦντας ἐπιχειρεῖν κελεύομεν (sc. every kind of honest occupations), μηδὲν φροντίζοντας τῶν ἄλλως τὰ τοιαῦτα προφερόντων, οἷον εἰώθασι λοιδοροῦμενοι προφέρειν πολλάκις οὐ μόνον τὰς αὐτῶν ἐργασίας, αἷς οὐδὲν ἄτοπον πρόσσεστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν γονέων, ἂν τινος ἐριθος ἢ μήτηρ ἢ τρυγῆτρια ἐξεληθοῦσά ποτε ἢ μισθοῦ τιθεύσῃ παῖδα τῶν ὀρφανῶν ἢ πλουσίων ἢ ὁ πατήρ διδάξῃ γράμματα ἢ παιδαγωγῇ. μηδὲν οὖν τοιοῦτον αἰσχυνομένους ὁμόσε ἰέναι. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλως αὐτὰ ἐροῦσιν, ἂν λέγωσιν, ἢ ὡς σημεῖα πενίας, πενίαν αὐτὴν λοιδοροῦντες δῆλον ὅτι καὶ προφέροντες ὡς κακὸν δὴ τι καὶ δυστυχές, οὐ τῶν ἔργων οὐδέν. ὥστε ἐπειδὴ οὐ φαμεν χεῖρον οὐδὲ δυστυχέστερον πλούτου πενίαν, οὐδὲ πολλοῖς ἴσως ἀξυμφορώτερον, οὐδὲ τὸ ὄνειδος τοῦ ὀνείδους μᾶλλον τι βαραντέον τοῦτ' ἐκείνου.

This passage shows a striking difference from the traditional view, e.g. Cicero's distinction between "vulgar" and "liberal" occupations, *De off.* I, ch. 42.

1256—In the second century, there were numerous Cynics, both in Rome and Alexandria, in Asia and Greece. The κυνικὸς βίος did not imply adherence to a theoretically developed system of philosophy. Of the kind of charlatans found among them a vivid picture is given in Lucianus' *Fugitivi*.

The vulgar
kind of
Cynics

¹ Gen. pretii.

a. Lucianus, *Fugitivi* 3-4; 16:

While, on Olympus, Zeus and Apollo are discussing the death of Peregrinus, who burnt himself to death near Olympia, Philosophy enters in great trouble, weeping and complaining of how she has been treated on earth. Zeus speaks:

Τί, ὦ θύγατερ, δακρύεις; ἢ τί ἀπολιπούσα τὸν βίον ἐλήλυθας; ἄρα μὴ οἱ ἰδιῶται αὖθις ἐπιβεβουλευκάσι σοι ὥς τὸ πρόσθεν, ὅτε τὸν Σωκράτην ἀπέκτειναν ὑπὸ Ἀνύτου κατηγορηθέντα, εἴτα φεύγεις διὰ τοῦτο αὐτούς;

ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ. Οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον, ὦ πάτερ, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ὁ πολὺς λεῶς ἐπὶ ἡνῶν καὶ διὰ τιμῆς ἦγον αἰδούμενοι καὶ θαυμάζοντές με καὶ μονονοῦχι προσκυνοῦντες, εἰ καὶ μὴ σφόδρα συνίεσαν ὧν λέγοιμι. οἱ δὲ πῶς ἂν εἴποιμι, οἱ συνήθεις καὶ φίλοι φάσκοντες εἶναι καὶ τοῦνομα τοῦμόν ὑποδύμενοι, ἐκεῖνοί με τὰ δεινότατα εἰργάσαντο.

ZEYΣ. Οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἐπιβουλὴν τίνα ἐπιβεβουλευκάσι σοι;

ΦΙΛ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ πάτερ, οἱ γε συνηδίκηγνται μοι καὶ αὐτοί.

ZEYΣ. Πρὸς τίνων οὖν ἡδίκησαι, εἰ μήτε τοὺς ἰδιώτας μήτε τοὺς φιλοσόφους αἰτιᾷ;

ΦΙΛ. Εἰσὶ τινες, ὦ Ζεῦ, ἐν μεταίχμῳ τῶν τε πολλῶν καὶ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων, τὸ μὲν σχῆμα καὶ βλέμμα καὶ βάδισμα ἡμῖν ὅμοιοι καὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐσταλμένοι· ἀξιοῦσι γοῦν ὑπ' ἐμοὶ τάττεσθαι καὶ τοῦνομα τὸ ἡμέτερον ἐπιγράφονται, μαθηταὶ καὶ ὁμιληταὶ καὶ θιασῶται ἡμῶν εἶναι λέγοντες· ὁ βίος δὲ παμμίαιρος αὐτῶν, ἀμαθίας καὶ θράσους καὶ ἀσελγείας ἀνάπλεως, ὕβρις οὐ μικρὰ καθ' ἡμῶν· ὑπὸ τούτων, ὦ πάτερ, ἡδίκημένη πέφευγα.

These vulgar and ignorant people take advantage of the profound respect which the average man usually shows towards the philosopher.

Τοιγαροῦν ἐμπέπλησται πᾶσα ἡ πόλις τῆς τοιαύτης ῥαδιουργίας, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν Διογένην καὶ Ἀντισθένην καὶ Κράτητα ἐπιγεγραφομένων καὶ ὑπὸ τῷ κυνὶ ταττομένων, οἱ τὸ μὲν χρήσιμον ὅποσον ἔνεστι τῇ φύσει τῶν κυνῶν, οἷον τὸ φυλακτικὸν ἢ οἰκουρικὸν ἢ φιλοδέσποτον ἢ μνημονικὸν οὐδαμῶς ἐξηλώκασιν, ὑλακὴν δὲ καὶ λιχνεῖαν καὶ ἀρπαγὴν καὶ ἀφροδίσια συχνὰ καὶ κολακείαν καὶ τὸ σαίνειν τὸν διδόντα καὶ περὶ τραπέζας ἔχειν, ταῦτα ἀκριβῶς ἐκπεπονήκασιν.

b. As to Peregrinus, we have sufficient evidence to conclude that Lucianus presents a distorted picture. Gellius visited the man frequently and calls him *virum gravem atque constantem* (*N.A.* 8, 3). His death by fire was to be an example of endurance, like that of the Brahmani. Peregrinus

Literature:

J. Bernays, *Lukian u. die Kyniker*, Berlin 1879.

M. Caster, *Lucien et la pensée religieuse de son temps*, Paris 1937.

On Peregrinus:

H. M. Hornsby, *The Cynicism of Peregrinus Proteus*, in *Hermathena* 1933.

Dudley, *History of Cynicism*, pp. 170-182.

Demonax.
His life and
character

1257—Lucianus describes the life and character of Demonax as follows.

a. Lucianus, *Demonax* 3:

Ἦν δὲ τὸ μὲν γένος Κύπριος, οὐ τῶν ἀφανῶν ὅσα εἰς ἀξίωμα πολιτικὸν καὶ κτῆσιν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων τούτων ὑπεράνω γενόμενος καὶ ἀξιώσας ἑαυτὸν τῶν καλλίστων πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν ὥρμησεν οὐκ Ἀγαθοβούλου¹ μὰ Δί' οὐδὲ Δημητρίου πρὸ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ Ἐπικτήτου ἐπεχειράντων, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι μὲν συνεγένετο τούτοις καὶ ἔτι Τιμοκράτει τῷ Ἡρακλεώτῃ, σοφῶ ἄνδρι φωνήν τε καὶ γνώμην μάλιστα κεκοσμημένῃ. ἀλλ' ὃ γε Δημῶναξ οὐχ ὑπὸ τούτων τινός, ὡς ἔφην, παρακληθείς, ἀλλ' ὑπ' οἰκείας πρὸς τὰ καλὰ ὁρμῆς καὶ ἐμφύτου πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν ἔρωτος ἐκ παίδων εὐθὺς κεκίνημένος ὑπερεῖδε μὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων, ὅλον δὲ παραδούς ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ παρρησίᾳ διετέλεσεν αὐτός τε ὀρθῶ καὶ ὑγιεῖ καὶ ἀνεπιλήπτῳ βίῳ χρώμενος καὶ τοῖς ὁρῶσι καὶ ἀκούουσι παράδειγμα παρέχων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀλήθειαν.

b. He was gentle in his behaviour towards other people.

Ib. 7:

Οὐδεπώποτε γοῦν ὥφθη κεκραγώς ἢ ὑπερδιατεινόμενος ἢ ἀγανακτῶν, οὐδ' εἰ ἐπιτιμᾶν τῷ δέοι, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἀμαρτημάτων καθήπτετο, τοῖς δὲ ἀμαρτάνουσι συνεγίνωσκε, καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα παρὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν ἡξίου λαμβάνειν τὰ μὲν νοσήματα ἰωμένων, ὀργῇ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς νοσοῦντας οὐ χρώμενων· ἡγεῖτο γὰρ ἀνθρώπου μὲν εἶναι τὸ ἀμαρτάνειν, θεοῦ δὲ ἢ ἀνδρὸς ἰσοθέου τὰ πταισθέντα ἐπανορθοῦν.

c. He calmed the excited, comforted the suffering and made peace between those who quarrelled.

Ib. 8-9:

Καὶ τοὺς μὲν εὐτυχεῖν δοκοῦντας αὐτῶν ὑπεμύνησκεν ὡς ἐπ' ὀλιγοχρονίοις τοῖς δοκοῦσιν ἀγαθοῖς ἐπαιρομένους, τοὺς δὲ ἢ πενίαν ὀδυρομένους ἢ φυγὴν δυσχεραίνοντας ἢ γῆρας ἢ νόσον αἰτιωμένους σὺν γέλῳ παρεμυθεῖτο, οὐχ ὀρῶντας ὅτι μετὰ μικρὸν αὐτοῖς παύσεται μὲν τὰ ἀνιώντα, λήθη δὲ τις ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἐλευθερία μακρὰ πάντας ἐν ὀλίγῳ καταλήψεται. ἔμελε δ' αὐτῷ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς στασιάζοντας διαλλάττειν καὶ γυναιξὶ πρὸς τοὺς γεγαμηκότας εἰρήνην πρυτανεύειν.

¹ Agathoboulos must have been a prominent Cynic in the first half of the second century. He is mentioned as the teacher both of Demonax and of Peregrinus.

d. He did all these things gracefully and with humour.

Ib. 10:

Καὶ πάντα ταῦτα μετὰ Χαρίτων καὶ Ἀφροδίτης αὐτῆς ἐπραττέ τε καὶ ἔλεγεν, ὥς ἀεὶ, τὸ κωμικὸν ἐκεῖνο, τὴν πειθῶ τοῖς χεῖλεσιν αὐτοῦ ἐπικαθῆσθαι.

1258—a. Lucianus, *Demonax* 21:

Demonax

and

Peregrinus

Περεγρίνου δὲ τοῦ Πρωτέως¹ ἐπιτιμῶντος αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐγέλα τὰ πολλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις προσέπαιζε, καὶ λέγοντος, “Δημῶναξ, οὐ κυνᾶς”, ἀπεκρίνατο, “Περεγρίνε, οὐκ ἀνθρωπίζεις.”

b. Ib. 28:

Demonax on
a philosophical
dispute

Ἰδὼν δὲ ποτε δύο τινὰς φιλοσόφους κομιδῇ ἀπαιδευτάς ἐν ζητήσει ἐρίζοντας καὶ τὸν μὲν ἄτοπα ἐρωτῶντα, τὸν δὲ οὐδὲν πρὸς λόγον ἀποκρινόμενον, “οὐ δοκεῖ ὑμῖν”, ἔφη, “ὦ φίλοι, ὁ μὲν ἕτερος τούτων τράγον ἀμέλγειν, ὁ δὲ αὐτῷ κόσκινον ὑποτιθέναι;”

1259—During the last years of his life and after his death, at Athens he was worshipped as a saint.

a. Lucianus, *Demonax* 63:

Demonax
in old age

Ἐβίω δὲ ἔτη ὀλίγου δέοντα τῶν ἑκατὸν ἄννοσος, ἄλυπος, οὐδένα ἐνοχλήσας τι ἢ αἰτήσας, φίλοις χρήσιμος, ἐχθρὸν οὐδένα οὐδεπώποτε ἐσχηκώς· καὶ τοσοῦτον ἔρωτα ἔσχον πρὸς αὐτὸν Ἀθηναῖοι τε αὐτοὶ καὶ ἅπανα ἡ Ἑλλάς, ὥστε παριόντι ὑπεξανίστασθαι μὲν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, σιωπῇ δὲ γίνεσθαι παρὰ πάντων. τὸ τελευταῖον δὲ ἥδη ὑπέργρηως ὦν ἀκλητος εἰς ἣν τύχοι παριῶν οἰκίαν ἐδείπνει καὶ ἐκάθευδε, τῶν ἐνοικούντων θεοῦ τινα ἐπιφάνειαν ἡγουμένων τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τινα ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα εἰσεληλυθῆναι αὐτοῖς ἐς τὴν οἰκίαν. παριόντα δὲ αἱ ἀρτοπώλιδες ἀνθεῖλκον πρὸς αὐτάς ἐκάστη ἀξιούσα παρ’ αὐτῆς λαμβάνειν τῶν ἄρτων, καὶ τοῦτο εὐτυχίαν ἑαυτῆς ἢ δεδωκυῖα ᾤετο. καὶ μὴν καὶ οἱ παῖδες ὁπώρας προσέφερον αὐτῷ πατέρα ὀνομάζοντες.

b. Ib. 65:

His death

“Ὅτε δὲ συνῆκεν οὐκέθ’ οἶός τε ὦν αὐτῷ ἐπικουρεῖν, . . . πάντων ἀποσχόμενος ἀπῆλθε τοῦ βίου φαιδρὸς καὶ οἶος ἀεὶ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν ἐφαίνετο.

c. Ib. 67:

A kind of
saint worship

Οἱ μέντοι Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ἔθαψαν αὐτὸν δημοσίᾳ μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ ἐπένθησαν καὶ τὸν θάκον τὸν λίθινον, ἐφ’ οὗ εἰώθει ὁπότε κάμνοι ἀναπαύεσθαι, προσεκύνουν καὶ ἐστεφάνουν ἐς τιμὴν τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἡγούμενοι ἱερὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸν λίθον ἐφ’ οὗ ἐκαθέζετο.

¹ Peregrinus called himself by this name after the Homeric Proteus: ἅπαντα γὰρ δόξης ἕνεκα γενόμενος καὶ μυρίας τροπὰς τραπόμενος τὰ τελευταῖα ταῦτα καὶ πῦρ ἐγένετο (Lucian., *De morte Peregrini* 1).

1260—Other second century Cynics.

**Oenomaus
of Gadara**

a. *Oenomaus of Gadara* probably lived under Hadrian. Julian cites his work κατὰ τῶν χρηστηρίων. Eusebius, *Praep. ev.*, quotes passages of his Γοήτων φωρά (*The Charlatans exposed*). His criticism of oracles is most interesting. Dudley, p. 162-170.

Favorinus

b. Of *Favorinus*, who lived in Rome under Hadrian and for some time was exiled, a speech Περὶ φυγῆς has been found on papyrus (P. Vat. 111). He is influenced by Epictetus and by Dio. The Orations 37 and 64 under Dio's name have been ascribed to Favorinus with great probability. Dudley, p. 199 f.; B. Häsele, *Favorin über die Verbannung*, Thesis Berlin 1935.

**Maximus
of Tyrus**

c. *Maximus of Tyrus*, second half of the second century, in his 36th discourse discusses the question as to whether the Cynic life is a προηγμένον and decides the point in the affirmative. In his Διαλέξεις Plato is frequently cited. We shall have a word to say of him in dealing with Prae-neoplatonism.

**Influence on
Christian
authors**

d. Of ecclesiastical authors, *S. Gregory of Nazianzus* had great sympathy for Cynicism. His works show a strong influence by the diatribe. The same can be said of the sermons of *Asterius*, bishop of Amasea (Pontus), c. 400 (Migne, P. Gr. 40).

See: A. Bretz, *Studien u. Texte zu Asterios von Amasea*, Leipzig 1914, in Harnack & Schmidt, *Texte u. Untersuchungen* XL. Bd., p. 46-55. Dudley, p. 207.

Sallustius

1261—The last Cynic was Sallustius, second half of the fifth century.

He came from Syria, was taught rhetoric and sophistic at Emesa, and later studied philosophy at Athens and Alexandria. He lived in a very ascetic style.

Suidas s.v. Σαλούστιος (III):

Δαμάσκιός φησι· Οὗτος εἰς Ἀλεξάνδρειαν ἦκεν Ἀθήνηθεν σὺν Ἰσιδώρῳ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ¹. Παράδοξος δὲ ὁ τρόπος Σαλουστίου πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, τὰ μὲν φιλοσοφούντος ἐπὶ τὸ καρτερώτερον, τὰ δὲ παίζοντος ἐπὶ τὸ γελοιότερον· ἐκάτερον, οἶμαι, πέρα τοῦ μετρίου.

See further: Asmus, *Der Kyniker Sallustios bei Damascios*, in *Neue Jahrb.* XXV (1910), pp. 504-522.

Dudley, 207 ff.

8—MARCUS AURELIUS

**Marcus
Aurelius.
His Stoicism
and his
individual
problems**

1262—The emperor Marcus Aurelius has left us the book of his Meditations, written during his campaign in Dacia.

Like Epictetus, Marcus is dominated by the idea of the freedom of the inner man. In his view of man, however, *social obligations* are the most prominent feature and receive a very strong emphasis. They are rooted in the Stoic view of the universe, in which we find Posidonius' idea of the organical Whole united with a certain spiritualism: νοῦς or νοερά ψυχή, which is related to νοῦς.

The love of our fellow-men is the natural and most binding consequence of this principle. Marcus' personal problems are here: (1) in the moral obligation

¹ Probably Marinus' successor in the School of Proclus is meant. If this is true, Sall. the Cynic cannot be identified with Julian's friend, the author of the Π. θεῶν καὶ κόσμου (infra, nr. 1454f).

of loving men and being kind to them, while on the other hand, in practice, they are usually not lovable, and even very irritating; (2) in the very keen sense of the transience and futility of all things, and on the other hand, the importance of our task in the community.

a. Marc. Aur. II 1:

Man and his
social task

Ἔωθεν προλέγειν ἑαυτῷ· συντεύξομαι περιέργω, ἀχαρίστω, ὕβριστῇ, δολερῷ, βασκάνῳ, ἀκοινωνήτῳ· πάντα ταῦτα συμβέβηκεν ἐκείνοις παρὰ τὴν ἀγνοίαν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. ἐγὼ δὲ θεωρητικῶς τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι καλὸν καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀμαρτάνοντος φύσιν ὅτι μοι συγγενὴς οὐχὶ αἵματος ἢ σπέρματος τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ νοῦ καὶ θείας ἀπομοίρας μέτοχος, οὔτε βλαβῆναι ὑπὸ τινος αὐτῶν δύναμαι· αἰσχρῷ γάρ με οὐδεὶς περιβαλεῖ· οὔτε ὀργίζεσθαι τῷ συγγενεῖ δύναμαι οὔτε ἀπέχθεσθαι αὐτῷ. γεγόμενα γὰρ πρὸς συνεργίαν, ὡς πόδες, ὡς χεῖρες, ὡς βλέφαρα, ὡς οἱ στοῖχοι τῶν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὁδόντων. τὸ οὖν ἀντιπράσσειν ἀλλήλοις παρὰ φύσιν· ἀντιπρακτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἀγανακτεῖν καὶ ἀποστρέφεσθαι.

b. Ib. VII 55:

Μὴ περιβλέπου ἀλλότρια ἡγεμονικά, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ βλέπε κατ' εὐθύ, ἐπὶ τί σε ἡ φύσις ὁδηγεῖ ἢ τε τοῦ ὅλου διὰ τῶν συμβαινόντων σοι καὶ ἡ σὴ διὰ τῶν πρακτέων ὑπὸ σοῦ. πρακτέον δὲ ἐκάστῳ τὸ ἐξῆς τῇ κατασκευῇ· κατεσκευάσται δὲ τὰ μὲν λοιπὰ τῶν λογικῶν ἕνεκεν καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς ἄλλου τὰ χεῖρω τῶν κρειτόνων ἕνεκεν, τὰ δὲ λογικὰ ἀλλήλων ἕνεκεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν προηγούμενον ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῇ τὸ κοινωνικόν ἐστι· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἀνένδοτον πρὸς τὰς σωματικὰς πείσεις· λογικῆς γὰρ καὶ νοερᾶς κινήσεως ἴδιον περιορίζειν ἑαυτὴν καὶ μήποτε ἡττᾶσθαι μήτε αἰσθητικῆς μήτε ὀρμητικῆς κινήσεως· ζώῳδεις γὰρ ἐκάτεραι, ἡ δὲ νοερὰ ἐθέλει πρωτιστεύειν καὶ μὴ κατακρατεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἐκείνων.

c. Ib. VIII 7:

Ἀρκεῖται πᾶσα φύσις ἑαυτῇ εὐοδόσῃ· φύσις δὲ λογικὴ εὐοδεῖ ἐν μὲν φαντασίαις μήτε ψευδεῖ μήτε ἀδήλῳ συγκατατιθεμένη, τὰς ὁρμὰς δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ κοινωνικὰ ἔργα μόνᾳ ἀπευθύνουσα, τὰς ὁρέξεις δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐκκλίσεις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν μόνων πεποιημένη, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως ἀπονεμόμενον πᾶν ἀσπαζομένη. μέρος γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστίν, ὡς ἡ τοῦ φύλλου φύσις τῆς τοῦ φυτοῦ φύσεως· πλὴν ὅτι ἐκεῖ μὲν ἡ τοῦ φύλλου φύσις μέρος ἐστὶ φύσεως καὶ ἀναισθητοῦ καὶ ἀλόγου καὶ ἐμποδίζεσθαι δυναμένης, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις μέρος ἐστὶν ἀνεμποδίστου φύσεως καὶ νοερᾶς καὶ δικαίας.

d. That indeed he found some difficulty in enduring the characters of his fellow-men, may be seen in a sentence such as the following.

V 10, 4:

Μετὰ τοῦτο¹ ἐπιθι ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν συμβιούντων ἦθη, ὧν μόλις ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ χαριστάτου ἀνασχέσθαι, ἵνα μὴ λέγω, ὅτι καὶ ἑαυτὸν τις μόγις ὑπομένει.

e. Or also in V 33, 6:

Περιμενεῖς ἰλεως τὴν εἴτε σβέσιν εἴτε μετὰστασιν. ἕως δὲ ἐκείνης ὁ καιρὸς ἐφίσταται, τί ἀρκεῖ; τί δ' ἄλλο ἢ θεοὺς μὲν σέβειν καὶ εὐφημεῖν, ἀνθρώπους δὲ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι αὐτῶν καὶ ἀπέχεσθαι²; —

Independence of the hegemonikon

1263—The hegemonikón cannot be disturbed by anything, unless it be disturbed by itself.

a. Marc. Aur. VII 16, 4:

Ἀπροσδεές ἐστίν, ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ, τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, ἐὰν μὴ ἑαυτῷ ἐνδειαν ποιῇ, κατὰ ταῦτά δὲ καὶ ἀτάραχον καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστον, ἐὰν μὴ ἑαυτὸ ταράσῃ καὶ ἐμποδίῃ.

b. The hegemonikón can make itself whatever it wills.

Ib. VI 8:

Τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ἐστὶ τὸ ἑαυτὸ ἐγεῖρον καὶ τρέπον καὶ ποιοῦν μὲν ἑαυτό, οἶον ἂν καὶ θέλῃ, ποιοῦν δὲ ἑαυτῷ φαίνεσθαι πᾶν τὸ συμβαῖνον, οἶον αὐτὸ θέλει.

It is Chrysippus' theory of the hegemonikon πὼς ἔχον that recurs here. It is also found at the end of III 7, where it is said that the one thing we have to mind throughout our lives is: τὸ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν τινι ἀνοικεῖν νοεροῦ <καὶ> πολιτικοῦ ζήφου τροπῇ γενέσθαι.

c. Cp. V 36, 4: All depends on the inner man.

Ἐγενόμην ποτὲ ὅπουδὴποτε καταλειφθεὶς εὐμοῖρος ἄνθρωπος· τὸ δὲ εὐμοῖρος, ἀγαθὴν μοῖραν σεαυτῷ ἀπονείμας· ἀγαθαὶ δὲ μοῖραι ἀγαθαὶ τροπαὶ ψυχῆς, ἀγαθαὶ ὁρμαί, ἀγαθαὶ πράξεις.

External things cannot hurt us

1264—Outward events, as such, cannot hurt us.

a. Marc. Aurel. VIII 47, 1-3:

Εἰ μὲν διὰ τι τῶν ἐκτὸς λυπῇ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνό σοι ἐνοχλεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ σὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ κρῖμα. τοῦτο δὲ ἥδη ἐξαλεῖψαι ἐπὶ σοὶ ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ λυπεῖ σέ τι τῶν ἐν τῇ σῇ διαθέσει, τίς ὁ κωλύων διορθῶσαι τὸ δόγμα;

b. Ib., VII 14:

Ὁ θέλει, ἔξωθεν προσπιπτέτω τοῖς παθεῖν ἐκ τῆς προσπτώσεως ταύτης

¹ I.e.: after having realized, first, how mysterious all things are and how difficult to understand; next, how transitory and how worthless.

² Cp. Epictetus, fr. X Schenkl (= 179 Schw.): according to Favorinus Epict. used to say one should remember these two words: ἀνέχου and ἀπέχου (Gellius, N.A. 17, 19, 6).

δυναμένοις. ἐκεῖνα γάρ, ἐὰν θελήσῃ, μέμψεται τὰ παθόντα, ἐγὼ δέ, ἐὰν μὴ ὑπολάβω, ὅτι κακὸν τὸ συμβεβηκός, οὐπω βέβλαμμαι. ἔξεστι δέ μοι μὴ ὑπολαβεῖν.

c. IV 7:

Ἄρον τὴν ὑπόληψιν, ἦρται τὸ βέβλαμμαι. ἄρον τὸ βέβλαμμαι, ἦρται ἡ βλάβη.

1265—That which is hidden within us makes the man.

**Nous alone
is really ours**

a. X 38:

Μέννησο ὅτι τὸ νευροσπαστοῦν ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἔνδον ἐγκεκρυμμένον· ἐκεῖνο ῥητορεία, ἐκεῖνο ζωή, ἐκεῖνο, εἰ δεῖ εἰπεῖν, ἄνθρωπος. μηδέποτε συμπεριφαντάζου τὸ περικείμενον ἀγγειῶδες καὶ τὰ ὀργάνια ταῦτα τὰ περιπεπλασμένα. ὁμοία γάρ ἐστι σκεπάρνῳ, μόνον διαφέροντα, καθότι προσφυῇ ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ τοι οὐ μᾶλλον τι τούτων ὀφελός ἐστι τῶν μορίων χωρὶς τῆς κινούσης καὶ ἰσχύουσης αὐτὰ αἰτίας, ἢ τῆς κερκίδος τῇ ὑφαντρίᾳ καὶ τοῦ καλάμου τῷ γράφοντι καὶ τοῦ μαστιγίου τῷ ἡνιόχῳ.

b. Cp. XII 3, 1-2:

Σῶμα, ψυχή,
νοῦς

Τρία ἐστίν, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε· σῶματιον, πνευμάτιον, νοῦς. τούτων τᾶλλα μέχρι τοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖν σά ἐστι· τὸ δὲ τρίτον μόνον κυρίως σόν.

The tripartition σῶμα, ψυχή, νοῦς also occurs in III 16, where it is explained as follows: σώματος αἰσθήσεις, ψυχῆς ὁρμαί, νοῦ δόγματα.

Now the first two, man shares with animals. As to the third, it is peculiar to man,—but not only to good men. See further under 1266.

The distinction between ψυχή and νοῦς was apparently not made by Epictetus. Marcus is congenial to Posidonius, both on this point and on that of cosmic sympathy.

c. God sees only the spiritual man.

XII 2:

Ὁ θεὸς πάντα τὰ ἡγεμονικὰ γυμνά τῶν ὑλικῶν ἀγγείων καὶ φλοιῶν καὶ καθαρμάτων ὁρᾷ· μόνῳ γάρ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ νοερῷ μόνων ἅπτεται τῶν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ εἰς ταῦτα ἐρρηκόντων καὶ ἀπωχευμένων. ἐὰν δὲ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ἐθίσῃς ποιεῖν, τὸν πολὺν περισπασμὸν σεαυτοῦ περιαιρήσεις. ὁ γὰρ μὴ τὰ περικείμενα κρεάδια ὁρῶν ἢ πού γε ἐσθῆτα καὶ οἰκίαν καὶ δόξαν καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην περιβολὴν καὶ σκηνὴν θεώμενος ἀσχολήσεται;

1266—What is peculiar to the *good* man.

a. Marcus Aurelius III 16, 2-4:

**Keep the
divine genius
within you
pure**

Τὸ δὲ νοῦν ἡγεμόνα ἔχειν ἐπὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καθήκοντα καὶ τῶν θεοῦς μὴ νομιζόντων καὶ τῶν τὴν πατρίδα ἐγκαταλειπόντων καὶ τῶν . . . * ποιούντων,

* ὁτιοῦν suppl. Gataker, ποῖ οὐ Bury.

ἐπειδὴν κλείσωσι τὰς θύρας. εἰ οὖν τὰ λοιπὰ κοινὰ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὰ εἰρημένα, λοιπὸν τὸ ἴδιόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φιλεῖν μὲν καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τὰ συμβαίνοντα καὶ συγκλωθόμενα αὐτῷ· τὸν δὲ ἔνδον ἐν τῷ στήθει ἰδρυμένον δαίμονα μὴ φύρειν μηδὲ θορυβεῖν ὅχλῳ φαντασιῶν, ἀλλὰ ἔλεων διατηρεῖν, κοσμίως ἐπόμμενον θεῷ, μήτε φθεγγόμενόν τι παρὰ τὰ ἀληθῆ μήτε ἐνεργοῦντα παρὰ τὰ δίκαια. εἰ δὲ ἀπιστοῦσιν αὐτῷ πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ὅτι ἀπλῶς καὶ αἰδημόνως καὶ εὐθύμως βιοῖ, οὔτε χαλεπαίνει τινὶ τούτων οὔτε παρατρέπεται τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς ἀγούσης ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τοῦ βίου, ἐφ' ὃ δεῖ ἔλθεῖν καθαρὸν, ἡσύχιον, εὐλυτον, ἀβιάστως τῇ ἑαυτοῦ μοίρᾳ συνηρμοσμένον.

Also in II 17 he speaks of τηρεῖν τὸν ἔνδον δαίμονα ἀνύβριστον καὶ αἰσινῇ. See 1275b.

In III 4, 4 he calls it "that which is enthroned within (us)", and hence, calls the good man "a kind of priest and minister of the gods", χρώμενος καὶ τῷ ἔνδον ἰδρυμένῳ αὐτῷ, ὃ παρέχεται τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἄχραντον ἡδονῶν, κτλ. See under c.

b. As a specific feature of the good man the fact that he gladly accepts everything that happens is always mentioned.

IV 33:

Τί οὖν ἐστὶ, περὶ ὃ δεῖ σπουδῇ ἐισφέρεισθαι; ἐν τούτῳ, διάνοια δικάια καὶ πράξεις κοινωνικαὶ καὶ λόγος, οἷος μηδέποτε διαψεύσασθαι, καὶ διαθέσεις ἀσπαζομένη πᾶν τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς γινώριμον, ὡς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τοιαύτης καὶ πηγῆς ῥέον.

c. Thus, the good man is depicted as follows.

III 4, 4:

Ὁ γάρ τοι ἄνθρωπος ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐκ ἔτι ὑπερτιθέμενος τὸ ὡς ἐν ἀρίστοις ἦδη εἶναι ἱερεὺς τις καὶ ὑπουργὸς θεῶν χρώμενος καὶ τῷ ἔνδον ἰδρυμένῳ αὐτοῦ, ὃ παρέχεται τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἄχραντον ἡδονῶν, ἄτρωτον ὑπὸ παντὸς πόνου, πάσης ὕβρεως ἀνέπαφον, πάσης ἀναίσθητον πονηρίας, ἀθλητὴν ἀθλου τοῦ μεγίστου, τοῦ ὑπὸ μηδενὸς πάθους καταβληθῆναι, δικαιοσύνη βεβαμμένον εἰς βάθος, ἀσπαζόμενον μὲν ἐξ ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ συμβαίνοντα καὶ ἀπονεμόμενα πάντα, μὴ πολλάκις δὲ μηδὲ χωρὶς μεγάλης καὶ κοινωφελοῦς ἀνάγκης φανταζόμενον, τί ποτε ἄλλος λέγει ἢ πράσσει ἢ διανοεῖται.

Obedience
to Nature

1267—Obedience to nature, that gives all and may take all back again.

a. Marc. Aur. X 14:

Τῇ πάντα διδούσῃ καὶ ἀπολαμβανούσῃ φύσει ὁ πεπαιδευμένος καὶ αἰδήμων λέγει "ὁδὸς ὃ θέλεις, ἀπόλαβε ὃ θέλεις". λέγει δὲ τοῦτο οὐ καταθρασυνόμενος, ἀλλὰ πειθαρχῶν μόνον καὶ εὐνοῶν αὐτῇ.

Everyone
has his
function in

b. Willingly or unwillingly, we all co-operate in one mighty scheme, governed by a rational Power.

Ib. VI 42:

the scheme
of the
universe

Πάντες εἰς ἓν ἀποτέλεσμα συνεργοῦμεν, οἱ μὲν εἰδότης καὶ παρακολουθητὶ-
κῶς, οἱ δὲ ἀνεπιστάτως, ὥσπερ καὶ τοὺς καθεύδοντας, οἶμαι, ὁ Ἑράκλειτος
ἐργάτας εἶναι λέγει καὶ συνεργοὺς τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γινομένων. ἄλλος δὲ κατ'
ἄλλο συνεργεῖ, ἐκ περιουσίας δὲ ¹ καὶ ὁ μεμφόμενος καὶ ὁ ἀντιβαίνειν πειρώμενος
καὶ ἀναιρεῖν τὰ γινόμενα· καὶ γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου ἔχρηξεν ὁ κόσμος. λοιπὸν
οὖν σῦνες, εἰς τίνας ἑαυτὸν κατατάσσεις· ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ πάντως σοὶ καλῶς
χρήσεται ὁ τὰ ὅλα διοικῶν καὶ παραδέχεται σε εἰς μέρος τι τῶν συνεργῶν καὶ
συνεργητικῶν. ἀλλὰ σὺ μὴ τοιοῦτον μέρος γένῃ, ὅλος ὁ εὐτελής καὶ γελοῖος στίχος
ἐν τῷ δράματι, οὗ Χρῦσιππος μέμνηται ².

In V 32, the end, he speaks of "the Logos who governs the Whole according to appointed cycles through all eternity" (τὸν δι' ὅλης τῆς οὐσίας διήκοντα λόγον καὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος κατὰ περιόδους τεταγμένας οἰκονομοῦντα τὸ πᾶν.)

1268—The Logos, who governs the universe, is good.

The Logos
is good

a. Marc. Aur. VI 1:

Ἡ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία ³ εὐπειθής καὶ εὐτρεπής· ὁ δὲ ταύτην διοικῶν λόγος
οὐδεμίαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰτίαν ἔχει τοῦ κακοποιεῖν· κακίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ τι
κακῶς ποιεῖ οὐδὲ βλάπτεται τι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. πάντα δὲ κατ' ἐκεῖνον γίνεται καὶ
περαίνεται.

b. The Logos is "social": He coordinates and subordinates and gives and „social” everything its due.

Ib. V 30:

Ὁ τοῦ ὅλου νοῦς κοινωνικός. πεποίηκε γοῦν τὰ χεῖρω τῶν κρείττωνων
ἐνεκεν καὶ τὰ κρείττω ἀλλήλοις συνήρμοσεν. ὁρᾷς, πῶς ὑπέταξε, συνέταξε
καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπένειμεν ἐκάστοις καὶ τὰ κρατιστεύοντα εἰς ὁμόνοιαν
ἀλλήλων συνήγαγεν.

1269—Repeatedly Marcus posits the dilemma of either atomism or rational World-order. In the first case, life would be senseless, in the latter we can gladly and confidently accept it.

Either
atomism or
rational
world-order

Marc. Aur. VI 10:

Ἦτοι κυκεῶν καὶ ἀντεμπλοκή καὶ σκεδασμός, ἡ ἔνωσις καὶ τάξις καὶ πρό-
νοια. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὰ πρότερα, τί καὶ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰκαίῃ συγκρίματι καὶ φυρμῷ
τοιούτῳ ἐνδιατρίβειν; τί δέ μοι καὶ μέλει ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ τοῦ ὅπως ποτὲ αἶτα

¹ Farquharson: "not in the main intention of his acts, but unwillingly and "as an extra." Cp. the draught-dog of Cleanthes (above, 944b).

² See Plut., *De comm. not.* 14, p. 1065d (SVF II 1181).

³ He means apparently the passive aspect of the universe, as opposed to the Logos. Sometimes, Stoics speak of *matter*. Cp. our nrs. 899, 900.

γίνεσθαι¹; τί δὲ καὶ ταράσσομαι; ἥξει γὰρ ἐπ' ἐμέ ὁ σκεδασμός, ὃ τι ἂν ποιῶ. εἰ δὲ θάτερά ἐστιν, σέβω καὶ εὐσταθῶ καὶ θαρρῶ τῷ διοικοῦντι.

The same alternative in XI 18, 2:

"Ανωθεν δὲ ἐπιθι ἀπὸ τοῦ "εἰ μὴ ἄτομοι, φύσις ἡ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦσα". εἰ τοῦτο, τὰ χεῖρονα τῶν κρειττόνων ἔνεκεν, ταῦτα δὲ ἀλλήλων.

Also in IX 28:

Τὸ δ' ὅλον· εἴτε θεός, εὖ ἔχει πάντα, εἴτε τὸ εἰκῆ, μὴ καὶ σὺ εἰκῆ.

b. In the following passage he mentions three possibilities.

XII 14, 1-4:

"Ἦτοι ἀνάγκη εἰμαρμένης καὶ ἀπαράβατος τάξις ἢ πρόνοια ἰλάσιμος ἢ φυρμός· εἰκαιότητος ἀπροσάττητος. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀπαράβατος ἀνάγκη, τί ἀντιτείνεις; εἰ δὲ πρόνοια ἐπιδεχομένη τὸ ἰλάσκεσθαι, ἄξιον σαυτὸν ποιήσον τῆς ἐκ τοῦ θείου βοηθείας. εἰ δὲ φυρμός ἀνηγεμόνευτος, ἀσμένιζε, ὅτι ἐν τοιούτῳ τῷ κλύδωνι αὐτὸς ἔχεις ἐν σαυτῷ τινα νοῦν ἡγεμονικόν.

The first two possibilities evidently are compatible with a rational world-order. As to the last, Marcus does not admit this as a true possibility. He makes a firm choice of the first, in favour of the existence of Gods and of Providence.

The Gods
and
Providence

c. Cp. II 11, 2-3:

Τὸ δὲ ἔξ ἀνθρώπων ἀπελθεῖν, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ εἰσὶν, οὐδὲν δεινόν· κακῶ γάρ σε οὐκ ἂν περιβάλοιεν· εἰ δὲ ἦτοι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἢ οὐ μέλει αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, τί μοι ζῆν ἐν κόσμῳ κενῷ θεῶν ἢ προνοίας κενῷ; ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰσὶ καὶ μέλει αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπείων.

How to
explain
imperfection
in the
universe

1270—Imperfection in the universe explained as chips and shavings in a carpenter's shop.

Marc. Aur. VIII 50:

Σίκυος πικρός· ἄφες. βάτοι ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ· ἐκκλινον. ἀρκεῖ, μὴ προσεπειτῆς "τί δὲ καὶ ἐγένετο ταῦτα ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ;" ἐπεὶ καταγελασθήσῃ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπου φυσιολόγου, ὡς ἂν καὶ ὑπὸ τέκτονος καὶ σκυτέως γελασθείης καταγινώσκων ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἐργαστηρίῳ ξέσματα καὶ περιτμήματα τῶν κατασκευαζομένων ὄρεῖς. καίτοι ἐκεῖνοί γε ἔχουσι ποῦ αὐτὰ ῥίψωσιν· ἡ δὲ τῶν ὄλων φύσιν ἔξω οὐδὲν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ θαυμαστὸν τῆς τέχνης ταύτης ἐστίν, ὅτι περιορίσασα ἑαυτὴν πᾶν τὸ ἔνδον διαφθείρεσθαι καὶ γηράσκειν καὶ ἀχρηστον εἶναι δοκοῦν εἰς ἑαυτὴν μεταβάλλει καὶ ὅτι πάλιν ἄλλα νεαρά ἐκ τούτων αὐτῶν ποιεῖ, ἵνα μήτε οὐσίας ἔξωθεν χρήζῃ μήτε, ὅπου ἐκβάλῃ τὰ σαπρότερα, προσδέχεται. ἀρκεῖται οὖν καὶ χώρα τῇ ἑαυτῆς καὶ ὕλῃ τῇ ἑαυτῆς καὶ τέχνῃ τῇ ἰδίᾳ.

Unity of
the cosmos

1271—The organical unity of the cosmos.

a. One substance, one soul, one Spirit (νοερὰ ψυχὴ) that governs the whole.

¹ Hom., II. 7, 99.

Marc. Aur. XII 30:

Ἐν φῶς ἡλίου, καὶ διείργηται τοίχοις, ὄρεσιν, ἄλλοις μυρίοις. μία οὐσία¹ κοινή, καὶ διείργηται ἰδίως ποιοῖς σώμασι μυρίοις. μία ψυχὴ, καὶ φύσει διείργηται μυρίαὶς καὶ ἰδίαις περιγραφαῖς. μία νοερά ψυχὴ, καὶ διακεκρίσθαι δοκῇ. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα μέρη τῶν εἰρημένων, οἷον πνεύματα, καὶ ὑποκείμενα ἀναίσθητα καὶ ἀνοικείωτα ἀλλήλοις· καίτοι κάκεῖνα τὸ νοοῦν συνέχει καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ βρῖθον. διάνοια δὲ ἰδίως ἐπὶ τὸ ὁμόφυλον τείνεται καὶ συνίσταται καὶ οὐ διείργεται τὸ κοινωνικὸν πάθος.

b. Interdependence of all things in the universe.

VI 38:

Πολλάκις ἐνθυμοῦ τὴν ἐπισύνδεσιν πάντων τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ σχέσιν πρὸς ἄλληλα. τρόπον γάρ τινα πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἐπιπέπλεκται καὶ πάντα κατὰ τοῦτο φίλα ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ ἄλλω ἄλλο ἐξῆς ἐστὶ ταῦτα διὰ τὴν τονικὴν κίνησιν καὶ σύμπνοιαν καὶ τὴν ἔνωσιν τῆς οὐσίας.

See also VII 9.

c. What is advantageous to the whole, can never be injurious to the part.

X 6:

Εἴτε ἄτομοι εἴτε φύσις, πρῶτον κείσθω, ὅτι μέρος εἰμὶ τοῦ ὅλου ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικουμένου· ἔπειτα ὅτι ἔχω πως οἰκείως πρὸς τὰ ὁμογενῆ μέρη. τούτων γὰρ μεμνημένος, καθότι μὲν μέρος εἰμί, οὐδενὶ δυσαρεστήσω τῶν ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου ἀπονεμομένων· οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβερὸν τῷ μέρει, ὃ τῷ ὅλῳ συμφέρει. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τι τὸ ὅλον, ὃ μὴ συμφέρει ἑαυτῷ· πασῶν μὲν φύσεων κοινὸν ἔχουσῶν τοῦτο, τῆς δὲ τοῦ κόσμου προσειληφείας τὸ μηδὲ ὑπὸ τινος ἔξωθεν αἰτίας ἀναγκάζεσθαι βλαβερὸν τι ἑαυτῇ γεννᾶν. κατὰ μὲν δὴ τὸ μεμνησθαι, ὅτι μέρος εἰμὶ ὅλου τοῦ τοιούτου, εὐαρεστήσω παντὶ τῷ ἀποβαίνοντι. καθόσον δὲ ἔχω πως οἰκείως πρὸς τὰ ὁμογενῆ μέρη, οὐδὲν πράξω ἀκοινωνήτον, μᾶλλον δὲ στοχάζομαι τῶν ὁμογενῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον πᾶσαν ὁρμὴν ἑμαυτοῦ ἄξω καὶ ἀπὸ τούναντίου ἀπάξω. τούτων δὲ οὕτω περαινομένων ἀνάγκη τὸν βίον εὐροεῖν, ὥς ἂν καὶ πολίτου βίον εὖρουν ἐπινοήσεως προϊόντος διὰ πράξεων τοῖς πολίταις λυσιτελῶν καί, ὅπερ ἂν ἡ πόλις ἀπονέμῃ, τοῦτο ἀσπαζομένου.

d. Your personal health contributes to the health of the universe and the welfare of Zeus.

V 8, 8-9, 12-13:

Τοιούτον τί σοι δοκεῖτω ἄνυσις καὶ συντέλεια τῶν τῇ κοινῇ φύσει δοκούντων,

¹ οὐσία is here again used in the sense of ὄλη, as we found it in VI 1 (1268a).

οἶον ἢ σὴ ὑγίεια. καὶ οὕτως ἀσπάζου πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον, καὶ ἀπηνέστερον δοκῇ, διὰ τὸ ἐκεῖσε ἄγειν, ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν τοῦ Διὸς εὐοδίαν καὶ εὐπραγίαν. —

Οὐκοῦν κατὰ δυὸ λόγους στέργειν χρὴ τὸ συμβαῖνόν σοι· καθ' ἓνα μὲν, ὅτι σοὶ ἐγίνετο καὶ σοὶ συνετάττετο καὶ πρὸς σέ πως εἶχεν ἄνωθεν ἐκ τῶν πρεσβυτάτων αἰτίων συγκλωθόμενον. καθ' ἕτερον δέ, ὅτι τῷ τὸ ὅλον διοικοῦντι τῆς εὐοδίας καὶ τῆς συντελείας καὶ νῆ Δία τῆς συμμονῆς αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ ἰδίᾳ εἰς ἕκαστον ἦκον αἰτίον ἐστι. πηροῦται γὰρ τὸ ὁλόκληρον, ἐὰν καὶ ὀτιοῦν διακόψῃς τῆς συναφείας καὶ συνεχείας ὥσπερ τῶν μορίων, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν αἰτίων· διακόπτεις δέ, ὅσον ἐπὶ σοί, ὅταν δυσαρεστῇς, καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ἀναιρεῖς.

Μέλος,
not
μέρος

1272—a. You are an organical part of the whole, therefore: μέλος, not μέρος.

VII 13:

Οἶόν ἐστιν ἐν ἡνωμένοις τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος, τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν λόγον ἐν διεστῶσι τὰ λογικὰ πρὸς μίαν τινὰ συνεργίαν κατεσκευασμένα. μᾶλλον δέ σοι ἢ τούτου νόησις προσπεσεῖται, ἐὰν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν πολλὰκις λέγῃς ὅτι “μέλος εἰμὶ τοῦ ἐκ τῶν λογικῶν συστήματος”· ἐὰν δὲ διὰ τοῦ ῥῶ στοιχείου μέρος εἴναι ἑαυτὸν λέγῃς, οὐπω ἀπὸ καρδίας φιλεῖς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, οὐπω σε καταληπτικῶς εὐφραίνει τὸ εὐεργετεῖν· ἔτι, εἰ ὥς πρέπον αὐτὸ ψίλον ποιεῖς, οὐπω ὥς ἑαυτὸν εὖ ποιῶν.

b. Cp. X 1, 3, where the kosmos is called the τέλειον ζῶον¹.

(He speaks to his soul.)

Συμπείσεις σεαυτὴν, ὅτι πάντα, ἃ σοὶ πάρεστι, παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πάρεστι καὶ πάντα σοὶ εὖ ἔχει καὶ εὖ ἔξει, ὅσα φίλον αὐτοῖς καὶ ὅσα μέλλουσι δώσειν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τοῦ τελείου ζώου, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ καλοῦ καὶ γεννῶντος πάντα καὶ συνέχοντος καὶ περιέχοντος καὶ περιλαμβάνοντος διαλυόμενα εἰς γένεσιν ἐτέρων ὁμοίων;

The kosmos
renews
itself

1273—The universe continually renews itself.

a. VII 23, 25:

(23) Ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ἐκ τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας ὥς κηροῦ νῦν μὲν ἱππάριον ἔπλασε, συγχέασα δὲ τοῦτο εἰς δενδρύφιον συνεκρήσατο τῇ ὕλῃ αὐτοῦ, εἴτα εἰς ἀνθρωπάριον, εἴτα εἰς ἄλλο τι· ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων πρὸς ὀλίγιστον ὑπέστη, δεινὸν δὲ οὐδὲν τὸ διαλυθῆναι τῷ κιβωτίῳ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ συμπαγῆναι.

¹ Plato, *Tim.* 30b-d; 37d.

(25) Πάντα, ὅσα ὀρᾶς, ὅσον οὐπω μεταβαλεῖ ἢ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦσα φύσις καὶ ἄλλα ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῶν ποιήσῃ καὶ πάλιν ἄλλα ἐκ τῆς ἐκείνων οὐσίας, ἵνα ἀεὶ νεαρὸς ᾦ ὁ κόσμος.

Cp. also VIII 50, l. 10 (nr. 1270).

b. V 23:

**The stream
of things**

Πολλάκις ἐνθυμοῦ τὸ τάχος τῆς παραφορᾶς καὶ ὑπεξαγωγῆς τῶν ὄντων καὶ γινομένων. ἢ τε γὰρ οὐσία ὅλον ποταμὸς ἐν διηνεκεῖ ῥύσει καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν συνεχέσι μεταβολαῖς καὶ τὰ αἷτια ἐν μυρίαις τροπαῖς καὶ σχεδὸν οὐδὲν ἐστὼς * καὶ τὸ πάρεγγυς· τὸ δὲ ἄπειρον τοῦ τε παρῳχηκότος καὶ μέλλοντος ἀχανές, ᾧ πάντα ἐναφανίζεται. πῶς οὖν οὐ μωρὸς ὁ ἐν τούτοις φυσώμενος ἢ σπώμενος ἢ σχετλιάζων ὥς ἐν τινι χρόνῳ καὶ ἐπὶ μάκρον ἐνοχλήσαντι;

Cp. also IV 43.

c. Human life is futile compared with eternity.

**Human life
compared
with
eternity**

IV 50, the end:

Βλέπε γὰρ ὀπίσω τὸ ἀχανές τοῦ αἰῶνος καὶ τὸ πρόσω ἄλλο ἄπειρον. ἐν δὴ τούτῳ τί διαφέρει ὁ τριήμερος τοῦ τριγερηνίου;

That the duration of life is of no importance, is a thought frequently expressed in the Emperor's Meditations, e.g. VII 49 (1274b).

1274—Things are ever the same, and nothing new can be expected.

**Things are
always the
same**

a. VI 37:

‘Ὁ τὰ νῦν ἰδὼν πάντα ἐώρακεν, ὅσα τε ἐξ αἰδίου ἐγένετο καὶ ὅσα εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον ἔσται· πάντα γὰρ ὁμογενῇ καὶ ὁμοειδῇ.

With a reminiscence of Heraclitus' ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω he says in VI 46:

Πάντα γὰρ ἄνω κάτω τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν. Μέχρι τίνος οὖν;

b. VII 49: The man of 40 years has seen everything:

Τὰ προγεγονότα ἀναθεωρεῖν, τὰς τοσαύτας τῶν ἡγεμονιῶν μεταβολάς. ἔξεστι καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα προεφορᾶν. ὁμοειδῇ γὰρ πάντως ἔσται καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἐκβῆναι τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ τῶν νῦν γινομένων· ὅθεν καὶ ἴσον τὸ τεσσαράκοντα ἔτεσιν ἱστορῆσαι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον τῷ ἐπὶ ἔτη μύρια. τί γὰρ πλεόν ὄψει;

c. VIII 6:

‘Ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις τοῦτο ἔργον ἔχει, τὰ ὧδε ὄντα ἐκεῖ μετατιθέναι, μεταβάλλειν, αἵρειν ἐνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖ φέρειν. πάντα τροπαί, οὐχ ὥστε φοβηθῆναι, μὴ τι καινόν· πάντα συνήθη· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἴσαι αἱ ἀπονεμήσεις.

* To the following words Schenkl noticed: „vix sana haec; exspectes καὶ ἔτι πάρεγγυς τό τε ἄπειρον τοῦ παρῳχηκότος καὶ <τὸ τοῦ> (sic iam Morus) μέλλοντος ἀχανές.”

Vanity of
life, yet a
moral task

1275—Vanity of human life.—Yet, man has a great moral task.

a. V 33, I-3:

Ὅσον οὐδέπω σποδὸς ἢ σκελετὸς καὶ ἦτοι ὄνομα ἢ οὐδὲ ὄνομα· τὸ δὲ ὄνομα
φύφος καὶ ἀπήχημα. τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πολυτίμητα κενὰ καὶ σαπρὰ καὶ μικρὰ
καὶ κυνίδια διαδακνόμενα καὶ παιδία φιλόνεικα, γελῶντα, εἴτα εὐθὺς κλαίοντα.
πίστις δὲ καὶ αἰδῶς καὶ δίκη καὶ ἀλήθεια

πρὸς Ὀλυμπον ἀπὸ χθόνος εὐρουδείης¹.

b. II 17:

Τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου βίου ὁ μὲν χρόνος στιγμή, ἡ δὲ οὐσία ρέουσα, ἡ δὲ αἵσθησις
ἀμυδρά, ἡ δὲ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος σύγκρισις εὐσηπτος, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ῥόμβος, ἡ δὲ
τύχη δυστέκμαρτον, ἡ δὲ φήμη ἄκριτον· συνελόντι δὲ εἰπεῖν, πάντα τὰ μὲν
τοῦ σώματος ποταμός, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄνειρος καὶ τυφος, ὁ δὲ βίος πόλεμος
καὶ ξένου ἐπιδημία, ἡ δὲ ὑστεροφημία λήθη. τί οὖν τὸ παραπέμψαι δυνάμενον;
ἐν καὶ μόνον φιλοσοφία. τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τῷ τηρεῖν τὸν ἔνδον δαίμονα ἀνύβριστον
καὶ ἀσινῇ, ἡδονῶν καὶ πόνων κρείσσονα, μηδὲν εἰκῇ ποιῶντα μηδὲ διεψευσμένως
καὶ μεθ' ὑποκρίσεως, ἀνενδεῇ τοῦ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι τι ἢ μὴ ποιῆσαι· ἔτι δὲ τὰ
συμβαίνοντα καὶ ἀπονεμόμενα δεχόμενον ὥς ἐκεῖθεν ποθεν ἐρχόμενα, ὅθεν
αὐτὸς ἦλθεν· ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ τὸν θάνατον ἔλεω τῇ γνώμῃ περιμένοντα ὥς οὐδὲν
ἄλλο ἢ λύσιν τῶν στοιχείων, ἐξ ὧν ἕκαστον ζῶον συγκρίνεται. εἰ δὲ αὐτοῖς
τοῖς στοιχείοις μηδὲν δεινὸν ἐν τῷ ἕκαστον διηνεκῶς εἰς ἕτερον μεταβάλλειν,
διὰ τί ὑπὶδηταί τις τὴν πάντων μεταβολὴν καὶ διάλυσιν; κατὰ φύσιν γάρ·
οὐδὲν δὲ κακὸν κατὰ φύσιν.

One manuscript bears the subscription: Written at *Carnuntum* (Haimburg in Hungary).

On his own
exploits

1276—a. Military achievements *sub specie aeternitatis*.

X 10:

Ἀράχνιον μυῖαν θηρᾶσαν μέγα φρονεῖ, ἄλλος δὲ λαγίδιον, ἄλλος δὲ ὑποχῆ
ἀφύην, ἄλλος δὲ συτῖδια, ἄλλος δὲ ἄρκτους, ἄλλος Σαρμάτας. οὗτοι γὰρ οὐ
λησται, ἐὰν τὰ δόγματα ἐξετάζης;

b. The emperor challenges himself to his social task.

VI 30:

Simplicity
and love of
God and man

Ὅρα, μὴ ἀποκαισαρωθῆς, μὴ βαφῆς· γίνεται γάρ. τήρησον οὖν σεαυτὸν
ἀπλοῦν, ἀγαθόν, ἀκέραιον, σεμνόν, ἀκομψον, τοῦ δικαίου φίλον, θεοσεβῆ, εὐμενῇ,
φιλόστοργον, ἐρρωμένον πρὸς τὰ πρόποντα ἔργα. ἀγώνισαι, ἵνα τοιοῦτος συμμεί-

¹ Hesiod, *Erga* 197.

νης, οἷόν σε ἠθέλησε ποιῆσαι φιλοσοφία, αἰδοῦ θεοῦς, σῶζε ἀνθρώπους. βραχὺς ὁ βίος· εἷς κάρπος τῆς ἐπιγείου ζωῆς διάθεσις ὅσια καὶ πράξεις κοινωνικαί.

Cp. also VII 31:

Φαίδρυνον σεαυτὸν ἀπλότῃ καὶ αἰδοῖ καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιαφορίᾳ. φίλησον τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος. ἀκολούθησον θεῷ. ἐκεῖνος ¹ μὲν φησιν, ὅτι "πάντα νομιστί, ἔτεγῃ δὲ μόνα τὰ στοιχεῖα". ἀρκεῖ δὲ μεμνησθαι, ὅτι τὰ πάντα νομιστί ἔχει· ἤδη λίαν ὀλίγα.

1277—Having thus lived a social life, in the service of God and our fellow-men, we can leave it graciously. **The end of life**

a. XII 36:

"Ἀνθρωπε, ἐπολιτεύσω ἐν τῇ μεγάλῃ ταύτῃ πόλει· τί σοι διαφέρει, εἰ πέντε ἔτεσιν <ἢ τρισίν>; τὸ γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἴσον ἐκάστω. τί οὖν δεινόν, εἰ τῆς πόλεως ἀποπέμψει σε οὐ τύραννος οὐδὲ δικαστὴς ἄδικος, ἀλλ' ἡ φύσις ἡ εἰσαγαγοῦσα; οἷον εἰ κωμῳδὸν ἀπολύει τῆς σκηνῆς ὁ παραλαβὼν στρατηγός ² "ἀλλ' οὐκ εἶπον τὰ πέντε μέρη, ἀλλὰ τὰ τρία." καλῶς εἶπας· ἐν μέντοι τῷ βίῳ τὰ τρία ὅλον τὸ δρᾶμά ἐστι. τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἐκεῖνος ὀρίζει ὁ τότε μὲν τῆς συγκρίσεως, νῦν δὲ τῆς διαλύσεως αἷτιος· σὺ δὲ ἀναίτιος ἀμφοτέρων. ἅπιθι οὖν ἔλεως· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀπολύων ἔλεως.

The term ἔλεως is repeatedly used by Marcus when speaking of death. E.g. II 17, cited above (nr. **1275b**), and V 33, 5 (**1262e**).

b. Cp. also IV 48, the end:

Τὸ γὰρ ὅλον, κατιδεῖν αἰεὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ὡς ἐφήμερα καὶ εὐτελῆ καὶ ἐχθρὰ μὲν μυξάριον, αὔριον δὲ τάριχος ἢ τέφρα. τὸ ἀκαριαῖον οὖν τοῦτο τοῦ χρόνου κατὰ φύσιν διελθεῖν καὶ ἔλεων καταλῦσαι, ὥς ἂν εἰ ἡ ἐλαία πέπειρος γενομένη ἐπιπτεν εὐφημοῦσα τὴν ἐνεγκοῦσαν καὶ χάριν εἰδυῖα τῷ φύσαντι δένδρῳ.

¹ He means Democritus. Cp. above (Vol. I), nr. **142a**.

² στρατηγός - praetor.

BOOK VI

THE THEOLOGICAL AND THEOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS

TWENTY-FOURTH CHAPTER

PRAE-NEOPLATONISM

By Prae-neoplatonism—a term used by W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, Berlin 1930—we mean that kind of philosophy of synthesis which appears in various forms from the first century B.C. onward. As far as it synthetizes the three great positive systems—Plato, Aristotle and the Stoa—, we found a beginning of it with Antiochus of Ascalon; as far as it is inclined towards a more or less hierarchical conception of the universe, we found a (probable) beginning of it with Posidonius, and further back in the Early Academy. In the first and second century of our era Platonism, explained in a metaphysical-religious sense, prevailed. More or less clearly we find the conception of a hierarchy of being in very different circles, and hence in rather different forms.

I—THE REVIVAL OF PYTHAGOREANISM IN THE FIRST CENTURY B.C. TILL THE SECOND CENTURY OF OUR ERA

Of the school of Pythagoras hardly any traces are found between Aristoxenus and the first century B.C. Since the first part of this century, however, a stream of Pythagorean pseudepigrapha bursts forth¹. Varro mentions Pythagoreans frequently; he knows Ocellus and Archytas. Cicero mentions P. Nigidius Figulus as the man who restored Pythagoreanism in Rome.

1278—a. Cicero, *Timaeus* I 1:

multa sunt a nobis et in Academicis conscripta contra physicos et saepe <cum> P. Nigidio Carneadeo more et modo disputata. fuit enim vir ille cum ceteris artibus, quae quidem dignae libero essent, ornatus omnibus, tum acer investigator et diligens earum rerum quae a natura involutae videntur; denique sic iudico, post illos nobiles Pythagoreos,

¹ A list of writings is found in Zeller III 24, p. 116 ff. Nearly ninety are known to us either by fragments or by titles.

quorum disciplina exstincta est quodam modo, cum aliquot saecula in Italia Siciliaque viguisset, hunc exstitisse qui illam renovaret.

b. Gellius, *N.A.* IV 9, 1 cites Nigidius as a man of great learning: Nigidius Figulus, homo, ut ego arbitror, iuxta M. Varronem doctissimus.

1279—Our oldest testimony of the revival of Pythagoreanism is Alexander Polyhistor's account of what he found ἐν Πυθαγορικοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν, preserved in Diog. Laërt. VIII 25-35. Alex.
Polyhistor
ap. Diog. L.

Alexander Polyhistor lived in Rome, $\pm$ 80-40 B.C. The doctrine described in his account was dated by Zeller¹ as little earlier than the first century B.C. Though the first part of it (c. 25) is clearly postplatonic, M. Wellmann argued in *Hermes* 54 (1919), p. 225 ff., that the whole document is of early Pythagorean origin. He was followed by Kranz, who added our passage to the section of *Anonymous Pythagoreans* in Diel's *Vorsokratiker*, 5th and 6th edition, 58 B. Also W. Wiersma (*Das Referat des Alexandros Polyhistor über die Pythag. Phil.* in *Mnemosyne* 1941, p. 97-112), though he makes an exception for the first part of c. 25, argues that the greater part of the account goes back to fifth century theories and therefore may be safely used as a source of ancient Pythagoreanism.

Against this A. J. Festugière (*Les "Mémoires pythagoriques" cités par Alexandre Polyhistor* in *Revue des Et. grecques* 1945, p. 1-65) shows:

(1) that Diog. L. VIII 24-35 contains an ἐπιτομή of the kind which does not occur before the Hellenistic age, the scheme of which is determined by Plato's *Timaeus*;

(2) that the first section (c. 25, first part, on First principles) can be the oldest, but not older than Speusippus (always eager to bring his theories under the flag of early Pythagoreanism).

(3) The section *De mundo* (25-27) contains an aether theory in an eclectic form, and a theory of the equilibrium of opposites which, indeed, goes back to Alcmaeon and Sicilian physicians, but is here probably taken from the dialogues of Plato.

(4) Of the last section (*De anima*) which contains the theory of a double pneuma, the physician Diocles of Carystos is the main source.

(5) The whole account was perhaps put together in the 2nd century from which may date the expression εἰμαρμένη in c. 27 (sub d).

In any case it cannot serve as a source of early Pythagoreanism.—Though Festugière's arguments must be corrected or completed on certain points of detail (see below, under a and b), his results are mainly right.

a. Diog. Laërt. VIII 25:

Ἀρχὴν μὲν ἀπάντων μονάδα· ἐκ δὲ τῆς μονάδος ἀόριστον δυάδα ὡς ἂν ὕλην τῇ μονάδι αἰτίῳ ὄντι ὑποστῆναι· ἐκ δὲ τῆς μονάδος καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος τοὺς ἀριθμούς· ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν τὰ σημεῖα· ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰς γραμμάς, ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἐπίπεδα σχήματα· ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἐπιπέδων τὰ στερεὰ σχήματα· ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰ αἰσθητὰ σώματα· ὧν καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα εἶναι τέτταρα, πῦρ, ὕδωρ,

The monad
the principle
of all things

¹ *Ph. d. Gr.* III 24, p. 107 f., 113.

γῆν, ἀέρα· μεταβάλλειν δὲ καὶ τρέπεσθαι δι' ὅλων, καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν κόσμον ἔμψυχον, νοερόν, σφαιροειδῆ, μέσῃ περιέχοντα τὴν γῆν καὶ αὐτὴν σφαιροειδῆ καὶ περιρικουμένην.

To the first sentence of this passage three remarks must be made. (1) That in fact the earliest Pythagoreans were not monists, but dualists, and, moreover, did not use by preference the term *ἐν* or *μονάς* to indicate their first principle in the left side of their *συστοιχία* may be seen in our nr. 42. (2) Aristotle says in *Metaph.* A 6, 987 b 26 f. that, instead of the Pythagorean *ἄπειρον* which is one, Plato posited the undefined dyad. We must infer from this that, wherever the *δυάς* ἀόριστος appears as a second principle, we have not to do with early Pythagorean doctrine. (3) As may be seen in our nr. 364, Plato, at least in his later years, called his first Principle the One. He also assumed a second principle, which he called either by the Pythagorean term *ἄπειρον* (*Phil.* 24-25, our nr. 347), or by his own denominations τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρόν or ἀόριστος *δυάς* (see the description in *Phil.* 24a-25b; cp. that of Hermodorus and of Sextus; above, nr. 371). This second principle, however, far from being derived directly from the One, forms the antipole of the scale of being. One wonders how Plato could have traced it back to the First Principle. It seems that on this point Alexander's account shows a later, unplatonic conception. Cp. ps.-Archytas (infra, nr. 1281) and Moderatus (1285).¹

As to the derivation of mathematical figures from the One, see above, nr. 372, and the passages cited in n. 2, p. 280. Also Sextus Emp., *Math.* X, 278 ff.

The doctrine that the elements interchange and turn into one another is Stoic Heracliteism. We shall find it also in Ocellus and in Philo, who views the Logos as "mediating" between the opposites. Cp. Alexander's account under b.

Festugière's statement that the doctrine is found in *Tim.* 54b, is only partly correct: Plato says that the four elements only *seemed* to blend into each other, but that in fact one of them does not change into anything else.

An equilibrium of opposites

b. Ib. 26 (the same passage continued):

Ἰσόμοιρά τ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ φῶς καὶ σκότος, καὶ θερμόν καὶ ψυχρόν, καὶ ξηρόν καὶ ὑγρόν· ὧν κατ' ἐπικράτειαν θερμοῦ μὲν θέρος γίνεσθαι, ψυχροῦ δὲ χειμῶνα, ξηροῦ δ' ἔαρ, καὶ ὑγροῦ φθινόπωρον. ἐὰν δὲ ἰσομοιρῇ, τὰ κάλλιστα εἶναι τοῦ ἔτους, οὗ τὸ μὲν θάλλον ἔαρ ὑγιεινόν, τὸ δὲ φθίνον φθινόπωρον νοσερόν.

Cp. infra, Philo, nr. 1306 b, c.—Doubtless, the doctrine of the opposite qualities and their equilibrium is found in Plato, as Festugière pointed out (e.g. *Symp.* 186d, 188a; *Tim.* 81e sqq.), and our author *may* have borrowed it there, though it goes back to Alcmaeon.

Mortal beings fed by air, immortal beings by aether

c. Ib. 26-27:

Τόν τε περὶ τὴν γῆν ἀέρα ἄσειστον καὶ νοσερόν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα θνητά· τὸν δὲ ἀνωτάτῳ ἀεικίνητόν τ' εἶναι καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ὑγιᾶ καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀθάνατα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο θεῖα. ἥλιόν τε καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀστέρας εἶναι θεούς· ἐπικρατεῖν γὰρ τὸ θερμόν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἐστὶ ζωῆς αἴτιον.

What stands here comes partly from Plato, partly from Aristotle.

(1) The aether theory, as it occurs here, shows Plato's view in *Tim.* 58d, where

¹ The present author reconsidered this question in a paper read to the Sorbonne, May 2nd 1958, which will be published shortly in the *Revue de Phil.* (jan. 1959).

the aether is not yet a fifth element, but is known as the purest air. Cp. *Cratylus* 410 b, where αἰθήρ is derived from ἀεὶ θεῖ (later in Arist., *De caelo* I 3, 270 b 22).

(2) The aether feeds immortal beings, see above, nr. 431. We shall find the point again in Philo and Plutarchus.

(3) As to the doctrine that heat is the cause of life, see for instance Aristotle's account of the genesis of living beings in *De generatione anim.* II 3, 736 b 33-737 a 6, where it is supposed that the "vital heat" in animals is something analogous to the aether, because it generates living beings.

d. Ib. 27 (continued):

God and man

Καὶ ἀνθρώποις εἶναι πρὸς θεοὺς συγγένειαν, κατὰ τὸ μετέχειν ἀνθρωπὸν θερμοῦ· διὸ καὶ προνοεῖσθαι τὸν θεὸν ἡμῶν, εἰμαρμένην τε τῶν ὄλων καὶ κατὰ **Providence** μέρος αἰτίαν εἶναι τῆς διοικήσεως.

Here, Alexander's Pythagoreans share Stoic pantheism: their God is not transcendent, but by his reason man is of the substance of God, i.e. of the fiery pneuma that penetrates the universe.

The formula that εἰμαρμένη is the cause of things being ordered, both as a whole and in particular, indicates that for these so-called Pythagoreans the relation of πρόνοια and εἰμαρμένη—much discussed in the second century after Christ, and later by Plotinus and those who follow him—was already a problem. In fact, we see that Varro (ap. Cic., *Acad. post.* 7, 29), speaking of the providence of God, calls it *prudentiam quandam procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris ea quae pertineant ad homines; quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant*.

Varro, who follows Antiochus (see above, nr. 1200), though he says that πρόνοια (prudentia) is especially concerned with celestial things, still identifies it with εἰμαρμένη. As soon as platonic transcendence comes in, the distinction between the one and the other becomes necessary. We find it in Philo and ps.-Plutarchus' *De fato* (infra, nr. 1321); with Celsus who opposes the view that God's providence is concerned with the preservation of the whole and not with details, to the Christian conception of an all-embracing Providence. See also Apuleius, infra, nr. 1331b.

For Plotinus and later Neoplatonists the question of πρόνοια and εἰμαρμένη becomes quite an important problem. See Plotinus, *Enn.* III 1-3; also Proclus, *Elementa* 120 and Dodds's commentary on it (p. 263).

e. Ib. 32:

Souls or
daemons in
the air

Εἶναι τε πάντα τὸν ἀέρα ψυχῶν ἔμπλεων· καὶ ταύτας δαίμονας τε καὶ ἥρωας ὀνομάζεσθαι· καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων πέμπεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τοὺς τ' ὀνείρους καὶ τὰ σημεῖα νόσου τε καὶ ὑγείας, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ καὶ προβάτοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κτήνεσιν· εἷς τε τούτους γίνεσθαι τοὺς τε καθαρμούς καὶ ἀποτροπιασμούς μαντικὴν τε πᾶσαν καὶ κληδόνας καὶ τὰ ὅμοια.

Also in Ocellus 3, 3; Ecphantus ap. Stob., IV 7, 64, p. 272, 2 H.; *Carmen Aur.* V 3. Timaeus Locr. says that God gave to daemons the rule over the world (infra, nrs. 1280c, 1283).

Cp. Philo, our nrs. 1304 and 1306, Plutarchus, nrs. 1318-1320, and such later Platonists as Albinus, Maximus of Tyrus and Apuleius. Nicomachus, *Theol. arithm.* p. 43 f. connects Greek demonology with the Persian and Jewish belief in angels. Cp. what St. Paul says of evil spirits in the air (*Eph.* 6, 12).

See also supra, nr. 1192.

Harmony f. Ib., 33:

Purification
and
abstinence

Τὴν τ' ἀρετὴν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἅπαν καὶ τὸν θεόν· διὸ καὶ καθ' ἀρμονίαν συνεστάναι τὰ ὅλα. φιλίαν τ' εἶναι ἐναρμόνιον ἰσότητα.—Τὴν δ' ἀγνείαν εἶναι διὰ καθαρμῶν καὶ λουτρῶν καὶ περιρραντηρίων καὶ διὰ τοῦ καθαρεύειν ἀπὸ τε κήδους καὶ λεχοῦς καὶ μιάσματος παντὸς καὶ ἀπέχεσθαι βρωτῶν θνησειδίων τε κρεῶν καὶ τριγλῶν καὶ μελανούρων καὶ ὧν καὶ τῶν φωτόκων ζώων καὶ κυάμων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν παρακελεύονται καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἐπιτελοῦντες.

These things bring us back to the ancient Orphic-Pythagorean sphere. Supra, nrs. 24, 29 and 33.

Zeller l.l. was probably right in thinking that the doctrine here expounded did not originate from Rome, where Nigidius Figulus is said to have first restored Pythagoreanism, but from Alexandria, where it is known to Arius Didymus in the first century B.C.

One or two generations later Philo is strongly influenced by it.

Ocellus 1280—Ocellus, whose work *Περὶ τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως* is cited by Censorinus¹ and by Philo², shows mainly Peripatetic influence.

The universe
is
imperishable

a. Ocellus I 2, 7, 9 (Harder 2-3, 9, 11):

Δοκεῖ γάρ μοι τὸ πᾶν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι καὶ ἀγέννητον· αἰεὶ τε γὰρ ἦν καὶ ἔσται· εἰ γὰρ ἐγγχρονον, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἦν· οὕτως οὖν ἀνώλεθρόν τε καὶ ἀγέννητον τὸ πᾶν. οὔτε γὰρ εἰ γενόμενόν τις αὐτὸ δοξάζει, εὐροίτο ἂν <ἐξ ὅτου γένοιτο, οὔτε εἰ φθαρτόν, εὐροίτο ἂν> εἰς δ φθαρείη καὶ διαλυθείη.— τὸ δέ γε ὅλον καὶ τὸ πᾶν ὀνομάζω τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον· δι' αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τῆς προσηγορίας ἔτυχε ταύτης, ἐκ τῶν ἀπάντων διακοσμηθείς. σύστημα γὰρ ἐστὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων φύσεως αὐτοτελὲς καὶ τέλειον³. — ὁ δέ γε κόσμος αἰτιός ἐστι τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ σφύζεσθαι καὶ τοῦ αὐτοτελεῖν εἶναι· αὐτὸς ἄρα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ αἰτιδιός ἐστι καὶ αὐτοτελής καὶ διαμένων τὸν πάντα αἰῶνα, καὶ δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο [τοῖς ἄλλοις] παραίτιος γινόμενος τῆς διαμονῆς τῶν ὅλων.

On coming-
to-be

b. Ocellus II 3-6 (Harder 20-24):

Ἐν ᾧ δὲ μέρει τοῦ κόσμου φύσις τε καὶ γένεσις ἔχουσι τὴν δυναστείαν, τρία δεῖ ταῦτα ὑπεῖναι· πρῶτον μὲν τὸ πρὸς ἀφὴν ὑφικζόμενον σῶμα πᾶσι τοῖς εἰς γένεσιν ἐρχομένοις· τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη πανδεχὲς καὶ ἐκμαγεῖον αὐτῆς τῆς γενέσεως, οὕτως ἔχον πρὸς τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γινόμενα ὡς ὕδωρ πρὸς χυλὸν καὶ σιγὴ πρὸς ψόφον καὶ σκότος πρὸς φῶς καὶ ὕλη πρὸς τεχνητόν. — δυνάμει

¹ Ap. Varro, *R.r.* II 1, 3.

² *De aeternitate mundi* 12.

³ This definition of the cosmos is Stoic (S.V.F. II fr. 527 Chrysippus). Cp. also Plato, *Tim.* 33d.

μὲν οὖν πάντα ἐν τούτῳ πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως, συντελεία δὲ γενόμενα καὶ λαβόντα φύσιν. ἐν οὖν δεῖ τοῦτο πρῶτον ὑπεῖναι πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαι γένεσιν. δεύτερον δὲ τὰς ἐναντιότητας, ἵνα μεταβολαὶ καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις ἐπιτελῶνται πάθος καὶ διάθεσιν ἐπιδεχομένης τῆς ὕλης, καὶ ἵνα αἱ δυνάμεις ἀντιπαθεῖς οὐσαι μῆτε κρατῶσιν εἰς τέλος αὐταὶ αὐτῶν μῆτε κρατῶνται ὑπ' αὐτῶν· τυγχάνουσι δ' αὐταὶ τό τε θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν. τρίτον δὲ αἱ οὐσίαι ὧν αἱ δυνάμεις εἰσὶν αὐταὶ, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀήρ καὶ γῆ· διαφέρουσι δὲ αὐταὶ τῶν δυνάμεων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐσίαι ἐν τόπῳ φθείρονται ἐξ ἀλλήλων, αἱ δὲ δυνάμεις οὔτε φθείρονται οὔτε γίνονται, λόγοι γὰρ ἀσώματοι τυγχάνουσι τούτων. τῶν δὲ τεσσάρων τὸ μὲν θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ὡς αἷτια καὶ ποιητικά, τὸ δὲ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν ὡς ὕλη καὶ παθητικά. πρῶτως δὲ ὕλη τὸ πανδεχές, κοινὸν γὰρ ὑπόκειται πᾶσιν· ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν τὸ δυνάμει σῶμα αἰσθητὸν ἀρχή, δεύτερον δὲ αἱ ἐναντιώσεις, οἷον θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης καὶ ὑγρότης καὶ ξηρότης, τρίτον δὲ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ καὶ ἀήρ· ταῦτα γὰρ μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς ἄλληλα, αἱ δὲ ἐναντιώσεις οὐ μεταβάλλουσιν.

The last sentence (off ὥστε) is a quotation from Aristotle, *De gen. et corr.* II 1, 329 a 32-b3, of which the whole passage is a paraphrastic explanation. As Diels, *Dox.* 188, and Harder, *Ocellus Lucanus* p. 97 ff., suppose, the author probably used a younger peripatetic commentary on *De gen. et corr.* II.

c. Ocellus III 3 (Harder 40):

gods-men-
daemons

The author distinguishes three "parts" of the cosmos, and a special kind of beings in each of them.

Ἐπεὶ οὖν καθ' ἐκάστην ἀποτομὴν ὑπερέχον τι γένος ἐντέτακται τῶν ἄλλων, ἐν μὲν οὐρανῷ τὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἐν δὲ γῇ ἄνθρωπος, ἐν δὲ τῷ μεταρσίῳ τόπῳ δαίμονες, ἀνάγκη τὸ γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων αἰτῖδιον εἶναι, εἴπερ ἀληθῶς ὁ λόγος συμβιβάζει μὴ μόνον τὰ μέρη συνυπάρχειν τῷ κόσμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ <ἐμ>περιεχόμενα τοῖς μέρεσιν.

The tripartition οὐρανός, γῆ, μεταρσίον is found in Seneca, *Nat. qu.* II 1, 1 (*caelestia, sublimia, terrena*), probably due to Posidonius. Cp. also Cic., *De natura deorum* II 99-101; Plut., *De facie i.o.l.*, supra, nr. 1192, infra, 1319; *De fato* 571b, and further the passages and authors mentioned under 1279e.

1281—Ps.-Archytas, Περὶ ἀρχῶν, ap. Stob., *Ecl.* I, p. 278 ff. W., Ps.-Archytas follows Aristotle in assuming three principles in nature: a ὑποκείμενον which is ἀόριστον, the form (μορφή) and an efficient cause (ἡ αἰτία). That he calls the ὑποκείμενον or ὕλη "the substance" (ἡ ὥσια or ἡ ἐστὼ), is Stoic¹.

Remarkable is also the dualism of this author: the definite and the indefinite principle are opposed as the good and the bad one, and hence two λόγοι are assumed, the one opposed to the other.

¹ Above, 900a.

Two
principles
and a moving
cause

a. Ps.-Archytas, Π. ἀρχῶν, ap. Stob. *Ecl.* I, p. 278 ff. W.:

Ἀνάγκη [καί] δύο ἀρχὰς εἶμεν τῶν ὄντων, μίαν μὲν τὰν συστοιχίαν ἔχουσιν τῶν τεταγμένων καὶ ὀριστῶν, ἑτέραν δὲ τὰν συστοιχίαν ἔχουσιν τῶν ἀτάκτων καὶ ἀορίστων. —

Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ περ ἀρχαὶ δύο κατὰ γένος ἀντιδιαιρεόμεναι τὰ πράγματα τυγχάνοντι τῷ τὰν μὲν εἶμεν ἀγαθοποιόν, τὰν δ' εἶμεν κακοποιόν, ἀνάγκη καὶ δύο λόγως εἶμεν, τὸν μὲν ἕνα τᾶς ἀγαθοποιῶ φύσιος, τὸν δ' ἕνα τᾶς κακοποιῶ. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ τέχνη καὶ τὰ φύσι γινόμενα δύο τούτων πρώτων μετείληφε, τᾶς τε μορφῶς καὶ τᾶς ὥσιας. Καὶ ἃ μὲν μορφῶ ἐντὶ ἃ αἰτία τῷ τόδε τι εἶμεν· ἃ δὲ ὥσια τὸ ὑποκείμενον, παραδεχόμενον τὰν μορφῶν.

Οὕτε δὲ τᾶ ὥσις οἶόν τέ ἐντι μορφῶς μετεῖμεν αὐτᾶ ἐξ αὐτᾶς, οὔτε μὲν τὰν μορφῶ γενέσθαι περὶ τὰν ὥσιαν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἄτεραν τινὰ εἶμεν αἰτίαν, τὰν κινάσοισαν τὰν ἐστῶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰν μορφῶν· ταύταν δὲ τὰν πράταν τᾶ δυνάμει καὶ καθυπερτάταν εἶμεν τᾶν ἁλλῶν· ὀνομάζεσθαι δ' αὐτὰν ποθάκει¹ θεόν· ὥστε τρεῖς ἀρχὰς εἶμεν ἤδη, τὸν τε θεὸν καὶ τὰν ἐστῶ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τὰν μορφῶν. Καὶ τὸν μὲν θεὸν τὸν τεχνίταν καὶ τὸν κινέοντα, τὰν δ' ἐστῶ τὰν ὕλαν καὶ τὸ κινεόμενον, τὰν δὲ μορφῶ τὰν τέχνην καὶ ποθ' ἂν κινέεται ὑπὸ τῷ κινέοντος ἃ ἐστῶ.

The moving cause that harmonizes the opposites is also called Harmony,— and τὸ πράτως κινέον!

b. Syrianus says that Archytas called his First Principle αἰτία πρὸ αἰτίας.

Syrianus in *Ar. Metaph.* XIV, the beginning (Mullach II, p. 117):

Αἰτία πρὸ
αἰτίας

Ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὥσανει ἀντικειμένων οἱ ἄνδρες ἤρχοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν δύο στοιχείων τὸ ἐπέκεινα ἤδεσαν, ὡς μαρτυρεῖ Φιλόλαος τὸν θεὸν λέγων πέρας καὶ ἀπειρίαν ὑποστῆσαι, διὰ μὲν τοῦ πέρατος τὴν τῷ ἐνὶ συγγενεστέραν ἐνδεικνύμενος πᾶσαν συστοιχίαν, διὰ δὲ τῆς ἀπειρίας τὴν ταύτης ὑφειμένην, καὶ ἔτι πρὸ τῶν δύο ἀρχῶν τὴν ἐνιαίαν αἰτίαν καὶ πάντων ἐξηρημένην προέταττον ἣν Ἀρχαίνετος (Ἀρχύτας) μὲν “αἰτίαν πρὸ αἰτίας” εἰναί φησι, Φιλόλαος δὲ τῶν πάντων ἀρχὰν εἶναι δισχυρίζεται.

Here the ps. Archytas shows the beginning of that extreme transcendentalism which posits the First Principle as an ἄρρητον beyond the Νοητόν, as will be rather generally found in the Platonism of the first centuries of our era.

1282—Onatus, another writer of this group, transposes this view into a defence of polytheism.

Onatus' defence of
polytheism

Onatus, *Περὶ Θεοῦ καὶ θείου* (Mullach II p. 113):

Ὁ μὲν θεὸς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐπαίει, οὔτε ὁρατὸς ὢν οὔτε ἐπαΐστος,

¹ ποθάκει = προσήκει.

εἰ μή τισι πάγχυ ὀλίγοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἐντὶ νόος καὶ ψυχὰ καὶ τὸ ἀγεμονικὸν τῷ σύμπαντος κόσμῳ. —

Ὁ μὲν ὦν θεὸς αὐτὸς οὔτε ὁρατὸς οὔτε αἰσθητός, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ μόνον καὶ νόφῳ θεωρατός· τὰ δὲ ἔργα αὐτῷ καὶ ταὶ πράξεις ἐναργέες τε καὶ αἰσθηταὶ ἐντὶ πάντεσιν ἀνθρώποις. Δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ μὴ εἷς εἶμεν θεός, ἀλλ' εἷς μὲν ὁ μέγιστος καὶ καθυπέρτερος καὶ ὁ κρατέων τῷ παντός, τοὶ δ' ἄλλοι πολλοὶ διαφέροντες κατὰ δύνανμιν· βασιλεύειν δὲ πάντων αὐτῶν ὁ καὶ κράτει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ ἀρετᾷ μάζων. οὗτος δὲ κα εἷη θεὸς ὁ περιέχων τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον, τοὶ δ' ἄλλοι θεοὶ οἱ θεόντές ἐντὶ κατ' οὐρανὸν σὺν τᾷ τῷ παντός περιαγήσι, κατὰ λόγον ὁπαδέοντες τῷ πρῶτῳ καὶ νοατῷ. Τοὶ δὲ λέγοντες ἓνα θεὸν εἶμεν ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλῶς, ἁμαρτάνοντι. Τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον ἀξίωμα τᾶς θείας ὑπεροχᾶς οὐ συνθεωρεῦντι. Λέγω δὴ τὸ ἄρχεν καὶ καθαγέεσθαι τῶν ὁμοίων, καὶ κράτιστον καὶ καθυπέρτερον εἶμεν τῶν ἄλλων. Τοὶ δ' ἄλλοι θεοὶ ποτὶ τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν καὶ νοατὸν οὕτως ἔχοντι, ὥσπερ χορευταὶ ποτὶ κορυφαῖον, καὶ στρατιῶται ποτὶ στραταγόν, καὶ λοχῖται καὶ συντεταγμένοι ποτὶ ταξιάρχαν καὶ λοχαγέταν, ἔχοντες φύσιν ἔπεσθαι καὶ ἐπακολουθεῖν τῷ καλῶς καθαγεομένῳ. — Θεὸς μὲν ὦν ἐντὶ, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχᾷ τῷ λόγῳ εἶπον, αὐτὸς ἀρχὰ καὶ πρῶτον· θεῖος δὲ ὁ κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ δινέμενα πάντα. Ὡς ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δαίμων ἐντὶ ἅ ψυχὰ, αὐτὰ γὰρ ἄρχει καὶ κινεῖ τὸ διόλω ζῶον. Δαιμόνιον δὲ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ τοῦτω δὲ πάντα.

In the second century a similar defence of polytheism was opposed by Celsus to the Christian doctrine of one God. See Origenes, *Contra Celsum*, e.g. V 6 and 26. Cp. also Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* III 32, 2; 35, 3.

1283—Daemons are usually placed in the intermediate sphere between Gods and man. Thus

Timaeus Locrus, *De anima mundi* 12 (the end), Mullach II p. 46:

Those who live a life of obedience to Reason live a happy life; but hardness and disobedience is followed by punishment hereafter and reincarnation.

Ἄπαντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν δευτέρᾳ περιόδῳ ἡ Νέμεσις συνδιέκρινε σὺν δαίμοσι παλαμναίοις χθονίοις τε, τοῖς ἐπόπταις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, οἷς ὁ πάντων ἀγεμὼν θεὸς ἐπέτρεψε διοίκησιν κόσμῳ συμπεπληρωμένῳ ἐκ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων τῶν τε ἄλλων ζώων, ὅσα δεδαμιούργαται ποτ' εἰκόνα τὰν ἀρίστην εἶδες ἀγεννάτω καὶ αἰωνίῳ καὶ νοατῷ.

The admini-
stration of
the world is
confided to
daemons

1284—In Rome Quintus Sextius founded a school of philosophy, Q. Sextius which flourished under Augustus and claimed to be Pythagorean but in fact was eclectic. Seneca knows the works of the elder Sextius and cites him often with great esteem:

a. Seneca, *Epist.* 59, 7:

Sextium ecce cum maxime lego, virum acrem, Graecis verbis, Romanis moribus philosophantem.

b. Seneca, *Epist.* 64, 2:

Lectus est deinde liber Quinti Sextii patris, magni, si quid mihi credis, viri et, licet neget, Stoici. Quantus in illo, di boni, vigor est, quantum animi! hoc non in omnibus philosophis invenies: quorundam scripta clarum habentium nomen exanguia sunt. instituunt, disputant, cavillantur, non faciunt animum, quia non habent: cum legeris Sextium, dices: "vivit, viget, liber est, supra hominem est, dimittit me plenum ingentis fiduciae."

c. Seneca, *Epist.* 73, 12:

Solebat Sextius dicere Iovem plus non posse quam bonum virum.

d. In Seneca's days the school was almost forgotten.

Seneca, *Nat. quaest.* VII 32, 2:

Pythagorica illa invidiosa turbae schola praeceptorem non invenit; Sextiorum nova et Romani roboris secta inter initia sua, cum magno impetu coepisset, extincta est.

1285—In the first and second century of our era only a few Neopythagoreans are known to us by name.

Moderatus
of Gades

Moderatus of Gades lived under Nero or the Flavians. His 11¹ books Πυθαγορικῶν σχολῶν are mentioned by Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* VI 19, 8. According to Porphyrius' account he used Pythagorean number theory as a means to explain Plato's metaphysical principles.

Plato's
metaphysical
principles
explained
by numbers

a. Porphyrius, *Vita Pythag.* 48-51:

Ἡ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν πραγματεία, ὥς ἄλλοι τε φασὶν καὶ Μοδέρματος ὁ ἐκ Γαδείρων πάνυ συνετῶς ἐν ἑνδεκα βιβλίοις συναγαγὼν τὸ ἀρέσκον τοῖς ἀνδράσι διὰ τοῦτο ἐσπουδάσθη. μὴ δυνάμενοι γάρ, φησί, τὰ πρῶτα εἶδη καὶ τὰς πρῶτας ἀρχὰς σαφῶς τῷ λόγῳ παραδοῦναι διὰ τε τὸ δυσπερινόητον αὐτῶν καὶ δυσέξιστον, παρεγένοντο ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς εὐσήμου διδασκαλίας χάριν μιμησάμενοι τοὺς γεωμέτρους καὶ τοὺς γραμματιστάς. ὥς γὰρ οὗτοι, τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν στοιχείων καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα βουλόμενοι παραδοῦναι, παρεγένοντο

¹ According to another reading 10 books (Bücheler, *Rhein. Mus.* XXXVII p. 335).

ἐπὶ τοὺς χαρακτῆρας, τούτους λέγοντες ὥς πρὸς τὴν πρώτην διδασκαλίαν στοιχεῖα εἶναι, ὕστερον μέντοι διδάσκουσιν ὅτι οὐχ οὗτοι στοιχεῖά εἰσιν οἱ χαρακτῆρες, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτων ἔννοια γίνεται τῶν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν στοιχείων· καὶ οἱ γεωμέτραι μὴ ἰσχύοντες τὰ ἀσώματα εἶδη λόγῳ παραστήσαι παραγίνονται ἐπὶ τὰς διαγραφὰς τῶν σχημάτων, λέγοντες εἶναι τρίγωνον τόδε, οὐ τοῦτο βουλόμενοι τρίγωνον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν ὑποπίπτον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτο, καὶ διὰ τούτου τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ τριγώνου παριστᾶσι. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οὖν λόγων καὶ εἰδῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐποίησαν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, μὴ ἰσχύοντες λόγῳ παραδιδόναι τὰ ἀσώματα εἶδη καὶ τὰς πρώτας ἀρχάς, παρεγένοντο ἐπὶ τὴν διὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν δῆλωσιν. καὶ οὕτως τὸν μὲν τῆς ἐνόητος λόγον καὶ τὸν τῆς ταυτότητος καὶ ἰσότητος καὶ τὸ αἷτιον τῆς συμπνοίας καὶ τῆς συμπαθείας τῶν ὅλων καὶ τῆς σωτηρίας τοῦ κατὰ ταῦτά καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος ἐν προσηγόρευσαν. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἐν τοιοῦτον ὑπάρχει ἡνωμένον τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ σύμπνουν κατὰ μετουσίαν τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου. τὸν δὲ τῆς ἐτερότητος καὶ ἀνισότητος καὶ παντός τοῦ μεριστοῦ καὶ ἐν μεταβολῇ καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἔχοντος δυοειδῆ λόγον καὶ δυάδα προσηγόρευσαν· τοιαύτη γὰρ κἂν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἢ τῶν δύο φύσις. καὶ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι οὐ κατὰ τούτους μὲν εἰσί, κατὰ δὲ τοὺς λοιποὺς οὐκ ἔτι, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους φιλοσόφους δυνάμεις τινὰς ἀπολιπόντας ἐνοποιοὺς καὶ διακρατητικὰς τῶν ὅλων οὐσας, καὶ εἰσὶ τινες καὶ παρ' ἐκείνοις λόγοι ἰσότητος καὶ ἀνομοιότητος καὶ ἐτερότητος. τούτους οὖν τοὺς λόγους εὐσήμου χάριν διδασκαλίας τῷ τοῦ ἐνὸς ὀνόματι προσαγορεύουσιν καὶ τῷ τῆς δυάδος· οὐ διαφέρει δὲ γε τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἢ δυοειδὲς ἢ ἀνισοειδὲς εἰπεῖν ἢ ἑτεροειδὲς. ὁμοίως δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· πᾶς γὰρ κατὰ τινων δυνάμεων τέτακται. πάλιν γὰρ ἔστι τι ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν. κατὰ τοῦ τοιοῦτου εἶδους καὶ κατὰ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως τὸν τρία ἀριθμὸν κατηγορήσαν. διὸ καὶ πᾶν τὸ μεσότητι προσκεχρημένον τριοειδὲς εἶναι φασίν. [οὕτως δὲ καὶ πᾶν τὸ τέλειον προσηγόρευσαν.] καὶ εἰ τί ἐστι τέλειον, τοῦτό φασιν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἀρχῇ προσκεχρῆσθαι καὶ κατ' ἐκείνην κεκοσμηῆσθαι. ἣν ἄλλως μὴ δυνάμενοι ὀνομάσαι τῷ τῆς τριάδος ὀνόματι ἐπ' αὐτῆς ἐχρήσαντο· καὶ εἰς ἔννοιαν αὐτῆς βουλόμενοι εἰσαγαγεῖν ἡμᾶς διὰ τοῦ εἶδους τούτου ταύτη εἰσήγαγον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων δ' ἀριθμῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. οὗτοι οὖν οἱ λόγοι καθ' οὓς οἱ ῥηθέντες ἀριθμοὶ ἐτάγησαν.

b. We have another account of Moderatus' theory by Simplicius, who cites a passage of Porphyrius' *Περὶ ὕλης*.

Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 230, 41 - 231, 25 Diels:

Pythagoreans were the first to conceive ὕλη as something that is distinguished by mass and distance and division (ὄγκῳ καὶ διαστάσει καὶ μερισμῷ) ¹, not measur-

¹ This description of the ἄπειρον is certainly not of early Pythagorean origin, but comes from Plato's description of τὰ ἄλλα in *Parm.* 164b-165e (our nr. 334).

**The Neo-
platonist
hierarchy
of being**

able by ordinary measures, but only capable of being defined by means of εἰδητικά μέτρα¹. After them Plato conceived it in this way, as Moderatus says.

Οὗτος γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορείους τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐν ὑπὲρ τὸ εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀποφαίνεται, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἐν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄντως ὄν καὶ νοητόν, τὰ εἶδη φησὶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ψυχικόν, μετέχειν τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν, τὴν δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου τελευταίαν φύσιν τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσαν μὴδὲ μετέχειν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐμφασιν ἐκείνων² κεκοσμηθῆναι, τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ὕλης τοῦ μὴ ὄντος πρῶτως ἐν τῷ ποσῷ ὄντος οὐσης³ σκίασμα καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ὑποβεβηκυίας καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου. καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ὁ Πορφύριος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ ὕλης τὰ τοῦ Μοδεράτου παρατιθέμενος γέγραπεν ὅτι "βουλευθεὶς ὁ ἐνιαῖος λόγος, ὡς πού φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, τὴν γένεσιν ἀφ' ἐαυτοῦ τῶν ὄντων συστήσασθαι, κατὰ στέρησιν αὐτοῦ ἐχώρησε τὴν ποσότητα πάντων αὐτὴν στερήσας τῶν αὐτοῦ λόγων καὶ εἰδῶν. τοῦτο δὲ ποσότητα ἐκάλεσεν ἄμορφον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον, ἐπιδεχομένην μέντοι μορφήν σχῆμα διαίρεσιν ποιότητα πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον. ἐπὶ ταύτης ἔοικε, φησί, τῆς ποσότητος ὁ Πλάτων τὰ πλείω ὀνόματα κατηγορεῖσθαι "πανδεχῆ" καὶ ἀνείδεον λέγων καὶ "ἀόρατον" καὶ "ἀπορώτατα τοῦ νοητοῦ μετεληφέναι" αὐτὴν καὶ "λογισμῷ νόθῳ μόλις ληπτὴν" καὶ πᾶν τὸ τούτοις ἐμπερές. αὕτη δὲ ἡ ποσότης, φησί, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ στέρησιν τοῦ ἐνιαίου λόγου νοούμενον τοῦ πάντας τοὺς λόγους τῶν ὄντων ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιελιγφότος παραδείγματά ἐστι τῆς τῶν σωμάτων ὕλης, ἣν καὶ αὐτὴν ποσὸν καὶ τοὺς Πυθαγορείους καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα καλεῖν ἔλεγεν, οὐ τὸ ὡς εἶδος ποσόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ παράλυσιν καὶ ἔκτασιν καὶ διασπασμὸν καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος παράλλαξιν, δι' ἧς καὶ κακὸν δοκεῖ ἡ ὕλη ὡς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀποφεύγουσα. καὶ καταλαμβάνεται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐξελεθῆναι τῶν ὄρων οὐ συγχωρεῖται, τῆς μὲν ἐκτάσεως τὸν τοῦ εἰδητικοῦ μεγέθους λόγον ἐπιδεχομένης καὶ τούτῳ ὀριζομένης, τοῦ δὲ διασπασμοῦ τῇ ἀριθμητικῇ διακρίσει εἰδοποιουμένου".

**A Neo-
pythagorean
interpreta-
tion of
Plato's
Parmenides**

In Simplicius' account of Moderatus' doctrine we see for the first time the four stages of the Neoplatonic hierarchy of being clearly outlined. Dodds⁴ recognized it as a Neopythagorean interpretation of Plato's *Parmenides*, of which he finds an earlier trace in a correction made by the Neopythagorean Eudorus of Alexandria (± 25 A.D.) in a passage of Aristotle. The text of Ar., *Metaph.* A 988 a 10-11 is: τὰ γὰρ εἶδη τοῦ τί ἐστὶν αἷτια τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς δ' εἶδεσιν τὸ ἐν. Alexander in *Metaph.* p. 58, l. 31-59, l. 8, says that Eudorus and Euarmostus read: τοῖς δ' εἶδεσιν τὸ ἐν καὶ

¹ This formula again is neither directly Pythagorean nor directly Platonic. The term and the wording ὀρίζεσθαι δυνάμενα ὑπὸ τῶν εἰδητικῶν μέτρων presupposes Aristotle as well as Plato.

² Sensible things are a *reflection* of the Ideas. We shall find this later in Plotinus.

³ The term ποσόν or ποσότης to indicate multiplicity in the intelligible world is Neopythagorean. Theon of Smyrna e.g. defines number as τὸ ἐν νοητοῖς ποσόν (Dodds in *Class. Qu.* 1928, p. 138).

⁴ *The Parmenides of Plato and the origin of the Neoplatonic "One"*, in *Class. Quart.* 1928, p. 129-142.

τῇ ὕλῃ. Dodds thinks there is not an omission here in our MSS, but Eudorus changed the text of Aristotle in the sense of Neopythagorean monism, which derived the ἄπειρον directly from the one. See above, nr. 1279b and the footnote to the explanation given there.

1286—Moderatus seems to have conceived the soul as a kind of mathematical harmony, while "Timaeus Locrus" applied this notion to the genesis of beings, as "a mean" and "a bond".

Stob., *Ecl.* I p. 364, l. 19-25 W.:

The soul a
harmony

Ἔτι τοίνυν τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἰδωμεν, οὐ τὴν ἐν σώμασιν ἐνιδρυμένην, ἀλλ' ἥτις ἐστὶ μαθηματικὴ. Ταύτην τοίνυν, ὡς μὲν ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, τὴν τὰ διαφέροντα ὁπωσοῦν σύμμετρα καὶ προσήγορα ἀπεργαζομένην ἀναφέρει εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν Μοδέρατος· τὴν δ' ὡς ἐν οὐσίαις καὶ ζωαῖς καὶ γενέσει πάντων μεσότητα καὶ σύνδεσιν ὁ Τίμαιος αὐτῇ ἀνατίθησι.

Cp.
"Timaeus"

We shall find that Philo conceived the Logos exactly in this sense. *Infra*, nr. 1306ab.

1287—Apollonius of Tyana, too, lived in the first cent. A.D.

Apollonius
of Tyana

a. Suidas:

Ἀπολλώνιος Τυανεύς, φιλόσοφος. — ἤχμαζε μὲν ἐπὶ Κλαυδίου καὶ Γαίου καὶ Νέρωνος καὶ μέχρι Νέρβα, ἐφ' οὗ καὶ μετέλλαξεν. ἐσιώπησε δὲ κατὰ Πυθαγόραν πέντε ἔτη. εἶτα ἀπῆρεν εἰς Αἴγυπτον, ἔπειτα εἰς Βαβυλῶνα πρὸς τοὺς μάγους κάκειθεν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀραβας, καὶ συνῆξεν ἐκ πάντων τὰ μυρία καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ θρυλούμενα μαγγανεύματα. συνέταξε δὲ τοσαῦτα· Τελετὰς ἣ περὶ θυσιῶν, Διαθήκην, Χρησμούς, Ἐπιστολάς, Πυθαγόρου βίον.

In the third century Philostratus wrote a kind of saint's life of Apollonius, as an example of the perfectus sapiens in Pythagorean style. The story abounds with miracles, but the author takes great pains to explain that they are not produced by magic art, but spring from a superior wisdom and intimate connection with God (or the gods) ¹. Dio Cassius mentions Apoll., LXXVII 18. His life of Pythagoras is cited by Porphyrius, *V.P.* 2, and by Iamblichus, *V.P.* 254. Of his books Π. θυσιῶν a fragment is preserved by Eusebius. See under b.

b. Apollonius ap. Euseb., *Praef. ev.* IV 13:

The true
worship
of God

Οὕτως τοίνυν μάλιστα ἄν τις, οἶμαι, τὴν προσήκουσαν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιοῖτο τοῦ θεοῦ, τυγχάνοι τε αὐτόθεν ἱλαῶ τε καὶ εὐμενοῦς αὐτοῦ παρ' ὄντινα οὖν μόνος ἀνθρώπων, εἰ Θεῷ μὲν ὄν δὴ πρῶτον ἔφαμεν, ἐνὶ τε ὄντι κεχωρισμένῳ πάντων, μεθ' ὃν γνωρίζεσθαι τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀναγκαῖον, μὴ θύοι τι τὴν ἀρχὴν, μήτε ἀνάπτοι πῦρ, μήτε καθόλου τι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπονομάζοι. (δεῖται γὰρ οὐδενὸς οὐδὲ παρὰ τῶν κρειττόνων ἥπερ ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν· οὐδ' ἔστιν ὃ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀνίησι γῇ φυτόν, ἣ τρέφει ζῶον, ἣ ἀήρ, ὃ μὴ πρόσεστί γέ τι μίasma·) μόνῳ

¹ Philostr. I 2; V 12; VIII 7, 9.

δὲ χρῶτο πρὸς αὐτὸν αἰεὶ τῷ κρείττονι λόγῳ, λέγω δὲ τῷ μὴ διὰ στόματος ἰόντι, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν ὄντων διὰ τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν αἰτοίῃ τὰγαθὰ· νοῦς δὲ ἐστὶν οὗτος ὄργανον μὴ δεόμενος.

Cp. Philostr., *Apoll.* III 4, VI 19.

Nicomachus

1288—Nicomachus of Gerasa elaborated the early Pythagorean theory of number as a cosmic principle.

a. Nicomachus, *Arithm. introd.* I 3, 3-6, p. 6-8 Hoche.

Of the mathematical sciences arithmetic is concerned with absolute quantity, music with relative quantity; two other sciences deal with size, geometry with the part that is at rest, astronomy with that which moves. These sciences are indispensable for the knowledge of things and a condition of wisdom.

Mathematics a condition of wisdom

Οὐκ ἄρα τούτων ἄνευ δυνατόν τὰ τοῦ ὄντος εἶδη ἀκριβῶσαι οὐδ' ἄρα τὴν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀλήθειαν εὑρεῖν, ἥς ἐπιστήμη σοφία, φαίνεται δέ, ὅτι οὐδ' ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφεῖν· ὅπερ γὰρ ζωγραφίῃ συμβάλλεται τέχναις βαναύσοις πρὸς θεωρίης ὀρθότητα, τοῦτό τοι γραμμαὶ καὶ ἀριθμοὶ καὶ ἀρμονικὰ διαστήματα καὶ κύκλων περιπολήσεις πρὸς λόγων σοφῶν μαθήσιας συνεργίῃν ἔχουσιν, Ἀνδροκύδης¹ φησὶν ὁ Πυθαγορικός. ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀρχύτας ὁ Ταραντῖνος² ἀρχόμενος τοῦ ἀρμονικοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ οὕτω πως λέγει· καλῶς μοι δοκοῦντι περὶ τὰ μαθήματα διαγινώμεναι καὶ οὐδὲν ἄτοπον αὐτοὺς ὀρθῶς, οἷα ἐντί, περὶ ἐκάστου φρονεῖν. περὶ γὰρ τὰς τῶν ὄλων φύσιος καλῶς διαγινόντες ἐμελλον καὶ περὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος, οἷα ἐντί, καλῶς ὀφείσθαι. —

Καὶ Πλάτων δὲ ἐπὶ τέλει τοῦ τρισκαίδεκάτου τῶν Νόμων³, ὅπερ τινὲς φιλόσοφον ἐπιγράφουσιν, ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ περισκοπεῖ καὶ διορίζεται, ποταπὸν χρὴ τὸν ὄντως φιλόσοφον εἶναι, ἀνακεφαλαιούμενος τὰ διὰ πλειόνων προδιαλεχθέντα καὶ προδιαβεβαιωθέντα ἐπιφέρει· ἅπαν διάγραμμα ἀριθμοῦ τε σύστημα καὶ ἀρμονίας σύστασιν ἅπασαν τῆς τε τῶν ἄστρον φορᾶς τὴν ἀναλογίαν μίαν ἀναφανῆναι δεῖ τῷ κατὰ τρόπον μαθηθάνοντι, φανήσεται δ' ἂν, ὃ λέγομεν, ὀρθῶς τις εἰς ἐν βλέπων πάντα μαθηθάνῃ⁴. δεσμὸς γὰρ ἀπάντων τούτων εἷς ἀναφανήσεται· εἰ δέ τις ἄλλως μεταχειριεῖται φιλοσοφίαν τύχην δεῖ καλεῖν συνεργόν· οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων ἡ ὁδὸς ποτε, ἀλλ' οὗτος ὁ τρόπος, ταῦτα τὰ μαθήματα εἴτε χαλεπὰ εἴτε ῥάδια, ταῦτ' ἰτέον, ἀμελεῖν δὲ οὐ δεῖ. τὸν δὲ ταῦτα πάντα οὕτω λαβόντα, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, τοῦτον ἐγὼ καλῶ σοφώτατον καὶ δισχυρίζομαι παίζων τε καὶ σπουδάζων. δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι κλίμαξί τισι καὶ

¹ Androcydes is also mentioned in the *Theol. Arithm.*, p. 40 Ast.

² The same passage is quoted by Porphyrius, *In Ptolem. Harm.*, p. 236.

³ The reference is to *Epinomis* 991d ff.

⁴ I follow the reading proposed by d'Ooge.

γεφύραις ἔοικε ταῦτα τὰ μαθήματα διαβιβάζοντα τὴν διάνοιαν ἡμῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ δοξαστῶν ἐπὶ τὰ νοητὰ καὶ ἐπιστημονικὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν συντρόφων ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ βρεφῶν ὄντων συνήθων ὑλικῶν καὶ σωματικῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀσυνήθη τε καὶ ἑτερόφυλα πρὸς τὰς αἰσθήσεις, τῇ δὲ ἀυλὶα καὶ ἀιδιότητι συγγενέστερα ταῖς ἡμετέραις ψυχαῖς καὶ πολὺ πρότερον τῷ ἐν αὐταῖς νοητικῷ.

b. Nicomachus, *ib.*, I 6, 1; p. 12 Hoche:

Number pre-
existing in
the mind of
God

Πάντα τὰ κατὰ τεχνικὴν διέξοδον ὑπὸ φύσεως ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ διατεταγμένα κατὰ μέρος τε καὶ ὅλα φαίνεται κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὑπὸ τῆς προνοίας καὶ τοῦ τὰ ὅλα δημιουργήσαντος νοῦ διακεκρίσθαι τε καὶ κεκοσμηθῆναι βεβαιουμένου τοῦ παραδείγματος ὅλον λόγον προχαράγματος ἐκ τοῦ ἐπέχειν τὸν ἀριθμὸν προϋποστάντα ἐν τῇ τοῦ κοσμοποιοῦ θεοῦ διανοίᾳ, νοητὸν αὐτὸν μόνον καὶ παντάπασιν ἄυλον, οὐσίαν μέντοι τὴν ὄντως τὴν ἀίδιον, ἵνα πρὸς αὐτὸν ὡς λόγον τεχνικὸν ἀποτελεσθῇ τὰ σύμπαντα ταῦτα, χρόνος, κίνησις, οὐρανός, ἄστρα, ἐξελιγμοὶ παντοῖοι.

Cp. *infra*, 1293b and c (Philo); 1326b (Albinus) and our notes there.

c. Nicomachus, *Arithm. theol.* epitome ap. Phot., *Bibl.*, cod. 187, p. 143, 22 Bekker:

The
μονὰς ἀρ-
σενόθης

Λέγει δὲ τὴν μονάδα ἄλλα τε οὐκ ὀλίγα τῶν πλασμάτων τῇ περὶ αὐτὴν ἀληθείᾳ, καὶ τοῖς προσοῦσι φυσικοῖς ἰδιώμασι καταμιγνύς, καὶ ὡς νοῦς τε εἴη, εἴτα καὶ ἀρσενόθης, καὶ θεός, καὶ ὕλη δὲ πῶς, πάντα χρήματα μιγνύς ὡς ἀληθῶς, καὶ πανδοχεὺς λοιπὸν καὶ χωρητικὴ καὶ χάος, σύγχυσις, σύγκρασις, ἀλαμπία, σκοτωδία, χάσμα, τάρταρος.

On the μονὰς ἀρσενόθης see Festugière, *Le dieu inconnu et la gnose*, p. 43 ff. *Infra* 1340a: the Νοῦς ἀρρενόθης appears in *Corp. Herm.* I 9. See n. 2 there. That the first Principle is at once ὕλη—not only that ὕλη derives from it—is not yet in Alexander Polyhistor's account of Pythagorean doctrine ap. Diog. L. VIII 25. But it is found in the Stoa (above nr. 900). In spite of Festugière's comments, oriental influence is probable.

On σύγχυσις, χάσμα, etc.: Festugière, *o.c.*, p. 51 ff. Cp. also *Theol. arithm.* ed. Ast. p. 6:

᾽Ωσαύτως δὲ χάος αὐτὴν φασὶ τὸ παρ' ᾽Ησιόδῳ πρωτόγονον, ἐξ οὗ τὰ λοιπὰ ὡς ἐκ μονάδος· ἡ αὐτὴ σύγχυσις τε καὶ σύγκρασις, ἀλαμπία τε καὶ σκοτωδία στερήσει διαρθρώσεως καὶ διακρίσεως τῶν ἐξῆς ἀπάντων ἐπινοεῖται.

2—PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA

1289—With Philo a new element comes into the history of philosophy, namely Revelation. Since, however, Philo was an Alexandrian Jew of Hellenistic culture, bred in the Greek philosophy of his age, the question arises as to what prevails in his thought: either Revelation in Scripture or Greek philosophy.

**The
character of
Philo's
thought**

I. Heinemann, H. Leisegang, E. R. Goodenough and others (see Bibliogr.) think that with Philo Hellenism prevails. A different outlook was given recently by H. A. Wolfson, *Philo* (Cambridge Mass., 1948). Here Philo is represented as the father of that religious philosophy which, during the Middle Ages, subordinated philosophy to theology and, according to the author, is found not only in Western scholastic philosophy, but also with the Jewish and Arabic philosophers of that age. He therefore qualifies Philo as one of the greatest thinkers of mankind and attributes to him a perfectly clear and consistent system.

Important objections to this view were raised by I. Heinemann, *Philo als Vater der mittelalterlichen Philosophie?* in: *Theologische Zeitschrift*, (Basel) 1950, p. 99-116. See also H. Chadwick in *Class. Review* 1949, p. 24 f., and Leisegang's characteristic of Philo in Pauly-Wissowa XX 1 (1941).

Philo, in fact, accepted Revelation. His idea of God and creation is, as will be seen in the following texts, on essential points determined by it. This is, of course, important; but it does not yet make Philo a great philosopher. Moreover, it cannot be held that he made a clear distinction between natural Reason and Revelation, such as was made later by St. Thomas Aquinas. The climate of Philo's thought is highly syncretistic (see in particular our nrs. 1294 and 1303): he read Scripture in the Septuagint version and understood its terms, often in an amazing way, in the sense of Greek philosophy, i.e. of that synthetical philosophy of his age, in which both Platonism and Stoicism prevailed.

**Philo's life
and work**

a. Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* II 4, 2:

Κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον (sc. τὸν Γάϊον) Φίλων ἐγνωρίζετο ¹ πλείστοις ἀνὴρ οὐ μόνον τῶν ἡμετέρων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξωθεν ὁρμωμένων παιδείας ἐπισημότατος. τὸ μὲν οὖν γένος ἀνέκαθεν Ἑβραῖος ἦν, τῶν ἐπ' Ἀλεξανδρείας ἐν τέλει διαφανῶν οὐδενὸς χεῖρων ², περὶ δὲ τὰ θεῖα καὶ πάτρια μαθήματα ὅσον τε καὶ ὀπηλίκον εἰσενήνεκται πόνον, ἐργῶ πάσι δῆλος ³, καὶ περὶ τὰ φιλόσοφα δὲ καὶ ἐλευθέρια τῆς ἔξωθεν παιδείας οἷός τις ἦν, οὐδὲν δεῖ λέγειν, ὅτε μάλιστα τὴν κατὰ Πλάωνα καὶ Πυθαγόραν ἐζηλωκῶς ἀγωγὴν ⁴, διενεγκεῖν ἅπαντας τοὺς καθ' ἐαυτὸν ἱστορεῖται.

b. In his treatise on the value of preliminary studies (§ 74 ff.), taking the story of Abraham, Hagar and Sarah as an allegory, he calls the ἐγκύκλια (grammar, geometry and musical theory) "the handmaids", while Philosophy is "the mistress" or "the lawful wife".

¹ Philo was an ambassador of Alexandria to the emperor Gaius (Caligula) 39 A.D.

² His brother Alabarches was, according to Josephus, *Antiqu.* XX 3, the wealthiest man of Alexandria.

³ Ph.'s three books Νόμων ἱερῶν ἀλληγορίαι and fifteen other works are commentaries on the Pentateuch or parts of it. In the books *De somniis* the theories of Chrysippus and Posidonius are illustrated by biblical instances. The *Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim et Exodum* preserved in an Armenian translation, are a part of another allegorical commentary on the Pentateuch.

⁴ In fact Ph.'s Platonism shows all the features of first century-Pythagoreanism. The author is particularly interested in number speculations

Philo, *De congressu eruditionis gratia* 79-80 (C.W. III, p. 87 f.):

Καὶ μὴν ὥσπερ τὰ ἐγκύκλια συμβάλλεται πρὸς φιλοσοφίας ἀνάληψιν, οὕτω καὶ φιλοσοφία πρὸς σοφίας κτῆσιν. ἔστι γὰρ φιλοσοφία ἐπιτήδευσις σοφίας, σοφία δ' ἐπιστήμη θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ τῶν τούτων αἰτίων ¹. γένοιτ' ἂν οὖν ὥσπερ ἡ ἐγκύκλιος μουσικῆ φιλοσοφίας, οὕτω καὶ φιλοσοφία δούλη σοφίας. 5 φιλοσοφία δὲ ἐγκράτειαν μὲν γαστρούς, ἐγκράτειαν δὲ τῶν μετὰ γαστέρα, ἐγκράτειαν δὲ καὶ γλώττης ἀναδιδάσκει. ταῦτα λέγεται μὲν εἶναι δι' αὐτὰ αἰρετά, σεμνότερα δὲ φαίνονται <ἀν>, εἰ θεοῦ τιμῆς καὶ ἀρεσκείας ἕνεκα ἐπιτηδεύοιτο ². μεμνησθαι οὖν δεῖ τῆς κυρίας, ὅποτε μέλλοιμεν αὐτῆς <τάς> θεραπαινίδας μνᾶσθαι· καὶ λεγόμεθα μὲν ἄνδρες εἶναι τούτων, ὑπαρχέτω δ' ἡμῖν ἐκείνη 10 πρὸς ἀλήθειαν γυνή, μὴ λεγέσθω.

It would be certainly as erroneous to conclude from this passage that Philo proclaimed Philosophy to be "the mistress", and such in opposition to Scripture, as to say that here he is ranking "theology" above philosophy. He does not oppose Scripture or theology to philosophy at all. Where he corrects the Stoa, he does so by "true philosophy". And this is what he attributes to Moses. Cp. 1290a.

c. The following passage shows how he speaks later of his philosophical studies.

Philo, *De special. legibus* III 1, 1-4 (C.W. V, p. 150 f.):

Ἦν ποτε χρόνος, ὅτε φιλοσοφία σχολάζων καὶ θεωρία τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸν καλὸν καὶ περιπόθητον καὶ μακάριον ὄντως νοῦν ἐκαρπούμην, 10 θείους ἀεὶ λόγοις συγγινόμενος καὶ δόγμασιν, ὧν ἀπλήστως καὶ ἀκορέστως ἔχων ἐνευφραινόμην, οὐδὲν ταπεινὸν φρονῶν ἢ χαμαίζηλον οὐδὲ περὶ δόξαν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τὰς σώματος εὐπαθείας ἱλυσπώμενος, ἀλλ' ἄνω μετάρσιος ἐδόκουν ἀεὶ φέρεσθαι κατὰ τινα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθειασμὸν καὶ συμπεριπολεῖν ἡλίφ καὶ 15 σελήνῃ καὶ σύμπαντι οὐρανῷ τε καὶ κόσμῳ. τότε δὴ τότε διακλύπτων ἄνωθεν ἀπ' αἰθέρος καὶ τείνων ὥσπερ ἀπὸ σκοπιᾶς τὸ τῆς διανοίας ὄμμα κατεθεώμην 1 ἀνὰ κράτος ἐκπεφευγότα τὰς ἐν τῷ θνητῷ βίῳ κῆρας. ἐφήδρευε δ' ἄρα μοι τὸ κακῶν ἀργαλεώτατον, ὁ μισόκαλος φθόνος, ὃς ἐξαπινάϊως ἐπιπεσὼν οὐ πρότερον ἐπαύσατο καθέλκων πρὸς βίαν ἢ με καταβαλεῖν εἰς μέγα πέλαιγος τῶν ἐν πολιτείᾳ φροντίδων, ἐν ᾧ φορούμενος οὐδ' ὅσον ἀνανήξασθαι δύναμαι. 5 στένων δ' ὁμῶς ἀντέχω τὸν ἐκ πρώτης ἡλικίας ἐνιδρυμένον τῇ ψυχῇ παιδείας ἕμερον ἔχων, ὃς ἔλεόν μου καὶ οἴκτον ἀεὶ λαμβάνων ἀνεγείρει καὶ ἀνακουφίζει. διὰ τοῦτον ἔστιν ὅτε τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐπαίρω καὶ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμασιν ἀμυδρῶς μὲν — τὸ γὰρ ὀξυδερκὲς αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ἀλλοκότων πραγμάτων ἀχλὺς ἐπεσκίασεν —

¹ This is a Stoic definition of philosophy. See above, 897b, 1215c.

² Here Philo is correcting the Stoa.

ἀλλ' ἀναγκαίως γοῦν περιβλέπομαι τὰν κύκλῳ καθαρᾶς καὶ ἀμιγοῦς κακῶν ἰοζωῆς σπάσαι γλιχόμενος.

1290—In the very beginning of his treatise *On the Creation* Ph. rebukes those who hold that the world is without beginning and is everlasting. To their view he opposes Moses' doctrine of creation.

God and
the world

a. Philo, *De opif. mundi* 2, 7-9; C.W. I, p. 2-3.

Τινὲς γὰρ τὸν κόσμον μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν κοσμοποιὸν θαυμάσαντες τὸν μὲν ἀγένητόν τε καὶ ἀτίδιον ἀπεφάναντο, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ πολλὴν ἀπραξίαν ἀνάγκως κατεψεύσαντο, δέον ἔμπαλιν τοῦ μὲν τὰς δυνάμεις ὡς ποιητοῦ καὶ πατρὸς καταπλαγῆναι, 15 τὸν δὲ μὴ πλεόν ἀποσεμνῦναι τοῦ μετρίου¹. Μωυσῆς δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐπ' αὐτὴν φθάσας ἀκρότητα καὶ χρησιμοῖς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ συνεκτικώτατα τῶν τῆς φύσεως ἀναδιδαχθεὶς² ἔγνω δὴ, ὅτι ἀναγκαιότατόν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δραστήριον αἴτιον, τὸ δὲ παθητόν³, καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν δραστήριον ὁ τῶν ὄλων νοῦς ἐστιν εἰλικρινέστατος καὶ ἀκραιφνέστατος, κρείττων ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ κρείττων 20 ἢ ἐπιστήμη καὶ κρείττων ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν⁴, τὸ δὲ παθητόν 1 ἄψυχον καὶ ἀκίνητον ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, κινήθην δὲ καὶ σχηματισθὲν καὶ ψυχωθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ μετέβαλεν εἰς τὸ τελειότατον ἔργον, τόνδε τὸν κόσμον⁵. ὃν οἱ φάσκοντες ὡς ἐστιν ἀγένητος λελήθασιν τὸ ὠφελιμώτατον καὶ ἀναγκαιότατον τῶν εἰς 5 εὐσέβειαν ὑποτεμνόμενοι τὴν πρόνοιαν.

Providence

b. By the doctrine of Creation that of Providence is established at the same time.

¹ By the last words, Ph. certainly alludes more to Aristotle's doctrine of the ἀφθαρσία τοῦ κόσμου than to Plato's description in the *Timaeus*, where in the Greek sense a κόσμος is "made" or "produced" by the Demiurge.

² The wording of this sentence shows that for Philo "philosophy" and Revelation are not opposed the one to the other; with Moses, personal insight and divine instruction work together.

³ This distinction between an active and a passive principle in Nature reminds one of Stoic doctrine, as reported by Diog. Laert. VII 134 (supra, nr. 899a), though in calling the δραστήριον αἴτιον Νοῦς Philo speaks the language of Plato in the *Philebus* and *Timaeus* (supra, nrs. 347e and 349).

⁴ Philo stresses the transcendence of God as strongly as possible and declines to call him αὐτὸ τὸ Ἀγαθόν (Plato's term in *Resp.* VI 508-509; supra, nr. 292) or αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν (*Symp.* 211d; supra, nr. 273).

⁵ The παθητόν, by being set in motion, shaped and quickened by the divine Mind, is transformed into "the most perfect masterpiece", namely the world. Here, Philo follows Plato and does not exclude some vague pre-existence of "matter". However, in *De conf. lingu.* 27, 136 (C.W. II p. 254, l. 24) he says that both χώρα and τόπος were created coincidentally with the existing things: καὶ χώραν καὶ τόπον αὐτὸς τοῖς σώμασι συγγεγέννηκε. Cp. Plato, *Tim.* 49e-52a (supra, nrs. 356b-e); Wolfson I, p. 300-309. See also Philo, *Leg. alleg.* II 1 (infra, nr. 1279).

Ib. 2, 10-11:

Τοῦ μὲν γὰρ γεγονότος ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τὸν πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν αἰρεῖ λόγος· καὶ γὰρ πατὴρ ἐκγόνων καὶ δημιουργὸς τῶν δημιουργηθέντων στοχάζεται τῆς διαμονῆς καὶ ὅσα μὲν ἐπιζήμια καὶ βλαβερὰ μηχανῇ πάσῃ διωθεῖται, τὰ δὲ ὅσα ὠφέλιμα καὶ λυσιτελεῖ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐκπορίζει ἐπιποθεῖ·
 10 πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ γεγονὸς οἰκείωσις¹ οὐδεμία τῷ μὴ πεποιηκότι. ἀπεριμάχητον δὲ δόγμα καὶ ἀνωφελὲς ἀναρχίαν ὡς ἐν πόλει κατασκευάζον τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ τὸν ἔφορον ἢ βραβευτὴν ἢ δικαστὴν οὐκ ἔχοντι, ὅφ' οὐ πάντ' οἰκονομεῖσθαι καὶ πρυτανεύεσθαι θέμις.

The rule of Providence over the cosmos and over human life according to Philo is one of the main points of Moses' teaching. Together with the doctrine of God's existence and His unity, it is also the leading idea of Philo's own thought: at the same time a religious and a philosophical doctrine.

Cp. *De opif. mundi* 61, 170-172.

1291—God from eternity was alone and anything besides Him must have been brought into being by Him.

**God is
unique**

Philo, *Leg. alleg.* II 1, 1-3 (C.W. I, p. 90):

“Καὶ εἶπε κύριος ὁ θεός· Οὐ καλὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον μόνον, ποιήσωμεν αὐτῷ βοηθὸν κατ’ αὐτόν” (*Gen.* 2, 18). διὰ τί τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὃ προφῆτα, οὐκ ἔστι καλὸν εἶναι μόνον; ὅτι, φησί, καλὸν ἔστι τὸν μόνον εἶναι μόνον·
 5 μόνος δὲ καὶ καθ’ αὐτὸν εἷς ὢν ὁ θεός, οὐδὲν δὲ ὅμοιον θεῷ· ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ τὸ μόνον εἶναι τὸν ὄντα καλὸν ἔστι — καὶ γὰρ περὶ μόνον αὐτὸν τὸ καλόν —, οὐκ ἂν εἶη καλὸν τὸ εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον μόνον. τὸ δὲ μόνον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν ἔστι μὲν ἐκδέξασθαι καὶ οὕτως, ὅτι οὔτε πρὸ γενέσεως ἦν τι σὺν τῷ θεῷ οὔτε κόσμου γενο-
 10 μένου συντάττεται τι αὐτῷ· χρῆζει γὰρ οὐδενὸς τὸ παράπαν. ἀμείνων δὲ ἦδε ἡ ἐκδοχή· ὁ θεὸς μόνος ἔστι καὶ ἕν, οὐ σύγκριμα, φύσις ἀπλῆ, ἡμῶν δ’ ἕκαστος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γέγονε πολλά· οἷον ἐγὼ πολλά εἰμι, ψυχὴ σῶμα, καὶ ψυχῆς ἄλογον λογικόν, πάλιν σώματος θερμὸν ψυχρὸν βαρὺ κοῦφον ξηρὸν ὑγρόν· ὁ δὲ θεὸς οὐ σύγκριμα οὐδὲ ἐκ πολλῶν συνεστώς, ἀλλ’ ἀμιγῆς ἅλῳ· ὁ γὰρ ἂν
 15 προσκριθῇ θεῷ, ἢ κρείσσον ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ἢ ἔλασσον ἢ ἴσον αὐτῷ· οὔτε δὲ ἴσον οὔτε κρείσσον ἔστι θεοῦ, ἔλασσον γὰρ μὴν οὐδὲν αὐτῷ προσκρίνεται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐλαττωθήσεται· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ φθαρτὸς ἔσται, ὅπερ οὐδὲ θέμις νοῆσαι. τέτακται οὖν ὁ θεὸς κατὰ τὸ ἕν καὶ τὴν μονάδα, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡ μονὰς
 20 κατὰ τὸν ἕνα θεόν· πᾶς γὰρ ἀριθμὸς νεώτερος κόσμου, ὡς καὶ χρόνος, ὁ δὲ θεὸς πρεσβύτερος κόσμου καὶ δημιουργός.

¹ For the sense of this Stoic term see *supra*, under nr. 999b.

God alone
is really

1292—God alone has veritable being. Hence, His virtue alone is real virtue.

Philo, *Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 44, 160 (C.W. I, p. 294, l. 19):

Τῶν γὰρ ἀρετῶν ἡ μὲν θεοῦ πρὸς ἀλήθειάν ἐστι κατὰ τὸ εἶναι συνεστῶσα, ἐπεὶ 20
καὶ ὁ θεὸς μόνος ἐν τῷ εἶναι ὑφέστηκεν· οὗ χάριν ἀναγκαίως ἐρεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ·
“ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ ὢν” (*Exod.* 3, 14), ὡς τῶν μετ’ αὐτὸν οὐκ ὄντων κατὰ τὸ εἶναι,
δόξη δὲ μόνον ὑφεστάναι νομιζομένων· ἡ δὲ Μωυσέως σκηνὴ συμβολικῶς
οὕσα ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ κλήσεως, οὐχ ὑπάρξεως, ἀξιωθήσεται, μίμημα καὶ
ἀπεικόνισμα τῆς θείας ἐκείνης ὑπάρχουσα.

25

Creation of
the intelli-
gible world

1293—First, God created the intelligible world, as a perfect and God-like pattern for the creation of material things.

a. Philo, *De opif. mundi* 4, 16 (C.W. I, p. 4-5):

Προλαβὼν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἅτε θεὸς ὅτι μίμημα καλὸν οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο δίχα
καλοῦ παραδείγματος οὐδέ τι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀνυπαίτιον, ὃ μὴ πρὸς ἀρχέτυπον
καὶ νοητὴν ἰδέαν ἀπεικονίσθη, βουλευθεὶς τὸν ὁρατὸν κόσμον τουτονὶ δημιουρ-
γῆσαι προεξετύπου τὸν νοητὸν, ἵνα χρώμενος ἀσωμάτῳ καὶ θεοειδεστάτῳ
παραδείγματι τὸν σωματικὸν ἀπεργάσθαι, πρεσβυτέρου νεώτερον ἀπεικόνισμα, 5
τοσαῦτα περιέξοντα αἰσθητὰ γένη ὅσαπερ ἐν ἐκείνῳ νοητά.

The intelli-
gible World
is in the
divine Mind

b. The intelligible world has no other location than the divine Mind.

Ib., 4, 17 - 5, 20 (C.W. I, p. 5-6):

Τὸν δ’ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν συνεστῶτα κόσμον ἐν τόπῳ τινὶ λέγειν ἢ ὑπονοεῖν οὐ
θεμιτόν· ἢ δὲ συνέστηκεν, εἰσόμεθα παρακολουθήσαντες εἰκόνι τινὶ τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν.
ἐπειδὴν πόλις κτίζεται κατὰ πολλὴν φιλοτιμίαν βασιλέως ἢ τινος ἡγεμόνος 10
αὐτοκρατοῦς ἐξουσίας μεταποιουμένου καὶ ἅμα τὸ φρόνημα λαμπροῦ τὴν
εὐτυχίαν συνεπικοσμοῦντος, παρελθὼν ἔστιν ὅτε τις τῶν ἀπὸ παιδείας ἀνὴρ
ἀρχιτεκτονικὸς καὶ τὴν εὐκρασίαν καὶ εὐκαιρίαν τοῦ τόπου θεασάμενος δια-
γράφει πρῶτον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ τῆς μελλούσης ἀποτελεῖσθαι πόλεως μέρη σχεδὸν
ἅπαντα, ἱερὰ γυμνάσια πρυτανεῖα ἀγορὰς λιμένας νεωσοίκους στενωπούς, 15
τειχῶν κατασκευάς, ἰδρύσεις οἰκιῶν καὶ δημοσίων ἄλλων οἰκοδομημάτων· εἰθ’
ὥσπερ ἐν κηρῷ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ τοὺς ἐκάστων δεξάμενος τύπους ἀγαλματοφορεῖ
νοητὴν πόλιν, ἥς ἀνακινήσας τὰ εἰδῶλα μνήμῃ τῇ συμφύτῳ καὶ τοὺς χαρακ-
τῆρας ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐνσφραγισάμενος, οἷα δημιουργὸς ἀγαθός, ἀποβλέπων εἰς 1
τὸ παράδειγμα τὴν ἐκ λίθων καὶ ξύλων ἄρχεται κατασκευάζειν, ἐκάστη τῶν
ἀσωμάτων ἰδεῶν τὰς σωματικὰς ἐξομοιῶν οὐσίας. τὰ παραπλήσια δὲ καὶ περὶ
θεοῦ δοξαστέον, ὡς ἄρα τὴν μεγαλόπολιν κτίζειν διανοηθεὶς ἐνενόησε πρότερον 5
τοὺς τύπους αὐτῆς, ἐξ ὧν κόσμον νοητὸν συστησάμενος ἀπετέλει καὶ τὸν

αἰσθητὸν παραδείγματι χρώμενος ἐκείνῳ. καθάπερ οὖν ἡ ἐν τῷ ἀρχιτεκτονικῷ
 προδιατυπωθεῖσα πόλις χώραν ἐκτὸς οὐκ εἶχεν, ἀλλ' ἐνεσφράγιστο τῇ τοῦ
 τεχνίτου ψυχῇ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδ' ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν κόσμος ἄλλον ἂν ἔχοι
 10 τὸν τρόπον ἢ τὸν θεῖον λόγον τὸν ταῦτα διακοσμήσαντα.

c. To put it in a simpler form, it is nothing else than the Word of God, when already engaged in the act of creation.

**It is the
divine Mind
or Logos**

Ib. 6, 24 (C.W. I, p. 7):

11 Εἰ δέ τις ἐβελήσειε γυμνοτέροις χρήσασθαι τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἕτερον
 εἴποι τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον εἶναι ἢ τοῦ λόγον ἤδη κοσμοποιούντος· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 ἡ νοητὴ πόλις ἕτερόν τί ἐστιν ἢ ὁ τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος λογισμὸς ἡδη τὴν [νοητὴν]
 πόλιν κτίζειν διανοουμένου.

d. That such is really Moses' doctrine and not his own interpretation is concluded by Philo from *Genesis* I 27.

**This doctrine
inferred from
Gen. I 27**

Philo, *De opif. mundi* 6, 25 (C.W. I, p. 7-8):

15 Τὸ δὲ δόγμα τοῦτο Μωυσέως ἐστίν, οὐκ ἐμόν· τὴν γοῦν ἀνθρώπου γένεσιν
 ἀναγράφων ἐν τοῖς ἔπειτα διαρρήδην ὁμολογεῖ, ὡς ἄρα κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ διετυ-
 1 πάθη (*Gen.* I, 27). εἰ δὲ τὸ μέρος εἰκὼν εἰκόνας [δῆλον ὅτι] καὶ τὸ ὅλον εἶδος,
 σύμπας οὗτος ὁ αἰσθητὸς κόσμος, εἰ μείζων τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἐστίν, μίμημα
 θείας εἰκόνας, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρχέτυπος σφραγίς, ὃν φαμεν νοητὸν εἶναι κόσμον,
 αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη [τὸ παράδειγμα, ἀρχέτυπος ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν] ὁ θεοῦ λόγος.

1294—In *De special. legibus* I 6, 45-48 (C.W. V, p. 11-12) Ph. identifies the Platonic Ideas with the scriptural *powers* of God.

**The Ideas
identified
with the
Powers of
God**

In *Exod.* 33, 13 Moses prays God: "Reveal Thyself to me", and again, on having been answered that such knowledge is impossible to man, he prays (v. 18): "I beseech Thee that I may at least see the glory that surrounds Thee"; and this he explains as "the powers that keep guard around God".

Ἰκετεύω δὲ τὴν γοῦν περὶ σὲ δόξαν θεάσασθαι (*Exod.* 33, 18)· δόξαν δὲ
 20 σὴν εἶναι νομίζω τὰς περὶ σὲ δορυφορούσας δυνάμεις. —

Ἄς ἐπιζητεῖς δυνάμεις εἰσὶν ἀόρατοι καὶ νοηταὶ
 πάντως ἐμοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου καὶ νοητοῦ· λέγω δὲ νοητάς οὐχὶ τὰς ἡδη ὑπὸ νοῦ
 1 καταλαμβανόμενας¹, ἀλλ' ὅτι εἰ καταλαμβάνεσθαι οἶαι τε εἶεν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσθησις

¹ Modern interpreters seem to find difficulties in the formula τὰς ἡδη ὑπὸ νοῦ καταλαμβανόμενας and suggest that the text is corrupt (Heinemann, Colson). I think it is correct and means simply: "By intelligible I do not mean those which are actually apprehended by mind", i.e. not directly all our "notions" or "concepts".

αὐτὰς ἄλλ' ἀκραιφνέστατος νοῦς καταλαμβάνοι. πεφυκυῖαι δ' ἀκατάληπτοι κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὁμῶς παραφαίνουσιν ἐκμαγεῖόν τι καὶ ἀπεικόνισμα τῆς ἐαυτῶν ἐνεργείας· οἷαι αἱ παρ' ὑμῖν σφραγίδες — ὅταν <γάρ> προσενεχθῇ κηρὸς ἢ 5 τις ὁμοιότροπος ὕλη, μυρίους ὅσους τύπους ἐναπομάττονται, μηδὲν ἀκρωτηριασθεῖσαι μέρος, ἀλλ' ἐν ὁμοίᾳ μένουσαι —, τοιαύτας ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὰς περὶ ἐμὲ δυνάμεις περιποιούσας ἀποίοις ποιότητος καὶ μορφᾶς ἀμόρφους καὶ μηδὲν τῆς αἰδίου φύσεως μήτ' ἀλλαττομένας μήτε μειουμένας. ὀνομάζουσι δ' αὐτὰς οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ τινες τῶν παρ' ὑμῖν ιδέας, ἐπειδὴ ἕκαστα τῶν ὄντων 10 εἰδοποιούσι τὰ ἄτακτα τάττουςαι καὶ τὰ ἄπειρα καὶ ἀόριστα καὶ ἀσχημάτιστα περατοῦσαι καὶ περιορίζουσαι καὶ σχηματίζουσαι καὶ συνόλως τὸ χεῖρον εἰς τὸ ἄμεινον μεθαρμοζόμεναι.

The identification of the *glory* of God with the *powers* that stand around Him was suggested to Philo by the Septuagint translation of the Hebrew expression *Jahweh sabaoth* by κύριος τῶν δυνάμεων in such well-known verses as Ps. 24, 9-10.

**Creation of
the intelli-
gible world**

1295—First, then, God created an intelligible heaven and earth.

a. *De opif. mundi*, 7, 29 (C.W. I, p. 9):

Πρῶτον οὖν ὁ ποιῶν ἐποίησεν οὐρανὸν ἀσώματον καὶ γῆν ἀόρατον καὶ ἀέρος 5 ιδέαν καὶ κενοῦ· ὦν τὸ μὲν ἐπεφήμισε σκότος, ἐπειδὴ μέλας ὁ ἀήρ τῇ φύσει, τὴν δ' ἄβυσσον, πολύβυθον γὰρ τό γε κενὸν καὶ ἀχανές· εἴθ' ὕδατος ἀσώματον οὐσίαν καὶ πνεύματος καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐβδόμου φωτός, ὃ πάλιν ἀσώματον ἦν καὶ νοητὸν ἡλίου παράδειγμα καὶ πάντων ὅσα φωσφόρα ἄστρα κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἔμελλε συνίστασθαι.

b. The invisible Light was an image of the Divine Logos.

Ib., 8, 31 (C.W. I, p. 9):

Τὸ δὲ ἀόρατον καὶ νοητὸν φῶς ἐκεῖνο θεοῦ λόγου γέγονεν εἰκῶν.

15

**The creation
of man**

1296—After all the rest, man is created in the image of God and in His likeness.

a. *De opif. mundi* 23, 69 (C.W. I, p. 23):

Μετὰ δὴ τᾶλλα πάντα, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη, τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν φησι γεγενῆσθαι κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν (*Gen.* I, 26)· πάνυ καλῶς, ἐμφερέστερον γὰρ οὐδὲν γηγενὲς ἀνθρώπου θεῶ, τὴν δ' ἐμφέρειαν μηδεὶς εἰκαζέτω σώματος 5 χαρακτῆρι· οὔτε γὰρ ἀνθρωπόμορφος ὁ θεὸς οὔτε θεοειδὲς τὸ ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα. ἡ δὲ εἰκὼν λέλεκται κατὰ τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμόνα νοῦν. πρὸς γὰρ ἕνα τὸν τῶν ὄλων ἐκεῖνον ὡς ἂν ἀρχέτυπον ὃ ἐν ἐκάστῳ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀπεικονίσθη, τρόπον τινὰ θεὸς ὦν τοῦ φέροντος καὶ ἀγαλματοφοροῦντος αὐτόν· ὃν γὰρ ἔχει

10 λόγον ὁ μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ κόσμῳ, τοῦτον ὡς ἔοικε καὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ.

Here again Ph. follows Plato's pattern in the *Timaeus*, where first the world-soul was created, next the world and the heavenly bodies, and only after these the soul of man.

b. Man thus created in God's image, however, is not the concrete composed by soul and body, but an "intelligible" man, an "idea" or "type" or "seal". The spiritual man is created after God's image

Ib. 46, 134 (C.W. I, p. 46):

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτά φησιν ὅτι "ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν λαβὼν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς" (*Gen.* 2, 7).
 15 ἐναργέστατα καὶ διὰ τούτου παρίστησι ὅτι διαφορὰ παμμεγέθους ἐστὶ τοῦ τε νῦν πλασθέντος ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονότος πρότερον· ὁ μὲν διαπλασθεὶς αἰσθητὸς ἤδη μετέχων ποιότητος, ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς συνεστώς, ἀνὴρ ἢ γυνή, φύσει θνητός· ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα ἰδέα τις ἢ γένος ἢ σφραγίς, νοητός, ἀσώματος, οὐτ' ἄρρεν οὔτε θῆλυ, ἀφθαρτος φύσει.

c. The concrete and individual man is composite, half material half spiritual, half mortal half immortal.

Ib. 46, 135 (C.W. I, p. 46-47):

20 Τοῦ δ' αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀνθρώπου τὴν κατασκευὴν σύνθετον εἶναι φησιν ἕκ τε γεώδους οὐσίας καὶ πνεύματος θείου· γεγενῆσθαι γὰρ τὸ μὲν σῶμα χοῦν τοῦ τεχνίτου λαβόντος καὶ μορφήν ἀνθρωπίνην ἐξ αὐτοῦ διαπλάσαντος, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἀπ' οὐδενὸς γενητοῦ τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ ἡγε-
 5 μόνος τῶν πάντων· ὁ γὰρ ἐνεφύσησεν, οὐδὲν ἦν ἕτερον ἢ πνεῦμα θεῖον ἀπὸ τῆς μακαρίας καὶ εὐδαίμονος φύσεως ἐκείνης ἀποικίαν τὴν ἐνθαδὲ στειλάμενον ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ τοῦ γένους ἡμῶν, ἵν' εἰ καὶ θνητὸν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ὁρατὴν μερίδα, κατὰ χοῦν τὴν ἀόρατον ἀθανατίζηται. διὸ καὶ κυρίως ἂν τις εἴποι τὸν ἄνθρωπον θνητῆς καὶ ἀθανάτου φύσεως εἶναι μεθόριον ἑκατέρας ὅσον ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι
 10 μετέχοντα καὶ γεγενῆσθαι θνητὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀθάνατον, θνητὸν μὲν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀθάνατον.

1297—The problem of evil is dealt with by Ph. after the creation of the *spiritual* man; for vice and virtue have their dwelling-place in mind and reason. Ph. solves it in the same way as Plato did: since God cannot be the Creator of any kind of evil, he ascribes vice in man to subordinate fellow-workers of the Creator. The problem of evil

a. Philo, *De opif. mundi* 24, 72-75 (C.W. I, p. 24-25):

Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ, τί δήποτε τὴν ἀνθρώπου μόνου γένεσιν οὐχ ἐνὶ δημιουργῷ καθάπερ τᾶλλα ἀνέθηκεν, ἀλλ' ὥσανει πλείοσιν· εἰσάγει γὰρ τὸν πατέρα τῶν ὄλων ταυτὶ λέγοντα· “ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν”. μὴ γὰρ χρεῖός ἐστιν, εἴποιμ' ἂν, οὐτινοσοῦν, ὥ 15 πάντα ὑπήκοα; ἢ τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν ἡνίκα ἐποίει καὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὴν θάλατταν, οὐδενὸς ἐδεήθη τοῦ συνεργήσοντος, ἄνθρωπον δὲ βραχὺ ζῶον οὕτως καὶ ἐπικηρον οὐχ οἷός τε ἦν διχα συμπράξεως ἐτέρων αὐτὸς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ κατασκευάσασθαι; τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀληθεστάτην αἰτίαν θεὸν ἀνάγκη μόνον εἶδέναι, τὴν δ' εἰκότι στοχασμῷ πιθανὴν καὶ εὐλογον εἶναι δοκοῦσαν οὐκ ἀποκρυπτέον. ἔστι 20 δὲ ἥδε. τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν οὐτ' ἀρετῆς οὔτε κακίας μετέχει, ὥσπερ φυτὰ καὶ ζῶα ἄλογα, τὰ μὲν ὅτι ἄψυχά τε ἐστὶ καὶ ἀφαντάστῳ φύσει διοικεῖται, τὰ δ' ὅτι νοῦν καὶ λόγον ἐκτέμνεται· κακίας δὲ καὶ ἀρετῆς ὡς ἂν οἶκος νοῦς καὶ λόγος, 1 ὥ πεφύκασιν ἐνδiciaτᾶσθαι· τὰ δ' αὖ μόνης κεκοινώνηκεν ἀρετῆς ἀμέτοχα πάσης ὄντα κακίας, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀστέρες· οὗτοι γὰρ ζῶα τε εἶναι λέγονται καὶ ζῶα νοερά, μᾶλλον δὲ νοῦς αὐτὸς ἕκαστος, ὅλος δι' ὄλων σπουδαῖος καὶ παντὸς ἀνεπίδεκτος κακοῦ· τὰ δὲ τῆς μικτῆς ἐστὶ φύσεως, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος, ὃς ἐπι- 5 δέχεται τάναντία, φρόνησιν καὶ ἀφροσύνην, σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀκολασίαν, ἀνδρείαν καὶ δειλίαν, δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀδικίαν, καὶ συνελόντι φράσαι ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ, καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρά, ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν. τῷ δὲ πάντων πατρὶ θεῷ τὰ μὲν σπουδαῖα δι' αὐτοῦ μόνου ποιεῖν οἰκειότατον ἦν ἕνεκα τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν συγγενείας, τὰ δὲ 10 ἀδιάφορα οὐκ ἀλλότριον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐχθρᾶς αὐτῷ κακίας ἀμοιρεῖ, τὰ δὲ μικτὰ τῇ μὲν οἰκεῖον τῇ δ' ἀνοίκειον, οἰκεῖον μὲν ἕνεκα τῆς ἀνακεκραμένης βελτίονος ἰδέας, ἀνοίκειον δ' ἕνεκα τῆς ἐναντίας καὶ χείρονος. διὰ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ μόνης τῆς ἀνθρώπου γενέσεώς φησιν ὅτι εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς “ποιήσωμεν”, ὅπερ ἐμφαίνει συμπράληψιν ἐτέρων ὡς ἂν συνεργῶν, ἵνα ταῖς μὲν ἀνεπιλήπτοις 20 βουλαῖς τε καὶ πράξεσιν ἀνθρώπου κατορθοῦντος ἐπιγράφῃται θεὸς ὁ πάντων ἡγεμών, ταῖς δ' ἐναντίαις ἕτεροι τῶν ὑπήκόων· ἔδει γὰρ ἀναίτιον εἶναι κακοῦ τὸν πατέρα τοῖς ἐκγόνοις· κακὸν δ' ἢ κακία καὶ αἱ κατὰ κακίαν ἐνέργειαι.

b. Cp. Philo, *De fuga et inventione* 13, 67-68 (C.W. III, p. 124):

Τὰ μὲν γὰρ πρεσβύτερα ἀγαθὰ, οἷς ἡ ψυχὴ τρέφεται, ἀνέθηκε θεῷ, τὰ δὲ νεώτερα ὅσα ἐκ φυγῆς ἀμαρτημάτων περιγίνεται, θεράποντι θεοῦ. διὰ τοῦτ', οἶμαι, καὶ ἡνίκα τὰ τῆς κοσμοποιίας ἐφιλοσόφει, πάντα τᾶλλα εἰπὼν ὑπὸ θεοῦ 20 γενέσθαι μόνον τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὡς ἂν μετὰ συνεργῶν ἐτέρων ἐδήλωσε διαπλασθέντα.

In Plato's *Timaeus* 41d-42e only the soul of man is made by the Demiurge and by Him alone, while the body is made by the “created gods”, i.e. the astral Spirits (supra, nrs. 353-354).

1298—Nevertheless, the soul of man is said by Ph. to be a copy of the Divine Logos and therefore, in the first man at least, perfect. The soul a copy of the Logos

Philo, *De opif. mundi* 48, 139 (C.W. I, p. 48-49):

“Οτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἄριστος ἦν, φανερόν· οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἐτέρῳ παραδείγματι τῶν ἐν γενέσει πρὸς τὴν κατασκευὴν αὐτῆς ἔοικε χρήσασθαι, μόνῳ δ’ ὡς εἶπον τῷ
 15 ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ. διὸ φησιν ἀπεικόνισμα καὶ μίμημα γεγενῆσθαι τούτου τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐμπνευσθέντα εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον, ἔνθα τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὁ τόπος, αἷς τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἐψύχωσεν ὁ δημιουργός, τὸν δὲ βασιλέα λογισμὸν ἐνιδρυσάμενος τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ παρέδωκε δορυφορεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς χρωμάτων καὶ φωνῶν χυλῶν τε αὖ καὶ ἀτμῶν καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων ἀντιλήψεις, ἃς ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως δι’
 1 αὐτοῦ μόνου καταλαβεῖν οὐχ οἷός τε ἦν. ἀνάγκη δὲ παγκάλου παραδείγματος πάγκαλον εἶναι τὸ μίμημα. θεοῦ δὲ λόγος καὶ αὐτοῦ κάλλους, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ φύσει κάλλος, ἀμείνων, οὐ κοσμούμενος κάλλει, κόσμος δ’ αὐτός, εἰ δεῖ τάληθές εἰπεῖν, εὐπρεπέστατος ἐκείνου.

1299—The term *Logos* is used by Philo in different meanings.

a. First, he knows a *transcendent Logos*, which is the divine Mind, whose powers are infinite, as is said for instance in *De sacrif. Abelis et Caini* 15, 59 (C.W. I, p. 226): The term Logos used in different senses

3 Ἀπερίγραφος γὰρ ὁ θεός, ἀπερίγραφοι δὲ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ.

b. The Ideas, which God conceived as the pattern of the world to be created, are therefore said to have their place *within* the *Divine Logos* (*Opif.* 5, 20; supra, **1293b** the end), whose boundless powers are only limited by the capacity of the creation. 1. The Logos uncreated and eternal

Philo, *Opif.* 6, 23 (C.W. I, p. 7):

2 — μόνῳ δὲ αὐτῷ χρησάμενος ὁ θεὸς ἔγνω δεῖν εὐεργετεῖν ἀταμιεύτοις καὶ πλουσίαις χάρισι.

5 — Ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος εὐεργετεῖ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ χαρίτων — ἀπερίγραφοι γὰρ αὐταὶ γε καὶ ἀτελεύτητοι —, πρὸς δὲ τὰς τῶν εὐεργετουμένων δυνάμεις· οὐ γὰρ ὡς πέφυκεν ὁ θεὸς εὖ ποιεῖν, οὕτως καὶ τὸ γινόμενον εὖ πάσχειν, ἐπεὶ τοῦ μὲν αἱ δυνάμεις ὑπερβάλλουσι, τὸ δ’ ἀσθενέστερον ὃν ἢ ὥστε δέξασθαι
 10 τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν ἀπεῖπεν ἄν, εἰ μὴ διεμετρήσατο σταθμισάμενος εὐαρμότως ἐκάστω τὸ ἐπιβάλλον.

In this sense then the Logos is uncreated and eternal.

Wolfson I, p. 210 and 223, described it rightly by saying that, before God conceived the κόσμος τῶν ἰδεῶν which served as a pattern of the things of the world to be created, there existed from eternity an infinite variety of Ideas in the Mind of God. The limited κόσμος τῶν ἰδεῶν however, conceived “at a certain

moment" by God when He is going to create the world, is according to Wolfson's account still uncreated, but not eternal. It should be noticed, however, that Ph. explains even creation as an act of the divine Mind *before time comes in*; χρόνος γὰρ οὐκ ἦν πρὸ κόσμου (*Opif.* 7, 26).

Therefore, also his κόσμος τῶν ἰδεῶν before the creation must certainly be considered as eternal.

2. The
transcendent
Logos
created

1300—a. The κόσμος νοητός, then, is created by God to an existence, as it seems, outside His thoughts.

Philo, *Opif.* 7, 29 (supra, **1295a**).

b. This creation is explained by Ph. explicitly as not being an event in time.

but not in
time

Philo, *Opif.* 7, 26 (C.W. I, p. 8):

Φησὶ δ' ὥς "ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν", τὴν ἀρχὴν 5 παραλαμβάνων οὐχ ὥς οἴονταί τινες τὴν κατὰ χρόνον· χρόνος γὰρ οὐκ ἦν πρὸ κόσμου, ἀλλ' ἡ σὺν αὐτῷ γέγονεν ἡ μετ' αὐτόν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεώς ¹ ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος, προτέρα δὲ τοῦ κινουμένου κίνησις οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὴν ἢ ὕστερον ἢ ἅμα συνίστασθαι, ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα 10 καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἢ ἰσῆλικά κόσμου γεγενῆσθαι ἢ νεώτερον ἐκείνου· πρεσβύτερον δ' ἀποφαίνεσθαι τολμᾷ ἀφιλόσοφον.

Also the "created Logos" in Philo's sense must therefore be regarded as eternal.

The Logos
described as
rays of light

c. The created κόσμος νοητός is also described as myriads of rays of light poured forth by God as "the archetypal Light".

Philo, *De cherubim* 28, 97 (C.W. I, p. 193-194):

(God is His own light).

Ὁ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος ὀφθαλμὸς φωτὸς ἐτέρου πρὸς κατάληψιν οὐ δεῖται, αὐτὸς 25 δ' ὢν ἀρχέτυπος αὐγὴ μυρίας ἀκτίνας ἐκβάλλει, ὧν οὐδεμία ἐστὶν αἰσθητή, νοηταὶ δ' ἅπασαι· παρὸ καὶ μόνος ὁ νοητὸς θεὸς αὐταῖς χρῆται, τῶν δὲ γενέσεως 1 μεμοιραμένων οὐδεὶς· αἰσθητὸν γὰρ τὸ γενόμενον, αἰσθήσει δὲ ἀκατάληπτος ἡ νοητὴ φύσις.

Three centuries later the great Athanasius will use the simile of rays of light poured forth by God to illustrate that the Word or "Son" is of the substance of the Father and therefore uncreated (*Or. c. Arianos* I 28, II 33, II 34, III 4, III 5, III 13 (the end), III 36, IV 10). The fact that Philo did not distinguish between "generation" and "creation" gave rise to theological difficulties; for the "created" (transcendent) Logos is called by him God, but in the sense of a δεύτερος θεός subordinate to the πρῶτος Θεός. See our next nr.

Intermediate
place of the
created
Logos

1301—The created Logos occupies an intermediate place between God and the world.

¹ This is Chrysippus' definition of time (Stob. Ecl. I, p. 106, 5 W.; SVF II 509 ff.).

a. Philo, *Leg. alleg.* III 61, 175 - 62, 177 (C.W. I, p. 151 f.):

30 'Ο λόγος δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ ὑπεράνω παντός ἐστι τοῦ κόσμου καὶ πρεσβύτατος καὶ γενικώτατος τῶν ὅσα γέγονεν. —

'Ο δὲ Ἰακώβ καὶ τὸν λόγον ὑπερκύψας ὑπ' αὐτοῦ φησι τρέφεσθαι τοῦ θεοῦ,
10 λέγει δ' οὕτως· "ὁ θεός, ᾧ εὐηρέστησαν οἱ πατέρες μου Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσαάκ, ὁ θεός ὁ τρέφων με ἐκ νεότητος ἕως τῆς ἡμέρας ταύτης, ὁ ἄγγελος ὁ ῥυθιζόμενός με ἐκ πάντων τῶν κακῶν, εὐλογῆσαι τὰ παιδία ταῦτα" (*Gen.* 48, 15, 16). ὥραϊος οὗτος ὁ τρόπος· τροφέα τὸν θεόν, οὐχὶ λόγον, ἡγεῖται, τὸν δὲ ἄγγελον, ὅς ἐστι λόγος, ὥσπερ ἱατρὸν κακῶν· φυσικώτατα· ἀρέσκει γὰρ αὐτῷ
15 τὰ μὲν προηγουμένα ἀγαθὰ αὐτοπροσώπως αὐτὸν τὸν ὄντα διδόναι, τὰ δεύτερα δὲ τοὺς ἀγγέλους καὶ λόγους αὐτοῦ· δεύτερα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα περιέχει κακῶν ἀπαλλαγὴν.

Cp. also *Leg. alleg.* II 21, 86:

Τὸ δὲ γενικώτατόν ἐστιν ὁ θεός, καὶ δεύτερος ὁ Θεοῦ Λόγος.

b. The created Logos is called *God* by Philo, but without the article.

It is called
Θεός,
but not
ὁ Θεός

Philo, *De somniis* I 39, 227-229 (C.W. III, p. 253 f.):

The angel of Jahweh spoke to Jacob in his dream:

20 "Ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ θεός ὁ ὀφθεῖς σοι ἐν τόπῳ θεοῦ" (*Gen.* 31, 13) ¹. πάγκαλόν γε αὐχμημα ψυχῇ, τὸ ἀξιοῦν θεὸν ἐπιφαίνεσθαι καὶ ἐνομιλεῖν αὐτῇ. μὴ παρέλθης δὲ τὸ εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάσον, εἰ τῷ ὄντι δύο εἰσὶ θεοί· λέγεται γὰρ ὅτι "Ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ θεός ὁ ὀφθεῖς σοι", οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ ἐμῷ, ἀλλ' "ἐν τόπῳ θεοῦ",
25 ὡς ἂν ἐτέρου. τί οὖν χρὴ λέγειν; ὁ μὲν ἀληθεὶς θεός εἷς ἐστίν, οἱ δ' ἐν καταχρήσει λεγόμενοι πλείους. διὸ καὶ ὁ ἱερὸς λόγος ἐν τῷ παρόντι τὸν μὲν ἀληθεῖα διὰ
1 τοῦ ἄρθρου μεμήνυκεν εἰπών· "Ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ θεός", τὸν δ' ἐν καταχρήσει χωρὶς ἄρθρου φάσκων· "ὁ ὀφθεῖς σοι ἐν τόπῳ", οὐ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ μόνον "θεοῦ". καλεῖ δὲ θεὸν τὸν πρεσβύτατον αὐτοῦ νυνὶ λόγον.

c. He is also called *the elder Son of God*, while the visible world is called His younger Son.

Also
„the elder
Son of God”

Philo, *Quod Deus sit immutabilis* 6, 31 (C. W. II, p. 63):

6 'Ο μὲν γὰρ κόσμος οὗτος νεώτερος υἱὸς θεοῦ, ἅτε αἰσθητὸς ὢν· τὸν γὰρ πρεσβύτερον [οὐδένα εἶπε] — νοητὸς δ' ἐκεῖνος — πρεσβείων ἀξιώσας παρ' ἑαυτῷ καταμένειν διανοήθη.

1302—The Ideas, after having served as patterns on which God modelled the world, were introduced by Him into the world to act within
3. The Logos
as the Law
immanent
in nature

¹ The formula of the Septuagint version ἐν τόπῳ θεοῦ is a translation of the Hebrew word *Bethel*.

Sensible
things bear
an impress
of „the
archetypal
seal”

as the immutable laws of nature. See above, nr. 1293d, where the κόσμος αἰσθητός is called “a copy of a divine image”, sc. of the created but transcendent κόσμος νοητός, which in this very passage is also called “the archetypal seal”.

a. Philo, *De fuga et inventione* 2, 12 (C.W. III, p. 112):

Γέγονε τε γὰρ ὁ κόσμος καὶ πάντως ὑπ’ αἰτίου τινὸς γέγονεν· ὁ δὲ τοῦ ποιοῦντος λόγος αὐτός ἐστιν ἡ σφραγίς, ἥ τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον μεμόρφωται· παρὸ καὶ τέλειον τοῖς γινομένοις ἐξ ἀρχῆς παρακολουθεῖ τὸ εἶδος, ἅτε ἔκμα- 15 γεῖον καὶ εἰκὼν τελείου λόγου.

Cp. later, in Athanasius, *Or. c. Arianos* II 79:

Αὕτη ἡ δημιουργὸς καὶ ἀληθινὴ Σοφία, ἥς τύπος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐν κόσμῳ ἐκχυθεῖσα σοφία . . . ἡ ἐγκτιζομένη τοῖς ἔργοις (i.e. in things created).

b. Cp. *De mutatione nominum* 23, 135 (C.W. III, p. 179), where “the seal of the universe, the archetypal Idea” appears on a level with “the world-order, the chain of destiny, the correspondence and sequence of all things”.

Εἰμαρμένη Tamar says: “To whomsoever these things belong, of him I bear a child”.

Τίνος ὁ δακτύλιος, ἡ πίστις¹, ἡ τῶν ὅλων σφραγίς, ἡ ἀρχέτυπος ἰδέα, 20 ἥ τὰ πάντ’ ἀνειδέα ὄντα καὶ ἄποια σημειωθέντα ἐτυπώθη; τίνος δὲ καὶ <ὁ> ὁρμίσκος, ἡ [ὁ κόσμος] εἰμαρμένη, ἀκολουθία καὶ ἀναλογία τῶν συμπάντων εἰρμόν ἔχουσα ἀδιάλυτον;

Cp. what has been said above of the Stoic notion of εἰμαρμένη and of cosmic sympathy.

The
immutable
laws of
nature

c. The immutable laws of nature are mentioned e.g. in *De opif. mundi* 19, 61 (C.W. I, p. 20):

Εἰς τοσαύτας καὶ οὕτως ἀναγκαίας διατείνουσιν ὠφελείας αἱ τῶν κατ’ οὐρανὸν φύσεις τε καὶ κινήσεις ἀστέρων· εἰς πόσα δ’ ἄλλα φαῖνεν ἂν ἔγωγε τῶν ἡμῶν μὲν ἀδηλουμένων — οὐ γὰρ πάντα τῷ θνητῷ γένει γνώριμα — πρὸς δὲ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου συνεργούντων διαμονήν, ἃ θεσμοῖς καὶ νόμοις, οὓς ὥρισεν ὁ θεὸς ἀκινήτους ἐν τῷ παντί, συμβαίνει πάντη τε καὶ πάντως ἐπιτελεῖσθαι.

Cp. also *De special. legibus* IV 14, 232 (C.W. V, p. 263):

Πάντα ἰσότης τὰ τε κατ’ οὐρανὸν καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς εὖ διατάξατο νόμοις καὶ θεσμοῖς ἀκινήτοις.

The cyclical
motion of
the Logos

d. Even the Stoic idea of the cyclical motion of the universal order appears in Philo, *Quod Deus sit immutabilis* 36, 176 (C.W. II, p. 92):

¹ “The pledge of faith”.

Χορεύει γὰρ ἐν κύκλῳ λόγος ὁ θεῖος, ὃν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀνομάζουσι
τύχην· εἴτα ἀεὶ βέων κατὰ πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη καὶ χώρας τὰ ἄλλων ἄλλοις καὶ
25 πᾶσι τὰ πάντων ἐπινέμει, χρόνοις αὐτὸ μόνον ἀλλάττων τὰ παρ' ἐκάστοις,
ἵνα ὡς μία πόλις ἡ οἰκουμένη πᾶσα τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτειῶν ἄγῃ δημοκρατίαν.

e. Ph. also calls "the divine Logos", which is the active element of Λόγος σπερ-
knowledge, both of the intellect and of the senses, σπερματικὸς καὶ ματικὸς καὶ
τεχνικός.

Philo, *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 24, 119 (C.W. III, p. 28):

Ὁ γὰρ διοιγνὺς τὴν μήτραν ἐκάστων, τοῦ μὲν νοῦ πρὸς τὰς νοητάς καταλή-
ψεις, τοῦ δὲ λόγου πρὸς τὰς διὰ φωνῆς ἐνεργείας, τῶν δὲ αἰσθήσεων πρὸς τὰς
ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐγγινομένας φαντασίας, τοῦ δὲ σώματος πρὸς τὰς οἰ-
10 κείους αὐτῷ σχέσεις τε καὶ κινήσεις ἀόρατος καὶ σπερματικὸς καὶ τεχνικός
θεῖός ἐστι λόγος.

In the *Legatio ad Gaium* 8, 55 (C.W. VI, p. 166) he speaks of λόγοι σπερματικοί.

1303—Ph., however, never identifies the immanent law of nature with God. He definitely opposed the Stoic identification of God with
Εἰμαρμένη and those astrological beliefs which rather generally were
connected with it. The imma-
nent law of
nature not
identified
with God

a. Philo, *De migratione Abr.* 32, 179-181 (C.W. II, p. 303):

10 Οὗτοι (sc. οἱ Χαλδαῖοι) τὸν φαινόμενον τοῦτον κόσμον ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν ὑπετό-
πησαν εἶναι μόνον, ἢ θεὸν ὄντα αὐτὸν ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ θεὸν περιέχοντα, τὴν τῶν
ὄλων ψυχὴν· εἰμαρμένην τε καὶ ἀνάγκην θεοπλαστήσαντες ἀσεβείας πολλῆς
κατέπλησαν τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον, ἀναδιδάξαντες ὡς δίχα τῶν φαινομένων
15 οὐδενός ἐστιν οὐδὲν αἷτιον τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ἀστέρων αἱ περίοδοι τὰ τε ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἐκάστω τῶν ὄντων ἀπονέ-
μουσι. Μωυσῆς μέντοι τῇ μὲν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι κοινωνία καὶ συμπαθεία τοῦ
παντὸς εἶκε συνεπιγράφεσθαι, ἕνα καὶ γεννητὸν ἀποφηνάμενος τὸν κόσμον
22 εἶναι . . . , τῇ δὲ περὶ θεοῦ δόξῃ διαφέρεισθαι· μήτε γὰρ τὸν κόσμον μήτε τὴν
τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν τὸν πρῶτον εἶναι θεὸν μηδὲ τοὺς ἀστέρας ἢ τὰς χορείας
25 αὐτῶν τὰ πρεσβύτατα τῶν συμβαινόντων ἀνθρώποις αἷτια, ἀλλὰ συνέχεσθαι
μὲν τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἀοράτοις δυνάμεσιν, ἃς ἀπὸ γῆς ἐσχάτων ἄχρις οὐρανοῦ
περάτων ὁ δημιουργὸς ἀπέτεινε, τοῦ μὴ ἀνεθῆναι τὰ δεθέντα καλῶς προμη-
θοῦμενος· δεσμοὶ γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις τοῦ παντὸς ἄρρηκτοι.

According to this passage the established world-order is maintained by spiritual beings, called "the powers". And these powers are, as Ph. says repeatedly, governed or conducted by the divine Logos.

b. Thus, the divine Logos is represented as the charioteer, conducting the powers, but commanded by God, who is seated in the chariot and gives directions to the charioteer.

The
charioteer
conducting
the powers

Philo, *De fuga et inventione* 19, 101 (C.W. III, p. 132):

‘Ο δ’ ὑπεράνω τούτων λόγος θεῖος εἰς ὁρατὴν οὐκ ἦλθεν ιδέαν, ἅτε μηδενὶ 5
τῶν κατ’ αἰσθησιν ἐμφορῆς ὢν, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς εἰκὼν ὑπάρχων θεοῦ, τῶν νοητῶν
ἅπαξ ἀπάντων ὁ πρεσβύτατος, ὁ ἐγγυτάτω, μηδενὸς ὄντος μεθορίου διαστή-
ματος, τοῦ μόνου, ὃ ἔστιν ἀψευδῶς, ἐφιδρυμένος. λέγεται γάρ· “λαλήσω σοι
ἄνωθεν τοῦ ἰλαστηρίου, ἀνὰ μέσον τῶν дуεῖν Χερουβίμ” (*Exod.* 25, 21), 10
ὥστ’ ἡνίοχον μὲν εἶναι τῶν δυνάμεων τὸν λόγον, ἐποχον δὲ τὸν λαλοῦντα,
ἐπικελευόμενον τῷ ἡνίοχῳ τὰ πρὸς ὀρθὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἡνίοχῃσιν.

It can hardly be said, as is done by Wolfson, that it is the immanent Logos who is represented here as the charioteer. It is rather the Powers that represent the immanent world-order; and they are governed by the *transcendent* Logos, “who did not take a visible form”. The transcendent Logos, however, is itself an *image* of God, though nearest to Him (τῶν νοητῶν πρεσβύτατος). It occupies, as we saw above, an intermediate place.

c. Again, in another passage, commenting on the beginning of the 23rd psalm (“The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want”), Ph. represents the Logos as the Shepherd, set by God over the flock of the elements and all living beings (including the heavenly bodies), “like some viceroy of a great king”.

The
Shepherd
of the flock

Philo, *De agricultura* 12, 51 (C.W. II, p. 105-106):

Τοῦτο μέντοι τὸ ἄσμα παντὶ φιλοθέῳ μελετᾶν ἐμπρεπές, τῷ δὲ δὴ κόσμῳ 20
καὶ διαφερόντως· καθάπερ γάρ τινα ποιμνὴν γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ
καὶ ὅσα ἐν τούτοις φυτὰ τε αὖ καὶ ζῷα, τὰ μὲν θνητὰ τὰ δὲ θεῖα, ἔτι δὲ οὐρανοῦ
φύσιν καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης περιόδους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστέρων τροπὰς τε αὖ 25
καὶ χορείας ἐναρμονίους ὁ ποιμὴν καὶ βασιλεὺς θεὸς ἄγει κατὰ δίκην καὶ νόμον, 1
προσθησάμενος τὸν ὀρθὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον καὶ πρωτόγονον υἱόν, ὃς τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν
τῆς ἱερᾶς ταύτης ἀγέλης οἶά τις μεγάλου βασιλέως ὑπαρχος διαδέξεται· καὶ
γὰρ εἰρηταί που· “Ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ εἰμι, ἀποστέλλω ἄγγελόν μου εἰς πρόσωπόν
σου τοῦ φυλάξαι σε ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ” (*Exod.* 23, 20).

Here again the Logos, called ὀρθὸς Λόγος of God and His Firstborn Son, is certainly not the immanent order of the universe, but the transcendent Logos, who occupies the intermediate position of a satrap of the great King. But cp. 1306.

That for a Platonist of those days the idea of God as the ἀγωγέας or κορυφαῖος of the heavenly bodies is quite familiar, may be seen in Maximus Tyrius 41, 2 (Hobein), who calls God:

Τὸν οὐρανοῦ ἀρμοστήν, τὸν ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἀγωγέα, τὸν κορυφαῖον τῆς τῶν ἄστρον περιφορᾶς καὶ δινήσεως καὶ χορείας καὶ δρόμου.

The simile of the κορυφαῖος was used first, so far as we can see, by the author of the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *Περὶ κόσμου*, Arist., Bekker 399a 12-21 (Didot vol. III p. 638, l. 44-51). In his 6th ch. he gives an ample description of the work of Providence. Here, too, we find the Lord and Governor of the universe compared with the Persian kings¹, a simile by which the author wishes to illustrate that it would not suit the Lord of the universe to exercise a direct and all-embracing providence, "enduring the trouble of an animal which works and toils itself" (p. 636, 40-43)² or of a slave. It suits Him to have His place ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτω χώρας, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν διὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου διήκουσαν ἡλίον τε κινεῖν καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τὸν πᾶντα οὐρανὸν περιάγειν, αἰτίον τε γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς σωτηρίας (p. 637, 50-54)³.

Thus, we shall find in Plotinus the idea of providence exercised from a distance, and distinguished from direct providence, which is exercised only by soul coming into contact with a body. Below, nrs. 1376 and 1426.

To Philo's view of the universe, cp. also Plotinus' view of the sensible world as being full of δυνάμεις. Below, nr. 1428e, f.

1304—Elsewhere, spiritual beings—"souls" or "spirits"—floating in the air between heaven and earth, are identified by Ph. with the daemons of philosophy (cp. above, our nr. 431a) and with the angels in the books of Moses.

a. Philo, *De gigantibus* 2, 6-9 and 3, 12 (C.W. II, p. 43 f.):

The angels

Οὓς ἄλλοι φιλόσοφοι δαίμονας, ἀγγέλους Μωυσῆς εἶωθεν ὀνομάζειν· ψυχαὶ
 10 δ' εἰσὶ κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα πετόμεναι. καὶ μηδεὶς ὑπολάβῃ μῦθον εἶναι τὸ εἰρημένον·
 ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὅλον δι' ὅλων τὸν κόσμον ἐψυχῶσθαι, τῶν πρώτων καὶ στοιχειωδῶν
 μερῶν ἐκάστου τὰ οἰκεία καὶ πρόσφορα ζῶα περιέχοντος, γῆς μὲν τὰ χερσαῖα,
 θαλάττης δὲ καὶ ποταμῶν τὰ ἐνυδρα, πυρὸς δὲ τὰ πυρίγονα — λόγος δ' ἔχει
 ταῦτα κατὰ Μακεδονίαν μάλιστα γίνεσθαι —, οὐρανοῦ δὲ τοὺς ἀστέρας. καὶ
 15 γὰρ οὗτοι ψυχαὶ ὅλαι δι' ὅλων ἀκήρατοί τε καὶ θεῖαι, παρὸ καὶ κύκλῳ κινεῦνται
 τὴν συγγενεστάτην νῶ κίνησιν· νοῦς γὰρ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἀκραιφνέστατος.
 ἔστιν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸν ἀέρα ζῶων πεπληρῶσθαι· ταῦτα δὲ ἡμῖν ἔστιν
 ἀόρατα, ὅτιπερ καὶ αὐτὸς οὐχ ὁρατὸς αἰσθήσει. ἀλλ' οὐ παρ' ὅσον ἀδύνατος ἡ
 20 ὄψις ψυχῶν φαντασιωθῆναι τύπους, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐκ εἰσιν ἐν ἀέρι ψυχαί, κατα-
 λαμβάνεσθαι δ' αὐτάς ἀναγκαῖον ὑπὸ νοῦ, ἵνα πρὸς τῶν ὁμοίων τὸ ὅμοιον
 2 θεωρῇται. — Τῶν οὖν ψυχῶν αἱ μὲν πρὸς σώματα κατέβησαν, αἱ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν
 γῆς μορίων ἤξιώσαν ποτε συνενεχθῆναι. ταύταις ἀφιερωθείσαις καὶ τῆς τοῦ
 5 πατρὸς θεραπείας περιεχομέναις ὑπηρέτισι καὶ διακόνοις ὁ δημιουργὸς εἶωθε
 χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν θνητῶν ἐπιστάσιν.

¹ For this very reason Festugière (*Le Dieu Cosmique* p. 479) dates the treatise at the beginning of our era. It might be even earlier and come from the school of Posidonius.

² Bekker 397b, 20-23.

³ Bekker 398b, 6-10.

b. Cp. Philo, *De somniis* I 134-135, where the Jacob's ladder (*Genesis* 28, 12-13) is identified with the air, which up to the Moon is said to be full of souls without body (C.W. III, p. 234).

Κλίμαξ τοίνυν ἐν μὲν τῷ κόσμῳ συμβολικῶς λέγεται ὁ ἀήρ, οὗ βάσις μὲν 5 ἐστὶ γῆ, κορυφή δ' οὐρανός· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῆς σεληνιακῆς σφαίρας, ἣν ἐσχάτην μὲν τῶν κατ' οὐρανὸν κύκλων, πρώτην δὲ τῶν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναγράφουσιν οἱ φροντισταὶ τῶν μετεώρων, ἄχρι γῆς ἐσχάτης ὁ ἀήρ πάντῃ ταθεὶς ἐφθακεν. οὗτος δ' ἐστὶ ψυχῶν ἀσωμάτων οἶκος, ἐπειδὴ πάντα τῷ ποιητῇ τὰ τοῦ κόσμου 10 μέρη καλὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναι ζῶων ἀναπληρῶσαι. διὰ τοῦτο γῆ μὲν τὰ χερσαῖα ἐγκατεσκευάζε, θαλάτταις δὲ καὶ ποταμοῖς τὰ ἐνυδρα, οὐρανῷ δὲ τοὺς ἀστέρας — καὶ γὰρ ἕκαστος τούτων οὐ μόνον ζῶον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῦς ὅλος δι' ὅλων ὁ καθαρώ- 15 τατος εἶναι λέγεται· — ὥστε καὶ ἐν τῷ λοιπῷ τμήματι τοῦ παντός, ἀέρι, ζῶα γέγονεν. εἰ δὲ μὴ αἰσθήσει καταληπτὰ, τί τοῦτο; καὶ ψυχὴ γὰρ ἀόρατον.

See also 1306c.

We shall find the theme again in Plutarch, *De defectu oraculorum* and *De facie in orbe lunae* (infra, nrs. 1318 and 1319).

The idea of spiritual Powers ruling the forces of Nature or identified with them is seen e.g. in the N.T., *Joh.* 5, 4 (the angel of the pond of Bethesda), and is found in many of the Christian Fathers. J. H. Newman is quite familiar with it, as appears for instance in his Sermon on *The Powers of Nature* (*Parochial and Plain Sermons* II 29), where he says: "I do not pretend to say that we are told in Scripture what Matter is; but I affirm that, as our souls move our bodies, . . . so there are spiritual Intelligences which move those wonderful and vast portions of the natural world which seem to be inanimate" (p. 361).

**The Logos
the instru-
mental cause
of creation**

1305—Sometimes the Logos is called the instrumental cause of creation, or the ὄργανον δι' οὗ God created the world.

a. Philo, *De cherubim* 35, 126-127 (C.W. I, p. 200):

Φέρε γάρ, εἴ τις ἀνέροιτο, οἰκία καὶ πόλις πᾶσα ἵνα κατασκευασθῇ, τίνα συνελθεῖν δεῖ; ἄρ' οὐ δημιουργὸν καὶ λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ ὄργανα; τί οὖν ἐστὶ δημιουργὸς πλὴν τὸ αἷτιον ὑφ' οὗ; τί δὲ λίθοι καὶ ξύλα πλὴν ἢ ὕλη, ἐξ ἧς ἡ 5 κατασκευὴ; τί δὲ τὰ ὄργανα πλὴν τὰ δι' ὧν; τίνας δὲ ἔνεκα πλὴν σκέπης καὶ ἀσφαλείας, τὸ δι' ὃ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ; μετελθὼν οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν μέρει κατασκευῶν ἴδε τὴν μεγίστην οἰκίαν ἢ πόλιν, τόνδε τὸν κόσμον· εὐρήσεις γὰρ αἷτιον μὲν αὐτοῦ τὸν θεὸν ὑφ' οὗ γέγονεν, ὕλην δὲ τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα ἐξ ὧν συνεκράθη, 10 ὄργανον δὲ λόγον θεοῦ δι' οὗ κατεσκευάσθη, τῆς δὲ κατασκευῆς αἰτίαν τὴν ἀγαθότητα τοῦ δημιουργοῦ.

To the four Aristotelian causes (above, nrs. 393-394) apparently the later Stoa added one or two others. Seneca, *Ep.* 65, 8 speaks of five causes:

Quinque ergo causae sunt, ut Plato dicit: *id ex quo, id a quo, id in quo, id ad quod, id propter quod.*

Cp. Simpl., *In Arist. Phys.* 184, l. 11, citing Porphyry:

Τετραχῶς οὖν ἡ ἀρχὴ κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην· ἡ γὰρ τὸ ἐξ οὗ ὡς ἡ ὕλη ἡ τὸ καὶ θ' ὁ ὡς τὸ εἶδος ἡ τὸ ὅφ' οὗ ὡς τὸ ποιοῦν ἡ τὸ δι' ὁ ὡς τὸ τέλος. Κατὰ δὲ Πλάτωνα καὶ τὸ πρὸς δὲ ὡς τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ τὸ δι' οὗ ὡς τὸ ὀργανικόν.

b. Philo, *De special. legibus* I 81 (C.W. V, p. 21):

10 Λόγος δ' ἐστὶν εἰκὼν θεοῦ, δι' οὗ σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἐδημιουργεῖτο.

Here also the Logos is doubtless the transcendent but created Logos.

1306—We find the *immanent* Logos for instance in the following passages, where it is firstly described as δεσμὸς ἄρρηκτος, as were the “powers” above (1291a). **The Logos a bond of the universe**

a. Philo, *De plantatione* 2, 8-9 (C.W. II, p. 135):

5 Οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν ὕλαις κραταῖον οὕτως, ὡς τὸν κόσμον ἀχθοφορεῖν ἰσχυῖσαι, λόγος δὲ ὁ αἰδῖος θεοῦ τοῦ αἰωνίου τὸ ὀχυρώτατον καὶ βεβαιότατον ἔρεισμα τῶν ὄλων ἐστίν. οὗτος ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄκρων ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα ταθεὶς δολιχεύει τὸν τῆς φύσεως δρόμον ἀήττητον συνάγων τὰ μέρη πάντα καὶ σφίγγων· δεσμὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἄρρηκτον τοῦ παντὸς ὁ γεννήσας ἐποίει πατήρ.

We can only conclude that the totality of the spiritual beings called the Powers or angels, are sometimes spoken of as the Logos.

b. To the Logos Philo attributes the function of harmonizing opposites. He therefore says that it “mediates” and “arbitrates”, or he speaks of μεσίται and διαιτηταὶ λόγοι. **The Logos is a „mediator” and arbiter**

Philo, *Quaestiones in Exodum* II 68:

Ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος μέσος ὢν οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ φύσει καταλείπει κενόν, τὰ ὅλα πληρῶν, καὶ μεσιτεύει καὶ διαιτᾷ τοῖς παρ' ἑκατέρᾳ διεστάναι δοκοῦσι, φιλίαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἐργαζόμενος· αἶψα γὰρ κοινωνίας αἴτιος καὶ δημιουργὸς εἰρήνης.

c. Man needs λόγοι acting on our behalf as mediators (μεσίται) and arbiters (διαιτηταί). This is what the angels serve for. **The angels are called μεσίται καὶ διαιτηταὶ λόγοι**

Philo, *De somniis* I 141-142 (C.W. III, p. 235):

Pure souls that never have felt any craving for the things of earth, act as God's servants¹ and messengers.

Ταύτας δαίμονας μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι φιλόσοφοι, ὁ δὲ ἱερὸς λόγος ἀγγέλους εἶωθε καλεῖν προσφυστέρω χρώμενος ὀνόματι· καὶ γὰρ τὰς τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπικελεύσεις τοῖς ἐγγόνις καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐγγόνων χρείας τῷ πατρὶ διαγγέλλουσι. παρὸ καὶ

¹ Here again Philo uses the term ὑπαρχοὶ τοῦ πανηγεμόνος, “satraps of the great Ruler”, as he said of the *transcendent* Logos (1291c).

ἀνερχομένους αὐτοὺς καὶ κατιόντας εἰσήγαγεν, οὐκ ἐπειδὴ τῶν μηνυσόντων 15
ὁ πάντη ἐφθακῶς θεὸς δεῖται, ἀλλ' ὅτι τοῖς ἐπικήροις ἡμῖν συνέφερε μεσίταις
καὶ διαιτηταῖς λόγοις χρῆσθαι διὰ τὸ τεθηπέναι καὶ πεφρικέναι τὸν παμπρύ-
τανιν καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀρχῆς αὐτοῦ κράτος.

The Logos
πρωτόγονος
is said to be
immanent

d. Indeed, after having declared that the Λόγος πρεσβύτατος is
transcendent (1301a), Philo goes on without any difficulty to say that
ὁ πρωτόγονος θεὸς Λόγος is *within* the cosmos.

Philo, *De somniis* I 215 (C.W. III, p. 251):

Ἐν μὲν ὅδε ὁ κόσμος, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἀρχιερεὺς ὁ πρωτόγονος αὐτοῦ θεὸς λόγος,
ἕτερον δὲ λογικὴ ψυχὴ, ἧς ἱερεὺς ὁ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπος, οὗ μίμημα αἰσθητὸν 15
ὁ τὰς πατρίους εὐχὰς καὶ θυσίας ἐπιτελῶν ἐστίν, ᾧ τὸν εἰρημένον ἐπιτέτραπται
χιτῶνα ἐνδύεσθαι, τοῦ παντὸς ἀντίμιμον ὄντα οὐρανοῦ, ἵνα συνιερουργῇ καὶ
ὁ κόσμος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντὶ ἄνθρωπος.

The immanent Logos is not essentially distinguished from the transcendent one,
as it is distinguished on the other hand from the soul of man.

The twofold
Logos in the
cosmos and
in man

1307—Summarizing, Ph. speaks of a twofold Logos, both in the cosmos
and in man.

De vita Mosis II 13, 127 (C.W. IV, p. 229 f.):

Διπλοῦν δὲ τὸ λογεῖον οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ· διττὸς γὰρ ὁ λόγος ἓν τε τῷ παντὶ 20
καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ φύσει· κατὰ μὲν τὸ πᾶν ὃ τε περὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων καὶ παρα- 1
δειγματικῶν ἰδεῶν, ἐξ ὧν ὁ νοητὸς ἐπάγῃ κόσμος, καὶ ὁ περὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν,
ᾧ δὴ μιμήματα καὶ ἀπεικονίσματα τῶν ἰδεῶν ἐκείνων ἐστίν, ἐξ ὧν ὁ αἰσθητὸς
οὗτος ἀπετελεῖτο· ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ δ' ὁ μὲν ἐστίν ἐνδιάθετος, ὁ δὲ προφορικός, 5
<καὶ ὁ μὲν> οἷά τις πηγὴ, ὁ δὲ γεγωνὸς ἀπ' ἐκείνου ῥέων· καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐστὶ χώρα
τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, τοῦ δὲ κατὰ προφορὰν γλῶττα καὶ στόμα καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πᾶσα
φωνῆς ὀργανοποιία.

The distinction between λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός is Stoic¹.

Man as a
cosmopolites
stands under
the law of
nature

1308—The first man was placed in the universe, and therefore under
the same law as the universe itself.

Philo, *De opif. mundi* 49, 142 - 50, 143 (C.W. I, p. 50):

Τὸν δ' ἀρχηγέτην ἐκεῖνον οὐ μόνον πρῶτον ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ καὶ μόνον
κοσμοπολίτην λέγοντες ἀψευδέστατα ἐροῦμεν· ἦν γὰρ οἶκος αὐτῷ καὶ πόλις
ὁ κόσμος, μηδεμιᾶς χειροποίητου κατασκευῆς δεδημιουργημένης ἐκ λίθων 5
καὶ ξύλων ὕλης, ᾧ καθάπερ ἐν πατρίδι μετὰ πάσης ἀσφαλείας ἐνδιητᾶτο. —

¹ Above, nr. 965.

10 Ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πόλις εὖνομος ἔχει πολιτείαν, ἀναγκαίως συνέβαινε τῷ κοσμοπολίτῃ χρῆσθαι πολιτείᾳ ἥ καὶ σύμπας ὁ κόσμος· αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ τῆς φύσεως ὀρθὸς λόγος, ὃς κυριωτέρᾳ κλήσει προσονομάζεται θεσμός, νόμος θεῖος ὢν, καθ' ὃν τὰ προσήκοντα καὶ ἐπιβάλλοντα ἐκάστοις ἀπενεμήθη.

It is a curious sign of Ph.'s syncretistic spirit, that he identifies the ὀρθὸς λόγος of Stoicism with the divine Law of Scripture.

1309—Ph. himself is so much penetrated by the thought of the divine Law, that he regarded pious and virtuous men such as the patriarchs almost as an incarnation of it, before special laws were written.

a. Philo, *De Abr.* I, 4-6 (C.W. IV, p. 2):

The patriarchs an incarnation of the Divine Law of nature

Οὗτοι δὲ εἰσιν ἀνδρῶν οἱ ἀνεπιλήπτως καὶ καλῶς βιώσαντες, ὧν τὰς ἀρετὰς
 5 ἐν ταῖς ἱερωτάταις ἐστηλιτεῦσθαι γραφαῖς συμβέβηκεν, οὐ πρὸς τὸν ἐκεῖνων ἔπαινον αὐτὸ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας προτρέψασθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ζῆλον ἀγαγεῖν. οἱ γὰρ ἔμψυχοι καὶ λογικοὶ νόμοι ἄνδρες ἐκεῖνοι γεγόνασιν, οὓς δυοῖν χάριν ἐσέμνυνεν· ἐνὸς μὲν βουλόμενος ἐπιδειξαι,
 10 ὅτι τὰ τεθειμένα διατάγματα τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἀπάδει, δευτέρου δὲ ὅτι οὐ πολὺς πόνος τοῖς ἐθέλουσι κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους ζῆν, ὁπότε καὶ ἀγράφῳ τῇ νομοθεσίᾳ, πρὶν τι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀναγραφῆναι τῶν ἐν μέρει, ῥαδίως καὶ εὐπετῶς ἐχρήσαντο οἱ πρῶτοι· ὥς δεόντως ἂν τινα φάναι, τοὺς τεθέντας νόμους μηδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ ὑπομνήματα εἶναι βίου τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀρχαιολογοῦντας ἔργα καὶ λόγους,
 15 οἷς ἐχρήσαντο. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὔτε γνώριμοι καὶ φοιτηταὶ γενόμενοί τινων οὔτε παρὰ διδασκάλοις ἀ χρῆ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν ἀναδιδασχθέντες, αὐτήκοοι δὲ καὶ αὐτομαθεῖς, ἀκολουθίαν φύσεως ἀσπασάμενοι, τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, πρεσβύτατον θεσμὸν εἶναι ὑπολαβόντες ἅπαντα τὸν βίον ἠὲ νομήθησαν, ὑπαίτιον μὲν οὐδὲν γνώμαις ἐκουσίοις ἐργασάμενοι, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐκ
 20 τύχης ποτνιώμενοι τὸν θεὸν καὶ λιταῖς καὶ ἱκεσίαις ἐξευμενιζόμενοι πρὸς ὀλοκλήρου μετουσίαν ζωῆς δι' ἀμφοτέρων κατορθουμένης τῶν τε ἐκ προνοίας καὶ τῶν ἀνευ ἐκουσίου γνῶμης.

b. Thus, Ph. describes the tenor of Moses' life in the terms of Stoic philosophy.

De vita Mosis, I 48 (C.W. IV, p. 131):

Ἐν ᾧ δὲ ἐμελλε δικάζειν (sc. ὁ Θεὸς αὐτόν), τοὺς ἀρετῆς ἄθλους Μωυσῆς διήθλει τὸν ἀλείπτῃν ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ λογισμὸν ἀστέιον, ὅφ' οὗ γυμναζόμενος
 10 πρὸς τοὺς ἀρίστους βίους, τὸν τε θεωρητικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν, ἐπονεῖτο φιλοσοφίας ἀνελίστων ἀεὶ δόγματα καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ διαγινώσκων εὐτρόχως καὶ μνήμη παρακατατιθέμενος εἰς τὸ ἄληστον αὐτὰ καὶ τὰς οἰκείας αὐτίκα πράξεις ἐφαρμόττων ἐπαινετὰς πάσας, ἐφιέμενος οὐ τοῦ δοκεῖν ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀληθείας, διὰ τὸ

προκεισθαι σκοπόν ἓνα τὸν ὀρθὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον, ὃς μόνος ἐστὶν ἀρετῶν ἀρχή τε καὶ πηγὴ.

Enthusiasm 1310—To the Stoic notion of the divine Law practised by virtuous men Ph. adds his idea of *enthusiasm*, a kind of extasy, by which the prophet is characterized.

a. *De vita Mosis* II 23, 191 (C.W. IV, p. 245):

Τὸ ἐνθουσιῶδες —, καθ' ὃ μάλιστα καὶ κυρίως νενόμισται προφήτης. 2

beyond
reason

b. Ph. describes this "enthusiasm" as a kind of sober intoxication, happening to the mind of him who contemplates the intelligible truth and beauty of the Ideas. *De opif. mundi* 23, 70-71 (C.W. I, p. 23 f.):

The mind of man first investigates the earthly elements.

Καὶ πάλιν πτηνὸς ἀρθεὶς καὶ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὰ τοῦτου παθήματα κατασκε- 15
ψάμενος ἀνωτέρω φέρεται πρὸς αἰθέρα καὶ τὰς οὐρανοῦ περιόδους, πλανήτων
τε καὶ ἀπλανῶν χορείαις συμπεριποληθεὶς κατὰ τοὺς μουσικῆς τελείας νόμους,
ἐπόμενος ἔρωτι σοφίας ποδηγετοῦντι, πᾶσαν τὴν αἴσθητὴν οὐσίαν ὑπερκύψας, 1
ἐνταῦθα ἐφίεται τῆς νοητῆς· καὶ ὧν εἶδεν ἐνταῦθα αἰσθητῶν ἐν ἐκείνῃ τὰ παρα-
δείγματα καὶ τὰς ιδέας θεασάμενος, ὑπερβάλλοντα κάλλη, μέθη νηφαλίῳ
κατασχεθεὶς ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες ἐνθουσιᾷ, ἑτέρου γεμισθεὶς ἡμέρου καὶ
πόθου βελτίονος, ὅφ' οὗ πρὸς τὴν ἄκραν ἀψίδα παραπεμφθεὶς τῶν νοητῶν ἐπ' 5
αὐτὸν ἵεναι δοκεῖ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα· γλιχομένου δ' ἰδεῖν, ἀθρόου φωτὸς ἄκρατοι
καὶ ἀμιγεῖς αὐγαὶ χειμάρρου τρόπον ἐκχέονται, ὥς ταῖς μαρμαρυγαῖς τὸ τῆς
διανοίας ὄμμα σκοτοδιναῖν.

The
prerogative
of the heir of
divine things

c. This kind of extasy, then, by which the mind, surpassing reason, comes to the knowledge of God, is the prerogative of "the heir of divine things".

Philo, *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 14, 68-70 (C.W. III, p. 16 f.):

Τίς οὖν γενήσεται κληρονόμος; οὐχ ὁ μένων ἐν τῇ τοῦ σώματος εἰρκτῇ 10
λογισμὸς καθ' ἐκούσιον γνώμην, ἀλλ' ὁ λυθεὶς τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ ἐλευθερωθεὶς
καὶ ἔξω τειχῶν προσηλυθὼς καὶ καταλειπωπῶς, εἰ οἶδόν τε τοῦτο εἰπεῖν,
αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν. "ὃς γὰρ ἐξελεύσεται ἐκ σοῦ" φησὶν, "οὗτος κληρονομήσει σε
(*Gen.* 15, 4)". πόθος οὖν εἴ τις εἰσέρχεται σε, ψυχὴ, τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν κλη- 15
ρονοῦν, μὴ μόνον "γῆν", τὸ σῶμα, καὶ "συγγένειαν", <τὴν> αἴσθησιν, καὶ
"οἶκον πατρός" (*Gen.* 12, 1), τὸν λόγον, καταλίπης, ἀλλὰ καὶ σαυτὴν ἀπόδραθι
καὶ ἐκστῇ σεαυτῆς, ὥσπερ οἱ κατεχόμενοι καὶ κορυβαντιῶντες βακχευθεῖσα
καὶ θεοφορηθεῖσα κατὰ τινὰ προφητικὸν ἐπιθειασμόν· ἐνθουσιώσης γὰρ καὶ
οὐκέτ' οὔσης ἐν ἑαυτῇ διανοίας, ἀλλ' ἔρωτι οὐρανίῳ σεσοβημένης ἀκχεμεν- 20

νυίας καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος ἡγγμένης καὶ ἄνω πρὸς αὐτὸ εἰλκυσμένης, προϋού-
 1 σης ἀληθείας καὶ τὰν ποσὶν ἀναστελλούσης, ἵνα κατὰ λεωφόρου βαίνοι τῆς
 ὁδοῦ, κληῖρος οὗτος.

d. Philo also uses the term ἑκστασις (*Heres* 249 ff.), of which he distinguishes four kinds, the fourth and best being the ἐνθεος κατοκωχή
 τε καὶ μανία ἥ τὸ προφητικὸν γένος χρῆται. The prophet, being divinely
 inspired, does not speak his own word. Yet, the inspiration is not de-
 tached from his moral character.

Not detached
 from moral
 qualities

Heres 52, 259 (C.W. III, p. 59):

Προφήτης γὰρ ἴδιον μὲν οὐδὲν ἀποφθέγγεται, ἀλλότρια δὲ πάντα ὑπηχοῦντος
 ἐτέρου· φαύλῳ δὲ οὐ θέμις ἐρμηνεῖ γενέσθαι θεοῦ, ὥστε κυρίως μοχθηρὸς οὐδεις
 15 ἐνθουσιᾷ, μόνῳ δὲ σοφῷ ταῦτ' ἐφαρμόττει, ἐπεὶ καὶ μόνος ὄργανον θεοῦ ἐστὶν
 ἡχεῖον, κρουόμενον καὶ πληττόμενον ἀοράτως ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.

The terms φαῦλος and σοφός in this passage are again a sign of the syncretistic climate of Ph.'s thought.

1311—By his allegorical interpretation of Scripture Ph. inaugurates
 a long period in the history of exegesis.

Allegorical
 interpreta-
 tion

The method itself is not new: as we have seen above, it was much practised in the Stoa (nr. 924a); but it can be traced back at least to the second half of the fifth century. See the articles of J. Tate in *Class. Rev.* XLI p. 214; *Class. Quart.* XXIII p. 41, 142; XXIV p. 1; XXVIII p. 105; H. Leisegang in *Philol. Wochenschrift* LII p. 265 ff.; J. Heinemann in *Mnemos.* 1949, and again J. Tate in *Eranos* 1953.

The method, applied by Greek philosophers to Homer and Hesiod, was by Philo applied to Scripture, as was done before him to a certain extent in Talmudic literature.

Lit.: I. Heinemann, *Altjüdische Allegoristik*, 1936.

Wolfson, *Philo* I, p. 133 f.

a. The following passage reveals Ph.'s attitude towards those things in Greek mythology and the classical poets which are shocking to the moral and religious sense of a later generation.

Its function
 with relation
 to Greek
 mythology

Philo, *De providentia* II 40:

Blasphemiam includit de diis, sed est indicium inclusae physiologiae; cuius non licet apud illos, quorum capita minime sunt uncta, patefacere mysteria.

In other words: "blasphemies" (i.e. such strange things about the gods, as abound in Homer and Hesiod) are an indication that such passages of the poets contain a doctrine on nature ("physiologia"), which can only be understood by the initiated.—Ph. means that the Gods of Greek mythology must be understood either as powers of nature or as moral powers. Such was also Varro's conviction.

b. Cp. Varro's description of the *tria genera theologiae*, cited by Augustinus, *De civ. Dei* VI, 5 (the beginning):

Mythicon appellat, quo maxime utuntur poetae; physicon, quo philosophi; civile, quo populi. Primum, inquit, quod dixi, in eo sunt multa contra dignitatem et naturam immortalium ficta. In hoc . . . omnia diis adtribuuntur, quae non modo in hominem, sed etiam quae in contemptissimum hominem cadere possunt. —

Secundum genus est, inquit, quod demonstravi, de quo multos libros philosophi reliquerunt; in quibus est, dii qui sint, ubi, quod genus, quale est: a quodam tempore an a sempiterno fuerint dii; ex igni sint, ut credit Heraclitus, an ex numeris, ut Pythagoras, an ex atomis, ut ait Epicurus. Sic alia quae facilius intra parietes in schola quam extra in foro ferre possunt aures.

c. We find it also defined by Euseb., *Praep. ev.* III 1, 3:

‘Ἡ παλαιὰ φυσιολογία καὶ παρ’ Ἑλλησι καὶ βαρβάρους λόγος ἦν φυσικὸς ἐγκεκρυμμένος μύθοις, τὰ πολλὰ δι’ αἰνιγμάτων καὶ ὑπονοιῶν ἐπικρυφός καὶ μυστηριώδης θεολογία. — Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ συμβολικὸν εἶδος.

**Why Philo
applies the
method to
Scripture**

Philo applied the method to Scripture, not because he regarded the books of Moses as being of the same level as Greek mythology. Doubtless, Scripture was in his eyes divinely inspired. That he seeks a “hidden truth” behind its words, is not because he found some kind of blasphemy in it, but because he wished to bring it into the sphere of mystery.

3—PLUTARCHUS

**General
character
of his
philosophy**

Plutarchus of Chaeronea is the greatest representative of Platonism in the first and early second century. Like Philo he may be called a preparer of Neoplatonism, 1° by a marked transcendentalism in his conception of God, 2° by ranking Νοῦς higher than ψυχή, 3° in general, by his religious attitude and by making a sort of philosophical synthesis in which certain Aristotelian and Stoic elements are introduced into a theologically interpreted Platonism.

Plutarchus' idea of God is expressed most clearly in two of his writings, the treatise *De E apud Delphos* and *De Iside et Osiride*. His thoughts on Providence are expounded in *De sera numinis vindicta*, while his ideas of the afterworld are displayed in three great myths, placed at the end of the *De sera vindicta*, *De facie in orbe lunae* and *De genio Socratis*.

Also his demonology is interesting. It is known to us by different works, but chiefly by a long passage in *De defectu oraculorum*.

Plutarchus lived from the middle of the first century till about 125. He must

have been in Rome towards the end of Vespasian's reign ¹ and again under Domitian, shortly after 90 ². Usually he lived at Chaeronea, where he had a kind of informal School.

1312—As was done in those days by Neopythagorean interpreters, Plut. applies to God expressions which by Plato were used of the Ideas or the νοητά.

a. Plut., *De E apud Delphos* 17-18 (391F-392B):

Plutarchus with a circle of friends are engaged in a conversation on the sense of the letter E on the wall of the temple of Apollo at Delphi. Six explanations have been proposed, when Ammonius begins to speak as follows:

Οὐτ' . . . ἀριθμὸν οὔτε τάξιν οὔτε σύνδεσμον οὔτ' ἄλλο τῶν ἐλλειπῶν
μορίων οὐδὲν οἶμαι τὸ γράμμα σημαίνειν· ἀλλ' ἔστιν αὐτοτελὴς τοῦ θεοῦ προσ-
15 αγόρευσις καὶ προσφώνησις, ἅμα τῷ ῥήματι τὸν φθειγόμενον εἰς ἔννοιαν
καθιστάσα τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεὸς ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ἐνταῦθα
προσιόντα οἷον ἀσπαζόμενος προσαγορεύει τὸ "Γνωθὶ σαυτόν", ὃ δὴ τοῦ χαῖρε
οὐδὲν μεῖζον ἔστιν. Ἡμεῖς δὲ πάλιν ἀμειβόμενοι τὸν θεόν, "Εἰ" φαμέν, ὡς ἀληθῆ
20 καὶ ἀψευδῆ καὶ μόνην μόνῃ προσήκουσαν τὴν τοῦ εἶναι προσαγόρευσιν ἀποδι-
δόντες.

God alone
has true
being

Ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντως τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστιν οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα θνητὴ φύσις
1 ἐν μέσῳ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς γενομένη φάσμα παρέχει καὶ δόκησιν ἀμυδρὰν
καὶ ἀβέβαιον αὐτῆς· ἂν δὲ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπερείσης λαβέσθαι βουλόμενος, ὥσπερ
ἢ σφοδρὰ περιδραξίς ὕδατος τῷ πιέζειν εἰς ταῦτόν καὶ συνάγειν διαρρέον ἀπόλλυσι
5 τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον, οὕτω τῶν παθητῶν καὶ μεταβλητῶν ἑκάστου τὴν ἄγαν
ἐνάργειαν ὁ λόγος διώκων ἀποσφάλλεται, τῇ μὲν εἰς τὸ γιγνόμενον αὐτοῦ,
τῇ δ' εἰς τὸ φθειρόμενον, οὐδενὸς λαβέσθαι μένοντος οὐδὲ ὄντως ὄντος
δυνάμενος.

b. Ib., c. 19 (392E-F):

Sensible things are continually changing and, therefore, *are* not in the full sense; God alone, who is always the Same, *is*.

Τί οὖν ὄντως ὄν ἐστι; Τὸ αἰδίδιον καὶ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀφθαρτον, ὃ χρόνος
15 μεταβολὴν οὐδὲ εἰς ἐπάγει. Κινητὸν γάρ τι, καὶ κινουμένη συμφανταζόμενον
ὕλη, καὶ ῥέον αἶψα καὶ μὴ στέγον, ὥσπερ ἀγγεῖον φθορᾶς καὶ γενέσεως, ὁ χρόνος·
οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ μὲν ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ τὸ ἔσται λεγόμενον καὶ τὸ γέγονεν,
αὐτόθεν ἐξομολόγησις ἐστὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ εἶναι τὸ μηδέπω γεγονὸς
20 ἢ πεπαυμένον ἤδη τοῦ εἶναι λέγειν, ὡς ἔστιν, εὐηθες καὶ ἄτοπον.

True being
is beyond
time and
motion

¹ *Vita Demosth.* II 2; cp. *De curios.* 15, 522 D.

² *Quaest. conv.* VIII 7, 1.

God alone is
truly one

c. Ib., c. 20 (393AB):

Ἄλλ' ἔστιν ὁ θεός, εἰ χρὴ φάναι, καὶ ἔστι κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν αἰῶνα τὸν ἀκίνητον καὶ ἄχρονον καὶ ἀνέγκλιτον καὶ οὐ πρότερον οὐδὲν ἔστιν οὐδ' ὕστερον οὐδὲ μέλλον οὐδὲ παρωχήμενον οὐδὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ νεώτερον· ἀλλ' εἷς ὢν ἐνὶ τῷ νῦν τὸ αἰεὶ πεπλήρωκε, καὶ μόνον ἔστι τὸ κατὰ τοῦτον ὄντως ὄν, οὐ γεγονὸς οὐδ' ἐσόμενον οὐδ' ἀρξάμενον οὐδὲ παυσόμενον. Οὕτως οὖν αὐτὸν δεῖ σεβομένους ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ προσαγορεύειν, "εἴ", ἥ καὶ νῆ Δία, ὡς ἐνιοὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, "Εἰ ἔν". Οὐ γὰρ πολλὰ τὸ θεῖόν ἔστιν, ὡς ἡμῶν ἕκαστος ἐκ μυρίων διαφορῶν ἐν πάθεσι γινομένων, ἄθροισμα παντοδαπὸν καὶ πανηγυρικῶς μεμιγμένον· ἀλλ' ἐν εἶναι δεῖ τὸ ὄν, ὥσπερ ὄν τὸ ἐν. Ἡ δ' ἑτερότης διαφορᾶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰς γένεσιν ἐξίσταται τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.

20

1313—Thus, Plut. seems to make the distance between God and the world as great as possible. In *De Iside et Osiride* he calls Him as the First Principle ἀμιγῆς καὶ ἀπαθής (c. 54), even "as far as possible removed from the earth and from all things that are subject to destruction and death" (c. 78). He also identifies Him ("Osiris") with τὸ Ἀγαθόν (in Plato's sense) and says that "Isis" (which means: the receptive principle, χώρα or ὕλη) is longing for it (c. 53).

The highest
Principle
identified
with God

a. Plut., *De Iside et Osiride* c. 53 (372 EF):

Ἡ γὰρ Ἴσις ἔστι μὲν τὸ τῆς φύσεως θῆλυ καὶ δεκτικὸν ἀπάσης γενέσεως, καθὼ τιτηνὴ καὶ πανδεχῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος¹, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν πολλῶν μυριάδων² κέκληται διὰ τὸ πάσας ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τρεπομένη μορφὰς δέχεσθαι καὶ ἰδέας. Ἐχει δὲ σύμφυτον ἔρωτα τοῦ πρώτου καὶ κυριωτάτου πάντων, ὃ τᾶγαθῷ ταῦτόν ἐστι, κάκεῖνο ποθεῖ καὶ διώκει· τὴν δ' ἐκ τοῦ κακοῦ φεύγει καὶ διωθεῖται μοῖραν, ἀμφοῖν μὲν οὕσα χώρα καὶ ὕλη, βέπουσα δ' αἰεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἐξ ἑαυτῆς, καὶ παρέχουσα γεννᾶν ἐκείνῳ καὶ κατασπείρειν εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἀπορροίας καὶ ὁμοιότητας, αἷς χαίρει καὶ γέγηθε κυττομένη καὶ ὑποπιμπλαμένη τῶν γενέσεων. Εἰκὼν γάρ ἐστιν οὐσίας <ῆ> ἐν ὕλῃ γένεσις καὶ μίμημα τοῦ ὄντος τὸ γινόμενον.

b. Osiris cannot be the cause of evil and disorder in the world. Another power, therefore, subordinate to Him, must be introduced to account for evil. Plutarch identifies him with Typhon, while Horus is the symbol of the visible world.

¹ Above, nr. 356.

² The idea of Matter longing for its Form as a τέλος which is always an ἀγαθόν is Aristotelian. Cp. our nrs. 490b and 514.

De Iside et Osiride 54 (373 AB):

He is
eternal and
imperishable

"Οθεν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου μυθολογοῦσι τὴν Ὀσίριδος ψυχὴν ἀίδιον εἶναι καὶ
5 ἀφθαρτον, τὸ δὲ σῶμα πολλάκις διασπᾶν καὶ ἀφανίζειν τὸν Τυφῶνα· τὴν δ'
ἴσιν πλανωμένην καὶ ζητεῖν καὶ συναρμόττειν πάλιν. Τὸ γὰρ ὃν καὶ νοητὸν
καὶ ἀγαθὸν φθορᾶς καὶ μεταβολῆς κρεῖττον ἐστίν· ὅς δ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ αἰσθητὸν
10 καὶ σωματικὸν εἰκόνας ἐκμάττεται, καὶ λόγους καὶ εἶδη καὶ ὁμοιότητας ἀνα-
λαμβάνει, καθάπερ ἐν κηρῷ σφραγιῖδες οὐκ αἰεὶ διαμένουσιν, ἀλλὰ καταλαμβάνει
τὸ ἄτακτον αὐτάς καὶ ταραχῶδες ἐνταῦθα τῆς ἄνω χώρας ἀπεληλαμένον καὶ
μαχόμενον πρὸς τὸν Ὡρον, ὃν ἡ ἴσις εἰκόνα τοῦ νοητοῦ κόσμου¹ αἰσθητὸν ὄντα
15 γεννᾷ. Διὸ καὶ δίκην φεύγειν λέγεται νοθείας ὑπὸ Τυφῶνος, ὡς οὐκ ὦν καθαρὸς
οὐδὲ εἰλικρινής, οἷος ὁ πατήρ λόγος αὐτὸς καθ' ἑαυτὸν, ἀμιγῆς καὶ ἀπαθής²,
ἀλλὰ νενοθευμένος τῇ ὕλῃ διὰ τὸ σωματικόν.

According to this passage, Osiris is identified with "the Logos in itself". Plut. the Logos in
evidently knows also lower and derived forms of "logos". His thought resembles
itself
in this very much that of Philo. He does not, however, distinguish the supreme
God (Osiris) from the κόσμος νοητός, as Philo did by introducing the "created"
κόσμος νοητός which then becomes a δεύτερος θεός, but identifies Osiris directly
with the Intelligible world, of which Horus, being the κόσμος αἰσθητός, becomes an
εἰκὼν and a μίμημα. E. de Faye³ was mistaken when he wrote that Plut. interposed
Horus as a δεύτερος θεός between the supreme God and man, Horus being called
λόγος αὐτὸς καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀμιγῆς καὶ ἀπαθής. This is not what Plutarchus wrote.

Meanwhile, Plut. did know intermediate powers between the supreme God
and man: the daemons. In this too his thought is very much like Philo's and that
of the early Fathers of the Christian Church.

c. Plut. opposed those who identified Osiris with Dis or Plouton.

Osiris
separated
from the
material
world

De Iside et Osiride, c. 78 (382 EF):

Καὶ τοῦτο ὅπερ οἱ νῦν ἱερεῖς ἀφοσιούμενοι καὶ παρακαλυπτόμενοι μετ'
20 εὐλαβείας ὑποδηλοῦσιν, ὡς ὁ θεὸς οὗτος ἄρχει καὶ βασιλεύει τῶν τεθηγκότων,
οὐχ ἕτερος ὢν τοῦ καλουμένου παρ' Ἑλλήσιν Ἀιδου καὶ Πλούτωνος, ἀγνοοῦ-
μενον ὅπως ἀληθές ἐστι, διαταράττει τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπονοοῦντας ἐν γῇ καὶ ὑπὸ
25 γῇ τὸν ἱερὸν καὶ ὅσιον ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀσίριν οἰκεῖν, ὅπου τὰ σώματα κρύπτεται
τῶν τέλους ἔχειν δοκούντων. Ὁ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν αὐτὸς ἀπωτάτω τῆς γῆς ἄχραντος
καὶ ἀμίαντος καὶ καθαρὸς οὐσίας ἀπάσης φθορὰν δεχομένης καὶ θάνατον.

1314—Plut. follows Plato in stating that neither ἄψυχα σώματα nor an
ὕλη ἄποιος could be the cause or ἀρχή of things. But, since Osiris is the

Dualism

¹ Horus is called an εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ κόσμου. The term κόσμος νοητός is used here
by Plutarch as a current expression. Though it is first found in Philo, it is improb-
able that he introduced the term, as Wolfson thinks he did.

² Osiris then is called καθαρὸς καὶ εἰλικρινής, Λόγος αὐτὸς καθ' ἑαυτὸν, ἀμιγῆς καὶ
ἀπαθής.

³ Origène, Vol. II, *L'ambiance philosophique*, Paris 1927, p. 135 ff.

cause of good things only, another (living) principle must be admitted in Nature.

a. Plut., *De Iside et Osiride* 45 (369 B²-D):

Διὸ καὶ παμπάλαιος αὕτη κάτεισιν ἐκ θεολόγων καὶ νομοθετῶν εἰς τε ποιητάς 10 καὶ φιλοσόφους δόξα, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀδέσποτον ἔχουσα, τὴν δὲ πίστιν ἰσχυράν καὶ δυσεξάλειπτον, οὐκ ἐν λόγοις μόνον οὐδὲ ἐν φήμαις, ἀλλὰ ἐν τε τελεταῖς ἐν τε θυσίαις, καὶ βαρβάροις καὶ Ἑλληνσι πολλαχοῦ περιφερομένη, ὥς οὐτ' ἄνουν 15 καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἀκυβέρνητον αἰωρεῖται τῷ αὐτομάτῳ τὸ πᾶν, οὔτε εἰς ἐστὶν ὁ κρατῶν καὶ κατευθύνων ὥσπερ οἶαξιν ἢ τισι πειθηνίοις χαλινοῖς ¹ λόγος, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ καὶ μεμιγμένα κακοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς· μᾶλλον δὲ μηδέν, ὥς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἄκρατον ἐνταῦθα τῆς φύσεως φερούσης, οὐ δυεῖν πίθων εἰς ταμίας ², 20 ὥσπερ νάματα τὰ πράγματα καπηλικῶς διανεμῶν ἀνακεράννουσιν ἡμῖν· ἀλλ' ἀπὸ δυεῖν ἐναντίων ἀρχῶν, καὶ δυεῖν ἀντιπάλων δυνάμεων, τῆς μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ κατ' εὐθεῖαν ὑφηγουμένης, τῆς δ' ἔμπαλιν ἀναστρεφούσης καὶ ἀνακλώσης, 25 ὁ τε βίος μικτός, ὁ τε κόσμος, εἰ καὶ μὴ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ὁ περίγειος οὗτος καὶ μετὰ σελήνην, ἀνώμαλος καὶ ποικίλος γέγονε, καὶ μεταβολὰς πάσας δεχόμενος. ¹ Εἰ γὰρ οὐθὲν ἀναιτίως πέφυκε γενέσθαι, αἰτίαν δὲ κακοῦ τάγαθόν οὐκ ἂν παράσχοι, δεῖ γένεσιν ἰδίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν, ὥσπερ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν.

b. In the next chapter Plut. speaks of the Persian Mazdeists and explains the doctrine of Zarathustra in such a way, that Ahriman (as a daemon) is subordinated to the God Ahura Mazda.

De Iside et Osiride, c. 46 (369 EF):

Καὶ δοκεῖ τοῦτο τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ σοφωτάτοις. Νομίζουσι γὰρ οἱ μὲν θεοὺς εἶναι δύο, καθάπερ ἀντιτέχνους, τὸν μὲν ἀγαθῶν, τὸν δὲ φαύλων δημιουργόν. Οἱ δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀμείνονα θεόν, τὸν δὲ ἕτερον δαίμονα καλοῦσιν· ὥσπερ Ζωροάστρης ὁ μάγος, ὃν πεντακισχιλίοις ἔτεσι τῶν Τρωϊκῶν γεγονέναι πρεσ- 10 βύτερον ἱστοροῦσιν. Οὗτος οὖν ἐκάλει τὸν μὲν Ὠρομάζην, τὸν δ' Ἀρειμάνιον· καὶ προσαπεφαίνετο τὸν μὲν εἰκέναι φωτὶ μάλιστα τῶν αἰσθητῶν, τὸν δ' ἔμπαλιν σκότῳ καὶ ἀγνοίᾳ, μέσον δ' ἀμφοῖν τὸν Μίθρην εἶναι. Διὸ καὶ Μίθρην 15 Πέρσαι τὸν Μεσίτην ὀνομάζουσιν. — Καὶ γὰρ τῶν φυτῶν νομίζουσι τὰ μὲν ² 21 τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ θεοῦ, τὰ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ δαίμονος εἶναι· καὶ τῶν ζώων, ὥσπερ κύνας καὶ ὄρνιθας καὶ χερσαίους ἐχίνους, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· τοῦ δὲ φαύλου τοὺς ἐνύδρους εἶναι·—

See on the whole passage Th. Hopfner's Commentary, vol. II, p. 201 ff.

¹ Cp. Sophocles, fr. 785 Nauck.

² Cp. Hom., *Ilias* 24, 527 f. and Plato, *Resp.* 379d.

c. He finds the essence of this doctrine also with the Chaldaeans, in Greek official religion and in philosophy, especially with the Pythagoreans and in Plato.

De Iside et Osiride, c. 48 (370 C-371 A):

Χαλδαῖοι δὲ τῶν πλανητῶν, οὓς θεοὺς γενεθλίους * καλοῦσι, δύο μὲν ἀγαθουργούς, δύο δὲ κακοποιούς, μέσους δὲ τοὺς τρεῖς ἀποφαίνουσι καὶ κοι-
 5 νοῦς. Τὰ δὲ Ἑλλήνων πᾶσι που δῆλα, τὴν μὲν ἀγαθὴν Διὸς Ὀλυμπίου μερίδα, τὴν δ' ἀποτρόπαιον Ἀίδου ποιουμένων. Ἐκ δ' Ἀφροδίτης καὶ Ἄρεως Ἀρ-
 μονίαν γεγονέναι μυθολογοῦνται. ὣν ὁ μὲν ἀπηνῆς καὶ φιλονεικος, ἡ δὲ μειλίχιος
 10 καὶ γενέθλιος. Σκόπει δὲ τοὺς φιλοσόφους τούτοις συμφερομένους. Ἡράκλειτος μὲν γὰρ ἄντικρυς πόλεμον ὀνομάζει πατέρα καὶ βασιλέα καὶ κύριον πάντων ¹. —
 17 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀγαθουργὸν ἀρχὴν φιλότητα καὶ φιλίαν ² —, τὴν
 20 δὲ χείρονα νεῖκος οὐλόμενον καὶ δῆριν αἱματόεσσαν. Οἱ μὲν Πυθαγορικοὶ διὰ πλειόνων ὀνομάτων κατηγοροῦσι, τοῦ μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἓν, τὸ πεπερασμένον, τὸ μένον, τὸ εὐθύ, τὸ περισσόν, τὸ τετράγωνον, <τὸ ἴσον>, τὸ δεξιόν, τὸ λαμπρόν.
 25 τοῦ δὲ κακοῦ τὴν δυάδα, τὸ ἄπειρον, τὸ φερόμενον, τὸ καμπύλον, τὸ ἄρτιον, τὸ ἐτερόμηκες, τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ ἀριστερόν, τὸ σκοτεινόν. ὥστε ταύτας ἀρχὰς
 1 γενέσεως ὑποκειμένας ³. Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ νοῦν καὶ ἄπειρον ⁴. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ τὸ μὲν εἶδος τὸ δὲ στέρησιν ⁵. Πλάτων δὲ πολλαχοῦ μὲν οἶον ἐπηλυγαζόμενος καὶ παρακαλυπτόμενος, τῶν ἐναντίων ἀρχῶν τὴν μὲν ταύτην ὀνομάζει, τὴν δὲ
 5 θάτερον ⁶. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς Νόμοις ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ὢν οὐ δι' αἰνιγμῶν οὐδὲ συμβολικῶς, ἀλλὰ κυρίως ὀνόμασιν, οὐ μιᾶ ψυχῇ φησι κινεῖσθαι τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ πλείοσιν ἴσως, δυεῖν δὲ πάντως οὐκ ἐλάττωσιν. ὣν τὴν μὲν ἀγαθουργὸν
 10 εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἐναντίαν ταύτῃ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων δημιουργόν ⁷. ἀπολείπει δὲ καὶ τρίτην τινὰ μετὰ φύσιν, οὐκ ἄψυχον οὐδ' ἄλογον οὐδ' ἀκίνητον ἐξ αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι νομίζουσιν, ἀλλ' ἀνακειμένην ἀμφοῖν ἐκείναις, ἐφιεμένην δὲ τῆς ἀμείνονος αἰεὶ, καὶ ποθοῦσαν καὶ διώκουσαν, ὡς τὰ ἐπιόντα δηλώσει τοῦ λόγου,
 15 τὴν Αἰγυπτίων θεολογίαν μάλιστα ταύτῃ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ συνονικιοῦντος.

d. Thus, "Osiris" and "Typhon" are present both in the world and in the soul of man.

De Iside et Osiride 49 (371 AB):

Μεμειγμένη γὰρ ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις καὶ σύστασις ἐξ ἐναντίων, οὗ

Osiris and
Typhon in
the world
and in the
soul of man

* οὓς θεοὺς γενεθλίους corr. Wytttenbach; τοὺς θεοὺς γενέσθαι οὓς codd.

¹ Above, nr. 53. ² Our nr. 107.

³ Above, nr. 42.

⁴ The opposition is somewhat strange here. Cp. our nrs. 124a and 127.

⁵ Above (vol. II), nrs. 478, 480.

⁶ *Tim.* 35ab, our nr. 350.

⁷ *Leg.* X 896e, our nr. 390.

μὴν ἰσοσθενῶν, δυνάμεων, ἀλλὰ τῆς βελτίονος τὸ κράτος ἐστίν· ἀπολέσθαι δὲ τὴν φαύλην παντάπασιν ἀδύνατον, πολλὴν μὲν ἐμπεφυκυῖαν τῷ σώματι, πολλὴν 20 δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ παντός, καὶ πρὸς τὴν βελτίονα αἰεὶ δυσμαχοῦσιν. Ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ ψυχῇ νοῦς καὶ λόγος ὁ τῶν ἀρίστων πάντων ἡγεμὼν καὶ κύριος Ὁσίρις ἐστίν. ἐν δὲ γῇ καὶ πνεύμασι καὶ ὕδασι καὶ οὐρανῷ καὶ ἄστροις τὸ τεταγμένον 25 καὶ καθεστηκὸς καὶ ὑγιαῖνον, ὥραις καὶ κράσεσι καὶ περιόδοις, Ὁσίριδος ἀπορροή καὶ εἰκὼν ἐμφαινόμενη· Τυφῶν δέ, τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ τιτα- νικὸν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἔμπληκτον· τοῦ δὲ σωματικοῦ τὸ ἐπὶ κληρον * καὶ νοσῶδες 1 καὶ ταρακτικὸν ἀωρίαις καὶ δυσκρασίαις καὶ κρύψεσι ἡλίου καὶ ἀφανισμοῖς σελήνης, οἷον ἐκδρομαὶ καὶ ἀφηνιασμοὶ ** Τυφῶνος.

The
providence
of God

1315—Plutarch defends divine Providence against the objections that by the lateness of the Divine punishment sinners are encouraged in their wickedness, while those who suffer are discouraged.

a. It is hard, nay impossible, to man to judge the methods of Divine Providence. Even human laws often seem absurd.

Impossible
for man to
judge of it

Plut., *De sera numinis vindicta* 4 (549 E-550 C):

Πρῶτον οὖν ὥσπερ ἀφ' ἐστίας ἀρχόμενοι πατρώας, τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐ- λαβείας τῶν ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ φιλοσόφων, τὸ μὲν ὡς εἰδότες τι περὶ τούτων λέγειν 20 ἀφοσιωσόμεθα. Πλέον γάρ ἐστι τοῦ περὶ μουσικῶν ἀμουσους καὶ πολεμικῶν ἀστρατεύτους διαλέγεσθαι τὸ τὰ θεῖα καὶ τὰ δαιμόνια πράγματα διασκοπεῖν, ἀνθρώπους ὄντας, οἷον ἀτέχνους τεχνιτῶν διάνοιαν ἀπὸ δόξης καὶ ὑπονοίας 1 κατὰ τὸ εἶκος μετιόντας. Οὐ γὰρ ἱατροῦ μὲν ἰδιώτην ὄντα συμβαλεῖν λογισμόν, ὡς πρότερον οὐκ ἔτεμεν ἀλλ' ὕστερον, οὐδὲ χθές ἔκαυσεν + ἀλλὰ σήμερον, ἔργον ἐστί· περὶ θεῶν δὲ θνητὸν ῥάδιον ἢ βέβαιον εἰπεῖν ἄλλο, πλὴν ὅτι τὸν καιρὸν 5 εἰδὼς ἄριστα τῆς περὶ τὴν κακίαν ἱατρείας, ὡς φάρμακον ἐκάστῳ προσφέρει τὴν κόλασιν οὔτε μεγέθους μέτρον κοινὸν οὔτε χρόνον ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πάντων ἔχουσιν. Ὅτι γὰρ ἡ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἱατρεία, δίκη δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνη προσαγορευομένη, πασῶν ἐστὶ τεχνῶν μεγίστη, πρὸς μυρίοις ἑτέροις καὶ 10 Πίνδαρος ἐμαρτύρησεν ¹, ἀριστοτέχνην ἀνακαλούμενος τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ κύριον ἀπάντων θεόν, ὡς δὴ δίκης ὄντα δημιουργόν, ἥ προσήκει τὸ πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ μέχρι πόσου κολαστέον ἕκαστον τῶν πονηρῶν ὀρίζειν. Καὶ ταύτης φησὶ τῆς τέχνης 15 ὁ Πλάτων ² υἱὸν ὄντα τοῦ Διὸς γεγονέναι τὸν Μίνω μαθητὴν, ὡς οὐ δυνατόν ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις κατορθοῦν οὐδ' αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ κατορθοῦντος τὸν μὴ μαθόντα

* ἐπὶ κληρον is a correction of Xylander. Mss. ἐπὶ κλητον.

** ἀφηνιασμοὶ Markland; ἀφανισμοὶ Mss.

+ Corr. Klostermann. Two mss read ἔλουσεν, others ἔλουσεν.

¹ Fr. 57.

² Leg. 624a; cp. *Minos* 319d.

μηδὲ κτησάμενον τὴν ἐπιστήμην. Οὐδὲ γὰρ οὓς ἄνθρωποι νόμους τίθενται τὸ
 20 εὐλογον ἀπλῶς ἔχουσι καὶ πάντοτε φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' ἔνια καὶ δοκεῖ κομιδῇ
 γελοῖα τῶν προσταγμάτων· ὅλον ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι κηρύττουσιν οἱ ἔφοροι παριόντες
 1 εὐθὺς εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴ τρέφειν μύστακα καὶ πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, ὥς μὴ
 χαλεποὶ ὦσιν αὐτοῖς· Ῥωμαῖοι δέ, οὓς ἂν εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἀφαιρῶνται, κάρφος
 αὐτῶν λεπτὸν ἐπιβάλλουσι τοῖς σώμασιν· ὅταν δὲ διαθήκας γράφωσιν, ἑτέρους
 5 μὲν ἀπολείπουσι κληρονόμους, ἑτέροις δὲ πωλοῦσι τὰς οὐσίας¹. ὁ δοκεῖ παρά-
 λογον εἶναι. Παραλογώτατον δὲ τὸ τοῦ Σόλωνος, ἄτιμον εἶναι τὸν ἐν στάσει
 πόλεως μηδετέρᾳ μερίδι προσθέμενον μηδὲ συστασιάσαντα². Καὶ ὅλως πολλὰς
 ἂν τις ἐξείποι νόμων ἀτοπίας μήτε τὸν λόγον ἔχων τοῦ νομοθέτου μήτε τὴν
 10 αἰτίαν συνιείς ἐκάστου τῶν γραφομένων. Τί δὴ θαυμαστόν, εἰ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων
 οὕτως ἡμῖν ὄντων δυσθεωρήτων οὐκ εὐπορόν ἐστι τὸ περὶ τῶν θεῶν εἰπεῖν,
 ὅτινι λόγῳ τοὺς μὲν ὕστερον, τοὺς δὲ πρότερον τῶν ἀμαρτανόντων κολάζουσιν;

b. God is for man an example of order and of long-suffering.

**God an
example
for man**

Ib., c. 5 (550 C-F):

Ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖτε πρῶτον, ὅτι κατὰ Πλάτωνα πάντων καλῶν ὁ θεὸς ἑαυτὸν
 ἐν μέσῳ παράδειγμα θέμενος³, τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀρετὴν, ἐξομοίωσιν οὖσαν
 20 ἀμωσγέπως πρὸς αὐτόν, ἐνδίδωσι τοῖς ἔπεσθαι θεῷ δυναμένοις. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ
 πάντων φύσις ἄτακτος οὖσα, ταύτην ἔσχε τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ μεταβαλεῖν καὶ
 γενέσθαι κόσμος, ὁμοιότητι καὶ μετέξει τινὶ τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἰδέας καὶ ἀρετῆς.
 1 Καὶ τὴν ὅσιν αὐτὸς οὗτος ἀνὴρ ἀνάψαι φησὶ τὴν φύσιν ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅπως ὑπὸ θεάς
 τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ φερομένων καὶ θαύματος ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιζομένη τὸ
 εὐσχημον ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ τεταγμένον, ἀπεχθάνηται τοῖς ἀναρμόστοις καὶ πλανητοῖς
 5 πάθεσι καὶ φεύγῃ τὸ εἰκῇ καὶ ὥς ἔτυχεν, ὥς κακίας καὶ πλημμελείας ἀπάσης
 γένεσιν⁴. Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὅτι μεῖζον ἄνθρωπος ἀπολαβεῖν θεοῦ πέφυκεν ἢ τὸ μιμή-
 σει καὶ διώξει τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν εἰς ἀρετὴν καθίστασθαι. Διὸ
 καὶ τοῖς πονηροῖς ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ σχολαίως τὴν δίκην ἐπιτίθησιν, οὐκ αὐτὸς τινα
 10 τοῦ ταχὺ κολάζειν ἀμαρτίαν δεδιὼς ἢ μετάνοιαν, ἀλλ' ἡμῶν τὸ περὶ τὰς τιμωρίας
 θηριῶδες καὶ λάβρον ἀφαιρῶν καὶ διδάσκων μὴ σὺν ὀργῇ μηδ' ὅτε μάλιστα
 φλέγεται καὶ σφαδάζει

Πηδῶν ὁ θυμὸς τῶν φρενῶν ἀνωτέρω⁵,
 15 καθάπερ δίψαν ἢ πεῖναν ἀποπιμπλάντας, ἐπιτηδᾶν τοῖς λελυπηκόσιν, ἀλλὰ
 μιμουμένους τὴν ἐκείνου προφύτητα καὶ τὴν μέλλησιν, ἐν τάξει καὶ ἐμμελείᾳ τὸν
 ἥκιστα μετανόια προσοισόμενον χρόνον ἔχοντας σύμβουλον, ἄπτεσθαι τῆς δίκης.

¹ Cp. Gai. *Inst.* II 103.

² Cp. Plut. *Solon* c. 20.

³ E.g. *Leg.* IV 715e-716c (see vol. I, nr. 374b) and *Theaet.* 176b (the ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ). Vol. I, nr. 318. For τοῖς ἔπεσθαι δυναμένοις cp. *Phaedr.* 247a: ἔπεται δὲ ὁ αἰεὶ ἐθέλων τε καὶ δυνάμενος (our nr. 272), and 253a.

⁴ *Tim.* 47bc (our nr. 355).

⁵ *Fragm. Trag. Adesp.* 390

c. God cares for the souls of sinners and gives them time to repent.

His long-suffering

Ib. c. 6 (551 C-E):

Δεύτερον τοίνυν τοῦτο διανοηθῶμεν, ὥς αἱ μὲν δικαίωσεις αἱ παρ' ἀνθρώπων μόνον ἔχουσαι τὸ ἀντιλυποῦν [καί] ἐν τῷ κακῶς τὸν δεδρακότα παθεῖν ἴστανται, περαιτέρω δ' οὐκ ἐξικνοῦνται· διὸ τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασι κυνὸς δίκην ἐφυλακτοῦσαι κατακολουθοῦσι καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐκ ποδὸς ἐπιδιδώκουσι· τὸν 5 θεὸν δ' εἰκός, ἥς ἂν ἐφάπτηται τῇ δίκῃ ψυχῆς νοσοῦσης, τὰ τε πάθη διορᾶν, εἴ πῃ τι καμπτόμενα πρὸς μετάνοιαν ἐνδίδωσι, καὶ χρόνον γε οἷς οὐκ ἄκρατος οὐδ' ἄτρεπτος ἡ κακία πέφυκε προσίζανειν. Ἄτε γὰρ εἰδὼς ὅσῃ μοῖραν ἀρετῆς 10 ἀπ' αὐτοῦ φερόμεναι πρὸς γένεσιν αἱ ψυχαὶ βαδίζουσι, καὶ τὸ γενναῖον ὥς ἰσχυρὸν αὐταῖς καὶ οὐκ ἐξίτηλον ἐμπέφυκεν, ἐξανθεῖ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὴν κακίαν ὑπὸ τροφῆς καὶ ὁμιλίας φαύλης φθειρόμενον, εἴτα θεραπευθὲν ἐνίοις καλῶς ἀπολαμβάνει τὴν προσήκουσαν ἔξιν, οὐ πᾶσι κατεπείγει τὴν τιμωρίαν ὁμοίως· 15 ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀνῆκεστον εὐθύς ἐξεῖλε τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀπέκοψεν, ὥς ἑτέροις γε πάντως βλαβερὸν, αὐτῷ τε βλαβερώτατον, αἰεὶ συνεῖναι μετὰ πονηρίας· οἷς δ' ὑπ' ἀγνοίας τοῦ καλοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ προαιρέσει τοῦ αἰσχροῦ τὸ ἁμαρτητικὸν εἰκὸς ἐγγεγονέναι, δίδωσι μεταβαλέσθαι χρόνον. Ἐὰν δ' ἐπιμένωσι, καὶ τούτοις 1 ἀπέδωκε τὴν δίκην· οὐ γὰρ που δέδιδε, μὴ διαφύγῃσι.

1316—Reply to those who say that it is senseless to visit the sins of the fathers upon the children and grandchildren.

a. Plut., *De sera numinis vindicta* 19 (561 C-562 A):

Ὁ γὰρ Βίων τὸν θεὸν κολάζοντα τοὺς παῖδας τῶν πονηρῶν γελοιότερον εἶναι φησιν ἱατροῦ διὰ νόσον πάππου καὶ πατρὸς ἔκγονον ἢ παῖδα φαρμακεύοντος. Ἔστι δὲ πῇ μὲν ἀνόμοια τὰ πράγματα, πῇ δ' εἰκότα καὶ ὅμοια. Νόσου μὲν γὰρ ἄλλος ἄλλον οὐ παύει θεραπευόμενος, οὐδὲ βέλτιόν τις ἔσχε 15 τῶν ὀφθαλμιῶντων ἢ πυρεττόντων ἰδὼν ἄλλον ὑπαλειφόμενον ἢ καταπλαττόμενον· αἱ δὲ τιμωρίαι τῶν πονηρῶν διὰ τοῦτο δείκνυνται πᾶσιν, ὅτι δίκης κατὰ λόγον περαιομένης ἔργον ἐστὶν ἑτέρους δι' ἑτέρων κολαζομένων ἐπισχεῖν. Ἡ δὲ προσέειπε τῷ ζητουμένῳ τὸ παραβαλλόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ Βίωνος ἔλαθεν 20 αὐτόν· ἥδη γὰρ ἀνδρὸς εἰς νόσημα μοχθηρὸν οὐ μὴν ἀνίατον ἐμπεσόντος, εἴτ' ἄκρασίᾳ καὶ μαλακίᾳ προεμένου τῷ πάθει τὸ σῶμα καὶ διαφθαρέντος, υἱὸν οὐ δοκοῦντα νοσεῖν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐπιτηδείως ἔχοντα πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν νόσον, 25 ἱατρὸς ἢ οἰκεῖος ἢ ἀλείπτῃς καταμαθὼν ἢ δεσπότης χρηστός, ἐμβαλὼν εἰς δίκαιαν αὖστηράν καὶ ἀφελὼν ὄψα καὶ πέμματα καὶ πότους καὶ γύναια, φαρ- 1 μακείαις δὲ χρησάμενος ἐνδελεχέσι καὶ διαπονήσας [τὸ σῶμα] γυμνασίους, ἐσκέδασε καὶ ἀπέπεμψε μεγάλου πάθους σπέρμα μικρόν, οὐκ ἑάσας εἰς μέγεθος προελθεῖν. Ἡ γὰρ οὐχ οὕτω παρακελεύομεθα, προσέχειν ἀξιοῦντες ἑαυτοῖς καὶ παραφυλάττεσθαι καὶ μὴ παραμελεῖν ὅσοι γεγονάσιν ἐκ πατέρων ἢ μη- 5

τέρων νοσηματικῶν, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἐξωθεῖν τὴν ἐγκεκραμένην ἀρχὴν εὐκίνητον οὔσαν καὶ ἀκροσφαλῇ προκαταλαμβάνοντας; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφασαν. Οὐ τοῖνυν
 10 ἄτοπον, εἶπον, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον, οὐδὲ γελοῖον, ἀλλ' ὠφέλιμον πρᾶγμα ποιοῦμεν, ἐπιληπτικῶν παισὶ καὶ μελαγχολικῶν καὶ ποδαγρικῶν γυμνάσια καὶ διαίτας καὶ φάρμακα προσάγοντες οὐ νοσοῦσιν ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τοῦ μὴ νοσῆσαι. Τὸ γὰρ
 15 ἐκ πονηροῦ σώματος γινόμενον σῶμα τιμωρίας μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς, ἱατρείας δὲ καὶ φυλακῆς ἄξιόν ἐστιν· ἦν εἴ τις, ὅτι τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀφαιρεῖ, καὶ δηγμὸν ἐπάγει καὶ πόνον, τιμωρίαν ὑπὸ δειλίας καὶ μαλακίας ἀποκαλεῖ, χαίρειν ἑατέον. Ἄρ' οὖν σῶμα μὲν ἔκγονον φαύλου σώματος ἄξιόν ἐστι θεραπεύειν καὶ φυλάττειν,
 20 κακίας δὲ ὁμοιότητα συγγενικὴν ἐν νέῳ βλαστάνουσιν ἤθει καὶ ἀναφυομένην ἔαν δεῖ καὶ περιμένειν καὶ μέλλειν ἄχρις ἂν ἐκχυθεῖσα τοῖς πάθεσιν ἐμφανὴς γένηται
 “κακόφρονά τ' ἀμφάνη πραπίδων
 καρπὸν”,

ὥς φησι Πίνδαρος;¹

b. Often men do not show their true nature directly. But God, who knows their hidden dispositions, often prevents their wickedness from bursting out.

Ib., c. 20-21 (562 C-E):

Often God prevents sin from bursting out

Οὐ γὰρ ἅμα γίγνεται καὶ φαίνεται τῶν πονηρῶν ἕκαστος· ἀλλ' ἔχει μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὴν κακίαν, χρῆται δὲ καιροῦ καὶ δυνάμεως ἐπιλαβόμενος τῷ κλέπτειν ὁ κλέπτης καὶ τῷ παρανομεῖν ὁ τυραννικός. Ἄλλ' ὁ θεὸς οὐτ' ἀγνοεῖ δῆπου τὴν ἐκάστου διάθεσιν καὶ φύσιν, ἅτε δὴ ψυχῆς μᾶλλον ἢ σώματος αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφυκώς, οὐτ' ἀναμένει τὴν βίαν ἐν χερσὶ γενομένην καὶ τὴν ἀναίδειαν ἐν φωνῇ καὶ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἐν αἰδοίοις κολάζειν. Οὐ γὰρ ἀμύνεται τὸν ἀδικήσαντα κακῶς παθόν, οὐδ' ὀργίζεται τῷ ἀρπάσαντι βιασθείς, οὐδὲ μισεῖ τὸν μοιχὸν
 5 ὕβρισθεις, ἀλλ' ἱατρείας ἕνεκα τὸν μοιχικὸν καὶ τὸν πλεονεκτικὸν καὶ ἀδικητικὸν κολάζει πολλάκις, ὥσπερ ἐπιληψίαν τὴν κακίαν πρὶν ἢ καταλαβεῖν ἀναιρῶν.
 Ἡμεῖς δ' ἀρτίως μὲν ἡγανακτοῦμεν, ὥς ὅψε καὶ βραδέως τῶν πονηρῶν
 15 δίκην διδόντων· νῦν δὲ ὅτι καὶ πρὶν ἀδικεῖν ἐνίοις τὴν ἑξὶν αὐτῶν κολοῦει καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν, ἐγκαλοῦμεν, ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτε τοῦ γενομένου πολλάκις τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ λανθάνον τοῦ προδήλου χειρόν ἐστι καὶ φοβερώτερον· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ συλλογίζεσθαι τὰς αἰτίας, δι' ἃς ἐνίοις μὲν καὶ ἀδικήσαντας
 20 ἔαν βέλτιόν ἐστιν, ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ διανοουμένους προκαταλαμβάνειν· ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ φάρμακα ἐνίοις μὲν οὐχ ἀρμόζει νοσοῦσιν, ἐνίοις δὲ λυσιτελεῖ καὶ μὴ νοσοῦσιν ἐπισφαλέςτερον ἐκείνων ἔχουσιν.

1317—The treatise ends by the story of Thespesius of Soli, a man who **The story of Thespesius**

¹ FR. 211.

lived in evil throughout his life, till one day he fell down from a height and broke his neck, but on the third day came back to life, after a vision of the life hereafter. Here is his account of the punishment of sinners.

Plut., *De sera numinis vindicta* 30 (566 E-567 D):

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πρὸς τὴν θεὰν τῶν κολαζομένων ἐτρέποντο. Καὶ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα δυσχερεῖς καὶ οἰκτρὰς εἶχον ὕψεις μόνον· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ φίλοις καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ συνήθεσιν Θεσπέσιος οὐκ ἂν προσδοκήσας κολαζομένοις ἐνετύγχανε, οἱ καὶ δεινὰ παθήματα καὶ τιμωρίας ἀσχήμονας καὶ ἀλγεινὰς ὑπομένοντες 5 ῥκτίζοντο πρὸς ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἀνεκλαίοντο· τέλος δὲ τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κατ-εἶδεν ἐκ τινος βαράθρου στιγμάτων καὶ οὐλῶν μεστὸν ἀναδυόμενον, ὀρέγοντα τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῷ καὶ σιωπᾶν οὐκ ἐώμενον, ἀλλ' ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαζόμενον ὑπὸ 10 τῶν ἐφεστώτων ταῖς τιμωρίαις, ὅτι περὶ ξένους τινὰς μισαρὸς γενόμενος χρυσίον ἔχοντας, φαρμάκοις διαφθείρας καὶ ἐκεῖ διαλαθὼν ἅπαντας, ἐνταῦθ' ἐξελεγχ-θεῖς, τὰ μὲν ἤδη πέπονθε, τὰ δ' ἄγεται πεισόμενος. Ἰκετεύειν μὲν [οὖν] ἢ παραιτεῖσθαι περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς οὐκ ἐτόλμα δι' ἐκπληξιν καὶ δέος· ὑποστρέψαι 15 δὲ καὶ φυγεῖν βουλόμενος οὐκ ἔτι τὸν πρῶτον ἐκεῖνον ἐώρα καὶ οἰκεῖον ξεναγόν, ἀλλ' ὕψ' ἐτέρων τινῶν φοβερῶν τὴν ὕψιν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ὠθούμενος, ὡς ἀνάγκην οὖσαν οὕτω διεξελεθεῖν, ἐθεᾶτο τῶν μὲν γνωρίμως πονηρῶν γενομένων καὶ κολασθέντων αὐτόθι τὴν σκιὰν οὐκέτ' εἶναι χαλεπῶς οὐδ' ὁμοίως τριβομένην, 20 ἅτε δὴ περὶ τὸ ἄλογον καὶ παθητικὸν ἐπίπονον οὖσαν· ὅσοι δὲ πρόσχημα καὶ δόξαν ἀρετῆς περιβαλόμενοι διεβίωσαν κακίᾳ λανθανούσῃ, τούτους ἐπιπίνωνας καὶ ὀδυνηρῶς ἠνάγκαζον ἕτεροι περιεστῶτες ἐκτρέπεσθαι τὰ ἐντὸς ἔξω τῆς 1 ψυχῆς, ἰλυσπωμένους παρὰ φύσιν καὶ ἀνακαμπτομένους, ὥσπερ αἱ θαλάττιαι σκολόπενδραι καταπιοῦσαι τὸ ἄγκιστρον, ἐκτρέπουσιν ἑαυτάς· ἐνίους δ' ἀνα-δέροντες αὐτῶν καὶ ἀναπτύσσοντες ἀπεδείκνυσαν ὑπούλους καὶ ποικίλους, 5 ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ καὶ κυρίῳ τὴν μοχθηρίαν ἔχοντας. Ἄλλας δ' ἔφη ψυχὰς ἰδεῖν, ὥσπερ τὰς ἐχίδνας περιπεπλεγμένας σύνδυο καὶ σύντρεις καὶ πλείονας, ἀλλήλας ἐσθιούσας ὑπὸ μνησικακίας καὶ κακοθυμίας ὧν ἔπαθον ἐν τῷ ζῆν ἢ ἔδρασαν. Εἶναι δὲ καὶ λίμνας παρ' ἀλλήλας, τὴν μὲν χρυσοῦ περιζέοντος, τὴν 10 δὲ μολίβδου ψυχροτάτην, ἄλλην δὲ τραχεῖαν σιδήρου· καὶ τινὰς ἐφεστάναι δαίμονας ὥσπερ οἱ χαλκεῖς ὀργάνοις ἀναλαμβάνοντας καὶ καθιέντας ἐν μέρει τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν δι' ἀπληστίαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν πονηρῶν. Ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ χρυσῷ 15 διαπύρους καὶ διαφανεῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ φλέγεσθαι γενομένας ἐνέβαλλον εἰς τὴν τοῦ μολίβδου βάπτοντες. ἐκπαγείσας δ' αὐτόθι καὶ γενομένας σκληρὰς ὥσπερ αἱ χάλαι, πάλιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ σιδήρου μεθίστασαν· ἐνταῦθα δὲ μέλαιναί τε δεινῶς ἐγίνοντο, καὶ περικλώμεναι διὰ σκληρότητα καὶ συντριβόμεναι τὰ εἶδη μετ- 20 ἐβαλλον· εἴθ' οὕτω πάλιν εἰς τὸν χρυσὸν ἐκομίζοντο, δεινὰς, ὡς ἔλεγεν, ἐν ταῖς μεταβολαῖς ἀλγηδónας ὑπομένουσαι.

The framework of the story and its general tendency reminds us strongly of the myth of Er in Plato's *Resp.* X. Many of the details, however are of Plutarch's invention. The myth is amply discussed by G. Méautis, *Plutarque, Des délais de la justice divine*, Lausanne 1935, p. 57 ff.

1318—a. On admitting demons as intermediate powers between God and man.

Demonology

Plut. *De defectu oraculorum* 10, 414 F-415 C; 12, the end (416 C):

- 15 Εὐ μὲν οὖν λέγουσι καὶ οἱ λέγοντες, ὅτι Πλάτων τὸ ταῖς γεννωμέναις ποιότησιν ὑποκείμενον στοιχεῖον ἐξευρών, ὃ νῦν ὕλην καὶ φύσιν καλοῦσιν, πολλῶν ἀπῆλ-
λαξε καὶ μεγάλων ἀποριῶν τοὺς φιλοσόφους· ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι πλείονας λῦσαι
20 καὶ μείζονας ἀπορίας οἱ τὸ τῶν δαιμόνων γένος ἐν μέσῳ * θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τρόπον τινὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν ἡμῶν συνάγον εἰς ταῦτ' οὐ καὶ συνάπττον ἐξευρόντες·
εἴτε μάγων τῶν περὶ Ζωροάστρην ὁ λόγος οὗτός ἐστιν, εἴτε Θοράκιος ἀπ' Ὀρφείως εἴτ' Αἰγύπτιος ἢ Φρύγιος, ὡς τεκμαιρόμεθα ταῖς ἐκατέρωθι τελεταῖς
25 ἀναμειγμένα πολλὰ θνητὰ καὶ πένθιμα τῶν ὀργιαζομένων καὶ δρωμένων ἱερῶν ὁρῶντες. Ἑλλήνων δ' Ὀμηρος μὲν ἔτι φαίνεται κοινῶς ἀμφοτέροις χρώμενος τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἔστιν ὅτε δαίμονας προσαγορεύων ¹. Ἡσίοδος δὲ καθαρῶς καὶ διωρισμένως πρῶτος ἐξέθηκε τῶν λογικῶν τέσσαρα γένη, θεοὺς εἴτα δαί-
5 μονας εἴθ' ἥρωας, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώπους, ἐξ ὧν εὖικε ποιεῖν τὴν μεταβολήν, τοῦ μὲν χρυσοῦ γένους εἰς δαίμονας πολλοὺς ἀγαθοὺς, τῶν δ' ἡμιθέων εἰς ἥρωας ἀποκριθέντων ². Ἔτεροι δὲ μεταβολὴν τοῖς τε σώμασιν ὁμοίως ποιοῦσι καὶ ταῖς
10 ψυχαῖς, ὥσπερ [γὰρ] ἐκ γῆς ὕδωρ, ἐκ δὲ ὕδατος ἀήρ, ἐκ δ' ἀέρος πῦρ γεννώμενον ὁράται, τῆς οὐσίας ἄνω φερομένης· οὕτως ἐκ μὲν ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἥρωας, ἐκ δὲ ἡρώων εἰς δαίμονας αἱ βελτίονες ψυχαὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν λαμβάνουσιν ³. Ἐκ δὲ δαιμόνων ὀλίγαι μὲν ἐν χρόνῳ πολλῶ δι' ἀρετῆς καθαρθεῖσαι παντάπασιν
15 θειότητος μετέσχον· ἐνίσαις δὲ συμβαίνει μὴ κρατεῖν ἑαυτῶν, ἀλλ' ὑφιεμέναις καὶ ἀναδυομέναις πάλιν σώμασι θνητοῖς, ἀλαμπῇ καὶ ἀμυδρᾷ ζωὴν ὥσπερ ἀναθυμιάσιν ἴσχειν.

As to the lifetime of these beings, different views are put forward. The essential point, however, is that their existence must be admitted.

- 25 Καὶ γὰρ ἂν πλείων ὁ χρόνος ἦ, καὶ ἐλάττων καὶ τεταγμένος καὶ ἄτακτος, ἢ ἐν ᾧ μεταλλάττει δαίμονος ψυχὴ καὶ ἥρωος βίος, οὐδὲν ἥττον ἐφ' ᾧ βούλεται δεδεῖξεται μετὰ μαρτύρων σοφῶν καὶ παλαιῶν, ὅτι φύσεις εἰσὶ τινες ὥσπερ

* ἐν μέσῳ θέντες Eus.

¹ E.g. *Ilias* III 420, where Aphrodite is called a δαίμων.

² Hes. *Erga* 159 f. was explained by Plato in this sense (*Resp.* V 468e-469b; *Crat.* 397e-398c). Cp. O. Reverdin, *La religion de la cité platonicienne*, p. 128 ff.

³ Flacelière in his commentary on the *De def. orac.* thinks of *Epinomis* 984d. But there the argument is different. Cp. our nr. 431a (vol. II) and the literature cited there. Also G. Soury, *La démonologie de Plutarque*, p. 24 f.

ἐν μεθορίῳ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, δεχόμεναι πάθη θνητὰ καὶ μεταβολὰς ἀναγκαίαις, οὓς δαίμονας ὀρθῶς ἔχει κατὰ νόμον πατέρων ἡγουμένους καὶ ὀνομάζοντας 5 σέβεσθαι.

b. Plutarchus mentions Xenocrates as a source of these theories. The moon is described as a mixed body which parallels the demons.

De def. orac. 13, 416 D-F:

Παράδειγμα δὲ τῷ λόγῳ Ξενοκράτης μὲν, ὁ Πλάτωνος ἐταῖρος, ἐποιήσατο τὸ τῶν τριγώνων, θεῖω μὲν ἀπεικάσας τὸ ἰσόπλευρον, θνητῷ δὲ τὸ σκαληνόν, τὸ δ' ἰσοσκελὲς δαιμονίῳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἴσον πάντῃ, τὸ δ' ἄνισον πάντῃ· τὸ δ' 10 πῇ μὲν ἴσον, πῇ δ' ἄνισον, ὥσπερ ἡ δαιμόνων φύσις ἔχουσα καὶ πάθος θνητοῦ καὶ θεοῦ δύναμιν. Ἡ δὲ φύσις αἰσθητὰς εἰκόνας ἐξέθηκε καὶ ὁμοιότητας ὀρωμένας, θεῶν μὲν ἥλιον καὶ ἄστρα, θνητῶν δὲ σέλα καὶ κομήτας καὶ διάττοντας. 15 Ὡς Εὐριπίδης εἵκασεν, ἐν οἷς εἶπεν·

‘Ο δ’ ἄρτι θάλλων σάρκα, διοπετὴς ὅπως
ἀστὴρ ἀπέσβη, πνεῦμ’ ἀφείς εἰς αἰθέρα.¹

Μικτὸν δὲ σῶμα καὶ μίμημα δαιμόνιον ὄντως τὴν σελήνην, τῷ τῇ τούτου τοῦ γένους συνάδειν περιφορᾷ, φθίσεις φαινομένας δεχομένην καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ μετα- 20 βολὰς, ὀρώντες οἱ μὲν ἄστρον γεῶδες, οἱ δ’ ὀλυμπίαν γῆν², οἱ δὲ χθονίας ὁμοῦ καὶ οὐρανίας κληῖρον Ἑκάτης προσεῖπον. Ὡσπερ οὖν εἰ τὸν ἀέρα τις ἀνέλοι καὶ ἀποσπάσειε τὸν μεταξὺ γῆς καὶ σελήνης, τὴν ἐνότητα διαλύσει καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν 25 τοῦ παντὸς ἐν μέσῳ κενῆς καὶ ἀσυνδέτου χώρας γενομένης, οὕτως οἱ δαιμόνων γένος μὴ ἀπολείποντες, ἀνεπίμικτα τὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ποιοῦσι καὶ 1 ἀσυνάλλακτα, τὴν ἐρμηνευτικὴν, ὡς Πλάτων ἔλεγεν³, καὶ διακονικὴν ἀναιροῦντες φύσιν, ἣ πάντα φύρειν ἅμα καὶ ταράττειν ἀναγκάζουσιν ἡμᾶς τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνους πάθεσι καὶ πράγμασι τὸν θεὸν ἐμβιβάζοντας, καὶ κατασπώντας ἐπὶ τὰς χρεῖας, 5 ὥσπερ αἱ Θετταλαὶ λέγονται τὴν σελήνην.

On “the air between the earth and the moon” as the dwelling-place of “souls” or daemons, cp. Philo, above, our nr. 1304. There, the “souls” or angels are also introduced as spirits serving God (ὕπηρετιδες καὶ διάκονοι).

c. The function of the demons on earth.

Ib., c. 13, 417 AB:

Ἡμεῖς δὲ μήτε μαντείας τινὰς ἀθειάστους εἶναι λέγοντας, ἢ τελετὰς καὶ ὀργασμοὺς ἀμελουμένους ὑπὸ θεῶν, ἀκούωμεν· μήτ’ αὖ πάλιν τὸν θεὸν ἐν τούτοις ἀναστρέφεσθαι καὶ παρεῖναι καὶ συμπραγματεύεσθαι δοξάζωμεν, ἀλλ’ 15

¹ Fr. 971 Nauck.

² The expression γῆν ὀλυμπίαν is also used in the *De facie*, 935c. Cp. also *De facie* 943e: οἷον ἄστρου σύγγραμμα καὶ γῆς οὖσαν (sc. τ. σελήνην).

³ *Symp.* 202e: Ἑρμηνεῖον (πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον) καὶ διαπορθμεῖον θεοῖς τὰ παρ’ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν.

οἷς δίκαιόν ἐστι ταῦτα λειτουργοῖς θεῶν ἀνατιθέντες ὥσπερ ὑπηρέταις καὶ γραμματεῦσι, δαίμονας νομίζωμεν ἐπισκόπους θείων + ἱερῶν καὶ μυστηρίων ὀργαστάς· ἄλλους δὲ τῶν ὑπερηφάνων καὶ μεγάλων τιμωροὺς ἀδικιῶν περιπολεῖν.

Cp. *infra*, *De facie* c. 30, under nr. 1319c.

d. Older traces of the doctrine.

De def. orac. 17, 419 A:

Πρὸς ταῦτα τοῦ Ἡρακλέωνος σιωπῇ διανοομένου τι πρὸς αὐτόν, “Ἀλλὰ φαύλους μὲν,” ἔφη, “δαίμονας οὐκ ἔμπεδοκλῆς μόνον, ὧς Ἡρακλέων, ἀπέλιπεν, 5 ἀλλὰ καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Χρύσιππος· ἔτι δὲ Δημόκριτος, εὐχόμενος εὐλόγῃων εἰδῶλων τυγχάνειν, δῆλος ἦν ἕτερα δυστράπελα καὶ μοχθηρὰς γινώσκων ἔχοντα προαιρέσεις τινὰς καὶ ὁρμάς.” —

As to Empedocles, cp. fr. 115 Diels (our nr. 116a); Democritus fr. 166 Diels (Gr. Ph. 143d). Plato, *Symp.* 202e is cited in n. 3 on this page. For Xenocrates, see Heinze, *Xenocr.* p. 89 ff.; for Chrysippus, Von Arnim, *SVF* II nr. 1104.

1319—In the myth of the *De facie*, which we cited above when dealing with Posidonius (nr. 1192d), is found the tripartition of man into body, soul and spirit.

a. Plut., *De facie in orbe lunae* 28, 943 AB:

Noûs is
superior
to soul

15 Τὸν ἄνθρωπον οἱ πολλοὶ σύνθετον μὲν ὀρθῶς, ἐκ δυοῖν δὲ μόνων σύνθετον οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡγοῦνται· μόριον γὰρ εἶναι πῶς ψυχῆς οἴονται τὸν νοῦν, οὐδὲν ἥττον ἐκείνων ἀμαρτάνοντες, οἷς ἡ ψυχὴ δοκεῖ μόριον εἶναι τοῦ σώματος· νοῦς γὰρ ψυχῆς ὅσῳ ψυχὴ σώματος ἁμεινόν ἐστι καὶ θεióτερον· ποιεῖ δὲ ἡ 20 μὲν ψυχῆς <καὶ σώματος μῖξις αἴσθησιν, ἡ δὲ νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς> * σύνοδος λόγον, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἡδονῆς ἀρχὴ καὶ πόνου, τὸ δ' ἄρετῆς καὶ κακίας. Τριῶν δὲ τούτων συμπαγόντων, τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἡ γῆ, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἡ σελήνη, τὸν δὲ νοῦν ὁ ἥλιος 1 παρέσχεν εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, . . . ** ὥσπερ αὖ τῇ σελήνῃ τὸ φέγγος. “Ὀν δ' ἀποθνήσκομεν θάνατον, ὁ μὲν ἐκ τριῶν δύο ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὁ δὲ ἐν ἐκ δυοῖν· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ τῆς Δήμητρος, . . . *** ἐν αὐτῇ τελεῖν, καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς 5 Ἀθηναῖοι Δημητρεῖους ὠνόμαζον τὸ παλαιόν· ὁ δ' ἐν τῇ σελήνῃ τῆς Περσεφόνης ¹.

The moon
the abode
of souls

b. The moon is the place where souls are punished for their sins, while on another side of it are the Elysian fields.

+ θείων Reiske, followed by Flacelière; θεῶν codd.

* Suppl. Pohlenz.

** Lacuna of 7 letters.

*** Lacuna of 22 letters, filled by Cherniss as follows: <διὸ τελευτᾶν λέγεται τὸν βίον αὐτῇ τελεῖν. Before τῆς Δήμητρος Madvig supplied γῆ.

¹ Kore or Persephone, according to the myth (942d), should not be placed in the same regions as Demeter, but the latter rules the earth, while Persephone governs the moon.

Ib., c. 29, 944 BC:

Ἐκφοβεῖ δ' αὐτάς (sc. τὰς τῶν κολαζομένων ψυχάς) καὶ τὸ καλούμενον πρόσωπον, ὅταν ἐγγὺς γένωνται, βλοσυρόν τι καὶ φρικῶδες ὁρώμενον. Ἔστι δ' οὐ τοιοῦτον· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἡ παρ' ἡμῖν ἔχει γῆ κόλπους βαθεῖς καὶ μεγάλους, 25 ἓνα μὲν ἐνταῦθα διὰ στηλῶν Ἑρακλείων ἀναχέομενον εἶσω πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἔξω 1 δὲ τὸν Κάσπιον καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὴν Ἐρυθρὰν θάλατταν, οὕτω βάθη ταῦτα τῆς σελήνης ἐστὶ καὶ κοιλάματα· καλοῦσι δ' αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν μέγιστον Ἑκάτης μυχόν, ὅπου καὶ δίκας διδῶσιν αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ λαμβάνουσιν, ὧν ἂν ἤδη γεγεννη- 5 μέναι δαίμονες ἢ πάθωσιν ἢ δράσωσι· τὰ δὲ δύο, μακρὰ *· περαιοῦνται γὰρ αἱ ψυχαὶ δι' αὐτῶν, νῦν μὲν εἰς τὰ πρὸς οὐρανὸν τῆς σελήνης, νῦν δὲ πάλιν εἰς τὰ πρὸς γῆν· ὀνομάζεσθαι δὲ τὰ μὲν πρὸς οὐρανὸν τῆς σελήνης Ἡλύσιον πεδίον, 10 τὰ δ' ἐνταῦθα Φερσεφόνης οὐκ ἀντίχθονος¹.

In this chapter again Xenocrates, and to a certain extent Plato, are mentioned as the authors of the theory that the moon has a "mixed" nature, intermediate between the earth and the fiery nature of the sun, Xenocrates holding that both the stars and the sun are of a fiery nature, while Plato held that no body is visible unless it is mixed up with a certain, however small, part of earth.

The function
of daemons
on the earth

c. Here again the function of the daemons on earth is mentioned.

Ib., c. 30, 944 CD:

Οὐκ αἰεὶ δὲ διατρίβουσιν ἐπ' αὐτὴν οἱ δαίμονες, ἀλλὰ χρηστηρίων δεῦρο κατίασιν ἐπιμελησόμενοι, καὶ ταῖς ἀνωτάτω συμπάρεισι καὶ συνοργαζόουσι τῶν τελετῶν, κολασταὶ τε γίνονται καὶ φύλακες ἀδίκημάτων, καὶ σωτῆρες 15 ἔν τε πολέμοις καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ἐπιλάμπουσιν· ὅ τι ἂν μὴ καλῶς περὶ ταῦτα πράξωσιν, ἀλλὰ ὑπ' ὀργῆς ἢ πρὸς ἄδικον χάριν ἢ φθόνῳ, δίκην τίνουσιν· ὠθοῦνται γὰρ αὖθις ἐπὶ γῆν συρρηγνύμενοι σώμασιν ἀνθρωπίνους.

The myth is discussed by R. M. Jones, *The Platonism of Plutarch*, p. 49-56. Recent literature:

W. Hamilton, *Class. Quart.* 28 (1934), p. 25 ff.

Also G. Soury, *Mort et initiation*. Sur quelques sources de Plutarque, *De facie* 943 CD, in *Revue des Et. grecques* 53 (1940), p. 51-58.

1320'—Another account of daemons and their genesis is found in the story of Timarchus.

Plut., *De genio Socratis* 22, 591 C-F:

Timarchus was a young friend and disciple of Socrates who, after the master's death, went to the oracle of Trophonius to inquire about the daimonion. He stayed

* τὰ δὲ δύο μακρὰ <τὰς Πύλας> Cherniss.

¹ P. Rainuard in his commentary on the *De facie* thinks that the Persephone of the moon is distinguished from another Persephone in the Antichthon. Perhaps the text is not sound and should be read without the negation. Zuntz (in *Rhein. Mus.* 1953, p. 233) suggested οὐδος ἀντιχθόνιος.

in the cave for two days and in his dreams saw a vision of the world hereafter. Over him he saw isles flooded by a soft light, beneath a dark and wide gap (μέγα χάσμα), whence wailings and lamentations were heard. A voice gave him the following explanation.

“Αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλαι νῆσοι θεοὺς ἔχουσι· σελήνη δὲ δαιμόνων ἐπιχθονίων
 30 οὖσα φεύγει τὴν Στύγα μικρὸν ὑπερφέρουσα· λαμβάνεται δὲ ἅπαξ ἐν μέτροις
 1 δευτέροις ἑκατὸν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐπτά· καὶ τῆς Στυγὸς ἐπιφερομένης αἱ ψυχὰι
 βοῶσι δειμαίνουσαι· πολλὰς γὰρ ὁ “Αἰδης ἀφαρπάζει περιολισθανούσας· ἄλλας
 5 δ’ ἀνακομίζεται κάτωθεν ἡ σελήνη προσηγομένης, αἷς εἰς καιρὸν ἡ τῆς γενέσεως
 τελευτῇ ἐνέπεσε, πλὴν ὅσαι μιαιφαί καὶ ἀκάθαρτοι· ταύτας δ’ ἀστράπτουσα
 καὶ μυκωμένη φοβερὸν οὐκ ἔξ πελάζειν, ἀλλὰ θρηνοῦσαι τὸν ἑαυτῶν πότμον
 ἀποσφαλλόμεναι φέρονται κάτω πάλιν ἐπ’ ἄλλην γένεσιν, ὡς ὀρέξ.” “Ἄλλ’
 οὐδὲν ὀρώ”, τὸν Τίμαρχον εἰπεῖν, “ἡ πολλοὺς ἀστέρας περὶ τὸ χάσμα παλλομένους,
 10 ἐτέρους δὲ καταδυομένους εἰς αὐτό, τοὺς δὲ ἄττοντας αὐτὸ κάτωθεν.” “Αὐτοὺς
 ἄρα”, φάναι, “τοὺς δαίμονας ὀρῶν ἀγνοεῖς.” Ἐχει γὰρ ὧδε· ψυχὴ πᾶσα νοῦ μετ-
 ἔσχεν· ἄλογος δὲ καὶ ἄνους οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀλλ’ ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς σαρκὶ μιχθῇ καὶ πάθῃσιν,
 15 ἄλλοιούμενον τρέπεται καθ’ ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀλγηδόνας εἰς τὸ ἄλογον. Μίγνυται δ’
 οὐ πᾶσα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον· ἀλλ’ αἱ μὲν ὅλαι κατέδυσαν εἰς σῶμα, καὶ δι’ ὧν
 ἀναταραχθεῖσαι τὸ σύμπαν ὑπὸ παθῶν διαφέρονται κατὰ τὸν βίον· αἱ δὲ πῇ
 μὲν ἀνεκράθησαν, πῇ δ’ ἔλιπον ἔξω τὸ καθαρώτατον, οὐκ ἐπισπώμενον, ἀλλ’
 20 οἷον ἀκρόπλου ἐπιψαῦον ἐκ κεφαλῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καθάπερ ἐν βυθῷ δεδυκότος
 ἄρτημα κορυφαῖον, ὀρθουμένης περὶ αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνέχον ὅσον ὑπακούει
 καὶ οὐ κρατεῖται τοῖς πάθεσιν. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑποβρύχιον ἐν τῷ σώματι φερόμενον
 ψυχὴ λέγεται. τὸ δὲ φθορᾶς λειφθὲν οἱ πολλοὶ Νοῦν καλοῦντες ἐντὸς εἶναι
 25 νομίζουσιν αὐτῶν*, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐσόπτροις τὰ φαινόμενα κατ’ ἀνταύγειαν·
 οἱ δ’ ὀρθῶς ὑπονοοῦντες, ὡς ἐκτὸς ὄντα Δαίμονα προσαγορεύουσι. Τοὺς μὲν
 οὖν ἀποσβέννυσθαι δοκοῦντας ἀστέρας, ὧ Τίμαρχε,” φάναι, “τάς εἰς σῶμα κατα-
 30 δυομένας ὅλας ψυχὰς ὀρᾶν νόμιζε· τοὺς δὲ οἷον ἀναλάμποντας πάλιν καὶ ἀνα-
 φαινομένους κάτωθεν, ἀγλύν τινα καὶ ζόφον ὥσπερ πηλὸν ἀποσειομένους,
 1 τὰς ἐκ τῶν σωμάτων ἐπαναπλεούσας μετὰ τὸν θάνατον· οἱ δ’ ἄνω διαφερό-
 μενοι δαίμονές εἰσι τῶν νοῦν ἔχειν λεγομένων ἀνθρώπων.”

Here, then, it is the higher part of man, *Noús*, which is called *Daemon*. Cp. the above-cited passage of Philo in *De gigantibus* 2, 8 (our nr. 1292a) where it is said that each of the “souls” or angels is νοῦς ἀκραϊνέστατος.

Literature on the myth:

W. Hamilton, *The myth in Plutarch's De genio*, *Class. Quart.* 28 (1934), p. 175 ff.

Also G. Méautis, *Recherches sur le Pythagorisme*, Neuchâtel 1922.

R. M. Jones, *The Platonism of Plutarch*, Chicago 1916, p. 57 ff.

Heinze, *Xenocr.* 130 f., tried to prove that Posidonius is the source of the myth;

R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog II* p. 160, attributed it to Dicaearchus.

Jones, following Rohde, thinks that Heracl. Ponticus is the source.

* αὐτῶν Bernardakis.

The
hierarchy
of being

1321—Summarizing, we find in Plutarch the following hierarchy:

Νοῦς→ψυχή→σῶμα (nrs. **1319a**, **1320**)

God (τὸ Πρῶτον, τὸ Νοητόν, τὸ Ἀγαθόν (nrs. **1312**, **1313**)→
the daemons (bodiless Souls or Spirits) as intermediate powers)→
man (nrs. **1319b**, c; **1320**).

Jones, *The Platonism of Plutarch* p. 11, noticed that Plut. did not carry the doctrine of the transcendence of God to the same extent as Neoplatonists "or even certain other Platonists or Neopythagoreans": he did not place God above the Νοῦς or νοητόν, or call Him ἄποιος (as Philo did, *Leg. Alleg.* I 51¹; cp. Albinus, *Εἰσαγωγή* 10), or make the Demiurge a second God.—We might reply that in such texts as cited under **1312f.** the distinction between τὸ Πρῶτον (νοητόν) and further νοητά is very near at least, and even that it appears in the following passage of the *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης*, where the δεῦτεροι θεοί are clearly νοητά ranked under the Πρῶτον νοητόν which is God.

The treatise *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* (*De fato*) is not of Plutarch, but (as Ziegler says²) could be so as to the contents.

Three stages
of Providence

a. [Plut.] *De fato* 9, 572 F-573 B:

"Ἔστιν οὖν πρόνοια, ἥ μὲν ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρώτη, τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ νόησις, εἴτε καὶ βούλησις οὕσα εὐεργέτις ἀπάντων, καθ' ἣν πρώτως ἕκαστα τῶν θείων 20 διὰ παντὸς ἀριστά τε καὶ κάλλιστα κεκόσμηται. Ἡ δὲ δευτέρα, δευτέρων θεῶν τῶν κατ' οὐρανὸν ἰόντων, καθ' ἣν τὰ τε θνητὰ γίνεται τεταγμένως καὶ ὅσα πρὸς διαμονὴν καὶ σωτηρίαν ἐκάστων τῶν γενῶν. Τρίτη δ' ἂν εἰκότι ῥηθεῖη πρόνοιά τε καὶ προμήθεια τῶν ὅσοι περὶ γῆν δαίμονες τεταγμένοι τῶν ἀνθρω- 25 πίνων πράξεων φύλακές τε καὶ ἐπίσκοποι εἰσι. Τριττῆς τοίνυν τῆς προνοίας θεωρουμένης, κυριώτατα δὲ καὶ μάλιστα τῆς πρώτης λεγομένης, οὐκ ἂν ὀκνήσαιμεν εἰπεῖν, εἰ καὶ φιλοσόφοις ἀνδράσι τάναντία λέγειν δόξαιμεν, ὥς πάντα 1 μὲν καθ' εἰμαρμένην καὶ κατὰ πρόνοιαν, οὐ μὴν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν· ἀλλ' ἕνια μὲν κατὰ πρόνοιαν καὶ ἄλλα γε κατ' ἄλλην, ἕνια δὲ καθ' εἰμαρμένην. Καὶ ἡ μὲν εἰμαρμένη πάντως κατὰ πρόνοιαν, ἥ δὲ πρόνοια οὐδαμῶς καθ' εἰμαρμένην (ἔστω 5 δ' ὁ λόγος τὰ νῦν περὶ τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀνωτάτω)· τὸ μὲν <γὰρ> κατὰ τι ὕστερον ἐκείνου, καθ' ὃ τι ἂν καὶ λέγεται· οἷον τὸ κατὰ νόμον τοῦ νόμου, καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῆς φύσεως· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ καθ' εἰμαρμένην τῆς εἰμαρμένης νεώτερον ἂν εἴη. Ἡ δ' ἀνωτάτω πρόνοια πρεσβύτατον ἀπάντων, πλὴν οὐπὲρ ἔστιν εἴτε 10 βούλησις εἴτε νόησις εἴτε καὶ ἑκάτερον. Ἔστι δ' ὥς πρότερον εἴρηται τοῦ πάντων πατρός τε καὶ δημιουργοῦ.

Follow quotations from the *Timaeus*: 29d, 41d, 42d. At the end of the chapter *Leg.* 875c is cited, where Plato says that Knowledge and Insight (ἐπιστήμη and νοῦς) are superior to any (written) law or τάξις, "for it is not suitable that Νοῦς should be subjected to anything."

¹ C.W. I p. 73.

² Pauly-Wissowa, *RE* XXI 1, col. 725 f.

b. Ib. 10, 574 B:

Τριττῆς γὰρ οὔσης τῆς προνοίας ἡ μὲν, ἅτε γεννήσασα τὴν εἰμαρμένην, τρόπον τινὰ αὐτὴν περιλαμβάνει· ἡ δὲ συγγεννηθεῖσα τῇ εἰμαρμένῃ πάντως
 15 αὐτῇ συμπεριλαμβάνεται· ἡ δὲ ὡς ὕστερον τῆς εἰμαρμένης γενομένη κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὴ ἐμπεριέχεται ὑπ' αὐτῆς, καθ' ἃ καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἡ τύχη εἴρηται.

Philo, too, distinguished between God and εἰμαρμένη (supra, nr. '1303a).

Cp. also Origenes, *Contra Celsum* IV 99, V 14. The doctrine Celsus opposed to the Christian view of Providence was that the providence of God only aims at the perfection and preservation of the whole, while on earth His power is legated to the daemons, who act as secondary causes in a field where God himself cannot inter-meddle. See our comment on 1279d (supra) and the passages cited there.

1322—Ethics are most systematically dealt with by Plutarch in the treatise *De virtute morali* (Π. ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς). In this writing Aristotelian influence prevails. Elsewhere, much of Plato's thought and also Stoic elements may be found in Plutarch's ethics.

His moral attitude is first of all characterized by what he calls himself *φιλανθρωπία*: love of our fellow-creatures (animals included).

a. Love of one's fellow-men the sum of virtues.

φιλανθρωπία

Plut., *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 34, p. 120 A:

Οὗτος δ' ἐπὶ τῆς εὐανθεστάτης ἡλικίας προαπεφοίτησεν ὁλόκληρος ἡμίθεος,
 15 ζηλωτὸς καὶ περιβλεπτός πᾶσι τοῖς συνήθεσιν αὐτῷ· φιλοπάτωρ γενόμενος καὶ φιλομήτωρ καὶ φιλοίκειος καὶ φιλόσοφος, τὸ δὲ σύμπαν εἶπεῖν, φιλόανθρωπος.

b. Τὸ φιλόανθρωπον καὶ φιλόκαλον is that which honours a man.

Plut., *An seni respubl. gerenda sit* 1, p. 783 D:

(Not tyranny) πολιτεία δὲ δημοκρατικὴ καὶ νόμιμος ἀνδρὸς εἰθισμένου παρ-
 15 ἔχειν αὐτὸν οὐχ ἥττον ἀρχόμενον ὠφελίμως ἢ ἀρχοντα, καλὸν ἐντάφιον ὡς ἀληθῶς τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ βίου δόξαν τῷ θανάτῳ προστίθησι· τοῦτο γὰρ "ἔσχατον δύεται κατὰ γᾶς", ὥς φησι Σιμωνίδης¹, πλὴν ὧν προαποθνήσκει τὸ φιλάν-
 20 θρωπον καὶ φιλόκαλον, καὶ προαπαυδᾷ τῆς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπιθυμίας ὁ τῶν καλῶν ζῆλος, ὡς τὰ πρακτικὰ μέρη καὶ θεῖα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξιτηλότερα τῶν παθη-
 τικῶν καὶ σωματικῶν ἐχούσης· ὅπερ οὐδὲ λέγειν καλόν· οὐδ' ἀποδέχεσθαι [δεῖ] τῶν λεγόντων ὡς κερδαίνοντες μόνον οὐ κοπιῶμεν·—

c. Cp. Plut., *Cons. ad uxorem* 2, p. 608 D:

5 Αὐτὴ δὲ (sc. the little daughter he lost and who was particularly dear to him) ... θαυμαστὴν ἔσχεν εὐκολίαν καὶ πρᾶξι, καὶ τὸ ἀντιφιλοῦν καὶ χαριζόμενον αὐτῆς, ἡδονὴν ἅμα καὶ κατανόησιν τοῦ φιλανθρώπου παρεῖχεν·—

¹ Fr. 59 Diehl.

Illustrations

1323—Besides the passages where the term φιλάνθρωπία or τὸ φιλάνθρωπον is explicitly used, there is quite a number of passages where the matter itself is described with practical details.

a. The true statesman is φιλάνθρωπος, says Plut. (*An seni gerenda sit resp.* 26, p. 796 E). And here are the details.

Plut., *Praecepta gerendae rei publ.* 32, p. 824 D:

Λείπεται δὴ τῷ πολιτικῷ μόνον ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἔργων, ὃ μηδενὸς ἔλαττόν ἐστι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὁμόνοιαν ἐμποιεῖν καὶ φιλίαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀεὶ 5 τοῖς συνοικοῦσιν, ἔριδας δὲ καὶ διχοφροσύνας καὶ δυσμένειαν ἐξαιρεῖν ἅπασαν, ὥσπερ ἐν φίλων διαφοραῖς, τὸ μᾶλλον οἰόμενον ἀδικεῖσθαι μέρος ἐξομιλοῦντα πρότερον καὶ συναδικεῖσθαι δοκοῦντα καὶ συναγανακτεῖν, εἴτα οὕτως ἐπιχει- 10 ροῦντα πραῦναι καὶ διδάσκειν ὅτι τῶν βιάζεσθαι καὶ νικᾶν ἐριζόντων οἱ παρέντες οὐκ ἐπιεικέα καὶ ἡθεῖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι καὶ μεγέθει ψυχῆς διαφέρουσι, καὶ μικρὸν ὑφιέμενοι νικῶσιν ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις καὶ μεγίστοις· ἔπειτα καὶ καθ' ἓνα καὶ κοινῇ διδάσκοντα καὶ φράζοντα τὴν τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν 15 πραγμάτων ἀσθένειαν, ἧς ἐναπολαῦσαι ἄμεινόν ἐστι τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσι, καὶ μεθ' ἡσυχίας καὶ ὁμοιοῦς καταβιῶναι, μηδὲν ἐν μέσῳ τῆς τύχης ἄθλον ὑπολελοι- πύιας. —

And, if a στάσις has arisen,—

Οὐδενὸς ἤττον τῷ πολιτικῷ προσήκει ταῦτ' ἰᾶσθαι καὶ προκαταλαμβάνειν, 5 ὅπως τὰ μὲν οὐδὲ ὅλως ἔσται, τὰ δὲ παύσεται ταχέως, τὰ δ' οὐ λήψεται μέγεθος, οὐδὲ ἄψεται τῶν δημοσίων, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτοῖς μενεῖ τοῖς διαφερομένοις, αὐτόν τε προσέχοντα καὶ φράζοντα τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἴδια κοινῶν καὶ μικρὰ μεγάλων 10 αἵτια καθίσταται, παροφθέντα καὶ μὴ τυχόντα θεραπείας ἐν ἀρχῇ μηδὲ παρηγορίας.

b. He rebukes Cato for his brutish treatment of slaves.

Plut., *Cato maior* 5 (p. 338 F-339 A):

Πλὴν τὸ τοῖς οἰκέταις ὡς ὑποζυγίοις ἀποχρησάμενον ἐπὶ γήρῳ ἐλαύνειν καὶ πιπράσκειν ἀτενοῦς ἄγαν ἥθους ἐγὼ τίθεμαι καὶ μηδὲν ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς 20 ἀνθρώπῳ οἰόμενον κοινῶνῃμα τῆς χρείας πλέον ὑπάρχειν. Καίτοι τὴν χρηστότητα τῆς δικαιοσύνης πλατύτερον τόπον ὀρώμεν ἐπιλαμβανούσαν· νόμῳ μὲν γάρ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους μόνον χρῆσθαι πεφύκαμεν, πρὸς εὐεργεσίας δὲ καὶ χάριτας ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ὥσπερ ἐκ πηγῆς πλουσίας 25 ἀπορρεῖ τῆς ἡμερότητας. Καὶ γὰρ ἵππων ἀπειρηκότων ὑπὸ πόνου τροφαὶ καὶ κυνῶν οὐ σκυλακεῖται μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ γηροκομῖαι τῷ χρηστῷ προσήκουσιν.

c. Very characteristic is the following passage.

Pericles 38, p. 173 BC:

"Ἦδη δὲ πρὸς τῷ τελευτᾷ ὄντος αὐτοῦ περικαθήμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν οἱ βέλτιστοι καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ περιόντες λόγον ἐποιοῦντο τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, ὅση γένοιτο, καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀνεμετροῦντο καὶ τῶν τροπαίων τὸ πλῆθος· ἐννέα γὰρ ἦν αὐτῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ νικῶν ἔστησεν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως. Ταῦτα ὡς οὐκέτι συνιέντος, ἀλλὰ καθηρημένου τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτοῦ διελέγοντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους· ὁ δὲ πᾶσιν ἐτύγχανε τὸν νοῦν προσεσχηκῶς καὶ φθεγξάμενος εἰς μέσον ἔφη θαυμάζειν, ὅτι ταῦτα μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ μνημονεύουσιν, 10 αὐτὸς καὶ πρὸς τύχην ἐστὶ κοινὰ καὶ γέγονεν ἤδη πολλοῖς στρατηγοῖς, τὸ δὲ κάλλιστον καὶ μέγιστον οὐ λέγουσιν. "Οὐδεὶς γάρ," ἔφη, "δὲ ἐμὲ τῶν ὄντων Ἀθηναίων μέλαν ἱμάτιον περιεβάλετο."

R. Hirzel, who wrote an excellent chapter on Plutarch's "philanthropia", says: "Wer überhaupt durch die Schriften Plutarchs in seinen Freundes- und Familienkreis hineinblickt, hat den Eindruck in ein Heiligtum der Philanthropie zu blicken" (*Plutarch* p. 29).

The same author noticed the difference between *humanitas* as "erhöhtes menschliches Selbstgefühl" and *philanthropia*: the latter can also be said of the Gods and of animals, and, in fact, is often used so, while *humanitas* can only be predicated of man ¹.

1324—Plut.'s attitude towards women and marriage bears strongly the stamp of φιλοφροσύνη. **Women and marriage**

a. Plut., *De fraterno amore* 21, op. 491 D-F:

A man must care for his brothers, their friends and relatives, but his brother's wife he should venerate and honour as the most holy thing of all.

Ἐπιμέλεια δὲ καλὴ μὲν αὐτῶν τῶν ἀδελφῶν, ἔτι δὲ καλλίων πενθεροῖς 20 καὶ γαμβροῖς τοῖς ἐκείνων εὖνουν αἰεὶ παρέχειν εἰς ἅπαντα καὶ πρόθυμον ἑαυτόν, οἰκέτας τε φιλοδεσπότους ἀσπάζεσθαι, καὶ φιλοφρονεῖσθαι, καὶ χάριν ἔχειν ἱατροῖς θεραπεύσασιν αὐτοὺς καὶ φίλοις πιστοῖς καὶ προθύμως συνδι- 25 ἑνεγκοῦσιν ἀποδημίαν ἢ στρατείαν· γυναῖκα δ' ἀδελφοῦ γαμετὴν ὡς ἀπάντων 1 φημεῖν, ἀμελουμένη δὲ συναγανακτεῖν, χαλεπαίνουσιν δὲ πραῖναι· ἂν δ' ἀμάρτη τι τῶν μετρίων, συνδιαλλάττειν καὶ συμπαρακαλεῖν τὸν ἄνδρα· καὶ αὐτῷ τις ἰδίᾳ γένηται διαφορὰ πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν, αἰτιᾶσθαι παρ' ἐκείνῃ καὶ 5 διαλύεσθαι τὴν μέμψιν· ἀγαμίαν δ' ἀδελφοῦ καὶ ἀπαιδίαν μάλιστα δυσχεραίνειν, καὶ παρακαλοῦντα καὶ λοιδοροῦντα, συνελαύνειν πανταχόθεν εἰς γάμον καὶ συνειργνύναι νομίμοις κηδεύμασι· κτησαμένου δὲ παῖδας ἐμφανέστερον 10 χρῆσθαι τῇ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐνοίᾳ καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τιμῇ.

¹ R. Hirzel, *Plutarch* p. 24.

* <ἂν μὲν φιλοστέργως πρὸς αὐτὴν ἔχη> Pohlenz.

b. *Cato Maior* 20, p. 347 F:

Plut. praises Cato as *περὶ γυναῖκα χρηστὸς ἀνὴρ* and illustrates this by the following description.

Τὸν δὲ τύπτοντα γαμετὴν ἢ παῖδα τοῖς ἀγιωτάτοις ἔλεγεν ἱεροῖς προσφέρειν τὰς χεῖρας. Ἐν ἐπαίνῳ δὲ μείζονι τίθεσθαι τὸ γαμέτην ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ μέγαν εἶναι συγκλητικόν· ἐπεὶ καὶ Σωκράτους οὐδὲν ἄλλο θαυμάζειν τοῦ παλαιοῦ πλὴν ὅτι γυναικὶ χαλεπῇ καὶ παισὶν ἀποπλήκτοις χρώμενος ἐπιεικῶς καὶ πρῶως διετέλεσε. Γενομένου δὲ τοῦ παιδὸς οὐδὲν ἦν ἔργον οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ μὴ τι δημόσιον, ὥς μὴ παρεῖναι τῇ γυναικὶ λουούσῃ τὸ βρέφος καὶ σπαργανούσῃ.

The
coniugalia
praecepta

c. Sexual love is not stable unless it is fed and established by personal affection.

Plut., *Coniugalia praecepta* 4 (I38 F):

Ὡςπερ τὸ πῦρ ἐξάπτεται μὲν εὐχερῶς ἐν ἀχύροις [καὶ θρυαλλίδι] καὶ θριξὶ λαγώαις, σβέννυται δὲ τάχιον, ἂν μὴ τινος ἐτέρου δυναμένου στέγειν ἅμα καὶ τρέφειν ἐπιλάβηται, οὕτω τὸν ἀπὸ σώματος καὶ ὥρας ὀξὺν ἔρωτα τῶν νεογάμων 25 ἀναφλεγόμενον, δεῖ μὴ διαρκῇ μηδὲ βέβαιον νομίζειν, ἂν μὴ περὶ τὸ ἦθος ἰδρυθεῖς, καὶ τοῦ φρονούντος ἀψάμενος ἔμψυχον λάβῃ διάθεσιν.

d. A man should share his spiritual life with his wife.

Ib. 48 (I45 BC):

Καὶ σὺ μὲν ὦραν ἔχων ἤδη φιλοσοφεῖν, τοῖς μετ' ἀποδείξεως καὶ κατασκευῆς λεγομένοις ἐπικόσμει τὸ ἦθος, ἐντυγχάνων [καὶ πλησιάζων] τοῖς 5 ὠφελοῦσι· τῇ δὲ γυναικὶ πανταχόθεν τὸ χρήσιμον συνάγων, ὥσπερ αἱ μέλιται, καὶ φέρων αὐτὸς ἐν σεαυτῷ, μεταδίδου καὶ προσδιαλέγου φίλους αὐτῇ ποιῶν καὶ συνήθεις τῶν λόγων τοὺς ἀρίστους· “Πατὴρ” μὲν γὰρ “ἐσσί” αὐτῇ

καὶ πότνια μήτηρ,

10

ἣδὲ κασίγνητος.¹

Οὐχ ἦττον δὲ σεμνὸν ἀκοῦσαι γαμετῆς λεγούσης· “Ἄνερ, ἀτὰρ σὺ μοὶ ἐσσι καθηγητὴς καὶ φιλόσοφος καὶ διδάσκαλος τῶν καλλίστων καὶ θειοτάτων.” Τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα πρῶτον ἀφίστησι τῶν ἀτόπων τὰς γυναῖκας· αἰσχυν- 15 θήσεται γὰρ ὀρχεῖσθαι γυνὴ γεωμετρεῖν μανθάνουσα, καὶ φαρμάκων ἐπωδὰς οὐ προσδέξεται, τοῖς Πλάτωνος ἐπαδομένη λόγοις καὶ τοῖς Ξενοφῶντος· ἂν δέ τις ἐπαγγέλληται καθαιρεῖν τὴν σελήνην, γελάσεται τὴν ἀμαθίαν καὶ τὴν ἐβελτηρίαν τῶν ταῦτα πειθομένων γυναικῶν.

¹ An adaptation of the well-known words of Andromache to Hector, *Iliad* VI 429.

4—MIDDLE PLATONISM: ALBINUS, APULEIUS, MAXIMUS OF TYRUS

In the second century Platonism is concentrated in at least three centres: (1) Athens. Here *Calvisius Taurus* (mentioned by Gellius I 26) was the head of the Academy under Hadrian and Antoninus. He was probably succeeded by *Atticus*, under Marcus Aurelius. (2) Pergamum, where *Gaius* was heard by Galenus¹, and Smyrna where Albinus had his School². Also *Theon* belongs to this group and probably the author of the anonymous commentary on the Theaetetus. (3) Alexandria. Probably *Celsus* lived here, and in any case *Ammonius Saccas*, the teacher of Plotinus. Maximus of Tyrus engaged in philosophy at Rome. Also Nigrinus (known to us by Lucianus' portrait) lived there.³

Platonism
in the 2nd
century

1325—The Academy of the second century appears to have been hostile towards Aristotle. Of Atticus, we have long fragments in Eusebius' *Praeparatio*, where he opposes the habit of introducing Aristotelian elements into Platonism, a habit which (as we saw) dates from the first century B.C. (Antiochus of Ascalon, who was followed by Arius Didymus) and was practised for instance by Albinus.

Atticus

a. Euseb., *Praep. ev.* XI 1, 2 - 2, 3 (p. 509a-d):

Atticus, opposing the infiltration of Aristotelian doctrine into Platonism, himself ascribes the Stoic tripartition of philosophy to Plato.

His view of
Plato

509a Θήσω δὲ τὰ ἀρέσκοντα Πλάτωνι ἀπὸ τῶν τὰ αὐτοῦ πρεσβεύοντων, ὧν Ἀττικὸς διαφανὴς ἀνὴρ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν φιλοσόφων ὧδέ πη τὰ δοκοῦντα τῶ ἀνδρὶ διέξεισιν, ἐν οἷς ἴσταιαι πρὸς τοὺς διὰ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους τὰ Πλάτωνος ὑπισχνουμένους.

b Τριχῇ τοίνυν διαιρουμένης τῆς ἐντελοῦς φιλοσοφίας, εἷς τε τὸν ἠθικὸν καλούμενον τόπον, καὶ τὸν φυσικόν, καὶ ἔτι τὸν λογικόν, καὶ τοῦ μὲν πρώτου κατασκευάζοντος ἡμῶν ἕκαστον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τοὺς οἴκους ὅλους εἰς c τὸ ἄριστον ἐπανορθοῦντος, ἥδη δὲ καὶ δῆμον σύμπαντα πολιτεία τῇ διαφερούσῃ καὶ νόμοις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις κοσμοῦντος, τοῦ δευτέρου δὲ πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῶν θείων γνῶσιν διήκοντος, αὐτῶν τε τῶν πρώτων, καὶ τῶν αἰτίων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα ἐκ τούτων γίνεται, ἃ δὴ περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν ὁ Πλάτων ὠνόμακεν· εἰς δὲ τὴν περὶ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων διάκρισιν τε καὶ εὑρεσιν τοῦ τρίτου παρα- λαμβανομένου· ὅτι μὲν Πλάτων πρῶτος καὶ μάλιστα συναγείρας εἰς ἐν πάντα τὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας μέρη, τῶς ἐσκεδασμένα καὶ διερριμμένα ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ

¹ V, 41 K.

² Galenus, *ib.*

³ Luc., *Nigr.* 18.

Πενθέως μέλη, καθάπερ εἶπέ τις, σῶμά τι καὶ ζῶον ὁλόκληρον ἀπέφηνε τὴν d φιλοσοφίαν, δῆλα παντὶ λεγόμενα.

I.e. Atticus interprets Plato's philosophy as an organic and complete system.

b. Euseb., *Praep. ev.* XV 3, 1-4, 2; 4, 5 (794a-d, 795c):

Atticus opposes the Peripatetic doctrine that virtue is not sufficient for happiness.

The telos

Τοῦ τε Πλάτωνος . . . τέλος εὐδαιμονίας τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀποφαινομένου, τὴν 794a ἑτέραν ὁδεύσας ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης οὐκ ἄλλως εὐδαιμονία τινὰ φησιν ἔσεσθαι ἢ καὶ διὰ τῆς τοῦ σώματος εὐπαθείας καὶ τῆς τῶν ἐκτὸς περιουσίας, ὣν ἄνευ μὴδὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὠφελεῖν. Πρὸς δὲ ὅπως ἔστησαν διεψευσμένην αὐτοῦ τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἀπελέγχοντες οἱ Πλάτωνος γνώριμοι πάρεστι μαθεῖν διὰ τούτων· b

Τῆς γὰρ συμπάσης φιλοσοφίας κοινῇ γνώμῃ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων τὴν c ἀνθρωπίνην εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπισχνουμένης, τριχῇ δὲ διαιρουμένης κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων ποιητικὴν διανέμησιν, τοσοῦτον ἀποδέων ἐν τούτοις τοῦ διδάσκειν τι τῶν Πλάτωνος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς ὀφθῆσεται, ὥστε πλείονων ὄντων οἱ διαφέρονται Πλάτωνι, μάλιστα ἐναντιούμενος αὐτὸς φανέται. Καὶ πρῶτόν γε ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ καὶ μεγίστου καὶ κυριωτάτου τὴν πρὸς Πλάτωνα παραλ- d λαγὴν ἐποίησατο, μὴ τηρήσας τὸ μέτρον τῆς εὐδαιμονίας μὴδὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτάρκη πρὸς τοῦτο συγχωρήσας, ἀλλ' ἀπολισθὼν τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ ἡγησάμενος αὐτῇ προσδεῖν τῶν ἐκ τῆς τύχης, ἵνα μετὰ τούτων ἔλῃ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν· εἰ δ' ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ληφθεῖ, ὡς ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκ ἐφικτὸν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας μεμψάμενος. — Καὶ μεθ' ἑτέρα ἐπιλέγει· Τούτων τοίνυν 795c οὕτως ἐχόντων, καὶ πειρωμένου τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἔλκειν τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχὰς ἄνω που πρὸς τὸ θεῖον, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον προσοικειοῦντος μὲν τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῷ καλῷ, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀναπείθοντος ὑπερφρονεῖν, φράσσον ἡμῖν, ὦ Περιπατητικέ, πῶς ἐκδιδάξεις ταῦτα; Πῶς ὁδηγήσεις ἐπ' αὐτὰ τοὺς φιλο- πλάτωνα; Ποῦ σοι τῆς αἰρέσεως τοσοῦτον ὕψος λόγων, ὥστε τὸ τῶν Ἀλωάδων φρόνημα κτήσασθαι καὶ τὴν εἰς οὐρανὸν ὁδὸν ζητεῖν;

c. Euseb., *Praep. ev.* XV 5, 1-3 (798c-799a):

Providence

Again, Atticus opposes Aristotle who denies the universal providence of God.

Πάλιν Μωσέως καὶ τῶν παρ' Ἑβραίοις προφητῶν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ Πλάτωνος 798c ἐν τούτοις συμφώνως, τὸν περὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων προνοίας λόγον εὐκρινῶς διατεθειμένων, ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης μέχρι σελήνης στήσας τὸ θεῖον τὰ λοιπὰ τοῦ κόσμου μέρη περιγράφει τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ διοικήσεως· ἐφ' οἷς καὶ ἀπελέγχεται πρὸς τοῦ δηλωθέντος, ὡδὲ πῃ διεξιόντος·

Ὅντος δ' ἔτι μεγίστου καὶ κυριωτάτου τῶν εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν συντελούντων d τοῦ περὶ τῆς προνοίας πείσματος, ὃ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον ὀρθοῖ, εἴ γε μὴ μέλλομεν ἀγνοεῖν

Πότερον δίκᾳ τεῖχος ὕψιον
ἢ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις ἀναβαίνει
ἐπιχθονίων γένος ἀνδρῶν·¹

ὁ μὲν Πλάτων εἰς Θεὸν καὶ ἐκ Θεοῦ πάντα ἀνάπτει. Φησὶ γὰρ² αὐτόν, ἀρχὴν τε καὶ μέσα καὶ τελευτὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων ἔχοντα, εὐθείᾳ περαίνειν περιπορευόμενον. Καὶ αὖ πάλιν φησὶν³ αὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἀγαθῷ δὲ μηδὲνα φθόνον ἐγγίγνεσθαι περὶ μηδενός. Τούτου δὲ ἐκτὸς ὄντα, πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ ποιεῖν, εἰς τάξιν ἄγοντα ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας. Πάντων δὲ ἐπιμελούμενον καὶ πάντα κατὰ δύναμιν κοσμοῦντα πεφροντικένοι καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. — Καὶ μετὰ βραχέα·
799a Καὶ ὁ μὲν Πλάτων οὕτως. Ὁ δὲ τὴν δαιμονίαν ταύτην φύσιν ἐκποδῶν ποιούμενος, καὶ τὴν γε εἰσαυθις ἐλπίδα τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποτέμνων, τὴν τε ἐν τῷ παρόντι πρὸς τῶν κρειττόνων εὐλάβειαν ἀφαιρούμενος, τίνα πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἔχει κοινωνίαν; Ἡ πῶς ἂν ἐφ' ἧς βούλεται Πλάτων παρακαλέσαι, καὶ πιστώσαιο τὰ εἰρημένα;

d. Euseb. Ib. 6, 1-3 (801b-802a):

Creation

801b Πάλιν Μωσέως γενητὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον ὀρισσάμενον, ποιητὴν τε καὶ δημιουργὸν τοῖς ὅλοις τὸν Θεὸν ἐπιστήσαντος, τοῦ τε Πλάτωνος τὰ ἴσα Μωσεῖ φιλοσοφοῦντος, τὴν ἐναντίαν κἀν τούτῳ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ὁδεύσας ἀπελέγχεται πρὸς τοῦ δηλωθέντος συγγραφέως, ὧδε πρὸς ῥῆμα γράφωντος· Πρῶτον δὲ
c περὶ γενέσεως κόσμου σκοπῶν καὶ τὸ τῆς προνοίας τὸ μέγα τοῦτο καὶ πολυωφελὲς δόγμα πάντα ζητεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ἡγούμενος, καὶ λογισάμενος ὅτι τῷ μὴ γενομένῳ οὔτε τινὸς ποιητοῦ οὔτε τινὸς κηδεμόνος πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι καλῶς χρεῖα, ἵνα μὴ ἀποστερήσῃ τὸν κόσμον τῆς προνοίας ἀφεῖλε τὸ ἀγέννητον αὐτοῦ. Παραιτούμεθα δὲ νῦν μὴ ἐμποδῶν ἡμῖν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστίας εἶναι, οἷς ἀρέσκει καὶ κατὰ Πλάτωνα τὸν κόσμον ἀγέννητον εἶναι. Δίκαιοι γάρ εἰσιν ἡμῖν
d συγγνώμην νέμειν, εἰ περὶ τῶν δοκούντων Πλάτωνι πιστεύομεν οἷς αὐτὸς "Ἑλλήν ὢν πρὸς Ἑλληνας ἡμᾶς σαφεῖ τε καὶ τρανῶ τῷ στόματι διείλεκται. Παραλαβὼν γάρ, φησὶν⁴, ὁ θεὸς πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατόν, οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον πλημμελῶς δὲ καὶ ἀτάκτως κινούμενον, εἰς τάξιν ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, ἡγησάμενος τοῦτο ἐκείνου πάντως ἄμεινον. "Ἐτι δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ὅτι μὴ δι' αἰνιγματῶν, μηδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ σαφοῦς χρεῖα τὴν γένεσιν παρεδέξατο, δηλοῖ δι' ὧν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῷ τῶν πάντων διείλεκται περὶ τούτου μετὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων δημιουργίαν. Ἐπειδὴ γάρ,
802a φησὶ⁵, γεγέννησθε (λέγει δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς), ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ οὐδ' ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν, οὔτε μὲν δὴ λυθήσεσθέ γε, τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως τυχόντες.

¹ Pindarus, Fr. incert. 129 Boeckh.

² Plato, Leg. IV 715e.

³ Tim. 29e.

⁴ Tim. 30a.

⁵ Tim. 41b.

The
immortality
of the soul

e. Euseb., ib. 9, 1-3 (p. 808d-809c):

Finally Atticus maintains the immortality of the soul as the keystone of Plato's philosophy as opposed to Aristotle.

Ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τί καὶ λέγοιμεν ἄν; Δῆλα γὰρ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον τοῖς 808d
φιλοσοφοῦσιν ἀλλ' ἤδη σχεδὸν καὶ τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἅπασιν, ὅτι Πλάτων μὲν
ἀθάνατον τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπολείπει, καὶ πολλοὺς ὑπὲρ τοῦτου λόγους πεποιήται, 809a
ποικίλως καὶ παντοίως ἀποδεικνύς ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχὴ. Πολλὴ δὲ καὶ
τοῖς ἐσπουδακόσι περὶ τὰ Πλάτωνος ἡ φιλοτιμίᾳ γέγονε, συναγωνιζομένοις
τῷ τε δόγματι καὶ τῷ Πλάτωνι. Σχεδὸν γὰρ τὸ συνέχον τὴν πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν
τάνδρὸς τοῦτό ἐστιν. "Ἡ τε γὰρ τῶν ἠθικῶν δογμάτων ὑπόθεσις ἐπηκολούθησε
τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀθανασία, τὸ μέγα καὶ λαμπρὸν καὶ νεανικὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὸ
τῆς ψυχῆς θεῖον σῶσαι δυνηθείσης· τὰ τε τῆς φύσεως πράγματα πάντα κατὰ b
τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς διοίκησιν ἔσχε τὸ καλῶς διοικεῖσθαι δύνασθαι. Ψυχὴ γὰρ πᾶσα,
φησί¹, παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου, πάντα δὲ οὐρανὸν περιπολεῖ, ἄλλοτ'
ἐν ἄλλοις εἶδεσι γινομένη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς σοφίας
εἰς τὴν ἀθανασίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνήπτει τῷ Πλάτωνι. Πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ μαθήσεις
ἀναμνήσεις· καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως οἴεται δύνασθαι σφῆζεσθαι καὶ ζητήσιν καὶ μάθησιν, ἐξ
ᾧ ἐπιστήμη γίνεται. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, οὐδὲ ἀνάμνησις· εἰ δὲ μὴ c
τοῦτο, οὐδὲ μάθησις. Πάντων οὖν τῶν Πλάτωνος δογμάτων ἀτεχνῶς ἐξηρητη-
μένων καὶ ἐκκρεμαμένων τῆς κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν θεϊότητός τε καὶ ἀθανασίας,
ὃ μὴ συγχωρῶν τοῦτο τὴν πᾶσαν ἀνατρέπει φιλοσοφίαν Πλάτωνος. Τίς οὖν
ἐστὶν ὁ πρῶτος ἐγχειρήσας ἀντιτάξασθαι ἀποδείξεσι, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀφελέσθαι
τῆς ἀθανασίας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πάσης δυνάμεως; Τίς δ' ἕτερος πρὸ Ἀριστοτέλους;

Albinus 1326—Albinus² must have been a Platonist of great authority in his time³. His work is usually referred to under the title of *Didaskalikos*, but the older MSS give the title *Epitome*⁴. The author expounds the doctrine of the ἀρχαί as follows.

The ἀρχαί a. First there is ὕλη.

Albinus, *Epitome* 8, 2:

ὕλη described Ταύτην τοίνυν ἐκμαγεῖόν τε καὶ πανδεχὲς καὶ τιθήνην καὶ μητέρα καὶ χώραν

¹ *Phaedr.* 246b.

² The name Alkinoos, which is read in all the MSS, is due to a palaeographical error, as was shown by Freudenthal, *Hellenistische Studien* III (1879), p. 322 ff.

³ Testimonia are cited by P. Louis, *Albinus, Epitome* (Thèse compl., Paris 1945) p. XIII f. Cp. also E. R. Witt, *Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism*, Cambridge 1937, p. 107 ff.

⁴ P. Louis, o.c., p. XII. The full title is: Ἐπιτομὴ τῶν Πλάτωνος δογμάτων.

ονομάζει και υποκείμενον ἄπτόν τε μετ' ἀναισθησίας και νόθῳ λογισμῷ ληπτόν· ιδιότητα δ' ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὥστε πᾶσαν γένεσιν ὑποδέχασθαι τιθήνης λόγον ἐπέχουσιν τῷ φέρειν αὐτάς και ἀναδέχασθαι μὲν αὐτὴν πάντα τὰ εἶδη, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν ἄμορφόν τε ὑπάρχειν και ἄποιον και ἀνείδεον, ἀναματτομένην δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα και ἐκτυπουμένην καθάπερ ἐκμαγεῖον και σχηματιζομένην ὑπὸ τούτων, μηδὲν ἴδιον σχῆμα ἔχουσιν μηδὲ ποιότητα.

Cp. *Tim.* 50b-52b. The term ὑποκείμενον is not used by Plato. The terms ἄμορφον και ἄποιον are not found in any of the dialogues either, but something very similar is found at the end of the Hermodorus passage (above, 371a).

b. The two other ἀρχαί. The ἰδέα defined.

Albinus 9, 1-2:

The ἰδέαι

Ἀρχικὸν δὲ λόγον ἐπεχούσης τῆς ὕλης, ἔτι και ἄλλας ἀρχὰς παραλαμβάνει τὴν τε παραδειγματικὴν, τούτέστι τὴν τῶν ἰδεῶν, και τὴν τοῦ πατρός τε και αἰτίου πάντων θεοῦ. Ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἰδέα ὡς μὲν πρὸς θεὸν νόησις αὐτοῦ, ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς νοητὸν πρῶτον, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὕλην μέτρον, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὸν αἰσθητὸν κόσμον παράδειγμα, ὡς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἐξεταζομένη οὐσία. —

(2) Ὅριζονται δὲ τὴν ἰδέαν παράδειγμα τῶν κατὰ φύσιν αἰώνιον. Οὕτε γὰρ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ἀρέσκει τῶν τεχνικῶν εἶναι ἰδέας, οἷον ἀσπίδος ἢ λύρας, οὕτε μὴν τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, οἷον πυρετοῦ και χολέρας, οὕτε τῶν κατὰ μέρος, οἷον Σωκράτους και Πλάτωνος, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν εὐτελῶν τινος, οἷον ῥύπου και κάρφους, οὕτε τῶν πρὸς τι, οἷον μείζονος και ὑπερέχοντος· εἶναι γὰρ τὰς ἰδέας νοήσεις θεοῦ αἰώνιους τε και αὐτοτελεῖς.

We found this conception of the Ideas also in Philo (our nr. 1293), and certainly he was not the first to introduce it. That the Stoics, in their allegorising of the Gods of mythology, explained Athena as ἡ τοῦ Διὸς σύνεσις, and identified this with Ἡρόνια¹, is certainly not the same, but it must be noted here. For Varro (according to Augustinus, *De civ.* VII 28) explained "Minerva" as "exempla rerum quas Plato appellat ideas", and Seneca in *Epist.* 65, 7, probably using Arius Didymus, says: *Haec exemplaria rerum omnium Deus intra se habet numerosque universorum quae agenda sunt et modos mente complexus est, plenus his figuris est quas Plato ideas appellat, immortales, immutabiles, infatigabiles.*

Surely this betrays (as Witt² has well seen), that in the first century B.C. a doxographical account existed according to which the exemplaric Forms of Plato were explained as eternal and immutable thoughts of a divine Mind. Our oldest explicit trace of this conception goes back to the IVth century. It is found in Alkimos' account of Plato's doctrine ap. Diog. Laërt. III 12-13:

Ἔστι δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν ἓν ἕκαστον ἀίδιον τε και νόημα και πρὸς τούτοις ἀπαθές.

The matter is discussed by W. Theiler, *Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, p. 33 ff. (cp. our nr. 1200); Witt, *Albinus* 70-77; C. J. de Vogel, *A la recherche des étapes précises entre Platon et le Néoplatonisme*, in *Mnemosyne* 1954, p. 118 ff.

On Plato, *Soph.* 249a as the source of this conception, see: C. J. de Vogel in *Actes du XIe Congrès International de Philosophie*, Bruxelles 1953, Vol. XII, p. 61-67.

¹ Thus, Cornutus, p. 35, 7 Lang.

² *Albinus*, p. 75.

The third
ἀρχή
is almost
ἄρρητον

1327—The third Principle is above human understanding.

a. Albinus X 1:

Ἐξῆς δὲ περὶ τῆς τρίτης ἀρχῆς ποιητέον τὸν λόγον, ἣν μικροῦ δεῖν καὶ ἄρρητον ἡγεῖται ὁ Πλάτων· ἐπαχθείμεν δ' ἂν περὶ αὐτῆς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. Εἰ ἔστι νοητά, ταῦτα δὲ οὔτε αἰσθητά ἐστὶν οὔτε μέτοχα τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτων τινῶν τῶν νοητῶν, ἔστι πρῶτα νοητά ἀπλᾶ, ὥς καὶ πρῶτα αἰσθητά· τὸ δ' ἡγούμενον, τὸ ἄρα λῆγον¹. Ἀνθρωποι μὲν δὴ ἄτε τοῦ τῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθους ἐμπιπλάμενοι, ὥστε καὶ ὅποτε νοεῖν προαιροῦντο τὸ νοητόν, ἐμφανταζόμενον ἔχειν τὸ αἰσθητόν, ὥς καὶ μέγεθος συνεπινοεῖν καὶ σχῆμα καὶ χρῶμα πολλάκις, οὐ καθαρῶς τὰ νοητά νοοῦσι, θεοὶ δὲ ἀπηλλαγμένως τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰλικρινῶς τε καὶ ἀμιγῶς.

Noûs
ἀκίνητος

b. It is the Cause which is above the continually active Noûs.

Albinus X 2:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ψυχῆς νοῦς ἀμείνων, νοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἐν δυνάμει ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν πάντα νοῶν καὶ ἅμα καὶ αἰεὶ, τούτου δὲ καλλίων ὁ αἷτιος τούτου καὶ ὅπερ ἂν ἔτι ἀνωτέρω τούτων ὑφέστηκεν, οὗτος ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος θεός, αἷτιος ὑπάρχων τοῦ αἰεὶ ἐνεργεῖν τῷ νῷ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ. Ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἀκίνητος, αὐτὸς ὢν εἰς τοῦτον ὥς καὶ ὁ ἥλιος εἰς τὴν ὄρασιν, ὅταν αὐτῷ προσβλέπη, καὶ ὥς τὸ ὀρεκτόν κινεῖ τὴν ὀρεξίν ἀκίνητον ὑπάρχον· οὕτω γε δὴ καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς κινήσει τὸν νοῦν τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ.

The
hierarchy
of being

Thus, the Cause of the always active νοῦς τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ is itself Noûs, and we have the following hierarchy:

1. ὁ (πρῶτος) Νοῦς ἀκίνητος (First Principle).

2. ὁ Νοῦς τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ (αἰεὶ ἐνεργῶν)

3. ὁ ἐν δυνάμει νοῦς which is (according to the next §) a "power" of the ψυχῇ τοῦ κόσμου.

Next follow the stars ("visible gods", ch. 14), and finally the earth with its elements, governed by δαίμονες in each of them (ch. 15).

Λόγος
ἄληπτος

c. The first Principle is also called λόγος ἄληπτος.

Albinus IV 2:

Διττὸς δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ παντελῶς ἄληπτός τε καὶ ἀτρεκής, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων γνῶσιν ἀδιάψευστος, τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν πρότερος θεῶν δυνατός, ἀνθρώπων δὲ ἀδύνατος, ὁ δὲ δεύτερος καὶ ἀνθρώπων δυνατός.

d. As it was done by Aristotle, the first Noûs is conceived as ἑαυτὸν νοῶν, just as in Plato it is called good and conceived as the Cause of order, i.e. as Δημιουργός in the sense of the *Timaeus*.

¹ Albinus uses the technical terminology of Stoic logic: si antecedens, ergo consequens.

Albinus X 3:

Ἐαυτὸν νοεῖ

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς κάλλιστος, δεῖ καὶ κάλλιστον αὐτῷ νοητὸν ὑποκεῖσθαι, οὐδὲν δὲ αὐτοῦ κάλλιον· ἑαυτὸν ἂν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ νοήματα ἀεινοοίη, καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ ἰδέα ὑπάρχει. Καὶ μὴν ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς ἀτιδὸς ἐστίν, ἄρρητος, αὐτοτελής, τουτέστιν ἀπροσδεής, ἀειτελής, τουτέστιν ἀειτέλειος, παντελής, τουτέστι πάντη τέλειος· θειότης, οὐσιότης, ἀλήθεια, συμμετρία, ἀγαθόν. Λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὡς χωρίζων ταῦτα, ἀλλ' ὡς κατὰ πάντα ἐνὸς νοουμένου.

Καὶ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἐστίν, διότι πάντα εἰς δύναμιν εὐεργετεῖ, παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ αἷτιος ὢν· καλὸν δέ, ὅτι αὐτὸς τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει τέλειόν ἐστι καὶ σύμμετρον· ἀλήθεια δέ, διότι πάσης ἀληθείας ἀρχὴ ὑπάρχει, ὡς ὁ ἥλιος παντὸς φωτός· πατήρ δὲ ἐστὶ τῷ αἷτιος εἶναι πάντων καὶ κοσμεῖν τὸν οὐράνιον νοῦν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ κόσμου πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ νοήσεις. Κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ἐμπέπληκε πάντα ἑαυτοῦ, τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ κόσμου ἐπεγεύρας καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέψας, τοῦ νοῦ αὐτῆς αἷτιος ὑπάρχων· ὃς κοσμηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς διακοσμεῖ σύμπασαν φύσιν ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ.

Αἷτιος
παντὸς
ἀγαθοῦ

e. Again it is called ἄρρητος and beyond any attribute or quality.

Albinus X 4:

ἄρρητος

Ἄρρητος δ' ἐστὶ καὶ νῶ μόνῳ ληπτός, ὡς εἴρηται, ἐπεὶ οὔτε γένος ἐστίν οὔτε εἶδος οὔτε διαφορά, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ συμβέβηκε τι αὐτῷ, οὔτε κακόν (οὐ γὰρ θέμις τοῦτο εἰπεῖν), οὔτε ἀγαθόν (κατὰ μετοχὴν γὰρ τινος ἔσται οὗτος καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθότητος), οὔτε ἀδιάφορον (οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο κατὰ ἔννοιαν αὐτοῦ), οὔτε ποιόν (οὐ γὰρ ποιωθέν ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπὸ ποιότητος τοιοῦτον ἀποτετελεσμένον), οὔτε ἄποιον (οὐ γὰρ ἐστέρεται τοῦ ποιὸν εἶναι ἐπιβάλλοντός τινος αὐτῷ ποιοῦ)· οὔτε μέρος τινός, οὔτε ὡς ὅλον ἔχον τινὰ μέρη, οὔτε ὥστε ταῦτόν τινι εἶναι ἢ ἕτερον· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ συμβέβηκε, καθ' ὃ δύναται τῶν ἄλλων χωρισθῆναι· οὔτε κινεῖ οὔτε κινεῖται.

1328—Again, the First Noûs is identified with the Demiurge.

Albinus XII 1:

Identified
with the
Δημιουργός

Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν αἰσθητῶν καὶ κατὰ μέρος ὠρισμένα τινὰ δεῖ παραδείγματα εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας, ὧν καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας γίνεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ὅρους, — — ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ κάλλιστον κατασκευάσμα τὸν κόσμον ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ δεδημιουργῆσθαι πρὸς τινὰ ἰδέαν κόσμου ἀποβλέποντος, παράδειγμα ὑπάρχουσαν τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου ὡς ἂν ἀπεικονισμένου ἀπ' ἐκείνης, πρὸς ἣν ἀφομοιωθέντα ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ αὐτὸν ἀπειργάσθαι κατὰ θαυμασιωτάτην πρόνοιαν καὶ δίκαιταν ἐλθόντος ἐπὶ τὸ δημιουργεῖν τὸν κόσμον, διότι ἀγαθὸς ᾔην.

The stars
are visible
gods

1329—a. The seven planets and the fixed stars are "visible gods".
Albinus XIV 7 (the end):

Πάντες δὲ οὗτοι (sc. οἱ ἀστέρες) νοερά ζῶα καὶ θεοὶ καὶ σφαιρικὰ τοῖς σχήμασιν.

daemons

b. Albinus XV 1-2:

(1) Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι δαίμονες, οὓς καὶ καλοῖη ἂν τις γεννητοὺς θεοὺς, καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν στοιχείων, οἱ μὲν ὄρατοί, οἱ δὲ ἀόρατοι, ἐν τε αἰθέρι καὶ πυρὶ ἀέρι τε καὶ ὕδατι, ὡς μηδὲν κόσμου μέρος ψυχῆς ἄμοιρον εἶναι μηδὲ ζώου κρείττονος θνητῆς φύσεως· τούτοις δὲ ὑποτέτακται τὰ ὑπὸ σελήνην πάντα καὶ τὰ ἐπίγεια.

(2) Ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεὸς τοῦ τε παντός ὑπάρχει ποιητῆς αὐτός καὶ τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων, ὃ δὴ πᾶν λύσιν οὐκ ἔχει κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οἱ ἐκείνου παῖδες ἡγοῦνται, κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ἐντολὴν καὶ μίμησιν πράττοντες ὅσα πράττουσιν, ἀφ' ὧν κληδόνες καὶ ὀνείρατα καὶ χρησμοὶ καὶ ὅσα κατὰ μαντείαν ὑπὸ θνητῶν τεχνιτεύεται.

Maximus
of Tyrus

1330—Maximus of Tyrus in his diatribe *Τίς ὁ Θεὸς κατὰ Πλάτωνα* expounds a very similar doctrine.

a. It is a matter of general agreement that there is one supreme God and many subordinate gods.

Maximus Tyr. XI 5a-b (Hobein):

Ἐν τοσοῦτῳ δὴ πολέμῳ καὶ στάσει καὶ διαφωνίᾳ ἕνα ἴδοις ἂν ἐν πάσῃ γῇ ὁμόφωνον νόμον καὶ λόγον, ὅτι θεὸς εἰς πάντων βασιλεὺς καὶ πατὴρ, καὶ θεοὶ πολλοί, θεοῦ παῖδες, συνάρχοντες θεοῦ. Ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Ἑλλήν λέγει, καὶ ὁ βάρβαρος λέγει, καὶ ὁ ἡπειρώτης, καὶ ὁ θαλάττιος καὶ <ὁ σοφὸς καὶ ὁ> ἄσοφος.

God is the
most perfect
Noûs

b. God cannot be placed in the stream of changing things.

Maximus Tyr. XI 8 h-i:

Λεῖπεται δὴ ὥσπερ εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ἀναβιβασαμένους τῷ λόγῳ τὸν θεὸν ἰδρῶσαι κατὰ τὸν νοῦν αὐτὸν τὸν ἀρχηγικώτατον. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνταῦθα διφυῇ ὀρῶ· τοῦ γὰρ νοῦ ὁ μὲν νοεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ μὴ νοῶν· ὁ δὲ καὶ πέφυκε, καὶ νοεῖ· ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος οὕτω τέλειος, ἂν μὴ προσθῇς αὐτῷ τὸ καὶ νοεῖν αἰεὶ, καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα· ὥστε εἶη ἂν ἐντελέστατος, ὁ νοῶν αἰεὶ, καὶ πάντα, καὶ ἅμα.

c. This Noûs is the Father and the Creator of the universe, invisible, intangible, unspeakable.

Ib., 9 c d:

Τοῦτον μὲν δὴ ὁ ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας ἡμῖν ἄγγελος δίδωσι πατέρα καὶ γεννητὴν

τοῦ ξύμπαντος· τούτου ὄνομα μὲν οὐ λέγει, οὐ γὰρ οἶδεν· οὐδὲ χροῖαν λέγει, οὐ γὰρ εἶδεν· οὐδὲ μέγεθος λέγει, οὐ γὰρ ᾤψατο. —

Τὸ δὲ θεῖον αὐτὸ ἀόρατον ὀφθαλμοῖς, ἄρρητον φωνῇ, ἀναφές σαρκί, ἀπευθές ἀκοῇ, μόνῳ δὲ τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς καλλίστῳ καὶ καθαρωτάτῳ καὶ νοερωτάτῳ καὶ κουφοτάτῳ καὶ πρεσβυτάτῳ ὁρατὸν δι' ὁμοιότητα, καὶ ἀκουστὸν διὰ συγγένειαν, ὅλον ἀθρόον ἀθρόα συνέσει παραγινόμενον.

d. All beauty streams from Him as from an eternally flowing source.

Ib., II b-d:

Εἰ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἤδη μαθεῖν ἐρᾷς τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν, πῶς τις αὐτὴν διηγήσεται; Καλὸν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν καλῶν τὸ φανότατον· ἀλλ' οὐ σῶμα καλόν, ἀλλ' ὅθεν καὶ τῷ σώματι ἐπιρρεῖ τὸ κάλλος· οὐδὲ λειμῶνα καλόν, ἀλλ' ὁπόθεν καὶ ὁ λειμῶν καλός· καὶ ποταμοῦ κάλλος, καὶ θαλάττης, καὶ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν, πᾶν τὸ κάλλος τοῦτο ἐκείθεν ῥεῖ, ὃν ἐκ πηγῆς ἀενάου καὶ ἀκηράτου. Καθόσον δ' αὐτοῦ μετέσχεον ἕκαστα, καλὰ καὶ ἐδραῖα καὶ σφζόμενα, καὶ καθόσον αὐτοῦ ἀπολείπεται, αἰσχυρά καὶ διαλυόμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα. Εἰ μὲν ταῦτα ἱκανά, ἐώρακας τὸν θεόν· εἰ δὲ μή, πῶς τις αὐτὸν αἰνίζειται;

e. At the end of this diatribe Maximus described the intermediate powers between God and man.

The inferior
gods and
daemons

Ib., XI 12 a-e:

Εἰ δὲ ἐξασθενεῖς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ δημιουργοῦ θεάν, ἀρκεῖ σοι τὰ ἔργα ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὄρα, καὶ προσκυνεῖν τὰ ἔργονα πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπά ὄντα, οὐχ ὅσα Βοιωτίας ποιητῆς λέγει¹. οὐ γὰρ τρισμῦριοι μόνον θεοὶ θεοῦ παῖδες καὶ φίλοι, ἀλλ' ἄληπτοι ἀριθμῷ· τοῦτο μὲν κατ' οὐρανὸν αἱ ἀστέρων φύσεις, τοῦτο δ' αὖ κατ' αἰθέρα αἱ δαιμόνων οὐσίαι. Βούλομαι δέ σοι δεῖξαι τὸ λεγόμενον σαφεστέρῳ εἰκόνι. Ἐννόει μεγάλην ἀρχὴν, καὶ βασιλείαν ἐρρωμένην, πρὸς μίαν ψυχὴν βασιλέως τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ πρεσβυτάτου συμπάντων νενευκότων ἐκόντων. ὅρον δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐχ Ἄλυν ποταμόν, οὐδὲ Ἑλλησποντον, οὐδὲ τὴν Μαιῶτιν, οὐδὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ ὠκεανῷ ἡτόνας· ἀλλὰ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν, τὸν μὲν ὑψοῦ, τὴν δ' ἔνερθεν· οὐρανὸν μὲν οἷον τεῖχος τι ἐληλαμένον ἐν κύκλῳ, ἄρρηκτον, πάντα χρήματα ἐν ἑαυτῷ στέγον, γῆν δὲ οἷον φρουράν καὶ δεσμούςς ἀλιτρῶν σωμάτων· βασιλέα δὲ αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν μέγαν ἀτρεμοῦντα, ὥσπερ νόμον, παρέχοντα τοῖς πειθομένοις σωτηρίαν ὑπάρχουσιν ἐν αὐτῷ· καὶ κοινωνοὺς τῆς ἀρχῆς πολλοὺς μὲν ὁρατοὺς θεοὺς, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀφανεῖς, τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὰ πρόθυρα αὐτὰ εἰλουμένους, οἷον εἰσαγγελέας τινὰς καὶ βασιλεῖς συγγενεστάτους, ὁμοτραπέζους αὐτοῦ καὶ συνεστίους, τοὺς δὲ τούτων ὑπέρετας, τοὺς δ' ἔτι τούτων καταδεεστέρους. Διαδοχὴν ὁρᾷς καὶ τάξιν ἀρχῆς καταβαίνουσιν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ μεχρὶ γῆς.

¹ The reference is to Hes., *Erga* 252.

Apuleius

1331—Also Apuleius explains Plato's doctrine in this sense.

a. Apuleius, *De Platone* I 11:

Speaking of the fixed stars and planets he says:

Hos astrorum ignes sphaeris adfixos perpetuis atque indefessis cursibus labi. et hos animalis deos dicit esse, sphaerarum vero ingenium ex igni coalitum et fabricatum. iam ipsa animantium genera in quattuor species dividuntur, quarum una est ex natura ignis eiusmodi, qualem solem ac lunam videmus ceterasque siderum stellas, alterum ex aëria qualitate — hanc etiam daemonum dicit —, tertium ex aqua terraque coalescere et mortale genus corporum ex eo dividi terrenum atque terrestre — sic enim πεζόν et χερσαῖον censui[t] nuncupanda — terrenumque esse arborum ceterarumque frugum, quae humi fixae vitam trahunt, terrestria vero, quae alit ac sustinet tellus. deorum trinas nuncupat species, quarum est prima unus et solus summus ille, ultramundanus, incorporeus, quem patrem et architectum huius divini orbis superius ostendimus; aliud genus est, quale astra habent ceteraque numina, quos caelicolas nominamus; tertium habent, quos medioximos Romani veteres appellant, quod [est] sui ratione, sed <et> loco * et potestate diis summis sunt minores, natura hominum profecto maiores.

Three kinds
of Gods

b. There is a double providence: that of the First, transcendent God, and next that of the caelicolae and daemones subordinated to Him.

A double
providenceApuleius, *ib.* 12:

Sed omnia, quae naturaliter et propterea recte feruntur, providentiae custodia gubernantur nec ullius mali causa deo poterit adscribi. quare nec omnia ad fati sortem arbitratur esse referenda. ita enim definit: providentiam esse divinam sententiam, conservatricem prosperitatis eius, cuius causa tale suscepit officium; divinam legem esse fatum, per quod inevitabiles cogitationes dei atque incepta complentur. unde si quid providentia geritur, id agitur et fato, et quod fato terminatur, providentia debet susceptum videri. et primam quidem providentiam esse summi exsuperantissimique deorum omnium, qui non solum deos caelicolas ordinavit, quos ad tutelam et decus per omnia mundi membra dispersit, sed natura etiam mortales eos, qui praestarent sapientia ceteris terrenis animantibus, ad aevitatem temporis [s] e<di>dit fundatisque legibus reliquarum dispositionem ac tutelam rerum, quas cotidie fieri necesse est, diis ceteris tradidit. unde susceptam providentiam dii secundae providentiae ita naviter retinent, ut omnia, etiam quae caelitus mortali-

* Or rather: et sui ratione et loco?

bus exhibentur, inmutabilem ordinationis paternae statum teneant. daemones vero, quos Genios et Lares possumus nuncupare, ministros deorum arbitra[n]tur custodesque hominum et interpretes, si quid a diis velint. nec sane omnia referenda esse ad vim fati puta[n]t, sed esse aliquid in nobis, et in fortuna esse nonnihil.

c. Cp. Apuleius, *De deo Socratis* 6:

Divinae
mediae
potestates

Ceterum sunt quaedam divinae mediae potestates inter summum aethera et infimas terras in isto intersitae aëris spatio, per quas et desideria nostra et merita ad deos commeant. hos Graeci nomine δαίμονας nuncupant, inter <terrícolas> caelícolasque vectores hinc precum, inde donorum, qui ultro citro portant hinc petitiones, inde suppetias, ceu quidam utri[us]que interpretes et salutigeri. per hos eosdem, ut Plato in Symposio autumat, cuncta denuntiata et magorum varia miracula omnesque praesagiorum species reguntur. eorum quippe de numero praediti curant singuli * [eorum], proinde ut est cuique tributa provincia, vel somniis conformandis vel extis fissiculandis vel praepetibus gubernandis vel oscinibus erudiendis vel vatibus inspirandis vel fulminibus iaculandis vel nubibus coruscandis ceterisque adeo, per quae futura dinoscimus. quae cuncta caelestium voluntate et numine et auctoritate sed daemonum obsequio et opera et ministerio fieri arbitrandum est.

5—GNOSIS AND HERMETICS

1332—a. Gnosticism or gnosis was a wide-spread religious movement, inspired by Oriental myths and influenced by mystery religions, partly also connected with Christianity. It flourished in Egypt in the second century, is found in Palestine in the days of the Apostles (Simon Magus) and got new forces when in the third century the Persian Mani connected it with Zoroastrian dualism. In Egypt Basilides (c. 130) and Valentinus (about ten years younger) were Christian gnostics of Greek culture. Especially in the form the latter gave it gnosticism, though always too mythological and fantastic to be considered as philosophy, shows an affinity with the Platonism of the first and second century.

The variety
of gnostic
systems

b. The following features should be noted.

General cha-
racteristics
of gnosis

1. A very transcendent conception of God.

All gnostics, except Marcion who is more a biblical theologian, place God beyond reason. He is the ἄγνωστος θεός, by Valentinus called Βυθός and said to exist together with Σιγῇ.

Cp. Albinus (ἄρρητος: above, nr. 1327).

* Scaliger corr. singula.

2. A rather strong dualism of Spirit versus Matter.

Not all gnostic systems, however, were dualistic in the sense of Zoroaster and Mani. In Valentinian gnosis evil springs from the spiritual world (called *pleroma*) and thus is neither an eternal nor an independent principle.

3. A hierarchy of spiritual and semi-spiritual beings is placed between the supreme God and the visible world.

Valentinus populates his *pleroma* with a whole series of spiritual beings. The last of them, *Sophia*, leaves the *pleroma* and, vexed by passions, creates the *Demiurge*, a "psychic" being, placed in a middle sphere. By the *Demiurge* the visible world is created, and the earthy part of man, not after the example of the spiritual world, as it is with Plato, but in ignorance of it.

Normally man, as a son of the *Demiurge*, is a *ψυχικός*. But a part of mankind by some special gift from above is endowed with spirit. These are called *πνευματικοί*. They are akin to the spiritual world by nature and therefore can never perish. Others are so entangled in matter that they cannot be saved. These are called *ὕλικοί*. As to the middle group, they are *ἀντεξούσιοι*: it depends on their own will whether they will be saved or not.

Other gnostic sects regarded the *Demiurge* as a bad spirit and man as either *πνευματικός* or *ὕλικός*.

4. A return of the spiritual part of man to the spiritual world.

According to Valentinus, who was deeply influenced by Christianity, the return is worked by redemption: Christ is sent forth from the *pleroma* and, after having healed *Sophia* from her passions, brings gnosis to man, as far as he is turned to the spiritual world, be it by nature (in the case of the *πνευματικοί*) or by choice (in the case of the *ψυχικοί*).

According to other gnostics the return is either a result of inner illumination (the "coming back to oneself") or of magic (the journey of the soul through the astral spheres, in which the knowledge of magic formulas is essential).

Prae-neo-platonism

In its general outline Valentinian metaphysics, in spite of its mythological appearance, is a kind of prae-neoplatonism.

Sources

c. Till lately gnostic systems were mainly known to us by the criticism of ecclesiastical authors who polemized against them. Thus, Clement of Alexandria and Origenes preserved to us some fragments of Basilides and of Valentinus and his direct followers; Irenaeus in the first chapters of his *Adversus haereses* gives an outline of Valentinian metaphysics; Tertullianus is our main source for Marcion. Various other forms of gnosis are described in the works of Irenaeus, Hippolytus and Epiphanius. St. Augustine, who belonged to the Manichaean sect for 9 years, speaks of it repeatedly in his *Confessions* and wrote a special treatise *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*.

A few gnostic writings were (long before the newly found manuscripts mentioned below) preserved in Coptic: *Pistis Sophia*, the *books of Jeû* and another book without title. These works, however, date from the second half of the third century, which is for Egyptian gnosis a time of decay.

Valentinus and Valentinians

d. As to Valentinus, *Irenaeus' testimony* is proved by recent studies to be of the greatest value.

W. Förster, *Von Valentin zu Herakleon*, Giessen 1928.

F. M. M. Sagnard, *La gnose valentinienne et le témoignage de St. Irénée*, Paris 1947.

Of Valentinus' direct disciples Ptolemaeus and Heracleon important texts are preserved.

The *fragments of Heracleon*, for the greater part cited by Origenes in Joh. t. I-XX, were collected by Hilgenfeld, *Ketzergeschichte des Urchristentums*, Leipzig 1870, p. 472-498.

Discussed by E. de Faye, *Gnostiques et gnosticisme*, Paris 1925, p. 77-102.

Ptolemaeus' *Letter to Flora*, preserved by Epiphanius, *C. haer.* 33, 3-7, was edited by Harnack in *Lietzmann's Kleine Texte*, Bonn 1904. New edition by G. Quispel (*Sources chrétiennes*) Paris 1949.

The letter deals with Mosaic Law and is not primarily concerned with metaphysics.

Another important source for Valentinianism are the *Excerpta ex Theodoto*. The text is found in:

W. Völker, *Quellen zur Geschichte der christlichen Gnosis*, Tüb. 1932.

R. P. Casey, *Excerpta ex Theodoto*, London 1934.

New edition by F. Sagnard in *Sources chrétiennes*, Paris 1948.

e. W. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, Göttingen 1907.

Derives all kinds of gnosis from Irano-Babylonian syncretism.

E. de Faye, *Gnostiques et gnosticisme*, ²Paris 1925.

Still a very interesting study, though the author's explanations are sometimes rather artificial.

H. Leisegang, *Die Gnosis*, Leipzig 1924.

Explains gnosis as a Greek form of thinking, going back to mythical and mystical elements in pre-Socratic philosophy.

H. Jonas, *Gnosis u. spätantiker Geist*. Teil I: *Die mythologische Gnosis*, Göttingen 1934; Teil II 1: *Von der Mythologie zur mystischen Philosophie*, 1954.

The author represents a kind of pangnosticism, including Philo, Origenes and Plotinus.

In fact, Origenes opposed gnosticism very sharply by his theory of free will (see especially *De principiis* III 1, 8), while Plotinus criticizes their view of the cosmos and of the origin of evil, but most of all detests their irrationalism (*Enn.* II 9).

f. In 1930 Manichaean manuscripts were found in Medinet Madi (Egypt). **Finds of new manuscripts**
Part of them—a collection of sermons, a kind of dogmatic and half a psalter—are already edited.

Recently (1946) a whole gnostic library was found in Nag Hammadi (Egypt): 13 papyrus codices, containing 48 gnostic books written in Coptic, translated from the Greek.

Communications of J. Doresse, H. C. Puech and Togo Mina, read in the *Institut de France*, Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, the 20th Febr. 1948, published in the *Comptes-Rendus de L'Académie des Inscr. et Belles-Lettres*, 1948.

Togo Mina and J. Doresse in *Vigiliae Christianae* 1948, p. 129-160; 1949, p. 129-141;

G. Quispel, *ib.* 1953, p. 193.

H. C. Puech, *Les Nouveaux écrits gnostiques*, in: *Coptic Studies in honour of Walter Crum*, The Byzantine Institute, Boston (Mass.) 1950, p. 91-154.

See also G. Quispel, *Gnosis als Weltreligion*, Zürich 1951.

**General
works on
gnosis**

These books belonged to the sect of the Sethians, in their days regarded as Christian heretics. In fact they were rather far from the Christian Church, which is founded on the appearance of Christ in history, while gnostics were not interested in history at all. They prove to have had relations with Palestine and with the Hermetics of Alexandria (see our next paragraph). Three of the books mentioned by Porphyrius as being in the hands of the Egyptian gnostics against whom Plotinus wrote his anti-gnostic treatise, were found at Nag Hammadi.

The pleroma
described by
Valentinus

1333—The pleroma or spiritual world according to Valentinus.

a. Irenaeus, *Adv. haereses* I 1, 1-2:

Λέγουσιν ¹ γάρ τινα εἶναι ἐν ἀοράτοις καὶ ἀκατονομάστοις ὑψώμασι τέλειον Αἰῶνα προόντα ². τοῦτον δὲ καὶ προαρχὴν καὶ προπάτορα καὶ Βυθὸν ³ καλοῦσιν. ὑπάρχοντα δ' αὐτὸν ἀχώρητον καὶ ἀόρατον, ἀτίδιόν τε καὶ ἀγέννητον, ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ ἡρεμίᾳ πολλῇ γεγενῆσθαι ἐν ἀπείροις αἰῶσι χρόνων. συνυπάρχειν δ' αὐτῷ καὶ Ἐννοίαν ⁴, ἣν δὴ καὶ Χάριν, καὶ Σιγὴν ὀνομάζουσι· καὶ ἐννοηθῆναι ποτε ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ προβαλέσθαι τὸν Βυθὸν τοῦτον, ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων καὶ καθάπερ σπέρμα, τὴν προβολὴν ταύτην, ἣν προβαλέσθαι ἐνενοήθη, καὶ καθέσθαι ὡς ἐν μήτρᾳ τῇ συνυπαρχούσῃ ἑαυτῷ Σιγῇ. ταύτην δὲ ὑποδεξαμένην τὸ σπέρμα τοῦτο καὶ ἐγκύμονα γενομένην, ἀποκυῖσαι Νοῦν, ὅμοιον τε καὶ ἴσον τῷ προβαλόντι, καὶ μόνον χωροῦντα τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ Πατρὸς· τὸν δὲ Νοῦν τοῦτον καὶ Μονογενῆ καλοῦσι, καὶ Πατέρα, καὶ Ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων· συμπροβεβλήσθαι δὲ αὐτῷ Ἀλήθειαν· καὶ εἶναι ταύτην πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχέγονον Πυθαγορικὴν τετρακτύν, ἣν καὶ ῥίζαν τῶν πάντων καλοῦσιν· ἔστι γὰρ Βυθὸς καὶ Σιγὴ, ἔπειτα Νοῦς καὶ Ἀλήθεια. Αἰσθόμενόν τε τὸν Μονογενῆ τοῦτον ἐφ' οἷς προσεβλήθη, προβαλεῖν καὶ αὐτὸν Λόγον καὶ Ζωήν, πατέρα πάντων τῶν μετ' αὐτὸν ἐσομένων, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ μόρφωσιν παντὸς τοῦ πληρώματος. Ἐκ δὲ τοῦ Λόγου καὶ τῆς Ζωῆς προβεβλήσθαι κατὰ συζυγίαν Ἀνθρώπον καὶ Ἐκκλησίαν· καὶ εἶναι ταύτην ἀρχέγονον Ὀγδοάδα, ῥίζαν καὶ ὑπόστασιν τῶν πάντων, τέτρασιν ὀνόμασι παρ' αὐτοῖς καλουμένων Βυθῷ, καὶ Νῷ καὶ Λόγῳ, καὶ Ἀνθρώπῳ· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἀρρενόθηλον. —

Τούτους δὲ τοὺς Αἰῶνας εἰς δόξαν τοῦ Πατρὸς προβεβλημένους, βουλευθέντας καὶ αὐτοὺς διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου δοξάσαι τὸν Πατέρα, προβαλεῖν προβολὰς ἐν συζυγίᾳ·

¹ Sc. Valentinians. Irenaeus is not speaking here of Valentinus alone.

² Cp. Tertull. *Adv. Valentinianos* 7: Substantialiter quidem αἰῶνα τέλειον appellans, personaliter vero προαρχὴν et τὴν ἀρχὴν, etiam Bython.

³ The names Προαρχή and Προπάτωρ were frequently used by Valentinus' immediate followers who changed the doctrine in the sense of Christian monotheism. He himself appears to have spoken of Βυθός.

⁴ The nomination Ἐννοία to indicate the female aspect of the First Principle is found in other gnostic sects, e.g. with Simon Magus and his Helena. Valentinus coupled Βυθός with Σιγὴ. Cp. Iren. I 11.

τὸν μὲν Λόγον καὶ τὴν Ζωὴν, μετὰ τὸ προβαλέσθαι τὸν Ἀνθρωπον καὶ τὴν Ἐκκλησίαν, ἄλλους δέκα Ἀἰῶνας. —

Τὸν δὲ Ἀνθρωπον καὶ αὐτὸν προβαλεῖν μετὰ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας Αἰῶνας δώδεκα.

The last couple of aeons was called Thelètos and Sophia.

b. Irenaeus, ib. I 2, 1:

Τὸν μὲν οὖν Προπάτορα αὐτῶν γινώσκεισθαι μόνῳ λέγουσι τῷ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγονότι Μονογενεῖ, τουτέστι τῷ Νῶ· τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς πᾶσιν ἄορατον καὶ ἀκατάληπτον ὑπάρχειν· μόνος δὲ ὁ Νοῦς κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐτέρπετο θεωρῶν τὸν Πατέρα, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τὸ ἀμέτρητον αὐτοῦ κατανοῶν ἡγάλλετο· καὶ διεννοεῖτο καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς αἰῶσιν ἀνακοινώσασθαι τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ Πατρός, ἡλικός τε καὶ ὅσος ὑπῆρχε, καὶ ὡς ἦν ἀναρχός τε καὶ ἀχώρητος, καὶ οὐ καταληπτὸς ἰδεῖν· κατέσχε δ' αὐτὸν ἡ Σιγὴ βουλήσει τοῦ Πατρός, διὰ τὸ θέλειν πάντος αὐτοὺς εἰς ἔννοιαν καὶ πόθον ζητήσεως τοῦ προειρημένου Προπάτορος αὐτῶν ἀγαγεῖν. Καὶ οἱ μὲν λοιποὶ ὁμοίως Αἰῶνες ἡσυχῇ πως ἐπεπόθουν τὸν προβολέα τοῦ σπέρματος αὐτῶν ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὴν ἀναρχον ῥίζαν ἱστορῆσαι. —

Νοῦς
only knows
Βυθός

c. Valentinus separated his First Principle from the rest of the pleroma, as the pleroma again was separated from inferior being, which is generated by Sophia (called "the Mother") after her leaving the spiritual world.

Bythos
separated
from the
other aeons

Irenaeus, ib. I 11, 1:

Ὅρους τε δύο ὑπέθετο, ἓνα μὲν μεταξὺ τοῦ Βυθοῦ καὶ τοῦ λοιποῦ πληρώματος, διορίζοντα τοὺς γεννητοὺς Αἰῶνας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου Πατρός· ἕτερον δὲ τὸν ἀφορίζοντα αὐτῷ [αὐτῶν] τὴν Μητέρα ἀπὸ τοῦ πληρώματος.

1334—The thirtieth aeon by ὕβρις separates himself from the spiritual world and gets entangled in passions.

The
ὕβρις
of Sophia

a. Irenaeus, ib. I 2, 2:

Προήλατο δὲ πολὺ ὁ τελευταῖος καὶ νεώτατος τῆς δωδεκάδος, τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀνθρώπου καὶ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας, προβεβλημένος Αἰὼν, τουτέστιν ἡ Σοφία, καὶ ἔπαθε πάθος ἄνευ τῆς ἐπιπλοκῆς τοῦ ζυγοῦ τοῦ Θελητοῦ· ὃ ἐνῆρξατο μὲν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Νοῦν καὶ τὴν Ἀλήθειαν, ἀπέσκηψε ¹ δ' εἰς τοῦτον τὸν παρατραπέντα, πρόφασιν μὲν ἀγάπης, τόλμης δέ, διὰ τὸ μὴ κεκοινωνῆσθαι τῷ Πατρὶ τῷ τελείῳ, καθὼς καὶ ὁ Νοῦς. Τὸ δὲ πάθος εἶναι ζήτησιν τοῦ Πατρός· ἤθελε γάρ, ὡς λέγουσι, τὸ μέγεθος αὐτοῦ καταλαβεῖν. —

¹ ἀπέσκηψε is a medical term, used of the determination of humours to a certain part of the body. Thus Tertull., *Adv. Val.* 9, explains: In hunc autem, id est in Sophiam, derivarat, ut solent vitia in corpore alibi connata in aliud membrum perniciem suam efflare. Cp. Galenus, *De methodo medendi*, II 9.

She meets
"Ορος

b. Finally she meets Horos. Irenaeus ib.:

"Επειτα μὴ δυνηθῆναι, διὰ τὸ ἀδυνάτῳ ἐπιβαλεῖν πράγματι, καὶ ἐν πολλῷ πάνυ ἀγῶνι γερόμενον, διὰ τε τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ βάθους, καὶ τὸ ἀνεξιχνίαστον τοῦ Πατρός, καὶ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν στοργήν, ἐκτεινόμενον αἰεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ πρόσθεν, ὑπὸ τῆς γλυκύτητος αὐτοῦ τελευταῖον ἂν καταπεπόσθαι, καὶ ἀναλεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν, εἰ μὴ τῇ στηριζούσῃ καὶ ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἄρρητου μεγέθους φυλασσούσῃ τὰ ὅλα συνέτυχε δυνάμει. Ταυτὴν δὲ τὴν δυνάμιν καὶ "Ορον καλοῦσιν, ὅφ' ἥς ἐπεσχῆσθαι καὶ ἐστηρίχθαι, καὶ μόγις ἐπιστρέψαντα εἰς ἑαυτόν, καὶ πεισθέντα ὅτι ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν ὁ Πατήρ, ἀποθέσθαι τὴν προτέραν ἐνθύμησιν σὺν τῷ ἐπιγινομένῳ πάθει ἐκ τοῦ ἐκπλήκτου ἐκείνου θαύματος.

c. How the Demiurge is brought forth by Sophia.

The
demiurge
brought
forth by
Sophia

Irenaeus, ib. I II, 1:

Καὶ τὸν Χριστὸν δὲ οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ πληρώματι Αἰώνων προβεβλῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ τῆς μητρός, ἔξω γενομένης, κατὰ τὴν γνώμην¹ τῶν κρείττωνων ἀποκεκυῆσθαι μετὰ σκιᾶς τινος. Καὶ τοῦτον μὲν, ἅτε ἄρρενα ὑπάρχοντα, ἀποκόψαντα ἅφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν σκιάν, ἀναδραμεῖν εἰς τὸ πλήρωμα. Τὴν δὲ μητέρα ὑπολειφθεῖσαν μετὰ τῆς σκιᾶς, κεκνωμένην τε τῆς πνευματικῆς ὑποστάσεως, ἕτερον υἱὸν προενέγκασθαι· καὶ τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν Δημιουργόν, ὃν καὶ παντοκράτορα λέγει τῶν ὑποκειμένων.

d. How both ψυχή and ὕλη arise from the passions of Sophia.

Irenaeus, ib. I 4, 1-2:

Μὴ δυνηθεῖσαν δὲ διδοεῦσαι τὸν "Ορον, διὰ τὸ συμπεπλέχθαι τῷ πάθει, καὶ μόνην ἀπολειφθεῖσαν ἔξω, παντὶ μέρει τοῦ πάθους ὑποπεσεῖν πολυμεροῦς καὶ πολυποικίλου ὑπάρχοντος, καὶ παθεῖν, λύπην μὲν, ὅτι οὐ κατέλαβε² φόβον δέ, μὴ καθάπερ αὐτὴν τὸ φῶς, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἐπιλίπη· ἀπορίαν τε ἐπὶ τούτοις· ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ δὲ τὰ πάντα. — Ἐπισυμβεβηκέναι δ' αὐτῇ καὶ ἐτέραν διαθέσιν, τὴν τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς ἐπὶ τὸν ζωοποιήσαντα.

The ele-
ments arise
from her
passions

Ταύτην σύστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν τῆς ὕλης γεγενῆσθαι λέγουσιν, ἐξ ἥς ὁδε ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν. Ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς τὴν τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν τὴν γένεσιν εἰληφέναι, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ φόβου καὶ τῆς λύπης τὰ λοιπὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐσχηκέναι· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν δακρύων αὐτῆς γεγονέναι πᾶσαν ἔνυγρον οὐσίαν· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ γέλωτος, τὴν φωτεινὴν· ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς λύπης καὶ τῆς ἐκπλήξεως, τὰ σωματικὰ τοῦ κόσμου στοιχεῖα.

¹ She brings forth Christ in remembrance of the higher world. Perhaps μνήμην should be read instead of γνώμην.

² sc. τὸν Πατέρα.

e. The Demiurge creates the world without knowing the archetypal Ideas. Ignorance
of the
Demiurge

Irenaeus, ib. I 5, 3:

Οὐρανὸν <γάρ> πεποιημέναι μὴ εἰδότα τὸν οὐρανόν· καὶ ἄνθρωπον πεπλα-
κέναι, μὴ εἰδότα τὸν ἄνθρωπον· γῆν δὲ δεδειχέναι, μὴ ἐπιστάμενον τὴν γῆν·
καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως λέγουσιν ἡγνοημέναι αὐτῶν τὰς ἰδέας ὧν ἐποίει, καὶ
αὐτὴν τὴν μητέρα· αὐτὸν δὲ μόνον ὥησθαι πάντα εἶναι.

1335—a. Three kinds of beings: πνευματικοί, ψυχικοί, ὑλικοί.

πνευματικοί,
ψυχικοί,
ὕλικοί

Irenaeus, ib. I 6, 1:

Τριῶν οὖν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὑλικόν, ὃ καὶ ἀριστερόν καλοῦσι, κατὰ ἀνάγκην
ἀπόλλυσθαι λέγουσιν, ἅτε μηδεμίαν ἐπιδέξασθαι πνοὴν ἀφθαρσίας δυνάμενον·
τὸ δὲ ψυχικόν, ὃ καὶ δεξιὸν προσαγορεύουσιν, ἅτε μέσον ὄν τοῦ τε πνευματικοῦ
καὶ ὑλικοῦ, ἐκεῖσε χωρεῖν, ὅπου ἂν καὶ τὴν πρόσκλισιν ποιήσῃται· τὸ δὲ πνευ-
ματικὸν ἐκπεπέμφθαι, ὅπως ἐνθάδε τῷ ψυχικῷ συζυγὲν μορφωθῇ, συμπαι-
δευθὲν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ἀναστροφῇ. Καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι λέγουσι τὸ ἅλας, καὶ τὸ φῶς
τοῦ κόσμου· ἔδει γὰρ τῶν ψυχικῶν [τῷ ψυχικῷ] καὶ αἰσθητῶν παιδευμάτων.
Δι' ὧν καὶ κόσμον κατεσκευάσθαι λέγουσι, καὶ τὸν Σωτῆρα δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦτο
παραγεγονέναι τὸ ψυχικόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτεξούσιόν ἐστιν, ὅπως αὐτὸ σώσῃ.

b. The πνευματικοί are imperishable by nature.

Irenaeus, ib. I 6, 2:

Ὡς γὰρ τὸ χοῖκὸν ἀδύνατον σωτηρίας μετασχεῖν (οὐ γὰρ εἶναι λέγουσιν
αὐτοὶ δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς), οὕτως πάλιν τὸ πνευματικὸν θέλουσιν οἱ αὐτοὶ εἶναι
ἀδύνατον φθορὰν καταδέξασθαι, καὶ ὅποιας συγκαταγένηνται πράξεσιν. "Ὁν
γὰρ τρόπον χρυσὸς ἐν βορβόρῳ κατατεθεὶς οὐκ ἀποβάλλει τὴν καλλονὴν αὐτοῦ,
ἀλλὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν διαφυλάττει, τοῦ βορβόρου μὴδὲν ἀδικῆσαι δυναμένον
τὸν χρυσόν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς λέγουσι, καὶ ἐν ὅποιαις ὑλικάῃς πράξεσι κατα-
γένηνται, μὴδὲν αὐτοὺς παραβλάπτεσθαι, μὴδὲ ἀποβάλλειν τὴν πνευματικὴν
ὑπόστασιν.

c. Clem. Alex., *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 56:

Κατὰ τοῦτο πατὴρ ἡμῶν ὁ Ἀδάμ "ὁ πρῶτος [δ'] ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός". —
Διὰ τοῦτο πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ ὑλικοί, οὐ πολλοὶ δὲ ψυχικοί· σπάνιοι δὲ οἱ
πνευματικοί.

Cp. *Asclepius* 22: Sunt autem non multi aut admodum pauci, ita ut numerari
etiam in mundo possint, religiosi¹.

¹ *Corpus Hermeticum*, ed. Nock et Festugière II p. 323.

A Valentinian psalm

1336—a. Valentinus expressed his vision of the hierarchy of being in the following psalm.

Philosophoumena VI 11, p. 300 f Cruice:

Ἀέρος πάντα βλέπω κρεμάμενα,
πάντα δ' ὀχούμενα πνεύματι νοῶ,
σάρκα μὲν ἐκ ψυχῆς κρεμαμένην,
ψυχὴν δ' ἀέρος ἐξεχομένην,
ἀέρα δ' ἐξ αἰθρης κρεμάμενον,
ἐκ δὲ βυθοῦ καρπούς φερόμενους,
ἐκ μήτρας δὲ βρέφος φερόμενον.

The hierarchy of being

The author of the *Philosophoumena* explains:

Οὕτως ταῦτα νοῶν· σάρξ ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη κατ' αὐτούς, ἥτις κρέμαται ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ δημιουργοῦ. ψυχὴ δὲ ἀέρος ἐξέχεται, τουτέστιν ὁ Δημιουργὸς τοῦ πνεύματος ἔξω πληρώματος. Ἄηρ δὲ αἰθρης ἐξέχεται, τουτέστιν ἡ ἔξω Σοφία τοῦ ἐντὸς ὅρου καὶ παντὸς πληρώματος. Ἐκ δὲ Βυθοῦ καρποὶ φέρονται ἡ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς πᾶσα προβολὴ τῶν Αἰώνων γενομένη.

Basilides

b. A clear summary of Valentinus' doctrine is found in Hippolytus, *Ref.* X 13. What follows in chapter 14 on Basilides' doctrine is much less clear. It seems, however, that Basilides taught a similar conception of metaphysics: under the unknown God he placed a double Noûs, which he separated from the "psychic" sphere by a μεθόριον πνεῦμα. The sphere of "soul" was divided into two stages, (1) aether, inhabited by the aether-soul, (2) air, with the air-soul. Next follows the spiritual man in the visible world,—the non-spiritual man being not considered as a man at all! Thus, redemption is for "mankind" as a whole!

See on Basilides: G. Quispel, *L'homme gnostique* in: *Eranos Jahrbuch*, Zürich 1949, p. 89-139.

Oracula chaldaica

c. A similar conception is found in the Chaldaic oracles. *Oracula Chaldaica*, Kroll¹ p. 14; p. 28:

Δυὰς παρὰ τῷδε² κάθηται·
ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ ἔχει, νῶ μὲν κατέχειν τὰ νοητά,
αἰσθησὶν δ' ἐπάγειν κόσμοις³.

Μετὰ δὲ πατρικᾶς διανοίας
ψυχὴ ἐγὼ ναίω θέρμη ψυχούσα τὰ πάντα.

The double Noûs is also found in Arnobius II 25 (Marchesi p. 95):

Haecine est anima docta illa quam dicitis, immortalis perfecta divina, post Deum principem rerum et post geminas mentes locum optinens quartum.

¹ W. Kroll, *De oraculis Chaldaicis*, Bresl. philol. Abh. VII 1895.

² Sc. the supreme God or τέλειος Πατήρ.

³ Cp. the Hermetic treatise *Asclepius* 32, where the all-embracing Intellect which is nearest to the supreme God is called *omnis sensus* (= ὁ πᾶς νοῦς), while the world-Spirit (νοῦς ἐγκόσμιος) is indicated by the term *sensus mundanus*.

1337—In Valentinus, as in other gnostics, we find the same kind of **Demonology** demonology which we found in other authors of the first and second century.

a. The human heart inhabited by many evil spirits.

Clem. Alex., *Strom.* II 20, 114, 3 (St. II, p. 175):

God alone is good, and He alone can make the heart of man pure.

The heart a dwelling-place of demons

Πολλὰ γὰρ ἐνοικοῦντα αὐτῇ πνεύματα οὐκ ἔα καθαρεύειν, ἕκαστον δ' αὐτῶν τὰ ἴδια ἐκτελεῖ ἔργα πολλαχῶς ἐνυβρίζοντων ἐπιθυμίαις οὐ προσηκούσαις. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ὁμοῖόν τι πάσχειν τῷ πανδοχείῳ ἡ καρδία· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο κατατιτράται τε καὶ ὀρύττεται καὶ πολλάκις κόπρου πίμπλεται ἀνθρώπων ἀσελγῶς ἐμμενόντων καὶ μηδεμίαν πρόνοιαν ποιουμένων τοῦ χωρίου, καθάπερ ἄλλοτρίου καθεστῶτος. τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον καὶ ἡ καρδία, μέχρι μὴ προνοίας τυγχάνει, ἀκάθαρτος [οὔσα], πολλῶν οὔσα δαιμόνων οἰκητήριον.

b. Irenaeus, *Adv. haereses* I 5, 4:

The "hylic substance" springs from the passions of the Mother: like the Demiurge arose from her ἐπιστροφή, so from her sorrow "the evil spirits" are said to have arisen.

The evil spirits

Ἐκ δὲ τῆς λύπης τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας διδάσκουσι γεγονέναι· ὅθεν τὸν Διάβολον τὴν γένεσιν ἐσχηκέναι, ὃν καὶ κοσμοκράτορα καλοῦσι, καὶ τὰ δαιμόνια, καὶ τοὺς ἀγγέλους, καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν πνευματικὴν τῆς πονηρίας ὑπόστασιν.

c. There are also good spirits or "angels". Jesus, who comes from the pleroma, takes them with him for the redemption of man, — at least: the spiritual man, called "the seed".

Clem. Alex., *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 35:

Good spirits or Angels

Ὁ Ἰησοῦς, "τὸ Φῶς" ἡμῶν, ὡς λέγει ὁ Ἀπόστολος, "ἑαυτὸν κενώσας"¹ (τουτέστιν· ἐκτὸς τοῦ Ὄρου γενόμενος, κατὰ Θεόδοτον), ἐπεὶ "Ἀγγελος" ἦν τοῦ πληρώματος, τοὺς Ἀγγέλους τοῦ διαφέροντος σπέρματος συνεξήγαγεν ἑαυτῷ. Καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν τὴν λύτρωσιν, ὡς ἀπὸ πληρώματος προελθὼν, εἶχεν· τοὺς δὲ Ἀγγέλους εἰς διόρθωσιν τοῦ σπέρματος ἤγαγεν.

1338—The Corpus Hermeticum is a collection of religious works of different **The Corpus Hermeticum** form and inspiration: dialogues, letters, popular treatises, revelations. Sometimes Hermes is speaking to his pupil Asclepius, sometimes the Noûs is introduced speaking to Hermes. In some of the Hermetic writings (V, VIII, IX) the deity is conceived (with Stoicism) as penetrating the cosmos; in others the cosmos is viewed as radically bad (VI, VII, XIII) and God is the unknown God of Gnosticism: He must be found by flying from the world. Sometimes contradictory ideas are found in the same treatise, e.g. in X that the cosmos is good (c. 14) and that it is not good (c. 10).

¹ *Philipp.* 2, 7: ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε μορφὴν δούλου λαβών.

Poimandres and Asclepius Two important writings of the Corpus, the *Poimandres* (I) and the *Asclepius*, are gnostic writings: the explanation of the universe is dualistic, in the *Poimandres* Eros is considered as the fundamental evil; mention is made of the return of the separated self to its origin.

In both treatises the part of mythology is less important than it is in nearly all other gnostic writings. In the *Poimandres*, the first Principle is called Noûs. In Him the archetypal Ideas are seen as "innumerable Powers". A second Noûs δημιουργός is generated by Him. Man is a spiritual being as created by the first Noûs, but of a lower nature as far as united with matter.

The text of the *Asclepius* is only preserved in Latin. It is found in vol. II of the edition of Nock and Festugière¹. Also in vol. III of the works of Apuleius, ed. P. Thomas, Leipzig 1908, p. 36-81.

1339—a. *Corp. Herm.* I 1 (*Poimandres*), 4-5.

Hermes' first vision: Light and darkness The Noûs appears to Hermes and reveals to him the nature of things. He calls himself ὁ Ποιμάνδρης. Hermes' first vision.

Εὐθέως πάντα μοι ἦνοικτο ῥοπή, καὶ ὁρῶ θεάν ἀόριστον, φῶς δὲ πάντα γεγεννημένα, εὐδίον τε καὶ ἱλαρόν, καὶ ἡράσθην ἰδών. καὶ μετ' ὀλίγον σκότος καταφερὲς ἦν, ἐν μέρει γεγεννημένον², φοβερόν τε καὶ στυγνόν, σκολιῶς ἐσπειραμένον, ὡς <ῥφει>³ εἰκάσαι με· εἴτα μεταβαλλόμενον τὸ σκότος εἰς ὑγρὰν τινα φύσιν, ἀφάτως τετραγαγμένην καὶ καπνὸν ἀποδιδούσαν, ὡς ἀπὸ πυρός, καὶ τινα ἦχον ἀποτελοῦσαν ἀνεκλάλητον γοῶδη· εἴτα βοή ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀσυνάρθρως ἐξεπέμπετο, ὡς εἰκάσαι φωνῇ πυρός⁴, ἐκ δὲ φωτὸς . . . λόγος ἅγιος ἐπέβη τῇ φύσει, καὶ πῦρ ἄκρατον ἐξεπήδησεν ἐκ τῆς ὑγρᾶς φύσεως ἄνω εἰς ὕψος· κοῦφον δὲ ἦν καὶ ὀξύ, δραστικὸν δὲ ἅμα, καὶ ὁ ἀήρ ἐλαφρὸς ὦν ἠκολούθησε τῷ πνεύματι, ἀναβαίνοντος αὐτοῦ μέχρι τοῦ πυρός ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος, ὡς δοκεῖν κρέμασθαι αὐτὸν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ· γῆ δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ ἔμμενε καθ' ἑαυτὰ συμμεμιγμένα, ὡς μὴ θεωρεῖσθαι <τὴν γῆν> ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος· κινούμενα δὲ ἦν διὰ τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον πνευματικὸν λόγον εἰς ἀκοήν.

The Light is Noûs

b. The vision explained. *Corp. Herm.* I 1, 6:

Ὁ δὲ Ποιμάνδρης ἐμοί, Ἐνοήσας, φησί, τὴν θεάν ταύτην ὃ τι καὶ βούλεται;

¹ Corpus Hermeticum t. II, Paris 1945, pp. 296-355.

² Festugière translates in C.H. I (1945): "il y avait une obscurité se portant vers le bas, *survenue à son tour*." But in *Le Dieu inconnu et la Gnose* (1954) p. 41 ff. he suggests that the expression means that Matter is split off from the substance of God (the Light), like Moderatus said that God "separated quantity (i.e. matter) from Himself"—αὐτοῦ ἐχώρισε τὴν ποσότητα (supra, nr. 1285b)—and Iamblichus, *De mysteriis* VIII 3, p. 264, 13 ff. P. says that God "made matter exist" (ὕλην παρῆγαγεν ὁ θεός) by splitting off materiality from the divine Substance (ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσιότητος ὑποσχισθείσης ὕλότητος).—This interpretation of ἐν μέρει γεγεννημένον seems doubtful. The vision of Hermes rather makes the impression of dualism.

³ Obscurity is represented as a dragon e.g. in *Pistis Sophia* c. 126 (p. 207 Schmidt) and with several other gnostics.

⁴ The brutal cry of Chaos is opposed to the articulated word of the Logos.

καὶ Γινώσομαι, ἔφην ἐγώ. — Τὸ φῶς ἐκεῖνο, ἔφη, ἐγὼ Νοῦς ὁ σὸς θεός, ὁ πρὸ φύσεως ὑγρᾶς τῆς ἐκ σκότους φανείσης· ὁ δὲ ἐκ Νοὸς φωτεινὸς Λόγος υἱὸς θεοῦ. — Τί οὖν; φημί. — Οὕτω γινῶθι· τὸ ἐν σοὶ βλέπον καὶ ἀκοῦον, λόγος κυρίου, ὁ δὲ νοῦς πατὴρ θεός. οὐ γὰρ δίστανται ἀπ' ἀλλήλων· ἔνωσις γὰρ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ ζωή.

c. Second vision: the Light consists of innumerable powers.

Corp. Herm. I 1, 7-8:

Εἰπόντος ταῦτα ἐπὶ πλείονα χρόνον ἀντώπησέ μοι, ὥστε μὲν τρέμειν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἰδέαν· ἀνανεύσαντος δέ, θεωρῶ ἐν τῷ νοῦ μου τὸ φῶς ἐν δυνάμεσιν ἀναριθμήτοις ὄν, καὶ κόσμον ἀπεριόριστον γεγεννημένον, καὶ περισχεσθαι τὸ πῦρ δυνάμει μεγίστη, καὶ στάσιν ἐσχηκέναι κρατούμενον· ταῦτα δὲ ἐγὼ διενόηθην ὁρῶν διὰ τὸν τοῦ Ποιμάνδρου λόγον.

Ὡς δὲ ἐν ἐκπλήξει μου ὄντος, φησὶ πάλιν ἐμοί· Εἶδες ἐν τῷ νῷ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον εἶδος, τὸ προάρχον¹ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἀπεράντου· ταῦτα ὁ Ποιμάνδρης ἐμοί. — Τὰ οὖν, ἐγὼ φημι, στοιχεῖα τῆς φύσεως πόθεν ὑπέστη; — πάλιν ἐκεῖνος πρὸς ταῦτα· Ἐκ βουλῆς θεοῦ, ἥτις λαβοῦσα τὸν Λόγον καὶ ἰδοῦσα τὸν καλὸν κόσμον ἐμιμήσατο, κοσμοποιηθεῖσα διὰ τῶν ἑαυτῆς στοιχείων καὶ γεννημάτων ψυχῶν.

**In the Light
there are in-
numerable
powers**

1340—By the first Noûs or Light a second Noûs is generated: the δημιουργός.

**The second
Noûs**

a. *Corp. Herm.* I 1, 9:

Ὁ δὲ Νοῦς ὁ θεός, ἀρρενόθηλος² ὢν, ζωὴ καὶ φῶς ὑπάρχων, ἀπεκύησε λόγῳ ἕτερον Νοῦν δημιουργόν, ὃς θεὸς τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ πνεύματος ὢν, ἐδημιούργησε διοικητάς τινας³ ἐπτά, ἐν κύκλοις περιέχοντας τὸν αἰσθητὸν κόσμον, καὶ ἡ διοίκησις αὐτῶν εἰμαρμένη καλεῖται.

¹ Cp. Valentinus ap. Iren. I 1, 1: προαρχὴν καὶ προπάτορα, of the first God (Βυθός) who is the Father of Noûs (above, 1333a).

² That the supreme God is bisexual is a current idea in Indian theosophy and in all kinds of Oriental gnosis. Festugière, *Le Dieu inconnu et la gnose* p. 43 ff. points to Greek precedents: there is the Orphic fragment 21a Kern—Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζεὺς ἄμβροτος ἔπλετο νύμφη—preserved in ps.-Aristot., II. κόσμου 401 a 25; next Diog. Babyl. fr. 33 (SVF III), where Ζεὺς ἄρρην, Ζεὺς θῆλυς is spoken of as a well-known expression. Later it is found in Nicomachus of Gerasa and Iamblichus. Festugière concludes that it is Pythagorean doctrine of the third century B.C., since Pythagoreans are found to have been monists as early as the second century at least (see above, nr. 1279a).—Evidently this possibility does not exclude oriental influence at all. Cp. Valentinus (supra, 1333a). The Asclepius says of the Father of all things: *hic ergo, solus ut omnia, utraque sexus fecunditate plenissimus* (C.H. II p. 321, 9-10).

³ Ἡ διοίκησις τοῦ κόσμου is a Stoic term. E.g. SVF III p. 17, 7; cp. Philo V 252, 4 C.W. The planets are called "governors" e.g. by Bardesanes, *The books of the Laws* (Patrol. Syriaca II 567 f.).

b. The Logos leaves the elements and unites with the Νοῦς δημιουργός.

Corp. Herm. I 1, 10:

Ἐπῆδυσεν εὐθύς ἐκ τῶν κατωφερῶν στοιχείων [τοῦ θεοῦ] ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγος εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τῆς φύσεως δημιουργήμα, καὶ ἠνώθη τῷ δημιουργῷ Νῶ (ὁμοούσιος γὰρ ἦν), καὶ κατελείφθη [τά] ἄλογα τὰ κατωφερῇ τῆς φύσεως στοιχεῖα, ὥς εἶναι ὕλην μόνην¹. Ὁ δὲ δημιουργὸς Νοῦς σὺν τῷ Λόγῳ, ὁ περίσχωον τοὺς κύκλους καὶ δινῶν ῥοίζῳ, ἔστρεψε τὰ ἑαυτοῦ δημιουργήματα καὶ εἶλσε στρέφεσθαι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀορίστου εἰς ἀπέραντον τέλος· ἄρχεται γάρ, οὗ λήγει· ἡ δὲ τούτων περιφορά, καθὼς ἠθέλησεν ὁ Νοῦς, ἐκ τῶν κατωφερῶν στοιχείων ζῶα ἤνεγκεν ἄλογα (οὐ γὰρ ἐπεῖχε τὸν Λόγον), ἀλλ' ἡ πετεινὰ ἤνεγκε, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ νηκτά· διακεχώρισται δὲ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἡ τε γῆ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, καθὼς ἠθέλησεν ὁ Νοῦς, καὶ <ἡ γῆ> ἐξήνεγκεν ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἃ εἶχε ζῶα τετράποδα <καὶ> ἐρπετά, θηρία ἄγρια καὶ ἡμερα.

The
archetypal
man

1341—The archetypal man is created by the first Νοῦς.

a. *Corp. Herm.* I 1, 12:

Ὁ δὲ πάντων πατήρ ὁ Νοῦς, ὦν ζωὴ καὶ φῶς, ἀπεκύησεν Ἀνθρωπον αὐτῷ ἴσον, οὗ ἡράσθη ὡς ιδίου τόκου· περικαλλῆς γάρ, τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς εἰκόνα ἔχων· ὄντως γὰρ καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἡράσθη τῆς ιδίας μορφῆς, παρέδωκε τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πάντα δημιουργήματα.

How he
comes to be
a double
being

b. He becomes a double being by attaching himself to Matter.

Corp. Herm. I 1, 14-15:

Καὶ ὁ τοῦ τῶν θνητῶν κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἔχων πᾶσαν ἐξουσίαν διὰ τῆς ἁρμονίας² παρέκυψεν, ἀναρρήξας τὸ κύτος³, καὶ ἔδειξε τῇ κατωφερεῖ φύσει τὴν καλὴν τοῦ θεοῦ μορφήν, ὃν ἰδοῦσα ἀκόρεστον κάλλος <καὶ> πᾶσαν ἐνέργειαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχοντα τῶν διοικητόρων τὴν τε μορφήν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐμεδίασεν ἔρωτι, ὥς ἄτε τῆς καλλίστης μορφῆς τοῦ Ἀνθρώπου τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ἰδοῦσα καὶ τὸ σκίασμα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς. Ὁ δὲ ἰδὼν τὴν ὁμοίαν αὐτῷ μορφήν ἐν αὐτῇ οὖσαν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, ἐφίλησε καὶ ἠβουλήθη αὐτοῦ οἰκεῖν· ἅμα δὲ τῇ βουλῇ ἐγένετο ἐνέργεια, καὶ ὥκησε τὴν ἄλογον μορφήν· ἡ δὲ φύσις λαβοῦσα τὸν ἐρώμενον περιεπλάκη ὅλη καὶ ἐμίγησαν· ἐρώμενοι γὰρ ἦσαν.

¹ Likewise, according to Valentinus Jesus returns to the pleroma and leaves his Mother, and she, "bereft of the spiritual substance", brought forth the Demiurge (above, nr. 1334c).

² The "composite framework" of the heavenly spheres (Nock).

³ Κύτος of the starry vault of heaven, also ap. Vettius Valens 172, 32 Kr.

Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο παρὰ πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ζῶα διπλοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, θνητὸς μὲν διὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀθάνατος δὲ διὰ τὸν οὐσιώδη ἄνθρωπον.

1342—The man who comes to know himself returns to the Light. **The return of the spiritual man**

a. *Corp. Herm.* I 1, 21:

Κατὰ τί δὲ “ὁ νοήσας ἑαυτὸν εἰς αὐτὸν χωρεῖ”, ὅπερ ἔχει ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος; — φημί ἐγώ· “Ὅτι ἐκ φωτὸς καὶ ζωῆς συνέστηκεν ὁ πατήρ τῶν ὅλων, ἐξ οὗ γέγονεν ὁ Ἄνθρωπος. — Εὖ φῆς λαλῶν· φῶς καὶ ζωὴ ἐστὶν ὁ θεὸς καὶ πατήρ, ἐξ οὗ ἐγένετο ὁ Ἄνθρωπος. ἐὰν οὖν μάθῃς αὐτὸν ἐκ ζωῆς καὶ φωτὸς ὄντα καὶ ὅτι ἐκ τούτων τυγχάνεις, εἰς ζωὴν πάλιν χωρήσεις. ταῦτα ὁ Ποιμάνδρης ἔλεπεν.

b. His ascent through the celestial spheres and his return to God. **His ascent through the spheres**
Corp. Herm. I 1, 25-26:

Καὶ οὕτως ὁρμᾷ λοιπὸν ἄνω διὰ τῆς ἁρμονίας, καὶ τῇ πρώτῃ ζώνῃ δίδωσι τὴν αὐξητικὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν μειωτικὴν, καὶ τῇ δευτέρᾳ τὴν μηχανὴν τῶν κακῶν, δόλον ἀνενέργητον, καὶ τῇ τρίτῃ τὴν ἐπιθυμητικὴν ἀπάτην ἀνενέργητον, καὶ τῇ τετάρτῃ τὴν ἀρχοντικὴν προφανίαν ἀπλεονέκτητον, καὶ τῇ πέμπτῃ τὸ θράσος τὸ ἀνόσιον καὶ τῆς τόλμης τὴν προπέτειαν, καὶ τῇ ἕκτῃ τὰς ἀφορμὰς τὰς κακὰς τοῦ πλοῦτου ἀνενεργήτους, καὶ τῇ ἑβδόμῃ ζώνῃ τὸ ἐνεδρεῦον ψεῦδος. καὶ τότε γυμνωθεὶς ἀπὸ τῶν τῆς ἁρμονίας ἐνεργημάτων¹ γίνεται ἐπὶ τὴν ὀγδοατικὴν φύσιν², τὴν ἰδίαν δυνάμιν ἔχων, καὶ ὑμνεῖ σὺν τοῖς οὐσι τὸν πατέρα· συγχαίρουσι δὲ οἱ παρόντες τῇ τούτου παρουσίᾳ, καὶ ὁμοιωθεὶς τοῖς συνοῦσιν ἀκούει καὶ τινων δυνάμεων ὑπὲρ τὴν ὀγδοατικὴν φύσιν φωνῇ τινι ἡδεῖα ὑμνουσῶν τὸν θεόν· καὶ τότε τάξει ἀνέρχονται πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰς δυνάμεις ἑαυτοὺς παραδιδόασι, καὶ δυνάμεις γενόμενοι ἐν θεῷ γίνονται.

See on this passage Festugière, *Les doctrines de l'âme*, p. 130-152.

On the δυνάμεις ib., 153-174.

Similar ideas are found in Numenius, Porphyrius and many others. See our nr. 1356 and the note under b.

1343—*Corp. Herm.* I 1, 31:

“Ἄγιος ὁ θεὸς καὶ πατήρ τῶν ὅλων.

“Ἄγιος ὁ θεός, οὗ ἡ βουλὴ τελεῖται ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων δυνάμεων.

The final hymn of the Poimandres

¹ Cp. Plotinus, *Enn.* I 6, 7: ἕως ἄν τις παρελθὼν ἐν τῇ ἀναβάσει πᾶν ὅσον ἀλλότριον τοῦ θεοῦ αὐτῷ μόνῳ αὐτὸ μόνον ἴδῃ εἰλικρινές, ἀπλοῦν καθαρόν, ἀφ’ οὗ πάντα ἐξήρτηται. See also Cumont, *Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*, Paris 1929, p. 282 f., n. 69, and W. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, p. 361-369.

² The ogdoas is also mentioned in C.H. XIII 15. Cp. Clem. Alex., *Exc. ex Theod.* 63, 1.

"Αγιος ὁ θεός, ὃς γνωσθῆναι βούλεται καὶ γινώσκεται τοῖς ἰδίοις.

"Αγιος εἶ, ὁ λόγῳ συστησάμενος τὰ ὄντα.

"Αγιος εἶ, οὗ πᾶσα φύσις εἰκὼν ἔφυ.

"Αγιος εἶ, ὃν ἡ φύσις οὐκ ἐμόρφωσεν.

"Αγιος εἶ, ὁ πάσης δυνάμεως ἰσχυρότερος.

"Αγιος εἶ, ὁ πάσης ὑπεροχῆς μείζων.

"Αγιος εἶ, ὁ κρείττων τῶν ἐπαίνων.

Here we see an idea of God which is very near to Philo's, e.g. God's will is fulfilled by His own Powers (cp. above, nr. 1294, 1303b); by the Logos He constituted all that is (1305); nature is an image of Him (1302a); He is stronger than all Powers (1303b). "He is known, or makes himself known, by those who belong to Him" is a gnostic feature. Cp. Hippolytus, *Ref.* V 8, p. 156 Duncker-Schneidewin (on the Naassene sect): ὁ Ἀδάμας, φησί, λέγει πρὸς τοὺς ἰδίους ἀνθρώπους.

An expression like πάσης ὑπεροχῆς μείζων foreshadows Proclus, e.g. *El. theol.* 122 (p. 108, 3 Dodds), 124 (p. 110, 17), 151 (p. 132, 29).

The soul of
man is
drawn down
by the body

1344—In X, which is a summary of the teaching of Hermes (called Κλείς) the "fall" of soul by its incorporation in a body is spoken of as a necessity.

Corp. Herm. I 10, 15:

Οὐ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖ τὸν ἀνθρώπον ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ γνωρίζει καὶ θέλει γνωρίζεσθαι. τοῦτο μόνον σωτήριον ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστίν, ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ θεοῦ. αὕτη εἰς τὸν Ὀλυμπον ἀνάβασις· οὕτω μόνως ἀγαθὴ ψυχὴ, καὶ οὐδέποτε ἀγαθὴ <αεί>, κακὴ δὲ γίνεται· κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεται. — πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Τρισμέγιστε;

— Ψυχὴν παιδὸς θέασαι, ὦ τέκνον, αὐτὴν διάλυσιν αὐτῆς μηδέπω ἐπιδεχομένην, τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς * ἔτι ὀλίγον ὄγκωτο καὶ * μηδέπω τὸ πᾶν ὠγκωμένου, πῶς καλὴν μὲν βλέπειν πανταχοῦ, μηδέποτε δὲ τεθολωμένην ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθῶν, ἔτι σχεδὸν ἡρτημένην τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῆς· ὅταν δὲ ὄγκωτῃ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατασπάσῃ αὐτὴν εἰς τοὺς τοῦ σώματος ὄγκους, διαλύσασα δὲ ἑαυτὴν ἐγγενῶς λήθην, καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ οὐ μεταλαμβάνει· ἡ δὲ λήθη κακία γίνεται.

What is said of the oblivion of the spiritual world as the source of evil recalls words of Plotinus in *Enn.* I 8, 4. Plotinus, however, does not go so far as to call it a necessity to be pulled down by the body (see *Enn.* I 8, 5, the end: κρατεῖν γὰρ αὐτῆς . . . τῷ μὴ ἐνύλῳ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντι). He says that the body is not bad in the primary sense (I 8, 4, the beginning); but it does trouble the soul by its irregular motion and may bring it to ἀμετρία. Also 8, 8: Γενομένη γὰρ κυρία τοῦ εἰς αὐτὴν ἐμφασθέντος φθείρει αὐτό, κτλ.

Cp. Porph. *Ἀφορμαί* 29, 2 (p. 14, 18 M.): the body brings the soul to complete obscurity and stupidity (πεσοῦση δὲ εἰς σώματα, . . . ἀγνοία ἔπεται τοῦ ὄντος τελεία καὶ σκότῳσις καὶ νηπιότης).

6—NUMENIUS

1345—a. Suidas s.v. Νουμήνιος (test. 1 Leemans):

Numenius
of Apamea

Ἀπαμεὺς ἀπὸ Συρίας, φιλόσοφος Πυθαγόρειος· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐξελέγξας διάνοιαν, ὡς ἐκ τῶν Μωσαϊκῶν τὰ περὶ θεοῦ καὶ κόσμου γενέσεως ἀποσυλήσασαν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φησι· τί γὰρ ἐστὶ Πλάτων .ἢ Μωσῆς ἀττικίζων;

The name Νουμήνιος is probably the Greek transcription of a Phoenician, in any case of a Semitic name. It is found in Phoenician inscriptions (C.I.S., I, nr. 117 and 118). See H. Puech in *Mélanges Bidez* (1934) p. 754.

b. Cp. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* I 22, p. 93 St. (Fr. 10 L.):

Νουμήνιος ὁ Πυθαγορικὸς φιλόσοφος ἄντικρυς γράφει· Τί γὰρ ἐστὶ Πλάτων ἢ Μωσῆς ἀττικίζων;

c. Numenius lived in the second century. He was a Pythagorean in the sense of that age. His philosophy is full of the metaphysics of Plato, which he explains with philosophical arguments, but seeking confirmation in old religious traditions, both in Greece and in the Orient. He has a preference for the books of Moses and knows even the rabbinic tradition (see Orig., *C. Celsum* I 15; IV 51). Lydus (*De mensibus* p. 109, 25 Wünsch) says, Num. called the God of the temple in Jerusalem πατέρα πάντων τῶν θεῶν.

Num. is cited frequently by Neoplatonic writers; also by Origenes. Porphyry, *V. Plot.* 17, tells he was read in the school of Plotinus.

Plotinus' friend and pupil Amelius wrote a book on the difference between Plotinus' doctrine and that of Numenius (Porph., *V. Plot.* 17).

Of Num.' work Περὶ τάγαθού important fragments are preserved in Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* XI and XV, of his work against the scepticism of the Academy (II. τῆς τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν πρὸς Πλάτωνα διαστάσεως) in *Praep. ev.* XIV. His books II. ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς are cited by Orig., *C. Celsum* V 57.

A new edition of the fragments of Numenius (after Thedinga, Bonn 1875) was given by E. A. Leemans, Bruxelles 1937. It is preceded by a study on "The philosopher Numenius of Apamea". Though by no means neglecting the Oriental elements in Numenius' thought, Leemans stresses the fact that N. is a philosopher trained in Greek dialectic and shows himself so in every fragment.

W. Bousset (in a review of J. Kroll's *Lehren des Hermes Trismegistos in Gött. gelehrte Anz.* 1914, p. 716) classed Num. among Greek gnostics. Cp. also E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, Berlin 1923, p. 72 f.

Similarly H. C. Puech in *Mélanges Bidez*, Bruxelles 1934, pp. 745-778. See infra under nr. **1349c** and **1350f**.

That Numenius' work II. ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς is the source of Macrobius in *Somn. Scip.* I 2 and 12, was argued by Fr. Cumont in *Revue des Etudes grecques* 1919, p. 119 f.; *Revue de Philol.* 1920, p. 231 n. 1; *Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*, 4Paris 1929, p. 301, and by Leemans, o.c., p. 43-64.

Festugière deals with Num. in *Les doctrines de l'âme*, Paris 1953, p. 42-47, and in *Le Dieu inconnu et la gnose*, Paris 1954, p. 123-132. He considers Num. as a Platonist of the same kind as Albinus and his school.

The
fragments

Editions

Literature

**Numenius'
method**

1346—a. Euseb., *Praep. ev.* IX 7, p. 411 B (fr. 9 a L.):

Καὶ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ Πυθαγορικοῦ φιλοσόφου, τοῦ Νουμηνίου λέγω, ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου Περὶ τάγαθοῦ τάδε παραθήσομαι·

Εἰς δὲ τοῦτο δεήσει εἰπόντα καὶ σημηνάμενον ταῖς μαρτυρίαις ταῖς Πλάτωνος ἀναχωρήσασθαι καὶ ξυνδήσασθαι τοῖς λόγοις τοῦ Πυθαγόρου, ἐπικαλέσασθαι δὲ τὰ ἔθνη τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα, προσφερόμενον αὐτῶν τὰς τελετὰς καὶ τὰ δόγματα τὰς τε ἰδρύσεις συντελουμένας Πλάτωνι ὁμολογουμένως, ὁπόσας Βραχμᾶνες καὶ Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ Μάγοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι διέθεντο.

b. Cp. Origenes, *C. Celsum* I 15 (fr. 9 b L.):

Πόσῳ δὲ βελτίων Κέλσου καὶ διὰ πολλῶν δείξας εἶναι ἐλλογιμώτατος καὶ πλείονα βασανίσας δόγματα, καὶ ἀπὸ πλείονων συναγαγὼν ἃ ἐφαντάσθη εἶναι ἀληθῆ ὁ Πυθαγόρειος Νουμήνιος, ὅστις ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ περὶ τάγαθοῦ λέγων περὶ τῶν ἔθνων, ὅσα περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ὡς ἀσωμάτου διείληφεν, ἐγκατέταξεν αὐτοῖς καὶ τοὺς Ἰουδαίους, οὐκ ὀκνήσας ἐν τῇ συγγραφῇ αὐτοῦ χρήσασθαι καὶ λόγοις προφητικοῖς καὶ τροπολογῆσαι αὐτούς· —

**Dialectical
arguments**

1347—Though he seeks confirmation by authorities, Num. begins by philosophical arguments.

a. Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* XV 17, p. 819 A (fr. 12 L.):

Ἄλλὰ τί δὴ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν; ἄρα ταυτὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰ τέτταρα, ἡ γῆ καὶ τὸ πῦρ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι δύο μεταξύ φύσεις; Ἄρα οὖν δὴ τὰ ὄντα ταῦτά ἐστιν, ἥτοι ξυλ- b λήβδην ἢ καθ' ἓν γέ τι αὐτῶν;

— Καὶ πῶς, ἃ γέ ἐστὶ καὶ γενητὰ καὶ παλινάγρετα, εἴ γε ἔστιν ὁρᾶν αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γιγνόμενα καὶ ἐπαλλασσόμενα καὶ μήτε στοιχεῖα ὑπάρχοντα μήτε συλλαβάς;

— Σῶμα μὲν ταυτὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ὄν. Ἄλλ' ἄρα ταυτὶ μὲν οὐ, ἡ δὲ 5 ὕλη δύναται εἶναι ὄν;

— Ἄλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴν παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀδύνατον, ἀρρωστίᾳ τοῦ μένειν· ποταμὸς γάρ ἡ ὕλη ρόωδης καὶ ὀξύρροπος, βάθος καὶ πλάτος καὶ μῆκος ἀόριστος καὶ ἀνήνυτος.

b. Eusebius, *ib.* 819 C (fr. 13 L.):

Καὶ μετὰ βραχεὰ ἐπιλέγει· ὥστε καλῶς ὁ λόγος εἴρηκε φάς, εἰ ἔστιν ἄπειρος c ἡ ὕλη, ἀόριστον εἶναι αὐτήν· εἰ δὲ ἀόριστος, ἄλογος· εἰ δὲ ἄλογος, ἄγνωστος. Ἄγνωστον δέ γε οὖσαν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἄτακτον, ὡς τεταγμένα γνωσ- 5 θῆναι πάνυ δῆπουθεν ἂν εἴη ῥάδια· τὸ δὲ ἄτακτον οὐχ ἔστηκεν, ὅ τι δὲ μὴ ἔστηκεν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὄν. —

Οὐκ οὖν φημι τὴν ὕλην οὔτε αὐτὴν οὔτε τὰ σώματα εἶναι ὄν.

- d — Τί οὖν δῆ; Ἦ ἔχομεν παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι ἐν τῇ φύσει τῇ τῶν ὄλων;
 — Ναί· τοῦτο οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ποικίλον, εἰ τόδε πρῶτον μὲν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς
 ἅμα πειραθείημεν διαλεγόμενοι· *** Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ σώματά ἐστι φύσει τεθνηκότα
 5 καὶ νεκρά καὶ πεφορημένα καὶ οὐδ' ἐν ταύτῳ μένοντα, ἄρ' οὐχὶ τοῦ καθέξοντος
 αὐτοῖς ἔδει;
 — Παντὸς μᾶλλον.
 — Εἰ μὴ τύχοι δὴ τούτου, ἄρα μείνειεν ἄν;
 — Παντὸς ἤττον.

820 — Τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ κατασχῆσον; Εἰ μὲν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο εἶη σῶμα, Διὸς σω-
 τῆρος δοκεῖ ἂν ἐμοὶ δεηθῆναι αὐτὸ παραλυόμενον καὶ σκιδνάμενον· εἰ μέντοι
 χρὴ αὐτὸ ἀπηλλάχθαι τῆς τῶν σωμάτων πάθης, ἵνα κάκείνοις κεκυημένοις τὴν
 5 φθορὰν ἀμύνειν δύνηται καὶ κατέχῃ, ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ μόνον
 γε τὸ ἀσώματον· αὕτη γὰρ δὴ φύσεων πασῶν μόνῃ ἔστηκε καὶ ἔστιν ἀραρυῖα
 καὶ οὐδὲν σωματική. Οὔτε γοῦν γίνεταί οὔτε αὔξεται οὔτε κίνησιν κινεῖται
 ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καλῶς δίκαιον ἐφάνη πρεσβεῦσαι τὸ ἀσώματον.

1348—Euseb., *Praep. ev.* XI 21, p. 543 B (fr. 11 L.):

Contempla-
tion

- b Πάλιν δὲ καὶ ὁ Νουμήνιος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τάγαθοῦ, τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος διά-
 νοιαν διερμηνεύων, τοῦτον διέξεισι τὸν τρόπον· Τὰ μὲν οὖν σώματα λαβεῖν
 5 ὑμῖν ἔξεστι σημαينوμένοις ἐκ τε ὁμοίων ἀπὸ τε τῶν ἐν τοῖς παρακειμένοις
 c γνωρισμάτων ἐνόντων· τάγαθον δὲ οὐδενὸς ἐκ παρακειμένου οὐδ' αὖ ἀπὸ
 ὁμοίου αἰσθητοῦ ἐστὶ λαβεῖν μηχανή τις οὐδεμία· ἀλλὰ δεήσει, ὅσον εἴ τις
 ἐπὶ σκοπῇ καθήμενος ναῦν ἀλιάδα βραχεῖάν τινα τούτων τῶν ἐπακτρίδων τῶν
 5 μόνων μίαν μόνην ἔρημον μετακυμίοις ἐχομένην ὀξὺ δεδορκώς, μιᾶ βολῇ
 κατεῖδε [τὴν ναῦν], οὕτως δεῖ τινα ἀπελθόντα πόρρω ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὁμιλῆσαι
 τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνῳ μόνον, ἐνθα μήτε τις ἄνθρωπος μήτε τι ζῷον ἕτερον, μηδὲ
 d σῶμα μέγα μηδὲ σμικρόν, ἀλλὰ τις ἄφατος καὶ ἀδιήγητος ἀτεχνῶς ἐρημία
 θεσπέσιος, ἐνθα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἡδὴ διατριβαί τε καὶ ἀγαταί, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐν εἰρήνῃ
 ἐν εὐμενεῖα τε, ἡρεμον τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, ἵλεων ἐποχοῦμενον ἐπὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ. Εἰ δὲ
 5 τις πρὸς τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς λιπαρῶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐφιπτάμενον φαντάζεται, κάπνεται
 τρυφῶν οἷοιτο τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἐντετυχηκέναι, τοῦ παντὸς ἀμαρτάνει. Τῷ γὰρ ὄντι
 οὐ βῆδίας, θείας δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ δεῖ μεθόδου· καὶ ἐστὶ κράτιστον, τῶν αἰσθητῶν
 ἀμελήσαντι νεανιευσαμένῳ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα, τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς θεασαμένῳ,
 οὕτως ἐκμελετῆσαι μάθημα, τί ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν.

1349—a. Euseb., *Praep. ev.* XI 17, p. 536 D (fr. 20 L.):

The three
Gods

- d Ὁ δὲ Νουμήνιος τὰ Πλάτωνος πρεσβεύων, ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τάγαθοῦ τάδε καὶ
 αὐτὸς περὶ τοῦ δευτέρου αἰτίου λέγων διερμηνεύει· Τὸν μέλλοντα δὲ συνήσειν
 5 θεοῦ περὶ πρῶτου καὶ δευτέρου χρὴ πρότερον διελέσθαι ἕκαστα ἐν τάξει καὶ ἐν

εὐθυμοσύνη τινί· κάπναιτα ἐπὶ δὸς δοκῇ ἤδη εὖ ἔχειν, τότε καὶ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν p. 537
εἰπεῖν κοσμίως, ἄλλως δὲ μή. Ἡ τῷ πρωϊότερον πρὶν τὰ πρῶτα γενέσθαι
ἀπτομένῳ σποδὸς ὁ θησαυρὸς γίγνεσθαι λέγεται. Μὴ δὲ πάθωμεν ἡμεῖς ταυτόν·
θεὸν δὲ προκαλεσάμενοι ἑαυτοῦ γινώμονα γενόμενον τῷ λόγῳ δεῖξαι θησαυρὸν 5
φροντίδων, ἀρχώμεθα οὕτως. Εὐκτέον μὲν ἤδη, διελέσθαι δὲ δεῖ. Ὁ θεὸς ὁ
μὲν πρῶτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὧν ἐστὶν ἀπλοῦς διὰ τὸ ἑαυτῷ συγγενόμενος διόλου μὴ
ποτε εἶναι διαιρετός· ὁ θεὸς μέντοι ὁ δεῦτερος καὶ τρίτος ἐστὶν εἷς. συμφερό- b
μενος δὲ τῇ ὕλῃ δυάδι οὕσῃ ἐνοῦ μὲν αὐτήν, σχίζεται δὲ ὑπ' αὐτῆς, ἐπιθυμητικὸν
ἦθος ἐχούσης καὶ ῥεούσης. Τῷ οὖν μὴ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ νοητῷ (ἦν γὰρ ἂν πρὸς
ἑαυτῷ) διὰ τὸ τὴν ὕλην βλέπειν, ταύτης ἐπιμελούμενος ἀπερίοπτος ἑαυτοῦ
γίγνεται. Καὶ ἄπτεται τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ περιέπει ἀνάγει τε ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἴδιον 5
ἦθος ἐπορεζάμενος τῆς ὕλης.

According to this description Numenius' first God is absolutely one—Plato's
"Ἐν or 'Αγαθόν—, the second is Noûs adhering to Himself, the third is Noûs turned
to Matter. The First principle is not called Noûs. This might *seem* to be a difference
from Albinus and an analogy to gnosticism, but in fact it is not. For in fr. 25 (below,
1350a) the first God is called Noûs. Cp. Albinus who, though calling his First
principle ἄρρητος and ἄληπτος, qualified it as Νοῦς ἀκίνητος (supra, nr. 1327).

When Numenius, as will appear in the following text, separates the demiurgic
function from the First principle, he differs from Albinus by a greater logical con-
sistency (cp. nr. 1328), but is hardly further removed from Plato.

The first God
is an
ἀργός
βασιλεὺς,
the second
God is the
Demiurge

b. Euseb., ib. 537 B (fr. 21 L.):

Καὶ μεθ' ἑτερά φησι·

Καὶ γὰρ οὔτε δημιουργεῖν ἐστὶ χρεὼν τὸν πρῶτον, καὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦντος
θεοῦ χρὴ εἶναι νομίζεσθαι πατέρα τὸν πρῶτον θεόν.

Εἰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τοῦ δημιουργικοῦ ζητοῦμεν, φάσκοντες δεῖν τὸν πρότερον 10
ὑπάρξαντα οὕτως ἂν ποιεῖν ἔχειν διαφερόντως, εἰκοιῦα ἢ πρόσδοδος αὕτη γεγο- c
νυῖα ἂν εἴη τοῦ λόγου· εἰ δὲ περὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ μὴ ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, ζητοῦμεν
δὲ περὶ τοῦ πρώτου, ἀφοσιοῦμαι τε τὰ λεχθέντα, καὶ ἔστω μὲν ἐκεῖνα ἄρρητα,
μέτειμι δὲ ἐλεῖν τὸν λόγον ἐτέρωθεν θηράσας. Πρὸ μέντοι τοῦ λόγου τῆς ἀλώ-
σεως διομολογησόμεθα ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὁμολογίαν οὐκ ἀμφισβητήσιμον ἀκοῦσαι, 5
τὸν μὲν πρῶτον θεὸν ἀργὸν εἶναι ἔργων ξυμπάντων καὶ βασιλέα, τὸν δημιουργικὸν
δὲ θεὸν ἡγεμονεύειν, δι' οὐρανοῦ ἰόντα.

That Numenius' second God is essentially the same as the transcendent Logos
in Philo, appears from the nrs. 1301, 1303 and 1305 supra. A similar conception of a
second God who is Noûs, is found in the Chaldaic oracles. See Kroll, *Orac. Chald.* p. 14:

Πάντα γὰρ ἐξετέλεσσε Πατὴρ καὶ Νῶ παρέδωκε
δευτέρῳ, ὃν πρῶτον κληῖτε πᾶν γένος ἀνδρῶν.

See also the following text of Numenius.

c. Euseb., *Praep. ev.* XI 18, p. 538 B (fr. 22 L.):

Νουμήνιος ἐπάκουσον οἷα περὶ τοῦ δευτέρου αἰτίου θεολογεῖ· "Ὡσπερ δὲ

c πάλιν λόγος ἐστὶ γεωργῶ πρὸς τὸν φυτεύοντα ἀναφερόμενος, τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μάλιστα ἐστὶν ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς πρὸς τὸν δημιουργόν. Ὁ μὲν γε ὦν σπέρμα πάσης ψυχῆς σπείρει εἰς τὰ μεταλαγχάνοντα αὐτοῦ χρήματα ξύμπαντα· ὁ νομοθέτης δὲ 5 φυτεύει καὶ διανέμει καὶ μεταφυτεύει εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐκάστους τὰ ἐκεῖθεν προκαταβεβλημένα.

In fact, the relation between the First and the Second God as here described is rather that of the ὄργανον δι' οὗ (Philo, nr. 1305) than that of the demiurge of the gnostics. The latter is not conceived as a spirit (Νοῦς), but always as generated outside the spiritual world (or pleroma). He created the visible world in ignorance of the archetypal Ideas. Such a view is as far from Num. as it was from Philo and will be found to be from Plotinus.

H. C. Puech, o.c., did not see this when ranking Num. with gnostics because of his separating the demiurgic function from the First Principle and attributing it to a second.

1350—The difference between Numenius' second God and the gnostic demiurge will be seen more clearly in the following fragments. Even the first God is not quite so "gnostic" as it might appear above.

The first
God called
Νοῦς

a. Euseb., *Praep. ev.* XI 22, p. 544 A (fr. 25 L.):

Ἐν δὲ τῷ πέμπτῳ ταῦτά φησιν· Εἰ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν νοητὸν ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἡ ἰδέα, ταύτης δ' ὠμολογήθη πρεσβύτερον καὶ αἴτιον εἶναι ὁ νοῦς, αὐτὸς οὗτος μόνος 5 ἡŷρηται ὦν τὸ ἀγαθόν. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὁ μὲν δημιουργὸς θεὸς ἐστὶ γενέσεως, ἀρκεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐσίας εἶναι ἀρχή.

Ἀνάλογον δὲ τούτῳ μὲν ὁ δημιουργὸς θεός, ὦν αὐτοῦ μιμητής, τῇ δὲ οὐσίᾳ ἡ γένεσις, <ἡ> εἰκὼν αὐτῆς ἐστὶ καὶ μίμημα. Εἴπερ δὲ ὁ δημιουργὸς ὁ τῆς 10 γενέσεώς ἐστιν ἀγαθός, ἣ που ἔσται καὶ ὁ τῆς οὐσίας δημιουργὸς αὐτοάγαθον, σύμφυτον τῇ οὐσίᾳ. ὁ γὰρ δεύτερος διττός ὢν, αὐτοποιεῖ τὴν τε ἰδέαν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὸν κόσμον, δημιουργὸς ὢν· ἔπειτα θεωρητικὸς ὅλως.

5 Συλλελογισμένων δ' ἡμῶν ὀνόματα τεσσάρων πραγμάτων, τέσσαρα ἔστω ταῦτα· ὁ μὲν πρῶτος θεὸς αὐτοάγαθον· ὁ δὲ τούτου μιμητής δημιουργὸς ἀγαθός, ἡ δ' οὐσία μία μὲν ἡ τοῦ πρώτου, ἑτέρα δὲ ἡ τοῦ δευτέρου· ἥς μίμημα ὁ καλὸς κόσμος, κεκαλλωπισμένος μετουσίᾳ τοῦ καλοῦ.

This view of the Demiurge and of the cosmos is certainly not gnostic, but rather such as Plotinus considered the relation between Νοῦς and cosmos to be. (What Plotinus rejected in Numenius' theory was the element of mythology in it, when there is question of a Father, a son, and a grandson. Cp. Porphyrius' testimony, below, nr. 1363a).

b. Also what follows in the above-cited fr. 21 (1349a) after the words that the God who is Demiurge governs, δι' οὐρανοῦ ἰόντα, shows that Num. is far from the gnostic view of man and matter.

Euseb., *Praep. ev.* XI 18, 537 C (fr. 21 L., l. 19):

Διὰ δὲ τούτου καὶ ὁ στόλος ἡμῖν ἐστίν, κάτω τοῦ νοῦ πεμπομένου ἐν διεξόδῳ πᾶσι τοῖς κοινωνῆσαι συντεταγμένοις.

Βλέποντος μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐπεστραμμένου πρὸς ἡμῶν ἕκαστον τοῦ θεοῦ συμβαίνει ὁ ζῆν τε καὶ βιώσκεισθαι τότε τὰ σώματα, κηδεύοντος τοῦ θεοῦ τοῖς ἀκροβολισμοῖς· μεταστρέφοντος δὲ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ περιωπὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ταῦτα μὲν ἀποσβέννυσθαι, τὸν δὲ νοῦν ζῆν βίου ἐπαυρόμενον εὐδαίμονος. 5

Here Num. shows a remarkable difference from Plotinus. The latter is concerned with the soul's either looking or not looking to the superior sphere of being (Noûs) and says that in the first case soul is creative, in the second not. Num. however speaks of God the Demiurge (Noûs) as looking to man and by His looking keeping the body alive. He may have learned this from "Moses", not from Plato.

c. Again, the first God is called Noûs in the following fragment.

Euseb., *Praep. ev.* XI 18, p. 539 B (fr. 26 L.):

Ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐν τῷ ἑκτῷ προστίθῃσι ταῦτα· Ἐπειδὴ ᾗδει ὁ Πλάτων παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὸν μὲν δημιουργὸν γιγνωσκόμενον μόνον, τὸν μέντοι ὁ πρῶτον νοῦν, ὅστις καλεῖται αὐτὸ ὄν, παντάπασιν ἀγνοούμενον παρ' αὐτοῖς, διὰ τοῦτο οὕτως εἶπεν, ὥσπερ ἂν τις [οὕτω] λέγῃ· ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὃν τοπάξετε ὑμεῖς νοῦν, οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτος, ἀλλ' ἕτερος πρὸ τούτου νοῦς πρεσβύτερος καὶ θειότερος. 5

The function
of the
Demiurge
described

1351—The following description of the function of the Demiurge is in its essence purely Platonic¹. It is only put in a more dramatic setting.

Euseb., *ib.* p. 539 C (fr. 27 L.):

Κυβερνήτης μὲν που ἐν μέσῳ πελάγει φορούμενος ὑπὲρ πηδαλίων ὑψίζυγος τοῖς οἶαξι διῆθύνει τὴν ναῦν ἐφεζόμενος, ὅμματα δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νοῦς εὐθὺ τοῦ αἰθέρος ξυντέταται πρὸς τὰ μετάρσια, καὶ ἡ ὁδὸς αὐτῷ ἄνω δι' οὐρανοῦ ἄπεισι, πλέοντι κάτω κατὰ τὴν θάλατταν· οὕτω καὶ ὁ δημιουργὸς τὴν ὕλην, τοῦ μήτε διακροῦσαι μήτε ἀποπλαγχθῆναι αὐτήν, ἀρμονία ξυνδησάμενος, αὐτὸς μὲν ὑπὲρ ταύτης ἰδρυται, οἷον ὑπὲρ νεῶς ἐπὶ θαλάττης, τῆς ὕλης· τὴν ἀρμονίαν δὲ ἰθύνει, 5 ταῖς ιδέαις οἰακίζων, βλέπει τε ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ εἰς τὸν ἄνω θεὸν προσαγόμενον αὐτοῦ τὰ ὅμματα, λαμβάνει τε τὸ μὲν κριτικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς θεωρίας, τὸ δὲ ὁρμητικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐφέσεως.

¹ Cp. Plato, *Tim.* 28ab, 29a: The Demiurge created the world looking to that which is always unchanging and using it as a pattern of the world to be made.

1352—Proclus describes Numenius' theory of the three gods not quite correctly.

**Proclus'
testimony**

a. Proclus, *in Tim.* I p. 303, 27 Diehl (Test. 24 L.):

Νουμήνιος μὲν γὰρ τρεῖς ἀνυμνήσας θεοὺς πατέρα μὲν καλεῖ τὸν πρῶτον, ποιητὴν δὲ τὸν δεύτερον, ποίημα δὲ τὸν τρίτον· ὁ γὰρ κόσμος κατ' αὐτὸν ὁ τρίτος ἐστὶ θεός. ὥστε ὁ κατ' αὐτὸν δημιουργὸς διττός, ὃ τε πρῶτος θεὸς καὶ ὁ δεύτερος, τὸ δὲ δημιουργούμενον ὁ τρίτος. Ἀμεινον γὰρ οὕτω λέγειν ἢ ὡς ἐκεῖνος λέγει προστραφῶδῶν, ἀππρον, ἔγγονον, ἀπόγονον¹.

It is not correct to say that according to Num. the Demiurge was double, "namely, the First and the second God". Cp. above, **1349a**. That *the cosmos* was called by Num. the third God, is not correct either. This appears most clearly in the following passage of Proclus.

b. Proclus, *in Tim.* III p. 103, 28 D (Test. 25 L.):

Νουμήνιος δὲ τὸν μὲν πρῶτον (sc. νοῦν) κατὰ τὸ ὅ ἐστι ζῶον τάττει καὶ φησιν ἐν προσχρήσει τοῦ δευτέρου νοεῖν, τὸν δὲ δεύτερον κατὰ τὸν νοῦν, καὶ τοῦτον αὖ ἐν προσχρήσει τοῦ τρίτου δημιουργεῖν, τὸν δὲ τρίτον κατὰ τὸ διανοούμενον.

This passage proves two things: (1) Proclus understood Numenius' First God not as the "Ev of Plotinus or the Unknown God of the Gnostics, but as the intelligible World conceived as a Noûs or living being (τὸ ὅ ἐστι ζῶον = αὐτὸ τὸ ζῶον). See my interpretation of Plato, *Soph.* 249 a and *Tim.* 31b in: *Proceedings of the XIth international Congress of Phil.*, Brussels 1953, vol. XII, p. 61-67, and the text of Aristotle, *De anima* I 2, 404b, 16-21, cited in Gr. Ph. I, nr. **372**).

(2) Since the third God of Num. was ranked κατὰ τὸ διανοούμενον, the term appears to have meant not the visible world, but the conception of it in the mind of the Demiurge. Thus, the second God was the demiurgic Intellect in its active aspect (the Demiurge thinking the world), while the third means the same Intellect viewed in its passive sense (the world as thought by the Demiurge). Cp. fr. 20 (nr. **1349a**). The passage is explained in this sense by Festugière, *Le Dieu inconnu et la gnose*, p. 123 f.

1353—Numenius does not join the monistic trend of the Neopythagorean school which derived the *δυάς ἀόριστος* of Plato's later doctrine from the One (see above, **1279a**).

a. Chalcidius, *in Timaeum* c. 295 f. (test. 30 L.):

Two ἀρχαί

Nunc iam Pythagoricum dogma recenseatur. Numenius ex Pythagorae magisterio Stoicorum hoc de initiis² dogma refellens Pythagorae dogmate cui concinere dicit dogma Platonicum³, ait Pythagoram deum

¹ Cp. *Tim.* 50 d: Καὶ δὴ καὶ προσεικάσαι πρέπει τὸ μὲν δεχόμενον μητρί, τὸ δ' ὄθεν πατρί, τὴν δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων φύσιν ἐκγόνῳ.

² de initiis—περὶ ἀρχῶν.

³ That in fact the doctrine of ἐν and ἀόριστος *δυάς* as first principles was a Platonic and not an originally Pythagorean doctrine, has been shown above (see **1279a**).

quidem singularitatis <nomine>¹ nominasse, silvam vero duitatis². quam duitatem indeterminatam quidem minime genitam³, limitatam vero generatam esse dicere⁴.

Num. opposes both those Pythagoreans who wish to derive the infinite principle from the "Εν, and those Stoics who admit that matter is defined and limited and has a *propria natura*⁵.

(296) Igitur Pythagoras quoque, inquit, fluidam⁶ et sine qualitate silvam esse censet, nec tamen, ut Stoici, naturae mediae, interque bonorum malorumque viciniam, quod genus illi appellant indifferens⁷, sed plane noxiam. Deum quippe esse, ut etiam Platoni videtur, initium et causam bonorum, silvam malorum.

Mixed
character
of the
cosmos

b. Chalcidius, ib. 296 (continued):

At vero quod ex specie silvaeque sit⁸ indifferens. Non ergo silvam sed mundum ex speciei bonitate silvaeque malitia temperatum⁹, denique ex providentia et necessitate progenitum¹⁰ veterum theologorum scitis haberi.

Matter the
source of evil

c. Numenius, therefore stresses the necessity of evil.

Chalcidius, ib. 297:

Ait (Pythagoras) existente providentia mala quoque necessario substituisse, propterea quod silva sit, et eadem sit malitia praedita. Quod si mundus ex silva, certe factus est de existente olim natura maligna¹¹;

¹ We have no reason to admit that *Pythagoras* called God τὸ "Εν, but Pythagoreans did, from the second century B.C.

² silva—ὕλη; duitatis—δυάς.

³ duitatem indeterminatam e.q.s.—τὴν ἀόριστον δυάδα εἶναι ἀγένητον.

⁴ limitatam vero generatam esse—τὸν δὲ κόσμον γενητόν.

Thus, Atticus taught (according to Proclus, in *Tim.* I p. 283, 27 D) τὸ μὲν πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως κινούμενον (*Tim.* 30a) εἶναι ἀγένητον, τὸν δὲ κόσμον ἀπὸ χρόνου γενητόν. Cp. C. Bäumker, *Das Problem der Materie in der griech. Phil.*, München 1890, p. 143 ff.

⁵ This is, however, not exact. Stoics always called ὕλη ἄποιος, but they did call it οὐσία and σῶμα (above, nrs. 899-902).

⁶ This, again, is Plato's doctrine in *Phil.* 24 ff. and according to Hermodorus. See 347a b, 371a, l. 11 f.: ἔστι γὰρ μᾶλλον εἶναι μείζον καὶ ἑλαττον εἰς ἄπειρον φερόμενα.—ὥστε ἄστατον καὶ ἄμορφον καὶ ἄπειρον . . . τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγεσθαι.

⁷ ἀδιάφορον. Above, nrs. 1012b, 1018.

⁸ "what is composed from form and matter", sc. the cosmos.

⁹ That, in fact, according to the *Timaeus* the cosmos can hardly be called a composite or "mixture" of form and matter, may be seen in the passages cited under nr. 356 (particularly *Tim.* 51e-52b).

¹⁰ *Tim.* 68e: Διὸ δὴ χρὴ δυ' αἰτίας εἶδη διορίζεσθαι, τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δὲ θεῖον, e.q.s.

¹¹ Here Numenius' dualism is certainly stronger than Plato's.

proptereaue Numenius laudat Heraclitum ¹ reprehendentem Homerum, qui optaverit interitum ac vastitatem malis vitae, quod non intellegeret mundum sibi deleri placere, siquidem silva quae malorum fons est, exterminaretur.

d. Numenius identifies "the bad worldsoul" of *Leg.* 896e ² with "matter" and divides the soul of man into a passive and a rational part, the first of which is connected with matter.

Chalcidius, *ib.* (297 continued):

Platonemque idem Numenius laudat, quod duas mundi animas autumet, unam beneficentissimam, malignam alteram, scilicet silvam. Quae licet incondite fluctuet, tamen quia intimo proprioque motu movetur, vivat et anima convegetetur necesse est, lege eorum omnium quae genuino motu moventur. Quae quidem etiam patibilis animae partis, in qua est aliquid corpulentum mortaleque et corporis simile, auctrix est et patrona, sicut rationabilis animae pars auctore utitur ratione ac Deo.

The bad
worldsoul
and the soul
of man

Porph. says that Num. did not "divide" the soul of man into a "passive" and a rational part, but spoke of *two souls* in man. See **1354a**.

e. Matter moves *πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως* (Plato, *Tim.* 30a), and though the Demiurge brought it from *ἀταξία* to *τάξις* (*ib.*), the mixture is *confusa*, says Chalcidius following Num., *nec ex providentiae consultiis salubribus*. Hence

Chalcidius, *ib.* 298:

Ergo iuxta Pythagoram silvae anima neque sine ulla est substantia, ut plerique arbitrantur, et adversatur providentiae, consulta eius impugnare gestiens malitiae suae viribus.

Matter is
not merely
στέρησις,
but positively
bad

The term *malitia* is certainly stronger than what is said either by Plato or by Aristotle on *ὕλη* resisting the Demiurge (Plato, *Politicus* 273b ³; cp. what is said of the nature of the *ἕτερον* in *Tim.* 35a ⁴) and on the *ἀναγκαῖον* in *Tim.* 68e) or resisting Form (Arist., *De gen. anim.* IV 4, 770b, 17 ⁵).

Plotinus, *Enn.* I 8, maintains strictly the *στέρησις* character of *ὕλη* ⁶. The soul turns bad if it turns away from *Noûs*, thus getting filled with *δοριστία* (c. 4 at the end).

¹ See our nr. **53b** (Arist., *Eth. Eud.* VII 1, 1235a, 25).

² Our nr. **390**. For the identification, cp. **388**.

³ The Cause of *θόρυβοι* and *ταραχή* in the cosmos is: τὸ σωματοειδὲς τῆς συγκράσεως, τὸ τῆς πάλαι ποτὲ φύσεως σύντροφον, ὅτι πολλῆς ἦν μετέχον ἀταξίας πρὶν εἰς τὸν νῦν κόσμον ἀφικέσθαι.

⁴ τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμεικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταῦτόν συναρμόττων βίᾳ (supra, nr. **350**).

⁵ ὅταν μὴ κρατήσῃ τὴν κατὰ τὴν ὕλην ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος φύσιν (Above, nr. **496b**).

⁶ See in particular the cc. 3-5 and 11-12; below, nr. **1410**.

Two souls
in man

1354—a. Porphyrius, Π. τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων, ap. Stob. I p. 350, 25 W. (Test. 36 L.):

"Ἄλλοι δέ, ὧν καὶ Νομήνιος, οὐ τρία μέρη ψυχῆς μιᾶς ἢ δύο γε, τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ἀλλὰ δύο ψυχὰς ἔχειν ἡμᾶς οἴονται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλα, τὴν μὲν λογικὴν, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον.

b. Cp. Iamblichus, Π. ψυχῆς, ap. Stob. I p. 374, 21 W. (Test. 35 L.):

"Ἦδη τοίνυν καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς Πλατωνικοῖς πολλοὶ διαστασιάζουσιν, οἳ μὲν εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν καὶ μίαν ἰδέαν τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ μόρια τῆς ζωῆς καὶ τὰ ἐνεργήματα συνάγοντες, ὥσπερ Πλωτῖνός τε καὶ Πορφύριος· οἳ δὲ εἰς μάχην ταῦτα κατατείνοντες, ὥσπερ Νομήνιος· οἳ δὲ ἐκ μαχομένων αὐτὰ συναρμόζοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ Ἀττικὸν καὶ Πλούταρχον.

To be bound
in a body is
always evil

1355—Since "matter" is bad, the *κάθοδος* τῶν ψυχῶν and their embodiment is considered by Num. as always an evil.

a. Iambl., Π. διαφορᾶς καθόδου τῶν ψυχῶν, ap. Stob. I p. 380, 14 W. (Test. 40 L.):

Some people, Iambl. says, consider the *κάθοδος* τῶν ψυχῶν as not always evil: it may serve for different purposes, e.g. for the *σωτηρία* and *κάθαρσις* of others, or also for the training and correction of one's own character.

<Τινὲς δὲ τῶν νεωτέρων οὐχ οὕτως> διακρίνουσιν, οὐκ ἔχοντες δὲ σκοπὸν τῆς διαφορότητος εἰς ταῦτ' ἀσχετοῦσι τὰς ἐνσωματώσεις τῶν ὄλων, κακὰς τε εἶναι πάσας δισχυρίζονται καὶ διαφερόντως οἱ περὶ Κρόνιον τε καὶ Νομήνιον.

The soul
reunited
with its
ἀρχαί

b. The soul delivered from the body is unified with its *ἀρχαί*.

Iambl., Π. ψυχῆς, ap. Stob. I p. 458, 3 W. (Test. 34 L.):

"Ἐνωσιν μὲν οὖν καὶ ταυτότητα ἀδιάκριτον τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὰς ἑαυτῆς ἀρχὰς πρεσβεύειν φαίνεται Νομήνιος.

What is meant by this return of the soul to its "origins", will appear more clearly in the next fragment. Certainly the plural is not used without reason. Cp. also the final chapters of Plut., *De facie*, cited above (nrs. 1192d and 1319).

The ascent
of the soul
after death

1356—Numenius' ideas on the ascent of the soul after death and its abode hereafter are found in a fragment of his comments on the myth of Er cited by Proclus.

a. Proclus, *In rempubl.* II, p. 128, 26 Kroll (Test. 42 L.):

Νομήνιος μὲν γὰρ τὸ κέντρον εἶναι φησιν τοῦτον (sc. τὸν τόπον) τοῦ τε κόσμου παντός καὶ τῆς γῆς, ὡς μεταξὺ μὲν ὃν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, μεταξὺ δὲ καὶ p. 129 τῆς γῆς· ἐν ᾧ καθῆσθαι τοὺς δικαστὰς καὶ παραπέμπειν τὰς μὲν εἰς οὐρανὸν τῶν ψυχῶν, τὰς δὲ εἰς τὸν ὑπὸ γῆς τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἐκεῖ ποταμούς· οὐρανὸν μὲν

5 τὴν ἀπλανῆ λέγων καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ δύο χάσματα, τὸν αἰγόκερω καὶ τὸν καρκίνον, τοῦτον μὲν καθόδου χάσμα τῆς εἰς γένεσιν, ἀνόδου δὲ ἐκεῖνον, ποταμούς δὲ ὑπὸ γῆς τὰς πλανωμένας (ἀνάγει γὰρ εἰς ταύτας τοὺς ποταμούς καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Τάρταρον)· καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν ἐπεισάγων τερατολογίαν, πηδήσεις τε ψυχῶν ἀπὸ τῶν τρο-
 10 πικῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἡμερινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων εἰς τὰ τροπικὰ καὶ μεταβάσεις, ἃς αὐτὸς πηδῶν ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα μεταφέρει, καὶ συρράπτων τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ ῥήματα τοῖς γενεθλιαλογικοῖς καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς τελεστικοῖς· μαρτυρόμενος τῶν δύο χασμάτων καὶ τὴν Ὀμήρου ποιήσιν οὐ μόνον λέγουσαν (Οδ., ν, 110-112)
 15 “τὰς μὲν πρὸς βορέαο καταΐβοντας ἀνθρώποισιν” ὁδοῦς, ἐπεὶ περ ὁ καρκίνος εἰς * αἰγόκερον προσελθὼν ἀποτελεῖ· τὰς δὲ πρὸς νότον [εἶναι θειοτέρας], δι’ ὧν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδράσιν [εἰσελθεῖν, ἀθανάτων δὲ μόνον ὁδοῦς αὐτὰς ὑπάρχειν·
 20 ὁ γὰρ αἰγόκερος ἀνάγων τὰς ψυχὰς λύει μὲν αὐτῶν τὴν ἐν ἀνδράσι ζωὴν, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἀθάνατον εἰσδέχεται καὶ θείαν· οὐ ταῦτα δ’ οὖν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡλίου πύλας ὑμνοῦσαν καὶ δῆμον ὀνειρώων (Οδ., ω, 12), τὰ μὲν δύο τροπικὰ ζώδια πύλας ἡλίου προσαγορεύσασαν, δῆμον δὲ ὀνειρώων, ὥς φησιν ἐκεῖνος,
 25 τὸν γαλαξίαν. Καὶ γὰρ τὸν Πυθαγόραν δι’ ἀπορρήτων “Αἰδὴν τὸν γαλαξίαν καὶ τόπον ψυχῶν ἀποκαλεῖν, ὥς ἐκεῖ συνωθουμένων· διὸ παρά τισιν ἔθνεσιν
 130 γάλα σπένδεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς τοῖς τῶν ψυχῶν καθαρχαῖς, καὶ τῶν πεσουσῶν εἰς γένεσιν εἶναι γάλα τὴν πρώτην τροφήν. Τὸν δὲ δὴ Πλάτωνα διὰ μὲν τῶν χασμάτων, ὥς εἴρηται, δηλοῦν τὰς δύο πύλας, διὰ δὲ τοῦ φωτός, ὃ δὴ σύνδεσμον
 5 εἶναι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, τὸν γαλαξίαν· εἰς ὃν ἀνιέναι δι’ ἡμερῶν δυοκαίδεκα τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ τόπου τῶν δικαστῶν.

There are also fragments of Num. in Porph., *De antro nympharum* c. 21 and 28. Similar ideas are found in Macrobi., *In somn. Scip.* I 12, 1-3. On the whole question: Leemans, p. 43-64; test. 43-47.

The conception of the Milky Way as the abode of souls before their descent goes back to Heraclides Ponticus (above, 775). Thus,

b. Macrobius, *In somn. Scip.* I 11, 11 (p. 529 Eyss.) (Test. 47 L.):

The descent
of the soul
from the
Milky Way

27 Animae beatae ab omni cuiuscumque contagione corporis liberae caelum possident; quae vero appetentiam corporis et huius, quam in terris
 530 vitam vocamus ab illa specula altissima et perpetua luce despiciens desiderio latenti cogitaverit, pondere ipso terrenae cogitationis paulatim in inferiora delabitur. Nec subito a perfecta incorporalitate luteum corpus
 5 induitur, sed sensim per tacita detrimenta et longiorem simplicis et absolutissimae puritatis recessum in quaedam siderei corporis incrementa turgescit: in singulis enim sphaeris, quae caelo subiectae sunt, aetheria obvolutione vestitur, ut per eas gradatim societati huius indumenti
 10 testei concilietur, et ideo totidem mortibus, quot sphaeras transit, ad hanc pervenit, quae in terris vita vocitatur.

Then, the descent of the soul is described. The tropica signa, Capricornus et Cancer, are mentioned.

Capricornus
et Cancer

(12) — hominum una, altera deorum vocatur: hominum Cancer, quia per hunc in inferiora descensus est, Capricornus deorum, quia per illum 25 animae in propriae immortalitatis sedem et in deorum numerum revertuntur.

At the Lion the soul leaves the Milky way and first participates of matter.

The Lion

Ergo descensurae cum adhuc in Cancro sunt, quoniam illic positaep. 531 necdum lacteum reliquerunt, adhuc in numero sunt deorum. Cum vero ad Leonem labendo pervenerint, illic condicionis futurae auspicantur exordium, et quia in Leone sunt rudimenta nascendi et quaedam hu- 10 manae naturae tirocinia¹. —

Ibique a puncto suo, quod est monas, venit (anima) in dyadem, quae 20 est prima protractio². —

Anima ergo cum trahitur ad corpus, in hanc prima sui productione silvestrem tumultum³, id est ὕλην influentem, sibi incipit experiri. 30

The acqui-
sition of
earthly
powers

Now begins the descent of the soul through the planetary spheres. In each of them she acquires one of the powers of an earthly being.

Hoc ergo primo pondere de zodiaco et lacteo ad subiectas usque sphae- p. 532 ras anima delapsa, dum et per illas labitur, in singulis non solum, ut 10 iam diximus, luminosi corporis amicitur accessu, sed et singulos motus, quos in exercitio est habitura, producit; in Saturni ratiocinationem et intelligentiam, quod λογιστικόν et θεωρητικόν vocant; in Iovis vim agendi, 15 quod πρακτικόν dicitur; in Martis animositatis ardorem, quod θυμικόν nuncupatur; in solis sentiendi opinandique naturam, quod αἰσθητικόν et φανταστικόν appellant; desiderii vero motum, quod ἐπιθυμητικόν vocatur, in Veneris; pronuntiandi et interpretandi quae sentiat, quod 20 ἐρμηνευτικόν dicitur, in orbe Mercurii; φωτικόν vero, id est naturam plantandi et augendi corpora, in ingressu globi lunaris exercet. et est haec, sicut a divinis ultima, ita in nostris terrenis omnibus prima: corpus enim hoc, sicut faex rerum divinarum est, ita animalis est prima 25

¹ See the explanation under the text.

² Since Plato and the Early Academy, length was derived from the ideal number 2. See the passages in Aristotle's *Metaph.* cited in *Gr. Ph.* I, p. 280, n. 2; in particular *Metaph.* N 3, 1090b 21.

³ *Silvestrem tumultum* - Doubtless a reminiscence of *Tim.* 43b-d, where the disorder resulting from the soul's being bound in a body is described as a θόρυβος caused by a violent stream, and as a violent and perpetual motion. For further explanation, see under the text.

534 substantia. et haec est differentia inter terrena corpora et supera, caeli dico et siderum aliorumque elementorum, quod illa quidem sursum arcessita sunt ad animae sedem et immortalitatem ex ipsa natura
 5 regionis et sublimitatis imitatione meruerunt: ad haec vero terrena corpora anima ipsa deducitur, et ideo mori creditur, cum in caducam regionem et in sedem mortalitatis includitur.

These ideas are evidently connected with Chaldaic astrology. Since they are also found in the gnostic writings of the *Corpus Hermeticum* (above, 1342b), in the *Chaldaic Oracles* (Kroll, p. 51, n. 2), in Servius in *Verg. Aen.* (VI 714; XI 51), in Arnobius (*Adv. nationes* II 16-28), and took a great place in the Mithras cult¹, we must admit that they were by no means confined to Num., Porphyrius and their followers and go back to a much earlier date².

As to the "first influx of matter" mentioned by Macrobius, this refers to the πνευματικόν or αἰθέριον σῶμα, also called ὄχημα, repeatedly mentioned by Porphyrius (e.g. *Sententiae* 29, p. 13 Mommert) and Proclus (e.g. in *Tim.* I 147, III 234 Diehl). It is opposed to the σῶμα γήινον ἐκ τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων φαραθέν (Procl., ib. I 5 D.).

Cp. Verbeke, *La doctrine du Pneuma*, p. 364 ff.

¹ Here the Lion was a high degree of initiation. See Vermaseren, *De Mithrasdienst in Rome*, Nijmegen 1951, p. 128 ff. Cp. Orig., *C. Celsum* II p. 92 K. and Cumont, *Les religions orientales*, p. 282 n. 69; M. J. Vermaseren, *Corpus inscr. et monum. religionis Mithriacae*, Hagae Comitatus 1956, the numbers mentioned in the General index s.v. lion as a grade.

² On Hellenistic astrology and astrological Hermetism, see A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* I, *L'Astrologie et les sciences occultes*, especially pp. 89-123. Further literature is mentioned there (p. 89 n. 1).

TWENTY-FIFTH CHAPTER

PLOTINUS, THE FOUNDER OF NEOPLATONISM

I—LIFE AND WORKS

1357—Plotinus' life and personality are mainly known to us by the *Vita* of Porphyrius.

He was
silent about
his birth
and origin

a. Porphyrius, *Vita Plot.* 1, 1-9 Henry-Schwyzler:

Πλωτῖνος ὁ καθ' ἡμᾶς γεγονώς φιλόσοφος ἐφίκει μὲν αἰσχυνομένῳ ὅτι ἐν σώματι εἴη. Ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης διαθέσεως οὔτε περὶ τοῦ γένους αὐτοῦ διηγεῖσθαι ἠνείχετο οὔτε περὶ τῶν γονέων οὔτε περὶ τῆς πατρίδος. Ζωγράφου 5 δὲ ἀνασχέσθαι ἢ πλάστου τοσοῦτον ἀπηξίου ὥστε καὶ λέγειν πρὸς Ἀμέλιον δεόμενον εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι ἐπιτρέψαι· οὐ γὰρ ἄρκεϊ φέρειν ὃ ἡ φύσις εἰδῶλον ἡμῖν περιτέθεικεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰδῶλου εἰδῶλον συγχωρεῖν αὐτὸν ἀξιοῦν πολυχρονιώτερον καταλιπεῖν ὥς δὴ τι τῶν ἀξιοθεάτων ἔργων;

Eunapius, *Vit. soph.* p. 6 Boiss., and Suidas say that he was born at Lycopolis in Egypt.

The year of
his death

b. *Ib.*, 2, 23, 25-27, 29-31, 34-43 H.-S.:

Μέλλων δὲ τελευτᾶν . . . φήσας πειρᾶσθαι τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον ἀνάγειν πρὸς τὸ 25 ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεῖον, . . . ἀφῆκε τὸ πνεῦμα ἔτη γεγονώς, ὥς ὁ Εὐστόχιος ἔλεγεν, ἕξ τε καὶ ἐξήκοντα, τοῦ δευτέρου ἔτους τῆς Κλαυδίου βασιλείας πληρουμένου. ¹— 30

Ἀναψηφίζουσι δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ δευτέρου ἔτους τῆς Κλαυδίου βασιλείας 35 εἰς τοῦπίσω ἔτη ἕξ τε καὶ ἐξήκοντα ὁ χρόνος αὐτῷ τῆς γενέσεως εἰς τὸ τρισκαιδέκατον ἔτος τῆς Σεβήρου βασιλείας πίπτει ². Οὔτε δὲ τὸν μῆνα δεδήλωκέ τινα καθ' ὃν γεγένηται, οὔτε τὴν γενέθλιον ἡμέραν, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ θύειν ἢ ἐστιᾶν τινα τοῖς αὐτοῦ γενεθλίοις ἡζίου, καίπερ ἐν τοῖς Πλάτωνος καὶ Σωκράτους παρα- 40 δεδομένοις γενεθλίοις θύων τε καὶ ἐστιῶν τοὺς ἐταίρους ³, ὅτε καὶ λόγον ἔδει τῶν ἐταίρων τοὺς δυνατοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν συνελθόντων ἀναγνῶναι.

1358—a. *Porph., Vita* 3, 6-24 H.-S.:

Εἰκοστὸν δὲ καὶ ὄγδοον ἔτος αὐτὸν ἄγοντα ὁρμῆσαι ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ τοῖς

¹ I.e. A.D. 270.

² A.D. 203/4.

³ Cp. *supra*, nr. 815.

τότε κατὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν εὐδοκιμοῦσι συσταθέντα κατιέναι ἐκ τῆς ἀκροά-
 10 σεως αὐτῶν κατηφῇ καὶ λύπης πλήρη, ὡς καὶ τιγὶ τῶν φίλων διηγεῖσθαι ἃ
 πάσχοι· τὸν δὲ συνέντα αὐτοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ βούλημα ἀπενέγκαι πρὸς Ἀμμώνιον,
 οὐ μὴδέπω πεπείρατο. Τὸν δὲ εἰσελθόντα καὶ ἀκούσαντα φάναι πρὸς τὸν ἑταῖρον·
 “τοῦτον ἐζήτουν”. Καὶ ἀπ’ ἐκείνης τῆς ἡμέρας συνεχῶς τῷ Ἀμμωνίῳ παραμέ-
 15 νοντα τοσαύτην ἔξιν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ κτήσασθαι, ὡς καὶ τῆς παρὰ τοῖς Πέρσαις
 ἐπιτηδευομένης πείραν λαβεῖν σπεῦσαι καὶ τῆς παρ’ Ἰνδοῖς κατορθουμένης.
 Γορδιανοῦ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπὶ τοὺς Πέρσας παριέναι μέλλοντος δούς ἑαυτὸν
 τῷ στρατοπέδῳ συνεισῆει ἔτος ἤδη τριακοστὸν ἄγων καὶ ἔννατον. “Ἐνδεκα
 20 γὰρ ὄλων ἐτῶν παραμένων τῷ Ἀμμωνίῳ συνεσχόλασε. Τοῦ δὲ Γορδιανοῦ περὶ
 τὴν Μεσοποταμίαν ἀναιρεθέντος μόλις φεύγων εἰς τὴν Ἀντιόχειαν διεσώθη.
 Καὶ Φιλίππου τὴν βασιλείαν κρατήσαντος τεσσαράκοντα γεγονώς ἔτη εἰς
 τὴν Ῥώμην ἄνεισιν.

His master
Ammonius

Gordianus’
expedition
to Persia

Arrival at
Rome

On Ammonius see:

M. Dehaut, *Vie et doctrine d’Ammonius Sakkas* (Mémoires de l’Acad. Royale de Belgique IX, Bruxelles 1836).

K. H. E. de Jong, *Plotinus of Ammonius Sakkas?*, Leiden 1941.

H. Dörrie, *Ammonius, der Lehrer Plotins*, in: *Hermes* 83 (1955), p. 439-477.

b. Ib., l. 32-38 H.-S.:

His teaching

Πλωτῖνος δὲ ἄχρι μὲν πολλοῦ γράφων οὐδὲν διετελέσεν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς Ἀμμωνίου
 συνουσίας ποιούμενος τὰς διατριβάς· καὶ οὕτως ὄλων ἐτῶν δέκα διετελέσε,
 35 συνὼν μὲν τισι, γράφων δὲ οὐδὲν. Ἦν δὲ ἡ διατριβή, ὡς ἂν αὐτοῦ ζητεῖν
 προτρεπομένου τοὺς συνόντας, ἀταξίας πλήρης καὶ πολλῆς φλυαρίας, ὡς
 Ἀμέλιος ἡμῖν διηγείτο.

c. Amelius stayed with P. for 24 years and kept records of his lectures.

His pupil
Amelius

Ib., l. 38-42, 46 f.:

Προσῆλθε δὲ αὐτῷ ὁ Ἀμέλιος τρίτον ἔτος ἄγοντι ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ κατὰ τὸ
 40 τρίτον ἔτος τῆς Φιλίππου βασιλείας καὶ ἄχρι τοῦ πρώτου ἔτους τῆς Κλαυδίου
 βασιλείας παραμείνας ἔτη ὅλα συγγέγονεν εἴκοσι καὶ τέσσαρα, . . . σχόλια δὲ
 ἐκ τῶν συνουσιῶν ποιούμενος ἑκατόν που βιβλία συνέταξε τῶν σχολίων. —

d. Porphyry himself came to P. when the latter was 59 years of age. He stayed with him for six years, then went to Sicily for reasons of health. In the cc. 4-6 he gives a chronological list of Plotinus’ works.

Porphyry

1359—Among P.’s pupils at Rome quite a number of intellectuals are mentioned; several of them were senators.

The senator
Rogatianus

Porph., *Vita* 7, 29-46 H.-S.:

Ἦκροῶντο δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς συγκλήτου οὐκ ὀλίγοι ὦν ἔργον ἐν

φιλοσοφία μάλιστα ἐποίουν Μάρκελλος Ὀρρόντιος καὶ Σαβινίλλος. Ἦν δὲ 30
καὶ Ῥογατιανὸς ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου, ὃς εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀποστροφῆς τοῦ βίου
τούτου προκεχωρήκει ὥς πάσης μὲν κτήσεως ἀποστῆναι, πάντα δὲ οἰκέτην
ἀποπέμψασθαι, ἀποστῆναι δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἀξιώματος· καὶ πραίτωρ προιέναι 35
μέλλων παρόντων τῶν ὑπηρετῶν μήτε προελθεῖν μήτε φροντίσαι τῆς λει-
τουργίας, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ οἰκίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἐλέσθαι κατοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τινας τῶν φίλων
καὶ συνήθων φοιτῶντα ἐκεῖ τε δειπνεῖν κάκει καθεῦδειν, σιτεῖσθαι δὲ παρὰ
μίαν· ἀφ' ἧς δὴ ἀποστάσεως καὶ ἀφροντιστίας τοῦ βίου ποδαγρῶντα μὲν 40
οὕτως, ὥς καὶ δίφρῳ βαστάζεσθαι, ἀναρρωσθῆναι, τὰς χεῖρας δὲ ἐκτείνειν μὴ
οἶόν τε ὄντα χρῆσθαι ταύταις πολὺ μᾶλλον εὐμαρῶς ἢ οἱ τὰς τέχνας διὰ τῶν
χειρῶν μετιόντες. Τοῦτον ἀπεδέχετο ὁ Πλωτίνος καὶ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα ἐπαινῶν
διετέλει εἰς ἀγαθὸν παράδειγμα τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσι προβαλλόμενος. 45

1360—The following chapter gives us a view of Plotinus' domestic life.

a. Porph., *Vita* 9, l. I, 5-22:

Women pupils Ἔσχε δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας σφόδρα προσκειμένας. —

His care of orphans Πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες ἀποθνήσκουσιν μέλλοντες τῶν εὐγενεσ- 5
τάτων φέροντες τὰ ἑαυτῶν τέχνα, ἄρρενάς τε ὁμοῦ καὶ θηλείας, ἐκεῖνῳ παρε-
δίδοσαν μετὰ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας ὥς ἱερῷ τινι καὶ θείῳ φύλακι. Διὸ καὶ ἐπεπλήρωτο
αὐτῷ ἡ οἰκία παίδων καὶ παρθένων. Ἐν τούτοις δὲ ἦν καὶ Ποτάμων, οὗ τῆς 10
παιδείσεως φροντίζων πολλάκις ἐν καὶ μεταποιούντος¹ ἡχροάσατο. Ἦνείχετο δὲ
καὶ τοὺς λογισμούς, ἀναφερόντων τῶν ἐκείνοις παραμενόντων, καὶ τῆς ἀκριβείας
ἐπεμελεῖτο λέγων, ἕως ἂν μὴ φιλοσοφῶσιν, ἔχειν αὐτοὺς δεῖν τὰς κτήσεις
καὶ τὰς προσόδους ἀνεπάφους τε καὶ σφζομένας. Καὶ ὅμως τοσοῦτοις ἐπαρκῶν¹⁵
τὰς εἰς τὸν βίον φροντίδας τε καὶ ἐπιμελείας τὴν πρὸς τὸν νοῦν τάσιν οὐδέποτ'
ἂν ἐγρηγορώτως ἐχάλασεν.

Arbiter in quarrels Ἦν δὲ καὶ πρῶτος καὶ πᾶσιν ἐκκείμενος τοῖς ὁπωσοῦν πρὸς αὐτὸν συνήθειαν
ἐσχηκόσι. Διὸ εἴκοσι καὶ ἑξ ἑτῶν ὄλων ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ διατρίψας καὶ πλείστοις 20
δαιτήσας τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀμφισβητήσεις οὐδένα τῶν πολιτικῶν ἐχθρόν
ποτε ἔσχε.

His insight into human character b. Ib., II:

Περιῆν δὲ αὐτῷ τοσαύτη περιουσία ἡθῶν κατανοήσεως, ὥς κλοπῆς ποτε
γεγονυίας πολυτελοῦς περιδεραίου Χιόνης, ἥτις αὐτῷ συνάκει μετὰ τῶν τέκνων
σεμνῶς τὴν χρεῖαν διεξάγουσα, καὶ ὑπ' ὅσιν τοῦ Πλωτίνου τῶν οἰκείων συνηγ-
μένων ἐμβλέψας ἄπασιν· “οὗτος”, ἔφη, “ἐστὶν ὁ κεκλοφώς”, δείξας ἕνα τινά. 5
Μαστιζόμενος δὲ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἐπιπλεῖον ἀρνούμενος τὰ πρῶτα ὕστερον ὠμολόγησε

¹ The text is explained by H.-S.: *etiam cum unum idemque retractabat*. Wytttenbach corrected it elegantly by reading ἂν καὶ μέτῳ ποιοῦντος.

καὶ φέρων τὸ κλαπὲν ἀπέδωκε. Προεῖπε δ' ἂν καὶ τῶν συνόντων παίδων περὶ
 10 ἐκάστου οἷος ἀποβήσεται· ὥς καὶ περὶ τοῦ Πολέμωνος οἷος ἔσται, ὅτι ἐρωτικὸς
 ἔσται καὶ ὀλιγοχρόνιος, ὅπερ καὶ ἀπέβη.

Καὶ ποτε ἐμοῦ Πορφυρίου ἤσθητο ἐξάγειν ἑμαυτὸν διανοουμένου τοῦ βίου·
 καὶ ἐξαίφνης ἐπιστάς μοι ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ διατρίβοντι καὶ εἰπὼν μὴ εἶναι ταύτην
 15 τὴν προθυμίαν ἐκ νοερᾶς καταστάσεως, ἀλλ' ἐκ μελαγχολικῆς τινος νόσου,
 ἀποδημῆσαι ἐκέλευσε. Πεισθεὶς δὲ αὐτῷ ἐγὼ εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν ἀφικόμεν
 Πρόβον τινὰ ἀκούων ἐλλόγιμον ἄνδρα περὶ τὸ Λιλύβαιον διατρίβειν· καὶ αὐτὸς
 τε τῆς τοιαύτης προθυμίας ἀπεσχόμεν τοῦ τε παρεῖναι ἄχρι θανάτου τῷ
 Πλωτίνῳ ἐνεποδίσθη.

1361—His project of founding a city.

Platonopolis

Ib., 12:

Ἐτίμησαν δὲ τὸν Πλωτῖνον μάλιστα καὶ ἐσέφθησαν Γαλιῆνός τε ὁ αὐτοκρά-
 τωρ καὶ ἡ τούτου γυνὴ Σαλωνίνα. Ὁ δὲ τῇ φιλῇ τῇ τούτων καταχρώμενος
 φιλοσόφων τινὰ πόλιν κατὰ τὴν Καμπανίαν γεγενῆσθαι λεγομένην, ἄλλως
 5 δὲ καττριπωμένην, ἡξίου ἀνεγείρειν καὶ τὴν πέριξ χώραν χαρίσασθαι οἰκισθείσῃ
 τῇ πόλει, νόμοις δὲ χρῆσθαι τοὺς κατοικεῖν μέλλοντας τοῖς Πλάτωνος καὶ τὴν
 προσηγορίαν αὐτῇ Πλατωνόπολιν θέσθαι, ἐκεῖ τε αὐτὸς μετὰ τῶν ἐταίρων
 10 ἀναχωρήσειν ὑπισχνεῖτο. Καὶ ἐγένετ' ἂν τὸ βούλημα ἐκ τοῦ ῥάψτου τῷ φιλο-
 σόφῳ, εἰ μὴ τινες τῶν συνόντων τῷ βασιλεῖ φθονοῦντες ἢ νεμεσῶντες ἢ δι'
 ἄλλην μοχθηρὰν αἰτίαν ἐνεπόδισαν.

1362—His way of writing and teaching.

**Porphry
his corrector**

a. Porph., *Vita* 7, 49-51; 8, 1-8 H.-S.:

50 "Ἔσχε δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ Πορφύριον Τύριον ὄντα ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα ἐταῖρον, ὃν καὶ
 διορθοῦν αὐτοῦ τὰ συγγράμματα ἡξίου.

(8). Γράψας γὰρ ἐκεῖνος δις τὸ γραφὲν μεταλαβεῖν οὐδέποτ' ἂν ἠνέσχετο, **His way of
writing**
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἅπαξ γοῦν ἀναγνῶναι καὶ διελθεῖν διὰ τὴν ὅρασιν μὴ ὑπηρετεῖσθαι
 αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν. Ἐγγραφε δὲ οὔτε εἰς κάλλος ἀποτυπούμενος τὰ
 5 γράμματα οὔτε εὐσήμως τὰς συλλαβὰς διαιρῶν οὔτε τῆς ὀρθογραφίας φροντί-
 ζων, ἀλλὰ μόνον τοῦ νοῦ ἐχόμενος, καί, ὃ πάντες ἐθαυμάζομεν, ἐκεῖνο ποιῶν
 ἄχρι τελευτῆς διετέλεσε.

b. The works of other philosophers were read in his school and
 commented on in a personal style.

Ib., 14, 10-18 H.-S.:

10 Ἐν δὲ ταῖς συνουσίαις ἀνεγινώσκετο μὲν αὐτῷ τὰ ὑπομνήματα, εἴτε Σεβήρου

**Other
philosophers
read in his
school**

εἴη, εἴτε Κρονίου ἢ Νουμηνίου ἢ Γαίου ἢ Ἀττικοῦ, κἀν τοῖς Περιπατητικοῖς τὰ τε Ἀσπασίου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου Ἀδράστου τε καὶ τῶν ἐμπεσόντων. Ἐλέγετο δὲ ἐκ τούτων οὐδὲν καθάπαξ, ἀλλ' ἴδιος ἦν καὶ ἐξηλλαγμένος ἐν τῇ θεωρίᾳ 15 καὶ τὸν Ἀμμωνίου φέρων νοῦν ἐν ταῖς ἐξετάσεσιν. Ἐπληροῦτο δὲ ταχέως καὶ δι' ὀλίγων δούς νοῦν βαθέος θεωρήματος ἀνίστατο.

Longinus
about P. and
Amelius

1363—Longinus' judgment about Plotinus and Amelius.

a. Porphy., *Vita* 20, 68-81 H.-S.:

Longinus, passing in review the writers of his time, mentions Plotinus and Amelius as the most able authors he knows.

Οἱ δὲ καὶ πλήθει προβλημάτων ἃ μετεχειρίσαντο τὴν σπουδὴν τοῦ γράφειν ἀποδειξάμενοι καὶ τρόπῳ θεωρίας ἰδίῳ χρησάμενοι Πλωτῖνός εἰσι καὶ Γεντυλίου 70 νός Ἀμέλιος· ὃς μὲν τὰς Πυθαγορείους ἀρχὰς καὶ Πλατωνικάς, ὡς ἐδόκει, πρὸς σαφεστέραν τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ καταστησάμενος ἐξήγησιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐγγύς τι τὰ Νουμηνίου καὶ Κρονίου καὶ Μοδεράτου καὶ Θρασύλλου τοῖς Πλωτίνου 75 περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν συγγράμμασιν εἰς ἀκρίβειαν· ὁ δὲ Ἀμέλιος κατ' ἔχνη μὲν τούτου βαδίζειν προαιρούμενος καὶ τὰ πολλὰ μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν δογμάτων ἐχόμενος, τῇ δὲ ἐξεργασίᾳ πολὺς ὢν καὶ τῇ τῆς ἐρμηνείας περιβολῇ πρὸς τὸν ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ ζῆλον ὑπαγόμενος· ὦν καὶ μόνων ἡμεῖς ἄξιον εἶναι νομίζομεν ἐπισκοπεῖ- 80 σθαι τὰ συγγράμματα.

b. Ib., 19, 34-41 H.-S.:

Again, in a letter to Porphyrius, Longinus wrote as follows.

Τοῦτο γὰρ οὖν καὶ παρόντι σοι καὶ μακρὰν ἀπόντι καὶ περὶ τὴν Τύρῳ διατρί- 35 βοντι τυγχάνω δῆπουθεν ἐπεσταλκῶς ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὑποθέσεων οὐ πάνυ με τὰς πολλὰς προσέεισθαι συμβέβηκε· τὸν δὲ τύπον τῆς γραφῆς καὶ τῶν ἐννοιῶν τάνδρὸς τὴν πυκνότητα καὶ τὸ φιλόσοφον τῆς τῶν ζητημάτων διαθέσεως ὑπερβαλλόντως ἄγαμαι καὶ φιλῶ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἐλλογιμωτάτων ἄγειν τὰ τούτου 40 βιβλία φαίην ἂν δεῖν τοὺς ζητητικούς.

2—THE THEORY OF THE THREE HYPOSTASES

The monistic
principle

1364—All things must be reduced to one single Cause, which works by itself and as a whole, not by its parts.

a. Plot., *Enn.* VI 5, 9, 1-10 Br.:

Καὶ τοίνυν εἰ πάντα γενόμενα ἤδη τὰ στοιχεῖα τῷ λόγῳ τις εἰς ἓν σφαιρικὸν σχῆμα ἄγοι, οὐ πολλοὺς φατέον τὴν σφαῖραν ποιεῖν κατὰ μέρη ἄλλον ἄλλη ἀποτεμνόμενον αὐτῷ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν μέρος, ἀλλ' ἓν εἶναι τὸ αἷτιον τῆς ποιήσεως

5 ὅλα ἑαυτῷ ποιοῦν οὐ μέρους αὐτοῦ ἄλλου ἄλλο ποιοῦντος· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πάλιν πολλοὶ εἶεν, εἰ μὴ εἷς ἐν ἡμέρῃς ἀναφέροις τὴν ποίησιν, μᾶλλον δ' εἰ μὴ ἐν ἡμέρῃς τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν σφαῖραν εἴη οὐκ αὐτοῦ χυθέντος εἰς τὴν σφαῖραν τοῦ
10 ποιοῦντος, ἀλλὰ τῆς σφαίρας ὅλης εἰς τὸ ποιοῦν ἀνηρτημένης.

Cp. VI 5, 5, where the many νοητά are represented as many centres (not in a flat surface, but in a sphere), which can be reduced to one.

b. The First Principle contains everything within itself.

Enn. VI 8, 18, 1-3 Br.:

Καὶ σὺ ζητῶν μηδὲν ἔξω ζῆται αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' εἴσω πάντα ἰὰ μετ' αὐτόν· —
Τὸ γὰρ ἔξω αὐτός ἐστι, περίληψις πάντων καὶ μέτρον.

c. *Enn.* VI 8, 21, 19-22 Br.:

20 Τὸ δὲ συνέχειν ἑαυτὸν οὕτω ληπτέον νοεῖν, εἴ τις ὁρθῶς αὐτὸ φθέγγοιτο, ὥς τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα ὅσα ἐστὶ παρὰ τούτου ἀνέχεται· μετουσίᾳ γὰρ τινι αὐτοῦ ἐστι, καὶ εἰς τοῦτον ἢ ἀναγωγὴ πάντων· —

d. Every multitude must be traced back to a principle which is absolutely one.

Enn. V 3, 16, 12-16 Br.:

Οὐ γὰρ ἐκ πολλοῦ πολὺ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολὺ τοῦτο ἐξ οὐ πολλοῦ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸ πολὺ, οὐκ ἀρχὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἄλλο πρὸ τούτου. Συστῆναι οὖν δεῖ εἰς ἐν ὄντως
15 παντὸς πλήθους ἔξω καὶ ἀπλότητος ἡστινοσοῦν, εἴπερ ὄντως ἀπλοῦν.

1365—Many intelligible forms *must* spring from the First Principle, ^{The neces-} like the sensible world *must* spring from Soul, every nature producing ^{sity of} "creation" by necessity what comes "after" it.

a. *Enn.* IV 8, 6, 1-16 Br.:

Εἴπερ οὖν δεῖ μὴ ἐν μόνον εἶναι — ἐκέκρυπτο γὰρ ἂν πάντα μορφὴν ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὐκ ἔχοντα, οὐδ' ἂν ὑπῆρχέ τι τῶν ὄντων στάντος ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκείνου, οὐδ' ἂν τὸ πλήθος ᾔην ἂν τῶν ὄντων τούτων τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς γεννηθέντων
5 μὴ τῶν μετ' αὐτὸ τὴν πρόοδον λαβόντων, ἀ ψυχῶν εἴληχε τάξιν· τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ ψυχὰς ἔδει μόνον εἶναι μὴ τῶν δι' αὐτάς γενομένων φανέντων, εἴπερ ἐκάστη φύσει τοῦτο ἔνεστι τὸ μετ' αὐτὴν ποιεῖν καὶ ἐξελίττεσθαι οἶον σπέρματος ἐκ τινος ἡμεροῦς ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἰούσῃ, μένοντος
10 μὲν αἰεὶ τοῦ προτέρου ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἔδρᾳ, τοῦ δὲ μετ' αὐτὸ οἶον γεννωμένου ἐκ δυνάμεως ἀφάτου, ὅση ᾔην ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ᾔην οὐκ ἔδει στήσαι οἶον περιγράφαντα φθόνῳ, χωρεῖν δὲ αἰεὶ, ἕως εἰς ἔσχατον μέχρι τοῦ δυνατοῦ τὰ πάντα ἥκη αἰτία δυνάμεως ἀπλέτου ἐπὶ πάντα παρ' αὐτῆς πεμπούσης καὶ οὐδὲν περιδεῖν
15 ἄμοιρον αὐτῆς δυναμένης.

b. Enn. IV 3, 17, 12-16 Br.:

"Ἐστὶ γάρ τι οἶον κέντρον, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτῳ κύκλος ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκλάμπων, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἄλλος, φῶς ἐκ φωτός· ἔξωθεν δὲ τούτων οὐκέτι φωτός κύκλος ἄλλος, ἀλλὰ δεόμενος οὗτος, οἰκείου φωτός ἀπορίᾳ, αὐγῆς ἀλλοτρίας.

15

The first circle of light, radiating from the centre, is *Noûs* (Cp. V 3, 12, l. 40-48). The second circle is Soul, ἔξωθεν περὶ τοῦτον (sc. τὸν *Noûn*) χορεύουσα, as it is said in I 8, 2, l. 23 f.

The light of soul at its utmost confines turns into darkness, and soul merely by its presence forms this darkness. This is the origin of the sensible world (texts under c and d).

c. Enn. IV 3, 9, 23-30; 34-36:

Τῆς δὴ στάσεως αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς) ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ στάσει οἶονεῖ ῥωννυμένης οἶον πολὺ φῶς ἐκλάμπαν ἐπ' ἄκροις τοῖς ἐσχάτοις τοῦ πυρὸς σκότος ἐγίγνετο, 25 ὅπερ ἰδοῦσα ἡ ψυχὴ, ἐπείπερ ὑπέστη, ἐμόρφωσεν αὐτό. Οὐ γὰρ ἦν θεμιτὸν γειτονοῦντι αὐτῇ λόγου ἅμοιρον εἶναι, οἶον ἐδέχετο τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀμυδρὸν ἐν ἀμυδρῷ τῷ γενομένῳ. Γενόμενος δὲ οἶον οἰκός τις καλὸς καὶ ποικίλος οὐκ ἀπετμήθη τοῦ πεποιηκότος· . . . ἔμψυχος τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ, ἔχων ψυχὴν 30 οὐχ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ, κρατούμενος οὐ κρατῶν, καὶ ἐχόμενος ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχων. 35

d. Enn. V 9, 9, 8-15:

Ὡς γὰρ ὄντος λόγου ζώου τινός, οὔσης δὲ καὶ ὕλης τῆς τὸν λόγον τὸν σπερματικὸν δεξαμένης, ἀνάγκη ζῶον γενέσθαι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ φύσεως 10 νοεῖας καὶ παντοδυνάμου οὔσης καὶ οὐδενὸς διείργοντος, μηδενὸς ὄντος μεταξὺ τούτου καὶ τοῦ δέξασθαι δυναμένου, ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν κοσμηθῆναι, τὸ δὲ κοσμηῆσαι. Καὶ τὸ μὲν κοσμηθὲν ἔχει τὸ εἶδος μεμερισμένον, ἀλλαχοῦ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ ἥλιον· τὸ δὲ ἐν ἐνὶ πάντα.

15

Creation explained

1366—*How* was it that anything sprang from the First Principle? — P. answers: The First Principle remains in itself and turned to itself. By its fullness it overflows (ἐξερρύη) and shines around (περιλάμπει — περιλαμψίς).

Which means: "creation" is an *eternal relation*; it is *not an act of the will*. There is "love" of the created Spirit and Soul for its Creator; not the reverse.

Enn. V 1, 6, 4-54:

Πῶς ἐξ ἐνὸς τοιούτου ὄντος, οἶον λέγομεν τὸ ἐν εἶναι, ὑπόστασιν ἔσχεν ὁτιοῦν εἴτε πλῆθος εἴτε δυάς εἴτε ἀριθμός, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔμεινεν ἐκεῖνο ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, 5 τοσοῦτον δὲ πλῆθος ἐξ ἐρρύη, ὃ ὁρᾶται μὲν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἀνάγειν δὲ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἀξιοῦμεν; Ὡς οὖν λεγέσθω θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐπικαλεσαμένους οὐ

abundance

10 λόγῳ γεγωνῶ, ἀλλὰ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκτείνασιν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς εὐχὴν πρὸς ἐκεῖνον, εὐχεσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον δυναμένους μόνους πρὸς μόνον. Δεῖ τοίνυν θεατῇ ἐκεῖνου ἐν τῷ εἴσω οἶον νεῶ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὄντος, μένοντος ἡσύχου ἐπέκεινα ἀπάντων, τὰ οἶον πρὸς τὰ ἔξω ἤδη ἀγάλαμα ἐστῶτα, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀγαλαμα τὸ πρῶτον ἐκ-
 15 φανέν θεᾶσθαι πεφηνὸς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· παντὶ τῷ κινουμένῳ δεῖ τι εἶναι, πρὸς ὃ κινεῖται· μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐκεῖνῳ μηδενὸς μὴ τιθώμεθα αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' εἴ τι μετ' αὐτὸ γίνεται, ἐπιστραφέντος αἰεὶ ἐκεῖνου πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι γεγονέναι. (Ἐκποδὼν δὲ ἡμῖν ἔστω γένεσις ἢ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸν λόγον περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ
 20 ὄντων ποιουμένοις· τῷ δὲ λόγῳ τὴν γένεσιν προσάπτοντας αὐτοῖς αἰτίας καὶ τάξεως ἀποδόσει)· τὸ γοῦν γινόμενον ἐκεῖθεν οὐ κινηθέντος φατέον γίνεσθαι· εἰ γὰρ κινηθέντος αὐτοῦ τι γίνοιτο, τρίτον ἀπ' ἐκεῖνου τὸ γινόμενον μετὰ τὴν
 25 κίνησιν ἂν γίνοιτο καὶ οὐ δεύτερον. Δεῖ οὖν ἀκινήτου ὄντος, εἴ τι δεύτερον μετ' αὐτό, οὐ προσενέυσαντος οὐδὲ βουλευθέντος οὐδὲ ὅλως κινηθέντος ὑποστῆναι αὐτό. Πῶς οὖν; Καὶ τί δεῖ νοῆσαι περὶ ἐκεῖνο μένον; Π ε ρ ῖ λ α μ ψ ι ν ἐξ
 αὐτοῦ μέν, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ μένοντος, οἶον ἡλίου τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν λαμπρὸν φῶς περιθέον,
 30 ἐξ αὐτοῦ αἰεὶ γεννώμενον μένοντος. Καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἕως μένει ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας ἀναγκαῖαν τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω αὐτῶν ἐκ τῆς παρούσης δυνάμεως δίδωσιν αὐτῶν ἐξηρητημένην ὑπόστασιν, εἰκόνα οὔσαν οἶον ἀρχετύπων ὧν ἐξέφυ,
 35 πῦρ μὲν τὴν παρ' αὐτοῦ θερμότητα· καὶ χιῶν οὐκ εἴσω μόνον τὸ ψυχρὸν κατέχει· μάλιστα δὲ ὅσα εὐώδη μαρτυρεῖ τούτῳ· ἕως γὰρ ἔστι, πρόεισί τι ἐξ αὐτῶν περὶ αὐτά, ὧν ἀπολαύει ὑποστάντων ὃ τι πλησίον. Καὶ πάντα δὲ ὅσα ἤδη τέλεια γεννᾷ· τὸ δὴ αἰεὶ τέλειον αἰεὶ καὶ αἰδιδιον γεννᾷ· καὶ ἔλαττον δὲ ἑαυτοῦ γεννᾷ.
 40 Τί οὖν χρή περὶ τοῦ τελειοτάτου λέγειν; Μηδὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ τὰ μέγιστα μετ' αὐτό. Μέγιστον δὲ μετ' αὐτὸ νοῦς καὶ δεύτερον· καὶ γὰρ ὁρᾷ ὁ νοῦς ἐκεῖνο καὶ δεῖται αὐτοῦ μόνου· ἐκεῖνο δὲ τούτου οὐδέν· καὶ τὸ γεννώμενον ἀπὸ κρείττονος νοῦ νοῦν εἶναι, καὶ κρείττων ἀπάντων νοῦς, ὅτι τᾶλλα μετ' αὐτόν· οἶον καὶ ἡ
 45 ψυχὴ λόγος νοῦ καὶ ἐνέργειά τις, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνου. Ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς μὲν ἀμυδρὸς ὁ λόγος· ὥς γὰρ εἰδῶλον νοῦ, ταύτῃ καὶ εἰς νοῦν βλέπειν δεῖ· νοῦς δὲ ὡσαύτως πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ἵνα ᾖ νοῦς. Ὅρᾳ δὲ αὐτὸ οὐ χωρισθείς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ
 50 μεταξὺ οὐδέν, ὥς οὐδὲ ψυχῆς καὶ νοῦ. Ποθεῖ δὲ πᾶν τὸ γεννῆσαν <τὸ γεγεννη- μένον> καὶ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾷ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ὤσι μόνοι τὸ γεννῆσαν καὶ τὸ γε- γεννημένον· ὅταν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον ᾗ τὸ γεννῆσαν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης σύνεστιν αὐτῷ, ὥς τῇ ἑτερότητι μόνον κεχωρίσθαι.

radiation

1367—*Enn.* VI 9, 9, 1-13.

The soul dances as it were round the First Principle.

Ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ τῇ χορείᾳ καθορᾷ πηγὴν μὲν ζωῆς, πηγὴν δὲ νοῦ, ἀρχὴν ὄντος, ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίας, ρίζαν ψυχῆς· οὐκ ἐκχεομένων ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείνων, εἴτ' ἐλατ- τούντων· οὐ γὰρ ὄγκος· ἢ φθαρτὰ ἂν ᾗν τὰ γεννώμενα. Νῦν δὲ ἐστὶν αἰδία,

An eternal
relation

ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ὡσαύτως μένει οὐ μεμερισμένη εἰς αὐτά, ἀλλ' ὅλη μένουσα. 5
 Διὸ καὶ κεῖνα μένει· οἷον εἰ μένοντος ἡλίου καὶ τὸ φῶς μένει. Οὐ γὰρ ἀποτετμή-
 μεθα οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἐσμέν, εἰ καὶ παρεμπεσοῦσα ἡ σώματος φύσις πρὸς αὐτὴν
 ἡμᾶς εἴλκυσεν, ἀλλ' ἐμπνέομεν καὶ σφζόμεθα οὐ δόντος, εἴτα ἀποστάντος 10
 ἐκείνου, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ χορηγοῦντος ἕως ἂν ᾗ ὅπερ ἔστι. Μᾶλλον μέντοι ἐσμέν νεύσαντες
 πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ εὖ ἐνταῦθα, τὸ <δὲ> πόρρω εἶναι μόνον καὶ ἤττον εἶναι. —

Creation is
 not by
 deliberation
 or provi-
 dence

1368—The First Principle is beyond thinking and intelligence. It is something like eternal waking, not distinct from its subject. All things spring from it, but evidently not by any kind of deliberation or by any act of conscious providence.

a. *Enn.* VI 8, 16, 31-38 Br.:

Εἰ οὖν μὴ γέγονε, ἀλλ' ἦν αἰεὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ καὶ οἷον ἐγρήγορσις οὐκ ἄλλου
 ὄντος τοῦ ἐγρηγορότος, ἐγρήγορσις καὶ ὑπερνόησις αἰεὶ οὕσα, ἔστιν οὕτως, 35
 ὡς ἐγρηγόρησεν. Ἡ δὲ ἐγρήγορσις ἔστιν ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας καὶ νοῦ καὶ ζωῆς
 ἔμφρονος· ταῦτα δὲ αὐτός ἐστιν. Αὐτὸς ἄρα ἔστιν ἐνέργεια ὑπὲρ νοῦν καὶ
 φρόνησιν καὶ ζωὴν· ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ οὐ παρ' ἄλλου.

b. *Ib.*, 17, 1-12 Br.:

Ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδε· ἕκαστά φαμεν τὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ καὶ τότε τὸ πᾶν οὕτως
 ἔχειν, ὡς ἂν ἔσχεν, ὡς ἡ τοῦ ποιοῦντος προαίρεσις ἠθέλησε, καὶ ὡς ἂν προθέ-
 μενος, καὶ προῖδὼν ἐν λογισμοῖς κατὰ πρόνοιαν οὕτως εἰργάσατο· αἰεὶ δὲ οὕτως
 ἐχόντων καὶ αἰεὶ οὕτως γιγνομένων, οὕτω τοι καὶ αἰεὶ ἐν τοῖς ποιούσι κεῖσθαι 5
 τοὺς λόγους ἐν μεῖζονι εὐθυμοσύνῃ ἐστῶτας· ὥστε ἐπέκεινα προνοίας τάκεῖ
 εἶναι καὶ ἐπέκεινα προαιρέσεως καὶ πάντα αἰεὶ νοερῶς ἐστηκότα εἶναι, ὅσα
 ἐν τῷ ὄντι. Ὡστε τὴν οὕτω διάθεσιν εἴ τις ὀνομάζοι πρόνοιαν, οὕτω νοεῖτω, 10
 ὅτι ἐστὶ πρὸ τοῦδε νοῦς τοῦ παντός ἐστώς, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ καθ' ὃν τὸ πᾶν τότε.

Cp. below, the nrs. 1426, 1429.

1369—The sensible universe does not come into being by deliberation either. As we saw above (1365c, d), an "image" of the intelligible Form appears in the ὕλη by the mere "neighbourhood" of the intelligible being.

How sensible
 things arise

a. *Enn.* V 8, 7, 1-16 Br.:

Τοῦτο δὴ τὸ πᾶν, ἐπεὶ περ συγχωροῦμεν παρ' ἄλλου αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ τοιοῦτον
 εἶναι, ἄρα οἰώμεθα τὸν ποιητὴν αὐτοῦ ἐπινοῆσαι παρ' αὐτῷ γῆν καὶ ταύτην
 ἐν μέσῳ δεῖν στήναι, εἴτα ὕδωρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ γῇ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν τάξει μέχρι
 τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, εἴτα ζῶα πάντα καὶ τούτοις μορφὰς τοιαύτας ἐκάστω, ὅσαι νῦν 5
 εἰσι, καὶ τὰ ἐνδον ἐκάστοις σπλάγχνα καὶ τὰ ἔξω μέρη, εἴτα διατιθέντα ἕκαστα

παρ' αὐτῶ οὕτως ἐπιχειρεῖν τῷ ἔργῳ; Ἄλλ' οὔτε ἡ ἐπίνοια δυνατὴ ἡ τοιαύτη·
 10 πόθεν γὰρ ἐπῆλθεν οὐπώποτε ἑωρακότι; Οὔτε ἐξ ἄλλου λαβόντι δυνατὸν ἦν
 ἐργάσασθαι, ὅπως νῦν οἱ δημιουργοὶ ποιοῦσι χερσὶ καὶ ὀργάνοις χρώμενοι·
 ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ χεῖρες καὶ πόδες. Λείπεται τοίνυν εἶναι μὲν πάντα ἐν ἄλλῳ,
 οὐδενὸς δὲ μεταξὺ ὄντος τῇ <τοῦ> ἐν τῷ ὄντι πρὸς ἄλλο γειτονείᾳ οἶον ἐξαίφνης
 15 ἀναφανῆναι Ἰνδαλμα καὶ εἰκόνα ἐκείνου εἴτε αὐτόθεν εἴτε ψυχῆς διακονησαμένης
 (διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι) ἢ ψυχῆς τινος.

b. Everything here has its archetypon in the intelligible world or Noûs.

Enn. V 8, 7, 16-18 Br.:

Ἄλλ' οὖν ἐκεῖθεν ἦν σύμπαντα ταῦτα, καὶ καλλιόνως ἐκεῖ· τὰ γὰρ τῇδε
 μέμικται, καὶ οὐκ ἐκεῖνα μέμικται.

Noûs con-
 tains the
 archetypa of
 all sensible
 things

c. *Enn.* V 9, 5, 17-23; 26-29 Br.:

Τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον ἕκαστον οὐ τὸ αἰσθητόν· τὸ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶδος ἐπὶ ὕλῃ
 εἶδωλον ὄντος, πᾶν τε εἶδος ἐν ἄλλῳ παρ' ἄλλου εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἔρχεται καὶ ἐστὶν
 20 εἰκὼν ἐκείνου. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ποιητὴν δεῖ εἶναι τοῦδε τοῦ παντός, οὐ τὰ ἐν τῷ
 μήπω ὄντι οὗτος νοήσει, ἵνα αὐτὸ ποιῇ. Πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι ἐκεῖνα,
 οὐ τύπους ἀφ' ἐτέρων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχέτυπα καὶ πρῶτα καὶ νοῦ οὐσίαν. — Ὁ
 26 νοῦς ἄρα τὰ ὄντα ὄντως, οὐχ οἷά ἐστιν ἄλλοθι νοῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν οὔτε πρὸ
 αὐτοῦ οὔτε μετ' αὐτόν· ἀλλὰ οἶον νομοθέτης πρῶτος, μᾶλλον δὲ νόμος αὐτός
 τοῦ εἶναι.

Cp. also 1376, 1426.

1370—a. A summary of the theory of the three hypostases.

The three
 hypostases

Enn. V 2, 1, 1-22 Br.:

Τὸ ἐν πάντα καὶ οὐδὲ ἐν· ἀρχὴ γὰρ πάντων οὐ πάντα, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο πάντα·
 ἐκεῖ γὰρ οἶον ἀνέδραμε· μᾶλλον δὲ οὕτω ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ἐσται. — Πῶς οὖν ἐξ
 ἀπλοῦ ἐνὸς οὐδεμιᾶς ἐν ταύτῳ φαινομένης ποικιλίας, οὐ διπλῆς ὅπου οὖν;
 5 Ἡ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ, διὰ τοῦτο ἐξ αὐτοῦ πάντα, καὶ ἵνα τὸ ὄν ᾖ, διὰ τοῦτο
 αὐτὸ οὐκ ὄν, γεννητῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ· καὶ πρώτη οἶον γέννησις αὕτη· ὃν γὰρ τέλειον
 τῷ μηδὲν ζητεῖν μηδὲ ἔχειν μηδὲ δεῖσθαι οἶον ὑπερερρῦν καὶ τὸ ὑπερπλήρες
 αὐτοῦ πεποίηκεν ἄλλο· τὸ δὲ γεγόμενον εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπεστράφη καὶ ἐπληρώθη καὶ
 10 ἐγένετο πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπον καὶ νοῦς οὕτως. Καὶ ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο στάσις αὐτοῦ
 τὸ ὄν ἐποίησεν, ἡ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ θέα τὸν νοῦν. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔστη πρὸς αὐτό, ἵνα ἴδῃ,
 ὁμοῦ νοῦς γίνεται καὶ ὄν.
 15 Οὕτως οὖν ὢν οἶον ἐκεῖνος τὰ ὅμοια ποιεῖ δύναμιν προχέας πολλήν· εἶδος

δὲ καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ πρότερον προέχεε. Καὶ αὕτη ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ἐνέργεια ψυχὴ τοῦτο μένοντος ἐκείνου γενομένη· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς μένοντος τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο. — Ἡ δὲ οὐ μένουσα ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ κινηθεῖσα ἐγέννα εἴδωλον. Ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν βλέπουσα, ὅθεν ἐγένετο, πληροῦται, προελθοῦσα δὲ εἰς κίνησιν ἄλλην καὶ ἐναντίαν γεννᾷ εἴδωλον αὐτῆς αἰσθησιν καὶ φύσιν τὴν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. — Οὐδὲν δὲ τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἀπῆρηται οὐδ' ἀποτέμνεται. —

b. It is illustrated by the following simile.

Enn. V 6, 4, 16-22 Br.:

Καὶ οὖν ἀπεικαστέον τὸ μὲν φωτί, τὸ δὲ ἐφεξῆς ἡλίῳ, τὸ δὲ τρίτον τῷ σελήνης ἄστρῳ κομιζομένῳ τὸ φῶς παρ' ἡλίου. Ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ ἐπακτὸν νοῦν ἔχει ἐπιχρωννύντα αὐτὴν νοερὰν οὔσαν, νοῦς δ' ἐν αὐτῷ οἰκεῖον ἔχει οὐ φῶς ὦν μόνον, ἀλλ' ὃ ἐστι πεφωτισμένος ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ, τὸ δὲ παρέχον τούτῳ τὸ φῶς οὐκ ἄλλο ὢν φῶς ἐστὶν ἀπλοῦν παρέχον τὴν δύναμιν ἐκείνῳ τοῦ εἶναι ὃ ἐστι.

c. The One, Noûs and Soul—these three principles must be assumed. No more than these and no less.

For the One *must* be distinguished as the absolute Principle from Noûs which is all, and Noûs from Soul which is nearest to ὕλη. But neither the First nor the second Principle could be doubled, e.g. by saying that the one is potential, the other in act; for the One is beyond this distinction, and Noûs is always "act". Nor is it allowed to place Logos as another hypostasis between Noûs and Soul; for Soul depends on Noûs directly. There could be nothing between.

There are
three and no
more than
three
hypostases

Enn. II 9, 1, 1. 1-33, 57-63; c. 2, 1. 1-2:

Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀπλὴ φύσις καὶ πρώτη — πᾶν γὰρ τὸ οὐ πρῶτον οὐχ ἀπλοῦν — καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλὰ ἐν τι, καὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς λεγομένου ἡ φύσις ἡ αὐτή — καὶ γὰρ αὕτη οὐκ ἄλλο, εἴτα ἐν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἄλλο, εἴτα ἀγαθόν —, ὅταν λέγωμεν τὸ ἐν, καὶ ὅταν λέγωμεν ἀγαθόν, ταύτην δεῖ νομίζειν τὴν φύσιν καὶ μίαν λέγειν οὐ κατηγοροῦντας ἐκείνης οὐδέν, δηλοῦντας δὲ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οἶόν τε. Καὶ τὸ πρῶτον δὲ οὕτως, ὅτι ἀπλούστατον, καὶ τὸ αὐταρκές, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ πλειόνων· οὕτω γὰρ ἀναρτηθήσεται εἰς τὰ ἐξ ὧν· καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ παρ' ἄλλου. Εἰ οὖν μηδὲ παρ' ἄλλου μηδὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδὲ σύνθεσις μηδεμία, ἀνάγκη μηδὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτὸ εἶναι. Οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ ἐφ' ἐτέρας ἀρχὰς ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο προσθησαμένους, εἴτα νοῦν μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ νοοῦν πρῶτως, εἴτα ψυχὴν μετὰ νοῦν — αὕτη γὰρ τάξις κατὰ φύσιν — καὶ μήτε πλείω τούτων τίθεσθαι ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, μήτε ἐλάττω. Εἴτε γὰρ ἐλάττω, ἢ

ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν ταῦτόν φήσουσιν, ἢ νοῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, ἐδείχθη πολλαχῇ. Λοιπὸν δὲ ἐπισκέψασθαι ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εἰ πλείω τῶν τριῶν
 20 τούτων, τίνες ἂν οὖν εἶεν φύσεις παρ' αὐτάς. Τῆς τε γὰρ λεχθείσης οὕτως ἔχειν ἀρχῆς τῆς πάντων οὐδεὶς ἂν εὖροι ἀπλουστέραν οὐδ' ἐπαναβεβηκυῖαν ἡντινοῦν. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὴν μὲν δυνάμει, τὴν δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ φήσουσι· γελοῖον γὰρ
 25 ἐν τοῖς ἐνεργείᾳ οὔσι καὶ αὐτοῖς τὸ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ διαιρουμένους φύσεις ποιεῖσθαι πλείους. 'Αλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα· οὐδ' ἐπινοεῖν τὸν μὲν τινα νοῦν ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ τινί, τὸν δὲ οἷον κινούμενον. Τίς γὰρ ἂν ἡσυχία νοῦ καὶ τίς κίνησις καὶ προφορὰ ἂν εἴη ἢ τίς ἀργία καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου τί ἔργον; 'Ἐστι γὰρ ὡς ἔστι
 30 νοῦς ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἐνεργείᾳ κείμενος ἐστώσῃ· κίνησις δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν ψυχῆς ἥδη ἔργον καὶ λόγος ἀπ' αὐτοῦ εἰς ψυχὴν ψυχὴν νοεράν ποιῶν, οὐκ ἄλλην τινὰ μεταξὺ νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς φύσιν. — Τὸν δὲ λόγον ὅταν τις ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ ποιῇ, εἴτα ἀπὸ τούτου γίνεσθαι ἐν ψυχῇ ἄλλον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα
 60 μεταξὺ ψυχῆς καὶ νοῦ ἦ οὗτος, ἀποστερήσει τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ νοεῖν, εἰ μὴ παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ κομιεῖται, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ἄλλου τοῦ μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον· καὶ εἰδῶλον λόγου, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγον ἔξει, καὶ ὅλως οὐκ εἰδήσει νοῦν οὐδὲ ὅλως νοήσει. —

(2) Οὐ τοίνυν οὔτε πλείω τούτων οὔτε ἐπινοίας περιττὰς ἐν ἐκείνοις . . . θετέον.

Thus, P. maintains his doctrine of the three hypostases against Valentinian gnostics, who first double the First Principle and next introduce a whole series of other spiritual beings to populate their pleroma (above, nr. 1333).

3—SOUL: ITS ΜΕΣΗ ΤΑΞΙΣ

Since for Plotinus soul is, by its self-reflection, the true starting-point of man's ascent to the Source of all things, or (as he says in V I, 1) "to the Father", we begin our more detailed exposition by considering soul.

1371—Soul is the cause of the unity of bodies. Therefore, it must be itself a unity, though not an absolute one.

a. *Enn.* VI 2, 5, 1-10 Br.:

Soul is
plurality-
unity

Πρῶτον δὲ τοῦτο ἐνθυμητέον ὡς, ἐπειδὴ τὰ σώματα, οἷον τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν φυτῶν, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν πολλὰ ἔστι καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ μεγέθεσι καὶ εἵδεσι μερῶν καὶ ἄλλο ἄλλοι, ἔρχεται δὲ τὰ πάντα ἐξ ἐνός, ἢ παντάπασιν
 5 ἐξ ἐνός ἢ ἔξει πάντα παντὸς ἐνός· ἢ μᾶλλον μὲν ἐνός ἢ οἷον τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον ὄντος ἢ τὸ γενόμενον· ὅσῳ γὰρ πρὸς ἐν ἢ ἀπόστασις, τόσῳ καὶ πρὸς ὄν. 'Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐξ ἐνός μὲν, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ἐνός, ὡς πάντῃ ἐν ἢ αὐτοέν (οὐ γὰρ ἂν διεστηκὸς πλῆθος ἐποίει) λείπεται εἶναι ἐκ πλήθους ἐνός. Τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν
 10 ἦν ψυχὴ· τοῦτο ἄρα πλῆθος ἔν.

b. It is, therefore, both μεριστή and ἀμέριστος¹, but essentially the latter, since it belongs to the θεία φύσις, as is said in IV 7, 10.

Enn. IV 2, 1, 62-76 Br.:

‘Ἡ δ’ ὁμοῦ μεριστή τε καὶ ἀμέριστος φύσις, ἣν δὴ ψυχὴν εἶναι φαμεν, οὐχ οὕτως ὡς τὸ συνεχές μία, μέρος ἄλλο, τὸ δ’ ἄλλο ἔχουσα· ἀλλὰ μεριστή μὲν, ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι μέρεσι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, ἀμέριστος δέ, ὅτι ὅλη ἐν πᾶσι καὶ ἐν ὁτιοῦν 65 αὐτῶν ὅλη. Καὶ ὁ τοῦτο κατιδὼν τὸ μέγεθος τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς εἴσεται, ὡς θεῶν τὸ χρῆμα αὐτῆς καὶ θαυμαστὸν καὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ τὰ χρήματα φύσεων. Μέγεθος οὐκ ἔχουσα παντὶ μεγέθει σύνεστι καὶ ὠδὶ οὐσα ὠδὶ πάλιν αὐτῇ 70 οὐκ ἄλλω, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῷ· ὥστε μεμερίσθαι καὶ μὴ μεμερίσθαι αὐτῇ, μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ μεμερίσθαι αὐτὴν μὴδὲ μεμερισμένην γεγονέναι· μένει γὰρ μεθ’ ἑαυτῆς ὅλη, περὶ δὲ τὰ σώματά ἐστι μεμερισμένη τῶν σωμάτων τῷ οἰκείῳ μεριστῷ οὐ δυναμένων αὐτὴν ἀμερίστως δέξασθαι· ὥστε εἶναι τῶν σωμάτων πάθημα 75 τὸν μερισμόν, οὐκ αὐτῆς.

P. speaks repeatedly of the relation of μεριστόν and ἀμέριστον in the soul. His most explicit and definite view of it is found in IV 3, 19.

c. Since it is essentially indivisible, soul cannot be the entelechy of the body. It belongs to “true being” in the Platonic sense of the term.

Enn. IV 7, 8⁵, 1. 35-51:

Soul is not
the entelechy
of the body

Πῶς δ’ ἂν καὶ ἀμερῆς οὐσα μεριστοῦ τοῦ σώματος ἐντελέχεια γένοιτο 35 μεριστή; Ἡ τε αὐτὴ ψυχὴ ἐξ ἄλλου ζώου ἄλλου γίνεται· πῶς οὖν ἡ τοῦ προτέρου τοῦ ἐφεξῆς ἂν γένοιτο, εἰ ἦν ἐντελέχεια ἐνός; Φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν μεταβαλλόντων ζώων εἰς ἄλλα ζῶα. Οὐκ ἄρα τῷ εἶδος εἶναι τινος τὸ 40 εἶναι ἔχει, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν οὐσία οὐ παρὰ τοῦ ἐν σώματι ἰδρῦσθαι τὸ εἶναι λαμβάνουσα, ἀλλ’ οὐσα πρὶν καὶ τοῦδε γενέσθαι οἶον ζώου, οὗ τὸ σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν γεννήσει. Τίς οὖν οὐσία αὐτῆς; Εἰ δὲ μήτε σῶμα, μήτε πάθος σώματος, πρᾶξις δὲ καὶ ποίησις, καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς, οὐσία παρὰ τὰ 45 σώματα οὐσα ποία τίς ἐστιν; Ἡ δὴλον ὅτι ἦν φαμεν ὄντως οὐσίαν εἶναι. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ γένεσις, ἀλλ’ οὐκ οὐσία, πᾶν τὸ σωματικὸν εἶναι λέγοιτ’ ἂν, γινόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν², μεταλήψει δὲ τοῦ ὄντος 50 σφζόμενον, καθ’ ὅσον ἂν αὐτοῦ μεταλαμβάνη.

Against the Aristotelian definition of soul as the entelechy of an organical body (above, nr. 636) P. uses also the following interesting argument: in that case *sleep would be impossible*, for the entelechy is always present and thus soul would not have any opportunity of withdrawing ἄνω! (l. 9-11).

¹ The terms are Plato's in *Tim.* 35a. See Gr. Phil. I, nr. 350.

² Cp. Plato, *Ph.* 79a-80b, *Phaedr.* 245 c-e; *Tim.* 27d-28a; *Phil.* 59 ab.

1372—This twofold nature of soul is due to its intermediate position: on the outskirts of the νοητόν, quite close to sensible nature.

a. *Enn.* IV 8, 7, I-I4 Br.:

Its
μέση τάξις

Διττῆς δὲ φύσεως ταύτης οὐσης, τῆς μὲν νοητῆς, τῆς δὲ αἰσθητῆς, ἄμεινον μὲν ψυχῇ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη γε μὴν ἔχει καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν τοιαύτην φύσιν ἐχούσῃ, καὶ οὐκ ἀγανακτῆτέον αὐτήν, εἰ μὴ πάντα ἐστὶ τὸ
5 κρεῖττον, μέσῃν τάξιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐπισχοῦσαν, θείας μὲν μοίρας οὖσαν, ἐν ἐσχάτῳ δὲ τοῦ νοητοῦ οὖσαν, ὥς ὁμορον οὖσαν τῇ αἰσθητῇ φύσει διδόναι μὲν
10 αὐτῆς ἀσφαλοῦς διακοσμοῖ, προθυμίᾳ δὲ πλείονι εἰς τὸ εἴσω δύοιτο μὴ μείνασα ὅλη μεθ' ὅλης, ἄλλως τε καὶ δυνατόν <ὄν> αὐτῇ πάλιν ἐξαναδύναι, ἱστορίαν ὦν ἐνταῦθα εἶδὲ τε καὶ ἔπαθε προσλαβούσῃ καὶ μαθούσῃ, οἷον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τῇ παραθέσει τῶν οἷον ἐναντίων σαφέστερον τὰ ἀμείνω μαθούσῃ.

About the question of "how soul can exercise providence in safety for itself", see our next numbers.

As to the intermediate place of soul, we found the idea fairly emphatically in Nemesius of Emesa and traced it back to Posidonius; supra, nr. **1181b**, cp. **1193**. Plotinus, too, knows "intermediate stages" between anorganic and organic nature, between plants and animals, between animals and man. See *Enn.* IV 22-27, on the soul of the earth. In his opinion not only the rational soul of man is eternal, but also the vegetative soul; the soul of animals as well as the soul of plants (*Enn.* IV 7, 14). Cp. above, **1182**.

As to man and his μέση τάξις, we found that the idea comes from the Early Academy (above, nr. **1193**). Later, it plays an important part in the philosophy of Marsilio Ficino. See also below, **1430a**.

b. *Enn.* VI 2, 22, 28-35 Br.:

double
aspect of
soul

Ψυχῆς δὲ ἐνεργούσης ὡς γένους ἢ εἶδους αἱ ἄλλαι ψυχαὶ ὡς εἶδη· καὶ τούτων
30 αἱ ἐνέργειαι διτταί. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω νοῦς, ἡ δὲ πρὸς τὸ κάτω αἱ ἄλλαι δυνάμεις κατὰ λόγον· ἡ δὲ ἐσχάτη ὕλης ἥδη ἐφαπτομένη καὶ μορφοῦσα καὶ τὸ κάτω αὐτῆς τὸ ἄλλο πᾶν οὐ κωλύει εἶναι ἄνω. Ἡ καὶ τὸ κάτω λεγόμενον αὐτῆς ἰνδαλμά ἐστιν αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἀποτετμημένον δέ, ἀλλ' ὡς τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις,
35 ἕως ἂν τὸ ἀρχέτυπον παρῇ ἕξω.

1373—Soul is at different distances from Noûs: first, there is universal soul (l. 21 ff., τὴν μὲν ἐκ παντός); next, the world-soul, (l. 26 ff., τῆς μὲν οὖν —) which is the lower part of the first (τῆς κατωτάτω τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ παντός); then, there is a lower soul of man (l. 28 ff., τοῦ δὲ ἡμῶν κάτω), and finally a higher soul of man (l. 30 ff., τῆς δὲ ἄλλης ψυχῆς —).

a. *Enn.* IV 3, 4, 1. 21-37 Br.:

Souls of
different
kinds

Καὶ τὴν μὲν τοῦ παντός αἰεὶ ὑπερέχειν τῷ μηδὲ εἶναι αὐτῇ τὸ κατελθεῖν

μηδὲ τὸ κάτω μηδὲ ἐπιστροφὴν <πρὸς> τὰ τῆδε, τὰς δ' ἡμετέρας <οὐκ αἰε> τῷ τε εἶναι ἀφωρισμένον αὐταῖς τὸ μέρος ἐν τῷδε καὶ τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ τοῦ προσδεο- 25 μένου φροντίσεως, τῆς μὲν οὖν οἰκουίας τῇ ἐν φυτῷ μεγάλῃ ψυχῇ, ἣ ἀπόνως τὸ φυτὸν καὶ ἀσφόρως διοικεῖ, τῆς κατωτάτῃ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ παντός, τοῦ δὲ ἡμῶν κάτω, οἷον εἰ εὐλαὶ ἐν σαπέντι μέρει τοῦ φυτοῦ γίνονται — οὕτω γὰρ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἔμψυχον ἐν τῷ παντί· τῆς δὲ ἄλλης ψυχῆς τῆς ὁμοειδοῦς τῶν ἄνω τῆς 30 ὅλης, οἷον εἴ τις γεωργὸς ἐν φροντίδι τῶν ἐν τῷ φυτῷ εὐλῶν γίνονται καὶ ταῖς μερίμναις πρὸς τῷ φυτῷ γίνονται, ἣ εἴ τις ὑγιαίνοντα μὲν καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὑγιαίνόντων ὄντα πρὸς ἐκείνοις εἶναι λέγοι, πρὸς οἷς ἐστὶν ἡ πράττων ἡ 35 θεωρίας ἑαυτὸν παρέχων, νοσήσαντος δὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῖς τοῦ σώματος θερα- πείαις ὄντος πρὸς τῷ σώματι εἶναι καὶ τοῦ σώματος γεγενέναι.

On the distinction between a "Soul of the universe" which is transcendent, and a soul of the visible world which is δεθεῖσα σώματι, cp. the following passages.

III 5, c. 2 l. 14 ff. and c. 3 l. 27 ff., where Ἀφροδίτη ἡ οὐρανία is opposed to another who belongs to "this world".

II 1, 5, l. 7 ff.: ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς οὐρανίας Ἰνδαλμα αὐτῆς ἰὸν καὶ οἷον ἀπορρέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ζῶα ποιεῖν.

II 3, 9, l. 31 ff.: καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος δὲ ὁ μὲν τὸ ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς τινος δεθείσης σώματι, ὁ δὲ ἡ τοῦ παντός ψυχὴ ἡ μὴ ἐν σώματι, ἐλλάμπουσα δὲ ἔχνη τῇ ἐν σώματι.

II 3, 17, l. 15 ff.: Νοῦς δὲ ψυχῇ δίδωσι τῇ τοῦ παντός (τοὺς λόγους), ψυχὴ δὲ παρ' αὐτῆς ἡ μετὰ Νοῦν τῇ μετ' αὐτὴν ἐλλάμπουσα καὶ τυποῦσα, ἣ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐπιταχθεῖσα ἤδη ποιεῖ.

II 3, 18 l. 12: τὸ ἐξ αὐτῆς Ἰνδαλμα.

b. Universal soul is more creative than particular souls, because the first is nearer to Νοῦς.

Universal
soul and
particular
souls

Enn. IV 3, 6, l. 21-34 Br.:

Τῶν γὰρ ἐκεῖ νενευκότων ἡ δύναμις μείζων. Σφύζουσαι γὰρ αὐτάς ἐπ' ἀσφαλοῦς ἐκ τοῦ ῥάστου ποιοῦσι . . . ἡ δὲ δύναμις ἐκ τοῦ ἄνω μένει. Μένουσα οὖν ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖ προσιόντων, αἱ δὲ αὐταὶ προῆλθον. Ἀπέστησαν οὖν εἰς βάθος. 25 Ἡ πολὺ αὐτῶν καθελκυσθὲν συνεφειλκύσατο καὶ αὐτάς ταῖς γνώμαις εἰς τὸ κάτω ἰέναι. Τὸ γὰρ δευτέρας καὶ τρίτας¹ τῷ ἐγγύθεν καὶ τῷ πορρώτερον ὑπονοητέον εἰρησθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν οὐχ ὁμοίως πάσαις ψυχαῖς ὑπάρχει τὰ πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἐνοῖντο ἄν, οἱ δὲ ἐπιβάλλοιεν ἂν ἐγγὺς ἐφιέμενοι, 30 τοῖς δὲ ἤττον ἂν ἔχοι τοῦτο, καθ' ὃ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν οὐ ταῖς αὐταῖς ἐνεργοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ, οἱ δὲ τῇ μετ' ἐκείνην, οἱ δὲ τῇ τρίτῃ, ἀπάντων τὰς πάσας ἐχόντων.

c. Our own soul is not a part of the world-soul (as it might seem to be suggested in *Philebus* 30a).

¹ *Tim.* 41d: δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα.

Enn. IV 3, 7, 1-12:

**Individual
souls not a
part of the
world-soul**

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ταύτη. Ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν Φιλήβῳ λεχθὲν παρέχον ὑπόνοιαν μοίρας
τῆς τοῦ παντός τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι; Βούλεται δὲ ὁ λόγος οὐ τοῦτο, ὃ τις οἶεται,
ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἦν χρήσιμον αὐτῷ τότε, καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐμψυχον εἶναι. Τοῦτο οὖν
5 πιστοῦται λέγων, ὡς ἄτοπον τὸν οὐρανὸν ἄψυχον λέγειν ἡμῶν, οἱ μέρος σώματος
ἔχομεν τοῦ παντός, ψυχὴν ἐχόντων. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέρος ἔσχεν ἀψύχου τοῦ
παντός ὄντος; Δῆλον δὲ μάλιστα τὸ τῆς γνώμης αὐτοῦ ἐν Τιμαίῳ ποιεῖ, οὐ
10 γενομένης τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ παντός ὕστερον τὰς ἄλλας ποιεῖ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μινύων
κρατῆρος, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ἡ τῶν ὄλων, ὁμοειδῆ ποιῶν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ διαφορὰν
δευτέροις καὶ τρίτοις διδούς¹.

On the difference between Universal Soul and our individual souls cp. also IV
8, 7, 1. 17-32: Universal soul cannot come into direct contact with things here,
individual souls can.

1374—To the question “how is there a plurality of souls” P. answers: **Why many
souls?** Because there is a plurality in Noûs.

a. *Enn.* IV 8, 3, 1. 6-13 Br.:

Ὅντος τοίνυν παντός νοῦ ἐν τῷ τῆς νοήσεως τόπῳ ὅλου τε καὶ παντός, ὃν δὴ
κόσμον νοητὸν τιθέμεθα, ὄντων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτῳ περιεχομένων νοερῶν
10 δυνάμεων καὶ νόων τῶν κατέκαστα — οὐ γὰρ εἷς νοῦς μόνος, ἀλλ' εἷς καὶ πολλοί —
πολλὰς ἔδει καὶ ψυχὰς καὶ μίαν εἶναι, καὶ ἐκ τῆς μιᾶς τὰς πολλὰς διαφόρους,
ὥσπερ ἐκ γένους ἐνός εἶδη τὰ μὲν ἀμείνω, τὰ δὲ χεῖρω, καὶ τὰ μὲν νοερώτερα,
τὰ δ' ἥττον ἐνεργεῖα τοιαῦτα.

b. In Noûs there is a plurality of intelligible Forms, because it con-
tains the (intelligible) principle of ἐτερότης; and this plurality ends in
infinity. So it is with soul.

**How to
explain
plurality
in Noûs**

Enn. VI 2, 22, 1. 7-23 Br.:

Ὁ δὴ νοῦς οὗτος, ὃν φαμεν καθορᾶν, οὐκ ἀπαλλαγεὶς τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐξ
αὐτοῦ ὦν, ἅτε ὦν ἐξ ἐνός πολλὰ καὶ τὴν τοῦ θατέρου φύσιν συνοῦσαν ἔχων,
10 εἷς πολλὰ γίνεται. Εἷς δὲ νοῦς τὰ πολλὰ ὦν καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς νοῦς ποιεῖ ἐξ
ἀνάγκης τῆς τοιαύτης. Ὅλως δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐν ἀριθμῷ λαβεῖν καὶ ἄτομον.
ὃ τι γὰρ ἂν λάβης, εἶδος· ἄνευ γὰρ ὕλης. Διὸ καὶ τοῦτο αἰνιττόμενος ὁ Πλάτων
εἷς ἀπειρά φησι κατακερματίζεσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν². Ἔως μὲν γὰρ εἷς ἄλλο εἶδος,
15 οἶον ἐκ γένους, οὕτω ἀπειρον· περατοῦται γὰρ τοῖς γεννηθεῖσιν εἵδεσι· τὸ
δ' ἔσχατον εἶδος ὃ μὴ διαιρεῖται εἰς εἶδη, μᾶλλον ἀπειρον. Καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ

¹ The passage referred to is again *Tim.* 41d.

² P. thinks of *Parm.* 144b.

τότε δὲ ἤδη εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθέντα ἔαν χαίρειν¹. 'Αλλ' ὅσον μὲν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἄπειρα· τῷ δὲ ἐνὶ περιληφθέντα εἰς ἀριθμὸν ἔρχεται ἡδη. Νοῦς μὲν οὖν 20 ἔχει τὸ μεθ' ἑαυτὸν ψυχὴν, ὥστε ἐν ἀριθμῷ εἶναι καὶ ψυχὴν μέχρι τοῦ ἐσχάτου αὐτῆς, τὸ δὲ ἐσχάτον αὐτῆς ἡδη ἄπειρον παντάπασιν.

Thus, the plurality of souls is explained by P. not by the presence of ὅλη nor of bodies, as was done by Aristotle. According to P., plurality originates in the intelligible world itself and by an intelligible principle.

c. The same question is asked in the following passage. In his answer the author stresses the fact that this plurality in the world of Spirit and of soul does not exclude unity.

Enn. VI 4, 4, l. 18 f.; 23-26; 32-46 Br.:

Plurality
not opposed
to unity

'Αλλὰ πῶς ψυχαὶ πολλαὶ καὶ νοῖ πολλοῖ καὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὰ ὄντα; — Τὸ ὄν 25 πολλὰ συγχωροῦμεν εἶναι ἑτερότητι, οὐ τόπω. 'Ομοῦ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ὄν, καὶ πολὺ οὕτως ἦ· ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει² καὶ πᾶν ὁμοῦ³ καὶ νοῦς πολλὺς 30 ἑτερότητι, οὐ τόπω, ὁμοῦ δὲ πᾶς. — 'Επεὶ, ὅτι οὐ συνδιείληπται τοῖς μέρεσιν, ἀλλ' ὅλη πανταχοῦ, φανερόν ποιεῖ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἀμέριστον ὄντως τῆς φύσεως. Οὗτ' οὖν τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὰς πολλὰς ἀναιρεῖ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν τὰ ὄντα, οὔτε μάχεται τὸ 35 πλῆθος ἐκεῖ τῷ ἐνί, οὔτε τῷ πλήθει συμπληροῦν δεῖ ζωῆς τὰ σώματα, οὔτε διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος δεῖ νομίζειν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ψυχῶν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι καὶ πολλὰς καὶ μίαν. 'Εν γὰρ τῷ ὅλῳ αἱ πολλαὶ ἡδη 40 οὐ δυνάμει, ἀλλ' ἐνεργείᾳ ἐκάστη· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ μία ἢ ὅλη κωλύει τὰς πολλὰς ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι, οὔτε αἱ πολλαὶ τὴν μίαν. Διέστησαν γὰρ οὐ διεστῶσαι καὶ πάρεσιν ἀλλήλαις οὐκ ἄλλοτριωθεῖσαι· οὐ γὰρ πέρασιν εἰσι διωρισμέναι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐπιστῆμαι αἱ πολλαὶ ἐν ψυχῇ μιᾷ. καὶ ἔστιν ἡ μία τοιαύτη, ὥστε ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῇ 45 πάσας. Οὕτως ἐστὶν ἄπειρος ἡ τοιαύτη φύσις.

45

1375—The function of soul is not only thinking,—for in this case it would not differ from Νοῦς. Soul has a particular task with regard to what comes after it: the task of ordering and governing.

a. *Enn.* IV 8, 3, l. 21-31 Br.:

The function
of soul

Ψυχῆς δὲ ἔργον τῆς λογικωτέρας νοεῖν μὲν, οὐ τὸ νοεῖν δὲ μόνον· τί γὰρ ἂν 25 καὶ νοῦ διαφέρει; Προσλαβοῦσα γὰρ τῷ νοερᾷ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλο, καθ' ὃ τὴν οἰκείαν ἔσχεν ὑπόστασιν, νοῦς οὐκ ἔμεινεν, ἔχει τε ἔργον καὶ αὐτῇ, εἴπερ καὶ πᾶν, ὃ ἂν ἦ τῶν ὄντων. Βλέπουσα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ πρὸ ἑαυτῆς νοεῖ, εἰς δὲ ἑαυτὴν σφίξει ἑαυτήν, εἰς δὲ τὸ μετ' αὐτὴν κοσμεῖ τε καὶ διοικεῖ καὶ ἄρχει αὐτοῦ· ὅτι μὴδὲ

¹ *Phil.* 16e.

² Parmenides, fr. 8, l. 25 (*Gr. Ph.* I, nr. 83).

³ Anaxagoras, fr. 1 (*Gr. Ph.* I, nr. 124a).

οἶόν τε ἦν στῆναι τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, δυναμένου ἐφεξῆς καὶ ἄλλου γενέσθαι
30 ἐλάττονος μὲν, ἀναγκαίου δὲ εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ.

b. Cp. *Enn.* IV 7, 13, l. 2-13 Br.:

Its
difference
from Noûs

"Ὅσος μὲν νοῦς μόνος, ἀπαθὴς ἐν τοῖς ζώῃν μόνον νοερὰν ἔχων ἐκεῖ ἀεὶ
μένει· οὐ γὰρ ἐνὶ ὁρμῇ οὐδ' ὄρεξις· ὁ δ' ἂν ὄρεξιν προσλάβῃ ἐφεξῆς ἐκείνῳ τῷ
5 νῷ ὄν, τῇ προσθήκῃ τῆς ὀρέξεως οἶον πρόεισιν ἤδη ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ κοσμεῖν
ὀρεγόμενον καθ' ἃ ἐν νῷ εἶδεν, ὥσπερ κυοῦν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ ὠδίνον γεννῆσαι,
ποιεῖν σπεύδει καὶ δημιουργεῖν. Καὶ τῇ σπουδῇ ταύτῃ περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τετα-
10 μένη, μετὰ μὲν πάσης τῆς τῶν ὄλων ψυχῆς ὑπερέχουσα τοῦ διοικουμένου εἰς τὸ
ἔξω καὶ τοῦ παντὸς συνεπιμελουμένη, μέρος δὲ διοικεῖν βουλευθεῖσα μονομένη
καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ γιγνομένη, ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, οὐχ ὅλη οὐδὲ πᾶσα τοῦ σώματος γενομένη,
ἀλλὰ τι καὶ ἔξω σώματος ἔχουσα.

c. Individual souls may exercise their task of providence while staying "yonder" with universal Soul and turned to this. So long they are safe. But as soon as a soul attaches itself to a part, it loses its contact with the spiritual world. To such souls the body becomes a prison. They can free themselves only by noûs; for they always keep some higher principle within themselves.

Enn. IV 8, 4, l. 1-23, 28-35 Br.:

The body not
necessarily
a prison

Τὰς δὴ καθέκαστα ψυχὰς ὀρέξει μὲν νοερᾷ χρωμένας ἐν τῇ ἐξ οὗ ἐγένοντο πρὸς
αὐτὸ ἐπιστροφῇ, δύναμιν δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε ἔχουσας, οἷα περ φῶς ἐξηρτη-
μένον μὲν κατὰ τὰ ἄνω ἡλίου, τῷ δὲ μετ' αὐτὸ οὐ φθονοῦν τῆς χορηγίας, ἀπή-
5 μονας μὲν εἶναι <δεῖ> μετὰ τῆς ὅλης μενούσας ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, ἐν οὐρανῷ δὲ μετὰ
τῆς ὅλης συνδιοικεῖν ἐκείνῃ, οἷα οἱ βασιλεῖς τῷ πάντων κρατοῦντι συνόντες
συνδιοικοῦσιν ἐκείνῳ οὐ καταβαίνοντες οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἀπὸ τῶν βασιλείων τόπων·
καὶ γὰρ εἰσιν ὁμοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τότε.
10 Μεταβάλλουσαι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου εἰς τὸ μέρος τε εἶναι καὶ ἑαυτῶν¹ καὶ οἶον
κάμνουσαι τῷ σὺν ἄλλῳ εἶναι ἀναχωροῦσιν εἰς τὸ αὐτῶν ἐκάστη. "Ὅταν δὴ
τοῦτο διὰ χρόνων ποιῇ φεύγουσα τὸ πᾶν καὶ τῇ διακρίσει ἀποστᾶσα καὶ μὴ
πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν βλέπῃ, μέρος γενομένη μονοῦται τε καὶ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ πολυ-
15 πραγμονεῖ καὶ πρὸς μέρος βλέπει καὶ τῷ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅλου χωρισμῷ ἐνός τινος
ἐπιβᾶσα καὶ τὸ ἄλλο πᾶν φυγοῦσα, ἐλθοῦσα καὶ στραφεῖσα εἰς τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ
πληττόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ὄλων καὶ πάντων τοῦ τε ὅλου ἀπέστη, καὶ τὸ καθέκαστον
20 μετὰ περιστάσεως διοικεῖ ἐφαπτομένη ἤδη καὶ θεραπεύουσα τὰ ἔξωθεν καὶ

¹ Cp. V 1, 1, where the question of "What it is that made the souls forget God their Father" is answered by these words: "The beginning of evil was for them recklessness, becoming, the first difference and the will to be of themselves" (τὸ βουλευθῆναι ἑαυτῶν εἶναι).

παροῦσα καὶ δῶσα αὐτοῦ πολὺ εἰς τὸ εἶσω. "὘νθα καὶ συμβαίνει αὐτῇ τὸ λεγόμενον πτερορρηῆσαι ¹ καὶ ἐν δεσμοῖς τοῖς τοῦ σώματος γενέσθαι . . . ἐπιστραφεῖσα δὲ πρὸς νόησιν λύεσθαι τε ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ ἀναβαίνειν, ὅταν ἀρχὴν λάβῃ ἐξ ἀναμνήσεως θεᾶσθαι τὰ ὄντα. "Ἐχει γὰρ αἰεὶ οὐδὲν ἥττον ὑπερέχον τι. 30

Γίγνονται οὖν οἷον ἀμφίβιοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸν τε ἐκεῖ βίον τὸν τε ἐνταῦθα παρὰ μέρος βιοῦσαι, πλεῖον μὲν τὸν ἐκεῖ, αἱ δύνανται πλεόν τῷ νῷ συνεῖναι, τὸν δὲ ἐνθάδε πλεῖον, αἷς τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ φύσει ἢ τύχαις ὑπῆρξεν. 35

P.'s theory about the "providence" exercised by Soul in general and by the particular souls is expounded in a preceding chapter of the same treatise, which is cited below (1376).

**Two kinds
of providence**

1376—P. distinguishes two kinds of "providence": general providence, which works indirectly, by orders, and direct providence, working by contact. The first is the way in which Universal soul, which is transcendent, cares for the cosmos as a whole; the latter is the kind of care of particular bodies taken by particular souls.

a. Enn. IV 8, 2, l. 27-39 Br.:

Διττὴ γὰρ ἐπιμέλεια παντός, τοῦ μὲν καθόλου κελεύσει κοσμοῦσα ἀπράγμονι ἐπιστασία βασιλικῇ, τοῦ δὲ καθέκαστα ἤδη αὐτουργῷ τινι ποιήσει συναφῇ 30 τῇ πρὸς τὸ πραττόμενον τὸ πρᾶττον τοῦ πραττομένου τῆς φύσεως ἀναπιμπλάσσει. Τῆς δὲ θείας ψυχῆς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τὸν οὐρανὸν ἅπαντα διοικεῖν αἰεὶ λεγομένης, ὑπερεχούσης μὲν τῷ κρείττονι, δύναμιν δὲ τὴν ἐσχάτην εἰς τὸ εἶσω πεμπούσης, αἰτίαν μὲν ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἂν ἔτι λέγοιτο ἔχειν τοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ παντός ἐν χεῖρονι 35 πεποιηκέναι, ἢ τε ψυχὴ οὐκ ἀπεστέρηται τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἐξ αἰδίου τοῦτ' ἔχουσα καὶ ἔξουσα αἰεὶ, ὃ μὴ οἷόν τε παρὰ φύσιν αὐτῇ εἶναι· ὅπερ διηνεκῶς αὐτῇ αἰεὶ ὑπάρχει οὐποτε ἀρξάμενον.

**Providence
exercised by
star-souls**

b. Star-souls exercise the same kind of providence as Universal soul.

Ib., l. 39-48 Br.:

Τὰς τε τῶν ἀστέρων ψυχὰς τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ἔχειν λέγων, 40 ὥσπερ τὸ πᾶν — ἐντίθησι γὰρ καὶ τούτων τὰ σώματα εἰς τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς περιφοράς — ἀποσφῶζοι ἂν καὶ τὴν περὶ τούτους πρέπουσαν εὐδαιμονίαν. Δύο γὰρ ὄντων δι' αὐτὴν δυσχεραίνεται ἡ ψυχῆς πρὸς σώματα κοινωνία, ὅτι τε ἐμπόδιον πρὸς τὰς νοήσεις γίγνεται, καὶ ὅτι ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν πίμπλησιν 45 αὐτήν, οὐδέτερον τούτων ἂν γένοιτο ψυχῇ, ἥτις μὴ εἰς τὸ εἶσω ἔδω τοῦ σώματος, μηδὲ τινός ἐστι, μηδὲ ἐκείνου ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο αὐτῆς.

Star-souls are, like the All-soul, ἀπαθεῖς: they have neither desires (ἐπιθυμίαι) nor πάθη. Cp. IV 4, 42, l. 23 ff.:

¹ *Phaedr.* 246c, 248c.

Ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀστροῖς, καθ' ὅσον μὲν μέρη, τὰ πάθη, ἀπαθῆ μέντοι αὐτὰ τῷ τε τὰς προαιρέσεις καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι.

c. Soul (i.e. Universal soul or All-soul) "illuminates darkness" **Soul works**
(i.e. creates the sensible world) κατὰ λόγους, i.e. according to spiritual **κατὰ λόγους**
principles ¹. But this act of creation, again, is an act of nature, all conscious
deliberation and will being excluded.

Enn. IV 3, 10, 1. 10-22 Br.:

10 Ἐκοσμεῖτο δὲ κατὰ λόγον ψυχῆς δυνάμει ἐχούσης ἐν αὐτῇ δι' ὅλης δυνάμει
κατὰ λόγους κοσμεῖν· οἷα καὶ οἱ ἐν σπέρμασι λόγοι πλάττουσι καὶ μορφοῦσι
τὰ ζῶα οἷον μικροὺς τινὰς κόσμους. Ὁ τι γὰρ ἂν ἐφάψηται ψυχῆς, οὕτω
ποιεῖται ὥς ἔχει φύσεως ψυχῆς ἢ οὐσίας· ἡ δὲ ποιεῖ οὐκ ἐπακτῷ γνώμῃ οὐδὲ
15 βουλῇ ἢ σκέψιν ἀναμείνασα· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐπακτὸν
τέχνην ἂν ποιῷ. Τέχνη γὰρ ὑστέρᾳ αὐτῆς καὶ μιμεῖται ἀμυδρὰ καὶ ἀσθενῇ
ποιοῦσα μιμήματα, παίγνια ἅττα καὶ οὐ πολλοῦ ἀξία, μηχαναῖς πολλῶν εἰς
εἰδῶλων φύσιν προσχρωμένη. Ἡ δὲ οὐσίας δυνάμει κυρία σωμάτων εἰς τὸ
20 γενέσθαι τε καὶ οὕτως ἔχειν ὥς αὐτῇ ἄγει, οὐ δυναμένων τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐναν-
τιοῦσθαι τῇ αὐτῆς βουλήσει.

it is
κυρία
σωμάτων

d. Soul, then, is not so much a reasoning power as a never-failing
reasonable power. As φρόνησις it is opposed to φύσις, which does not
possess any intelligence.

Enn. IV 4, 13, 1. 1-8, 17-22 Br.:

„Thinking”
opposed to
„nature”

Ἀλλὰ τί διοίσει τῆς λεγομένης φύσεως ἢ τοιαύτη φρόνησις; Ἡ ὅτι ἡ μὲν
φρόνησις πρῶτον, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἔσχατον· Ἰνδαλμα γὰρ φρονήσεως ἢ φύσις καὶ
ψυχῆς ἔσχατον ὃν ἔσχατον καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐλλαμπόμενον λόγον ἔχει, οἷον εἰ
5 ἐν κηρῷ βαθεῖ δικνοῖτο εἰς ἔσχατον ἐπὶ θάτερα ἐν τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ τύπος, ἐναργοῦς
μὲν ὄντος τοῦ ἄνω, ἔχρους δὲ ἀσθενοῦς ὄντος τοῦ κάτω. Ὅθεν οὐδὲ οἶδε, μόνον
δὲ ποιεῖ. — Νοῦς μὲν οὖν ἔχει, ψυχὴ δὲ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ἐκομίσαστο εἰς αἰεὶ καὶ
τοῦτό ἐστιν αὐτῇ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον αἰεὶ σύνεσις νοούσης· τὸ δὲ ἐξ
20 αὐτῆς ἐμφαντασθὲν εἰς ὕλην φύσις, ἐν ᾗ ἴσταται τὰ ὄντα, ἥ καὶ πρὸ τούτου,
καὶ ἔστιν ἔσχατα ταῦτα τοῦ νοητοῦ· ἥδη γὰρ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν τὰ μιμήματα.

1377—The soul which enters into a body is not necessarily harmed

Direct
providence
may be
exercised
without
harm

¹ λόγοι means for P.: *spiritual principles with regard to creation*. Thus, in V 9, 3, 1. 31 f.: Νοῦς procures λ. for soul. Cp. IV 7, 4-5 (against the Stoic doctrine that soul is a body): the notion of πνεῦμα ἔνουν presupposes a λόγος; V 9, 5, 1. 23 ff. (against the Stoic conception of λ. σπερματικοί): Εἰ δὲ λόγους φήσουσιν ἀρκεῖν, αἰδίους δῆλον· εἰ δὲ αἰδίους καὶ ἀπαθεῖς, ἐν νῷ δεῖ εἶναι καὶ τοιοῦτω καὶ προτέρῳ ἔξωθεν καὶ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς· δυνάμει γὰρ ταῦτα.

by the contact: if it withdraws directly, it does not get entangled with evil.

a. *Enn.* IV 8, 5, l. 24-30 Br.:

Οὕτω τοι καίπερ οὔσα θεῖον καὶ ἐκ τῶν τόπων τῶν ἄνω ἐντὸς γίνεται τοῦ σώματος καὶ θεὸς οὔσα ὁ ὕστερος ῥοπῇ αὐτεξουσίῳ καὶ αἰτίᾳ δυνάμεως καὶ τοῦ 25 μετ' αὐτὴν κοσμήσεως ὥδι ἔρχεται· καὶ μὲν θᾶττον φύγη, οὐδὲν βέβλαπται γνῶσιν κακοῦ προσλαβοῦσα καὶ φύσιν κακίας γνοῦσα τὰς τε δυνάμεις ἀγαθοῦσα αὐτῆς εἰς τὸ φανερόν. 30

b. That indeed soul in itself belongs to the *θεία* or *νοητὴ φύσις*, will be found if one considers a pure soul: here *πάθη* and *ἐπιθυμίας* will appear to be *προσθῆκαι*.

Soul and its
προσθῆκαι

Enn. IV 7, 10, l. 7-16 Br.:

Λάβωμεν δὲ ψυχὴν μὴ τὴν ἐν σώματι ἐπιθυμίας ἀλόγους καὶ θυμοὺς προσλαβοῦσαν καὶ πάθη ἄλλα ἀναδεξαμένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν ταῦτα ἀποτριψαμένην καὶ καθ' ὅσον οἶόν τε μὴ κοινωνοῦσαν τῷ σώματι. Ἦτις καὶ δῆλον ποιεῖ, ὡς προσθῆκαι 10 τὰ κακὰ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ἄλλοθεν, καθηραμένη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐνυπάρχει τὰ ἄριστα, φρόνησις καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ, οἰκεῖα ὄντα. Εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ἡ ψυχὴ, ὅταν ἐφ' ἑαυτὴν ἀνέλθῃ, πῶς οὐ τῆς φύσεως ἐκείνης, οἷαν φαμέν τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ αἰδίου 15 παντὸς εἶναι;

c. The pure soul strips easily the additional qualities due to its incarnation, viz. in the dissolution of the compositum; others may keep them quite a long time.

Enn. IV 7, 14, l. 8-14 Br.:

Εἰ δὲ τὴν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν τριμερῇ οὔσαν τῷ συνθέτῳ λυθήσεσθαι <φήσουσι>, καὶ ἡμεῖς φήσομεν τὰς μὲν καθαρὰς ἀπαλλαττομένας τὸ προσπλασθὲν ἐν τῇ 10 γενέσει ἀφήσειν, τὰς δὲ τοῦτῳ συνέσεσθαι ἐπὶ πλείστον· ἀφειμένον δὲ τὸ χεῖρον οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ἀπολεῖσθαι, ἕως ἂν ᾗ ὅθεν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχήν. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ἀπολεῖται.

Cp. below, nr. 1414.

1378—Both perception and memory are “additions”. For perception is effected by means of the body (soul using the organs of the body as its instruments). And as to *μνήμη*, *νοῦς* being eternal cannot be its subject, for it does not know a succession in time. Soul, then, must be the subject, the body being only an impediment for memory. But by what function?—P. answers: by the *φανταστικόν*. And the *φάντασμα* is a result of perception.

The higher soul, therefore, strips the remembrances of the lower soul (III 3, cc. 25-32).

a. The compositum may be said to be the subject of perception, but in this sense only that soul has the leading part, while the body is the instrument employed by the soul.

Enn. IV 3, 26, l. 1-8 Br.:

**Perception
belongs to
the
compositum**

Εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ συναμφοτερόν ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ταῖς κατ' ἐνέργειαν, δεῖ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοιοῦτον εἶναι — διὸ καὶ κοινὸν λέγεται — οἷον τὸ τρυπᾶν καὶ τὸ ὑφαίνειν, ἵνα κατὰ μὲν τὸν τεχνίτην ἢ ψυχὴ ᾗ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι, κατὰ
5 δὲ τὸ ὄργανον τὸ σῶμα, τοῦ μὲν σώματος πάσχοντος καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς παραδεχομένης τὴν τύπωσιν τὴν τοῦ σώματος, ἢ τὴν διὰ τοῦ σώματος, ἢ τὴν κρίσιν, ἣν ἐποιήσατο ἐκ τοῦ παθήματος τοῦ σώματος. —

See further below, nr. 1415 f.

b. Memory, however, cannot be in this sense a κοινὸν ἔργον, for the body appears to be a cause of oblivion, not of memory.

Ib., l. 50-56:

**Memory
belongs to
soul**

50 Τὸ δὲ τῆς μνήμης καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐμπόδιον ἔχει· ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν προστιθεμένων τινῶν λήθῃ, ἐν δ' ἀφαιρέσει καὶ καθάρσει ἀνακύπτει πολλάκις ἡ μνήμη. Μονῆς δὲ οὔσης αὐτῆς ἀνάγκη τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν κινουμένην καὶ ῥέουσιν λήθῃς αἰτίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ μνήμης εἶναι· διὸ καὶ ὁ τῆς λήθῃς ποταμὸς οὕτως ἂν ὑπονοοῖτο.
55 Ψυχῆς μὲν δὴ ἔστω τὸ πάθημα τοῦτο.

c. But by what faculty of soul do we remember?—Not by the same as that by which we perceive.

Enn. IV 3, 27, l. 23-25; 29, l. 19-32 Br.:

**By what
faculty of
soul do we
remember?**

Ἡ δὲ δὴ μόνη γενομένη τί μνημονεύσει; Ἡ πρότερον σκεπτέον τίνι δυνάμει
25 ψυχῆς τὸ μνημονεύειν παραγίνεται.

(29.) Ἄλλὰ πάλιν αὖ, εἰ ἄλλο ἑκάτερον δεήσει εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλο μνημονεύσει ὧν
20 ἢ αἰσθησις ἦσθετο πρότερον, ἀκαεῖνο δεῖ αἰσθέσθαι οὐπερ μελλήσει μνημο-
νεύειν. Ἡ οὐδὲν κωλύσει τῷ μνημονεύσοντι τὸ αἰσθημα φάντασμα εἶναι, καὶ
τῷ φανταστικῷ ἄλλω ὄντι τὴν μνήμην καὶ κατοχὴν ὑπάρχειν· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν,
25 εἰς δὲ λήγει ἢ αἰσθησις, καὶ μηκέτι οὔσης τούτῳ πάρεστι τὸ ὄραμα. Εἰ οὖν παρὰ
τούτῳ τοῦ ἀπόντος ἤδη ἢ φαντασία, μνημονεύει ἤδη, καὶ ἐπ' ὀλίγον παρῇ.
Ἦ δὲ εἰ μὲν ἐπ' ὀλίγον παραμένοι, ὀλίγη ἡ μνήμη, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον μνημονικοὶ
30 τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης οὔσης ἰσχυροτέρας, ὥς μὴ ῥαδίως τρεπομένης ἀφεῖσθαι
ἀποσεισθεῖσαν τὴν μνήμην. Τοῦ φανταστικοῦ ἄρα ἡ μνήμη, καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν
τῶν τοιούτων ἔσται.

Life of the
soul in
eternity

1379—As soon as it is in the intelligible world, the soul has lost its remembrance of things here and lives in eternity.

a. *Enn.* IV 4, 1, l. 1-6, 10-17 Br.:

Τί οὖν ἐρεῖ, καὶ τίνων τὴν μνήμην ἔξει ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἐκείνης γενομένη; Ἡ ἀκόλουθον εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνα θεωρεῖν καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἐνεργεῖν, ἐν οἷς ἔστιν, ἢ μὴδὲ ἐκεῖ εἶναι. Τῶν οὖν ἐνταῦθα οὐδέν, οἷον ὅτι ἐφιλοσόφησε, καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι ἐνταῦθα οὐσα ἐθεῶτο τὰ ἐκεῖ. — Οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καθαρῶς 5 ὄντα μνήμην ἔχειν τῶν τῇδὲ ποτε αὐτῷ τινι γεγεννημένων. Εἰ δὲ καί, ὥσπερ 10 δοκεῖ, ἄχρονος πᾶσα ἡ νόησις, ἐν αἰῶνι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ ὄντων τῶν ἐκεῖ, ἀδύνατον μνήμην εἶναι ἐκεῖ οὐχ ὅτι τῶν ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ὁτουοῦν. Ἄλλ' ἔστιν ἕκαστον παρόν.

15

b. Will the soul in its life yonder remain conscious of its own individuality?

Does the
soul yonder
remain
conscious
of itself?

Enn. IV 4, 2, l. 1-14, 30-32 Br.:

Ἄλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν αὐτῇ. Ἐαυτοῦ δὲ πῶς; Ἡ οὐδὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἔξει τὴν μνήμην, οὐδ' ὅτι αὐτὸς ὁ θεωρῶν, οἷον Σωκράτης, ἢ ὅτι νοῦς ἢ ψυχὴ. Πρὸς δὲ ταῦτά τις ἀναμνησθήτω, ὥς ὅταν καὶ ἐνταῦθα θεωρῇ καὶ μάλιστα ἐναργῶς, οὐκ ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τότε τῇ νοήσει, ἀλλ' ἔχει μὲν ἑαυτόν, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια 5 πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, κἀκεῖνο γίνεται οἷον ὕλην ἑαυτὸν παρασχών, εἰδοποιούμενος δὲ κατὰ τὸ ὁρώμενον καὶ δυνάμει ὦν τότε αὐτός. Τότε οὖν αὐτός ἐστιν ἐνεργεία, ὅταν μὴδὲν νοῇ· ἢ, εἰ μὲν αὐτός, κενός ἐστι παντός. Εἰ δὲ ἐστιν αὐτός τοιοῦτος οἷος πάντα εἶναι, ὅταν αὐτὸν νοῇ, πάντα ὁμοῦ νοεῖ. ὥστε 10 τῇ μὲν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιβολῇ καὶ ἐνεργεία ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν τὰ πάντα ἐμπεριεχόμενα ἔχει, τῇ δὲ πρὸς τὰ πάντα ἐμπεριεχόμενον ἑαυτόν. — Οὕτως οὖν ἔχουσα οὐκ ἂν μεταβάλλοι, ἀλλὰ ἔχοι ἂν ἀτρέπτως πρὸς νόησιν ὁμοῦ 30 ἔχουσα τὴν συναίσθησιν αὐτῆς, ὥς ἐν ἅμα τῷ νοητῷ ταῦτόν γενομένη.

1380—The individual existence of soul in the intelligible world is explained by P.'s theory of the plurality in Noûs (above, 1374). In answer to the question concerning what is called immortality of the soul it is clearly expressed in the following passage.

Individual
existence of
the soul
yonder

Enn. IV 3, 5, l. 1-14 Br.:

Ἄλλὰ πῶς ἔτι ἡ μὲν σή, ἡ δὲ τοῦδε, ἡ δὲ ἄλλου ἔσται; ἄρ' οὖν τοῦδε μὲν κατὰ τὸ κάτω, οὐ τοῦδε δέ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνου κατὰ τὸ ἄνω; Ἄλλ' οὕτως γε Σωκράτης μὲν ἔσται ὅταν ἐν σώματι ᾗ ἡ Σωκράτους ψυχὴ· ἀπολείπεται δέ, ὅταν μάλιστα γένηται ἐν τῷ ἀρίστῳ. Ἡ ἀπολείπεται οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων· ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖ 5 οἱ νόες οὐκ ἀπολοῦνται, ὅτι μὴ εἰσι σωματικῶς μεμερισμένοι, [εἰς ἓν] ἀλλὰ

μένει ἕκαστον ἐν ἑτερότητι ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸ δ' ἔστιν εἶναι. Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ <αἱ> ψυχαὶ ἐφεξῆς καθ' ἕκαστον νοῦν ἐξηρητημέναι, λόγοι νῶν οὔσαι καὶ ἐξειλιγμέναι
 10 μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκεῖνοι, οἷον πολὺ ἐξ ὀλίγου γενόμεναι, συναφεῖς τῷ ὀλίγῳ οὔσαι ἀμερεστέρφ' ἐκείνων ἐκάστῳ μερίζεσθαι ἤδη θελήσασαι καὶ οὐ δυνάμεναι εἰς πᾶν μερισμοῦ ἰέναι τὸ ταυτὸν καὶ ἕτερον σφύζουσαι μένει τε ἐκάστη ἓν, καὶ ὁμοῦ ἐν πᾶσαι.

1381—In V 1 P. leads the way of ascent to “the Father” (above, **1375c**, n. 1) by the self-reflection of the soul.

a. *Enn.* V 1, 2:

Self-reflection
of the soul

Ἐνθυμείσθω τοίνυν πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο πᾶσα ψυχῇ, ὥς αὐτὴ μὲν ζῶα ἐποίησε
 πάντα ἐμπνεύσασα αὐτοῖς ζωὴν, ἃ τε γῇ τρέφει ἃ τε θάλασσα ἃ τε ἐν ἀέρι ἃ τε
 ἐν οὐρανῷ ἄστρα θεῖα, αὐτὴ δὲ ἥλιον, αὐτὴ δὲ τὸν μέγαν τοῦτον οὐρανόν,
 5 καὶ αὐτὴ ἐκόσμησεν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἐν τάξει περιάγει φύσις οὔσα ἑτέρα ὧν κοσμεῖ
 καὶ ὧν κινεῖ καὶ ἃ ζῆν ποιεῖ· καὶ τούτων ἀνάγκη εἶναι τιμιωτέραν, γιγνομένων
 <μὲν> τούτων καὶ φθειρομένων, ὅταν αὐτὰ ψυχῇ ἀπολείπη ἢ χορηγῇ τὸ ζῆν,
 αὐτὴ δὲ οὔσα ἀεὶ τῷ μὴ ἀπολείπειν ἑαυτήν. Τίς δὲ <ὁ> τρόπος τῆς χορηγίας
 10 τοῦ ζῆν ἐν τε τῷ σύμπαντι ἐν τε τοῖς ἐκάστοις, ὧδε λογιζέσθω. Σκοπεῖσθω δὴ
 τὴν μεγάλην ψυχὴν ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ οὐ σμικρὰ ἀξία τοῦ σκοπεῖν γενομένη ἀπαλλα-
 γεῖσα ἀπάτης καὶ τῶν γεγοητευκότων τὰς ἄλλας ἡσύχῳ τῇ καταστάσει.
 15 Ἦσυχον δὲ αὐτῇ ἔστω μὴ μόνον τὸ περικείμενον σῶμα καὶ ὁ τοῦ σώματος
 κλύδων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶν τὸ περιέχον· ἡσυχος μὲν γῇ, ἡσυχος δὲ θάλασσα καὶ
 ἀήρ καὶ αὐτὸς οὐρανὸς ἀμείνων. Νοεῖτω δὲ πάντοθεν εἰς αὐτὸν ἐστῶτα ψυχὴν
 ἑξῶθεν οἷον εἰσρέουσιν καὶ εἰσχυθεῖσαν καὶ πάντοθεν εἰσιούσαν καὶ εἰσλάμπου-
 20 σαν· οἷον σκοτεινὸν νέφος ἡλίου βολαὶ φωτίσασαι λάμπειν ποιοῦσι χρυσοειδῇ
 ὄψιν διδοῦσαι, οὕτω τοι καὶ ψυχῇ ἐλθοῦσα εἰς σῶμα οὐρανοῦ ἔδωκε μὲν ζωὴν,
 ἔδωκε δὲ ἀθανασίαν, ἡγείρε δὲ κείμενον. Ὅ δὲ κινήθεις κίνησιν ἀττίδιον ὑπὸ
 ψυχῆς ἐμφρόνως ἀγούσης ζῶον εὐδαιμον ἐγένετο, ἔσχε τε ἀξίαν οὐρανὸς ψυχῆς
 25 εἰσοικισθείσης ὧν πρὸ ψυχῆς σῶμα νεκρόν, γῇ καὶ ὕδωρ, μᾶλλον δὲ σκότος
 ὕλης καὶ μὴ ὄν καὶ “ὁ στυγέουσιν οἱ θεοί”¹, φησί τις. Γένοιτο δ' ἂν φανερωτέρα
 αὐτῆς καὶ ἐναργεστέρα ἢ δύναμις καὶ ἡ φύσις, εἴ τις ἐνταῦθα διανοηθεῖη,
 30 ὅπως περιέχει καὶ ἄγει ταῖς αὐτῆς βουλήσεσι τὸν οὐρανόν². Παντὶ μὲν γὰρ τῷ
 μεγέθει τούτῳ, ὅσος ἐστίν, ἔδωκεν ἑαυτήν καὶ πᾶν διάστημα καὶ μέγα καὶ
 μικρὸν ἐψύχωται ἄλλου μὲν ἄλλῃ κειμένου τοῦ σώματος καὶ τοῦ μὲν ὠδί, τοῦ
 δὲ ὠδί ὄντος, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐξ ἐναντίας, τῶν δὲ ἄλλῃ ἀπάρτησιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων
 35 ἐχόντων. Ἄλλ' οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ οὕτως, οὐδὲ μέρει ἑαυτῆς ἐκάστῳ κατακερματισθεῖσα

¹ *Ilias* 21, 165.

² The subject is dealt with in *Enn.* II 2.

μορίῳ [ψυχῆς] ζῆν ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ πάντα ζῆ τῇ ὅλῃ, καὶ πάρεστι πᾶσα πανταχοῦ τῷ γεννήσαντι πατρὶ ¹ ὁμοιουμένη καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐν καὶ κατὰ τὸ πάντῃ. Καὶ πολὺς ὢν ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἄλλος ἄλλη ἐν ἐστὶ τῇ ταύτης δυνάμει καὶ θεὸς ἐστὶ διὰ ταύτην ὁ κόσμος ὅδε. "Ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἥλιος θεός, ὅτι ἔμψυχος, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα, καὶ ⁴⁰ ἡμεῖς, εἴπερ τι, διὰ τοῦτο. "νέκυες γὰρ κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι." ² Τὴν δὲ θεοῖς ³ αἰτίαν τοῦ θεοῖς εἶναι ἀνάγκη πρεσβυτέραν [θεὸν] αὐτῶν εἶναι. ὁμοειδὴς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα, καὶ ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν προσελθόντων σκοπῆς λαβῶν κεκαθαρ- ⁴⁵ μένην, εὐρήσεις τὸ αὐτὸ τίμιον, ὃ ἦν ψυχὴ, καὶ τιμιώτερον παντὸς τοῦ δ' ἂν σωματικὸν ἦ. Γῆ γὰρ πάντα· καὶ πῦρ δὲ ἦ, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ καῖον αὐτοῦ; Καὶ ὅσα ἐκ τούτων σύνθετα καὶ ὕδωρ αὐτοῖς προσθῆς καὶ ἀέρα. Εἰ δ' ὅτι ἔμψυχον διωκτὸν ἔσται, τί παρεῖς τις ἑαυτὸν ἄλλον διώκει; Τὴν δὲ ἐν ἄλλῃ ψυχὴν ⁵⁰ ἀγάμενος σεαυτὸν ἄγασαι.

It is an
image of
Noûs

b. Ib., c. 3:

Οὕτω δὲ τίμιον καὶ θείου ὄντος χρήματος τῆς ψυχῆς, πιστεύσας ἤδη τῷ τοιούτῳ θεὸν μετιέναι μετὰ τοιαύτης αἰτίας ἀνάβαινε πρὸς ἐκεῖνον· πάντως που οὐ πόρρω ἐπιβαλεῖς· οὐδὲ πολλὰ τὰ μεταξύ. Λάμβανε τοίνυν τοῦ θείου τούτου θειώτερον τὸ ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄνω γειτόνημα, μεθ' ὃ καὶ ἀφ' οὗ ἡ ψυχὴ ⁵ καίπερ γὰρ οὕσα χρῆμα οἷον ἔδειξεν ὁ λόγος, εἰκὼν τίς ἐστὶ νοῦ· οἷον λόγος ὁ ἐν προφορᾷ λόγου τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ, οὕτω τοι καὶ αὐτὴ λόγος νοῦ καὶ ἡ πᾶσα ἐνέργεια καθ' ἣν προῖεται ζωὴν εἰς ἄλλον ὑπόστασιν ⁴. Οἷον πυρὸς τὸ μὲν ἡ συνοῦσα θερμότης, ἡ δὲ ἦν παρέχει. Δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν ἐκεῖ οὐκ ἐκρέουσας, ἀλλὰ μένουσας ¹⁰ μὲν τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ὑφισταμένην ⁵. Οὕσα οὖν ἀπὸ νοῦ νοερά ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐν λογισμοῖς ὁ νοῦς αὐτῆς καὶ ἡ τελείωσις ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάλιν οἷον πατρὸς ἐκθρέψαντος, ὃν οὐ τέλειον ὡς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐγέννησεν. "Ἡ τε οὖν ὑπόστασις αὐτῇ ἀπὸ νοῦ ὃ τε ἐνεργεῖα λόγος νοῦ αὐτῇ ὁρῳμένου. "Ὅταν γὰρ ἐνίδῃ εἰς ¹⁵ νοῦν, ἐνδοθεν ἔχει καὶ οἰκεῖα αὐτῇ νοεῖ καὶ ἐνεργεῖ. Καὶ ταύτας μόνας δεῖ λέγειν ἐνεργείας ψυχῆς, ὅσα νοερώς καὶ ὅσα οἰκοθεν· τὰ δὲ χεῖρω ἄλλοθεν καὶ πάθῃ ψυχῆς τῆς τοιαύτης. Νοῦς οὖν ἐπὶ μᾶλλον θειότεραν ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ πατὴρ εἶναι ²⁰ καὶ τῷ παρεῖναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ μεταξύ ἢ τὸ ἑτέροις εἶναι, ὡς ἐφεξῆς μέντοι καὶ ὡς τὸ δεχόμενον, τὸ δὲ ὡς εἶδος ⁶. καλὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ νοῦ ὕλη νοοειδῆς οὕσα καὶ

¹ Sc. the Noûs.

² Heracl. fr. 96 Diels.

³ Sc. the stars.

⁴ Soul is "the λόγος of Noûs and its whole activity, according to which it sends forth life to make subsist other beings". Cp. 1376c, n. 1, on the sense of λόγος.

⁵ Part of Soul stays with Noûs, part of it comes to an existence of its own. Cp. above, 1373.

⁶ With regard to Noûs soul is "receptive", for it receives the "forms" from Noûs. Thus, the relation of Noûs to ψυχὴ is that of εἶδος to ὕλη, to speak in Aristo-

ἀπλῇ, οἷον δὴ ὁ νοῦς. Καὶ αὐτῷ μὲν τούτῳ δῆλον, ὅτι κρείττων ψυχῆς τοιαῦδε
25 οὕσης.

4—NOÛS OR THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD

1382—Noûs is a light springing from the original Light.

**Light from
Light**

a. *Enn.* V 3, 12, 1. 40-51 Br.:

40 Ἡ κατὰ λόγον θησόμεθα τὴν μὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ οἷον ῥυεῖσαν ἐνέργειαν ὡς ἀπὸ
ἡλίου <φῶς>. Φῶς τι οὖν θησόμεθα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐπ'
ἄκρῳ τῷ νοητῷ ἐστηκότα βασιλεύειν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἐξώσαντα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ
ἐκφανέν. Ἡ ἄλλο φῶς πρὸ φωτὸς ποιήσομεν, ἐπιλάμπειν δὲ αἰεὶ μένον ἐπὶ
45 τοῦ νοητοῦ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀποτετέμνεται τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδ' αὖ ταῦτόν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ
τοιοῦτον οἷον μὴ οὐσία εἶναι, οὐδ' αὖ οἷον τυφλὸν εἶναι· ἀλλ' ὁρῶν καὶ γινώσκον
ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρῶτον γινώσκον. Τὸ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ, οὕτως καὶ ἐπέκεινα
γνώσεως, οὐδὲν δεόμενον ὥσπερ οὐδενός, οὕτως οὐδὲ τοῦ γινώσκειν· ἀλλ'
50 ἔστιν ἐν δευτέρᾳ φύσει τὸ γινώσκειν.

b. Noûs is not the Good itself, but the direct image of it.

**A direct
image of the
Good**

Enn. V 6, 4, 1. 6 f.:

Ἔτι ἄλλο νοῦς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἀγαθοειδὴς γὰρ τῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν νοεῖν.

Thus, in V 1, 6, 1. 14 f. Noûs is called ἀγαλμα τὸ πρῶτον ἐκφανέν. Cp. also **1370b**.

c. The relation of the Good to Noûs is also explained in the following passage.

Enn. VI 7, 15, 1. 10-24 Br.:

**Multiplicity
begins in
Noûs**

10 Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, ὃ δὲ ἀγαθός ἐστιν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖν τὸ ζῆν ἔχων·
θεωρεῖ δὲ ἀγαθοειδῆ ὄντα τὰ θεωρούμενα καὶ αὐτά, ἃ ἐκτήσατο, ὅτε ἐθεώρει
τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν. Ἦλθε δὲ εἰς αὐτὸν οὐχ ὡς ἐκεῖ ἦν, ἀλλ' ὡς αὐτὸς ἔσχεν.
15 Ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου ἐν τούτῳ καὶ οὗτος ὁ ποιήσας ταῦτα ἐξ ἐκείνου.
Οὐ γὰρ ἦν θέμις βλέποντα εἰς ἐκείνον μηδὲν νοεῖν οὐδ' αὖ τὰ ἐν ἐκείνῳ· οὐ γὰρ
ἂν αὐτὸς ἐγέννα. Δύναμιν οὖν εἰς τὸ γεννᾶν εἶχε παρ' ἐκείνου καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ
20 πληροῦσθαι γεννημάτων διδόντος ἐκείνου ἃ μὴ εἶχεν αὐτός. Ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐνός
αὐτοῦ πολλὰ τούτῳ· ἦν γὰρ ἐκομίζετο δύναμιν ἀδυνατῶν ἔχειν συνέθραυε καὶ
πολλὰ ἐποίησε τὴν μίαν, ἵν' οὕτω δύναιτο κατὰ μέρος φέρειν. Ὅτι οὖν ἐγέννα,
ἀγαθοῦ ἐκ δυνάμεως ἦν καὶ ἀγαθοειδὲς ἦν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς ἐξ ἀγαθοειδῶν,
ἀγαθὸν ποικίλον.

telian terms. Yet, the tendency of the passage is more Platonic: what the author means is not that soul is potentially noûs, but that soul receives "forms" from noûs, by a downward motion going from noûs to soul.

The second
God

d. Noûs, therefore, is a God, but not the highest God.

Enn. V 5, 3, l. 1-21 Br.:

Μία τοίνυν φύσις αὕτη ἡμῖν [νοῦς], τὰ ὄντα πάντα [ἡ ἀλήθεια]. εἰ δέ, θεός τις μέγας· μᾶλλον δὲ οὐ τίς, ἀλλὰ πᾶς ἀξιοῖ ταῦτα εἶναι. Καὶ θεὸς αὕτη ἡ φύσις, καὶ θεὸς δεύτερος προφαίνων ἑαυτὸν πρὶν ὁρᾶν ἐκείνον· ὁ δὲ ὑπερ-κάθηται καὶ ὑπερίδρυται ἐπὶ καλῆς οὕτως οἶον κρηπίδος, ἥ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐξήρτηται. 5 "Ἐδει γὰρ ἐκείνον βαίνοντα μὴ ἐπ' ἀψύχου τινὸς μηδ' αὖ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς εὐθὺς βεβη-κέναι, ἀλλ' εἶναι αὐτῷ κάλλος ἀμήχανον πρὸ αὐτοῦ προϊόν, οἶον πρὸ μεγάλου βασιλέως πρόεισι μὲν πρῶτα ἐν ταῖς προόδοις τὰ ἐλάττω, αἶε δὲ τὰ μείζω καὶ 10 τὰ σεμνότερα ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὰ περὶ βασιλέα ἤδη μᾶλλον βασιλικώτερα, εἴτα τὰ μετ' αὐτὸν τίμια· ἐφ' ἅπασιν δὲ τούτοις βασιλεὺς προφαίνεται ἐξαίφνης αὐτὸς ὁ μέγας, οἱ δ' εὐχονται καὶ προσκυνοῦσιν, ὅσοι μὴ προαπῆλθον ἀρκεσθέντες τοῖς πρὸ τοῦ βασιλέως ὀφθεῖσιν. Ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἄλλος, οἱ τε πρὸ 15 αὐτοῦ προϊόντες ἄλλοι αὐτοῦ· ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖ βασιλεὺς οὐκ ἄλλοτρίων ἄρχων, ἀλλ' ἔχων τὴν δικαιοτάτην καὶ φύσει ἀρχὴν καὶ τὴν ἀληθῆ βασιλείαν, ἅτε τῆς ἀληθείας βασιλεὺς καὶ ὢν κατὰ φύσιν κύριος τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀθρόου γεννήματος καὶ θείου συντάγματος, βασιλεὺς βασιλέων καὶ πατὴρ δικαιοτέρον ἢ κληθεὶς θεῶν. 20

For the notion of a δεύτερος θεός cp. Philo 1301b, 1305a b, 1306b, d; Plut 1321; Albinus 1327b; Apuleius 1331; Poimandres 1340; Numenius 1349.

Eternal spirit
contains
all eternal
being

1383—Noûs is eternal and contains all spiritual being within itself.

a. *Enn.* V I, 4, l. 10-29 Br.:

Πάντα γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ ἀθάνατα περιέχει, νοῦν πάντα, θεὸν πάντα, ψυχὴν 10 πᾶσαν, ἐστῶτα αἶε. Τί γὰρ ζητεῖ μεταβάλλειν εὖ ἔχων; Ποῖ δὲ μετελθεῖν πάντα παρ' αὐτῷ ἔχων; Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ αὖξιν ζητεῖ τελειότατος ὢν¹. Διὸ καὶ τὰ παρ' αὐτῷ πάντα τέλεια, ἵνα πάντῃ ἢ τέλειος οὐδὲν ἔχων ὃ τι μὴ τοιοῦτον, 15 οὐδὲν <δ> ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ ὃ μὴ νοεῖ· νοεῖ δὲ οὐ ζητῶν, ἀλλ' ἔχων². Καὶ τὸ μακάριον αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐπίκρητον, ἀλλ' ἐν αἰῶνι πάντα, καὶ ὁ ὄντως αἰὼν, ὃν μιμεῖται χρόνος περιθέων ψυχὴν τὰ μὲν παριείς, τοῖς δὲ ἐπιβάλλων. Καὶ γὰρ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα αὖ περὶ ψυχὴν· ποτὲ γὰρ Σωκράτης, ποτὲ δὲ ἵππος, ἐν τι αἶε τῶν 20 ὄντων· ὁ δὲ νοῦς πάντα. Ἐχει οὖν ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα ἐστῶτα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ ἔστι μόνον, καὶ τὸ ἔστιν αἶε, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ τὸ μέλλον· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τότε· οὐδὲ τὸ παρελθυθός· οὐ γάρ τι ἐκεῖ παρελήλυθεν, ἀλλ' ἐνέστηκεν αἶε ἅτε τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα οἶον ἀγαπῶντα ἑαυτὰ οὕτως ἔχοντα. Ἐκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν νοῦς καὶ ὃν 25 ἔστι καὶ τὸ σύμπαν πᾶς νοῦς καὶ πᾶν ὄν³, ὁ μὲν νοῦς κατὰ τὸ νοεῖν ὑφιστάς

¹ These lines remind us strongly of Parm. fr. 8 (above, nr. 83) l. 6 f. and 26 ff.

² I.e.: Noûs is not discursive thinking, but *intuitive* thinking, since it possesses its object within itself. Cp. nr. 1385, l. 28 ff.

³ Cp. again Parm. fr. 8, l. 34 ff.

τὸ ὄν, τὸ δὲ ὄν τῷ νοεῖσθαι τῷ νῶ διδόν τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ εἶναι· τοῦ δὲ νοεῖν αἵτιον ἄλλο, ὃ καὶ τῷ ὄντι.

b. Cp. *Enn.* V 4, 2, l. 46-51 Br.:

Noûs is
identical with
its object

Οὐ γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων ὁ νοῦς, ὥσπερ ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν αἰσθητῶν προόντων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς <ὁ> νοῦς τὰ πράγματα, εἴπερ μὴ εἶδη αὐτῶν κομίζεται. Πόθεν γάρ; 'Αλλ' ἐνταῦθα μετὰ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ταῦτόν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐν· καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη
50 δὲ ὅλη τῶν ἀνευ ὕλης τὰ πράγματα.

c. Noûs in the primary sense is ἐνέργεια and therefore being. Why Noûs = the νοητόν

Enn. V 3, 5, l. 29-48 Br.:

'Αλλ' εἰ ἡ νόησις καὶ τὸ νοητόν ἐν, πῶς διὰ τοῦτο τὸ νοοῦν νοήσει ἑαυτό;
30 'Η μὲν γὰρ νόησις οἶον περιέξει τὸ νοητόν, ἢ ταῦτόν τῷ νοητῷ ἔσται, οὐπω δὲ ὁ νοῦς δῆλος ἑαυτὸν νοῶν. — 'Αλλ' εἰ ἡ νόησις καὶ τὸ νοητόν ταῦτόν — ἐνέργεια γάρ τις τὸ νοητόν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ δυνάμεις οὐδὲ γε ζωῆς χωρὶς οὐδ' αὖ ἐπακτόν τὸ ζῆν
35 οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν ἄλλω ὄντι, οἶον λίθω ἢ ἀψύχῳ τινί, καὶ οὐσία ἡ πρώτη τὸ νοητόν· εἰ οὖν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ πρώτη ἐνέργεια καὶ καλλίστη δὴ νόησις ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐσιώδης νόησις· καὶ γὰρ ἀληθεστάτη νόησις δὲ τοιαύτη καὶ πρώτη οὕσα καὶ πρώτως νοῦς ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς οὗτος δυνάμει οὐδ' ἕτερος μὲν αὐτός, ἢ δὲ νόησις
40 ἄλλο· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πάλιν τὸ οὐσιώδες αὐτοῦ δυνάμει. Εἰ οὖν ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἐνέργεια, ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἂν εἴη· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ νοητόν· ἐν <ἄρα> ἅμα πάντα ἔσται, νοῦς, νόησις, τὸ νοητόν. Εἰ οὖν ἡ νόησις αὐτοῦ τὸ νοητόν, τὸ δὲ νοητόν αὐτός, αὐτὸς ἄρα ἑαυτὸν νοήσει·
45 νοήσει γὰρ τῇ νοήσει, ὅπερ ἦν αὐτός, καὶ νοήσει τὸ νοητόν, ὅπερ ἦν αὐτός. Καθ' ἑκάτερον ἄρα ἑαυτὸν νοήσει, καθ' ὃ τι καὶ ἡ νόησις αὐτὸς ἦν, καὶ καθ' ὃ τι τὸ νοητόν αὐτός, ὅπερ ἐνόει τῇ νοήσει, ὃ ἦν αὐτός.

d. Primary thinking must contain its object within itself.

Noûs =
primary
thinking

Enn. V 6, 1, l. 5-14 Br.:

5 Μᾶλλον οὖν νοεῖ, ὅτι ἔχει, καὶ πρώτως νοεῖ, ὅτι τὸ νοοῦν δεῖ ἐν καὶ δύο εἶναι. Εἴτε γὰρ μὴ ἐν, ἄλλο τὸ νοοῦν, ἄλλο τὸ νοούμενον ἔσται — οὐκ ἂν οὖν πρώτως νοοῦν εἴη, ὅτι ἄλλου τὴν νόησιν λαμβάνον οὐ τὸ πρώτως νοοῦν ἔσται,
10 ὅτι ὁ νοεῖ οὐκ ἔχει ὡς αὐτοῦ, ὥστε οὐδ' αὐτό· ἢ εἰ ἔχει ὡς αὐτό, ἵνα κυρίως νοῇ, τὰ δύο ἐν ἔσται· δεῖ ἄρα ἐν εἶναι ἄμφω — εἴτε ἐν μὲν, μὴ δύο δὲ αὖ ἔσται, ὃ τι νοήσει οὐχ ἔξει· ὥστε οὐδὲ νοοῦν ἔσται. Ἀπλοῦν ἄρα καὶ οὐχ ἀπλοῦν δεῖ εἶναι.

1384—a. On the other hand: "being" is *living* being, and therefore is thinking. „Being” is thinking

Enn. V 4, 2, l. 44-46 Br.:

Τὸ γὰρ ὄν οὐ νεκρὸν οὐδὲ οὐ ζωὴ οὐδὲ οὐ νοοῦν· νοῦς δὴ καὶ ὄν ταῦτόν.

b. Noûs is τὰ πρῶτα, i.e. Noûs is the intelligible universe: "everything is together" (speaking with Anaxagoras) within Noûs, as its eternal object.

Eternal
Being is
contained
in Noûs

Enn. V 9, 7, l. 8-17 Br.:

Ὁ νοῦς . . . ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τὰ πρῶτα, συνὼν αὐτῷ αἰεὶ καὶ ἐνέργεια ὑπάρχων καὶ οὐκ ἐπιβάλλων ὥς οὐκ ἔχων ἢ ἐπικτώμενος ἢ διεξοδεύων ¹ οὐ προκεχει- 10
ρισμένα· ψυχῆς γὰρ ταῦτα πάθη· ἀλλ' ἐστήκεν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁμοῦ πάντα ὧν ²,
οὐ νοήσας, ἔν' ὑποστήσῃ ἑκαστα. Οὐ γάρ, ὅτε ἐνόησε θεόν, θεὸς ἐγένετο, οὐδέ,
ὅτε ἐνόησε κίνησιν, κίνησις ἐγένετο. "Ὅθεν καὶ τὸ λέγειν νοήσεις τὰ εἶδη, εἰ
οὕτω λέγεται, ὥς, ἐπειδὴ ἐνόησε, τότε ἐγένετο ἢ ἔστι τόδε, οὐκ ὁρθῶς. Ταύτης 15
γὰρ τῆς νοήσεως πρότερον δεῖ τὸ νοούμενον εἶναι.

In this passage the author declares with a certain emphasis that the intelligible "things" are *not produced* by Noûs, as if they did not exist before being thought. Noûs *contains* the νοητά as its eternal object and in this sense the Ideas are the object of the divine Mind which is Noûs; but they are not just "thoughts" in the sense of conceptions or "ideas" that did not exist before being conceived. As will be confirmed in our next nrs., *P. maintains fairly emphatically the priority of being to thinking* (cp. 1385a, the beginning, and 1386b).

c. Intelligible being, therefore, must be contained in Noûs.

Enn. V 5, 2, l. 1-12 Br.:

Οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ οὔτε ἔξω τὰ νοητὰ ζητεῖν, οὔτε τύπους ἐν τῷ νῷ τῶν ὄντων λέγειν εἶναι, οὔτε τῆς ἀληθείας ἀποστεροῦντας αὐτὸν ἀγνωσίαν τε τῶν νοητῶν ποιεῖν καὶ ἀνυπαρξίαν καὶ ἔτι αὐτὸν τὸν νοῦν ἀναιρεῖν· ἀλλ' εἶπερ καὶ γινώσκιν δεῖ καὶ ἀλήθειαν εἰσάγειν καὶ τὰ ὄντα τηρεῖν καὶ γινώσκιν τοῦ τί ἑκαστόν ἐστιν, 5
ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ ποῖόν τι ἑκαστον, ἅτε εἰδωλον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔχνος ἴσχοντας, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὰ ἔχοντας καὶ συνόντας καὶ συγκραθέντας αὐτοῖς, τῷ ἀληθινῷ νῷ δοτέον τὰ πάντα. Οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ εἰδείη, καὶ ἀληθινῶς εἰδείη, καὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἐπιλάθοιτο οὐδ' ἂν περιέλθοι ζητῶν, καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἔδρα ἔσται τοῖς οὖσι καὶ 10
ζήσεται καὶ νοήσει.

1385—The identification of Noûs and being.

a. Thinking is the "act" of being and, therefore, can be identified with it.

Thinking
is the
ἐνέργεια
of being

Enn. V 9, 8, l. 8-17 Br.:

Εἰ μὲν οὖν προεπενοεῖτο ὁ νοῦς πρότερος τοῦ ὄντος, ἔδει τὸν νοῦν λέγειν

¹ διεξοδεύω means in the technical language of Carneades (above, nr. 1116b) the first operation of controlling a πιθανὴ φαντασία.

² The expression "ὁμοῦ πάντα" is probably a reminiscence of Anaxagoras, fr. 1 (above, nr. 124a).

10 ἐνεργήσαντα καὶ νοήσαντα ἀποτελέσαι καὶ γεννῆσαι τὰ ὄντα· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὄν
τοῦ νοῦ προεπινοεῖν ἀνάγκη, ἐγκεισθαι δεῖ τίθεσθαι ἐν τῷ νοοῦντι τὰ ὄντα, τὴν
δὲ ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν νόησιν ἐπὶ τοῖς οὖσιν, οἷον ἐπὶ πυρὶ ἥδη τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς
ἐνέργειαν, ἢν' ἐνόντα τὸν νοῦν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ἔχῃ ἐνέργειαν αὐτῶν. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ
15 τὸ ὄν ἐνέργεια· μία οὖν ἀμφοῖν ἐνέργεια, μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ ἄμφω ἓν. Μία μὲν οὖν
φύσις τό τε ὄν ὃ τε νοῦς· —

b. The question of "How Noûs which is one produces the plurality of particular beings" is answered by P. by an enthusiastic description of the perfection of Noûs: Noûs is an organical living Being, and there is nothing failing in Him.

Enn. VI 2, 21, l. 1-38; 44-45; 51-59 Br.:

Noûs
described in
its fullness

Πῶς οὖν μένων αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὰ ἐν μέρει ποιεῖ; Τοῦτο δὲ ταῦτ' ὅν <τῷ>
πῶς ἐκ τῶν τεττάρων ἐκείνων τὰ λεγόμενα ἐφεξῆς. "Ορα τοίνυν ἐν τούτῳ <τῷ>
μεγάλῳ νῷ καὶ ἀμηχάνῳ, οὐ πολυάλῳ ἀλλὰ πολύνῳ νῷ, τῷ πάντα νῷ καὶ
5 ὅλῳ καὶ οὐ μέρει οὐδὲ τινὶ νῷ, ὅπως ἐνὶ τὰ πάντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ. Ἀριθμὸν δὴ πάντως
ἔχει ἐν τούτοις οἷς ὁρᾷ, καὶ ἔστι δὲ ἐν καὶ πολλά, καὶ ταῦτα δὲ δυνάμεις καὶ θαυ-
μασταὶ δυνάμεις, οὐκ ἀσθενεῖς, ἀλλ' ἅτε καθαραὶ οὖσαι μέγισταί εἰσι καὶ οἷον
σφριγιῶσαι καὶ ἀληθῶς δυνάμεις, οὐ τὸ μέχρι τινὸς ἔχουσαι· ἄπειρον τοίνυν καὶ
10 ἀπειρία καὶ τὸ μέγα. Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ μέγα σὺν τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ καλῷ τῆς οὐσίας
καὶ τῇ περὶ αὐτὸ ἀγλαΐᾳ καὶ τῷ φωτὶ ὡς ἐν νῷ ὄντα ἰδὼν ὁρᾷ καὶ τὸ ποιὸν
ἥδη ἐπανθοῦν, μετὰ δὲ τοῦ συνεχοῦς τῆς ἐνεργείας μέγεθος προφανόμενον τῇ
15 σῇ προσβολῇ ἐν ἡσυχῇ κείμενον. Ἐνὸς δὲ καὶ δύο ὄντων καὶ τριῶν, καὶ τὸ
μέγεθος τριττὸν ὄν καὶ τὸ ποσὸν πᾶν. Τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ ἐνορωμένου καὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ
καὶ ἄμφω εἰς ἓν ἰόντων καὶ οἷον γινομένων καὶ σχῆμα ὅρα. Εἰσπίπτοντος δὲ
τοῦ θατέρου καὶ διαιροῦντος καὶ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ τὸ ποιὸν σχημάτων τε διαφοραὶ
20 καὶ ποιότητες ἄλλαι· καὶ ταυτότης μὲν συνοῦσα ἰσότητα ποιεῖ εἶναι, ἐτερότης
δὲ ἀνισότητα ἐν ποσῷ, ἐν τε ἀριθμῷ ἐν τε μεγέθει, ἐξ ὧν καὶ κύκλους καὶ
τετράγωνα καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀνίσων σχήματα, ἀριθμούς τε ὁμοίους καὶ ἀνομοίους,
περιττοὺς τε καὶ ἀρτίους. Οὖσα γὰρ ἔνους ζωὴ καὶ ἐνέργεια οὐκ ἀτελής
25 οὐδὲν παραλείπει ὧν εὐρίσκομεν νῦν νοερὸν ἔργον ὄν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἔχει ἐν τῇ
αὐτῇ δυνάμει ὄντα αὐτὰ ἔχουσα καὶ ὡς ἂν νοῦς ἔχοι.

Ἐχει δὲ νοῦς ὡς ἐν νοήσει· νοήσει δὲ οὐ τῇ ἐν διεξόδῳ· παραλέλειπται δὲ
30 οὐδὲν τῶν ὅσα λόγοι, ἀλλ' ἔστιν εἰς οἷον λόγος, μέγας, τέλειος, πάντας περιέχων,
ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων αὐτοῦ ἐπεξιών, μᾶλλον δὲ αἰεὶ ἐπεξελλθὼν, ὥστε μηδέποτε
τὸ ἐπεξίεναι ἀληθὲς εἶναι. Ὅλως γὰρ πανταχοῦ, ὅσα ἂν τις ἐκ λογισμοῦ λάβῃ
ἐν τῇ φύσει ὄντα, ταῦτα εὐρήσει ἐν νῷ ἄνευ λογισμοῦ ὄντα, ὥστε νομίζειν τὸ
35 ὄν νοῦν λελογισμένον οὕτω ποιῆσαι, οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν τὰ ζῶα ποι-

It is not
discursive
reasoning

ούντων· ὡς γὰρ ἂν ὁ ἀκριβέστατος λογισμὸς λογίσαιτο ὡς ἄριστα, οὕτως ἔχει πάντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις πρὸ λογισμοῦ οὔσι. —

Σχημάτων δὴ πάντων ὁφθέντων ἐν τῷ ὄντι καὶ ποιότητος ἀπάσης . . . 45 καὶ ζωῆς ἐπιθεούσης, μᾶλλον δὲ συνούσης πανταχοῦ, πάντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ζῶα ἐγίνετο, καὶ ἦν καὶ σώματα ὕλης καὶ ποιότητος οὐσῶν. Γενομένων δὲ πάντων ἀεὶ καὶ μενόντων καὶ ἐν τῷ εἶναι αἰῶνι περιληφθέντων, χωρὶς μὲν ἐκάστων ἃ ἔστιν ὄντων, ὁμοῦ δ' αὖ ἐν ἐνὶ ὄντων, ἢ πάντων ἐν ἐνὶ ὄντων οἷον συμπλοκὴ καὶ 55 σύνθεσις νοῦς ἐστι· καὶ ἔχων μὲν τὰ ὄντα ἐν αὐτῷ ζῶον ἐστι παντελὲς καὶ ὁ ἔστι ζῶον, τῷ δ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὄντι παρέχων ἑαυτὸν ὁρᾶσθαι νοητὸν γενόμενος ἐκείνῃ διδωσιν ὁρθῶς λέγεσθαι.

a perfect
living being

The expression ζῶον παντελὲς is used by Plato in *Tim.* 31b, apparently to indicate the intelligible παράδειγμα of the ζῶον ἐμψυχον ἔνουν which is the visible world. Cp. also Arist., *De anima* I 2, 404b 19 ff. (above, nr. 372, with n. 1): αὐτὸ τὸ ζῶον.

That the παντελῶς ὄν of *Soph.* 249a must be understood in this sense, was expounded by me at Brussels 1953. See: *Actes du XIe Congrès international de Phil.* vol. XII, p. 61-67.

1386—All things are contained in Noûs as an organical unity, “all together” and yet distinguished. Thus, Noûs is “the perfect living Being”, containing all living beings.

The
intelligible
world a
living being

a. *Enn.* VI 6, 7, l. 1-4, 7, 9-10, 15-19 Br.:

“Ὀλως γὰρ δεῖ νοῆσαι τὰ πράγματα ἐν μιᾷ <φύσει> καὶ μίαν φύσιν πάντα ἔχουσιν καὶ οἷον περιλαβοῦσαν, οὐχ ὡς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἕκαστον χωρὶς, ἀλλαχοῦ ἥλιος καὶ ἄλλο ἄλλοι, ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ ἐν ἐνὶ πάντα· αὕτη γὰρ νοῦ φύσις· — Ὁμοῦ δὲ πάντων ὄντων ἕκαστον αὖ χωρὶς ἐστίν· — Κεχώρισται γὰρ ἤδη ἐν 15 αὐτῷ ἀεὶ. — Τὸ δὴ παντελὲς ζῶον ἐκ πάντων ζῶων ὄν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα ζῶα περιέχον καὶ ἐν ὄν τοσοῦτον, ὅσα τὰ πάντα, ὥσπερ καὶ τότε τὸ πᾶν ἐν ὄν καὶ πᾶν τὸ ὁρατὸν περιέχον πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ.

b. It contains Number and all Ideas, but in a different sense, Number being of primary importance and to be ranked with οὐσία, while “thinking” and “living being” are ranked after it.

Number is
ranked first
in the
intelligible
world

Enn. VI 6, 8, l. 1-7, 17-22 Br.:

Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν καὶ ζῶον πρῶτως ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτοζῶον καὶ νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐσία ἢ ὄντως καὶ φαμεν ἔχειν καὶ ζῶα τὰ πάντα καὶ ἀριθμὸν τὸν σύμπαντα καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καὶ καλὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα (ἄλλως γὰρ αὐτοάνθρωπόν φαμεν καὶ ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν καὶ δίκαιον αὐτό), σκεπτέον πῶς 5 τούτων ἕκαστον καὶ τί ὄν εἰς ὅσον οἷόν τέ τι εὐρεῖν περὶ τούτων. —

Εἰ δὴ τὸ ὄν πρῶτον δεῖ λαβεῖν πρῶτον ὄν, εἴτα νοῦν, εἴτα τὸ ζῶον (τοῦτο

γάρ ἤδη πάντα δοκεῖ περιέχειν) ὁ δὲ νοῦς δεύτερον (ἐνέργεια γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας),
 20 οὐτ' ἂν κατὰ τὸ ζῶον ὁ ἀριθμὸς εἴη (ἤδη γὰρ καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν καὶ δύο ἦν)
 οὔτε κατὰ τὸν νοῦν· πρὸ γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία ἐν οὔσα καὶ πολλὰ ἦν.

1387—In what sense is Number before Being?

Number
before
Being?

a. *Enn.* VI 6, 9, I. 11-29 Br.:

'Ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ὄν ἐν ὄν ἐστι καὶ τὰ δύο δύο ὄντα ἐστί, προηγῆσεται τοῦ τε ὄντος
 τὸ ἐν καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν ὄντων. 'Ἀρ' οὖν τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἐπιβολῇ; ἢ καὶ τῇ
 15 ὑποστάσει. Σκεπτέον δὲ ὧδε· ὅταν τις ἀνθρώπων ὄντα νοῇ καὶ καλὸν ἔν, ὕστερον
 δήπου τὸ ἐν νοεῖ ἐφ' ἐκατέρῳ· καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅταν ἵππων καὶ κύνᾳ· καὶ δὴ σαφῶς
 τὰ δύο ἐνταῦθα ὕστερον. 'Ἀλλ' εἰ γεννῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ γεννῶν ἵππων καὶ
 κύνᾳ ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντας προφέρει καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ἐπελθὼν μήτε γεννῶν μήτε
 20 προφέρει, ἄρ' οὐκ ἐρεῖ· "εἰς ἐν ἰτέον καὶ μετιτέον εἰς ἄλλο ἐν καὶ δύο ποιητέον
 καὶ μετ' ἐμοῦ καὶ ἄλλο ποιητέον"; Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰ ὄντα, ὅτε ἐγένετο, ἡριθμήθη,
 ἀλλ' ὅσα δεῖ γενέσθαι δῆλον ἦν, ὅτε ἔδει. Πᾶς ἄρα ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἦν πρὸ αὐτῶν τῶν
 ὄντων. 'Ἀλλ' εἰ πρὸ τῶν ὄντων, οὐκ ἦν ὄντα. Ἡ ἦν ἐν τῷ ὄντι, οὐκ ἀριθμὸς ὢν
 25 τοῦ ὄντος (ἐν γὰρ ἦν ἔτι τὸ ὄν) ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δύναμις ὑποστᾶσα ἐμέρισε
 τὸ ὄν καὶ οἷον ὠδίνειν ἐποίησεν αὐτὸ τὸ πλῆθος· ἢ γὰρ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἢ ἡ
 ἐνέργεια ἀριθμὸς ἔσται καὶ τὸ ζῶον αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἀριθμὸς.

b. Since Being springs from the One, it must be Number, and Ideas may be called Numbers or units.

Ib., I. 29-42 Br.:

'Ἀρ' οὖν τὸ μὲν ὄν ἀριθμὸς ἠνωμένος, τὰ δὲ ὄντα ἐξεληλιγμένος ἀριθμὸς, νοῦς
 30 δὲ ἀριθμὸς ἐν αὐτῷ κινούμενος, τὸ δὲ ζῶον ἀριθμὸς περιέχων; 'Επεὶ καὶ ἀπὸ
 τοῦ ἐνός γενόμενον τὸ ὄν, ὡς ἦν ἐν ἐκεῖνο, δεῖ αὐτὸ οὕτως ἀριθμὸν εἶναι· διὸ
 καὶ τὰ εἶδη ἔλεγον καὶ ἐνάδας καὶ ἀριθμούς. Καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ οὐσιώδης ἀριθμὸς·
 35 ἄλλος δὲ ὁ μοναδικὸς λεγόμενος εἰδῶλον τούτου¹. 'Ο δὲ οὐσιώδης ὁ μὲν ἐπι-
 θεωρούμενος τοῖς εἶδεσι καὶ συγγενῶν αὐτά, πρῶτως δὲ ὁ ἐν τῷ ὄντι καὶ μετὰ
 τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πρὸ τῶν ὄντων. Βάσιν δὲ ἔχει τὰ ὄντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ πηγὴν καὶ
 40 ῥίζαν καὶ ἀρχήν. Καὶ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου ἐστὶν ὄν· σκεδασ-
 θείη γὰρ ἄν· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἐν· ἥδη γὰρ ἄν εἴη ἐν πρὶν
 τυχεῖν τοῦ ἐνός, καὶ ἤδη τὸ τυγχάνον τῆς δεκάδος δεκάς πρὶν τυχεῖν τῆς
 δεκάδος.

Ideas are
"substantial
numbers"

¹ "Ideal Number", as it is called by Aristotle (εἰδητικός ἀριθμός, *Metaph.* N 3, 1090b, 32-36; *Gr. Ph.* I nr. 363b), by P. is named οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός, while "mathematical number" (μαθηματικός in Ar., l.c.) is named by him μοναδικὸς ἀριθμός.

True being
is immutable
and
ἀπαθής

1388—Immutability of the intelligible world.

Enn. VI 5, 3, 1. 1-12:

Εἰ δὴ τὸ ὄν ὄντως τοῦτο καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ἐξίσταται αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ γενέσεις περὶ αὐτὸ οὐδεμία οὐδ' ἐν τόπῳ ἐλέγετο εἶναι, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ οὕτως ἔχον αἰετὶ σὺν αὐτῷ εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διεστάναι ἀφ' αὐτοῦ μηδὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν ὡδί, τὸ δὲ ὡδί εἶναι, μηδὲ προῖέναι τι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ· ἥδη γὰρ ἂν ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ εἴη, καὶ 5 ὅλως ἐν τινι εἴη, καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ οὐδ' ἀπαθές· πάθοι γὰρ ἂν, εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ· εἰ δ' ἐν ἀπαθεί ἔσται, οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ. Εἰ οὖν μὴ ἀποστάν ἑαυτοῦ μηδὲ μερισθὲν μηδὲ μεταβάλλον αὐτὸ μηδεμίαν μεταβολὴν ἐν πολλοῖς ἅμα εἴη ἐν ὅλῳ ἅμα ἑαυτῷ 10 ὄν, τὸ αὐτὸ ὄν πανταχοῦ ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἐν πολλοῖς εἶναι ἂν ἔχοι· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὄν μὴ αὖ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι.

Cp. also 1375b, the beginning.

1389—Noûs possesses two faculties: first, that of *thinking*, i.e. seeing what is within itself, secondly, that of seeing what is beyond it.

Double
function of
νοῦς

a. *Enn.* VI 7, 35, 1. 19-30 Br :

Καὶ τὸν νοῦν τοίνυν <δεῖ> τὴν μὲν ἔχειν δύναμιν εἰς τὸ νοεῖν, ἥ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ 20 βλέπει, τὴν δέ, ἥ τὰ ἐπέκεινα αὐτοῦ ἐπιβολῇ τινι καὶ παραδοχῇ, καθ' ἣν καὶ πρότερον ἐώρα μόνον καὶ ὁρῶν ὕστερον καὶ νοῦν ἔσχε καὶ ἐν ἔστι· καὶ ἔστιν ἐκείνη μὲν ἥ θέα νοῦ ἔμφορος, αὕτη δὲ νοῦς ἐρῶν. "Ὅταν γὰρ ἄφρων γένηται μεθυθεὶς τοῦ νέκταρος, τότε ἐρῶν γίνεται ἀπλωθεὶς εἰς εὐπάθειαν τῷ κόρῳ· 25 καὶ ἔστιν αὐτῷ μεθύειν βέλτιον ἢ σεμνοτέρῳ εἶναι τοιαύτης μέθης.

Παρά μέρος δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐκεῖνος ἄλλα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα ὁρᾷ; "Ἢ οὐ· ὁ δὲ λόγος διδάσκων γινόμενα ποιεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἔχει τὸ νοεῖν αἰετὶ, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ νοεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλως ἐκεῖνον βλέπειν.

30

b. Noûs sees the νοητά through the light of the One; but it (he) can also contemplate this Light itself. Just as our corporeal eye has light within itself, so Noûs finds the Light-itself deep down in His own heart.

Noûs finds
the Light of
the One
within itself

Enn. V 5, 7, 1. 17-35 Br.:

Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ὄψις ὁρᾷ μὲν καὶ αὕτη δι' ἄλλου φωτὸς τὰ πε- φωτισμένα ἐκείνη τῇ πρώτῃ φύσει καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις ὄντως ὁρᾷ, νεύουσα μέντοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν καταλαμπομένων φύσιν ἥττον αὐτὸ ὁρᾷ. Εἰ δ' ἀφήσει τὰ ὁρώ- 20 μενα καὶ δι' οὗ εἶδεν εἰς αὐτὸ βλέπει, φῶς ἂν καὶ φωτὸς ἀρχὴν ἂν βλέποι.

Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ μὴ ὡς ἔξω ὄν δεῖ τὸν νοῦν τοῦτο τὸ φῶς βλέπειν, πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἱτέον, ὅς ποτε καὶ αὐτὸς οὐ τὸ ἔξω φῶς οὐδὲ τὸ ἀλλότριοι ἐῖσεται, 25 ἀλλὰ πρὸ τοῦ ἔξω οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ μᾶλλον στυλνότερον ἐν ἀκαρεῖ θεᾷται, ἥ

νύκτωρ ἐν σκότῳ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ προπηδήσαντος ἢ ὅταν μηδὲν ἐθελήσας
 τῶν ἄλλων βλέπειν προβάλληται πρὸ αὐτοῦ τὴν τῶν βλεφάρων φύσιν τὸ φῶς
 30 ὅμως προφέρων, ἢ καὶ πιέσαντος τοῦ ἔχοντος τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ φῶς ἴδῃ· τότε γὰρ
 οὐχ ὁρῶν ὁρᾷ καὶ μάλιστα τότε ὁρᾷ· φῶς γὰρ ὁρᾷ· τὰ δ' ἄλλα φωτοειδῇ μὲν
 ἦν, φῶς δὲ οὐκ ἦν. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ νοῦς αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων καλύψας καὶ συνα-
 γαγῶν εἰς τὸ εἶσω μηδὲν ὁρῶν θεάσεται οὐκ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ φῶς, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ
 35 καθ' αὐτὸ μόνον καθαρὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐξαίφνης φανέν.

c. The contemplation of the One. We must wait quietly till it appears. It comes without coming. It is Noûs that must come. And Noûs sees it with that part of itself which is not thinking.

The
 Contempla-
 tion of the
 One

Enn. V 5, 8, 1. 1-26 Br.:

“Ὡστε ἀπορεῖν ὅθεν ἐφάνη, ἔξωθεν ἢ ἐνδον, καὶ ἀπελθόντος εἰπεῖν “ἐνδον
 ἄρα ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἐνδον αὖ”. Ἡ οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν πόθεν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ πόθεν· οὔτε
 γὰρ ἔρχεται οὔτε ἄπεισιν οὐδαμοῦ, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται· διὸ οὐ
 5 χρὴ διώκειν, ἀλλ' ἡσυχῇ μένειν, ἕως ἂν φανῇ, παρασκευάσαντα ἑαυτὸν θεατὴν
 εἶναι, ὥσπερ ὁφθαλμὸς ἀνατολὰς ἡλίου περιμένει· ὁ δὲ ὑπερφανὲς τοῦ ὀρίζοντος
 (ἐξ ὠκεανοῦ φασιν οἱ ποιηταί) ἔδωκεν ἑαυτὸν θεάσασθαι τοῖς ὄμμασιν. —
 Οὗτοσι δέ, ὃν μιμεῖται ὁ ἥλιος, ὑπερσχήσει πόθεν; Καὶ τί ὑπερβαλὼν φανήσεται;
 10 — Ἡ αὐτὸν ὑπερσχὼν τὸν νοῦν τὸν θεώμενον· ἐστήξεται μὲν γὰρ ὁ νοῦς πρὸς
 τὴν θεάν εἰς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν βλέπων, ἐκεῖ ἑαυτὸν πᾶς τρέπων καὶ
 διδούς, στάς δὲ καὶ οἷον πληρωθεὶς μένους εἶδε μὲν τὰ πρῶτα καλλίως γενό-
 15 μενον ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐπιστῖλβοντα, ὡς ἐγγὺς ὄντος αὐτοῦ. Ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἦει, ὥς τις
 προσεδόκα, ἀλλ' ἦλθεν ὡς οὐκ ἐλθὼν· ὥφθη γὰρ ὡς οὐκ ἐλθὼν, ἀλλὰ πρὸ
 ἀπάντων παρών, πρὶν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἐλθεῖν. Εἶναι δὲ <δεῖ> τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐλθόντα
 καὶ τοῦτον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀπιόντα, ὅτι μὴ οἶδε ποῦ μένειν δεῖ καὶ ποῦ ἐκεῖνος
 20 μένει, ὅτι ἐν οὐδενί. Καὶ εἰ οἷόν τε ἦν καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ νῷ μένειν μηδαμοῦ — οὐχ
 ὅτι ἐν τόπῳ· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἐν τόπῳ, ἀλλ' ὅλως οὐδαμοῦ —, ἦν ἂν αἰεὶ
 ἐκεῖνον βλέπων· καίτοι οὐδὲ βλέπων, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὦν καὶ οὐ δύο. Νῦν δέ,
 25 ὅτι ἐστὶ νοῦς, οὕτω βλέπει, ὅτε βλέπει, τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μὴ νῷ. Θαῦμα δὴ, πῶς οὐκ
 ἐλθὼν πάρεστι, καὶ πῶς οὐκ ὦν οὐδαμοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπου μὴ ἔστιν.

1390—Why Noûs is not the first, but the second principle. First, it contains a duality.

a. *Enn.* VI 9, 2, 1. 32-40 Br.:

“Ὅτι δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸν νοῦν τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον ἔσται· τὸν νοῦν ἀνάγκη ἐν τῷ νοεῖν εἶναι καὶ τὸν γε ἄριστον καὶ τὸν οὐ πρὸς τὰ ἕξω
 35 βλέποντα νοεῖν τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ· εἰς ἑαυτὸν γὰρ ἐπιστρέφων εἰς ἀρχὴν ἐπιστρέφει.

Noûs not
 the first but
 the second
 principle

Καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον, διπλοῦς ἔσται καὶ οὐχ ἀπλοῦς οὐδὲ τὸ ἓν· εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον βλέπει, πάντως πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ. Εἰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ οὕτω δεύτερον. 40

Cp. also III 8, 9, 1. 5 f.: Καὶ οὗτος νοῦς καὶ νοητὸν ἅμα, ὥστε δύο ἅμα. Εἰ δὲ δύο, δεῖ τὸ πρὸ τοῦ δύο λαβεῖν.

b. It is the cause of beauty of the soul, is beautiful in itself—the One being beyond beauty—and as it were a vestibule of the Good.

Noûs is a
vestibule of
the Good

Enn. V 9, 2, 1. 16-28 Br.:

Τί οὖν τὸ ποιῆσαν σῶμα καλόν; "Ἀλλως μὲν κάλλους παρουσία, ἄλλως δὲ ψυχῇ, ἣ ἔπλασέ τε καὶ μορφὴν τοιάνδε ἐνήκε. Τί οὖν; Ψυχὴ παρ' αὐτῆς καλόν; "Ἡ οὐ. Οὐ γὰρ <ἄν> ἡ μὲν ἦν φρόνιμός τε καὶ καλή, ἡ δὲ ἄφρων τε καὶ αἰσχροά. Φρονήσει ἄρα τὸ καλὸν περὶ ψυχῇ. Καὶ τίς οὖν ὁ φρόνησιν δοὺς ψυχῇ; "Ἡ νοῦς 20 ἐξ ἀνάγκης, νοῦς δὲ οὐ ποτὲ μὲν νοῦς, ποτὲ δὲ ἄνους¹, ὃ γε ἀληθινός. Παρ' αὐτοῦ ἄρα καλός. Καὶ πότερον δὲ ἐνταῦθα δεῖ στήναι, ὥς πρῶτον, ἢ καὶ νοῦ ἐπέκεινα δεῖ ἰέναι; Νοῦς δὲ προσέστηκε μὲν ἀρχῇς τῆς πρώτης ὥς πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ ἐν προθύροις τάγαθοῦ ἀπαγγέλλων ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, ὥσπερ ἐκείνου 25 τύπος μᾶλλον ἐν πλήθει, ἐκείνου πάντη μένοντος ἐν ἐνί².

c. Noûs is Being, and Being is the All. Therefore not the One.

Noûs is a
universe,
ergo not
the One

Enn. VI 9, 2, 1. 40-47 Br.:

Καὶ χρὴ τὸν νοῦν τοιοῦτον τίθεσθαι, οἷον παρεῖναι μὲν τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ 40 πρῶτῳ καὶ βλέπειν εἰς ἐκεῖνον, συνεῖναι δὲ καὶ ἑαυτῷ νοεῖν τε καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ νοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὄντα τὰ πάντα. Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ τὸ ἐν εἶναι ποικίλον ὄντα. Οὐ τοῖνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν τὰ πάντα ἔσται, οὕτω γὰρ <ἄν> οὐκέτι ἐν εἶη· οὐδὲ νοῦς, καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως εἶη τὰ πάντα τοῦ νοῦ τὰ πάντα ὄντος· οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν· τὸ γὰρ 45 ὄν τὰ πάντα.

d. Cp. *Enn.* III 8, 9, 1. 39-44 Br.:

Οὐ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τὰ πάντα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πάντα· αὐτὴ δὲ οὐκέτι τὰ πάντα 40 οὐδέ τι τῶν πάντων, ἵνα γεννήσῃ τὰ πάντα, καὶ ἵνα μὴ πλῆθος ᾖ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πλῆθους ἀρχή· τοῦ γὰρ γεννηθέντος πανταχοῦ τὸ γεννῶν ἀπλούστερον. Εἰ οὖν τοῦτο νοῦν ἐγέννησεν, ἀπλούστερον νοῦ δεῖ αὐτὸ εἶναι.

1391—a. "Thought thinking itself"³ cannot be the First Principle.

¹ Cp. Arist., *De an.* III 5, 430a 22-23: ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ, ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ. Supra (vol. II), nr. 652.

² Cp. Plato, *Tim.* 37d: μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἐνί.

³ Νόησις νοήσεως, as Aristotle said of the Prime Mover (*Metaph.* Λ 9; supra, nr. 516b) is a formula which might have been used by Plot., but in fact does not occur in a passage such as V 3, 5 (cited under 1383c).

Enn. VI 7, 40, l. 43-46; 51-54 Br.:

Εἰ δέ τις καὶ τοῦτο (sc. τὸ "Ἐν ἢ τὸ 'Αγαθόν") ἅμα νοοῦν καὶ νοούμενον ποιοῖ καὶ οὐσίαν καὶ νόησιν συνοῦσαν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ νοοῦν θέλοι ποιεῖν, ἄλλου δεήσεται καὶ τούτου πρὸ αὐτοῦ. —

Ὡς δὲ μήτε τι ἄλλο πρὸ αὐτοῦ μήτε τι σύνεστιν αὐτῷ ἐξ ἄλλου, τί καὶ νοήσει ἢ πῶς ἑαυτό; τί γὰρ ἐζήτει; ἢ τί ἐπόθει;

The First Principle does not think

b. Thinking is given to divine but not absolute natures.

Enn. VI 7, 41, l. 1-7 Br.:

Κινδυνεύει γὰρ βοήθεια τὸ νοεῖν δεδόσθαι ταῖς φύσεσι ταῖς θειοτέραις μέν, ἐλάττωσι δὲ οὐσαις, καὶ οἷον αὐταῖς τυφλαῖς οὐσαις ὄμμα. 'Ο δ' ὀφθαλμὸς τί ἂν δέοιτο τὸ ὄν ὁρᾶν φῶς αὐτὸς ὢν; 'Ο δ' ἂν δέχεται δι' ὀφθαλμοῦ, σκότον ἔχον 5 παρ' αὐτῷ φῶς ζητεῖ. Εἰ οὖν φῶς τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ δὲ φῶς φῶς οὐ ζητεῖ, οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνη ἢ αὐγὴ φῶς μὴ ζητοῦσα ζητήσκει νοεῖν, οὐδὲ προσθήσει αὐτῇ τὸ νοεῖν.

5—THE ONE OR THE GOOD

1392—a. The One is the First Principle, for it is simple and not composite.

Enn. VI 9, 2, l. 29-32 Br.:

"Ὅπως δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν πρῶτον, ὁ δὲ νοῦς καὶ τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὸ ὄν οὐ πρῶτα. Εἶδός τε γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ σύνθετον καὶ ὕστερον· ἐξ ὧν γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι, πρότερον ἐκεῖνα.

the First Principle

b. It is before Noûs, for it does not belong to Being. It has neither Form not property, not even that it is a Cause.

It is before Being and has no form

Enn. VI 9, 3, l. 36-51 Br.:

Οὐδὲ νοῦς τοίνυν, ἀλλὰ πρὸ νοῦ· τί γὰρ τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ὁ νοῦς· ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ τι, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἐκάστου, οὐδὲ ὄν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὄν οἷον μορφὴν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἔχει, ἄμορφον δὲ ἐκεῖνο καὶ μορφῆς νοητῆς. Γεννητικὴ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἐνὸς φύσις 40 οὐσα τῶν πάντων οὐδὲν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν. Οὔτε οὖν τι οὔτε ποιὸν οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε νοῦς οὔτε ψυχὴ· οὐδὲ κινούμενον οὐδ' αὖ ἐστῶς, οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ, οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μονοειδές, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνείδεον πρὸ εἰδους ὄν παντός, πρὸ κινήσεως, πρὸ στάσεως· ταῦτα γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἃ πολλὰ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ. Διὰ τί 45 οὖν, εἰ μὴ κινούμενον, οὐχ ἐστῶς; "Ὅτι περὶ μὲν τὸ ὄν τούτων θάτερον ἢ ἀμφοτέρω ἀνάγκη, τό τε ἐστῶς στάσει ἐστῶς καὶ οὐ ταῦτόν τῇ στάσει· ὥστε συμβήσεται αὐτῷ καὶ οὐκέτι ἀπλοῦν μένει. 'Επεὶ καὶ τὸ αἷτιον λέγειν οὐ κατη- 50 γορεῖν ἐστὶ συμβεβηκός τι αὐτῷ¹, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν, ὅτι ἔχομέν τι παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου ὄντος ἐν αὐτῷ.

¹ συμβεβηκός is used by P. in the sense of "property".

c. It is called one neither as a predicate nor as a numeric unit.

Enn. VI 9, 5, l. 24-26, 29-46 Br.:

not a
predicate

Τὸ δὴ πρὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς οὐσι τιμιωτάτου (εἴπερ δεῖ τι πρὸ νοῦ εἶναι ἐν μὲν 25
εἶναι βουλομένου, οὐκ ὄντος δὲ ἐν, ἐνοειδοῦς δέ), — τὸ δὴ πρὸ τούτου θαῦμα τὸ
ἐν, ὃ μὴ ὄν ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα κατ' ἄλλου τὸ ἐν, ᾧ ὄνομα μὲν κατ' 30
ἀλήθειαν οὐδὲν προσῆκον, εἴπερ δὲ δεῖ ὀνομάσαι, κοινῶς ἂν λεχθεῖη προση-
κόντως ἐν, οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο, εἴτα ἐν, χαλεπὸν μὲν γνωσθῆναι διὰ τοῦτο, γιγνω-
σκόμενον δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ ἅπ' αὐτοῦ γεννήματι, τῇ οὐσίᾳ· καὶ <γάρ> ἄγει εἰς 35
οὐσίαν νοῦν, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις τοιαύτη, ὡς πηγὴν τῶν ἀρίστων εἶναι καὶ
δύναμιν γεννῶσαν τὰ ὄντα μένουσαν ἐν ἑαυτῇ καὶ οὐκ ἐλαττουμένην οὐδ' ἐν
τοῖς γινομένοις ὑπ' αὐτῆς οὖσαν, ὅτι καὶ πρὸ τούτων, <ἦν> ὀνομάζομεν ἐν ἐξ
ἀνάγκης τῷ σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις αὐτὴν τῷ ὀνόματι εἰς ἔννοιαν ἀμέριστον ἄγοντες 40
καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐνοῦν θέλοντες, οὐχ οὕτως ἐν λέγοντες καὶ ἀμερές, ὡς σημεῖον
ἢ μονάδα λέγοντες· τὸ γὰρ οὕτως ἐν ποσοῦ ἀρχή, ὃ οὐκ ἂν ὑπέστη μὴ προουσίης
οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ πρὸ οὐσίας· οὐκ οὖν δεῖ ἐνταῦθα βάλλειν τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀλλὰ
ταῦτα ὁμοιωσαὶ ἐκείνοις ἐν ἀναλογίαις τῷ ἁπλῷ καὶ τῇ φυγῇ τοῦ πλήθους καὶ 45
τοῦ μερισμοῦ.

not a
numerical
unit

d. No relation to anything should be attributed to it. It is what it is, and even the "is" cannot be applied to it.

no relation
to anything,

Enn. VI 8, 8, l. 12-16 Br.:

no
"ἐστιν"
or

"πέφυκεν"

Δεῖ δὲ ὅλως πρὸς οὐδὲν αὐτὸν λέγειν· ἔστι γὰρ ὅπερ ἔστι καὶ πρὸ αὐτῶν·
ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ἀφαιρούμεν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὰ ὄντα ὅπως οὖν· οὐδὲ δὴ 15
τὸ ὡς πέφυκεν· ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο.

1393—**a.** The One *is* its οὐσία and its ἐνέργεια.

The One is
its essence

Enn. VI 8, 12, l. 1-15, 22-25 Br.:

Τί οὖν; Οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ ἔστι; Τοῦ δὲ εἶναι ὃ ἔστιν ἢ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα εἶναι ἄρα γε
κύριος αὐτός; Πάλιν γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδὲν τι πεισθεῖσα τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἄπορος
ἐστι. Λεκτέον τοίνυν πρὸς ταῦτα ὧδε, ὡς ἕκαστος μὲν ἡμῶν κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα
πόρρω ἂν εἴη οὐσίας, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ὃ μάλιστα ἐσμέν μετέχομεν οὐσίας 5
καὶ ἐσμέν τις οὐσία. Τοῦτο δὲ ἔστιν οἷον σύνθετόν τι ἐκ διαφορᾶς καὶ οὐσίας·
οὐκ οὖν κυρίως οὐσία οὐδ' αὐτοουσία· διὸ οὐδὲ κύριοι τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας. "Ἄλλο
γὰρ πως ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄλλο, καὶ κύριοι οὐχ ἡμεῖς τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας, ἀλλ' 10
ἡ οὐσία αὐτὴ ἡμῶν, εἴπερ αὕτη καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν προστίθῃσιν. "Ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ
ὅπερ κύριον ἡμῶν ἡμεῖς πως ἐσμέν, οὕτω τοι οὐδὲν ἤττον καὶ ἐνταῦθα λεγόμεθα
ἂν αὐτῶν κύριοι· ὃ δὲ γε παντελῶς ἔστιν ὃ ἔστιν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν αὐτό, ἄλλο 15
δὲ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, ἐνταῦθα ὅπερ ἔστι τοῦτο ἐστί. —

Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τις ἐνέργεια ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αὐτὸν θησόμεθα,
οὐδ' ἂν διὰ τοῦτο εἴη ἂν ἕτερον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ κύριος, ἀφ' οὗ ἡ
25 ἐνέργεια, ὅτι μὴ ἕτερον ἐνέργεια καὶ αὐτός.

and its
activity

b. But, if activities are attributed to it, then also will; and if activity is its essence, the same must be said of its will.

Enn. VI 8, 13, l. 5-8; 27-33 Br.:

it is its will

5 Εἰ γὰρ δοίμεν ἐνεργείας αὐτῷ, τὰς δὲ ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ οἷον βουλήσει αὐτοῦ
(οὐ γὰρ ἀβουλῶν ἐνεργεῖ) αἱ δὲ ἐνέργειαι ἢ οἷον οὐσία αὐτοῦ, ἢ βούλησις αὐτοῦ
καὶ ἡ οὐσία ταῦτόν ἐσται. —

Καὶ σύνεστιν αὐτοῦ τῇ οἷον οὐσίᾳ ἢ θέλησις τοῦ οἷον τοιοῦτον εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ
ἔστιν αὐτὸν λαβεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ θέλειν ἑαυτῷ ὅπερ ἔστι, καὶ σύνδρομος αὐτός
30 ἑαυτῷ θέλων αὐτὸς εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο ὢν, ὅπερ θέλει, καὶ ἡ θέλησις καὶ αὐτός
ἐν, καὶ τούτῳ οὐχ ἦττον ἐν, ὅτι μὴ ἄλλο αὐτός. ὅπερ ἔτυχεν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ὥς
ἐβουλήθη ἄν. Τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἠθέλησεν ἢ τοῦτο, ὃ ἔστι;

P. speaks of βούλησις or θέλημα of the One, not to ascribe some kind of "providence" to it—for, as we shall see, this he denies—but to refute those opponents who argue that, if the One is not by a reasonable will, it is τύχη or αὐτομάτῳ or ἀνάγκη. P. replies: the One is by a reasonable Will, but not by any will anterior to or distinct from itself. It is beyond τύχη and αὐτόματον, and evidently it is beyond ἀνάγκη. See further d.

On the influence of Plotinus' theory of the first Principle on the Christian reflection on God: under d.

c. Likewise "good" does not belong to it as an attribute.

and its
goodness

Enn. V 5, 13, l. 1-II Br.:

Ἔδει δὲ καὶ τάγαθόν αὐτὸν ὄντα καὶ μὴ ἀγαθὸν μὴ ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ μηδὲν,
ἐπεὶ μηδὲ ἀγαθόν. Ὁ γὰρ ἔξει, ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἀγαθόν· ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐν τῷ
ἀγαθῷ τῷ κυρίως καὶ πρώτως ἀγαθῷ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθόν, οὔτε τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχει τὸ
5 ἀγαθόν. Εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν μήτε τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχει, οὐδὲν ἔχει· εἰ οὖν
οὐδὲν ἔχει, μόνον καὶ ἔρημον τῶν ἄλλων ἐστίν. Εἰ οὖν τὰ ἄλλα ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἐστί
καὶ οὐ τάγαθόν ἢ οὐκ ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, οὐδέτερά δὲ τούτων ἔχει, οὐδὲν ἔχων τῷ
μηδὲν ἔχειν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν. Εἰ δ' ἄρα τις ὁτιοῦν αὐτῷ προστίθῃσιν, ἢ οὐσίαν
10 ἢ νοῦν ἢ καλόν, τῇ προσθήκῃ ἀφαιρεῖται αὐτοῦ τάγαθὸν εἶναι.

d. Since it is the Father of Reason, Cause and causal Essence, it is its own ground, depending on nothing but itself.

Enn. VI 8, 14, l. 38 f., 42 f. Br.:

It is
causa sui

Λόγου ὢν καὶ αἰτίας καὶ οὐσίας αἰτιώδους πατήρ, . . . αἴτιον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ
παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτός· καὶ γὰρ πρώτως αὐτός καὶ ὑπερόντως αὐτός.

How much Christian reflection on God owes to the thought of P., may be seen e.g. in the following chapters of Thomas Aquinas.

S. Th. I 3, a. 3: Deus est idem quod sua essentia vel natura;

S. Th. I 19, a. 1, ad 3m: Voluntas Dei est eius essentia;

Ib.: Objectum divinae voluntatis est bonitas sua, quae est eius essentia;

S. Th. I 19, a. 3: Deus bonitatem suam ex necessitate vult.

S. Th. I 59, a. 2: Ibi solum est idem essentia et voluntas, ubi totaliter bonum continetur in essentia volentis, sc. in Deo.

S. Th. I 40, a. 1, ad 1m: Quia vero divina simplicitas excludit compositionem subjecti et accidentis, sequitur quod quicquid attribuitur Deo, est eius essentia.

St. Thomas evidently did not read Plotinus, but he was influenced by Neoplatonism through the medium of St. Augustine on the one hand and Dionysius Areopagita on the other.

Dionysius' exuberant language, full of expressions like *ὑπερουσιώδης θεϊότης* and *ὑπέρθειος*, is somewhat foreshadowed by P.'s language in the above passage.

1394—In what sense is the One "the Good".

The One is
the Good:

a. Not as a predicate. In that sense P. declares that the One is beyond the Good.

not as a
predicate

Enn. VI 9, 6, l. 40-42 Br.:

Ἄλλ' ἔστιν ὑπεράγαθον καὶ αὐτὸ οὐχ ἑαυτῷ, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἀγαθόν, εἴ τι αὐτοῦ δύναται μεταλαμβάνειν.

Cp. V 5, 13, cited above (1393c).

The Good is
not a
primary
genus

b. Not as a primary genus; for the Good itself is not predicated of anything. And "good" as a quality is of secondary order.

Enn. VI 2, 17, l. 1-22 Br.:

In this treatise P. deals with the theory of the supreme kinds in Plato's *Sophistes* 250a-255 (*Gr. Ph.* I, nr. 341). Like Plato he considers *στάσις* and *κίνησις*, *ταῦτόν* and *ἕτερον* as coequal with the *ὄν*, excluding all other concepts from the rank of first genera. In contradistinction to Aristotle, he confines their use strictly to the intelligible world, and deals with the supreme kinds of the *κόσμος αἰσθητός* in his next treatise.

Ἄλλὰ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις, ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς; Ἡ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν, εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, ἦν δὴ λέγομεν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, καθ' ἧς οὐδὲν κατηγορεῖται, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς μὴ ἔχοντες ἄλλως σημεῖναι οὕτω λέγομεν, γένος οὐδενὸς ἂν εἴη. Οὐ γὰρ κατ' ἄλλων λέγεται ἢ ἦν ἂν καθ' ὧν λέγεται ἕκαστον ἐκεῖνο λεγόμενον. Καὶ πρὸ οὐσίας δὲ ἐκεῖνο, οὐκ ἐν οὐσίᾳ. Εἰ δ' ὥς ποιοῦν τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις. Τί οὖν; ἢ τοῦ ὄντος φύσις οὐκ ἀγαθόν; Ἡ πρῶτον μὲν ἄλλως καὶ οὐκ ἐκείνως ὥς τὸ πρῶτον· καὶ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν οὐχ ὥς ποιοῦν, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἔφαμεν γένη 10 ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ διότι κοινόν τι ἦν ἕκαστον καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἐωρᾶτο, γένος. Εἰ οὖν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὁρᾶται ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ μέρει τῆς οὐσίας ἢ τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς πλείστοις, διὰ τί οὐ γένος καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις; Ἡ ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς μέρεσιν οὐ 15

ταυτόν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτως καὶ δευτέρως καὶ ὑστέρως· ἡ γὰρ ὅτι θάτερον παρὰ
θατέρου, τὸ ὕστερον παρὰ τοῦ προτέρου, ἡ ὅτι παρ' ἐνὸς πάντα τοῦ ἐπέκεινα,
ἀλλὰ ἄλλως κατὰ φύσιν τὴν αὐτῶν μεταλαμβάνει. Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ γένος ἐθέλοι
20 τις θέσθαι, ὕστερον· ὕστερον γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ τί ἐστι τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ
ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἂν αἰεὶ συνῇ, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἦν τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν καὶ εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν.

c. Can the Good be defined as the ἐφετόν, as Aristotle did in *Eth.*
Nic. I 1 (the beginning)? P. answers this question in the negative:
the First Principle is the Good, not because it is desirable, but it is desi-
rable because it is the Good.—There is a hierarchy of goods, the Good
itself being at the top, as the absolute Cause of all.

Enn. VI 7, 25, l. 16-24:

Is it the
ἐφετόν?

Ἐφετόν μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι τῷ ἐφετόν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν γί-
νεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἐφετόν γίνεσθαι.

Ἄρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν ἐσχάτῳ ἐν τοῖς οὐσι τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ αἰεὶ ἡ ἀνάβασις τὸ
ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου διδοῦσα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ ὑπ' αὐτῷ, εἰ ἡ ἀνάβασις οὐκ ἐξίσταται
τοῦ ἀνά λόγον, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ μεῖζον αἰεὶ προχωροῦ; Τότε δὲ στήσεται ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ,
μεθ' ὃ οὐδὲν ἔστιν εἰς τὸ ἄνω λαβεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ
μάλιστα κυρίως ἔσται, καὶ αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις.

The hier-
archy of
ἀγαθά

1395—Trying to define the Good positively, P. describes it as the Light
by which the intelligible world becomes desirable and soul is awakened
and gets wings.

a. *Enn.* VI 7, 21, l. 2-7, 11-17; c. 22, l. 1-21:

What makes
the
νοητά
a good?

Ἦδε τοίνυν τετολμήσθω· εἶναι μὲν τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὴν ζώην ἐκείνην ἀγαθοειδῆ,
ἔφεσιν δὲ εἶναι καὶ τούτων, καθ' ὅσον ἀγαθοειδῆ· ἀγαθοειδῆ δὲ λέγω τῷ τὴν
5 μὲν τάγαθοῦ εἶναι ἐνέργειαν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐκ τάγαθοῦ ἐνέργειαν, τὸν δὲ ἡδὴ
ὀρισθεῖσαν ἐνέργειαν· εἶναι δ' αὐτὰ μεστὰ μὲν ἀγλαίας καὶ διώκεσθαι μὲν
ὑπὸ ψυχῆς, ὡς ἐκεῖθεν καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα αὔ. — Γίνεται δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἔρως
ὁ σύντονος οὐχ ὅταν ἢ ἄπερ ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐκεῖθεν ἡδὴ ὄν ἄπερ ἐστίν ἄλλο
προσλάβῃ. Οἷον γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων φωτὸς ἐμμεμιγμένου ὅμως δεῖ φωτὸς
15 ἄλλου, ἵνα καὶ φανείῃ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς φῶς, οὕτω τοι δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ καίπερ
πολὺ φῶς ἐχόντων φωτὸς κρείττονος ἄλλου, ἵνα κάκεῖνα καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ
ὑπ' ἄλλου ὀφθῇ.

(22) "Ὅταν οὖν τὸ φῶς τοῦτό τις ἴδῃ, τότε δὴ καὶ κινεῖται ἐπ' αὐτὰ καὶ
τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ ἐπιθέοντος ἐπ' αὐτοῖς γλιχόμενος εὐφραίνεται, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν
ἐνταῦθα σωμάτων οὐ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐστίν ὁ ἔρως, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐμφανταζομένου
5 κάλλους ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. Ἐστὶ γὰρ ἑκάστου ὃ ἔστιν ἐφ' αὐτοῦ· ἐφετόν δὲ γίνεται

The light of
the Good
makes Noûs
desirable

ἐπιχρώσαντος αὐτὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὥσπερ χάριτας δόντος αὐτοῖς καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐφιέ-
μενα ἔρωτας. Καὶ τοίνυν ψυχὴ λαβοῦσα εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπορροὴν κινεῖται
καὶ ἀναβακχεύεται καὶ οἷστρον πίμπλαται καὶ ἔρωτος γίνεται. Πρὸ τοῦ δὲ οὐδὲ
πρὸς τὸν νοῦν κινεῖται, καίπερ καλὸν ὄντα· ἀργόν τε γὰρ τὸ κάλλος αὐτοῦ, 10
πρὶν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φῶς λάβῃ, ὑπτίᾳ τε ἀναπέπτωκεν ἡ ψυχὴ παρ' αὐτῆς καὶ πρὸς
πᾶν ἀργῶς ἔχει καὶ παρόντος νοῦ ἔστι πρὸς αὐτὸν νωθῆς. Ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἤκη
εἰς αὐτὴν ὥσπερ θερμασία ἐκεῖθεν, ῥώννυται τε καὶ ἐγείρεται καὶ ὄντως 15
πτεροῦται καὶ πρὸς τὸ παρακείμενον καὶ πλησίον καίπερ ἐπτοημένη ὁμῶς
πρὸς ἄλλο οἶον τῇ μνήμῃ μεῖζον κουφίζεται. Καὶ ἕως τί ἐστιν ἀνωτέρω τοῦ
παρόντος, αἴρεται φύσει ἄνω αἰρομένη ὑπὸ τοῦ δόντος τὸν ἔρωτα. Καὶ νοῦν
μὲν ὑπεραίρει, οὐ δύναται δὲ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν, ὅτι μηδὲν ἐστι τὸ ὑπερ- 20
κείμενον.

The light by
which the
νοητά
are seen

b. Again, P. says repeatedly that the One is the Light by which
noûs sees the νοητά. Cp. above, nrs. 1382a and 1389b. In the following
passage he describes the difference between discursive thinking or reason-
ing, and direct contemplation, "when the soul suddenly gets light" and
by this sudden illumination sees that Light itself which is her true τέλος.

Enn. V 3, 17, l. 23-38:

The light it-
self is seen

Δεῖ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἵνα τι εἴπῃ, ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο λαβεῖν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ διέξοδος·
ἐν δὲ πάντῃ ἀπλῶ διέξοδος τίς ἐστιν; Ἄλλ' ἀρκεῖ ἅν νοερῶς ἐφάψασθαι. 25
ἐφαψάμενον δέ, ὅτε ἐφάπτεται, πάντῃ μηδὲν μήτε δύνασθαι μήτε σχολὴν ἄγειν
λέγειν, ὕστερον δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι. Τότε δὲ χρὴ ἐωρακέναι πιστεύειν,
ὅταν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐξαίφνης φῶς λάβῃ· τοῦτο γὰρ παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός· καὶ τότε
χρὴ νομίζειν παρῆναι, ὅταν ὥσπερ θεὸς ἄλλος εἰς οἶκον καλοῦντός τινος ἐλθὼν 30
φωτίσῃ· ἢ μηδ' ἐλθὼν οὐκ ἐφώτισεν. Οὕτω τοι καὶ ψυχὴ ἀφώτιστος ἀθέατος
ἐκείνου· φωτισθεῖσα δὲ ἔχει, ὃ ἐζήτει, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ τέλος τάληθινὸν ψυχῇ,
ἐφάψασθαι φωτὸς ἐκείνου καὶ αὐτῷ αὐτὸ θεάσασθαι, οὐκ ἄλλω φωτί, ἀλλ' 35
αὐτῷ, δι' οὗ καὶ ὁρά. Δι' οὗ γὰρ ἐφωτίσθη, τοῦτο ἐστιν, ὃ δεῖ θεάσασθαι·
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἥλιον διὰ φωτὸς ἄλλου. Πῶς ἂν οὖν τοῦτο γένοιτο; Ἀφελε πάντα.

The Good is
anterior to
Beauty

1396—a. The Good is ranked higher than Beauty.

Enn. V 5, 12, l. 9-19, 31-38:

Καὶ τοῦ μὲν καλοῦ ἤδη οἶον εἰδόσι καὶ ἐργηγορόσιν ἡ ἀντίληψις καὶ τὸ θάμβος 10
καὶ τοῦ ἔρωτος ἡ ἔγερσις, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄτε πάλαι παρὸν εἰς ἔφεσιν σύμφυτον
καὶ κοιμωμένους πάρεστι καὶ οὐ θαμβεῖ ποτε ἰδόντας, ὅτι σύνεστιν αἰεὶ καὶ οὐ
ποτέ ἡ ἀνάμνησις· οὐ μὴν ὁρῶσιν αὐτό, ὅτι κοιμωμένοι πάρεστι. Τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ
ὃ ἔρωτος, ὅταν παρῇ, ὁδύνας δίδωσιν, ὅτι δεῖ ἰδόντας ἐφίεσθαι. Δεύτερος <οὔν> 15

οὗτος ὁ ἔρως καὶ ἤδη συνιέντων μᾶλλον δεύτερον μηνύει τὸ καλὸν εἶναι· ἡ δὲ ἀρχαιότερα τούτου καὶ ἀναίσθητος ἔφεσις ἀρχαιότερόν φησι καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι
19 καὶ πρότερον τούτου. —

Καὶ . . . τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ οὐ δεῖται τοῦ καλοῦ, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἐκείνου.
Καὶ ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἥπιον καὶ προσηγνὲς καὶ ἀβρότερον καί, ὥς ἐθέλει τις, παρὸν
35 αὐτῷ· τὸ δὲ θάμβος ἔχει καὶ ἐκπληξιν καὶ συμμιγῇ τῷ ἀλγύνοντι τὴν ἡδονήν.
Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ἔλκει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς οὐκ εἰδότας, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ πατρὸς
τὸ ἐρώμενον· νεώτερον γάρ· τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐ χρόνῳ. ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀληθεῖ,
ὁ καὶ τὴν δύνανται προτέραν ἔχει.

b. Yet, it is the source of Beauty, and as such ἐράσμιον.

Enn. VI 7, 32, l. 1-10, 14-17, 19-20, 23-34:

The source
of Beauty

Ποῦ οὖν ὁ ποιήσας τὸ τοσοῦτον κάλλος καὶ τὴν τοσαύτην ζωὴν καὶ γεννήσας
οὐσίαν; 'Ορᾷς τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἅπασι ποικίλοις οὖσιν εἶδεσι κάλλος; καλὸν μὲν
ὠδὲ μένειν· ἀλλ' ἐν καλῷ ὄντα δεῖ βλέπειν, ὅθεν ταῦτα καὶ ὅθεν καλά. Δεῖ δ'
5 αὐτὸν εἶναι τούτων μηδὲ ἐν· τί γὰρ αὐτῶν ἔσται μέρος τε ἔσται. Οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ
τοιαύτη μορφή οὐδὲ τις δυνάμις οὐδ' αὖ πᾶσαι αἱ γεγεννημέναι καὶ οὔσαι ἐν-
ταῦθα, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ὑπὲρ πάσας εἶναι δυνάμεις καὶ ὑπὲρ πάσας μορφάς. 'Αρχή
10 δὲ τὸ ἀνείδεον, οὐ τὸ μορφῆς δεόμενον, ἀλλ' ἀφ' οὗ πᾶσα μορφή νοερά. —
Πάντα δὲ ποιεῖν δυνάμενον τί ἂν μέγεθος ἔχοι; "Ἡ ἄπειρον ἂν εἴη, ἀλλ' εἰ
15 ἄπειρον, μέγεθος ἂν ἔχοι οὐδέν· καὶ γὰρ μέγεθος ἐν τοῖς ὑστάτοις· καὶ δεῖ,
εἰ καὶ τοῦτο ποιήσῃ, αὐτὸν μὴ ἔχειν. — Τὸ δὲ μέγα αὐτοῦ τὸ μηδὲν αὐτοῦ εἶναι
20 δυνατώτερον παρισυῖσθαι τε μηδὲν δύνασθαι. — Οὐ τοίνυν αὐτὸ οὐδὲ σχῆμα.
Καὶ μὴν, ὅτου ἂν ποθεινοῦ ὄντος μήτε σχῆμα μήτε μορφήν ἔχῃς λαβεῖν, ποθεινό-
25 τατον καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἂν ἄμετρος εἴη· οὐ γὰρ ὥρισται
ἐνταῦθα ὁ ἔρως, ὅτι μηδὲ τὸ ἐρώμενον, ἀλλ' ἄπειρος ἂν εἴη ὁ τούτου ἔρως, ὥστε
καὶ τὸ κάλλος αὐτοῦ ἄλλον τρόπον καὶ κάλλος ὑπὲρ κάλλος. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄν τί
30 κάλλος; 'Εράσμιον δὲ ὄν τὸ γεννῶν ἂν εἴη τὸ κάλλος. Δυνάμις οὖν <ὄν> παντὸς
καλοῦ ἄνθος ἐστὶ κάλλους καλλοποιόν· καὶ γὰρ γεννᾷ αὐτὸ καὶ κάλλιον ποιεῖ τῇ
παρ' αὐτοῦ περιουσίᾳ τοῦ κάλλους, ὥστε ἀρχὴ κάλλους καὶ πέρας κάλλους.

1397—The First Principle is not only beyond providence, i.e. the care of all those things that are not Itself. Aristotle too denied this to his First Principle, defining it as νόησις νοήσεως¹.

The one is
beyond
providence

P. went further: he placed the One beyond any kind of thought.

and thought

a. *Enn.* VI 7, 37, l. 1-10:

Οἱ μὲν οὖν νόησιν αὐτῷ δόντες τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων καὶ τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ οὐκ

¹ *Gr. Ph.* II, nr. 516.

ἔδοσαν· καίτοι καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον τὰ ἄλλα, φασὶ τινες, μὴ εἰδέναι· ἀλλ' οὖν ἐκεῖνοι ἄλλο τιμιώτερον αὐτοῦ οὐχ εὐρόντες τὴν νόησιν αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ εἶναι ἔδοσαν, ὥσπερ τῇ νοήσει σεμνοτέρου αὐτοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν κρείττονος 5 ἢ κατ' αὐτὸν ὃ ἔστιν ὄντος, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοῦ σεμνύνοντος τὴν νόησιν. Τίτι γὰρ τὸ τίμιον ἔξει, τῇ νοήσει ἢ αὐτῷ; Εἰ μὲν τῇ νοήσει, αὐτῷ οὐ τίμιον ἢ ἦττον, εἰ δὲ αὐτῷ, πρὸ τῆς νοήσεώς ἐστι τέλειος καὶ οὐ τῇ νοήσει τελειούμενος. 10

Cp. above, nr. 1391.

b. As we found above (nr. 1386b), a deliberate choice and care of things is by P. not even attributed to Noûs. What is usually called "providence" is explained by him by the existence of an eternal and intelligible order of things: πάντα αἰεὶ νοερώς ἐστηκότα εἶναι ὅσα ἐν τῷ ὄντι (VI 8, 17). Since, however, this whole order depends directly on the One, there is at least an analogy between the First Principle and Noûs; in the author's words: this order "testifies τὸν οἶον ἐν ἐνὶ νοῦν οὐ νοῦν ὄντα".

P. admits
an analogy
between
the One
and Noûs

Enn. VI 8, 18, l. 8-22:

"Ὡσπερ ἂν οὖν κύκλος ἐφαπτόμενος κέντρου ὁμολογοῖτο ἂν τὴν δύναμιν παρὰ τοῦ κέντρου ἔχειν, καὶ οἶον κεντροειδής, ἥ γραμμαὶ ἐν κύκλῳ πρὸς κέντρον 10 ἐν συνιοῦσαι τὸ πέρας αὐτῶν τὸ πρὸς τὸ κέντρον ποιοῦσι τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἶον τὸ πρὸς ὃ ἠνέχθησαν καὶ ἀφ' οὗ οἶον ἐξέφυσαν, μείζονος ὄντος ἢ κατὰ ταύτας τὰς γραμμάς καὶ τὰ πέρατα αὐτῶν (καὶ ἔστι μὲν οἶον ἐκεῖνο, ἀμυδρὰ δὲ καὶ οἶον ἔχνη ἐκεῖνου τοῦ 15 δὲ δύναται αὐτὰ καὶ τὰς γραμμάς δυναμένου, αἱ πανταχοῦ ἔχουσιν αὐτό, καὶ ἐμφαίνεται διὰ τῶν γραμμῶν, οἶόν ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο, οἶον ἐξελιχθὲν οὐκ ἐξεληλιγμένον), οὕτω τοι καὶ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ ὃν χρὴ λαμβάνειν, γενόμενον ἐξ ἐκεῖνου καὶ οἶον ἐκχυθὲν καὶ ἐξελιχθὲν καὶ ἐξηρηγμένον ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ νοεῖας 20 φύσεως μαρτυρεῖν τὸν οἶον ἐν ἐνὶ νοῦν οὐ νοῦν ὄντα· ἐν γάρ.

For P.' frequent use of the simile of the centre of a circle or a sphere, see above, 1364a, b and 1365b. Besides in the passages cited there, the simile occurs in V 1, 11, l. 10-15. Cp. VI 9, 8, where soul is said to turn in a circle round the One as its centre; and I 8, 2, l. 23 ff.: soul "dances" in a circle round Noûs and through it sees God.

ἐνέργεια
without
οὐσία

1398—a. P. does not hesitate to call the One ἐνέργεια, though he does not call it "being".

Enn. VI 8, 20, l. 9-11:

Οὐδὲ γὰρ φοβητέον ἐνέργειαν τὴν πρώτην τίθεσθαι ἄνευ οὐσίας, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν οἶον ὑπόστασιν θετέον.

It is infinite
Power

b. After having explained that the One is not indivisible in the sense of a quantitative minimum, P. declares that it is a dynamical maximum.

Enn. VI 9, 6, 1. 6-12:

Τὸ δὲ οὔτε ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἐν μεριστῷ οὔτε οὕτως ἀμερές, ὡς τὸ σμικρότατον· μέγιστον γὰρ ἀπάντων οὐ μεγέθει, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἀμέγεθες δυνάμει· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ μετ' αὐτὸ ὄντα ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἀμέριστα καὶ ἀμερῇ, οὐ τοῖς ὅγκοις.
 10 Ληπτέον δὲ καὶ ἀπειρον αὐτὸ οὐ τῷ ἀδιεξιτήτῳ ἢ τοῦ μεγέθους ἢ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπεριλήπτῳ τῆς δυνάμεως.

P. speaks of δυνάμεις in the One in the sense of *potentia activa*: as the Source of all intelligible Being, the First Principle is δύναμις ἀπειρος. Cp. VI 7, 14, 1. 11 ff.: Also in Noûs there must be infinity, to explain the infinite variety of being within it. And IV 3, 8, 1. 35 ff.: Soul is an ἀπειρον, because its δύναμις is infinite.

In VI 6, 1 P. asks the question "Whether plurality is apostasy of the One, and infinity absolute apostasy, because it is innumerable plurality". He answers (ch. 3) by saying that in the realm of being plurality is always *unified* plurality and in so far good; and likewise infinity in the sphere of *being* is always determined.

'Αλλ' ἡ ἀπειρία πῶς; — 'Η γὰρ οὐσα ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἤδη ὠρίσται, ἢ εἰ μὴ ὠρίσται, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς γινομένοις ἴσως, ὡς καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ.

c. "Could it then have made itself different from what it is?" **Its liberty**

By this question P. replies to such problems as "Whether the Good can cause evil" and "if not, how it can be called free".

He answers that these questions are senseless, since the First Principle *is* its Will and its Goodness. By a higher form of liberty it cannot otherwise but be willing Itself (cp. VI 8, 13, 1. 27 ff.; above, nr. 1393b). It is *beyond opposites*¹, beyond the alternative of acting in this or that way.

Enn. VI 8, 21, 1. 1-7:

Ἐδύνατο οὖν ἄλλο τι ποιεῖν ἑαυτὸν ἢ ὃ ἐποίησεν; Ἡ οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖν ἀναιρήσομεν, ὅτι μὴ ἂν κακοποιοῖ. Οὐ γὰρ οὕτω τὸ δύνασθαι ἐκεῖ, ὡς καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀστεμφεῖ καὶ ἀμετακινήτῳ δυνάμει, ἢ μάλιστα
 5 δύναμις ἐστίν, ὅταν μὴ ἐξίστηται τοῦ ἑν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ τὰ ἀντικείμενα δύνασθαι ἀδυναμίας ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου μένειν.

Cp. the passages of Thomas Aquinas cited under 1393c.

d. That it "contains itself", should be taken in this sense, that everything depends on it (*Enn.* VI 8, 21, 1. 19 ff., cited above, nr. 1364c). In the same sense P. could call the First Principle δύναμις τῶν πάντων: it is like an ever-streaming source of life, which in itself stays what it is.

Enn. III 8, 10, 1. 1-19:

the ever-streaming source

[It is οὐδὲν τῶν πάντων, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῶν πάντων.]

Τί δὴ ὄν; Δύναμις τῶν πάντων· ἥς μὴ οὕσης οὐδ' ἂν τὰ πάντα, οὐδ' ἂν νοῦς ζωὴ ἢ πρώτη καὶ πᾶσα. Τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ τὴν ζωὴν αἴτιον ζωῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἡ τῆς ζωῆς ἐνέργεια τὰ πάντα οὐσα πρώτη, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ προχυθεῖσα αὐτὴ οἶον ἐκ πηγῆς.

¹ Nicolaus Cusanus' idea of the *coincidentia oppositorum* in God is rooted here.

Νόησον γὰρ πηγὴν ἀρχὴν ἄλλην οὐκ ἔχουσαν, δοῦσαν δὲ ποταμοῖς πᾶσιν 5 αὐτὴν, οὐκ ἀναλωθεῖσαν τοῖς ποταμοῖς, ἀλλὰ μένουσαν αὐτὴν ἡσυχῶς, τοὺς δὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς προεληλυθότας πρὶν ἄλλον ἄλλῃ ρεῖν ὁμοῦ συνιόντας ἔτι, ἥδη δὲ οἶον ἐκάστους εἰδότας οἱ ἀφήσουσιν αὐτῶν τὰ ρεύματα· ἡ ζῶν φυτοῦ μεγίστου διὰ 10 παντὸς ἐλθοῦσαν ἀρχῆς μενούσης καὶ οὐ σκεδασθείσης περὶ πᾶν αὐτῆς οἶον ἐν ῥίζῃ ἰδρυμένης. Αὕτη τοίνυν παρέσχε μὲν τὴν πᾶσαν ζῶν τῷ φυτῷ τὴν πολλήν, ἔμεινε δὲ αὐτὴ οὐ πολλὴ οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἀρχὴ τῆς πολλῆς. Καὶ θαῦμα οὐδέν.

*Ὡ καὶ θαῦμα, πῶς τὸ πλῆθος τῆς ζωῆς ἐξ οὐ πλῆθους ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἦν τὸ 15 πλῆθος, εἰ μὴ πρὸ τοῦ πλῆθους ἦν ὁ μὴ πλῆθος ἦν. Οὐ γὰρ μερίζεται εἰς τὸ πᾶν ἡ ἀρχή· μερισθεῖσα γὰρ ἀπώλεσεν ἂν καὶ τὸ πᾶν, καὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἔτι γένοιτο μὴ μενούσης τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐφ' αὐτῆς ἐτέρας οὔσης.

1399—Since it is beyond being and beyond reason, it is known by direct presence, by those only who are able to see it and have left all other things behind them.

It is known
by
παρουσία

a. *Enn.* VI 9, 4, l. 1-26, 30-34:

Γίνεται δὲ ἡ ἀπορία μάλιστα, ὅτι μὴδὲ κατ' ἐπιστήμην ἡ σύνεσις ἐκείνου μὴδὲ κατὰ νόησιν, ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα νοητά, ἀλλὰ κατὰ παρουσίαν ἐπιστήμης κρείττονα. Πάσχει δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόστασιν καὶ οὐ πάντῃ ἐστὶν ἐν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ λαμβάνῃ· λόγος γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, πολλὰ δὲ ὁ λόγος. 5 Παρέρχεται οὖν τὸ ἐν εἰς ἀριθμὸν καὶ πλῆθος πεσοῦσα. Ὑπὲρ ἐπιστήμην τοίνυν δεῖ δραμεῖν καὶ μηδαμῇ ἐκβαίνειν τοῦ ἐν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀποστῆναι δεῖ καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ ἐπιστητῶν καὶ παντὸς ἄλλου καὶ καλοῦ θεάματος. Πᾶν γὰρ καλὸν ὕστερον ἐκείνου καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου, ὥσπερ πᾶν φῶς μεθήμερινὸν παρ' ἡλίου. Διὸ 10 οὐδὲ ῥήτῳ οὐδὲ γραπτῷ φησιν¹. Ἀλλὰ λέγομεν καὶ γράφομεν πέμποντες εἰς αὐτὸ καὶ ἀνεγείροντες ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐπὶ τὴν θεάν ὥσπερ ὁδὸν δεικνύντες τῷ τι θεάσασθαι βουλομένῳ. Μέχρι μὲν γὰρ τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ τῆς πορείας ἡ δίδαξις, 15 ἡ δὲ θέα αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἥδη τοῦ ἰδεῖν βεβουλημένου. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἡλθέ τις ἐπὶ τὸ θέαμα, μὴδὲ σύνεσιν ἔσχεν ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἐκεῖ ἀγλαίας μὴδὲ ἔπαθε μὴδὲ ἔσχεν ἐν αὐτῇ οἶον ἐρωτικὸν πάθημα ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἐραστοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐρᾷ ἀναπαυσασμένου, δεξάμενος <μὲν> φῶς ἀληθινὸν καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν περιφωτίσας διὰ τὸ 20 ἐγγυτέρω γεγονέναι, ἀναβεβηκῶς δὲ ἔτι ὀπισθοβαρῆς ὑπάρχων, ἃ ἐμπόδια ἦν τῇ θεᾷ, καὶ οὐ μόνος ἀναβεβηκῶς, ἀλλ' ἔχων τὸ διεῖργον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἡ μήπω εἰς ἐν συναχθεῖς — οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄπεστιν οὐδενὸς ἐκεῖνο καὶ πάντων δέ, ὥστε παρὸν μὴ παρεῖναι ἀλλ' ἡ τοῖς δέχεσθαι δυναμένοις καὶ παρεσκευασμένοις — . . . 25 εἰ οὖν μήπω ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ, ἀλλὰ διὰ ταῦτά ἐστιν ἔξω, ἡ δι' ἐνδεῖαν τοῦ παιδαγωγῶντος λόγου καὶ πίστιν περὶ αὐτοῦ παρεχομένου, δι' ἐκεῖνα μὲν αὐτὸν ἐν αἰτίᾳ τιθέσθω, καὶ πειράσθω ἀποστάς πάντων μόνος εἶναι.

¹ Plato, *Ep.* VII 341c (supra, nr. 262).

b. Those who think that things exist and are held together by chance and corporeal necessity, are unable to understand anything concerning the One.

Enn. VI 9, 5, l. 1-9:

**Materialists
are excluded**

"Ὅστις οἶεται τὰ ὄντα τύχῃ καὶ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ διοικεῖσθαι καὶ σωματικαῖς συνέχεσθαι αἰτίαις, οὗτος πόρρω ἀπελήλαται καὶ θεοῦ καὶ ἐννοίας ἐνός, καὶ ὁ λόγος οὐ πρὸς τούτους, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλην φύσιν παρὰ τὰ σώματα τιθεμένους
5 καὶ ἀνιόντας ἐπὶ ψυχῇ. Καὶ δεῖ δὴ τούτους φύσιν ψυχῆς κατανενοηκέναι τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ ὡς παρὰ νοῦ ἐστὶ καὶ λόγου παρὰ τούτου κοινωνήσασα ἀρετὴν ἴσχει· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα νοῦν λαβεῖν ἕτερον τοῦ λογιζομένου καὶ λογιστικοῦ καλουμένου.

P., as so often, polemizes against the Stoa.

c. *Enn.* VI 9, 7, l. 1-9, 12-16:

The ascent

Εἰ δ' ὅτι μὴδὲν τούτων ἐστίν, ἀοριστεῖς τῇ γνώμῃ, στῆσον σαυτὸν εἰς ταῦτα, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων θεῶ· θεῶ δὲ μὴ ἔξω ῥίπτων τὴν διάνοιαν. Οὐ γὰρ κεῖται· που ἐρημῶσαν αὐτοῦ τὰ ἄλλα, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ θιγεῖν ἐκεῖνο παρόν, τῷ δ'
5 ἀδυνατοῦντι οὐ πάρεστιν. "Ὡς περ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐκ ἐστὶ τι νοεῖν ἄλλο νοοῦντα καὶ πρὸς ἄλλῃ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ δεῖ μὴδὲν προσάπτειν τῷ νοουμένῳ, ἵνα ἡ αὐτὸ τὸ νοούμενον, οὕτω δεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα συνιέναι, ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄλλου ἔχοντα
9 ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τύπον ἐκεῖνο νοῆσαι, . . . ἀλλ' ὥς περ περὶ τῆς ὕλης λέγεται, ὡς ἄρα ἄποιον εἶναι δεῖ πάντων, εἰ μέλλει δέχεσθαι τοὺς πάντων τύπους, οὕτω καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀνειδεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι, εἰ μέλλει μὴδὲν ἐμπόδιον ἐγκαθήμενον
15 ἔσεσθαι πρὸς πλήρωσιν καὶ ἔλλαμψιν αὐτῇ τῆς φύσεως τῆς πρώτης.

d. *Enn.* VI 8, 21, l. 25-28:

**Leave all
other things**

"Ὅταν αὐτὸν εἴπῃς ἡ ἐννοηθῆς, τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἄφες. Ἀφελὼν <οὖν> πάντα, καταλιπὼν δὲ μόνον αὐτόν, μὴ τί προσθῆς ζήτει, ἀλλὰ μὴ τί πω οὐκ ἀφήρηκας ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐν γνώμῃ τῇ σῇ.

1400—a. The soul is always around It, but she does not always look at It. If only she does, she reaches her true goal. For the true life and full development of the spirit are "yonder".

**The life
"yonder"**

Enn. VI 9, 8, l. 36-45; c. 9, l. 13-22:

Καὶ αἰεὶ μὲν περὶ αὐτό, οὐκ αἰεὶ δὲ εἰς αὐτὸ βλέπομεν, ἀλλ' οἷον χορὸς ἐξῆδων καί περ ἔχων περὶ τὸν κορυφαῖον τραπίην ἂν εἰς τὸ ἔξω τῆς θέας, ὅταν δὲ
40 ἐπιστρέψῃ, ἄδει τε καλῶς καὶ ὄντως περὶ αὐτὸν ἔχει· οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς αἰεὶ μὲν περὶ αὐτό, καὶ ὅταν μὴ, λύσις ἡμῖν παντελὴς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκέτι ἐσόμεθα· οὐκ αἰεὶ δὲ εἰς αὐτό, ἀλλ' ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸ ἴδωμεν, τότε ἡμῖν τέλος καὶ ἀνάπαυλα
45 καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀπάδειν χορεύουσιν ὄντως περὶ αὐτὸ χορεῖαν ἐνθεον. —

Ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἀναπαύεται ψυχὴ κακῶν ἔξω εἰς τὸν τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸν τόπον **The true life**

ἀναδραμοῦσα· καὶ νοεῖ ἐνταῦθα, καὶ ἀπαθής ἐνταῦθα· καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς ζῆν ἐνταῦθα· τὸ γὰρ νῦν καὶ τὸ ἄνευ θεοῦ ἔχνος ζωῆς ἐκείνην μιμούμενον, τὸ δὲ ἐκεῖ 15 ζῆν ἐνέργεια μὲν νοῦ ¹, ἐνεργεία δὲ καὶ γεννᾷ θεοὺς ἐν ἡσυχῇ τῇ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἐπαφῇ, γεννᾷ δὲ κάλλος, γεννᾷ δικαιοσύνην, ἀρετὴν γεννᾷ ². ταῦτα γὰρ κύει ψυχὴ πληρωθεῖσα θεοῦ καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῇ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος· ἀρχὴ μὲν, ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν, 20 τέλος δέ, ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκεῖ, καὶ ἐκεῖ γενομένη γίνεται αὐτῇ ὅπερ ἦν.

Perfect
happiness

b. *Enn.* VI 7, 34, l. 8-27; 32-38:

Ὅταν δὲ τούτου εὐτυχήσῃ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἦκῃ πρὸς αὐτήν, μᾶλλον δὲ παρὸν φανῇ, ὅταν ἐκείνη ἐκνεύσῃ τῶν παρόντων, καὶ παρασκευάσασα αὐτήν ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα 10 καλὴν καὶ εἰς ὁμοιότητα ἐλθοῦσα· ἡ δὲ παρασκευὴ καὶ ἡ κόσμησις δῆλη πού τοις παρασκευαζομένοις· ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐξαίφνης φανέντα (μεταξὺ γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἔτι δύο, ἀλλ' ἐν ἅμφω· οὐ γὰρ ἂν διακρίναις ἔτι, ἕως πάρεστι· μίμησις δὲ τούτου καὶ οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐρασται καὶ ἐρώμενοι συγκρῖναι θέλοντες) 15 οὔτε σώματος ἔτι αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῷ, οὔτε ἑαυτὴν ἄλλο τι λέγει, οὐκ ἄνθρωπον, οὐ ζῶον, οὐκ ὄν, οὐδὲ πᾶν· ἀνώμαλος γὰρ ἡ τούτων πως θέα, καὶ οὔτε σχολὴν ἄγει πρὸς αὐτὰ οὔτε θέλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ ζητήσασα ἐκείνῳ παρόντι ἀπαντᾷ κάκεῖνο ἄντ' αὐτῆς βλέπει· τίς δὲ οὕσα βλέπει, οὐδὲ τοῦτο 20 σχολάζει ὁρᾶν. Ἐνθα δὴ οὐδὲν πάντων ἂν τούτου ἀλλάζαιτο, οὐδ' εἴ τις αὐτῇ πάντα τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐπιτρέποι, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος ἄλλου ἔτι ἀμείνωνος οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἀγαθοῦ· οὔτε γὰρ ἀνωτέρω τρέχει τὰ τε ἄλλα πάντα κατιούσης, κἂν ἦ ἄνω· ὥστε τότε ἔχει καὶ τὸ κρίνειν καλῶς καὶ γινώσκειν, ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν οὐ ἐφίετο, 25 καὶ τίθεσθαι, ὅτι μηδὲν ἐστὶ κρεῖττον αὐτοῦ. —

Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, οἷς πρὶν ἦδετο, ἀρχαῖς ἢ δυνάμεσιν ἢ πλούτοις ἢ κάλλεσιν ἢ ἐπιστήμας, ταῦτα ὑπεριδοῦσα λέγει οὐκ ἂν εἰποῦσα μὴ κρεῖττοσι συντυχοῦσα τούτων· οὐδὲ φοβεῖται, μὴ τι πάθῃ, μετ' ἐκείνου οὕσα οὐδ' ὅλως 35 ἰδοῦσα· εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ περὶ αὐτὴν φθείροιτο, εὖ μάλα καὶ βούλεται, ἵνα πρὸς τούτῳ ἦ μόνον· εἰς τόσον ἦκει εὐπαθείας.

The light
only

c. *Enn.* VI 7, 36, l. 15-21:

Ἐνθα δὴ ἐάσας τις πᾶν μάθημα καὶ μέχρι τούτου παιδαγωγηθεὶς καὶ ἐν καλῷ ἰδρυθεὶς, ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἐστὶ, μέχρι τούτου νοεῖ, ἐξενεχθεὶς δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ τοῦ νοῦ οἶον κύματι καὶ ὑψοῦ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οἶον οἰδήσαντος ἀρθείς εἰσεῖδεν ἐξαίφνης ³ οὐκ ἰδὼν ὅπως, ἀλλ' ἡ θέα πλήσασα φωτὸς τὰ ὄμματα οὐ δι' αὐτοῦ πεποίηκεν 20 ἄλλο ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς τὸ ὄραμα ἦν.

¹ Aristotle, speaking of the διαγωγὴ of the Prime Mover, attributes life to it, because life is ἡ νοῦ ἐνέργεια (*Metaph.* Δ 7, 1072b 26; above, nr. 516a). It is certainly this passage which P. has in his mind, when applying the definition to the life of Soul in contemplating the One, not to the One itself.

² In this whole passage P. is inspired by Plato, *Symp.* 211d-212a (above, nr. 273).

³ Plato, *Symp.* 210 c.

6—THE SENSIBLE WORLD

1401—Creation, as we saw above (nrs. **1365-1369**), is a necessary and eternal process, which reaches its final term (τέλος) in the αἰσθητόν.

a. *Enn.* IV 8, 6, l. 1-16:

The text was cited above, nr. **1365a**.

b. *Ib.*, l. 16-28:

Therefore, matter, too, must participate of the nature of the good. For "that which gives existence as it were by grace" could not stop before coming to it. This is proved by the beauty found in sensible things.

Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἦν ὁ ἐκώλυεν ὅτιοῦν ἔμμοιρον εἶναι φύσεως ἀγαθοῦ, καθ' ὅσον
 20 ἕκαστον οἶόν τε ἦν μεταλαμβάνειν. Εἴτ' οὖν ἦν ἀεὶ ἡ τῆς ὕλης φύσις, οὐχ οἶόν τε
 ἦν αὐτὴν μὴ μετασχεῖν οὖσαν τοῦ πᾶσι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καθ' ὅσον δύναται ἕκαστον
 χορηγοῦντος· εἴτ' ἐπηκολούθησεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ γένεσις αὐτῆς τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῆς
 25 αἰτίοις, οὐδ' ὥς ἔδει χωρὶς εἶναι, ἀδυναμία πρὶν εἰς αὐτὴν ἔλθεῖν σπάντος τοῦ
 καὶ τὸ εἶναι οἶον ἐν χάριτι δόντος. Δεῖξίς οὖν τῶν ἀρίστων ἐν νοητοῖς τὸ ἐν
 αἰσθητῷ κάλλιστον, τῆς τε δυνάμεως τῆς τε ἀγαθότητος αὐτῶν, καὶ συνέχεται
 πάντα εἰς ἀεὶ τὰ τε νοητῶς τὰ τε αἰσθητῶς ὄντα, τὰ μὲν παρ' αὐτῶν ὄντα,
 τὰ δὲ μετοχῇ τούτων τὸ εἶναι εἰς ἀεὶ λαβόντα, μιμούμενα τὴν νοητὴν καθ'
 ὅσον δύναται φύσιν.

The
 αἰσθητόν
 is the end of
 the creative
 power of
 Divine
 Nature

Matter,
 too, must
 partake of
 goodness

c. In the following passage the spiritual man, detached from sense-perception, describes how he sees the relation between Noûs ("the God") and the sensible world. In the form of a theogony he qualifies this world as "the last-born son" of "the God", the only one who did not stay with Him (cp. above: Philo, nr. **1301c**). This world is beautiful, since it is an image of "the Father"; and for the same reason it must be eternal and created eternally,—i.e. not by deliberation nor by an act of the will.

Enn. V 8, 12, l. 2-25:

Ἰδὼν δὴ (sc. ὁ νοῦς), —τί ἀπαγγέλλει; Ἡ θεὸν ἐωρακέναι τόκον ὠδίνοντα καλὸν
 καὶ πάντα δὴ ἐν αὐτῷ γεγεννηκότα καὶ ἄλυπον ἔχοντα τὴν ὠδῖνα ἐν αὐτῷ· ἥσθεις
 5 γὰρ οἷς ἐγέννα καὶ ἀγασθεις τῶν τόκων κατέσχε πάντα παρ' αὐτῷ τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ
 τὴν αὐτῶν ἀγλαίαν ἀσμενίσας· ὁ δὲ καλῶν ὄντων καὶ καλλιώνων τῶν εἰς τὸ
 εἶσω μεμενηκότων μόνος ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων παῖς ἐξεφάνη εἰς τὸ ἔξω. Ἀφ' οὗ καὶ
 10 ὑστάτου παιδὸς ὄντος ἔστιν ἰδεῖν οἶον ἐξ εἰκόνης τινὸς αὐτοῦ, ὅσος ὁ πατήρ
 ἐκεῖνος καὶ οἱ μείναντες παρὰ τῷ πατρὶ ἀδελφοί. Ὁ δὲ οὐ φησι μάτην ἔλθεῖν
 παρὰ τοῦ πατρός· εἶναι γὰρ δὴ αὐτοῦ ἄλλον κόσμον γεγονότα καλόν, ὥς
 εἰκόνα καλοῦ· μηδὲ γὰρ εἶναι θεμιτὸν εἰκόνα καλὴν μὴ εἶναι μήτε καλοῦ μήτε

The created
 world „the
 youngest
 Son of God”

ουσίας. Μιμεῖται δὴ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον πανταχῇ· καὶ γὰρ ζῶν ἔχει καὶ τὸ τῆς 15
ουσίας, ὡς μίμημα, καὶ τὸ κάλλος εἶναι, ὡς ἐκεῖθεν· ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ αὐτοῦ,
ὡς εἰκῶν· ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ἔξει εἰκόνα, ποτὲ δὲ οὐ, οὐ τέχνη γενομένης τῆς εἰκόνης;
Πᾶσα δὲ φύσει εἰκῶν ἐστίν, ὅσον ἂν τὸ ἀρχέτυπον μένη. Διὸ οὐκ ὀρθῶς, οἱ
φθείρουσι τοῦ νοητοῦ μένοντος καὶ γεννώσιν οὕτως, ὡς ποτὲ βουλευσαμένου τοῦ 20
ποιούντος ποιεῖν. "Ὅστις γὰρ τρόπος ποιήσεως τοιαύτης οὐκ ἐθέλουσι συνιέναι
οὐδ' ἴσασιν, ὅτι, ὅσον ἐκεῖνο ἐλλάμπει, οὐ μήποτε τὰ ἄλλα ἐλλείπη, ἀλλ' ἐξ
οὗ ἐστι καὶ ταῦτα ἐστίν· ἦν δ' αὖ καὶ ἔσται.

Mixed
character of
this world

1402—a. This world is of a mixed character, and here is the source of difficulties.

Enn. II 3, 9, l. 42-47:

Τὰ δὲ δυσχερῇ διὰ τὴν μῆξιν. Μεμιγμένη γὰρ οὖν δὴ ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ παντός
φύσις, καὶ εἴ τις τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν χωριστὴν αὐτοῦ χωρίσειε, τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ μέγα.
Θεὸς μὲν οὖν ἐκείνης συναριθμουμένης, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν δαίμων, φησί, μέγας 45
καὶ τὰ πάθη τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ δαιμόνια. ¹

How it
arises from
soul as a
perpetual
image

b. It is an εἰκῶν αὖ εἰκονιζόμενος, a reality of the third degree.

Enn. II 3, 18, l. 8-22:

Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς εἴρηται, δεῖ τὴν τοῦ παντός ψυχὴν θεωρεῖν μὲν τὰ ἄριστα
αὖ ἱεμένην πρὸς τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸν θεόν, πληρουμένης δὲ αὐτῆς καὶ 10
πεπληρωμένης οἷον ἀπομεστουμένης αὐτῆς τὸ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἰνδαλμα καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον
αὐτῆς πρὸς τὸ κάτω τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦτο εἶναι ². Ποιητὴς οὖν ἔσχατος οὗτος· ἐπὶ δ'
αὐτῇ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πρῶτως πληρούμενον παρὰ νοῦ· ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ νοῦς δη-
μιουργός, ὃς καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ μετ' αὐτὸν δίδωσιν ὧν ἔχνη ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ. Εἰκότως 15
οὖν λέγεται οὗτος ὁ κόσμος εἰκῶν αὖ εἰκονιζόμενος, ἐστηκότων μὲν τοῦ πρώτου
καὶ δευτέρου, τοῦ δὲ τρίτου ἐστηκότος μὲν καὶ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ κατὰ
συμβεβηκὸς κινουμένου. "Εὖς γὰρ ἂν ἡ νοῦς καὶ ψυχὴ, ῥεύσονται οἱ λόγοι εἰς 20
τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος τῆς ψυχῆς, ὥσπερ, ἔως ἂν ἡ ἥλιος, πάντα τὰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ φῶτα.

c. According to the following passage, the particular soul produces the μὴ ὄν (i.e. ὕλη) as an εἰδωλον, which is quite indeterminated and obscure. Next, at a second glance, she illuminates it and forms it.

Enn. III 9, 3, l. 7-16:

The
μὴ ὄν
is first
produced by
the partic-
ular Soul;
next it is
illuminated
by it

Φωτίζεται μὲν οὖν ἡ μερικὴ (ψυχὴ) πρὸς τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς φερομένη — ὄντι γὰρ
ἐντυγχάνει —, εἰς δὲ τὸ μετ' αὐτὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν. Τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ, ὅταν πρὸς αὐτὴν·

¹ It is of *Eros* that Plato says (*Symp.* 202d-e) that he is a "great daemon".

² By this lowest form of soul, which is creative, the author means: φύσις. Cp. below, nr. 1405.

- 10 πρὸς αὐτὴν γὰρ βουλομένη * τὸ μετ' αὐτὴν ποιεῖ εἶδωλον αὐτῆς, τὸ μὴ
 ὄν, οἷον κενεμβατοῦσα καὶ ἀοριστοτέρα γινομένη· καὶ ταῦτο τὸ εἶδωλον τὸ
 ἀόριστον πάντη σκοτεινόν· ἄλογον γὰρ καὶ ἀνόητον πάντη καὶ πολὺ τοῦ ὄντος
 15 ἀποστατοῦν. Εἰς δὲ τὸ μεταξύ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ, πάλιν δὲ ἰδοῦσα οἷον δευτέρᾳ
 προσβολῇ τὸ εἶδωλον ἐμόρφωσε καὶ ἡσθεῖσα ἔρχεται εἰς αὐτό.

1403—Opposing the gnostics—according to recent discoveries they were a Christian sect of Sethians from Egypt—Plotinus states:

a. The sensible world is a clear and beautiful image of the intelligible. It is not equal to it, but it does resemble it.

Enn. II 9, 8, l. 8-20:

- Ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τοῦ παντὸς τὴν διοίκησιν ὀρθῶς ἂν τις μέμψαιτο πρῶτον μὲν
 10 ἐνδεικνυμένην τῆς νοητῆς φύσεως τὸ μέγεθος. Εἰ γὰρ οὕτως εἰς τὸ ζῆν παρε-
 λήλυθεν, ὥς μὴ ζωὴν ἀδιάθρωτον ἔχειν—ὅποια τὰ σμικρότερα τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ,
 ἃ τῇ πολλῇ ζωῇ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀεὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν γεννᾶται—ἀλλ' ἐστὶ
 συνεχῆς καὶ ἐναργῆς καὶ πολλὴ καὶ πανταχοῦ ζωὴ σοφίαν ἀμήχανον ἐνδεικνυ-
 15 μένη, πῶς οὐκ ἂν τις ἄγαλμα ἐναργὲς καὶ καλὸν τῶν νοητῶν θεῶν ¹ εἴποι;
 Εἰ δὲ μιμούμενον μὴ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο, αὐτὸ τοῦτο κατὰ φύσιν ἔχει· οὐ γὰρ ἦν **
 ἔτι μιμούμενον. Τὸ δὲ ἀνομοίως μεμιμῆσθαι ψεῦδος· οὐδὲν γὰρ παραλέλειπται
 ὦν οἷόν τε ἦν καλὴν εἰκόνα φυσικὴν ἔχειν.

The sensible
 world is an
 ἄγαλμα
 resembling
 the
 intelligible

b. It has not been created by sin or a lapse of the soul.

Enn. II 9, 4, l. I-II:

- Εἰ δὲ οἷον πτερορρυήσασαν ² τὴν ψυχὴν φήσουσι πεποιηκέναι, οὐχ ἡ τοῦ
 παντὸς τοῦτο πάσχει· εἰ δὲ σφαλεῖσαν αὐτοὶ φήσουσι, τοῦ σφάλματος λεγέτωσαν
 τὴν αἰτίαν. Πότε δὲ ἐσφάλῃ; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αἰδίου, μένει κατὰ τὸν αὐτῶν λόγον
 5 ἐσφαλμένη· εἰ δὲ ἥρξατο, διὰ τί οὐ πρὸ τοῦ; Ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ νεῦσιν φαμεν τὴν
 ποιοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μὴ νεῦσιν. Εἰ δὲ ἔνευσε, τῷ ἐπιλελῆσθαι δηλονότι τῶν
 ἐκεῖ· εἰ δὲ ἐπελάθετο, πῶς δημιουργεῖ; Πόθεν γὰρ ποιεῖ ἢ ἐξ ὧν εἶδεν ἐκεῖ;
 Εἰ δὲ ἐκείνων μεμνημένη ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ ὅλως ἔνευσεν, οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ ἀμυδρῶς ἔχει.
 10 Οὐ μᾶλλον νεύει ἐκεῖ, ἵνα μὴ ἀμυδρῶς ἴδῃ;

It was not
 created by a
 lapse of the
 soul

c. Those who blame the sensible world do not understand that there *must* be a hierarchy of being and that things belonging to a lower stage are not evil because they are not as good as that which is "before" them.

Enn. II 9, 13, l. I-8:

Ὁ ἄρα μεμφόμενος τῇ τοῦ κόσμου φύσει οὐκ οἶδεν ὃ τι ποιεῖ, οὐδ' ὅπου τὸ

There is no
 reason for
 blaming it

* <εἶναι> suppl. Vitringa.

** <ἂν> suppl. Kirchhoff.

¹ Plato, *Tim.* 37c.

² Plato, *Phaedr.* 246c.

θράσος αὐτοῦ τοῦτο χωρεῖ. Τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασι τάξιν τῶν ἐφεξῆς πρώτων καὶ δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων καὶ αἰεὶ μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων, καὶ ὡς οὐ λοιδορητέον τοῖς χεῖροσι τῶν πρώτων, ἀλλὰ πρῶως συγχωρητέον τῇ πάντων φύσει αὐτὸν θέοντα 5 πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα παυσάμενον τῆς τραγωδίας τῶν φοβερῶν, ὡς οἴονται, ἐν ταῖς τοῦ κόσμου σφαίραις, αἱ δὴ πάντα μείλιχα τεύχουσιν¹ αὐτοῖς.—

d. By despising this world and the gods that are in it man makes himself evil. For you cannot honour the intelligible while despising the visible order which springs from it.

Despising
this world
makes evil
men

Enn. II 9, 16, 1. 1-9:

Οὐδ' αὖ τῷ καταφρονῆσαι κόσμου καὶ θεῶν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καλῶν ἀγαθόν ἐστι γενέσθαι. Καὶ γὰρ πᾶς κακὸς καὶ πρὸ τοῦ καταφρονήσειεν ἂν θεῶν, καὶ μὴ πρότερον πᾶς κακὸς καταφρονήσας, καὶ εἰ τὰ ἄλλα μὴ πάντα κακὸς εἶη, αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἂν γεγονώς εἶη. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς νοητοὺς 5 θεοὺς λεγομένη αὐτοῖς τιμὴ ἀσυμπαθὴς ἂν γένοιτο· ὁ γὰρ τὸ φιλεῖν πρὸς ὁτιοῦν ἔχων καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς πᾶν οὐ φιλεῖ ἀσπάζεται καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ὧν τὸν πατέρα ἀγαπᾷ· ψυχὴ δὲ πᾶσα πατρὸς ἐκείνου.

1404—Plotinus, as we saw above, says repeatedly that the world must be eternal and that creation is an eternal process. E.g. **1402b**: εἰκῶν αἰεὶ εἰκονιζόμενος, and **1403b**: πότε δὲ ἐσφάλη; e.q.s.

In the treatise *Περὶ τοῦ κόσμου* (II 1) the "immortality" of the cosmos is amply discussed. It is defended first of all by the argument that it would be absurd to admit that soul by its "wonderful power" should not *always* hold the world together.

The world is
imperishable

a. *Enn.* II 1, 3, 1. 1-5:

Πῶς οὖν ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ παντὸς συνεργὸν ἂν εἶη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ἀθανασίαν αἰεὶ ῥέον; Ἡ ὅτι, φαῖμεν ἂν, <ῥεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ>· ῥεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἔξω. Εἰ οὖν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, μένον τὸ αὐτὸ οὐτ' ἂν αὐξοίτο οὔτε φθίνοι· οὐ 5 τοίνυν οὐδὲ γηράσκει.

Soul holds
it together
eternally

b. *Enn.* II 1, 4, 1. 14-20:

Τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον, τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφεξῆς τοῖς ἀρίστοις κινουμένην δυνάμει θαυμαστῇ κειμένην, πῶς ἐκφεύζεται τι αὐτὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι τῶν ἀπαξ ἐν αὐτῇ 15 τεθέντων; Μὴ παντὸς δὲ δεσμοῦ οἴεσθαι κρείττονα εἶναι ἐκ θεοῦ ὥρμημένην, ἀνθρώπων ἀπειρῶν ἐστὶν αἰτίας τῆς συνεχούσης τὰ πάντα. Ἀτοπον γὰρ τὴν καὶ ὁποσονοῦν χρόνον δυνηθεῖσαν συνέχειν μὴ καὶ αἰεὶ ποιεῖν τοῦτο.

20

c. Thus, in opposing the gnostics, Plotinus argues that "the soul

¹ Pind. *Olymp.* I 48.

which stayed yonder" and is not a part of us, while we are not a part of it, gives to the cosmos whatever this world is able to accept of the intelligible; and, being illuminated from beyond eternally, she (i.e. universal soul) does so without end.

Enn. II 9, 2, l. 11 - 3, l. 15:

Ψυχὴ μείνασα, ἢ μὴ μέρος, μηδὲ ἥς ἡμεῖς ἔτι μέρος, ἔδωκε τῷ παντὶ σώματι αὐτῷ τε ἔχειν ὅσον δύναται παρ' αὐτῆς ἔχειν, μένει τε ἀπραγμόνως αὐτὴ οὐκ ἐκ διανοίας διοικοῦσα οὐδὲ τι διορθουμένη, ἀλλὰ τῇ εἰς τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς θεᾷ κατα-
15 κοσμοῦσα δυνάμει θαυμαστῇ. "Ὅσον γὰρ πρὸς αὐτῇ ἔστι, τόσῳ καλλίων καὶ δυνατωτέρα· κακεῖθεν ἔχουσα δίδωσι τῷ μετ' αὐτὴν καὶ ὥσπερ ἐλλάμπουσα ἀεὶ ἐλλάμπεται.

Creation
must be an
eternal
process

(3) 'Αεὶ οὖν ἐλλαμπομένη καὶ διηνεκὲς ἔχουσα τὸ φῶς δίδωσιν εἰς τὰ ἐφεξῆς, τὰ δ' ἀεὶ συνέχεται καὶ ἄρδεται τούτῳ τῷ φωτὶ καὶ ἀπολαύει τοῦ ζῆν καθ' ὅσον δύναται· ὥσπερ εἰ πυρὸς ἐν μέσῳ που κειμένου ἀλεαίνονται οἷς οἶόν τε.
5 Καίτοι τὸ πῦρ ἐστὶν ἐν μέτρῳ· ὅταν δὲ δυνάμεις μὴ μετρηθεῖσαι μὴ ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ὥσιν ἀνηρημέναι, πῶς οἶόν τε εἶναι μέν, μηδὲν δὲ αὐτῶν μεταλαμβάνειν; 'Αλλ' ἀνάγκη ἕκαστον τὸ αὐτοῦ διδόναι καὶ ἄλλῳ, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, ἢ ὁ νοῦς οὐ νοῦς, ἢ ψυχὴ μὴ τοῦτο, εἰ μὴ τι μετὰ τοῦ πρώτως ζῆν
10 ζῶν καὶ δευτέρως ἕως ἔστι τὸ πρώτως. 'Ανάγκη τοίνυν ἐφεξῆς εἶναι πάντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἀεὶ, γενητὰ δὲ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ παρ' ἄλλων εἶναι. Οὐ τοίνυν ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ἐγένετο καὶ γενήσεται, ὅσα γενητὰ λέγεται· οὐδὲ φθαρήσεται, ἀλλ' ἢ
15 ὅσα ἔχει εἰς ἅ· δ δὲ μὴ ἔχει εἰς ὅ, οὐδὲ φθαρήσεται.

d. Cp. *Enn.* II 9, 12, l. 32 f.:

Τί γὰρ ἐλλάμπειν ἔδει, εἰ μὴ πάντως ἔδει;

Why illu-
minating if
not
eternally?

1405—What is φύσις?

In *Enn.* IV, 4, 13, cited under 1376d, we found φρόνησις opposed to φύσις, the latter being described as ψυχῆς ἔσχατον ὄν. Nature "produces" (ποιεῖ) without knowing.—It does not even possess imagination, which is a mean between νόησις and φύσις.

φύσις,
the lowest
stage of soul

a. *Enn.* IV 4, 13, l. 7-15:

Οὐδὲ οἶδε, μόνον δὲ ποιεῖ· δ γὰρ ἔχει τῷ ἐφεξῆς διδοῦσα ἀπροαιρέτως τὴν δόσιν τῷ σωματικῷ καὶ ὑλικῷ ποίησιν ἔχει, οἶον καὶ τὸ θερμανθὲν τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἀψαμένῳ δέδωκε τὸ αὐτοῦ εἶδος θερμὸν ἐλαττόνως ποιῆσαν. Διὰ τοῦτό τοι ἡ φύσις οὐδὲ φαντασίαν ἔχει· ἡ δὲ νόησις φαντασίας κρείττων· φαντασία δὲ μεταξὺ φύσεως τύπου καὶ νοήσεως. 'Η μὲν γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἀντίληψιν οὐδὲ σύνεσιν
10 ἔχει, ἡ δὲ φαντασία σύνεσιν ἐπακτοῦ.

b. P. speaks again of φύσις in the treatise *Περὶ θεωρίας* (III 8). The productive power in nature, he explains here, is the *logos* in it. This *logos* is an εἶδος without ὕλη. It produces another *logos*, which "gives something" (of itself) to the ὑποκείμενον.

The stable
element in
nature,
which is
creative, is
the *logos*

Enn. III 8, 2, l. 9-34:

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐχρῆν συνοοῦντας, ὥς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τὰς τέχνας τὰς τοιαύτας μετιόν- 10
των, ὅτι δεῖ τι ἐν αὐτοῖς μένειν, καθ' ὃ μένον διὰ χειρῶν ποιήσουσιν ἃ αὐτῶν ἔργα,
ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνελθεῖν τῆς φύσεως καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ συνεῖναι, ὥς μένειν δεῖ καὶ
ἐνταῦθα τὴν δύναμιν τὴν οὐ διὰ χειρῶν ποιοῦσαν καὶ πᾶσαν μένειν. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ 15
δεῖται τῶν μὲν ὥς μερόντων, τῶν δὲ ὥς κινουμένων — ἡ γὰρ ὕλη τὸ κινούμενον,
αὐτῆς δὲ οὐδὲν κινούμενον — ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὐκ ἔσται τὸ κινοῦν πρῶτως, οὐδὲ ἡ
φύσις τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀκίνητον τὸ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ. Ὁ μὲν δὴ λόγος, φαίη ἂν τις,
ἀκίνητος, αὕτη δὲ ἄλλη παρὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ κινουμένη. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πᾶσαν 20
φήσουσι, καὶ ὁ λόγος· εἰ δέ τι αὐτῆς ἀκίνητον, τοῦτο καὶ ὁ λόγος. Καὶ γὰρ εἶδος
αὐτὴν δεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἶδους· τί γὰρ δεῖ αὐτῇ ὕλης θερμῆς ἢ
ψυχρᾶς; Ἡ γὰρ ὑποκειμένη καὶ δημιουργουμένη ὕλη ἔχει τοῦτο φέρουσα,
ἢ γίνεται τοιαύτη ἢ μὴ ποιότητα ἔχουσα λογωθεῖσα. Οὐ γὰρ πῦρ δεῖ προσελθεῖν, 25
ἵνα πῦρ ἢ ὕλη γένηται, ἀλλὰ λόγον· ὃ καὶ σημεῖον οὐ μικρὸν τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ζώοις
καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς τοὺς λόγους εἶναι τοὺς ποιοῦντας καὶ τὴν φύσιν εἶναι λόγον,
ὃς ποιεῖ λόγον ἄλλον γέννημα αὐτοῦ δόντα μὲν τι τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, μένοντα δ' 30
αὐτόν. Ὁ μὲν οὖν λόγος ὁ κατὰ τὴν μορφήν τὴν ὁρωμένην ἔσχατος ἦδη καὶ
νεκρὸς καὶ οὐκέτι ποιεῖν δύναται ἄλλον, ὃ δὲ ζῶν ἔχων ὁ τοῦ ποιήσαντος τὴν
μορφήν ἀδελφὸς ὢν καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχων ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ γενομένῳ.

c. This productive faculty may be called *θεωρία*, since it is productive without being practical.

In what sense
this produc-
tive faculty
may be called
θεωρία

Enn. III 8, 3, l. 1-6; 12-22:

Πῶς οὖν ποιῶν καὶ οὕτω ποιῶν *θεωρίας* τινὸς ἂν ἐφάπτοιτο; Ἡ, εἰ μένων 5
ποιεῖ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ μένων καὶ ἐστὶ λόγος, εἴη ἂν αὐτὸς *θεωρία*. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ πρᾶξις
γένειτ' ἂν κατὰ λόγον ἑτέρα οὖσα δηλονότι τοῦ λόγου· ὁ μέντοι λόγος καὶ
αὐτὸς ὁ συνὼν τῇ πράξει καὶ ἐπιστατῶν οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρᾶξις. Εἰ οὖν μὴ πρᾶξις 10
ἀλλὰ λόγος, *θεωρία*. — Πῶς δὲ αὕτη ἔχει *θεωρίαν*; Τὴν μὲν δὴ ἐκ λόγου οὐκ
ἔχει· λέγω δ' ἐκ λόγου τὸ σκοπεῖσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ. Διὰ τί οὖν ζῶη τις
οὖσα καὶ λόγος καὶ δύναμις ποιοῦσα; Ἀρ' ὅτι τὸ σκοπεῖσθαι ἐστὶ τὸ μήπω 15
ἔχειν; Ἡ δὲ ἔχει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι ἔχει καὶ ποιεῖ. Τὸ οὖν εἶναι αὐτῇ ὃ ἐστὶ τοῦτό
ἐστὶ τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτῇ καὶ ὅσον ἐστὶ τοῦτό ἐστὶ τὸ ποιοῦν. Ἔστι δὲ *θεωρία* καὶ
θεώρημα, λόγος γάρ. Τῷ οὖν εἶναι *θεωρία* καὶ *θεώρημα* καὶ λόγος τούτῳ καὶ ποιεῖ 20
ἢ ταῦτά ἐστιν. Ἡ ποίησις ἄρα *θεωρία* ἡμῖν ἀναπέφονται· ἔστι γὰρ ἀποτέλεσμα
θεωρίας μενούσης *θεωρίας* οὐκ ἄλλο τι πραξάσης, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἶναι *θεωρία* ποιησάσης.

d. Nature produces without thinking or conscience. It is soul, but soul of the lowest degree.

Enn. III 8, 4, 1. 15-25:

- 15 Τί οὖν ταῦτα βούλεται; Ὡς ἡ μὲν λεγομένη φύσις ψυχὴ οὖσα, γέννημα ψυχῆς
 προτέρας δυνατώτερον ζώσης, ἡσυχῇ ἐν ἑαυτῇ θεωρίαν ἔχουσα οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω
 οὐδ' αὖ ἐτι πρὸς τὸ κάτω, στάσα δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς στάσει καὶ οἶον
 20 συναισθῆσει, τῇ συνέσει ταύτῃ καὶ συναισθῆσει τὸ μετ' αὐτὴν εἶδεν ὡς οἶόν τε
 αὐτῇ καὶ οὐκέτι ἐζήτησεν ἄλλα θεώρημα ἀποτελέσασα ἀγλαὸν καὶ χαρίεν.
 Καὶ εἴτε τις βούλεται σύνεσιν τινα ἢ αἰσθησιν αὐτῇ διδόναι, οὐχ οἶαν λέγομεν
 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὴν αἰσθησιν ἢ τὴν σύνεσιν, ἀλλ' οἶον εἴ τις τὴν τοῦ ὕψους
 25 τῇ * ἐργηγορότος προσεικάσειε.

1406—Plotinus' theory of ὕλη is chiefly expounded in the treatise *Περὶ τῶν δύο ὕλων* (II 4), as it is named by Porphyry.

The ὕλη which is the ὑποκείμενον of the sensible world, is prefigured in the intelligible world. In other words: if there is ὕλη αἰσθητή, the existence of ὕλη νοητή must be assumed.

a. *Enn.* II 4, 3, 1. 1-16:

- Πρῶτον οὖν λεκτέον ὡς οὐ πανταχοῦ τὸ ἀόριστον ἀτιμαστέον, οὐδὲ δ' ἂν
 ἄμορφον ἢ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπινοίᾳ, εἰ μέλλοι παρέχειν αὐτὸ τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῖς
 ἀρίστοις· οἶόν τι καὶ ψυχὴ πρὸς νοῦν καὶ λόγον πέφυκε μορφουμένη παρὰ τούτων
 5 καὶ εἰς εἶδος βέλτιον ἀγομένη· ἐν τε τοῖς νοητοῖς τὸ σύνθετον ἐτέρως, οὐχ ὡς
 τὰ σώματα· ἐπεὶ καὶ λόγοι σύνθετοι καὶ ἐνεργεῖα δὲ σύνθετον ποιοῦσι τὴν
 ἐνεργουῦσαν εἰς εἶδος φύσιν. Εἰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ παρ' ἄλλου, καὶ μᾶλλον.
 Ἡ δὲ τῶν γιγνομένων ὕλη αἰεὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο εἶδος ἴσχει, τῶν δὲ αἰδίων ἡ αὐτὴ
 10 ταῦτόν αἰεὶ. Τάχα δὲ ἀνάπαλιν ἡ ἐνταῦθα. Ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ παρὰ μέρος πάντα
 καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοτε· διὸ οὐδὲν ἐμμένει ἄλλου ἄλλο ἐξωθουῦντος· διὸ οὐ ταῦτόν αἰεὶ.
 Ἐκεῖ δ' ἅμα πάντα· διὸ οὐκ ἔχει εἰς δ' μεταβάλλοι, ἥδη γὰρ ἔχει πάντα. Οὐδέποτε
 οὖν ἄμορφος οὔτε ἐκεῖ ἢ ἐκεῖ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἡ ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἕτερον τρόπον ἐκατέρω.

ὕλη νοητή,
 its
 difference
 from
 ὕλη αἰσθητή

b. *Ib.*, c. 4, 1. 2-17:

- Εἰ οὖν πολλὰ τὰ εἶδη, κοινὸν μὲν τι ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη εἶναι· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἴδιον,
 5 ᾧ διαφέρει ἄλλο ἄλλου. Τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἴδιον καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ ἡ χωρίζουσα ἡ οἰκεία
 ἐστὶ μορφή. Εἰ δὲ μορφή, ἔστι τὸ μορφούμενον, περὶ δ' ἡ διαφορὰ. Ἔστιν ἄρα
 καὶ ὕλη ἡ τὴν μορφήν δεχομένη καὶ αἰεὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον.

- Ἔτι, εἰ κόσμος νοητὸς ἔστιν ἐκεῖ, μίμημα δὲ οὗτος ἐκείνου, οὗτος δὲ σύνθετος
 10 καὶ ἐξ ὕλης, ἀκαεῖ δεῖ ὕλην εἶναι. Ἡ πῶς προσερεῖς κόσμον μὴ εἰς εἶδος ἰδών;
 Πῶς δὲ εἶδος μὴ ἐφ' ᾧ τὸ εἶδος λαβών; Ἀμερὲς μὲν γὰρ παντελῶς πάντῃ αὐτό,

Arguments
 for assuming
 ὕλη νοητή

* τοῦ codd.; <τῇ> τοῦ Müller, Br.

μεριστόν δὲ ὁπωσοῦν. Καὶ εἰ μὲν διασπασθέντα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὰ μέρη, ἡ τομὴ καὶ ἡ διάσπασις ὕλης ἐστὶ πάθος· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ τμηθεῖσα· εἰ δὲ πολλὰ ὄν ἀμέριστόν ἐστι, τὰ πολλὰ ἐν ἐνὶ ὄντα ἐν ὕλῃ ἐστὶ τῷ ἐνὶ αὐτὰ μορφαὶ αὐτοῦ ὄντα· τὸ γὰρ 15 ἐν τοῦτο τὸ ποικίλον νόησον ποικίλον καὶ πολύμορφον.

c. In what sense intelligible things are composite.

Ib., c. 5, l. 1-9:

ὕλη
is darkness

Εἰ δ', ὅτι αἰεὶ ἔχει ταῦτα καὶ ὁμοῦ, ἐν ἄμφω καὶ οὐχ ὕλῃ ἐκεῖνο, οὐδ' ἐν-
ταῦθα ἔσται τῶν σωμάτων ὕλη, οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἄνευ μορφῆς, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ὅλον σῶμα,
σύνθετον μὴν ὅμως. Καὶ νοῦς εὐρίσκει τὸ διττόν· οὗτος γὰρ διαιρεῖ, ἕως
εἰς ἀπλοῦν ἤκη μηκέτι αὐτὸ ἀναλύεσθαι δυνάμενον· ἕως δὲ δύναται, χωρεῖ 5
αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ βάθος. Τὸ δὲ βάθος ἐκάστου ἡ ὕλη· διὸ καὶ σκοτεινὴ πᾶσα, ὅτι
τὸ φῶς ὁ λόγος καὶ ὁ νοῦς λόγος. Διὸ τὸν ἐφ' ἐκάστου λόγον ὁρῶν τὸ κάτω
ὡς ὑπὸ τὸ φῶς σκοτεινὸν ἡγεῖται *.

d. Again: the difference between intelligible and sensible ὕλη.
The first is οὐσία.

Ib., c. 5, l. 12-23:

Again:
difference
between
the two
ὕλαι

Διάφορόν γε μὴν τὸ σκοτεινὸν τό τε ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς τό τε ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς
ὑπάρχει διάφορός τε ἡ ὕλη, ὅσα καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐπικείμενον ἀμφοῖν διάφορον·
ἡ μὲν γὰρ θεία λαβοῦσα τὸ ὀρίζον αὐτὴν ζῶν ὠρισμένην καὶ νοερὰν ἔχει, 15
ἡ δὲ ὠρισμένον μὲν τι γίγνεται, οὐ μὴν ζῶν οὐδὲ νοῦν, ἀλλὰ νεκρὸν κεκοσμημένον.
Καὶ ἡ μορφή δὲ εἶδωλον· ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἶδωλον. Ἐκεῖ δὲ ἡ μορφή
ἀληθινόν· ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. Διὸ καὶ τοὺς λέγοντας οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην, 20
εἰ περὶ ἐκείνης ἔλεγον, ὁρθῶς ἔδει ὑπολαμβάνειν λέγειν· τὸ γὰρ ὑποκείμενον
ἐκεῖ οὐσία, μᾶλλον δὲ μετὰ τοῦ ἐπ' αὐτῇ νοουμένη καὶ ὅλη οὕσα πεφωτισμένη
οὐσία.

ὕλη νοητὴ
is
substance

e. Ib., c. 5, l. 24-37:

It is eternal

eternally
produced
by
ἐτερότης

Πότερα δὲ αἰδῖος ἡ νοητὴ ὁμοίως ζητητέον, ὡς ἂν τις καὶ τὰς ιδέας ζητοῖ·
γεννητὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἀρχὴν ἔχειν, ἀγέννητα δέ, ὅτι μὴ χρόνῳ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει, 25
ἀλλ' αἰεὶ παρ' ἄλλου, οὐχ ὡς γινόμενα αἰεὶ, ὥσπερ ὁ ** κόσμος, ἀλλὰ ὄντα
αἰεὶ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐκεῖ κόσμος. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐτερότης ἡ ἐκεῖ αἰεὶ, ἡ τὴν ὕλην ποιεῖ·
ἀρχὴ γὰρ ὕλης αὕτη, καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἡ πρώτη· διὸ καὶ αὕτη ἐτερότης ἐλέγετο, 30
ὅτι ὁμοῦ ἐξέφυσαν κίνησις καὶ ἐτερότης· ἀόριστον δὲ καὶ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ ἐτερότης
ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου, κἀκείνου πρὸς τὸ ὀρισθῆναι δεόμενα· ὀρίζεται δέ, ὅταν πρὸς
αὐτὸ ἐπιστραφῇ· πρὶν δὲ ἀόριστον ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ οὐπῶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ'
ἀφώτιστον ἐκείνου. Εἰ γὰρ παρ' ἐκείνου τὸ φῶς, τὸ δεχόμενον τὸ φῶς, πρὶν 35
δέξασθαι, φῶς οὐκ ἔχει αἰεὶ, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο ὄν ἔχει, εἴπερ τὸ φῶς παρ' ἄλλου.

* ἡγηται H.-S.

** <ἐνταῦθα> suppl. Müller, Br.

1407—a. Why ὕλη αἰσθητή must be assumed.

Enn. II 4, 6, I. 1-10:

Περὶ δὴ τῆς τῶν σωμάτων ὑποδοχῆς ὥδε λεγέσθω. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τι τοῖς σώμασιν ὑποκείμενον εἶναι ἄλλο ὄν παρ' αὐτά, ἢ τε εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴ τῶν στοιχείων δηλοῖ. Οὐ γὰρ παντελὴς τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος ἡ φθορά· ἢ ἔσται τις οὐσία εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀπολομένη· οὐδ' αὖ τὸ γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ παντελῶς μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὄν ἐλήλυθεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν εἰδους μεταβολὴ ἐξ εἰδους ἐτέρου. Μένει δὲ τὸ δεξάμενον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γενομένου καὶ ἀποβαλὼν θάτερον. Τοῦτο τε οὖν δηλοῖ 5 καὶ ὅλως ἡ φθορά· συνθέτου γάρ· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἰδους ἕκαστον.

Why
ὕλη αἰσθητή?

b. Sensible matter is completely ἄποιος.

Ib., c. 8, I. 1-8, II, 13-14:

Τίς οὖν ἡ μία αὕτη καὶ συνεχὴς καὶ ἄποιος λεγομένη; Καὶ ὅτι μὲν μὴ σῶμα, εἴπερ ἄποιος, δηλόν· ἡ ποιότηता ἔξει. Λέγοντες δὲ πάντων αὐτὴν εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ οὐ τινῶν μὲν ὕλην, πρὸς ἄλλα δὲ εἶδος οὔσαν — οἶον τὸν πηλὸν 5 ὕλην τῷ κεραμεύοντι, ἀπλῶς δὲ οὐχ ὕλην — οὐ δὴ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα λέγοντες, οὐδὲν ἂν αὐτῇ προσάπτοιμεν τῇ αὐτῆς φύσει, ὅσα ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὁράται. — Οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ μέγεθος. — Δεῖ δὲ αὐτὴν μὴ σύνθετον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἓν τι τῇ αὐτῆς φύσει· οὕτω γὰρ πάντων ἕρημος.

It is
completely
ἄποιος

c. How can it be the "receptacle", if it does not possess μέγεθος or ὄγκος?

How is it the
ὑποδεχόμενον
without
extension
or mass?

Ib., c. II, I. 1-7, 13-16, 17-19; 25-38, 40-43:

Καὶ τί δεῖ τινος ἄλλου πρὸς σύστασιν σωμάτων μετὰ μέγεθος καὶ ποιότητας ἀπάσας; Ἡ τοῦ ὑποδεχομένου πάντα. Οὐκ οὐκ ὄγκος· εἰ δὲ ὄγκος, μέγεθος δὴπου· εἰ δὲ ἀμέγεθες, οὐδ' ὅπου δέξεται ἔχει. Ἀμέγεθες δὲ ὄν τί 5 ἂν συμβάλλοιτο, εἰ μήτε εἰς εἶδος καὶ τὸ ποιὸν μήτε εἰς τὴν διάστασιν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος, ὃ δὴ παρὰ τῆς ὕλης δοκεῖ, ὅπου ἂν ᾖ, ἔρχεσθαι εἰς τὰ σώματα; — Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ ὑποδεχόμενον ὅτιοῦν ὄγκον εἶναι, ἐὰν μὴ 15 μέγεθος ἤδη αὐτῷ παρῇ· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ πάντα δεχομένη ὁμοῦ ἔχει πάντα. — Ἡ δὲ ὕλη διὰ τοῦτο ἐν διαστήματι ἀδέχεται λαμβάνει, ὅτι διαστήματός ἐστι δεκτικὴ· —

Μέγεθος is not required as a substrate for Form.

25 Οὐ τοίνυν ὄγκον δεῖ εἶναι τὸ δεξόμενον τὸ εἶδος, ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ τῷ γενέσθαι ὄγκον καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ποιότητα δέχεσθαι. Καὶ φάντασμα μὲν ἔχειν ὄγκου ὡς ἐπιτηδειότητα τούτου ὥσπερ πρῶτην, κενὸν δὲ ὄγκον. "Ὅθεν τινὲς ταύτῃ τῷ κενῷ τὴν ὕλην εἰρήκασι. Φάντασμα δὲ ὄγκου λέγω, ὅτι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδὲν 30 ἔχουσα ὀρίσαι, ὅταν τῇ ὕλῃ προσομιλῇ, εἰς ἀοριστίαν χεῖ ἑαυτὴν οὔτε περιγρά-

It has only
the
appearance
of
ὄγκος

It is great
and small

φουσα οὔτε εἰς σημεῖον ἰέναι δυναμένη· ἥδη γὰρ ὀρίζει. Διὸ οὔτε μέγα λεκτέον χωρὶς οὔτε σμικρὸν αὖ, ἀλλὰ μέγα καὶ μικρόν ¹· καὶ οὕτως ὄγκος καὶ ἀμέγεθες οὕτως, ὅτι ὕλη ὄγκου καὶ συστελλόμενον ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου ἐπὶ τὸ σμικρὸν καὶ ἐκ 35 τοῦ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ τὸ μέγα οἶον ὄγκον διατρέχει· καὶ ἡ ἀοριστία αὐτῆς ὁ τοιοῦτος ὄγκος, ὑποδοχὴ μεγέθους ἐν αὐτῇ ². — 'Ἡ δὲ ἀόριστος οὖσα καὶ μήπω σταῖσα ³ παρ' αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πᾶν εἶδος φερομένη δεῦρο ἀκαεῖσε καὶ πάντα εὐάγωγος οὖσα ⁴⁰ πολλή τε γίνεται τῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἀγωγῇ καὶ γενέσκει καὶ ἔσχε τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον φύσιν ὄγκου.

1408—Since the "essence" of ὕλη is indefiniteness (ἀοριστία), two questions arise, namely

- 1) whether it must be distinguished from the Aristotelian notion of στέρησις (see above, nrs. **476**, **478**, **480**),
- 2) in what sense it may be called ἄπειρον.

Is
ὕλη
= στέρησις?

a. *Enn.* II 4, I4, l. 1-6, 22-30:

'Ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ζητητέον, πότερα στέρησις, ἢ περὶ αὐτῆς ἡ στέρησις. 'Ο τοῖνον λέγων λόγος ὑποκειμένῳ μὲν ἐν ἄμφω, λόγῳ δὲ δύο, δίκαιος ἦν διδάσκειν καὶ τὸν λόγον ἐκατέρου ὄντινα δεῖ ἀποδιδόναι, τῆς μὲν ὕλης ὅς ὀριεῖται αὐτὴν οὐδὲν προσασπτόμενος τῆς στερήσεως, τῆς τε αὖ στερήσεως ὡσαύτως. 5

Εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ὄν, ὅτι μὴ τὸ ὄν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο ὄν τί ἐστι, δύο οἱ λόγοι, ὁ μὲν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἀπτόμενος, ὁ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα σχέσιν δηλῶν. 'Ἡ ὁ μὲν τῆς ὕλης πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα καὶ ὁ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα, ὁ δὲ 25 τῆς στερήσεως εἰ τὸ ἀόριστον αὐτῆς δηλοῖ, τάχα ἂν αὐτὸς αὐτῆς ἐφάπτοιτο· πλὴν ἐν γε ἐκατέρως τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, λόγῳ δὲ δύο. Εἰ μέντοι τῷ ἀορίστῳ εἶναι καὶ ἀπείρῳ εἶναι καὶ ἀποίῳ εἶναι τῇ ὕλῃ ταυτόν, πῶς ἔτι δύο οἱ λόγοι;

b. "Ὑλη = the ἄπειρον, but not in the sense of a property.

ὕλη =
the
ἄπειρον

Enn. II 4, I5, l. 10-12, 17:

'Ανάγκη τοῖνον τὴν ὕλην τὸ ἄπειρον εἶναι, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ἄπειρον, ὡς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τῷ συμβεβηκέναι τὸ ἄπειρον αὐτῇ. — Αὐτὴ τοῖνον τὸ ἄπειρον.

c. The ἄπειρον, namely, is twofold, like ὕλη is. Only in this case the archetypon, i.e. the ἄπειρον in the intelligible world, is less infinite than its image in the sensible world. For (as P. says in VI 6, 3) the ἄπειρον in the intelligible world is always determined. Cp. II 4, 3, l. 14 f.: οὐδέποτ' οὖν ἄμορφος ἢ ἐκεῖ (ὕλη), nr. **1406a**, and **1406d**.

¹ Cp. Arist. on Plato in *Metaph.* A 6, 987b 20 (*Gr. Ph.* I, nr. **365a**).

² Cp. Plato, *Parm.* 164d (*Gr. Ph.* I, nr. **334**).

³ Cp. Hermodorus ap. Simpl., *Phys.* 248 (*Gr. Ph.* I, nr. **371a**, the end). ὥστε ἄστατον καὶ ἄμορφον καὶ ἄπειρον, κτλ.

Enn. II 4, 15, l. 17-28:

Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἡ ὕλη τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ εἴη ἂν γεννηθὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ
 20 ἐνὸς ἀπειρίας ἢ δυνάμεως ἢ τοῦ ἀεί, οὐκ οὔσης ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἀπειρίας ἀλλὰ ποιούντος.
 Πῶς οὖν ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα; Ἡ διττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. Καὶ τί διαφέρει; Ὡς
 ἀρχέτυπον καὶ εἶδωλον. Ἐλαττόνως οὖν ἄπειρον τοῦτο; Ἡ μᾶλλον· ὅσῳ γὰρ
 εἶδωλον πεφευγὸς τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές, μᾶλλον ἄπειρον. Ἡ γὰρ ἀπειρία ἐν τῷ ἤττον
 25 ὀρισθέντι μᾶλλον· τὸ γὰρ ἤττον ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ κακῷ. Τὸ ἐκεῖ οὖν
 μᾶλλον ὃν εἶδωλον ὥς ἄπειρον, τὸ δ' ἐνταῦθα ἤττον, ὅσῳ πέφευγε τὸ εἶναι
 καὶ τὸ ἀληθές, εἰς δὲ εἰδώλου κατερρῦη φύσιν, ἀληθεστέρως ἄπειρον.

The
 ἄπειρον
 as archety-
 pon is less
 infinite

d. That there is ἄπειρον in Noûs, because this is one and many, is said by P. repeatedly, e.g. in *Enn.* VI 7, 14, l. 11 f.:

Καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον οὕτως ἐν νῷ, ὅτι αὐτὸς ἐν πολλά, οὐχ ὡς οἶκος εἷς, ἀλλ'
 ὡς λόγος πολὺς ἐν αὐτῷ.

The
 ἄπειρον
 in the
 intelligible
 world

Cp. also VI 2, 21, l. 10 (above, nr. 1385b) and III 8, 8, the end. As we saw above, in II 4, 3 (nr. 1406a) he reminds the reader that the ἄπειρον should not always be despised. In VI 6 he begins his treatise Περὶ ἀριθμῶν by asking:

Ἄρ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀπόστασις τοῦ ἐνός, καὶ ἡ ἀπειρία ἀπόστασις παντελὴς τῷ πλῆθος ἀνάριθμον εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κακὸν ἢ ἀπειρία καὶ ἡμεῖς κακοί, ὅταν πλῆθος;

To this question he answers in c. 3 that in the intelligible world πλῆθος is always determined, and even the ἄπειρον is so.

e. Thus, ὕλη (=the ἄπειρον) together with the intelligible world is derived by P. from the First Principle, which he calls δύναιμις τῶν πάντων (III 8, 10, the beginning), and "the Father" who made the intelligible world; e.g. V 1, 5, l. 3 ff.:

Τίς οὖν ὁ τοῦτον γεννήσας, ὁ ἀπλοῦς καὶ ὁ πρὸ τοῦ τοιούτου, ὁ αἷτιος τοῦ
 5 καὶ εἶναι καὶ πολὺν εἶναι τοῦτον, ὁ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ποιῶν; Ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς οὐ πρῶ-
 τος· καὶ γὰρ πρὸ τῆς δυάδος τὸ ἐν, δεύτερον δὲ δυάς καὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐνὸς γεγενη-
 μένη ἐκεῖνο ὀριστὴν ἔχει, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀόριστον παρ' αὐτῆς.

It is derived
 directly
 from the
 First
 Principle

Here again we find the indefinite Two directly engendered by the One. Cp. above, nr. 1279a, 1285b and the explanations given there. Also 1288c: on the μονὰς ἀρσενόθης, and 1340a (*Corpus Herm.* I 9, where the Noûs is called ἀρσενόθης).

By the derivation of ὕλη from the First Principle Plotinus' monism is completed and a certain obscurity of classical Platonism corrected and made precise.

Monism
 completed

1409—In III 6, second part (cc. 6-19), Plotinus deals with ὕλη as an ἀσώματον, and as such ἀπαθής.

a. "Ὑλη is ἀπαθής in quite another sense than intelligible Being is. The latter is beyond πάθη, ὕλη is below. As non-being it is never really "formed" by that which comes into it.

Enn. III 6, 6, 1. 1-7; c. 7, 1. 3-31, 37-43:

Τὴν μὲν δὴ οὐσίαν τὴν νοητὴν τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἅπασαν τεταγμένην ὡς ἀπαθῆ δεῖ εἶναι δοκεῖν εἴρηται. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἐν τι τῶν ἀσωμάτων, εἰ καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον, σκεπτέον καὶ περὶ ταύτης τίνα τρόπον ἔχει, πότερα παθητή, 5 ὡς λέγεται, καὶ κατὰ πάντα τρεπτή¹, ἢ καὶ ταύτην δεῖ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι οἷεσθαι, καὶ τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἀπαθείας. —

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν (ἡ ὕλη) ἀσώματος, ἐπεὶ περ τὸ σῶμα ὕστερον καὶ σύνθετον καὶ αὐτὴ μετ' ἄλλου ποιεῖ σῶμα. Οὕτω γὰρ τοῦ ὀνόματος τετύχηκε τοῦ αὐτοῦ 5 κατὰ τὸ ἀσώματον, ὅτι ἐκάτερον τό τε ὄν ἢ τε ὕλη ἕτερα τῶν σωμάτων. Οὕτε δὲ ψυχὴ οὐσα οὔτε νοῦς οὔτε ζωὴ οὔτε εἶδος οὔτε λόγος οὔτε πέρας — ἀπειρία γάρ — οὔτε δύναμις — τί γὰρ καὶ ποιεῖ; — ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὑπερεκπεσοῦσα πάντα οὐδὲ τὴν 10 τοῦ ὄντος προσσηγορίαν ὁρθῶς ἂν δέχοιτο, μὴ ὄν δ' ἂν εἰκότως λέγοιτο, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ κίνησις μὴ ὄν ἢ στάσις μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ' ἀληθινῶς μὴ ὄν, εἰδῶλον καὶ φάντασμα ὄγκου καὶ ὑποστάσεως ἔφεσις καὶ ἐστηκὸς οὐκ ἐν στάσει καὶ ἀόρατον καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ φεῦγον τὸ βουλόμενον ἰδεῖν, καὶ ὅταν τις μὴ ἴδῃ γιγνόμενον, ἀτενίσαντι 15 δὲ οὐχ ὀρώμενον, καὶ τὰ ἐναντία αἰεὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ φανταζόμενον, μικρὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ ἤττον καὶ μᾶλλον, ἐλλείπον τε καὶ ὑπερέχον, εἰδῶλον οὐ μένον οὐδ' αὖ φεύγειν δυνάμενον· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἰσχύει ἅτε μὴ ἰσχὺν παρὰ νοῦ λαβόν, ἀλλ' ἐν 20 ἐλλείψει τοῦ ὄντος παντὸς γενόμενον. Διὸ πᾶν ὃ ἂν ἐπαγγέλληται ψεύδεται, καὶ μέγα φαντασθῆ, μικρὸν ἐστί, καὶ μᾶλλον, ἤττον ἐστί, καὶ τὸ ὄν αὐτοῦ ἐν φαντάσει οὐκ ὄν ἐστίν, οἷον παίγνιον φεύγον· ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐγγίγνεσθαι δοκοῦντα παίγνια, εἰδῶλα ἐν εἰδώλῳ ἀτεχνῶς, ὡς ἐν κατόπτρῳ τὸ ἀλλαχοῦ 25 ἰδρυμένον, ἀλλαχοῦ φανταζόμενον· καὶ πιμπλάμενον, ὡς δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔχον οὐδὲν καὶ δοκοῦν τὰ πάντα². Τὰ δὲ εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα τῶν ὄντων μιμήματα³ καὶ εἰδῶλα εἰς εἰδῶλον ἁμορφον καὶ διὰ τὸ ἁμορφον αὐτῆς ἐνωρώμενα ποιεῖν μὲν δοκεῖ εἰς αὐτὴν, ποιεῖ δὲ οὐδέν· ἁμενηνὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀσθενῆ καὶ ἀντερεῖδον οὐκ ἔχοντα. — 30

Καὶ τούτων μαθεῖν ἐστί τὴν πείσεως ψεύδος ψεύδους ὄντος τοῦ ἐνορω- μένου καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἔχοντος ὁμοιότητα πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαν. Ἀσθενὲς δὴ καὶ ψεύδος 40 ὄν καὶ εἰς ψεύδος ἐμπύπτον, οἷα ἐν ὀνείρῳ ἢ ὕδατι ἢ κατόπτρῳ, ἀπαθῆ αὐτὴν εἶασεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι· καίτοι ἐν γε τοῖς προειρημένοις ὁμοιώσις τοῖς ἐνορω- μένοις ἐστί πρὸς τὰ ἐνορῶντα.

b. Matter is not affected by that which comes into it. Thus, it cannot be influenced by the good. This means that it is evil by nature—"evil" in the sense οἱ στέρησις (cp. Plato's doctrine of the ἀπειρον, above, vol. I, nr. 371).

¹ This is the Stoic doctrine. Cp. SVF II 309.

² The whole description is clearly inspired by Plato, *Parm.* 164d-165c (*Gr.* Ph. I, 334).

³ Plato, *Tim.* 50c.

Enn. III 6, 11, 1. 15-18, 36-45:

Its
ἀπάθεια

- 15 Τῇ δὲ ὕλῃ οὔτε τι πλεον εἰς τὴν αὐτῆς σύστασιν προσελθόντος ὁτουοῦν·
οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται τότε ὃ ἔστι προσελθόντος, οὔτε ἔλαττον ἀπελθόντος· μένει γὰρ
ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἦν. — Οὐ γὰρ ἐξίσταται ἑαυτῆς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι μετα-
λαμβάνειν ἀμηγέπη μεταλαμβάνει ἕως ἂν ᾗ, τῷ δ' εἶναι ὃ ἔστι τρόπῳ μετα-
λήψεως τηροῦντι αὐτὴν οὐ βλάπτεται εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρὰ τοῦ οὕτω διδόντος,
40 καὶ κινδυνεύει διὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ἥττον εἶναι κακῇ, ὅτι αἰ μένει τοῦτο ὃ ἔστι.
Μεταλαμβάνουσα γὰρ ὄντως καὶ ἀλλοιουμένη ὄντως ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὐκ ἂν
ἦν τὴν φύσιν κακῇ. "Ὡστε εἴ τις τὴν ὕλην λέγει κακὴν, οὕτως ἂν ἀληθεύοι, εἰ
45 τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀπαθῇ λέγοι· τοῦτο δὲ ταῦτόν ἐστι τῷ ὅλως ἀπαθῇ εἶναι.

In this sense
it is evil

c. Cp. *ib.*, c. 13, 1. 29-34, 49-55:

"Ὑλῃ is the "receptacle"; but what comes into it are neither the Ideas themselves, nor is the image produced in it a full reality.

- 30 Καὶ χώρα πάντων, καὶ οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχ * ὑποδοχή. Ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ εἰσιόντων
τὴν αὐτὴν μένειν καὶ ἐξιόντων ἀπαθῇ, ἵνα καὶ εἰσὶν τι αἰεὶ εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἐξίη.
Εἴσειςι δὴ τὸ εἰσιὸν εἰδωλὸν ὃν καὶ εἰς οὐκ ἀληθινὸν οὐκ ἀληθές. Ἄρ' οὖν
ἀληθῶς; Καὶ πῶς, ὃ μηδαμῶς θέμις ἀληθείας μετέχειν διὰ τὸ ψεῦδος εἶναι; —
50 Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔστι τι ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις, καὶ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ οὕτω τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἔστω·
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι, φαίνεται δὲ εἶναι, κάκεῖ φατέον φαίνεσθαι ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης αἰτιωμένους
τῆς φαντάσεως τὴν τῶν ὄντων ὑπόστασιν, ἥς τὰ μὲν ὄντα ὄντως αἰεὶ μεταλαμ-
βάνει, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα μὴ ὄντως, ἐπεὶ περ οὐ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν αὐτὰ ὡς εἶχεν ἂν
55 τοῦ ὄντως μὴ ὄντος, εἰ ἦν αὐτά.

The Forms
themselves
do not come
into it

1410—Thus, in a sense, matter is bad; namely, *sensible* matter, which is formless and in complete lack of the good. P. deals with this problem more amply in the treatise Πόθεν τὰ κακὰ (I 8).

a. There is no evil in the intelligible world. Therefore, evil cannot belong to the sphere of Being; it must be non-being, relative non-being, and this not in the sense of ἕτερον, but either in the sense of an εἰκὼν (which means an inferior degree of reality) or below this.

Enn. I 8, 2, 1. 25-31; c. 3, 1. 1-12.

After having spoken of the life of the Spirit (Noûs) and of Soul, which "dances around Him" and sees God through Him, P. goes on:

- 25 Καὶ οὗτος θεῶν ἀπήμων καὶ μακάριος βίος καὶ τὸ κακὸν οὐδαμοῦ ἐνταῦθα
καὶ εἰ ἐνταῦθα ἔστω, κακὸν οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερα τὰγαθὰ
καὶ τρίτα· περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα πάντα ἐστί, καὶ ἐκεῖνο αἷτιον

* ὅτου οὐχ corr. Kirchhoff; ὁτουοῦν codd., H.-S.

πάντων καλῶν, καὶ πάντα ἐστὶν ἐκείνου, καὶ δεύτερον περὶ τὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα ¹.

No evil in
the
intelligible
world

(3) Εἰ δὴ ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὸ ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τοῖς οὐσί το κακὸν ἐνείη, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὄντων· ἀγαθὰ γὰρ ταῦτα. Λείπεται τοίνυν, εἴπερ ἔστιν, ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὐσιν εἶναι οἷον εἰδός τι ² τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὃν καὶ περὶ τι τῶν μεμιγμένων τῷ μὴ ὄντι ἢ ὅπως οὖν κοινωνούντων τῷ μὴ ὄντι. 5 Μὴ ὃν δὲ οὐτι τὸ παντελῶς μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον μόνον τοῦ ὄντος· οὐχ οὕτω δὲ μὴ ὄν, ὡς κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἢ περὶ τὸ ὄν ³, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰκὼν τοῦ ὄντος ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον μὴ ὄν. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πᾶν καὶ ὅσα περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πάθη ἢ ὑστερόν τι τούτων καὶ ὡς συμβεβηκὸς τούτοις ἢ ἀρχὴ τούτων ἢ ἐν τι τῶν 10 συμπληρούντων τοῦτο τοιοῦτον ὄν.

It must be a
μὴ ὄν

As will become clear in what follows, P. does not mean that the αἰσθητόν is μὴ ὄν as such or evil as such. But he does mean that it is evil "in a sense", namely *so far as it is defective*. It is, as he says below, evil *in a secondary sense*. See under **d**.

b. Evil defined as ἀμετρία, ἄπειρον, etc. It is essentially negative, and therefore never a substance.

Evil defined
as
αἰσθητά,
etc.

Enn. I 8, 3, l. 12-24, 30-32, 35-40:

"Ἦδη γὰρ ἂν τις εἰς ἐννοίαν ἦκοι αὐτοῦ οἷον ἀμετρίαν εἶναι πρὸς μέτρον καὶ ἄπειρον πρὸς πέρας καὶ ἀνείδεον πρὸς εἰδοποιητικὸν καὶ αἰετὸς πρὸς αὐταρκες, αἰετὸς ἀόριστον, οὐδαμῇ ἐστὼς ⁴, παμπαθές, ἀκόρητον, πενία παντελής· 15 καὶ οὐ συμβεβηκὸς ταῦτα αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' οἷον οὐσία ⁵ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν αὐτοῦ μέρος ἴδῃς, καὶ αὐτὸ πάντα ταῦτα· τὰ δ' ἄλλα, ὅσα ἂν αὐτοῦ μεταλάβῃ καὶ ὁμοιωθῇ, κακὰ μὲν γίνεσθαι, οὐχ ὅπερ δὲ κακὰ εἶναι.

Is there an
evil in
itself?

Τίνι οὖν ὑποστάσει ταῦτα πάρεστιν οὐχ ἕτερα ὄντα ἐκείνης, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη; Καὶ γὰρ 20 εἰ ἐτέρῳ συμβαίνει τὸ κακόν, δεῖ τι πρότερον αὐτὸ εἶναι, καὶ μὴ οὐσία τις ἦ. 'Ὡς γὰρ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μὲν αὐτό, τὸ δὲ δὲ συμβέβηκεν, οὕτω καὶ κακόν τὸ μὲν αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ἤδη κατ' ἐκεῖνο συμβεβηκὸς ἐτέρῳ. — Δεῖ οὖν εἶναι τι καὶ ἄπειρον καθ' 30 αὐτὸ καὶ ἀνείδεον αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ πρόσθεν, ἃ τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ ἐχαρκτηρίζε φύσιν. — Τὴν δὲ ὑποκειμένην σχήμασι καὶ εἶδεσι καὶ μορφαῖς καὶ 35 μέτροις καὶ πέρασι καὶ ἀλλοτρίῳ κόσμῳ κοσμουμένην, μηδὲν παρ' αὐτῆς ἀγαθὸν ἔχουσιν, εἰδῶλον δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὰ ὄντα, κακοῦ δὲ οὐσίαν, εἴ τις καὶ

¹ The quotation is from [Plato], *Epist.* II 312e.

² By the οἷον P. avoids to call the κακόν (which is completely negative) an εἶδος.

³ Evil is not non-being in the sense in which Plato defined it in *Soph.* 256d-258e (above, nr. 342).

⁴ The definition recalls once more Hermodorus' description ap. *Simpl., Phys.* p. 248, l. 13-15 (our nr. 371a, the end).

⁵ Again, the οἷον indicates that the κακόν cannot be, properly speaking, a substance.

δύνανται κακοῦ οὐσία εἶναι¹, ταύτην ἀνευρίσκει ὁ λόγος κακὸν εἶναι πρῶτον
40 καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ κακόν.

c. Neither in the body nor in soul is evil primary. Since soul in **Evil in body and soul** itself is not bad, moreover, beyond πάθη, and cannot be the source of evil, it appears that only the lower soul is liable to this. The cause of it is ὕλη, sc. lack of measure, from which springs vice.

Enn. I 8, 4, 1. 1-2, 5-32:

Σωμάτων δὲ φύσις, καθόσον μετέχει ὕλης, κακὸν ἂν οὐ πρῶτον εἴη· — **In what sense can soul be bad?**
5 ψυχὴ δὲ καθ' ἑαυτὴν μὲν οὐ κακὴ οὐδ' αὖ πᾶσα κακὴ. Ἀλλὰ τίς ἡ κακὴ; Οἷόν φησι² δουλωσάμενοι μὲν ᾧ πέφυκε κακία ψυχῆς ἐγγίνεσθαι, ὡς τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς εἰδους τὸ κακὸν δεχομένου, ἀμετρίαν καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ
10 ἔλλειψιν³, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ δειλία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς κακία, ἀκούσια παθήματα, δόξας ψευδεῖς ἐμποιοῦντα κακά τε νομίζειν καὶ ἀγαθὰ δὲ φεύγει τε καὶ διώκει.

Ἀλλὰ τί τὸ πεποιηκὸς τὴν κακίαν ταύτην καὶ πῶς εἰς ἀρχὴν ἐκείνην καὶ αἰτίαν ἀνάξεις; Ἡ πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἔξω ὕλης οὐδὲ καθ' αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ τοιαύτη.
15 Μέμικται οὖν ἀμετρία καὶ ἄμοιρος εἶδους τοῦ κοσμοῦντος καὶ εἰς μέτρον ἄγοντος· σώματι γὰρ ἐγκέκραται ὕλην ἔχοντι. Ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ τὸ λογιζόμενον εἰ βλάπτεται, ὁρᾷ κωλύεται καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἐπισκοτεῖσθαι τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ πρὸς ὕλην νενευκέναι καὶ ὅλως οὐ πρὸς οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς γένεσιν ὁρᾷ, ἥς ἀρχὴ ἡ ὕλης
20 φύσις οὕτως οὕσα κακὴ ὡς καὶ τὸ μήπω ἐν αὐτῇ, μόνον δὲ βλέψαν εἰς αὐτὴν, ἀναπιμπλάναι κακοῦ ἑαυτῆς. Ἀμοιρος γὰρ παντελῶς οὕσα ἀγαθοῦ καὶ στέρησις τούτου καὶ ἄκρατος ἔλλειψις ἐξομοιοῖ ἑαυτῇ πᾶν ὃ τι ἂν αὐτῆς προσάψηται ὁπωσοῦν.
25 Ἡ μὲν οὖν τελεία καὶ πρὸς νοῦν νεύουσα ψυχὴ αἰεὶ καθαρὰ καὶ ὕλην ἀπέστραπτει καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον ἅπαν καὶ τὸ ἄμετρον καὶ κακὸν οὔτε ὁρᾷ οὔτε πελάζει· καθαρὰ οὖν μένει ὀρισθεῖσα νῶ παντελῶς. Ἡ δὲ μὴ μείνασα τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτῆς προελθοῦσα τῷ μὴ τελείῳ μηδὲ πρῶτῳ οἷον Ἰνδαλμα ἐκείνης, τῷ ἐλλείμματι
30 καθόσον ἐνέλιπεν ἀοριστίας πληρωθεῖσα σκότον ὁρᾷ καὶ ἔχει ἥδη ὕλην βλέπουσα εἰς ὃ μὴ βλέπει, ὡς λεγόμεθα ὁρᾷ καὶ τὸ σκότος.

d. Complete ἔλλειψις means evil in itself. Now this is exactly ὕλη, which—as we saw before—cannot participate in the good (nr. 1409b).

¹ Again: there is not, properly speaking, a "substance" of evil.

² Sc. Plato, *Phaedr.* 256 b.

³ Cp. ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις in Sext. *Emp., Adv. math.* X, 275 (my nr. 371b); ὑπερβολή and ἔλλειψις are frequently used in Aristotle's *Ethics*. See nrs. 571b, 572, 573.

Complete
ἐλλειψις
is evil in
itself

Enn. I 8, 5, l. 5-14; c. 8, l. 37-44:

Ἡ οὐκ ἐν τῇ ὁπωσοῦν ἐλλείψει, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ παντελεῖ τὸ κακόν· τὸ γοῦν 5
ἐλλεῖπον ὀλίγω τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὐ κακόν, δύναται γὰρ καὶ τέλος εἶναι ὡς πρὸς
φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ. Ἀλλ' ὅταν παντελῶς ἐλλείπη, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη, τοῦτο τὸ
ὄντως κακὸν μηδεμίαν ἔχον ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι ἔχει ἡ ὕλη,
ἵνα ἀγαθοῦ ταύτῃ μετεῖχεν, ἀλλ' ὁμῶνυμον αὐτῇ τὸ εἶναι, ὡς ἀληθὲς εἶναι 10
λέγειν αὐτὸ μὴ εἶναι. Ἡ οὖν ἐλλειψις ἔχει μὲν τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἡ δὲ παντελεῖς
τὸ κακόν· ἡ δὲ πλείων τὸ πεσεῖν εἰς τὸ κακὸν δύνασθαι καὶ ἤδη κακόν.

Vice, then, is evil in a secondary sense, and so are the ἔξω ψυχῆς κακά. Thus, P. explains (c. 8, l. 37):

Vice is
secondary
evil

Ἐστω δὴ πρῶτως μὲν τὸ ἄμετρον κακόν, τὸ δ' ἐν ἄμετρίᾳ γενόμενον ἡ
ὁμοιώσει ἢ μεταλήψει τῷ συμβεβηκέναι αὐτῷ¹ δευτέρως κακόν· καὶ πρῶτως 40
μὲν τὸ σκότος, τὸ δὲ ἐσκοτισμένον δευτέρως ὡσαύτως. Κακία δὲ ἄγνοια
οὕσα καὶ ἄμετρία περὶ ψυχὴν δευτέρως κακὸν καὶ οὐκ αὐτοκακόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ
ἀρετὴ πρῶτον ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ὁμοίωται ἢ μετείληφεν αὐτοῦ.

e. Evil, then, lies in στέρησις and thus cannot be substantial. In the soul it is a lack of goodness,—evidently not an absolute lack; for then this would not be a soul at all.

Evil as
στέρησις

Enn. I 8, II, l. 1-6, 8-9:

Ἀλλ' ἡ ἐναντία τῷ εἶδει παντὶ φύσις στέρησις· στέρησις δὲ αἰεὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ
καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῆς οὐχ ὑπόστασις· ὥστε τὸ κακὸν εἰ ἐν στερήσει, ἐν τῷ ἐστερημένῳ
εἶδους τὸ κακὸν ἔσται· ὥστε καθ' ἑαυτὸ οὐκ ἔσται. Εἰ οὖν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔσται
κακόν, ἡ στέρησις ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἡ κακία ἔσται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔξω. — 5
Οὐδὲν οὖν δεῖ ἄλλοθι ζητεῖν τὸ κακόν, ἀλλὰ θέμενον ἐν ψυχῇ οὕτω θέσθαι
ἀπουσίαν ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι.

On moral evil or sin see also our next paragraph, nr. 1417.

Arguments
against
gnosticism

1411—To gnostics and gnosticism Plotinus opposes the following arguments (in *Enn.* II 9, Πρὸς τοὺς γνωστικούς):

1. Creation must be eternal (cc. 3, 8, 12, from l. 32).
2. It is impossible that a lapse of soul should be the cause of creation (cc. 4 and 8).
3. In that case, the cause of evil would be transferred to the spiritual world (c. 12, from l. 32).
4. The demiurge, as they represent him (viz. not as a spiritual being), cannot have created the cosmos (c. 12, l. 1-3).

¹ τῷ συμβεβηκέναι αὐτῷ—having as an attribute.

5. Gnostics despise this world, which is a clear and beautiful image of the intelligible (cc. 5, 8, 16).

6. They deny that divine Providence extends to the cosmos (cc. 10-12, 15, 16, l. 16-32: they confine Providence to themselves).

7. Thus, they despise the gods that are here (cc. 9, 16, 18, l. 17-20).

8. They think of the Spiritual World not spiritually enough (cc. 6, 8, 14).

9. They blame unduly the connection of soul and body (cc. 6, 18, l. 1-17).

10. They do not care for virtue at all (cc. 15, 18, l. 27-35).

We saw some of these arguments in dealing with creation (nr. 1403) and will find others when speaking of man and his life on earth. Two other passages deserve particular attention here.

P. reproaches gnostics with a lack of interest in moral questions (cp. above, our nr. 1335; below, 1420d) and confining the care of divine Providence to their own persons. To this he opposes his conviction that, if God cares for individual men, much more must He care for the whole of the cosmos and for the heavenly bodies. Therefore, he rebukes this Christian sect for not honouring the "gods that are here". But he also opposes to them the duty of honouring the *νοητοὶ θεοί* and *not to confine Divinity to one*; for "the great King" shows His greatness most of all in the plurality of the many gods. Cp. below, 1428a.

Thus, in opposing these Christian gnostics, P. firmly maintains polytheism, and it is the presence of the many gods that makes him honour both the spiritual and the sensible universe.

a. *Enn.* II 9, 9, l. 26-54; 55-60:

P. defends
polytheism
against Chr.
gnostics

30 Ἀλλὰ χρὴ ὡς ἄριστον μὲν αὐτὸν πειρᾶσθαι γίνεσθαι, μὴ μόνον δὲ αὐτὸν * νομίζειν ἄριστον δύνασθαι γενέσθαι — οὕτω γὰρ οὐπὼ ἄριστος — ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀν-
θρώπους ἄλλους ἀρίστους, ἔτι καὶ δαίμονας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον θεοὺς
τούς τε ἐν τῷδε ὄντας κάκει βλέποντας, πάντων δὲ μάλιστα τὸν ἡγεμόνα
τοῦδε τοῦ παντός, ψυχὴν μακαριωτάτην· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἤδη καὶ τοὺς νοητοὺς
35 ὑμνεῖν θεοὺς, ἐφ' ἅπασι δὲ ἤδη τὸν μέγαν τὸν ἐκεῖ βασιλέα καὶ ἐν τῷ πλήθει
μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν τὸ μέγα αὐτοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένους· οὐ γὰρ τὸ συστεῖλαι εἰς ἓν,
ἀλλὰ τὸ δεῖξαι πολὺ τὸ θεῖον, ὅσον ἔδειξεν αὐτός, τοῦτό ἐστι δύναμιν θεοῦ
εἰδόντων, ὅταν μένων ὅς ἐστι πολλοὺς ποιῇ πάντας εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνηρτημένους καὶ
40 δι' ἐκεῖνον καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου ὄντας.

40 Καὶ ὁ κόσμος δὲ ὅδε δι' ἐκεῖνόν ἐστι κάκει βλέπει, καὶ πᾶς καὶ θεῶν ἕκαστος
καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου προφητεύει ἀνθρώποις καὶ χρωσὶν ἃ ἐκείνοις φίλα. Εἰ δὲ μὴ
τοῦτο εἰσιν, ὃ ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο κατὰ φύσιν ἔχει. Εἰ δ' ὑπερορᾶν θέλεις
καὶ σεμνύνεις σαυτὸν ὡς οὐ χεῖρων, πρῶτον μὲν, ὅσω τις ἄριστος, πρὸς πάντας
45 εὐμενῶς ἔχει καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους· ἔπειτα σεμνὸν ¹ δεῖ εἰς μέτρον μετὰ οὐκ
ἀγροικίας, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἰόντα ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ φύσις δύναται ἡμῶν, ἀνιέναι, τοῖς δ'

These
gnostics are
arrogant

* αὐτὸν Kirchhoff, Br.

¹ H.-S. explain: cum μέτρον coniungendum.

ἄλλοις νομίζειν εἶναι χώραν παρὰ τῷ θεῷ καὶ μὴ αὐτὸν μόνον μετ' ἐκεῖνον τάξαντα ὥσπερ ὀνειράσι πέτεσθαι ἀποστεροῦντα ἑαυτὸν καθ' ὅσον ἐστὶ δυνατὸν ψυχῇ ἀνθρώπου θεῷ γενέσθαι· δύναται δὲ εἰς ὅσον νοῦς ἄγει· τὸ δ' ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἡδὴ ἐστὶν ἔξω νοῦ πσεῖν. Πείθονται δὲ ἄνθρωποι ἀνόητοι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις τῶν λόγων ἐξαίφνης ἀκούοντες ὥς σὺ ἔση βελτίων ἀπάντων οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν. — 50 54

To the doctrine of "salvation by faith" he opposes his way of the ascent of the soul by and through the spirit: "the soul of man may become god"—in a sense, by purification and meditation. Immediate salvation by faith seems to him an αὐθάδεια.

Their
αὐθάδεια

(I. 55) Πολλὴ γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἡ αὐθάδεια, καὶ ὁ πρότερον ταπεινὸς καὶ μέτριος καὶ ἰδιώτης ἀνὴρ εἰ ἀκούσειε· "σὺ εἰ θεοῦ παῖς, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι, οὐς ἐθαύμαζες, οὐ παῖδες οὐδ' <ἄστρα> * ἃ τιμῶσιν ἐκ πατέρων λαβόντες, σὺ δὲ κρείττων καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐδὲν πονήσας" — εἶτα καὶ συνεπηχῶσιν ¹ ἄλλοι;

b. *Enn.* II 9, 18, l. 17-20.

Manifestly, P. would have greatly preferred to call the sun and the heavenly bodies his brothers than to call by this name many of the most undistinguished people.

Brother Sun
and brothers
stars

* Ἡ ἀδελφοὺς μὲν καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους ἀξιοῦσι προσενέπειν, ἥλιον δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἀπαξιοῦσιν ἀδελφοὺς λέγειν οὐδὲ τὴν κόσμου ψυχὴν στόματι μαينوμένῳ ²;

7—MAN AND HIS LIFE ON EARTH

What is
man?

1412—To the question of "what is man" Plotinus answers that there is intelligible man, who has a more divine soul than concrete man.

a. *Enn.* VI 7, 4, l. 6-21:

Is "man here" (ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος) = the soul? Or is he the soul using a body? Or the composite of both? ³

Ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς σκέψεως ἐντεῦθεν· ἄρα ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος λόγος ἐστὶ ψυχῆς

* Add. Müller, Br.

¹ H.-S. explain: coniunctivus dubitativus.

² Heracl., fr. 92 D.

³ The first thesis, that "man = the soul", is found *ipsis verbis* in the *Alcib.* *Mai.* 130c, a passage repeatedly cited or referred to by Plotinus (e.g. I 3, 3 and V 1, 10). "Socrates" in the *Alcib.* comes to this conclusion by the premiss that man is "soul using the body" (130a). To the author, this excludes the possibility of the third thesis: "man using the body" is essentially soul, which is superior to the body, not a composite of both. As to the last theory, this is held by Aristotle in *De anima*, a treatise belonging to the author's latest years. See the definition cited in our nr. 636 (vol. II) and its consequences (637). A comparison with the numbers 417a, c and 422b will show the difference of this later theory from that of Aristotle's early works.

ἕτερος τῆς τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦτον ποιούσης καὶ ζῆν αὐτὸν καὶ λογίζεσθαι παρε-
 10 χομένης; "Ἡ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ τοιαύτη ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστίν; "Ἡ ἡ τῷ σώματι τῷ τοιῷδε
 ψυχῇ προσχωμένη; "Ἄλλ' εἰ μὲν ζῶν λογικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ζῶν δὲ τὸ ἐκ
 ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος οὗτος τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ αὐτός. "Ἄλλ' εἰ
 τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σώματος ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, πῶς ἂν εἴη ὑπό-
 15 στασις ἀτίδιος, τούτου τοῦ λόγου τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνθρώπου γινομένου, ὅταν σῶμα
 καὶ ψυχὴ συνέλθῃ; "Ἔσται γὰρ ὁ λόγος οὗτος δηλωτικὸς τοῦ ἐσομένου, οὐχ
 οἷος ὃν φαμεν αὐτοάνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰκῶς ὄρω, καὶ τοιούτῳ οἷῳ μὴδὲ
 δηλωτικῷ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι. Οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰδους ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐνύλου, ἀλλὰ τὸ συναμ-
 20 φότερον δηλῶν, ὃ ἐστὶν ἡδῆ· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐπω εὗρηται ὁ ἄνθρωπος· ἦν γὰρ
 ὁ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ¹.

b. *Ib.*, c. 5, l. 11-18, 21-25:

P. opposes the Aristotelian thesis that man is a composite. Surely, in a sense, he says, this is man; but not man in the primary sense. It is only an εἰκὼν of the first man, which is intelligible.

"Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἡ τοιαύτη ἡ ἐγγενομένη τῇ τοιαύτῃ ὕλῃ, ἅτε οὐσα τοῦτο, οἷον
 οὕτω διακειμένη καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος, ἄνθρωπος, ἐν σώματι δὲ μορφώσασα
 15 καθ' αὐτήν καὶ ἄλλο εἰδῶλον ἀνθρώπου ὅσον ἐδέχετο τὸ σῶμα ποιήσασα,
 ὥσπερ καὶ τούτου αὖ ποιήσει ὁ ζωγράφος ἔτι ἐλάττω ἀνθρώπῳ τινα, τὴν
 μορφήν ἔχει καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἢ τὰ ἦθη, τὰς διαθέσεις, τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀμυδρὰ
 21 πάντα, ὅτι μὴ οὗτος πρῶτος. — ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἄνθρωπος ψυχῆς ἡδῆ θειο-
 τέρας, ἐχούσης βελτίῳ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ αἰσθήσεις ἐναργεστέρας. Καὶ εἴη ἂν ὁ
 Πλάτων τοῦτον ὀρισάμενος, προσθεὶς δὲ τὸ χρωμένῃν σώματι, ὅτι ἐποχεῖται
 25 τῇ ἡτις προσχρῆται πρῶτως σώματι, ἡ δὲ δευτέρως.

c. *Enn.* VI 7, 9, l. 6-10.

Man here differs from man yonder in that the first is λογικός (i.e. has the faculty of discursive reasoning), while the latter is πρὸ τοῦ λογίζεσθαι. For in Νοῦς, as was said before, is intuitive thinking and knowledge, while the faculty of λογίζεσθαι is proper to soul.

Man here
differs from
man yonder

... ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐνταῦθα οὐ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷος ἐκεῖνος, ὥστε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
 ζῶα οὐχ οἷα τὰ ἐνταῦθα κάκει, ἀλλὰ μειζόνως δεῖ ἐκεῖνα λαμβάνειν· εἴτα
 οὐδὲ τὸ λογικὸν ἐκεῖ· ὧδε γὰρ ἴσως λογικός, ἐκεῖ δὲ ὁ πρὸ τοῦ λογίζεσθαι.

d. *Enn.* VI 4, 14, l. 16-31.

Before being born in a body, man pre-existed as pure soul with Νοῦς, connected with universal Being (sc. the intelligible world). To this spiritual man that we were, another quite different kind of man was added; and thus we became the συνάμ-
 φω. And sometimes even the latter man prevails, as though the first were not pre-
 sent.

Pre-existing
man and man
in a body

¹ Above, nr. 541.

Ἡμεῖς δέ — τίνες δὲ ἡμεῖς; Ἄρα ἐκεῖνο ἢ τὸ πελάζον καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν χρόνῳ; Ἡ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ταύτην τὴν γένεσιν γενέσθαι ἤμεν ἐκεῖ ἄνθρωποι ἄλλοι ὄντες καὶ τινες καὶ θεοί, ψυχαὶ καθαραὶ καὶ νοῦς συνημμένος τῇ ἀπάσῃ οὐσίᾳ, μέρη ὄντες τοῦ νοητοῦ οὐκ ἀφωρισμένα οὐδ' ἀποτετμημένα, ἀλλ' ὄντες τοῦ ὅλου· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ νῦν ἀποτετμήμεθα. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ νῦν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ προσελήλυθεν ἄνθρωπος ἄλλος εἶναι θέλων καὶ εὐρών ἡμᾶς· ἤμεν γὰρ τοῦ παντὸς οὐκ ἔξω· περιέθηκεν ἑαυτὸν ἡμῖν καὶ προσέθηκεν ἑαυτὸν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ ὃς ἦν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τότε (οἶον εἰ φωνῆς οὐσης μιᾶς καὶ λόγου ἑνὸς ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν παραθεῖς τὸ οὖς ἀκούσειε καὶ δέξαιτο καὶ γένοιτο κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀκοή τις ἔχουσα τὸ ἐνεργοῦν εἰς αὐτὴν παρόν) καὶ γεγενήμεθα τὸ συνάμφῳ, καὶ οὐ θάτερον, ὃ πρότερον ἤμεν, καὶ θάτερόν ποτε, ὃ ὕστερον προσεθέμεθα ἀργή-σαντος τοῦ προτέρου ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον οὐ παρόντος.

Man in a
body

e. *Enn.* VI 4, 15, l. 18-40.

Man in a body is good as long as the divine soul prevails in him. The body brings disturbance (cp. Plato in *Tim.* 43b, c and the whole passage of 69c ff. and 86b-88c. Supra, nrs. 357-361).

Ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐκ τοῦ θείου ψυχὴ ἡσυχος ἦν κατὰ τὸ ἦθος τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς βεβῶσα, τὸ δὲ ὑπ' ἀσθενείας θορυβούμενον καὶ ῥέον τε αὐτὸ καὶ πληγαῖς κρουόμενον ταῖς ἔξω πρῶτον αὐτό, <εἶτα> εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ ζφου ἐφθέγγετο, καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ ταραχὴν ἐδίδου τῷ ὅλῳ· οἶον <ἐν> ἐκκλησίᾳ δημογερόντων καθημένων ἐφ' ἡσυχῇ συννοίᾳ δῆμος ἄτακτος τροφῆς δεόμενος καὶ ἄλλα αἰ δὴ πάσχει αἰτιώμενος τὴν πᾶσαν ἐκκλησίαν εἰς θόρυβον ἀσχήμονα <ἂν> ἐμβάλλοι. Ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἡσυχίαν ἀγόντων τῶν τοιούτων ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονοῦντος ἡκῃ εἰς αὐτοὺς λόγος, κατέστη εἰς τάξιν μετρίαν τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ οὐ κεκράτηκε τὸ χειρόν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, κρατεῖ τὸ χειρόν ἡσυχίαν ἀγοντος τοῦ βελτίονος, ὅτι μὴ ἡδυνήθη τὸ θορυβοῦν δέξασθαι τὸν ἄνωθεν λόγον, καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶ πόλεως καὶ ἐκκλησίας κακία. Τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπου κακία αὖ ἔχοντος δῆμον ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων κρατησάντων συνδόντος ἑαυτὸν τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνθρώπου δῆμῳ τῷ τοιούτῳ· ὃς δ' ἂν τοῦτον τὸν ὄχλον δουλωσῇται καὶ ἀναδράμῃ εἰς ἐκεῖνον, ὃς ποτε ἦν, κατ' ἐκεῖνόν τε ζῇ καὶ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνος διδούς τῷ σώματι, ὅσα δίδωσιν ὡς ἐτέρῳ ὄντι ἑαυτοῦ· ἄλλος δὲ τις ὅτε μὲν οὕτως, ὅτε δὲ ἄλλως ζῇ, μικτός τις ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κακοῦ ἐτέρου γεγεννημένος.

The inner
man

1413—Thus, P. declares that, beyond his connection with a body, man has a higher soul, and this is his true self.

a. *Enn.* II 1, 5, l. 18-23.

In this passage the author distinguishes between a lower soul (the πάθη), which is given to man by the heavenly bodies ("the gods in the heavens") and by the

heavens themselves ¹, and a higher soul by which we are our true selves. It is, as will be explained in the passage to be quoted sub **b**, what Plato suggested in *Tim.* 41a-d and 69c ².

Ἡμεῖς δὲ πλασθέντες ὑπὸ τῆς διδομένης παρὰ τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν ψυχῆς
20 καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καθ' ἐκείνην καὶ σύνεσμεν τοῖς σώμασιν· ἡ γὰρ ἄλλη
ψυχή, καθ' ἣν ἡμεῖς, τοῦ εὖ εἶναι, οὐ τοῦ εἶναι αἰτία ³. Ἦδη γοῦν τοῦ σώματος
ἔρχεται γενομένου μικρὰ ἐκ λογισμοῦ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι συνεκλαμβανομένη.

b. *Enn.* II 3, 9, 1. 6-30:

Ἐν τε Τιμαίῳ θεὸς μὲν ὁ ποιήσας τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ψυχῆς δίδωσιν, οἱ δὲ φερό-
μενοι θεοὶ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα πάθη, θυμοὺς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ
10 λύπας αὖ, καὶ ψυχῆς ἄλλο εἶδος, ἀφ' οὗ τὰ παθήματα ταυτί ⁴. Οὗτοι γὰρ οἱ
λόγοι συνδέουσιν ἡμᾶς τοῖς ἄστροις παρ' αὐτῶν ψυχὴν κομιζομένους καὶ
ὑποτάττουσι τῇ ἀνάγκῃ ἐνταῦθα ἰόντας· καὶ ἦθη τοίνυν παρ' αὐτῶν καὶ κατὰ
τὰ ἦθη πράξεις καὶ πάθη ἀπὸ ἕξεως παθητικῆς οὕσης· ὥστε τί λοιπὸν ἡμεῖς;
15 Ἦ ὁ περ ἐσμεν κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἡμεῖς, οἷς καὶ κρατεῖν τῶν
παθῶν ἔδωκεν ἡ φύσις. Καὶ γὰρ ὅμως ἐν τούτοις τοῖς κακοῖς διὰ τοῦ
σώματος ἀπειλημμένοις ἀδέσποτον ἀρετὴν ⁵ θεὸς ἔδωκεν. Οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἡσυχῇ
οὕσιν ἀρετῆς δεῖ ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ὅταν κίνδυνος ἐν κακοῖς εἶναι ἀρετῆς οὐ
20 παρούσης. Διὸ καὶ φεύγειν ἐντεῦθεν δεῖ ⁶ καὶ χωρίζειν αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν προσ-
γεγεννημένων ⁷ καὶ μὴ τὸ σύνθετον εἶναι σῶμα ἐψυχωμένον ἐν ᾧ κρατεῖ μᾶλλον
ἢ σώματος φύσις ψυχῆς τι ἔχνος λαβοῦσα, ὡς τὴν ζωὴν τὴν κοινὴν μᾶλλον τοῦ
σώματος εἶναι· πάντα γὰρ σωματικά, ὅσα ταύτης. Τῆς δὲ ἐτέρας τῆς ἕξω
25 ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω φορὰ καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ θεῖον ὧν οὐδεὶς κρατεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ προσ-
χρῆται, ἐν' ᾗ ἐκεῖνο καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ζῇ ἀναχωρήσας· ἡ ἔρημος ταύτης τῆς ψυχῆς
γενόμενος ζῇ ἐν εἰμαρμένῃ ⁸, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὰ ἄστρα αὐτῷ οὐ μόνον σημαίνει ⁹,
30 ἀλλὰ γίνεται αὐτὸς οἷον μέρος καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ συνέπεται, οὐ μέρος ¹⁰.

¹ The "created gods" of *Tim.* 41a.

² Above, vol. I, nrs. 353 and 357a.

³ For the formula καθ' ἣν ἡμεῖς cp. the passages cited infra, sub **b** and **c**. τοῦ εὖ εἶναι, οὐ τοῦ εἶναι reminds us of a well-known expression used repeatedly by Aristotle. Above, vol. II, nrs. 420b, 566 (*E.N.* I 4, 1095a, 19), 608b, 610a.

⁴ *Tim.*, 69c-d.

⁵ *Rep.* 617e (above, nr. 306, p. 215);

⁶ Also Plotinus' treatise II. ἀρετῶν (*Enn.* I, 2) is a comment on the χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν of *Theaet.* 176a (supra, nr. 318).

⁷ τὰ προσγεγεννημένα, also called the προσθήκαι, are the cause of sin. Infra, 1417b.

⁸ εἰμαρμένη indicates physical necessity as opposed to πρόνοια. See our next paragraph.

⁹ As we shall see later, P. does believe in the influence of the heavenly bodies on things on earth, but he opposes the popular view that this influence should result from a deliberate will. Hence he stresses the fact that, for man, the heavenly bodies are a sign of what is going to happen, not properly speaking the "cause" of it.

¹⁰ Man who lives according to the lower soul becomes a part of the physical universe and thus is submitted to physical necessity, while the higher soul is beyond this.

c. *Enn.* I 1, 7, l. 14-24.

P. after having described the "perception of the soul" as a contemplation of "forms", which takes place ἀπαθῶς¹, continues as follows.

„We”, i.e.
our intel-
lectual life

Ἀπὸ δὴ τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν, ἀφ’ ὧν ψυχὴ ἤδη παραδέχεται μόνη τὴν τοῦ 15
ζώου ἡγεμονίαν, διάνοιαι δὴ καὶ δόξαι καὶ νοήσεις· ἐνθα δὴ ἡμεῖς μάλιστα.
Τὰ δὲ πρὸ τούτων ἡμέτερα, ἡμεῖς δὴ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ἄνω ἐφεστηκότες τῷ ζῳῷ.
Καλύσει δὲ οὐδὲν τὸ σύμπαν ζῷον λέγειν, μικτὸν μὲν τὰ κάτω, τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν
ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἀληθὴς σχεδόν· ἐκεῖνα δὲ τὸ λεοντώδες καὶ τὸ ποικίλον ὅλως 20
θηρίον. Συνδρόμου γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῇ λογικῇ ψυχῇ, ὅταν λογιζώμεθα,
ἡμεῖς λογιζώμεθα τῷ τοὺς λογισμοὺς ψυχῆς εἶναι ἐνεργήματα.

Thus, the πάθη do not belong to "us".

d. *Enn.* I 1, 10, l. 1-11.

Sometimes, the κοινόν is called man, "the beast" being included. But the true man is the spiritual man, called ὁ ἔνδον ἄνθρωπος (I 1, 10, l. 15), or elsewhere ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος (V 1, 10, l. 10).

Sometimes
"the beast"
is included

Ἀλλ’ εἰ ἡμεῖς ἡ ψυχὴ, πάσχομεν δὲ ταῦτα ἡμεῖς, ταῦτα ἂν εἴη πάσχουσα ἡ
ψυχὴ καὶ αὐτὴ ποιήσει ἃ ποιούμεν. Ἡ καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἔφαμεν ἡμῶν εἶναι καὶ
μάλιστα οὕτω κεχωρισμένων· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἃ πάσχει τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς φαμεν
πάσχειν. Διττὸν οὖν τὸ ἡμεῖς, ἢ συναριθμουμένου τοῦ θηρίου, ἢ τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦτο 5
ἤδη· θηρίον δὲ ζωῳθὲν τὸ σῶμα. Ὁ δ’ ἀληθὴς ἄνθρωπος ἄλλος ὁ καθαρὸς τού-
των τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχων τὰς ἐν νοήσει, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χωριζομένη ψυχῇ ἔδρυνται,
χωριζομένη δὲ καὶ χωριστῇ ἔτι ἐνταῦθα οὖση· ἐπεὶ καί, ὅταν αὐτὴ παντάπασιν 10
ἀποστῇ, καὶ ἡ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς ἐλλαμφθεῖσα ἀπελήλυθε συνεπομένη.

The
πάθη

1414—To what do the πάθη belong: to the body, or to the soul, or to the compound? (I 1, 1). — To this question P. answers:

(1) If the soul is not identical with its essence, it would be a compound and hence might have πάθη. But, on the other hand, if it is identical with its essence, it is an εἶδος and as such ἀπαθής (I 1, 2).

(2) Moreover, soul which uses the body as an instrument must be above the πάθη (I 1, 3).

a. *Enn.* I 1, 1, l. 1-4; 2, l. 1-13; 3, l. 1-5.

Ἦδοναὶ καὶ λύπαι φόβοι τε καὶ θάρρη ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ ἀποστροφαι καὶ τὸ
ἀλγεῖν τίνος ἂν εἴεν; Ἡ γὰρ ψυχῆς, ἢ χρωμένης ψυχῆς σώματι, ἢ τρίτου τινὸς
ἐξ ἁμφοῦν. —

(c. 2) Πρῶτον δὲ ψυχὴν ληπτέον πότερον ἄλλο μὲν ψυχῇ, ἄλλο δὲ ψυχῇ

¹ On πάθη and αἰσθησις see our next numbers.

εἶναι. Εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, σύνθετόν τι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπον ἤδη δέχεσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ αὐτῆς εἶναι τὰ πάθη τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἰ ἐπιτρέψει καὶ οὕτως ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὅλως
 5 ἔξεις καὶ διαθέσεις χεῖρους καὶ βελτίους. "Η, εἰ ταυτόν ἐστι ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ ψυχῇ
 εἶναι, εἰδὸς τι ἂν εἴη ψυχῇ ἄδεκτον τούτων ἀπασῶν τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, ὧν ἐποιστικὸν
 ἄλλω, ἑαυτῷ δὲ συμφυᾶ ἔχον τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἦντινα ἂν φήνῃ ὁ λόγος.
 10 Οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀθάνατον ἀληθὲς λέγειν, εἴπερ δεῖ τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀφθαρτον
 ἀπαθὲς εἶναι, ἄλλω ἑαυτοῦ πῶς διδόν, αὐτὸ δὲ παρ' ἄλλου μηδὲν ἢ ὅσον παρὰ
 τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχειν, ὧν μὴ ἀποτέμνεται κρειττόνων ὄντων. —

(c. 3) 'Αλλὰ γὰρ ἐν σώματι θετέον ψυχὴν, οὐσαν εἴτε πρὸ τούτου, εἴτ'
 ἐν τούτῳ, ἐξ οὗ καὶ αὐτῆς ζῶον τὸ σύμπαν ἐκλήθη. Χρωμένη μὲν οὖν σώματι
 5 οἷα ὀργάνῳ οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται δέξασθαι τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα, ὥσπερ
 οὐδὲ τὰ τῶν ὀργάνων παθήματα οἱ τεχνῖται.

b. How is it that the compound feels pain? And where lies the origin of pain and other feelings: in the soul, in the compound, or in the body? (I 1, 5) — To these questions P. answers: the faculties of the soul, ἐπιθυμητικὸν and θυμικόν, make feelings possible by their presence in the living being, but are themselves impassible. Subject of feelings is the living being as such (c. 6), i.e. the compound.

Enn. I 1, 5, l. 8-35; 6, l. 1-4, 10-14:

Τὸ δὲ συναμφοτέρῳ οἷον λυπεῖσθαι πῶς; 'Αρα ὅτι τοῦ σώματος οὕτως
 10 διατεθέντος καὶ μέχρις αἰσθήσεως διελθόντος τοῦ πάθους τῆς αἰσθήσεως εἰς
 ψυχὴν τελευτώσης; 'Αλλ' ἡ αἰσθησις οὕτω δῆλον πῶς. 'Αλλ' ὅταν ἡ λύπη ἀρχῇ
 ἀπὸ δόξης καὶ κρίσεως λάβῃ τοῦ κακόν τι παρῆναι ¹ ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ τινι τῶν
 15 οἰκείων, εἴτ' ἐντεῦθεν τροπὴ λυπηρὰ ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὅλως ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ ζῶον
 γένηται; 'Αλλὰ καὶ τὸ τῆς δόξης οὕτω δῆλον τίνος, τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ τοῦ συν-
 αμφοτέρου. εἴτα ἡ μὲν δόξα ἢ περὶ τοῦ κακόν τὸ τῆς λύπης οὐκ ἔχει πάθος·
 20 καὶ γὰρ καὶ δυνατόν τῆς δόξης παρούσης μὴ πάντως ἐπιγίνεσθαι τὸ λυπεῖσθαι,
 μὴδ' αὖ τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι δόξης τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι γενομένης, μὴδ' αὖ ἀγαθοῦ
 δόξης κινεῖσθαι τὴν ὀρεξιν. Πῶς οὖν κοινὰ ταῦτα; "Η, ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία
 τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ καὶ ὁ θυμὸς τοῦ θυμικοῦ καὶ ὅλως τοῦ ὀρεκτικοῦ ἢ ἐπὶ
 25 τι ἔκστασις ². 'Αλλ' οὕτως οὐκέτι κοινὰ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μόνης· ἢ
 καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ὅτι δεῖ αἷμα καὶ χολὴν ζέσαι καὶ πῶς διατεθὲν τὸ σῶμα τὴν
 ὀρεξιν κινῆσαι, οἷον ἐπὶ ἀφροδισίων. 'Η δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὀρεξεις μὴ κοινὸν πάθημα
 ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς ἔστω, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλα, καὶ οὐ πάντα τοῦ κοινοῦ δίδωσί τις λόγος.
 30 'Αλλὰ ὀρεγομένου ἀφροδισίων τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔσται μὲν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐπιθυμῶν,

How do pain
and other
feelings
arise?

¹ See above, Zeno's definition of λύπη, under nrs. 954 and 955.

² ἔκστασις is a common Greek word for displacement. The author may quite well have used it here in the vague sense of "tendency".

ἔσται δὲ ἄλλως καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἐπιθυμοῦν. Καὶ πῶς; Ἐὰρ ἄρξει μὲν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ἐπακολουθήσει δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν; Ἀλλὰ πῶς ὅλως ἐπεθύμησεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος μὴ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ κεκινημένου; Ἀλλ' ἄρξει τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. Ἀλλὰ τοῦ σώματος μὴ πρότερον οὕτως διατεθέντος πόθεν ἄρζεται;

(c. 6) Ἀλλ' ἴσως βέλτιον εἰπεῖν καθόλου τῷ παρεῖναι τὰς δυνάμεις τὰ ἔχοντα εἶναι τὰ ἐνεργοῦντα κατ' αὐτάς, αὐτάς δὲ ἀκινήτους εἶναι χορηγούσας τὸ δύνασθαι τοῖς ἔχουσιν. — Ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ αἰσθησις διὰ σώματος κινήσεως οὐσα εἰς 10 ψυχὴν τελευτᾷ, πῶς ἡ ψυχὴ οὐκ αἰσθήσεται; Ἡ τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς αἰσθητικῆς παρούσης τῷ ταύτην παρεῖναι αἰσθήσεται. Τί αἰσθήσεται; Τὸ συναμφοτέρον;

c. But, P. objects, if the faculties of the soul are impassible, what then is the part of the soul in having feelings? — Reply: Soul gives herself to the compound (which is the living being) not as such, but in such a way that she somehow illuminates the living body.

How soul is
related with
the body

Enn. I 1, 6, l. 14-16; 7, l. 1-6:

Ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ δύναμις μὴ κινήσεται, πῶς ἔτι τὸ συναμφοτέρον μὴ συναριθμουμένης ψυχῆς μηδὲ τῆς ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως;

(c. 7) Ἡ τὸ συναμφοτέρον ἔστω τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ παρεῖναι οὐχ αὐτὴν δούσης τῆς τοιαύτης εἰς τὸ συναμφοτέρον ἢ εἰς θάτερον, ἀλλὰ ποιούσης ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ τοιούτου καὶ τινος οἷον φωτὸς τοῦ παρ' αὐτὴν¹ δοθέντος τὴν τοῦ ζώου φύσιν ἕτερόν τι, οὗ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα ζώου πάθη εἴρηται. 5

1415—How to explain perception, if soul is impassible.

What is
αἰσθησις?

The perception of the soul is not directly concerned with αἰσθητά, but is impassibly a contemplation of τύποι in the living being which come from the αἰσθητά. These τύποι, far from being material (as was taught by the Stoa), are already νοητά.

It has not
to do with
sensible
impressions

a. *Enn.* I 1, 7, l. 9-14:

Τὴν δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι δύναμιν οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἶναι δεῖ, τῶν 10 δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐγγιγνομένων τῷ ζῳῳ τύπων ἀντιληπτικὴν εἶναι μᾶλλον· νοητὰ γὰρ ἤδη ταῦτα· ὥς τὴν αἰσθησιν τὴν ἕξω εἰδωλὸν εἶναι ταύτης, ἐκείνην δὲ ἀληθεστέραν τῇ οὐσίᾳ οὖσαν εἰδῶν μόνων ἀπαθῶς εἶναι θεωρίαν.

b. Consequently discursive thinking, called διάνοια, which is a link between outward things and the inner man, is a purely intellectual function which has nothing to do with sense-impressions.

διάνοια
is purely
intellectual

Enn. I 1, 9, l. 15-23:

Διείλομεν δὴ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια τῷ τὰ μὲν σωματικὰ καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ σώ- 15

¹ H.-S. explain: *ratione ipsius*.

ματος εἶναι, ὅσα δὲ οὐ δεῖται σώματος εἰς ἐνέργειαν, ταῦτα ἴδια ψυχῆς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπὶ κρῖσιν ποιουμένην τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τύπων εἶδη
 20 ἤδη θεωρεῖν καὶ θεωρεῖν οἷον συναισθήσει, τὴν γε κυρίως τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἀληθοῦς διάνοιαν· νοήσεων γὰρ ἐνέργεια ἢ διάνοια ἢ ἀληθὴς καὶ τῶν ἕξω πολλακίς πρὸς τᾶνδον ὁμοιότης καὶ κοινωνία.

c. Again, in the treatise *Περὶ τῆς ἀπαθείας τῶν ἀσωμάτων* P. begins by stating that the so-called τυπώσεις do not have the character of πάθη (as is usually thought), but are ἐνέργειαι¹.

Enn. III 6, 1, 1. 1-11:

The so-called
 τυπώσεις
 are
 ἐνέργειαι

Τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐ πάθη λέγοντες εἶναι, ἐνεργείας δὲ περὶ παθήματα καὶ κρίσεις, τῶν μὲν παθῶν περὶ ἄλλο γινομένων, οἷον τὸ σῶμα φέρε τὸ τοιόνδε, τῆς δὲ κρίσεως περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐ τῆς κρίσεως πάθους οὐσης — ἔδει γὰρ αὐ
 5 ἄλλην κρίσιν γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐπαναβαίνειν αἰεὶ εἰς ἄπειρον — εἵχομεν οὐδὲν ἥττον καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀπορίαν, εἰ ἢ κρίσις ἢ κρίσις οὐδὲν ἔχει τοῦ κρινομένου. "Ἡ, εἰ τύπον ἔχοι, πέπονθεν. Ἦν δ' ὅμως λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῶν καλουμένων τυπώ-
 10 σεων, ὡς ὁ τρόπος ὅλως ἕτερος ἢ ὡς ὑπείληπται, ὁποῖος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν νοήσεων ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τούτων οὐσῶν γινώσκειν ἄνευ τοῦ παθεῖν τι δυναμένων. —

1416—Generally speaking, the so-called passive part of the soul is not passive at all. Since soul is an εἶδος, she must be active.

a. *Enn.* III 6, 4, 1. 31-43:

Soul as an
 εἶδος
 must be
 active

Ἄλλ' ἔστι μὲν τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος τὸ παθητικὸν οὐ σῶμα μὲν, εἶδος δέ τι. Ἐν ὕλῃ μέντοι καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν καὶ τό γε θρεπτικόν τε καὶ αὐξητικὸν καὶ γεννητικόν, ὃ ἔστι ρίζα καὶ ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος καὶ παθητικοῦ εἶδους.
 35 Εἶδει δὲ οὐδενὶ δεῖ παρεῖναι ταραχὴν ἢ ὅλως πάθος, ἀλλ' ἔστηκέναι μὲν αὐτό, τὴν δὲ ὕλην αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ πάθει γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν γίγνηται, ἐκείνου τῇ παρουσίᾳ κινουῦντος. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ φυτικόν, ὅταν φύῃ, φύεται, οὐδ' ὅταν αὖξῃ, αὖξεται, οὐδ' ὅλως, ὅταν κινῇ, κινεῖται ἐκείνην τὴν κίνησιν ἣν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἢ οὐδ' ὅλως,
 40 ἢ ἄλλος τρόπος κινήσεως ἢ ἐνεργείας. Αὐτὴν μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὴν τοῦ εἶδους φύσιν ἐνεργεῖαν εἶναι καὶ τῇ παρουσίᾳ ποιεῖν, οἷον εἰ ἢ ἀρμονία ἕξ αὐτῆς τὰς χορδὰς ἐκίνει.

b. This whole conception is opposed by P. to Stoic materialism. Perception, though the active rôle of the soul is maintained, must be said to presuppose the body and hence is to be considered as belonging to a kind of sleeping state of the soul. Her true awaking is: leaving the body entirely.

¹ Cp. Zeno's description of sense-impressions, above, nr. 984.

Perception
is proper to
a sleeping
state of the
soul

Enn. III 6, 6, 1. 65-76:

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἴρηται πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς σώμασι τιθεμένους τὰ ὄντα τῇ 65
τῶν ὀθισμῶν μαρτυρία καὶ τοῖς διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως φαντάσμασι πίστιν τῆς
ἀληθείας λαμβάνοντας, οἱ παραπλήσιον τοῖς ὄνειρώττουσι ποιοῦσι ταῦτα
ἐνεργεῖν νομίζουσιν, ἃ ὁρῶσιν εἶναι ἐνύπνια ὄντα. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως
ψυχῆς ἐστὶν εὐδούσης· ὅσον γὰρ ἐν σώματι ψυχῆς, τοῦτο εὐδεῖ· ἡ δ' ἀληθινὴ 70
ἐγρήγορσις ἀληθινὴ ἀπὸ σώματος, οὐ μετὰ σώματος, ἀνάστασις ¹. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ
μετὰ σώματος μετάστασις ἐστὶν ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλον ὕπνον, οἷον ἐξ ἐτέρων
δεμνίων· ἡ δ' ἀληθὴς ὅλως ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων, ἃ τῆς φύσεως ὄντα τῆς ἐναντίας
ψυχῇ τὸ ἐναντίον εἰς οὐσίαν ἔχει. 75

1417—How can man, who is a spiritual being, sin?

Answer: Not by his higher soul which is divine, but by yielding to what is inferior to it. Soul in itself is undisturbed.

Sin ascribed
to what is
inferior to
soul

a. *Enn.* I 1, 9, 1. 1-13; 23-26:

Ἔσται τοίνυν ἐκείνης ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ φύσις ἀπηλλαγμένη αἰτίας κακῶν,
ὅσα ἄνθρωπος ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχει· περὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῶον ταῦτα, τὸ κοινόν, καὶ κοινόν,
ὡς εἴρηται. Ἄλλ' εἰ δόξα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ διάνοια, πῶς ἀναμάρτητος; Ψευδὴς 5
γὰρ δόξα καὶ πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὴν πράττεται τῶν κακῶν. Ἡ πράττεται μὲν τὰ
κακὰ ἡττωμένων ἡμῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ χείρονος — πολλὰ γὰρ ἡμεῖς — ἢ ἐπιθυμίας ἢ
θυμοῦ ἢ εἰδώλου κακοῦ· ἡ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν λεγομένη διάνοια φαντασία οὕσα
οὐκ ἀνέμεινε τὴν τοῦ διανοητικοῦ κρίσιν, ἀλλ' ἐπράξαμεν τοῖς χείροσι πεισθέν- 10
τες, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως πρὶν τῷ διανοητικῷ ἐπικρῖναι ψευδῇ ὁρᾶν συμ-
βαίνει τῇ κοινῇ αἰσθήσει. Ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἢ ἐφῆψατο ἢ οὐ, ὥστε ἀναμάρτητος. —
'Ατρεμήσει οὖν οὐδὲν ἤττον ἢ ψυχὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῇ· αἱ δὲ τροπαὶ
καὶ ὁ θόρυβος ἐν ἡμῖν παρὰ τῶν συνηρημένων καὶ τῶν τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὃ τι δῆποτέ 25
ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὡς εἴρηται, παθημάτων.

These remarks are once more directed against the Stoics, who explained sin as ψευδὴς δόξα (above, nrs. 1053 ff.) and considered πάθη as *perturbationes animi* (cp. nr. 1060b).

b. If soul is impeccable, why punishments here and hereafter? To this question again P. answers, as was seen above (1412e), that at his birth man was conjoined to another kind of soul, which is liable to πάθη, and that hence the compound can sin.

Only the
soul with
προσθήκαι
can sin

Enn. I 1, 12, 1. 1-12, 17-21:

Ἄλλ' εἰ ἀναμάρτητος ἡ ψυχὴ, πῶς αἱ δίκαι; Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὗτος ὁ λόγος
ἀσυμφωνεῖ παντὶ λόγῳ, ὅς φησιν αὐτὴν καὶ ἀμαρτάνειν καὶ κατορθοῦν καὶ
διδόναι δίκας καὶ ἐν Ἄιδου καὶ μετενσωματοῦσθαι. Προσθετέον μὲν οὖν ὅτι

¹ This is obviously directed against the Christian doctrine of resurrection.

5 τις βούλεται λόγῳ· τάχα δ' ἂν τις ἐξεύροι καὶ ὅπη μὴ μαχοῦνται. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ
τὸ ἀναμάρτητον διδούς τῇ ψυχῇ λόγος ἐν ἀπλοῦν πάντῃ ἐτίθετο τὸ αὐτὸ ψυχὴν
καὶ τὸ ψυχῇ εἶναι λέγων, ὁ δ' ἁμαρτεῖν διδούς συμπλέκει μὲν καὶ προστίθῃσιν
10 αὐτῇ καὶ ἄλλο ψυχῆς εἶδος τὸ τὰ δεινὰ ἔχον πάθη· σύνθετος οὖν καὶ τὸ ἐκ
πάντων ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτῇ γίνεται καὶ πάσχει δὴ κατὰ τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἁμαρτάνει τὸ
σύνθετον καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ διδὸν δίκην αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο. — Ἄλλῃ οὖν ζῶῃ
καὶ ἄλλαι ἐνέργειαι καὶ τὸ κολαζόμενον ἕτερον· ἡ δὲ ἀναχώρησις καὶ ὁ χωρισμὸς
20 οὐ μόνον τοῦδε τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἅπαντος τοῦ προστεθέντος. Καὶ γὰρ
ἐν τῇ γενέσει ἡ προσθήκη· ἡ ὅλως ἡ γένεσις τοῦ ἄλλου ψυχῆς εἶδους.

1418—Man as a spiritual being is above the nexus of physical causality.
Hence P. leaves a large space to the free will of the individual man.

a. *Enn.* III 1, 8, l. 4-20:

Free will

5 Ψυχὴν δὴ δεῖ ἀρχὴν οὔσαν ἄλλην ἐπεισφέροντας εἰς τὰ ὄντα, οὐ μόνον τὴν
τοῦ παντός, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐκάστου μετὰ ταύτης, ὡς ἀρχῆς οὐ σμικρᾶς οὔσης,
πλέκειν τὰ πάντα, οὐ γινομένης καὶ αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα, ἐκ σπερμάτων,
ἀλλὰ πρωτοουργοῦ αἰτίας οὔσης. Ἄνευ μὲν οὖν σώματος οὔσα κυριωτάτῃ τε
10 αὐτῆς * καὶ ἐλευθέρᾳ καὶ κοσμικῆς αἰτίας ἔξω· ἐνεχθεῖσα δὲ εἰς σῶμα οὐκέτι
πάντα κυρία, ὡς ἂν μεθ' ἐτέρων ταχθεῖσα. Τύχαι δὲ τὰ κύκλῳ πάντα, οἷς
συνέπεσεν ἔλθοῦσα εἰς μέσον, τὰ πολλὰ ἡγαγον, ὥστε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν διὰ ταῦτα,
τὰ δὲ κρατοῦσαν αὐτὴν ταῦτα ὅπη ἐθέλει ἄγειν. Πλείω δὲ κρατεῖ ἡ ἀμείνων,
15 ἐλάττω δὲ ἡ χείρων. Ἡ γὰρ κράσει σώματός τι ἐνδιδοῦσα ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ ὀργίζεσθαι
ἠνάγκασται ἢ πενίαις ταπεινὴ ἢ πλούτοις χαῦνος ἢ δυνάμεσι τύραννος· ἡ δὲ
καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ἀντέσχευ, ἡ ἀγαθὴ τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ἡλλοῖωσεν αὐτὰ
μᾶλλον ἢ ἡλλοιώθη, ὥστε τὰ μὲν ἑτεροιώσαι, τοῖς δὲ συγχωρῆσαι μὴ μετὰ
20 κάκης.

b. *Ib.*, c. 9, l. 4-16:

5 Ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀλλοιωθεῖσα παρὰ τῶν ἔξω ψυχὴ πράττῃ τι καὶ ὁρμᾷ ὅλον
τυφλῇ τῇ φορᾷ χρωμένη, οὐχὶ ἐκούσιον τὴν πράξιν οὐδὲ τὴν διάθεσιν λεκτέον·
καὶ ὅταν αὐτὴ παρ' αὐτῆς χείρων οὔσα οὐκ ὀρθαῖς πανταχοῦ οὐδὲ ἡγεμονούσαις
ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ἢ χρωμένη. Λόγον δὲ ὅταν ἡγεμόνα καθαρὸν καὶ ἀπαθῆ τὸν οἰκεῖον
10 ἔχουσα ὁρμᾷ, ταύτην μόνην τὴν ὁρμὴν φατέον εἶναι ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσιον,
καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἡμέτερον ἔργον, ὃ μὴ ἄλλοθεν ἦλθεν, ἀλλ' ἐνδοθεν ἀπὸ
καθαρᾶς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πρώτης ἡγουμένης καὶ κυρίας, ἀλλ' οὐ πλάνην
15 ἐξ ἀγνοίας παθοῦσης ἢ ἥτταν ἐκ βίας ἐπιθυμιῶν, αἱ προσελθοῦσαι ἄγουσι καὶ
ἔλκουσι καὶ οὐκέτι ἔργα ἐῷσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ παθήματα παρ' ἡμῶν.

See further our next paragraph, the nrs. **1425, 1430** ff.

* αὐτῆς Br.

Virtue

1419—To the question of “what is virtue” P. answers that virtue is: the state of the soul which follows if she turns to what is congenial to her.

a. *Enn.* I 2, 4, 1. 1-28.

In this treatise (Π. ἀρετῶν) P. inquires into the φυγή ἐνθένδε which is ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν according to *Theaet.* 176a, b.

When the soul has purified herself from the body and is concerned with things intelligible, this state may be called resemblance to God. Is then virtue = purification, or is it identical with the state of being purified?

Is virtue
κάθαρσις?

Ζητητέον δέ, εἰ ἡ κάθαρσις ταυτὸν τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀρετῇ, ἣ προηγεῖται μὲν ἡ κάθαρσις, ἔπεται δὲ ἡ ἀρετή, καὶ πότερον ἐν τῷ καθαιρεσθαι ἢ ἀρετῇ ἢ ἐν τῷ κεκαθάρθαι. Ἀτελεστέρα τῆς ἐν τῷ κεκαθάρθαι <ἢ ἐν τῷ καθαιρεσθαι> τὸ 5 γὰρ κεκαθάρθαι οἷον τέλος ἤδη. Ἀλλὰ τὸ κεκαθάρθαι ἀφαίρεσις ἀλλοτρίου παντός, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερον αὐτοῦ. Ἡ, εἰ πρὸ τῆς ἀκαθαρσίας ἀγαθὸν ἦν, ἡ κάθαρσις ἀρκεῖ· ἀλλ’ ἀρκέσει μὲν ἡ κάθαρσις, τὸ δὲ καταλειπόμενον ἔσται τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐχ ἡ κάθαρσις. Καὶ τί τὸ καταλειπόμενον ἔστι, ζητητέον· ἴσως γὰρ 10 οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἦν ἡ φύσις ἡ καταλειπομένη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο ἐν κακῷ. Ἄρ’ οὖν ἀγαθοειδῆ λεκτέον; Ἡ οὐχ ἱκανὴν πρὸς τὸ μένειν ἐν τῷ ὄντως ἀγαθῷ· πέφυκε γὰρ ἐπ’ ἄμφω. Τὸ οὖν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῆς τὸ συνεῖναι τῷ συγγενεῖ, τὸ δὲ κακὸν τὸ τοῖς ἐναντίοις. Δεῖ οὖν καθηραμένην συνεῖναι. Συνέσται δὲ ἐπιστρα- 15 φεῖσα. Ἄρ’ οὖν μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν ἐπιστρέφεται; Ἡ μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν ἐπέστραπται. Τοῦτ’ οὖν ἡ ἀρετὴ αὐτῆς; Ἡ τὸ γινόμενον αὐτῇ ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς. Τί οὖν τοῦτο; Θέα καὶ τύπος τοῦ ὁφθέντος ἐντεθεῖς καὶ ἐνεργῶν, ὡς ἡ ὄψις περὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον. Οὐκ ἄρα εἶχεν αὐτὰ οὐδ’ ἀναμνησκεται; Ἡ εἶχεν οὐκ 20 ἐνεργοῦντα, ἀλλὰ ἀποκείμενα ἀφώτιστα· ἵνα δὲ φωτισθῇ καὶ τότε γινῶ αὐτὰ ἐνόντα, δεῖ προσβαλεῖν τῷ φωτίζοντι. Εἶχε δὲ οὐκ αὐτά, ἀλλὰ τύπους· δεῖ οὖν τὸν τύπον τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς, ὧν καὶ οἱ τύποι, ἐφαρμόσαι. Τάχα δὲ καὶ οὕτω λέγεται 25 ἔχειν, ὅτι ὁ νοῦς οὐκ ἀλλότριος καὶ μάλιστα δὲ οὐκ ἀλλότριος, ὅταν πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπῃ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ παρὼν ἀλλότριος. Ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις· ἐὰν μὴδ’ ὅλως ἐνεργῶμεν κατ’ αὐτάς, ἀλλότριαι.

Thus, just as Aristotle in *E.N.* I 1098a 7-18 defined εὐδαιμονία (above, vol. II, p. 143), P. defines virtue as an *activity of the soul*. But according to P. for this ἐνέργεια an “illumination” from beyond is needed. Cp. St. Augustine in *De magistro* XII 40; *De civ. Dei* l. X c. 2; *De Trin.* l. XII c. 15; *Retract.* l. I c. 8.

b. Cp. also the following passage of the treatise Περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, in which the traditional “moral virtues” are described as a purification from the πάθος of the body and a preparation for that state of the soul in which she is brought back to Νοῦς, which for her is the source of beauty and resemblance to God.

Enn. I 6, 6, l. 1-3, 6-20:

Ἔστι γὰρ δὴ, ὡς ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρία καὶ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καθαρσις καὶ ἡ φρόνησις αὐτή. — Τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ εἴη σωφροσύνη ἀληθῆς ἢ τὸ μὴ προσομιλεῖν ἡδοναῖς τοῦ σώματος, φεύγειν δὲ ὡς οὐ καθαρὰς οὐδὲ καθαροῦ; Ἡ δὲ ἀνδρία ἀφοβία θανάτου. Ὁ δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ θάνατος χωρὶς εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος. Οὐ φοβεῖται δὲ τοῦτο, ὅς ἀγαπᾷ μόνος γενέσθαι. Μεγαλοψυχία δὲ δὴ ὑπεροψία τῶν τῆδε. Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις νόησις ἐν ἀποστροφῇ τῶν κάτω, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἄνω τὴν ψυχὴν ἄγουσα. Γίνεται οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ καθαρθεῖσα εἶδος καὶ λόγος καὶ πάντα ἀσώματος καὶ νοερά καὶ ὅλη τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅθεν ἡ πηγὴ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τὰ συγγενῆ πάντα τοιαῦτα. Ψυχὴ οὖν ἀναχθεῖσα πρὸς νοῦν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ καλόν. Νοῦς δὲ καὶ τὰ παρὰ νοῦ τὸ κάλλος αὐτῇ οἰκτεῖον καὶ οὐκ ἀλλότριον, ὅτι τότε ἐστὶν ὄντως μόνον ψυχὴ. Διὸ καὶ λέγεται ὀρθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι ὁμοιωθῆναι εἶναι θεῷ, ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν τὸ καλόν. —

καθαρσις
a condition
to the
ὁμοιωσις
θεῷ

Thus, P. knows a higher and a lower virtue, the latter of which is the condition to the first, while the first is not implied in the latter. Below, 1420b.

c. As long as soul is not entirely purified from the πάθη, she is demoniac, not divine.

Enn. I 2, 6, l. 3-7:

Εἰ μὲν οὖν τι τῶν τοιούτων ἀπροαίρετον γίνοιτο, θεὸς ἂν εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος καὶ δαίμων διπλοῦς ὢν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἔχων σὺν αὐτῷ ἄλλον ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἔχοντα· εἰ δὲ μηδέν, θεὸς μόνον· θεὸς δὲ τῶν ἐπομένων τῷ πρώτῳ¹.

d. In a later treatise P. qualifies (higher) virtue as “a ἔξις which causes the soul to be spiritualized” or even as “another kind of Noûs”; from which he concludes that that liberty of man which is called τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν lies not in action but in Noûs.

Enn. VI 8, 5, l. 34-37:

Εἰ οὖν οἶον νοῦς τις ἄλλος ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἔξις οἶον νοωθῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν ποιοῦσα, πάλιν αὖ ἥκει οὐκ ἐν πράξει τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, ἀλλ’ ἐν νῷ ἡσύχῳ τῶν πράξεων.

Virtue is a
spiritualized
state of the
soul

e. In soul, the contemplation of intelligible being is called virtue; in Noûs itself it is not. Here it is “act” (ἐνέργεια) and essence.

Enn. I 2, 6, l. 12-18:

Ἡ σοφία μὲν καὶ φρόνησις ἐν θεωρίᾳ ὧν νοῦς ἔχει· νοῦς δὲ τῇ ἐπαφῇ. Διττὴ δὲ ἑκατέρω, ἡ μὲν ἐν νῷ οὔσα, ἡ δὲ ἐν ψυχῇ. Κάκεῖ μὲν οὐκ ἀρετὴ, ἐν

What is
„act” in
Noûs, in soul
becomes
virtue

¹ For P.’s polytheism, see our preceding paragraph, nr. 1411.

δὲ ψυχῇ ἀρετή. Ἐκεῖ οὖν τί; Ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁ ἐστίν· ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν 15 ἄλλῳ ἐκεῖθεν ἀρετή. Οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοδικαιοσύνη καὶ ἐκάστη ἀρετή, ἀλλ' οἷον παράδειγμα· τὸ δὲ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἐν ψυχῇ ἀρετή.

1420—The distinction between a higher and a lower kind of virtue must be made, because "moral virtue" (as it is called by Aristotle) presupposes πλῆθος, while virtue in the higher sense does not.

Higher and
lower virtue

a. *Enn.* I 2, 6, 1. 19-27:

Δικαιοσύνη δὲ εἶπερ οἰκαιοπραγία ¹, ἄρα αἰεὶ ἐν πλῆθει μερῶν; Ἡ ἡ μὲν ἐν 20 πλῆθει, ὅταν πολλὰ ᾖ τὰ μέρη, ἡ δὲ ὅλως οἰκαιοπραγία, καὶ ἐνός ᾖ. Ἡ γοῦν ἀληθὴς αὐτοδικαιοσύνη ἐνός πρὸς αὐτό *, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο· ὥστε καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ δικαιοσύνη ἡ μείζων τὸ πρὸς νοῦν ἐνεργεῖν, τὸ δὲ σωφρονεῖν ἡ εἴσω πρὸς νοῦν στροφή, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρία ἀπάθεια καθ' ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ πρὸς ὁ βλέπει 25 ἀπαθὲς ὃν τὴν φύσιν· αὕτη δὲ ἐξ ἀρετῆς, ἵνα μὴ συμπαθῇ τῷ χεῖρονι συνοίκῳ.

b. Virtues are linked the one with the other, as their examples are in Noûs. Moreover, he who possesses the higher virtues always possesses the minor ones, at least potentially. On the other hand, the man who possesses the minor virtues does not necessarily possess the higher ones.

How far
they are
linked

Enn. I 2, 7, 1. 1-12:

Ἀντακολουθοῦσι τοίνυν ἀλλήλαις καὶ αὗται αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὥσπερ κακεῖ τὰ πρὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς αἱ ἐν νῷ ὥσπερ παραδείγματα. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ νόησις ἐκεῖ ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία, τὸ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη, τὸ δὲ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἡ οἰκαιοπραγία, τὸ δὲ οἷον ἀνδρία ἡ αὐλότης καὶ τὸ ἐφ' αὐτοῦ μένειν καθαρὸν. 5 Ἐν ψυχῇ τοίνυν πρὸς νοῦν ἡ ὄρασις σοφία καὶ φρόνησις, ἀρεταὶ αὐτῆς· οὐ γὰρ αὕτη ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ. Καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως ἀκολουθεῖ· καὶ τῇ καθάρσει δέ, εἶπερ πᾶσαι καθάρσεις κατὰ τὸ κεκαθάρθαι, ἀνάγκη πάσας· ἢ οὐδεμία 10 τελεία. Καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχων τὰς μείζους καὶ τὰς ἐλάττους ἐξ ἀνάγκης δυνάμει, ὁ δὲ τὰς ἐλάττους οὐκ ἀναγκαίως ἔχει ἐκείνας.

c. It is the task of dialectic to form man's natural aptitudes into real virtue, both by arguments and by exercise.

Dialectic
has to train
man to
virtue

Enn. I 3, 6, 1. 14-24:

Πότερα δὲ ἔστι τὰ κάτω ² εἶναι ἄνευ διαλεκτικῆς καὶ σοφίας; Ἡ ἀτελεῶς καὶ 15 ἐλλειπόντως. Ἔστι δὲ σοφὸν εἶναι καὶ διαλεκτικὸν οὕτως ἄνευ τούτων; Ἡ οὐδ' ἂν

* αὐτό Br.

¹ According to Plato's definition in *Resp.* IV 433d-e, 435b (our nrs. 284c, 285a).

² The lower virtues.

γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ ἢ πρότερον ἢ ἅμα συναύζεται. Καὶ τάχα ἂν φυσικὰς τις ἀρετὰς ἔχοι, ἐξ ὧν αἱ τέλειαι σοφίας γενομένης *. Μετὰ τὰς φυσικὰς οὖν ἡ σοφία· εἴτα
 20 τελειοῖ τὰ ἦθη. Ἡ τῶν φυσικῶν οὐσῶν συναύζεται ἤδη ἅμφω καὶ συντελειοῦται· ἢ προλαβοῦσα ἢ ἐτέρα τὴν ἐτέραν ἐτελείωσεν· ὅλως γὰρ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὅμμα ἀτελὲς καὶ ἦθος ἔχει, καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀμφοτέραις, ἀφ' ὧν ἔχομεν.

d. How much P. is convinced that training in the lower virtues is an indispensable condition for any higher spiritual life, may be seen in his treatise against the gnostics, whom he blames not only for denying providence, but also for their complete neglect of virtue "which is perfected by λόγος and ἄσκησις".

Enn. II 9, 15, l. 8-17, 26-40:

ἽΟ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀνελὼν τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸ ἡδεσθαι, ὅπερ
 10 ἦν λοιπόν, τοῦτο διώκειν παρακελεύεται· ὁ δὲ λόγος οὗτος ἐστὶ νεανικώτερον τὸν τῆς προνοίας κύριον καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν πρόνοιαν μεμψάμενος καὶ πάντας νόμους τοὺς ἐνταῦθα ἀτιμάσας καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου ἀνηρυημένην τό τε σωφρονεῖν τοῦτο ἐν γέλῳ τι θέμενος, ἵνα μηδὲν καλὸν
 15 ἐνταῦθα δὴ ὀφθελὴ ὑπάρχον, ἀνείλε τό τε σωφρονεῖν καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἡθεσι σύμφυτον δικαιοσύνην τὴν τελειομένην ἐκ λόγου καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ ὅλως καθ' ἃ σπουδαῖος ἄνθρωπος ἂν γένοιτο. — Οἷς δὲ ἀρετῆς μὴ μέτεστιν, οὐκ ἂν εἶεν τὸ παράπαν κινηθέντες πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ¹.

27 Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τόδε τὸ μηδένα λόγον περὶ ἀρετῆς πεποιῆσθαι, ἐκλελοιπέναι δὲ παντάπασιν τὸν περὶ τούτων λόγον, καὶ μήτε τί ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν
 30 μήτε πόσα μήτε ὅσα τεθεώρηται πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ τοῖς τῶν παλαιῶν λόγοις, μήτε ἐξ ὧν περιέσται καὶ κτήσεται, μήτε ὡς θεραπεύεται ψυχὴ μήτε ὡς καθαίρεται. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ εἰπεῖν "βλέπε πρὸς θεόν" προὔργου τι ἐργάζεται, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ πῶς ** βλέψει διδάξῃ. Τί γὰρ καλύει, εἴποι τις ἂν, βλέπειν καὶ μη-
 35 δεμιᾶς ἀπέχεσθαι ἡδονῆς, ἢ ἀκρατῇ θυμοῦ εἶναι μεμνημένον μὲν ὀνόματος τοῦ θεός, συνεχόμενον δὲ ἅπασιν πάθεσι, μηδὲν δὲ αὐτῶν πειρώμενον ἐξαιρεῖν; Ἀρετὴ μὲν οὖν εἰς τέλος προϊοῦσα καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ ἐγγενομένη μετὰ φρονήσεως
 40 θεὸν δείκνυσιν· ἄνευ δὲ ἀρετῆς ἀληθινῆς θεός λεγόμενος ὀνομά ἐστιν.

P. blames
gnostics for
their neglect
of virtue

Without
virtue the
cult of God
a meaning-
less dictum

1421—Man can possess happiness, because he is able to have the perfect life, i.e. spiritual life. Since this is not a part of him, but his true being, he may be said to be the cause of his own happiness, though the deepest ground of it is transcendent. Moreover, he is αὐτάρκης, so far as he does not strive after other things.

Happiness

* <προς>γενομένης Müller, Br.

¹ ἐκεῖνα is Plotinus' usual term for the Intelligible World which is "God".

** καὶ πῶς transp. Volkman, Br.; πῶς καὶ codd., H.-S.

Enn. I 4, 4, 1. 1-23:

Εἰ μὲν οὖν τὴν τελείαν ζωὴν ἔχειν οἷός τε ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ταύτην ἔχων τὴν ζωὴν εὐδαίμων. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἐν θεοῖς ἂν τις τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν θεῖτο, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνοις μόνοις ἢ τοιαύτῃ ζωῇ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν φαμὲν εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τοῦτο, σκεπτέον πῶς ἔστι τοῦτο. Λέγω δὲ ὧδε· ὅτι μὲν οὖν 5 ἔχει τελείαν ζωὴν ἄνθρωπος οὐ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν μόνον ἔχων, ἀλλὰ καὶ λογισμὸν καὶ νοῦν ἀληθινόν, δῆλον καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων. Ἄλλ' ἄρα γε ὡς ἄλλος ὢν ἄλλο τοῦτο ἔχει; Ἡ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ὅλως ἄνθρωπος μὴ οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἢ δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ 10 ἔχων, ὃν δὴ καὶ φαμὲν εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. Ἄλλ' ὡς μέρος αὐτοῦ τοῦτο φήσομεν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ εἶδος τῆς ζωῆς τὸ τέλειον εἶναι; Ἡ τὸν μὲν ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον μέρος τι τοῦτο ἔχειν δυνάμει ἔχοντα, τὸν δὲ εὐδαίμονα ἤδη, ὃς δὴ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἔστι τοῦτο καὶ μεταβέβηκε πρὸς τὸ αὐτό, εἶναι τοῦτο· περικεῖσθαι δ' αὐτῷ τὰ 15 ἄλλα ἤδη, ἃ δὴ οὐδὲ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἂν τις θεῖτο οὐκ ἐθέλοντι περικεῖμενα· ἦν δ' ἂν αὐτοῦ κατὰ βούλησιν συνηρτημένα.

Τούτῳ τοίνυν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν; Ἡ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὅπερ ἔχει· τὸ δὲ ἐπέκεινα αἴτιον τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἄλλως ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ παρὸν ἄλλως.

Μαρτύριον δὲ τοῦ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἄλλο ζητεῖν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα. Τί γὰρ 20 ἂν καὶ ζητήσῃ; Τῶν μὲν γὰρ χειρόνων οὐδέν, τῷ δὲ ἀρίστῳ σύνεστιν. Αὐτάρκης οὖν ὁ βίος τῷ οὕτως ζωὴν ἔχοντι.

1422—a. The Peripatetic arguments against the self-sufficiency of the spiritual life.

Arguments
against
self-
sufficiency

Enn. I 4, 5, 1. 1-5, 14-22:

Ἀλγυδόνες δ' ἔτι καὶ νόσοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλως * καλύοντα ἐνεργεῖν; Εἰ δὲ δὴ 1 μηδ' ἑαυτῷ παρακολουθοῖ¹; Γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐκ φαρμάκων καὶ τινων νόσων. Πῶς δὴ ἐν τούτοις ἅπασιν τὸ ζῆν εὖ καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἂν ἔχοι; Πενίας γὰρ καὶ ἀδοξίας ἐατέον. — Ἡδονῆς δὲ συναριθμουμένης τῷ εὐδαίμονι βίῳ, πῶς ἂν λυπηρὸν διὰ τύχας καὶ ὀδύνας ἔχων εὐδαίμων εἴη, ὅτῳ ταῦτα σπουδαίῳ 15 ὄντι γίγνεται; Ἀλλὰ θεοῖς μὲν ἢ τοιαύτῃ διάθεσις εὐδαίμων καὶ αὐτάρκης, ἀνθρώποις δὲ προσθήκη τοῦ χειρόνος λαβοῦσι περὶ ὅλον χρὴ τὸ γενόμενον τὸ εὐδαίμον ζητεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ μέρος, ὅτι ἐκ θατέρου κακῶς ἔχοντος ἀναγκά- 20 ζοιτο ἂν καὶ θάτερον τὸ κρεῖττον ** ἐμποδιῆσθαι πρὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι μὴ καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου καλῶς ἔχει.

b. To this Plotinus answers that, since happiness is not in outward things, the wise man will not seek for it there.

* ὅλως H.-S.; ἄλλως Br.

¹ παρακολουθεῖν and παρακολουθήσις are Plotinian terms for (having) self-consciousness. See under c.

** τὸ κρεῖττον secl. Müller, Br.

Ib., c. 6, l. 1-13, 27-33:

rejected
by P.

Ἄλλ' εἰ μὲν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐν τῷ μὴ ἀλγεῖν μηδὲ νοσεῖν μηδὲ δυστυχεῖν
μηδὲ συμφοραῖς μεγάλαις περιπίπτειν ἐδίδου ὁ λόγος, οὐκ ἦν τῶν ἐναντίων
παρόντων εἶναι ὄντινον εὐδαίμονα· εἰ δ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κτήσει
5 τοῦτο ἐστὶ κείμενον, τί δεῖ παρέντας τοῦτο καὶ οὐ * πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντας κρίνειν
τὸν εὐδαίμονα τὰ ἄλλα ζητεῖν, ἀ μὴ ἐν τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἡρίθμηται; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ
συμφόρησις ἦν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλ' ἀγαθῶν
καὶ τούτων λεγομένων, ἐχρῆν καὶ ταῦτα παρεῖναι ζητεῖν· εἰ δὲ τὸ τέλος ἐν τι
10 εἶναι ἀλλ' οὐ πολλὰ δεῖ — οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐ τέλος, ἀλλὰ τέλη ἂν ζητοῖ — ἐκεῖνο
χρῆ λαμβάνειν μόνον, ὃ ἐσχατόν τέ ἐστὶ καὶ τιμιώτατον καὶ ὃ ἡ ψυχὴ ζητεῖ ἐν
αὐτῇ ἐγκολπίσασθαι. — “Α δὲ παρόντα μὲν οὐδὲν ἐπαγωγὸν ἔχει οὐδὲ προστίθησί
τι πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἀπόντα δὲ διὰ τὴν τῶν λυπούντων παρουσίαν ζητεῖται»,
30 εὐλογον ἀναγκαῖα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀγαθὰ φάσκειν εἶναι. Οὐδὲ συναριθμητέα τοῖνυν τῷ
τέλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόντων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων παρόντων ἀκέραιον τὸ τέλος
τηρητέον.

c. To those who say that even the spiritual man may lose his awareness and, as it seems, his faculty of thinking by illness or by drugs, P. answers: there is an activity of our spirit before we are aware of it. To this activity our consciousness is not of primary importance. Soul is like a mirror, reflecting the image of what happens in Noûs. The mirror may go to pieces, the life of the spirit goes on. It may be even purer if it is not reflected.

On the
possibility
of losing
one's con-
sciousness

Enn. I 4, 10, l. 3-19, 21-33:

Αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ νοῦς διὰ τί οὐκ ἐνεργήσει καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ περὶ αὐτὸν ἢ πρὸ αἰσθήσεως
5 καὶ ὅλως ἀντιλήψεως; Δεῖ γὰρ τὸ πρὸ ἀντιλήψεως ἐνέργημα εἶναι, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ
τὸ νοεῖν καὶ εἶναι¹. Καὶ ἔοικεν ἡ ἀντίληψις εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι ἀνακάμπ-
τοντος τοῦ νοήματος καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος τοῦ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν τῆς ψυχῆς οἶον
ἀπωσθέντος πάλιν, ὥσπερ τὸ ἐν κατόπτρῳ περὶ τὸ λεῖον καὶ λαμπρὸν ἡσυχάζον.
10 Ὡς οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις παρόντος μὲν τοῦ κατόπτρου ἐγένετο τὸ εἶδωλον,
μὴ παρόντος δὲ ἢ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντος ἐνεργείᾳ πάρεστιν οὐ τὸ εἶδωλον ἦν ἂν,
οὕτω καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν ἡσυχίαν μὲν ἄγοντος τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν τοιοῦτου, ᾧ ἐμφαίνεται
τὰ τῆς διανοίας καὶ τοῦ νοῦ εἰκονίσματα, ἐνορᾶται ταῦτα καὶ οἶον αἰσθητῶς
15 γινώσκεται μετὰ τῆς προτέρας γνώσεως, ὅτι ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ διάνοια ἐνεργεῖ.
Συγκλασθέντος δὲ τούτου διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ταραττομένην ἁρμονίαν ἄνευ
εἰδώλου ἢ διάνοια καὶ ὁ νοῦς νοεῖ καὶ ἄνευ φαντασίας ἢ νόησις τότε. — Πολλὰς
21 δ' ἂν τις εὖροι καὶ ἐρηγορότων καλὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ θεωρίας καὶ πράξεις,
ὅτε θεωροῦμεν καὶ ὅτε πράττομεν, τὸ παρακολουθεῖν ἡμᾶς αὐταῖς οὐκ ἐχούσας.

* οὐ Br.; τὸ codd., H.-S.

¹ Parm., fr. 3 D.

Οὐ γὰρ τὸν ἀναγινώσκοντα ἀνάγκη παρακολουθεῖν ὅτι ἀναγινώσκει καὶ τότε 25
 μάλιστα, ὅτε μετὰ τοῦ συντόνου ἀναγινώσκοι· οὐδὲ ὁ ἀνδριζόμενος ὅτι ἀνδρι-
 ζεται καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρίαν ἐνεργεῖ ὅσῳ ἐνεργεῖ· καὶ ἄλλα μυρία· ὥστε τὰς
 παρακολουθήσεις κινδυνεύειν ἀμυδροτέρας αὐτὰς τὰς ἐνεργείας αἷς παρακολου-
 θοῦσι ποιεῖν, μόνας δὲ αὐτὰς οὐσας καθαρὰς τότε εἶναι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐνεργεῖν καὶ 30
 μᾶλλον ζῆν καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθει τῶν σπουδαίων γενομένων μᾶλλον
 τὸ ζῆν εἶναι, οὐ κεχυμένον εἰς αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ συνηγμένον.

The wise
 man and his
 happiness

1423—That man is not the compound, may be seen in the wise man:
 his happiness is not of the living being as such, but of the soul, and even
 exclusively of the higher soul.

a. *Enn.* I 4, 14, l. 1-31:

Τὸ δὲ μὴ συναμφοτέρον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ μάλιστα τὸν σπουδαῖον
 μαρτυρεῖ καὶ ὁ χωρισμὸς ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἡ τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν τοῦ
 σώματος καταφρόνησις. Τὸ δὲ καθόσον ἀξιοῦν τὸ ζῶον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι
 γελοῖον εὐζωίας τῆς εὐδαιμονίας οὐσης, ἣ περὶ ψυχὴν συνίσταται, ἐνεργείας 5
 ταύτης οὐσης καὶ ψυχῆς οὐ πάσης — οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῆς φυτικῆς, ἔν' ἂν καὶ ἐφήψατο
 σώματος· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τοῦτο ἦν σώματος μέγεθος καὶ εὐεξία —
 οὐδ' αὖ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι εὔ, ἐπεὶ καὶ κινδυνεύουσιν αἱ τούτων πλεονεξίαι 10
 βαρύνασαι πρὸς αὐτὰς φέρειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Ἀντισηκώσεως δὲ οἷον ἐπὶ
 θάτερα πρὸς τὰ ἄριστα γενομένης μινύθειν * καὶ χεῖρω τὰ σώματα ποιεῖν,
 ἵνα δεικνύοιτο οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄλλος ὢν ἢ τὰ ἔξω. Ὁ δὲ τῶν τῆδε ἄνθρωπος
 ἔστω καὶ καλὸς καὶ μέγας καὶ πλούσιος καὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἄρχων ὡς ἂν 15
 ὢν τοῦδε τοῦ τόπου, καὶ οὐ φθονητέον αὐτῷ τῶν τοιούτων ἡπατημένῳ. Περὶ δὲ
 σοφὸν ταῦτα ἴσως μὲν ἂν οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν γένοιτο, γενομένων δὲ ἐλαττώσει
 αὐτός, εἴπερ αὐτοῦ κήδεται. Καὶ ἐλαττώσει μὲν καὶ μαρανεῖ ἀμελείᾳ τὰς τοῦ 20
 σώματος πλεονεξίας, ἀρχὰς δὲ ἀποθήσεται. Σώματος δὲ ὑγίειαν φυλάττων οὐκ
 ἄπειρος νόσων εἶναι παντάπασιν βουλήσεται· οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδὲ ἄπειρος εἶναι ἀλγη-
 δόνων· ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ γινομένων νέος ὢν μαθεῖν βουλήσεται, ἥδη δὲ ἐν γήρᾳ
 ὢν οὔτε ταύτας οὔτε ἡδονὰς ἐνοχλεῖν οὐδέ τι τῶν τῆδε οὔτε προσηγνές οὔτε 25
 ἐναντίον, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα βλέπη. Γινόμενος δ' ἐν ἀλγηδόσι τὴν πρὸς
 ταύτας αὐτῷ πεπορισμένην δύναμιν ἀντιτάξει οὔτε προσθήκην ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς
 καὶ ὑγίειαις καὶ ἀπονίαις πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν λαμβάνων οὔτε ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ
 ἐλάττωσιν ταύτης ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις τούτων. Τοῦ γὰρ ἐναντίου μὴ προστιθέντος 30
 τῷ αὐτῷ πῶς ἂν τὸ ἐναντίον ἀφαιροῖ;

b. Since he is above outward things, he will not be more happy
 if he has them than if he has not.

* μινύθειν <δεῖ> Müller, Br.

He is above
outward
things

Ib., c. 15, l. 1-8:

Ἄλλ' εἰ δύο εἶεν σοφοί, τῷ δὲ ἐτέρῳ παρείη ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται, τῷ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, ἴσον φήσομεν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν αὐτοῖς παρεῖναι; Φήσομεν, εἴπερ ἐπίσης σοφοί. Εἰ δὲ καλὸς τὸ σῶμα ὁ ἕτερος καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα μὴ πρὸς 5 σοφίαν μὴδὲ ὅλως πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου θέαν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον εἶναι, τί τοῦτο ἂν εἴη; Ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ὁ ταῦτα ἔχων σεμνυνεῖται ὡς μᾶλλον εὐδαίμων τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος. —

c. The wise man *must* be placed on this spiritual level. Otherwise he would be just a decent man, who is of a mixed life and character and not worthy of being called happy.

Ib., c. 16, l. 1-15:

Εἰ δέ τις μὴ ἐνταῦθα ἐν τῷ νῷ τούτῳ ἄρας θήσκει τὸν σπουδαῖον, κατάγοι δὲ πρὸς τύχας καὶ ταύτας φοβήσεται περὶ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι, οὔτε σπουδαῖον τηρήσει, οἷον ἀξιοῦμεν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐπιεικῇ ἄνθρωπον, καὶ μικτὸν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ 5 καὶ κακοῦ διδοὺς μικτὸν βίον ἐκ τινος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ ἀποδώσει τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐ ῥᾶδιον γενέσθαι. Ὅς εἰ καὶ γένοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ὀνομάζεσθαι εὐδαίμων εἴη ἀξίος οὐκ ἔχων τὸ μέγα οὔτε ἐν ἀξίᾳ σοφίας οὔτε ἐν καθαρότητι ἀγαθοῦ. 10 Οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ἐν τῷ κοινῷ εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν. Ὁρθῶς γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἐκεῖθεν ἄνωθεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀξιοῖ λαμβάνειν καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπειν τὸν μέλλοντα σοφὸν καὶ εὐδαίμονα ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐκεῖνῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνο ζῆν. Τοῦτο οὖν δεῖ ἔχειν μόνον πρὸς τὸ τέλος, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὡς ἂν καὶ τόπους μεταβάλλοι οὐκ 15 ἐκ τῶν τόπων προσθήκην πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔχων. —

1424—As we saw above (nr. 1411, 1420d), Plotinus rebuked gnostics for despising the visible world, for denying that the care of Providence extends to it, despising “the gods that are here”, and also for blaming unduly the connection of soul and body. Here follows the passage where he speaks of the last point.

Enn. II 9, 18, l. 1-17:

We should
accept the
body meekly

Ἄλλ' ἴσως φήσουσιν ἐκείνους μὲν τοὺς λόγους¹ φεύγειν τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖν πόρρωθεν μισοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ ἡμετέρους κατέχειν τὴν ψυχὴν πρὸς αὐτῷ. Τοῦτο 5 δὲ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δύο οἶκον καλὸν τὸν αὐτὸν οἰκούντων, τοῦ μὲν ψέγοντος τὴν κατασκευὴν καὶ τὸν ποιήσαντα καὶ μένοντος οὐχ ἤττον ἐν αὐτῷ, τοῦ δὲ μὴ ψέγοντος, ἀλλὰ τὸν ποιήσαντα τεχνικώτατα πεποιηκέναι λέγοντος, τὸν δὲ χρόνον ἀναμένοντος ἕως ἂν ἤκη, ἐν ᾧ ἀπαλλάσσεται, οὐ μὴκέτι οἴκου 10 δεήσειτο, ὁ δὲ σοφώτερος οἶοιτο εἶναι καὶ ἐτοιμότερος ἐξελθεῖν, ὅτι οἶδε λέγειν ἐκ λίθων ἀψύχων τοὺς τοίχους καὶ ξύλων συνεστάναι καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖν τῆς

¹ Sc. their own theories.

ἀληθινῆς οἰκήσεως, ἀγνοῶν ὅτι τῷ μὴ φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα διαφέρει, εἴπερ καὶ μὴ ποιεῖται * δυσχεραίνειν ἀγαπῶν ἡσυχῇ τὸ κάλλος τῶν λίθων. Δεῖ δὲ μένειν μὲν ἐν οἴκοις σῶμα ἔχοντας κατασκευασθεῖσιν ὑπὸ ψυχῆς ἀδελφῆς 15 ἀγαθῆς πολλὴν δύναμιν εἰς τὸ δημιουργεῖν ἀπόνως ἐχούσης.

8—FATE AND PROVIDENCE, LOGOS AND THE "BOUNDLESS POWERS",
TIME AND ETERNITY

1425—The doctrine of Fate, so important in later Antiquity, is discussed by P. in the treatise Π. εἰμαρμένης (*Enn.* III 1).

The Stoic
ἐν καὶ πᾶν
criticized

a. *Enn.* III 1, 4, l. 1-28.

After having dealt shortly with Democritean atomism, which makes everything determined by the mere mechanical motion of the atoms and thus destroys all personal life, reducing living beings to machines, P. criticizes the Stoic conception of the universe as ἐν καὶ πᾶν, which is at the same time ποιῶν and πάσχον (above, nr. 899). In this case too, human liberty is destroyed, and moreover the first and universal Principle would be the cause of evil.

Ἄλλ' ἄρα μία τις ψυχὴ διὰ παντός διήκουσα περαίνει τὰ πάντα ἐκάστου ταύτῃ κινουμένου ὡς μέρους, ἥ τὸ ὅλον ἄγει, φερομένων δὲ ἐκεῖθεν τῶν αἰτίων ἀκολουθῶν ἀνάγκῃ τὴν τούτων ἐφεξῆς συνέχειαν καὶ συμπλοκὴν εἰμαρμένην; Οἶον εἰ φυτοῦ ἐκ ῥίζης τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος τὴν ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ πάντα διοίκησιν ** 5 αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα συμπλοκὴν, ποίησιν τε καὶ πείσιν, διοίκησιν μίαν καὶ οἶον εἰμαρμένην τοῦ φυτοῦ τις εἶναι λέγοι. Ἄλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο τὸ σφοδρὸν τῆς ἀνάγκης καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εἰμαρμένης αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν εἰμαρ- 10 μένην καὶ τῶν αἰτίων τὸν εἰρμόν καὶ τὴν συμπλοκὴν ἀναιρεῖ. Ὡς γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις μέρεσι κατὰ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν κινουμένοις ἄλογον τὸ καθ' εἰμαρμένην λέγειν κινεῖσθαι — οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν τὸ ἐνδεδωκὸς τὴν κίνησιν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ παρα- δεξάμενον καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ τῇ ὁρμῇ κεχρημένον, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνόν ἐστι πρῶτον τὸ 15 κινήσαν τὸ σκέλος — τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εἰ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντός ἐν ἔσται τὸ πᾶν ποιῶν καὶ πάσχον καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο παρ' ἄλλου κατ' αἰτίας τὴν ἀναγωγὴν αἰεὶ ἐφ' ἕτερον ἐχούσας, οὐ δὲ ἀληθὲς κατ' αἰτίας τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἔσται τὰ 20 πάντα. Ὡστε οὔτε ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς οὔτε τι ἡμέτερον ἔργον· οὐδὲ λογιζόμεθα αὐτοί, ἀλλ' ἐτέρου λογισμοὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα βουλευόμεθα· οὐδὲ πράττομεν ἡμεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' οἱ πόδες λακτίζουσιν, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς διὰ μερῶν τῶν ἑαυτῶν. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ἕκαστον ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πράξεις ἡμετέρας καὶ διανοίας ὑπάρχειν 25 καὶ τὰς ἐκάστου καλὰς τε καὶ αἰσχροὺς πράξεις παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐκάστου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῷ παντὶ τὴν γοῦν τῶν αἰσchrῶν ποίησιν ἀνατιθέναι.

The influ-
ence of the
heavenly
bodies

b. Next, P. criticizes the doctrine of the influence of the heavenly bodies as it was usually conceived in his days.

* πρὸς ταῦτα corr. Br.; <προσ>ποιεῖται Dodds in *Class. Qu.* 16, 1922, p. 94.

** διήκουσαν Br.

As was said before, P. does not doubt of this influence itself (cp. IV 3, 12, l. 12-30 and IV 4, 26). He accepts it as a consequence of what is called by Stoics cosmic sympathy (above, nrs. 912 f., 935, 937, 1177). What he rejects is: (1) the idea that the heavenly bodies, instead of being for man a *sign* of things to come, *cause* these things directly and by deliberate will¹; (2) that they are the cause of spiritual qualities, of the character of man and of those things which depend on our own will; (3) that they (being gods) would be the cause of evil.

Enn. III 1, 5, l. 1-24, 37-59; c. 6, l. 1-11:

Ἄλλ' ἴσως μὲν οὐχ οὕτως ἕκαστα περαίνεται, ἡ δὲ φορὰ διοικοῦσα πάντα
καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄστρον κίνησις οὕτως ἕκαστα τίθησιν, ὥς ἂν πρὸς ἄλληλα στάσεως
ἔξη μαρτυρίας² καὶ ἀνατολαῖς, δύσεσί τε καὶ παραβολαῖς. Ἀπὸ τούτων γοῦν
5 μαντευόμενοι προλέγουσι περὶ τε τῶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἐσομένων περὶ τε ἐκάστου,
ὅπως τε τύχης καὶ διανοίας οὐχ ἥκιστα ἔξει. Ὅρᾳ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα τε
καὶ φυτὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τούτων συμπαθείας αὐξόμενά τε καὶ μειούμενα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
10 παρ' αὐτῶν πάσχοντα, τοὺς τε τόπους τοὺς ἐπὶ γῆς διαφέροντας ἀλλήλων εἶναι
κατὰ τε τὴν πρὸς τὸ πᾶν σχέσιν καὶ πρὸς ἥλιον μάλιστα· ἀκολουθεῖν δὲ τοῖς
τόποις οὐ μόνον τὰ ἄλλα φυτὰ τε καὶ ζῶα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἶδη τε καὶ
μεγέθη καὶ χροᾶς καὶ θυμούς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἐπιτηδεύματά τε καὶ ἦθη. Κυρία
15 ἄρα ἡ τοῦ παντὸς πάντων φορὰ. Πρὸς δὲ ταῦτα πρῶτον μὲν ἐκεῖνο ῥητέον,
ὅτι καὶ οὗτος ἕτερον τρόπον ἐκείνοις ἀνατίθησι τὰ ἡμέτερα, βουλάς καὶ πάθη,
κακίας τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἡμῖν δὲ οὐδὲν διδούς λίθοις φερομένοις καταλείπει εἶναι,
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνθρώποις ἔχουσι παρ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν φύσεως ἔργον. Ἀλλὰ
20 χρὴ διδόναι μὲν τὸ ἡμέτερον ἡμῖν, ἡκεῖν δὲ εἰς τὰ ἡμέτερα ἤδη τινὰ ὄντα καὶ
οἰκεῖα ἡμῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἄττα, καὶ διαιρούμενον, τίνα μὲν ἡμεῖς ἐργαζόμεθα,
τίνα δὲ πάσχομεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, μὴ πάντα ἐκείνοις ἀνατιθέναι. — Ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ
τῶνδε ἀκριβέστερον ἂν τις περὶ τούτων ἐπισκέψαιτο. Ἄ τις ἂν ἰδὼν εἰς τὴν τῶν
40 ἄστρον σχέσιν, ἣν εἶχον ὅτε ἕκαστος ἐγίνετο, προείποι, ταῦτά φασι καὶ γίνεσθαι
παρ' αὐτῶν οὐ σημαινόντων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιούντων. Ὅταν τοίνυν περὶ
εὐγενείας λέγωσιν ὥς ἐξ ἐνδόξων τῶν πατέρων καὶ μητέρων, πῶς ἐνι ποιεῖσθαι
λέγειν ταῦτα, ἃ προϋπάρχει περὶ τοὺς γονεῖς πρὶν τὴν σχέσιν γενέσθαι ταύτην τῶν
45 ἄστρον ἀφ' ἧς προλέγουσι; Καὶ μὴν καὶ γονέων τύχας ἀπὸ τῶν παίδων τῆς
γενέσεως καὶ παίδων διαθέσεις οἶα ἔσονται καὶ ὁποίαις συνέσονται τύχαις
ἀπὸ τῶν πατέρων περὶ τῶν οὕτω γεγονότων λέγουσι καὶ ἐξ ἀδελφῶν ἀδελφῶν
θανάτους καὶ ἐκ γυναικῶν τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀνάπαλιν τε ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνα.
50 Πῶς ἂν οὖν ἡ ἐκάστου σχέσις ἐπὶ τῶν ἄστρον ποιοῖ, ἃ ἤδη ἐκ πατέρων οὕτως
ἔξειν λέγεται; Ἡ γὰρ ἐκεῖνα τὰ πρότερα ἔσται τὰ ποιούντα, ἢ, εἰ μὴ ἐκεῖνα
ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ ταῦτα. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡ ὁμοιότης ἐν τοῖς εἶδεσι πρὸς τοὺς γονέας

¹ The question of how cosmic laws function is dealt with amply in IV 4, 30-42, which will be cited below.

² H.-S. explain: *positus stellarum*. Br. reads, with Orelli: *μεσουρανήσεις*.

οἴκοθεν φησι καὶ κάλλος καὶ αἰσχος ἵεναι, ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ φορᾶς ἄστρον. Εὐλογόν 55
τε κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους καὶ ἄλλα * ἅμα ζῶν τε παντοδαπὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους
ἅμα γίνεσθαι· οἷς ἅπανιν ἐχρῆν τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι, οἷς ἡ αὐτὴ σχέσις. Πῶς οὖν
ἅμα μὲν ἀνθρώπους, ἅμα δὲ τὰ ἄλλα διὰ τῶν ** σχημάτων;

(6) Ἄλλα γὰρ γίγνεται μὲν ἕκαστα κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν φύσεις, ἵππος μὲν,
ὅτι ἐξ ἵππου, καὶ ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ τοιοῦσδε, ὅτι ἐκ τοιοῦδε.
Ἔστω δὲ συνεργὸς καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς φορὰ συγχωροῦσα τὸ πολὺ τοῖς γινομένοις,
ἔστωσαν δὲ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ σώματος πολλὰ σωματικῶς διδόντες, θερμότητας καὶ 5
ψύξεις καὶ σωμάτων κράσεις ἐπακολουθοῦσας, πῶς οὖν τὰ ἦθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύ-
ματα καὶ μάλιστα ὅσα οὐ *** δοκεῖ κράσει σωμάτων δουλεῦναι, οἷον γραμματικὸς
τίς καὶ γεωμετρικὸς καὶ κυβευτικὸς καὶ τῶνδε τίς εὐρετής; Πονηρία δὲ 10
ῥήθους παρὰ **** θεῶν ὄντων πῶς ἂν δοθείη;

Stoic
determinism
rejected

c. The Stoic conception of everything being determined by the universal law of Nature does not leave any liberty to man.

Enn. III 1, 7, 1. 1-4, 12-24:

Λοιπὸν δὲ ἰδεῖν τὴν ἐπιπλέκουσαν καὶ οἷον συνείρουσαν ἀλλήλοις πάντα
καὶ τὸ πῶς ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἐπιφέρειουσαν ἀρχὴν τιθεμένην μίαν, ἀφ' ἧς πάντα κατὰ
λόγους σπερματικούς περαίνεται. — Τοιαῦτα δὲ ὄντα ὡς ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς
ὠρμημένα ἡμῖν οὐδὲν καταλείπει, ἢ φέρεσθαι ὅπῃ ἂν ἐκεῖνα ὦθῃ. Αἶ τε γὰρ
φαντασίαι τοῖς προηγησαμένοις αἶ τε ὁρμαὶ κατὰ ταύτας ἔσονται, ὄνομα τε 15
μόνον τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ ὅτι ὁρμῶμεν ἡμεῖς, ταύτῃ τι πλέον ἔσται τῆς
ὁρμῆς κατ' ἐκεῖνα γεννωμένης· τοιοῦτόν τε τὸ ἡμέτερον ἔσται, οἷον καὶ τὸ
τῶν ἄλλων ζῶων καὶ τὸ τῶν νηπίων καθ' ὁρμὰς τυφλὰς ἰόντων καὶ τὸ τῶν
μαινομένων· ὁρμῶσι γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι· καὶ νῆ Δία αἱ πυρὸς ὁρμαὶ καὶ πάντων ὅσα 20
δουλεύοντα τῇ αὐτῶν κατασκευῇ φέρεται κατὰ ταύτην. Τοῦτο δὲ καὶ πάντες
ὁρῶντες οὐκ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὁρμῆς ταύτης ἄλλας αἰτίας ζητοῦντες
οὐχ ἔστανται ὡς ἐπ' ἀρχῆς ταύτης.

Soul an
independent
cause

d. P.'s own solution—that Soul must be introduced into the system of the universe as an independent principle, free from physical necessity—is expounded in the cc. 8-9, cited above, sub 1418a. P. concludes as follows.

Enn. III 1, 10, 1. 1-II:

Τέλος δὴ φησιν ὁ λόγος πάντα μὲν σημαίνεσθαι καὶ γίνεσθαι κατ' αἰτίας
μὲν πάντα, διττάς δὲ ταύτας· καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ ψυχῆς, τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς
κύκλῳ. Πραττούσας δὲ ψυχὰς ὅσα πράττουσι κατὰ μὲν λόγον ποιούσας ὀρθόν

* ἄλλα om. H.-S.

** τῶν αὐτῶν Volkmann, Br.

*** ὅσα οὐ Orelli, Br.; οὐχ ὅσα codd., H.-S.

**** παρ' <ἀστέρων> Müller, Br.; H.-S. notice: „immo tacite supplendum”.

5 παρ' αὐτῶν πράττειν ὅταν πράττωσι, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἐμποδιζομένας τὰ αὐτῶν
 πράττειν, πάσχειν τε μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν. "Ὡστε τοῦ μὲν μὴ φρονεῖν ἄλλα αἷτια
 εἶναι· καὶ ταῦτα ἴσως ὀρθὸν καθ' εἰμαρμένην λέγειν πράττειν, οἷς γε καὶ
 10 δοκεῖ ἐξῶθεν τὴν εἰμαρμένην αἷτιον εἶναι· τὰ δὲ ἄριστα παρ' ἡμῶν. Ταύτης γὰρ
 καὶ τῆς φύσεώς ἐσμεν, ὅταν μόνοι ὦμεν. —

Cp. below, our nrs. **1430** and **1431**. See also Carneades' criticism of Stoic
 εἰμαρμένη, above, nr. **1124**.

1426—As was said before (nr. **1376**), P. distinguished between indirect
 providence, exercised from a distance by Universal soul, and direct Providence
 providence, exercised by particular souls coming into contact with a
 body. Emphasis is laid on this point, that Universal soul operates through
 a reasonable power called Λόγος, which is natural, but not by deliberation,
 which would mean that it were ἐπακτόν. The same or similar ideas are
 expressed in the opening chapters of the treatises Περὶ προνοίας (III
 2 and 3), which are among P.'s latest works. They were written against
 those who either deny Providence or hold that the world was made by
 a bad Demiurge. It is clear that P. is thinking in particular of gnostics.

a. Providence in detail, in the sense of deliberation before the
 work, is excluded; but also deliberation about the whole. *Providence*
means only that the universe is κατὰ νοῦν. Nothing else. Creation is not in
 time, and Noûs is the archetypicon of sensible things not in the chrono-
 logical order but eternally.

**Deliberation
 excluded**

Enn. III 2, I, l. 10-26:

Πρόνοιαν τοίνυν τὴν μὲν ἐφ' ἐκάστω, ἣ ἐστι λόγος πρὸ ἔργου ὅπως δεῖ
 γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι τι τῶν οὐ δεόντων πραχθῆναι ἢ ὅπως τι εἶη ἢ μὴ
 εἶη ἡμῖν, ἀφείσθω· ἦν δὲ τοῦ παντὸς λέγομεν πρόνοιαν εἶναι, ταύτην ὑποθέμενοι
 15 τὰ ἐφεξῆς συνάπτωμεν. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τινος χρόνου πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα τὸν
 κόσμον ἐλέγομεν γεγονέναι, τὴν αὐτὴν ἂν τῷ λόγῳ ἐτιθέμεθα, οἷαν καὶ ἐπὶ
 τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἐλέγομεν εἶναι, προόρασίν τινα καὶ λογισμὸν θεοῦ, ὡς ἂν
 γένοιτο τόδε τὸ πᾶν, καὶ ὡς ἂν ἄριστα κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν εἶη. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ
 20 καὶ τὸ οὐποτε μὴ τῷ κόσμῳ τῷδὲ φαμεν παρεῖναι, τὴν πρόνοιαν ὀρθῶς ἂν
 καὶ ἀκολούθως λέγοιμεν τῷ παντὶ εἶναι τὸ κατὰ νοῦν αὐτὸν εἶναι, καὶ νοῦν πρὸ
 αὐτοῦ εἶναι οὐχ ὡς χρόνῳ πρότερον ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὅτι παρὰ νοῦ ἐστὶ καὶ φύσει
 25 πρότερος ἐκεῖνος καὶ αἷτιος τούτου ἀρχέτυπον οἶον καὶ παράδειγμα εἰκόνας
 τούτου ὄντος καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον ὄντος καὶ ὑποστάντος ἀεὶ. —

b. Our world came into being "by the necessity inherent in the
 second nature". For this, which had an "immense power" in itself,
 could not be the last of all things.

**The "power"
 inherent in
 Noûs**

Enn. III 2, 2, 1. 1-2, 8-15:

‘Υφίσταται γοῦν ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ἐνὸς κόσμος οὗτος οὐχ εἷς ἀληθῶς. — Γέγονε δὲ οὐ λογισμῷ τοῦ δεῖν γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ φύσεως δευτέρας ἀνάγκη· οὐ γὰρ ἦν τοιοῦτον ἐκεῖνο οἷον ἔσχατον εἶναι τῶν ὄντων. Πρῶτον γὰρ ἦν καὶ πολλὴν δύναμιν ἔχον καὶ πᾶσαν· καὶ ταύτην τοίνυν τὴν 10 τοῦ ποιεῖν ἄλλο ἄνευ τοῦ ζητεῖν ποιῆσαι. Ἦδη γὰρ ἂν αὐτόθεν οὐκ εἶχεν, εἰ ἐζήτει, οὐδ’ ἂν ἦν ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ οὐσίας, ἀλλ’ ἦν οἷον τεχνίτης ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τὸ ποιεῖν οὐκ ἔχων, ἀλλ’ ἐπακτόν, ἐκ τοῦ μαθεῖν λαβὼν τοῦτο. 15

Similarly, in the ps. Aristotelian treatise II. κόσμου, cited above (under 1303c), we find the natural power of the Lord and Governor of the universe opposed to technical help and aid from others:

Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπιτεχνήσεως αὐτῷ δεῖ καὶ ὑπηρεσίας τῆς παρ’ ἐτέρων, ὥσπερ τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀρχοῦσι τῆς πολυχειρίας διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἦν τὸ θειότατον, τὸ μετὰ ραιστώνης καὶ ἀπλῆς κινήσεως παντοδαπὰς ἀποτελεῖν ἰδέας. — οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἡ θεία φύσις ἀπὸ τινος ἀπλῆς κινήσεως τοῦ πρώτου τὴν δύναμιν εἰς τὰ ξυνεχῆ δίδωσι, καὶ ἀπ’ ἐκείνων πάλιν εἰς τὰ πορρωτέρω, μέχρι ἂν διὰ τοῦ παντός διεξέλθῃ.

Aristotle, Bekker 398b, 10-14, 19-22 (Didot, vol. III p. 638, l. 1-5, 11-14).

1427—With regard to creation both the terms δύναμις (or δυνάμεις) and λόγος (or λόγοι) are used.

The term
Logos used
with regard
to creation

a. Noûs gives something of itself to ὕλη, and this is λόγος. It flows eternally from Noûs, containing the multiplicity and the opposites that are in the visible world, exactly as the λόγοι σπερματικοί contain in themselves the multiplicity and the opposites that are in individual living beings.

Enn. III 2, 2, 1. 15-33:

Νοῦς τοίνυν δούς τι ἑαυτοῦ εἰς ὕλην ἀτρεμῆς καὶ ἡσυχος τὰ πάντα εἰργάζετο· 15 οὗτος δὲ ὁ λόγος ἐκ νοῦ ῥυεῖς. Τὸ γὰρ ἀπορρέον ἐκ νοῦ λόγος, καὶ αἰεὶ ἀπορρεῖ, ἕως ἂν ᾗ παρὼν ἐν τοῖς οὐσι νοῦς. Ὡσπερ δὲ ἐν λόγῳ τῷ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι ὁμοῦ πάντων καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄντων καὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδενὶ μαχομένου οὐδὲ διαφορομένου 20 οὐδὲ ἐμποδίου ὄντος, γίνεται τι ἥδη ἐν ὅγκῳ καὶ ἄλλο μέρος ἀλλαχοῦ καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐμποδίσειεν ἂν ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ καὶ ἀπαναλώσειεν ἄλλο ἄλλο, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐξ ἐνὸς νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ λόγου ἀνέστη τόδε τὸ πᾶν καὶ διέστη καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μὲν ἐγένετο φίλα καὶ προσηνῆ, τὰ δὲ ἐχθρὰ καὶ πολέμια, καὶ τὰ 25 μὲν ἐκόντα, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἄκοντα ἀλλήλοις ἐλυμήνατο καὶ φθειρόμενα θάτερα γένεσιν ἀλλήλοις εἰργάσατο, καὶ μίαν ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς τοιαῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ πάσχουσιν ὅμως ἀρμονίαν ἀνεστήσατο φθεγγομένων μὲν ἐκάστων τὰ αὐτῶν, τοῦ δὲ λόγου ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀρμονίαν καὶ μίαν τὴν σύνταξιν εἰς τὰ ὅλα ποιοιμένου. Ἔστι γὰρ 30 τὸ πᾶν τόδε οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ νοῦς καὶ λόγος, ἀλλὰ μετέχον νοῦ καὶ λόγου.

b. Similarly, Logos is explained in the following passage as a rational principle in life, coming forth from Noûs and Soul, without

being identical with them, and containing in itself all opposites, uniting them into a harmonious whole.

Enn. III 2, 16, 1. 12-54, 56-58:

**Logos is
neither Nous
itself nor
pure soul**

"Ἔστι τοίνυν οὗτος ὁ λόγος — τετολήσθω γάρ· τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ τύχοιμεν —
ἔστι τοίνυν οὗτος οὐκ ἄκρατος νοῦς οὐδ' αὐτονοῦς οὐδέ γε ψυχῆς καθαρᾶς τὸ
15 γένος, ἡρτημένος δὲ ἐκείνης καὶ οἷον ἐκλαμψις ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ
ψυχῆς κατὰ νοῦν διακειμένης γεννησάντων τὸν λόγον τοῦτον ζωὴν λόγον τινὰ
ἡσυχῇ ἔχουσιν. Πᾶσα δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ φαύλη· ἐνέργεια δὲ οὐχ ὥς τὸ
πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς, καὶ μὴ αἰσθησίς τις παρῇ, κίνησίς τις οὐκ
20 εἰκῇ. Οἷς γοῦν ἂν παρῇ * καὶ μετάσχη ὅπως οὖν ὅτι οὖν, εὐθύς λελόγεται, τοῦτο
δὲ ἔστι μεμόρφωται, ὥς τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς κατὰ τὴν ζωὴν μορφοῦν δυναμένης καὶ
κινούσης οὕτως ὥς μορφοῦν. Ἡ τοίνυν ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς τεχνική, ὥσπερ ἂν ὁ
ὀρχούμενος κινούμενος εἴη· ὁ γὰρ ὀρχηστής τῇ οὕτω τεχνικῇ ζωῇ ἔοικεν
25 αὐτὸς καὶ ἡ τέχνη αὐτὸν κινεῖ καὶ οὕτω κινεῖ, ὥς τῆς ζωῆς αὐτῆς τοιαύτης πως
οὔσης. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω τοῦ οἷαν δεῖ καὶ τὴν ἡντινοῦν ζωὴν ἡγεῖσθαι
ἐνεκα. Ἦκων τοίνυν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐκ νοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ ζωῆς μιᾶς πλήρους ὄντος
30 ἐκατέρου οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε ζωὴ μία οὔτε νοῦς τις εἷς οὔτε ἐκασταχοῦ πλήρης
οὐδὲ διδοὺς ἑαυτὸν οἷς δίδωσιν ὅλον τε καὶ πάντα. Ἀντιθεῖς δὲ ἀλλήλοις τὰ
μέρη καὶ ποιήσας ἐνδεᾶ πολέμου καὶ μάχης σύστασιν καὶ γένεσιν εἰργάσατο
καὶ οὕτως ἔστιν εἷς πᾶς, εἰ μὴ ἓν εἴη. Γενόμενον γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τοῖς μέρεσι πολέμιον
35 οὕτως ἓν ἔστι καὶ φίλον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δράματος λόγος· εἷς ὁ τοῦ δράματος ἔχων
ἐν αὐτῷ πολλὰς μάχας. Τὸ μὲν οὖν δράμα τὰ μεμαχημένα οἷον εἰς μίαν ἁρμονίαν
ἄγει σύμφωνον, οἷον διηγῇσιν τὴν πᾶσαν τῶν μαχομένων ποιούμενον **. ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐξ
40 ἐνὸς λόγου ἡ τῶν διαστάτων μάχη· ὥστε μᾶλλον ἂν τις τῇ ἁρμονίᾳ τῇ ἐκ μαχομένων
εἰκάσειε καὶ ζητήσῃ διὰ τί τὰ μαχομένα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. Εἰ οὖν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁζὺ
καὶ βαρὺ <σύμφωνον> *** ποιούσι λόγοι καὶ συνίσουσιν εἷς ἓν, ὄντες ἁρμονίας λόγοι,
εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν ἁρμονίαν, ἄλλον λόγον μείζονα, ὄντες ἐλάττους αὐτοὶ καὶ μέρος,
45 ὀρῶμεν δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ παντὶ τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον λευκὸν μέλαν, θερμὸν ψυχρόν, καὶ
δὴ πτερωτὸν ἄπτερον, ἄπουν ὑπόπουν, λογικὸν ἄλογον, πάντα δὲ ζῶον ἐνὸς
τοῦ σύμπαντος μέρη, καὶ τὸ πᾶν ὁμολογεῖ ἑαυτῷ τῶν μερῶν πολλαχοῦ μαχο-
μένων, κατὰ λόγον δὲ τὸ πᾶν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν ἓνα τοῦτον λόγον ἐξ ἐναντίας
50 λόγον εἶναι ἓνα, τὴν σύστασιν αὐτῶν καὶ οἷον οὐσίαν τῆς τοιαύτης ἐναντιώσεως
φερούσης. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ πολὺς ἦν, οὐδ' ἂν ἦν πᾶς, οὐδ' ἂν λόγος· λόγος δὲ
ὢν διάφορός τε πρὸς αὐτόν ἐστι καὶ ἡ μάλιστα διαφορὰ ἐναντιώσεως ἐστίν· —
ὥστε ἄκρως ἕτερον ποιῶν καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ποιήσῃ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τέλος ἔσται,
55 οὐκ εἰ διάφορα μόνον, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἐναντία ποιοῖ εἶναι ἑαυτόν.

* H.-S. keep the reading of most codd.: ἐὰν μὴ παρῇ.

** The reading ποιούμενος is defended by H.-S.

*** Added by Br.

It should be noticed that also Philo of Alexandria spoke of Logos with regard to creation (above, 1293), and that he too described it as the harmonizer of opposites (above, 1306b). Yet, to say—as Bréhier did¹—that P. simply reproduced the theory of Logos as it is found in Philo, would be misleading. In fact, there is a great difference between Philo's view and that of Plotinus. As shown above (1299ff.) Philo's doctrine was complicated: for him Logos was not only the Stoic notion of universal Law, immanent in nature; it was also the Platonic world of transcendent paradeigmata, the κόσμος νοητός (above, nr. 1293). For Philo, the Logos is primarily the *divine Mind*, or what Plotinus called Noûs. For Plotinus it is not. He refuses explicitly to use the term in this sense. He does speak of δύνανμις in Noûs (below, nr. 1428); he does say that Noûs contains everything in its archetypal form (above, 1369c); that all things are ὁμοῦ in Noûs and yet distinguished the one from the other, since every νοητόν is a δύνανμις ἰδίᾳ (V 9, 6). But he does not say that Noûs as such is Logos. On the contrary, he excludes this. Thus, Plotinus marks clearly the difference between Plato's intelligible world and the Stoic conception of logos. Philo's use of the term could give rise to the Christian identification of Logos with the Son of God, that of Plotinus could not.

“Power” and
“powers”

1428—As we saw above (1426b), the “second nature”, i.e. Noûs, was said to possess πολλήν δύνανμιν καὶ πᾶσαν. Δύναμις is a term much used by Plotinus, not only with reference to the intelligible world.

The
boundless
Power in
Noûs

a. In Noûs there is boundless power, because intelligible being does not contain matter, so that it would be limited by the extent of its mass (V 5, 12, l. 3-7). On the other hand, since it is the totality of being, it does contain πληθος. Therefore, Plotinus can speak of the “many different powers of the many gods that are in God the Creator”, forming together “universal Power which is boundless” (δύναμις πᾶσα, εἰς ἄπειρον ἰοῦσα).

The following passage describes how to imagine and to invoke this Power.

Enn. V 8, 9, l. 7-37:

Ἔστω οὖν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φωτεινὴ τις φαντασία σφαίρας ἔχουσα πάντα ἐν αὐτῇ, εἴτε κινούμενα εἴτε ἐστηκότα, ἢ τὰ μὲν κινούμενα, τὰ δὲ ἐστηκότα. Φυλάττων δὲ ταύτην ἄλλην παρὰ σαυτῷ ἀφελὼν τὸν ὄγκον λαβέ· ἀφελε δὲ 10 καὶ τοὺς τόπους καὶ τὸ τῆς ὕλης ἐν σοὶ φάντασμα, καὶ μὴ πειρῶ αὐτῆς ἄλλην σμικροτέραν λαβεῖν τῷ ὄγκῳ, θεὸν δὲ καλέσας τὸν πεποιηκότα ἧς ἔχεις τὸ φάντασμα εὖξαι ἐλθεῖν. Ὁ δὲ ἦκοι τὸν αὐτοῦ κόσμον φέρων μετὰ πάντων τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ θεῶν εἰς ὧν καὶ πάντες καὶ ἕκαστος πάντες, συνόντες εἰς ἓν καὶ ταῖς 15 μὲν δυνάμεσιν ἄλλοι, τῇ δὲ μιᾷ ἐκείνῃ τῇ πολλῇ πάντες εἰς· μᾶλλον δὲ ὁ εἰς πάντες· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτός, ἦν πάντες ἐκεῖνοι γένωνται, ὁμοῦ δὲ εἰσι καὶ

¹ Plotin, *Ennéades*, texte établi et traduit, vol. III, p. 19: “Nous retrouvons d’abord, dans presque tous ces détails, la théorie du logos sous la forme qu’elle a prise chez Philon d’Alexandrie”.

- 20 ἕκαστος χωρὶς αὖ ἐν στάσει ἀδιαστάτῳ οὐ μορφήν αἰσθητὴν οὐδεμίαν ἔχων·
 ἥδη γὰρ ἂν ὁ μὲν ἄλλοθι, ὁ δὲ πού ἄλλοθι ᾗ, καὶ ἕκαστος δὲ οὐ πᾶς ἐν αὐτῷ·
 οὐδὲ μέρη ἄλλα ἔχων ἄλλοις ᾗ αὐτῷ οὐδὲ ἕκαστον ὅλον δύναμις κερματισθεῖσα
 καὶ τοσαύτη οὔσα, ὅσα τὰ μέρη μετρούμενα. Τὸ δὲ ἐστὶ δύναμις πᾶσα, εἰς
 25 ἄπειρον μὲν ἰοῦσα, εἰς ἄπειρον δὲ δυναμένη· καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος μέγας,
 ὡς καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἄπειρα γεγονέναι. Ποῦ γάρ τι ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν, ὅπου μὴ
 φθάνει; Μέγας μὲν οὖν καὶ ὅδε ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ αἱ ἐν αὐτῷ πᾶσαι δυνάμεις ὁμοῦ,
 30 ἀλλὰ μείζων ἂν ᾗ καὶ ὁπόσος οὐδ' ἂν ᾗ εἰπεῖν, εἰ μὴ τις αὐτῷ συνῇ σώματος
 δύναμις μικρά· καίτοι γε μεγάλας ἂν τις φήσκει πυρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σωμάτων
 τὰς δυνάμεις· ἀλλὰ ἥδη ἀπειρία δυνάμεως ἀληθινῆς φαντάζονται καίουςαι καὶ
 φθεῖρουςαι καὶ θλίβουςαι καὶ πρὸς γένεσιν τῶν ζώων ὑπουργοῦσαι. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα
 35 μὲν φθεῖρει, ὅτι καὶ φθεῖρεται, καὶ συγγεννᾷ, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὰ γίνεται· ἡ δὲ δύναμις
 ἡ ἐκεῖ μόνον τὸ εἶναι ἔχει καὶ μόνον τὸ καλὸν εἶναι.

b. Also of the Ideas, which are “together” in Noûs, P. says that each of them is a particular Power. **The ideas are Powers**

Enn. V 9, 6, 1. 1-9:

- Νοῦς μὲν δὴ ἔστω τὰ ὄντα, καὶ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ ἔχων, ἀλλ'
 ὡς αὐτὸν ἔχων καὶ ἐν ὧν αὐτοῖς. Πάντα δὲ ὁμοῦ ἐκεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν ἥττον διακε-
 κριμένα. Ἐπεὶ καὶ ψυχὴ ὁμοῦ ἔχουσα πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐν ἑαυτῇ οὐδὲν ἔχει
 5 συγκεχυμένον καὶ ἐκάστη πράττει τὸ αὐτῆς, ὅταν δέη, οὐ συνεφέλκουσα τὰς
 ἄλλας, νόημα δὲ ἕκαστον καθαρὸν ἐνεργεῖ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδον αὖ νοημάτων κειμένων.
 Οὕτως οὖν καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁμοῦ πάντα καὶ αὖ οὐχ ὁμοῦ, ὅτι
 ἕκαστον δύναμις ἰδίᾳ.

Cp. Philo, above, nr. 1294.

c. Since Noûs as “the second Nature” derives its Power from the First Principle, we can hardly wonder that P., in describing this Principle, speaks of the absoluteness (τὸ ἀπερίληπτον) of its power. **The Absolute Power of the First Principle**

The passage was cited under 1398b.

d. In general, “every nature”—i.e. every spiritual or divine Nature, including Soul—must bring forth what comes after it ἐκ δυνάμεως ἀφάτου, as was in the First Principle (ὅση ᾗ ἐν ἐκείνῳ). “For this Power should not be stopped, as by limitation from envy, but it should always go on, until all its effects come to the utmost limits of what is possible, by an *immense power* (αἰτία δυνάμεως ἀπλέτου), which sends forth from itself (sc. all that is good) and cannot leave anything without a share in itself”.

The passage was cited under 1365a.

**Soul, too,
has an
unspeakable
Power**

The powers
of the
sensible
world

e. But for P., δύναμις is not confined to the spiritual world. As we said above (sub a, this nr.) he speaks also of the powers in the οὐρανός: Μέγας μὲν οὖν καὶ ὅδε ὁ οὐρανός καὶ αἱ ἐν αὐτῷ πᾶσαι δυνάμεις, e.q.s. (V 8, 9, l. 33 ff.), and in describing the forces of the sensible universe he says that it contains a great variety of δυνάμεις.

Enn. IV 4, 36, l. 1-27:

Ποικιλώτατον γὰρ τὸ πᾶν καὶ λόγοι πάντες ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ δυνάμεις ἄπειροι καὶ ποικίλαι. Οἶον δὴ φασὶ καὶ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου ἄλλην μὲν δύνάμιν ἔχειν ὀφθαλμὸν καὶ ὁστοῦν τόδε, τοδὶ δ' ἄλλην, χειρὸς μὲν τοδὶ καὶ δακτύλου τοῦ ποδός, καὶ οὐδὲν μέρος εἶναι ὃ μὴ ἔχει καὶ οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ἔχει — ἀγνοοῦμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς, 5 εἰ μὴ τις τὰ τοιαῦτα μεμάθηκεν —, οὕτω καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον· μᾶλλον δέ, <ὅτι> ἴχνος ταῦτα ἐκείνων· ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἀδιήγητον δὴ καὶ θαυμαστὴν ποικιλίαν εἶναι δυνάμεων, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατ' οὐρανὸν φερομένοις. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ, ὥσπερ 10 ἄψυχον οἰκίαν μεγάλην ἄλλως καὶ πολλὴν ἐκ τινων εὐαριθμητῶν κατ' εἶδος, οἶον λίθων καὶ ξύλων, εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, εἰς κόσμον ἔδει αὐτὸ γεγονέναι, ἀλλ' εἶναι αὐτὸ ἐγρηγορὸς πανταχῇ καὶ ζῶν ἄλλο ἄλλως καὶ μηδὲν δύνασθαι εἶναι, ὃ μὴ ἐστὶν <ἐν> αὐτῷ.

Διὸ καὶ ἐνταῦθα λύοιτο ἂν ἡ ἀπορία ἢ πῶς ἐν ζῳῳ ἐμψύχῳ ἄψυχον· οὕτως 15 γὰρ ὁ λόγος φησὶν ἄλλο ἄλλως ζῆν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ, ἡμᾶς δὲ τὸ μὴ αἰσθητῶς παρ' αὐτοῦ κινούμενον ζῆν μὴ λέγειν· τὸ δὲ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον ζῶν λανθάνον, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητῶς ζῶν συγκείμενον ἐκ τῶν μὴ αἰσθητῶς μὲν ζώντων, θαυμαστάς δὲ 20 δυνάμεις εἰς τὸ ζῆν τῷ τοιούτῳ ζῳῳ παρεχομένων. Μὴ γὰρ ἂν κινηθῆναι ἐπὶ τοσαῦτα ἀνθρωπον ἐκ πάντῃ ἀψύχων τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμεων κινούμενον, μηδ' αὖ τὸ πᾶν οὕτω ζῆν μὴ ἐκάστου τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ζώντος τὴν οἰκείαν ζωὴν, καὶ προαίρεσις αὐτῷ μὴ παρῇ. Ποιεῖ γὰρ καὶ προαιρέσεως οὐ δεηθέν, ἅτε προαι- 25 ρέσεως ὃν προγενέστερον· διὸ καὶ πολλὰ δουλεύει αὐτῶν ταῖς δυνάμεσιν.

f. Not every part of the great living being which is the κόσμος αἰσθητός possesses life perceptible to us. Yet, as is said in the above-cited passage, imperceptibly these parts of the cosmos do live. They do not have προαίρεσις, no "choice" or conscious will. They need not even be rational powers, as λόγος is, but may be ἄλογοι. Thus in the next chapter of IV 4 it is said that everything that was generated and formed in the universe has an ἄλογος δύναμις.

δύναμις
ἄλογος

Enn. IV 4, 37, l. 11-26:

"Ἐχειν μὲν οὖν ἕκαστον δυνάμιν τινα ἄλογον φατέον ἐν τῷ παντὶ πλασθὲν καὶ μορφωθὲν καὶ μετεληφὸς πῶς ψυχῆς παρὰ τοῦ ὅλου ὄντος ἐμψύχου καὶ περιει- 15 λημμένον ὑπὸ τοιούτου καὶ μόνον ὃν ἐμψύχου — οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ ὃ τι μὴ

μέρος —, ἄλλα δὲ ἄλλων πρὸς τὸ δρᾶν δυνατώτερα, καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς τὰ τῶν οὐρανίων μᾶλλον, ἅτε ἐναργεστέρῃ φύσει χρώμενα, καὶ γίνεσθαι πολλὰ κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας, οὐ τῇ προαιρέσει ἀφ' ὧν δοκεῖ λέναι τὸ δρώμενον — ἔστι
 20 γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς προαίρεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσιν —, οὐδὲ ἐπιστραφέντων τῇ δόσει τῆς δυνάμεως, καὶ ψυχῆς τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἴη. Γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ ζῶα ἐκ ζώου οὐ τῆς προαιρέσεως ποιούσης οὐδ' αὖ ἐλαττουμένου οὐδ' αὖ παρακολουθοῦντος· αὐτὸ γὰρ <οὐκ> * ἦν ἡ προαίρεσις, εἰ ἔχοι, ἡ ποιούσα. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔχοι τι προαίρεσιν
 25 ζῶον, ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ παρακολουθεῖν.¹

From all this may be concluded that for P., on the one hand, the "power" of the spiritual world is more spiritual than λόγος is. Λόγος for P. is related to ὕλη, while the "powers" of the spiritual world are not. On the other hand, P. knows "powers" in the sensible universe, and these powers are not eternal. They may be ἄλογοι.

Conclusion

As to this view of the visible world as being full of "powers", cp. Philo, nr. 1303b, c, and what is noticed there.

1429—The multiform variety of nature is for P. an argument in defence of Providence: things ought not to be the same; by their very variety the world has a harmonious beauty, worked by the all-embracing Logos.

Excusatio providentiae

a. *Enn.* III 2, 11, l. 1-16:

Πότερα δὲ φυσικαῖς ἀνάγκαις οὕτως ἕκαστα καὶ ἀκολουθίαις καὶ ὅπη δυνατόν καλῶς; "Ἡ οὖν, ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος ταῦτα πάντα ποιεῖ ἄρχων καὶ οὕτω βούλεται καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα κακὰ αὐτὸς κατὰ λόγον ποιεῖ οὐ βουλόμενος πάντα ἀγαθὰ
 5 εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τεχνίτης οὐ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ζῳῷ ὀφθαλμούς ποιεῖ· οὕτως οὐδ' ὁ λόγος πάντα θεοὺς εἰργάζετο, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν θεοὺς, τὰ δὲ δαίμονας, δευτέραν φύσιν, εἴτα ἀνθρώπους καὶ ζῶα ἐφεξῆς, οὐ φθόνῳ, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ ποικιλίαν
 10 νοερὰν ἔχοντι. Ἡμεῖς δέ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄπειροι γραφικῆς τέχνης αἰτιῶνται, ὥς οὐ καλὰ τὰ χρώματα πανταχοῦ, ὁ δὲ ἄρα τὰ προσήκοντα ἀπέδωκεν ἑκάστῳ τόπῳ· καὶ αἱ πόλεις δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἴσων καὶ εἰ εὐνομία ** χρῶνται, ἢ εἴ τις δρᾶμα μέμφοιτο, ὅτι μὴ πάντες ἥρωες ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἰκέτης καὶ τις ἀγροῖκος καὶ φαύλος
 15 φθεγγόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐ καλὸν ἐστίν, εἴ τις τοὺς χεῖρους ἐξέλοι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων συμπληρούμενον.

Many of the questions dealt with and many of the arguments used by the Stoics in their theodicy recur in this treatise of Plotinus.

b. The world was not made by deliberation; but its order is so reasonable, that it might have been made so in the most perfect sense.

The world is reasonable but not by deliberation

Enn. III 2, 14, l. 1-6:

"Ἐχει τοίνυν ἡ διάταξις οὕτω κατὰ νοῦν, ὥς ἄνευ λογισμοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω

* <οὐκ> add. Br.

¹ See above, ad 1422a.

** καὶ εἰ εὐνομία Page, followed by H.-S.; καὶ αἱ εὐνομίαι codd.

δὲ εἶναι, ὥς, εἴ τις ἄριστα δύναιτο λογισμῷ χρῆσθαι, θαυμάσαι, ὅτι μὴ ἄν ἄλλως εὔρε λογισμὸς ποιῆσαι, ὁποῖόν τι γινώσκεται καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ' ἑκαστα φύσεσι, γινομένων εἰς αἰ νοερώτερον ἢ κατὰ λογισμοῦ διάταξιν.

c. Evil men have their due place and function in the whole. Thus, the beauty of the universe is not disturbed by their wickedness.

Wicked men
have their
due place in
the whole

Enn. III 2, 17, l. 64-89:

Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸ καλόν, εἰ ἕκαστος οὗ δεῖ τετάσσεται 65
φθεγγόμενος κακὰ ἐν τῷ σκότῳ καὶ τῷ ταρτάρῳ· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ καλὸν τὸ οὕτω
φθέγγεσθαι· καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο καλόν, οὐκ εἰ λίθος * εἴη ἕκαστος, ἀλλ' εἰ τὸν
φθόγγον τὸν αὐτοῦ εἰσφερόμενος συντελεῖ εἰς μίαν ἁρμονίαν ζῶν καὶ αὐτὸς
φωνῶν, ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ χεῖρω καὶ ἀτελεστέραν· ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν σύριγγι φωνῇ 70
μία, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐλάττων τις οὔσα καὶ ἀμυδρὰ πρὸς ἁρμονίαν τῆς πάσης σύριγγος
συντελεῖ, ὅτι μεμέρισται ἡ ἁρμονία εἰς οὐκ ἴσα μέρη καὶ ἄνισοι μὲν οἱ φθόγγοι
πάντες, ὁ δὲ τέλος εἰς ἐκ πάντων. Καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ πᾶς εἷς, μεμέρισται 75
δὲ οὐκ εἰς ἴσα· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦ παντὸς διάφοροι τόποι, βελτίους καὶ χεῖρους, καὶ
ψυχὰς οὐκ ἴσαι ἐναρμόττουσιν οὕτω τοῖς οὐκ ἴσοις, καὶ οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα
συμβαίνει καὶ τοὺς τόπους ἀνομοίους καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οὐ τὰς αὐτάς, ἀλλ' ἀνίσους
οὔσας καὶ ἀνομοίους τοὺς τρόπους ἐχούσας, οἷον κατὰ σύριγγος ἢ τινος ἄλλου 80
ὀργάνου ἀνομοιότητας, ἐν τόποις τε πρὸς ἄλληλα διαφέρουσιν εἶναι <καὶ> καθ'
ἕκαστον τόπον τὰ αὐτῶν συμφώνως καὶ τοῖς τόποις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ φθεγγόμενας.
Καὶ τὸ κακῶς αὐταῖς ἐν καλῷ κατὰ τὸ πᾶν κείσεται καὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τῷ
παντὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐδὲν ἥττον φθόγγος ἐλάττων. Ἀλλ' οὐ χεῖρον πεποίηκε 85
τὸ ὅλον οὕτω φθεγγόμενην, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὁ δῆμιος πονηρὸς ὢν χεῖρω πεποίηκε
τὴν εὐνομουμένην πόλιν, εἰ δεῖ καὶ ἄλλη χρῆσθαι εἰκόνι. Δεῖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτου ἐν
πόλει — δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπου τοιοῦτου πολλάκις — καὶ καλῶς καὶ οὕτως κεῖται.

The part of
man and his
free will

1430—Within the framework of cosmic order man is placed as a reasonable being, not the supreme, but for a large part free, and hence responsible for his deeds.

a. Man must execute his own affairs and fight his own victories. He should not expect God to do this for him and in his place.

Enn. III 2, 8, l. 7-16, 36-52:

What about
injustice in
the world?

Θαυμάζεται δὲ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀδικία, ὅτι ἄνθρωπον ἀξιοῦσιν ἐν τῷ παντὶ
τὸ τίμιον εἶναι ὥς οὐδενὸς ὄντος σοφωτέρου. Τὸ δὲ κεῖται ** ἐν μέσῳ θεῶν καὶ
θηρίων καὶ ῥέπει ἐπ' ἄμφω καὶ ὁμοιοῦνται οἱ μὲν τῷ ἑτέρῳ, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἑτέρῳ, 10
οἱ δὲ μεταξύ εἰσιν, οἱ πολλοί. Οἱ δὴ κακυνθέντες εἰς τὸ ἐγγὺς ζῶων ἀλόγων

* H.-S. adopt Sleeman's suggestion, Λίθος (Class. Qu. 1926, p. 153), explaining: nam imperitus quoque aliquantum affert ad harmoniam.

** The MSS reading Τὸ δὲ κεῖται ἄνθρωπος is maintained by H.-S.

καὶ θηρίων ἵνα ἔλκουσι τοὺς μέσους καὶ βιάζονται· οἱ δὲ βελτίους μὲν εἰσι
 τῶν βιαζομένων, κρατοῦνται γε μὴν ὑπὸ τῶν χειρόνων· ἢ εἰσι χείρους καὶ
 15 αὐτοὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ οὐδὲ παρσκευάσαν αὐτοὺς μὴ παθεῖν. — Ἐνθα οὐ
 θεὸν ἔδει ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀπολέμων αὐτὸν μάχεσθαι· σφῆζεσθαι γὰρ ἐκ πολέμων φησὶ
 δεῖν ὁ νόμος ἀνδριζομένους, ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐχομένους· οὐδὲ γὰρ κομίζεσθαι καρποὺς
 εὐχομένους ἀλλὰ γῆς ἐπιμελουμένους, οὐδὲ γε ὑγιαίνειν μὴ ὑγιείας ἐπιμελου-
 40 μένους· οὐδ' ἀγανακτεῖν δέ, εἰ τοῖς φαύλοις πλείους γίνοντο καρποὶ ἢ ὅλως
 αὐτοῖς γεωργοῦσιν ἢ ἄμεινον. Ἐπειτα γελοῖον τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα τὰ κατὰ
 τὸν βίον γνώμη τῇ ἑαυτῶν πράττειν, καὶ μὴ ταύτῃ πράττωσιν, ἢ θεοῖς φίλα,
 45 σφῆζεσθαι δὲ μόνον παρὰ θεῶν οὐδὲ ταῦτα ποιήσαντας, δι' ὧν κελεύουσιν αὐτοὺς
 οἱ θεοὶ σφῆζεσθαι. Καὶ τοίνυν οἱ θάνατοι αὐτοῖς βελτίους ἢ τὸ οὕτως ζῶντας
 εἶναι, ὅπως ζῇν αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν οἱ ἐν τῷ παντὶ νόμοι· ὥστε τῶν ἐναντίων
 γιγνομένων, εἰρήνης ἐν ἀνοίαις καὶ κακίαις πάσαις φυλαττομένης, ἀμελῶς ἂν
 50 ἔσχε τὰ τῆς προνοίας ἐώσης κρατεῖν οὕτως τὰ χεῖρω. Ἀρχοῦσι δὲ οἱ κακοὶ
 ἀρχομένων ἀνανδρία· τοῦτο γὰρ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐκείνο.

About the μέση τάξις of man, above, nr. 1372a.

b. Providence is not so, that nothing should be left to man. What is left to him is: to perform his own task,—which means: *to be man*.

Enn. III 2, 9, l. 1-8:

Οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὕτως τὴν πρόνοιαν εἶναι δεῖ, ὥστε μηδὲν ἡμᾶς εἶναι· πάντα
 δὲ οὔσης προνοίας καὶ μόνης αὐτῆς οὐδ' ἂν εἴη· τίνας γὰρ ἂν ἔτι εἴη; Ἀλλὰ
 μόνον ἂν εἴη τὸ θεῖον. Τοῦτο δὲ καὶ νῦν ἐστὶ· καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ἐλήλυθεν,
 οὐχ ἵνα ἀνέλῃ τὸ ἄλλο, ἀλλ' ἐπιόντι οἷον ἀνθρώπῳ ἦν ἐπ' αὐτῷ τηροῦσα τὸν
 ἀνθρώπον ὄντα· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ νόμῳ προνοίας ζῶντα, ὃ δὴ ἐστὶ πράττοντα
 ὅσα ὁ νόμος αὐτῆς λέγει.

To man the
 task is left
 of being man

c. The old Socratic principle of "Nobody sins willingly" does not take away responsibility. Surely the laws of nature are fixed, but not in such a sense that human liberty would be excluded. Man and his will is an independent cause.

Enn. III 2, 10, l. 1-19:

Ἄλλ' εἰ ἄνθρωποι ἄκοντές εἰσι κακοὶ καὶ τοιοῦτοι οὐχ ἐκόντες, οὐτ' ἂν τις
 τοὺς ἀδικούντας αἰτιάσαιτο, οὔτε τοὺς πάσχοντας ὥς δι' αὐτοὺς ταῦτα πάσ-
 χοντας. Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀνάγκη οὕτω κακοὺς γίνεσθαι εἴτε ὑπὸ τῆς φορᾶς εἴτε
 5 τῆς ἀρχῆς διδούσης τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐντεῦθεν, φυσικῶς οὕτως. Εἰ δὲ δὴ ὁ λόγος
 αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν, πῶς οὐκ ἄδικα οὕτως; Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκοντες, ὅτι ἁμαρτία
 ἀκούσιον· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὸ αὐτοὺς τοὺς πράττοντας παρ' αὐτῶν εἶναι,
 ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐτοὶ ποιοῦσι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἁμαρτάνουσιν· ἢ οὐδ' ἂν ὅλως

Man is an
 independent
 principle

ἡμαρτον μὴ αὐτοὶ οἱ ποιοῦντες ὄντες. Τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀνάγκης οὐκ ἔξωθεν, ἀλλ' ὅτι 10 πάντως. Τὸ δὲ τῆς φορᾶς οὐχ ὥστε μηδὲν ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἔξωθεν τὸ πᾶν, οὕτως ἂν ᾔην, ὥς αὐτοὶ οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐβούλοντο· ὥστε οὐκ ἂν αὐτοῖς ἐναντία ἐτίθεντο ἄνθρωποι οὐδ' ἂν ἀσεβεῖς, εἰ θεοὶ ἐποίουν. Νῦν δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τοῦτο. 15 Ἀρχῆς δὲ δοθείσης τὸ ἐφεξῆς περαίνεται συμπαραλαμβανομένων εἰς τὴν ἀκολουθίαν καὶ τῶν ὅσαι εἰσὶν ἀρχαί· ἀρχαὶ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωποι. Κινοῦνται γοῦν πρὸς τὰ καλὰ οἰκεία φύσει καὶ ἀρχὴ αὕτη αὐτεξούσιος.

d. Thus, in describing the laws of the universe in IV 4 (a description which will be cited in our next nr.) P. says that man is only partly subject to these laws and compares him with a labourer in free service: he does receive orders, but moderate ones; he is not a slave, in complete possession of a master.

Man is only partly subject to the cosmic laws

Enn. IV 4, 34, l. 1-7:

Ἡμᾶς δὲ διδόντας τὸ μέρος αὐτῶν εἰς τὸ πάσχειν, ὅσον ἦν ἡμέτερον ἐκείνου τοῦ σώματος, μὴ τὸ πᾶν ἐκείνου νομίζοντας, μέτρια παρ' αὐτοῦ πάσχειν· ὥσπερ οἱ ἔμφρονες τῶν θητευόντων τὸ μὲν τι τοῖς δεσπόζουσιν ὑπηρετοῦντες, τὸ δ' αὐτῶν ὄντες, μετριωτέρων τῶν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότη ἐπιταγμάτων διὰ 5 τοῦτο τυγχάνοντες, ἅτε μὴ ἀνδράποδα ὄντες μηδὲ τὸ πᾶν ἄλλου.

The laws of the universe

1431—In connection with the question of "How the stars hear our prayers" P. dealt amply with the problem of how cosmic forces work in the long excursus of his *Περὶ ψυχῆς ἀπορίων Β'* (IV 4), cc. 30-45. Here too, his first care is to exclude deliberation.

a. He describes the motion of the universe as a dance in which each dancer performs spontaneously those movements that are needed for the order of the whole.

The cosmic dance

Enn. IV 4, 33, l. 1-41:

Τῆς δὲ φορᾶς τὸ εἰκῇ οὐκ ἐχούσης, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ζῶον φερομένης, ἔδει καὶ συμφωνίαν τοῦ ποιούντος πρὸς τὸ πάσχον εἶναι καὶ τινα τάξιν εἰς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα συντάσσουσαν, ὥστε καθ' ἑκάστην σχέσιν τῆς φορᾶς καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τὴν φορὰν ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην τὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι, οἷον μίαν ὄρχησιν 5 ἐν ποικίλῃ χορείᾳ ποιοῦντων· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ταῖς παρ' ἡμῖν ὀρχήσεσι τὰ μὲν ἔξω πρὸς τὴν ὄρχησιν καθ' ἑκαστον τῶν κινήματων ὥς ἐτέρως μεταβαλλόντων τῶν συντελούντων πρὸς τὴν ὄρχησιν, αὐλῶν τε καὶ ᾠδῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συνηρ- 10 τημένων, τί ἂν τις λέγοι φανερῶν ὄντων; Ἀλλὰ τὰ μέρη τοῦ τὴν ὄρχησιν παρεχομένου καθ' ἑκαστον σχῆμα ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐκ ἂν ὡσαύτως δύναιτο λέγειν τῶν μελῶν τοῦ σώματος ταύτῃ συνεπομένων καὶ καμπτομένων, καὶ πιεζομένου μὲν ἐτέρου, ἀνιεμένου δὲ ἄλλου, καὶ τοῦ μὲν πονοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ ἀναπνοήν τινα ἐν τῷ 15

διαφόρῳ σχηματισμῷ δεχομένου. Καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις τοῦ ὀρχουμένου πρὸς ἄλλο βλέπει, τὰ δὲ πάσχει τῇ ὀρχήσει ἐπομένως καὶ ὑπουργεῖ τῇ ὀρχήσει καὶ συναποτελεῖ τὴν πᾶσαν, ὥστε τὸν ἐμπειρον ὀρχήσεως εἰπεῖν ἄν, ὡς τῷ τοιοῦτῳ
 20 σχηματισμῷ αἶρεται μὲν ὑψοῦ τοδὶ μέλος τοῦ σώματος, συγκαμπτεται δὲ τοδί, τοδί δὲ ἀποκρύπτεται, ταπεινὸν δὲ ἄλλο γίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλως τοῦ ὀρχηστοῦ προελομένου τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ ὅλου σώματος ὀρχήσει θέσιν ταύτην
 25 ἀναγκαίαν ἴσχοντός τοῦδε τοῦ μέρους τοῦ τὴν ὀρχησιν διαπεραίνοντος. Τοῦτον τοῖνον τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ φατέον ποιεῖν, ὅσα ποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ καὶ σημαίνειν, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν μὲν ὅλον κόσμον τὴν ὅλην αὐτοῦ ζωὴν ἐνεργεῖν κινουῖντα ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ μέρη τὰ μεγάλα καὶ μετασχηματίζοντα αἰεὶ, τὰς δὲ σχέσεις τῶν
 30 μερῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὰς διαφόρους αὐτῶν θέσεις ἐπόμενα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὡς ζῶου ἐνὸς κινουμένου, παρέχεσθαι, ὥδι μὲν ἴσχοντα κατὰ τὰς ὥδι σχέσεις καὶ θέσεις καὶ σχηματισμούς, ὥδι δὲ κατὰ τὰς ὥδι, ὡς μὴ τοὺς σχηματιζομένους τοὺς ποιῶντας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸν σχηματίζοντα, μηδ' αὖ τὸν
 35 σχηματίζοντα ἄλλο ποιῶντα ἄλλο ποιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἄλλο· ἀλλ' αὐτὸν πάντα τὰ γινόμενα εἶναι, ἐκεῖ μὲν τὰ σχήματα, ἐνθαδὶ δὲ τὰ συνεπόμενα τοῖς σχήμασιν ἀναγκαῖα παθήματα περὶ τὸ οὕτως κινούμενον ζῶον εἶναι, καὶ αὖ περὶ τὸ
 40 οὕτως συγκείμενον καὶ συνεστὼς φύσει καὶ πάσχον καὶ δρῶν εἰς αὐτὸ ἀνάγκαις.

b. What is the power of the figures of this dance?—P. emphasizes that the parts of the cosmos (e.g. the heavenly bodies) do not have any will of their own. The whole living Being, which is the Universe, has but one will, and the parts perform their motions in subordination to this.

Enn. IV 4, 35, l. 1-38:

The universe
is one
living being

Πῶς δὴ οὖν αὐται αἱ δυνάμεις; Σαφέστερον γὰρ πάλιν λεκτέον. Τί τὸ τρίγωνον παρὰ τὸ τρίγωνον διάφορον ἔχει; Τί δὲ ὅδι πρὸς τονδί, καὶ κατὰ τί τοδί ἐργάζεται καὶ μέχρι τίνος; Ἐπειδὴ οὔτε τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτῶν οὔτε ταῖς
 5 προαιρέσεσιν ἀπέδομεν τὰς ποιήσεις· τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν, ὅτι μὴ μόνον σώματος ἦν ποιήματα τὰ γινόμενα, ταῖς δὲ προαιρέσεσιν, ὅτι ἄτοπον ἦν <κατὰ> προαίρεσιν θεοὺς ποιεῖν ἄτοπα. Εἰ δὲ μνημονεύοιμεν, ὅτι ζῶον ἐν ὑπεθέμεθα εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχον συμπαθὲς αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔδει εἶναι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι κατὰ
 10 λόγον ἢ διέξοδος τῆς ζωῆς σύμφωνος ἑαυτῇ ἅπασα, καὶ ὅτι τὸ εἰκῇ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ζωῇ, ἀλλὰ μία ἁρμονία καὶ τάξις, καὶ οἱ σχηματισμοὶ κατὰ λόγον, καὶ κατ' ἀριθμούς δὲ ἕκαστα καὶ τὰ χορεύοντα ζῶου μέρη, ἅμφω ἀνάγκη ὁμολογεῖν
 15 τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ παντός εἶναι, τὰ τε ἐν αὐτῷ γινόμενα σχήματα καὶ τὰ σχηματιζόμενα μέρη αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐπόμενα, καὶ οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ζῆν τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς τοῦτο συμβάλλειν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔχουσαι ἐγένοντο ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν λόγοις πεποιηκότος· καὶ τὰ μὲν σχήματα οἷον λόγους εἶναι ἢ δια-
 20 στάσεις ζῶου καὶ ῥυθμούς καὶ σχέσεις ζῶου κατὰ λόγον, τὰ δὲ διεσθηκότα καὶ

ἐσχηματισμένα μέλη ἄλλα· καὶ εἶναι τοῦ ζώου δυνάμεις χωρὶς τῆς προαιρέσεως ἄλλας τὰς ὡς ζώου μέρη, ἐπεὶ τὸ τῆς προαιρέσεως αὐτοῖς ἔξω καὶ οὐ συντελοῦν πρὸς τοῦ ζώου τοῦδε τὴν φύσιν. Μία γὰρ ἡ προαίρεσις ἐνὸς ζώου, 25 αἱ δὲ δυνάμεις αἱ ἄλλαι αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἄλλο πολλαί. "Ὅσαι δ' ἐν αὐτῷ προαίρεσεις, πρὸς τὸ αὐτό, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντός ἡ μία. Ἐπιθυμία μὲν γὰρ ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· λαβεῖν γάρ τι τῶν ἐτέρων ἐθέλει μέρος τὸ ἄλλο μέρος ἐνδεὲς ὃν αὐτοῦ· καὶ θυμὸς πρὸς ἕτερον, ὅταν τι παραλυπῇ, καὶ ἡ αὔξησις παρ' ἄλλου 30 καὶ ἡ γένεσις εἰς ἄλλο τῶν μερῶν. Τὸ δ' ὅλον καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν ταῦτα ποιεῖ, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ζητεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ βλέπει. Τοῦτο τοίνυν καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ προαίρεσις ἡ ὑπὲρ τὰ πάθη ζητεῖ καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ταύτῃ συμβάλλει· ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν παρ' 35 ἄλλῃ θητευόντων πολλὰ μὲν τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῖς βλέπει πρὸς τὰ ἐπιταχθέντα ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὁρεξὶς πρὸς τὸ αὐτό, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ὁ δεσπότης.

c. P. concludes from this that, since in the universe things happen by a kind of physical necessity, evil cannot be said to be produced by the will of the gods.

Evil not to be attributed to the will of the gods

Enn. IV 4, 39, l. 18-28:

Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεται, λύονται ἂν ἡδὴ αἱ ἀπορίαι, ἥ τε πρὸς τὸ κακῶν δόσιν παρὰ θεῶν γίνεσθαι τῷ μήτε προαιρέσεις εἶναι τὰς ποιούσας, φυσικαῖς 20 δὲ ἀνάγκαις γίνεσθαι ὅσα ἐκεῖθεν, ὡς μερῶν πρὸς μέρη, καὶ ἐπόμενα ἐνὸς ζωῆ, καὶ τῷ πολλὰ παρ' αὐτῶν τοῖς γινομένοις προστιθέναι, καὶ τῷ τῶν διδομένων παρ' ἐκάστων οὐ κακῶν ὄντων ἐν τῇ μίξει γίνεσθαι ἄλλο τι, καὶ τῷ μὴ ἔνεκα ἐκάστου ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τοῦ ὅλου τὴν ζωὴν <εἶναι>, καὶ τὴν ὑποκειμένην δὲ 25 φύσιν ἄλλο λαβοῦσαν ἄλλο πάσχειν καὶ μὴδὲ δύνασθαι κρατῆσαι τοῦ δοθέντος.

d. Thus, the effect of prayers is a mere mechanical reaction, due to the organical unity of the cosmos. The heavenly bodies do not need either perception or memory to "hear" our prayers and "act" on them; for what is called their influence is nothing but a reaction which happens automatically.

The effect of prayers an automatic process

Enn. IV 4, 41, l. 1-3; c. 42, l. 1-6:

Καὶ γίνεται τὸ κατὰ τὴν εὐχὴν συμπαθοῦς μέρους μέρει γενομένου, ὥσπερ ἐν μιᾷ νευρᾷ τεταμένη· κινηθεῖσα γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ κάτω καὶ ἄνω ἔχει τὴν κίνησιν.—

The influence of the stars not due to will

(42) "Ὡστε οὔτε μνήμης διὰ τοῦτο δεήσει τοῖς ἄστροις, οὔπερ χάριν καὶ ταῦτα πεπραγμάτευται, οὔτε αἰσθήσεων ἀναπεμπομένων· οὐδὲ ἐπινεύσεις τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εὐχαῖς, ὡς οἶονταί τινες, προαιρετικὰς τινας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετ' εὐχῆς γίνεσθαι τι δοτέον καὶ εὐχῆς ἄνευ παρ' αὐτῶν, ἥ μέρη καὶ <αὐτὰ> ἐνός. 5

1432—In the same way the effect of magic art must be explained.

a. *Enn.* IV 4, 40, l. 1-6, 12-27, 27-33:

**Magic
explained**

Τὰς δὲ γοητείας πῶς; Ἡ τῇ συμπαθείᾳ, καὶ τῷ πεφυκέναι συμφωνίαν εἶναι ὁμοίων καὶ ἐναντίωσιν ἀνομοίων, καὶ τῇ τῶν δυνάμεων τῶν πολλῶν ποικιλίᾳ εἰς ἓν ζῶον συντελούντων. Καὶ γὰρ μηδενὸς μηχανωμένου ἄλλου πολλὰ ἔλκεται 5 καὶ γοητεύεται· καὶ ἡ ἀληθινὴ μαγεία ἡ ἐν τῷ παντὶ φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος αὐ.—

The sorcerer is the man who knows and makes use of the forces in the universe, which attract and repel one another.

Καὶ συνάπτουσι δὲ ἄλλην ψυχὴν ἄλλῃ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ φυτὰ διεστηκότα ἐξαψά- 15 μνοι πρὸς ἄλληλα· καὶ τοῖς σχήμασι δὲ προσχρῶνται δυνάμεις ἔχουσι, καὶ αὐτοὺς σχηματίζοντες ὡδὶ ἐπάγουσιν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ἀποφῆτι δυνάμεις ἐν ἐνὶ ὄντες εἰς ἓν· ἐπεὶ ἔξω γε τοῦ παντὸς εἴ τις ὑπόθοιτο τὸν τοιοῦτον, οὐτ' ἂν ἔλξειεν οὐτ' ἂν καταγάγοι ἐπαγωγᾶς ἢ καταδέσμοις· ἀλλὰ νῦν, ὅτι μὴ οἶον 20 ἀλλαχοῦ ἄγει, ἔχει ἄγειν εἰδῶς ὅπῃ τι ἐν τῷ ζῳῷ πρὸς ἄλλο ἄγεται. Πέφυκε δὲ καὶ ἐπωδῆς τῷ μέλει καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἡχῇ καὶ τῷ σχήματι τοῦ δρῶντος—ἔλκει γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἶον τὰ ἐλεεινὰ σχήματα καὶ φθέγματα—ἄγεσθαι ἢ ψυχῇ· οὐ γὰρ ἡ προαίρεσις οὐδ' ὁ λόγος ὑπὸ μουσικῆς θέλγεται, ἀλλ' ἡ ἄλογος ψυχῇ, 25 καὶ οὐ θαυμάζεται ἡ γοητεία ἡ τοιαύτη· καίτοι φιλοῦσι κηλούμενοι, καὶ μὴ τοῦτο αἰτῶνται παρὰ τῶν τῇ μουσικῇ χρωμένων.

Thus, the influence of prayers is impersonal.

Καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δὲ εὐχὰς οὐ τῆς προαιρέσεως ἀκουούσης οἰητέον· οὐ γὰρ οἱ θελγόμενοι ταῖς ἐπωδαῖς οὕτως, οὐδ' ὅταν γοητεύῃ ὅφιν ἀνθρώπους, σύνεσιν 30 ὁ γοητευόμενος ἔχει, οὐδ' αἰσθάνεται, ἀλλὰ γινώσκει ἤδη παθὼν ὅτι πέπονθεν, ἀπαθὲς δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἡγούμενόν ἐστιν. Ὡς δ' ἠϋζατο, ἤλθε τι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐξ ἐκείνου ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον· ὁ δὲ ἥλιος ἢ ἄλλο ἄστρον οὐκ ἐπαίτει.

b. The magician is not necessarily a good man. For a wicked man too may draw from the source of the natural forces.

**Wicked men
may practice
magic art**

Enn. IV 4, 42, l. 14-19:

Εἰ δὲ κακὸς ὁ αἰτῶν, θαυμάζειν οὐ δεῖ· καὶ γὰρ ἐκ ποταμῶν ἀρύονται οἱ κακοὶ καὶ τὸ διδόν αὐτὸ οὐκ οἶδεν ὁ δίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ δίδωσι μόνον. ἀλλ' ὅμως συντέτακται καὶ δέδοται τῇ φύσει τοῦ παντός. Ὡστε εἴ τις ἔλαβεν ἐκ τῶν 5 πᾶσι κειμένων, οὐ δέον, ἐπεσθαι αὐτῷ ἀναγκαίῳ νόμῳ τὴν δίκην.

c. Since magic (as was said above, sub a) works through the ἄλογος ψυχῇ, it is evident that the higher soul of the spiritual man is beyond magic influence.

**The wise
man is
beyond
magic
influence**

Enn. IV 4, 43, l. 1-7:

Ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος πῶς ὑπὸ γοητείας καὶ φαρμάκων; Ἡ τῇ μὲν ψυχῇ ἀπαθὲς εἰς γοήτευσιν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν τὸ λογικὸν αὐτοῦ πάθοι, οὐδ' ἂν μεταδοξάσει· τὸ δὲ

ὅσον τοῦ παντὸς ἐν αὐτῷ ἄλογον κατὰ τοῦτο πάθοι ἄν, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦτο πάθοι ἄν· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔρωτας ἐκ φαρμάκων, εἴπερ τὸ ἐρᾶν ἐπινευούσης καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς 5 τῆς ἄλλης τῷ τῆς ἄλλης παθήματι.

On Plotinus' relation to magic see A. H. Armstrong, *Was P. a magician?* in *Phronesis* I, 1, p. 73-79.

Time and
eternity

1433—The problems of time and eternity are introduced by P. by the statement that usually αἰών is considered as being related to the αἰδίδιος φύσις, while χρόνος belongs to τὸ γινόμενον, but that, for the rest, precision is difficult. He first considers αἰών.

a. Is eternity identical with intelligible being?—It is predicated of it, but is not identical with it. Nor can it be identical with rest.

Is eternity
= intelligible
being?

Enn. III 7, 2, 1. 1-27:

Τίνα οὖν ποτε χρὴ φάναι τὸν αἰῶνα εἶναι; Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὴν νοητὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγοι τὸν χρόνον τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον εἶναι; Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν ἔσχον τινές, φασί, περὶ τοῦ χρόνου. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ σεμνότατόν τι τὸν αἰῶνα εἶναι φανταζόμεθα καὶ νοοῦμεν, σεμνότατον δὲ 5 τὸ τῆς νοητῆς φύσεως, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι σεμνότερον ὁποτεροῦν — τοῦ δ' ἐπέκεινα οὐδὲ τοῦτο κατηγορητέον — εἰς ταῦτόν ἂν τις οὕτω συνάγοι. Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ τε κόσμος ὁ νοητὸς ὁ τε αἰὼν περιεκτικὰ ἄμφω καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. Ἄλλ' ὅταν τὸ ἕτερον ἐν θατέρῳ λέγωμεν, ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι * κεῖσθαι, καὶ ὅταν τὸ αἰώνιον 10 κατηγοροῦμεν αὐτῶν—ἡ μὲν γὰρ, φησι, τοῦ παραδείγματος φύσις ἐτύγχανεν οὕσα αἰώνιος—ἄλλο τὸν αἰῶνα πάλιν αὐτὸν λέγομεν, εἶναι μέντοι περὶ ἐκείνην ἢ ἐν ἐκείνῃ ἢ παρῑναί ἐκείνη φαμέν. Τὸ δὲ σεμνὸν ἐκάτερον εἶναι ταυτότητα 15 οὐ δηλοῖ· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν καὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ αὐτῶν παρὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ σεμνὸν γίνοιτο. Ἡ τε περιοχὴ τῷ μὲν ὡς μερῶν ἔσται, τῷ δὲ αἰῶνι ὁμοῦ τὸ ὅλον οὐχ ὡς μέρος, ἀλλ' ὅτι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα οἷα αἰώνια κατ' αὐτόν.

Ἄλλ' ἄρα κατὰ τὴν στάσιν φατέον τὴν ἐκεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα 20 τὸν χρόνον κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν φασιν; Ἄλλ' εἰκότως ἂν τις τὸν αἰῶνα ζητήσῃ πότερα ταῦτόν τῇ στάσει λέγοντες ἢ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τῇ στάσει τῇ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῇ στάσει ταῦτόν, πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἐροῦμεν αἰώνιον τὴν στάσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν αἰῶνα αἰώνιον· τὸ γὰρ αἰώνιον τὸ μετέχον αἰῶνος. Ἐπειτα ἡ 25 κίνησις πῶς αἰώνιον;

b. Together with intelligible Being and on the same level, motion and rest are given, identity and difference. These are the five supreme genera of Plato's *Sophistes*, acknowledged as the five "categories" of the intelligible world in P.'s second treatise Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος (*Enn.*

* ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι del. Kirchhoff, Br.

VI 2). Uniting these five aspects of intelligible being and viewing them as one life, without end and always staying what it was, you see eternity,—not the “substrate” of the intelligible world, but as it were its radiance.

Enn. III 7, 3, l. 8-38:

Καὶ ὁ γε τὴν πολλὴν δύναμιν εἰσαθρήσας κατὰ μὲν τοδὶ τὸ οἶον ὑποκείμενον λέγει οὐσίαν, εἴτα κίνησιν τοῦτο, καθ' ὃ ζῶν ὄρᾳ, εἴτα στάσιν τὸ πάντῃ ὡσαύτως, θάτερον δὲ καὶ ταυτόν, ἥ ταῦτα ὁμοῦ ἓν. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ συνθεῖς ἅλιν αὖ εἰς ἓν ὁμοῦ εἶναι ζῶν μόνην, ἐν τούτοις τὴν ἑτερότητα συστείλας καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τὸ ἄπαυστον καὶ τὸ ταυτόν καὶ οὐδέποτε ἄλλο καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο νόησιν ἢ ζῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡσαύτως καὶ αἰεὶ ἀδιαστάτως, ταῦτα πάντα ἰδὼν αἰῶνα εἶδεν ἰδὼν ζῶν μένουσαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ αἰεὶ παρὸν τὸ πᾶν ἔχουσαν, ἀλλ' οὐ νῦν μὲν τότε, αὐθις δ' ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ἅμα τὰ πάντα, καὶ οὐ νῦν μὲν ἕτερα, αὐθις δ' ἕτερα, ἀλλὰ τέλος ἀμερές, οἶον ἐν σημείῳ ὁμοῦ πάντων ὄντων καὶ οὐποτε εἰς ῥύσιν προιόντων, ἀλλὰ μένοντος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ οὐ μὴ μεταβάλλοντος, ὄντος δὲ ἐν τῷ παρόντι αἰεὶ, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ παρῆλθεν οὐδ' αὖ γενήσεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ὅπερ ἔστι, τοῦτο καὶ αἰεὶ ὄντος· ὥστε εἶναι τὸν αἰῶνα οὐ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου οἶον ἐκλάμπον κατὰ τὴν ἣν ἐπαγγέλλεται περὶ τοῦ μὴ μέλλοντος, ἀλλὰ ἥδη ὄντος, ταυτότητα, ὡς ἄρα οὕτως καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως.

**Eternity =
total life in
intelligible
Being**

Τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὕστερον αὐτῷ γένοιτο, ὃ μὴ νῦν ἐστι; Μηδ' αὖ ὕστερον ἐσομένου, ὃ μὴ ἔστιν ἤδη. Οὔτε γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀφ' οὗ εἰς τὸ νῦν ἦξει· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἦν οὐκ ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο· οὔτε μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι, ὃ μὴ νῦν ἔχει, ἐξ ἀνάγκης· οὔτε τὸ ἦν ἔξει περὶ αὐτό· τί γὰρ ἔστιν, ὃ ἦν αὐτῷ καὶ παρελήλυθεν; Οὔτε τὸ ἔσται· τί γὰρ ἔσται αὐτῷ;

**What is al-
ways and at
the same
time present**

Λέπεται δὴ ἐν τῷ εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ἔστιν εἶναι. “Ὁ οὖν μήτε ἦν, μήτε ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἔστι μόνον, τοῦτο ἐστὼς ἔχον τὸ εἶναι τῷ μὴ μεταβάλλειν εἰς τὸ ἔσται μηδ' αὖ μεταβεβληκέναι ἐστὶν ὁ αἰὼν.

Γίνεται τοίνυν ἡ περὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ εἶναι ζῶν ὁμοῦ πᾶσα καὶ πλήρης ἀδιάστατος πανταχῇ τοῦτο, ὃ δὴ ζητοῦμεν, αἰὼν.

**This life in
its fullness
and
indivisible**

c. P. arrives at his final definition by adding to the notion of the “totality” of life the note of “nothing of it being lost”.

Enn. III 7, 5, l. 22-30:

Εἰ δ' ἐκ πολλῶν λέγομεν αὐτόν, οὐ δεῖ θαυμάζειν· πολλὰ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐκεῖ διὰ δύναμιν ἄπειρον· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον τὸ * μὴ ἂν ἐπιλείπειν, καὶ τοῦτο κυρίως, ὅτι μὴδὲν αὐτοῦ ἀναλίσκει. Καὶ εἴ τις οὕτω τὸν αἰῶνα λέγοι ζῶν ἄπειρον ἥδη τῷ πᾶσαν εἶναι καὶ μὴδὲν ἀναλίσκειν αὐτῆς τῷ μὴ παρεληλυθέναι μηδ' αὖ μέλλειν — ἥδη γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πᾶσα — ἐγγύς ἂν εἴη τοῦ ὁρί-

**Final
definition
of eternity**

* τὸ codd., H.-S.; τῷ ed. princeps, Br.

ζεσθαί. Τὸ γὰρ ἐξῆς τῷ πᾶσαν εἶναι καὶ μηδὲν ἀναλίσκειν ἐξήγησις ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἄπειρον ἤδη εἶναι.

30

The apories
of time

1434—Time is not motion. Is it something which belongs to motion? Is it the interval of motion, or of regular motion? Or is it the space covered by a moving object?—In all these cases, time would be many, not one, and its repetition will be a number, while its interval will be in the space covered by the movement. And where then place the duration of rest?

It is not
motion

a. *Enn.* III 7, 8, l. 1-8, 23-44, 53-69:

Κίνησιν μὲν οὐχ οἶόν τε οὔτε τὰς συμπάσας λαμβάνοντι κινήσεις καὶ οἶον μίαν ἐκ πασῶν ποιοῦντι, οὔτε τὴν τεταγμένην· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἑκατέρω ἡ λεγομένη. Εἰ δέ τις μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἂν ἀπείη τοῦ χρόνου εἶναι, ὥς ἄλλου ὄντος τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἡ κίνησις, ἄλλου * τῆς κινήσεως αὐτῆς οὔσης. 5 Καὶ ἄλλων λεγομένων καὶ λεχθέντων ἂν ἀρκοῖ τοῦτο καὶ ὅτι κινήσεις μὲν ἂν καὶ παύσαιτο καὶ διαλίποι, χρόνος δὲ οὐ. ¹—

Is it the
interval of
motion?

Ἄρ' οὖν κινήσεώς τι; Εἰ μὲν διάστημα, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ πάσης κινήσεως τὸ αὐτό, οὐδὲ τῆς ὁμοειδοῦς· θάττον γὰρ καὶ βραδύτερον ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ ἐν τόπῳ. 25 Καὶ εἴεν ἂν ἄμφω μετρούμενα· αἱ διαστάσεις ἐνὶ ἐτέρῳ, ὃ δὴ ὀρθότερον ἂν τις εἴποι χρόνον. Ποτέρας δὲ αὐτῶν τὸ διάστημα χρόνος, μᾶλλον δὲ τίνος αὐτῶν ἀπείρων οὐσῶν; Εἰ δὲ τῆς τεταγμένης, οὐ πάσης μὲν οὐδὲ τῆς τοιαύτης· πολλὰ γὰρ αὐταί· ὥστε καὶ πολλοὶ χρόνοι ἅμα ἔσονται. Εἰ δὲ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς διά- 30 στημα, εἰ μὲν τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ κινήσει διάστημα, τί ἂν ἄλλο ἢ ἡ κίνησις ἂν εἴη; Τοσὴδε μέντοι· τὸ δὲ τοσόνδε τοῦτο ἦτοι τῷ τόπῳ, ὅτι τοσόνδε ὃν διεξῆλθε, μετρηθήσεται, καὶ τὸ διάστημα τοῦτο ἔσται· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ χρόνος, ἀλλὰ τόπος· ἢ αὐτὴ ἡ κίνησις τῇ συνεχείᾳ αὐτῆς καὶ τῷ μὴ εὐθὺς πεπαῦσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπιλαμ- 35 βάνειν αἰεὶ, τὸ διάστημα ἔξει. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο τὸ πολὺ τῆς κινήσεως ἂν εἴη· καὶ εἰ μὲν εἰς αὐτὴν τις βλέπων ἀποφανεῖται πολλήν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις πολὺ τὸ θερμὸν λέγοι, οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα χρόνος φανεῖται οὐδὲ προσκίπτει, ἀλλὰ κίνησις 40 πάλιν καὶ πάλιν, ὥσπερ εἰς ὕδωρ ῥέον πάλιν καὶ πάλιν, καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ διάστημα θεωρούμενον. Καὶ τὸ μὲν πάλιν καὶ πάλιν ἔσται ἀριθμός, ὥσπερ δυὰς ἢ τριάς, τὸ δὲ διάστημα τοῦ ὄγκου.— Εἰ δὲ τὸ διάστημα τῆς κινήσεως λέγοι τις χρόνον, οὐ τὸ αὐτῆς τῆς κινήσεως, ἀλλὰ παρ' ὃ αὐτὴ ἡ κίνησις τὴν παράτασιν ἔχει οἶον 55 συμπαραθέουσα ἐκείνῳ, τί δὲ τοῦτό ἐστιν οὐκ εἴρηται. Δῆλον γὰρ, ὅτι τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος, ἐν ᾧ γέγονεν ἡ κίνησις. Τοῦτο δ' ἦν ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐζήτει ὁ λόγος, τί ὢν ἐστι χρόνος· ἐπεὶ ὁμοίον τε γίνεται καὶ ταῦτόν οἶον εἴ τις ἐρωτηθεῖς τί

* ἀλλ' οὐ H.-S.

¹ Cp. Aristotle, *Phys.* IV 10; above, nr. 508a.

60 ἔστι χρόνος, λέγοι κινήσεως διάστημα ἐν χρόνῳ. Τί οὖν ἔστι τοῦτο τὸ διάστημα,
 δὲ δὴ χρόνον καλεῖς τῆς κινήσεως τοῦ οἰκείου διαστήματος ἔξω τιθέμενος;
 Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ὁ τιθέμενος τῇ κινήσει τὸ διάστημα τὴν τῆς ἡρεμίας
 65 διάστασιν ποῖ θήσεται, ἄπορος ἔσται. "Ὅσον γὰρ κινεῖται τι, τοσοῦτον ἂν σταίῃ
 καὶ ἄλλο, καὶ εἴποισ ἂν τὸν χρόνον ἑκατέρου τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὥς ἄλλον δηλονότι
 ἀμφοῖν ὄντα. Τί οὖν ἔστι καὶ τίνα φύσιν ἔχει τοῦτο τὸ διάστημα; Ἐπεὶ περ
 τοπικὸν οὐχ οἷόν τε· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γε ἔξωθεν ἔστιν.

b. Next, Aristotle's definition (above, nr. 510) is considered.

Enn. III 7, 9, 1. 1-28, 35-61, 71-76, 78-84:

Is it
 ἀριθμός
 or
 μέτρον
 κινήσεως?

Ἀριθμὸς δὲ κινήσεως ἢ μέτρον — βέλτιον γὰρ οὕτω συνεχοῦς οὔσης — πῶς,
 σκεπτέον. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ πάσης ὁμοίως ἀπορητέον, ὥσπερ
 καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ διαστήματος τῆς κινήσεως, εἴ τις τῆς πάσης εἶναι ἐλέγετο. Πῶς γὰρ
 5 ἂν τις ἀριθμήσειε τὴν ἄτακτον καὶ ἀνώμαλον; ἢ τίς ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέτρον ἢ κατὰ
 τί τὸ μέτρον;

Εἰ δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ ἑκατέραν καὶ ὅλως πᾶσαν, ταχεῖαν, βραδεῖαν, ἔσται ὁ ἀριθμὸς
 καὶ τὸ μέτρον τοιοῦτον, οἷον εἰ δεκάς εἴη μετροῦσα καὶ ἵππους καὶ βοῦς, ἢ εἰ
 10 τὸ αὐτὸ μέτρον καὶ ὑγρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν εἴη. Εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτον μέτρον, τίνων μὲν
 ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος εἴρηται, ὅτι κινήσεων, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ ἔστιν οὕτω εἴρηται. Εἰ δὲ
 ὥσπερ δεκάδος ληφθείσης καὶ ἄνευ ἵππων ἔστι νοεῖν τὸν ἀριθμὸν, καὶ τὸ μέτρον
 μέτρον ἐστὶ φύσιν ἔχον τινά, καὶ μήπω μετρή, οὕτω δεῖ ἔχειν καὶ τὸν χρόνον
 15 μέτρον ὄντα· εἰ μὲν τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ οἷον ἀριθμὸς, τί ἂν τοῦδε τοῦ
 ἀριθμοῦ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν δεκάδα ἢ ἄλλου ὅτουοῦν διαφέρει μοναδικοῦ; Εἰ δὲ συνεχὲς
 μέτρον ἐστὶ, ποσὸν τι δὴν μέτρον ἔσται, οἷον τὸ πηχυαῖον μέγεθος. Μέγεθος τοί-
 20 νυν ἔσται, οἷον γραμμὴ συνθέουσα δηλονότι κινήσει. Ἄλλ' αὕτη συνθέουσα
 πῶς μετρήσει τὸ ὅ συνθεῖ; Τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁποτερονοῦν θάτερον; Καὶ βέλτιον
 τίθεσθαι καὶ πιθανώτερον οὐκ ἐπὶ πάσης, ἀλλ' ἢ συνθεῖ. Τοῦτο δὲ συνεχὲς δεῖ
 εἶναι, ἢ ἐφέξει ἢ συνθέουσα. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἔξωθεν δεῖ τὸ μετροῦν λαμβάνειν οὐδὲ
 25 χωρὶς, ἀλλὰ ὁμοῦ κίνησιν μεμετρημένην. Καὶ τί τὸ μετροῦν ἔσται; Ἡ μεμε-
 τρημένη μὲν ἢ κίνησις ἔσται, μεμετρηκὸς δὲ ἔσται μέγεθος. Καὶ ποῖον αὐτῶν
 ὁ χρόνος ἔσται; Ἡ κίνησις ἢ μεμετρημένη, ἢ τὸ μέγεθος τὸ μετρήσαν; —
 35 Εἰ δὲ δὴ μεμετρημένη κίνησις ὁ χρόνος καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ποσοῦ μεμετρημένη, ὥσπερ
 τὴν κίνησιν, εἰ ἔδει μεμετρηθῆναι, οὐχ ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἔδει μεμετρηθῆναι, ἀλλ' ἑτέρῳ,
 οὕτως ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ μέτρον ἔξει ἄλλο ἢ κίνησις παρ' αὐτήν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
 40 ἐδεήθημεν τοῦ συνεχοῦς μέτρου εἰς μέτρησιν αὐτῆς, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δεῖ καὶ
 τῷ μεγέθει αὐτῷ μέτρου, ἵν' ἢ κίνησις τοσοῦδε γεγεννημένου τοῦ καθ' ὃ με-
 τρεῖται ὅση, μετρηθῇ. Καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τοῦ μεγέθους ἔσται τῇ κινήσει παρο-
 μαρτοῦντος ἐκεῖνος ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ μέγεθος τὸ συνθέν τῇ κινήσει. Οὗτος
 45 δὲ τίς ἂν εἴη ἢ ὁ μοναδικός; Ὅς ὅπως μετρήσει ἀπορεῖν ἀνάγκη. Ἐπεὶ, καὶ

τις ἐξεύρη ὅπως, οὐ χρόνον εὐρήσει μετροῦντα, ἀλλὰ τὸν τοσόνδε χρόνον· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ ταῦτὸν χρόνον. "Ἐτερον γὰρ εἰπεῖν χρόνον, ἕτερον δὲ τοσόνδε χρόνον· πρὸ γὰρ τοῦ τοσόνδε δεῖ ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνο, ὃ τοσόνδε ἐστίν. 'Αλλ' 50 ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ μετρήσας τὴν κίνησιν ἔξωθεν τῆς κινήσεως ὁ χρόνος, οἷον ἡ δεκάς ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων οὐ μετὰ τῶν ἵππων λαμβανόμενος *. Τίς οὖν οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμὸς οὐκ εἴρηται, ὃς πρὸ τοῦ μετρεῖν ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἡ δεκάς.

"Ἡ οὗτος, ὃς κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τῆς κινήσεως παραθέων ἐμέ- 55 τρησεν. 'Αλλ' οὗτος ὁ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον οὕτω δῆλος ὅστις ἐστίν. 'Αλλ' οὖν κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον μετρῶν εἴτε σημεῖα εἶθ' ὀψοῦν ἄλλω πάντως κατὰ χρόνον μετρήσει. "Ἔσται οὖν ὁ χρόνος οὗτος ὁ μετρῶν τὴν κίνησιν τῷ προτέρῳ καὶ ὑστέρῳ ἐχόμενος τοῦ χρόνου καὶ ἐφαπτόμενος, ἵνα μετρήῃ. — 60

'Αλλ' οὖν διὰ τί ἀριθμοῦ μὲν γενομένου χρόνος ἔσται, κινήσεως δὲ οὐσης καὶ τοῦ προτέρου πάντως ὑπάρχοντος περὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τοῦ ὑστέρου οὐκ ἔσται χρόνος; "Ὡσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγοι τὸ μέγεθος μὴ εἶναι ὅσον ἐστίν, εἰ μὴ τις τὸ ὅσον ἐστὶ τοῦτο λάβοι. 'Απειροῦ δὲ τοῦ χρόνου ὄντος καὶ λεγομένου πῶς ἂν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸς εἴη; — Διὰ τί δὲ οὐκ ἔσται πρὶν καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν μετροῦσαν εἶναι; 75 Εἰ μὴ τις τὴν γένεσιν αὐτοῦ παρὰ ψυχῆς λέγοι γίνεσθαι. 'Ἐπεὶ διὰ γε τὸ μετρεῖν οὐδαμῶς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι **. ὑπάρχει γὰρ ὅσον ἐστὶ, καὶ μὴ τις μετρήῃ. Τὸ δὲ 80 τῷ μεγέθει χρησάμενον πρὸς τὸ μετρήσαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἂν τις λέγοι· τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἔννοιαν χρόνου;

P.'s
definition
of time

c. P. now comes to his own explanation. He starts from his own view of eternity as "total life which in its fullness is always present", and states that "in soul was a non-quiet power": *this could not bear that all intelligible Being was present to it directly and as a whole*. It asked for a succession of acts. And thus its life, which is *a movement by which soul passes from one state into the other*, is time, like the non-changing, ever constant life of the intelligible World is eternity.

Enn. III 7, II, l. 1-62:

Δεῖ δὴ ἀναγαγεῖν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς πάλιν εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν διάθεσιν ἣν ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐλέγομεν εἶναι, τὴν ἀτρεμῇ ἐκείνην καὶ ὁμοῦ πᾶσαν καὶ ἀπειρον ἥδη ζωὴν καὶ ἀκλινῇ πάντα καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ πρὸς ἐν ἐστῶσαν. Χρόνος δὲ οὕτω ἦν, 5 ἣ ἐκείνοις γε οὐκ ἦν, γεννήσομεν δὲ χρόνον λόγῳ καὶ φύσει τοῦ ὑστέρου. Τούτων δὲ οὖν ἡσυχίαν ἀγόντων ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὅπως δὲ πρῶτον ἐξέπεσε χρόνος, τὰς μὲν Μούσας οὕτω τότε οὔσας οὐκ ἂν τις ἴσως καλοῖ εἰπεῖν τοῦτο· ἀλλ'

* λαμβανόμενος H.-S., who explain: congruit cum ἀριθμός. λαμβανομένη Br.

¹ Cp. Aristotle, *Phys.* IV 14; above, nr. 512.

** ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶν Volkmann, Br.

10 ἴσως εἴπερ ἦσαν καὶ αἱ Μοῦσαι τότε, αὐτὸν δ' ἂν τις τάχα τὸν γενόμενον χρόνον, ὅπως ἐστὶν ἐκφανεῖς καὶ γενόμενος. Λέγοι δ' ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὧδέ πως·

ὥς πρότερον, πρὶν τὸ πρότερον δὴ τοῦτο γεννηῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ ὑστερου δεηθῆναι, σὺν αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἀνεπαύετο χρόνος οὐκ ὢν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡσυχίαν
 15 ἦγε. Φύσεως δὲ πολυπράγμονος καὶ ἄρχειν αὐτῆς βουλομένης καὶ εἶναι αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ πλεον τοῦ παρόντος ζητεῖν ἐλομένης ἐκινήθη μὲν αὐτῇ, ἐκινήθη δὲ καὶ αὐτός, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ ὕστερον καὶ οὐ ταῦτόν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον εἴθ' ἕτερον κινούμενοι μῆκος τι τῆς πορείας ποιησάμενοι αἰῶνος εἰκόνα τὸν χρόνον
 20 εἰργάσμεθα¹. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ψυχῆς ἦν τις δύναμις οὐχ ἡσυχος, τὸ δ' ἐκεῖ ὁρώμενον ἀεὶ μεταφέρειν εἰς ἄλλο βουλομένης, τὸ μὲν ἀθρόον αὐτῇ πᾶν παρεῖναι οὐκ ἤθελεν· ὥσπερ δ' ἐκ σπέρματος ἡσύχου ἐξελίττων αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος διέξοδον εἰς πολὺ,
 25 ὡς οἶεται, ποιεῖ ἐμφανίζων * τὸ πολὺ τῷ μερισμῷ, καὶ ἀνθ' ἐνὸς ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ἐν δαπανῶν εἰς μῆκος ἀσθενέστερον πρόεισιν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ αὐτῇ κόσμον ποιοῦσα αἰσθητὸν μιμήσει ἐκείνου κινούμενον κίνησιν οὐ τὴν ἐκεῖ, ὁμοίαν δὲ τῇ ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐθέλουσαν εἰκόνα ἐκείνης εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν ἑαυτὴν ἐχρόνωνσεν
 30 ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος τοῦτον ποιήσασα· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῷ γενομένῳ ἔδωκε δουλεύειν χρόνῳ, ἐν χρόνῳ αὐτὸν πάντα ποιήσασα εἶναι, τὰς τούτου διεξόδους ἀπάσας ἐν αὐτῷ περιλαβοῦσα· ἐν ἐκείνῃ γὰρ κινούμενος—οὐ γάρ τις αὐτοῦ τοῦδε τοῦ παντός τόπος ἢ ψυχῇ—καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐκείνης αὐ ἐκινεῖτο χρόνῳ.

35 Τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν αὐτῆς παρεχομένη ἄλλην μετ' ἄλλην, εἴθ' ἐτέραν πάλιν ἐφεξῆς, ἐγέννα τε μετὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας τὸ ἐφεξῆς καὶ συμπορῇ μετὰ διανοίας ἐτέρας μετ' ἐκείνην τὸ μὴ πρότερον ὄν, ὅτι οὐδ' ἡ διάνοια ἐνεργηθεῖσα ἦν
 40 οὐδ' ἡ νῦν ζωὴ ὁμοία τῇ πρὸ αὐτῆς. Ἀμα οὖν ζωὴ ἄλλη καὶ τὸ ἄλλη χρόνον εἶχεν ἄλλον. Διάστασις οὖν ζωῆς χρόνον εἶχε καὶ τὸ πρόσω ἀεὶ τῆς ζωῆς χρόνον ἔχει ἀεὶ καὶ ἡ παρελθοῦσα ζωὴ χρόνον ἔχει παρεληλυθότα. Εἰ οὖν
 45 λέγειν ;

Εἰ γὰρ αἰὼν ἐστὶ ζωὴ ἐν στάσει καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἄπειρος ἤδη, εἰκόνα δὲ δεῖ τοῦ αἰῶνος τὸν χρόνον εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ τότε τὸ πᾶν ἔχει πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ἀντὶ μὲν ζωῆς τῆς ἐκεῖ ἄλλην δεῖ ζῶν τὴν τῆσδε τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς
 50 ψυχῆς ὥσπερ ὁμῶνυμον λέγειν εἶναι καὶ ἀντὶ κινήσεως νοεράς ψυχῆς τινος μέρους κίνησιν, ἀντὶ δὲ ταυτότητος καὶ τοῦ ὡσαύτως καὶ μένοντος τὸ μὴ μένον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἄλλο δὲ καὶ ἄλλο ἐνεργοῦν, ἀντὶ δὲ ἀδιαστάτου καὶ ἐνὸς εἰδωλον τοῦ ἐνὸς τὸ ἐν συνεχείᾳ ἐν, ἀντὶ δὲ ἀπείρου ἤδη καὶ ὅλου τὸ εἰς ἄπειρον πρὸς τὸ

The life of
soul in its
transition
from one
state to the
other

¹ Time was called "a moving likeness of eternity" by Plato in *Tim.* 37d (above, nr. 351).

* ἀφανίζων codd., H.-S.; ἐμφανίζων conj. Schegk, Br.

ἐφεξῆς αἰεί, ἀντί δὲ ἀθρόου ὅλου τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἐσόμενον καὶ αἰεί ἐσόμενον ὅλον. 55
Οὕτω γὰρ μιμήσεται τὸ ἤδη ὅλον καὶ ἀθρόον καὶ ἀπειρον ἤδη, εἰ ἐθελήσει αἰεί
προσχωόμενον εἶναι ἐν τῷ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι οὕτω τὸ ἐκείνου μιμήσεται.

Time
essentially
connected
with soul

Δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐξωθεν τῆς ψυχῆς λαμβάνειν τὸν χρό-
νον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν αἰῶνα ἐκεῖ ἐξω τοῦ ὄντος, οὐδ' 60
αὐτοῦ παρακολούθημα οὐδ' ὕστερον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐνορώμενον καὶ ἐνόντα
καὶ συνόντα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖ ὁ αἰὼν.

Time a
distention

1435—a. Hence P. described time as a "distention of the soul", as it was said by St. Augustine: it must be understood as "the length of such a life (sc. of the soul), progressing silently in regular and equable changes".

Enn. III 7, 12, l. 1-4:

Νοῆσαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν, ὡς ἡ φύσις αὕτη, χρόνος, τὸ τοιούτου μῆκος βίου
ἐν μεταβολαῖς προῖον ὁμαλαῖς τε καὶ ὁμοίαις ἀποφητὶ προϋούσαις, συνεχὲς
τὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἔχον.

Augustinus, *Conf.* XI 23, 30 (the end) and 26, 33 (l. 24) defines time as a *distentio*. He adds: "sed cuius rei nescio, et mirum si non ipsius animi". His way of posing the problem and of illustrating it is original, but the idea itself of a *distentio* comes from Plotinus.

Time was
engendered
together
with the
sensible
universe

b. Supposing that this life of the soul should stop and that soul should stay in Noûs,—there would be nothing but Noûs itself; no sensible world, no time. Both of these are engendered together, as was said by Plato (*Tim.* 38b).

Enn. III 7, 12, l. 4-25:

Εἰ δὴ πάλιν τῷ λόγῳ ἀναστρέψαι ποιήσασιν τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην καὶ παύ-
σασιν τοῦδε τοῦ βίου, ὃν νῦν ἔχει ἀπαυστον ὄντα καὶ οὐποτε λήξοντα, ὅτι ψυχῆς 5
τινος αἰεί οὔσης ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, οὐ πρὸς αὐτὴν οὐδ' ἐν αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ἐν ποιήσει καὶ
γενέσει—εἰ οὖν ὑποθούμεθα μηκέτι ἐνεργοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ παυσασμένην ταύτην τὴν
ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἐπιστραφέν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸν 10
αἰῶνα καὶ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ μένον, τί ἂν ἔτι μετὰ αἰῶνα εἴη; Τί δ' ἂν ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο
πάντων ἐν ἐνὶ μεινάντων; Τί δ' ἂν ἔτι πρότερον; Τί δ' ἂν ὕστερον ἢ μέλλον *;
Ποῦ δ' ἂν ἔτι ψυχὴ ἐπιβάλλοι εἰς ἄλλο ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι; Μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ τούτῳ·
ἀφεστήκοι γὰρ ἂν πρότερον, ἵνα ἐπιβάλλῃ. Ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἡ σφαῖρα αὕτη εἴη, 15
ἢ οὐ πρῶτως ὑπάρχει· [χρόνος]** ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ καὶ αὕτη καὶ ἔστι καὶ κινεῖται,
κἂν στῇ, ἐκείνης ἐνεργούσης, ὅση ἡ στάσις αὐτῆς μετρήσομεν, ἕως ἐκείνη τοῦ
αἰῶνός ἐστιν ἔξω.

* μέλλον Page, H.-S.; μᾶλλον codd.

** χρόνος del. H.-S.

20 Εἰ οὖν ἀποστάσης ἐκείνης καὶ ἐνωθείσης ἀνήρηται χρόνος, δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ταύτης ἀρχὴ πρὸς ταῦτα κινήσεως καὶ οὗτος ὁ βίος τὸν χρόνον γεννᾷ. Διὸ καὶ εἴρηται ἅμα τῷδε τῷ παντὶ γεγονέναι, ὅτι ψυχὴ αὐτὸν μετὰ τοῦδε τοῦ παντός ἐγέννησεν. Ἐν γὰρ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ τόδε γεγένηται τὸ πᾶν· καὶ ἡ μὲν χρόνος, τὸ δὲ ἐν χρόνῳ.

Thus, Augustinus in *Confess.* XI 30, 40 rebukes those people who ask questions such as: "What was God doing before He made the heavens and the earth" and "How did He come to the idea of making something, while He did not do so before?"—To this Aug. replies: "Videant itaque nullum tempus esse posse sine creatura et desinant istam vanitatem loqui. Extendantur etiam in ea, quae ante sunt, et intellegant te ante omnia tempora aeternum Creatorem omnium temporum neque ulla tempora tibi esse coaeterna nec ullam creaturam, etiamsi est aliqua supra tempora".

Cp. Thomas Aq., *S. th.* I, qu. 46, art. 3: "In principio creavit Deus coelum et terram" does not mean that things were created *in principio temporis*, but "quia simul cum tempore coelum et terra creata sunt".

TWENTY-SIXTH CHAPTER LATER NEOPLATONISM

I—PORPHYRIUS

Neoplatonic succession

1436—Julianus mentions Plotinus, Porphyrius and Iamblichus in succession as carrying on the tradition of Plato.

Julianus, *Or.* VII 222B:

Speaking of the worship of Dionysos he says: the man in whom the multifarious character of life has not been perfected by divine frenzy for the god, whose nature is uniform and indivisible, runs the risk that his life may flow into many channels, and as it flows be torn to shreds. But these expressions should not be taken literally,—

Ξυνιέτω δὲ τὰ λεγόμενα τρόπον ἄλλον, ὃν Πλάτων, ὃν Πλωτῖνος, ὃν Πορφύριος, ὃν ὁ δαμόνιος Ἰάμβλιχος.

Porphyrius

1437—Porphyrius' life is partly known to us by what he tells us himself in his *Life of Plotinus*, partly by Eunapius.

a. Eunapius, *Vitae phil.* p. 455/6:

Πορφυρίῳ Τύρος μὲν ἦν πατρίς, ἡ πρώτη τῶν ἀρχαίων Φοινίκων πόλις, καὶ πατέρες δὲ οὐκ ἄσημοι. τυχὼν δὲ τῆς προσηκούσης παιδείας, ἀνά τε ἔδραμε τοσοῦτον καὶ ἐπέδωκεν, ὥς Λογγίνου μὲν ἦν ἀκροατής, καὶ ἐκόσμει τὸν διδάσκαλον ἐντὸς ὀλίγου χρόνου. Λογγῖνος δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ἐκεῖνον βιβλιοθήκη τις ἦν ἔμψυχος καὶ περιπατοῦν μουσεῖον.—Καὶ εἴ τις κατέγνω τινὸς τῶν παλαιῶν, οὐ τὸ δοξασθὲν ἐκράτει πρότερον, ἀλλ' ἡ Λογγίνου πάντως ἐκράτει κρίσις. οὕτω δὲ ἀχθεὶς τὴν πρώτην παιδείαν καὶ ὑπὸ πάντων ἀποβλεπόμενος, τὴν μεγίστην Ῥώμην ἰδεῖν ἐπιθυμήσας ἵνα κατὰσχῃ διὰ σοφίας τὴν πόλιν, ἐπειδὴ τάχιστα εἰς αὐτὴν ἀφίκετο καὶ τῷ μεγίστῳ Πλωτίνῳ συνῆλθεν εἰς ὁμιλίαν, πάντων ἐπελάθετο τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ προσέθετο φέρων ἑαυτὸν ἐκεῖνῳ.

b. Porph., *Vita Plot.* 4; l. 1-9:

Τῷ δεκάτῳ δὲ ἔτει τῆς Γαλιήνου βασιλείας¹ ἐγὼ Πορφύριος ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μετὰ Ἀντωνίου τοῦ Ῥοδίου γεγονώς καταλαμβάνω μὲν τὸν Ἀμέλιον ὀκτωκαιδέκατον ἔτος ἔχοντα τῆς πρὸς Πλωτῖνον συνουσίας, μηδὲν δέ πω γράφειν τολμήσαντα πλὴν τῶν σχολίων ἃ οὐδέπω εἰς ἑκάτὸν τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῷ

¹ A. 363.

συνῆκτο. ἦν δὲ ὁ Πλωτῖνος τῷ δεκάτῳ ἔτει τῆς Γαλιήνου βασιλείας ἀμφὶ τὰ πεντήκοντα ἔτη καὶ ἑννέα. ἐγὼ δὲ Πορφύριος τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῷ συγγέγονα αὐτὸς ὦν τότε ἑτῶν τριάκοντα.

Porph. stayed for five years with Plotinus, then was sent to Sicily for reasons of health (above, nr. 1360b: *V.P.* 11, l. 11 ff.). On his intimacy with the master and his function as a corrector, above, nr. 1362a.

c. Porph. came back to Rome after the death of Plotinus (Eunapius' account is incorrect on this point) and settled there to teach his master's philosophy. Eunapius praises him for the lucidity of his expositions and for his learning.

Eunapius, *Vitae* 456/7:

His fame
as a teacher

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλωτῖνος τῷ τε τῆς ψυχῆς οὐρανίῳ καὶ τῷ λοξῷ καὶ αἰνιγματώδει τῶν λόγων, βαρὺς ἐδόκει καὶ δυσήκοος· ὁ δὲ Πορφύριος, ὥσπερ Ἑρμαϊκὴ τις σειρὰ¹ καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἐπινεύουσα, διὰ ποικίλης παιδείας πάντα εἰς τὸ εὐγνωστον καὶ καθαρὸν ἐξήγγειλεν.—

Ἔστι γοῦν ἀπορῆσαι καθ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ θαυμάσαι, τί πλεῖόν ἐστι τῶν ἐσπου- His learning
δασμένων· πότερον τὰ εἰς ὕλην ῥητορικὴν τείνοντα, ἢ τὰ εἰς γραμματικὴν ἀκρίβειαν φέροντα, ἢ ὅσα τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἡρτῆται, ἢ ὅσα νέει πρὸς γεωμετρίαν, ἢ ὅσα πρὸς μουσικὴν ῥέπει. τὰ δὲ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ λόγου καταληπτόν, οὔτε τὸ ἡθικὸν ἐφικτὸν λόγῳ· τὸ δὲ φυσικὸν καὶ θεουργὸν τελεταῖς ἀφείσθω καὶ μυστηρίοις· οὕτω παντομιγὲς πρὸς ἅπασαν ἀρετὴν ὁ ἀνὴρ αὐτὸς² χρῆμά τι γέγονεν.

d. He married the widow of a friend.

Eunapius, *Vitae* 457:

His
marriage

Γάμοις τε ὁμιλήσας φαίνεται, καὶ πρὸς Μάρκελλάν γε αὐτοῦ γυναῖκα γενομένην βιβλίον φέρεται, ἣν φησιν ἀγαγέσθαι καὶ ταῦτα οὖσαν πέντε μητέρα τέκνων, οὐχ ἵνα παῖδας ἐξ αὐτῆς ποιήσῃται, ἀλλ' ἵνα οἱ γεγονότες παιδείας τύχωσιν· ἐκ φίλου γὰρ ἦν αὐτοῦ τῇ γυναικὶ τὰ τέκνα προὑπάρξαντα.

1438—Porph. is known to us first as the editor of the *Enneads*. He His works
also speaks of explicatory works of his own on Plotinus' writings.

Porph., *Vita Plot.* 26, l. 28-37 H.-S.:

After having enumerated the treatises of Plotinus as arranged by him in six enneads he concludes:

¹ Probably a vague reminiscence of the χρυσὴ σειρὰ of *Iliad* VIII 19, which played a part in Neoplatonic symbolism (cf. Kern, *Orph. fragm.* nr. 166) and may have been connected by the author with Hermes by some strange error (a confusion with Ἑρμαϊκὴ λύρα?).—Unless H. (ψυχοπομπός) was in fact represented with a cord. But of such a representation so far as I know not a trace has been found.

² "the man himself"—as opposed to his fellow-disciples (συμφοιτηταί) who are mentioned before as famous men and praised by Porph. for their ability.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν βιβλία εἰς ἕξ ἐννεάδας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κατετάξαμεν τέσσαρα καὶ πεντήκοντα ὄντα· καταβεβλήμεθα δὲ καὶ εἷς τινα αὐτῶν ὑπομνήματα 30 ἀτάκτως διὰ τοὺς ἐπείζαντας ἡμᾶς ἐταίρους γράφειν εἰς ἅπερ αὐτοὶ τὴν σαφηνειαν αὐτοῖς γενέσθαι ἤξιουν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ κεφάλαια τῶν πάντων πλὴν τοῦ “Περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ” διὰ τὸ λειψαὶ ἡμῖν πεποιήμεθα κατὰ τὴν χρονικὴν ἔκδοσιν τῶν βιβλίων· ἀλλ’ ἐν τούτῳ οὐ τὰ κεφάλαια μόνον καθ’ ἕκαστον ἔκκειται τῶν 35 βιβλίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιχειρήματα, ἃ ὡς κεφάλαια συναριθμεῖται.

What are the
'Αφορμαί

The question has been raised whether the works mentioned here, either the three or one or two of them, were identical with the 'Αφορμαί πρὸς τὰ νοητά which are preserved to us (cited below as *Sententiae*). The 'Αφορμαί are a short description of Plotinus' doctrine, a kind of στοιχειώσεις θεολογική in aphorisms, comparable with the *Enchiridion* of Epictetus in its relation to the *Diatribes*. Mommert seems to be right in stating that this work is probably neither identical with the ὑπομνήματα (commentaries of parts of the *Enneads*), nor with the κεφάλαια (which were summaries of all Plotinus's treatises except the *Περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ*), nor with the ἐπιχειρήματα (discussions or expositions of Plotinus's arguments in the *Enneads*, comparable with the "Notices" of Bréhier which precede the text of each of the treatises in his edition).

Character
of Porph.'s
teaching

In his teaching of Plotinus' philosophy Porph. laid great emphasis on its moral implications. The purification from the πάθη, the ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ, the moral and spiritual character of the true service of God, these are the leading principles, both of his letter to Marcella and of his four books *De abstinentia* (*Περὶ ἀποχῆς ἐμψύχων*).

1439—From the 'Αφορμαί we cite the chapter on virtues, which shows the author's interest in ethics. From a comparison with *Enn.* I 2 (above, nrs. 1419, 1420) will appear that Porph.'s classification of virtues is more elaborate than Plotinus's was.

Classifica-
tion of
virtues

Porph., *Sent.* 32 (Stob. III 3, p. 89), I-5:

Ἄλλαι αἱ ἀρεταὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ ἄλλαι αἱ τοῦ πρὸς θεωρίαν ἀνιόντος καὶ § 1 διὰ τοῦτο λεγομένου θεωρητικοῦ καὶ ἄλλαι αἱ τοῦ ἤδη τελείου θεωρητικοῦ καὶ ἡδὴ θεατοῦ καὶ ἄλλαι αἱ τοῦ νοῦ, καθὼς νοῦς καὶ ἀπὸ ψυχῆς καθαρός.

Αἱ μὲν τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἐν μετριοπαθείᾳ κείμεναι, τῷ ἔπεσθαι καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν § 2 τῷ λογισμῷ τοῦ καθήκοντος κατὰ τὰς πράξεις. διὸ πρὸς κοινωνίαν βλέπουσαι τὴν ἀβλαβῆ τῶν πλησίων ἐκ τοῦ συναγελασμοῦ καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας πολιτικαὶ λέγονται. —

Αἱ δὲ τοῦ πρὸς θεωρίαν προκόπτοντος θεωρητικοῦ ἐν ἀποστάσει κεῖνται § 3 τῶν ἐντεῦθεν· διὸ καὶ καθάρσεις αὗται λέγονται, ἐν ἀποχῇ θεωρούμεναι τῶν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος πράξεων καὶ συμπαθειῶν τῶν πρὸς αὐτό. αὗται μὲν γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφισταμένης πρὸς τὸ ὄντως ὂν, αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ τὸν θνητὸν ἄνθρωπον κατακοσμοῦσι, καὶ πρόδρομοί γε αἱ πολιτικαὶ τῶν καθάρσεων· δεῖ γὰρ κοσμη-

θέντα κατ' αὐτάς ἀποστῆναι τοῦ σὺν σώματι πράττειν τι προηγουμένως. —

Ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρετὰς διάθεσις ἐν μετριοπαθείᾳ θεωρεῖται τέλος ἔχουσα τὸ ζῆν ὡς ἄνθρωπον κατὰ φύσιν, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὰς θεωρητικὰς ἐν ἀπαθείᾳ, ἧς τέλος ἡ πρὸς θεὸν ὁμοίωσις. —

Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ καθαίρειν τε καὶ κεκαθάρθαι ἀφαίρεσις ἦν παντὸς τοῦ ἄλλοτρίου, τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερον ἂν εἴη τοῦ κατήραντος· ὡς εἶγε πρὸ τῆς ἀκαθαρσίας ἀγαθὸν ἦν τὸ καθαίρομενον, ἡ κάθαρσις ἤρκει. ἀλλ' ἀρκέσει μὲν ἡ κάθαρσις, τὸ δὲ καταλειπόμενον ἔσται τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐχ ἡ κάθαρσις. ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχῆς φύσις οὐκ ἦν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἀγαθοῦ μετέχειν δυνάμενον καὶ ἀγαθοειδές. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο ἐν κακῷ. τὸ οὖν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ ἐν τῷ συνεῖναι τῷ γεννήσαντι, κακία δὲ τὸ τοῖς ὑστέροις. καὶ διπλῇ γε κακία· τό τε τούτοις συνεῖναι καὶ μετὰ παθῶν ὑπερβολῆς. διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ πολιτικαὶ ἀρεταί, μιᾶς γοῦν αὐτὴν κακίας ἀπαλλάττουσαι, ἀρεταὶ ἐκρίθησαν καὶ τίμιαι. αἱ δὲ καθαρτικαὶ τιμιώτεραι καὶ τῆς ὡς ψυχῆς κακίας ἀπαλλάττουσαι· δεῖ τοίνυν καθηραμένην αὐτὴν συνεῖναι τῷ γεννήσαντι. καὶ ἀρετὴ ἄρα αὐτῆς μετὰ τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν αὐτῇ, ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἐν γνώσει καὶ εἰδήσει τοῦ ὄντος, οὐχ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει παρ' αὐτῇ ταύτην, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ πρὸ αὐτῆς οὐχ ὁρᾷ τὰ αὐτῆς.

§ 4 Ἄλλο οὖν γένος τρίτον ἀρετῶν μετὰ τὰς καθαρτικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς, νοερῶς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργούσης. σοφία μὲν καὶ φρόνησις ἐν θεωρίᾳ ὧν νοῦς ἔχει, δικαιοσύνη δὲ οἰκαιοπραγία ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸν νοῦν ἀκολουθίᾳ καὶ τῷ πρὸς τὸν νοῦν ἐνεργεῖν, σωφροσύνη δὲ ἡ εἴσω πρὸς νοῦν στροφή, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία ἀπάθεια καθ' ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ πρὸς ὃ βλέπει, ἀπαθὲς δὲ τὴν φύσιν. καὶ ἀνταλοκουθοῦσί γε αὐταὶ ἀλλήλαις, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι.

§ 5 Τέταρτον δὲ εἶδος ἀρετῶν, τὸ τῶν παραδειγματικῶν, αἵπερ ἦσαν ἐν τῷ νῷ, κρείττους οὔσαι τῶν ψυχικῶν καὶ τούτων παραδείγματα, ὧν αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦσαν ὁμοιώματα.

The distinction between πολιτικαὶ and καθαρτικαὶ ἀρεταί is added by Porph. to Plotinus' theory. Moreover, Plotinus does not speak of "virtue" in *Noûs*: the παράδειγμα of virtue is no virtue, he declared (*Enn.* I 2, 6, l. 14-18; above, nr. 1419e).

The passage on κάθαρσις and virtue (§ 3, l. 11 ff.) is taken from *Enn.* I 2, 4, l. 5-17 (above, nr. 1419b), § 4 from I 2, 6, l. 20 ff. (above, 1420a).

1440—We follow Porph. in his admonitions to his wife.

The letter to
Marcella

His first point is that ἡδονή and ῥαθυμία are opposed to the ascent to God and that, hence, πόνος must be practised as a training for spiritual life. The life of the philosopher must bear witness to his theory.—Follows a summary of the doctrine. The author admonishes his correspondent to find spiritual wealth within herself and to exercise her mind. For the mind of the wise man is a temple of God, and God is the only thing the wise man needs. Unless one is directed towards Him, the soul becomes a dwelling-place of daemons.

a. Porph., *Ad Marc.* 7-11 (Nauck, *Porph. opusc. sel.* p. 278 l. 17-282 l. 4):

Praise of
πόνος

Παντός γὰρ καλοῦ κτήματος πόνους δεῖ προηγεῖσθαι, καὶ πονεῖν ἀνάγκη τὸν τυχεῖν ἀρετῆς σπουδάζοντα. ἀκούεις δὲ καὶ τὸν Ἡρακλέα τοὺς τε Διοσκοῦρους καὶ τὸν Ἀσκληπιὸν τοὺς τε ἄλλους ὅσοι θεῶν παῖδες ἐγένοντο ὡς διὰ τῶν πόνων καὶ τῆς καρτερίας τὴν μακαρίαν εἰς θεοὺς ὁδὸν ἐξετέλεσαν. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν δι' ἡδονῆς βεβιωκότων ἀνθρώπων αἱ εἰς θεὸν ἀναδρομαί, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν τὰ μέγιστα τῶν συμβαινόντων γενναίως διενεγκεῖν μεμαθηκότων.—

Life must
bear witness
to theory

(8) Ἐχει δὲ οὐχ οὕτω παντάπασι δυσκαρτερήτως σοὶ τὰ παρόντα, εἰ παρεῖσα τὴν ἐκ τοῦ πάθους ἀλόγιστον ταραχὴν μὴ περὶ φαύλων ἡγήσῃ μεμυῆσθαι ὧν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν τὴν ὀρθὴν παρὰ τῶν θείων ἐτελέσθης λόγων· ὧν τὴν βεβαίαν ἀκρόασιν αἱ πράξεις ἐλέγχειν εἰώθασι. τὰ γὰρ ἔργα τῶν δογμάτων ἐκάστου φέρειν πέφυκε τὰς ἀποδείξεις· καὶ δεῖ οὕτως βιοῦν ὅστις ἐπίστευσεν, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς πιστὸς ᾖ μάρτυς περὶ ὧν λέγει τοῖς ἀκρωμένοις.

Τίνα οὖν ᾖ ἄρα ἃ παρὰ τῶν σαφέστατ' εἰδότην τὰ κατ' ἀνθρώπους μεμαθήκαμεν; ἄρ' οὐχ ὅτι μὲν σοὶ ἐγὼ οὐχ ὁ ἀπτός οὗτος καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ὑποπτωτός, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀφεστηκώς τοῦ σώματος, ὁ ἀχρώματος καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος, καὶ χερσὶ μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἐπαφητός, διανοίᾳ δὲ μόνῃ κρατητός;—

(9) Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐχ ὅτι πᾶν πάθος ψυχῆς εἰς σωτηρίαν αὐτῆς πολεμιώτατον, καὶ ἀπαιδευσία μὲν τῶν παθῶν πάντων μήτηρ, τὸ δὲ πεπαιδεῦσθαι οὐκ ἐν πολυμαθείας ἀναλήψει, ἐν ἀπαλλάξει δὲ τῶν ψυχικῶν παθῶν ἐθεωρεῖτο; πάθη δὲ νοσημάτων ἀρχαί· ψυχῆς δὲ νόσημα κακία· κακία δὲ πᾶσα αἰσχροὶν· τὸ δὲ αἰσχροὶν τῷ καλῷ ἐναντίον· καλοῦ δὲ ὄντος τοῦ θείου ἀμύχανον αὐτῷ σὺν κακίᾳ πελάζειν· καθαροῦ γὰρ μὴ καθαρὸν ἐφάπτεσθαι οὐδὲν ὁ Πλάτων φησὶ θεμιτὸν εἶναι. διὸ καὶ μέχρι τοῦ νῦν καθαρεύειν δεῖ τῶν παθῶν τε καὶ τῶν διὰ τὸ πάθος ἀμαρτημάτων.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τοιαῦτα ᾖ οἷς μάλιστα συνήνεις, ὡς γράμματα θεῖα ἐνόντα παρὰ σαυτῇ διὰ τῆς τῶν λόγων ἐπιδείξεως ἀναγινώσκουσα; πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἄτοπον τὴν πεπεισμένην ἐν σοὶ εἶναι καὶ τὸ σῶζον καὶ τὸ σφζόμενον καὶ τό γε ἀπολλύον καὶ <τὸ> ἀπολλύμενον τὸν τε πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν πενίαν τὸν τε πατέρα καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τῶν ὄντων ἀγαθῶν καθηγεμόνα, κεχηγένην πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὕψιγγου σκιάν, ὡς δὴ τὸν ὄντως ὕψιγγτὴν μὴ ἐντὸς ἔχουσιν μηδὲ παρὰ σαυτῇ πάντα τὸν πλοῦτον;—

(10) Συνάγοις δ' ἂν καὶ ἐνίζοις τὰς ἐμφύτους ἐννοίας καὶ διαρθροῦν συγκεχυμένας καὶ εἰς φῶς ἔλκειν ἐσκοτισμένας πειρωμένην. ἀφ' ὧν ὁρμώμενος καὶ ὁ θεῖος Πλάτων ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπὶ τὰ νοητὰ τὰς ἀνακλήσεις πεποιήται.—

(11) Λέγει δὲ ὁ λόγος πάντῃ μὲν καὶ πάντως παρεῖναι τὸ θεῖον, νεῶν δὲ τούτῳ παρ' ἀνθρώποις καθιερωθῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν μάλιστα τοῦ σοφοῦ μόνῃ, τιμὴν τε προσήκουσαν ἀπονέμεσθαι τῷ θεῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ μάλιστα τὸν θεὸν ἐγνω-

κότος· τοῦτον δὲ εἶναι εἰκότως μόνον τὸν σοφόν.—Θεὸς μὲν γὰρ δεῖται οὐδενός, σοφὸς δὲ μόνου θεοῦ. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς γένοιτο ἢ <ὁ> νοῶν τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν, ὅπερ ἐξέχει τοῦ θείου· οὐδ' αὖ ἄλλος κακοδαίμων ἄνθρωπος ἢ <ὁ> πονηρῶν δαιμόνων ἐνδιαίτημα τὴν ψυχὴν κατασκευάσας. ἄνθρωπῳ δὲ σοφῷ θεὸς θεοῦ δίδωσιν ἐξουσίαν, καὶ καθαίρεται μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἐννοία θεοῦ, δικαιοπραγίαν δὲ ἀπὸ θεοῦ ὁρμώμενος δίδωκει.

b. *Ad Marc.* 12 (Nauck p. 282 l. 5-19):

Think of God as being present at all your works and deeds. He is the cause of all good things, while we ourselves are the cause of evil. Ask of Him only spiritual blessings, which cannot be lost.

**God's
presence
in our life**

Πάσης πράξεως καὶ παντὸς ἔργου καὶ λόγου θεὸς ἐπόπτης παρέστω καὶ ἔφορος. καὶ πάντων ὧν πράττομεν ἀγαθῶν τὸν θεὸν αἷτιον ἡγώμεθα· τῶν δὲ κακῶν αἷτιοι ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν οἱ ἐλόμενοι, θεὸς δὲ ἀναίτιος¹. ὅθεν καὶ εὐκτέον θεῷ τὰ ἄξια θεοῦ. καὶ αἰτώμεθα ἃ μὴ λάβοιμεν ἂν παρ' ἐτέρου· καὶ ὧν ἡγεμόνες οἱ μετ' ἀρετῆς πόνοι, ταῦτα εὐχώμεθα γενέσθαι μετὰ τοὺς πόνους· εὐχὴ γὰρ βῆθύμου μάταιος λόγος. ἃ δὲ κτησαμένη οὐ καθέξεις, μὴ αἰτοῦ παρὰ θεοῦ· δῶρον γὰρ θεοῦ πᾶν ἀναφαίρετον· ὥστε οὐ δώσει ὃ μὴ καθέξεις. ὧν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσα οὐ δεηθῇ, ἐκείνων καταφρόνει· καὶ ὧν ἂν ἀπαλλαγεῖσα δεηθῇ, ταῦτά σοι ἀσκουμένη τὸν θεὸν παρακάλει γενέσθαι συλλήπτορα. οὐκ οὖν δεήσῃ οὐδενὸς ὧν καὶ ἡ τύχη δοῦσα πολλάκις πάλιν ἀφαιρεῖται.

c. *Ib.*, 14-19 (Nauck p. 283-287):

Striving after pleasure is incompatible with the love of God. Do not speak lightly about God. Virtue is the only way to serve Him.

**Love of
pleasure
excluded**

Ἀδύνατον τὸν αὐτὸν φιλόθεόν τε εἶναι καὶ φιλήδονον [καὶ φιλοσώματον]. ὁ γὰρ φιλήδονος καὶ φιλοσώματος, ὁ δὲ φιλοσώματος πάντως καὶ φιλοχρήματος, ὁ δὲ φιλοχρήματος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος καὶ εἰς θεὸν καὶ εἰς πατέρας ἀνόσιος καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους παράνομος, ὥστε καὶ ἐκατόμβας θύῃ καὶ μυρίους ἀναθήμασι τοὺς νεῶς ἀγάλλῃ, ἀσεβής ἐστι καὶ ἄθεος καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει ἱερόσυλος. διὸ καὶ πάντα φιλοσώματον ὡς ἄθεον καὶ μισαρὸν ἐκτρέπεσθαι χρή. —

(15) Νόμιζε αἰρετώτερον εἶναι σιγᾶν ἢ λόγον εἰκῇ προέσθαι περὶ θεοῦ. ἀξίαν σε ποιήσει θεοῦ τὸ μηδὲν ἀνάξιον θεοῦ μήτε λέγειν μήτε πράττειν μήτε πάντως εἰδέναι ἀξιῶν. ὁ δὲ ἀξίος ἄνθρωπος θεοῦ θεὸς ἂν εἴη. καὶ τιμήσεις μὲν ἄριστα τὸν θεόν, ὅταν τῷ θεῷ τὴν σαυτῆς διάνοιαν ὁμοίωσης· ἡ δὲ ὁμοίωσις ἔσται διὰ μόνης ἀρετῆς· μόνῃ γὰρ ἀρετῇ τὴν ψυχὴν ἄνω ἔλκει καὶ πρὸς τὸ συγγενές. καὶ μέγα οὐδὲν ἄλλο μετὰ θεὸν ἢ ἀρετή.—

Οὐχ ἡ γλῶττα τοῦ σοφοῦ τίμιον παρὰ θεῷ, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἔργα. σοφὸς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ σιγῶν τὸν θεὸν τιμᾷ· ἄνθρωπος δὲ ἀμαθὴς καὶ εὐχόμενος καὶ θύων μιαίνει τὸ θεῖον. μόνος οὖν ἱερεὺς ὁ σοφός, μόνος θεοφιλής, μόνος εἰδὼς εὖξασθαι.

**Virtue the
only way to
God**

¹ Plato, *Rep.* X 617e (*Gr. Ph.* I, p. 215).

καὶ ὁ σοφίαν ἀσκῶν ἐπιστήμην ἀσκεῖ τὴν περὶ θεοῦ, οὐ λιτανεύων ἀεὶ καὶ θύων, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἔργων τὴν πρὸς θεὸν ἀσκῶν εὐσέβειαν.

(18) Βωμοὶ δὲ θεοῦ ἱεουργοῦμενοι μὲν οὐδὲν βλάπτουσιν, ἀμελούμενοι δὲ οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦσιν. ὅστις δὲ τιμᾷ τὸν θεὸν ὡς προσδεόμενον, οὗτος λέληθεν ἑαυτὸν δοξάζων τοῦ θεοῦ κρείττων εἶναι.—(19) Οὔτε δάκρυα καὶ ἱκετεῖαι θεὸν ἐπιστρέφουσιν οὔτε θυητολῖαι θεὸν τιμῶσιν οὔτε ἀναθημάτων πληθὸς κοσμοῦσι θεόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔνθεον φρόνημα καλῶς ἡδρασμένον συνάπτει θεῷ.

d. As soon as man forgets God his soul becomes a dwelling-place of evil spirits.

Religious
and irreligious men

Ib., 21-24 (Nauck p. 287-289):

“Οπου δ’ ἂν λήθῃ παρεισέλθῃ θεοῦ, τὸν κακὸν δαίμονα ἀνάγκη ἐνοικεῖν· 21 χώρημα γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ, ὥσπερ μεμάθηκας, ἡ θεῶν ἡ δαιμόνων. καὶ θεῶν μὲν συνόντων πράξει τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ διὰ τῶν λόγων καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔργων· ὑποδεξαμένη δὲ [ψυχῇ] τὸν κακὸν σύνοικον διὰ πονηρίας πάντα ἐνεργεῖ. ὅταν οὖν ἴδῃς ἄνθρωπον τοῖς κακοῖς χαίροντα καὶ δρῶντα, γίνωσκε τοῦτον ἡρνησθαι μὲν τὸν θεὸν ἐν τῇ γνώμῃ, πονηροῦ δὲ δαίμονος ὄντα ἐνδιαίτημα.

Θεὸν οἱ μὲν εἶναι νομίζοντες καὶ διοικεῖν ἅπαντα τοῦτο γέρας ἐκτήσαντο διὰ τῆς γνώσεως καὶ τῆς βεβαίας πίστεως, τὸ μεμαθηκέναι ὅτι ὑπὸ θεοῦ προνοεῖται πάντα καὶ εἰσὶν ἄγγελοι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθοὶ δαίμονες ἐπόπται τῶν πραττομένων, οὓς καὶ λαθεῖν ἀμήχανον. καὶ δὴ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχειν πεπεισμένοι φυλάττονται μὲν μὴ διαπίπτειν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον, πρὸ ὅψεως ἔχοντες τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἀναπόδραστον ἐφόρασιν· εὐγνώμονα δὲ βίον κτησάμενοι μανθάνουσι θεοὺς γινώσκονταί τε γινωσκομένοις θεοῖς. οἱ δὲ μήτε εἶναι θεοὺς πιστεύσαντες μήτε 22 προνοία θεοῦ διοικεῖσθαι τὰ ὅλα, δίκης κόλασιν πεπόνθασι τὸ μήτε ἑαυτοῖς πιστεῦειν μήθ’ ἑτέροις ὅτι θεοὶ εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀλόγῳ φορᾷ διοικεῖται τὰ πάντα. εἰς κίνδυνον οὖν ἄφατον ἑαυτοὺς ἐμβαλόντες ἀλόγῳ ὁρμῇ καὶ εὐδιαπτῶτῳ τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ἐπιτίθενται καὶ πάντα δρῶσιν ἃ μὴ θέμις, ἀναιρεῖν πειρώμενοι τὴν περὶ θεοὺς ὑπόληψιν. καὶ δὴ τούτους μὲν ἀγνοίας ἕνεκα καὶ ἀπιστίας θεοὶ διαφεύγουσιν· αὐτοὶ δὲ θεοὺς καὶ τὴν ὁπαδὸν τῶν θεῶν δίκην οὔτε φυγεῖν οὔτε λαθεῖν δύνανται· βίον δὲ κακοδαίμονα καὶ πλανήτην ἐλόμενοι ἀγνοοῦντες θεοὺς γινώσκονται θεοῖς καὶ τῇ δίκῃ τῇ παρὰ θεῶν. κἂν θεοὺς τιμᾷ οἴωνται 23 καὶ πεπεῖσθαι εἶναι θεοὺς, ἀρετῆς δὲ ἀμελῶσι καὶ σοφίας, ἡρνηνται θεοὺς καὶ ἀτιμάζουσιν.

Their
prayers

(24) Εὐχὴ ἡ μὲν μετὰ φαύλων ἔργων ἀκάθαρτος καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπρόσδεκτος 24 ὑπὸ θεοῦ· ἡ δὲ μετὰ καλῶν ἔργων καθαρὰ τε ὁμοῦ καὶ εὐπρόσδεκτος.

e. Porphy. wishes to establish four principles concerning God.

Four
principles

Ad Marc. 24 (Nauck p. 289, l. 17-25):

Τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα μάλιστα κεκρατύνθω περὶ θεοῦ· πίστις, ἀλήθεια, ἔρως,

ἐλπίς. πιστεῦσαι γὰρ δεῖ ὅτι μόνη σωτηρία ἡ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἐπιστροφή, καὶ πιστεύσαντα ὡς ἐνὶ μάλιστα σπουδάζσαι τάληθῇ γινῶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ γνόντα ἐρασθῆναι τοῦ γνωσθέντος, ἐρασθέντα δὲ ἐλπίσιν ἀγαθαῖς τρέφειν τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τοῦ βίου. ἐλπίσι γὰρ ἀγαθαῖς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τῶν φαύλων ὑπερέχουσι. στοιχεῖα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα κεκρατύνθω.

No doubt Porph. arrived at these four principles in defending the Neoplatonic view of life and God against Christian doctrine. His master Plotinus neither began by faith nor ended with hope.

f. Plotinus, as we found above (nr. 1410c) excluded soul as the cause of evil. Sin is the consequence of yielding to things that are inferior to soul, and the cause of this yielding is not soul itself, but its προσθήκαι. Porphyrus, though not of an essentially different opinion, expressed himself in other terms. The body not the cause of sin

Ad Marc. 28 (Nauck p. 292/3):

Μηδὲ αἰτιώμεθα τὴν σάρκα ὡς τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν αἰτίαν μηδ' εἰς τὰ πράγματα τρέπωμεν τὰς δυσφορίας, ἐν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τὰς τούτων αἰτίας μᾶλλον ζητῶμεν καὶ ἀπορρήξαντες πᾶσαν ματαίαν τῶν ἐφημέρων ὄρεξιν καὶ ἐλπίδα ὅλοι γενώμεθα ἑαυτῶν. ἡ γὰρ διὰ φόβον τις κακοδαιμονεῖ ἢ δι' ἄοριστον καὶ κενὴν ἐπιθυμίαν· ἃ τις χαλινῶν δύναται τὸν μακάριον ἑαυτῷ περιποιεῖσθαι λογισμόν.

Evidently, in declaring that the cause of great sins should not be sought for in the body but in "soul", Porph. took "soul" in a more comprehensive sense than Plotinus did when he denied that soul could be the cause of sin. Cp. Iamblichus, below, nr. 1453.

1441—Also in *De abstinencia* Porphyrius's first warning is against the πάθη. Man should refrain from all sensations which could stimulate them.

Porph., *De abst.* I 33-35:

33 Δύο πηγαὶ ἀνεῖνται πρὸς δεσμὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνταῦθα, ἐξ ὧν ὥσπερ θανασίμων πωμάτων ἐμπιμπλαμένη ἐν λήθῃ τῶν οἰκείων γίγνεται θεαμάτων, ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη· ὧν παρασκευαστικὴ μὲν ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀντίληψις αἶ τε συνομαρτοῦσαι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι φαντασίαι τε καὶ δόξαι καὶ μνῆμαι, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἐγειρόμενα τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσα ἡ ἄλογία παχυνομένη κατὰγει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τοῦ οἰκείου περὶ τὸ ὄν ἀποστρέφει ἔρωτος. ἀποστατέον ἄρα εἰς δύναμιν τούτων. αἱ δὲ ἀποστάσεις διὰ τῶν ἐκκλίσεων τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παθῶν καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀλογίας, αἱ δὲ αἰσθήσεις ἢ διὰ τῶν ὁρατῶν ἢ τῶν ἀκουστῶν ἢ γευστῶν ἢ ὀσφραντῶν ἢ ἀπτῶν. οἷον γὰρ μητρόπολις ἡ αἴσθησις ἦν

How to get rid of the πάθη

τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν ἐκφύλου τῶν παθῶν ἀποικίας. φέρε γὰρ ἴδε καθ' ἐκάστην ὅσον τὸ ὑπέκκαυμα εἰσρεῖ τῶν παθῶν εἰς ἡμᾶς, τοῦτο μὲν ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὰς θεάς ἵππων τε ἀμίλλης καὶ ἀθλητῶν ἢ τῶν ἐκλελυγισμένων ὀρχήσεων, τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἐπιβλέψεως τῆς πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ, αἱ δέλεαρ τοῦ ἀλογίστου παντοίαις ἐπιθέτοις παγίσι χειροῦνται τὸ ἄλογον. κατὰ γὰρ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐκβακχευομένη ὑπὸ 34 τῆς ἀλογίας ἀναπηδᾷ τε ποιεῖ καὶ ἐκβοᾷ καὶ κεκραγένοι, τῆς ἔξω ταραχῆς ἀπὸ τῆς ἔνδον ἐκκαομένης, ἣν ἀνῆψεν ἡ αἰσθησις. αἱ δὲ διὰ τῶν ἀκοῶν ἐμπαθεῖς οὔσαι κινήσεις ἐκ τε ποιῶν ψόφων καὶ ἡχων, αἰσχρορρημοσύνης τε καὶ λοιδορίας, [ὥς] τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς τέλεον τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἐκδεδυκότος φέρεσθαι ποιιοῦσιν οἰστρουμένους, τοὺς δ' αὖ θηλυνομένους παντοίας στροφάς ἐλίττεσθαι. θυμιαμάτων δὲ χρήσεις ἢ εὐώδεις πνοαί, αἱ τε τοὺς αὐτῶν ἔρωτας τοῖς ἐρασταῖς ἐμπορευόμεναι, τίνα λελήθασιν, ὅσῃν τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ἡλογίαν πιαίνουσιν; περὶ γὰρ τῶν διὰ τῆς γεύσεως τί ἂν τις καὶ εἴποι παθημάτων, διπλοῦ μάλιστ' ἐνταῦθα τοῦ δεσμοῦ συμπλεκομένου· τοῦ μὲν ὃν ἐκ τῆς γεύσεως τὰ πάθη πιαίνει, τοῦ δὲ ὃν ἐκ τῆς ἐμφορήσεως τῶν ἄλλοτρίων σωμάτων βαρύν τε καὶ δυνατὸν ἐργαζόμεθα; φάρμακα γὰρ, ὥς πού τις τῶν ἱατρῶν ἔφη, οὐ μόνον τὰ σκευαστὰ ὑπὸ τῆς ἱατρικῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἡμέραν εἰς τροφήν παραλαμβάνόμενα σιτία τε καὶ ποτά· καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὸ θανάσιμον ἐκ τούτων τῇ ψυχῇ ἀναδίδεται ἢ ἐκ τῶν φαρμακειῶν εἰς διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος κατασκευάζεται. αἱ δὲ ἀφαί μόνον οὐ σωματοῦσαι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ εἰς ἀνάρθρους ψόφους, οἷα δὴ σῶμα, πολλάκις ἐκπίπτειν ἠρέθισαν. ἐξ ὧν αἱ μνημαι καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι αἱ τε δόξαι ἀθροιζόμεναι ἐσμὸν τῶν παθῶν ἐγείρουσαι, φόβων, ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὀργῶν, ἐρώτων, φίλτρων, λυπῶν, ζήλων, μεριμνῶν, νοσημάτων, τῶν ὁμοίων παθῶν πλήρη ἀπέδειξαν. διὸ πολλὸς μὲν ὁ ἄγων τούτων καθαρῆσαι, πολλὸς δὲ ὁ ὀνός ἀπαλλα- 35 γῆναι αὐτῶν τῆς μελέτης, καὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν τῆς κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν ἀναγκαίας συμπλοκῆς ἡμῖν παρούσης. ὅθεν ὅση δύναμις ἀποστατέον τῶν τοιούτων χωρίων, ἐν οἷς καὶ μὴ βουλόμενόν ἐστιν περιπίπτειν τῷ πάθει.

1442—In the following passage Porph. gives a survey of the doctrine of "some Platonists" about God, gods and daemons.

God, gods
and
daemons

a. Porph., *De abst.* II 37-39:

Ὁ μὲν πρῶτος θεὸς ἀσώματός τε ὢν καὶ ἀκίνητος καὶ ἀμέριστος καὶ οὔτε 37 ἐν τινι ὢν οὔτ' ἐνδεδεδεμένος εἰς ἑαυτόν, χρήζει οὐδενὸς τῶν ἔξωθεν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἢ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῇ ἔχουσα μὲν τὸ τριχῇ διαστατὸν καὶ αὐτοκίνητον ἐκ φύσεως, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ πεφυκυῖα τὸ καλῶς καὶ εὐτάκτως κινεῖσθαι καὶ κινεῖν τὸ σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου κατὰ τοὺς ἀρίστους λόγους. δέδεκται δὲ τὸ σῶμα εἰς ἑαυτὴν καὶ περιεῖληφεν, καίπερ ἀσώματος οὖσα καὶ παντὸς πάθους ἀμέτοχος. τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς θεοῖς, τῷ τε κόσμῳ καὶ τοῖς ἀπλανέσι καὶ

πλανωμένοις, ἔκ τε ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος οὖσιν ὁρατοῖς θεοῖς, ἀντευχαιριστήτεον τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον διὰ τῶν θυσιῶν τῶν ἀψύχων. λοιπὸν οὖν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν ἀοράτων πλῆθος, οὓς δαίμονας ἀδιαστόλως εἴρηκε Πλάτων. τούτων δὲ οἱ μὲν κατονομασθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων παρ' ἐκάστοις τυγχάνουσι τιμῶν τ' ἰσοθέων καὶ τῆς ἄλλης θεραπείας, οἱ δὲ ὥς τὸ πολὺ μὲν οὐ πάνυ τι κατωνομάσθησαν, ὑπ' ἐνίων δὲ κατὰ κώμας ἢ τινας πόλεις ὀνόματός τε καὶ θρησκείας ἀφανῶς τυγχάνουσιν. τὸ δὲ ἄλλο πλῆθος οὕτω μὲν κοινῶς προσαγορεύεται τῷ τῶν δαιμόνων ὀνόματι, πεῖσμα δὲ περὶ πάντων τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, ὥς ἄρα καὶ βλάπτειν <ἄν> εἰ χολωθεῖεν ἐπὶ τῷ παρορᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ τυγχάνειν τῆς νενομισμένης θεραπείας, καὶ πάλιν εὐεργετοῖεν ἂν τοὺς εὐχαῖς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ λιτανείαις θυσίαις τε καὶ τοῖς ἀκολούθοις ἐξευμενιζομένους. συγκεχυμένης δὲ τῆς περὶ αὐτῶν ἐννοίας καὶ εἰς πολλὴν διαβολὴν χωρούσης ἀναγκαῖον διαστεῖλαι λόγῳ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν. ἴσως γὰρ ἀναγκαῖόν φασιν ὅθεν ἡ πλάνη γέγονεν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνειν. διαιρετέον οὖν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. ὅσαι μὲν ψυχαὶ τῆς ὅλης ἐκπεφυκυῖαι μέγала μέρη διοικοῦσι τῶν ὑπὸ σελήνην τόπων, ἐπερειδόμεναι μὲν πνεύματι ¹, κρατοῦσαι δὲ αὐτοῦ κατὰ λόγον, ταύτας δαίμονας τε ἀγαθοὺς νομιστέον καὶ ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ τῶν ἀρχομένων πάντα πραγματεύεσθαι, εἴτε τινῶν ἀφηγοῖντο ζῶων, εἴτε καρπῶν ἀποτεταγμένων, εἴτε καὶ τῶν ἔνεκα τούτων, οἷον ὄμβρων, πνευμάτων μετρίων, εὐδίας, τῶν τε ἄλλων ἃ τούτοις συνεργεῖ, εὐκρασίας τε ὥρων τοῦ ἔτους, ἡμῖν αὖ τεχνῶν τε καὶ τῶν κατὰ μουσικὴν παιδείας τε συναπάσης ἱατρικῆς τε καὶ γυμναστικῆς ἢ τινος τούτοις ὁμοίας. τούτους γὰρ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς ὠφελείας ἐκπορίζειν καὶ πάλιν αὖ βλάβης ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς αἰτίους γίνεσθαι. ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἀριθμητέον καὶ τοὺς πορθιμύοντας, ὥς φησι Πλάτων ² καὶ διαγγέλλοντας τὰ παρ' ἀνθρώπων θεοῖς καὶ τὰ παρὰ θεῶν ἀνθρώποις, τὰς μὲν παρ' ἡμῶν εὐχὰς ὡς πρὸς δικαστὰς ἀναφέροντας τοὺς θεοὺς, τὰς δὲ ἐκείνων παραινέσεις καὶ νουθεσίας μετὰ μαντείων ἐκφέροντας ἡμῖν. ὅσαι δὲ ψυχαὶ τοῦ συνεχοῦς πνεύματος οὐ κρατοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ὥς τὸ πολὺ καὶ κρατοῦνται, δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἄγονται τε καὶ φέρονται λίαν, ὅταν αἱ τοῦ πνεύματος ὀργαὶ τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι τὴν ὁρμὴν λάβωσιν. αὗται δ' αἱ ψυχαὶ δαίμονες μὲν καὶ ³⁹ αὐταί, κακοεργοὶ δ' ἂν εἰκότως λέγοντο. καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ σύμπαντες οὗτοί τε καὶ οἱ τῆς ἐναντίας δυνάμεως ἀόρατοί τε καὶ τελῶς ἀνάισθητοι αἰσθήσεσιν ἀνθρωπί-

¹ By this πνεῦμα is meant the "ethereal" or shining body of light which, according to Porph., envelops the world-soul as well as individual souls (Proclus, *In rem publ.* II p. 196, 24 Kroll). Daemons who do not have a material body "rest on it" as upon a vehicle (ὄχημα), as it is called by Porph., *Sent.* 29, p. 13 Mommert. Cp. Procl., *In Tim.* I p. 5 Diehl: ὄχημα αἰθέριον ἀνάλογον τῷ οὐρανῷ. As will appear in the last lines of the present chapter and the beginning of the next, Porph. regards the pneumatical (or ethereal) body as liable to πάθη and perishable. The doctrine is referred to by Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* III 2, p. 727; Verbeke, *La doctrine du pneuma*, p. 363 ff.

² *Symp.* 202e.

ναις. οὐ γὰρ στερεὸν σῶμα περιβέβληνται οὐδὲ μορφὴν πάντες μίαν, ἀλλ' ἐν σχήμασι πλείοσιν ἐκτυπούμεναι αἱ χαρακτηρίζουσαι τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτῶν μορφαὶ τοτὲ μὲν ἐπιφαίνονται, τοτὲ δὲ ἀφανεῖς εἰσιν· ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ μεταβάλλουσι τὰς μορφὰς οἱ γε χεῖρους. τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ἢ μὲν ἐστὶ σωματικόν, παθητικόν ἐστὶ καὶ φθαρτόν· τῷ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ψυχῶν οὕτως δεδεσθαι, ὥστε τὸ εἶδος αὐτῶν διαμένειν πλείω χρόνον, οὐ μὴν ἐστὶν αἰώνιον.

According to Proclus, *In Tim.* I, p. 152 Diehl, Porph. called the highest of the good daemons ἀρχάγγελοι. Cp. also the *Letter to Anebo* (in ps.-Iambl. *De mysteriis*, ed. Parthey, Berlin 1857), nr. 10, 16.

The work of
evil daemons

b. Porph., *De abst.* II 40:

Ἐν γὰρ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τῆς μεγίστης βλάβης τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν κακοεργῶν δαιμόνων θετέον, ὅτι αὐτοὶ αἷτιοι γινόμενοι τῶν περὶ τὴν γῆν παθημάτων, οἷον λοιμῶν, ἀφοριῶν, σεισμῶν, αὐχμῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἀναπειθουσιν ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἄρα τούτων αἷτιοι εἰσιν οἷπερ καὶ τῶν ἐναντιωτάτων [τουτέστιν τῶν εὐφοριῶν], ἑαυτοὺς ἐξαιρουντες τῆς αἰτίας καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πραγματευόμενοι πρῶτον, τὸ λανθάνειν ἀδικοῦντες. τρέπουσιν τε μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπὶ λιτανείας ἡμᾶς καὶ θυσίας τῶν ἀγαθοεργῶν θεῶν ὡς ὠργισμένων. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια ποιοῦσιν μεταστῆσαι ἡμᾶς ἐθέλοντες ἀπὸ τῆς ὀρθῆς ἐννοίας τῶν θεῶν καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐπιστρέψαι. —

By rousing desires and passions in men the evil daemons are also the cause of wars and quarrels.

Cp. also Proclus, *In Tim.* I p. 77, II p. 12 Diehl; Euseb., *Praep. ev.* IV 23; August., *De civ. Dei* X 19. August., *De civ. Dei* X 9 cites Porph. on "theurgy".

Precious
offerings
a moral
danger

1443—Those who introduced precious offerings actually introduced a host of evil habits and ideas.

a. Porph., *De abst.* II 60:

Ἀγνοοῦσιν δὲ οἱ τὴν πολυτέλειαν εἰσαγαγόντες εἰς τὰς θυσίας, ὅπως ἅμα ταύτῃ ἐσμὸν κακῶν εἰσάγαγον, δεισιδαιμονίαν, τρυφήν, ὑπόληψιν τοῦ δεκάζειν δύνασθαι τὸ θεῖον καὶ θυσίαις ἀκεῖσθαι τὴν ἀδικίαν. ἢ πόθεν οἱ μὲν τριτῦας χρυσόκερως, οἱ δ' ἐκατόμβας, Ὀλυμπιάς δ' ἢ Ἀλεξάνδρου μήτηρ πάντα χίλια ἔθυσεν, ἀπαξ τῆς πολυτελείας ἐπὶ τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν προαγούσης; ὅταν δὲ νέος θεοὺς χαίρειν πολυτελείαις γνῶ καί, ὡς φασιν, ταῖς τῶν βοῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων θοίναις, πότ' ἂν ἐκὼν σωφρονήσειεν; πῶς δὲ κεχαρισμένα θύειν ἡγούμενος τοῖς θεοῖς ταῦτα, οὐκ ἐξεῖναι ἀδικεῖν οἴησεται αὐτῷ μέλλοντι διὰ τῶν θυσιῶν ἐξωνεῖσθαι τὴν ἀμαρτίαν; πεισθεις δὲ ὅτι τούτων χρεῖαν οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ θεοί, εἰς δὲ τὸ ἥθος ἀποβλέπουσι τῶν προσιόντων, μεγίστην θυσίαν λαμβάνοντες τὴν ὀρθὴν περὶ αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διάληψιν, πῶς οὐ σώφρων καὶ ὁσιος καὶ δίκαιος ἔσται;

b. Ib., 61:

Θεοῖς δὲ ἀρίστη μὲν ἀπαρχὴ νοῦς καθαρὸς καὶ ψυχὴ ἀπαθής, οἰκεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μετρίων μὲν ἀπάρχεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων, μὴ παρέργως δέ, ἀλλὰ σὺν πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ.

The best offering

1444—Against the Stoics, who exclude animals from their civitas of rational beings and hold that, hence, man has no moral obligations to them, Porph. defends that animals do have a share in reason, both προφορικῶς and ἐνδιαθετός. Therefore, man should treat animals as kindred beings.

Abstinence from flesh a duty to the philosopher

Porph. does not intend to impose abstinence from flesh on everybody, but he does hold that the philosopher, who is an ἄνθρωπος λελογωμένος, must follow a stricter rule than the mass.

Porph., *De abst.* IV 18 (the end).

Not everything that is allowed to simple or uncivilized people will suit more distinguished persons.

Τοιοῦτον οὖν τι καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς διαίτης φαίνεται· καὶ οὐχ ἥτις τοῖς πολλοῖς συγκεχώρηται, ταύτην ἂν τις καὶ τοῖς βελτίστοις συγχωρήσειεν. φιλοσοφῶν δὲ ἄνθρωπος μάλιστα· ἂν τοὺς ἱεροὺς ἑαυτῷ ὑπογράψει νόμους, οὓς θεοὶ τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι ἀφώρισαν θεοῖς ἐπόμενοι. οἱ δ' ἱεροὶ πεφήνασι νόμοι κατὰ ἔθνη καὶ κατὰ πόλεις ἀγνείαν μὲν προστάττοντες, ἐμψύχων δὲ βρῶσιν ἀπαγορεύοντες τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν, ἥδη <δὲ> καὶ εἰς πλῆθος πίνειν κωλύοντες, ἣ δι' εὐσέβειαν ἣ διὰ τινος βλάβας ἐκ τῆς τροφῆς· ὥστε ἣ τοὺς ἱερέας μιμητέον ἣ πᾶσι πειστέον τοῖς νομοθέταις. ἐκατέρως γὰρ πάντων ἀφεκτέον τὸν νόμιμόν τε τελειῶς καὶ εὐσεβῆ· εἰ γὰρ κατὰ μέρος τινὲς δι' εὐσέβειάν τινων ἀπέχονται, ὁ πρὸς πάντα εὐσεβῆς πάντων ἀφέζεται.

1445—a. Porph. wrote commentaries on several works of Aristotle. Extant are: his short introduction to the *Categories*, Εἰσαγωγή εἰς τὰς Ἀριστοτέλους Κατηγορίας, also called Περὶ τῶν πέντε φωνῶν, and two Commentaries on the *Categories* (*Comment. in Arist.* IV 1).

Other works of Porph.
a. The Εἰσαγωγή and Comm. on the Categ.

After Plotinus' sharp criticism of Aristotle's theory of the categories in *Enn.* VI 1, Porph. restored this theory. His Εἰσαγωγή is a work of far-reaching influence: in the Latin translation of Boëthius it was used in the Medieval schools and commented on by Medieval logicians. See e.g. Abaelard's *Dialectica* ed. by L. M. de Rijk, Assen 1956.

b. The Πυθαγόρου βίος was probably a part of a history of philosophy down to Plato.

b. Life of Pythagoras

c. The letter to the Egyptian priest Anebo (Πρὸς Ἀνεβώ) reconstructed from fragments in Euseb., Cyrillus and Augustinus by Thomas

c. Letter to Anebo

Gale in his edition of ps.-Iambl., *De mysteriis* (1678). It was re-edited by Parthey, Berlin 1857. The letter contains a sharp criticism of Egyptian polytheism.

d. De antro nympharum

d. The *De antro nympharum*, a sample of the allegorical interpretation of a passage in the *Odyssea*.

In Homer's description of the grotto of the Nymphs on Ithaca (*Od.* XIII 102-112) Porph. finds a "hidden meaning", namely, an ancient "theological wisdom", identical with "true philosophy".

e. Against the Christians

e. Of his 15 books *Κατὰ Χριστιανῶν* only fragments are extant.

f. Technical treatises

f. Three works on technical subjects are nowadays attributed to Porph., namely: (1) a commentary on Ptolemaeus' *Harmonica*; (2) an introduction to Ptolemaeus' *Tetrabiblos*; (3) a treatise on embryology, *Πρὸς Γαῦρον περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἐμψυχοῦται τὰ ἔμβρυα* (formerly attributed to Galenus).

g. A collection of oracles

g. Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* IV 7 preserved a collection of oracles gathered by Porph., which bears witness to the interest he took in these "signs of the gods to men".

2—IAMBLICHUS AND HIS SCHOOL

Life and personality

1446—a. Eunapius, *Vitae phil.* p. 457/8:

Μετὰ τοῦτους ὀνομαστότατος ἐπιγίνεται φιλόσοφος Ἰάμβλιχος, ὃς ἦν καὶ κατὰ γένος μὲν ἐπιφανὴς καὶ τῶν ἀβρῶν καὶ τῶν εὐδαιμόνων· πατὴρ δὲ ἦν αὐτῷ Χαλκίς· κατὰ τὴν κοίλῃν Συρίαν προσαγορευομένην ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις. οὗτος Ἀνατολίῳ τῷ μετὰ Πορφύριον τὰ δεύτερα φερομένῳ συγγενόμενος, πολὺ γε ἐπέδωκε καὶ εἰς ἄκρον φιλοσοφίας ἤλασεν· εἶτα μετ' Ἀνατόλιον Πορφυρίῳ προσθεὶς ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι καὶ Πορφυρίου διήνεγκεν, πλὴν ὅσον κατὰ τὴν συνθήκην καὶ δύναμιν τοῦ λόγου. οὔτε γὰρ εἰς Ἀφροδίτην αὐτοῦ καὶ χάριν τὰ λεγόμενα βέβαπται, οὔτε ἔχει λευκότητά τινα καὶ τῷ καθαρῷ καλλωπίζεται· οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀσαφῆ παντελῶς τυγχάνει, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν ἡμαρτημένα, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἔλεγε περὶ Ξενοκράτους ὁ Πλάτων, ταῖς Ἑρμαῖκαῖς οὐ τέθυται Χάρισιν. οὐκουν κατέχει τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ γοητεύει πρὸς τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν, ἀλλ' ἀποστρέφειν καὶ ἀποκναίνειν τὴν ἀκοὴν ἔοικεν. δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἀσκήσας, εὐηχοῖας ἔτυχε θεῶν τοσαύτης, ὥστε πλῆθος μὲν ἦσαν οἱ ὀμιλοῦντες, πανταχόθεν δὲ ἐφοίτων οἱ παιδείας ἐπιθυμοῦντες.—

The names of Sopater, Aedesius, Eustathius and others are mentioned.

Καὶ γὰρ ἦν πρὸς ἅπαντας ἄφθονος. ὀλίγα μὲν οὖν χωρὶς τῶν ἐταίρων καὶ

ὁμιλητῶν ἔπραττεν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, τὸ θεῖον σεβαζόμενος· τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα τοῖς ἐταίροις συνῆν, τὴν μὲν δίαίταν ὦν εὐκόλος καὶ ἀρχαῖος, τῇ δὲ παρὰ πτότον ὁμιλίᾳ τοὺς παρόντας καθηδύνων καὶ διαπιμπλάς ὥσπερ νέκταρος.

b. Ib., 458:

**His fame
among his
disciples**

Οἱ δέ, ἀλήκτως ἔχοντες καὶ ἀκορέστως τῆς ἀπολαύσεως, ἠνώχλουν αὐτῷ συνεχῶς, καὶ προστησάμενοί γε τοὺς ἀξίους λόγου, πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔφασκον· “τί δῆτα μόνος, ὃ διδάσκαλε θεϊότατε, καθ' ἑαυτὸν τινα πράττεις, οὐ μεταδιδούς τῆς τελειωτέρας σοφίας ἡμῖν; καίτοι γε ἐκφέρεται πρὸς ἡμᾶς λόγος ὑπὸ τῶν σῶν ἀνδραπόδων, ὡς εὐχόμενος τοῖς θεοῖς μετεωρίζῃ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς πλέον ἢ δέκα πήχεις εἰκάζεσθαι· τὸ σῶμα δέ σοι καὶ ἡ ἐσθῆς εἰς χρυσοειδές τι κάλλος ἀμείβεται, παυομένῳ δὲ τῆς εὐχῆς σῶμά τε γίνεται τῷ πρὶν εὐχεσθαι ὅμοιον, καὶ κατελθὼν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ποιῇ συνουσίαν.” οὐ τι μάλα γελασειῶν, ἐγέλασεν ἐπὶ τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις Ἰάμβλιχος. ἀλλ' εἰπὼν πρὸς αὐτοῦς, ὡς “ὁ μὲν ἀπατήσας ὑμᾶς οὐκ ἦν ἄχαρις, ταῦτα δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· τοῦ λοιποῦ δὲ οὐδὲν χωρὶς ὑμῶν πεπράξεται.” —

In the following pages Eunapius tells two miracle-stories about Iamblichus, θεουργία which he heard from Chrysanthius, the pupil of Aedesius.

c. That Iambl. ranked *θεουργία* above *θεωρία*, is at least highly probable. So is done in any case in the book *De mysteriis* II 11. For the authenticity of this work see below (ad 1449c).

Cf. also Olympiodorus, *In Phaed.*, p. 123, 3-6 Norvin:

“Ὅτι οἱ μὲν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν προτιμῶσιν, ὡς Πορφύριος καὶ Πλωτῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ φιλόσοφοι· οἱ δὲ τὴν ἱερατικὴν, ὡς Ἰάμβλιχος καὶ Συριανὸς καὶ Πρόκλος καὶ οἱ ἱερατικοὶ πάντες.

d. The emperor Julianus praises him as a great philosopher, not inferior to Plato.

**Julianus'
testimony**

Julianus, *Or.* IV 146a:

—καὶ Πλάτωνα τὸν μέγαν καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον ἄνδρα τοῖς χρόνοις, οὔτι μὴν τῇ φύσει καταδεέστερον· τὸν Χαλκιδέα φημί, τὸν Ἰάμβλιχον· ὃς ἡμᾶς τὰ τε ἄλλα περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν καὶ δὴ καὶ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν λόγων ἐμύησεν. —

Cp. also *Or.* VII 217b:

— οὐκ ἐτι μαρτύρων παλαιῶν ἐν πᾶσι προσδεόμενοι, ἐπόμενοι δὲ νέοις ἔχουσιν ἀνδρός, ὃν ἐγὼ μετὰ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐξ Ἰσῆς Ἀριστοτέλει καὶ Πλάτῳ ἀγαμὰ τε τέθηπά τε.

1447—Iambl. calls himself a Pythagorean. He wrote a *Life of Pythagoras*, and also his *Protrepticus* is full of Pythagoreanism.

**He is a
Pythagorean**

The
θεία
δόγματα
of
Pythagoras

a. He speaks of Pythagoras' doctrine as of θεῖα δόγματα, considering mathematics as a preparation for knowledge of the gods.

Iambl., *Protr.* 21, p. 110 Pistelli:

Γινώσιν οὖν θεῶν διαφερόντως τοῦτο εἰσηγεῖται, ὡς πάντα δυναμένων αὐτῶν. διὰ τοῦτο δὴ οὖν περὶ θεῶν μηδὲν ἀπιστεῖν παραγγέλλει. πρόσκειται δὲ μηδὲ περὶ θείων δογμάτων, τῶν τῇ Πυθαγορικῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ δοκούντων· ταῦτα γὰρ ὑπὸ μαθημάτων καὶ ἐπιστήμονος θεωρίας ἡσφαλισμένα ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀδιάψευστα μόνα ὑπάρχει, ἀποδείξει παντοίᾳ καὶ συναναγκασμῷ ὠχυρωμένα. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ταῦτα δύναται καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστήμην τὴν περὶ θεῶν προτρέπειν· παραγγέλλει γὰρ ἐπιστήμην τοιαύτην κτήσασθαι, δι' ἧς οὐδενὶ ἀπιστήσομεν τῶν λεγομένων περὶ θεῶν καὶ περὶ θείων δογμάτων.

b. The study of mathematics prepares the mind for the "great mysteries" of philosophy.

Iambl., *Protr.* 2, p. 10 Pistelli:

Κοσμητέον ἱερὸν μὲν ἀναθήμασι, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν μαθήμασιν, ὡς πρὸ τῶν μεγάλων μυστηρίων τὸ μικρὰ παραδοτέον, καὶ πρὸ φιλοσοφίας παιδείαν.

Divine grace
is needed to
grasp it

c. The doctrine of Pythagoras is a gift of the Gods, and divine grace is needed to take hold of it.

Iambl., *Vita Pythag.* I:

Ἐπὶ πάσης μὲν φιλοσοφίας ὁρμῇ θεὸν δῆπου παρακαλεῖν ἔθος ἄπασι τοῖς γε σώφροσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ τοῦ θείου Πυθαγόρου δικαίως ἐπωνύμῳ νομιζομένη πολὺ δῆπου μᾶλλον ἀρμόττει τοῦτο ποιεῖν· ἐκ θεῶν γὰρ αὐτῆς παραδοθείσης τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἄλλως ἢ διὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι.

Math. works
of Iambl.

It should be noticed here that three mathematical works on the name of Iambl. are extant, namely:

Περὶ τῆς κοινῆς μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης (*De communi mathematica scientia*), Περὶ τῆς Νικομάχου ἀριθμητικῆς εἰσαγωγῆς (*In Nicomachi arithmetica introductionem*) and Τὰ θεολογούμενα τῆς ἀριθμητικῆς (*Theologoumena arithmeticae*). The authenticity of the last work has been questioned.

1448—He explains the old Pythagorean precepts allegorically as an exhortation to the contemplation of the universe with the help of mathematics.

The mathe-
matical
method to
be used in
philosophy

a. Iambl., *Protr.* 21, p. 116:

Τὸ δὲ ἀλεκτρυόνα τρέφε μέν, μὴ θῦε δέ· μῆνη γὰρ καὶ ἡλίῳ καθιέρωται ¹ συμβουλευεῖ ἡμῖν ὑποτρέφειν καὶ σωματοποιεῖν καὶ μὴ παρορᾶν

¹ On the Pythagorean ἀκούσματα καὶ σύμβολα see *Gr. Ph.* I, nr. 29.

ἀπολλύμενα καὶ διαφθειρόμενα τὰ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ἐνώσεως καὶ ἀλληλουχίας συμπαθείας τε καὶ συμπνοίας μεγάλα τεκμήρια. ὥστε προτρέπει τῆς τοῦ παντὸς θεωρίας καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀπόκρυφος φύσει ἡ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἀλήθεια, καὶ δυσθήρατος ἱκανῶς· ζητητέα δὲ ὅμως ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἐξιχνευτέα μάλιστα διὰ φιλοσοφίας. διὰ γὰρ ἄλλου τινὸς ἐπιτηδεύματος οὕτως ἀδύνατον· αὕτη δὲ μικρά τινα ἐναύσματα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως λαμβάνουσα καὶ ὥσανεὶ ἐφοδιαζομένη ζωπυρεῖ τε αὐτὰ καὶ μεγεθύνει καὶ ἐνεργέστερα διὰ τῶν παρ' αὐτῆς μαθημάτων ἀπεργάζεται. φιλοσοφητέον <ἄρα> ἂν εἴη.

b. Ib., p. 118-119:

Τὸ δὲ ἐν ὁδῷ μὴ σχίζει δηλοῖ ὅτι ἐν μὲν τὸ ἀληθές, πολυσχιδὲς δὲ τὸ ψεῦδος· — Λέγει οὖν ὅτι αἰροῦ φιλοσοφίαν ἐκείνην καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ σοφίαν ὁδόν, ἐν ᾗ οὐ σχίσαις οὐδὲ ἀντιλεγόμενα δογματίσεις, ἀλλὰ ἐστῶτα καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτοῖς ἀποδείξει ἐπιστημονικῇ βεβαιωθέντα διὰ μαθημάτων καὶ θεωρίας, ὅ ἐστι Πυθαγορικῶς φιλοσοφεῖ. — Συμβουλεύει τοίνυν ἡμῖν τὸ παράγγελμα, ἐπειδὴν φιλοσοφῶμεν καὶ τὴν δηλουμένην ὁδὸν ἀνύωμεν, φεύγειν μὲν τὴν τῶν σωματικῶν πολυσχιδῶν ἐπιβολὴν καὶ ἀποδοχὴν, προσοικειοῦσθαι δὲ τῇ τῶν ἀσωμάτων οὐσίᾳ τῇ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτε οὐχὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμοίων διατελούντων διὰ τὴν ἐνυπάρχουσαν αὐτοῖς φύσει ἀλήθειαν καὶ ἀδιαπτωσίαν.

c. Philosophy promotes human sympathy and mutual love.

**Phil.
promotes
human
sympathy**

Ib., p. 123:

Τὸ δὲ καρδίαν μὴ τρῶγε σημαίνει τὸ μὴ δεῖν τὴν ἑνωσιν τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τὴν σύμπνοιαν διασπᾶν, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ ἴσθι βάσκανος, ἀλλὰ φιλάνθρωπος καὶ κοινωνικός. ἐκ δὲ τούτου φιλοσοφεῖν παραινεῖ· μόνη γὰρ αὕτη ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τεχνῶν οὔτε ἐπιλυπεῖται ἀγαθοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις οὔτε ἐπιχαίρει κακοῖς τοῖς πέλας ἅτε φύσει συγγενεῖς καὶ οἰκείους ὁμοιοπαθεῖς τε καὶ κοινῇ ὑποκειμένους τύχῃ ἀπροόρατόν τε τὸ μέλλον ἔχοντας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πάντας ὁμαλῶς ἀποφαινούσα· διόπερ συμπαθεῖς τε καὶ φιλαλλήλους παραγγέλλει εἶναι, κοινωνικόν τε ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ λογικὸν ζῶον.

1449—Iamblichus first elaborated the theory of emanation by assuming intermediate stages between the three fundamental hypostases of Plotinus, as will be done afterwards by the Athenian School in a more systematical form.

a. He assumes another One between the Absolute One of Plotinus (which he calls ἄρρητον) and Noûs.

**The
ἐν
placed after
the
ἄρρητος
ἀρχή**

Damascius, *Dubitationes et solutiones* c. 43, I p. 86 Ruelle:

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνο προβαλλώμεθα εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν, πότερον δύο εἰσὶν αἱ

πρῶται ἀρχαὶ πρὸ τῆς νοητῆς πρώτης τριάδος, ἥ τε πάντα ἄρρητος καὶ ἡ ἀσύντακτος πρὸς τὴν τριάδα, καθάπερ ἠξίωσεν ὁ μέγας Ἰάμβλιχος — ἡ ὡς οἱ πλείστοι τῶν μετ' αὐτὸν ἐδοκίμασαν, μετὰ τὴν ἄρρητον αἰτίαν καὶ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην τριάδα τῶν νοητῶν.

The First
Principle
doubled

Apparently Iamblichus, who called the First Principle ἡ πάντα ἄρρητος ἀρχή or τὸ πάντα ἄρρητον, wished to insert an intermediate stage between this absolute ἀρχή of which nothing could be predicated, not even that it is one, and the intelligible World which, according to Proclus' doctrine, is called by Damascius "the intelligible Triad". Thus, the First Principle of Plotinus was doubled by Iamblichus.

Damascius, taking the doctrine in this sense, concludes his c. 43 by stating:

Εἰ τοίνυν πρὸ μὲν τοῦ τριαδικοῦ τὸ μονοειδές, πρὸ δὲ τούτου τὸ πάντα ἄρρητον, ὡς ἐλέγομεν, δῆλον τὸ συμβαῖνον.

b. In c. 45 Damasc. mentions another explanation, namely, that the two First Principles beyond the intelligible World correspond with the πέρας and the ἀπειρον of early Pythagoreanism, of which the first is the unifying principle, while the latter is at the root of πλῆθος. After a slight hesitation he rejects this more or less dualistic interpretation with regard to Iamblichus.

Damascius, *Dub. et sol.* c. 45, I p. 88-89 R.:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὧδε κατασκευάσειεν ἂν τις ἀπὸ τῶν κάτωθεν, οἷον ἀπὸ τεκμηρίου· δύο γὰρ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὁρῶντες ἀντιδιηρημέναις συστοιχίας ἀλλήλαις, τὴν μὲν κρείττω φασί, τὴν δὲ χεῖρω, τὴν μὲν ἐνοειδῆ, τὴν δὲ πληθοειδῆ, ἀπὸ τούτων ἀναπεμπόμεθα καὶ εἰς δύο ἀρχάς, εἷς τε ἐν καὶ πλῆθος, τὰ ἀντιδιωρισμένα φημί, εἴτε ἄλλας ἢς βούλεται τις ὑποτίθεσθαι· ἑκατέρας δ' οὖν εἶναι ἀρχὴν ιδιότροπον, ἅτε ιδιοτρόπου, ἀφ' ἧς ἑκατέρῃ τὸ κοινὸν ἐνεστίν, οἷον τῇ μὲν ἐνοειδεῖ τὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ιδίωμα, τῇ δὲ πληθοειδεῖ τὸ τοῦ πλῆθους ἔχνος. — Ἄρα οὖν οὕτω θετέον δύο τὰς ἐπέκεινα τῶν νοητῶν τριάδων ἀρχάς, καὶ ὅλως εἰπεῖν, τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων, ὡς ἠξίωσεν ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος, ὅσον ἐμέ γε εἰδέναι, μόνος ἀξιώσας τό γε τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν ἀπάντων; ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἀκολουθητέον τοῖς μετ' αὐτόν;

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθέστατον θεὸς ἂν εἰδείη περὶ τῶν τηλικούτων· εἰ δὲ χρὴ τά γε ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα εἰπεῖν, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ ταῦτα ἐχυρὰ εἶναι πρὸς τὴν προκειμένην ἀπόδειξιν.

Cp. Proclus, *Elem. th.* 92, below, nr. 1462 f.

The same
doctrine in
De myst.

c. The same doctrine transposed into religious terms is found in the *Liber de mysteriis*, a work which is usually regarded as coming

from the School of Iamblichus but, after all, might be authentic¹.

[Iambl.], *De myst.* 8, 2:

Πρὸ τῶν ὄντως ὄντων καὶ τῶν ὄλων ἀρχῶν ἔστι θεὸς εἷς, πρότερος καὶ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ καὶ βασιλέως, ἀκίνητος ἐν μονότητι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἐνότητος μένων. οὔτε γὰρ νοητὸν αὐτῷ ἐπιπλέκεται οὔτε ἄλλο τι· παράδειγμα δὲ ἰδρυται τοῦ αὐτοπάτορος αὐτογόνου καὶ μονοπάτορος θεοῦ τοῦ ὄντως ἀγαθοῦ. μεῖζον γάρ τι καὶ πρῶτον καὶ πηγὴ τῶν πάντων καὶ πυθμὴν τῶν νοουμένων πρώτων ἰδεῶν ὄντων· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς τούτου ὁ αὐτάρκης θεὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξέλαμψε, διὸ καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ καὶ αὐτάρκης. ἀρχὴ γὰρ οὗτος καὶ θεὸς θεῶν, μονὰς ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός, προούσιος καὶ ἀρχὴ τῆς οὐσίας. ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἡ οὐσιότης καὶ ἡ οὐσία, διὸ καὶ οὐσιοπάτωρ καλεῖται· αὐτὸς γὰρ τὸ προόντως ὄν ἐστίν, τῶν νοητῶν ἀρχή, διὸ καὶ νοητάρκης προσαγορεύεται· αὐταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ πρεσβύταται πάντων, ἃς Ἑρμῆς πρὸ τῶν αἰθερίων καὶ ἐμπυρίων θεῶν προτάττει καὶ τῶν ἐπουρανίων.

Here the First and absolute Principle is called θεὸς εἷς, while the second "First" Principle is introduced as αὐτοπάτωρ αὐτόγονος and called ὁ ὄντως ἀγαθός. To maintain the absoluteness of the First, this "self-sufficient God" is said to have "radiated" Himself (ἑαυτὸν ἐξέλαμψε). He is μονὰς ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός, is beyond Being and the Source of Being.

1450—While Plotinus regarded Noûs as one-and-many, Iambl. doubles it by distinguishing Noûs that is one from Noûs that is many. He hypostasizes the first as τὸ αἰεὶ ὄν or αὐτὸ τὸ ὅπερ ὄν, which is a παράδειγμα τοῦ παντός and as such superior to the γένη τοῦ ὄντος and nearest to the One.

a. Proclus, *In Tim.* I p. 230, l. 5-8 Diehl:

Ἄλλ' ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἐμβριθῶς διαμάχεται τῷ λόγῳ², τὸ αἰεὶ ὄν κρεῖττον καὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος³ καὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν ἀποφαινόμενος καὶ ἐπ' ἄκρῳ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας ἰδρύων αὐτὸ πρῶτως μετέχον τοῦ ἐνός.

The Noûs
which is one
above the
Noûs which
is many

b. Cp. Proclus, *ib.* I p. 321, l. 26-30 D.:

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος αὐτὸ τὸ ὅπερ ὄν, δὲ δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτὸν ἐστίν, ἀφωρίσατο τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦ παντός, τὸ μὲν ἐν ἐπέκεινα τιθέμενος τοῦ παραδείγματος, τὸ δὲ ὅπερ ὄν αὐτῷ σύνδρομον ἀποφαινών, ἐκότερον δὲ νοήσει περιληπτὸν ἀποκαλῶν.

¹ The authenticity was defended by Rasche (*De Iamblichi libri qui inscribitur de Mysteriorum auctore*, Münster 1911) and Geffcken (*Ausgang* p. 283 ff.) and is accepted by Dodds (*Proclus, The Elements of Theol.*, p. XIX n. 1).

² τῷ λόγῳ—the view that πᾶς ὁ νοητὸς κόσμος = τὸ αἰεὶ ὄν, as was held by Plotinus.

³ The five genera of the *Sophistes*, accepted by Plot. as given together with the ὄν itself.

The
νοηται
τριάδες

1451—Meanwhile, Iambl. describes the first Noûs as a Triad: πατήρ - δύναμις - νοῦς, or also ὑπαρξίς - δύναμις τῆς ὑπάρξεως - νόησις τῆς δυνάμεως (or ἐνέργεια).

a. Damascius, *Dub. et sol.* c. 54, I p. 108 R.:

The two First Principles, as admitted by Iambl., are so related the one to the other, as the Gods themselves, speaking with men, declare the relation between the three ἀρχαί that are contained in the Third Principle (i.e. the first Noûs, which is one) to be. This means: there is no ἑτερότης between these sub-principles, since the five genera of being are not yet given in the first Noûs.

Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι οὔτε ὁμοταγεῖς εἰσιν . . . οὔτε διωρισμέναι εἰσὶν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, . . . οὔτε ἑτερότης διαλαμβάνει αὐτάς, εἴπερ οὐδὲ ταυτότης ἐν ἐκείνοις· ἀλλ' ὡς οἱ θεοὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ μέντοι ἀνθρώποις διαλεγόμενοι οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἀπεφάνησαν τὰς τρεῖς ἀρχὰς ὡς ἂν ἔχοι νοῦς καὶ δύναμις καὶ πατήρ, ἢ ὑπαρξίς καὶ δύναμις τῆς ὑπάρξεως καὶ νόησις τῆς δυνάμεως.

Three other
νοηται
τριάδες
and a
ἐβδομάς

b. Apparently Iambl. admitted three intelligible Triads, viewing each particular member of his first Triad as a new one. After these three νοηται τριάδες and—as it seems—after three others of νοεροὶ θεοί, he speaks in the following passage of a νοερὰ ἐβδομάς, the third member of which is identified with the Demiurge.

Proclus, *In Tim.* I, p. 308 f. Diehl:

Περὶ γὰρ τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ τοῦ Διὸς δημηγορίας ¹ γράφων μετὰ τὰς νοητάς 20 τριάδας καὶ τὰς τῶν νοερῶν θεῶν τρεῖς τριάδας ἐν τῇ νοερᾷ ἐβδομάδι τὴν τρίτην ἐν τοῖς πατράσιν ἀπονέμει τῷ δημιουργῷ τάξιν· τρεῖς γὰρ εἶναι θεοὺς τούτους καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ὑμνημένους, οἱ τοῦ μὲν ἐνὸς νοῦ, φησὶν, καὶ τὰς μονάδας ὅλας ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιέχοντος τὸ ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ 25 ἀγαθοειδὲς καὶ μένον ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ συνηνωμένον τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα γνωρίσματα τῆς ὑπεροχῆς παραδεδώκασι, τοῦ δὲ μέσου καὶ τὴν συμπλήρωσιν συνάγοντος τῶν τριῶν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἀποπληρωτικὸν καὶ τὸ τῆς θείας 30 ζωῆς γεννητικὸν καὶ τὸ προϊὼν πάντη καὶ τὸ ἀγαθουργὸν κάλλιστα δείγματα p. 309 λέγουσι, τοῦ δὲ τρίτου καὶ δημιουργοῦντος τὰ ὅλα τὰς μονίμους προόδους καὶ τὰς τῶν αἰτίων ὅλων ποιήσεις καὶ συνοχὰς τὰς τε ἀφωρισμένας ὅλας τοῖς εἶδεσιν αἰτίας καὶ τὰς προϊούσας πάσας δημιουργίας καὶ τὰ ὅμοια τούτοις τεκμήρια 5 κάλλιστα ἀναδιδάσκουσι. τὴν μὲν οὖν Ἰαμβλίχειον θεολογίαν ἀπὸ τούτων ἄξιον κρίνειν, ὅποια τίς ἐστὶ περὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ τῶν ὅλων· καὶ πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἦν ὅλον τὸ αἰεὶ ὄν ὁ δημιουργός, εἴπερ τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ ὄν ἤδη κατεδήσατο διὰ τῆς 10 ὀρικῆς ἀποδόσεως, τὸν δὲ δημιουργὸν εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον εἶναί φησι ² καὶ εὐρόντα εἰς ἅπαντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν; πῶς γὰρ ταῦτα ἀληθεύσει περὶ τοῦ ὀρικῶς ἀποδοθέντος καὶ εἰς φῶς ἐξενεχθέντος πᾶσι τοῖς παροῦσι;

¹ Plato, *Tim.* 41a-d (supra, nr. 353).

² Plato, ib. 28c (supra, nr. 349a).

Apparently we have in this passage a contamination of two different conceptions: **Chaldaean influence** (1) the hierarchical order of (a) three νοηταί τριάδες, (b) three other triads of νοεροί θεοί (doubtless, in the Noûs which is many), (c) the νοερά ἑβδομάς, the third member of which is said to be "the creator". (11) Three main principles, called "Gods", the first of which is Noûs which is one, the second the "Generator of divine Life", the third the Creator of the Universe. How these two different views should be combined, does not become clear in this passage. Cp. Zeller III 2, p. 748 ff.

c. The introduction of the seven is due to Chaldaean influence, as appears from the following text.

Damascius, *Dub. et sol.* c. 94, I p. 237 l. 11 R.:

Ὁ ἐπταχῇ προῦν ὅλος δημιουργὸς παρὰ τοῖς Χαλδαίοις.

Cp. Julianus, *Or.* V 172D, who speaks of "the God of the seven rays" of the Chaldaeans. Doubtless here the seven planets are intended.

All this belongs to a polytheistic system, elaborated in conscious opposition to the rising Christian faith and doctrine.

The above-cited line of Damascius suggests that the Demiurge himself was **The Demiur-** conceived as a septifold being, unfolding the third member of the νοερός τριάς. **ge conceived** Here the analogy with the Third Person of the Trinity of Christian doctrine, the **as sevenfold** Holy Spirit with its sevenfold gifts, presents itself to the mind.

1452—In the realm of Soul, too, Iamblichus applies the triadic system, deducing two other souls from the first which is one. **The triadic system applied to soul**

a. Proclus, *In Tim.* II p. 240, l. 4-6 D.:

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεὸς Ἰάμβλιχος ἄνω που μετεωροπολεῖ καὶ τὰ φανῇ μεριμνᾷ, τῇ τε μίαν ψυχὴν καὶ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς προελθούσας δύο.

b. Soul, evidently, does not depend directly on the first and absolute Noûs, but on the Noûs which is many. Iambl. also opposes those who hold that this noûs is a ἕξις of the soul.

Proclus, *ib.* II, p. 313, l. 15 ff. D.:

Ἰάμβλιχος δὲ τὸν νοῦν τοῦτον πρεσβύτερον ἀκούει τῆς ψυχῆς, ἄνωθεν αὐτὴν συνέχοντα καὶ τελειοῦντα, καὶ διαγωνίζεται πρὸς τοὺς ἢ αὐτόθι τῷ παντελεῖ νῷ συνάπτοντας τὴν ψυχὴν . . . ἢ τὸν νοῦν ἕξιν ὑποτιθεμένους τῆς ψυχῆς.

1453—Iambl., who maintains that noûs is of a level superior to soul, does not admit that soul contains a part which is ἀπαθής. If she sins, she does so by προαίρεσις; and how then hold that she is ἀναμάρτητος?

Soul is neither ἀπαθής nor ἀναμάρτητος

a. Proclus, *ib.* III, p. 333 f. Diehl:

Proclus is commenting here on *Tim.* 43a-44b, where Plato described the disorder thrown into the soul when it is united to a body. By the strong and perpetual commotion of the body the περίοδοι of the soul which is joined to it are violently

shaken: that of the ταῦτόν (see above, nr. 350) is completely hampered, while that of the θάτερον is greatly disturbed. Proclus comments on this as follows.

Ἡ μὲν ταύτοῦ περίοδος ἄρα πεπεδῆται μόνον καὶ ἔοικε τοῖς δεσμώταις μὲν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κωλυμένοις ἐνεργεῖν, μένουσι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεδεμένοις ἀδιαστρόφοις. ἡ δὲ θατέρου διασέσσειται ψευδῶν ἀναπλησθεῖσα δογμάτων.²⁵ ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν ἀλογίαν γειννιάσις ποιεῖ καὶ αὐτὴν εἰσδέχεσθαι τι πάθος ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκτός. ἀπὸ δὴ τούτων ὁρμώμενοι παρρησιασόμεθα πρὸς Πλωτῖνον καὶ τὸν μέγαν Θεόδωρον¹ ἀπαθές τι φυλάττοντας ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ἀεὶ νοοῦν. δύο γὰρ 30 κύκλους μόνον εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς παραλαβὼν ὁ Πλάτων τὸν μὲν ἐπέδησε, τὸν δὲ διέσεισεν, οὐδὲ τὸν πεπεδημένον οὔτε τὸν διασεσεισμένον ἐνεργεῖν νοερῶς^{P. 334} δυνατόν. ὁρθῶς ἄρα καὶ ὁ θεὸς Ἰάμβλικος διαγωνίζεται πρὸς τοὺς ταῦτα οἰομένους. τί γὰρ τὸ ἀμαρτάνον ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅταν τῆς ἀλογίας κινήσας πρὸς ἀκόλαστον φαντασίαν ἐπιδράμωμεν; ἄρ' οὐχ ἡ προαίρεσις; καὶ πῶς οὐχ αὕτη;⁵ κατὰ γὰρ ταύτην διαφέρομεν τῶν φαντασθέντων προπετῶς. εἰ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀμαρτάνει, πῶς ἀναμάρτητος ἡ ψυχὴ;

b. Cp. Stob., *Ecl.* I p. 365 Wachsmuth, where Iambl., Π. ψυχῆς, is cited as follows:

Ἰθι δὴ οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν καθ' αὐτὴν ἀσώματον οὐσίαν ἐπανίωμεν, διακρίνοντας⁵ καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῆς ἐν τάξει τὰς περὶ ψυχῆς πάσας δόξας. Εἰσὶ δὴ τινες, οἱ πᾶσαν τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ὁμοιομερῆ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν ἀποφαίνονται, ὡς καὶ ἐν ὄψοις αὐτῆς μέρει εἶναι τὰ ὅλα· οἷτινες καὶ ἐν τῇ μεριστῇ ψυχῇ τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον καὶ θεοὺς καὶ δαίμονας καὶ τάγαθόν καὶ πάντα τὰ πρεσβύτερα γένη¹⁰ αὐτῆς ἐνιδρῶνσι καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ὡσαύτως πάντα εἶναι ἀποφαίνονται, οἰκειῶς μέντοι κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἐν ἐκάστοις. Καὶ ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἀναμφισβητήτως μὲν ἐστὶ Νουμήνιος, οὐ πάντῃ δὲ ὁμολογουμένως Πλωτῖνος, ἀστάτως¹⁵ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ φέρεται Ἀμέλιος. Πορφύριος δὲ ἐνδοιάζει περὶ αὐτὴν, πῇ μὲν διατεταμένως αὐτῆς ἀφιστάμενος, πῇ δὲ συνακολουθῶν αὐτῇ, ὡς παραδοθείη ἄνωθεν. Κατὰ δὴ ταύτην νοῦ καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν κρειττόνων γενῶν οὐδὲν ἡ ψυχὴ²⁰ διενήνοχε κατὰ γε τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ γε πρὸς ταύτην ἀνθισταμένη δόξα χωρίζει μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡς ἀπὸ νοῦ γενομένην δευτέραν καθ' ἑτέραν ὑπόστασιν, τὸ δὲ μετὰ νοῦ αὐτῆς ἐξηγεῖται ὡς ἐξηρητημένον ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ, μετὰ τοῦ κατ' ἰδίαν ὑφεισθηκέναι²⁵ αὐτοτελῶς, χωρίζει δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν κρειττόνων γενῶν ὅλων, ἴδιον δὲ αὐτῇ τῆς οὐσίας ὅρον ἀπονέμει ἥτοι τὸ μέσον τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ ἀμερίστων <τῶν τε σωματικῶν καὶ ἀσωμάτων γενῶν, ἡ τὸ πλήρωμα τῶν καθόλου λόγων, p. 366 ἡ τὴν μετὰ τὰς ἰδέας ὑπηρεσίαν τῆς δημιουργίας, ἡ ζῶν παρ' ἑαυτῆς ἔχουσαν τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ προελθοῦσαν, ἡ τὴν αὖ τῶν γενῶν ὅλου τοῦ ὄντως

¹ Theodorus of Asine, a disciple of Iamblichus.

5 ὄντος πρόοδον εἰς ὑποδεεστέραν οὐσίαν. Περὶ δὴ ταύτας τὰς δόξας ὃ τε Πλάτων
αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ Πυθαγόρας, ὃ τε Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ ἀρχαῖοι πάντες, ὧν ὀνόματα
μεγάλα ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ ὑμνεῖται, τελέως ἐπιστρέφονται, εἴ τις αὐτῶν τὰς δόξας
10 ἀνιχνεύει μετ' ἐπιστάσεως.

Iambl., who calls himself a follower of Pythagoras, doubtless preferred the latter party.

1454—a. *Aedesius* was Iamblichus' successor in the School of Per- **The School**
gamum. **of Iambl.**

Eunapius, *Vitae* 461:

Ἐκδέχεται δὲ τὴν Ἰαμβλίχου διατριβὴν καὶ ὁμιλίαν ἐς τοὺς ἐταίρους Αἰδέσιος
ὁ ἐκ Καππαδοκίας.

b. Iamblichus' pupil *Sopater* came to great influence at the court
of Constantine.

Eunapius, *ib.* 462:

Sopater

Σώπατρος δὲ ὁ πάντων δεινότερος, διὰ τε φύσεως ὕψος καὶ ψυχῆς μέγεθος
οὐκ ἐνεγκὼν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ὁμιλεῖν, ἐπὶ τὰς βασιλικὰς αὐλὰς ἔδραμεν
ὀξύς, ὥς τὴν Κωνσταντίνου πρόφασιν τε καὶ φορὰν τυραννήσων καὶ μεταστή-
σων τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ ἐς τοσοῦτόν γε ἐξίκετο σοφίας καὶ δυνάμεως, ὥς ὁ μὲν
βασιλεὺς ἐαλῶκει τε ὑπ' αὐτῷ, καὶ δημοσίᾳ συνέδρον εἶχεν, εἰς τὸν δέξιον καθί-
ζων τόπον, ὃ καὶ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄπιστον.

But malicious people, "bursting with envy against a court so lately converted
to the study of philosophy" (ῥηγνύμενοι τῷ φθόνῳ πρὸς βασιλείαν ἄρτι φιλοσοφεῖν
μεταμανθάνουσαν) plotted against him and he was put to death.

c. *Maximus* and *Chrysanthius*, who both were pupils of Aedesius **Maximus,**
and famous for their "theurgy", were the masters and friends of the **Chrysan-**
emperor Julianus, who still heard Aedesius in his old age. **thius,**
Priscus

Eunapius, *Vitae* 474:

Τῆς δὲ ὁμιλίας αὐτοῦ (sc. Αἰδεσίου) προεστήκεισαν καὶ ἀνὰ τοὺς πρώτους
ἐφέροντο Μάξιμός τε, ὑπὲρ οὗ τάδε γράφεται, καὶ Χρυσάνθιος ὁ ἐκ Σάρδεων,
Πρίσκος τε ὁ Θεσπρωτὸς ἢ Μολοσσὸς Εὐσέβιος τε ὁ ἐκ Καρίας Μύνδου πόλεως.
καὶ συνουσίας ἀξιώθει τῆς Αἰδεσίου, ὃ καὶ ἐν μεираκίῳ πρεσβύτης Ἰουλιανός,
τὴν μὲν ἀκμὴν καὶ τὸ θεοειδὲς τῆς ψυχῆς καταπλαγαίς, οὐκ ἐβούλετο χωρί-
ζεσθαι, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ οἱ κατὰ τὸν μῦθον ὑπὸ τῆς διψάδος δηχθέντες, χανδὸν καὶ
ἀμυστὶ τῶν μαθημάτων ἔλκειν ἐβούλετο, καὶ δῶρά γε ἐπὶ τούτοις βασιλικά
διέπεμπεν· ὁ δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα προσίετο καὶ μετακαλέσας τὸν νεανίσκον, εἶπεν·
"ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν ἐμὴν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖς, τηλικαύταις ἀκοαῖς ἀκροώ-

μενος, τὸ δὲ ὄργανον αὐτῆς συνοῤῃς ὅπως διάκειται, τῆς γομφώσεως καὶ πῆξεως διαλυομένης εἰς τὸ συντιθέν· σὺ δέ, εἴ τι καὶ δρᾶν βούλει, τέκνον σοφίας ἐπήρατον (τοιαῦτα γάρ σου τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰνδάλματα καταμανθάνω), πρὸς τοὺς ἐμούς παῖδας πορευθεὶς ὄντας γνησίους, ἐκεῖθεν ῥύδην ἐμποροῦ σοφίας ἀπάσης καὶ μαθημάτων· κἂν τύχης τῶν μυστηρίων, αἰσχυνθήσῃ πάντως ὅτι ἐγένου καὶ ἐκλήθῃς ἄνθρωπος.”

With these words Aedesius sends the young Julian to his above-mentioned fellow-pupils. At the time Maximus was at Ephesus and Julian went to see him there. The emperor mentions him repeatedly in his writings. Three of his letters (8, 12 and 59) are addressed to him. *Priscus* too became his friend and adviser. He accompanied the emperor to Persia. Julian's letters 1, 2 and 5 are addressed to him.

Theodorus of Asine **d.** *Theodorus of Asine* was an immediate disciple both of Porphyrius and of Iamblichus. Proclus cites his commentaries frequently (see e.g. above, 1453a).

Dexippus **e.** *Dexippus*, a disciple of Iamblichus, wrote a work on the *Categories* of Aristotle which survives (*Comment. in Arist.* IV 2).

Sallustius **f.** *Sallustius*, another friend of Julian, is the author of the little book *De diis et mundo* (ed. Orelli 1821, included in Mullach, *Fr. phil.* Gr. III).

3—PROCLUS

The School of Athens **1455**—At the beginning of the 5th century we find Neoplatonism taught at Athens by one Plutarchus, who is succeeded by Syrianus. Both of them were the masters of Proclus, a Lycian who came from Alexandria to Athens to study philosophy.

The School of Alexandria In those days the Neoplatonic school of Alexandria flourished under the guidance of *Hypatia*, who is frequently mentioned and praised in the letters of her disciple Synesius. Apparently Proclus came to Alexandria a few years later. He first studied rhetoric and later, converted to philosophy on a journey to Byzantium, became the pupil of *Olympiodorus* and of the mathematician Hero. Having left Alexandria for Athens, he came first into contact with Syrianus, who introduced him to the aged master Plutarchus.

Proclus, disciple of Plut. and Syrianus **a.** Marinus, *Proclus* cc. 10-12:

Τούτοις (sc. Olympiodorus and Hero) οὖν ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ συσχολάσας, καὶ καθόσον αὐτοὶ δυνάμεως εἶχον τῆς συνουσίας αὐτῶν ἀπονάμενος, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ συναναγνώσει τινὸς ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ οὐκέτι ἄξιως τῆς τοῦ φιλοσόφου διανοίας φέρεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ἐξηγήσεσιν, ὑπεριδὼν ἐκείνων τῶν διδασκαλειῶν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ μεμνημένος τῆς ἐν τῷ Βυζαντίῳ θείας ὀψεως καὶ παρακελεύσεως, ἐπὶ τὰς

Ἀθήνας ἀνήγετο σὺν πομπῇ τινὶ πάντων τῶν λογίων καὶ τῶν φιλοσοφίας ἐφόρων θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων ἀγαθῶν. — (II) Ὑπερφρονήσας δὲ κἀνταῦθα τῶν ῥητορικῶν διατριβῶν, καίτοι περιμάχητος τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς γενόμενος, ὥς δὴ καὶ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἦκων, ἐντυγχάνει πρῶτῳ τῶν φιλοσόφων Συριανῷ τῷ Φιλοξένου. — (I2) Παραλαβὼν δὲ αὐτὸν ὁ Συριανὸς προσάγει τῷ μεγάλῳ Πλουτάρχῳ τῷ Νεστορίου. Ὁ δὲ νέον μὲν ἰδὼν καὶ οὐδὲ ὅλον εἰκοστὸν ἔτος ἄγοντα, ἀκούσας δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν αἴρεσιν καὶ τὴν πολλὴν ἔφεσιν τοῦ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ βίου, σφόδρα ἤσθη ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ὥστε καὶ ἐτοίμως ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδοῦναι αὐτῷ τῶν φιλοσόφων διατριβῶν, καὶ ταῦτα κωλυόμενος ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας· μάλα γὰρ ἦν ἤδη πρεσβύτης. Ἀναγινώσκει οὖν παρὰ τούτῳ Ἀριστοτέλους μὲν τὰ Περὶ ψυχῆς, Πλάτωνος δὲ τὸν Φαίδωνα. Προὔτρεπε δὲ αὐτὸν ὁ μέγας καὶ ἀπογράφεσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα, τῇ φιλοτιμίᾳ τοῦ νέου ὀργάνῳ χρώμενος, καὶ φάσκων ὅτι συμπληρωθέντων αὐτῷ τῶν σχολίων ἔσται καὶ Πρόκλου ὑπομνήματα φερόμενα εἰς τὸν Φαίδωνα. Καὶ ἄλλως δὲ ἔχαιρε τῷ νεανίσκῳ πεῖραν αὐτοῦ λαβὼν τῆς πρὸς τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύτητος καὶ τέκνον αὐτὸν συνεχῶς ἀπεκάλει καὶ ὁμοέστιον ἐποιεῖτο. — Δύο δὲ μόνα σχεδὸν ἔτη ἐπεβίω αὐτῷ ἐπιδημήσαντι ὁ πρεσβύτης, καὶ τελευτῶν τῷ διαδόχῳ Συριανῷ τὸν νέον συνίστη, οἷα καὶ τὸν ἔγγονον Ἀρχιάδαν. ὁ δὲ παραλαβὼν αὐτὸν οὐ μόνον ἔτι περὶ τοὺς λόγους μειζόνως ὠφέλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ σύνοικον τοῦ λοιποῦ καὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου βίου κοινωνὸν εἶχεν, τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν εὐρὼν οἷον πάλαι ἐζῆτει ἀκροατὴν ἔχειν καὶ διάδοχον δεκτικὸν ὄντα τῶν ἐκείνῳ παμπόλλων μαθημάτων καὶ θείων δογμάτων.

b. With Syrianus P. studied the complete works of Aristotle, and after these Plato's writings. He wrote his commentary on the *Timaeus* when he was 28.

Marinus, *ib.* c. 13:

Ἐν ἔτεσι γοῦν οὔτε δύο ὅλοις πάσας αὐτῷ τὰς Ἀριστοτέλους συνανέγνων πραγματείας, λογικὰς ἠθικὰς πολιτικὰς φυσικὰς, καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ ταύτας θεολογικὴν ἐπιστήμην. Ἀχθέντα δὲ διὰ τούτων ἱκανῶς, ὥσπερ διὰ τινῶν προτελείων καὶ μικρῶν μυστηρίων, εἰς τὴν Πλάτωνος ἦγε μυσταγωγίαν, ἐν τάξει καὶ οὐχ ὑπερβάθμιον πόδα, κατὰ τὸ λόγιον, τείνοντα, καὶ τὰς παρ' ἐκείνῳ θείας ὄντως τελετὰς ἐποπτεύειν ἐποiei, τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνεπιθολώτοις ὄμμασι καὶ τῇ τοῦ νοῦ ἀχράντῳ περιωπῇ. Ὁ δὲ ἀγρύπνῳ τε τῇ ἀσκήσει καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ χρώμενος νύκτωρ τε καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν, καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα συνοπτικῶς καὶ μετ' ἐπικρίσεως ἀπογραφόμενος, τοσοῦτον ἐν οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἐπεδίδου, ὥστε ὀγδοὺν καὶ εἰκοστὸν ἔτος ἄγων, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ συνέγραψε, καὶ τὰ εἰς Τίμαιον, γλαφυρὰ ὄντως καὶ ἐπιστήμης γέμοντα ὑπομνήματα.

Syrianus himself wrote commentaries on many of the works of Aristotle. His commentary on *Metaph.* BGMN is extant (Usener, *schol. in Arist.* p. 837-944).

Syrianus

Proclus speaks of his master with a profound veneration, calling him a teacher "filled with divine truth", who "came to earth as the benefactor of banished souls . . . and fount of salvation both to his own and to future generations" (*In Parm.* 618, 3 ff., transl. by Dodds). For the text, see under **1472a**.

No doubt Syrianus' doctrine has a considerable part in those theories which are commonly regarded as characteristic of Proclus (Dodds, *The Elements*, p. XXIII f.).

**Fasting and
abstinence**

1456—The following passages of Marinus are revealing as to Proclus' attitude towards the forms and practices of religion.

a. He not only abstained from animal food, but fasted on all the days prescribed by different religions. To these he added some private days of fasting.

Marinus, *Proclus* c. 19:

Τὰς δὲ ἀπὸ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν ἀναγκαίᾳς ἡδονάς, ἀπαλλαγὰς πόνων ἐποιεῖτο, ἵνα μὴ ἐνοχλοῖτο ὑπ' αὐτῶν· βραχέα γὰρ τούτων προσεφέρετο. Τὰ πολλὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν ἐμψύχων ἀποχὴν ἡσπάζετο· εἰ δὲ ποτε καιρὸς τις ἰσχυρότερος ἐπὶ τὴν τούτων χρῆσιν ἐκάλει, μόνον ἀπεγύετο, καὶ τοῦτο ὁσίας χάριν. τὰς δὲ Μητρῶακας παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις ἢ καὶ πρότερόν ποτε παρὰ Φρυξὶ σπουδασθείσας καστείας ἐκάστου μηνὸς ἡγνευεν, καὶ τὰς παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις δὲ ἀποφράδας ἐφύλαττε μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐκεῖνοι, καὶ ἰδικώτερον δὲ τινὰς ἐνήστευεν ἡμέρας ἐξ ἐπιφανείας¹.

b. He is praised for his θεωργικὴ ἀρετὴ and his θεωργικὰ ἐνεργήματα.

Marinus, *ib.* c. 28 f.:

θεουργία

... ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σχολῆς ἀρετὴν ἔτι μείζονα καὶ τελειώτεραν (sc. τῆς θεωρητικῆς) ἐπορίσατο τὴν θεωργικὴν, καὶ οὐκ ἔτι μέχρι τῆς θεωρητικῆς ἔστατο. —

(29) Καὶ πολλὰ ἂν τις ἔχοι λέγειν μηχανεῖν ἐθέλων, καὶ τὰ τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἐκείνου θεωργικὰ ἐνεργήματα ἀφηγούμενος.

Marinus then proceeds to report the story of how Proclus by his prayer restored to health the daughter of Plutarchus who was seriously ill.

c. Marinus also says that Proclus practised a cult of the dead in its most extensive form.

**Cult of the
dead**

Marinus, *ib.* c. 36:

Οὐδένα γὰρ καιρὸν τῆς εἰωθυίας αὐτῶν θεραπείας παραλέλοιπεν, ἐκάστου δὲ ἔτους κατὰ τινὰς ὀρισμένας ἡμέρας, καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἀττικῶν ἡρώων περινοστώων, τὰ τε τῶν φιλοσοφῶντων μνήματα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φίλων καὶ γνωρίμων αὐτῷ γεγονότων, ἔδρα τὰ νενομισμένα, οὐ δι' ἑτέρου ἄλλ' αὐτὸς ἐνεργῶν· μετὰ δὲ τὴν περὶ ἑκάστον θεραπείαν, ἀπιὼν εἰς τὴν Ἀκαδημίαν, τὰς τῶν

¹ sc. τῆς σελήνης.

προγόνων καὶ ὅλως τὰς ὁμογνίους ψυχὰς ἀφορισμένως ἐν τόπῳ τινὶ ἐξίλεοῦτο· κοινῇ δὲ πάλιν ταῖς τῶν φιλοσοφούντων ἀπάντων ψυχαῖς ἐν ἐτέρῳ μέρει ἐχεῖτο· καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ὁ εὐαγέστατος τρίτον ἄλλον περιγράψας τόπον, πάσαις ἐν αὐτῷ ταῖς τῶν ἀποικομένων ἀνθρώπων ψυχαῖς ἀφωσιοῦτο.

Th. Whittaker, *The Neoplatonists* p. 159, observes that in these things Proclus anticipated the idea of Comte's *Religion of Humanity* with a remarkable closeness.

1457—Proclus' works fall into five groups.

1. His commentaries, mainly on Plato, of which the following survive: on the *Republic*, the *Parmenides*, the *Timaeus*, and *Alcib. I*. Of that on the *Cratylus* we possess excerpts.

2. The *Theologia Platonica* (not edited since 1618). It was translated into Latin by Ficino, and into English by Thomas Taylor (1816).

3. A group of lost works on religious symbols (Π. τῶν μυθικῶν συμβόλων), on theurgy (Π. ἀγωγῆς), against the Christians, on Cybele and on Hecate. These are represented for us only by the fragment Περὶ τῆς καθ' "Ελληνας ἱερατικῆς τέχνης (*de sacrificio et magia*), translated into Latin by Ficino, now published in Greek by Bidez (*Catalogue des Mss alchimiques grecs*, VI, 148 ff.).

4. Three essays, translated into Latin by William of Morbecca (13th century): *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, *De providentia et fato*, and *De malorum subsistentia*. This Latin translation is printed in the *Procli philosophi platonici opera inedita* ed. V. Cousin, Paris, 1864. A few other essays are lost.

5. Two systematic manuals: the Στοιχείωσις θεολογική (*Elementa theologiae*), edited by E. R. Dodds, Oxford 1933, and the Στοιχείωσις φυσική (*Institutio physica*), ed. A. Ritzenfeld, Leipzig 1912.

Both works have the logical form of propositions followed by a proof. The *Inst. phys.* is almost exclusively based on Aristotle's *Physics*, while the *Elem.* are a compendium of Neoplatonic metaphysics. Proclus follows the footsteps of Iambl. and Theodorus of Asine in applying the triadic system to Plotinus' doctrine of Noûs. Moreover, he follows Iambl. (and probably Syrianus) in admitting unparticipated terms, and hence introducing another First Principle between the First and Being (or Noûs), and in doubling Noûs into an unparticipated and a participated one; finally in assigning to Soul a humbler cosmic status than it had in Plotinus' theory. His doctrine of the henads, which might seem to us rather characteristic of Proclus, was in fact at least prepared by Syrianus and, in a sense, by Neopythagoreans (see Dodds, *Elem.* p. 257 f.). Thus, in the *Elements* at least, Proclus is (as was said by Dodds) more a systematizer than an innovator.

In the nrs. **1458-1469** we shall follow the line of argument in the *Elements*.

1458—a. Proclus first establishes the priority of the one to the many by the following propositions. (The first is cited with the argument).

The character of the *Elementa*

The One and the many

Proclus, *Elem. theol.*, prop. 1-6:

1. Πᾶν πλῆθος μετέχει πῃ τοῦ ἐνός.

Εἰ γὰρ μηδαμῇ μετέχει, οὔτε τὸ ὅλον ἐν ἔσται οὔθ' ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ἐξ ὧν τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' ἔσται καὶ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον πλῆθος, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἀπειρον, καὶ τῶν ἀπειρῶν τούτων ἕκαστον ἔσται πάλιν πλῆθος ἀπειρον. μηδενὸς γὰρ ἐνός μηδαμῇ μετέχον μήτε καθ' ὅλον ἑαυτὸ μήτε καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ,

πάντη ἄπειρον ἔσται καὶ κατὰ πᾶν. τῶν γὰρ πολλῶν ἕκαστον, ὅπερ ἂν λάβῃς, ἤτοι ἐν ἔσται ἢ οὐχ ἕν· καὶ εἰ οὐχ ἕν, ἤτοι πολλὰ ἢ οὐδέν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἕκαστον οὐδέν, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ πολλὰ, ἐξ ἀπειράκις ἀπείρων ἕκαστον. ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατα. οὔτε γὰρ ἐξ ἀπειράκις ἀπείρων ἐστὶ τι τῶν ὄντων (τοῦ γὰρ ἀπείρου πλεον οὐκ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ ἐκ πάντων ἐκάστου πλεον) οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ μηδενὸς συντίθεσθαι τι δυνατόν. πᾶν ἄρα πλῆθος μετέχει πῃ τοῦ ἐνός.

2. Πᾶν τὸ μετέχον τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ἐν ἐστὶ καὶ οὐχ ἕν.
3. Πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἐν μεθέξει τοῦ ἐνός γίνεται ἐν.
4. Πᾶν τὸ ἡνωμένον ἑτερόν ἐστι τοῦ αὐτοενός.
5. Πᾶν πλῆθος δευτέρον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐνός.
6. Πᾶν πλῆθος ἢ ἐξ ἡνωμένων ἐστὶν ἢ ἐξ ἐνάδων.

The
hierarchy
of causes

b. Next, the priority of cause to effect, of participated good to the primal Good, of the self-sufficient to what is not self-sufficient; the inferiority of all that is self-sufficient to the absolute Good, and the dependence of all that exists on one single Cause.

Ib., prop. 7-11:

7. Πᾶν τὸ παρακτικὸν ἄλλου κρεῖττον ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ παραγομένου φύσεως. Ἦτοι γὰρ κρεῖττον ἐστὶν ἢ χειρόν ἢ ἴσον.

Ἔστω πρότερον ἴσον. τὸ τοίνυν ἀπὸ τούτου παραγόμενον ἢ δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ αὐτὸ παρακτικὴν ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ ἄγονον ὑπάρχει παντελῶς. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἄγονον εἴη, κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοῦ παράγοντος ἡλάττωται, καὶ ἔστιν ἄνισον ἐκείνῳ, γονίμῳ ὄντι καὶ δύναμιν ἔχοντι τοῦ ποιεῖν, ἀδρανὲς ὄν. εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ παρακτικὸν ἐστὶν ἄλλων, ἢ καὶ αὐτὸ ἴσον ἑαυτῷ παράγει, καὶ τοῦτο ὡσαύτως ἐπὶ πάντων, καὶ ἔσται τὰ ὄντα πάντα ἴσα ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἄλλου κρεῖττον, αἰ τοῦ παράγοντος ἴσον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἐφεξῆς ὑφιστάντος· ἢ ἄνισον, καὶ οὐκέτ' ἂν ἴσον εἴη τῷ αὐτὸ παράγοντι· δυνάμεων γὰρ ἴσων ἐστὶ τὸ τὰ ἴσα ποιεῖν· τὰ δ' ἐκ τούτων ἄνισα ἀλλήλοις, εἴπερ τὸ μὲν παράγον τῷ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἴσον, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ μετ' αὐτὸ ἄνισον. οὐκ ἄρα ἴσον εἶναι δεῖ τῷ παράγοντι τὸ παραγόμενον.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἔλαττον ἔσται ποτὲ τὸ παράγον. εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὴν οὐσίαν τῷ παραγομένῳ δίδωσιν, αὐτὸ καὶ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῷ χορηγεῖ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. εἰ δὲ αὐτὸ παρακτικὸν ἐστὶ τῆς δυνάμεως τῷ μετ' αὐτὸ πάσης, καὶ ἑαυτὸ δύναιτο ποιεῖν τοιοῦτον, οἷον ἐκεῖνο. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ποιήσκειν ἂν ἑαυτὸ δυνατώτερον. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι καλύει, παρούσης τῆς ποιητικῆς δυνάμεως· οὔτε τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι, πάντα γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὁρέγεται κατὰ φύσιν· ὥστε εἰ ἄλλο δύναται τελειότερον ἀπεργάσασθαι, καὶ ἑαυτὸ πρὸ τοῦ μετ' αὐτὸ τελειώσειεν.

Οὔτε ἴσον ἄρα τῷ παράγοντι τὸ παραγόμενόν ἐστιν οὔτε κρεῖττον. πάντῃ ἄρα τὸ παράγον κρεῖττον τῆς τοῦ παραγομένου φύσεως.

8. Πάντων τῶν ὁπωσοῦν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετεχόντων ἡγεῖται τὸ πρῶτως ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὁ μηδὲν ἐστὶν ἄλλο ἢ ἀγαθόν.

9. Πᾶν τὸ αὐταρκες ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν κρεῖττόν ἐστι τοῦ μὴ αὐτάρκους ἀλλ' εἰς ἄλλην οὐσίαν ἀνηρτημένου τὴν τῆς τελειότητος αἰτίαν.

10. Πᾶν τὸ αὐταρκες τοῦ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ καταδεέστερόν ἐστι.

11. Πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρόεισιν ἀπὸ μιᾶς αἰτίας, τῆς πρώτης.

1459—a. Things existing are divided into three groups: the unmoved, the selfmoved and the extrinsically moved. The grades of reality

Proclus, *Elem.*, prop. 14:

Πᾶν τὸ ὄν ἢ ἀκίνητόν ἐστιν ἢ κινούμενον· καὶ εἰ κινούμενον, ἢ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου· καὶ εἰ μὲν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτοκίνητόν ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ ὑπ' ἄλλου, ἑτεροκίνητον. πᾶν ἄρα ἢ ἀκίνητόν ἐστιν ἢ αὐτοκίνητον ἢ ἑτεροκίνητον.

Ἀνάγκη γὰρ τῶν ἑτεροκινήτων ὄντων εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀκίνητον, καὶ μετὰ τούτων τὸ αὐτοκίνητον.

b. All that is capable of reverting upon itself is incorporeal.

Ib., 15:

Πᾶν τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρεπτικὸν ἀσώματόν ἐστιν.

Οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων πρὸς ἑαυτὸ πέφυκεν ἐπιστρέφειν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐπιστρέφον πρὸς τι συνάπτεται ἐκείνῳ πρὸς ὃ ἐπιστρέφει, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι καὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος πάντα πρὸς πάντα συνάψει τοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστραφέντος· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρέψαι, ὅταν ἐν γένηται ἄμφω, τό τε ἐπιστραφέν καὶ πρὸς ὃ ἐπεστράφη. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἐπὶ σώματος τοῦτο, καὶ ὅλως τῶν μεριστῶν πάντων· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον ὅλῳ συνάπτεται ἑαυτῷ τὸ μεριστὸν διὰ τὸν τῶν μερῶν χωρισμόν, ἄλλων ἀλλαχοῦ κειμένων. οὐδὲν ἄρα σῶμα πρὸς ἑαυτὸ πέφυκεν ἐπιστρέφειν, ὥς ὅλον ἐπεστράφθαι πρὸς ὅλον. εἴ τι ἄρα πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρεπτικόν ἐστιν, ἀσώματόν ἐστι καὶ ἀμερές.

c. To this he adds: it has as such an existence separable from the body, and next: all that is self-moving belongs to it.

Ib., 16 and 17:

16. Πᾶν τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρεπτικὸν χωριστὴν οὐσίαν ἔχει παντὸς σώματος.

17. Πᾶν τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν πρῶτως πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐστὶν ἐπιστρεπτικόν.

d. The four stages.

Ib., 20:

Πάντων σωμάτων ἐπέκεινά ἐστιν ἡ ψυχῆς οὐσία, καὶ πασῶν ψυχῶν ἐπέκεινα ἡ νοερά φύσις, καὶ πασῶν τῶν νοερῶν ὑποστάσεων ἐπέκεινα τὸ Ἔν.

Argument: Body is moved by Soul; Soul as *ἀτοκίνητον* is inferior to *Noûs* which is *ἀκίνητον*; and *Noûs* which is *ἀκίνητον* but not one, is ranked under the One.

e. It should be observed here, that Proclus explicitly assigns a certain degree of being to the body: since it participates of being, body is *in a sense* *an ὄν*.

Ib., 87:

Πᾶν μὲν τὸ αἰώνιον ὄν ἐστίν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ ὄν αἰώνιον.

Καὶ γὰρ τοῖς γενητοῖς ὑπάρχει πως τοῦ ὄντος μέθεξις, καθ' ὅσον οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τὸ γινόμενον οὐδαμῶς ὄν, ἔστι πως ὄν. τὸ δὲ αἰώνιον οὐδαμῇ τοῖς γενητοῖς ὑπάρχει.

Procession
and rever-
sion

1460—In speaking of procession Proclus also speaks of reversion. For he sees procession (= emanation) as a cyclical movement, reverting to its source.

Proclus, *Elem.*, 31-33:

31. Πᾶν τὸ προῖδν ἀπὸ τινος κατ' οὐσίαν ἐπιστρέφεται πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἀφ' οὗ πρόεισιν.

Εἰ γὰρ προέρχοντο μὲν, μὴ ἐπιστρέφοι δὲ πρὸς τὸ αἷτιον τῆς προόδου ταύτης, οὐκ ἂν ὀρέγοιτο τῆς αἰτίας· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὀρεγόμενον ἐπέστραπται πρὸς τὸ ὀρεκτόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν πᾶν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐφίεται, καὶ ἡ ἐκείνου τεύξις διὰ τῆς προσεχοῦς αἰτίας ἐκάστοις· ὀρέγεται ἄρα καὶ τῆς ἑαυτῶν αἰτίας ἕκαστα. δι' οὗ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι ἐκάστῳ, διὰ τούτου καὶ τὸ εὖ· δι' οὗ δὲ τὸ εὖ, πρὸς τοῦτο ἡ ὀρεξις πρῶτον· πρὸς δὲ πρῶτον ἡ ὀρεξις, πρὸς τοῦτο ἡ ἐπιστροφή.

32. Πᾶσα ἐπιστροφή δι' ὁμοιότητος ἀποτελεῖται τῶν ἐπιστρεφομένων πρὸς δὲ ἐπιστρέφεται.

Τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστρεφόμενον πᾶν πρὸς πᾶν συνάπτεσθαι σπεύδει καὶ ὀρέγεται τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸ κοινωνίας καὶ συνδέσεως. συνδεῖ δὲ πάντα ἡ ὁμοιότης, ὥσπερ διακρίνει ἡ ἀνομοιότης καὶ διίστησιν. εἰ οὖν ἡ ἐπιστροφή κοινωνία τίς ἐστι καὶ συναφή, πᾶσα δὲ κοινωνία καὶ συναφή πᾶσα δι' ὁμοιότητος, πᾶσα ἄρα ἐπιστροφή δι' ὁμοιότητος ἀποτελοῖτο ἄν.

33. Πᾶν τὸ προῖδν ἀπὸ τινος καὶ ἐπιστρέφον κυκλικὴν ἔχει τὴν ἐνέργειαν.

Εἰ γὰρ, ἀφ' οὗ πρόεισιν, εἰς τοῦτο ἐπιστρέφει, συνάπτει τῇ ἀρχῇ τὸ τέλος, καὶ ἔστι μία καὶ συνεχὴς ἡ κίνησις, τῆς μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ μένοντος, τῆς δὲ πρὸς τὸ μεῖναι γινομένης· ὅθεν δὴ πάντα κύκλῳ πρόεισιν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰτίων ἐπὶ τὰ αἷτια. μεῖζους δὲ κύκλοι καὶ ἐλάττους, τῶν μὲν ἐπιστροφῶν πρὸς τὰ ὑπερκείμενα προσεχῶς γινομένων, τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἀνωτέρω καὶ μέχρι τῆς πάντων ἀρχῆς· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἐκείνης πάντα καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνην.

That which
is causa sui

1461—The doctrine of *αὐθύπόστατα* or self-constituted principles.

a. All that proceeds from another cause is subordinate to principles which get their substance from themselves and have a self-constituted existence.

Proclus, *Elem.* 40:

Πάντων τῶν ἀφ' ἐτέρας αἰτίας προϊόντων ἡγεῖται τὰ παρ' ἑαυτῶν ὑφιστάμενα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐθυπόστατον κεκτημένα.

Εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ αὐταρκες ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν κρεῖττον τοῦ εἰς ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἀνηρημένου· τὸ δὲ ἑαυτὸ παράγον, ἑαυτῷ τοῦ εἶναι παρεκτικὸν ὑπάρχον, αὐταρκες πρὸς οὐσίαν, τὸ δὲ ἀπ' ἄλλου μόνον παραγόμενον οὐκ αὐταρκες· τῷ δὲ ἀγαθῷ συγγενέστερον τὸ αὐταρκες· τὰ δὲ συγγενέστερα καὶ ὁμοιότερα ταῖς αἰτίαις πρὸ τῶν ἀνομοίων ὑφέστηκεν ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας· τὰ ἄρα παρ' ἑαυτῶν παραγόμενα καὶ αὐθυπόστατα πρεσβύτερά ἐστι τῶν ἀφ' ἐτέρου μόνον εἰς τὸ εἶναι προελθόντων.

b. All that has its existence in another is produced entirely from another, but all that exists in itself is self-constituted.

Ib., 41:

Πᾶν μὲν τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὃν ἀπ' ἄλλου μόνον παράγεται· πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὃν αὐθυπόστατόν ἐστι.

Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὃν καὶ ὑποκειμένου δεόμενον ἑαυτοῦ γεννητικὸν οὐκ ἂν ποτε εἶη· τὸ γὰρ γεννᾶν ἑαυτὸ πεφυκὸς ἔδρας ἄλλης οὐ δεῖται, συνεχόμενον ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ σωζόμενον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου χωρὶς. τὸ δὲ ἐν ἑαυτῷ μένειν καὶ ἰδρῦσθαι δυνάμενον ἑαυτοῦ παρακτικὸν ἐστίν, αὐτὸ εἰς ἑαυτὸ προϊόν, καὶ ἑαυτοῦ συνεκτικὸν ὑπάρχον, καὶ οὕτως ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν, ὡς ἐν αἰτίῳ τὸ αἰτιατόν.

c. All that is self-constituted is capable of reversion to itself.

Ib., 42:

Πᾶν τὸ αὐθυπόστατον πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐστὶν ἐπιστρεπτικόν.

Εἰ γὰρ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πρόεισι, καὶ τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν ποιήσεται πρὸς ἑαυτό· ἀφ' οὗ γὰρ ἡ πρόοδος ἐκάστοις, εἰς τοῦτο καὶ ἡ τῇ προόδῳ σύστοιχος ἐπιστροφή. εἰ γὰρ πρόεισιν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ μόνον, μὴ ἐπιστρέφοιτο δὲ προῖον εἰς ἑαυτό, οὐκ ἂν ποτε τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγοιτο καὶ ὃ δύναται ἑαυτῷ παρέχειν. δύναται δὲ πᾶν τὸ αἷτιον τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ διδόναι μετὰ τῆς οὐσίας, ἧς δίδωσι, καὶ τὸ εὖ τῆς οὐσίας, ἧς δίδωσι, συζυγές· ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ. τοῦτο ἄρα τὸ οἰκεῖον τῷ αὐθυποστάτῳ ἀγαθόν. τούτου δὲ οὐκ ὀρέζεται τὸ ἀνεπίστροφον πρὸς ἑαυτό· μὴ ὀρεγόμενον δέ, οὐδ' ἂν τύχοι, καὶ μὴ τυγχάνον, ἀτελὲς ἂν εἶη καὶ οὐκ αὐταρκες. ἀλλ' εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ, προσήκει καὶ τῷ αὐθυποστάτῳ αὐτάρκει καὶ τελείῳ εἶναι. καὶ τεύχεται ἄρα τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ ὀρέζεται καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτό στραφήσεται.

d. Also the reversed proposition is valid.

Ib., 43:

Πᾶν τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρεπτικὸν αὐθυπόστατόν ἐστιν.

Εἰ γὰρ ἐπέστραπται πρὸς ἑαυτὸ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἔστι τέλειον ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστροφῇ, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἂν παρ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔχοι· πρὸς δὲ γὰρ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἐπιστροφή, ἀπὸ τούτου καὶ ἡ πρόοδος ἡ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐκάστοις. εἰ οὖν ἑαυτῷ τὸ εὖ εἶναι παρέχει, καὶ τὸ εἶναι δήπου ἑαυτῷ παρέξει, καὶ ἔσται τῆς ἑαυτοῦ κύριον ὑποστάσεως. αὐθυπόστατον ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ δυνάμενον ἐπιστρέφειν.

e. All that is self-constituted is without temporal origin; is imperishable; is eternal, and transcends the things which are measured by time.

Ib., 45, 46, 49, 51:

45. Πᾶν τὸ αὐθυπόστατον ἀγένητόν ἐστιν.

Εἰ γὰρ γενητόν, διότι μὲν γενητόν, ἀτελὲς ἔσται καθ' ἑαυτὸ καὶ τῆς ἀπ' ἄλλου τελειώσεως ἐνδεές· διότι δὲ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ παράγει, τέλειον καὶ αὐταρκες.

46. Πᾶν τὸ αὐθυπόστατον ἄφθαρτόν ἐστιν.

Εἰ γὰρ φθαρήσεται, ἀπολείψει ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἔσται ἑαυτοῦ χωρίς. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον.

49. Πᾶν τὸ αὐθυπόστατον αἰδιόν ἐστι.

Δύο γὰρ εἰσι τρόποι, καθ' οὓς ἀνάγκη τι μὴ αἰδιόν εἶναι, ὃ τε ἀπὸ τῆς συνθέσεως καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ἄλλῳ ὄντων. τὸ δὲ αὐθυπόστατον οὔτε σύνθετόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἀπλοῦν· οὔτε ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑαυτῷ. αἰδιόν ἄρα ἐστίν.

51. Πᾶν τὸ αὐθυπόστατον ἐξήρηται τῶν ὑπὸ χρόνου μετρομένων κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν.

Εἰ γὰρ ἀγένητόν ἐστι τὸ αὐθυπόστατον, οὐκ ἂν ὑπὸ χρόνου κατὰ τὸ εἶναι μετροῖτο· γένεσις γὰρ περὶ τὴν ὑπὸ χρόνου μετρομένην φύσιν ἐστίν. οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν αὐθυποστάτων ἐν χρόνῳ ὑφέστηκεν.

Finite and
infinite

1462—a. What always is, is infinite in potency.

Proclus. *Elem.* 84:

Πᾶν τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν ἀπειροδύναμόν ἐστιν.

b. True being is infinite, neither in number nor in size, but only in potency.

Ib., 86:

Πᾶν τὸ ὄντως ὄν ἄπειρόν ἐστιν οὔτε κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος οὔτε κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν μόνην.

c. True being is composed of πέρας and ἄπειρον.

Ib., 89:

Πᾶν τὸ ὄντως ὄν ἐκ πέρατός ἐστι καὶ ἀπείρου.

Εἰ γὰρ ἀπειροδύναμόν ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι ἄπειρόν ἐστι, καὶ ταύτῃ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου ὑφέστηκεν. εἰ δὲ ἀμερές καὶ ἐνοειδές, ταύτῃ πέρατος μετείληφε· τὸ γὰρ ἐνὸς μετασχὸν πεπέρασται. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀμερές ἅμα καὶ ἀπειροδύναμόν ἐστιν. ἐκ πέρατος ἅρα ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπείρου πᾶν τὸ ὄντως ὄν.

d. Beyond Being there is the πρῶτον πέρας and πρώτη ἀπειρία.

Ib., 90:

Πάντων τῶν ἐκ πέρατος καὶ ἀπειρίας ὑποστάντων προϋπάρχει καθ' αὐτὰ τὸ πρῶτον πέρας καὶ ἡ πρώτη ἀπειρία.

Εἰ γὰρ τῶν τινὸς ὄντων τὰ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ὄντα προϋφέστηκεν ὡς κοινὰ πάντων καὶ ἀρχηγικὰ αἰτία καὶ μὴ τινῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντων ἀπλῶς, δεῖ πρὸ τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον πέρας καὶ τὸ πρώτως ἄπειρον. τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ μικτῷ πέρας ἀπειρίας ἐστὶ μετείληφός καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον πέρατος· τὸ δὲ πρῶτον ἐκάστου οὐκ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὃ ἐστίν· οὐκ ἄρα δεῖ περατοειδές εἶναι τὸ πρώτως ἄπειρον καὶ ἀπειροειδές τὸ πρῶτον πέρας· πρὸ τοῦ μικτοῦ ἄρα ταῦτα πρώτως.

Cp. Proclus, *In Parm.* II, p. 764, l. 28-30 Cousin: πλήθος καὶ ἐν οὐ μόνον οὐσιῶδες ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ οὐσίαν.

e. Finite potencies arise from infinite potency.

Ib., 91:

Πᾶσα δύναμις ἢ πεπερασμένη ἐστὶν ἢ ἄπειρος· ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν πεπερασμένη πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς ἀπείρου δυνάμεως ὑφέστηκεν, ἡ δὲ ἄπειρος δύναμις ἐκ τῆς πρώτης ἀπειρίας.

f. All infinite potencies depend on the first Infinity, called αὐτο-απειρία. This is not the very First Principle but, as it were, its reverse which is placed between the "Ἐν (called τὸ αὐτόπερας in *Theol. Plat.* 132) and ὄν.

Ib., 92:

Πᾶν τὸ πλήθος τῶν ἀπείρων δυνάμεων μιᾶς ἐξῆπται τῆς πρώτης ἀπειρίας, ἥτις οὐχ ὡς μετεχομένη δύναμις ἐστίν, οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς δυναμένοις ὑφέστηκεν, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτήν, οὐ τινὸς οὔσα δύναμις τοῦ μετέχοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντων αἰτία τῶν ὄντων.

Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὄν αὐτὸ τὸ πρῶτον ἔχει δύναμιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐστὶν ἡ αὐτοδύναμις. ἔχει γὰρ καὶ πέρας· ἡ δὲ πρώτη δύναμις ἀπειρία ἐστίν. αἱ γὰρ ἄπειροι δυνάμεις διὰ μετουσίαν ἀπειρίας ἄπειροι· ἡ οὖν αὐτοαπειρία πρὸ πασῶν ἐστὶ δυνάμεων,

δι' ἣν καὶ τὸ ὄν ἀπειροδύναμον καὶ πάντα μετέσχευ ἀπειρίας. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἢ ἀπειρία (μέτρον γὰρ πάντων ἐκεῖνο, τάγαθὸν ὑπάρχον καὶ ἓν) οὔτε τὸ ὄν (ἄπειρον γὰρ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπειρία)· μεταξὺ ἄρα τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ἀπειρία, πάντων αἰτία τῶν ἀπειροδυνάμων καὶ αἰτία πάσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν ἀπειρίας.

This is the explanation of Iamblichus' doubled ἀρχή we found in Damascius c. 45, cited above, **1449b**. The Christian author who calls himself Dionysius Areopagita unites the two ἀρχαί of Proclus and Damascius in the God-over-all, who is at the same time the Limit of all things and Infinitude. *De div. nom.* 5, 10:

Ὁ προὖν (Θεός) . . . πέρας πάντων καὶ ἀπειρία, πάσης ἀπειρίας καὶ πέρατος ὑπεροχικῶς ἐξηρημένος τῶν ὡς ἀντικειμένων.

Of unparticipated terms

1463—At the head of each series is an unparticipated term which has no cause other than itself, and as such is ἀγέννητος.

a. Proclus, *Elem.* 99:

Πᾶν ἀμέθεκτον, ἢ ἀμέθεκτόν ἐστι, ταύτῃ ἀπ' ἄλλης αἰτίας οὐχ ὑφίσταται, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ αἰτία τῶν μετεχομένων πάντων· καὶ οὕτως ἀρχὴ πᾶσα καθ' ἐκάστην σειρὰν ἀγέννητος. —

b. Yet, these ἀρχαί are not absolute principles: they depend on the First Principle of all things.

Ib., 100:

Πᾶσα μὲν σειρὰ τῶν ὄλων εἰς ἀμέθεκτον ἀρχὴν καὶ αἰτίαν ἀνατείνεται, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἀμέθεκτα τῆς μιᾶς ἐξέχεται τῶν πάντων ἀρχῆς. —

In general, Proclus starts from the principle that "the main task of knowledge is to find intermediate stages" (or, as he says, "mean terms") and "to produce fine workmanship as to the grades of the procession of beings". *In Tim.* III 153, l. 13-15 Diehl:

Καὶ ὅλως τοῦτο καὶ μέγιστόν ἐστι τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἔργον, ὃ τὰς μεσότητας καὶ τὰς προόδους τῶν ὄντων λεπτοουργεῖν.

c. Thus, at the head of the intelligible World there is unparticipated Noûs, unparticipated Life, and unparticipated Being, the "Noûs" of Plotinus being conceived as a triad of which ὄν is first, Life second and Noûs last.

Ib., 101:

Πάντων τῶν νοῦ μετεχόντων ἡγεῖται ὁ ἀμέθεκτος νοῦς, καὶ τῶν τῆς ζωῆς ἢ ζωῆς, καὶ τῶν τοῦ ὄντος τὸ ὄν· αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ὄν πρὸ τῆς ζωῆς, ἡ δὲ ζωὴ πρὸ τοῦ νοῦ.

Διότι μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἐκάστη τάξει τῶν ὄντων πρὸ τῶν μετεχομένων ἐστὶ τὰ

ἀμέθεκτα, δεῖ πρὸ τῶν νοερῶν εἶναι τὸν νοῦν καὶ πρὸ τῶν ζώντων τὴν ζωὴν καὶ πρὸ τῶν ὄντων τὸ ὄν. διότι δὲ προηγεῖται τὸ τῶν πλειόνων αἷτιον ἢ τὸ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, ἐν ἐκείνοις τὸ μὲν ὄν ἔσται πρῶτιστον· πᾶσι γὰρ πάρεστιν, οἷς ζωὴ καὶ νοῦς (ζῶν γὰρ πᾶν καὶ νοήσεως μετέχον ἔστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης), οὐκ ἔμπαλιν δέ (οὐ γὰρ τὰ ὄντα πάντα ζῆ καὶ νοεῖ). δευτέρα δὲ ἡ ζωὴ· πᾶσι γάρ, οἷς νοῦ μέτεστι, καὶ ζωῆς μέτεστιν, οὐκ ἔμπαλιν δέ· πολλὰ γὰρ ζῆ μὲν, γνώσεως δὲ ἄμοιρα ἀπολείπεται. τρίτος δὲ ὁ νοῦς· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ γνωστικὸν ὁπωσοῦν καὶ ζῆ καὶ ἔστιν. εἰ οὖν πλειόνων αἷτιον τὸ ὄν, ἐλαττόνων δὲ ἡ ζωὴ, καὶ ἔτι ἐλαττόνων ὁ νοῦς, πρῶτιστον τὸ ὄν, εἴτα ζωὴ, εἴτα νοῦς.

In the *Elements* the members of this fundamental Triad are not subdivided into new triads, as we know was already done by Iamblichus and Theodorus of Asine. That Pr. himself made such subdivisions, appears in his later work the *Theol. Plat.* III, 14.

1464—The doctrine of divine Henads or Gods.

Divine
Henads
or Gods

a. Proclus supposing that there is a plurality of gods, begins by positing that this plurality must have the character of a unity.

Elem., II3:

Πᾶς ὁ θεῖος ἀριθμὸς ἐνιαῖός ἐστιν.

Εἰ γὰρ ὁ θεῖος ἀριθμὸς αἰτίαν ἔχει προηγουμένην τὸ ἔν, ὡς ὁ νοερὸς τὸν νοῦν καὶ ὁ ψυχικὸς τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ἔστιν ἀνάλογον τὸ πλῆθος πανταχοῦ πρὸς τὴν αἰτίαν, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι καὶ ὁ θεῖος ἀριθμὸς ἐνιαῖός ἐστιν, εἴπερ τὸ ἔν θεός· τοῦτο δέ, εἴπερ τάγαθόν καὶ ἐν ταῦτόν· καὶ γὰρ τάγαθόν καὶ θεὸς ταῦτόν (οὐ γὰρ μηδὲν ἔστιν ἐπέκεινα καὶ οὐ πάντα ἐφίεται, θεὸς τοῦτο· καὶ ἄφ' οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ πρὸς ὅ, τοῦτο δὲ τάγαθόν). εἰ ἄρα ἔστι πλῆθος θεῶν, ἐνιαῖόν ἐστι τὸ πλῆθος. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι ἔστι, δῆλον, εἴπερ πᾶν αἷτιον ἀρχικὸν οἰκείου πλῆθους ἡγεῖται καὶ ὁμοίου πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ συγγενοῦς.

b. Every god is a self-complete henad, and every self-complete henad is a god.

Ib., II4:

Πᾶς θεὸς ἐνὰς ἔστιν αὐτοτελής, καὶ πᾶσα αὐτοτελής ἐνὰς θεός.

Εἰ γὰρ τῶν ἐνάδων διττὸς ὁ ἀριθμὸς, ὡς δέδεικται πρότερον, καὶ αἱ μὲν αὐτοτελεῖς εἰσιν αἱ δὲ ἐλλάμψεις ἀπ' ἐκείνων, τῷ δὲ ἐνὶ καὶ τάγαθῷ συγγενῆς καὶ ὁμοφυῆς ὁ θεῖος ἀριθμὸς, ἐνάδες εἰσιν αὐτοτελεῖς οἱ θεοί.

Καὶ ἔμπαλιν, εἰ ἔστιν αὐτοτελής ἐνὰς, θεός ἐστι. καὶ γὰρ ὡς ἐνὰς τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ὡς αὐτοτελής τάγαθῷ συγγενεστάτη διαφερόντως ἐστί, καὶ κατ' ἄμφω τῆς θείας ιδιότητος μετέχει, καὶ ἔστι θεός. εἰ δὲ ἦν ἐνὰς μὲν οὐκ αὐτοτελής δέ, ἢ

αὐτοτελὴς μὲν ἢ ὑπόστασις οὐκέτι δὲ ἑνός, εἰς ἑτέραν ἂν ἐτάττετο τάξιν διὰ τὴν τῆς ιδιότητος ἐξαλλαγὴν.

c. Every god is above Being, Life and Noûs: for these are not henads, but unified groups.

Ib., 115:

Πᾶς θεὸς ὑπερουσίος ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπέρζωος καὶ ὑπέρνους.

Εἰ γὰρ ἑνός ἐστὶν ἕκαστος αὐτοτελής, ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων οὐχὶ ἑνός ἀλλ' ἠνωμένον, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι πάντων ἐστὶν ἐπέκεινα τῶν εἰρημένων ἅπας θεός, οὐσίας καὶ ζωῆς καὶ νοῦ. εἰ γὰρ διέστηκε μὲν ταῦτα ἀλλήλων, πάντα δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν πᾶσιν, ἕκαστον τὰ πάντα ὃν ἐν ἂν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μόνον.

Ἔτι δέ, εἰ τὸ πρῶτον ὑπερουσίον, ἅπας δὲ θεὸς τῆς τοῦ πρώτου σειρᾶς ἐστὶν ἢ θεός, ὑπερουσίος ἕκαστος ἂν εἴη.

d. The First Principle differs from the other henads in that the First is not participable, while the others are.

Ib., 116:

Πᾶς θεὸς μεθεκτός ἐστι, πλὴν τοῦ ἑνός.

e. Every god is a measure of things existing.

Ib., 117:

Πᾶς θεὸς μέτρον ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων.

Εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐνιαῖος ἅπας θεός, τὰ πλήθη πάντα τῶν ὄντων ἀφορίζει καὶ μετρεῖ. πάντα μὲν γὰρ τὰ πλήθη, τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει ἀόριστα ὄντα, διὰ τὸ ἐν ὀρίζεται. τὸ δὲ ἐνιαῖον μετρεῖν καὶ περατοῦν, οἷς ἂν παρῇ, βούλεται, καὶ περιάγειν εἰς ὅρον τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν.

f. The attributes of the Gods.

Ib., 118, 119:

Πᾶν ὃ τι περ ἂν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς ᾗ, κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ιδιότητα προϋφέστηκεν ἐν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ ιδιότης αὐτῶν ἐνιαία καὶ ὑπερουσίος. ἐνιαίως ἄρα καὶ ὑπερουσίως πάντα ἐν αὐτοῖς. —

119. Πᾶς θεὸς κατὰ τὴν ὑπερουσίον ἀγαθότητα ὑφέστηκε, καὶ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς οὔτε καθ' ἑξὶν οὔτε κατ' οὐσίαν (καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἑξεις καὶ αἱ οὐσίαι δευτέραν καὶ πολλοστήν ἔλαχον τάξιν ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν), ἀλλ' ὑπερουσίως. —

g. Their providence.

Ib., 120:

Πᾶς θεὸς ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ὑπάρξει τὸ προνοεῖν τῶν ὅλων κέκτηται. καὶ τὸ πρῶτως προνοεῖν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς. —

h. Their goodness, power and knowledge.

Ib., 121:

Πᾶν τὸ θεῖον ὑπαρξιν μὲν ἔχει τὴν ἀγαθότητα, δύναμιν δὲ ἐνιαίαν καὶ γνῶσιν κρύφιον καὶ ἀληπτον πᾶσιν ὁμοῦ τοῖς δευτέροις.—

i. How the gods may be known by secondary beings.

Ib., 123:

Πᾶν τὸ θεῖον αὐτὸ μὲν διὰ τὴν ὑπερούσιον ἔνωσιν ἄρρητόν ἐστι καὶ ἀγνωστον πᾶσι τοῖς δευτέροις, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν μετεχόντων ληπτὸν ἐστι καὶ γνωστόν· διὸ μόνον τὸ πρῶτον παντελῶς ἄγνωστον, ἅτε ἀμέθεκτον ὄν.—

j. On divine knowledge.

Ib., 124:

Πᾶς θεὸς ἀμερίστως μὲν τὰ μεριστὰ γινώσκει, ἀχρόνως δὲ τὰ ἐγγχρονα, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαῖα ἀναγκαίως, καὶ τὰ μεταβλητὰ ἀμεταβλήτως, καὶ ὅλως πάντα κρειττόνως ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν τάξιν.—

k. A god is more universal as he is nearer to the One.

Ib., 126:

Πᾶς θεὸς ὀλικώτερος μὲν ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐγγυτέρω, μερικώτερος δὲ ὁ πορρωτέρω.—

1465—a. Grades of participation in the Divine.

**Participa-
tion in the
Divine**

Proclus, *Elem.* 128, 129, 138, 139:

128. Πᾶς θεός, ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ἐγγυτέρω μετεχόμενος, ἀμέσως μετέχεται· ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν πορρωτέρω, διὰ μέσων ἢ ἐλαττόνων ἢ πλείονων τινῶν.—

129. Πᾶν μὲν σῶμα θεῖον διὰ ψυχῆς ἐστὶ θεῖον τῆς ἐκθεουμένης, πᾶσα δὲ ψυχὴ θεία διὰ τοῦ θείου νοῦ, πᾶς δὲ νοῦς [θεῖος] κατὰ μέθεξιν τῆς θείας ἐνάδος· καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐνάς αὐτόθεν θεός, ὁ δὲ νοῦς θειότατος, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ θεία, τὸ δὲ σῶμα θεοειδές.—

138. Πάντων τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς θείας ιδιότητος καὶ ἐκθεουμένων πρῶ-
τιστόν ἐστι καὶ ἀκρότατος τὸ ὄν.—

139. Πάντα τὰ μετέχοντα τῶν θείων ἐνάδων, ἀρχόμενα ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος, εἰς τὴν σωματικὴν τελευτᾷ φύσιν· τὸ γὰρ πρῶτόν ἐστι τῶν μετεχόντων τὸ ὄν, ἔσχατος δὲ τὸ σῶμα (καὶ γὰρ σώματα θεῖα εἶναι φαμεν).—

b. All inferior principles retreat before the presence of the gods.

Ib., 143:

143. Πάντα τὰ καταδεέστερα τῇ παρουσίᾳ τῶν θεῶν ὑπεξίσταται· καὶ ἐπιτήδειον ἢ τὸ μετέχον, πᾶν μὲν τὸ ἀλλότριον τοῦ θείου φωτὸς ἐκποδὼν γίνεται, καταλάμπεται δὲ πάντα ἀθρόως ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν.

c. The procession of things existent and all cosmic orders of existent things extend as far as do the orders of the gods.

Ib., 144:

Πάντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ πᾶσαι τῶν ὄντων αἱ διακοσμήσεις ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον προεληλύθασιν, ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ αἱ τῶν θεῶν διατάξεις.

Principles
of divine
procession

1466—a. Divine procession is a circular motion: without beginning and without end.

Proclus, *Elem.* 146:

Πασῶν τῶν θείων προόδων τὰ τέλη πρὸς τὰς ἑαυτῶν ἀρχὰς ὁμοιοῦται, κύκλον ἀναρχον καὶ ἀτελεύτητον σώζοντα διὰ τῆς πρὸς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐπιστροφῆς. —

b. The manifold of divine henads must be limited in number, for it stands nearest to the One.

Ib., 149:

Πᾶν τὸ πληθὺς τῶν θείων ἐνάδων πεπερασμένον ἐστὶ κατὰ ἀριθμόν.

Εἰ γὰρ ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ ἐνός ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν ἄπειρον ὑπάρχοι· οὐ γὰρ συμφυὲς τῷ ἐνὶ τὸ ἄπειρον, ἀλλὰ ἀλλότριον.

Cp. above, 1462 f.

Πέρασ
and
ἄπειρον

c. Πέρασ and ἄπειρον are maintained as the two fundamental principles from which every order of gods is derived.

Ib., 159:

Πᾶσα τάξις θεῶν ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἐστὶν ἀρχῶν, πέρατος καὶ ἀπειρίας· ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν πρὸς τῆς τοῦ πέρατος αἰτίας μᾶλλον, ἢ δὲ πρὸς τῆς ἀπειρίας. —

Grades of
participa-
tion

d. There are νοεραὶ ἐνάδες, participated by Noûs, ὑπερκόσμιοι ἐνάδες, participated by Soul, and ἐγκόσμιοι ἐνάδες participated by sensible bodies. And since according to Proclus Being is above Noûs and νοηταὶ ἐνάδες above those which are called νοεραί, he ranks the νοηταὶ ἐνάδες directly after the Ἐν and regards them as participated by supreme Being which is the ἀμεθέκτως ὄν.

Ib., 163-165:

163. Πᾶν τὸ πληθὺς τῶν ἐνάδων τὸ μετεχόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀμεθέκτου νοῦ νοερόν ἐστιν.

Ὡς γὰρ ἔχει νοῦς πρὸς τὸ ὄντως ὄν, οὕτως αἱ ἐνάδες αὗται πρὸς τὰς ἐνάδας τὰς νοητὰς ἔχουσιν. ἥπερ οὖν καὶ ἐκεῖναι, καταλάμπουσιν τὸ ὄν, νοηταὶ εἰσι, ταύτῃ καὶ αὗται, καταλάμπουσιν τὸν θεῖον καὶ ἀμέθεκτον νοῦν, νοεραὶ εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτω νοεραὶ ὥς ἐν νῷ ὑφεστηκυῖαι, ἀλλ' ὥς κατ' αἰτίαν τοῦ νοῦ προϋπάρχουσαι καὶ ἀπογεννῶσαι τὸν νοῦν.

164. Πᾶν τὸ πλήθος τῶν ἐνάδων τὸ μετεχόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς ἀμεθέκτου πάσης ψυχῆς ὑπερκόσμιόν ἐστι.

Διότι γὰρ ἡ ἀμέθεκτος ψυχὴ πρώτως ὑπὲρ τὸν κόσμον ἐστί, καὶ οἱ μετεχόμενοι ὑπ' αὐτῆς θεοὶ ὑπερκόσμιοι εἰσιν, ἀνὰ λόγον ὄντες πρὸς τοὺς νοερούς καὶ νοητούς, ὃν ἔχει ψυχὴ πρὸς νοῦν καὶ νοῦς πρὸς τὸ ὄντως ὄν. ὥς οὖν ψυχὴ πᾶσα εἰς νοῦς ἀνήρτηται καὶ νοῦς εἰς τὸ νοητὸν ἐπέστραπται, οὕτω δὴ καὶ οἱ ὑπερκόσμιοι θεοὶ τῶν νοερῶν ἐξέχονται, καθάπερ δὴ καὶ οὗτοι τῶν νοητῶν.

165. Πᾶν τὸ πλήθος τῶν ἐνάδων τῶν μετεχομένων ὑπὸ τινος αἰσθητοῦ σώματος ἐγκόσμιόν ἐστιν.

Ἐλλάμπει γὰρ εἰς τι τῶν τοῦ κόσμου μερῶν διὰ μέσων τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς. οὔτε γὰρ νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς πάρεστί τινα τῶν ἐγκοσμίων σωμάτων οὔτε θεότης ἀμέσως συνάπτεται ψυχῇ (διὰ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων αἱ μεθέξεις)· καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς κατὰ τὸ νοητὸν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἀκρότατον μετέχει τῆς ἐνάδος. ἐγκόσμιοι οὖν αἱ ἐνάδες ὥς συμπληροῦσαι τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ ὥς ἐκθεωτικαὶ τῶν ἐμφανῶν σωμάτων.

Dodds, *Elements* p. 282, gives the following scheme of participation, according to Proclus in the above-cited propositions.

τὸ	Ἐν	—	ἐνάδες νοηταί	—	ἐνάδες νοεραί	—	ἐνάδες ὑπερκόσμιοι	—	ἐνάδες ἐγκόσμιοι
			↓		↓		↓		↓
τὸ	ἀμεθέκτως	ὄν	μεθέκτως	ὄν	μεθέκτως	ὄν	μεθέκτως	ὄν	μεθέκτως
			↓		↓		↓		↓
	θεῖος	Νοῦς	ἀμέθεκτος	θε.	Νοῦς	μεθεκτός	θε.	Νοῦς	μεθεκτός
			↓		↓		↓		↓
			θεῖα	ψυχὴ	ἀμέθεκτος	θε.	ψυχὴ	μεθεκτὴ	
					↓		↓		
							θεῖον	σῶμα	

1467—a. Participated and unparticipated Noûs.

Noûs

Proclus, *Elem.* 166:

Πᾶς νοῦς ἢ ἀμέθεκτός ἐστιν ἢ μεθεκτός· καὶ εἰ μεθεκτός, ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ὑπερκοσμίων ψυχῶν μετεχόμενος ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγκοσμίων.

Παντὸς μὲν γὰρ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν νόων ὁ ἀμέθεκτος ἡγεῖται, πρωτίστην ἔχων ὑπαρξιν· τῶν δὲ μετεχομένων οἱ μὲν τὴν ὑπερκόσμιον καὶ ἀμέθεκτον ἐλλάμπουσι ψυχὴν, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἐγκόσμιον. οὔτε γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀμεθέκτου τὸ πλήθος εὐθύς τὸ ἐγκόσμιον, εἴπερ αἱ πρόοδοι διὰ τῶν ὁμοίων, ὁμοιότερον δὲ τῷ ἀμεθέκτῳ τὸ χωριστὸν τοῦ κόσμου μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ διηρημένον περὶ αὐτόν· οὔτε μόνον τὸ ὑπερκόσμιον ὑπέστη πλήθος, ἀλλ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἐγκόσμιοι, εἴπερ καὶ θεῶν ἐγκοσμίων πλήθος, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ κόσμος ἑμψυχος ἅμα καὶ ἔννοος ἐστί, καὶ ἡ μέθεξις ταῖς ἐγκοσμίοις ψυχαῖς τῶν ὑπερκοσμίων νόων διὰ μέσων ἐστὶ τῶν ἐγκοσμίων νόων.

b. Every noûs knows itself by intuitive knowledge. The first Noûs

knows itself only; subsequent intelligence knows both itself and what is prior to it.

Ib., 167:

Πᾶς νοῦς ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ· ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν πρώτιστος ἑαυτὸν μόνον, καὶ ἐν κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἐν τούτῳ νοῦς καὶ νοητόν· ἕκαστος δὲ τῶν ἐφεξῆς ἑαυτὸν ἅμα καὶ τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ νοητόν ἐστι τούτῳ τὸ μὲν ὃ ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἄφ' οὗ ἐστίν. —

c. The first Noûs has absolute knowledge, subsequent intelligences have not.

Ib., 170:

Πᾶς νοῦς πάντα ἅμα νοεῖ· ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀμέθεκτος ἀπλῶς πάντα, τῶν δὲ μετ' ἐκείνων ἕκαστος καθ' ἐν πάντα. —

d. Noûs and the Ideas.

Ib., 177:

Πᾶς νοῦς πλήρωμα ὧν εἰδῶν, ὁ μὲν ὀλικωτέρων, ὁ δὲ μερικωτέρων ἐστὶ περιεκτικὸς εἰδῶν· καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνωτέρω νόες ὀλικώτερον ἔχουσιν ὅσα μερικώτερον οἱ μετ' αὐτούς, οἱ δὲ κατωτέρω μερικώτερον ὅσα ὀλικώτερον οἱ πρὸ αὐτῶν. —

e. Divine and not-divine Noûs.

Ib., 182-183:

182. Πᾶς θεῖος νοῦς μετεχόμενος ὑπὸ ψυχῶν μετέχεται θείων. —

183. Πᾶς νοῦς μετεχόμενος μέν, νοερός δὲ μόνον ὧν, μετέχεται ὑπὸ ψυχῶν οὔτε θείων οὔτε νοῦ καὶ ἀνοίας ἐν μεταβολῇ γινομένων. —

Soul

1468—a. Different kinds of souls.

Proclus, *Elem.* 184, 185:

184. Πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἢ θεία ἐστίν, ἢ μεταβάλλουσα ἀπὸ νοῦ εἰς ἀνοίαν, ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων αἰ μὲν νοοῦσα, καταδεεστέρα δὲ τῶν θείων ψυχῶν. —

185. Πᾶσαι μὲν αἱ θεῖαι ψυχαὶ θεοὶ εἰσι ψυχικῶς, πᾶσαι δὲ αἱ τοῦ νοεροῦ μετέχουσιν νοῦ θεῶν ὁπαδοὶ αἰεῖ, πᾶσαι δὲ αἱ μεταβολῆς δεκτικαὶ θεῶν ὁπαδοὶ ποτέ. —

b. Their common nature.

Ib., 186-187:

186. Πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἀσώματός ἐστιν οὐσία καὶ χωριστὴ σώματος.

187. Πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἀνώλεθρός ἐστι καὶ ἀφθαρτος.

c. Soul is both a principle of life and a living being.

Ib., 188, 189:

188. Πᾶσα ψυχὴ καὶ ζωὴ ἐστὶ καὶ ζῶν.

Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἂν παραγένηται ψυχὴ, τοῦτο ζῆ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· καὶ τὸ ψυχῆς ἐστερημένον ζωῆς εὐθὺς ἄμοιρον ἀπολείπεται.

Εἰ οὖν ζῶν ἐπιφέρει τοῖς ἐμψύχοις, ἡ ζωὴ ἐστὶν ἡ ζῶν μόνον ἢ τὸ συνάμφω, ζωὴ ἅμα καὶ ζῶν.—

Εἰ δὲ ζωὴ μόνον ἐστίν, οὐκέτι μεθέξει τῆς νοεῖας ζωῆς. τὸ γὰρ ζωῆς μετέχον ζῶν ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ ζωὴ μόνον· ζωὴ γὰρ μόνον ἡ πρώτη καὶ ἀμέθεκτος, ἡ δὲ μετ' ἐκείνην ζῶν ἅμα καὶ ζωὴ· ψυχὴ δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀμέθεκτος ζωὴ, ἅμα ἄρα ζωὴ ἐστὶ καὶ ζῶν ἢ ψυχὴ.

189. Πᾶσα ψυχὴ αὐτόζως ἐστίν.

Εἰ γὰρ ἐπιστρεπτική πρὸς ἑαυτήν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρεπτικὸν πᾶν αὐθυπόστατον, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα αὐθυπόστατος καὶ ἑαυτὴν ὑφίστησιν.

d. Participated soul has eternal existence, but a temporal activity. She both shares eternal being and is the first of things that come to be.

Ib., 191, 192:

191. Πᾶσα ψυχὴ μεθεκτὴ τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν αἰώνιον ἔχει, τὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν κατὰ χρόνον.—

192. Πᾶσα ψυχὴ μεθεκτὴ τῶν τε αἰετῶν ἐστὶ καὶ πρώτη τῶν γενητῶν.—

e. She possesses all the Forms which Noûs possesses primarily.

Ib., 194:

Πᾶσα ψυχὴ πάντα ἔχει τὰ εἶδη, ἃ ὁ νοῦς πρῶτως ἔχει.

Εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ νοῦ πρόεισι καὶ νοῦς ὑποστάτης ψυχῆς, καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ἀκίνητος ὢν πάντα ὁ νοῦς παράγει, δώσει καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ ὑφισταμένη τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πάντων οὐσιώδεις λόγους.

1469—a. Soul in the world has periodical motion and cyclic re-instatements. The periodical motion of soul

Proclus, *Elem.* 199:

Πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος περιόδοις χρῆται τῆς οἰκείας ζωῆς καὶ ἀποκαταστάσειν.

Εἰ γὰρ ὑπὸ χρόνου μετρεῖται καὶ μεταβατικῶς ἐνεργεῖ, καὶ ἐστὶν αὐτῆς ἰδία κινήσεις, πᾶν δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ χρόνου μετέχον, αἰδίων ὢν, χρῆται περιόδοις καὶ περιοδικῶς ἀνακυκλεῖται καὶ ἀποκαθίσταται ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτά, δηλὸν ὅτι καὶ πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος, κίνησιν ἔχουσα καὶ ἐνεργοῦσα κατὰ χρόνον, περιόδους τε τῶν κινήσεων ἔξει καὶ ἀποκαταστάσεις· πᾶσα γὰρ περίοδος τῶν αἰδίων ἀποκαταστατική ἐστίν.

b. Each soul has a periodic alternation of ascents and descents, and this movement is unceasing.

Ib., 206:

Πᾶσα ψυχὴ μερικὴ κατιέναι τε εἰς γένεσιν ἐπ' ἄπειρον καὶ ἀνιέναι δύναται ἀπὸ γενέσεως εἰς τὸ ὄν.

Εἰ γὰρ ποτὲ μὲν ἔπεται θεοῖς, ποτὲ δὲ ἀποπίπτει τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀνατάσεως, νοῦ τε καὶ ἀνοίας μετέχει, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι παρὰ μέρος ἐν τε τῇ γενέσει γίνεται καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς ἔστιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ <τὸν ἄπειρον οὐσα χρόνον ἐν σώμασιν ἐνύλοις ἔπειτα ἕτερον τοιοῦτον χρόνον ἔσται ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς, οὐδὲ> τὸν ἄπειρον οὐσα χρόνον ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς αὐθις ὅλον τὸν ἐφεξῆς χρόνον ἔσται ἐν τοῖς σώμασι· τὸ γὰρ ἀρχὴν χρονικὴν μὴ ἔχον οὐδὲ τελευτὴν ποτε ἔξει, καὶ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἔχον τελευτὴν ἀνάγκη μὴδὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχειν. λείπεται ἄρα περιόδους ἐκάστην ποιεῖσθαι ἀνόδων τε ἐκ τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῶν εἰς γένεσιν καθόδων, καὶ τοῦτο ἄπαυστον εἶναι διὰ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον. ἐκάστη ἄρα ψυχὴ μερικὴ κατιέναι τε ἐπ' ἄπειρον δύναται καὶ ἀνιέναι, καὶ τοῦτο οὐ μὴ παύσεται περὶ ἀπάσας τὸ πάθημα γινόμενον.

On Proclus' rejection of the possibility of eternal punishment, below, nr. 1474b. Cp. Sallustius c. 20, where the author says that souls cannot leave the body once for all and "remain for ever and ever in idleness" (τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα μένειν ἐν ἀργείᾳ).

The vehicle of soul c. Particular souls have an ὄχημα which is immaterial and impassible. It acquires increasingly material vestures in descending.

Ib., 208, 209:

208. Πάσης μερικῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ὄχημα ἄυλόν ἐστι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον κατ' οὐσίαν καὶ ἀπαθές. —

209. Πάσης μερικῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ὄχημα κάτεισι μὲν προσθέσει χιτῶνων ἐνυλοτέρων, συκναγνάγεται δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ δι' ἀφαιρέσεως παντὸς τοῦ ἐνύλου καὶ τῆς εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον εἶδος ἀναδρομῆς, ἀνάλογον τῇ χρωμένῃ ψυχῇ· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνη κάτεισι μὲν ἀλόγους προσλαβοῦσα ζώας, ἀνεισι δὲ ἀποσκευασαμένη πάσας τὰς γενεσιουργοὺς δυνάμεις, ἃς ἐν τῇ καθόδῳ περιεβάλλετο, καὶ γενομένη καθαρὰ καὶ γυμνὴ τῶν τοιούτων πασῶν δυνάμεων ὅσαι πρὸς τὴν τῆς γενέσεως χρεῖαν ὑπηρετοῦσι.

On the doctrine of the immaterial vehicle of soul and its προσθήκαι more explicit information is found in the Commentary on the *Timaeus*, a passage of which will be cited below (1474a).

Soul descends entire

d. When a soul descends into temporal existence, she descends entire. There is not a part of her which stays "yonder".

Ib., 211:

Πᾶσα μερικὴ ψυχὴ κατιοῦσα εἰς γένεσιν ὅλη κάτεισι, καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς ἄνω μένει, τὸ δὲ κάτεισιν. —

Cp. *In Tim.* III p. 333 f. Diehl, cited above (1453a). On this point as on many others Proclus joins Iamblichus.

1470—As Plotinus did when speaking of the ἄπειρον in the intelligible World (above, nr. 1408b-e) and in maintaining the existence of ὕλη νοητή (above, ib.), Pr. denies that “matter” taken in the sense of the πρῶτως ἄπειρον should be evil. For it springs from the First Cause, which is also called¹ “the Cause of the mixture”.

The cause
of evil

a. Proclus, *De malorum subsistentia*, p. 235/6 Cousin:

Si autem et ex se infinitum materiam dicendum, ex Deo materia sive τὸ prime infinitum. Substantialem enim infinitatem ex una causa dependentem divinitus exgenerari dicendum, et maxime eam quae cum fine facere mixturam non potentem: etenim subsistentiae ipsorum et mixtionis Deus causa; haec quidem igitur et corporis, qua corpus, naturam in unam causam ducere, scilicet Deum; ipse enim est qui mixtum genuit. Neque ergo corpus malum, neque materia: haec enim sunt Dei γενήματα hoc quidem ut mixtura, haec autem ut infinitum.

In this passage Pr. does not differ from Plotinus, as was pointed out above, except in so far as the conditional form of the first sentence marks a certain reserve as to calling the πρῶτως ἄπειρον “matter”. “If this is matter”, Pr. says, “then matter is generated by God”; and in this he joins Plotinus. But cp. *Theol. Plat.* p. 137-138, where he says that Being τὴν μὲν ὑπαρξιν ἐκ τοῦ πέρατος κομίζεται, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου· that, therefore, Being certainly μετέχει τῆς ἀπειρίας, but that it would be against the spirit of Platonism to call this ἄπειρον “matter” and thus to introduce a formless and undetermined nature into intelligible Being.

Theol. Plat. III c. 9, the end:

Εἰ δὲ ἄμορφόν τινα καὶ ἀνείδεον φύσιν καὶ ἀόριστον ἐπὶ τὴν νοητὴν οὐσίαν ἀναπέμπουσι, τῆς Πλατωνικῆς ἀμαρτάνειν μοι δοκοῦσι διανοίας. Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὕλη τοῦ πέρατος τὸ ἀπειρον, ἀλλὰ δύναμις, οὐδὲ εἶδος τοῦ ἀπείρου τὸ πέρας, ἀλλὰ ὑπαρξίς.—

The
πρῶτως
ἄπειρον
should not
be called
ὕλη

b. To the question of Πόθεν τὰ κακά Pr. answers that there is not just one cause of evil.

Proclus, *De malorum subs.* p. 250, 5-8 Cousin:

Unam quidem itaque secundum se malorum causam nullatenus ponendum. Si enim bonorum causa una, malorum multa et non unum.

There is not
one cause of
evil

¹ In Plato's *Philebus*, 23c.

c. *Malum* in the sense of *privatio* is perfectly negative and therefore could not be the cause of anything at all.

κακόν
in the
sense of
στέρησις
cannot be a
cause at all

Proclus, *ib.*, p. 240, 16-26 C.:

Si igitur malum quidem contrarium bono et dissidet ad ipsum, privatio autem neque oppugnat sui ipsius habitui, neque facere aliquid nata est cuius et esse tale debile omnino et non mansivum, ut illorum sermo, quomodo utique adhuc τὸ malificum ad ipsam reducemus, a qua remotum est omne facere? Species enim est hoc et potentia; haec autem informis et debilis, sed non potentia, magis autem absentia potentiae.

By this argument Pr. opposes Plotinus' doctrine of *Enn.* I 8, 11 (above, 1410d), in a sense at least. What he rejects is not so much the view of matter as στέρησις, but that matter so defined could "work". This could, however, hardly be meant by Plotinus. In fact, the essential point where Pr. differs from Plotinus is not so much matter, but soul (as was stated above).

d. Therefore, if souls are drawn towards an inferior level, it is by their own desires and their own inclinations, i.e. by themselves and not by matter.

The soul it-
self is the
cause of evil

Ib., p. 233, 16-23 C.:

Quomodo autem rursum habebit facere τὸ ἄποιον secundum se? Verum autem et adducit ad se ipsam materia animas, aut a se ipsis illae ducuntur et separatae fiunt potentia et impotentia sui ipsarum; si quidem itaque a se ipsis ducuntur, hoc erat ipsis malum qui ad deterius impetus et appetitus, sed non materia.

Cp. above, 1453a.

Fate and
Providence

1471—As Plotinus was, Pr. is much concerned with the problems of Fate and Providence. "Fate" for him is, so to say, the lower aspect of Providence, as it is seen by us. If we had a complete knowledge of reality, that which appears to us as mechanical necessity would be seen as a part of Providence.

a. Proclus, *De prov. et fato*, p. 148, l. 27-38; p. 149 l. 17-24 Cousin:

Primum quidem est Providentiam et Fatum non hac differre qua scripsisti (hoc quidem connexam consequentiam, hanc autem necessitatem huius causam), sed ambo quidem causas mundi et eorum quae in mundo fiunt esse, praeexistere autem Providentiam Fato et omnia quidem quaecumque fiunt secundum Fatum multo prius a Providentia fieri; contrarium autem non iam verum esse: summa enim totorum a Providentia recta esse diviniora Fato.—

Diffugiunt multa fatum, providentiam autem nihil; et . . . desuper providentia fatum gubernans, quod ipsa produxit, separavit ipsius ἐπιστασίαν usque ad ab altero mobilia ¹ aut ad sortita in ab altero mobilibus prima subsistentia.

Which means that Providence, as we found before, works from a distance, leaving the details of the sensible world to secondary causes, partly to ἐτεροκίνητα, partly to divine beings placed in this world (the ἐγκόσμιοι ἐνάδες). Cp. above, ad 1279d, 1331b, etc. On the function of angels and daemons, see our next nrs.

b. Proclus, *ib.*, p. 156, 23 - 157, 1:

Fate sub-ordinated to Providence

Providentiam itaque non est tibi difficile videre quam dicimus. Si enim fontem bonorum, primum quidem divinam ipsam causam determinans recte dices (unde enim aliunde omnibus bona quam divinitus? Ita ut bonorum quidem, ait Plato ², nullum alium causandum quam Deum); deinde, omnibus superstantem intellectualibusque et sensibilibus, superiorem esse Fato; et quae quidem sub Fato entia et sub Providentia perseverare, τὸ connecti quidem a Fato habentia, bonificari autem a Providentia, ut et connexio finem habeat Bonum, et Providentia Fati in se ipsa; quae autem rursum sub Providentia non adhuc omnia indigere et Fato, sed intellectualia ab hoc exempta esse.

In all this, again, Pr. did not essentially differ from Plotinus; but he did give a personal form to these conceptions.

1472—The four groups of henads or Gods we found in *Elem.* 163 ff. (above, 1466d) reappear in the prayer which, at the beginning of his commentary on the *Parmenides*, is addressed by Pr. to all the gods and goddesses. In this prayer they are followed by the choirs of angels, by the good daemons, and finally by heroes.

Gods - angels - daemons - heroes

a. Proclus, *In Parm.* p. 617, 1 - 618, 1 Cousin:

Εὐχομαι τοῖς θεοῖς πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις ποδηγῆσαι μου τὸν νοῦν εἰς τὴν προκειμένην θεωρίαν, καὶ φῶς ἐν ἐμοὶ στίλπνόν τῆς ἀληθείας ἀνάψαντας ἀναπλῶσαι τὴν ἐμὴν διάνοιαν ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστήμην, ἀνοῖξαι τε τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἐμῆς πύλας εἰς ὑποδοχὴν τῆς ἐνθέου τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὑφηγήσεως· καὶ ὀρμήσαντάς μου τὴν γνῶσιν εἰς τὸ φανότατον τοῦ ὄντος παῦσαι με τῆς πολλῆς δοξοσοφίας καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα πλάνης τῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα νοερωτάτῃ διατριβῇ, παρ' ὧν μόνων τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα τρέφεται τε καὶ ἄρδεται ³, καθάπερ φησὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ Σωκράτης· ἐνδοῦναί τέ μοι νοῦν μὲν τέλειον τοὺς νοητοὺς θεούς, δύναμιν δ' ἀναγωγὸν τοὺς νοερούς, ἐνέργειαν δὲ ἄλυτον καὶ ἀφειμένην

¹ I.e. ἐτεροκίνητα.

² *Rep.* 379c.

³ Plato, *Phaedr.* 251 b: ἡ τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις ἄρδεται. Cf. 246 e: τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πτέρωμα, cited by Proclus in his Commentary on the *First Alcib.*, p. 324 Cousin.

τῶν ὑλικῶν γνώσεων τοὺς ὑπὲρ τὸν οὐρανὸν τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμόνας ¹, ζῶν δὲ ἐπτερωμένην τοὺς τὸν κόσμον λαχόντας ², ἔκφανσιν δὲ τῶν θείων ἀληθῆ τοὺς ἀγγελικούς χορούς, ἀποπλήρωσιν δὲ τῆς παρὰ θεῶν ἐπιπνοίας τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς δαίμονας, μεγαλόφρονα δὲ καὶ σεμνὴν καὶ ὑψηλὴν κατάστασιν τοὺς ἥρωας· πάντα δὲ ἀπλῶς τὰ θεῖα γένη παρασκευὴν ἐνθεῖναι μοι τελείαν εἰς τὴν μετουσίαν τῆς ἐποπτικωτάτης τοῦ Πλάτωνος καὶ μυστικωτάτης θεωρίας. —

It is in the following lines that Pr. speaks of his master Syrianus as ὁ τῷ Πλάτωνι μὲν συμβακχεύσας ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ ὁ μεστὸς καταστάς τῆς θείας ἀληθείας, as τῶν θείων τούτων λόγων ὄντως ἱεροφάντης and as a saviour of mankind (σωτηρίας ἀρχηγὸν τοῖς γε νῦν οὖσι ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς εἰσαῦθις γενησομένοις).

The passage was referred to above, under 1455b.

b. The functions of angels, daemons and heroes are described in the following passage.

The
functions
of angels,
daemons
and heroes

Proclus, *In Tim.* III p. 165, l. 5-8, 11-30 Diehl:

Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ δαιμόνιον τὴν μεταξὺ χώραν ἀναπληροῖ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων. 5
διότι δὴ παντελὴς ἀπόστασις ἐστὶ τῶν τε ἡμετέρων καὶ τῶν θείων πραγμάτων,
. . . διὰ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ τριάς ἐστὶν ἡ συνάπτουσα τὰ ἡμέτερα τοῖς θεοῖς, ἀνὰ λόγον 11
προελθοῦσα ταῖς τρισὶν ἀρχικαῖς αἰτίαις, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαν δαιμόνιον αὐτὸς εἴωθε
καλεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀγγελικὸν πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν τὸ πρῶτως ἐκφάνει ἀπὸ τῆς
ἀρρήτου καὶ ἀποκεκρυμμένης τῶν ὄντων πηγῆς ἀναλογίαν ἀποσφᾶζει, διὸ καὶ 15
αὐτὸ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐκφαίνει καὶ τὸ κρύφιον αὐτῶν ἐξαγγέλλει. τὸ δὲ δαιμόνιον πρὸς
τὴν ζῶν τὴν ἄπειρον, διὸ πανταχοῦ πρόεισι κατὰ πολλὰς τάξεις καὶ πολυειδές
ἐστὶ καὶ πολύμορφον. τὸ δὲ ἡρωϊκὸν κατὰ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν, διὸ 20
καὶ αὐτὸ καθάρσεώς ἐστιν ἔφορον καὶ ζωῆς μεγαουργοῦ καὶ ὑψηλῆς χορηγόν.
ἔτι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀγγελικὸν κατὰ τὴν νοερὰν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ προέρχεται ζῶν, διὸ
καὶ αὐτὸ νοερὸν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἐρμηνεύει καὶ διαπορθεύει τὸν
θεῖον νοῦν εἰς τὰ δεύτερα. τὸ δὲ δαιμόνιον κατὰ τὴν δημιουργικὴν τῶν ὅλων 25
πρόνοιαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν κατευθύνει καὶ τὴν τάξιν ὀρθῶς συμπληροῖ τοῦ παντὸς
κόσμου. τὸ δὲ ἡρωϊκὸν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστρεπτικὴν αὐ τούτων πάντων προμήθειαν,
διὸ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ γένος ὑψηλὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀναγωγὸν τῶν ψυχῶν καὶ ἀδρότητος 30
αἵτιον. —

c. Cp. *Theol. Plat.* VI 4, p. 352:

"Ἀπαντες ³ γὰρ ἡγεμόνες εἰσὶ καὶ ἄρχοντες ἐν τῷ παντί. καὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἀγγέλων τάξεις περιχορεύουσιν αὐτοῖς. πολλοὶ τε δαιμόνων ἀριθμοί, πολλὰ δὲ ἡρώων ἀγέλαι, παμπληθεῖς δὲ ψυχὰι μερικαί.

Cp. also *In Tim.* III 153, 11-15 and *In Remp.* I 91, 11 ff.

¹ The ἐνάδες ὑπερκόσμιοι of *Elem.* 164.

² The ἐνάδες ἐγκόσμιοι of *Elem.* 165 (above, 1466d).

³ In the preceding lines the author spoke of the heavenly bodies.

1473—a. That Providence is not only general (as e.g. Celsus opposed to Christian doctrine) but extends to individuals, is explicitly asserted by Proclus. **Providence extends to individuals**

Proclus, *In Rempubl.* II p. 103, l. 5-6 Kroll:

Καὶ οὐ τὰ ἅλα προνοεῖται μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, θεῶν ὄντων καὶ δαιμόνων ὑπουργούντων τοῖς θεοῖς.

b. In commenting on *Resp.* 617d-e (above, nr. 307) he maintains the importance of the free will of man against ἀνάγκη. **Free will maintained against necessity**

Proclus, *In Rempubl.* II p. 275, l. 14-19 Kr.:

Τόνδε γὰρ ἐλόμενοι τὸν βίον συνεσόμεθα αὐτῷ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· ἀπλῶς δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· ἐνεδέχετο γὰρ καὶ ἄλλον βίον ζῆν, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῆς αἰρέσεως, μετὰ δὲ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἀδύνατον. καὶ οὕτως ἔοικεν καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον¹ εἰς ἀναγκαίαν μεταπίπτειν δύναμιν διὰ τῆς ἀκολουθίας, καὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἀναγκαίως ἐνδεχομένοις ἄλλοις ἐπομένων.

1474—As we found above (1469c) Pr.—apparently following Syrianus—asserted that every particular soul has an immaterial body which is immortal. He assumes that this body (θεῖον σῶμα or ὄχημα) in descending is increased by another, semi-spiritual body (πνευματικὸν σῶμα) which is not eternal but πολυχρόνιον and survives the material body. The theory is expounded in the following passage.

a. Proclus, *In Tim.* III p. 236, 31 - 237, 9 Diehl:

To questions concerning punishments, purification, reincarnations, possibly in animals (ἄλογα), Pr. replies: **The "vehicle" of soul and its increments**

Μήποτε οὖν κάλλιον οὕτω λέγειν, ὥσπερ ὁ ἡμέτερος διδάσκαλος², τὰς μὲν ἀκρότητας τῆς ἀλόγου ζωῆς τὸ πνεῦμα περιέχειν καὶ εἶναι ταύτας μετὰ τοῦ ὀχήματος αἰδίοις ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ παρηγμένας³, ταύτας δὲ ἐκτεινόμενας καὶ μεριζομένας ποιεῖν τὴν ζωὴν ταύτην, ἣν προσυφαίνουσιν οἱ νέοι θεοί⁴, θνητὴν μὲν οὖσαν διότι τὸν μερισμὸν τοῦτον ἀποτίθεσθαι ποτε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναγκαῖον, ὅταν ἀποκαταστῇ τυχοῦσα καθάρσεως, πολυχρονιωτέραν δὲ τῆς τοῦ σώματος τούτου ζωῆς· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐν "Αἰδου καὶ τοὺς βίους αἱρουμένην ἔχειν τὴν τοιαύτην ζωὴν· κατὰ γὰρ αὐτὴν τὴν ῥοπὴν προσλαμβάνει τὴν θνητὴν ταύτην ζωὴν ἀπὸ νέων θεῶν.

¹ For the meaning of this term see *Gr. Ph.* II, nrs. 443b, 559a.

² Syrianus.

³ Pr. holds that certain *apices* of unreasonable life are imperishable, together with the immaterial "vehicle", and caused by the Demiurge.

⁴ The νέοι θεοί are the "created gods" addressed by the Demiurge in *Tim.* 41 (above, nr. 353).

We found similar conceptions in Posidonius, Plutarchus, in the Hermetic writings and in Porphyrius. Cp. Dodds, *The Elements* p. 306 f. and *App.* II.

b. Pr. who holds the doctrine of an eternal alternation of ascent and descent of souls, excludes the possibility of either eternal bliss or eternal punishment. The man who is incurable (ἀνίατος) will perish as for his own doing, but he will be finally "saved" (i.e. brought back to the upperworld) by "that which comes to him from the Whole". This is illustrated by the famous case of Ardiaeus (*Resp.* 615c; above, nr. 307).

Proclus, *In Rempubl.* II p. 178, l. 5 - 179, 2 Kroll:

Eternal
punishment
excluded

Speaking of the ἀνίατοι ψυχαί in the myths of *Gorg.* 525c and *Phaed.* 113e the author says:

Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐδείκνυμεν καὶ ἐν τοῖς εἰς ἐκείνους τοὺς μύθους εἰρημένοις, ὥς 5
ἄρα περίοδον ὅλην τινὰ κολάζων τὰς ἀνιάτους ψυχὰς τοιαῦτα φθέγγεται· τὸ
γὰρ παντελῶς ἀνίατον εἶναι ψυχὴν [ἄτοπον εἶναι ῥητέον]· τὸ γὰρ ἐν χρόνῳ
γεγονυῖ[αν ἀνίατον] μὴ καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ χωρίζεσθαι [τῶν νόσ]ων ἐκείνων ἀμήχανον. 10
καὶ εἰ μὲν [πᾶσα]ν ψυχὴν δυνατόν τηλικαῦτα ἀμαρτεῖν καὶ [ἀνία]τον γενέσθαι,
πᾶν ἐπιλείπει τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ψυχῶν τὴν γένεσιν, ἐκεῖ γεγονυιῶν πασῶν ἐν
τῷ ἀπείρῳ χρόνῳ καὶ μὴ ἀνιουσῶν· εἰ δέ τι γένος ἐστὶν ἴδιον ψυχῶν τὸ ταῦτα
πάσχον, ἔσεσθαι χρόνον, ἐν ᾧ πᾶν τὸ τοιόνδε γένος ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ γῆς τόποις 15
δεδεμένον ἐπιλείπει τὴν γένεσιν. τούτων δὲ ὄντων ἀτοπωτάτων ἐλέγομεν τὴν
ἀνίατον ζωὴν παρ' ἐαυτῆς εἶναι τοιαύτην ὡς ἀμεταμέλητον· . . . τῆς δὲ οἰκείας
διορθώσεως ἀνρηγήμενης αὐτὴ μὲν ἐστὶν παρ' ἐαυτῆς ἀνίατος ἢ τοιαύτη πᾶσα 21
ζωή, τυγχάνει δὲ ἰάσεως ὑπὸ τῶν ὅλων κατὰ τινὰ περίοδον λύουσιν αὐτῆς τὴν
ἐκεῖ κατὰτάξιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀφ' ἐαυτοῦ βοηθούμενον πολλῶ μειζόνως ἀπὸ τῶν
ὅλων βοηθεῖται κοσμικῶν περιόδων· τὸ δὲ ἀφ' ἐαυτοῦ σωτηρίας οὐκ ἔχον 25
ἐλπίδα ἢ λαμβάνει σωτηρίας ἀφορμὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὅλων, αἰδίδιον ὄν, ἢ ἀπόλλυται
παντελῶς, εἰ μὴ αἰδίδιον ὄν τυγχάνοι. Διὰ ταῦτα τοῖνον καὶ τοῦ Ἀρδιαίου πάντως
ἀπεγίγνωσκον ὡς ἀναβησομένου ποτέ, τὴν παροῦσαν ζωὴν γέμουσαν κακῶν 30
ὀρώντες καὶ ἀνήκεστα πάσχουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔδρασεν· τὰ δὲ ὅλα τίναν p. 179
τρόπον σφάζει τὰς τοιαύτας ψυχὰς, οὐχ ἐώρων.

See also p. 184, l. 25 f.:

Εἰ δὲ ὅπως οὖν λατρεύεται, παρ' ἐαυτοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάσχοι τοῦτο ἀνίατος ὢν, παρὰ
δὲ τῶν ὅλων δυνάμεων.

Reincarna-
tion in
animals
rejected

c. Pr. rejects the theory of reincarnation of human souls in animals. He explains the passages of Plato relating to this in allegorical sense.

Proclus, *In Rempubl.* II p. 312, l. 10-14; 313, 7-12:

Commenting on *Resp.* 620a-d, where it is said that the soul of Orpheus was re-incarnated in a swan, Pr. says:

"Οτι μὲν παντελῶς ταῦτα ἀτοπίας μεστὰ τοῖς ἀπερισκέπτως αὐτὰ μετιοῦσιν ἔστιν, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἄλλως ἂν εἴποιμι. τὸ γὰρ τὰς τῶν θείων ἀνδρῶν ψυχὰς εἰσοικίζειν εἰς ἄλογα ζῶα καὶ τὰς ἡρωϊκὰς ὑπερβολὴν οὐ καταλιμπάνει τῆς περὶ ἐκείνας πλημμελείας. —

ο. 313 Μήποτε οὖν, ἵνα καὶ τῷ μύθῳ χαρισώμεθα καὶ συγχωρήσωμεν ἃ βούλεται πλάττειν καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα τῆς εἰς τοὺς ἥρωας δυσφημίας ἐξέλωμεν, ἐκεῖνο 10 ῥητέον, ὡς ἄρα διὰ τῶν τοιούτων πλασμάτων οὐκ αὐτὰς θέλει τὰς ψυχὰς ἐκείνας ὧν διαμνημονεύει νῦν ἡρώων εἰς τὰ ἄλογα κατασπᾶν, ἀλλὰ ζώων εἶδη αἰνίσσεσθαι διὰ τῶνδε τῶν ὀνομάτων.

1475—a. The Neoplatonism of Proclus came to Western Europe first of all through the works of the Christian author of the early 6th century who called himself Dionysius Areopagita and, from the 8th century onwards, was generally accepted as such; next by the *Liber de causis*, which in the 12th was translated into Latin. The original was an Arabic work of the 9th century, based on Proclus' *Elements*. Finally in the 13th century, the *Elements* were translated into Latin by William of Morbecca. Thus, Proclus' summary of Plotinus' doctrine was known in Western Europe before the greater part of Plato's dialogues and before the *Enneads*. Nicolaus Cusanus in the 15th century read William Morbecca's version of the *Elements*, and to Ficino Proclus was as high an authority as Plato and Plotinus were. Still with the Cambridge Platonists, who in the 17th century opposed a Neoplatonic spiritualism to the materialism of Hobbes, the influence of Proclus and his *Elements* can be clearly traced. Dodds (*The Elements*, p. XXXII) finds "a distant echo" of the *Elements* in the *Fairie Queen*, and a quotation of the *Theologia Platonica* in Coleridge.

b. Important parts of the Commentaries were translated into Syriac and Arabic and diffused in the East during the early Middle Ages. The *Elements* were also translated into Arabic, later into Georgian and Armenian (12th and 13th centuries). Apparently they were still read and translated in the 18th and 19th centuries.

c. In Byzantium, Michael Psellus (11th cent.) was well up in Proclus. He makes abundant use of the *Elements* in his *De omnifaria doctrina*. In the 12th cent. Nicolaus, bishop of Methone, wrote an Ἀνάπτυξις τῆς θεολογικῆς στοιχειώσεως.

4—DAMASCIUS AND THE END OF THE SCHOOL OF ATHENS

1476—The last of Proclus' successors in the School of Athens was Damascius. We cited his work Ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις περὶ τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν εἰς τὸν Πλάτωνος Παρμενίδην in dealing with Iamblichus' doubling of the First Principle. Dam. maintained with the greatest emphasis and careful elaboration that the First Principle is beyond human knowledge. He joins Iambl. in placing it above the One.

The First
Principle
beyond
human
language
and under-
standing

a. The First Principle cannot be named or conceived at all.

Damascius, *Dub. et sol.* 2, p. 4, l. 6-10 Ruelle:

Μαντεύεται ἄρα ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν ὁπωσοῦν πάντων ἐπινοουμένων εἶναι ἀρχὴν ἐπέκεινα πάντων ἀσύντακτον πρὸς πάντα. Οὐδὲ ἄρα ἀρχήν, οὐδὲ αἴτιον ἐκείνην κλητέον, οὐδὲ πρῶτον, οὐδέ γε πρὸ πάντων, οὐδ' ἐπέκεινα πάντων· σχολῇ γε ἄρα πάντα αὐτὴν ὑμνητέον· οὐδ' ὅλως * ὑμνητέον, οὐδ' ἐννοητέον, οὐδὲ ὑπονοητέον.

Why beyond
the One

b. Why a First Principle beyond the One?

Damascius, *ib.* p. 5, 2-9; c. 3, p. 5, 14-6, 7:

Ἄλλ' εἰ τὸ ἐν πάντων αἴτιον καὶ πάντων περιεκτικόν, τίς ἡ ἐπέκεινα καὶ τούτου ἀνάβασις ἡμῶν; μήποτε γὰρ κενεμβατοῦμεν εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ οὐδὲν ἀνατεινόμενοι· ὁ γὰρ μὴδὲ ἐν ἐστὶ, τοῦτο οὐδὲν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ δικαιοῦτατον· πόθεν γὰρ 5 ὅτι τὸ ἐστὶ τι τοῦ ἐνός ἐπέκεινα; ἄλλου γὰρ οὐδενὸς χρήζει τὰ πολλὰ ἢ τοῦ ἐνός· διὸ μόνον τὸ ἐν αἴτιον τῶν πολλῶν· διὸ καὶ τὸ ἐν πάντων αἴτιον, ὅτι τῶν πολλῶν αἴτιον δεῖ μόνον εἶναι τὸ ἐν· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ οὐδὲν (τὸ γὰρ οὐδὲν αἴτιον οὐδενός), οὔτε αὐτὰ τὰ πολλὰ. —

Εἰ δ' οὖν ταῦτά τις ἀπορούμενος λέγοι ἀρκεῖσθαι τῇ ἀρχῇ τοῦ ἐνός καὶ προστιθεῖν τὸν κολοφῶνα ὡς οὐδὲ ἐννοῖαν οὐδὲ ὑπόνοιαν ἔχομεν ἀπλουστέραν 15 τοῦ ἐνός, πῶς οὖν ὑπονοήσομεν ἐπέκεινά τι τῆς ἐσχάτης ὑπονοίας τε καὶ ἐννοίας; εἰ τις ταῦτα φάσκει, συγγνωσόμεθα μὲν αὐτῷ τῆς ἀπορίας· ἄβατος γὰρ ὡς ἔοικεν καὶ ἀμήχανος ἢ τοιάδε φροντίς. Ἄλλ' ὅμως ἐκ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωριμωτέρων ἀνεθιστέον τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν ἀρρήτους ὠδῖνας εἰς τὴν ἀρρητον οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως εἴπω συναίσθησιν τῆς ὑπερφάνου ταύτης ἀληθείας· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς 20 τῇδε τὸ ἄσχετον πάντη τιμιώτερον τοῦ ἐν σχέσει καὶ τοῦ συντεταγμένου τὸ ἀσύντακτον, ὡς ὁ θεωρητικὸς τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, καὶ ὁ Κρόνος φέρε εἰπεῖν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, καὶ τὸ ὄν τῶν εἰδῶν, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν πολλῶν, ὧν ἀρχὴ τὸ ἐν, οὕτω καὶ ἀπλῶς αἰτίων καὶ αἰτιατῶν καὶ ἀρχῶν ἀπασῶν καὶ ἀρχομένων τὸ πάντα p. 6 τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐκβεβηκὸς καὶ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ συντάξει καὶ σχέσει ὑποτιθέμενον, ὡς τῷ λόγῳ φάναι· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν πολλῶν φύσει προέστηκεν καὶ τὸ ἀπλούστατον τῶν συνθετωτέρων ὁπωσοῦν, καὶ τὸ περιεκτικώτατον τῶν εἴσω περιεχομένων· τόδ' εἰ θέλεις εἰπεῖν ἐπέκεινα πάσης ἐστὶν καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀντιθέσεως, 5 ἐπέκεινα οὐ τῆς ἐν ὁμοταγεί μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ὡς πρώτου καὶ μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον.

* ὅλως is the reading of a minority of Mss. I prefer it to ὅμως which is read in most Mss. and in the edition of Ruelle.

1477—a. In what sense it is unknowable.

Damascius, c. 7, p. 12, l. 24-28 R.:

πῶς
ἄγνωστον;

Πῶς οὖν ἀποδεικτὸν τό γε ὅσον ἐν ἡμῖν συνίσταται περὶ ἐκεῖνο ἀγνόημα; πῶς γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ἄγνωστον λέγομεν; ἐνὶ μὲν λόγῳ τῷ ῥηθέντι, ὅτι αἰεὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ τὴν γνῶσιν τιμιώτερον εὐρίσκομεν· ὥστε τὸ ὑπὲρ ἅπασαν γνῶσιν εἴπερ ἦν εὐρετόν, εὐρέθη ἂν καὶ αὐτὸ τιμιώτατον.

b. Even the predicate *transcendent* (ἐξηρημένον) is not adequate, for it presupposes a relation to other things. Negation too is still a word and as such insufficient. Only silence and the confession of complete ignorance are fitting here.

Damascius, ib., p. 15, l. 11-25 R.:

Silence only
suits here

Οὕτω δὴ καὶ πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν γνωστὸν καὶ ὑπονοητὸν λαβόντες ἐν τῷ νῷ, μέχρι καὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀξιοῦμεν, εἰ δεῖ φθέγγεσθαι τὰ ἀφθεγκτα καὶ ἐννοεῖν τὰ ἀεννόητα. Ἀξιοῦμεν ὅμως ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸ ἀσύμβατον πρὸς πάντα καὶ ἀσύντακτον καὶ οὕτως ἐξηρημένον, ὥστε μὴδὲ τὸ ἐξηρημένον ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν·
 15 ἐξήρηται γὰρ αἰεὶ τινος τό γε ἐξηρημένον καὶ οὐ πάντῃ ἐστὶν ἐξηρημένον, ἅτε σχέσιν ἔχον πρὸς τὸ οὐ ἐξήρηται, καὶ ὅλως ἐν προηγῇσει τινὶ σύνταξιν. Εἰ οὖν μέλλοι τῷ ὄντι ἐξηρημένον ὑποκείσθαι, μὴδ' ἐξηρημένον ὑποκείσθω· οὐ γὰρ ἐπαληθεύει τῷ ἐξηρημένῳ τὸ οἰκτεῖον ὄνομα κατὰ ἀκρίβειαν· ἅμα γὰρ ἡδὴ καὶ συντεταγμένον, ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῦ ἀποφῆσαι ἀνάγκη· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ
 20 ἀπόφασις λόγος τις, καὶ τὸ ἀποφατὸν πράγμα, τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ἄρα ἀποφατόν, οὐδὲ λεκτὸν ὅλως, οὐδὲ γνωστὸν ὁπωσοῦν· ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀποφῆναι τὴν ἀπόφασιν δυνατόν. Ἀλλὰ ἡ πάντῃ περιτροπὴ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν νοήσεων αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐμφανταζομένη ἡμῖν ἀπόδειξις οὗ λέγομεν· καὶ τί πέρας ἔσται τοῦ λόγου, πλὴν σιγῆς ἀμηχάνου καὶ ὁμολογίας τοῦ μὴδὲν γινώσκειν, ὣν μὴδὲ θέμις,
 25 ἀδυνάτων ὄντων, εἰς γνῶσιν ἐλθεῖν;

1478—Damascius shows, if not an inclination towards irrationalism, yet at any rate a strong feeling for the inadequacy of words.

a. Since the First Principle is beyond causation, another 'Ἀρχή must be assumed which is described, however inadequately, as δύναμις of the First and Cause of causes. The second
ἀρχή
described

Damascius, c. 38, p. 78, l. 14-19, p. 79, 2-7 R.:

Ὡς οὖν πρὸς ἐνδειξιν ταύτης, διωρίσθω τινα τρόπον ἀσυμφανέστατον καὶ ἥκιστα γε τρανῇ προσδιορισμόν. Καὶ τὸν πρώτιστον λέγω πάντων προσδιορισμῶν καὶ σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀδιορίστου καταπινόμενον, ὥστε δύναμιν τοῦ πρώτου τὸ δεύτερον εἶναι δοκεῖν, δύναμιν τῇ ὑπάρξει συμπεπηγυῖαν, ὡς ἡδὴ τινὲς ἱερολόγοι τοῦτο αἰνίττονται. —

Ἡ δὲ ἄλλη πρόοδος καὶ τάξις ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων αἰτίων ἐφήκει τοῖς πᾶσιν· ἀπὸ δὲ ἐκείνου καὶ ταῦτα μὲν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν τοῖς πᾶσι καὶ ταῦτα. Διὸ μόνον ἐκεῖνο τῶν πάντων αἷτιον, ἄλλο δὲ ἄλλου τούτων πάντων. "Οτι δὲ ὡς πάντων ὁμοῦ 5 ἐκεῖνο ἀρχή, δηλοῖ μὲν αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ παντελές, δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ ἀδιόριστον, οὐ μᾶλλον τοῦδε ὃν ἢ τοῦδε, δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ἐπιπόθησις τῆς πάντων, ὡς πάντων.

b. The procession of all things from this Principle is conceived by us, inadequately, as μονή - πρόοδος - ἐπιστροφή, though it is in fact beyond division and determination. The Principle of Being is also beyond the triad ὑπαρξις - δύναμις - ἐνέργεια. It is beyond production and is Cause in an unspeakable way.

The mode of procession

Damascius, c. 39, p. 79, l. 30-p. 80, 14 R.:

Μὴ τοίνυν ἀπορεῖτω τις εἰ τὰ ἄλλα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πρόεισιν, ἐχωρίσθη αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἄρα τούτων ἐχωρίσθη· εἰ δὲ ἦνῳται, οὐ προῆλθεν· οὔτε γὰρ οὕτως p. 80 ὡς ἡμεῖς νοοῦμεν, οὔτε προῆλθεν, οὔτε οὐ προῆλθεν. "Αλλος γὰρ ὁ τρόπος ἐκεῖνος τῆς ἐνιαίας προόδου, ὃν ἡμεῖς οὕτω συννοοῦμεν, ἅτε μεμερισμένοι εἰς μονὴν καὶ πρόοδον καὶ ἐπιστροφήν, ὃ δὲ ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ τὸν διορισμὸν τῶν τοιούτων, οὔτε ἀναγκαῖον ἦνῳσθαι, εἰ μὴ διακρίνηται, οὔτε διακρίνεσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἦνῳται· 5 ἐκεῖνο γὰρ τὴν πρὸ ἀμφοῖν ἀδιόριστον· τὰ δὲ ἐστὶν ἀντικείμενα. Μὴδὲ αὖ ζητεῖτω τις εἰ παράγει, τὰ δὲ παράγεται· εἰ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ, καὶ δύναται καὶ ὑπάρχει. Τρία οὖν τὰ πάντα, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἓν, ὑπαρξις, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια. "Αλλ' εἴρηται ὅτι ἐκεῖνο πρὸ ἐνεργείας καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ ὑπάρξεως. ἐν γάρ, ἀλλ' οὐ 10 τρία, πρὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, ὡς ἐν καὶ τὰ τρία. "Απορίᾳ δὲ ἡμεῖς καὶ νοήσεως καὶ 10 ἐξηγήσεως παράγειν ὅμως αὐτὸ λέγομεν, διακαθαρτέον δὲ τὸν τρόπον τῆς παραγωγῆς, ὡς ὄντα ἀσύμφυλον ἡμῖν, καὶ οὔτε τῷ ἐνεργεῖν, οὔτε τῷ δύνασθαι, οὔτε τῷ ὑπάρχειν ἐπιτελούμενον, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνὶ πρὸ τῶν τριῶν ἀπορρήτῳ τρόπῳ.

c. Cp. also c. 54, cited above (nr. 1451a), where it is said that the two ἀρχαί are neither ὁμοταγεῖς nor διωρισμένοι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων since they are beyond ταυτότης and ἐτερότης. The analogy is drawn with the triad πατήρ - δύναμις - νοῦς, but to this simile the author adds:

Πάντως δὲ φανερόν ὅτι οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἀληθεύεται ἀληθῶς ἐπ' ἐκείνων.

The end of the School of Athens

1479—A.D. 529 the last School of philosophy at Athens was closed by the edict of the emperor Justinianus.

Joh. Malalas, *Chronogr.* XVIII p. 187:

Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ὑπατείας τοῦ αὐτοῦ Δεκίου ὁ αὐτὸς βασιλεὺς θεσπίσας πρόσταξιν ἐπεμψεν, ἐν Ἀθήναις κελεύσας μηδένα διδάσκειν φιλοσοφίαν μήτε νόμιμα ἐξηγεῖσθαι· —

1480—A.D. 531/2 seven Athenian philosophers, i.a. Damascius and Simplicius (the famous commentator on Aristoteles) emigrated to Persia, invited by the New Persian king Khosru Nuschirvan, an admirer of Greek culture and philosophy. The historian Agathias tells how, after a bitter disappointment and many difficulties, they came back to Athens (in the year 533). Khosru let them go after having made a treaty of peace with Justinian, to which a clause was added, stipulating that the philosophers should not be constrained to forsake their own opinions and the tradition handed down to them.

**Emigration
of Athenian
philosophers
to Persia**

Agathias, *Hist.* II c. 30-31, p. 231 Dindorf:

Οὐ πολλῶ γάρ ἔμπροσθεν Δαμάσκιος ὁ Σύρος καὶ Σιμπλίκιος ὁ Κίλιξ Εὐλάλιός τε ὁ Φρύξ καὶ Πρισκιανὸς ὁ Λυδὸς Ἑρμείας τε καὶ Διογένης οἱ ἐκ Φοινίκης καὶ Ἰσίδωρος ὁ Γαζαῖος, οὗτοι δὴ οὖν ἅπαντες τὸ ἄκρον ἄωτον, κατὰ τὴν ποίησιν, τῶν ἐν τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ φιλοσοφησάντων, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοὺς ἡ παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις κρατοῦσα ἐπὶ τῷ κρείττονι δόξᾳ οὐκ ἤρεσκεν, ὥντό τε τὴν Περσικὴν πολιτείαν πολλῶ εἶναι ἀμείνονα, τούτοις δὴ τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν περιαδομένοις ἀναπεπεισμένοι ὡς εἴη παρ' ἐκείνοις δικαιοτάτον μὲν τὸ ἄρχον καὶ ὁποῖον εἶναι ὁ Πλάτωνος βούλεται λόγος, φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ βασιλείας ἐς ταῦτ' οὐκ ἐξυμνοῦσας, σῶφρον δὲ ἐς τὰ μάλιστα καὶ κόσμιον τὸ κατήκοον, καὶ οὔτε φῶρες χρημάτων οὔτε ἄρπαγες ἀναφύονται, ἀτὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ἄλλην μετιόντες ἀδικίαν, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τι τῶν τιμίων κτημάτων ἐν ὅτῳ δὴ οὖν χώρῳ ἐρημοτάτῳ καταλειφθεῖη, ἀφαιρεῖται ὅστις οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων, μένει δὲ οὕτως, εἰ καὶ ἀφύλακτον ᾗ, σωζόμενον τῷ λελοιπότῳ ἔστ' ἂν ἐπανήκοι· τούτοις δὴ οὖν ὡς ἀληθέσιν ἀρθέντες, καὶ πρὸς γε ἀπειρημένον αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἀδεῶς ἐνταῦθα ἐμπολιτεύεσθαι, ὡς τῷ καθεστῶτι¹ οὐχ ἐπομένοις, οἱ δὲ αὐτίκα ἀπιόντες ὥχοντο ἐς ἄλλοδαπά καὶ ἄμικτα ἥθη, ὡς ἐκεῖσε τὸ λοιπὸν βιωσόμενοι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τέλει ἀλαζόνας μάλα εὐρόντες καὶ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος ἐξωγαμένους, ἐβδελύττοντό γε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐκάκιζον· ἔπειτα δὲ ἐώρων ὡς τοιχωρύχοι τε πολλοὶ καὶ λωποδύται οἱ μὲν ἡλίσκοντο, οἱ δὲ καὶ διελάνθανον, ἅπαν δὲ εἶδος ἀδικίας ἡμαρτάνετο. καὶ γὰρ οἱ δυνατοὶ τοὺς ἐλάττονας λυμαίνονται, ὡμότητί τε πολλῇ χρῶνται κατ' ἀλλήλων καὶ ἀπανθρωπία, καὶ τὸ δὴ πάντων παραλογώτερον· ἐξὸν γὰρ ἐκάστῳ μυρίας ὅσας ἄγεσθαι γαμετάς, καὶ τοίνυν ἀγομένοις, ἀλλὰ μοιχεῖαι γε ὅμως τολμῶνται. τούτων δὴ οὖν ἀπάντων ἕκατι οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἐδυσφόρου καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡτιῶντο τῆς μεταστάσεως.

(31) Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τῷ βασιλεῖ διαλεχθέντες ἐψεύσθησαν τῆς ἐλπίδος, ἄνδρα εὐρόντες φιλοσοφεῖν μὲν φρυαττόμενον, οὐδὲν δὲ ὅ τι καὶ ἐπαίοντα τῶν αἰπυτέρων, ὅτι τε αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ τῆς δόξης ἐκοινώνει, ἕτερα δὲ ἄττα ἐνόμιζεν ὅποια

¹ τῷ καθεστῶτι—"the established order", i.e. Christian religion.

ἤδη μοι εἴρηται ¹, τὴν τε τῶν μίξεων κακοδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἐνεγκόντες, ὥς τάχιστα ἐπανήεσαν. καίτοι ἔστεργέ τε αὐτούς ἐκεῖνος καὶ μένειν ἡξίου, οἱ δὲ ἄμεινον εἶναι σφίσιν ἡγοῦντο ἐπιβάντες μόνον τῶν Ῥωμαϊκῶν ὀρίων αὐτίκα οὕτω παρασχὼν καὶ τεθνάναι ἢ μένοντες παρὰ Πέρσαις τῶν μεγίστων γερῶν μεταλαγχάνειν. οὕτω τε ἅπαντες οἴκαδε ἀπενόστησαν, χαίρειν εἰπόντες τῇ τοῦ βαρβάρου φιλοξενίᾳ. ἀπώναντο δὲ ὁμῶς τῆς ἐκδημίας, οὐκ ἐν βραχεῖ τινι καὶ ἡμελημένῳ, ἀλλ' ὅθεν αὐτοῖς ὁ ἐφεξῆς βίος εἰς τὸ θυμῆρές τε καὶ ἡδιστον ἀπετελεύτησεν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ κατ' ἐκεῖνο τοῦ χρόνου Ῥωμαῖοί τε καὶ Πέρσαι σπονδὰς ἔθεντο καὶ ξυνθήκας, μέρος ὑπῆρχε τῶν κατ' αὐτὰς ἀναγεγραμμένων τὸ δεῖν ἐκείνους τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐς τὰ σφέτερα ἤθη κατιόντας βιοτεύειν ἀδεῶς τὸ λοιπὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς, οὐδὲν ὀτιοῦν πέρα τῶν δοκούντων φρονεῖν ἢ μεταβάλλειν τὴν πατρῶαν δόξαν ἀναγκαζομένους. οὐ γὰρ ἀνῆκεν ὁ Χοσρόης μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τῷδε συστῆναι καὶ κρατεῖν τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν.

¹ In the preceding pages it was mentioned that Khosru had a Greek philosopher, named Uranius, in his house, a sceptic of apparently rather a bad reputation among the Athenian philosophers.

A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY ¹

I—THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN AGE

A—GENERAL WORKS

- P. Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur*, Tübingen 1912.
J. B. Bury, *The hellenistic age and the history of civilization* (The hellenistic age), Cambridge 1923.
K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* IV, Leipzig-Berlin, ²1925.
J. Kaerst, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* II, Leipzig-Berlin 1926.
J. Hatzfeld, *Histoire de la Grèce ancienne*, Paris 1932².
W. Tarn, *Hellenistic civilization*, London 1927. 3rd ed., revised by the Author and G. T. Griffith, London 1951.
U. Kahrstedt, *Kulturgeschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit*, München 1944.
W. Jaeger, *Paideia* II-III, Oxford 1944-45.
H. Meyer, *Geschichte der abendländischen Weltanschauung*, I-II, Würzburg 1947.
M. Rostovtzeff, *Social and economic history of the hellenistic world*, Oxford 1941.
R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, Leipzig 1895. Repr. in prep.
A. Oltramare, *Les origines de la diatribe romaine*, Genève 1926.
W. Nestle, *Die Nachsokratiker*, Jena 1923.

B—SPECIAL PROBLEMS

- M. Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos in der griech. Phil.*, Oldenburg 1872. Repr. 1961.
A. Aall, *Geschichte der Logosidee in der griech. Phil.*, Leipzig 1896-1899 (2 vol.).
H. Meyer, *Die Lehre von den Keimkräften von der Stoa bis zum Ausgang der Patristik*, Bonn 1914.
H. Leisegang, *Der heilige Geist*, Leipzig 1919.
F. Rüsche, *Blut, Leben u. Seele*, Paderborn 1930 (Studien zur Geschichte u. Kultur d. Altertums, Ergänzungsband V).
— *Das Seelenpneuma*. Seine Entwicklung von der Hauchseele zur Geistseele, Paderborn 1933 (ib. XVIII 3).
G. Verbeke, *L'évolution de la doctrine du pneuma du stoïcisme à S. Augustin*, Paris-Louvain 1945.
P. Rabbow, *Antike Schriften über Seelenheilung u. Seelenleitung* I, Leipzig 1914.
— *Seelenführung*, Münster 1954.
J. Haussleiter, *Der Vegetarismus in der Antike*, Berlin 1935.
U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Der Glaube der Hellenen*, Berlin 1931, 2 vol.
A. J. Festugière, *La religion de la Grèce*, Paris 1944 (Histoire générale de religion, Grèce-Rome).

¹ In this bibliography I follow as much as possible a systematical and chronological order.

C. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande* I, Leipzig 1855.

H. Scholz, *Geschichte der Logik*, Berlin 1931.

I. M. Bochenski, *Ancient formal logic*, Amsterdam 1951.

H. Steinthal, *Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen u. Römern*, Berlin 1890 (2 vol.).

H. Dahlmann, *Varro u. die hellenistische Sprachtheorie*, Berlin 1932 (Problemata V).

2—EPICURUS AND HIS SCHOOL

TEXTS

H. Usener, *Epicurea*, Leipzig 1887 (Contains the preserved writings and the fragments, except the pap. fragm. of II. φύσεως).

E. Bignone, *Epicuro* (Text with Italian transl., introd. and notes), Bari 1920.

P. von der Muehl, *Epicurus*, Lipsiae 1922 (Teubner).

C. Bailey, *Epicurus*, The extant remains, Oxford 1926. (Text with English transl.).

Diogenes Laërtius ed. R. D. Hicks, London 1925 (with Engl. transl., 2 vol.).

A survey of the fragments of the II. φύσεως is found in Bailey, p. 391 f.

See further:

A. Vogliano, *Epicuri et Epicureorum scripta*, I, Berlin 1928.

W. Crönert, *Kolotes u. Menedemos*, Leipzig 1906.

C. Jensen, *Ein neuer Brief Epikurs* (Abh. Ges. Göttingen 1933).

F. Sbordone, *Philodemi adversus sophistas*. Napoli 1947.

Lucretius, *De rerum natura* ed. C. Bailey, Oxford 1898, 1921.

— ed. A. Ernout, Paris 1920 (Budé) with French transl., 2 vol.

— ed. J. Martin, Lipsiae 1934 (Teubner).

— ed. C. Bailey, Oxford 1947, Vol. I: Prolegomena, Text, Transl.;

II-III, Commentary.

Diogenes Oenoandensis ed. J. Williams, Lipsiae 1907.

LITERATURE

C. Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus*. Oxford 1928.

W. Schmid, *Epikurs Kritik der platonischen Elementenlehre*, Leipzig 1936.

E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, Firenze 1936, 2 vol.

(Important, though often not sufficiently founded).

E. Bignone, *La dottrina epicurea del "clinamen"*, sua formazione e sua cronologia, in rapporto con la polemica con le scuole avversarie. Nuove luci sulla storia dell' atomismo Greco. Firenze 1940.

A. J. Festugière, *Epicure et ses Dieux*, Paris 1946. Engl. transl. Oxford 1955.

W. Schmid, *Götter u. Menschen in der Theologie Epikurs*, in: *Rhein. Mus.* 1951, pp. 97-156.

N. W. Dewitt, *Epicurus and his Philosophy*, Minneapolis 1954. See on this book the review of Ph. Merlan in *Phil. Review* 1955, p. 140-145.

3—THE STOIA (THE ANCIENT STOIA AND GENERAL WORKS)

TEXTS

A. C. Pearson, *The fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, London 1891.

- J. von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, Leipzig 1903-1924 (4 vol.).
 N. Festa, *I frammenti degli Stoici antichi*, Bari 1932-1935 (2 vol.) Italian transl. and notes.

LITERATURE

- P. Barth, *Die Stoa*, Stuttgart, 1902, ³⁻⁴1921. Revised by A. Goedeckemeyer, 1941.
 A. Dyroff, *Die Ethik der alten Stoa*, Berlin 1897.
 E. Bréhier, *La théorie des incorporels dans l'ancien stoïcisme*, Paris 1908.
 — *Chrysippe*, Paris 1910. Revised ed. 1951.
 E. Bevan, *Stoics and Sceptics*, Oxford 1913. Repr. Cambridge 1959.
 R. M. Wenley, *Stoicism and its influence*, Boston 1924.
 E. Grumach, *Physis u. Agathon in der älteren Stoa*, Berlin 1932 (Problemata, Heft 6).
 O. Rieth, *Grundbegriffe der stoischen Ethik*, Berlin 1933.
 E. Elorduy, *Die Sozialphilosophie der Stoa*, Philologus Suppl. XXVIII, 1936.
 W. Wiersma, *Περὶ τέλους*, Diss. Groningen 1937.
 M. Pohlenz, *Zenon u. Chrysipp*, Göttingen 1938. (Nachr. Gött. Ges., phil.-hist. Kl., Fachgr. I, N.F. II 9).
 — *Die Begründung d. abendländischen Sprachlehre durch die Stoa*, Göttingen 1939 (ib. III 6).
 — *Grundfragen der stoischen Philosophie*, Göttingen 1940 (ib., 3. Folge 26).
 K. H. E. de Jong, *De Stoa, Een wereld-philosophie*, Amsterdam (1937).
 M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa, Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung*, Göttingen 1949 (2 vol.).
 G. Verbeke, *Kleanthes van Assos*, Brussel 1949 (Verhandeling v. d. Kon. Vlaamse Ac.).
 V. Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps*, Paris 1953. Interesting, but too speculative.
 See also under 1B.

4—SCEPTICISM (INCLUDING THE MIDDLE AND NEW ACADEMY)

TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS

- U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Antigonos von Karystos* (Philol. Untersuch. IV) Berlin 1881. Repr. 1963.
 Contains the texts, mainly of Diog. Laërt., concerning Pyrrho, Timon, Arcesilas a.o., with important critical studies.
 H. Diels, *Poetarum philosophorum fragmenta*, Berlin 1901. Contains the fragments of Timon.
 Sextus Empiricus ed. H. Mutschmann, vol. I, *Pyrrh. hyp.*, Leipzig 1912; vol. II, *Adv. dogmaticos* (= Adv. math. VII-IX), ib. 1914; vol. III, *Adv. math. I-VI* ed. J. Mau, ib. 1954; ²1961. Vol. IV, indices on vol. I-III, coll. K. Janáček, ib. ²1962.
 Revised ed. of vol. I by Mau, 1958.
 Sextus Empiricus, text (of Imm. Bekker, Berlin 1842) with Engl. transl. and notes by R. G. Bury, vol. I, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, London 1933, ²1939; vol. II, *Against the logicians* (Adv. math. VII-VIII), ib. 1935; vol. III, *Against the physicists* (= Adv. math. IX-X), *Against the ethicists* (= Adv. math. XI), ib. 1936, ²1953; vol. IV, *Against the professors* (= Adv. math. I-VI), ib. 1949.
 Fragments in Cicero, Eusebius, *Praep. ev.*, Stobaeus and Photius.
 For Carneades: Cicero, *De fato*, ed. A. Yon, Paris ²1950 (Budé).
 For the empirical school:
 K. Deichgräber, *Die griechische Empirikerschule. Sammlung der Fragmente u. Darstellung der Lehre*. Berlin 1930.

LITERATURE

- Norman Maccoll, *The Greek sceptics from Pyrrho to Sextus*, London-Cambridge 1869.
 Ch. Waddington, *Pyrrhon et le pyrrhonisme*, Paris 1877.
 R. Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros phil. Schriften*, Leipzig 1883, vol. III, p. 1 ff., 39 ff. (The chapters concerning the origin and the development of the pyrrhonian skepsis).
 P. Natorp, *Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems*, Berlin 1884, p. 63 ff.: Die Erfahrungslehre der Skeptiker u. ihr Ursprung.
 E. Pappenheim, *Die Tropen der griechischen Skeptiker*, Gymn. Progr. Berlin, 1885.
 ——— *Der Sitz der Schule der pyrrhonischen Skeptiker*, in: *Archiv f. Gesch. d. Phil.* I, 1888, p. 37 ff.
 ——— *Der angebliche Heraklitismus des Skeptikers Aenesidemus*, Berlin 1889.
 V. Brochard, *La méthode expérimentale chez les anciens*, in: *Revue philos.* I, 1887, p. 37-49.
 ——— *Les sceptiques grecs*, Paris 1887; reprinted 1923; ³1959.
 Of great importance.
 M. Patrick, *Sextus Empiricus and Greek scepticism*, Cambridge 1889.
 L. Credaro, *Lo Scetticismo degli Academici*, Milano 1889-1893, 2 vol.
 W. Vollgraff, *La vie de Sextus Empiricus*, in: *Rev. de Philologie* 1902, p. 195-210.
 Ch. Waddington, *Le scepticisme après Pyrrhon. Les Nouveaux Académiciens; Enésidème et les nouveaux Pyrrhoniens* (Séances et travaux de l'Acad. des Sc. mor. et polit., 1902, p. 223 ff.).
 A. Gödeckemeyer, *Die Geschichte der griechischen Skeptizismus*, Leipzig 1905.
 R. Richter, *Der Skeptizismus in der Philosophie*, Leipzig 1904, vol. I. Repr. 1963.
 Superior to the work of Gödeckemeyer.
 E. Bevan, *Stoics and Sceptics*, Oxford 1913; repr. Cambridge 1959.
 E. Bréhier, *Les tropes d'Enésidème contre la logique inductive*, in: *Rev. des Etudes anciennes* XX, 1918, p. 69 ff.
 P. Couissin, *La critique du réalisme des concepts chez Sextus Empiricus*, in: *Rev. d'histoire de la phil.*, 1927, p. 377-405.
 ——— *L'origine et l'évolution de l'ἐποχή* in: *Rev. des Etudes grecques* XLII, 1929, p. 373-397.
 ——— *Les sorites de Carnéade contre le polythéisme*, ib., LIV, 1941, p. 43-57.
 J. Croissant, *La morale de Carnéade*, in: *Rev. internationale de phil.* 1939, p. 545-570.
 L. Robin, *Pyrrhon et le scepticisme grec*, Paris 1944.
 Important.
 K. Deichgräber, *Die griech. Empirikerschule*.
 Cited under Texts.

5—THE MIDDLE STOA AND FOURTH ACADEMY; CICERO

TEXTS

- H. N. Fowler, *Panaetii et Hecatonis librorum fragmenta*, Bonn 1885.
 M. van Straaten, *Panétius, sa vie, ses écrits et sa doctrine avec une édition des fragments*, Amsterdam 1946 (Diss. Nijmegen).
 A separate edition of the fragments:
 Panaetii Rhodii Fragmenta, coll. iterumque ed., Leiden 1952; ²1962.
 I. Bake, *Posidonii Rhodii reliquiae*, Lugd. Bat. 1820.
 G. Luck, *Der Akademiker Antiochos*, Bern 1953.
 Contains an edition of the fragments.
 Cicero, in *De officiis* I-II follows Panaetius, II. τοῦ καθήκοντος, with a certain liberty.

Teubner ed. by Atzert (1923, ²1932). Repr. 1958.

Ed. with a commentary by H. A. Holden, 1891.

Traces of Posidonius are found in many authors, i.a. (probably) in passages of the following works of Cicero:

Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* I (Teubner-ed. by M. Pohlenz, 1918; by G. Fohlen and J. Humbert, Coll. Budé, Paris 1931;

ed. with a commentary by T. W. Dougan and R. H. Henry, 2 vol., Cambridge 1905, 1934).

— *De natura deorum* II (Ed. O. Plasberg, Teubner 1908; W. Ax, 1961; commentary by J. B. Mayor, 1885, Comm. by A. S. Pease, Vol. II, Cambr. (Mass.) 1958).

— *De divinatione* I (ed. O. Plasberg and W. Ax, Teubner 1938).

ed. with Commentary by A. S. Pease, Urbana, Univ. of Illinois, 1920-1923.

— *De re publica* VI (ed. K. Ziegler, Teubner 1929, ⁵1960).

For Antiochus (more or less directly):

Cicero, *Academica*, ed. O. Plasberg, Teubner 1922; repr. 1961.

Ed. with commentary by J. S. Reid, London 1885.

— *De finibus bonorum et malorum*, ed. J. Martha, Coll. Budé 1928-30; ²1955.

For Cicero's political philosophy:

— *De legibus* (ed. K. Ziegler, Heidelberg 1950; ed. with Engl. translation by Clinton Walker Keyes, London (Loeb) 1928; G. de Plinval, Budé 1959).

— *De re publica*. (ed. K. Ziegler, Teubner ⁵1960; with Engl. transl. by C. W. Keyes, London (Loeb) 1951).

— *De officiis* III.

LITERATURE

A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa*, Berlin 1892.

B. N. Tatakis, *Panétius de Rhodes*, Paris 1931.

M. Pohlenz, *Antikes Führertum. Cicero de officiis u. das Lebensideal des Panaitios*, Leipzig 1934.

L. Labowsky, *Die Ethik des Panaitios*, Leipzig 1934.

M. van Straaten, *Panétius*, etc. (see texts).

W. Jaeger, *Nemesios von Emesa*, Quellenforschungen zum Neuplatonismus u.s. Anfängen bei Poseidonios, Berlin 1914.

K. Gronau, *Poseidonios u. die jüdisch-christliche Genesisexegese*, Leipzig 1914.

K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios*, München 1921.

— *Kosmos u. Sympathie*, München 1926.

— *Poseidonios über Ursprung u. Entartung*, Orient u. Antike VI, Heidelberg 1928.

I. Heinemann, *Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften* I-II, Breslau 1921, 1928,

R. M. Jones, *Posidonius and Cicero's Tusc. disp.* I 17-81, in: *Class. Philol.* 1923, p. 202-228. See above, under **1192c**.

— *Posidonius and the flight of the mind*, ib. 1926, p. 97-113.

— *Posidonius and solar eschatology*, ib. 1936, p. 115 ff.

See above, under **1192b**.

W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung d. Neuplatonism.*, Berl. '30, p. 61-109. Repr. in prep.

R. E. Witt, *Plotinus and Posidonius*, in: *Class. Quart.* 1930, p. 198-207.

L. Edelstein, *The philosophical system of Posidonius*, in: *Amer. Journal of Philol.* 57 (1936), p. 286-325.

See above, nrs. **1192-1195**.

P. Boyancé, *Etudes sur le songe de Scipion*, Paris 1936.

M. van den Bruwaene, *La théologie de Cicéron*, Louvain 1937.

G. Nebel, *Zur Ethik des Poseidonios*, in: *Hermes* 1939, p. 34-57.

- S. Blankert, *Seneca (Ep. 90) over natuur en cultuur en Posidonius als zijn bron*. Diss. Utrecht 1940.
- On the *Somnium Scipionis*: see above, under nr. **959b**, VI.
- An important chapter on Cicero and cosmic religion is found in:
- A. J. Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste II, Le Dieu cosmique*, Paris, 1949, p. 370-459.
- On the sources of *Tusc. I*:
- A. Barigazzi, *Sulle fonte del libro I delle Tusculane*, in: *Rivista di filologia* 1948, p. 161-163; 1950, p. 1-29.
- A recent summary of Posidonius-studies is found in:
- K. Reinhardt, *Art. Poseidonios* in Pauly-Wissowa RE vol. XXII 1, col. 558-826 (1953).
Contains a detailed bibliography (col. 559-563).
- Concerning Cicero*:
- P. Boyancé, *Le platonisme à Rome. Platon et Cicéron*, in the *Actes du Congrès Budé de Tours et Poitiers*, 3-9 Sept. 1953 (Paris 1954), p. 195-221.
- On Antiochus*:
- R. Hoyer, *De Antiocho Ascalonita*, Diss. Bonn 1883.
- E. Howald, *Das Compendium des Areios Didymos*, in: *Hermes* 55 (1920), p. 68 ff.
- H. von Arnim, *Arius Didymus' Abriss der peripatetischen Ethik* (Sitz. ber. Wien 204.3, 1926).
- W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, Berlin 1930, p. 40 ff.
- R. Philippson, *Das erste Naturgemässe*, in *Philologus* 87, 1932, p. 447 ff.
- L. Edelstein, Review of P. Boyancé, *Etudes sur le Songe de Scipion*, in: *Amer. Journal of Philol.* 59, 1938, p. 360-364.
- A. M. Lueder, *Die philosophische Persönlichkeit des Antiochos von Askalon*, Diss. Göttingen 1940.
- G. Luck, *Der Akademiker Antiochos* (Noctes Romanae 7), Bern 1953.

6—THE STOA OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS

- Seneca, *Dialogi* ed. E. Hermes, Leipzig 1904.
- *De beneficiis, De clementia* ed. C. Hosius, Leipzig ²1914.
- *Epistulae* ed. O. Hense, Leipzig 1914.
- *Naturales quaestiones* ed. A. Gercke, Leipzig 1907 (Teubner).
- *Dialogues*, t. I-IV, text and French transl. by A. Bourguery and R. Waltz, Paris (Budé) 1922-1927; ²1942-45.
- *Epistulae* ed. A. Beltrami, I, Brescia 1926, II, Bologna 1927; ²Rome, 1931.
- Musonius Rufus ed. O. Hense, Leipzig 1905; Cora E. Lutz, New Haven 1947.
- Epictetus ed. H. Schenkl, Leipzig 1894, ²1916 (Teubner).
With an English transl. by W. A. Oldfather, London 1925-1928 (2 vol.), Loeb Libr.
- Marcus Aurelius (Antoninus) ed. H. Schenkl, Leipzig 1913 (Teubner).
New ed. with Engl. translation by A. S. L. Farquharson, *The meditations of the emperor Marcus Antoninus*, Oxford 1944, (2 vol.).

LITERATURE

- C. Martha, *Les moralistes sous l'Empire romain*, Paris ²1900.
- E. V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, Cambridge 1911; repr. London 1958.
- C. Marchesi, *Seneca*, Messina 1920, ²1934.
- G. ten Veldhuys, *De misericordiae et clementiae apud Senecam philosophum usu atque ratione*. Diss. Utrecht 1935.

- F. Smuts, *Die etiek van Seneca*. Diss. Utrecht 1948.
 A. de Bovis, *La sagesse de Sénèque*, Paris 1948.
 W. Klei, *Seneca De constantia sapientis*, with a commentary. Diss. Utrecht 1948.
 A. C. van Geytenbeek, *Musonius Rufus en de Griekse Diatribe*, Diss. Utrecht 1948.
 A. Bonhöffer, *Epiktet u. die Stoa*, Stuttgart 1890; repr. in prep.
 — *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet*, Stuttgart 1894; repr. in prep.
 Still of great value.
 Th. Colardeau, *Etude sur Epictète*, Paris 1903.
 D. S. Sharp, *Epictetus and the New Testament*, London 1914.
 H. D. Sedgwick, *Marcus Aurelius, A biography*, Oxford 1921.
 U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Kaiser Marcus*, Berlin 1931.
 A. S. L. Farquharson, *Marcus Aurelius. His life and his world*, edited by D. A. Rees, Oxford 1951.

7—LATER CYNICS

TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS

- Teletis reliquiae ed. O. Hense, Leipzig 1909 (Teubner).
 The *Diogenes papyrus* of Vienna, ed. by C. Wessely in *Festschrift Th. Gomperz*, Wien 1902, p. 68-72;
 by W. Crönert in *Kolotes u. Menedemos*, Leipzig 1906 (Stud. z. Palaeogr. u. Papyruskunde Bd. VI), p. 49-52.
 Dio Chrysostomus ed. G. de Budé, Leipzig 1915-1919 (Teubner), 2 vol. With an English translation by J. W. Cohoon, London 1932-1951. 5 vol. (Loeb).
 Lucianus ed. C. Jacobitz (Teubner), vol. II p. 195 ff. (*Demonax*);
 vol. III p. 271 ff. (*De morte Peregrini*);
 Vol. III p. 287 ff. (*Fugitivi*).
 Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* V 18-36 (ed. Gifford vol. I). Contains fragments of Oenomaus of Gadara, Γοήτων φωρά (= κατὰ χρηστηρίων).
 Favorinus Περὶ φυγῆς (Pap. Vat. 11).
 Maximus Tyrius ed. H. Hobein, Leipzig 1910 (Teubner).
 Asterius of Amasea in: Migne, *Patrol. Gr.* t. 40.
 Damascius, *Vita Isidori*, in: Photius, *Bibl.* ed. Bekker (Berlin 1824) p. 342a, 27 ff.
 Speaks of Sallustius the Cynic. Budé edition by R. Henry, Paris 1960.
 The *Vita Isidori* of Damascius was also edited by Cobet and printed in the Didot edition of his *Diog. Laërt.* (1850).
 The passage on Sall. is found in § 89 ff.

LITERATURE

- H. von Arnim, *Leben u. Werke des Dio von Prusa*, Berlin 1898.
 K. von Fritz, *Quellenuntersuchungen zu Leben u. Philosophie des Diogenes von Sinope*. Philologus, Suppl. Bd. 18, 2, Leipzig 1926.
 D. R. Dudley, *A history of Cynicism*, London 1937.
 R. Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King*, Uppsala 1948.
 On Lucianus and Cynicism: see under nr. **1256b**; on Asterius sub **1260d**, on Favorinus sub **1260b**.

NEOPYTHAGOREANS

TEXTS

- Alexander Polyhistor ap. Diog. Laërt. VIII 24.
 See under nr. **1279**.

- Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* X, 261 ff., 281 ff.
Pythagoreorum fragmenta ap. Mullach, *Fragm. phil. Gr.* II, Parisiis 1867.
Ocellus Lucanus, Text u. Kommentar von R. Harder, Berlin 1926 (Neue philol. Untersuch. 1).
 Moderatus ap. Porphy., *Vit. Pyth.*; Simplicius, in *Ar. Phys.*; Stob. *Ecl.*
 Nicomachus, *Introd. arithmetica* ed. R. Hoche, Lipsiae 1866.
 Iamblichi in *Nicomachi arithm. introd.* ed. H. Pistelli, Lipsiae 1894.
 A commentary of Johannes Philoponus on the first book of Nicomachus' *Introduction* is edited by R. Hoche, Wesel 1864. On the second book, *ib.* 1867.
 An epitome of Nicomachus' Ἀριθμητικὰ θεολογούμενα is found in Photius' *Bibliotheca*, Vol. I ed. Bekker, Berolini 1824, p. 142b, 16-145b, 7.
 Philostratus, *The life of Apollonius of Tyana, the Epistles of Apoll. and the Treatise of Eusebius*, with an Engl. transl. of F. C. Conybeare, 2 vol., London 1912.
 A complete list of the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha is found in Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* III 2⁴, p. 115 n. 3 and 119 n. 1.

LITERATURE

- Zeller, o.c., p. 114-175.
 On Alexander Polyhistor's account of Pythagorean doctrine the studies of M. Wellmann (in *Hermes* 1919, p. 225 ff.) A. Delatte (*La vie de Pyth. de Diog. Laezye*, Bruxelles 1922, p. 198 ff.) and of W. Wiersma (in *Mnemosyne* 1941, p. 97-112) are antiquated by A. J. Festugière in *Revue des Etudes grecques* 1945, pp. 1-65.
 See also:
 A. J. Festugière, *Le Dieu inconnu et la gnose*, Paris 1954, p. 1-53.
 Of Nicomachus' *Introduction to Arithmetic* an English translation appeared by M. L. d'Ooge (with studies in Greek mathematics by F. E. Robbins and L. C. Karpinski), New York 1926.

PHILO

TEXTS

- Opera Omnia* ed. Thomas Mangey, 2 vol., Londini 1742.
 A modern critical edition without the fragments:
Philonis opera quae supersunt ed. L. Cohn, P. Wendland, S. Reiter, vol. I-VI, Berlin 1896-1915.
 Vol. VII, Indices by H. Leisegang, Berlin 1930. Repr. 1962.
 (Editio minor without critical apparatus).
 The fragments are found in the edition of Mangey. Further:
 J. R. Harris, *Fragments of Philo Judaeus*, Cambridge 1896.
 P. Wendland, *Neu entdeckte Fragmente Philos, nebst eine Unters. üb. d. urspr. Gestalt d. Schr. De sacrificiis Abelis*, Berlin 1891.
 K. Praechter, *Unbeachtete Philo-Fragmente*, in: *Archiv f. Gesch. d. Phil.* IX (1896), p. 415-426.
 H. Lewy, *Neue Philo-Texte*, Sitz. Ber. Akad., Berlin 1932, IV, p. 23-84.
 The Armenian writings of Philo: ed. F. C. Conybeare, Venezia 1892.

TRANSLATIONS

- Philos Werke* hrsg. von L. Cohn u. J. Heinemann, 6 vol., Breslau, Münz 1909-1938.
Commentaire allégorique des saintes lois, texte et trad. par. E. Bréhier, Paris 1909.
 Text and English transl. by F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker, vol. I-X, London 1929-1941.

Supplement I: *Questions and answers on Genesis* translated from the Armenian by R. Marcus, London 1943.

Supplement II: *Questions and answers on Exodus* transl. from the Armenian by R. Marcus, London 1943.

LITERATURE

- E. Vacherot, *Histoire critique de l'Ecole d'Alexandrie*, 3 vol., Paris 1846.
 P. Wendland, *Philo u. die Kynisch-Stoische Diatribe*, Berlin 1895.
 A. Aall, *Der Logos*; Geschichte seiner Entwicklung in der griech. Phil. u. der christl. Literatur, Leipzig 1896-1899.
 E. Bréhier, *Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie*. Thèse, Paris 1907; 1924. Repr. 1950.
 W. Bousset, *Jüdisch-christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria u. Rom*, Göttingen 1915.
 H. Leisegang, *Der Heilige Geist*. Das Wesen u. Werden der mystisch-intuitiven Erkenntnis in der Phil. u. Religion der Griechen. Leipzig-Berlin 1919.
 E. Turowski, *Die Widerspiegelung des stoischen Systems bei Ph. v. A.* Diss. Königsb. 1927.
 M. Adler, *Studien zu Ph. von Alex.*, Breslau 1929.
 E. Stein, *Die alleg. Exegese des Ph. v. Alex.*, Beih. z. Zeitschr. f. alttest. Wiss. 51, Giessen 1929.
 H. Lewy, *Sobria ebrietas*, Unters. z. Gesch. d. antiken Mystik, Beitr. z. Zeitschr. f. die neuest. Wiss. IX, Giessen 1929, p. 1-107.
 J. Gross, *Philons v. Alex. Anschauungen über die Natur des Menschen*. Diss. Tübingen 1930.
 M. J. Lagrange, *Le judaïsme avant Jésus Christ*, Paris 1931.
 E. R. Goodenough, *By Light Light*. The mystic gospel of hellenistic Judaism. New Haven, Yale Univ. Pr. 1935.
 — *The Politics of Philo Judaeus*. Practice and Theory. With a General Bibliogr. of Philo by H. L. Goodhart and E. R. Goodenough. 2 vol. New Haven, Yale Univ. Pr. 1938.
 W. Völker, *Fortschritt u. Vollendung bei Ph. v. Alex.*, Leipzig 1938.
 H. Leisegang, article *Philon* (Alex.) in Pauly-Wissowa XX 1, 1-50 (1941).
 See also Leisegang's article *Logos* in P.-W. XIII, 1047-1081 (on Philo: 1072-1078).
 H. Wilms, *Eikoon*, Eine begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zum Platonismus, 1. Teil: Philon von Alexandria, mit einer Einleitung über Platon und die Zwischenzeit. Münster i. Westf. 1935.
 H. A. Wolfson, *Philo*. Foundations of religious philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam. 2 vol. Cambridge (Mass.) 1948.
 To this work objections were made by:
 I. Heinemann, *Philo als Vater der mittelalterlichen Philosophie?* in: Theologische Zeitschr. (Basel) 1950, p. 99-116.
 See also Goodenough, *Wolfson's Philo* in: *Journal of Bibl. Litt.* 1948, p. 87;
 H. Chadwick in *Class. Review* 1949, p. 24 ff.;
 J. Daniélou in *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, 1950, p. 230.
 R. Marcus gives an almost complete adhesion to Wolfson (*Wolfson's revaluation of Philo* in: *The Review of Religion*, 1949, p. 368-381).

PLUTARCHUS

TEXTEDITIONS

- Vitae* ed. Sintenis, Leipzig 1839 - 1846.
 — Lindsckog-Ziegler, Leipzig 1914 - 1939.

Moralia ed. Deubner, Paris Didot 1839-1846.

— Bernadakis, Leipzig Teubner 1888-1896.

— Hubert, Nachstädt, Paton, Pohlenz etc. I-IV, Leipzig Teubner 1925-1938, V-VI, 1950-59.

SPECIAL EDITIONS WITH A COMMENTARY

Plutarque, *Sur l'E de Delphes* ed. R. Flacelière, Paris 1941 (Annales de l'université de Lyon, 3e série, Lettres, Fasc. 11).

— *Sur la disparition des oracles* ed. R. Flacelière, Paris 1947 (Annales de l'université de Lyon, 3e série, Lettres, Fasc. 14).

Plutarch, *Ueber Isis u. Osiris*. Text, Uebersetzung u. Kommentar von Th. Hopfner, Prag 1940 (2 vol.) (Monographien des Archiv Orientální, Prag).

Le Περὶ τοῦ προσώπου de Plutarque. Texte critique avec trad. et commentaire par P. Rainguard. Chartres 1934. (Thèse Paris 1934).

TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY

G. Méautis, Plutarque, *Des délais de la justice divine*. Trad. nouvelle, introd. et notes explicatives. Lausanne 1935.

GENERAL WORKS

R. Hirzel, *Plutarch*, Leipzig 1912 (Das Erbe der Alten, Heft IV).

— *Der Dialog*, Leipzig 1895, vol. 2, p. 124-239.

R. M. Jones, *The platonism of Plutarch*, diss. Chicago 1916.

G. Soury, *La démonologie de Plutarque*, Paris 1942.

K. Ziegler, *Ploutarchos von Chaironeia*, in Pauly-Wissowa, RE vol. XXI 1 (1951), col. 635-961). Also separatim.

Further literature is mentioned here.

MIDDLE PLATONISM

TEXTS

Atticus, fragm. ap. Euseb., *Praeparatio evangelica* XI 1-2; XV 4-9; 12 f.

Theo Smyrnaeus ed. E. Hiller, Leipzig 1878.

Albinus, *Prologus et Didascalicus* (= *Epitome*) ap. C. Fr. Hermann, *Platonis Dialogi* vol. VI, Leipzig 1853, pp. 152-189.

— *Epitome* ed P. Louis, Rennes 1945 (Thèse compl., Paris).

Anonymer Kommentar zu Platons Theaetetus ed. H. Diels, Berlin 1905.

Maximus Tyrius, *Philosophumena* ed. H. Hobein, Leipzig 1910.

Apuleius, *De philosophia libri* ed. P. Thomas, Leipzig 1908.

GENERAL WORKS

Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* III 2⁴, p. 219-234.

R. E. Witt, *Albinus and the history of Middle Platonism*, Cambridge 1937.

E. de Faye, *Origène, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée*. Vol. II, *L'Ambiance philosophique*. Paris 1927, p. 154-164 (on Maximus of Tyrus).

A. J. Festugière, *Le Dieu inconnu et la Gnose*, Paris 1954, p. 92-140.

GNOSIS

General works are mentioned under **1332e**.

On the newly found manuscripts: **1332f**.

On Valentinus and Valentinians: **1332d**.

See further on Basilides:

P. Hendrix, *De Alexandrijnsche haeresiarch Basilides* Diss. Leiden 1926.

G. Quispel, *L'homme gnostique (La doctrine de Basilide)* in: *Eranos Jahrbuch* XVI, Zürich 1948, p. 89-140.

On Valentinus:

F. M. M. Sagnard, *La gnose valentinienne et le témoignage de Saint Irénée*, Paris 1947. (Work of capital importance). With a bibliography.

G. Quispel, *The original doctrine of Valentine*, in: *Vigiliae Christianae* I 1947, p. 43-73.

— *La conception de l'homme dans la gnose valentinienne* in: *Eranos Jahrb.* XV, Zürich 1947, p. 249-286.

HERMETICA

Corpus Hermeticum, tomes I-IV, ed. A. D. Nock, French transl. of A. J. Festugière. Paris 1945-54.

A. J. Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*

I. *L'astrologie et les sciences occultes*. P². 1950.

II. *Le Dieu cosmique*, P. 1949.

III. *Les doctrines de l'âme*, P. 1953.

IV. *Le Dieu inconnu et la gnose*, P. 1954.

Older literature is mentioned here and in the C.H. before each treatise.

NUMENIUS

E. A. Leemans, *Studie over den wijsgeer Numenius van Apamea met uitgave der fragmenten* (Kon. Belg. Akad., Afd. Letterk., Verhandelingen, Verzameling in 8°, Boek XXXVII, Afl. 2 en laatste). Brussel 1937.

H. Ch. Puech, *Numénios d'Apamée et les théologies orientales au second siècle* in: *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'histoire orientales (Mélanges Bidez)*, Tome II, Bruxelles 1934, p. 745-778.

(Confounds Numenius' Noûs demiourgós with the gnostic demiurge.)

A. J. Festugière in the passage indicated under nr. 1345 (ad fin.).

PLOTINUS

TEXTS

Plotinus, *Enneades* ed. R. Volkmann, Lipsiae 1884, 2 vol. (with the vita by Porphyrius).

Plotin, *Ennéades*. Texte établi et traduit par E. Bréhier, Paris 1924-1938, 6 vol. Contains a general introd., the Life of P. by Porph. and a short introd. to each treatise.

Plotini Opera ed. P. Henry et H.-R. Schwyzer, tom. I (Porph. Vita Plot., Enn. I-III), Paris-Bruxelles 1951.

Critical edition. Vol. II 1959; Vol. III in preparation.

TRANSLATIONS

Engl. by S. MacKenna and B. S. Page. London 1917-1930. Revised edition 1956. French by E. Bréhier, see above.

German by R. Harder, Lpz. 1930-37. Revised edition vol. I, Hamburg 1956. Continued by R. Beutler and W. Theiler.

A new Engl. transl. with notes by A. H. Armstrong is in preparation for the Loeb-collection.

LITERATURE

A—General

- Th. Whittaker, *The Neoplatonists*. Cambridge ²1918 (repr. 1928, 1961), pp. 40-106.
 W. R. Inge, *The philosophy of Plotinus*, London, ²1928, (reprinted 1948), 2 vol.
 E. Bréhier, *La philosophie de Plotin*, Paris 1928.
 F. Heinemann, *Plotin*, Leipzig 1921. (Attempts to trace a development in Plotinus' thought).

B. Special subjects.

- R. Arnou, *Le Désir de Dieu dans la phil. de P.*, Paris 1921.
 B. A. G. Fuller, *The problem of evil in P.*, Cambridge 1912.
 E. Schröder, *P.'s Abhandlung Πόθεν τὰ κακά*; Diss. Rostock 1916.
 G. Nebel, *P.'s Kategorien der intelligiblen Welt*, Tübingen 1929.
 C. Schmidt, *P.'s Stellung zum Gnosticismus u. kirchlichen Christentum*. Leipzig 1901.
 A. H. Armstrong, *The architecture of the intelligible universe in the phil. of P.* Cambridge 1940.
 J. Trouillard, *La purification plotinienne*, Paris 1955.
 ——— *La procession plotinienne*, Paris 1955.
 Eugénie de Keyser, *La signification de l'art dans les Ennéades de P.*, Louvain 1955.
 On the problem of being in later Antiquity (Plotin - Marius Victorinus - Augustinus):
 G. Huber, *Das Sein und das Absolute*. Studien zur Geschichte der ontologischen Problematik in der spätantiken Phil. (Studia philosophica, Jahrbuch der Schweizerischen phil. Gesellschaft, Supplementum 6), Basel 1955.

PORPHYRIUS

TEXTS

- Eunapius, Βίοι φιλοσόφων καὶ σοφιστῶν, in: Philostratus and Eunapius, *The lives of the Sophists*, with an Engl. transl. by W. C. Wright, London 1922, pp. 352-362.
 Porphyrius, Περὶ Πλωτίνου βίου, in the editions of Plotinus, *The Enneads*.
 Porphyrius, Πυθαγόρου βίος (= *Vita Pythagorae*).
 ——— Περὶ τοῦ ἐν Ὀδυσσεύϊ τῶν νυμφῶν ἄντρον (= *De antro nympharum*).
 ——— Περὶ ἀποχῆς ἐμψύχων (*De abstinencia*) ll. IV.
 ——— Πρὸς Μάρκελλον (*Ad Marcellam*).
 These four writings are found in:
 Porphyrii *Opuscula selecta* recogn. A. Nauck, Lipsiae 1886; repr. 1963.
 Porphyrius, Ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ νοητά (= *Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes*) ed. B. Mommert, Lipsiae 1907.
 Other works, see above, nr. 1445.

LITERATURE

- Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* III 2, pp. 693-735.
 Th. Whittaker, *The Neoplatonists*, Cambridge ³1928, p. 107-120.
 J. Bidez, *Vie de Porphyre*, Gand-Leipzig 1913. Includes fragments of the Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων and *De regressu animae*.

IAMBlichUS

TEXTS

- Eunapius, *Vitae phil.*, p. 362-378 Wright.
 Iamblichus, Περὶ τοῦ Πυθαγορείου βίου (*De vita Pythagorica liber*) ed. L. Deubner, Lipsiae 1937.

Iamblichus, Προτρεπτικός ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν (Protrepticus) ed. H. Pistelli, Lipsiae 1888. Three mathematical works, see above, nr. 1447c.

De mysteriis ed. G. Parthey, Berlin 1857.

On the authenticity see above, p. 557 n. 1.

German translation and comm. by Th. Hopfner, 1922.

LITERATURE

Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* III 2, pp. 735-796.

Whittaker, *The Neoplatonists*, pp. 121-135.

E. R. Dodds, *Proclus' Elements of Theology*, Oxford 1933, p. XIX ff.

PROCLUS

TEXTS

Marinus, *Vita Procli* ed. J. F. Boissonade, Lipsiae 1814.

Also in Cousin, *Procli opera inedita* (see below).

Proclus, Εἰς τὸν Τίμαιον Πλάτωνος (*In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*) ed. E. Diehl, Lipsiae 1903-1906, 3 vol.

— Εἰς τὸν Πλάτωνος πρῶτον Ἀλκιβιάδην (*In Platonis primum Alcib.*).

— Εἰς τὸν Πλάτωνος Παρμενίδην (*In Platonis Parmenidem*) ll. VII.

These two commentaries were published by V. Cousin in *Procli philosophi Platonici opera inedita*, Paris 1864, together with the *Vita* of Marinus, William Morbecca's translation of the treatises *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, *De providentia et fato et eo quod in nobis*, *De malorum subsistentia*, and finally with the *Scholia in Parmenidem*. Repr. 1961.

Cousin's edition of Proclus' *Commentary on the Parmenides* was not complete. It was completed by R. Klibansky and C. Labowsky (*Corpus Platonicum medii aevi*, *Plato Latinus* vol. III), Warburg Institute, London 1953.

This volume contains the Latin translation of the *Parm.*, probably of William of Morbecca (until p. 142A), the last part of the 7th book of Proclus' commentary, with an Engl. transl. of G. E. M. Anscombe and C. Labowsky, (the end of Proclus' commentary is preserved only in Latin; to the Greek part Morbecca's translation is added), and the marginal notes to Proclus' commentary by Nicolaus Cusanus.

The *commentary on the Alcibiades Maior* was newly reedited by L. G. Westerink, Amsterdam 1954.

(Dr. Westerink also edited the *Scholia in Alcib.* of Olympiodorus¹, Amsterdam 1956).

Proclus, Εἰς τὴν Πολιτείαν Πλάτωνος ὑπόμνημα (*In Platonis rem publicam commentarii*) ed. G. Kroll, Lipsiae 1899-1901, 2 vol.

This is not a running commentary, as those on the *Tim.*, *Alcib. Mai.*, and *Parm.*, but a collection of essays on special subjects. The greater part of vol. I is taken by a defence of Homer against Plato.

Ἐκ τῶν Πρόκλου σχολίων εἰς τὸν Κράτυλον τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐκλογαὶ χρήσιμοι (*In Platonis Cratylum commentaria*) ed. G. Pasquali, Lipsiae 1808.

¹ This is not the Alexandrian O., who was the teacher of Proclus, but the 6th cent. Neoplatonician who was the author of the Comm. on the *Phaedo*, ed. by Norvin.

- Proclus, *Εἰς τὴν Πλάτωνος θεολογίαν* (*In Platonis theologiam*) II. VI, with the Latin transl. of Aemilius Portus and the Vita of Marinus, Hamburgi 1618. Repr. Frankfurt 1960.
- *Στοιχείωσις θεολογική*. The Elements of Theology. Text with an Engl. transl., introd. and comm. by E. R. Dodds, Oxford 1933. Repr. 1963.
- *Στοιχείωσις φυσική* (*Institutio physica*). Text with a German transl., a Latin preface and a short comm. by Ritzenfeld, Lipsiae 1912.
- Proclus also wrote a commentary on the first book of Euclides (*Εἰς τὸ πρῶτον τῶν Εὐκλείδου στοιχείων*). This was recently translated into German by L. Schoenberger, with an introd. and a commentary (Halle 1945). A French transl. (with introd. and notes) by P. Vereecke appeared at Bruges, 1946.

LITERATURE

- Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* III 2, pp. 834-890.
- Whittaker, *The Neopl.*, pp. 157-180, 231-314.
- E. R. Dodds, *The Elements*, introd.
- L. J. Rosán, *The philosophy of Proclus*. The final phase of ancient thought. New York 1949.

DAMASCIUS

TEXT

- Damascius, *Ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις περὶ τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν εἰς τὸν Πλάτωνος Παρμενίδην* (*Dubitationes et solutiones de primis principiis, in Platonis Parm.*) ed. C. A. Ruelle, Paris 1889, 2 vol.

LITERATURE

- C. A. Ruelle, *Le philosophe Damascius; étude sur sa vie et ses ouvrages, suivie de neuf morceaux inédits extraits du Traité des premiers principes et traduits en Latin*. *Revue archéologique*, 1860 et 1861.
- Zeller, *Phil. der Gr.* III 2⁴, pp. 901-908.
- Whittaker, *The Neopl.*, pp. 180 ff.

ADDITIONS TO THE BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. A—GENERAL WORK

- Ph. de Lacy, *Some recent publications on hellenistic phil.* (1937-57). The class. World 1958-59.
- Gnomologium Vaticanum* ed. L. Sternbach, Berlin 1963.

I. B—SPECIAL PROBLEMS

- S. Sambursky, *The physical world of late Antiquity*, London 1962.
- W. & M. Kneale, *The development of logic*, Oxford 1962.
- Galen, *Einführung in die Logik*, Kommentar mit deutscher Übersetzung von J. Mau, Berlin 1960.
- V. L. Schmidt, *Die Ethik der alten Griechen*, 2 vol. 1882; repr. in prep.

2. EPICURUS AND HIS SCHOOL

- G. Arrighetti, *Epicurus, Opere*: introd., testo critico, trad. e note, Torino 1960.
- Diogenes Oenoandensis ed. A. Grilli, Milano 1960.
- P. Boyancé, *Lucrèce et l'Epicurisme*, Paris 1963.
- Ph. Merlan, *Studies in Epicure and Aristotle*, Wiesbaden 1960.

- R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, N.Y. 1910; repr. 1963.
 R. Westman, *Plutarch gegen Kolopes*. Die Schrift *Adv. Col.* als philosophiegeschichtliche Quelle. (Acta philosophica Fennica), Helsinki 1955.

3. THE STOA

Les Stoïciens. Textes traduits par E. Bréhier, édités sous la direction de P.-M. Schuhl (Bibl. de la Pléiade), Paris 1962.

Contains: A transl. of Cleanthes, *Hymn to Zeus*; Diog. Laert. b. VII; Plut., *De Stoic. repugn.* and *De comm. notionibus*.

Cicero, *Acad. I*, *De fin.* III, *Tusc.* II 12-13, III from ch. 4, IV and V; *De nat. deorum* II, *De fato*, *De officiis*.

Seneca, *De const. sapientis*, *De tranq. animi*, *De brev. vitae*, *De vita beata*, *De prov.*; *Epist. ad Lucil.* 71-74;

Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius (complete).

All treatises are supplied with notes. Bibliogr. by P. M. Schuhl.

J. Christensen, *An essay on the Unity of Stoic philosophy*, Copenhagen 1962.

S. Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics*, London 1959.

F. Solmsen, *Cleanthes or Posidonius?* The basis of Stoic physics. Amsterdam 1961 (Med. Kon. Acad.).

B. Mates, *Stoic logic*. Berkeley, Calif. 1953.

G. Pire, *Stoïcisme et pédagogie*. De Zénon à Marc Aurèle. De Sénèque à Montaigne et à J. J. Rousseau. Paris 1958.

4. SCEPTICISM

For Carneades:

Cicero, *De fato* ed. A. Yon, Paris 21950 (Budé).

A. Weiche, *Cicero und die neue Akademie*. Untersuchungen zur Entstehung u. Geschichte des antiken Scepticismus. Münster i. W., 1961.

M. dal Pra, *Lo Scetticismo Greco*, Milano 1950.

W. Heinz, *Studien zu Sextus Empiricus*, Halle 1932.

5. THE MIDDLE STOA AND IVTH ACADEMY; CICERO

Cicero, *De natura deorum*, with a commentary by A. S. Pease, Cambr. (Mass.), 1956-58.

— *De finibus* ed. Th. Schiche, Teubner 1915, repr. 1961.

— *Hortensius* ed. A. Grilli, Milano 1962.

M. Ruch, *L'Hortensius de Cicéron*, Paris 1958.

A. Michel, *Rhétorique et philosophie chez Cicéron*, Paris 1960.

P. Milton Valente S. J., *L'éthique stoïcienne chez Cicéron*, Paris 1956.

A. Ronconi, *Cicero, Somnium Scip.*: introd. e commento (Bibl. Naz., Testi greci e latini con commento filologico) 1961.

A. J. Kleiweg, *Ciceros Arbeitsweise im II. u. III. Buch der Schrift De nat. deorum* (Diss. Leiden) 1961.

G. Pfligersdorffer, *Studien zu Poseidonios*, Wien 1959.

M. Laffranque, *Posidonius*, in prep. (Paris).

6. THE STOA OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

Sénèque, *Lettres*, t. I-IV, text and French transl. by F. Préchac and H. Noblot, Paris (Budé) 1956-62.

J. N. Sevenster, *Paul and Seneca*, Leiden 1961.

W. Trillitzsch, *Senecas Beweisführung*, Berlin 1962.

Cora M. Lutz, *Musonius Rufus* (Text, transl. and introd.), New Haven 1947.

- A. C. van Geytenbeek, *Musonius Rufus and Greek diatribe*. Engl. ed. Assen 1963.
 B. L. Hijmans, ΑΣΚΗΣΙΣ. Notes on Epictetus' educational system. Assen 1959.
 W. Görlietz, *Marc-Aurèle, Empereur et philosophe*, Paris 1962.

7. LATER CYNICS

- Favorin von Arelate*, I. Teil der Fragmente ed. E. Mensching (with a commentary), Berlin 1963.

NEOPYTHAGOREANS

An important study on the dating of the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha was published by H. Thesleff, *An introduction to the Pythagorean writings of the Hellenistic period*, Åbo 1961.

PHILO

- J. Daniélou, *Philon d'Alexandrie*, Paris 1958.
 F. N. Klein, *Die Lichtterminologie bei Philo von Alexandrien u. in den hermetischen Schriften*, Leiden 1962.

GNOSIS

- R. McL. Wilson, *The gnostic problem*, London 1958.
 Frithjof Schuon, *Sentiers de gnose*, Paris 1957;
 Engl. transl.: *Gnosis, divine wisdom*, London 1959.
 R. Ambelain, *La notion gnostique de démiurge*, Paris 1959.

HERMETICA

See F. N. Klein, under PHILO.

NUMENIUS, CHALCIDIDIUS

- G. Martano, *Numenie d'Apamea*, un precursore del neoplatonismo, Napoli 1960.
 A new edition of C(h)alcidius' translation of, and commentary on, the *Timaeus* was made by J. H. Waszink (Plato Latinus, vol. IV), London 1962.
 J. C. M. van Winden, *Calcidius on Matter*, Leiden 1959.

PLOTINUS

- K. H. Volkman-Schluck, *Plotin als Interpret der Ontologie Platos*, Frankfurt, ²1957.
Les sources de Plotin, Entretiens vol. V, Vandœuvres-Genève 1957.
 J. Guitton, *Le temps et l'éternité chez Plotin et S. Augustin*, Paris 1933. Repr. 1961.
 Ch. Rutten, *Les catégories du monde sensible dans les Ennéades de Plotin*, Paris 1961.
 K. O. Weber, *Origenes der Neuplatoniker* (Zetemata 27), München 1962.

PORPHYRIUS

- H. Dörrie, *Porphyrios' Symmiktá Zetemata*, München 1959 (Zetemata, Heft 20).
 Porphyrius, *De philosophia ex oraculis haurienda* ed. G. Wolff, Berlin 1856. Repr. 1962.
 J. J. O'Meara, *Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles in Augustine*, Paris 1959.

IAMBlichus, SALLUSTIUS

Saloustios, *Des dieux et du monde*, text and transl. of G. Rochefort, Paris (Budé) 1960.

Older literature on Sallustius:

- F. Cumont, *Salluste le philosophe*, in: *Rev. de philol.* 1892, pp. 49-56.

E. E. Passamonti, *La dottrina dei miti di Sallustio filosofo neoplatonico*. Rendiconti accad. Lincei, ser. V 1, 1892, pp. 643-664.

— *La dottrina morale e religiosa di Sall. fil. neopl.*, ib., pp. 712-727.

G. Murray, *Four stages of Greek Religion*, Oxford 1912, ch. 4. Ch. 5 contains a translation of Sall., repr. in: *Five stages of Greek religion*, Oxford 1925.

Sallustius, *Concerning the gods and the universe* ed. A. D. Nock, Cambridge 1926. Edition of the text with a new Engl. transl., introd. and commentary.

French transl. by Mario Meunier, Paris 1931.

PROCLUS

Proclus, *Tria opuscula* (*De providentia*, *De libertate* and *De malo*), the Latin transl. of G. van Moerbeke and the Greek fragments edited anew and collected by H. Boese, Berlin 1960.

H. Boese, *Die mittelalterliche Übersetzung der Στοιχείωσις φυσική des Proklos*, Berlin 1958 (Berl. Akad. d. Wiss.).

Procli *Hymni* ed. E. Vogt, Wiesbaden 1957.

Italian transl. of the *Theologia Plat.* by E. Tubolla, Bari 1959.

DAMASCIUS

Damascius, *Lectures on the Philebus* ed. L. G. Westerink, Amsterdam 1959.

INDICES

I—NAMES

- Abaelard 1445 a
 Abraham 1289 b, 1301 a
 Achilles 1112 a, 1185 c, 1246 a
 Achilles Tatius 1192 a b
 Adam 1335 c
 Admetus 987 n. 2, 1116 b
 Adrastus 1362 b
 Aedesius 1446 a b, 1454 a c
 Aelianus 814 b
 Aelius Tubero, L., 1129 c
 Aenesidemus 1078 b, 1080, 1082 b,
 1087 b; **1129-1135**, 1142
 Aëtius 833 b c, 847 b, 897 b, 899 b,
 902 a, 927 a, 947 b, 991, 995 a
 Agamemnon 973 b, 1246 a
 Agathias 1480
 Agathoboulos 1257 a
 Agrippa 1080, 1129, **1136**
 Ahuramazda 1314 b
 Ahriman 1314 b
 Alabarches 1289 a n. 2
 Albinus 1200, 1279 e, 1288 b, 1321,
 1325, **1326-1329**, 1332 b, 1345 c,
 1349 a, 1382 d
 Alcestis 987 n. 2, 1116 b
 Alcmaeon of Croton 848 n. 1, 1279
 Aletheia 1333 a, 1334 a
 Alexander 805, 810 a, 1082 a, 1443 a
 Alexander of Aphrodisias 873 a, 912 c,
 914 a, 915 b, 920 c, 953 c, 993 a,
 1108, 1362 b (Alex. Peripateticus)
 Alexander [Paris] 1124
 Alexander Polyhistor 1279, 1288 c
 Alkimos 1326 b
 Allan, D. J., 1214 n. 1
 Amelius 1345 c, 1357 a, 1358 b c, 1363,
 1453 b
 Ammonius (Peripateticus) 969 b, 973 c
 Ammonius (friend of Plutarch) 1312 a
 Ammonius Saccas p. 397, § 4, introd.;
 1358 a b, 1362 b
 Amphikleia 1360 a
 Amynomachus 815 a
 Anatolius 1464 a
 Anaxagoras 811 b, 1081, 1123 a, 1141
 n. 4, 1314 c, 1384 b
 Anaxarchus of Abdera 1082 a, 1083 a
 Anaxicrates 810 a
 Androcydes 1288
 Andron of Argos 1135 a
 Andronicus 1058 c, 1063 b
 Anebo 1442 a, 1445 c
 Anthropos 1333 a, 1334 a, 1341 a b,
 1342 a
 Antigonus of Carystus 1082, 1083
 Antigonus Gonatas 888 a b, 1091
 Antiochus of Ascalon 999 c, 1026 b,
 1111 b, 1176 n. 2, 1197 c d, 1198,
 1199, 1200, 1201 c, 1205, 1243,
 1279 d, 1325
 Antiochus of Laodicea 1078 b
 Antipater of Tarsus 805, 893, 903 b,
 909, 962 c, 987 b, 999 c, 1004,
 1034 b, 1128 c, 1143, 1144, 1445,
 1146, 1147, 1188 c, 1196 a, 1212
 Antisthenes 920 b, 922 b, 924 c, 1013 b,
 1035 b, 1229 b, 1250 c
 Antonius of Rhodes 1437 b
 Anytus 1236 c, 1256 a
 Apelles 1149 b
 Apelles of Chios 1100 a
 Aphrodite 1121 b, 1314 c, 1318 a n. 2,
 1356 b, 1373 a
 Apollo 1121, 1123 b, 1124, 1202, 1256 a
 Apollodorus, the Epicurean, 810 a,
 812 b
 Apollodorus, the Stoic (the chronicler),
 987 b, 1018, 1082 a, 1096 a, 1108
 Apollonides of Nicaea 1091
 Apollonius of Antiochia [father and son]
 1137 a
 Apollonius of Tyana 1281, **1287**
 Apollonius Tyrius 884 a
 Apuleius 1279 d e, 1325, **1331**, 1338

- Aratus 1175
 Arcesilaus 805, 809, 896, 985, 1077, 1080, 1091, 1093, **1096-1107**, 1112, 1199
 Archainetos 1281 b
 Archedemus 898 c, 962 c, 1004, 1034 b, 1144, 1188 c
 Archytas 1278, **1281**, 1288 a
 Ardiaeus 1474 b
 Ares 1314 c, 1356 b
 Ariarathes of Cappadocia 1108
 Aristarchus of Samos 943 n. 2
 Aristarchus of Alexandria 972
 Aristippus 880, 1087 a
 Aristo of Chios 889, 896, 1021, 1028 c, 1030 a b, 1088 b c, 1096 b
 Aristocles 861 c, 905 a, 1082 a, 1087 a, 1129 b
 Ariston 1360 a
 Aristotle 806, 807, 810 a, 811 a, 812, 822, 848 n. 1, 849 n. 2, 859, 879 c, 899 c, 903, 907, 941 a, 959, 960 d, 964 b, 967, 969, 971, 979 n. 3, 982, 989, 991, 997, 998, 1003, 1011 b, 1017 b, 1023, 1024, 1026, 1028 a, 1032 a b, 1034 d, 1035 b, 1049 b, 1050 b, 1051, 1058 b, 1059, 1066 c, 1074 b, 1076, 1077 a, 1111 a, 1114, 1123 c, 1125, 1133 b, 1134, 1135 a, 1150, 1160 a, 1182 b, 1184 b, 1192 b, 1199, 1200 b, 1214, 1221 a, 1236 c, 1278, 1279 a, 1280 b, 1281, 1285 b n. 2, 1290 a n. 1, 1305 a, 1314 c, 1322, 1325, 1327 d, 1352 b, 1353 e, 1385 b, 1394 c, 1400 n. 1, 1412 a n. 1, 1413 a, 1419 a, 1426 b, 1434 b, 1445 a, 1446 c, 1453 b, 1454 e, 1455 a b, 1457
 Aristoxenus 1278
 Arius Didymus 945 c, 957 b, 999 c, 1026 c, 1180 a, 1279 f, 1325, 1326 b
 Armstrong, A. H., 1432 c
 Arnim, H. von, 893, 943, 945 c, 999 c, 1181
 Arnobius 1336 c, 1356 b
 Arrianus 1231
 Artemidorus 1226 b
 Ascanius of Abdera 1082 a
 Asklepiades 1132 b
 Asklepios 925 b, 1338, 1340 a n. 2, 1440 a
 Asmus 1261
 Aspasius 1058 b, 1362 b
 Asterius 1260 d
 Athanasius 1300 c, 1302 a
 Athena 1326 b
 Athenaeus 863 a, 1012 a, 1042 b, 1172
 Athenagoras 919 a, 924 b
 Attagas 1095
 Atticus Platonius 856 b, **1325**, 1353 a n. 6, 1354 b, 1362 b
 Augustinus 1003 n. 1, 1077, 1107 c, 1194 a, 1198 c, 1311 b, 1326 b, 1332 c, 1393 d, 1419 a, 1435 a b, 1442 b
 Augustus 1284
 Bacon, Francis, 845, 998
 Bailey, C., frequently cited in ch. XX
 Bardesanes 1340 a n. 3
 Barth, P., 939 d, 994 b, 998
 Barwick, K., 961
 Basilides 1332 a c, 1336 b
 Battos 1099 b
 Baumker, C., 1353 a n. 4
 Bekker 1129 c
 Benson, R. H., 935 n. 1
 Berkeley 992 b, 1112 b, 1134
 Bernays, J., 1256 b
 Bidez 1457
 Bier, Aug., 999 n. 1
 Bion of Borysthenes 806, 1249, 1316 a
 Blankert, S., 1192 b d, 1194 a, 1196 c d
 Blossius, C., of Cumae, 936
 Boëthius 975 b, 982, 1445 a
 Boëthus of Sidon 990, 1143 b, 1151 b
 Bonhöffer, A., 990 n. 2
 Bousset, W., 1332 e, 1342 b n. 3, 1345 c
 Boyancé, P., 959 b
 Bréhier, E., 983, 1438
 Bretz, A., 1260 d
 Brieger 832 n. 1, 849 n. 4
 Brochard, V., 983, 1078 b, 1080, 1086, 1089, 1106 a, 1107 d, 1116 b
 Brutus 1197 b, 1198 c
 Bryson 1082 a
 Buecheler 1285 n. 1
 Bury, R. G., 987 n. 1, 1094 n. 1
 Bythos 1333 a c, 1336 a
 Caesar, C. Julius, 1163
 Calanos 1082 a n. 2
 Caligula [Gaius] 1251, 1287, 1289 a
 Callicles 875 c
 Calvisius Taurus 1325

- Carneades 809, 812 a, 885 n. 1, 893, 896, 907, 910 a, 932 a, 935, 936, 958, 965 b, 989, 999 c, 1004, 1022, 1077 a, 1080, 1087 a, 1097 b, 1106 a, 1107 d, **1108-1128**, 1142, 1143, 1144, 1145, 1146, 1169 a, 1197 a d, 1278 a, 1384 b n. 1
- Casey, R. P., 1332 d
- Cassius 1234 a
- Caster, M., 1256 b
- Castor 1112 a, 1440 a
- Cato 942, 959 b, 999 c, 1022, 1047 d, 1050 b, 1065 b, 1109, 1111 a, 1163, 1207, 1323 b, 1324 b
- Catulus 1198 a
- Celsus 1231 b, 1279 d, 1282, 1321 b, 1325, 1346 b, 1473 a
- Censorinus 1280
- Cercidas 1229 b
- Chadwick, H., 1289
- Chairestrates 810 a
- Chalcidius 900 b, 927 b, 947 c, 948 a b, 1027 b, 1353 a - e
- Charis 1333 a
- Cherbury, Herbert of, 999 c
- Chione 1360 b
- Christ 1332 b, 1334 c, 1337 c, 1340 b n. 4
- Chrysanthius 1446 b, 1454 c
- Chrysippus
 introductory remarks 805
 the man and his work **891-892**
 altered Zeno's doctrine 896; cp. 956
 division of phil. 897 a, 898 c
 physics: 899 a, 904, 907 n. 1, 909, 911 b, 912 b, 913 b c, 914 c
 theory of the categories 915 a, 997
 of the hegemonikon 915 b c, 916
 of God 918 b, 920 c
 of providence 927 b, 932 a b c
 of mantic 933 a
 theodicy 938 ff.
 on fate and liberty 944
 on oikeiosis 945 a, 999 ff
 on the faculties of the soul 947
 on the seat of hegemonikon 948-950
 doctrine of the $\pi\alpha\theta\eta$ 951-956; 1053 ff.
 of immortality 957 c
 of voice 962 c
 of language 967, 969, 972
 logic 977, 981-983
 theory of knowledge 984, 986, 987 a b, 989, 990, 993, 997
- ethics 999 a c, 1001 c, 1003 a, 1004, 1005 d, 1011 a, 1015 b, 1018, 1021 c, 1023 b, 1030, 1032, 1034 b d, 1047 b, 1048 a
- theory of the $\pi\alpha\theta\eta$ 1053-1062; criticized by Posidonius 1185-1189; accepted by Seneca 1213; and by Epictetus 1238
- law 1066 c d, 1067 b, 1071, 1073, 1075
- this theory criticized by Carneades 1108, 1112 c, 1114, 1118, 1122, 1124
 criticized by Aenesidemus 1134
 on $\epsilon\upsilon\delta\omicron\lambda\alpha$ 1146
 criticized by Panaetius 1155
 relation to Posidonius 1176, 1177 b, 1178 a, 1180 a, 1181, 1184 b, 1185, 1186, 1188 b c d, 1190, 1196 a b
 relation to Antiochus of Ascalon 1201 c
 relation to Seneca 1207, 1213
 relation to Epictetus 1236 c d, 1238 a
 admired by Demetrius 1251 a
 his theory of the hegemonikon adopted by Marc. Aur. 1263 b
 mentioned 1267 b, 1280 a, n. 3, 1289 a, n. 3, 1318 d
 his definition of time 1300 b, n. 1
- Cicero 811 b, 815 b, 835, 846, 847 c, 849, 850 a, 851, 863 a, 866 c, 873 b, 876, 894, 897 c, 901 b, 902 b c, 903 a, 910, 923 b, 933 a c, 934, 935, 945 b, 955 b c, 958 a b, 959 a b, 964 b, 974, 985 a b c, 996 a, 999 c, 1000 a b, 1001 a b c, 1003 b, 1005 d, 1006, 1009, 1010 a d, 1011 c, 1013 c, 1014 b, 1015 b, 1016 a b, 1017 c d, 1020 a, 1021, 1022, 1026 a b, 1027 b, 1028 a, 1033 b, 1034 b c, 1036, 1039 a, 1044 b, 1046 b, 1047 d, 1050 b, 1051 b, 1060 b, 1061 c, 1064 a; political philosophy **1065-1075**; 1087 a, 1088 b c, 1097, 1102 a b, 1107 a, 1108, 1110-1113 a b, 1115 a b, 1117-1123, 1125 a b, 1127, 1128 c, 1129 c, 1143-1146, 1148 c, 1149, 1150 a, 1151 c, 1153-1155, 1157-1164, 1166, 1168-1171, 1176, 1177 a b, 1191 c, 1192 a c, 1194 a b, 1197-1205, 1223 a, 1243, 1255 c, 1278, 1280 c, 1289 a n. 5
- Claudius 1287, 1357 b, 1358 c

Cleanthes of Assos

life 889

doctrine: physics 899 a, 905 c, 908 a,
909, 918 d, 923, 925, 927 b, 939 a

the Hymn to Zeus 943

on Fate 944 c

dialogue between λογισμός and
θυμός 956 c, cp. 1054

immortality 957 c

grammatical science 961, 964 c, 971 a

theory of knowledge 986 a, 989 a

ethics 1001 c, 1005 d, 1011 b c, 1025
a, 1029, 1032, 1038 b, 1049,

1061 c, 1066 c

relation to Arcesilaus 1099

compared with Posidonius' vitalism
1176 a

theory of the πάθη 1185 n. 1

the sun the ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου
1196 a

the draught-dog 944 b; 1267 b, n. 1

Clemens Alexandrinus *cited passim*,
cf. 1035 b, 1037 a, 1332 c, 1335 c,
1337 a c, 1342 b n. 4, 1345 bCleomedes 1173 c, 1175, 1177 a, 1179
a b, 1180 bClitomachus 885 n. 1, 1077 a, 1108,
1197 a, 1198 a

Clytaemnestra 1124

Colotes 818, 875 d, 1250 b

Colson 1294 n. 1

Comte, A., 1456 c

Constantine 1454 b

Cornutus 908 b, 922 a, 1326 b n. 5

Cotta 851

Cousin, V., 1457, 1462 d, 1470 a b, 1471 a

Crantor 1096 b, 1199 b

Crates Academicus 885 n. 1, 986, 1096 b,
1199

Crates the Cynic 884 a, 885, 1250 c

Crates of Tarsus 885 n. 1, 972 a

Crisis 977

Critias 879 c

Critolaus 945 c, 1098 n. 3

Crönert, W., 1176 n. 3, 1250 b

Croesus 1036, 1123 b

Croissant, J., 1128

Crum, W., 1332 f.

Cumont, F., 905, 906, 1342 b n. 3,
1345 c, 1356 b n. 1

Cybele 1457

Cyrianus 1281 b

Damascius 1261, 1449 a b, 1451 a c,
1462 f, **1476-1480**

David of Dinant 916 b

Decius 1479

Dehaut, M., 1358 a

Demeter 925, 1319 a

Demetrius 1251, 1257 a

Democritus 811 c, 812 a, 821, 829,
831 a, 833, 835 a b, 838, 1081, 1118 c,
1276 n. 1, 1318 dDemonax **1257-1259**

Demophon 1135 a

Descartes 992 b, 994 b, 1115 b

Dexippus 1454 e

Diabolus 1337 b

Dicaearchus 1150 a, 1320

Diels, H., 849 n. 3, 957 n. 1, 1085 n. 1,
1086, 1091, 1094 n. 1, 1141 n. 3,
1279, 1280 bDio Chrysostomus (of Prusa) 1044 a,
1045 b, 1074 b, 1229 b, **1253-1255**,
1260 b

Diodorus Cronus 1096 b n. 1, 1141 a

Diodorus Siculus 1172, 1176 c

Diogenes of Apollonia 932 a

Diogenes the Babylonian 805, 893,
897 a, 961, 962 b c, 963, 966, 967,
968, 977, 990 n. 1, 999 c, 1004, 1017
c, 1034 b, 1109, 1128 c, **1143-1145**,
1146, 1148 a, 1153, 1188 c, 1340 a n. 2Diogenes Cynicus 1044 a, 1141 a n. 1,
1229 b, 1246 b, 1250 b c, 1252 a,
1253 c, 1254 cDiogenes Laërtius *cited passim*. VIII 25-
35, 1279

Note on Diog. himself 1091 n. 1

Diogenes of Oinoanda 833 a, 834 a,
883 b

Diogenianus 1095

Diocles 812 b, 891 a, 1082 a, 1279

Dionysius Areopagita 1003 n. 1, 1393 d,
1462 f, 1475 a

Dionysius of Halicarnassus 891 c, 967

Dionysius Thrax 961, 968, 970 a c

Dioscurides of Cyprus 1078 b

Dirlmeier, O., 945 c, 999 c

Dis 1313 c

Dodds, E. R., 1279 d, 1285 b, 1450 a
n. 1, 1455 b, 1457, 1466 d, 1474 a,
1475 a

Dörrie, H., 1358 a

Domitianus 1231, 1312

- Doresse, J., 1332 f
 Dudley, D. R., 1230 a, 1247 b, 1249 d,
 1250 a c, 1251 b, 1256 b, 1260 a b d,
 1261
 Dyroff, A., 1030 n. 1
- Ecclesia** 1333 a, 1334 a
Ecphantus 1279 e
Edelstein, L., 959 b, 1177 n. 1, 1178 b,
 1195 b, 1196 n. 1, 1196 d
Eedem, Fr. v., 939 d
Electra 1104, 1255 n. 1
Empedocles 811 b, 842, 1100 a, 1314 c,
 1318 d
Ennius 1123 b c
Ennoia 1333 a
Epaphroditus 1231 a c
Ephoros 1172 c
Epicomos 1108
Epictetus 806, 895, 896, 908 n. 2, **925**
 a b, 926 a, **929**, 944 c, 988, 990, 1007,
 1009, 1011 a, 1013 b, 1226, **1231-**
1248, 1249, **1252**, 1254 c, 1257 a,
 1260 b, 1262 e n. 2, 1265 b, 1438
Epicurus 806-809, **810-883**
 Life 810-820
 Basic principles 821-828
 Atomic theory 829-844
 Theology 845-858
 Ethics 859-883
 886, 896, 945, 989 c, 999, 1001 c,
 1011 b c, 1049 b, 1077 a, 1078 b,
 1083 b, 1090, 1126, 1131, 1132,
 1192 a b, 1218 d, 1240, 1311 b
Epiphanius 900 c, 920 b, 957, 1152 a,
 1332 c d
Erasistratus 1132 b
Eratosthenes 1071 c, 1084 a
Eros 1338, 1402 a n. 1
Euarmostes 1285 b
Eubulides 1121 n. 1
Eubulus of Alexandria 1078 b
Eudemus 982
Eudorus of Alexandria 1285 b
Eudoxus 860 b
Eudromos 898 c
Eulalius 1480
Eunapius 1357 a, 1437, 1446 a b, 1454 a c
Euphranor of Seleucia 1078 b
Euripides 891 b, 940 a, 1104 n. 1,
 1255 a, 1318 b
Eurysthenes 1153 a
Eurystheus 1112 a, 1246 b
Eusebius *cited frequently*
Eustathius 962 a, 1446 a
Eustochius 1357 b
- Farquharson** 1267 b n. 1
Favorinus 1260 b, 1262 e, n. 2
Faye, E. de, 1313 b, 1332 d e
Festugière, A. J., 805, 811 b, 848 n. 1,
 884 a, 943 n. 3, 959 b, 1151 c, 1279,
 1288 c, 1303 c, n. 1, 1338, 1339 a n. 1,
 1340 a n. 2, 1342 b, 1345 c, 1352 b,
 1356 b n. 1
Ficino, Marsilio, 1372 a, 1457, 1475 a
Flavius Sabinus 1253
Flacelière, R., 1318 a n. 4
Flora 1332 a
Florentinus 1076 b
Furster, W., 1332 d
Freudenthal 1326 n. 2
Fritz, K. von, 1250 b c, 1253 c
Furius Philus, L., 1111
- Gaius Pergamenus** 1325, 1362 b
Gaius Acilius 1109
Galba 1111 a
Gale, Th., 1445 c
Galenus 913 a, 948 c, 949, 950, 954 b,
 955 a, 959 b, 963, 965 a, 999 c,
 1023 b, 1027 a b, 1030 a b, 1053 a b,
 1054, 1060 a, 1061 a b, 1137 a b,
 1181, 1184-1190, 1191 b, 1192 a,
 1325, 1334 a n. 1, 1445 f
Galienus 1361, 1437 b
Galilei 960 a
Geffcken, J., 1450 a n. 1
Gellius, A., 939 d, 941 a, 944 a, 1166 a,
 1256 b, 1262 e n. 2, 1278 b
Geytenbeek, Dr. A. C. van, 1229 b
Gomperz, Th., 856 a, 1250 b
Goodenough, E. R., 1289
Gordianus 1358 a
Gorgias 1081
Gracchus, Ti., 936
Gregorius Nazianzenus 1046 c, 1260 d
- Hades** 1313 c, 1314 c
Hadrian 1260 a, 1325
Hagar 1289 b
Hamilton, W., 1319 c, 1320
Harder, R., 1280 a b c
Harmonia 1314 c

- Harnack 1332 d
 Häsle, B., 1260 b
 Hecataeus of Abdera 1090 n. 3
 Hecabe 1124, 1192 d, 1318 b, 1319 b, 1457
 Hecaton 1018, 1145 b, 1162 b
 Hector 1246 a
 Heine, H., 932 a
 Heinemann 1151 c, 1289, 1294 n. 1, 1311
 Heinze 1318 d, 1320
 Helen 987 n. 2, 1333 a, n. 4
 Helios 925 b
 Helvidius Priscus 1012 c
 Hephaestus 924 c
 Hera 924 c
 Heracleon 1318 d, 1319 b, 1332 d
 Heracles 905 b, 908 b, 924 a, 1044 n. 1, 1104, 1112 a, 1253, 1254 c, 1440 a
 Heraclides Ponticus 810, 959 b, 1078 b, 1320, 1356 a
 Heraclides of Tarentum 1137
 Heraclitus 812, 904 a, 920 c, 941, 1066 c, 1080, 1195 b, 1267 b, 1311 b, 1314 c, 1353 c
 Heraclitus Tyrius 1198 a
 Herillus 889, 896, 1021
 Hermarchos 813 c, 815 a, 1049 b, 1113 b
 Hermeias 1480
 Hermes (Mercurius) 924 a, 1356 b, 1437 c
 Hermes Trismegistus **1338-1344**
 Hermodorus 1352 a n. 8, 1410 b n. 4
 Hermogenes 1249 a
 Hero 1455
 Herodotus (disciple and friend of Epicurus) 806, 820, 823 b, 824 n. 1, 827 a, 829, 832 a, 833, 836 a c, 837, 840 a b, 843
 Herodotus (the historian) 1123 b
 Herodotus of Tarsus 1078 b, 1079 b
 Herophilus of Alexandria 948 c, 950, 1132 b, 1137 a, 1141 a.
 Hesiod 810 a b, 938, 1288 c, 1311 a, 1318 a, 1330 e
 Hicks, R. D., 827 b, 1095
 Hierocles 945 c, 999 c
 Hieronymus 880 a
 Hilgenfeld 1332 d
 Hipparchus 1172 c
 Hippobotus 1078 b, 1129 a
 Hippolytus 944 b, 1332 c, 1336 b, 1343
 Hipponicus 1100 c
 Hirzel, R., 1320, 1323 c
 Hobbes 1475 a
 Höistad, R., 1044 a, 1045 b, 1250 b, 1253 c, 1254 b c
 Homer 918 a, 944 a, 949 d, 1254 c, 1269 n. 1, 1311 a, 1314 a n. 2, 1318 a, 1353 c, 1445 d
 Hopfner, Th., 1314 b
 Horace 879 a, 1149 c
 Hornsby, H. M., 1256 b
 Horus 1313 b, 1334 b d, 1337 c
 Hultsch 1179 a
 Hume 1134
 Hypatia 1455
 Iamblichus 1001 a, 1339 a n. 2, 1340 a n. 2, 1354 b, 1355 a b, 1360 a, 1436, 1440 f, 1445 c, **1446-1454**, 1457, 1462 f, 1476
 Iccius 1149 c
 Idomeneus 814 a, 819, 820, 880 a
 Irenaeus 1332 c d, 1333 a b, 1334 a c d, 1335 a b, 1337 b, 1339 c n. 1
 Isaak 1301 a
 Isidorus 1261, 1480
 Isis 1313
 Iuno *see* Hera
 Iuppiter *see* Zeus
 Jacob 1301 a b
 Jaeger, W., 1181 b
 Jahweh 1301 b
 Jesus *see* Christ
 Jensen, Chr., 816 n. 2, 817, 858
 Jeû 1332 c
 John, St., 1304 b
 Jonas, H., 1332 e
 Jones, R. M., 959 b, 1192 b c d, 1193 a, 1319 c, 1320, 1321
 Jong, Dr. K. H. E., 1358 a
 Josephus 1289 a n. 2
 Julianus 879 a, 1260 a, 1436, 1446 d, 1451 c, 1454 c f
 Justinianus 1479, 1480
 Kaibel 1231 d
 Kant 1134
 Kepler 960 d
 Kern, O., 1340 a n. 2, 1437 c n. 2
 Khosru Nuschirvan 1480
 Krantor *see* Crantor
 Kranz, W., 1279
 Kroll, J., 1345 c

- Kroll, W., 1336 c n. 1, 1349 b, 1356 b
 Kronios 1355, 1362 b, 1363 a
 Ktesippos 813 c
 Lactantius 853 b, 911 a, 922 b, 1035
 n. 2, 1059 b c, 1066 c, 1110 a, 1111,
 1126 a b, 1128
 Laelius 1148 c, 1160 b, 1166 c, 1207
 Lambinus 849 n. ***
 Leemans, E. A., 1345 c, 1356 a
 Leibniz 932 d, 994 b
 Leisegang, H., 1289, 1311, 1332 e
 Leontion 813 a
 Leopold, J. H., 883 n. 1, 913 c
 Leucippus 811 b
 Liber 924 a
 Locke 991
 Logos 1333 a, 1339 b c
 Longinus 1363
 Lotze, H., 1182 a
 Louis, P., 1326 n. 3
 Lucianus 1050 a, 1256, 1257, 1259 a,
 1325
 Lucilius 926 c, 1110 a, 1208, 1220
 Luck, G., 1176 n. 2, 1198 c, 1200, 1205
 Lucretius 823 d, 825, 831 b, 832 a,
 834 b, 836 b, 837, 838, 840 c, 841,
 842, 844 b, 847 c, 848 b, 850 b c,
 853 a, 854, 855, 875 c, 879 b, 883 a
 Lucullus 1197 d, 1198
 Lueder, A., 1198 c, 1200, 1205
 Lukasiewicz, L., 983
 Lydus 1345 c

 Macrobius 1345 c, 1356 a b
 Malalas, Johannes, 1479
 Manetho 1090 n. 3
 Mani 1332 a b
 Marcella 1438, 1440
 Marcellus 1170
 Marcellus Orontius 1359
 Marcia 960 d
 Marcianus 1066 c, 1076 b
 Marcion 1332 b c
 Marcus Aurelius 895, 896, 907, 919 d,
 925 b, 926 b, 930, 931, 932 d, 939 c,
 940 c, 943, 988, 989 a, 1008, 1010 d,
 1011 a, 1079, 1089, 1231 a, **1262-**
 1277, 1325
 Marinus 1455 a b, 1456
 Marius 1171 a
 Mars *see* Ares

 Masurius 1234 a
 Mates, B., 983
 Matron 813 c
 Maximus of Tyrus 1260 c, 1279 e, 1303
 c, 1325, **1330**, 1454 c.
 Méautis, G., 1317, 1320
 Medea 1238 a b
 Meerwaldt, J. D., 908 n. 1 2, 943
 Meleager of Gadara 1250 a
 Meletus 1236 c
 Menander 973 n. 4
 Menedemus 807, 1250 b
 Menodotus 1078, 1087 a, 1137
 Menoeceus 820, 826 b, 844 b, 858, 859,
 860 a, 861 a b, 865, 866 a, 872 a, 873
 Menelaus 987 n. 2
 Mercurius *see* Hermes
 Merlan, Ph., 1193 a
 Metrodorus 810 a, 811 c, 812 a, 819,
 1049 b
 Minerva *see* Athena
 Minos 1315 a
 Minucius Felix 924 c
 Mithradates 894, 1171 b
 Mithras 1314 b, 1365 b
 Mnaseas 884 a
 Moderatus 1279 a, **1285-1286**, 1339 a
 n. 2, 1363 a
 Mommert 1438
 Moses 1196 c, 1289 b, 1290, 1292, 1293,
 1294, 1304 a, 1309 b, 1311 c, 1325
 c d, 1345 a b c, 1350 b
 Müller, L., 949 n. 1 2
 Mullach 1281 b, 1282, 1283, 1454 f
 Myron 1252 a
 Mys 812 a
 Musonius Rufus 806, 895, 896, 1035 b,
 1226-1230, 1231, 1252

 Nauck 1094 n. 1
 Nausiphanes 811 a, 812, 831 b, 1083 b,
 1090
 Nebel, G., 1034 d
 Nemesis 1283
 Nemesius 906, 947 a, 1181 b, 1182,
 1372 a
 Neocles 810 a
 Neptunus *see* Poseidon
 Nero 1226, 1231, 1251, 1252 a, 1285, 1287
 Nerva 1253, 1287
 Nestorius 1455 a
 Newman, cardinal, J. H., 942, 1304 b

- Nicagoras 1148 a
 Nicolaus Cusanus 1398 c n. 1, 1475 a
 Nicolaus of Methone 1475 c
 Nicolochus of Rhodes 1078 b
 Nicomachus of Gerasa 1279 e, **1288**,
 1340 a n. 2
 Nigidius Figulus, P., 1278, 1279 f
 Nigrinus 1325
 Nock, A. D., 1338, 1341 b n. 1
 Norden, E., 1345 c
 Noûs 1333a b, 1334 a, 1339 b, 1340 a,
 1341 a
 Numenius (the thief) 1095
 Numenius platonicus 1332, 1342 b,
1345-1356, 1362, 1363 a, 1382 d,
 1453 b
 Numenius ap. Euseb. 896, 1106 b, 1110 c

 Ocellus 1278, 1279 a c, 1280
 Oedipus 1124
 Oenomaus of Gadara 1260 a
 Olympias 1443 a
 Olympiodorus 880, 1446 b, 1455
 Ogdoas 1333 a
 Onatus 1282
 Ooge, d', 1288 a n. 4
 Ophellios 1252 a
 Orestes 1104
 Origenes 892 a, 907 n. 1, 916 n. 1,
 919 c, 938, 946 a, 960 d, 971 a,
 994 a, 1001 b, 1068 b, 1282, 1321 b,
 1325, 1332 c d e, 1345 c
 Orpheus 1318 a, 1474 c
 Osiris 1313, 1314
 Ovidius 1217 b
 Ovink, B. J. H., 1156

 Paetus Thrasea 1012 c, 1251 b
 Panaetius 808, 894, 896, 907, 936, 958,
 1000 b, 1005 d, 1075 c, 1144, 1145,
 1146, **1148-1169**, 1170 a, 1178,
 1190 c, 1192 a c, 1205, 1227
 Parmenides 1081, 1141 n. 3, 1383 a n. 1
 Parthey 1445 c
 Patroclus 1185 c
 Paul, St., 1037 c, 1279 e
 Pearson 904 b, 943
 Pentheus 1104 n. 1, 1325 a
 Perdiccas 810 a
 Peregrinus 1256 a b, 1258 a
 Persaeus 884 b, 888 a, 889, 924 n. 1
 Persephone 1319 a

 Phidias 1244 a
 Philemon (of Syracuse) 888 c
 Philinos of Cos 1137
 Philippson, R., 952 c, 953 d n. 1
 Philippus (Arabs) 1358 a c
 Philip of Macedonia 1252 a
 Philo Judaeus 941 b, 946 b, 951 a,
 1001 b, 1071 c, 1143, 1151 b, 1177
 n. 1, 1178 b, 1181, 1196 d, 1279 a-f,
 1280, 1286, 1288 b, **1289-1311**,
 1312, 1313 b n. 3, 1321, 1326 b,
 1332 e, 1340 b n. 3, 1343, 1349 b c,
 1382 d, 1401 c, 1427 b, 1428 b f
 Philo of Larisa 1197, 1198
 Philodemus
 816 b, 817, 849 n. 3, 856 a,
 857, 858, 911 b, 922 b, 924 n. 1,
 939 a.
 Philolaus 1281

 Philosophy 1256 a
 Philostratus 879 a, 1282, 1287
 Photius 1129 c, 1132 b, 1288 c
 Phylarchus 1078 b
 Pindarus 1066 c, 1315 a, 1316 a, 1325 c
 n. 1
 Pithane 1096 a
 Plato 805, 811 a, 812, 822, 828, 845,
 848 n. 1, 852, 879 c, 880, 897 c, 906,
 909, 919, 920 c, 958 b, 959 b, 960,
 989, 993 b, 998, 1003, 1017 b, 1028 b,
 1049 b, 1050 b, 1066 c, 1076, 1081,
 1096 b, 1097 a, 1107 b d, 1111 a,
 1125, 1150, 1160 b, 1184 b, 1187 a b,
 1188 b, 1192 c, 1193 a, 1196 d, 1197 d,
 1199, 1200, 1221 a, 1241 n. 1, 1260 c,
 1272 b n. 1, 1278, 1279, 1280 a n. 3,
 1285, 1288 a, 1289 a, 1290 a n. 1 3
 4 5, 1296 a, 1297 b, 1312, 1313,
 1314, 1315 a b, 1317, 1318 a b d,
 1319 b, 1321 a, 1322, 1325 a b c d e,
 1326 a b, 1327 d, 1330, 1331, 1332 b,
 1345 a b c, 1346 a, 1348, 1349 a,
 1350 b, 1351 n. 1, 1352 b, 1353,
 1356 a, 1357 b, 1361, 1363 a, 1371 b
 n. 1, 1374 b, 1385 b, 1394 b, 1400
 n. 2, 1402 a n. 1, 1410 a n. 1, 1412 e,
 1413 a, 1433 b, 1433 b, 1434 c, 1435
 a b, 1436, 1440 a, 1442 a, 1445 b,
 1446 a c, 1453 a, 1455 a b, 1457,
 1470 n. 1, 1471 b, 1472 a, 1474 c,
 1475 a, 1476, 1480

- Pleistarchus 1082
 Plinius Major 1177 b
 Plinius Minor 1226 b
 Plotinus 915 a, 916a, 1057, 1279 d,
 1285 b n. 3, 1303 c, 1325, 1332 e f,
 1342 b n. 3, 1344, 1345 c, 1349 c,
 1350 a b, 1352 b, 1353 e, 1354 b,
 Life and works **1357-1363**
 Theory of the hypostases **1364-1370**
 Soul **1371-1381**
 Noûs **1382-1391**
 The One or the Good **1392-1400**
 The sensible world **1401-1411**
 Man and his life on earth **1412-1424**
 Fate, Providence, Logos, Time
1425-1435
 1436, 1437, 1438, 1439, 1440 e f,
 1445 a, 1446 b, 1449, 1450, 1453 a b,
 1457, 1470, 1471, 1475 a
 Plouton 1313 c
 Plutarchus *cited passim*
 cf. 1001 a, 1016 a, 1053 b, 1079,
 1082 a, 1176 d, 1180 b, 1192 a c d,
 1193 a, 1194, 1279 c d e, 1280 c,
 1304 b, **1312-1324**, 1354 b, 1355 b,
 1474 a
 Pohlenz, M., 914 c, 915 c, 916 b, 920 b,
 932 b, 944 c, 945 c, 953 d n. 1, 954 b,
 955 a, 956 c, 961, 965 b, 967, 969,
 970 a, 983, 986 d, 987 a, 991, 999 c
 n. 1, 1053 b, 1149 c, 1151 c, 1172 d,
 1176 d, 1179 b, 1180 b, 1183, 1192 d,
 1195, 1205, 1213, 1216 c, 1218 d,
 1236 d
 Poimandres 1338, 1339 a b c, 1382 d
 Polemo 885 a d, 986, 1199
 Polemon (a pupil of Plotinus) 1360 b
 Pollux 1112 a, 1440 a
 Polyaenus 1049 b
 Polybius 1148 a, 1172 c
 Polygnotus 886
 Pompeius 894, 1171 b
 Porphyrius 916 a, 932 b, 1001 a, 1285,
 1288 a n. 2, 1332 f, 1342 b, 1344,
 1345 c, 1350 a, 1353 d, 1354 a b,
 1356 a b, 1357, 1363, **1436-1445**,
 1446 a b, 1453 b, 1454 d, 1474 a
 Poseidon 924 c, 1110 a, 1121 a
 Posidonius of Apamea 805, 894, 896,
 897 a, 898, 903 b, 907, 909, 934,
 937, 954 b, 956 a c, 958 b, 959,
 986 d, 989, 999 c, 1011 a, 1053 b,
 1054, 1055, 1057, 1084 b, 1149 b,
 1151, 1165, 1166 a, **1170-1196**,
 1199, 1207, 1213, 1223 a, 1227,
 1238 a, 1265 b, 1278, 1280 c, 1289 a
 n. 3, 1319, 1320, 1372 a, 1474 a
 Potamon (pupil of Plotinus) 1360 a
 Prantl 983
 Praylus of Troy 1078 b
 Priscianus 970 a b
 Priscianus of Lydia 1480
 Priscus 1454 c
 Probus 1360 b
 Procles 1153 a
 Proclus 919 b, 1279 d, 1343, 1352, 1356,
 1442 a b, 1446 b, 1449 a, 1450,
 1451 b, 1452 a b, 1453 a, 1454 d,
1455-1475
 Prodicus 924 c
 Prometheus 858
 Protagoras 1081
 Proteus 987 n. 3
 Proteus, Peregrinus, 1258 a
 Psellus, Michael, 1475 c
 Psyche 1336 c
 Ptolemaeus I 1090 n. 3
 Ptolemaeus II (Philadelphus) 1091
 Ptolemaeus of Cyrene 1078 a b, 1129 a
 Ptolemaeus (a Valentinian) 1332 d,
 1445 f
 Puech, H. C., 1332 f, 1345 a, 1349 c
 Pupius Piso Calpurnianus, M., 1198 c
 Pyrrho 805, 809, 811 a, 1021, 1049 b,
 1062 c, 1077, 1078, 1080, 1081,
1082-1089, 1090, 1091, 1095, 1096
 b, 1098, 1107 b, 1123 b, 1129 b,
 1134, 1142
 Pythagoras 812 b, 1278, 1285 a, 1287,
 1289 a, 1311 b, 1353 a e, 1363 a,
 1445 b, 1447, 1453 b
 Pythocles 806, 813 c, 816 a, 820, 840 c
 Quispel, G., 1332 d f, 1336 b
 Rainguard, P., 1319 b n. 2
 Rasche 1450 a n. 1
 Reinhardt, Karl, 1151 c, 1176 d, 1177
 a b n. 1, 1179 b, 1180 b, 1181, 1183,
 1192 c d
 Remmius Palaemon 961
 Reverdin, O., 1318 a n. 3
 Reymond, A., 983

- Reynders, H. F., 1205
 Ritzenfeld, A., 1457
 Robertson, J. M., 845 n. 1
 Robin, L., 1078 b, 1107 d, 1116 b,
 1129 c
 Rogatianus 1359
 Rohde, E., 1320
 Romulus 1162 b
 Rutilius, P., Rufus 1149 b
 Rijk, L. M. de, 1445 a
- Sabinillus** 1359
 Sagnard, F. M. M., 1332 d
 Sallustius the Cynic 1261
 Sallustius, author of *De dis et mundo*,
 1454 f, 1469 b
 Salonina 1361
 Sarah 1289 b
 Sardanapallos 1252 a
 Sarpedon 1078 b
 Saturninus 1078 b
 Saturnus 1121 a, 1356 b
 Scaliger 943 n. **
 Schenkl 1231 d
 Schmekel, A., 989
 Scipio Africanus 936, 959 b, 1148 a,
 1160 b
 Seneca 868 b, 895, 896, 897 n. 1, 899 c,
 902 a, 904 a, 905 b c, 907 a, 908 b,
 914 c, 918 d, 921, 924 a, 926 c, 928,
 937, 939 b, 940 b, 942, 956 b, 960,
 986 c, 996 b, 998, 1002, 1006, 1010
 b c, 1011 b, 1012 d, 1013 a, 1015 a,
 1026 d, 1027 b, 1031 b, 1035 a b,
 1041 b, 1048 b c, 1056 a, 1059 a,
 1062 c, 1071 a b, 1075 a, 1167, 1176
 b, 1181, 1183, 1191 a, 1193 b, 1194 a,
 1206-1225, 1226b, 1251, 1280 c,
 1284, 1326 b
 Serapion of Alexandria 1137
 Servius 924 a, 1356 b
 Seuthos 1096 a
 Severus 1357 b, 1362 b
 Sextius, Q., 1219, 1284
 Sextus Empiricus *cited passim*
 cf. 1077, 1078, 1079, 1080, 1086,
 1098 n. 3, 1108, 1112, 1133, 1135,
 1136, **1137-1142**
 Sige 1333 a b
 Simon Magus 1332 a
 Simonides 1322 b
- Simplicius 912 a, 915 a, 972 b, 997,
 1032 a b, 1285 b, 1480
 Socrates 848 n. 1, 906, 909, 933, 969 b,
 988 a, 1028 c, 1049 b, 1081, 1097 a b,
 1149 c, 1160 b, 1207, 1209, 1229 b,
 1235 b, 1236 c, 1237 b, 1241 c, 1249
 c, 1251 a, 1256 a, 1320, 1326 b,
 1357 b, 1379 b, 1380, 1383 a, 1412 a
 n. 1
 Solon 1315 a
 Sopater 1446 a, 1454 b
 Sophia 1302 a, 1332 b, 1333 a c, 1334
 a c d, 1336 a
 Sophocles 1314 a n. 1
 Sotion 810 a, 1078 b, 1091, 1129 a
 Soury, G., 1318 a n. 4, 1319 c
 Speusippus 1199, 1279
 Spinoza 994 b, 1010 d, 1089
 Steintal, H., 972 n. 1
 Stephanus 970 a
 Sterrett, J. R. S., 1231 d
 Stilpo of Megara 807, 885 a, 1062 c,
 1082 a, 1091
 Stobaeus *cited passim*
 Straaten, M. van, 953 d n. 1
 Strabo 1071 c, 1148 b, 1170 b c, 1171 b,
 1172, 1173, 1174 a b, 1177 n. 1,
 1182 d, 1195 a, 1196 c
 Strato of Lampsacus 1118 c
 Stuart Mill, J., 939 d
 Suidas 1079 b, 1148 a, 1170 a, 1231 a,
 1287, 1345 a, 1357 a
 Synezius 1455
 Syrianus 1446 b, 1455, 1457, 1472 a,
 1474
- Tacitus 1012 c, 1225, 1226 a c
 Tamar 1302 b
 Taylor, A. E., 1193 a
 Taylor, Th., 1457
 Teles 1249
 Thelêtos 1333 a, 1334 a
 Tertullianus 903 c, 1332 a n. 2, 1332 c,
 1334 a n. 1
 Thales 1123 a, 1248 n. 1
 Thedinga 1345 c
 Theiler, W., 1177 d, 1182 d, 1196 d,
 1200, 1278, 1326 b
 Theiodas of Laodicea 1078 b
 Themista 813 c
 Themistius 879 c, 913 a, 954 a
 Theodoretus 901 c, 927 a

- Theodorus of Asine 1453 a, 1454 d, 1457
 Theodotus 1332 d, 1335 c, 1337 c
 Theon of Smyrna 1285 b n. 4, 1325
 Theophrastus 807, 945 c, 982, 999 c,
 1032 b, 1096 b, 1150 a, 1200 b
 Thersites 1246 b
 Thespisius of Soli 1317
 Thévenaz, P., 1193 a
 Thomas Aquinas 916 b, 1003 n. 1, 1076 c,
 1128 c, 1289, 1393 d, 1398 c, 1435 b
 Thomas, P., 1338
 Thræsea Paetus *see* Paetus Thræsea
 Thrasyllus 1363 a
 Thrasymachus 875 c
 Tiberius 1091
 Timæus Locrus 1279 c, 1283, 1286
 Timarchus 1091, 1320
 Timocrates 815 a, 816 b, 817, 885 a,
 1257 a
 Timon 1042 b, 1078, 1080, 1082, 1085,
 1086, 1087 a, 1090, **1091-1095**,
 1129 b
 Togo Mina 1332 f
 Trajanus 1253
 Trophonius 1320
 Tubero, Q., 1166 c, 1207
 Tubero *see* Aelius
 Tyndareus 1124
 Typhon 1313 b, 1314 d
- Ulpanius 1076 a
 Uranius 1480
 Usener, H., Frequently cited in ch. XX
- Valentinus 1332 a b c d, 1333, 1336 a b,
 1337, 1339 c n. 1, 1340 b n. 1, 1370 c
 Varro 897 c, 972 a b, 1197 c, 1198 c,
 1200 a, 1278 b, 1279 d, 1280 n. 1,
 1311 a b, 1326 b
 Velleius 846, 849 n. 1, 923 b
 Venus *see* Aphrodite
 Verbeke, G., 807 n. 1, 908 a, 909,
 943 n. 1, 1192 d, 1193 a, 1194 n. 1,
 1196 d, 1356 b, 1442 a n. 1
 Vergil 840 c, 924 a, 1207
 Verginius Flavus 1226 a
 Vermaseren, M., 1356 b n. 1
 Vespasianus 1251, 1312
 Vettius Valens 1341 b n. 3
 Virieux-Reymond, A., 977 n. 1, 981, 983
 Voelker, W., 1332 d
 Vogel, C. J. de, 1193 a, 1279 a, n. 1, 1326 b
 Vogliano 815 b, 820
 Vollgraff, C. W., 1078 b, 1079
 Vulcanus *see* Hephaestus
- Wachsmuth 1030 n. 1, 1091
 Wellmann, M., 1279
 Wessely, C., 1250 c
 Whittaker, Th., 1456 b
 Wiersma, W., 999 a, 1001 c, 1004,
 1011 a c, 1034 b d, 1062 c, 1279
 William of Morbecca 1457, 1475 a
 Witt, R. E., 1196 d, 1200, 1326 b
 Wolfson, H. A., 1289, 1299 b, 1303 b,
 1311, 1313 b n. 1
- Xanthus 1091
 Xenocrates 810 a, 885 a, 897 c, 1012 b,
 1150 a, 1193 a, 1199, 1318 b d, 1319
 b, 1446 a
 Xenophanes 1092 b
 Xenophon 885 b, 910 b, 932 a, 1028 c,
 1229 b
- Zarathustra 1314 b, 1318 a, 1332 b
 Zeller, E., 952 c, 1078 b, 1129 c, 1278
 n. 1, 1279, 1442 a n. 1
 Zeno of Citium
 introductory remarks 805, 808, 809
 life **884-888**
 his doctrine altered by Chrysippus
 892 a; cp. 956; by others 896
 tripartition of philosophy 897 a,
 898 c
 physics 899 a b, 900 a c, 902 c, 903,
 904, 905 a, 910, 911, 913, 915 c,
 916 a
 God 920, 922 b, 923, 924 n. 1, 925
 providence 927 a b
 oikeiosis 945 c, 999 ff.
 parts of the soul 947 a
 seat of the hegemonikón 948 f.
 impressions of the soul (τυπώσεις)
 951; ὁρμή defined ib.
 πάθος defined 952; cf. 953 a, n. 1;
 954 a b, 955, 956 a, 957
 immortality 957
 language and grammar 961, 962 a,
 963, 964, 967, 969, 970a
 theory of knowledge 984, 985 n. 4,
 986, 987 a b, 989 a c, 992a
 ethics 999, 1001 c, 1003 a, 1004,
 1005 a d, 1012 a, 1013 c, 1014 a b,

1015 b, 1018, 1021, 1022, 1028
 a b c, 1035 a, 1041 a, 1042 a, 1044,
 1049 a b, 1050 b, 1051, 1052, 1053,
 1055, 1056 a, 1058 a, 1061 a, 1073,
 1075
 ridiculed by Timon 1092
 criticized by Arcesilaus 1104
 criticized by Carneades 1117 a, 1118a;
 newly interpreted by Panaetius 1156;
 basis of Posidonius' vitalism 1176;
 other Zenonian tenets adopted by
 Posidonius 1178 a, 1185 n. 1,
 1185 c, 1196 a
 cited by Antiochus of Ascalon
 1197 d; cf. 1199

admired by Seneca 1207; cf. 1215;
 1251 a
 cited by Epictetus 1234 b
 opposed by Plotinus 1415 c
 Zeno of Elea 1121 n. 1
 Zeus 908 n. 2, 918 a c d, 924 a b c, 925 a c,
 927, 938, 942, 943, 944 c, 989 b,
 1011 a, 1045 b, 1066 c, 1121 a, 1243a,
 1245 a, 1246 b, 1254 b, 1256 a, 1271
 d, 1284 c, 1314 c, 1340 a n. 2, 1356 b,
 1451 b
 Zeuxippus 1078 b
 Zeuxis 1078 b
 Ziegler, K., 1321
 Zoë 1333 a

II—CONCEPTS

Abstinence

of animal food etc. (Neopyth.) 1279 f
 defended by Porph. against the Stoics
 1444

practised by Procl. 1416 a

See also asceticism

Academy

the Middle A. 1096-1107

the Third (New) A. 1108-1128

the Fourth A. 1197-1205

the A. of the second century 1325

active principle

in nature acc. to the Stoa 899-902,
 917

aequalitas

men equal by nature 1069, 1071

a. in the sense of *ὁμολογία* or con-
 stantia 1215 c

aequitas 1065 b**aether**

called *anima tenuis* 1192 c; cp.
 1196 a

in Diog. Laërt. VIII 25 1279 c

in Basilides 1336 b

aetheric body see *ἀχρημα*

affection see *oikeiosis*

air

by Zeno identified with Hera 924 c

crassus aer 1192 c

in Neopyth. physics 1279 c

full of souls and daemons 1279 e

cp. Philo 1304

Plut. 1318 b

Apuleius 1331 a-c

In the Valentinian psalm 1336 a
 in Basilides 1336 b

allegoric interpretation

in the Stoa 924 c

in Philo 1311 a

in Porph. 1445 d

ambition

warning against a. 1160 b

amicitia see friendship**analogy**

in Stoic grammar 972

angels

with Neopyth. 1279 e, with comments

in Philo Alex. 1306 a, c

in Valentinus 1337 b, c

See also demons

in Proclus 1472

animals

distinguished from man by the Stoics
 946

man has no duties towards a. 1001

intermediate forms between plants
 and a. 1182 b

intelligent a. 1182 c

instinct distinguished from reason
 1183

treatment of a. (Plut.) 1323 b

the Stoic theory opposed by Porphyry
 1444

anomaly 972**aoristus 970 a**

apprehension see *κατάληψις*

- arrogance
warning against a. **1160 b**; **1411 a**
- ars
per quam humana et divina noscantur **1215 c**; cp. **897 b**
a. vivendi **1204 b**
- asceticism
of Epicurus **867**
rejected by Panaet. **1165**
practised by Sallustius **1261**
See also abstinence and ἐπιθυμία
(askesis)
in Musonius **1228**
for Epictetus see **1247 a**
for Plotinus **1411**; **1419 f**.
for Porphyrius **1440**
- assensio **985 a**
assensus **985 b**
- assent
whether συγκατάθεσις is a ἐτεροίωσις
ἐν ἡγεμονικῷ **956 a**
the Stoic doctrine of a. (συγκατάθεσις)
985 a b c; **987 a**
the Stoic doctrine criticized by the
Sceptics **1102**; **1103**
- astrology
accepted by the Stoics **937 b**
criticized by the Sceptics **1139**
by Panaetius **1153**
Plotinus' attitude towards a. **1413 b**,
the end, with n. g; **1425 b**; **1431 d**
For later Neoplatonists see **1356**
- atomic theory
of Epicurus **829-844**
- atoms vid. ἄτομα
- autarchy see αὐτάρχεια
- Being
four kinds of b. distinguished by
Chrysippus **915**
a hierarchy of b. admitted by Posi-
donius **1196 d**
generally found in the first centuries
Ch. XXIV, introd.
in Moderatus **1285 b**
in Plutarch **1321**
in Albinus **1327 b**
in Gnosis **1332 b**, sub 3
in Valentinus **1336**
in Plotinus **1365-1370**
in Proclus **1458-1470**
A special kind of —s in each part of
the cosmos **1280 c**; cp. **1304 a**
See also ὄν, ὄντα, and οὐσία
- beneficium **1217**
- body
—ies and space acc. to Epic. **829 a**
motion in compound —ies **837**
properties of compound —ies **838**
the Stoa:
everything which operates is a b.
901
virtues are —ies **914**
four kinds of natural —ies **1181**
b. and soul **1184 a** (Posid.), **1228**
(Musonius), **1265 b c** (M. Aur.)
Epict. **1232 a**, **1234 a**, **1235 a**
(τὸ σαρκίδιον), **1236 b c** (τὸ σω-
μάτιον), **1241 c** (τὸ σαρκίδιον)
For a positive appreciation of the
b., cp. **929 a**
M. Aur.: τὰ τοῦ σώματος ποταμός
1275 b
- Neopyth.:
the origin of sensible —ies **1279 a**
- Philo:
τὸ σῶμα οὐ θεοειδές **1296 a**; cp.
1296 b c
Plut. **1313 b** (Horus νενοθευμένος τῇ
ὄλῃ διὰ τὸ σωματικόν)
man consists of b., soul and spirit
1319 a (cp. M. Aur. **1265 b**)
the consequences of incarnation
1320
- Herm.:
how the spiritual man is joined to
a b. **1341 b**
the b. a burden **1344**
- Numenius:
the ὄν cannot be a b. **1347 a b**
- Plotinus:
soul and b. **1371 b c**; **1373 a** (the
end), **1375 b** (the end); **1376 c**
(l. 20), **1378 a** (τὸ ὄργανον τὸ
σῶμα)
μνήμη does not belong to the b.
1378 b
the b. of the universe **1373 c** (l. 6),
1404 a c
the b. always composite **1406 c**;
1407 a
ὄλῃ not a b. **1401 b c**; **1409 a**
the b. not primarily bad **1410 c**
man in a b. **1412-1424**

- the b. should be accepted meekly **1424**
 See also ἀνάστασις
 Porph.
 personality defined as ὁ ἐπὶ πλεῖ-
 στον ἀφροστηκῶς τοῦ σώματος **1440 a** (c. 8, sec. al.); cp. **1441**
 the b. (σάρξ) not the cause of sin **1440 f**; cp. Iambl. **1453 a**
- Iambl.
 his b. transfigured **1431 b**
- Proclus
 his comments on *Tim.* 43-44 (the
 b. a cause of disturbance) **1453 a**;
 (cp. Plot. **1412 e**)
 the b. moved by soul **1459 d**
 participates of being **1459 e**
 θεῖον διὰ ψυχῆς **1465 a** (c. 129, 139);
 cp. **1466 d** (c. 165)
 periodical return of the soul into
 a b. **1469 b**
 ethereal or pneumatical b. see ὁχημα
 celestial —ies see celestial
- bona
 in Stoic ethics **1012**; **1017 d**; **1022**;
1027 c
 Pyrrho and Aristo **1288**
 See also προηγμένον. For Plot. and
 later Neoplat. see ἀγαθά
- bonitas **876**
- bonum
 in the Stoa **1012**; **1015-1017**; **1021**
c; **1036**; **1062 c**
 See also τέλος (summum bonum) and
 honestum
- bravery see ἀνδρεία
- Caelum see οὐρανός
- canon
 the c. in Epicurus **821**; **823 a**
- caritas
 generis humani **1205**; cp. **1243**
 (Epict.) and **1262 a**; **1272 a**; **1276**
b (Marc. Aur.); cp. also Iambl.
1448 c
- casuistic
 in the Stoa **1128**; **1145**
- casus
 conscientiae **1128**; **1145**
 in grammar, vid. πτωσις; c. rectus
969 b
- categories
 four c. admitted by the Stoics **915 a**
 The Stoic theory of the c. criticized
 by Plot. **915 a**, under the text.
 For Plot. cp. **1433 b**, introd.
- cause
 in the Stoa, see active principle; also
919 b
 Five or six c.s admitted in the later
 Stoa **1305 a**, under the text
 c. of evil, see evil
 c. of the πάθη, see πάθη
 the principle of causality denied by
 the Sceptics **1131 f**.
 God the c. of the universe (Seneca)
1221
 ps.-Archytas **1281**
 one single c. admitted by Plot. **1364 a**
 a hierarchy of causes (Proclus) **1458 b**
 See also αἰτία
- celestial
 the c. bodies
 generally believed to be divine beings
848 b, introd., with n. 1
 this belief rejected by Epic. **448 b**
 accepted in the Stoa **902 a**
 criticized by Carn. **1117 b**; **1121 c**
 partly admitted by Boëthius of Sidon
1143 b
 apparently rejected by Panaetius, cp.
1152; **1153**
 the stars feeding on aether **1192 c**
 (the end). See also sun and moon.
 divine beings **1279 c**
 ζῶα νοερά **1297 a** (l. 4)
 God conducting the motion of the c.
 bodies **1303 c** (see also sm. pr. un-
 der the text)
 Plut. (Xenocr.): sun and stars εἰκόνες
 of the Gods **1318 b**
 the moon a μικτὸν σῶμα, see moon
 Albinus: the stars are spiritual beings
 and gods **1329 a**
- Plotinus:
 the star-souls **1376 b**
 the stars divine beings **1381 a** (l. 40)
 brother sun and brothers stars
1411 b
 the stars a sign of future events, not
 their cause **1413 b**, with n. 7;
 cp. **1425 b**; **1431 d**; **1432 a** (the
 end)

- For the influence of the c. bodies on earthly events, see astrology
 the c. spheres: ascent of the soul **1342 b**; decent **1356 b**
 c. immortality **959**; **960**; **1192-1194**; cp. **1319 b** and **1356**
 See also sun, moon, and Milky Way children
 on having c., see marriage
 circle
 the simile of the c. in Plot. **1364 a b**; **1365 b**, **1397 b** (sm. pr.)
 choice
 deliberate c., see προαίρεσις
 civitas
 communis deorum atque hominum **1001**; **1072**
 climatic
 c. influence on man **1184 a**
 clinamen vid. παρέγκλισις
 cognatio distantium rerum **935**
 See further s.v. cosmic sympathy
 coincidentia oppositorum **1398 c**, n. 1
 collision
 of the atoms acc. to Epic. **833**
 colour
 explained by Epic. **838**
 kataleptic presentation of colour denied by the Sceptics **1112 b**
 comitas **876**
 commendatio **1000 a**
 sibi commendari **945 b**
 See also conciliatio and οικειώσις
 common sense **1141 b**; **1142**
 compassion
 rejected in the Stoa **1064 b**
 compound body, see body
 comprehensio **985 a b**
 See also κατάληψις
 conciliatio **1003 b**
 sibi conciliari **945 b**; **999 c**
 See further οικειώσις
 concilium, see compound body
 conflagration, see εκπύρωσις
 coniunctio
 naturae **935**
 See further cosmic sympathy
 conscience
 in Seneca **1218-1220**
 consciousness, see self-consciousness
 consensus
 gentium **996 a b**
 omnium **1122 b**
 c. naturae **935**
 consitus
 the soul defined as c. spiritus **903 c**
 consilium
 ratio et c. the proprium of man **1001 c**
 constantia
 in Seneca **1006**
 See also self-consistency
 contemplation
 of the intelligible World (θεάσασθαι) **1310 b** (Philo)
 In Plotinus: ἡ θέα, τὸ θέαμα (sc. of the First Principle, called the Light), θεάσασθαι **1389 a-c**; **1399 a, c-d**; **1400**. Cp. Porph. **1441**, the beginning
 See also ἐπιστροφή, ἐπιστρέφεσθαι
 contingency
 of all things acc. to Epic. **808**, sub (2)
 contract
 the social c. theory held by Epic. **875**
 by Carneades **1126**
 contradiction
 the law of c. rejected by the Sceptics **1113**
 convenientia
 = ὁμολογία **1003 b**
 cosmic sympathy (συμπάθεια)
 Chrysippus' view of c. s. **913**
 artificial mantic based on c. s. **935**
 (called cognatio distantium rerum, coniunctio or consensus naturae)
 this theory attacked by Carn. **1122**, sub 3; also **935**
 c. s. in Posid.' system **1177**; in M. Aur. **1271-1272** (called ἐπισύνδησις πάντων, σύμπνοια and ἔνωσις τῆς οὐσίας); in Philo **1303 a**; in Plotinus **1431 a b**; **1432 a**
 cosmos
 endowed with soul and reason acc. to the Stoa **909**; divine **902 a**
 three arguments **910**; **920 c**
 unity of the c. **922**; **1271**
 the Sceptic arguments against the Stoic theory **1117 f**.
 the theory abandoned by Boëthius of Sidon **1143 b**
 eternity of the c. held by Panaetius **1151 b**

- the ancient Stoic theory restored by
Posid. **1177 b**; **1181 a**
difference **1196 a**
M. Aur.: **1272 b**; **1273**
Neopyth. theories **1279 a-d**; **1280**;
1282
Philo:
the intelligible c. **1293-1295**; **1300-1301**
the elder Son of God **1301 c**
the sensible c. the younger son of
God **1301 c**
Plut.:
the intelligible c.=Osiris, the sen-
sible c.=Horus **1313 b**
God separated from the sensible c.
1313 c; cp. **1312**
The Gnostic view:
characteristics **1332 b**
the intell. c. called pleroma **1333 a**
the sensible c. arises by the sin of
Sophia **1334**
not created in the likeness of arche-
typia **1334 e**
Herm.:
how the sensible c. is created **1340 a**
Numenius:
the sensible c. created by a good
Demiurge **1350 a**
the third god **1352 a**
mixed character **1353 b c**
Plotinus:
the intelligible c.=Noûs or τὰ
νοητά. See Noûs.
the sensible c. its εἰκὼν **1401**
mixed character **1402**
an ἄγαλμα, not created by sin
1403 a b
should not be blamed, nor despised
1403 c d
eternally created **1404**
the unity of the c. and its motion
1431 a b
the c. is reasonable but not by
deliberation **1429 b**
the powers of the sensible c.
1428 e f. See also nature
creation
cr. ex nihilo excluded by Epic. **829 a**;
no reason for cr. **854**
in the Stoa, see active principle and
cause. See also **932 b**
the Sceptic arguments against cr.
1118; **1131**
cr. acc. to Seneca **1221**
Epictetus (ὁ Ζεὺς ποιεῖ μόνος ἐν τῇ
ἐκπυρώσει) **925 b**
Philo **1290**; of the intelligible world
1293; **1295**; of man **1296**
Atticus (defends Plato's doctrine of
cr.) **1325 d**
cr. a necessity acc. to Plot. **1365**; **1401**
an eternal relation **1366**; **1367**
an eternal process **1404**
criterium (of truth)
in Epic. **823-828**
in the Stoa **990**; **993 a**. See also
φαντασία καταληπτική
sceptic arguments against the Stoic cr.
1102-1104; **1112**; **1140**
cult
of God, see God
of the dead **1456 c**
cupiditas, see ἐπιθυμία
Cynicism
Zeno's relation with c. **1044 a**; **1073**
Cynics **1227**; **1246**; **1249-1261**
Dance
the cosmic d. (Plot.) **1431 a**
death, see θάνατος and εὐλογος ἐξαγωγή
declinatio
atomi, see παρέγκλισις
decorum, see πρέπον
Demiurge, see δημιουργός
demonology, see demons
demon, demons (δαίμων, -μονες)
ὁ παρ' ἐκάστῳ δ. (Chrys.) **989 b**;
also **1011 a** (with some comments)
exterior to man acc. to Sen., Epict.
and M. Aur.? **926**
ὁ ἐν αὐτοῖς δ. (Posid.) **989 a**, **1055**;
cp. **1192**
an ἀγαθὸς δ. appearing **1259 a**
ὁ ἔνδον δ. (M. Aur.) **1266 a**; **1275 b**
Neopyth. **1279 e** (with some com-
ments), **1280 c**; **1283**
Philo **1304**; cp. **1306 b**
Plut. **1318**; **1319 c**; **1320**; **1321 a**
Albinus **1329 b**
Maximus of Tyrus **1330 e**
Apuleius **1331 b c**
Porph. **1440 d**; **1442 a b**
Procl. **1472**

desire, see ἐπιθυμία

dialectica **974**

See further διαλεκτική

diatribe

the genre defined **1249**

disease

man considered as suffering from a d.

883 b

cp. **1160 b**: phil. medetur animis

πάθη considered as a d. **1185**

sin regarded as a d. **1257 b**; **1316 a**,

the beginning

divinatio **1122 a**

See further mantic

divisibility

infinite d. of atoms rejected by Epic.

832

divisio

Carneadea **1111 b**

dogmatism

of Epic. and the Stoa, see theory of knowledge, s.v. knowledge

Stoic d. criticized by the Sceptics, ib.

Philo of Larisa did not return to d.

1197 c d

Antiochus did **1198**

dolor

nihil agis, d. **1171 b**

See also πάθη, and pain

dreams **1123 c**; **1194 a**

dualism

of ps.-Archytas **1281**

of Plut. **1313**; **1314**

in gnosis **1332 a b**; **1334 ff.**

the *Poimandres*: **1339 a**, with n. 2

Numenius **1353 ff.**

For Plot. and Proclus see ὄλη.

See also evil

duration

virtue not increased by d. **1036**

durativum **970 b**

dynamical

the One of Plot. a d. maximum **1398 b**

See further s.v. power

Earth

Posidonius' theories on form and circumference of the e. **1173-1176**

See further cosmos

effatum **974**

eidola, see εἰδωλα

elements, see στοιχεῖα

emanation, see ἐξερρύη

embryology

treatise of Porph. on e. **1445 f.**

empiricism **809**; **1137-1139**. See also **1116**

end, see τέλος

enthusiasm

characteristic of the prophet **1310**

Epicureanism

in general **805-808**

See further Epicurus

equilibrium

in the universe acc. to Epic. **850**

in Diog. Laert. VIII 26 **1279 b**

in Philo **1306 b c**

eternity

defined by Plot. **1433**

ethereal, see aetheric

ethics

Epic.' e. connected with physics **834**

Epic.' e. **859-883**

its place in the system of phil. **898**

Stoic e. **999-1076**

Pyrrho's relation to e. **1088**

Carneades' position in e. **1125-1128**

Diog. and Antipater **1144-1147**

Panaetius **1156-1169**

Posidonius **1184-1191**

Antiochus of Ascalon **1201-1205**

Seneca **1206-1220**

Musonius **1227-1230**

Epictetus **1232-1248**

later Cynics **1249 b-1254**; **1257 f.**

Marc. Aur. **1262 ff.**

Philo **1309 f.**

Plutarch **1322 ff.**

Atticus **1325 b**

Hermetics **1341 f.**; **1344**

Numenius **1355 f.**

lack of e. in Gnosticism **1411**

Plotinus **1410-1424**

Porphyry **1439-1441**

Iambl. **1453**

Proclus **1456 b**; **1473 b**; **1474**

etymology **971 b**

evidence

practical e. **809**; cp. **1116**; **1137 ff.**

evil

the problem of e. in Epic. **853a**;

cp. **865**; **883 a b**

in the Stoa **938-942**

- Sceptic arguments against this **1119**
 on moral evil, see sin
 The Stoic tenet: There is no e. except
 what is morally bad **1061 c**
 Seneca's attitude towards e. **1207:**
1210
 For Epictetus, cp. **1232 ff.**; **1239**
 The Cynics **1249 b**
 Marc. Aur. **1270 f.**
 the problem of e. in Philo **1297**
 the cause of e. acc. to Plut. **1314**
 acc. to Plot. **1410 a-e**
 e. defined as στέρησις **1410 e**
 e. men have their function in the
 whole **1429 c**
 e. cannot be ascribed to the Gods
1431 c
 Porphyry (man himself the cause of
 e.) **1440 b**
 Proclus **1479**
 explorer
 Posid. the greatest e. of Antiquity
1172 d
 ecstasy
 in Philo **1310**
 for Plot., see ἔκστασις
 externals, see outward things
- Fasting 1456 a**
fatalism 808
 See further fate, εἰμαρμένη, and κοινὸς
 νόμος s.v. law
 fate, fatum
 f. and liberty
 in the Stoa **943 f.**
 Carneades **1124**
 Plotinus **1413 b**, the end, with n.
 10; **1418**; **1430**
 Proclus **1473 b**
 f. and providence
 in Diog. Laërt. VIII 27 **1279 d**
 in Philo **1302 b-d**
 Plut. **1321**
 Apuleius **1331 b**
 Plot. **1421-1432**, esp. **1431**
 Proclus **1471**
 See further εἰμαρμένη, and κοινὸς
 νόμος s.v. law
- fear
 in Epic.:
 f. of death **844**; **865**
 of the gods ib.
- see also Cic. **1118 c**
 f. of punishment **875**
 in the Stoa:
 one of the four πάθη **955**; **1057-**
1060; **1121 b**
 Epict. mentions ἀφοβία as one of the
 precious qualities of the "free"
 man **1233 a**
 See also the problem of evil s.v. evil
 finalism
 Zeno a finalist **808**
 See further τέλος
 finite
 and infinite see πέρας and ἀπειρον
 fire
 in the Stoa **902 f.**
 See also πῦρ
 fortitudo see ἀνδρεία
 fortuita **1122**
 freedom (ἐλευθερία)
 in Epic. **1013 b**; **1234**; **1246**
 free will
 maintained by Epic. through the
 clinamen theory **833-835**
 in the early Stoa **943**; **944**
 in Epict.: προαίρεσις the first charac-
 teristic of man **1236 d**; **1242** (init.)
 Gnostics speak of τὸ αὐτεξούσιον **1335a**
 Plotinus opposes the Stoic doctrine of
 ἐν κ. πᾶν as abolishing f. w. **1425**
a-d. Cp. **1430**; **1432 c** (ἐκὼν,
 οἰκεία φύσις, αὐτεξούσιος)
 Iambl. **1453 a** (προαίρεσις)
 Procl. **1473 b** (αἰρεῖσθαι, αἵρεσις)
 See also fate (f. and liberty), and ἡμεῖς
 friendship
 in the School of Epic. **812 a b**; **813**;
815; **818**
 Epic.' theory **877**
 See also caritas, φιλανθρωπία, and φίλος
- Generation**
 the g. of the universe acc. to the Stoa
904
 See also regeneration and creation
 gentleness **1160 b** (Panaetius); **1257 b**
 (Demonax); **1424** (Plotinus)
 gnosis
 gnosticism } **1332-1337**
 gnostics }
 Plotinus' arguments against g. **1411**;
1420 b; **1424**

God, gods

the gods not concerned with human affairs according to Epic. **844 b**; **865 a**

their existence admitted and proved **845 ff.**; **850**

nature and properties **849**; **852**

example of happiness **856**

in the Stoa:

the active Principle, Logos, ἀτδιος, δημιουργός **899 a**; **904**; **911**; **917**
inseparable from matter **900 b c**;
matter **901**; πῦρ τεχνικόν **902**

πρώτη ὕλη πως ἔχουσα **916 b**

εἰμαρμένη **918** (also called Zeus);
Logos **919**

also called Νοῦς **920**; φύσις **921**
unity of G. **922**

plurality **923 f.**

Zeus or ὁ θεός **925**

Providence of G. see providence
and πρόνοια

a common civitas of man and g.
1001; **1072**

by Zeno only a spiritual cult of the
g. admitted **1073**

G. mentioned by Timon **1085 b**; cp.
1086

perceptions sent by the G.? **1115 b**

the Stoic arguments for the existence
of G. criticized by Carneades
1117-1123

Posidonius' conception of G. **1196**
Seneca **942**; **1221 f.**

Epictetus **1244-1248**; **1252**

Marc. Aur. **1262 e**; **1269 c**

ps.-Archytas **1281**

Onatus **1282** (defends polytheism)

Apoll. of Tyana on the true worship
of G. **1287 b**

Philo:

G. is unique **1291**

G. alone has real being **1292**

Creator and Logos **1293**

the powers of G. **1294**

creation **1295 f.**

the created Logos a second g. **1301**
(see also under **1300 c**)

the elder Son of G. **1301 c**

the immanent law of nature not
identified with G. **1303**

G. called ἡνίοχος τῶν δυνάμεων **1303 b**

ποιμὴν κ. βασιλεύς **1303 c**

Plut.:

G. alone has true being **1312 a**

G. alone is truly one **1312 c**

the supreme Principle **1313 a**

eternal, ἀμιγῆς κ. ἀπαθῆς **1313 b**

separated from matter **1313 c**

only the cause of good things **1314**

See also providence

Albinus' First Principle **1327**

Maximus of Tyrus **1330**

Apuleius (three kinds of gods) **1331**

the gnostic conception of G. **1332 f.**

Hermes Trism. **1339** (G.=Νοῦς) f.;
1343

the three g. of Numenius **1349-1352**

For Plotinus, see hypostasis (the
theory of the three hypostases);
see also the One, Νοῦς, soul, con-
templation and παρουσία

Plot. opposes the gnostic conception
of G. **1411**

defends polytheism **1411 a**

κάθαρσις and meditation the only way
to G. **1411 a**; **1420 d**

G.'s presence in our life (Porph.)
1440 d

virtue the only way to G. **1440 c**

the soul a dwelling-place either of g.
or of demons **1440 d**

g. and demons **1442 a**

divine Henads (Procl.) **1464**

the First Principle ἀρρητον (Dama-
scius) **1476**

See also πατήρ

good, see ἀγαθόν, bonum, bona and τέλος
grace

divine g. needed **1447 c**

Happiness

negative definition of h. by Epic.
805; cp. **864**

the gods an example of h. **856**

the happy life=the telos **859**

few conditions for h. acc. to Epic.
867; **871 f.**

in the Stoa a concomitant state
1011 b c

h. the inner aspect of virtue **1013 c**

virtue the only condition **1014**; **1022**

the wise man is happy **1046 c**

See also εὐροια, εὐδαιμονία and τέλος

- Carneades separates h. from justice and wisdom **1127-1128**
 Arcesilaus ap. Sext. Emp. **1105**
 Seneca on h. **1211**
 Epictetus **1234 b** ; **1252 a**
 the Cynics **1249 b**
 Obedience to reason condition for h. (Stoic principle found in Tim. Locrus) **1283**
 Plotinus:
 h. in the life of the spirit **1400 b** ; **1421-1424**
 harmonica **1445 f**
 harmony, see ἀρμονία
 heat
 the cause of life **1279 c**, sub (3); cp. **1279 d**
 hedonism **882**
 henads
 Proclus' doctrine of divine h. **1464**
 heroe
 Heracles the Cynic h. **1253 b** ; **1254 c**
 the function of —s (Procl.) **1472**
 heroism
 see e.g. Seneca in nr. **942**; Epict. on inner freedom **1234**; also **1241 c**, and the ideal of the wise man (s.v. wise)
 hierarchy
 of being, see being; of causes, see cause; of virtues, see virtue
 honestum
 in the Stoa=bonum: quod solum in bonis ducitur **1003**
 bonum est quod h. est **1012 d** ; **1065 b c**
 based on reason **1013 a** ; **1015 a**
 origin and character of the h. acc. to Panaetius **1157** ; **1158-1161**
 the h. should not be compared with the utile **1164**; cp. **876**
 Cp. also **1017 a** (the definition of bonum)
 h. nullam accessionem recipit **1212 a**
 humanitas **1000 b** ; **1145** ; **1159 b** ; **1162 a**
 See also **1161 b**: reverentia adversus homines
 h. and philanthropia **1323 c**, under the text
 humanus
 cogitatio h. a **1217 c**
 humanity, see man, and humanitas
 humility **1160 b**. See also arrogance
 humour
 (moisture) in the process of conflagration and renewal of the cosmos **905 c**; cp. **908 a**. See also ὑγρός (as a personal quality) **1257 d**
 hypostasis
 the theory of the three —es (Plot.) **1364-1370**
 the theory elaborated by Iambl. **1449**
 by Proclus **1458-1470**
 Idea
 innata **994**
 Plato's theory of the —s restored by Antiochus? **1200 b c**
 See further εἶδος, ἰδέα, and κόσμος νοητός (s.v. κόσμος)
 immanent
 the Stoic λόγοι σπερματικοί i. in matter **919 c**
 the i. λόγος in Philo **1302**
 not identified with God **1303**
 Cp. δύναμις in Plot., **1365 a** ; **1428 d-f**
 Also λόγος, **1427**
 immortality
 of the soul, rejected by Epic.; see death
 in the Stoa: Zeno and Cleanthes **957** ; Panaetius **958** ; **1154**; Posid. **959** ; **1192-1194**; celestial i. in the *Somn. Scip.* **959 b**; Seneca **960** ; **1223**; Plut. **1319 b** ; **1320**; Valentinus **1335**; Basilides **1336 b**; Herm. **1342**; Numenius **1356**; Plot. **1379-1380**; Procl. **1469 b** ; **1474**
 the Sceptic arguments against i. **1120 a b**
 imperfectum **970 b**
 imperialism
 Roman i. justified **1169**
 incarnation
 in animals rejected by Procl. **1474 c**
 See further body
 inconstancia **1006**; **1009**
 incorporeal, see ἀσώματος
 incrementa
 corporis i. **1356 b**
 Cp. προσθήκαι
 independence, see αὐτάρκεια
 individualism **805**

indifferentism

Pyrrho's i. **809**; **1082 b**; cp. **1089**

infinite, infinity, see ἀπειρον

injustice, see ἀδικία

instinct

opposed to intellect **946**; **1183**

intellect, see comprehensio, κατάληψις, λόγος, διάνοια and νοῦς

intelligentia **1003 b**; see also ἔννοια

intelligible

the i. world, see κόσμος νοητός (s.v. κόσμος) and ἰδέα. Also νοῦς.

intentio, spiritus, see τόνος

intention

virtue essentially a question of i. **1016**, **1217**

intermundia, see μετακόσμια

international law **1070**

interpenetration of bodies **912**

See also κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων s.v. κρᾶσις

irrational

On the question whether there is an i. part in man acc. to the Stoa, see πάθος

Numenius **1353 d**. See also ἄλογος

irrationalism
detested by Plot. **1332 e**, the end isonomy, see ἰσονομία

ius, see law

Justice, see δίκαιον and δικαιοσύνη

Kataleptic presentation, see κατάληψις and sense-impression

knowledge

theory of k.: introd. remark **808**, sub (4); in Epic. **821**; in the Stoa **984-997**

the Stoic theory criticized **1102-1104**; **1112 ff.**

For Plotinus, see **1414 c-1416**

Law

of the universe **808**. By the Stoics called λόγος or κοινὸς νόμος **918 d**; **943**. See also logos

the Stoic theory of natural l. **1065-1076**. Criticized by Carneades **1125 ff.**

the immutable —s of nature (Philo) **1302 c**

divinam legem esse fatum **1331 b**

the —s of the universe described by Plotinus **1431**

learning

despised by Epic. **816**; **879 d**

Epic. and Pyrrho **811 a**

cultivated by Panaet. **1149**

and Posid. **1170 c**; **1172**

Nigidius praised for his l. **1278 b**

See also παιδεία

lex, see law

liar

the sophism of the l. **974**

libertas see ἐλευθερία

life

a campaign (Epict.) **1247**

full of deceit, wickedness and sorrow (Dio) **1253 c**

human l. compared with eternity (M. Aur.) **1273 c**; is πόλεμος **1275 b**

true l. is yonder (Plot.) **1400 a b**

l. must bear witness to theory (Porph.) **1440 a**

unparticipated l. (Procl.) **1463 c**

See also ζωή

light

in the vision of the *Poimandres* **1339**;
frequently in Plotinus. See φῶς, ἐκλάμπειν, περίλαμψις, and creation

logic

its place in the system of phil. **897 f**.
Stoic l. **973-983**

the basis of logic attacked by Carn. **1113**

arguments against proof **1114**

against the Stoic criterium of truth **1115**

later Sceptic arguments **1130-1136**;
1141

Stoic l. ridiculed by Lucianus **1050a**

See further διαλεκτική

Logos (λόγος, ratio)

Heraclitus' concept of universal Law adopted in the Stoa:

the active principle in nature, God **899 a**; Zeus **904 a**; **925**; **943**

pervading the universe and called εἰμαρμένη **900 a**; **904 a**

material **901**; creative fire **902**

l. spermatikos **904 a**; **919**

contains the λ.οι σπερματικοί **902 a**;
919 a-d

κοινός λ. **918 c**; **943 l. 12**
 also called *noûs* **920**; and *πρόνοια*
927 a; cp. **928-930**
 identified with nature **921**
 =speech **968**; defined **966**
 λ. ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικός **965**;
 cp. **991**
 =argument **979-981**
 λ. ἀπέραντος **980**; ἀναπόδεικτος **981**
 λ. (ratio et consilium) the proprium
 of man **1001 c**; **1002**
 animals do not share in it **1001 b**
 living acc. to nature=living acc. to
 the l. **1003 a**
 basis of morality and law **989 c**;
1065 a (ὁρθός λόγος)
 cp. ratio summa **1066 a**; ratio recta
1066 b c
 πάθος defined as a λ. πονηρός **1053 b**
 ἀπειθές τῷ —φ **1056 a b**; cp. ἀπο-
 στρέφειν τὸν —ν **1185 b**
 the term λ. used by Orig. **1068 b**
 divine L. the criterium of truth
1195 b (Posid.)
 the L. governing the universe **1268**
 (M. Aur.)
 two —αι assumed by ps.-Archytas
1281
 the term λ. used by Philo **1299**
 l. described as rays of light **1300 c**
 the elder son of God **1301 c**
 the law immanent in nature **1302 c**
 cyclic motion **1302 d**
 l. spermatikos **1302 e**
 transcendent l. an image of God
1303 b
 the shepherd **1303 c**
 instrumental cause of creation **1305**
 the immanent l. **1306**
 a double l., both in the cosmos and
 in man **1307**
 ὁ τῆς φύσεως ὁρθός λ., νόμος θεῖος ὢν
1308
 By Plut. identified with Osiris **1313 b**
 a twofold l. admitted by Albinus
1327 c
 L. in Valentinus' *pleroma* **1333 a**
 in the *Poimandres* **1339 b**; **1340 b**
 in Plotinus: **1376 c**; **1381 b**; **1405 b**;
1427; **1428 f**.
 l. οἶον ἐκλαμψις ἐκ νοῦ κ. ψυχῆς **1427 b**

love

of ourselves and our fellow-men, see
oikeiosis and *caritas*
 Also *commendatio*, *conciliatio*, *φιλία*
 and *φιλανθρωπία*
 sexual l., acc. to Epic. **866 b d**
 Panaetius' attitude towards it **1167**
 Musonius Rufus **1229**;
 Plut. **1324 c**
 l. of the spirit and the soul for its
 Creator **1366**; **1367**; **1375 c**; **1389**
 See also ἔρωσ and ἐρωτικὸν πάθημα
 God's l. of man (τὸ φιλόανθρωπον) **995 b**
 Lyceum **807**

Magic

in gnosis **1332 b**, sub 4
 explained by Plotinus **1432 a**
magnanimus **1207**
magnitudo animi **1211** (Seneca)
animus magnus **1160 a** (Panaetius)
magnet
 the m. a connecting link between
 organic and anorganic nature **1182**
maius
 (magnitudo) qua nihil m. cogitari
 potest (of God) **1221 c**; cp **928**

malum

see evil and sin

man

the primary impulse of man acc. to
 the Stoa **945**
 m. opposed to animals **946**; **1001**
 the soul of m. **947 ff**.
 natural bond of m. and m. **1000**;
1069 b; **1072**
 reason the proprium of m. **1002 f**.
 the idea of humanity and *humanitas*
 in Panaetius and Cicero **1161 b**;
1162
 See further *humanitas* and *caritas*
 The wise man, see wise
 m. a psychophysical unity (Posid.)
1184
 between God and the world **1181 b**
 the Cynic ideal of m. **1253 f.**, **1257**
 the moral task of m. according to
 Seneca **1210**
 acc. to Marc. Aur. **1275-1276**
 Epict.' view of m. **1242**
 m. a part of God **1244**

- m. created in the image of God (Philo) **1296**
 vice in m. explained **1297**
 the soul of m. a copy of the Logos **1298**
 the Logos in m. **1307**
 m. a cosmopolites **1308**
 m. can incarnate divine Law **1309**
 prophetic m. **1310**
 m. a compound of three parts: nous, soul and body **1319 a**
 three kinds of m. acc. to the gnostics **1335; 1336 b**
 in the *Poimandres* **1341-1342; 1344**
 in Numenius **1353 d; 1354-1356**
 in Plotinus **1412-1424**
 μέση τάξις **1372 a** (comments)
 the inner m. **1413**
 above physical causality **1418**
 can possess happiness **1421**
 responsible for his deeds **1430**
 See also wise man s.v. wise
 religious and irreligious m. (Porph.) **1440 d**
 m. should refrain from passions **1441**
 See further s.v. body, soul, person, personality, and freedom, free will
- mantic
 in the Stoa **933-937**
 defined by Chrysippus **933 a b**
 natural and artificial **934**
 artificial m. based on cosmic sympathy **935**
 Carneades' arguments against m. **1122 f.**
 m. defended by Diog. and Antipater **1143 c**
 rejected by Panaetius **936; 1152**
 restored by Posid. **937; 1194**
- marriage
 avoided by Epic. **878**
 praised by Antipater **1147**
 by Musonius **1230**
 by Plutarchus **1324**
- materialism
 of Epic. and the Stoa **808**
 the consequences of Stoic m. **914**
 Stoic m. criticized by Plotinus **916**
- mathematics
 to be applied in phil. **1448 a**
- matter
 For Epic. see s.v. atoms and body
 In the Stoa: ὕλη **899-902**
 τὸ πάσχον **899**
 πρώτη ὕ. ἀν' οὐσία **900 a**; cp. **916 b**
 God inseparably connected with m. **900 b c; 902 a**
 m. in the process of creation **904 a**
 soul acc. to the Stoa essentially m. (Plot.) **916 a**
 God ὕ. πως ἔχουσα **916 b**
 The Pythagorean conception of m.: Moderatus **1285 b**
 By Moderatus m. derived from the First Principle **1285 b**, under the text
 the First Principle identified with m. by Nicomachus **1288 c**
 dualistic interpretation by Plut. **1313; 1314**
 Albinus **1326 a**
 Valentinus: m. arises from the passions of Sophia **1334 d**
 Cp. σκότος in Corp. Herm. I 1 (*Poimandres*) **1339 a**, with n. 2;
 Cp. also **1344**
 m. the source of evil acc. to Numenius **1353 c d e** (silva); cp. also ἀόριστος δυνάς
 Plotinus:
 m. must partake of goodness **1401 b**
 how produced by soul and formed by it **1402 c**
 the theory of ὕ. νοητή and αἰσθητή **1406-1408**
 ὕ. is ἀπαθής **1409**
 negative, and in so far evil **1410**
 Proclus:
 m. not the cause of evil **1470**
 cp. Porph. **1440 f**
 See further ὕλη, σῶμα, σάρξ, and σκότος
- mechanism
 on Epic.' physics **808**
- mediator
 the Logos a m. (Philo) **1306 b**
- memory
 in Epic. **880 a**
 does not belong to the compositum but to soul (Plot.) **1378 b**
- Milky Way
 the M. W. the abode of souls before their descent **1356 a** (under the text); **1356 b**

- minimae partes
 (in the atomic theory of Epic.) **832**
 miracles, see *θεουργία*
 misericordia, see compassion
 mixture
 Chrysippus' theory of m. **912-913**
 modality
 (in Stoic logic) **973; 975**
 modestia
 defined by Panaetius **1161**
 monism
 A tendency towards m. in the Stoa
 901 c, under the text
 in Diog. L. VIII 25 **1279 a**
 in Moderatus **1285 b**
 Nicomachus of Gerasa **1288 c**
 in the *Corp. Herm.* **1340 a**, with n. 2
 in Plotinus
 ὅλη αἰσθητή derived from the intel-
 ligible ἄπειρον **1408 c d**
 the indefinite Principle directly
 derived from the First **1408 e**
 one cause **1364 a-d**
 For Porphy. cp. **1440 f**; Proclus **1470**
 monotheism
 a monotheistic tendency in the Stoa
 922, but cp. **923; 924 b; 925; 943**
 in Plut. **1312 c**
 in Max. Tyr. **1330**
 in the *Poimandres* **1343**
 in Valentinus and his followers
 1333 a, esp. n. 3
 opposed by Plot. **1411 a**
 monstrosities **842; 1121 a**
 moon
 generally believed to be a divine being
 848 b, with n. 1
 this belief criticized by Carn. **1121 c**
 The moon produces new souls **1176 d**
 the phases of the m. connected with
 vegetation on earth and with tide
 1177 b
 Chrysippus' and Posid.' phys. theory
 1180
 soul springs from the m. and returns
 to it **1192 d; 1319 a**
 the abode of souls, Philo **1304 b**;
 Plut. **1319 b**
 a μικτὸν σώμα **1318 b**
 soul compared with the m. as a
 derived light (Plot.) **1370 b** (l. 17)
- morality
 based on reason **1013 a; 1015 a**
 basis of happiness **1013 c; 1014**
 defends on the inner man **1035**
 absolute character of m. **1036**
 founded on nature **1065 sqq.**
 moral character
 called χρηστότης καὶ καλοκάγαθία
 1227 c
 m. also called τὸ καλὸν or καλὸν καὶ
 δίκαιον, cp. **873 c; 874**
 See further ethics, bonum, honestum,
 and virtue
- motion
 of Epic.' atoms **830 b; 833 c**
 atomic speed **836 a**
 m. of atoms in compound bodies **837**
 In the Stoa πάθος defined as an irra-
 tional m. of the soul **1051 b**; cp.
 952
 the argument that m. is impossible
 and Herophilus' reply to this **1141 a**
 prolonged m. a therapy of passions
 1189 b
 the m. of the universe acc. to Plot.
 1431 a
- multiplicity, see plurality
- mysticism
 Epicurean m. **857**
 Posid. a mystic? **1195** (some com-
 ments under b)
 Philo **1310**
 Plotinus **1389; 1395 b; 1399 a-d;**
 1400
- mythology
 in the Stoa allegorically explained **924**;
 by Philo **1311 a**
 the mythological element in Gnosis
 1332 a c
 in the *Corp. Herm.* **1338**
 for Plotinus' attitude towards m. see
 nr. **1411**, esp. sub 1-4 and sub 8;
 1350 a, under the text; **1352 a**
- Names
 whether φύσει or θέσει **971; 972**
- nature (natura, φύσις)
 in the Stoa:
 two principles in n. (here called τὰ
 ἅλα; Lat.: natura rerum) **899 a**
 God and matter two aspects of the
 same n. **900 c**

n. defined as πῦρ τεχνικόν **902 b c**; **917**
 identified with εἰμαρμένη **918 c**
 = God or the Logos **921**; **924**
 = Providence **927**; **928**
 hierarchic order in n. (Marc. Aur.) **931**
 teleology in n. **932**
 the unity of n. viewed as cosmic
 sympathy **935**
 the existence of evil in n., see evil
 Zeus called φύσεως ἀρχηγός (Cleanthes)
943, l. 2
 living according to n. a moral prin-
 ciple **1003-1005**
 the good defined as —al perfection
1017 b
 as that which is absolute by n. **1017c**
 virtue a perfection of n. **1023**
 man has by n. an aptitude to virtue
1025; **1026**
 sin a perversion of n. **1027**
 πάθος defined as a motion against n.
1051
 n. the basis of morality and law
1065-1076
 this theory opposed by Carn. **1125-**
1128
 living acc. to n. interpreted in the
 Stoa after Carn. **1144**
 phil. of n. basis of Panaetius' phil.
1151
 living acc. to n. explained by Panae-
 tius **1156**; **1157**
 Posid.' phil. of n. **1173-1182**
 living acc. to n. explained by Posid.
1188 d
 φ. ranked second, after Zeus **1196 d**
 vivere sec. n. explained by Antiochus
1201-1205
 satis nos instruxit n. (Seneca) **1214 b**
 individual and universal n. con-
 nected (M. Aur.) **1262 c**
 obedience to n. **1267**
 the immanent law of n. (Philo) **1302**
 not identified with God **1303 a**
 God the conductor of the powers of
 n. **1303 b c**
 the patriarchs an incarnation of the
 divine Law of n. **1309 a**
 For Plut., Albinus, the gnostic and
 Hermetic view of n. see s.v. matter
 (ὕλη)
 By Plotinus the term φ. is used and

denotes the lowest stage of soul
1405
 φ. called Ἰνδαλμα φρονήσεως **1376 d**
 n. should not be despised **1403 d**;
1411; cp. **1424**; **1428 e-f**
 negation
 in Stoic logic **976**
 Neo-pythagoreanism
 Starts in the first century B.C., ch.
 XXIV 1, introd.; **1278-1288**
 Neo-platonism
 preparation, ch. XXIV; the N. of
 Plotinus, ch. XXV; later N., ch.
 XXVI
 notio
 —es communes **995-997**; **1003 b**
 See also ἔννοια
 notitia, notities (= πρόληψις)
 in Lucr. **825**; **854 b**
 noûs
 in the Stoa:
 the Logos called n. **904 a**; **909**;
920 a-c
 = the cosmic pneuma **957**, introd.
 διάνοια called n. **965 a**
 ν. καὶ λόγος the dwelling-place of
 virtue and vice **1001 b**
 Timon: spirit, understanding **1092 a**
 Posidonius:
 n. engendered by the sun **1176 d**
 Cp. **1185 (a)**: the ἀρίστη φύσις is
 νοερά (with comments), and
1186 b: νοεραὶ φύσεις
 Cp. also **1192 b** (the end), and
1192 c, with n. 4
 n. ranked higher than soul **1192 d**,
 the beginning
 cp. **1194 a** (comments), **1195 a b**
 the universe governed by n. **1196 a**
 M. Aur.:
1262 a; **1265 b** (of man); **1268 b**
 (ὁ τοῦ ὅλου ν.)
 Cp. **1262 b**: νοερά κίνησις; **1262 c**:
 νοερά φύσις
 Philo:
 each of the angels is a n. ἀκραιφνέσ-
 τατος **1304 a**
 Plut.:
 n. superior to soul **1192 d**; **1319 a**;
 called Daimon **1320**
 Albinus:
 the First Principle is N. ἀκίνητος

- 1327 b**; δημιουργός **1327 d**; **1328**
 ἄρρητος **1327 d e**
 cause of the n. of the whole ouranos
1327 b
 cp. **1327 d**: the First N. cause of
 the n. ἐν ψυχῇ (the world-soul)
 Also a potential n. admitted **1327 b**
 n. in Valentinus' pleroma **1333 a b**
 a double n. assumed by Basilides
1336 b
 in the *Poimandres* **1339 b**; **1340**
 Numerius calls his First God N.
1350
 Plotinus:
 n. the first circle around the centre,
 φῶς ἐκ φωτός **1365 b**
 the second hypostasis **1370**
 plurality in n. **1374 b**
 light from Light **1382 a**
 a direct image of the Good **1382 b**
 multiplicity begins in n. **1382 c**
 the second God **1382 d**
 eternal **1383 a**
 = τὸ νοητόν or τὰ νοητά **1383 b-d**
 primary thinking **1383 d**
 = τὸ ὄν **1384 a**
 contains the νοητά as its eternal ob-
 ject **1384 b c**; **1385 a**
 n. described **1385 b**
 the παντελὲς ζῶον **1386 a**
 contains number and all the Ideas
1386 b
 double function **1389 a**
 why not the First Principle **1390**
 relation to the sensible world **1401 c**
 the archetypon of sensible things
1426 a
 the power inherent in n. **1426 b**;
1428 a b
 Iambl. doubles the n. **1450**
 the first N. described as a triad **1451**
 Proclus:
 unparticipated n. **1463 c**
 participated n. **1467 a**
 its knowledge **1467 b c**
 N. and the ideas **1467 d**
 divine and not-divine n. **1467 e**
 number
 with Neopythagoreans **1279 a**
 Plato's metaphysical principles ex-
 plained by n. **1285**
 n. a cosmic principle **1288 a**
 pre-existing in the mind of God
1288 b
 in Plot.: ranked first in the intelligible
 world **1386 b**
 before being? **1387 a**
 being must be n. **1387 b**
 Obedience
 to God and cosmic Law e.g. **943**,
944 (Cleanthes); **1234 a**, **1245**
 (Epict.); **1267**, **1277** (M. Aur.)
 occupations
 vulgar and liberal, **1255 c**
 offerings
 only accepted from good men **1254 b**
 should not be precious **1443**
 officium, see καθήκον
 oikeiosis (Gr. οικείωσις, Lat. commen-
 datio, conciliatio; also caritas)
 the o. theory in the Stoa; **945**; **999**-
1003
 whether the theory goes back to
 Theophr. **945 c**, under the text
 the term used by Plot. **1057**
 the theory of natural law based on
 the o. principle by Cic. **1065 b c**;
1066-1067; **1070**
 opposed by Carn. **1125-1128**
 comments under **1128 c**
 renewed by Diog. and Antipater
1145
 Panaetius **1159**
 Antiochus of Ascalon **1201 a**; **1205**
 Musonius **1227 b**
 Philo **1290 b**
 See further love and caritas
 omina **933**
 one
 the o. as First Principle **1279 a**
 (μονάς)
 In Moderatus ἐνότης or ἐν **1285 a**,
 and τὸ πρῶτον ἐν **1285 b**
 principle of number (Nicomachus)
1288 a; also called μονάς **1288 c**
 In Plotinus the first hypostasis **1370**
 contains everything within itself
1364 b c
 contemplated by νοῦς **1389**
 the O. or the Good **1392-1400**;
 beyond being **1392**; **1398 a**
 infinite power **1398 b**

- By Iambl. the O. placed after the ἄρρητος ἀρχή **1449 a**
 Proclus: the O. and the many **1458 a**
 the O. beyond the intelligible world **1459 d**
 a series of divine Henads ranked under the O. **1464, a-k; 1466 b**
 the scheme of the hierarchy **1466 d**, under the text
 Damascius: the First Principle beyond the O. **1476**
- oracles
 trustworthiness of o. **1123 b**
 criticized by Oenomaus of Gadara **1260 a**
 o. explained by the interference of demons **1319 c**
 collected by Porph. **1445 g**
- organism, organical unity
 —s fortuitous combinations (Epic.) **808**
 formation of —s **842**
 The cosmos an organical unity, see cosmos
- outward things, outward conditions (externals)
 not needed for virtue **1022; 1035 b; 1036**
 should not be cared for by the philosopher (Epict.) **1239; 1249 ff.** (later Cynics); **1264** (M. Aur.)
 Epict. usually speaks of τὰ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν **1232 ff.**; but also of τὰ ἐκτός × τὰ ἔσω, e.g. **1007 a; 1239 a b**
 Plot.: τὰ ἄλλα or τὸ ἄλλο **1421**
 See for Plot. also **1422-1423**
 See also wise man s.v. wise
- Pain
 absence of p. = pleasure (Epic.) **860; 864**
 In the Stoa, see πάθη
 The attitude of the wise man towards p., **1062 b** (Chrys.)
 Seneca **1062 c**; also **1015 a** (tortorum perpassio)
 Panaetius **1166 c**
 Posid.' attitude towards p. **1171 b**
 different reactions of individual men **1185**
 For Plotinus, see **1423** (the wise man beyond outward things). Also **1414** (Does p. belong to the body or to the soul?)
- pantheism
 For the Ancient Stoa, see **900-902**
 Cleanthes? **943**; cp. **1196 a**
 Posidonius? **1196**, esp. **b-d**
 Seneca clearly not a pantheist **1221**
 Neopythag. **1279 d**
 For Plotinus see e.g. **1366** (clearly no p.)
- participation
 natural law a p. of divine law **1076 c**
 p. in the divine **1465** (Proclus)
 grades of p. **1466 d**
 For Plotinus see **1365 a; 1366-1369; 1370; 1401-1403**
 The term μετέχειν occurs e.g. in **1401 b**
 Plot. mostly speaks of εἰκὼν, μίμημα and ἀρχέτυπον. See there
 See also φῶς and φωτίζειν, πηγὴ and ἐκρεῖ
- passions, see πάθη
- perception (αἴσθησις)
 the basis of knowledge acc. to Epic. **822-828**. See also πρόληψις
 In the Stoa **984; 985-987; 990; 991**
 See also κατάληψις, φαντασία, and ἔννοια
 The Stoic theory criticized by Arcesilaus **1102-1104**
 by Carneades **1112**
 p. analyzed by Plotinus **1378**, introd.; **1378 a**
 p. of the soul has nothing to do with sense-impressions **1415**
 sense-p. a kind of sleeping state of the soul **1416 b**
- perfectum (perfect tense) **970 a**
- perpendicular **835 a**. See also στάθμη
- person, personality
 By Panaetius called *propria natura* (× *natura communis*) **1163**
 In Plotinus: the higher soul of particular men **1373 a-c**
 the inner man is the true self **1413**
 Cp. **959 b**, l. 2 (mens cuiusque is est quisque), with n. 3; **1265 c** (M. Aur.)
 Cp. ἡμεῖς, ἡμέτερον ἔργον **1425 a**;
 οἰκεία φύσις **1430 c**, the end
 Independence of the inner man from outward things, see wise man s.v. wise
 For Plot. **1423, 1431 c** (the wise man beyond the necessity of nature)

- The individuality of the p. does not get lost ἐκεῖ: **1379 b**; **1380**
 [Also *Enn.* IV 3, 5, l. 5-8: μένει ἑκαστον ἐν ἑτερότῃ ἐχον τὸ αὐτὸ δ' ἔστιν εἶναι.]
 Porph.: ἐγὼ οὐχ ὁ ἅπλος οὗτος **1440 a** (c. 8, sec. al.)
 See further the lemmata beginning by self-, such as self-knowledge, self-reflexion
 See also man, virtue, ἥθος, προαίρεσις
 For the social and religious side of human p. see κοινωνικός, πολιτικός, and religious
- perversio
 sin a p. naturae (διαστροφή) **1027**
 perversion of reason **955 b**
- phenomenism
 the theoretical consequence of Pyrrho's view **1087 a**, under the text, sub (3)
 Cp. Carneades' akatalepsia **1115**
 Aenesidemus **1130-1132**
 Menodotus and Sextus **1137-1142**
 See also empiricism
- philosophy
 in the Hell.-Roman period **806**; **807**
 ph. of life without scholarly pretensions (Epic.) **816**
 φρόνησις φιλοσοφίας τιμιώτερον **872 b**
 tripartition of ph. in the Stoa **897**; **898**
 By Chrys. ph. called ἐπιτήδευσις λόγου ὀρθότητος **989 b**, small print; cp. **897 b**; **1215 c**
 ph. the healing art of the soul **1060**
 Scepticism a new ph.? **1081**
 ph. of nature, see nature; also physics
 a humanistic trend in ph., see humanitas and man
 spiritualism in ph., see spiritualism
 the aim of ph. according to Seneca **1207**
 theoretical and practical ph. **1208**
 ph. required for everybody (Musi-nius) **1227**
 equally for men and women **1227 b**
 defined as καλοκαγαθίας ἐπιτήδευσις **1227 c**
 first principles of ph. acc. to Epict. **1232**
- character of M. Aur.' ph. **1262**, introd.
 ph. of synthesis in the first centuries, ch. XXIV, introd. (p. 340)
 number and mathematics in ph., see s.v. number and math.
 a new element in ph. with Philo **1289**, introd.
 Philo's appreciation of ph. **1289 b**
 general character of Plut.' ph., p. 376, § 3, introd.
 the part of ph. in gnosticism **1332 a**
 in the *Hermetica* **1338**
 in Numenius **1345 c**
 Greek ph. versus mythology and popular religion **1411**; **1431-1432**
 ph. (called dialectic) has to train man to virtue **1420 c**
 ph. taken in the rational sense by Plot. and Porph., θεωρηγία preferred by Iambl. and later Neopl. **1446 c**
 ph. promotes sympathy and mutual love (Iambl.) **1448 c**
 ph. in Alexandria and Athens, 5th cent. **1455**, introd.
 the end of Greek ph. **1479-1480**
- physics
 of Epicurus **829-844**
 in the Stoa:
 place of ph. in the system of phil. **897**; **898**
 general principles **899-916**
 God, providence, mantic **917-944**
 soul and immortality **945-960**
 Panaetius' interest in ph. **1151**
 Posid. **1173-1182**; Seneca **1221**;
 M. Aur. **1267-1274**
 Neopythag. phys. **1279**; **1280**; **1281**
 See further nature
- pleasure, see ἡδονή
- pleroma
 gnostic term for the spiritual world **1332 b**
 described by Valentinus **1333 a**
- plurality (πληθος)
 how to explain p. (Plot.) **1364-1367**;
1370; **1374**; **1382 c**
 Whether p. is apostasy of the One **1398 b**, under the text
 in the intelligible world always determined **1408 d**
 Proclus: p. always participates of Unity **1458 a**; **1464 e**

See also s.v. quantity and ποσότης
pneuma

in the Ancient Stoa:

πνεῦμα διῆκον δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου **902 a**

soul defined as π. ἐνθερμον **903 b**

the hegemonikon is p. **915 b**

soul is π. πῶς ἔχον **916 a**

the senses, voice and sperma are

π. πῶς ἔχον **947 b**

the soul π. σύμφυτον **948 c**

πολυχρόνιον π. **957 a**

notion of God as π. νοερόν **995 a**

cp. Posid. **1196 b**; Cleom. **1177 a**

the definition of soul as π. ἐνθερμον

found in Posid. **1192 a**

explained **1192 b-d**

Marc. Aur.: **1265 b** (πνευμάτιον for soul), **1271 a**

The Stoic p. theory with Neopythagoreans **1279 d**

Philo: **1295 a**, **1296 c**

In Valentinian gnosis p. is the instrument of spiritual knowledge; see **1336**. Also s.v. πνευματικοί

evil spirits called πνεύματα **1337 a b**

By Porph. p. is used frequently and can denote the ethereal or pneumatical body; see **1442 a**, with n. 1. Cp. **1356**, under the text. Also Procl. **1474 a**

See also s.v. body and ὄχημα
political

Epic.' attitude towards p. life compared with the Stoa **808**

the principle of avoiding p. life **879 d**
p. character of paideia in the Stoa **1045 a**

p. philosophy:

in the Stoa and of Cicero **1065-1075**

Plotinus' interest in politics **1361**

polytheism

in the Ancient Stoa **923**; in Seneca **924**

defended by Ocellus **1282** (some comments under the text)

Cp. e.g. Max. Tyr. **1330 a e**;

Apuleius **1331 a**

Valentinus **1333 a**, with n. 3

Numenius **1345 c**; **1349-1352**

Plotinus defends p. explicitly **1411 a**
Cp. **1428 a**

Porph. **1442 a**; Iambl. **1451 b**;

Procl. **1464**; **1472 a**

poor

the life of the p. **1255 a-c**

powers (δυνάμεις)

in Philo: ἀόρατοι δ. **1303 a**

conducted by the Logos **1303 b**

called angels **1304 a**

ψυχαὶ ἀσώματα **1304 b**

in the *Poimandres*: innumerable p. in the Light **1339 c**

Plotinus: immense p. in the noûs **1426 b**

boundless p. **1428 a**

the —s in Noûs identified with the Ideas **1428 b**

the absolute p. of the First Principle **1398 b**; **1428 c**

this p. propagates itself throughout divine Nature **1365 a** (δύναμις ἁφατος) **1401 a**; **1428 d**

the —s of the sensible world **1428 e**
δ. ἄλογος **1428 f**; some comments under the text

praesens (present tense) **970 b**

prayer

of Cleanthes **943**; **944 c**

of Epict. see e.g. **929 a** (a hymn of praise), **1244**; **1245 a d**

For Seneca cp. **960 d**, under the text; **1215 c**; **1222**

Plut. **1312 c**; the *Poimandres* **1343** (a hymn); Numenius **1349 a**

Plotinus:

spiritual p., e.g. **1366** (εὐχεσθαι μόνους πρὸς μόνον)

formal p. (its influence explained by an automatical process) **1431 d**; **1432 a l. 27**

moral conditions of p. (Porph.) **1440 d** (the end); a p. of Proclus **1472 a**

preferential

(„le type préférentiel”) in Stoic logic **977**

principle (ἀρχή),

principles (ἀρχαί)

In Epic.: τὰς —ας ἀτόμους σωματῶν φύσεις **829 a** (the end)

ἡδονή is ἀ. καὶ τέλος **859**; **860**

In the Stoa: two —αὶ τῶν ὄλων **899 a**;

ἀσώματα **899 b**

the —αὶ of virtues **1026 c**

- ἄ. ἀπάντων μονάδα **1279 a**
 three pr. admitted by ps-Archytas **1281**
 Plato's metaph. —s explained by Moderatus **1285**
 Nicomachus **1288 c**
 two —s admitted by Plut. **1313, 1314**
 Albinus expounds Plato's doctrine of the —αι **1326-1327**
 Valentinus **1333** (the First Pr. called προαρχή **1333 a**)
 Cp. *Poimandres* **1339 c** (τὸ προάρχον τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἀπεράντου)
 Two —αι assumed by Numenius **1353**
 Plot.: one First pr. **1364-1370; 1392-1400**
 absolute power of the First pr. **1428 c**
 the First pr. doubled by Iamb. **1449**
 Proclus' explanation of the Platonic —s πέρας and ἄπειρον **1462 f.**; cp. **1466 c**
 Damascius:
 The First pr. beyond human knowledge **1476; 1477**
 a second ἄ. is cause of causes **1478**
 See also s.v. monotheism and dualism
 probability
 Carneades' theory of p. **1116**
 procession, πρόοδος, προίέναι (=emanation)
 in Plot. **1365 a** (l. 5);
 Iambl. **1451 b; 1453 b**
 Proclus' theory of p. and reversion **1460; 1461 c d; 1463 b** (sm. pr.); **1466; 1467**
 p. described by Damascius **1478 b**
 profectus, proficere (προκοπή, προκόπτειν)
 Stoic term for moral progress **1041; 1216 a**
 See further προκόπτων
 pronoia (πρόνοια) see Providence
 property
 private p. defended by Panaetius and Cicero **1168**
 the senator Rogatianus left all his p. **1359**
 propositions
 theory of p. in Stoic logic **973; 975; 977; 978**
 propositum (σκοπός)
 intention, **1217 c**
 the essential of actions **1016 a**
 Providence
 denied by Epic. **845; 852**
 in the Stoa: **918 b; 920 c; 927-932**
 mantic based on the belief in p. **933**
 the problem of evil with regard to p. **938-942**
 Cleanthes' belief in p. **943; 944**
 the notion of God-P. a κοινή ἔννοια **995 a**
 the p. of a king **1045 b**
 M. Aur.' view of divine p. **1268-1270**
 The problem of πρόνοια and εἰμαρμένη in later Antiquity **1279 d** (some comments under the text)
 See also **1321; 1331 b; 1471**
 Philo's belief in P. **1290 b**; see also s.v. Logos
 direct and indirect p., Π. κόσμου c. 6, **1303 c**, sm. pr. (p. 369)
 Cp. **1376; 1426**
 Plut.' defence of P. **1315**
 three stages of p. **1321**
 Atticus defends the doctrine of P. against Aristotle **1325 c**
 a double p. assumed by Apuleius **1331 b**
 By Plot. no conscious p. ascribed either to the First Principle or to Noûs **1368; 1369; 1370; 1397** (the One beyond thinking); **1426** (Noûs beyond deliberation)
 two kinds of p. **1376**
 p. exercised by soul **1377**
 excusatio —tiae **1429-1430**
 p. and free will **1431-1432**
 Porph. **1440 d**
 Proclus: p. of the Gods **1464 g**
 Fate and P. **1471**
 prudentia (φρόνησις)
 the Latin term e.g. in **876; 914 c**
 defined by Chrysippus **1030 c**
 punishment
 fear of p. **875 c**, under the text
 Plut. on the lateness of Divine p. **1315-1317**
 the moon the place of p. of souls **1319 b**; also **1192 d**
 p. hereafter according to Timaeus Locrus **1283**
 eternal p. excluded by Proclus **1474 b**
 reincarnation and divine p. **1474 c**

purification

ritualistic (διὰ καθαρμῶν) **1279 f**
 moral (κάθαρσις) in Plot. and Porph.
 condition to higher virtue **1419 a b**
 the virtues themselves are —εις
1420 b; Porph. **1439**

Proclus **1474 a**

Pythagoreanism

the revival of P. **1279 ff.**

Quality (τὸ ποιόν, ποιότης)

Epic.: the atoms do not possess any
 —ies except shape, weight and
 size **831 a**

Zeno: —ies mix together as substan-
 ces do **913 a**

the —ies of the soul are bodies **914 a**
 προσσηγορία defined as indicating a
 common q. **967**

q. (τὸ ποιόν) admitted as a category
915 a

equilibrium of opposite —ies **1279 b**
 (with comments); cp. **1306 b**

quantity (τὸ ποσόν, ποσότης)

Epic.: pleasure must be selected
 according to q. **862 c**

In the Stoa: q. not admitted as a
 category **915 a**

q. (ποσότης) term used by Moderatus
 to indicate the principle of multi-
 plicity **1285 b** = ἀπειρον and ὅλη
 νοητή in Plotinus. See s.v. ἀπειρον
 and ὅλη

absolute and relative q. **1288 a**

quantitative ("le type quantitatif")
 propositions **977**

Radiation

of the divine Light (First Principle -
 Noûs - Soul) see φῶς.

Also creation

ratio, the Lat. term for λόγος

the proprium of man **1001 c**; **1002**;
1013 a; **1157**

pars divini spiritus **1015**;

nullum bonum sine —ne, ib.

the unity of virtue founded on the
 unity of r. **1028**

= lex recta, naturae congruens **1066 c**

does the cosmos possess r.? **1117 a**

appetitus oboediens —ni **1155 b**

ira non exaudit —nem **1214 a**

cum r. suadet finire se **1224 a**

ea pars philosophiae quae est in —ne
 et in disserendo **1200 a**

reality

grades of r., see hierarchy of being
 s.v. being

reason (λόγος, ratio)

see s.v. logos, λόγος and ratio; also
 s.v. nature

obedience to r. condition for a happy
 life, see s.v. happiness, virtue and
 wise (man)

r. the basis of morality, see s.v.
 bonum, morality, and virtue

r. and revelation in Philo **1289**, introd.

recordatio, see memory

redemption

by Christ through the gift of gnosis
1332 b, sub 4

regeneration

of the universe after the conflagration
905; **907**; **908**; **1273** (M. Aur.)

reincarnation

the doctrine of r. found in Tim. Locr.
1283; in Plut. **1318 a**; **1319 c**

explained by Proclus **1474 c**

religion

Epic.' attitude towards popular r.
845, introd.

of the Stoa, see allegorical interpre-
 tation s.v. allegorical

on the cosmic r. of the Stoa, see **805**
 sub (2), and especially **943**; **944**;

also **1262 e**; **1269 c**

the part of r. in Gnosis **1332 a**

in the Hermetica **1338**

in Numenius **1345 c**

Plotinus' attitude towards popular

r. may be seen in his reaction
 against the gnostics **1411**; **1420 d**;
1424

Porph. **1440 d e**; Procl. **1456**

See further God, gods, monotheism,
 and polytheism

religious

For the r. character of the Stoa, see
 esp. **943**; **944**; also **1045 b**

r. character of Posid.' philosophy
1192-1196

Was Seneca a r. man? **1222**; cp.
1215 c: incipis deorum socius esse,
 non supplex

- Epictetus **925 a b**, **929 a**; **1244**;
1245 a d
Marc. Aur. e.g. **1267-1270**; **1272 b**
(the feeling of utter dependence)
1276 b; **1277**
Plut. e.g. **1312**; **1315-1317**
Plotinus e.g. **1370**; **1389**; **1399**; **1400**
Porph. **1440 d-e**
Iambl. **1447**; Procl. **1471**; **1472 a**;
1473 a; Damasc. **1476**; **1477**
See also s.v. prayer and contemplation
renewal
of the cosmos, see regeneration
repentance
not considered as a virtue **1010**
revelation **1289**
- Saint worship **1259**, **1287 a**
sapiens
the ideal of the wise man, see s.v. wise
sapientia
defined as self-consistency **1006 ff.**
in *se tota conversa* **1016 b**
ars per quam humana et divina
noscantur **1215 c**; cp. **897 b**
See further philosophy and wise
scepticism
meaning of the term **1077**
the Sceptical School **1078-1080**
Is Sc. a new philosophy? **1081**
the Older Sceptics **1082-1095**
Sc. in the Middle Academy **1096-1107**
in the Third (New) Academy **1108-1128**
dialectical sc. **1129-1136**
the empirical school **1137-1142**
self-consciousness
συνείδησις, *sensus sui* in the Stoa
999 a; **999 c**
By Epictetus called *δύναμις παρακο-
λουθητική* **929 a**
In Plotinus: *παρακολουθεῖν*, *παρακο-
λούθησις*, e.g. **1422 a c**
π. not needed for the activity of the
spirit **1422 c**
Also *συναίσθησις*, e.g. **1379 b**
self-consistency
constantia **1006** (Seneca); **1215 a**
cp. Epict. **1007**; **1239 a b**; Marc.
Aur. **1008**; also **1009-1011**
self-knowledge **1202**
See also self-reflection
- self-love (se diligere, *οἰκειοῦσθαι ἑαυτῷ*)
basis of the *oikeiosis* theory **999 a c**
self-reflection
of the soul **1381**
self-restraint, self-control
temperantia (*σωφροσύνη*) **876**; **1161 a**
Chrysippus gave a merely intellectual
definition of *σ.* **1030 c**, but cp.
Cleanthes **1029 a**
- semen
semina innata virtutum **1026 a c**
sense-impressions
always true acc. to Epic. **822**; **823**;
828 (*αἰσθήσεις*)
In the Stoa called *φαντασία* and defined
as *τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ* **984 a**
φ. καταληπτική **984 b**. Criticized by
Arcesilaus **986**, introd.; **1104**
Chrysippus' definition of *φ.* **986 a b**
Later description **987 a**
This conception not followed in the
later Stoa **988**
criticized by Carn. **1112**; by Aene-
sidemus **1130**
The idea of *τυπώσεις* rejected by
Plotinus **1415 a-c**
sense-perception, see perception
senses
the five s. explained by Chrysippus
947 b, **948 c**
called *nuntii* to the soul **947 c**
sensualism
of Epicurus **808**; **822-828**
The Stoic theory of knowledge
should not be called s. **984**, introd.
explained **984-989**; esp. under **989 c**
shape
Epic.' atoms differ by s. **830 a**; **831 a**
(*σχῆμα*)
simplicitas
divina s. **1393 d**, sm. pr.
sin (*ἁμαρτημα*, *peccatum*; also *κακία*)
contains an inconsistency (Epict.)
1009. See also s.v. *vitium*
no degrees of s. (*peccata paria*)
1015 b; **1040**. This doctrine ridi-
culed by Cic., *Pro Mur.* 29 **1050 b**,
p. 168
s. a *perversio naturae* (*διαστροφή*) **1027**
the cause of s. within ourselves
(Posid.) **1186**
s. regarded as a disease **1257 b**

- punishment of —s (Plut.) **1192 d**;
1315-1317
 acc. to Tim. Loc. **1283**
 By Philo ascribed to subordinate powers **1297**
 By Plot. ascribed to what is inferior to soul **1417 a**
 only the soul with "additions" can sin **1417 b**
 Porph.: the body not the cause of s. **1440 f** (but cp. Plot. **1377 a**: soul in a body does not sin by necessity)
 Iambl.: the soul sins by free will and is therefore not without s. **1453 a**
 Procl.: not matter, but the soul itself is the cause of s. **1470 c d**
- size (μέγεθος)
 Epic.' atoms differ by s. **831 a**
 slave
 defined by Chrys. **1071 b**
 nobody a s. by nature **1071 c**
- social
 Epic.: man not naturally a social being (κοινωνικόν) **879 c**
 the Stoa: see oikeiosis. Also s.v. political
 the s. character of Stoic phil. is clearly seen in Cicero **1065-1075**
 s. virtues ranked higher than theoretical **1075 b**; cp. **1159**
 and in Marc. Aur.: **1262**; **1276 b**
 the Spirit of the whole (the Logos) is "social" **1268 b**
 Man an organical part of the whole **1272 a**
 Social virtues, see πολιτικός
- societas
 humani generis **1000 b**; **1001 a c**.
 See also civitas
- sonnium
 the S. *Scipionis* **959 b** (with some comments and bibliogr.)
- soritai **1121**
- sorrow, see λύπη and suffering
- soul
 Epic.: the s. a body consisting of fine atoms **843**
 The Stoa: s. is fire or pneuma **903 a**
 πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον **903 b**
 consitus spiritus **903 c**; πνεῦμά πως ἔχον **916 a**
 s. is "cooled pneuma" **916 a**, under the text, with n. 1; **957** (introd.)
 M. Aur.: s. originates from the Logos spermatikos and returns to it **919 d**
 the parts or faculties of s. **947**; see also hegemonikon
 Chrys.' theory of ἑτεροίωσις τῆς ψυχῆς **951**
 no irrational part in man **952-956**
 the s. not immortal acc. to Ancient Stoics **957**
 not immortal acc. to Panaetius **958**
 Posid. believes in celestial immortality **959**; cp. **1192**
 Seneca **960**; **1223 b-c**
 An irrational part in the s. admitted by Panaet. **1155**
 by Posid. **1184 b**; **1185-1190**
 Intellectual interpretation of passions by Epict. **1238**
 S. defined as ἰδέα τοῦ πάντη διαστατοῦ **1193 a**
 Intellectual interpretation of passions by Epict. **1238**
 S. (the inner man) a part of God **1244**
 (frequently called νοῦς or ἡγεμονικόν)
 the tripartition body, s., spirit **1265 b** (M. Aur.)
 —s or daemons in the air **1279 e**;
1280 c; **1283**; **1304**; **1318 b**;
1331 c
 s. a harmony (Moderatus) **1286**
 The s. of man a copy of the Logos **1298** (Philo)
 the world-soul **1303 a** (l. 23). Cp. **1327 d** (Albinus)
 Two principles present in the soul of man (Plut.) **1314 d**
 Noûs superior to s. **1319 a**; —s on the moon **1319 b**
 the soul's immortality maintained by Atticus against Ar. **1325 e**
 In Gnosis s. the lower level under the pleroma (Valentinus) **1334 d**
 Cp. the term ψυχικοί
 ψ. in the hymn of Valentinus **1336**
 in Basilides **1336 b**
 in the Chald. oracles **1336 c**
 The s. of man drawn down by the body (Herm.) **1344** (some comments under the text)
 Numenius: work II. ἀφθαρσίας —ῆς **1345 c**

two world-souls and two —s in man
1353 d; 1354 a
 the *καθοδος τῶν* —*ων* always an evil
1355 a. This doctrine opposed by
 Plot. **1377**
 return of the s. to its *ἀρχαί* **1355 b;**
1356 a; its descent from the
 Milky Way **1356 b**
 Cp. the ascent (Herm. I 1), **1342 b**
 Plotinus:
 the second hypostasis **1365;** second
 circle **1365 b**
 engenders darkness at its utmost
 confines, and then forms it **1365 c**
 the sensible world an *ἰνδαλμα* —*ῆς*
1369 a; *εἰδωλον* —*ῆς* **1370 a**
 s. an *εἶδος* of νοῦς **1370 a;** depends on
 νοῦς (*ἐπακτὸν νοῦν ἔχει*) **1370 b**
 depends directly on νοῦς **1370 c**
εἰκῶν of νοῦς **1381 b**
 is plurality-unity **1371 a b;** not the
 entelechy of the body **1371 c**
 —'s *μέση τάξις* **1372 a** (comments un-
 der the text); double aspect **1372 b**
 at different distances from νοῦς **1373 a**
 universals. and particular —s **1373 b c**
 why many —s **1374**
 the function of s. **1375 a;** its diffe-
 rence from νοῦς **1375 b**
 particular s. exercises direct provi-
 dence **1376 a**
 universal s. and star-s.s indirect
1376 b
 s. and its *προσθήκαι* **1377 b c; 1378**
 life of the s. in eternity **1379 a**
 the particular s. remains conscious
 of itself **1379 b;** cp. **1380**
 ascent of the s. by self-reflection **1381**
 Cp. **1411 a** (opposed to salvation by
 faith, sm. pr.); **1419-1423**
 s. has infinite power **1398 b,** under
 the text
 the higher s. of man is the true self
1413 a b c
 s. is *ἀπαθής* **1414 a**
 the part of the s. in pain and other
 feelings **1414 b**
 how s. is related with the body **1414 c**
 the s. not passive in perception **1415,**
1416
 s. itself cannot sin, only by the *προσ-*
θήκαι **1417;** cp. **1410 c**

s. an independent cause or principle
 in nature **1418; 1425 b**
 virtue the state of s. following
ἐπιστροφή to the spiritual world
1419 a b
 s. not entirely purified from the *πάθη*
 is demoniac, not divine **1419 c**
 virtue a spiritualized state of the s.
1419 d
 consciousness = a reflexion of νοῦς in
 s. **1422 c**
 s. not identical with logos **1427 b**
 s. is not quiet, does not bear the total
 presence of eternity; therefore es-
 sentially connected with time **1434 c**
 time a distension of the s. **1435 a**
 Porph.: man's s. may become a
 dwelling-place of evil spirits **1440 d**
 the cause of sin in s. **1440 f**
 Iambl.: the triadic system applied
 to s. **1452**
 s. neither *ἀπαθής* nor *ἀναμάρτητος*
1453
 Procl.: different kinds of —s **1468**
 periodical ascent and descent of s.
1469 b; 1474 b
 the vehicle of s. (*ὄχημα*) **1469 c;**
1474 a
 s. not *ἀναμάρτητος* **1470 d**
 human s. not reincarnated in
 animals **1474 c**
 space
 defined as τὸ πάντη διαστατόν **1193 d**
 See also *κενόν*
 spiritus
 consitus s. **903 c**
 intentio —us **908 b,** under the text.
 See also *τόνος*.
 S. divinus shared by man **1015 a**
 spiritualism
 of Posid. **1192 d** (with comments);
1193 b; 1195; 1196 d
 of Seneca **1223 a;** Epict. e.g. **1232;**
1233; concl. **1248 c,** under the
 text; M. Aur. **1262,** introd.
 Neoplatonism, evidently, is spiritua-
 listic *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. E.g. Plot. **1400**
a b
 Neopl. sp. of the 17th century **1475 a**
 stars
 see celestial bodies s.v. celestial
 state **1074**

- See also political philosophy, s.v. political
- Stoa**
 general features **805-808**
 chief representatives **884-895**
 name of the School **886**
 unity and diversity in St. doctrine **896**
 division of phil. **887-888**
 basic principles of physics **899-916**
 God, providence, mantic **917-944**
 soul and immortality **945-960**
 grammatical science **961-972**
 formal logic **973-983**
 theory of knowledge **984-998**
 ethics: the starting-point and the end **999-1011**
 bonum, bona and relatively valuable things **1012-1022**
 virtue, virtues; absolute and relative morality **1023-1037**
 wise men and fools **1038-1050**
 the doctrine of the *πάθη* **1051-1064**
 law, state, humanity **1065-1076**
 Stoic dogmatism criticized by Arce-silaus **1102-1104**
 by Carneades **1112-1128**
 by Aenesidemus **1130-1135**
 by Agrippa **1136**
 Chrysippus' successors **1143-1147**
 The Middle St.: Panaetius **1148-1169**; Posidonius **1170-1196**
 Strong St. influence on Antiochus of Ascalon **1197 d**; **1198-1205**
 The Roman St.: Seneca **1206-1225**; Musonius and Epictetus **1226-1248**
 Marc. Aurelius **1262-1277**
 Relation of the St. with Cynicism: **1044** (Zeno); **1073** (Zeno and Chrys.); **1227** (Musonius); Epict. **1246**; **1252**
 The St. criticized by Plotinus **915 a**, under the text; **916**
 Stoic influence on Neopyth. see e.g. *εὐμαρμένη*
 on Philo see e.g. Logos
- suffering
 for Epic.' attitude towards s. see s.v. fear, pain, and evil
 for the Stoa s.v. *adiaphora*, outward things, pain, dolor, *λύπη* and evil for Plotinus ib.
- summum bonum, see bonum, and telos
- sun**
 on the theory of the heavenly bodies believed to be divine beings, see celestial bodies s.v. celestial
 Posid.' physical theories of the s. **1179**
 vital force of the s. **1176 c**; the origin of *noûs* ascribed to the s. **1176 d**; **1319 a**
noûs is given to man by the s. **1192 d**, the beginning, with n. 3; *die Sonne ist das Herz der Welt* **1192 d**, under the text; the higher soul (*noûs*) returns to the s., ib.; cp. also **1192 c**
 Cp. Cleanthes: the s. is the *ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου* **1196 a**
 God conducting the revolution of s. and moon (Plut., Max. Tyr.) **1303 c** (with sm. pr.)
 Plut. (Xenocr.): s. and stars *εἰκόνες* of the Gods **1318 b**
 Plotinus:
 the radiation of the One compared with the light of the s. **1366** (l. 29), **1367** (l. 7); **1382 a** (l. 41)
 Noûs compared with the s. **1370 b**; **1375 c**
 s., stars and heavens created by the soul **1381 a** (l. 1-6)
 the s. a god, because *ἐμψυχος* **1381 a**, l. 40
 the s. an image of the One **1389 c**, (l. 9); cp. **1395 b** (l. 37)
 brother s. **1411 b**
- Tabula**
 the t. rasa theory in the Stoa **991**; **994 b**, under the text
- teleology
 the theory of t. in nature criticized by Epic. **855**
 the Stoic view of t. **931**; **932**
 criticized by Carneades **932 b**
 t. in nature no valid proof for the existence of God **1118 b**
- telos** (summum bonum)
 According to Epicurus: the t. is *ἡδονή* **808**; **812 b** (the end); **859**; **860**
 Acc. to the Stoa: virtue **808**; living acc. to nature (Reason) **1003**
 the t. formula: **1004**; the formula explained **1005-1111**

- identified with virtue **1031 a**; with eudaimonia **1105**
 explained by Chrys.' successors **1144**;
 by Panaetius **1156**; **1157**; by Posid. **1188 c d**; by Antiochus **1201-1205**; by Seneca **1215 c**
 pleasure cannot be the t. (Epict.) **1240 a**
- temperantia
 defined by Panaetius **1161**. See further virtues
- tempora
 the system of t. created by Stoics **970**
- theodicy, see s.v. evil
- theology, see s.v. God, gods
- theurgy, see θεωργία
- thinking
 intuitive, not discursive **1383 a**
 primary **1383 d**
- tide
 explained by Posid. **1177 b**
- time
 defined by Epic. **839**; infinite t. does not increase pleasure (Epic.) **870**
 in the Stoa
 virtue not increased by t. **1036**
 passions soothed by t. **1189 b**; cp. **1185 c**
 in Plut. **1312 b**
 T. analyzed and defined by Plot. **1434**
 a distention of the soul **1435 a**
 engendered together with the sensible universe **1435 b**
 For Proclus see **1469 b**, **1474 b**
- transcendentalism
 extreme t. of ps.-Archytas **1281 b**
 (remark under the text)
 cp. s.v. God: the notion of God from Philo onwards
 also First Principle s.v. principle
- truth
 standard of t. see criterium
- Universalism **805**, sub (2)
- universe
 the u.: κόσμος, τὰ ὅλα, τὸ ὅλον, τὸ πᾶν;
 universum, frequently in Stoic writers; in Plot. τὰ πάντα
 E.g. M. Aur.: everyone has his function in the u. **1267**
 imperfection in the u. **1270**
 Neopyth.: the u. is imperishable **1280**
- Philo: the Logos a bond of the u. **1306**; Plut.: the u. does not float reasonless and ungoverned **1314 a**
 Plotinus: πάντα, not πᾶν **1425 a** (the Stoic conception criticized)
 the laws of the u. **1431 a**
 one living being **1431 b**
 See also s.v. cosmos, universum, ὅλα, πᾶν
- universum
 in Seneca e.g. **918 d**; **928**; **1221 c**
 See further cosmos and universe
- Vibration (παλμός)
 interior v. of a compound body (Epic.) **837**
 vice, see κακία. Also s.v. sin
- virtue (ἀρετή)
 By Epic. subordinated to pleasure **808**, sub **1**; **873**
 nothing in itself **873 b**; **875** (based on social contract), **876**
 the correlate of pleasure **874**
 In the Stoa:
 —s are bodies **914**; animals do not share in v. and vice **1001 b**
 living acc. to nature (reason) **1003-1011**; **1013 a**
 v. the only good **1012**; implies freedom **1013 b**, and happiness **1013 c**; autarkeia of v. **1014**; **1022**; no degrees **1015**; the intention is essential **1016**; defined as ὄφελος (ὠφέλεια) **1017 a**; a natural perfection **1017 b**; absolute character of v. **1017 c d**
 perfectio naturae **1003 n. 1** (the precedents); **1023**
 not a ἔξις but a διάθεσις **1024**
 natural aptitude for v. **1025**; **1026**
 the unity of v. **1028 a**; **1031**; the four main —s **1028 b**
 Cleanthes' definition **1029 a**
 Chrysippus' definition **1030**
 v. cannot be lost **1032**
 καθήκοντα and κατορθώματα **1033-1037**
 v. not increased by duration **1036**
 no medium between v. and vice **1038**
 the wise man possesses all—s **1043 b**
 the katorthoma a commandment of law **1068**

- For Pyrrho v. = indifferentism **1088 c**, under the text
 Carn. attacks the idea of v. as a perfection of nature **1125-1128**
 By Panaetius —s are founded on natural strivings **1157**
 the —s described **1158-1162**
 the autarchy of v. abandoned **1165**
 Antiochus: the germ of v. must be developed by personal energy **1204**
 justice the leading v. **1205**
 Seneca: the cult of v. is true religion **1209**
 v. cannot be increased **1212 a b**
 inner character of v. **1217**
 Epict.: *aídos* and *pistis* are cardinal —s **1240**
 Philo: higher and lower —s **1297 b**
 Plotinus: Is v. *κάθαρσις*? **1419 a b**;
 a spiritualized state of the soul **1419 d**
 higher and lower —s **1420 a b**
 dialectic a training to v. **1420 c**
 no cult of God without v. **1420 d**
 Porph.' classification of —s **1439**
 v. the only way to God **1440 c**
 Procl. ranked *θεουργική ἀρετή* higher than *θεωρητική* **1456 b**
- vis
 v. *vitalis* (Posid.) **1176**; **1192**
visum, Lat. term for *φαντασία* **985 a b**
 vitalism
 of Zeno **808**, sub (2); cp. **899-916**
 (the term *ζωτική δύναμις* does not occur)
 of Posid. **1176** (with notes); **1192**
- vitium
 defined as *quod contra naturam est* **1003 n. 1** (p. 132)
 identified with *inconstantia* **1006**, introd.
- void
 τὸ κενόν (Epic.) **829 b**
voluntas, see will
voluptas, see *ἡδονή*
- Weight
 of Epic.' atoms **831 a b**
- will
 in the Stoa:
 virtue essentially a question of the w. (intention) **1016**; **1217**
velle, θέλειν, βούλεσθαι **1006**; **1007**;
1008 a; **1009**
nihil invitum (in the life of the wise man) **1010 a**; *voluntas* **1011 b**
 voluntary surrender to the w. of God **943**; **944 b c** (Cleanthes);
1011 a (Chrys.); **1245** (Epict.);
1267 (Marc. Aur.)
 the part of the w. in wisdom **1215 a**
 in moral progress **1216**
 virtue a question of the will (inner man, *mens*) **1035**; **1037**; **1217**
 See also *προαίρεσις* (deliberate choice)
 w. of the First Noûs (Albinus) **1327 d**,
1329 b
 in Plotinus:
 of the One **1393 b**
 free w. of man **1418 a b**; **1425**;
1430-1432
 Iambl.:
 man sins by free w. (*προαίρεσις*)
1453 a
 Procl.:
ad deterius impetus et appetitus **1470 d**
 free w. maintained against *ἀνάγκη* **1473 b**
- wise (*sapiens*, σοφός, σπουδαῖος)
 the ideal of the w. man in the Stoa **1038-1050**; **1062**
 only the w. man possesses *ἐπιστήμη* **985 b**; **1042**; **1043 a**
 and virtue **1042**; **1043 b**
 he is *ἀπαθής* **1062**
 The Stoic conception of the w. man criticized **1050**; **1103**; **1112 a**
 Pyrrho's ideal of the w. man **1084 b**
 Plotinus **1423**
 See also *sapientia*, σοφός and σπουδαῖος
- women
 in the School of Epic. **813 a b**
 in the School of Musonius **1227**
 in the School and house of Plot. **1360 a b**
 Cp. Porph.' letter to his wife **1440**
 Hypatia head of the School of Alexandria **1455**, introd.
 For the appreciation of women, see e.g. **1147 b**: the wife a most important help to her husband (Antipater)

and **1324 d**: a man should share his spiritual life with his wife (Plut.)
See also marriage and love
world
see cosmos and universe

the inhabited w. (ἡ οἰκουμένη) **1174**

Zones

Posid.' theory of the five z. **1173**
zoöphyta, **1182 b**

III—GREEK WORDS

*Αγαθόν

Epic.: ἡδονή the πρῶτον —, **862 a**
The pleasure of the body the root of all —, **863**

πᾶν — ἐν αἰσθήσει, **865 b**

In the Stoa:

— defined, **1017**; the προηγμένον not an —, **1020 a**, cp. **1023 a**, **1028 a**, **1034 b**, **1234 a**

the field of morals indicated as περὶ —ων κ. κακῶν, **1066 d**, **1185 a**, **1191 b**, **1252 a**, **1262 a**

ἀνθρώπεια — ἁ, **1259 c**

the essence of the — is προαίρεσις ποιᾶ, **1236 a**

οἱ —οί, **1254 b**

Philo distinguishes between πρεσβύτερα and νεώτερα —ἁ, **1297 b**

Numenius wrote a work Π. τᾶγαθοῦ, **1348**, cp. **1350 a**

Plotinus:

the — not a predicate, **1394 a**; not a primary genus, **1394 b**; a hierarchy of —α, **1394 c**

the — is the Light, **1395**; beyond beauty **1396**

ἀγαθοποιόν **1281 a**

ἄγαλμα

Plot.: νοῦς an —, **1366** (l. 14), **1382 b**, sm. pr.

the sensible world an —, **1403 a** (l. 15)

ἄγγελοι, see angels

ἄγλατα

Plot.: the — in νοῦς, **1385 b** (l. 12), **1395 a** (l. 6)

ἡ ἐκεῖ —, **1399 a** (l. 18)

of the sensible world, **1401 c** (l. 7)
Cp. **1348** (Num.)

ἀγνεία

defined, **1063 b**

ἀγωγεύς

God called the — of sun and moon **1303 c** (small print, under the text)

ἀδελφός

the fellow-man called —, **1242**, **1243**
Sun and stars **1411 b**

ἀδελφα

τὰ —, **829 a**

proof is an ἀδελγον (ap. Sext. Emp.) **1114**

τὰ φύσει ἁ, **1142**

ἀδιάφορα

the Stoic doctrine of —, **1012 b c**, **1018-1022**, **1030 b**, **1034 b**, **1050 a**; (Pyrrho) **1087 a**, **1088 b**

ἀδιαφορία **1084 a**

ἀδικία

not an evil in itself (Epic.), **875 c**
mentioned among κακά in the Stoa, **1012 b**

Plot.: What about the — in the world? **1430**

ἀήρ

frequently mentioned as one of the elements

distinguished from αἰθήρ and full of mortal living beings, **1279 c e**, **1304 a**; by Philo identified with the Jacob's ladder **1304 b**; Basilides **1336 b**

ἀθανασία

τοῦ κόσμου, **1404 a**

ἄθροισμα (also written ἄθροισμα), see compound body, s.v. body

ἀτίδιος **1461 e** (49)

αἰδώς

defined, **1063 b**

one of the cardinal virtues acc. to Epic., **1233 a**, **1240 a**; cp. **1241 c** (τὸν αἰδήμονα)

αἰθήρ

ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου acc. to Antipater, **1196 a**

noös feeds on — (=anima tenuis) **1192 c**

- feeds the heavenly bodies, **1279 c**,
under the text
cp. the tripartition οὐρανός, γῆ, μετ-
άριον mentioned under **1280 c**
Basilides, **1336 b**
- αἴρεσις
in Epic.: **862 a**, **872 b**
in the Stoa:
— κ. φυγή, e.g. **1030 b**
ap. Sext. Emp., **1105**
—έσεις κ. ἐκκλίσεις, e.g. **1029 a**
in the sense of School, e.g. **1073 b**,
1137 a b
- αἰρετέος
virtues are αἰρετέα, e.g. **1028 a**
Also αἰρετά × φευκτά
- αἰσθησις
in Epic.: **827 b**, **828**
πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κ. κακὸν ἐν αἰσθήσει
865 b
in the Stoa: **984**, **985 a**, n. 1, **991**,
1003 a, **1039 b**, **1095**, **1176 d**,
1265 b
Plot.: What is —?, **1415**, **1416**
See also perception
- αἰσθήσεις **823**, **829**
See also sense-impressions and senses.
The latter are also called τὰ αἰσθη-
τήρια, e.g. **947 b**
- αἰσθητά
in Epic.: **822**
in the Stoa: **990**, **1057**
Aenesidemus: **1130**, **1135 a**
with Neopythag.: τὰ — σώματα
1279 a
in Numenius **1349 a**
in Plotinus: τὸ —όν the final term of
creation, **1401 a**
- αἰσθητικόν
when acquired by the soul in its
descent? **1356 b**
- αἰτία
the form is — (ps.-Archytas), **1281 a**
— πρὸ —ας, **1281 b**
Num. speaks of a first and a second
αἴτιον, **1349 a**
See also cause
- αἴτιος
ὁ — τοῦ εἶναι, **1408 e**
- αἰτιῶδες
term in Stoic grammar and logic, **977**
- αἰών
1273 c (M. Aur.), **1280 a** (Ocellus),
1312 c (Plut.)
in Valentinus: **1333 a-c**
defined by Plot., **1433**
Cp. **1383 a**, l. 17 ff.
ἀκαταληψία **1077 a**, **1082 a**, **1115**
ἀκατάληπτος (-λημπτος), **1197 a**
ἀκοή
explained by Chrys., **947 b**, **948 c**
ἀκολασία **1012 b**, **1227**
ἀκολουθία
in the universe, **1302 b**, **1309 a**,
1429 a, **1473 b**
In logic **1430 c** (l. 17)
See also ἐπακολουθήσις
ἀκόλουθος
τὸ —ν (*constantia*), **1033 a**
ἀλαμπία
οἱ ὕλη, **1288 c**
ἀλγεῖν **860**, **872 b**, **1062 b**
τὸ ἀλγοῦν, **864 a b**, **869**, **872 a**
ἀλγηδών, ἄλγος
in Epic.: **826 a**, **862 b**, **880 c**
Plotinus: **1422**, **1423 a**
See also *dolor* and pain.
- ἀλήθεια
one of the four principles of Porph.,
1440 e
ἡ περὶ τοῦ παντός (Iambl.), **1448 a**
ἀλλοτριώσεις
the opp. of οικείωσις, **999 c**, sm. pr.;
1057
ἀλογία **1061 a**, **1441**, **1453 a**
ἄλογος
ἀ. κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς, **1051 a b**, cp.
1058 c
τὸ —ν τῆς ψυχῆς, **1053 a**, **1055**, **1056 b**
— ζωή, **1469 c** (209), **1474 a**
incarnation of souls into —α, **1474 c**
See also irrational, and animal
- ἀμάρτημα, see sin
ἀμέθεκτος, see s.v. μεθεκτός
ἀμέριστος
τὸ —ν, **1374 c**
See also s.v. μεριστόν
ἄμεσα **1114**, under the text
ἀμετάβλητος
of Epic.' atoms, **829 a**
in Plut. (of God) the notion is cir-
cumscribed, e.g. **1312 b**
also **1313 b** (μεταβολῆς κρεῖττον)

ἀμετρία

the cause of evil (Plot.), **1410 b - d**

ἀμιγής **1291, 1310 b, 1313 b**

ἄμορφον (of ὕλη) **1285 b, 1326 a, 1406 a**
1409 a, 1470 a (sm. pr.)

ἀναίδεια **1253**, introd.

Cp. ἀναισχυντία

ἀναισχυντία

κυνική, **885 b** (the end)

ἀναλογία **1302 b** (Philo),

1472 b (Proclus)

ἀνάστασις

ἀπὸ σώματος, οὐ μετὰ σώματος **1416 b**,
l. 71

ἀνδρεία

one of the four cardinal virtues: **875**,
914 c, 1012 b, 1028-1030, 1037,
1160, 1249 b

Defined by Plot. **1420 a**; cp. **1419 b**
by Porph. **1439**

ἀνθρωπίζειν **1258 a**

Cp. humanitas

ἄνθρωπος, see man

ἀνομολογία **989 a**

ἀντιλογία **1081, 1087 b**

ἀντιστροφή

conversion of terms in a proposition,
975 a

ἀνώλεθρος

τὸ πᾶν —ν, **1280 a**

πᾶσα ψυχή —, **1468 b** (187)

ἄξια **1017-1020, 1268 b**

ἄξιωμα **973-978, 1113 a**

ἀοριστία

of ὕλη (Plot.), **1410 c**; cp. ἀόριστος

ἀόριστος, ἀοριστία

χρόνοι —οι (in the Stoic system of
tenses), **970 a**

— δυάς, **1279 a, 1285 a, 1314 c**

τὰ —α, **1281 a**

in Plot.: **1406 a, 1408 e, 1410 b**

ὕλη is ἀοριστία, **1407 c** (l. 30 ff.),
1410 c (l. 30)

ἀπάθεια, ἀπαθής

the Stoic ideal of —, **805**, sub (3),
1062 a, cp. **1059**

in Epict. e.g. **1233 a**

rejected by Panaetius, **1150, 1166**

of Sextus' character, **1079 a**

of Pyrrho **1089**

in Plut. of Osiris, **1313**

For Plotinus cp. **1423 a** (the wise
man)

ὕλη is ἀπαθής, **1409**

νοητὴ οὐσία, **1409 a**

soul **1414-1416**

ἀπανθρωπία **1480**

ἀπεικόνισμα **1293 a, 1298**

See also εἰκὼν, μίμημα and ἑνδαλμα
ἄπειρος

Epic.:

the universe is —, **829 b**

the atoms —οι in number, **830 a**

κόσμοι —οι, **840 a**

ἀπειρία **1281 b** (God created πέρας
and ἄ.); cp. Procl., **1466 c**

Plotinus' theory of the ἄπειρον:

in the intelligible world, **1398 b**,
1408 b - e, 1409 a (c. 7, l. 8)

Procl.:

πέρας and —, **1462, 1466 c**

the πρώτως — should not be called
ὕλη, **1470 a**

See also matter (ὕλη)

ἀπεκλογία

τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, **999, 1004, 1034 b**,
1144

ἀπλοῦς

of a man's character, **1276 b**

ὁ πρώτος θεός ἐστιν — (Num.), **1349 a**
Plot.:

ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ —ῆ φύσις, **1370 c**
the ὕλη of noûs is —ῆ, as noûs itself,
1381 b

noûs is —ν καὶ οὐχ —ν, **1381 d**

noûs is διπλοῦς καὶ οὐχ —, **1390 a**
τὸ πάντη —ν, **1395 b**

ὁ —, **1408 e**

Procl.: **1461 e** (49)

ἄποιος

(ὕλη), **1326 a, 1407 b, 1409 b**

ἀποκατάστασις **906, 1139, 1469 a**, cp.
1474 a (ὅταν ἀποκαταστή)

ἀπολογία

εὐλογος —, **1105**

ἀποπροηγμένα **1019-1022**

ἀπορητική

other name for σκεπτική (ἀγωγή),
1077 b

ἀπόστασις

πλήθος — τοῦ ἑνός, **1408 d**, sm. pr.
ἀπόφασις **1087 c, 1096 a**

ἀποφατικός **976**

ἀρετή, see virtue

ἄρθρον

(grammatical term in the Stoa), 967

ἀριθμός, see number

ἁρμονία 1279 f, 1281 a

— μαθηματική, 1286

= the celestial spheres, 1341 b, 1342 b

τὴν ὕλην — α συνδησάμενος, 1351

μία — καὶ τάξις in the universe, 1431 b

ἄρνησις 1077

ἄρνητικός 976

ἄρρενόθηλος (or ἄρσενόθηλος)

μονάς —, 1288 c (with some comments)

Valentinus' aeons, 1333 a

Νοῦς —, 1340 a

ἄρρεψία

in Sceptical terminology, 1087 c

ἄρρητον

the First Principle as —, 1281 b
(comm. under the text)

1327 a d e (Albibus), 1330 c (Max. Tyr.), 1449 a (Iambl.)

Procl. 1464 i

cp. 1476-1477 (Damasc.)

Cp. Plotinus 1392 b - d, 1394

ἄρρώστημα 1185 a. See also disease

ἀρχάγγελοι

the highest of the good demons
(Porph.), 1442 a, under the text

[By Philo the Logos is sometimes
called —ος; not in this vol.]

ἀρχέτυπος

Philo: — ἰδέα 1293 a; σφραγίς 1293 d;

νοῦς 1296 a; αὐγή 1300 c

τὸ —ν εἶδος (Poim.), 1339 c

the —α of all things in Νοῦς (Plot.),
1369 c

See also 1366 a (l. 33), 1372 b (l. 35),
1401 c (l. 15 ff.), 1408 c (l. 22),
1426 a (l. 25)

ἀρχή, see principle

ἀσκησις 1187 b, 1228, 1253, introd.

See also asceticism, askesis

ἀστάθμητα 1087 a

ἀσχημάτιστον

(of ὕλη), 1285 b

ἀσώματος

Acc. to Epic. only the void is —ν, 843 c
in the Stoa: the ἀρχαί are —οι, 899 b

Moderatus: —α εἶδη, 1285 a

Numenius: τὸ —ν, 1347 b

Plotinus: ὕλη is an —ν, 1409 a

ἄτακτος

τὰ —α κ. ἀόριστα, Ps.-Archytas,
1281 a

cp. Numenius, 1347 b

ἀταραξία

Epic.: 852, 860, 880

Seneca: (*animus impatiens*), 1062 c

Epict.: 1233 a

Pyrrho: 1084 b, 1077 a

Arcesilaus: 1098

ἄτομα

Epic.: 829 ff.

Aenesidemus' criticism of Epic.
theory, 1131

Marc. Aur., 1269, 1271

αὐγή

ἀρχέτυπος —, 1300 c, 1310 b

αὐθάδεια 1411 a, l. 55

αὐθυπόστατα

Proclus' doctrine of self-constituted
principles, 1461, 1468 c

αὐτάρκεια, αὐτάρκης

acc. to Epic., 814 c, 872 a

in the Stoa: the — of virtue, 1014,
cp. 1022

In Cynicism, 1253, introd.

Plotinus: the — of spiritual life,
1421, the end, 1422, 1423

αὐτεξούσιος

944 b (Hippolytus)

in Valentinian gnosis: only the ψυχι-
κοί are —οι, 1332 b, sub 3, 1335 a

Plot. 1377 a, 1430 c; the end

αὐτοπάτωρ

in Valentinus 1333 a

in Iambl. *De Myst.*, 1449 c

ἀφασία 1087 a

ἄφή

defined by Chrysippus, 947 b, 948 c

ἀφθαρσία

τοῦ κόσμου, 1290 a, n. 1

See also ἀνώλεθρος

περὶ —ς ψυχῆς (Num.), 1345 b

ἀφθαρτος 1461 e (46), 1468 b (187)

ἀφοβία

mentioned by Epict. among the
prerogatives of the "free" man,
1233 a

ἀφορμή

1019 c (sm. pr.), 1025, 1137 a, 1156

ἀφροδίσια

by Epic. classed as natural but not necessary, **866 b**

Epic. rather declines them, **866 d**
Musonius Rufus, **1229**

ἀφροσύνη **1012 b**

ἀφώτιστον

ὅλη αἰσθητή in itself, **1406 e**

See also σκότος, σκοτεινόν

Βαρβαρισμός **968**

βάρος

of Epic.' atoms, see weight

βασιλεύς

cosmic and religious character of the Stoic β., **1045 b**

By Philo God called ποιμὴν κ. —, **1303 c**

Max. Tyr.: πάντων —, **1330 a**

Numenius: the first God an ἀργός —, **1349 b**

Plot.: — βασιλέων, **1382 d**

Iambl.: πρῶτος θεός καὶ —, **1449 c**

βίος

θεωρητικός κ. πρακτικός, **1309 b**

βούλησις

defined, **1063 b**

See further will

Γαλαξία

the Milky Way, τόπος ψυχῶν, **1356 a**

See also Milky Way

γάμος, see marriage

γένεσις

acc. to Ocellus, **1280 b**

εἰκὼν οὐσίας (Plut.), **1313 a**

cp. **1312**

Num.: **1350 a**

the γ. of ὅλη (Plot.), **1401 b** (hypothetical)

— ἡ ἐν χρόνῳ excluded from spiritual being, **1366** (l. 19), **1388**

— πᾶν τὸ σωματικόν, **1371 c**

— is of the lower part of the soul, **1417 b**, the end

Procl.: **1461 e** (51), **1469 b - d**, **1474 b**

See also γίνομαι and γεννᾶν

γεννᾶν

πάντα ὅσα τέλεια γεννᾷ, **1366** (l. 37 f.), **1370 a**

τὸ γεννώμενον, **1365 a**, **1366**

ὁ γεννήσας οὐσίαν, **1396 b**

See also γεννητής

γέννημα

materia et corpus Dei γεννήματα, **1470 a**

γέννησις

πρώτη οἶον —, **1370 a** (l. 7)

γεννητής

τὸ ἐν — τοῦ ὄντος, **1370 a** (l. 7)

Also ὁ γεννήσας, **1408 e** (sc. number and the indefinite principle), **1396 b** (οὐσίαν)

Cp. πατήρ: the One, **1375 c**, n. 1;

π. θεῶν, **1382 d**; νοῦς, **1381 a**, l. 37, **b** (l. 21); **1401 c** (l. 10)

γένος

τὰ πρῶτα — η (the categories), **997**

γεῦσις

defined by Chrysippus, **947 b**, **948 c**

γῆ

οἶον φρουρά, **1330 e**

γίνομαι, τὸ γενόμενον, τὰ γενόμενα

Plut.:

τὸ γιγνόμενον opposed to the ὄντως ὄν, **1312 a-c**

μίμημα τοῦ ὄντος, **1313 a**

Plot.:

(metaphorically) of νοῦς, **1365 a c**, **1366**, **1370 a**

Cp. γένεσις

Proclus:

τὸ γινόμενον ἐστὶ πως ὄν, **1459 e**

γνώσις

ἐναργής — (Epic.), **845**, **848 a**

See also Gnosis, Gnosticism

γραμμὴ

in Neopythag., **1279 a**

Δαιμόνιος

—ν τὸ σῶμα, **1282**

the πάθη of this world, **1402 a**

δαίμων, see demon, demons

an ἀγαθός — appearing, **1259 a**

— ἡ ψυχὴ, **1282**, the end

δειλία **1012 b**

δεσμός

Nicomachus:

εἷς — ἀπάντων, **1288 a**

Philo:

the δυνάμεις are —οὶ ἄρρηκτοι, **1303 a**
the logos a — ἄρρηκτος, **1306 a**

Max. Tyr.:

- earth a prison and —οὶ ἀλιτρῶν
σωμάτων, **1330 e**
- Plotinus:
—οὶ τοῦ σώματος, **1375 c** (l. 22 ff.)
soul παντὸς —οὐ κρείττων, **1404 b**
- Porph.:
— ψυχῆς, **1441** (init.)
- δεύτερος, θεός,
Philo: the Logos a second God,
1300 c, sm. pr., **1301 a**, with sm.
pr., **1301 b**, **1305 a b**, **1306 b d**
Cp. Plut. **1320**; Albinus, **1326 b**;
Herm. **1340**; Num. **1349**, **1352 a**;
Plot. **1382 d**
δευτέρα φύσις, **1382 a**, **1426 b**, **1429 a**
τὰ δευτέρα, (secondary beings), **1464**
h i, **1472 b** (Proclus)
- δημιουργός
God — τοῦ ὅλου, **899 a** (δημιουργεῖν)
Cp. **911 a**: *artifex universitatis*. See
further Demiurge
Nemesius: **1181 b**
Philo: **1297 a**, **1303 a**, **1304 a**, **1305 a**
Albinus: **1327 d**, **1328**
Max. Tyr.: **1330 e**
Gnostics: **1332 b**, **1334 c e**, **1336 a**,
1337 b
Herm.: **1340 a b**
Numenius: **1349 b c**, **1350 a b**, **1351**,
1352
Plotinus:
νοῦς —, **1402 b** (l. 15)
cp. **1405 b** (ἡ δημιουργουμένη ὕλη,
l. 24)
Iambl.: **1451 b c**
- διάθεσις
virtue a — of the hegemonikon, **986 d**,
1005 a, **1024**, **1033**, **1040 b**,
1053 b, **1135 a**
- δαιτητής
—αὶ λόγοι (Philo), **1306 c**
- διαλεκτική
acc. to Zeno linked with rhetoric,
964 a
cultivated by Arcesilaus, **1096 b**
later Sceptics dislike —, **1141**
in Plotinus: — a training to virtue,
1420 c
- διάλεκτος
defined in the Stoa, **966**
- διάνοια
in Epic.: **869**
- in the Stoa: **949 a b**, **951 c**, **953 a**,
963, **966**, **986 d**, **990** (small print),
991, **992 b**, **1053 b**, **1263 b** (small
print), **1266 b**
Philo: **1296 c**, the end.
in Plotinus: as a purely intellectual
function opposed to αἴσθησις,
1415 b. [Elsewhere distinguished
from νοῦς which is intuitive
thinking]
- διαστροφή
—αὶ τοῦ λόγου, **955 a**
(*perversio naturae*), **1027**
See also s.v. sin
- διαφωνία
the first trope of Agrippa: ὁ ἀπὸ —ας,
1136 a
πόλεμος καὶ — (in the cosmos), **1330 a**
- διεzeugμένον
disjunctive, **977**
- δικαιοσύνη (also: τὸ δίκαιον)
in Epic.: **875 a b**
in the Anc. Stoa: **914 c**, **1012 b**,
1028 b c, **1029 a** (def. by Clean-
thes), **1030** (def. by Chrys.), **1050**,
1065, **1066**, **1073**
Carneades' disputation on —, **1111 a**,
— not based on nature, **1125-1128**
Panaetius: **1159**
Antiochus of Ascalon: **1205 a**
Bion: **1249 b**
Plotinus: **1420 a**
Porph.: **1439**
- δόγμα
our —τα about things (judgments)
decisive in life (Epict.), **1237**
- δόξα
the problem⁷ of ψευδής —, **828** (under
the text)
λύπη defined as — πρόσφατος (Chrys.),
955, **1061 a** (under the text),
1185 c
λατρεία δοξῶν (Timon), **1085 a**
— defined by Arcesilaus, **1103 b**
the tenet that πάθη are δόξαι rejected
by Posid., **1185**, esp. **c**
Chrysippus' theory criticized by Plo-
tinus, **1414 b**
- δοξάζω
"οὐ δοξάζει ὁ σοφός", **1043 a**
criticized, **1103 b**

δοξαστά

αἰσθητὰ κ. —, **1288 a**

δοῦλος

the non-philosophical man called —
by Epict., **1013 b**

Cp. **1243 a** (ἀνδράποδον)

Opp. to ἐλεύθερος

See also slave

δυάς

ἀόριστος —, **1279 a**, **1285 a**, **1314 c**;

1349 a, **1353 a**, with n. 2 and 3;

1408 e (with comments)

δυνάμεις, see powers

Ἑβδομάς

a νοερά ἑβδομάς (Procl.), **1451 b**

ἐγκόσμιος **1466 d**, **1467 a**, **1469 a**

ἐγκράτεια, ἐγκρατής **1029 a**, **1190**,
1289 b

ἐγκύκλια

declined by Epic., **879 d**

relation to phil. acc. to Philo, **1289 b**

See also learning and παιδεία

ἐγώ

εἶμι ὁ ὢν, **1292**

οὐχ ὁ ἀπτός οὗτος, **1440 a** (c. 8, sec. al.)

εἶδος, see ἰδέα

εἰδητικός

— ἃ μέτρα, **1285 b**, with n. 1

εἶδωλον

— α (imagines) explaining the human
notion of gods (Epic.), **827 b**, sm.
pr., **849**

in Plotinus:

αἰσθησις κ. φύσις an εἶδωλον of soul,
1370 a

ὕλη an εἶδωλον of soul, **1402 c**,
1408 c

— καὶ φάντασμα ὄγκου, **1409 a**
(c. 7, l. 13)

— α ἐν εἰδώλῳ, ib., l. 24

τῶν ὄντων μιμήματα καὶ — α, l. 28

— οὐκ ἀληθές, **1409 c**

ὕλη an — ὡς πρὸς τὰ ὄντα, **1410 b**,
l. 37

εἰκὼν

in Philo:

the sensible world a μίμημα θείας
εἰκόνος, **1293 d**

the invisible light an — of the
Logos, **1295 b**

man created κατ' — ὄντι θεοῦ, **1296**

the εἶδος in sensible things an —
τελείου λόγου, **1302 a**

Plut.:

— οὐσίας ἢ γένεσις, **1313 a**

Horus an — of the intelligible
world, **1313 b**; cp. **1314 d**

αἰσθηταὶ — ὄνες, **1318 b**

Herm.:

the archetypal man an — τοῦ
πατρὸς, **1341 a**

οὐ πᾶσα φύσις —, **1343**

Plotinus:

— ὅσον ἀρχετύπων, **1366** (l. 33),
1369 a (l. 15)

soul an — of νοῦς, **1381 b** (l. 7)

the sensible world an — of its
Father, **1401 c** (l. 10)

an — ἀεὶ εἰκονιζόμενος, **1402 b**
time and —, **1434 c**

εἰμαρμένη (*fatum*)

in Epicurean texts: **834 a** (Diog.
Oen.), **835 a** (Cic. on Epic.' doc-
trine)

in the Stoa:

ἡ πολυθρύλητος αὐτοῖς —, **912 c**

— = Zeus, **918**, **919 a**; θεός, νοῦς,
920 a

κινητικὴ τῆς ὕλης, **927 a**

Posid.' conception of — differs
from the Ancient Stoic one,
1196 d

On πρόνοια and — in later Antiquity:
1279 d (with some comments un-
der the text), a.o. passages cited

under "fate and providence" s.v.
Fate

in Philo: **1302 b**, **1303 a**

Herm. **1340 a**

in Plot.: **1413 b**, **1425 a**

See also Fate

εἶναι (εἶ)

only to be said of God (Philo), **1292**

cp. **1303 b**: ὁ ἔστιν ἀψευδῶς

Plut. **1312 a**

a gift of grace (Plot.), **1401 b** (l. 23)
ἐκφεῖ

τὰ — (= τὰ νοητά), **1403 b**

τὸ — ζῆν, **1400 a**

— ἅμα πάντα, **1406 a** (l. 13)

ὁ — κόσμος, **1406 e**

opposed to the soul and its virtues,
1420 b

to the sensible world, **1427 a**
 ἡ δύναμις ἡ —, **1428 a**, the end
 ἡ ζωὴ ἡ —, **1434 c** (l. 48)
 ἐκλάμπειν **1365 c**, **1449 c**
 ἐκλαμψίς **1427 b**
 ἐκλογή
 τῶν κατὰ φύσιν, **999**, **1004**, **1034 b**,
1144
 ἐκμαγεῖον **1280 b**, **1294**, **1302 a**, **1326 a**
 ἐκπύρωσις
 the ancient Stoic doctrine of —, **905 a**,
907, **925 b**, **938**, **957 c**
 the theory abandoned by Diog. Bab.,
1143 a
 and by Panaetius, **1151 b**
 restored by Posid., **1178**
 ἐκρεῖ, see ἐξεργῶ
 ἐκστασις
 in Philo: **1310 d**
 By Plotinus the term — is used once
 only in the sense of ἐνθουσιασμός:
Enn. VI 9, 11, l. 23 (not in this vol.)
 ἐκτός
 τὰ —, term frequently used by Epict.,
 e.g. **1236 a**, **1239**
 M. Aur., **1264 a**
 See also outward things
 ἔλεος **953 b**, **1044 b**
 Cp. **1064 b** (*misericordia*)
 ἐλευθερία
 characteristic of the wise man in the
 Stoa: **1044 a**, **1046 a**
 frequently found in Epict., e.g.
1233 a (the end), **1245 a**
 of Demonax, **1257 a**
 ἐλεύθερος
 —α κίνησις (of the atoms), **833 a**
 in the Stoa: μόνον τὸν σοφὸν —ν,
 e.g. **1044 a**
 ἐλλάμπειν **1404 c d**, **1466 d**, **1467 a**
 ἔλλαμψις **1464 b**
 ἔλλειψις, evil defined as — (Plot.),
1410 c d
 ἐλληνισμός **968**
 ἐλπὶς **1440 e f**
 ἐμπειρία **991**, **1004**
 ἐμπειρικός
 ἡ — ἡ αἴρεσις, **1137 a**
 defined, **1137 b**
 ἐν, see One
 ἐνὰς (-άδες), **1464 b c**, **1465 a** (I39),
1466 b d

ἐνδιάθεσις
 ὁ κατὰ —ν λόγος, **991**
 Also λόγος ἐνδιάθετος. See logos
 In Philo: **1307**
 ἐνέργεια
 in Plotinus:
 the One is —, **1393 a**, l. 22-25
 — ἀνευ οὐσίας, **1398 a**
 νοῦς is —, **1385 b**, l. 25
 τὸ ὄν is —, **1385 d**, l. 15
 spiritual life is νοῦ —, **1400 a**, l. 17
 διάνοια is —, **1415 b**, l. 21
 αἰσθήσεις are —αι, **1415 c**
 the essence of soul is —, **1416 a**, l. 42
 πᾶσα ζωὴ —, **1427 b**, l. 17 sq.
 ἡ τοῦ παντός —, **1431 b**, l. 15
 time an — of soul, **1435 b**
 ἐνέργημα **1033**, **1034**
 ἐννόημα **991**, **992**. See also ἐννοια
 ἐννοια
 in the Stoa: the notion of God a
 κοινή —, **846**, n. 3; **995**
 the — described, **991**
 κοιναὶ —αι = προλήψεις, **993**
 their subject, **994-996**
 Cp. **1003 b**, **1138 a**, **1200 a**, n. 3
 τοῦ τριγώνου, **1285 a**
 τοῦ ἐνός, **1476 b**
 ἐνότης **1285 a**. See also One
 ἐνσφραγίζεσθαι **1293 b**. Cp. σφραγίς
 ἐνσωματώσις **1355 a**
 ἔνωσις
 M. Aur.: τῆς οὐσίας, **1271 b**
 Iambl.: τοῦ κόσμου, τοῦ παντός,
1448 a c
 Procl.: **1464 i**
 ἐξαγωγή
 the εὐλογος —, **1047**, **1224**
 Cp. Epict., **1007 b** (ἀποκαρτερεῖν)
 ἐξάγειν ἑαυτόν, **1047 c d**
 ἐξεργῶ (for emanation), **1366**
 The substantive does not occur in
 Plot.
 ἐξηρημένον
 τὸ —, **1477 b**
 ἐξις **1024**, **1032 b**, **1053 b**, **1181**, **1187 c**
 ἐπακολούθησις **939 c**
 See also παρακολούθησις
 ἐπακτός
 ἡ φαντασία σύνεσις —οῦ, **1405 a**
 The universal soul creates οὐκ —ῶ
 γνώμη, **1376 c**

ψυχὴ —ν νοῦν ἔχει, **1370 b**; cp. **1426 b** (l. 15)

ἐπέκεινα **1366** (l. 13), **1382 a**, **1410 a** (c. 3, init.), **1433 a** (l. 8), **1449 b**, **1450 b**, **1459 d**, **1464 a c**, **1476 a b**

ἐπιβολαί

τῆς διανοίας, **823 a e**, **824 n. 1**, **827**

ἐπιθυμητικόν

The — impassible acc. to Plot., **1414 b**
when acquired by the soul in its
descent? **1356 b**

ἐπιθυμία

in Epic.:

814 a, **866-867**; cp. **869**

in the Stoa:

one of the four main πάθη, **1058 a b**
defined **1058 c**

Cp. **1060 b** (*philosophia cupiditibus liberat*)

In Plotinus: **1414 b**. See further πάθη
ἐπιστήμη

θεῶν κ. ἀνθρωπίνων, **897 b**; cp. **1215 c**,
1289 b

Zeno called virtue not — but φρόνησις, **1028 c**

Aristo of Chios called it —, **1028 c**
(small print)

Chrysippus: **1030**, **1031 a**

the wise man alone possesses —,
1043 a

Posid.: not every virtue is —, **1190 b**

Plotinus: αἱ ἐπιστήμαι, **1419 a**, the end

See further knowledge

ἐπιστροφή, ἐπιστρέφειν

ἐπὶ τὸν ζωοποιήσαντα, **1334 d** (Valent.
ap. Iren.)

Numenius:

God ἐπέστραπται πρὸς ἕκαστον ἡμῶν
(with comm.), **1350 b**

Plotinus:

of the One to itself, **1366**

of things becoming (τὸ γενόμενον)
to Noûs (τὸ ὄν), **1370 a**

of noûs to the One, often called θέα,
e.g. **1370 a**

of soul to noûs, e.g. **1375 c**; also
called βλέπειν πρὸς, e.g. **1375 a**

virtue defined as being turned to
Noûs (ἐπέστραπται), **1419 a**

Porph.:

ἀρετὴ arises μετὰ τὴν —ν, **1439**

μόνη σωτηρία ἢ πρὸς θεὸν —, **1440 e**

in Procl. frequently, e.g.: **1460** (c. 32,
33), **1461** (c. 42, 43), **1466 a**, **1472 b**

Also ἐπιστρέφειν, ἐπιστρεπτικός:

πρὸς ἑαυτό, **1459 b c**, **1461 c d**
to its source, **1460**

νοῦς εἰς τὸ νοητόν, **1466 d**

ψυχὴ πρὸς ἑαυτήν, **1468 c**

—κὴ προμήθεια, **1472 b**

in Damasc.: **1478 b**. See also στροφή.

ἐπιστρέφω

the First Noûs ἐπέστρεψε τὴν ψυχὴν
τοῦ κόσμου εἰς ἑαυτόν, **1327 d**

ἐπισύνδεσις πάντων **1271 b**

ἐπιτήδευσις

λόγου ὁρθότητος, definition of phil.,
989 b

ἐπιφορά **979**

ἐποχή **809**, **1077**, **1082 a**, **1135 b**

ἐρημία **925 b**

ἐρμηνευτικόν

τὸ —, when acquired by the soul?
1356 b

ἔρως

of matter for the First principle,
1313 a

man's love of God's image (*Poimandres*), **1341 b**

Plotinus:

of soul for noûs, **1395 a**, l. 11

τοῦ καλοῦ, **1396 a**, l. 14 ff.; **b**,
l. 26 ff.

Porph.:

one of the four principles, **1440 e**;
cp. **1441**

ἐρωτικὸν πάθημα (Plot.), of the soul
seeing the object of its love, **1399 a**

ἐρώτημα, **973 b**

ἐστώ

ἄ — = οὐσία, acc. to ps.-Archytas =
τὸ ὑποκείμενον, **1281 a**

ἐτεροίωσις

τῆς ψυχῆς (Chrysippus), **951**, **986 a**
ἐν ἡγεμονικῷ, **986 b**

ἐτερότης

opp. of ταυτότης, **1285 a** (Moderatus)
Cp. Plut. **1312 c** (the end)

in Plotinus:

principle of plurality in Noûs,
1374 b c; cp. **1385 b**

principle of individual existence,
1380

ὅλη eternally produced by —, **1406 e**

- one of the aspects of the intelligible world, **1433 b**, **1434 c**
 Iambl., **1451 a**
 ἐτυμολογία **1200 a**
 εὐδαιμονία (εὐδαιμῶν εἶναι, εὐδαιμονεῖν)
 in Epic.: **814 b**
 in the Stoa:
 a concomitant state, **1011 b**
 virtue the only condition, **1014 a**,
1046 c
 — called the telos, **1105**
 the consequence of voluntary obedience to divine Law, **1234 b** (small print)
 τὸ εὖρουν καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονικόν, **1252 a**
 in Plotinus:
 εὐδαιμῶν εἶναι, εὐδαιμονεῖν, **1421**,
1422 a b, **1423 b c**
 —ία, **1423 a**
 εὐδοξία, **1146**
 εὐθεΐα
 —ν περαίνειν (to achieve a straight course), **1008 a**
 εὐλογον
 τὸ —, a rule for practical life, **1105**,
1106 (Arcesilaus)
 εὐλόγως **1190 b**
 —ς ἐξαγωγῇ, **1224**
 εὐπάθεια
 The three —αι acc. to the Stoa, **1063**
 in Plotinus: happiness, joy, **1400 b**,
 the end
 εὐπραγία **1037 a**
 εὐροια
 —βίου, term used for happiness both by Zeno and Chrysippus, **989 b**,
1011 a, **1234 b**, **1252 a**
 εὐρώως **1252 b**
 εὐροεῖν **1271 c**
 εὐστάθεια **881**
 εὐχρη, εὐχρεσθαι
 Plot.: **1366** (l. 10 f.), **1428 a**, **1431 d**,
1432 a (l. 27)
 Porph.: **1440 b**, c (c. 15), d (c. 24)
 Iambl.: **1446 b**
 Cp. Procl., **1456 b**, sm. pr.; **1472 a**
 ἐφεκτική
 sc. ἀγωγή or αἵρεσις, synonym of
 σκεπτική, **1077 b**
 ἐφ' ἡμῖν, οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν
 primary distinction made by Epict.,
1007 a, **1232 a**
 Ζητητική
 sc. ἀγωγή or αἵρεσις, synonym of
 σκεπτική, **1077 b**
 ζωή
 in the Stoa classed as adiaphoron,
1012 b
 Plotinus: created by soul, **1381 a**
 ἡ τελεία —, **1421**
 πᾶσα — ἐνέργεια, **1427 b**
 Proclus: **1468 c**
 ζώνη
 αἰ πέντε —αι, **1173** (Posid.)
 Herm.: the soul has to cross seven
 —αι before reaching God, **1342 b**
 ζῶον
 in the Stoa:
 virtues considered as ζῶα, **914 b**
 difference between λογικόν and
 ἄλογον —, **946**, **1182 c**
 man called a ἡμερον κ. φιλάλληλον —
 by Epict., **1243**, introd.
 νοερόν κ. πολιτικόν — (M. Aur.),
1263 b
 the cosmos the τέλειον —, **1272 b**
 the stars νοερά —α, **1297 a** (Philo),
1329 a (Albinus)
 in Plotinus:
 παντελές —, **1385 b**, **1386 a**
 one —, **1431 b**
 See also animal
 Ἡγεμονικόν
 Zeno's doctrine of the —, **947 a**
 Chrysippus **947 b**
 the — placed in the heart, **914 b**,
948-950
 Chrysippus' doctrine of the — πως
 ἔχον, **953**, **956**, **986 b-d**, **1030 a**
 (introd.), **1053 b**, **1056 a**, **1213**
 at birth the — a tabula rasa, **991**
 Chrys. seems to have identified the —
 with an inward δαίμων, **989 b**
 Cp. Posid., **989 a**
 Epict.: λοιγὸν —, **1009**
 the — as the inner man opposed to
 τὰ ἐκτός, **1239 a**; cp. **1252 a**,
 introd.
 M. Aur.: **1263**
 ἡδονή
 Acc. to Epic. the telos: **808**, **812 b**,
859-862
 the — of the body comes first, **863**

- limited by reason, **864** introd.,
864 b c
 defined by absence of pain, **864 a**
 not increased by infinite time, **870**
 virtue subordinated to —, **873**
 correlation, **874**
 Epicurus' theory compared with
 Aristippus, **880**
 general characteristic of the theory,
881-883
 in the Stoa:
 the πρώτη ὁρμή not for —, **999 a**
 — one of the four main πάθη,
 1058 a b, defined **1058 c**
 See further πάθη
 in the first trope of Aenesidemus,
1135 a
 Panaetius: **1166 b**
 Posid.: **1188 c**, cp. **1190**
 Musonius: **1229 a**
 Epictetus: **1240 a**
 Porph.: — καὶ λύπη sources of evil for
 the soul, **1441**, the beginning
 ἡθική, see ethics
 ἥθος
 named after ἔθος, **1026 c**
 πηγή βίου, **1035 a**, sm. pr.
 ἥλιος, see sun
 ἡμεῖς
 Plot.: — ἐσμέν ὅπερ κύριον ἡμῶν, **1393 a**
 Cp. **1412 d**, **1413 b**, **1425 a**
 See also person, personality
 ἡμέτερον ἔργον, **1418 b**, l. 12, **1425 a**
 See also οἰκεῖος
 ἡνίοχος
 God called — τῶν δυνάμεων, **1303 b**
 ἥρως
 —ες, Plut. **1318 a**
 Proclus: **1472 b c**, **1474 c**
 ἡρώϊκαι ψυχαί, **1474 c**
Θάνατος
 Epic.: **844 a**, **865 b**
 classed as adiaphoron, **1012 b**
 Epict.: **1237 b**, **1248**
 Cp. for Seneca **1223 c**, **1224**
 M. Aur. (λύσις τῶν στοιχείων), **1275 b**
 Plot.: **1419 b**
 See also death, immortality and
 εὐλογος ἐξαγωγή
 θέα, θέαμα, θεάσασθαι
 see contemplation and ἐπιστροφή
 θέλημα
 of the One (Plot.), **1393 b**
 See also will
 θεός, see God, gods
 θεωργία
 of Iambl., **1446 b** (small print), c
 of Proclus, **1454 c**, **1456 b**
 θερμασία
 soul is strengthened when a — ἐκεῖθεν
 comes to her, **1395 a**
 θερμή
 soul vivifies everything θερμή, **1336 c**
 θερμόν
 τὸ — the cause of life, **1279 c**
 See also heat
 θέσις
 whether names are φύσει or θέσει, **971**
 θεωρεῖν
 ἐν τῷ — τὸ ζῆν, **1382 c**
 θεωρητικόν
 τὸ —, when acquired by the soul in its
 descent, **1356 b**
 θεωρία
 Plot.: **1373 a** (l. 35), **1405 c d**, **1419 e**,
 1422 c (l. 22)
 See also θεωρεῖν
 Porph.: φρόνησις ἐν —α, **1439**
 In the later Neopl. School θεωργία
 ranked above —, **1446 c**; cp.
 1456 b
 Procl.: **1472**, the end
 θηρίον
 τὸ — in man, **1413 d**
 θείξις
 defined by Chrysippus, **947 b**
 θυμός
 dialogue of λογισμός and — (Cleanthes),
 956 c
 cited by Posid., **1054**
 τὸ θυμικόν, when acquired by the soul
 in its descent, **1356 b**
 Plot.: **1414 b**
Ἰδέα, ιδέαι (εἶδη)
 the Stoic ἐννοήματα identified with
 —αι, **992 a**
 soul defined as — τοῦ πάντη διαστατοῦ,
 1193 a
 id quod semper esset simplex, etc.,
 1200 a (some comments under the
 text; cp. **1200 b** and **c**)
 εἶδη (Moderatus), **1285 a**

Philo:

ἀσώματοι —αι, **1293 b**, **1307**
ἀρχέτυπος —, **1302 b**
τὰ παραδείγματα κ. τὰς —ας, **1310 b**
the —αι identified with the Powers
of God, **1294**, **1299**

See also κόσμος νοητός, Logos, and
power(s)

Albinus: **1326 b**

Numenius: **1350 a**, **1351**

Plotinus:

ὁ νοῦς καὶ τὰ εἶδη, **1392 a**
the εἶδη contained in noûs but not
νοήσεις in the usual sense, **1384 b**
the purified soul becomes an εἶδος,
1419 b (l. 13 f.)

ιδέαι, e.g. **1406 e** (l. 25)

Frequently called τὰ νοητά, τὸ
νοητόν or τὰ ὄντα, and identified
with noûs, **1383 a-d**

called τὸ παντελές ζῶον, **1385 b**,
1386 a

τὸ αὐτοζῶον, **1386 b**
the εἶδη are henads and numbers,
basis and principle of being, **1387 b**

Frequently in Proclus' *Elementa*, e.g.
1467 d, **1468 e**

ἱερός

the stone on which Demonax used to
sit down, **1259 c**

ἴλεως **1262 b**, **1275 b**, **1277**

ἰνδαλμα

Plot.:

— καὶ εἰκόν, **1369 a**, l. 15

of soul, **1372 b**, l. 33

cp. **1402 b**, l. 12, **1410 c**, l. 30

of Aphr. Our., **1373 a**, sm. pr.

— φρονήσεως ἢ φύσις, **1376 d**, l. 3

Porph.: τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς —άλματα, **1454 c**
ἰνδαλμοί **1094**

ἰσονομία

in Epic.' physics, **850 a b**, **851**

ἰσοταχεῖς

the atoms are —, **836 a**, **837**

ἶχνος

—η of Noûs in the sensible world,
1402 b

Κάθαρσις

acc. to Plotinus essential condition
of the ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ, **1419 b**

Porph.: **1439**; Proclus: **1474 a**

See also virtue

καθῆκον

in the Stoa: **1003 b**, **1004** (small
print), **1033-1034**, **1047 c d** (*of-*
ficium), **1099 a**

Arcesilaus: **1105** (with comments)

Important place of —ήκοντα in the
Stoa after Carn., **1144** (with com-
ments), cp. **1145-1147**

Panaetius' work Π.τ.κ., **1149 a b**

κάθοδος

the descent of the soul

By Numenius considered as essential-
ly an evil, **1355**

The — of the soul through the celestial
spheres, **1356 b**

Acc. to Plotinus the — not as such
an evil, **1375 c**; cp. **1424**

Cp. Porph., **1440 f**, Iambl. **1453**,
Procl. **1470 d**

Proclus' theory of periodical ascents
and descents of the soul, **1469**

κακία

the wickedness of man, **938** (small
print). Also called κακουργία, **939 c**
evil in general, **941 b**

vice (of speech), **968**

animals do not share in —, **1001 b**
— a *perversio naturae*, **1027**

no medium between ἀρετή and —,
1038, **1042**

ἀρετή and —, **1044 a**, **1047 b**, **1053 b**,
1075 b, **1254 b**, **1268 a**, **1297 a**

— has its roots within the soul, **1186**

— ψυχῆς, **1410 c**

πόλεως καὶ ἐκκλησίας, **1412 e** (l. 31)

See also s.v. evil, and sin

κακόν

Plutarchus' theory on the origin of
evil, **1314**

Plotinus: **1410**, **1431 c**

κακοποιόν **1281 a**

κακός, κακοί

Frequently. E.g. **943**, l. 17, **944 c**
Cp. **1186** (οἱ πονηροί)

In Plot.: **1403 d**, **1432 b**

κάλλος

of the Logos and in nature (Philo), **1298**
of the Ideas, **1310 b**

Max. Tyr.: πᾶν — ἐκεῖθεν ῥεῖ, **1330 d**
Herm.: of God and intelligible being,

1341 b

Plot.:
 noûs is ἀμήχανον — πρὸ αὐτοῦ (τοῦ
 'Ἐνός) προῖόν, **1382 d**
 Cp. **1395 a**, l. 10, **1396 b**
 of soul, **1419 b**
 of the sensible world, **1401 c**
 See also καλός and ἀγλαῖα
 καλοκάγαθία **1227 c**
 καλός
 τὸ —v = the *honestum*, e.g. **873 c**
 —ὡς καὶ δικαίως, **874**, **1315 c** (l. 18)
 —ἀ καὶ δίκαια, **1227 b**
 Plot.:
 in noûs, **1385 b**
 ἐκείθεν τὸ —v, **1419 b**, the end
 cp. **1399 a**, l. 10
 the sensible world γενόμενος, οἶον
 οἶός τις καλός, **1365 c**
 cp. **1424**
 τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸ —v, **1429 c**
 κανωνική **821**
 κανών **826 b**
 καρδία
 seat of the hegemonikon acc. to
 Chrys., **948 c**, **949**
 the centre whence spring the different
 faculties of man, **1184 b**, sm. pr.
 love your fellow-men ἀπὸ —ς, **1272**
 δαιμόνων οἰκητήριον, **1337 a**
 κατάληψις
 the Stoic criterium of truth = *com-*
prehensio
 explained by Zeno, **985 a** (with n. 4
 and 6), **b**, **c**
 See also φαντασία καταληπτική, **984**,
986-987
 Cp. **956 a**, **1032 c**, **1043 a**
 Sneered at by Timon, **1095**
 Criticized by Arcesilaus, **1102**, **1104**
 by Carneades, **1112**
 κατασκευή
 grammatical term in the Stoa, **968**
 καταστηματικός
 Epic. called ἡδονή —, **880**, sub (1)
 κατορθόω
 in Stoic ethics: **1009**, **1015 b**, **1037**
a b, **1237 a**
 κατόρθωμα
1015 b, **1017 d**, **1033-1037**, **1040**,
1068
 The Stoic concept criticized by Ar-
 cesilaus, **1105**

κενόν
 τὸ —, in Epic.' physics, **829 b**
 Denied by the Stoics, **922 a**
 cp. Philo, **1306 b**
 κίνησις, see motion
 κινεῖν (τὸ κινεῖον)
 τὸ πράτως —, **1281 a**
 κοινωνικός
 man not — by nature acc. to Epic.,
879 c
 in Epict., **1242**
 M. Aur.:
 τὸ —v the leading feature in man's
 constitution, **1262 b**
 πράξεις —αι, **1276 b** (the end)
 Iambl.: **1448 c**
 See also social
 κορυφαῖος
 God called the — of the stars, **1303 c**,
 sm. pr.
 κοσμεῖν
 soul —εἰ τὸ μετ' αὐτήν, **1375 a** (l. 28),
b (l. 6), **1376 a** l. 28 (ἐπιμέλεια
 —οὔσα)
 κατὰ λόγους, **1381 a** (l. 5 sq.); cp.
1410 c, l. 16
 κοσμοκράτωρ **1337 b**
 κοσμοπολίτης **1308**
 Cp. **1242**: πολίτης τοῦ κόσμου
 κόσμος, see cosmos
 κρᾶσις
 Chrysippus' theory of —, **912**, **913**,
1181 b
 κρίσις
 the πάθη defined as —εις, **954**, **955 a b**,
1053. See also πάθη
 κριτήριον, see criterium
 κύκλος
 Plot.: **1365 b**. See also circles
 Procl.: **1460**, **1466 a**. See also περί-
 οδοί
 κυκλική ἐνέργεια, **1460** (33)
 κυνισμός
 σύντομος ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ὁδός, **1044 a**
 cp. **1252**
 κύτος **1341 b**
 Λάθε βιώσας **879**
 λέξις
 term in Stoic grammar, **966**, **967**
 λεοντώδες
 τὸ — in man, **1413 c**

λήμματα

in Stoic logic = premisses, **979**

See also **1133 b**, **1134**

λογικός

τὸ —ν, **910 a**, **1412 c**

λογισμός

By Epic. and in the Stoa frequently used for reasoning and the r. faculty

Epic.: e.g. **870**, **872 b** (νήφων —)

By Cleanthes opposed to θυμός, **953 c** this passage commented on by Posid. **1054**

Cp. **1037 a**, **1189 b**, **1190 a**

Moderatus: — νόθος, **1285 b**

Also **1326 a** (Albinus)

Philo: **1293 c**, **1298**, **1310 c**

Cp. also διάνοια

In Plotinus frequently for deliberation, e.g. **1426 b**, **1429 b**

Cp. **1385 b** (l. 32 ff.): discursive reasoning

λογιστικόν

Platonic term used by Posid., e.g. **1190 b**

When acquired by the soul in its descent, **1356 b**

λόγος, see Logos

λογωθῆναι **1405 b** (l. 25)

λύπη

defined by Zeno, **955 a**

one of the four main πάθη, **1058**

how to treat it, **1061 a**

life full of — (Dio), **1253 c**

— explained by Plotinus, **1414 b**

Μαθηματικοί

professors of Arts and Sciences

Pyrrho and Epicurus hostile towards the —, **811 a**

See also s.v. learning

μακάριος

τὸ —ν, of the gods, **852**

—α φύσις, **1296 c**

τὸ —ν, of nou̐s (Plot.), **1383 a** (l. 17)

— βίος, **1410 a** (init.)

μᾶλλον

“Οὐδὲν —”, a sceptic rule, **1087 c**

— καὶ ἥττον (in the description of the ἄπειρον), **1408 c**

μανία **1310 d**

μεγαλοψυχία **1160**, introd.

See also magnanimus

defined by Plotinus, **1419 b**

μέγεθος

of Epic.’ atoms, **831 a**

in Plotinus: — not required as a substrate for Form, **1407 c**

μεθεκτός

and ἀμέθεκτος, **1466**, **1467**, **1468 c d**

μέθεξις **1458 a**, **1459 e**, **1465**, **1466**, **1467 a**, **1468 c**

See also μετέχειν, μεταλαμβάνειν, and participation

μέλος

man a — of a whole (M. Aur.), **1272**

μερισμός **1474 a**

μεριστός

Plot.:

—ή and ἀμέριστος φύσις in soul, **1371 b**

—ν τὸ σῶμα, **1371 c**

the intelligible world is in a sense —, **1406 b** (l. 12)

Iambl. **1453 b**

Procl. **1459 b**

μέρος

opposed to μέλος, **1272**

μεσίται

(διαιτηται) λόγοι, **1306 c**

—ης, Mithras called — by the Persians, **1314 b**

μεταβολή

of the hegemonikon, διόλου τρεπόμενον

κ. μεταβάλλον, **986 d**, **1053 b**

of the transition from φαυλότης to wisdom, **1039 c**

of the cosmos, **1181**

of the ever changing stream of things, **1273 b**

of the succession of sovereignties, **1274 b**

τῶν στοιχείων, **1280 b**

Plut.: τὸ ὄν —ής κρεῖττων, **1313 b**

Plot.:

not in the intelligible world, **1388**

— τῶν στοιχείων, **1407 a**

μετακόσμια

= intermundia, **808**, **840 c**

μεταλαμβάνειν, μετάληψις, see μετέχειν

μεταμέλεια

not considered as a virtue in the Stoa, **1010 a-d**

This view criticized by Cic., **1050 b**

— defined, **1064 b**

μετάπτωσις

ἀξιωματῶν ἐξ ἀληθῶν εἰς ψεύδη, **975 a**

μετάρσιον

τὸ —, **1280 c**

τὰ —α, **1351**

μετέχειν

Philo: **1296 b**, **1297 a**

Plot.: **1401 b** (l. 19), **1410 c** (l. 1),
1427 a (the end), **b** (l. 20)

Procl.: **1458 a**, **1462 c d f**, **1463**,
1465, **1466**, **1467**, **1468 c**

Cp. μεταλαμβάνειν, **1371 c** (l. 51),
1372 a (l. 3), **1401 b** (l. 17), **1404 c**
(l. 7), **1409 b** passim, **c** (l. 53),
1410 d (l. 44)

μετάληψις **1371 c** (l. 50), **1409 b** (l. 39)

μετουσία **1462 f**.

μέτρον

the Idea with regard to matter,
1326 b

πᾶς θεὸς — τῶν ὄντων, **1464 e**

μή ὄν

τὸ —, (ὕλη), Moderatus, **1285 b**

Plut.: **1312 b c**

Plotinus: ὕλη ἀληθινῶς —, **1409 a**
(l. 13), **1409 c**, **1410 a**

Cp. **1381 a** (l. 26 f.)

an εἰδῶλον ψυχῆς, **1402 c**

See also ὄν

μίμημα

ἥχου —, **943**, l. 4, with n. 1; cp. **971 a**
Philo called the sensible world re-
peatedly an ἀπεικόνισμα or — of
the intelligible archetypon, e.g.
1293 a b d

cp. **1302**, introd., **1302 a**, **1307**

the soul of man an ἀπεικόνισμα and —
of the Logos, **1298**

Plut.:

— τοῦ ὄντος τὸ γινόμενον, **1313 a**
Horus a — of Osiris, **1313 b**, sm. pr.

the moon a — δαμόνιον, **1318 b**

Numenius: the cosmos a — of in-
telligible being, **1350 a**

Plotinus:

the sensible world, **1401 c** (l. 15 f.),
1406 b (l. 8)

τῶν ὄντων —ήματα, **1409 a** (l. 28)

μίμησις, μιμεῖσθαι

(of time), **1434 c** (l. 28, 59)

See also εἰκὼν and ἑνδαλμα

μιζῆς **912 b**, **993 a**

μνήμη

a θησαυρισμὸς φαντασιῶν (Zeno), **986**
introd.

For the Sceptic argument against this
idea cp. **1134**

Plotinus: by what faculty of the soul
do we remember? **1378 b c**

μονάς

ἀρχὴ ἀπάντων, **1279 a**. Cp. **1288 c**

See also s.v. one

μοναδικός

ἀριθμὸς —, **1387 b**, l. 35

μονογενής

noûs called — by Valent., **1333 a b**

μορφή (μορφώ)

one of the ἀρχαί assumed by ps.-
Archytas, **1281 a**

Νοερός

in Proclus: **1459 c**, **1463 d**, **1466 d**,
1467 e (183), **1468 c** (188), **1472**
a b

νόησις

Albinus: the Idea a — of God,
1326 b (with sm. pr.)

In Plotinus frequently for thinking,
e.g. **1383 c d**, **1384 b**, **1385 a b**,
1397 a

φαντασίας κρείττων, **1405 a**

νοητός

τὰ —ά, **1327 a**, **1336 c**

τὸ —ν identified with noûs, **1383 c**

τὰ —ά, **1384 c**

—ή φύσις, **1402 b**, **1403 a**, **1433 a**

—οὶ θεοί, **1403 a**, **1411 a**

—ή οὐσία, **1409 a**

—αι ἐνάδες, **1466 d**, **1472 a b**

For κόσμος νοητός see cosmos (Philo-
Plotinus) and noûs (Plot.)

Also the nrs. **1433 a** (l. 9) and **1453 b**

νόμος, see law

νοῦς, see noûs

νοωθῆναι **1419 d**

Ξενία

better practised by the poor than by
wealthy people, **1255 a**

Ὀγδοαδικὴ φύσις, **1342 b**

ὄγκος

Term frequently found in Epic., see
e.g. **832 a**

Rarely in Stoic authors
ὕλη distinguished by — (Moderatus),
1285 b (sm. pr., introd.)

the —οι of the body, **1344**

In Plotinus:

ὕλη has only the appearance of —,
1407 c

εἰδωλον κ. φάντασμα —ου, **1409 a**

ὁδὸς κάτω ἄνω, **904 b**; cp. **1274 a**

οἰκαιοπραγία **1420 a b**, **1439**

οἰκεῖος

—εἰα φύσις (*propria natura*)

Panaetius, **1163**

Plotinus, **1430 c**, the end

See also person, personality

οἰκείωσις, see *oikeiosis*

ὅλος

τὰ ὅλα, frequently in the Stoa, e.g.

899 a, **1267 b**, **1268 a**, **1270**,

1273 a

Neopyth.: **1279 f**, **1280 a**

Philo: **1302 b**, **1303 b**, **1306 a**

Num.: ἡ τῶν —ων φύσις, **1347 b**

Plot.: ἡ τῶν —ων ψυχή, **1375 b**

Iambl.: **1453 b**

Procl.: **1474 b**

τὸ ὅλον

e.g. **1262 b**, **1277 b** (M. Aur.);

1302 c (Philo); **1375 c**, **1412 d**

(l. 21), **1413 b**, **1429 c** (Plot.)

See further universe, universum,
nature

ὁμοίωσις

τῷ θεῷ, **857** (Epic.)

Plotinus: higher virtue is *ὁμοιωθῆναι*

θεῷ, **1419 a b**

Porph.: **1440 c** (c. 15)

ὁμολογία (*convenientia*), **1003 b**; cp.

1215 (introd.)

ὁμολογουμένως (τῇ φύσει) ζῆν

the telos formula in the Stoa:

1003-1005; cp. **1012**, **1020 b**

See also telos

virtue defined as a διάθεσις — μένη,

1024 a

ὁμοούσιος **1340 b**

ὁμόφωνος

νόμος κ. λόγος, **1330 a**

ὄν, τὸ —, τὰ —τα

In the Stoa not a frequent term.

E.g. **1018**

[σώματα μόνον τὰ — εἶναι, SVF II 320,
525; not in this vol.]

Neopyth.:

δύο ἀρχαὶ τῶν —των, **1281 a**

τὸ ὄντως —, **1285 b**

τὸ μὴ —, ib.

τὰ τοῦ —τος εἶδη, **1288 a**

Plut.:

God alone is the ὄντως —, **1312 a b**

cp. **1313 a b**

the — must be one, **1312 c**

Num.:

τί ἐστι τὸ —, **1347 c**

Plotinus:

the — identified with νοῦς, **1383 a**

(l. 25 ff.), **1384 a**

τὰ ὄντα **1382 d**

in νοῦς, **1384 c**, **1385 a**

is ἐνέργεια, **1385 a**

immutable and ἀπαθές, **1388**

τὸ μὴ — produced by the particular
soul, **1402 c**

the ὕλη is ἀληθινῶς μὴ —, **1409 a c**

εἰκὼν τοῦ —τος, **1410 a**

Procl.:

participated — depends on un-
participated —, **1463 c**

τὸ ὄντως ὄν

Iambl.: **1449 c**, **1453 b**

Procl.: **1462 c**, **1466 d** (I64)

ὄνομα

(as a grammatical term) **967**

ὅρασις

defined by Chrys., **947 b**; cp. ὁψις

ὁργή **1057**, **1079 a**

ὁρεξίς

a προσθήκη of soul, **1375 b**

ὁρθός

—λόγος, see logos

—νόμος, see law

ὁρίζω

the Sceptic rule "οὐδὲν ὁρίζομεν",
1087 c

ὁρμή

πάθη καὶ —αί, **914 b**, **951-953**

explained as ἐτεροιώσεις, **956 a**; cp.

986 b, **1053 b**

the πρώτη — of man, **999 a**; **1003 a**

— and ἀφορμή, **1019 c**, **1030 b**

Panaetius' theory, **1155-1157**

Posidonius: **1185**

Antiochus: **1201 a c**

Epictetus: **1232 a**
 M. Aur.: **1263 c, 1268 a** (small print)
 Plot.: **1418 b, 1425 a c**
 ὄρχησις **1431 a**
 ὁσφρησις
 defined by Chrysippus, **947 a, 948 c**
 οὐρανός (*caelum*)
 explained as Zeus (Zeno), **924 c**
 ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου (Posid.), **1196 a**
 the tripartition —, γῆ, μετάρσιον,
 1280 c, sm. pr.
 the intelligible — created (Philo),
 1295 a
 not in time, **1300 b**
 the Logos conducting the —, **1303 c**
 τὸν—οὐ ἄρμοστέην (Max. Tyr.), **1303 c,**
 sm. pr.
 ὁ νοῦς τοῦ σύμπαντος —οὐ (Albinus),
 1327 b
 in eschatology: **1356 a b**, see also
 Milky Way
 Plot.: μέγας ὅδε ὁ οὐρανός, **1428 a,**
 1381 a
 οὐσία
 in the Stoa:
 τὸ πάσχον called ἡ ἄποιος —, **899 a**
 πρώτη ὄλη an —, **900 a**
 —αι liable to κραῖσις δι' ὅλων, **913 a**
 Cp. **997**: the first category called
 ὑποκείμενον
 ἡ τῶν ὅλων —, **1177 a** (Cleomedes)
 νοητὴ κ. αἰσθητὴ —, **1181 b** (Ne-
 mesius)
 ἡ τῶν περάτων —, **1193 a** (Plut.)
 — (the essence) τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ is a
 προαίρεσις ποιὰ (Epict.), **1236 a**
 κ. κακοῦ, **1252 a**
 M. Aur.:
 ὅλη ἡ — (the universe), **1267 b**
 ἡ τῶν ὅλων —, **1268 a**
 μία — κοινὴ, **1271**
 ἡ ὅλη —, **1273 a**
 — is like an ever streaming river,
 1273 b
 Ps.-Archytas:
 ἀ ὠσία τὸ ὑποκείμενον, **1281 a**
 Moderatus:
 τὸ ἐν ὑπὲρ τὸ εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν —ν,
 1285 b
 Numenius:
 — is intelligible, γένεσις its image
 1350 a

Plotinus:

soul is properly speaking an —,
 1371 c
 intelligible being is —, **1382 a,**
 1386 b
 εἰς ἄπειρα κατακεραματίζεσθαι, **1374 b**
 engendered by the One which is
 known through it, **1392 c**
 the One = τὸ πρὸ —ς, **1392 c**
 We are not = our — (essence), the
 One is its —, **1393 a**
 its will = its —, **1393 b**
 the Father of αἰτιώδης —, **1393 d**
 ὁ γεννήσας —ν, **1396 b**
 ἐνέργεια without —, **1398 a**
 the sensible world εἰκῶν —ς, **1401 c**
 ὄλη νοητὴ is —, **1406 d**
 — νοητὴ is ἀπαθής, **1409 a**
 evil properly speaking not an —,
 1410 b
 before our birth we were a νοῦς
 linked with universal —, **1412 d**
 (l. 19)
 τὸ ἐναντίον εἰς —ν (what is opposed
 to the essence of soul), **1416 b**
 οἶον — τῆς . . . ἐναντιώσεως, **1427 b,**
 l. 51
 Is αἰὼν = ἡ νοητὴ αὐτὴ —? **1433 a,**
 the beginning
 Iambli:
 the First Principle ἀρχὴ τῆς —ς,
 1449 c
 νοητὴ —, **1450 a**
 ἡ — τῆς ψυχῆς, **1453 a**
 ἀσώματος —, **1453 b**
 Proclus:
 = existence, **1458 b** (c. 7, l. 18 Dodds),
 1461 d (c. 43, l. 3 D.), **1468 d**
 (c. 191)
 κατ' —ν χρειττον, **1458 b** (c. 9)
 χωριστὴ —, **1459 c** (c. 16)
 ἡ ψυχῆς —, **1459 d**
 κατ' —ν, **1460** (c. 31), **1464 f** (c.
 119)
 κατὰ τὴν —, **1472 b**
 — αὐθυπόστατος, **1461 a**
 ἐπέκεινα —ς, **1464 c**
 νοητὴ —, **1470 a** (sm. pr.)
 οὐσιοπάτωρ **1449 c**
 οὐσιότης **1327 d, 1449 c**
 οὐσιώδης **1341 b, 1383 c, 1387 b**, with
 n. 1, **1468 e**

ὑφελος

virtue defined as —, **1017 a**

ὄχημα

σῶμα αἰθερικόν or πνευματικόν, **1356**
(comments), **1442 a**, with n. 1

ἄυλον, **1469 c**, **1474 a**

ὄψις **948 c**

Πάθη

in Epic.: **823 a b**, **826**

in the Stoa: **914 b**, **951-956**, **989 a**,
1051-1064, **1079 a**

Carneades: **1115**, **1121 b**

Posid.: **1185**, **1187-1190**, **1191**

Seneca: **1213**

Epictetus: **1238 a**

Plut.: **1320**

Plotinus: **1413 b**, **1414**

Porph.: the — not rejected as such,
1440 a (c. 9), **1441**

παίγιον

sensible things called —α, **1409 a**
(l. 23 f.)

παιδεία

Epic.: **816**

the Stoa: **1044 a** (sm. pr.), **1045 a**

Panaetius: **1159 b**

Posid: **1187**

Dio of Prusa: **1253 a - c**

Philo: **1289 a**

See also learning

παλιγγενεσία **1151 b**

See also regeneration, and renewal
For — in the sense of metempsychosis,
see reincarnation

παλμός, see vibration

πᾶν

τὸ —, τὰ πάντα

frequently in the Stoa, e.g. **918 b**
cp. **943**: πᾶς ὅδε κόσμος (l. 7), πάντα
κυβερνῶν (Zeus, l. 2), etc.

M. Aur.: **1267 b**, sm. pr.

Neopyth.: **1280 a**, **1282**

Philo: **1296 c**, **1302 c**, **1303 a b**,
1304 c, **1306 a** (also τὰ ὅλα), **1307**

Plut.: **1314 a** (τὸ π. does not float
reasonless and ungoverned)

ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ —τός, **1314 d**

Orac. Chald.: τὰ —, **1336 c**

Plotinus:

τὸ πᾶν **1357 b**, **1368 b**, **1369 a c**

ψυχὴ τοῦ —τός, **1373 a b**, **1376 d**,
1402 b, **1403 b**, **1418 a**

διοίκησις τοῦ —τός, **1403 a**

ὕλη κ. σῶμα τοῦ —τός, **1404 a**, cp.
1373 c (l. 6), **1404 c**

The Stoic conception of ἐν κ. πᾶν
criticized, **1425 a**

τόδε τὸ —, **1426 a**, **1427 a**

ποικιλώτατον γὰρ τὸ —, **1428 e**

ἐν τῷ —τί, **1428 f**, **1430 a c**

ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ —τός, **1431 b** (l. 15)

ἡ φύσις τοῦ —τός, **1432 b** (l. 17),
1402 a, **1403 c**

Iambl.:

ἐνωσις τοῦ —τός, **1448 c**

ἡ τοῦ —τός θεωρία, **1448 a**

Procl.: **1472 c**

τὰ πάντα, **1370 a**

ἐξ ἐνός, **1371 a** (l. 5)

cp. **1390 d**: ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ —.

ὁ νοῦς —, **1383 a**, cp. **1385 b**,
1390 c (τὸ δν —)

νοῦς ὁμοῦ —, **1428 b**

τὸ ἐν ≠ τὰ —, **1398 d**

See also universe, universum, nature

πανδεχής

of the material principle, **1280 b**, **1285 b**;

Isis (Plut.), **1313 a**

See also ὑποδοχῇ

πανδοχεῖον

ἡ καρδιά, **1337 a**

πανδοχεύς **1288 c**

παντελής

βίος (Epic.), **871**

—ἐς ζῶον, **1385 b** (l. 57), **1386 a** (l. 15)

παντοκράτωρ **1334 c**

παράδειγμα

Nicomachus: **1288 b**

Philo: **1293 a b d**, **1298**, **1305 a** (sm.
pr.)

Plut.: **1315 b**

Albinus: **1326 b** (the Idea = π. τῶν
κατὰ φύσιν αἰώνιον)

Plot.: **1419 e**, **1420 b**, **1426 a**, **1433 a**

Porph.: **1439**, the end

Iambl.: **1449 c**, **1450 b**

See also ἀρχέτυπον

παράθεσις

of bodies, **912 b**, **913 b**

παρακολούθησις

κατὰ —ιν (Chrys. ap. Gell.), **939 d**

Also κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν, **939 c**

- In Plot. — means self-consciousness, and παρακολουθεῖν = to be conscious, esp. self-conscious: **1422 a c, 1428 f**
 See also s.v. self-consciousness
- παρασυνημμένον
 inferential **977**
- παρέγκλισις (*clinamen*)
 of the atoms acc. to Epic., **833, 835 a**
- παρουσία
 τοῦ Πατρὸς (*Poim.*), **1342 b**
 the First Principle known by —
 (Plot.), **1399 a**
 — τῶν θεῶν (Procl.), **1465 b**
- παρηρσία **1257 a**
- πάσχω, τό,
 Stoic term for the material principle,
 opp. of τὸ ποιοῦν, **899 a**
 The Stoic conception criticized by
 Plotinus, **1425 a, l. 17 ff.**
- πατήρ
 God called —:
 by Cleanthes, **943** (l. 34)
 Epictetus, **1242** (πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ
 ἡγεῖσθαι τοῦ πατρὸς)
 Philo:
 τὸν πατέρα κ. ποιητήν, **1290 b, 1296 c, 1297 a**
 ὁ γεννήσας — (of the Logos),
1306 a, cp. 1306 c
 Albinus: the first Noûs, **1327 d**
 Max. Tyr.: **1330 a**
 Valentinus: **1333 a - c, 1334 a b**
 Herm.: ὁ νοῦς — θεός, **1339 b, 1341 a, 1342 a b, 1343**
 Num.: the first God, **1352 a**
 Plot.: **1375 c n. 1, 1381 a b** (νοῦς
 —), **1403 d** (the end), **1393 d**
 (the First Principle), **1401 c**
 (Nous)
 Iambl.: **1451 a**
 See also προπάτωρ and οὐσιοπάτωρ
 Iambl. **1449 c** speaks also of αὐτο-
 πάτωρ and μονοπάτωρ
- πενία
 the life of the poor, **1255 a - c**
- πέρας
 καὶ ἄπειρον, **1281 b**
 — τα, **1397 b, 1410 b** (l. 36)
 ἀρχὴ καὶ —, **1396 b**
 ἄπειρον and —, **1410 b** (l. 14)
 Proclus: — and ἄπειρον basic prin-
 ciples, **1462 c** (89), **d** (90), **f** (92),
1466 c, 1470 a, sm. pr.
- περιγραφή **913 b**
- περίλαμψις **1366**
- περίοδοι
 in M. Aur., **1267 b, sm. pr.**
 in Proclus, **1469 a b, 1474 b**
- περιοδικῶς **1469 a**
- πηγή
 ἦθος — βίου (Zeno), **1035 a**
 ἡ πάντων — (M. Aur.), **939 c**
 the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος is οἶά τις — (Philo)
1307
 the ὁρθὸς λόγος — ἀρετῶν, **1309 b**
 — ἀένσας καὶ ἀκήρατος (Max. Tyr.),
1330 d
 — ζωῆς, — νοῦ (Plot.), **1367**
 — ἀρχὴν ἄλλην οὐκ ἔχουσα, **1398 d**
 — τοῦ καλοῦ, **1419 b**
 — τῶν πάντων (Iambl.), **1449 c**
 — τῶν ὄντων (Procl.), **1472 b**
- πιθανόν
 τὸ —, probability (Carn.), **1116**,
 cp. **1106**
- πίστις
 cardinal virtue in Epict.' ethics,
1240, 1241
 one of the four principles of Proclus,
1440 e f
- πλάγια (πτῶσις), **969 a**
- πλήθος, see plurality. Also τὸ πολὺ
 πλήρωμα
1333 (Valentinus)
 cp. **1467 d** (Proclus), **1453 b** (Iambl.)
- πνεῦμα, see pneuma
- πνευματικοί
 the class of spiritual men acc. to
 Valentinian gnosis, **1332 b** (sub 4),
1335 a
 imperishable by nature, **1335 b**
- πνευματίον
 for soul, **1265 b**
- ποικίλος
 the intelligible world ἐν —ν, **1406 b**
 (l. 16)
 —ώτατον τὸ πᾶν, **1428 e**
- ποιμήν
 God called —, **1303 c**
- ποιοῦν, τό,
 Stoic term for the active principle in
 the Universe, **899 a, 917**
- ποιός, τὸ —ν, see quality

ποιότης, *ib.*

πόλεμος

ὁ βίος (M. Aur.), **1275 b**

everywhere on earth (Max. Tyr.),
1330 a

πόλις

defined by the Stoics, **1074 b**

See also political philosophy, *s.v.*
political

πολιτικά, *ib.*

πολιτικά ἀρεταί, social virtues, Porph.
1439

Cp. Plotinus **1420**

πόνος

in the Stoa classed as *adiaphoron*,
1012 b

praised by Porph., **1440 a**

ποσός

τὸ —, see quantity

ποσότης

ἄμορφος, the indefinite principle (ὕλη),
1285 b. Cp. **1339 a**, n. 2

ποταμός

τὰ τοῦ σώματος, **1275 b**

ἡ ὕλη, **1347 a**

πρακτικόν

τὸ —, when acquired by the soul in its
descent, **1356 b**

πρέπον

τὸ —, in speech, **968**

the *decorum*, **1161**

προαίρεσις

the essence of morality acc. to Epict.:
1236, **1237**, **1239 b**

the first characteristic of man, **1242**

Plotinus: not every part of the univer-
se has its own —, **1428 e**, l. 25 sq.,

1428 f, l. 13 sqq., **1431 b**, l. 5 sqq.,

1432 a, l. 24

Iambl.: By what do we sin? Not by
—?, **1453 a**

προηγμένα

τὰ —, a class of ἀδιάφορα, **1018-1020**,
1022, **1033 a**, **1034 b**, **1144**

προκοπή

moral progress (*profectus*), **1020 c**

προκόπτων

ὁ —, not of the level of the wise man,
1034 b, **1039**, **1189 a**, **1239 b**

See also *profectus*, *proficere*

Porph. οἱ πρὸς θεωρίαν —οντες, **1439**

πρόληψις

acc. to Epic.: **823 a**, **824**, **825**, **846**,
847, **848 a b**

Cp. **854 b** (notities)

in the Stoa: **990-995**, cp. **996**;
1141 b, **1200 c**

πρόνοια, see Providence

πρόοδος, προίεναι, see procession (*ema-*
nation)

προόρασις **1426 a**

προπάθεια **1213**

προπάτωρ **1333 a**

προσγεγεννημένα

τὰ —, see προσθήκαι

προσηγορία **967**

προσθήκη

—αι of the soul (Plot.), **1375 b**, **1417 b**

Also called τὰ προσγεγεννημένα, **1413 b**

Cp. **1356 b**: *incrementa corporis*

πρὸς τί πως ἔχον

one of the four categories in Stoic
logic, **915 a**

προφήτης **1310 a**

πρῶτα

in the Stoa: τὰ — κατὰ φύσιν, **1003 b**
(*introd.*), **1004** (*sm. pr.*), **1020 b**

(*sm. pr.*), **1021** (*prima naturae*),
1047 d, **1165**, **1188 c**

in Plotinus: τὰ — = intelligible Being

ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τὰ —, **1384 b**,
cp. **1369 c**

πρώτη ὕλη

900 a (is the οὐσία of everything);

πως ἔχουσα, **916**

πρωτόγονος

λόγος, **1306 d**, cp. **1303 c**

πτοία **952 d**, **1052**

πτῶσις

(grammatical term) **967**, **969**

πτώσεις τῆς ψυχῆς, **1053 a**

πῦρ

τεχνικόν, **902**, **907**, **917**

νοερόν, **916 a**, **957**

πυρίγονα **1304 a**

πῦσμα **973 b**

πως ἔχον

one of the four categories in Stoic
logic, **915 c**

the hegemonikon —, see ἡγεμονικόν

ῥεῖ

ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, **1404 a**

- ῥῆμα
in Stoic grammar, 967
ῥητορική 964 a
- Σάρξ
Epic.: 866 d, 867 b
Epict.: (σαρκίδιον) 1235 a, 1241 c
Plut.: 1320
Porph.: 1440 f
σαφήνεια 968
σελήνη, see moon
σημεῖα
given by the Gods to man, 933
the doctrine of — as a basis of inference criticized, 1132, 1133, 1142
(in the math. sense) 1279 a
σκοπός (propositum), intention
acc. to the Stoa the essential of an act, 1016 a, 1144 (sm. pr., n. 1), 1188 c
σκότος
in the *Poimandres*, 1339 a
in Plotinus frequently for ὕλη
(also τὸ σκοτεινόν): 1365 c, 1381 a
(l. 26), 1410 d (l. 40), 1402 c
(l. 13), 1406 d (l. 13)
(ὕλη) σκοτεινὴ πᾶσα, 1406 c (l. 7)
σκοτωδία
1288 c, with sm. pr.
Also ἀλαμπία
σκότωσης 1344, 1356 b
σολοικισμός 968
σοφία
in the Stoa defined as θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμη, 897 a
Cp. 1030 a, 1289 b
transcendent and created — distinguished (Philo), 1302 a, sm. pr.
Plot.: 1419 e, 1420 b
Porph.: 1439
σοφός
in the Stoa: 1042 b, 1046, 1050 a, 1062, 1075 b
Pyrrho: 1084 b
Arcesilaus: 1103 b
Philo: φαῦλος opp. to σοφός, 1310 d
σπέρμα
explained by Chrysippus, 947 b, cp. 948 c
cosmic —, 908 a
ἀρχαὶ κ. σπέρματα (of virtues), 1026 c
σπερματικός
(λόγος), 919 (introd.), 919 d
Philo 1302 e
Plot. 1365 d
—οί (λόγοι), 902 a, 919 a - d
Plot. 1425 c
σπουδαῖος
in the Stoa: 957 b, 1032 a, 1038 b, 1042, 1043 a, 1046 c, 1048 a, 1050 a
Carneades: 1112 a
Philo: 1297 a
Plotinus: 1423
στάθμη
κατὰ —ν, 833 a b, 835 a
στάσις,
opp. of κίνησις, 1433 a b, 1434 c, 1435 b
σταλαγμός
οἴνου ἓνα —ν, 913 c
στερέμνια
(solid bodies), 849
στερητικόν
(γένος), 976
στέρησις
in Stoic logic, 972 b
in Moderatus (of the indefinite principle in metaphysics), 1285 b, cp. 1288 c, sm. pr.
Plotinus, 1410 e
στοιχεῖα
τὰ τέσσαρα —, 899 b, 904 a (Zeno); 916 b (Stoics); 1100 a (Arcesilaus), 1181 b (Nemesius); Neopyth. 1279 a, 1285 a
ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ λύσις —είων, 1275 b
Philo: 1305 a
Valentinus: 1334 d
Herm.: 1339 c, 1340 b
Num.: 1347 a
στροφή
ἡ πρὸς νοῦν, 1420 a
συγγένεια
of man with God, 1297 a. Cp. 1330 c
συγκατάθεσις
914 b, 953 d, 956 a, 975 a, 985 a, n. 2, 985 b, 986 b, 989 b, 1103 b, 1106 b, 1112 a, 1185
See also assent
σύγκρασις 1288 c, sm. pr.
σύγχυσις 1288 c, sm. pr.

συλλαβή **967**

σύμβαμα

and παρασύμβαμα, **1050 a**

συμβεβηκότα

(Epic.), **829 a**

συμμετρία

ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, **1327 d**

συμπάθεια **912, 935, 1125, 1177, 1285 a**

See also cosmic sympathy, s.v. cosmic

σύμπνοια

(other term for cosmic sympathy),

1271 b, 1285 a, 1448 c

συμπτώματα

(Epic.), **829 a**

συμφυής **1177**

σύμφωνος

διάθεσις —, **1005 b**

Also κατὰ συμφωνίαν, **1011 a**

συναγωγή, συνακτικός **979**

συναίσθησις

(αὐτῆς) of the soul, **1379 b, 1405 d, 1415 b**

συναμφότερον

τὸ — (the human compositum)

frequently in Plot., e.g. **1378 a,**

1412 a, 1414 b c

Also τὸ κοινόν, **1413 d**

See further body, λεοντῶδες, θηρίον

or τὸ σύνθετον: **1413 b, 1417 b**

συνάμφω

τὸ —, **1412 d**

σύνδεσμος **967**

συνείδησις **999 a**. See also self-consciousness

συνεργία

M. Aur.: γενόμεναι πρὸς —ν, **1262 a**.

See also κοινωνικός

συνεργός

—οί (in the work of creation), **1297 a b**

σύνεσις

Athena explained as ἡ τοῦ Διὸς —, **1326 b, sm. pr.**

συνημμένον **977, 1133 b**

σύνθετος

Plut.:

man — of three parts, **1319 a**

Plot.:

the body always a —ν, **1406 c, 1407 a**

man in a body, **1413 b, 1417 b**

the sensible world, **1406 b**

συντομία **968**

σφραγίς

the Logos called ἀρχέτυπος — (Philo).

1293 d

the powers of God compared with

—ῖδες, **1294**

the archetypal man, **1296 b**

the Logos, **1302 a b**

σχῆμα

of Epic.' atoms, **830 a, 831 a**

ἐπίπεδα κ. στερεὰ σχήματα (Neopyth.),

1279 a

σφάζειν

ἀνθρώπους, **1276 b** (M. Aur.)

σῶμα, see body

σωτήρ

civilized men — ἦρες τῶν πολέων (Dio),

1253 a

the good demons appear as — ἦρες for man, **1319 c**

ὁ —, **1335 a**

σωτηρία

God αἷτιον τῆς —ς for earthly beings,

1303 c, sm. pr. (p. 369)

God procures — to those who are

obedient, **1330 e**

no — for χοῖκοί, **1335 b**

τῆς ψυχῆς, **1440 a** (c. 9)

μόνη — ἡ πρὸς θεὸν ἐπιστροφή, **1440 e**

— coming from "the Whole", **1474 b**

σωτήριος

ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ θεοῦ —ν ἀνθρώπῳ (Herm.),

1344

σωφροσύνη

one of the four cardinal virtues,

mentioned **1012 b, 1028 b-1030,**

1190, 1249 b

Defined by Cleanthes, **1029 a**

by Chrys., **1030 c**

by Plot., **1419 b, 1420 a b**

by Porph., **1439**

Ταυτότης

Moderatus: **1285 a**

Plotinus: **1385 b, 1433 b, 1434 c**

Iambl.: **1451 a**

τέλειος

in the Stoa: τὸ —ν κατὰ φύσιν (def. of virtue), **1017 b**

the cosmos a —ν ζῶον, **1272 b**

Philo: — λόγος, **1302 a**

Albinus: ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς —, **1327 d**

- Plotinus:
 everything in *noûs* is —, **1383 a**
noûs itself, **1385 b** (l. 30)
 πάντα ὅσα — α γεννᾷ, **1366** (l. 37 f.),
 cp. **1370 a**
 ἡ τελεία ψυχὴ, **1410 c**, l. 25
 τελεία ζωή, **1421**
 —αι ἀρεταί, **1420**
 τελειότης **1023 b**
 τελείωσις **1003 n. 1, 1023 a**
 τέλος, see *telos*
 τεταγμένα
 τὰ — καὶ ὀριστά, **1281 a**
 τέχνη
 virtues as ἐπιστήμαι κ. —αι, **1031 a**
 τομή, see *divisibility*
 τόνος **908 a, 1029**
 τρέπεσθαι δι' ὧν
1279 a (with comm.). Cp. **913**
 See also *μεταβολή*
 τριάς
 ἡ νοητὴ —, **1449 a b**
 νοεραὶ —άδες (Iambl.), **1451 b**
 the triadic system applied to soul, **1452**
noûs conceived as a — (Procl.), **1463 c**
 τρόπος
 the ten —οι of Aenesidemus, **1135**
 the five —οι of Agrippa, **1136**
 τύποι, τύψεις
 ἐν ψυχῇ, **951, 956 a, 984 a**
 Plotinus: τύποι, **1415 a**
 τυπώσεις (ἐνέργειαι), **1415 c**
- *Υγίεια
 classed among *adiaphora*, **1012 b,**
1018, 1030 b
 explained as ἁρμονία, **1279 f**
 Plotinus: **1423 a**
- ὕγρός
 —ά φύσις, **1339 a**
 ὕλη, see *matter*
 ὕλικοι **1332 b, 1335**
 ὕπαρξις **1451 a, 1464 g h, 1467 a,**
1470 a (sm. pr.), **1478 b**
 ὑπεράγαθον **1394 a**
 ὑπεραποφατικόν **976**
 ὑπερβολή
 and ἔλλειψις, **1410 c**, with n. 3
 ὑπέρζωος **1464 c**
 ὑπερκόσμιος **1466 d, 1467 a**
 ὑπέρνους **1464 c**
 ὑπερούσιος **1464 c f**
- ὑπεροχή
 God is πάσης —ῆς μείζων, **1343**
 ὑπερρεῖν
 ὑπερερρῶν **1370 a** (l. 8)
 ὑποδοχή
 (the ὕλη), **1407 a, 1409 c**
 ὑποκείμενον
 first category in Stoic logic, **997**
 Cp. ὕλη and οὐσία, **900 a, 916 b**
 Ps.-Archytas: ἃ ὥστιά τὸ —, **1281 a**
 Albinus: (ὕλη), **1326 a**
 Plot.: **1406 b d, 1407 a, 1408 a,**
1433 b
 Procl.: **1460 b**
- ὑπόληψις
 in Epic.: —λήψεις ψευδεῖς, **848 b**
 (introd.)
 Epict.: **1232 a**
 M. Aur.: **1264 c**
 Porph.: **1440 d**
- ὑπομνήματα
 Πυθαγορικά, **1279**
 ὑπόνοια
 τοῦ ἐνός, **1476 b**
- ὑπόστασις
 Valent. ap. Iren.: πνευματικὴ —.,
1334 c, 1335 b
 τῆς πονηρίας, **1337 d**
 Plot.: **1366, 1375 a, 1381 b, 1387 a,**
1398 a, 1409 a c, 1410 b
 Iambl.: **1450, 1453 b**
 Procl.: **1459 d, 1461 d, 1464 b**
 See also *αὐθυπόστατον*.
- Φαντασία
 in the Stoa: **914 b, 951, 953 d,**
956 a, 965 b
 φ. καταληπτική, **984-986**; cp. **988,**
991
 the Sceptics: **1104, 1112, 1115,**
1116, 1135 a, 1138 a
 Antiochus: **1197 d**
 Epict.: **1233 a b**
 M. Aur.: **1262 c**
 Plotinus: — μεταξύ φύσεως τύπου καὶ
 νοήσεως, **1405 a**
- φάντασμα
 in the Stoa: **991, 992 a, 1050 a**
 in Plot.: **1378 c,**
 — ὄγκου (ὕλη), **1407 c** (l. 27 ff.),
1409 a (l. 13)
 —άσματα τῆς αἰσθήσεως, **1416 b** (l. 67)

φανταστικόν

τὸ —, when acquired by the soul in its descent, **1356 b**

Plot.: **1378** introd., **1378 c**

φαῦλος

by the Stoics opp. to σοφός. See there

φῆμαι **934**

φιланθρωπία

812 a (of Epic.); **1159 b** (Panaetius); **1322, 1324** (Plut.)

φιλάνθρωπος **883 b, 1448 c**

τὸ —ν (for God's love of man), **995 b**

φίλια

in Epic., **877**

Cp. **812 a** (φιλανθρωπία) and **b** (φίλοι); also **813**

Epict.: **1241 a**

Neopyth.: defined as ἐναρμόνιος ἰσότης, **1279 f**

φίλος, φιλεῖν

Epic.: **812, 813**

M. Aur.: **1272 a, 1276 b** sm. pr.

φιλοσοφία

Epic.: φρόνησις τιμιώτερον —ας, **872 b**
defined in the Stoa, **897 b**, cp. Philo, **1289 b**

opposed to ἱερατική, **1446 c**

See further philosophy

φόβος, see fear

φορά, ἡ τῶν ἀτόμων, see motion

φρήν **965 a**

φρόνησις

acc. to Epic., **872 b**

in the Stoa: **1012 b, 1023 a, 1028 b c, 1030**

Arcesilaus: **1105**

Plot.:

φύσις Ἰνδαλμα —ήσεως, **1376 d**

one of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, **1419 b e, 1420 b**

Porph.: **1439**

φυγή

Epic.: αἵρεσις καὶ —, **862 a, 872 b**
(exilium) **1260 b**

φύσις

in the Stoa identified with the Logos, **921**

By Plotinus sometimes used in a general sense, almost identical with God, e.g. **1413 b**, l. 15 f.: ἔδωκεν ἡ —; cp. l. 17 f.: θεὸς ἔδωκεν

Cp. Marc. Aur. **1267 a**

δευτέρα —, **1382 a**

cp. δεύτερος θεός

What is —?, **1405**

ποιητῆς ἔσχατος, **1402 b**

See further Nature

φυτικόν

τὸ —, when acquired by the soul in its descent, **1356 b**

(Plot.) **1416 a**

φωνή

explained by Chrys., **947 b, 948 c**
defined, **962 a b**

corporeal, **962 c**

ᾗθεν ἡ —, **963**

in other definitions, **966**

φῶς

καὶ σκότος, **1279 b, 1280 b**

Philo: τὸ ἀόρατον κ. νοητὸν —, **1295 b**

cp. also **1300 c** (ἀρχέτυπος αὐγή)

Plut.: — κ. σκότος, **1314 b**

Valentinus: **1334 d, 1335 a** (τὸ φῶς τοῦ κόσμου), **1337 c** (Jesus)

the *Poim.*:

— καὶ σκότος, **1339 a**

τὸ —=Νοῦς ὁ θεός, **1339 b**

ζωὴ κ. —, **1340 a, 1341 a**, cp. **1342 a**

Plotinus:

πολὺ — ἐκλάψαν, **1365 c, 1366**

— in three stages, **1370 b**

the First Principle is — πρὸ —τός, **1382 a**, cp. **1389 b**

νοῦς is — ἐκ —τός, **1365 b**

— τὸ νοεῖν, **1391 b**

— coming from the ἀγαθόν to the soul, **1395 a b**

from soul to the sensible world, **1404 c**

to ὕλη, **1406 e**

to the body, **1414 c**

τὸ — itself is seen, **1395 b, 1400 c**

Proclus:

τὸ θεῖον —, **1465 b**

τῆς ἀληθείας, **1472 a**

φωτίζειν

—εται ἡ ψυχὴ, **1402 c, 1395 b**; cp. **1419 a**

πεφωτισμένος, **1370 b, 1389 b, 1406 d**

See also ἀφώτιστον, and ἐλλάμπειν

Χάος **1288 c**, sm. pr.

χαρά **953 b, 1063 b**

χάρις **1299 b, 1323 b, 1395 a, 1401 b**

χάσμα **1288 c** sm. pr., **1356 a**

χείμων

ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς, **860**

χορεία

ἐνθεος, of the Spirit around the One,

1400 a

the motion of the universe, **1431 a**

χρηστήρια

κατὰ τῶν —ων, **1260 d**

See further oracles

χρηστότης

καὶ καλοκάγαθία, **1227 c**

covers a larger field than δικαιοσύνη,

1323 b

χρόνος, see time, and tense, s.v. tempora

χώρα **1409 c**

χωρίζειν

ἐαυτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν προσγεγεννημένων,

1413 b

χωρισμός

ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, **1423 a**; cp. **1417 b**,

l. 18

χωριστός

—ἡ οὐσία, **1459 c**

—ἡ σώματος, **1468 b**

τὸ —ὄν τοῦ κόσμου, **1467 a**

Ψευδής

δόξα, **828**, sm. pr.

συγκατάθεσις, **1043 a**

δόξαι —εἴς, **1410 c**, l. 11

See also δόξα, δοξάζειν and ψεῦδος

ψεῦδος

the Stoa: no degrees of —, **1040 a**

Herm.: Inhabits the seventh zone,

1342 b

Plot.:

(of ὕλη and what enters into it),

1409 a (l. 38-41)

τὸ ἀνομοίως μεμιμῆσθαι —, **1403 a**

(l. 18)

Iambl.: πολυσχιδὲς τὸ —, **1448 b**

ψυχή, see soul

ψυχικοί

a particular class of mankind acc. to the Gnostics, **1332 b** (sub 4), **1335**

᾽Ωφέλεια

Epic.: friendship starts from —, **877 b**

the Stoa: the ἀγαθόν defined as —,

1017 a

in the first trope of Aenesidemus,

1135 a

ADDENDA

- p. 562, nr. **1454f**, the end, *supply*: New edition with prolegomena and Engl. translation by A. D. Nock, Cambridge 1926. French transl. by Mario Meunier, Paris 1931.
- p. 647, col. 2, between l. 8 and 9: Fate and free w. (Carn. adv. Chrys.) **1124**.
- p. 661, col. 1, l. 5 from bottom: οὐ — **1082a, 1087a**.
- p. 670, col. 1, l. 3 from bottom: ὑπερνόησις **1368a**.

